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**THE AMERICAN MERCHANT
MARINE PROBLEM**

**STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEMS**

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THE
AMERICAN MERCHANT
MARINE PROBLEM



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PREFACE

GOODS bought and sold, ships that carry them, capital that pays for them and builds industries to produce them, and travellers who come and go for pleasure or business—these are links that bind the United States to the rest of the world. With the development of the country, and especially as a result of the War, these links have been increased in number and strength till they have become a vital and pervasive force in our internal economic life.

This book of research is one of a series dealing with the major aspects of the broad problem of the character and effect of the changes in the economic position of the United States in world affairs brought about by the World War. The primary aspect of that problem is the rapid and sudden transformation of the United States into a creditor nation, as a consequence of the governmental loans to the Allied Nations during the war and of the subsequent expansion of private American capital investment abroad. This subject is treated in detail in another book of the National Industrial Conference Board, entitled "The International Financial Position of the United States." The second aspect of the general problem, that relating to the effect of this country's new creditor position upon its trade relationships with other countries, is discussed in the Conference Board's book, "The Foreign Trade of the United States."

The present study deals with a question that is in some respects closely related to the same general problem, not only because the World War produced a significant change in the position of this country as a maritime nation, but also because the maintenance of an American merchant marine and the policies adopted toward it may influence the international trade and financial relationships of the United States in many ways. But shipping is important not only as a link between the United States and the rest of the world and as a factor in all our international business transactions. It is itself a great and fundamental business, and its service as a factor in international economic life depends upon its position and growth as a business, and upon governmental policies affecting it.

Prior to 1914, American interests in shipping had for many years been chiefly in the operation of vessels in the coastwise and nearby foreign trades. During the war, the shipping industry in the United States was abnormally stimulated, and, thereafter, the decline in world production and trade and the general international economic disorganization left the industry, in respect both of ship construction and operation, in severe depression. Other basic industries greatly over-expanded in response to war needs were similarly affected, but in the case of shipping the problem of readjustment was complicated by the extent to which the Federal Government had become involved in the industry through the ownership and operation of vessels. That problem of readjustment has been modified by the gradual withdrawal of the Government from the field of ship operation and by the stimulus to private shipping interests afforded by the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.

But the merchant marine problem has not yet reached a final solution nor has a definite public policy toward the problem as a whole been formulated, save in the most general terms. Though the United States is in some measure committed to a policy of merchant marine expansion, the extent to which it is desirable to carry this expansion and the means by which it may be most economically and soundly aided by governmental action are still vaguely defined. Moreover, it is still uncertain whether such expansion is to be determined primarily by consideration of the economic position of shipping as an industry, or rather by consideration of its functions as an instrument of foreign trade and national defense.

Finally, whatever the economic position of the shipping industry or the relation of our shipping facilities to our foreign trade, it is obvious that our merchant marine has a vital relation to national security and that our merchant marine policy must ultimately be determined by our fundamental requirements in this respect. What these requirements are can be accurately known only by military and naval authorities, and to that extent they constitute an indeterminate factor in our policy. Yet, the importance and vagueness of the national defense aspect of the merchant

marine problem do not preclude consideration of other aspects of merchant marine policy. If an unlimited expansion of American shipping with governmental aid were assumed beforehand to be desirable for purposes of national defense, there would be no merchant marine problem at all, and no reason for discussing it in the light of the facts bearing on the economic position of our shipping and the character of our foreign trade.

From a practical as well as an academic point of view, the American merchant marine problem presents questions of general interest and importance, which deserve wider attention and better understanding on the part of the American public. If a wise solution is to be found, these questions must be analyzed on the basis of a clear understanding of the pertinent facts and of a farsighted consideration of the intangible issues involved. The purpose of this book is not to suggest new or to support old proposals for the solution of the merchant marine problem, but to bring together and to clarify the facts and controversial issues and thereby to promote a clearer public understanding of the situation.

In the preparation of this study the Conference Board has greatly benefited by the cooperation and suggestions of its Advisory Committee, composed of men specially interested in international economic problems and shipping questions, to whom the Conference Board wishes to express its indebtedness, *viz.*:

Fred I. Kent, Director, Bankers Trust Company, New York City, *Committee Chairman.*

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- Herbert B. Walker, President, American Steamship Owners'
Association, New York City.
- Laurence R. Wilder, Sponsor, Transoceanic Corporation of
the United States, New York City.

The Conference Board is especially indebted to Mr. Alfred H. Haag, Director of the Bureau of Research of the United States Shipping Board, for valuable assistance in supplying special data for this study.

In the preparation of its studies the National Industrial Conference Board avails itself of the experience and judgment of the business executives who compose its membership, and of recognized authorities in special fields, in addition to the scientific knowledge and equipment of its Research Staff. The publications of the Board thus finally represent the result of scientific investigation and broad business experience, and the conclusions expressed therein are those of the Conference Board as a body.

This volume was prepared by Mr. H. K. Murphey of the Conference Board's Research Staff, under the supervision of the Board's Staff Economic Council.

MAGNUS W. ALEXANDER,
President.

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THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS IN NATIONAL MERCHANT MARINE POLICIES

WHAT basic factors determine the extent to which a nation may properly attempt to develop its shipping facilities with governmental aid? If this question is considered in general terms, without specific reference to the United States or any other nation, it may emphasize certain general considerations that may profitably be borne in mind in discussing the American merchant marine problem. When the main features of the present situation of the American merchant marine are reviewed in succeeding chapters, it will be possible to see more clearly the ways in which any such general principles may need to be qualified in the light of special conditions confronting American shipping. In this way the question of national policy toward the American merchant marine can be more intelligently approached.

In the matter of shipping facilities and shipping policies, as in practically every other aspect of economic activity, each nation is of course differently situated, by reason of differences in geographical characteristics, in stages of industrial development, in natural resources, in types of industry and in international political relationships. These differences will naturally determine in each case the amount of shipping facilities required for foreign trade or for defense needs, as well as the ability of each country to supply such facilities through private initiative and, consequently, the extent to which governmental aid may be invoked. There is little incentive, for example, for nations without direct access to the sea to engage in shipping, although theoretically there is no reason why their nationals should not engage in the ship-

ping business as they might in any other economic activity. In such cases it is self-evident that there are obstacles, both economic and political in character, that make it impracticable to develop shipping facilities; and there are likewise factors of international cooperation that make it possible for such nations to rely upon others for such shipping as is needed to promote their international commerce. Though such nations afford the extreme instances of differences in situations that determine differences in shipping policies, even among the so-called maritime nations such differences exist and play a definite part in the determination of national policies toward merchant marine development.

It is obvious, however, that the development of shipping and national policies toward it are not determined wholly by objective factors of this kind, arising from actual differences in the economic and political situation of the various nations. Sentimental considerations, connected with national pride in marine power, undoubtedly have influenced some of the maritime nations in their shipping policies. Likewise, the self-interest of particular groups within each maritime nation, such as those engaged in the building and operation of ships or in the naval service, has been and continues to be an important influence upon shipping policies. Such influences, however, must be left out of consideration in any discussion of the broad elements of public welfare upon which national policies should be based, whether in regard to shipping or any other aspect of economic life. If a policy of unlimited shipping expansion is assumed as desirable beforehand, there is no reason for discussing the question at all.

The building and operation of ships may be regarded from two points of view, which are closely related in many respects but which should be clearly distinguished in any general discussion of the problem of shipping policies. In the first place, ship building, ship ownership and ship operation may be looked upon primarily as a part of the business activity of a nation. In fact, the business interests involved in construction, operation and financing of ships make shipping one of the world's largest and most basic industries. The various maritime nations, and even some non-maritime

nations, are interested and share in this vast industry in different degrees. With the increasing international mobility of capital, the interest in the financing of shipping is doubtless very widespread. For some nations, particularly Great Britain, the construction and operation of ships, their repair, insurance etc., constitute one of the most important branches of their economic life. Other nations engage in the building and operation of ships only incidentally, and the importance of this industry to them lies not so much in its direct share in the business life of the country as in other purposes that it serves.

This aspect of shipping is often lost sight of in general discussions of merchant marine questions, but it can not be ignored. The profitableness of the shipping industries as a whole, which rests upon the economic soundness of their position, is a basic consideration in the merchant marine policy of any nation. If a nation can not engage in the building and operation of ships profitably, it is obvious that that industry can not be considered in itself an economic asset in the industrial life of the nation. Such a country may make shipping profitable to those engaged in it by means of governmental aid, through which part of the cost is paid by the general public in the form of taxation, but this does not make that industry an economic asset in itself. In such case the importance of the industry must be measured in other terms than as a part of the business life of the country, and its preservation and development must be justified by quite other considerations than those of its value as a business. What these considerations are will be discussed later. They relate to the importance of shipping for the development of the foreign trade of the nation and for its security.

Obviously, however, the question of the relation of the shipping industry to the foreign trade and defense of a nation would not be likely to become an issue of national policy if its shipping industries were on a profitable and sound economic basis. In considering national policies toward shipping, it is therefore essential first to ascertain the conditions that affect the ability of the shipping industry in any nation to maintain itself on a profitable basis as a part of the economic life of the nation.

SHIPPING AS A COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY

Shipping is one of the most freely and intensely competitive businesses. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to limit the competition in this field by artificial means or to afford protection to either the building or operation of ships in the same way, or to the same extent, that manufacturing industries can be protected against foreign competition. Since the shipping business in its most important branches involves the rendering of transportation service *between* nations, the possibility of retaliation prevents the exercise of any large measure of discrimination against competitors and practically imposes freedom of trade in that field. In water transportation between points within each country it is possible to exclude outside competitors. This is done in some instances, as in the case of the coastwise trade of the United States by restricting such trade to vessels built within the country or operated under its flag. But the high seas are in peace time an open highroad accessible to all nations, and the freedom of competition in rendering service on this highroad can be restricted only indirectly, if at all, by discriminations against competitors at the terminal points in such matters as the use of ports and port facilities, or in charges and duties collected at such points, all of which easily invite retaliation that would cancel their effect. The possibilities in this direction are discussed in later chapters of this study. It is important here to emphasize chiefly that in ocean shipping practically free competitive conditions prevail and are likely to prevail in the future, so that any nation, apart from special governmental aid, must engage in the building and operation of ships mainly on the basis of its competitive efficiency and its ability to operate profitably under the existing conditions of the supply and demand for shipping services and the cost of providing them.

Shipping rates, or the price of shipping services, will be determined at any given time or on any particular trade route by the relation between the supply of and the demand for such services. But, in view of the competitive situation, the general price level will, in the long run, be closely related to the cost of ship operation to those nations that are

economically best fitted to provide shipping service. In the absence of governmental assistance, any expansion of the shipping interests of other countries will be contingent either upon an expansion in the volume of trade and a resulting increase in the demand for shipping or upon a lowering of the cost of providing it.

During the past two decades the world supply of shipping facilities has tended to increase more rapidly than the volume of world trade. Shipbuilding facilities, especially, were enlarged in Great Britain and the United States during the war, so that any indication of increased demand for ships thereafter could easily and quickly be met. The excess supply of shipping may not have existed as regards all types of shipping. In fact, there is some reason to believe that changes in the conditions of international trade, as well as in the costs of ship operation in comparison with rates, have created for more speedy and efficient types of ships a demand considerably in excess of the supply. Nevertheless, the large surplus of available serviceable ships has tended in the years since the war to depress shipping rates relatively to costs of ship operation and thus has made the competitive position of some maritime countries relatively unfavorable and made it difficult for them to maintain or expand their shipping industries. Those countries that have been willing to allow their older vessels to remain idle or, as in the case of Germany, have lost most of them and have undertaken to enter the field with new and improved types of shipping in advance of other nations, have been able to restore in larger measure the prosperity of their shipping industries. But though some countries have been better situated in this respect than others, the shipping industry all over the world has been more or less depressed, and capital has tended to flow into more profitable fields of investment.

SHIPPING RATES AND COSTS OF SHIPBUILDING AND OPERATION

The difference in the situation of the shipping industry in the various countries, particularly since the war, is due generally to the fact that shipping rates are determined by

almost free international competition, while the costs of ship operation and construction are determined chiefly by domestic national conditions, which have differed very widely in recent years. These differences in costs are of course due in some part to international differences in experience, initiative and skill in the shipping industries, and perhaps also to differences in the ready availability of materials for ship construction and of fuel for ship operation, or of adequate port facilities. But it can not fairly be said that such differences are important enough, so far as they exist at all, to account for the wide variations in costs of construction and operation. In larger part, such differences in costs in the various countries arise from the same general factors that make for differences in costs in other industries, namely, differences in the price levels of labor, materials and capital. These differences, in turn, are the result of many complex factors in the economic life of each nation, such as the abundance of its natural resources, the efficiency of labor and industrial management, the standard of living and the rate of national saving.

These differences in the level of values of materials, labor or capital will tend, however, gradually to be narrowed as between the various nations, if the free movement of commodities and labor between countries is not obstructed by artificial barriers. But protective tariffs and restrictive immigration policies contribute to accentuate existing differences in the cost of materials and of labor. In some fields of industry, high labor costs may be offset by increased labor efficiency through mechanization and intelligent management. Ship construction and operation, however, are industries which have so far not lent themselves to mechanization or mass production to as large an extent as other industries. In those countries, therefore, where wage levels have been raised as a result of artificial barriers, shipping is placed in a competitively disadvantageous position.

SHIPPING AND FOREIGN TRADE

Another factor that has to be considered in discussing the economic position or profitableness of shipping as an in-

dustry in any nation is the extent to which the foreign trade of that nation offers an adequate basis of demand for the economic development of its shipping facilities. This is a matter not only of the total volume of the nation's foreign trade but also of its character. A country with a very large foreign trade in comparison with its internal domestic trade has obviously a better basis for the development of a merchant marine than a country with a relatively small foreign trade in comparison with its internal trade. A nation with a large volume of foreign commerce has at least opportunity to secure for its own merchant marine a sufficient share of the business to make operation profitable, other things being equal; while a country with a small foreign trade could economically develop extensive shipping facilities only by being able or willing to meet the full force of competition for the trade of other nations.

More important, perhaps, is the consideration of the character and balance of a nation's trade. A country whose trade consists largely of bulky products of relatively low value, on which shipping rates will be relatively low, may conceivably support through its trade a large quantity of shipping of a type suited to such trade, whereas a nation whose export trade is chiefly in the form of highly finished products of high value and small bulk would find a merchant marine consisting of a large number of vessels of slow speed to be probably economically disadvantageous, but might need a relatively smaller amount of shipping facilities of superior type.

In consequence of these considerations there appear to be definite and largely permanent difficulties that prevent the economic development of shipping facilities in some nations to as great an extent as in others, or at least put obstacles in the way of profitable ship operation or construction for some nations and give others an advantage in this respect. If shipping is considered merely as an industry, therefore, there is no reason for assuming that it can be advantageously developed in all nations to an equal degree, apart from special artificial aid or protection of one kind or another. In determining national policies toward shipping, a primary consideration is the economic situation of the nation in respect

to its capacity to maintain a merchant marine on a profitable basis.

If in any nation there exist general conditions affecting the cost of ship operation and construction which, apart from questions of the relative efficiency, skill or initiative of those engaged in the shipping industry, make it impossible to develop a merchant marine on a profitable basis, there is in such a nation a *prima facie* case against any national policy of merchant marine expansion. Such expansion could be achieved only at the expense of other industries or of the general public, and such expense could be justified only on other grounds than those of the economic advantage to a nation which might result from the maintenance of activity in the shipping industry itself. Such other grounds might be found, as will be seen later, in the function of a merchant marine as a public utility, supporting the development of other industries through foreign trade and strengthening the national security.

SHIPPING AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS

But before a policy of merchant marine expansion can be justified on such other grounds, where shipping is inherently an unprofitable industry, one other important factor has first to be considered, namely, the international business relationships of the country in question, not merely in respect to the volume of its commodity imports and exports, but in respect to the total of its international business transactions. If a country is in the position of a debtor nation with large foreign private or governmental obligations, and especially if for any reason it has difficulty in developing an export surplus of commodities through which its debts may be paid, any services which it may render to other countries, such as shipping, become an important means of maintaining the soundness of its economic position by securing adequate supplies of foreign capital for its internal development and by paying for the imports of necessary raw materials. In such a case there would be a definite incentive for a nation to develop its merchant marine, even though that industry might be inherently unprofitable, as a means

of maintaining its international solvency and of assisting the growth of its export trade.

Conversely, a creditor nation with large foreign investments would normally be in receipt of an excess of imports of commodities or of services, and any effort to develop its shipping facilities on a large scale, especially if they were inherently unprofitable, would be disadvantageous to the nation as a whole because it would deprive other nations of an opportunity to render services to the creditor nation as a means of payment of interest and principal on their debts to it. Other things being equal, the value of foreign investments of such a creditor nation might conceivably be diminished by any policy of extensive merchant marine expansion. Such a situation would be aggravated where the creditor nation itself sought to expand its export trade in commodities by increasing its shipping facilities at public expense, and at the same time put obstacles in the way of the import of commodities through high tariffs. In short, generally speaking, where other conditions remain the same, it is likely to be economically more unsound for a creditor nation to adopt a policy of merchant marine expansion than it is for a debtor nation. In the former case, such a policy is working directly against the forces making for a sound balance of its international transactions; while in the latter case, shipping expansion may be an important means of securing a better balance in its international accounts.

As a general principle, it is economically sound to allow the production of any commodity or the provision of any service to be left to those in the community or among the nations who can perform them most cheaply and efficiently, especially where practically free international competition in such a field prevails, as it does in shipping. But it is obvious that this general principle of *laissez-faire* is and must be modified in reference to certain kinds of commodities and services by other considerations than those of immediate economic advantage. This is especially true of the provision of certain services, such as shipping, that have a bearing upon national welfare beyond their rôle as a part of the industrial or economic life of the nation. Shipping may be and generally is considered as a kind of public utility in which

there are certain general national interests at stake for all the maritime nations. When it is looked at in this way, questions of the profitableness and soundness of the shipping industries in any nation, though they must be borne in mind, become of secondary or subordinate importance to other considerations.

MERCHANT MARINE AS A PUBLIC UTILITY

The function of a nation's merchant marine as a public utility has two distinct aspects. In the first place, a nation's international shipping facilities serve as an adjunct of its foreign trade. In the second place, its shipping facilities, including facilities for construction of ships and the personnel required for their operation, serve as an indispensable adjunct to the means of international communication and military and naval defense essential to the national security.

The importance of a merchant marine from the point of view of national defense is obvious, but it is difficult to determine a nation's requirement for shipping facilities on this basis. The uses of a merchant marine as a support for national security are not confined to the employment of vessels as naval auxiliaries. Under modern conditions of international interdependence it is of vital importance for each country to be able to secure supplies of raw materials and to maintain communications with the rest of the world in time of international disturbance. How much shipping it would be in the national interest to support during peace time in view of war contingencies, for this purpose or for use as naval auxiliaries, is difficult to determine. It depends upon the character and sources of the materials the nation requires for its economic security, as well as upon its international political relationships, the character and location of international disturbances that might endanger its security, and the size and character of its naval defense. It is, of course, impossible for any nation to be prepared for all conceivable contingencies or to avoid some measure of economic inconvenience during international conflict, but, as long as international relations are uncertain and unstable, it is incumbent upon every nation to make some provision for a

reasonable degree of security in the event of conflict between other nations or of war in which it is engaged, so that it may be assured of a minimum of shipping facilities by which international communications may be maintained. This implies not only shipping facilities already provided but a certain minimum of facilities for building ships in case of need. Such a minimum of shipping is also important from the point of view of providing the trained personnel required by the Navy and naval auxiliaries during war time. What the merchant marine requirements from all these points of view will be in any particular case can be determined only by technical analysis of the situation for each country, and no general rule is applicable. Nevertheless, where the shipping industries of a country are in an economically disadvantageous position from the point of view of costs, it can at least be said that the nation is justified in maintaining such facilities up to the minimum required from the point of view of national security.

The function of a merchant marine as an adjunct of the foreign trade of a nation raises more controversial questions than does its function as part of the national defenses. It is obvious that shipping can be of use as an aid to the national security only when it is controlled by the nation in question; but it is not so obvious that the successful expansion of the foreign trade of a nation depends upon the ownership or control of the transportation facilities required for such trade. Transportation is, of course, an indispensable instrument of trade, whether within a nation or among nations. In the internal trade of any country it is recognized that adequate and economically sound transportation facilities are necessary for the greatest possible trade prosperity of the country, and for this reason they are treated in every country as a public utility and are brought under such regulation as is needed to protect the public interest in them.

SHIPPING AND TRADE EXPANSION

In internal trade, practically no importance attaches to the ownership or control of transportation facilities, except that their regulation as public utilities is considered neces-

sary to make the rates equitable and the service adequate. In international trade, however, there is a strong conviction that trade expansion and effective competition in foreign markets depends upon the ownership or control of shipping facilities. A nation that can not carry the larger part of its trade in its own vessels is thought to be handicapped in the struggle for foreign markets.

This conviction is based upon several strongly rooted ideas. The most important of these is that "trade follows the flag," and is merely part of the general acceptance of the principle of nationalism in international economic relations. Theoretically, it is questionable whether under present conditions the influence of national power upon international trade is as great as it is supposed to be, and it is probable that in the long run the expansion of a nation's foreign trade depends fundamentally upon basic economic factors, such as its geographical position, its natural resources, the character and efficiency of its labor and its industrial management, rather than upon its political influence. So long as all nations act according to the principle of nationalism, there is probably some advantage to be gained for a nation by applying the principle to some extent in its foreign trade policies. But in applying it in such matters as shipping, especially where the shipping industries are under an inherent handicap, there is danger of attaching too much importance to it. It is highly desirable for each nation to ascertain as carefully and objectively as possible how much its foreign trade can economically be expanded merely by virtue of the ownership or control of additional shipping facilities, and whether the gain from such expansion is likely to offset the cost involved. The possession of additional shipping facilities may create an incentive on the part of the shipping interests to secure more business by favoring in various ways the trade of their own nation. But if such additional shipping facilities are supported partly or wholly at public expense and a certain level of profitableness is guaranteed for them by public aid, will the incentive to expand the trade of the nation exist or be of great importance?

Furthermore, can the nation be sure that the trade expansion achieved in this way is, on the whole, economically

sound and permanent? For some countries, of course, the expansion of their export trade is a vital necessity, because of their debtor position internationally or because of the character of their industries and natural resources. In other countries, however, the domestic market may be so large and important or their supplies of natural resources may be diminishing so rapidly by reason of the domestic demand, that their export trade may be of secondary significance and serve merely as an outlet for a surplus of products of certain of their industries. For such nations it may even be positively disadvantageous in the long run to stimulate their export trade artificially and thus hasten the depletion of their natural resources.

The actual economic significance of the foreign trade of any nation can be determined only by a careful consideration of its internal industrial structure, the size and character of its population and natural resources, and its international financial position. The expansion of foreign trade can not in itself be regarded as an absolute economic benefit for all countries regardless of their industrial peculiarities; and a policy of trade expansion supported at public expense by artificial aids can not be considered to be economically justifiable in every case.

Nevertheless, so long as shipping is regarded as a public utility from a strictly nationalistic point of view, there will be in all maritime countries a definite demand for its support as a public utility to aid in the maintenance and expansion of foreign trade. This is a fact to be reckoned with, especially where such a demand is supported by considerations of national security and naval defense. The question thus arises whether there is any general principle that may be applied as a guide in determining national policies from this point of view. If the shipping industry of any country is in an inherently unprofitable position, how far is such a country justified in aiding the expansion of its merchant marine from the point of view of its own domestic interest and of international considerations, to provide an indispensable minimum of support for its foreign trade and to assure its national security?

So far as any generally valid answer to this question is possible, it would appear that the provision of shipping facilities required to carry one half of the foreign trade of a nation would constitute a reasonable standard. In most cases this would assure a fair measure of support for foreign trade and of national security, and in general it would be an ideal to which other nations could hardly take fair exception. Some countries, of course, would not feel it necessary to provide this minimum, either in view of their foreign trade requirements or of their national security. Others, because of peculiarities in their position, would find such a standard inadequate. In each case it is obviously necessary to take into consideration, first, the actual situation of the shipping industries as regards their profitableness and the obstacles that stand in the way of independent success; second, the needs of the nation as regards its foreign trade in the light of its natural resources, its geographical position and its industrial characteristics; and, finally, the requirements of national security as determined by its naval strength and its international political relations.

In the following chapters, the position of the United States in these respects is examined at length in order to provide a basis upon which a sound national policy toward the American merchant marine may be determined.

PART I
THE PRESENT SITUATION

CHAPTER II

THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE

THE internal development which took place in the United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century was reflected in the declining importance of shipping in the economic life of the nation. Continued westward expansion, the extensive exploitation of natural resources, railroad construction and the rapid growth of manufacturing occupied the attention of the American people and diverted capital and labor from the shipping and shipbuilding industries. Despite the vast increase in the volume of foreign commerce, the total tonnage of the American merchant marine, including both foreign trade and coastwise shipping, remained practically stationary during the period from 1861 to 1900, and showed only a relatively small increase during the first decade of the present century. On the basis of value the percentage of exports and imports carried in American vessels, which for the period from 1821 to 1860 averaged 77.3 %, steadily declined between 1861 and 1914, amounting in the latter year to only 9.7 %.¹

In 1916, the United States Shipping Board was created, and a program of ship construction under governmental auspices was subsequently instituted for the purpose of meeting the emergency situation brought about by the World War. During the following five years, a total of 2,312 vessels, aggregating 13,636,711 deadweight tons, was added to the American merchant marine.² This new construction, together with the additions resulting from the transfer of

¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation, "Merchant Marine Statistics, 1927," Washington, D. C., 1928, pp. 61-62.

² U. S. Shipping Board, "Sixth Annual Report, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922," Washington, D. C., 1922. For a definition of "deadweight tonnage" and other technical terms, see Appendix A of this volume.

foreign flag ships to American registry¹ and from the seizure of enemy vessels, increased the total tonnage of American shipping, including practically all types and sizes of boats and vessels, from 8,389,429 gross tons in 1915 to 18,462,967 gross tons in 1922.² The present merchant marine problem is in some aspects the product of this extraordinary war-time expansion.

In order to obtain a clear picture of the existing situation with respect to the American merchant marine, it is necessary at the outset to exclude certain types and classes of vessels not infrequently included in statistical comparisons of American and foreign shipping facilities. In attempting to evaluate the American merchant marine, the primary considerations are those relating to the use of vessels for national defense purposes and for the promotion of foreign trade interests. It is obvious that only steam or motor vessels of a reasonable size are important in respect to either national defense or foreign trade. Furthermore, vessels operated exclusively on rivers or lakes, including the Great Lakes, should not be brought into the picture, regardless of size, since the field of activity of such vessels is limited and since that class of shipping is dissociated from the conditions responsible for the merchant marine problem.³ The following analysis, therefore, of the size and character of the existing American merchant marine will be based exclusively upon ocean-going steam or motor vessels of 1,000 gross tons or more in size.

OCEAN-GOING TONNAGE

The status of this class of vessels on January 1, 1929, is shown in Table 1. While the total gross tonnage of sizable

¹ The transfer of foreign-built ships not over five years of age to American registry was authorized by the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, but no such transfers were made. The five-year age limit was repealed by the Ship Registry Act of 1914. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provided (by Section 22) that foreign-built vessels admitted to registry and owned by American citizens on February 1, 1920, and such ships owned by the government on June 5, 1920, when sold to American citizens might engage in the coasting trade. See U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "Government Aid to Shipping," Revised Edition, Washington, D. C., 1925, pp. 425-429.

² "Merchant Marine Statistics, 1927," *op. cit.*, p. 22. The term "gross tonnage" is defined in Appendix A.

³ In 1928 American shipping on the Great Lakes comprised 2,067 vessels with a gross tonnage of 2,549,799 tons. "Merchant Marine Statistics, 1928," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

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ocean-going vessels under the American flag amounts to 10,319,223 tons, it should be noted that a substantial part of that tonnage was not actively employed. On any given date, a certain amount of shipping is necessarily idle as a result of either the need for repairs or seasonal or other changes in the demand for shipping facilities. The privately-owned shipping tonnage not in service on January 1, 1929,

TABLE 1: NUMBER AND GROSS TONNAGE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, JANUARY 1, 1929

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Classification	Passenger and Combination		Freighters		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Private ownership								
Foreign trade.....	68	505,490	225	1,108,178	110	744,023	403	2,357,691
Coastwise.....	89	458,913	408	1,640,586	217	1,390,820	714	3,490,319
Laid-up vessels.....	29	111,718	106	337,870	27	152,996	162	602,584
Total.....	186	1,076,121	739	3,086,634	354	2,287,839	1279	6,450,594
U. S. Shipping Board								
Foreign trade.....	11	187,871	244	1,422,056	1	7,045	256	1,616,972
Coastwise.....	1	6,295	1	6,295
Government service	2	7,255	2	7,255
Laid-up vessels.....	2	37,733	440	2,122,765	5	31,173	447	2,191,671
Total.....	13	225,604	686	3,552,076	7	44,513	706	3,822,193
Panama R. R. (Government owned)
Foreign trade.....	2	19,244	2	5,201	4	24,445
Laid-up vessels.....	2	21,991	2	21,991
Total.....	2	19,244	4	27,192	6	46,436
Combined total.....	201	1,320,969	1429	6,665,902	361	2,332,352	1991	10,319,223

may be attributed to such conditions. But the laid-up tonnage of the United States Shipping Board is comprised almost entirely of vessels which have not been in service for a number of years and which will probably remain permanently idle. The character of this idle fleet of government-owned vessels will be described in a later chapter dealing with the Shipping Board and its activities. It is sufficient at this point to emphasize the fact that in general those

vessels in their present condition are not available for immediate use and should not be considered a part of the available shipping facilities under the American flag in making comparisons with the shipping of foreign countries.

SIZE AND SPEED OF COASTWISE SHIPPING

A substantial part of the American merchant marine is engaged in the coastwise or intercoastal trades. From time to time some of the vessels may be temporarily transferred to foreign trade. Some of them also touch at nearby foreign ports in the course of their coastwise operations. But as a whole the coastwise shipping represents a distinct class of vessels, which constitutes a part of the maritime strength of the United States in comparison with that of foreign nations only to the extent that those coastwise vessels may be useful for purposes of national defense. Such usefulness depends in part upon size and speed. Those characteristics, as well as age, are indicated in Table 2. The data in that table cover the coastwise vessels which were actively employed during the calendar year 1928 and the tonnage figures are, therefore, not identical with the corresponding figures in Table 1. Of the total coastwise tonnage of 3,471,849 gross tons, more than half represents vessels of 6,000 gross tons or more, but the greater part of these sizable vessels are tankers. In the case of freighters, 245 of the 422 vessels were under 4,000 gross tons in size. Four combination passenger and cargo vessels, totalling 68,442 gross tons, are shown in the class of vessels of 15,000 gross tons and over.

A relatively small proportion of this coastwise shipping has been constructed within the past five years. In the case of combination vessels, sixty-four of the ninety-eight ships were built prior to 1914. The larger part of the freighter and tanker tonnage was constructed during or immediately after the war period.

With respect to speed, the data in Table 2 show six combination vessels, representing 58,592 gross tons, with a speed of eighteen knots or over. More than two-thirds of the total coastwise tonnage, however, is composed of vessels having a speed of less than twelve knots.

TABLE 2: NUMBER AND GROSS TONNAGE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, ACTIVELY EMPLOYED IN THE COASTWISE TRADE DURING THE YEAR 1928, CLASSIFIED AS TO SIZE, AGE AND SPEED
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Classification	Passenger and Combination		Freighters		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Size (gross tons)								
1,000- 3,999	48	126,131	245	632,940	30	75,582	323	834,653
4,000- 5,999	28	153,630	99	509,079	26	135,573	153	798,282
6,000- 9,999	16	117,588	76	539,418	134	981,563	226	1,638,569
10,000-14,999	2	23,322	2	21,388	7	87,193	11	131,903
15,000 and over	4	68,442	4	68,442
Total	98	489,113	422	1,702,825	197	1,279,911	717	3,471,849
Age (year built)								
Prior to 1914	64	289,303	70	281,520	22	80,713	156	651,536
1914-1918	12	55,125	131	489,500	49	337,621	192	882,246
1919-1923	6	31,031	218	916,318	120	820,392	344	1,767,741
1924-1928	16	113,654	3	15,487	6	41,185	25	170,326
Total	98	489,113	422	1,702,825	197	1,279,911	717	3,471,849
Speed								
Under 12 knots	14	33,471	339	1,226,318	195	1,263,975	548	2,523,764
12-13 knots	40	161,462	61	344,944	2	15,936	103	522,342
14-15 knots	26	167,614	20	125,927	46	293,541
16-17 knots	12	67,974	2	5,636	14	73,610
18-19 knots	2	25,368	2	25,368
20 knots and over	4	33,224	4	33,224
Total	98	489,113	422	1,702,825	197	1,279,911	717	3,471,849

VESSELS OPERATING IN FOREIGN TRADE

It is evident that a certain part of this coastwise shipping might, in case of emergency, be used for national defense purposes. But in comparing the maritime strength of the United States with that of other nations, it is the shipping under the American flag which is operating in foreign trade which is important. Moreover, the value of a merchant marine in time of peace is chiefly related to its influence upon the development and protection of foreign trade interests. The American shipping in foreign trade is, therefore, of primary concern in any analysis of the merchant marine problem.

In Table 3 is shown the size of the privately-owned and United States Shipping Board vessels which were actively employed in foreign trade on January 1, 1929.¹ Of the 659 vessels, totalling 3,974,663 gross tons in active service on that date, only eighty-one, of 220,804 gross tons, all privately-owned, were less than 4,000 gross tons in size. In the case of

TABLE 3: SIZE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, ACTIVELY EMPLOYED IN FOREIGN TRADE ON JANUARY 1, 1929¹
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Gross Tonnage	Passenger and Combination		Freighters		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Private ownership								
1,000- 3,999.....	14	39,540	60	160,314	7	20,950	81	220,804
4,000- 5,999.....	20	96,457	125	665,835	29	144,166	174	906,458
6,000- 9,999.....	12	82,103	39	268,875	69	525,455	120	876,433
10,000-14,999.....	21	270,109	1	13,154	5	53,452	27	336,715
15,000 and over.....	1	17,281	1	17,281
Total.....	68	505,490	225	1,108,178	110	744,023	403	2,357,691
U. S. Shipping Board								
1,000- 3,999.....
4,000- 5,999.....	156	844,200	156	844,200
6,000- 9,999.....	5	37,150	88	577,856	1	7,045	94	622,051
10,000-14,999.....	2	27,738	2	27,738
15,000 and over.....	4	122,983	4	122,983
Total.....	11	187,871	244	1,422,056	1	7,045	256	1,616,972
Combined total....	79	693,367	469	2,530,234	111	751,068	659	3,974,663

¹ The four government-owned vessels operated by the Panama R. R. are not included in this table.

freighters, 281 of the 469 vessels are shown to be from 4,000 to 6,000 gross tons. The largest amount of tanker tonnage falls into the class comprising vessels of from 6,000 to 10,000 gross tons. The significant fact, however, is the small number of really large ships. Of the four passenger and combina-

¹ The data are given for a specific date rather than for the year 1928 as a whole because the transfer of several Shipping Board vessels to private ownership during 1928 renders the separate classification of government-owned and privately-owned vessels difficult in dealing with the year's activity.

tion vessels over 15,000 gross tons in size owned by the Shipping Board¹ only one, the *Leviathan*, of 59,956 gross tons, is in the large ship class. The other three vessels are the *George Washington* of 23,788 gross tons, the *America* of 21,329 gross tons and the *Republic* of 17,910 gross tons. The single privately-owned vessel over 15,000 shown in the table is the *Minnekahda* operated by the Atlantic Transport Company.

TABLE 4: AGE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, ACTIVELY EMPLOYED IN FOREIGN TRADE ON JANUARY 1, 1929¹
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Year Built	Passenger and Combination		Freighters		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Private ownership								
Prior to 1914.....	33	150,313	16	58,360	12	49,374	61	258,047
1914-1918.....	6	42,688	32	124,872	27	184,632	65	352,192
1919-1923.....	25	286,985	175	912,979	66	462,520	266	1,662,484
1924-1928.....	4	25,504	2	11,967	5	47,497	11	84,968
Total.....	68	505,490	225	1,108,178	110	744,023	403	2,357,691
U. S. Shipping Board								
Prior to 1914.....	3	63,027	1	8,413	4	71,440
1914-1918.....	1	59,956	43	259,367	44	319,323
1919-1923.....	7	64,888	200	1,154,276	1	7,045	208	1,226,209
1924-1928.....
Total.....	11	187,871	244	1,422,056	1	7,045	256	1,616,972
Combined total... ..	79	693,367	469	2,530,334	111	751,068	659	3,974,663

¹ See footnote to Table 3, p. 22.

Age is also important in determining the status of a merchant marine. The average life of a vessel is estimated to be twenty years, although there are instances of trans-Atlantic liners over that age limit but still in active service. In any case, it is evident that a nation which possesses a relatively large amount of recently constructed shipping is in an advantageous position. As shown in Table 4, the United States can not be said to have that advantage. Only eleven of the 659 vessels in foreign trade have been built within the past five years. On the other hand, only a relatively small propor-

¹ It should be noted that the recent sale of the United States line will in the near future bring about the transfer of these four vessels to private ownership.

tion of the total tonnage was built prior to 1914. Of the total 3,974,663 gross tons of shipping in foreign trade, 2,888,693 gross tons represent vessels constructed during the period from 1919 to 1923.

Speed is another important factor in relation to the competitive efficiency of ocean shipping. Slow speed vessels can be used only for the carriage of bulky commodities of low value. The interest charges on the money tied up in commodities which have a high value in proportion to their bulk, as, for example, raw silk, render the rapid transportation of such commodities of great importance to their owner. On the other hand, an increase in the speed of a vessel involves a disproportionately greater increase in fuel consumption and other operating costs, which is reflected in higher freight rates. A low-valued, bulky commodity, such as coal, can not be profitably shipped except on low speed vessels. The relative proportion of low-speed and high-speed shipping which would represent a well-developed merchant marine might, therefore, vary in the case of different maritime nations to the extent that their ocean-borne commerce consisted of low value or high value commodities on a tonnage basis.¹ In the case of the United States, for example, the combined export and import ocean-borne tonnage of low freight rate commodities amounted to over fifty-five million tons for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1927, while the similar combined tonnage of high freight rate commodities was nearly nineteen million tons.²

The speed of the American vessels engaged in foreign trade is shown in Table 5. It is noteworthy that in the total tonnage of 3,974,663 gross tons, only 851,298 gross tons represent vessels with a speed of twelve knots or over. Not a single general cargo vessel or tanker engaged in foreign trade under the American flag has a speed of fourteen knots or

¹ The discussion of speed should not be confused with the distinction between tramp ships and liners. A tramp ship is a vessel, usually having low speed, which is not engaged in any regular service but is shifted from trade to trade and from port to port as cargo opportunities present themselves. Not all relatively low speed vessels are tramps.

² U. S. Shipping Board, Bureau of Research, Division of Statistics, "Water-Borne Foreign Commerce of the United States, Fiscal year ended June 30, 1927," Special Report No. 242, Washington, D. C. Over ten million cargo tons of coal and coke were exported to the United Kingdom as a consequence of the British coal strike.

over, although in the coastwise trade there were twenty-two such vessels.¹ The freighters operated in foreign trade by the United States Shipping Board, with two exceptions, are less than twelve knot vessels. Even in the case of passenger and combination vessels there are only five ships of eighteen knots or over. The *Leviathan* is the only really fast ship in the foreign trade merchant fleet of the United States.

TABLE 5: SPEED OF AMERICAN OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, ACTIVELY EMPLOYED IN FOREIGN TRADE ON JANUARY 1, 1929¹
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Speed	Passenger and Combination		Freighters		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Private ownership								
Under 12 knots.....	6	20,835	193	966,567	107	721,142	305	1,708,544
12-13 knots.....	21	86,907	32	141,611	3	22,881	56	651,399
14-15 knots.....	13	108,822	13	108,822
16-17 knots.....	27	282,717	27	282,717
18-19 knots.....	1	6,209	1	6,209
20 knots and over....
Total.....	68	505,490	225	1,108,178	110	744,023	403	2,357,691
U. S. Shipping Board								
Under 12 knots.....	242	1,407,776	1	7,045	243	1,414,821
12-13 knots.....	2	14,280	2	14,280
14-15 knots.....	6	55,060	6	55,060
16-17 knots.....	1	21,329	1	21,329
18-19 knots.....	3	51,526	3	51,526
20 knots and over....	1	59,956	1	59,956
Total.....	11	189,871	244	1,442,056	1	7,045	256	1,616,972
Combined total. . .	79	693,367	469	2,530,234	111	751,068	659	3,974,663

¹ See footnote to Table 3, p. 22.

The type of propulsion of the American vessels in foreign trade is shown in Table 6. Vessels equipped with either reciprocating or turbine engines comprise approximately ninety-five per cent of the total tonnage. Since the other types of propulsion equipment are generally considered as being an improvement over the reciprocating or turbine engine, it is evident that the American merchant fleet operating in foreign trade is deficient in this respect.

¹ See Table 2, p. 21.

TABLE 6: TYPE OF PROPULSION OF AMERICAN OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, ACTIVELY EMPLOYED IN FOREIGN TRADE ON JANUARY 1, 1929¹

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Propulsion	Passenger and Combination		Freighters		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Private ownership								
Reciprocating.....	45	257,829	147	684,878	88	599,289	280	1,541,996
Turbine.....	21	231,731	71	400,214	14	74,491	106	706,436
Motor.....	2	15,930	7	23,086	7	65,315	16	104,331
Motor Electric.....	4,928	1	4,928
Turbo Electric.....
Total.....	68	505,490	225	1,108,178	110	744,023	403	2,357,691
U. S. Shipping Board								
Reciprocating.....	3	63,027	77	456,212	1	7,045	81	526,284
Turbine.....	8	124,844	151	862,860	159	987,704
Motor.....	11	64,999	11	64,999
Motor Electric.....
Turbo Electric.....	5	37,985	5	37,985
Total.....	11	187,871	244	1,422,056	1	7,045	256	1,616,972
Combined total ...	79	693,367	469	2,530,234	111	751,068	659	3,974,663

¹ See footnote to Table 3, p. 22.

OIL-BURNING TONNAGE

One of the most important developments of the present century in the field of marine engineering has been the substitution of oil for coal as fuel for ships. The advantages of the use of oil as fuel are numerous. It is stated that the conversion of the White Star Liner *Homer* from a coal to an oil burner made possible a reduction in the boiler room force from 171 to 39 men, and lessened the fueling time at New York from three days to fifteen hours.¹ The fact that less fuel space is required in the case of oil serves to increase cargo capacity and to enlarge the cruising radius of an oil-burning vessel as compared with a coal burner of similar size. The motor ship has all these advantages together with the additional advantage of reduced oil consumption. So

¹ H. C. Calvin and E. G. Stuart, "The Merchant Shipping Industry," New York, 1925, p. 15.

long as the world's supply of oil is sufficient and the present price relationship between coal and oil is maintained, oil-burning vessels of both types will have a marked degree of superiority over their coal-burning competitors.

The American merchant marine comprises a very substantial amount of oil-burning shipping, as shown in Table 7. The data in this table cover vessels actively employed during the year 1928 in the coastwise and foreign trades

TABLE 7: AMERICAN COAL-BURNING, OIL-BURNING AND MOTOR SHIPS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, ACTIVELY EMPLOYED IN COASTWISE TRADE AND FOREIGN TRADE, DURING THE YEAR 1928

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Service	Coal-Burning		Oil-Burning		Motor Ships		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Coastwise								
Passenger and combination.....	22	94,099	76	395,014	98	489,113
Freighters.....	99	331,406	312	1,330,274	11	41,145	422	1,702,825
Tankers.....	1	7,074	178	1,195,876	18	76,961	197	1,279,911
Total.....	122	432,579	566	2,921,164	29	118,106	717	3,471,849
Foreign trade								
Passenger and combination.....	12	107,013	72	609,473	1	8,196	85	724,682
Freighters.....	53	227,700	413	2,224,383	18	96,297	484	2,548,380
Tankers.....	1	2,951	145	910,147	7	53,804	153	966,902
Total.....	66	337,664	630	3,744,003	26	158,297	722	4,239,964
Combined total...	188	770,243	1196	6,665,167	55	276,403	1439	7,711,813

respectively. In the former, approximately only thirteen per cent of the tonnage is coal-burning; in the latter, less than eight per cent. Of the sixty-six coal-burning vessels operating in foreign trade, twenty-five are less than 4,000 gross tons in size. Motor ships constitute a small proportion of the total tonnage in both the coastwise and foreign trades. But, on the whole, the possession of so large a proportion of oil-burning shipping serves to offset in part the disadvantages previously indicated.

DISTRIBUTION OF SHIPPING SERVICES

The present relationship between the American merchant marine and the foreign commerce of the United States may be indicated by the distribution of shipping services under the American flag among the various trade districts. This is shown in Table 8. Of the total privately-owned tonnage, exclusive of tankers, nearly twenty per cent is operated in nearby foreign services, that is those to Canada, Mexico, Central America, West Indies and the North Coast of South America. Seventy per cent of the tanker tonnage which is almost entirely under private ownership is operated in the same trade districts. On the other hand, the greater part of the tonnage owned by the United States Shipping Board is engaged in transatlantic service, 160 vessels being operated in services to Atlantic Europe and the United Kingdom.¹ Relatively few vessels are operated in indirect trades. Two small vessels are shown to be so engaged. Likewise a certain amount of cargo carrying between foreign ports is probably done by the vessels in the service around the world. But the American merchant marine as a whole is employed in services between foreign ports and those of the United States.

In addition to government-owned vessels of the United States Shipping Board, there are four vessels operated by the Panama Railroad which are likewise government-owned. These four vessels, not shown in the table, comprise two passenger and combination ships totaling 19,244 gross tons, operated in the nearby trade, and two general cargo ships totalling 5,201 gross tons, operated in a service to the West Coast of South America. The operation of these vessels was originally intended to provide the service required by the Government in connection with the construction and maintenance of the Panama Canal. In recent years, however, the ships have extended the scope of their operations, entering into direct competition with private steamship lines.²

¹ The recent sale of the United States and American Merchant lines by the Shipping Board will enlarge the scope of private operations in the trans-Atlantic service as soon as the transfer of those lines is finally effected.

² See, Chester Leasure, "Our Unfair Government," *Nation's Business*, January, 1929.

TABLE 8: FOREIGN TRADE SERVICES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE AMERICAN AND UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER ON JANUARY 1, 1929

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Trade Service	Passenger and Combination				Freighters				Tankers				Total	
	Privately Owned		U. S. Shipping Board		Privately Owned		U. S. Shipping Board		Privately Owned		U. S. Shipping Board			
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Nearby foreign.....	36	159,358	57	178,992	1	4,828	76	525,714	170	868,892
South America														
East Coast.....	5	59,366	23	117,972	30	160,259	1	6,984	59	344,581
West Coast.....	6	36,330	21	116,311	7	46,756	1	7,045	35	206,442
Trans-Atlantic														
Atlantic Europe and United Kingdom.....	1	17,281	11	187,871	12	62,756	149	862,855	13	78,988	186	1,209,741
Baltic Europe.....	7	35,444	1	5,840	8	41,284
Mediterranean.....	22	114,936	22	118,963	44	233,899
India via Suez.....	2	12,344	6	36,371	1	8,403	9	57,118
East and South Africa.....	5	28,224	3	18,420	8	46,644
West Africa.....	9	48,735	1	5,769	10	54,504
Trans-Pacific														
Orient and Far East.....	9	127,286	43	265,606	20	141,006	6	43,811	78	577,709
Australia.....	3	17,994	11	56,107	8	46,907	1	7,541	23	128,549
Around the world.....	8	87,875	12	68,329	6	39,258	1	5,189	27	200,651
Foreign trading, foreign.....	1	2,422	1	2,217	2	4,639
Total.....	68	505,490	11	187,871	225	1,108,178	244	1,422,056	110	744,023	1	7,045	659	3,974,663

COMPARISON WITH FOREIGN MERCHANT MARINES

In order to complete the picture of the present status of the American merchant marine, it would be desirable to make some direct comparisons between the shipping operating in foreign trade under the American flag and the similar shipping of the chief foreign maritime nations. Such comparisons are difficult, not only because the data available are limited, but also because the coastwise shipping of foreign countries is not clearly distinguishable from that engaged in foreign trade. However, a relatively small amount of foreign coastwise shipping is represented when only fairly large-sized vessels are taken as the basis of comparison. In Table 9 is shown the number and gross tonnage respectively of the steamers and motor ships of 1,000 gross tons and over belonging to the leading maritime nations. The figures for the United States include only vessels actively engaged in foreign trade. Great Britain with over twenty million tons of shipping has both a larger number of vessels and a larger gross tonnage than the other five nations combined. The United States ranks second although its margin of superiority over Japan is small. If, however, only vessels of 6,000 gross tons and over are considered, the position of the United States is measurably improved. But this comparison does not take into account the matter of age and speed which are competitively of greater importance than total tonnage. The previous analysis of the character of the American merchant marine showed that a large proportion of the tonnage in foreign trade represented vessels built during or immediately after the World War and that the bulk of the general cargo vessel tonnage had a speed of less than twelve knots. The superiority of the shipping of foreign nations with respect to age and speed is indicated in Table 10. The data in that table cover only vessels of 2,000 gross tons and over built during the years 1920 to 1928, inclusive. The United States has 514,021 gross tons of shipping actively employed in foreign trade with a speed of twelve knots or over; Great Britain has 4,606,107 gross tons; and Germany 1,388,781 gross tons, not including vessels built prior to

TABLE 9: STEAMERS AND MOTORSHIPS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER OF THE LEADING MARITIME COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD ON JUNE 30, 1928

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board; original source, Lloyds Register, 1928-1929)

Size—Gross Tons	United States ¹		Great Britain		Japan		France		Italy		Germany	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
1,000-4,000.....	81	220,804	2164	4,858,018	646	1,468,148	412	922,560	338	836,103	467	975,763
4,000-6,000.....	330	1,750,658	1344	6,705,503	255	1,313,141	179	883,922	219	1,109,747	149	748,767
6,000 and over.....	248	2,003,201	1013	9,213,991	132	1,004,873	131	1,214,759	148	1,249,200	177	1,559,753
Total.....	659	3,974,663	4521	20,777,512	1033	3,786,162	722	3,021,241	705	3,195,050	793	3,284,283

¹ The figures for the United States include only vessels actively employed in foreign trade on January 1, 1929. The totals for the United States, including laid-up and coastwise vessels and shipping on the Great Lakes, were 2,561 vessels and 13,289,080 gross tons.

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TABLE 10: SPEED OF SHIPS OF 2,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER CONSTRUCTED IN THE YEARS 1920-1928, INCLUSIVE, FOR OCEAN SERVICE FOR UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN, FRANCE AND GERMANY
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Speed	United States ¹		Great Britain		Japan		France		Italy		Germany	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Under 12 knots.....	344	1,897,712	764	3,747,624	121	532,115	133	506,948	98	547,738	167	637,587
12-13 knots.....	22	135,017	354	2,109,485	46	272,467	68	439,179	38	234,120	124	851,466
14-15 knots.....	13	113,990	137	1,298,285	14	117,984	16	130,190	5	47,108	25	243,735
16-17 knots.....	18	221,089	64	900,865	1	3,620	6	43,990	2	14,916	8	141,666
18-19 knots.....	5	43,925	6	105,232	1	16,800	1	19,000	3	59,753
20 knots and over.....	7	192,240	2	10,520	2	77,722	8	199,242	4	151,914
Total.....	402	2,411,733	1332	8,353,731	185	953,506	226	1,217,029	154	1,102,877	328	2,026,368

¹ Data for the United States include only vessels actively employed in foreign trade as of April 1, 1929.

1920 or vessels of less than 2,000 gross tons. Moreover, Great Britain has seven modern vessels with a speed of twenty knots or over; Italy, eight such vessels; Germany, four; Japan and France, two. The United States, on the other hand, has only the *Leviathan* which was constructed in 1914 and, is therefore, seven years older than any of the foreign vessels represented.

In Table 11 is shown a classification of the same modern foreign vessels as coal-burning, oil-burning and motor

TABLE 11: COAL-BURNING, OIL-BURNING AND MOTOR SHIPS OF 2,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER CONSTRUCTED IN THE YEARS 1920-1928, INCLUSIVE, FOR OCEAN SERVICE FOR UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN, FRANCE AND GERMANY

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Country	Coal-Burning		Oil-Burning		Motor Ships		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Great Britain.....	653	3,291,470	448	3,484,967	231	1,577,294	1332	8,353,731
Japan.....	110	490,568	54	321,546	21	141,392	185	953,506
France.....	148	637,797	71	526,586	7	52,646	226	1,217,029
Italy.....	65	371,862	41	380,434	48	350,581	154	1,102,877
Germany.....	208	1,043,952	47	515,255	73	467,161	328	2,026,368
United States.....	13	67,897	371	2,220,225	18	123,614	402	2,411,733
Total.....	1197	5,903,543	1032	7,449,013	398	2,712,688	2627	16,065,244

¹ See footnote, Table 10.

ships. It is noteworthy that coal-burning vessels constitute a substantial proportion of the total tonnage represented and more than half of the tonnage of Japan, France and Germany. As previously noted in Table 7 the American merchant marine in both the coastwise and foreign trades is made up largely of oil-burning vessels. In so far as oil burners can be operated more cheaply than coal burners the United States has a certain advantage over other nations. But this advantage is offset by the superiority of Great Britain, Germany and Italy in the possession of motor ships. Great Britain has 231 such ships of recent construction totalling 1,577,294 gross tons.

This survey of the status of the American merchant marine has shown that, while there is at the present time a considerable amount of shipping in foreign trade under the American flag, there are several unfavorable elements in the situation. In the first place, the bulk of the American merchant fleet is comprised of slow speed cargo vessels built during the war period. In view of the activity of foreign shipyards and the addition of new vessels, particularly motor ships, to foreign fleets, it is evident that the competitive position of the American merchant marine will become difficult in the future, apart from any question of comparative operating costs, unless provision is made for the replacement of the inferior tonnage with new improved and faster vessels. In the second place, it has been shown that a substantial part of the American shipping under foreign trade is operated by the United States Shipping Board. It is evident, therefore, that one of the important aspects of the merchant marine problem concerns the question of continued government ownership. The two phases of the situation which need to be considered next relate to the activities of the Shipping Board and to the general character and extent of private American shipping operations. These topics will be treated in the two following chapters.

CHAPTER III

THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD

AS AT present constituted, the United States Shipping Board is composed of seven Commissioners appointed by the President on the following basis: two from states bordering on the Atlantic, two from states on the Pacific, one from states on the Gulf, one from states on the Great Lakes and one from the interior.¹

REGULATORY POWERS

The Board is empowered by the terms of its organic Act, as modified by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, to exercise specific regulatory powers² over privately-owned shipping operated in foreign trade as well as supervision of the sale or operation of government-owned vessels. These regulatory powers are similar in many respects to those of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Shipowners are specifically prohibited from using the deferred rebate,³ from operating "fighting ships,"⁴ from employing any retaliatory measures against shippers patronizing other lines and from making unfair or unjustly discriminatory contracts. The Shipping Board is charged with the enforcement of these prohibitions, violation of which is punishable by a fine of

¹ Originally the Board consisted of five members but was enlarged under the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

² Regulatory powers are also exercised by the Bureau of Navigation of the Department of Commerce. The dual character of governmental supervision over shipping is obviously open to criticism.

³ The deferred rebate is defined as the "return of any portion of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a consideration for the giving of all or any portion of his shipments to the same or any other carrier, or for any other purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the completion of the service for which it is paid, and is made only if, during both the period for which computed and the period of deferment, the shipper has complied with the terms of the rebate agreement or arrangement."

⁴ A "fighting ship" is a vessel used to drive another carrier out of business.

not more than \$25,000 for each offense. The Board may also determine and prescribe reasonable classifications and maximum rates and make such rules and regulations affecting shipping engaged in foreign trade as are not in conflict with existing laws. It is provided, however, that no rule shall be adopted the effect of which would be to give preference or favor to government-owned vessels over those owned by private American interests. The Shipping Board may give its approval to conference agreements, copies of which must be filed with it, such agreements when approved being exempted from the provisions of the anti-trust laws. Finally, no American vessels may be transferred to foreign registry or sold or mortgaged to any person not a citizen of the United States without the Board's consent. This, in brief, summarizes the chief regulatory powers of the Shipping Board.

SALE OF VESSELS AND SERVICES

The questions arising out of the governmental regulation of shipping through the agency of the United States Shipping Board are of secondary importance, so far as the present status of the American merchant marine is concerned, to the problems related to the sale and operation of the government-owned vessels. The Shipping Board is authorized by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 to sell the vessels in its possession to American citizens at such prices and on such terms as it may prescribe, subject to the provision that the completion of payment of the purchase price must not be deferred more than fifteen years.¹ In fixing the sale price of vessels, the Board is directed to take into consideration the prevailing market price and the other facts and conditions "that would influence a prudent solvent business man in the sale of similar vessels or property which he is not forced to sell." Sales may be made to aliens, only if no American purchasers can be found and then only by an affirmative vote of not less than five members of the Shipping Board. With respect to the operation

¹ The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 subsequently provided that no sale should be consummated except upon the affirmative vote of five commissioners.

of government-owned ships, the Board is directed to investigate and determine on what routes steamship lines should be established for the development of foreign trade and the maintenance of adequate postal service and to operate vessels on those routes until purchasers, who are American citizens and who will agree to continue the service, are found. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also provided that the services already established at the time of its enactment should be operated until, in the opinion of the Board, their maintenance was unbusinesslike and against the public interests. The administrative duties arising out of the operation of the government-owned vessels have been largely in the hands of a subsidiary agency, the Merchant Fleet Corporation, formerly called the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The Shipping Board has, however, always retained control over the determination of questions of policy.¹

The policy of the Shipping Board in relation to the sale of the government-owned vessels has been the subject of considerable criticism.² The first sales of steel vessels were made in 1919 at prices ranging from \$210 to \$225 a deadweight ton. These were from \$10 to \$25 a ton higher than the average cost to the government and between \$30 and \$50 a ton higher than the current reproduction costs in American shipyards.³ Although the terms of sale were radically changed at various times during 1920, the Board showed no disposition to make the drastic price reductions which were required to bring about the speedy sale of the government-owned ships. Meanwhile, the state of depression which had definitely settled over the shipping industry put a stop to further sales and at the same time rendered difficult the execution of sales already made.⁴

¹ The proper division of responsibility between the Shipping Board and the Merchant Fleet Corporation has been the subject of considerable discussion and their complete separation has been recommended. U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings Before the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries," Washington, D. C., 1928, Part 2, p. 842. See, also, Calvin and Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-331.

² See, for example, E. S. Gregg, "The Failure of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920," *American Economic Review*, December, 1921, Vol. XI, p. 601.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 602.

⁴ It was stated in 1922 that of the 1,300,000 deadweight tons sold at prices averaging \$177 per ton since the war, only 70,000 tons had been paid for, while in

Provisions of the Merchant Marine Act

Partly to remedy this situation and partly to provide guidance for the future conduct of the Shipping Board operations, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was enacted. Unfortunately this legislation was not sufficiently explicit in dealing with the issue of government ownership. The Board was directed to sell its war tonnage as soon as practicable, consistent with good business methods and the objects and purposes of the Act. The combined effect of the provisions dealing with the sale of the government shipping was the prevention of any action on the part of the Shipping Board in the direction of immediate disposal at the best price obtainable under existing market conditions. Although the object was declared to be the establishment of an American merchant marine "ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States," the Act did not provide for the abandonment of government ownership and operation within any specified period of time. In fact, the provision in the Shipping Act of 1916 directing the Board to sell its ships within five years after the end of the war was omitted in the Act of 1920.

The policy of the Shipping Board since the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 has been based upon the assumption that the legislation provided for a continuance of government ownership and operation until such time, not yet in sight, as private interests might be in a position successfully to maintain the shipping facilities and services now provided by the government-owned fleet. In carrying out this policy, sales of ships and ship lines have in some instances been conditioned upon the maintenance by the purchasers of specified service for a period of five years. Since 1921, however, the Shipping Board has shown a stronger disposition to get rid of its ships than during the earlier period. The new Board created under the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 instituted

the case of 309,000 tons the purchase was not completed and the ships were again in the possession of the Shipping Board. See testimony of Mr. Albert D. Lasker, U. S., 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "To Amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1920," Joint Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, and Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, on S. 3217 and H. R. 10644, Washington, D. C., 1922, Vol. 1, p. 13.

an examination into the conditions surrounding the existing market for ships, and reached the conclusion that the prices then asked, namely, \$160 to \$185 a deadweight ton, were too high and that a price of \$30 would be fair for the best steel cargo tonnage owned by the Board.¹ In 1923 a survey of the entire fleet was made and a basic sales price assigned to each vessel.² Various modifications in the terms of sale have subsequently been made, as, for example, the acceptance of a ten per cent initial cash payment from purchasers of laid-up vessels.³ The prices accepted by the Board for vessels sold under an agreement on the part of the purchaser to maintain a specified foreign trade service have been considerably below the prices obtained for vessels sold unconditionally. The Shipping Board in 1928 approved the sale of the American Palmetto Line, comprising nine vessels, for \$211,455, or approximately \$3 per deadweight ton.⁴

During the seven-year period, 1921 to June 30, 1928, the Shipping Board sold approximately one-half of the tonnage acquired for a total of over ninety million dollars. This included fifteen established ship-line services disposed of on the basis of guaranteed operation for a fixed number of years.⁵ Several sales have been made since June 30, 1928, the most noteworthy being that of the United States and American Merchant Lines to P. W. Chapman and Company for \$16,300,000.

During the fiscal years ended June 30, 1924 to 1928, 106 vessels aggregating 754,376 gross tons were sold for restricted operation in designated trade routes. During the same period 563,697 gross tons of shipping were sold for operation without restriction, and 291,286 gross tons were sold under agreements providing only for specified improvements to be made by the purchasers. That a

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1922, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

² *Ibid.*, 1924, p. 94.

³ *Ibid.*, 1927, p. 70.

⁴ *Journal of Commerce*, Sept. 26, 1928, p. 1.

⁵ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1928, p. 5. The prices received for vessels purchased for operation in specified services ranged from \$6 to \$18.10 per deadweight ton. See testimony of Mr. H. B. Walker, 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 380.

large proportion of the vessels sold by the Board have gone into the coasting trade is shown in Table 12.

In connection with the matter of ship sales it should also be noted that not all of the vessels sold have been fully paid for. As of June 30, 1928, the balance sheet of the Shipping Board showed an item of \$37,031,814.56 representing accounts and notes receivable for ship sales.¹ In the case of a number of the earlier sales the Board was forced to resume ownership of vessels because of the inability of the purchasers to carry out their contracts.

TABLE 12: EMPLOYMENT OF VESSELS SOLD BY UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD, JANUARY 1, 1929

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Employment	Number	Gross Tons
Nearby foreign.....	53	252,788
Overseas foreign.....	157	1,011,502
Coastwise.....	301	1,426,171
Total.....	511	2,690,461
Sold for scrapping.....	489 ²	2,024,710 ²

¹ Forty-three of this number not delivered.

² Deadweight tons.

LAIID-UP FLEET

The entire fleet of the United Shipping Board, as of January 19, 1929, comprised 630 vessels distributed as follows:²

270 vessels of 2,442,420 deadweight tons in service, on spot or being converted to diesel;

147 vessels of 1,223,992 deadweight tons in first reserve and in such shape that an average expenditure of \$50,000 per vessel would make them active;

118 vessels of 862,900 deadweight tons in second reserve and requiring a large expenditure of money to make them fit for service;

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1928, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

² Statement of Commissioner S. S. Sandberg at the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine, held in Washington, D. C., January 23 and 24, 1929. See, "Proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine," issued by the U. S. Shipping Board, Washington, D. C., 1929, p. 150.

95 surplus vessels of 745,005 deadweight tons in such shape that under normal conditions they should not be considered in any fair survey of the fleet.

Of the total shipping tonnage owned by the Shipping Board about forty-two per cent was in active service on January 1, 1929.¹ Although, as indicated in the above classification, some of the 447 vessels not in service were in fact ready for use, this laid-up fleet as a whole represents surplus tonnage the disposal of which is one of the major problems of the

TABLE 13: SIZE AND SPEED OF VESSELS IN UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD LAID-UP FLEET AS OF JANUARY 1, 1929

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Size—Gross Tons	Number	Gross Tons
20,000 and over.....	2	37,732
15,000—19,999.....
10,000—14,999.....	5	41,173
8,000— 9,999.....	92	574,679
6,000— 7,999.....	158	896,998
5,000— 5,999.....	51	235,816
4,000— 4,999.....	139	407,277
2,000— 3,999.....
1,000— 1,999.....
Total.....	447	2,193,675
Speed		
20 knots and over.....	2	37,732
12 to 19 knots.....
Under 10 knots.....	445	2,155,943
Total.....	447	2,193,675

Board. The distribution of this idle tonnage by size and speed is shown in Table 13. The average age of the ships in the laid-up fleet is nearly ten years. With two exceptions the speed of these vessels is less than twelve knots.² The average annual expenditure for the care and maintenance of these inactive vessels during the past five years has been approximately three and one-half million dollars.³ The foreign trade field is unlikely to provide under the most favorable circumstances a future market for all of the Board's un-

¹ See Table 1, p. 19 of this volume.

² The exceptions are the *Monticello* and *Mount Vernon*.

³ See Table 16, p. 44 of this volume.

used and aging ships. Moreover, the very existence of this surplus tonnage acts as a check upon the construction of the speedier and more modern vessels which are needed to improve the American Merchant Marine. Likewise the fact that persons without experience in the shipping field may purchase these vessels at low cost and operate them in competition with established services contributes to retard the development of those services. These considerations should be recognized in dealing with the problem of disposing of this idle fleet.

SERVICES MAINTAINED

The failure of the United States Shipping Board to dispose of the entire government-owned fleet has resulted in

TABLE 14: CARGO AND PASSENGER SERVICES MAINTAINED BY THE MERCHANT FLEET CORPORATION ON JUNE 30, 1928
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Service	Number of Services	Number of Vessels
European trades	27	146
Mediterranean trades	5	16
South American trades	7	30
Far East trades	8	58
Total	47	250

the continued operation, under the control of the Merchant Fleet Corporation, of those shipping services considered essential to the development of American foreign trade and to the maintenance of an efficient American merchant marine. More than two hundred passenger and cargo services, employing 1,023 vessels, were instituted immediately after the World War.¹ The subsequent depression of the shipping industry made contraction of operations necessary, and by the middle of 1923, the number of services had been reduced to seventy-eight, employing 356 vessels.² Since that date, further reductions have been made as a result of consolidation of services, sale or abandonment. The distribution of the active government-owned shipping

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1920, p. 140. ² *Ibid.*, 1923, p. 182.

at the close of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928 is shown in Table 14.¹

Except in the case of the United States Lines, which have been operated directly by the Merchant Fleet Corporation, the actual management of the services provided by the government-owned fleet is in the hands of private operators. The names of those operators and the amount of government-owned shipping operated by each company are shown in Table 15. The terms of the contracts under which such private operation has been conducted have been changed from time to time, but the underlying policy has always

TABLE 15: OPERATORS OF UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD VESSELS, WITH THE NUMBER AND GROSS TONNAGE OF THE VESSELS OPERATED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1928

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Name of Operator	Number	Gross Tons
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.....	11	61,421
Colombian S. S. Co.....	4	19,281
Black Diamond S. S. Corp.....	16	98,336
Roosevelt S. S. Co.....	29	185,269
J. H. Winchester and Co.....	10	61,982
Tampa Inter Ocean S. S. Co.....	23	149,759
C. H. Sprague and Sons.....	13	71,306
Dixie S. S. Co.....	25	142,325
Mississippi Shipping Co.....	18	99,067
Waterman S. S. Corp.....	14	82,607
Consolidated Navigation Co.....	19	100,477
Sykes Bros. Ripley S. S. Co.....	38	225,977
Texas Oceanic S. S. Co.....	17	105,707
United States Line.....	6	150,721
Rogers and Webb.....	8	45,114
Total.....	251	1,599,349

been to make the operator responsible for the equipment and management of the vessel and to allow him a percentage of the receipts as a reward for his work.² Since the operator under this policy assumes no responsibility for any losses incurred, the incentive to efficient management is not strong. Although in recent years the Merchant Fleet Corporation, by close supervision of the activities of its operating agents, appears to have increased operating efficiency, the basic weakness of the present contractual

¹ *Ibid.*, 1928, p. 11

² In a few cases, ships have been operated under bareboat charter, which is in effect a rental procedure.

arrangements is difficult to overcome.¹ Unfortunately no other policy, except that of direct government operation, seems practicable under existing circumstances. The present low level of ocean freight rates, as well as the high cost of ship operation under the American flag, renders the assumption of the risks of ship operation unattractive to private operators. Moreover, at least some of the services maintained by the Shipping Board offer little hope of ever becoming profitable.

DEFICITS

The operating activities of the Merchant Fleet Corporation have produced an annual deficit of very considerable amount. The losses resulting from ship operation, plus the cost of maintaining the inactive vessels, during the fiscal years from 1924 to 1928 are indicated in Table 16. It should be noted that these losses do not include any allowance for depreciation and interest.² Although the yearly deficit has been materially reduced since the high point in 1924, the future offers little hope of transforming government operation into a profitable business transaction. Tanker operation alone has been uniformly profitable. For the fiscal year 1927, the United States Line, operated directly by the Merchant Fleet Corporation, showed a profit, but in the following year that line was again operated at a loss. The operation of freighters has been responsible for a large part of the losses incurred.

In support of the continued operation of the government-owned fleet on the present basis until such time as private interests are willing to assume responsibility of the maintenance of the services now provided, it is contended that the losses incurred have been more than offset by the benefits to American importers and exporters resulting from low freight rates and adequate shipping facilities. In particular, two instances of special service are cited to

¹ These contracts were criticized in both the majority and minority reports of the Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations, Policies and Affairs of the United States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation, 69th Congress, 1st Session, House Report, No. 2, Washington, D. C., 1925, pp. 21, 51. It was recently reported that a new operating agreement was being formulated by the Board, under which operators would be required to assume a part of the losses incurred. *Journal of Commerce*, October 31, 1928, p. 1.

² Provision for insurance is included as an operating cost.

TABLE 16: PROFIT AND LOSS OF THE UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD MERCHANT FLEET CORPORATION, EXCLUDING LIQUIDATION, FISCAL YEARS 1924-1928, INCLUSIVE

(Source: Annual Reports of the U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Service	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Freighters.....	\$33,829,685.05	\$24,433,853.13	\$15,520,937.01	\$13,914,071.87	\$14,770,140.48
Passenger and cargo (excluding United States Lines), passenger.....	1,075,493.75	1,798,696.44	36,592.96	67,376.71	82,676.88
United States Lines, passenger.....	3,463,484.42	2,315,862.95	1,496,795.10	371,085.64	465,308.58
Tankers.....	1,012,098.29	685,901.72	385,367.15	782,102.57	164,906.74
Total ocean operations.....	\$37,356,564.93	\$27,862,510.80	\$16,668,957.92	\$12,828,260.37	\$15,153,219.20
Tugs.....	105,485.46	16,894.67	7,150.43	27,093.29	23,078.86
Chartered vessels.....	40,850.89	20,389.06	171.28	27,500.07	29,983.91
Total vessel operations.....	\$37,421,199.50	\$27,859,016.11	\$16,661,978.77	\$12,773,667.01	\$15,100,156.45
Expense of inactive vessels.....	4,467,569.75	2,708,373.62	3,843,781.23	4,438,942.95	2,072,860.68
Miscellaneous income, net.....	692,374.66	503,601.49	899,151.25	1,286,198.08	893,648.52
Loss.....	\$41,196,394.59	\$30,063,788.24	\$19,606,608.75	\$15,926,411.88	\$16,279,368.57

Amounts in Italics represent losses.

show the value of the Shipping Board's operations. In 1924, the Board supplied additional tonnage out of its reserve fleet to meet the demands of the grain movement out of the port of Galveston, Texas, with the alleged result of a saving to the farmers in the form of lower freight rates and higher prices for their grain.¹ During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1927, a similar emergency situation occurred as a result of the British coal strike which caused a large number of foreign ships to be drawn into the coal trade, thereby giving rise to a temporary shortage of shipping needed for transportation of the cotton and grain crops. Nearly a hundred of the laid-up vessels were put into operation at an expense of approximately two and one-half million dollars. In its annual report the Shipping Board stated that the benefit to American grain and cotton producers resulting from this action by the Merchant Fleet Corporation had been estimated to have amounted to several hundred million dollars.²

In addition to these special instances, it is contended that the operation of the government fleet has been beneficial because it has been instrumental in lowering ocean freight rates, as well as in developing new foreign trade routes. To give the United States Shipping Board entire credit for the drop in ocean freight rates after the war would be to ignore the numerous other factors which contributed to that result. The existence of the government-owned shipping tonnage undoubtedly had a direct influence upon ocean transportation rates, but that influence did not arise solely from the operating activities of the Board. Moreover, the effect of the depressed condition of the shipping industry upon American shipbuilding and ship operation raises the question whether this excessive lowering of freight rates was wholly beneficial to American industry.

INTEREST IN PORT DEVELOPMENT

The United States Shipping Board has without doubt been influential in bringing about the development of

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1925, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, 1927, p. 71.

many of the smaller ports by establishing regular services from those ports. Among the lines operating vessels out of the less important ports of the South Atlantic and Gulf districts are the Mobile Oceanic Line and the American Palmetto Line. The former maintains a cargo service from Mobile, Pensacola and Gulfport to England and the Havre-Hamburg range. The latter, which was sold by the Shipping Board in 1928, operates a similar service out of the ports on the South Atlantic between Wilmington, North Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida, to the United Kingdom and Continental Europe. The smaller Gulf and Atlantic ports are also served by other lines of government-owned vessels operating primarily through the larger ports, particularly New Orleans.¹ It is probable that the Shipping Board lines handle the greater part of the cargo tonnage carried by American vessels passing through the smaller ports.

While the operation of government-owned vessels from the less important ports of this country contributes to port development, the question remains whether the amount of available cargo is sufficient to justify all of the services now maintained by the Shipping Board. There seems to be a certain amount of unnecessary duplication of services in some instances. For example, the Texas U. K. Line, the Dixie U. K. Line and the Mobile Oceanic Line all run to English ports from Galveston and Houston, from New Orleans and from Mobile, Pensacola and Gulfport, respectively. Similarly, Havre, Ghent and Antwerp are reached by three lines from corresponding groups of Gulf ports. Some light might be thrown on the question of whether or not this form of duplication of service is justified if information were available showing the comparative deficits of the services operated under the direction of the Shipping Board. Unfortunately these data have not yet been made public.² It cannot be determined, there-

¹ For a description of the various services, see, U. S. Shipping Board, "Trade Routes and Shipping Services," Washington, D. C., 1928.

² It appears that this information is contained in the original copy of a report by H. N. Lawrie, "The American Merchant Marine," as submitted to the proper congressional committees, but is omitted in the mimeographed copies released by the Shipping Board on March 4, 1928.

fore, whether the operation of government-owned vessels out of minor ports is in accord with sound business policy. The existing situation gives rise to the impression that political influences have been in part responsible for the continued operation of at least some of the Board's services.

In concluding this discussion of operations of the United States Shipping Board, mention should be made of certain supplementary activities particularly those relating to marine insurance. The Shipping Board, under the authorization of the Act of 1920, created an insurance fund which it has used to insure the interest of the Government in vessels owned or sold. Under section 501 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, it is provided that this fund may also be used to cover any interest of the Government in vessels operating under mail contracts or built under the provisions of the construction loan fund. This legislation would seem to establish the Government permanently in the business of marine insurance. In the absence of very definite proof that private American companies in that field are unable to provide the facilities required, this form of governmental competition with private enterprise is not justified.

It may be anticipated that the United Shipping Board will continue to function as an administrative and regulatory agency. The maintenance of the Board's research bureau, which has been the source of new and valuable information, is also desirable. But the application of sound principles of government to the American merchant marine problem should bring about the early withdrawal of the Shipping Board from the business of marine insurance as well as of ship operation.

CHAPTER IV

PRIVATE AMERICAN SHIPPING INTERESTS

PPRIVATE American concerns operating ocean-going vessels in foreign trade¹ may be classified in two groups. The first group comprises the so-called industrial carriers, which are employed primarily in the carriage of their own products or raw materials. The second group consists of the common carriers, which are operating general passenger and cargo services. Each of these groups has its own peculiar problems.

INDUSTRIAL CARRIERS

The first group of private American ship operators, the industrial carriers, constitute an important part of privately-owned American shipping. In fact nearly one-half of the total privately-owned tonnage under the American flag is represented by ships owned and operated by industrial or importing concerns and used chiefly for the transportation of the products or property of their owners. Arguments have been advanced to support the grant of governmental assistance to industrial carriers, despite the fact that their operation is primarily for private purposes, on the ground that this class of shipping would be valuable in times of emergency and should not be discriminated against because of the character of its ownership. In any case, these industrial carriers must be considered as an integral part of the American merchant marine, and the commodities transported by them a part of the foreign commerce of the United States. This development in the shipping field is merely a duplication of the integrating process which has taken place in other lines of industry. Moreover, these industrial carriers also operate to some extent as common carriers. For example, in 1926 the fleet of the United

¹ A list of private American shipowners and the number of vessels and gross tonnage owned by each are given in Appendix B of this volume.

Fruit Company, in addition to bananas, carried 66,848 passengers, 993,683 tons of freight and 196,480 bags of mail.¹

The number and gross tonnage of the vessels operated as industrial carriers in the various trades during the year 1928 is shown in Table 17. In the combined nearby and overseas foreign trades, there was a total of 246 vessels of 1,458,503 gross tons. Approximately one-half of that tonnage represented tankers operated in the nearby foreign trade. Fifty-nine vessels of 328,718 gross tons purchased from the United States Shipping Board are included among the industrial carriers in foreign trade. Among the more

TABLE 17: AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL CARRIERS OPERATED IN CALENDAR YEAR 1928
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Service	Total		Foreign Trade				Intercoastal		Coastwise	
			Overseas		Nearby					
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Tankers.....	381	2,371,917	41	266,611	119	765,817	138	922,706	83	416,783
General cargo.....	96	447,777	40	249,377	46	176,698	10	21,702
Total.....	477	2,819,694	81	515,988	165	942,515	138	922,706	93	438,485

important owners of industrial carriers engaged in foreign trade are the United States Steel Products Company, a subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation, which operates thirty-seven vessels of 194,782 gross tons under the American flag, the United Fruit Company with twenty-three vessels of 98,000 gross tons and the Pan American Petroleum and Transportation Company with twenty-one vessels of 129,353 gross tons. In some instances vessels under foreign flags are also operated, either directly or through subsidiaries, by American industrial concerns.

COMMON CARRIERS

The second group of private American ship owners, those operating vessels as common carriers in foreign trade,

¹"Moody's Manual of Investments, Industrial Securities," 1927, p. 152.

TABLE 18: LINES FORMERLY OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD, NOW PRIVATELY OWNED AND OPERATED, AS OF APRIL 1, 1929

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Line	Ships Operated		Route
	Number	Gross Tons	
American Australia Orient (now Oceanic and Oriental Navigation Co.)	21	128,385	San Francisco and Los Angeles to Australia, Japan, China and Philippines
American Export	21 ¹	108,960	New York to Mediterranean ports
American Merchant	5	37,150	New York to London
American Oriental Mail (now Tacoma Oriental S.S. Co.)	7	53,182	United States Pacific Coast ports to Far East (freight service)
American Palmetto	9	45,720	South Atlantic ports to United Kingdom, Havre-Hamburg range
American Scantic	9 ²	47,126	United States North Atlantic ports to Baltic ports
American South African	5	28,272	United States North Atlantic ports to South and East Africa
American West African	11 ³	60,131	United States North Atlantic and Gulf ports to West Africa
American Oriental Mail (now American Mail Line)	5	70,730	Tacoma and Seattle to Far East (passenger service)
California Orient	4 ⁴	49,312	San Francisco and Los Angeles to Far East (passenger service)
American Antilles (now Ocean Dominion S.S. Corp.)	1	2,606	New York and Hampton Roads to Lesser Antilles
Dollar-Around the World	8 ⁴	95,119	Around the World
North Pacific (Grace Lines)	6	32,583	Pacific Coast ports to West Coast of South America
Oregon Oriental (now States S.S. Co.)	11	61,819	Columbia River ports to Far East
Pacific Argentine Brazil	7	39,483	United States Pacific Coast ports to East Coast of South America
Pan American (owned Munson S.S. Co.)	7	67,320	New York to East Coast South America
Gulf Brazil River Plate	12	63,451	Gulf ports to Trinidad and East Coast of South America
United States Lines	6	150,721	New York to Cobh, Plymouth, Southampton, Cherbourg and Bremen
Colombian S.S. Co.	5	12,948	New York to West Indies and Colombia

¹ Total of twenty-two vessels purchased; one vessel of 5,673 gross tons lost.

² Total of eight vessels purchased; one vessel of 4,975 gross tons lost. Includes two vessels of 11,682 gross tons, bareboat charter from U. S. Shipping Board.

³ Includes one vessel of 5,769 gross tons, bareboat charter from U. S. Shipping Board.

⁴ One vessel now operated by Dollar-Around the World Line, transferred from California Orient Line.

includes both the older established companies and several newcomers in the shipping field, the latter being chiefly purchasers of services formerly maintained by the United States Shipping Board. Private American steamship lines which have been in operation for a considerable period of years are practically limited to the nearby trades. Some of these established concerns also operate vessels in the coastwise trade. In some instances vessels purchased from the Shipping Board have been added to these lines.

In the overseas trades, the private American lines are almost without exception services originally inaugurated by the Shipping Board. A list of these services is shown in Table 18, in which is also indicated the number and tonnage of the vessels operated in each service. Many of the purchasers of these services have had considerable shipping experience; a few are relatively inexperienced.

The total tonnage of the privately-owned American vessels operated as common carriers in foreign trade during the year 1928 amounted to 1,544,536 gross tons, of which 166 vessels of 1,082,284 gross tons were engaged in overseas trade and 109 vessels of 462,252 gross tons were in nearby trades. Of these 275 vessels in foreign trade, 186, representing 1,064,763 gross tons, were formerly owned by the United States Shipping Board.

PURCHASERS OF SHIPPING BOARD SERVICES

The position of purchasers of Shipping Board vessels, particularly the operators of former Shipping Board services, is in some respects superior to that of other American ship operators. The low initial cost of the ships operated tends to reduce the fixed charges of interest, depreciation and insurance. In the case of the Export Steamship Corporation, the purchaser of the service between North Atlantic ports and the Mediterranean and Black Sea, it is estimated that the fixed charges on one of its twenty-one vessels, which were purchased from the Shipping Board for \$7.50 per deadweight ton, amount to only \$14,968 for the first year. But, if any of these ships were replaced by a new American-built vessel, the fixed charges on that vessel

would be \$201,096 for the first year, or an increase of \$197,128. This increase would be even greater if the newly constructed vessel was a motor ship.¹ The other purchasers of Shipping Board ships are in a similar situation; that is, their present fixed charges are low but will remain low only during the lifetime of those ships which, being now approximately ten years old, will need to be replaced during the next decade.

To what extent private ownership has produced profits out of services, which under the Board's ownership and operation showed a continuous record of losses, is not a matter of public record except in the case of the Export Steamship Corporation. If the financial position of that company be assumed to represent the general situation with respect to the purchasers of Shipping Board services, it would seem improbable that those services could be indefinitely maintained in the absence of governmental aid unless a substantial increase in the general level of ocean freight rates should take place in the near future. On nine voyages in 1925, the losses of the Export Steamship Corporation were \$37,836.53; on seventy-four voyages in 1926, they were \$244,585.09.² Although these losses are materially below those sustained prior to the purchase of this line from the Shipping Board, they indicate that, under existing conditions in the shipping field, the successful operation of ships in the less profitable trade routes can not be assured merely by the sale of government-owned vessels at nominal prices.

AMERICAN OWNERSHIP OF FOREIGN VESSELS

One other aspect of the situation with respect to private American shipping interests requires consideration. This relates to the American ownership and operation of vessels under foreign flags. From the viewpoint of national pride, it is apparent that the maritime prestige of this country is materially reduced through the unwillingness of American

¹ U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 380.

² *Ibid.*, p. 738.

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companies to operate all of their vessels under the American flag. Likewise these American-owned, foreign-flag ships are not available for purposes of national defense. But, in so far as the foreign trade interests of the United States are concerned, it may be assumed, at least in the case of foreign vessels operated as industrial carriers by American companies, that the American ownership affords some

TABLE 19: APPROXIMATE GROSS TONNAGE OF VESSELS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER OWNED AND OPERATED BY AMERICAN SHIPPING INTERESTS, PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL, 1928
(Laid-up tonnage excluded)

Ownership	Coastwise or Inter-Coastal Gross Tons	Overseas Foreign Gross Tons	Nearby Foreign Gross Tons	Total Gross Tons
Private ownership				
Common carriers.....	1,129,128 ¹	1,129,230	462,252	2,720,610
Industrial carriers.....	1,361,191	515,988	942,515	2,819,694
U. S. Shipping Board ²				
Private operation.....	..	1,459,966	6,295	1,466,261
Government operation.....	..	150,711	..	150,711
Panama railroad ³				
Government operation.....	..	5,201	19,244	24,445
Private ownership				
Under foreign flags ⁴	2,326,244		2,326,244

¹ This figure was obtained by deducting the tonnage of industrial carriers operated in the coastwise trade during the calendar year 1928 from the total active tonnage in that trade as of January 1, 1929.

² The data covering the vessels of the United States Shipping Board and the Panama Railroad are as of January 1, 1929. All other figures, except as noted in footnote 1, are for the calendar year 1928.

³ The information regarding American-owned foreign flag ships was obtained from the U. S. Shipping Board. Of the 460 vessels represented in the tonnage figure, 268 vessels of 1,678,720 gross tons were operated between United States and foreign ports, and 192 vessels of 647,524 gross tons were in service in or between foreign countries.

measure of protection. In 1928 there were 460 American-owned vessels under foreign flags with a total tonnage of 2,326,244 gross tons. This tonnage was almost equal to that of the American vessels owned and operated in foreign trade by private interests. It is evident, therefore, that on the basis of capital investment in ocean shipping, the position of the United States as a maritime nation is stronger than figures showing the tonnage of American vessels

would seem to indicate. Likewise, percentage figures representing the proportion of the ocean-borne foreign commerce of this country carried respectively in American and foreign ships tend to exaggerate the actual degree of dependence of American exporters and importers upon foreign shipping interests. These facts must be borne in mind in attempting to analyze the American merchant marine problem.

By way of summary, Table 19 gives an approximate and general idea of the relative importance of the various groups that constitute American shipping interests.

CHAPTER V

THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE IN RELATION TO FOREIGN TRADE

IN THE preceding chapters, the amount, character and ownership of the existing shipping facilities under the American flag have been described. It is now necessary to examine the situation with respect to American foreign trade, particularly that part which is ocean-borne, in order to determine the extent to which those facilities are either inadequate or unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of their influence upon the development of American trade interests. This survey of the situation will include, first, a statement of the various grounds upon which it is argued that an American merchant marine is necessary for the protection and expansion of foreign commerce, and, secondly, an analysis of the character of that commerce and of the extent to which American exports and imports are now being carried in American ships.

In the chapter dealing with the basic considerations in merchant marine policy, the fundamental relationships between trade and shipping were noted. That discussion, however, did not emphasize the individual interests of the United States in the maintenance of a merchant marine. It is, therefore, desirable to state as briefly as possible the reasons why shipping facilities under the American flag are considered essential to the welfare of American foreign trade.

VALUE OF A MERCHANT MARINE TO FOREIGN TRADE

The volume of American foreign commerce, of which at least seventy-five per cent is ocean-borne, is so large and its character so diversified that the maintenance of adequate and uninterrupted shipping services to all parts of the world is essential. Such services can be assured only through

the maintenance of steamship lines owned by American interests and operated as common carriers. Dependence upon foreign shipping, it is argued, is objectionable for various reasons. In the first place, the United States is an industrial rival of the leading maritime countries of the world, competing in world markets both in the sale of manufactured exports and in the purchase of raw materials. This fact alone renders the over-dependence of American exporters and importers upon foreign shipping inadvisable. Foreign ship operators can not be expected to have an interest in the protection and development of American commercial relationships abroad beyond that required to enable their vessels to secure full cargoes.

Where the lack of shipping facilities under the American flag makes necessary the transportation of American exports and imports in foreign ships, there is present the threat of discriminatory treatment, the possibility that valuable trade information regarding shipments may be conveyed to foreign competitors and the danger that conditions or circumstances may arise in foreign countries tending to hamper that trade. In particular, such dependence on foreign shipping exposes American commerce at all times to the serious consequences which naturally follow the withdrawal of foreign ships as a result of conditions in their home ports. The British coal strike, for example, gave rise to a shortage in the shipping required for the carriage of American exports and imports because a large number of British vessels were diverted to the coal trade. These dangers would be minimized by the development and maintenance of an adequate American merchant marine.

A merchant marine under the American flag is also considered necessary to provide security against unreasonable freight rates. Whenever special conditions give rise to a shortage of shipping facilities, freight rates soar. The maintenance of an adequate amount of American-owned and operated shipping in foreign trade would lessen the influence upon the level of freight rates of any shortage in shipping brought about by external circumstances. But there is also need for protection against the unreasonable

rate increases which may occur at any time as a result of agreements between competing foreign steamship lines. The complete dependence of American exporters and importers upon steamship lines under foreign ownership would be unfortunate, particularly since no effective control could be exercised by the Government over the rate conferences of those foreign lines. The operation of a substantial American merchant fleet is required to provide a safeguard against the possible exactions of foreign monopolies in the shipping field.

Finally, a merchant marine is needed to assist in the development of new markets for American exports. In many industrial fields, the domestic market has reached, or is reaching, a point where the demand is below productive capacity, a condition which greatly increases the need for finding new and wider markets abroad to take care of the exportable surplus. Direct shipping connections between the United States and South America, Africa, Australia and the Orient are essential to the development of new markets in those regions, and such connections can be satisfactorily assured only by the maintenance of line services under the American flag. A merchant marine is in itself a form of national advertising which may be expected to contribute materially to the development of any nation's foreign commerce. But in addition, shipping lines are instrumentalities through which commercial relations can be established and new lines of trade opened up. The interest of foreign ship operators in securing full cargoes is regarded as an unsatisfactory substitute for the services and patriotic efforts of American shipowners in promoting the expansion of American foreign trade.

Bearing in mind these various arguments in regard to the value of a merchant marine from the viewpoint of American foreign trade, the position of the existing shipping under the American flag in relation to the carriage of American exports and imports may now be examined. The situation with respect to the participation of American vessels in the passenger traffic must also be considered.

In so far as the need for maintaining an American merchant marine is concerned, only ocean-borne commerce is

involved. While the water-borne commerce between the United States and Canada is important in other respects, it does not affect the merchant marine problem, since the activities of vessels on the Great Lakes are restricted and since the various factors which in other fields tend to impose a competitive handicap upon the operation of ships under the American flag are largely inoperative in the case of Great Lakes shipping. The data required to present an accurate picture of the past as well as the present situation should, therefore, be based entirely upon ocean-borne commerce. It is not, however, always possible to separate foreign commerce over the Great Lakes from that which is ocean-borne. This is particularly true with respect to the statistical data based upon the value of American exports and imports which are the only data available for the years preceding 1921, at which date the United States Shipping Board started the compilation of extensive information regarding the amount and distribution of the cargo tonnage of American water-borne foreign trade.

PERCENTAGE OF CARGO CARRIED IN AMERICAN VESSELS

At the beginning of the present century, American vessels were carrying only a small percentage of the total value of American water-borne exports and imports as shown in Table 20. The average for the period from 1900 to 1914 was only 9.8%. If allowance is made for the inclusion of Great Lakes commerce, in which the participation of American vessels has always been considerable, it is probable that the share of American ships in the ocean-borne trade was not more than eight per cent. The greater part of this eight per cent was comprised of trade between the United States and nearby foreign regions, particularly the West Indies. The amount of overseas commerce carried in American vessels was practically negligible.

This situation was changed following the commencement of the World War, first, by the transfer of foreign vessels to American registry and, secondly, by the construction of vessels and inauguration of services under the direction of the United States Shipping Board. In 1920 American

ships carried 42.7% of the total water-borne trade based upon value, a figure which would probably be reduced to approximately 40% if commerce on the Great Lakes were excluded. Since that date, however, there has been a downward trend as a result of the expansion and improvement of foreign shipping, as compared with the stationary or declining status of the American merchant marine which has previously been described. The situation in recent years can be outlined more sharply by an examination of the data regarding the distribution of cargo tonnage which have been collected by the United States Shipping Board. This is shown in Table 21.

TABLE 20: PER CENT OF THE VALUE OF THE WATER-BORNE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES CARRIED IN AMERICAN VESSELS, 1870-1928, INCLUSIVE¹
(Source: "Merchant Marine Statistics, 1928")

Year	Per Cent	Year	Per Cent	Year	Per Cent
1860	66.5	1915	14.3	1922	34.7
1870	35.6	1916	16.3	1923	33.2
1880	17.4	1917	18.6	1924	36.3
1890	12.9	1918	21.9	1925	34.1
1900	9.3	1919	27.8	1926	32.2
1905	12.1	1920	42.7	1927	34.1
1910	8.7	1921	39.8	1928	33.6

¹ Includes that on the Great Lakes. Data are for fiscal years ended June 30.

A comparison of the percentage figures based on tonnage in Table 21 covering the total water-borne commerce of the United States with the corresponding figures based on value in Table 20 shows that the former, except in the case of the year 1926, are considerably higher. In 1927, for example, American vessels carried 41% of the water-borne foreign cargo tonnage but only 34.1% of the value of water-borne cargoes.¹ This indicates that foreign ships are obtaining a larger share of cargoes comprising com-

¹ This direct comparison is somewhat inaccurate, since the value percentages cover fiscal years while the tonnage percentages cover calendar years. The discrepancy is, however, not important. The percentage of value for the calendar year 1927 was 34.16. See, U. S. Department of Commerce, *Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce*, December, 1927, Part II, p. 80. The percentages for fiscal years have been presented in Table 20 because the figures for calendar years are not obtainable for the entire period from 1860 to 1927.

modities of high value in relation to their tonnage, a fact which emphasizes the present superiority of foreign shipping in the matter of speed. The close relationship between the value and tonnage percentages, respectively, in 1926 may be ascribed to the large amount of coal exports carried in British vessels on account of the British coal strike which correspondingly reduced the capacity of those vessels to carry cargoes of higher value in proportion to their bulk. The improvement of the American merchant marine by the addition of new and relatively speedy vessels would place it in a position of competitive equality and,

TABLE 21: PER CENT OF CARGO TONNAGE OF WATER-BORNE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES CARRIED IN AMERICAN VESSELS, 1921-1928, INCLUSIVE
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Cargo	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928 ^a
Ocean-borne								
Dry cargoes								
Overseas	31	30	28	29	26	21	31	30
Nearby foreign ¹	55	50	42	40	33	35	35	34
Total dry cargoes	36	34	31	32	29	24	32	31
Tanker cargoes	75	75	57	59	57	54	52	51
Total ocean-borne	49	48	40	41	37	31	38	38
Great Lakes cargoes	63	69	53	63	59	48	57	55
Grand total water-borne	51	51	42	44	40	33	41	41

¹ Including West Indies, Middle America and Canada, except Great Lakes cargoes.

² Figures for 1928 subject to revision.

thereby, effect a more equitable distribution of low-value and high-value cargoes between American and foreign shipping. Under such circumstances, the question of whether the adequacy of the American merchant marine should be determined on the basis of its ability to carry a specified percentage of the value or of the cargo tonnage of American foreign commerce would no longer be significant.

In attempting to analyze the present situation with respect to the participation of American vessels in the carriage of American foreign trade, it is necessary, as already pointed out, to consider only ocean-borne commerce. As shown in Table 21, American vessels have during the period covered carried a substantial proportion of the

Great Lakes cargoes, a fact which has served to increase somewhat the percentage figures based upon the total water-borne cargoes. When only ocean-borne cargoes are considered, it is shown that at no time during the period from 1921 to 1928 have American vessels carried the fifty per cent which is frequently assumed to represent a reasonable requirement. While in 1921 the American share of the cargo tonnage reached 49%, subsequent years brought a decline. In 1926, the share dropped to 31% but this was evidently brought about in part by the increase in the coal cargoes of British vessels previously referred to, since the figure rose to 38% in 1927. But the data in Table 21 also show that the carriage of tanker cargoes in American vessels has been substantial and that it has contributed to maintain the American percentage of all ocean-borne cargoes at a higher point than would otherwise have been the case. Even in the case of tanker cargoes, however, there has been a decline in the relative importance of American flag vessels. With respect to dry cargoes, which comprise all types of cargo except those carried by tankers, American vessels have maintained their position in the overseas trade but have secured a declining percentage of the cargoes carried to nearby regions.

Ocean-borne dry cargoes carried overseas constitute an important item in American foreign trade as shown in Table 22. Moreover that class of cargo has increased from 37,679,000 tons in 1921 to 43,163,000 tons in 1927. While the tonnage of ocean-borne dry cargoes arising out of trade with nearby regions is not as large, the increase during the period covered was noteworthy. The tonnage of tanker cargoes has remained fairly constant. Relating this data to the percentage figures in the previous table, several facts seem to be indicated. In the first place, since American vessels have, except during the year 1926, carried close to thirty per cent of the overseas dry cargoes, it is evident that they have shared in the increased tonnage in those trades. But in the case of nearby foreign dry cargoes, the drop in the percentage figures with the increase in the total volume of cargo indicates that American vessels have not benefited from the increased trade. Applying the

percentages to the tonnage figures, it is found that American ships carried approximately 5,243,000 tons of dry cargo in the nearby foreign trades in 1921 and 5,566,000 tons in 1927, although the total tonnage in these trades increased by 4,369,000 tons. In view of the fact that the foreign vessels engaged in these nearby trades are not, with possibly a few exceptions, registered under the flag of any one of the countries directly concerned, this situation is particularly significant. In the case of tanker cargoes, the failure of American vessels to maintain the percentage status held at the beginning of the period has resulted in a

TABLE 22: CARGO TONNAGE OF WATER-BORNE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1921-1928, INCLUSIVE

(In thousands of cargo tons of 2,240 lbs.)

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Cargo	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928 ^a
Ocean-borne								
Dry cargoes								
Overseas	37,679	39,181	40,904	40,974	41,069	58,808	43,163	40,805
Nearby foreign ¹	9,533	10,673	13,371	13,546	16,390	16,508	15,902	15,090
Total dry cargoes	47,212	49,854	54,275	54,520	57,459	75,316	59,065	55,895
Tanker cargoes	23,342	25,596	24,821	25,714	23,151	24,890	24,962	28,346
Total ocean-borne	70,554	75,450	79,096	80,234	80,610	100,206	84,027	84,241
Great Lakes cargoes	11,277	12,023	14,116	12,926	12,191	12,620	15,091	18,436
Grand total water-borne	81,831	87,473	93,219	93,160	92,801	112,826	99,118	102,677

¹ Including West Indies, Middle America and Canada, except by way of Great Lakes.

² See footnote 2, Table 21.

drop in the tonnage carried. In 1921, the tanker cargo tonnage carried under the American flag was approximately 17,506,500 tons; in 1927 it was only 12,980,240 tons, but still more than half of the total.

The preceding discussion has indicated the general situation during recent years with respect to the participation of American vessels in the ocean carriage of American commerce. It is now necessary to consider exports and imports separately. In Table 23 are shown the cargo tonnage of tanker and overseas and nearby foreign dry cargo imports and exports respectively, and the percentage of each group or class of cargo in 1927. Throughout the period 1921 to 1927, overseas dry cargo exports constituted the

TABLE 23: CARGO TONNAGE AND PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY TYPE OF CARGO, 1927¹

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)
(In thousands of cargo tons of 2,240 lbs.)

Type of Cargo	Exports		Imports		Total	
	Tonnage	Per Cent	Tonnage	Per Cent	Tonnage	Per Cent
Dry cargoes						
Overseas.....	28,092	59.5	15,071	40.9	43,163	51.4
Nearby foreign.....	5,612	11.9	10,290	28.0	15,902	18.9
Tanker cargoes.....	13,519	28.6	11,443	31.1	24,962	29.7
Total ocean-borne....	47,223	100.0	36,804	100.0	84,027	100.0

¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded.

largest division or branch of trade on a tonnage basis. In 1927 this class of exports amounted to 28,092,000 tons, or approximately one-third of the total ocean-borne cargo tonnage of exports and imports combined. In 1926 it reached 42,145,000 tons, primarily as a result of the increased exportation of coal. From the viewpoint of the relative need for adequate shipping facilities, dry cargoes exported overseas are particularly important.

In Table 24 is shown the per cent of each of the three classes of export and import cargoes carried in American vessels during the years 1921 to 1928 inclusive. Only in the case of imported tanker cargoes, have American vessels continuously secured more than fifty per cent of the cargo.

TABLE 24: PER CENT OF CARGO TONNAGE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS CARRIED IN AMERICAN VESSELS, 1921-1928, INCLUSIVE¹

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Type of Cargo	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928 ²
Imports								
Dry cargoes								
Overseas.....	37	28	26	31	28	29	32	31
Nearby foreign.....	53	48	39	35	29	31	32	31
Tanker cargoes.....	87	87	77	79	74	77	79	75
Exports								
Dry cargoes								
Overseas.....	29	32	28	28	26	18	29	29
Nearby foreign.....	58	54	48	47	39	43	43	40
Tanker cargoes.....	40	36	25	32	35	31	31	29

¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded.

² See footnote 2, Table 21.

They have on the whole been the least successful in the competition for dry cargo overseas exports which, as already noted, are particularly important so far as tonnage is concerned. However, except for the abnormal year, 1926, the percentage of dry cargo exports carried in American vessels has remained fairly constant.

The relative status of various shipping interests with respect to the carriage of American exports and imports is shown in Table 25. The percentages, both of imports

TABLE 25: PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF CARGO TONNAGE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY CARRIER, 1921-1928, INCLUSIVE¹
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Distribution	Percentages							
	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928 ²
Imports								
U. S. Shipping Board.....	16	13	8	7	6	7	6	5
Independent American.....	53	47	42	44	38	37	41	42
British.....	³ 19	21	21	21	23	24	22	22
Other foreign.....	31	21	29	28	33	32	31	31
Total.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Exports								
U. S. Shipping Board.....	18	19	17	15	13	9	13	11
Independent American.....	16	16	14	17	17	14	18	20
British.....	³ 32	32	35	34	34	39	32	31
Other foreign.....	66	33	34	34	36	38	37	38
Total.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded.

² Included in other foreign.

³ See footnote 2, Table 21.

and exports, carried in the government-owned vessels of United States Shipping Board have declined since 1921, a condition which might be expected to follow the sale of various government-owned services. But the acquisition of these services by private interests has failed to increase the percentages of cargo carried by independent American vessels. The percentage of imports carried by such vessels declined from 53 in 1921 to 42 in 1928. The percentage of exports was slightly increased but not enough to offset the drop in the percentage carried by Shipping Board vessels. From 1923 to 1927, inclusive, British vessels carried a

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larger proportion of export cargo than the government-owned and private American vessels combined.

These percentages, however, do not give an accurate picture of the situation, since tanker cargoes and trade with nearby foreign countries are included. In Table 26 is shown the per cent distribution of each of the three

TABLE 26: PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF CARGO TONNAGE OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, DRY CARGOES AND TANKER CARGOES, 1927¹
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Distribution	Dry Cargoes		Tanker Cargoes
	Overseas	Nearby Foreign	
Imports			
U. S. Shipping Board.....	13	..	1
Independent American.....	19	32	78
British.....	27	30	10
Other foreign.....	41	38	11
Total.....	100	100	100
Exports			
U. S. Shipping Board.....	21	..	2
Independent American.....	8	43	29
British.....	31	23	39
Other foreign.....	40	34	30
Total.....	100	100	100
Exports and imports combined			
U. S. Shipping Board.....	19	..	1
Independent American.....	12	35	51
British.....	29	28	26
Other foreign.....	40	37	22
Total.....	100	100	100

¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded.

classes of cargo in 1927. These data indicate that private American shipping interests predominate in the carriage of import tanker cargoes. But export tanker cargoes, the tonnage of which in 1927 exceeded the tonnage imported, were carried largely in foreign vessels. Privately-owned American shipping secured approximately one-third of the trade with the West Indies, Central America, Canada and other nearby foreign countries. But only eight per cent of the tonnage of dry cargoes exported to other parts of the

world was shipped in private American vessels. Since 1923, the United States Shipping Board has restricted its operations almost entirely to the carrying of overseas dry cargo. The proportion of such cargo carried by government-owned vessels has declined from nineteen per cent in 1922 to thirteen per cent in 1927 in the case of imports, and from twenty-five per cent to twenty-one per cent in the case of exports. On the other hand, the proportion of overseas dry cargo imports carried by private American shipping interests has increased during the same period from nine per cent to nineteen per cent, and that of similar exports from seven per cent to eight per cent. These increases, however, have been offset by the decline in the percentages of export and import cargo carried in the nearby foreign trades.¹

The distribution in 1927 of export and import cargo tonnage, including all types of cargo, among the various trade districts is shown in Table 27 and Charts 1 and 2. The West Indies were the source of the largest amount of import cargo, and North Atlantic and Baltic Europe was the destination of the largest amount of export cargo. More significant in relation to the present discussion of the status of the American merchant marine in foreign trade, however, are the percentage figures showing the relative position of American and foreign interests in the various trades indicated. In the case of imports, American vessels, including both private and government-owned, carried fifty per cent or more of the cargo tonnage from only five of the twenty trade regions. Of these five regions, three, namely, the North Coast of South America, Mexico and Central America, are classed as nearby foreign trades. The other two, the West Coast of South America and the Orient are treated as overseas trades. It is noteworthy that British vessels carried fifty per cent or more of the imports to the United States, not only from the United Kingdom, but also from all of the regions in which important parts of the British Empire are situated with the exception of Pacific Canada.

¹ The percentage figures in Table 24 covering nearby foreign trades represent the activity of independent American vessels alone in the years 1924 to 1927, inclusive, since no nearby cargoes were carried by government-owned vessels during those years.

TABLE 27: CARGO TONNAGE AND PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY FOREIGN TRADE DISTRICTS, 1927¹

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Distribution	Imports					Exports				
	Cargo Tons (2,240 Lbs.)	Per Cent Carried				Cargo Tons (2,240 Lbs.)	Per Cent Carried			
		American		Foreign			American		Foreign	
		U. S. Ship- ping Board	Inde- pen- dent Ameri- can	British	Other Foreign		U. S. Ship- ping Board	Inde- pen- dent Ameri- can	British	Other Foreign
North Coast, South America	3,074,799	0.3	77.6	7.7	14.4	424,312	..	47.9	10.2	41.9
East Coast, South America	1,719,786	19.1	28.2	25.4	27.3	3,776,428	9.6	18.6	46.1	25.7
West Coast, South America	2,617,078	..	57.3	12.5	30.2	1,269,770	..	56.1	24.6	19.3
West Indies	7,762,132	0.6	49.1	20.5	29.8	3,245,247	..	49.2	20.4	30.4
Mexico	5,475,758	1.9	80.5	3.8	13.8	514,332	..	56.6	1.9	41.5
Central America	1,342,613	..	35.5	15.2	49.3	2,084,366	4.0	80.9	8.5	6.6
United Kingdom	1,380,464	9.1	11.1	66.8	13.0	8,634,499	17.2	5.3	64.6	12.9
North Atlantic and Baltic Europe	1,226,977	13.3	0.9	2.1	83.7	2,007,297	6.5	4.2	10.3	79.0
Havre-Hamburg Range	3,479,802	21.2	4.3	12.9	61.6	9,251,960	27.9	4.6	15.5	52.0
South Atlantic Europe	399,159	8.1	1.4	40.8	49.7	1,365,149	11.3	9.0	23.7	56.0
West Mediterranean	1,173,881	1.3	14.2	19.1	65.4	2,863,723	7.6	6.1	12.5	73.8
East Mediterranean and Black Sea	429,331	..	14.0	46.3	39.7	526,412	3.3	24.5	25.1	47.0
West Africa	259,069	39.0	3.1	48.9	9.0	289,563	37.9	12.3	32.8	17.0
South and East Africa	247,506	..	21.2	77.9	0.9	455,797	..	24.6	70.2	5.2
Australasia	131,428	9.6	14.5	54.1	21.8	1,964,047	8.6	9.2	52.0	30.2
India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea	730,289	4.0	17.6	76.8	1.6	464,945	6.8	24.6	50.7	17.9
East Indies	546,849	2.6	22.4	53.1	21.9	403,358	4.4	19.5	43.0	33.1
Orient	1,390,691	34.4	17.1	18.1	30.4	5,612,671	14.3	14.4	24.0	47.3
Pacific Canada	1,321,352	..	45.1	45.3	9.6	909,988	2.1	40.5	56.2	1.2
Atlantic Canada and Newfoundland	1,656,311	..	6.5	52.9	40.6	961,812	1.0	15.6	35.4	48.0
Total	36,365,275	6.0	40.9	21.9	31.2	47,025,676	13.2	17.9	31.9	37.0

¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded. It should be noted that the figures in this table showing the total tonnage of ocean-borne exports and imports do not correspond with the similar figures in Table 23. This discrepancy arises out of the fact that in compiling this table it was not possible to segregate ocean-borne cargoes entering or leaving the United States through Great Lakes ports. Such cargoes, which amounted to about 439,000 tons in the case of imports and 198,000 tons in the case of exports, were therefore excluded, together with other Great Lakes cargo tonnage.

CHART 1: DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE IMPORTS, 1927





CHART 2: DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTS, 1927



In the case of exports, American vessels carried fifty per cent or more of the cargo tonnage to only four trade districts, namely, Central America, Mexico, West Africa and the West Coast of South America. In eight of the twenty trades, foreign vessels carried more than seventy-five per cent of the export tonnage. British vessels alone carried fifty per cent or more of the exports to the United Kingdom, South and East Africa, India, Australasia and Atlantic Canada.

CHARACTER OF AMERICAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

From the viewpoint of those persons who hold that, in order to afford proper protection to American ocean-borne commerce, American vessels should carry at the minimum fifty per cent of that commerce, the data thus far presented might be considered sufficient to prove that the existing situation is highly unsatisfactory and that there is need for developing a larger merchant marine. But the validity of several of the arguments advanced to show the value of a merchant marine can be tested only by an analysis of the character of American foreign trade. In the first place it is contended that shipping is important to protect the importation of essential raw materials and foodstuffs. To determine what weight should be given to this argument, it is necessary to discover the extent to which such commodities are represented in the total volume of American imports.

In Table 28 is shown the cargo tonnage of the principal imported commodities in 1927. The list includes all those items which, in the data compiled by the United States Shipping Board, are indicated as having amounted to 300,000 tons or more during the calendar year.¹ Foodstuffs are represented in the items sugar, bananas, molasses, coffee, vegetable products, animal, fish and dairy products, and vegetable oils. American vessels in 1927 carried seventy-two per cent of the cargo tonnage of molasses and fifty-one per cent of the coffee. In the case of each of the other

¹ One exception should be noted. In the original data, jute and jute manufactures were separately listed with a tonnage of 103,478 and 318,654 tons, respectively. The two items have been combined in the table.

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foodstuff commodities, the percentage figure was close to thirty.

With respect to essential raw materials not produced to any extent in the United States, the principal listed commodities, on the basis of their cargo tonnage, are nitrates, manganese, potash, rubber and jute, although similar essential materials are undoubtedly included in some of the broader classifications, particularly, non-metallic minerals,

TABLE 28: CARGO TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE IMPORTED COMMODITIES, 1927¹

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)
(In cargo tons of 2,240 lbs.)

Imported Commodities	Ocean-Borne Cargo Tonnage	Per Cent of Total Ocean-Borne Import Cargo Tonnage	Carried by U. S. Shipping Board Vessels, Cargo Tonnage	Carried by Independent American Vessels, Cargo Tonnage	Per Cent of Commodity Tonnage Carried in American Vessels
Petroleum and products	10,025,811	27.57	133,061	7,890,775	80.03
Sugar	3,590,119	9.87	162,504	962,991	31.35
Iron ores	2,797,230	7.69	22,150	1,434,966	52.09
Bananas	1,531,308	4.21	..	472,029	30.83
Logs and lumber	1,478,767	4.07	86,244	541,701	42.46
Molasses	1,195,160	3.29	27,921	839,543	72.58
Pulp and pulpwood	1,188,240	3.27	175,375	46,037	18.63
Non-metallic minerals, n.e.s.	1,074,442	2.95	147,602	170,712	29.63
Nitrates	812,353	2.23	74,369	203,768	34.24
Gypsum	752,587	2.07	973	58,329	7.88
Miscellaneous metals and manufactures	726,982	2.00	12,028	150,048	22.29
Iron, steel and manufactures	715,447	1.97	160,096	26,197	26.04
Coffee	667,103	1.83	130,857	214,077	51.71
Vegetables and vegetable products, n.e.s.	651,388	1.79	89,894	109,682	30.64
Pigments, chemicals and manufactures, n.e.s.	645,091	1.77	83,321	181,641	41.07
Manganese and manganese ore	615,481	1.69	22,371	109,895	21.49
Copper and manufactures	564,466	1.55	1,313	185,369	33.07
Potash	540,650	1.49	73,880	9,066	15.34
Oil Seeds	498,030	1.37	54,649	159,134	42.93
Rubber	458,786	1.26	9,975	108,163	25.75
Coal and coke	445,086	1.22	32	47,586	10.70
Jute and jute manufactures	422,132	1.16	17,276	88,317	25.01
Paper and manufactures	391,742	1.08	29,372	38,722	17.38
Animal, fish and dairy products	387,538	1.07	44,450	75,169	30.87
Clays	347,529	0.96	6,676	49,078	16.04
Vegetable oils	344,895	0.95	83,672	55,864	40.46
All others	3,496,912	9.62	545,100	655,577	34.34
Total	36,365,275	100.00	2,195,161	14,884,436	46.97


¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded. See footnote, Table 27, p. 67 of this volume.

and miscellaneous metals and manufactures, under one or the other of which headings are included such important articles as nickel, tin, mica, tungsten. The combined cargo tonnage of the five commodities listed amounted to approximately 2,850,000 tons, or less than eight per cent of the total ocean-borne import tonnage. Raw silk, which on the basis of value is extremely important, has not been separately listed since it contributed only 20,463 tons of cargo.

It is also evident from the data presented in Table 28 that American vessels participated to a smaller extent in the carriage of the essential raw materials, with the exception of nitrates, than in that of foodstuffs. The proportion of the commodity tonnage carried by American ships was 25.75% in the case of rubber; 25.01% in the case of jute and jute manufactures combined (but only 11.4% for jute alone); 21.49% in the case of manganese and manganese ore; 15.34% for potash. Only 2,386 tons of raw silk, or 11.6% of the total, were carried by American vessels. Raw silk, it should be noted, has a high value in proportion to its bulk and is usually shipped on fast vessels in order to save time and thereby reduce the interest charges on the tied-up capital.

It is also argued that a merchant marine is necessary to assist in the development of new markets for American exports and to protect those exports from discriminatory treatment and the possible disclosure of trade information. But this argument does not apply with equal force to all classes of exports. In the case of exported raw materials and foodstuffs which move through established channels to world markets, shipping is of importance to the producers or exporters only to the extent that they want dependable service and reasonable rates. But the exporters of manufactured products must advertise and in other ways strive to expand old and develop new markets and meet the competition of foreign manufacturers. To these exporters shipping is not merely a common carrier from which only dependable service and reasonable rates are required, but it is also an instrumentality through which, with proper cooperation, trade may be developed. Likewise, exports of

CHART 3: CARGO TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE COMMODITIES, 1927



manufactured commodities are more likely to be the subject of discrimination or to offer the opportunity for the disclosure of valuable trade information than exports of raw materials and foodstuffs. It follows, therefore, that a nation whose exports consist largely of manufactures might find justification for the maintenance of a merchant marine considerably larger than that of another nation with an equal volume of ocean-borne trade but a relatively small amount of manufactured exports.

In Table 29 is shown the ocean-borne tonnage of American exported commodities in 1927. The first five items in the list, all of which represent primarily raw materials, comprise 73.04% of the total export tonnage. Manufactured foodstuffs are included in the rather important items, wheat flour, and animal, fish and dairy products. These commodities, however, may be considered secondary to other manufactured articles so far as the need for shipping under the American flag is concerned on the ground that dependable service alone is required and that foreign purchasers, because of the scarcity of their own foodstuff resources, have an equal interest in the uninterrupted maintenance of those services. The manufactured export articles for the protection of which American ships are needed are those which come into direct competition with similar articles manufactured in the leading maritime countries and which may be the subject of discriminatory treatment. This type of export is represented in the items iron, steel and manufactures, vehicles, machinery and cotton manufactures, and to some extent in other items comprising both raw materials and manufactured products, for example, copper and manufactures. Since, however, fifteen of the twenty-six items listed in the table would be classed either as foodstuffs or raw materials and since those fifteen groups of commodities provided more than eighty-six per cent of the total ocean-borne export cargo tonnage, it seems evident that manufactured articles of the type especially requiring the aid of American shipping constitute a relatively small proportion of the volume of American exports.

Table 29 also shows the percentage of the tonnage of each export commodity carried in American vessels. It is of in-

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terest to note that, while American ships carried eighty per cent of the petroleum imports, they carried only thirty per cent of the exports. In the case of grain exports, the item next in importance to petroleum on the basis of tonnage, only 25.43 per cent was carried under the American flag. The percentage figure for cotton was 35.5; for wheat flour,

TABLE 29: CARGO TONNAGE OF PRINCIPAL AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE EXPORTED COMMODITIES, 1927¹

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

(In cargo tons of 2,240 lbs.)

Exported Commodities	Ocean-Borne Cargo Tonnage	Per Cent of Total Ocean-Borne Export Cargo Tonnage	Carried by U. S. Shipping Board Vessels, Cargo Tonnage	Carried by Independent American Vessels, Cargo Tonnage	Per Cent of Commodity Tonnage Carried in American Vessels
Petroleum and products.....	16,425,610	34.93	894,587	4,124,530	30.56
Grains ²	7,110,986	15.12	1,470,885	337,459	25.43
Logs and lumber.....	5,420,334	11.53	1,275,689	644,573	35.43
Coal and coke.....	3,263,365	6.94	40,658	565,751	18.58
Cotton.....	2,125,097	4.52	697,033	57,430	35.50
Wheat flour.....	1,400,625	2.98	360,051	309,672	47.82
Iron, steel and manufactures.....	1,377,576	2.93	74,094	540,156	44.59
Phosphates.....	923,471	1.96	209,374	6,056	23.33
Sulphur.....	771,522	1.64	139,720	17,723	20.41
Animal, fish and dairy products.....	746,082	1.59	78,504	191,934	36.25
Fruits and nuts.....	744,731	1.58	33,052	79,534	15.12
Oil cake and meal.....	714,461	1.52	211,044	7,319	30.56
Vehicles.....	654,402	1.39	69,356	139,229	31.87
Machinery.....	490,982	1.04	33,767	123,651	32.06
Pigments, chemicals and manufactures, n.e.s.....	453,027	0.96	37,892	104,328	31.39
Copper and manufactures.....	440,474	0.94	67,556	31,133	22.41
Naval stores.....	391,152	0.83	104,852	17,404	31.26
Vegetables and vegetable products, n.e.s.....	342,486	0.73	48,464	131,320	52.49
Ores, metals and manufactures n.e.s.....	280,795	0.60	57,687	31,232	31.67
Tobacco and manufactures.....	272,413	0.58	76,789	15,682	33.95
Non-metallic minerals and manufactures, n.e.s.....	231,063	0.49	17,471	99,109	50.45
Fertilizers (except phosphates)	219,629	0.47	6,179	99,608	49.08
Paper stock and manufactures.....	185,279	0.39	25,950	63,770	48.42
Sugar.....	162,168	0.34	21,694	27,936	30.60
Cement.....	131,320	0.28	4,074	68,412	55.20
Cotton manufactures.....	102,600	0.22	15,100	43,899	57.50
All others.....	1,644,026	3.50	113,535	560,860	41.02
Total.....	47,025,676	100.00	6,185,057	8,439,710	31.10

¹ Great Lakes cargoes excluded. See footnote Table 27, p. 67 of this volume.

² Grains include wheat, rye, corn, barley, oats, rice and other grains.

47.82; for animal, fish and dairy products, 36.25. American vessels carried 44.59% of the export tonnage of iron, steel and manufactures; 31.87% of the vehicles, 32.06% of the machinery, and 57.50% of the cotton manufactures.

FOREIGN VESSELS IN INDIRECT TRADE

Another phase of the foreign trade situation which needs to be considered relates to the carriage of American exports

TABLE 30: FOREIGN VESSELS IN DIRECT TRADE BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND IN INDIRECT TRADE BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR OWN

(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

(1,000 Gross Tons and Over, Steam and / or Motor, Including Tankers)
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1928

Flag	Total		Own Country		Own Possessions		Other Countries	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Argentine.....	1	6,702	1	6,702
Belgian.....	20	121,455	16	99,928	4	21,527
Brazilian.....	16	79,327	16	79,327
British.....	1,451	7,923,505	288	2,266,061	185 ¹	1,124,057	710	3,797,642
					268 ²	735,745		
Chilean.....	4	19,673	4	19,673
Colombian.....	1	2,054	1	2,054
Cuban.....	1	1,979	1	1,979
Danish.....	121	430,894	20	139,014	101	291,880
Danzig.....	12	105,441	12	105,441
Dutch.....	127	676,098	29	271,723	23	138,616	75	265,759
Finnish.....	2	8,842	2	8,842
French.....	89	623,076	60	499,919	4	13,086	25	110,071
German.....	148	884,670	93	652,636	55	232,034
Greek.....	17	83,437	7	37,541	10	45,896
Honduran.....	28	70,016	14	37,141	14	32,875
Italian.....	160	1,061,028	82	620,192	78	440,836
Japanese.....	198	1,238,566	152	968,164	46	270,402
Mexican.....	8	21,530	8	21,530
Nicaraguan.....	2	3,137	2	3,137
Norwegian.....	405	1,453,052	43	132,885	362	1,320,167
Panaman.....	12	36,384	12	36,384
Peruvian.....	4	15,454	2	6,918	2	8,536
Portuguese.....	3	18,529	3	18,529
Russian (USSR)...	1	2,674	1	2,674
Spanish.....	33	161,449	27	136,387	6	25,062
Swedish.....	104	418,463	28	142,165	76	276,298
Venezuelan.....	4	8,636	4	8,636
Total.....	2,972	15,476,071	898	6,153,712	480	2,011,504	1,594	7,310,855

¹ Other British possessions.

² Canadian trade.

and imports in foreign vessels operating under the flags of countries other than those directly concerned in the particular trade. A large amount of foreign shipping is engaged in this indirect trade. As shown in Table 30, nearly one-half of the total gross tonnage of foreign vessels in American foreign trade is being operated between the United States and countries other than their own. In particular, the British, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish shipping in the indirect trade is larger than that in direct trade with each of those countries. Great Britain has a larger number of vessels operating between the United States and non-British ports than there are in the entire active American merchant marine in foreign trade. Norway has approximately ten times as much shipping in indirect trade than it has in the direct trade between United States and Norway.

PASSENGER TRAFFIC

The situation with respect to the participation of American vessels in the passenger traffic is also an important aspect of the American merchant marine problem. In Table 31 is shown the number of passengers to or from Canada, Middle America and the West Indies, and overseas ports carried by American and foreign vessels. Of the total volume of passenger traffic during the five-year period, as shown in Chart 4, American vessels, including both private and government-owned, carried only 25.8% in the case of inbound traffic and 27.1% in the case of outbound. British vessels carried over forty-seven per cent in both cases.

Privately owned American lines to the West Indies and Middle America have secured a substantial part of the passenger traffic to those regions. But, as indicated in the percentage figures in Table 32, foreign shipping tended to increase its share of that traffic in 1927. In the case of the overseas traffic, which is the most important, American vessels, including both government and privately owned, carried only 13.1% of the inbound and 13.9% of the outbound during the year 1928.

The failure of the American merchant marine to secure a larger share of the passenger traffic may be accounted for in

TABLE 31: AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE PASSENGER TRAFFIC, 1923-1928, INCLUSIVE
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Distribution	Inbound						Outbound					
	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Canada												
U. S. Shipping Board.....	644	11	6	856
Independent American.....	36,845	56,357	59,478	65,269	63,122	96,421	33,798	57,318	59,278	60,472	62,011	100,963
British.....	170,025	152,686	165,960	154,416	151,650	140,185	135,818	143,251	163,272	152,338	145,444	129,299
Other foreign.....	7	68	32	45	162	118	..	8	13	70
Total.....	206,877	209,111	226,114	219,730	214,934	236,724	169,627	200,583	223,406	212,810	207,468	230,332
Middle America and West Indies												
U. S. Shipping Board.....	66	107	59	207	..	4	25	3	1	4	..	3
Independent American.....	79,935	80,867	91,984	96,096	92,562	115,116	68,034	77,410	89,158	87,084	81,435	106,379
British.....	39,061	38,775	35,440	36,546	42,479	46,131	23,713	45,167	35,381	33,932	40,504	44,958
Other foreign.....	5,060	6,861	5,916	10,472	9,673	9,855	3,279	4,575	5,929	6,175	9,462	10,051
Total.....	124,122	126,610	133,399	143,321	144,714	171,106	95,051	127,155	130,469	127,195	131,401	161,391
Overseas												
U. S. Shipping Board.....	80,817	54,399	57,439	50,995	52,331	49,842	36,696	41,822	40,180	33,567	37,704	36,719
Independent American.....	26,186	7,014	12,419	20,805	24,279	23,889	6,531	5,412	12,975	21,067	25,283	24,540
British.....	271,732	163,297	210,224	207,070	215,090	205,990	114,452	148,869	153,737	152,596	168,956	160,193
Other foreign.....	272,283	163,533	190,707	244,512	271,823	282,124	106,411	160,255	171,384	180,857	215,962	216,384
Total.....	651,018	388,243	470,789	523,382	563,523	561,845	264,090	356,358	378,276	388,087	447,905	437,836
Grand total.....	982,017	723,964	830,302	886,433	923,171	969,675	528,768	684,096	732,151	728,092	786,774	829,559

CHART 4: AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE PASSENGER TRAFFIC, 1923-1927, INCLUSIVE



INBOUND PASSENGERS - 4,345,887

OUTBOUND PASSENGERS - 3,459,881




TABLE 32: PER CENT OF AMERICAN OCEAN-BORNE PASSENGER TRAFFIC CARRIED BY AMERICAN VESSELS, 1923-1928, INCLUSIVE
(Source: U. S. Shipping Board)

Year	Inbound			Outbound		
	Canada	Middle America and West Indies	Overseas	Canada	Middle America and West Indies	Overseas
1923.....	17.8	64.5	16.4	19.9	71.6	16.3
1924.....	27.0	64.0	15.8	28.6	60.9	13.3
1925.....	26.6	69.0	14.8	26.9	68.3	14.1
1926.....	29.7	67.1	13.7	28.4	68.5	14.1
1927.....	29.4	64.0	13.6	29.9	62.0	14.1
1928.....	40.7	67.1	13.1	43.8	65.9	13.9

various ways. Probably the most important factor is the relative lack of fast passenger vessels under the American flag. In addition, the immigrant traffic has been largely diverted to foreign vessels, partly because the immigrants themselves prefer to travel on the ships of their respective native countries and partly because foreign governments, particularly Italy, have adopted measures to induce the use of national shipping. The prohibition law of the United States may also to some extent have contributed to increase the use of foreign vessels in preference to those under the American flag. There is, however, no evidence to show conclusively one way or the other the effect of prohibition upon American shipping.

CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

IN estimating the need for an American merchant marine from the viewpoint of national defense, some consideration must be given to the importance of maintaining lines of communication with other countries in time of war or other national emergency. To the extent that American industry requires raw materials of foreign origin, dependence upon foreign shipping would endanger the economic security of the United States in the event of war whether or not this country was directly involved. Any international conflict which included Great Britain among the participants would tie up world shipping and would tend to deprive the United States of the facilities needed to import such essential materials as rubber, coffee, silk, camphor and quinine, none of which are domestically produced. If the United States were itself engaged in war with another nation, the same danger of economic isolation would arise. While so far as essential foodstuffs are concerned, this country is fairly self-sufficing, any interference with existing lines of communication with other countries would have a very disturbing effect upon our economic life. For this reason the possession of shipping would serve materially to enhance the economic security of the United States.

VALUE OF THE SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

But the argument that a merchant marine is needed for national defense rests primarily on the fact that merchant vessels can be used in connection with military and naval operations in time of war and that merchant seamen constitute a valuable naval reserve force. This aspect of the merchant marine problem is related to the broader question of pre-

paredness and, therefore, the amount of merchant shipping constituting an adequate naval auxiliary is dependent in part upon the estimated need for naval armament, and other technical questions which are outside the scope of the present discussion.

In time of war, cargo vessels are needed to carry the fuel and supplies required in connection with naval operations. This country's lack of fortified bases outside its territorial limits increases the need for supply ships and renders it necessary that such ships should have a wide radius of action. Ships of sufficient speed and strength may be equipped with 6-inch guns and used as cruisers. The need for merchant vessels suitable for use as cruisers has become increasingly important with the reduction in naval armament. In the case of military operations outside the United States, transport ships would be necessary. In these and other ways, merchant shipping may be employed as an auxiliary to the Navy.

Past history furnishes a number of illustrations of the importance of an American merchant marine from the point of view of national defense. When the Navy was sent around the world by President Roosevelt, the necessary coal and supplies were provided by foreign ships because American vessels were not available. The lack of transport ships at the time this country entered the World War hindered the sending of troops abroad. Although the construction of a vast amount of shipping was immediately undertaken, very few of these vessels were completed during the war and practically all the American troops sent abroad were transported either in seized German ships or in the chartered vessels of other nations. An adequate merchant marine would have remedied the situation in these and similar instances.

The availability of merchant vessels as cruisers is aptly illustrated by the experience of Great Britain during the World War. At the outbreak of hostilities, a number of such vessels were equipped with guns and used for patrol and blockade purposes. The tenth Cruiser Squadron, composed of twenty-five armed merchant ships, was an effective unit of the British sea force.¹

¹ T. P. Magruder, "Sea Power and the Merchant Marine," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 3, 1928, p. 10.

The maintenance of a merchant marine is also important from the point of view of national defense because it provides trained seamen who can enlist in the naval forces in case of war. The scarcity of this class of labor at the time the United States entered the World War necessitated the establishment of training schools.¹ Trained seamen, however, can not be produced by educational methods but require years of experience on the high seas to learn their profession. This is also true of the men employed on naval vessels. But a seafaring man who has served on a merchant ship may be quickly trained for naval service. It is necessary, however, that a large percentage of the seamen employed on merchant vessels be citizens of the United States in order to transform the American merchant marine into a suitable source of naval recruits.

Finally, a merchant marine is needed to support the shipbuilding industry upon which the Government in time of war must rely for the construction of naval equipment. It is not possible to create shipyards at short notice. Nor can the staff of highly trained, technical men required be assembled from other fields of industry. Moreover, for the development of new ideas in regard to naval construction, the maintenance of an active shipbuilding industry is essential. At one time in the history of the United States, it was necessary to send students of marine engineering abroad to obtain the necessary technical education.² The necessary educational facilities have since been established in this country, but the lessened opportunity for employment in ship construction consequent upon the failure of the United States to support a merchant marine would make the continued maintenance of those facilities difficult. All these considerations demonstrate the importance of the shipbuilding industry, and everything connected with it, as part of the national resources for defense.

VESSELS AVAILABLE AS NAVAL AUXILIARY

From the viewpoint of national defense, the adequacy of the merchant marine as it exists today, or as it should be de-

¹ See, William F. Willoughby, "Government Organization in War Time and After," New York, 1919, p. 159.

² See testimony of Mr. Homer L. Ferguson, 70th Congress, 1st session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 250.

veloped in the future, might be determined by the degree to which the requirements of the Navy for auxiliary shipping in time of war are provided for. Practically all types of modern vessels, except the slowest cargo ships, are of use either as transports, supply ships, cruisers or for other specialized purposes. To some extent, vessels employed in the coastwise and intercoastal trades might be used for naval purposes, but the primary need is for the larger vessels which would normally be engaged in foreign trade. While it would seem possible to formulate an estimate of the amount and character of merchant shipping required for defensive purposes, it is obvious that no such estimate would be accepted without question as the proper basis for planning the future development of the American merchant marine, because the need for merchant vessels as a naval auxiliary is dependent in the first place upon the size of the Navy, which itself is a subject of dispute, and, secondly, upon the character of the hypothetical emergency situation for which preparation should be made. In other words, as long as there is lack of agreement regarding the general preparedness program which should be adopted by the United States, it will be difficult to establish any definite standard on the basis of national defense for determining what would constitute an adequate merchant marine.

Some general theories have been advanced with respect to this problem. It has been stated, for example, that "There can be no thought of naval equality with Great Britain until we possess a merchant marine in balance and tonnage equal to hers as a second line of defense to our Navy and as a source of supply and fuel."¹ While there is a recognized element of truth in this statement, it is not generally agreed that an American merchant marine equal to that of Great Britain is essential for purposes of national defense. The conclusion usually reached on this particular question has been given definite expression in the report of the National Merchant Marine Conference which was held in 1925 under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

¹ Statement of Mr. Albert D. Lasker, who at the time was Chairman of the United States Shipping Board, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 6.

This conference submitted the following statement regarding shipping requirements for national defense:

“In general the requirements for the national defense correspond with the requirements of a well balanced merchant marine to meet the needs of our foreign trade, including, in addition to existing American tonnage, cargo liners of improved type and combination passenger and cargo liners. High-speed passenger express steamers are also needed as reserve naval auxiliaries and for postal service.”¹

The present position of the United States in comparison with other nations on the basis of available auxiliary naval equipment is shown in Table 33. This country now has in its merchant marine seventy vessels of 757,858 gross tons, which

TABLE 33: AUXILIARY NAVAL EQUIPMENT OF CHIEF MARITIME NATIONS, 1928

VESSELS OF 4,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, AND SPEED OF 15 KNOTS OR MORE, WHICH MIGHT BE USED AS CRUISERS OR ARMED TRANSPORTS

(Source: National Council of American Shipbuilders)

Country	Number of Vessels	Gross Tonnage
United States	70	757,858
Great Britain	227	2,937,300
France	35	390,266
Italy	31	432,342
Japan	17	161,094
Germany	15	285,680

might be used as cruisers or armed transports. Many of these ships, however, have been designed for, and operated in, the coasting trade or waters requiring shallow-draft vessels. Moreover, a large proportion of them represent war tonnage built approximately ten years ago. It is also probable that structural or other changes would be required in most instances to render these vessels suitable for naval use, a procedure which would have been avoided if they had in every case been originally constructed with a view to such use.

Although this classification made by the National Council of American Shipbuilders indicates the availability of seventy American vessels for use as cruisers or armed transports, the number actually listed in the reserve fleet on January 1, 1929,

¹U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 805.

by the United States Navy Department was only thirty-one.¹ This represents the number of ships which had fully met the requirements of that Department including the provision that at least one-half of the officers and crew be enrolled in the naval reserve. In order to be of use in time of emergency, a merchant vessel must not only be constructed with a view to such use, but it must also be officered and manned by members of the naval reserve so that when taken over by the Navy it can be immediately operated with the same officers and crew. Any discussion of the adequacy of the existing American merchant marine in its relation to national defense, therefore, involves the consideration of the existing situation with respect to the merchant marine naval reserve.

THE NAVAL RESERVE

The Naval Reserve Act of 1925 authorized the creation of a naval reserve force. Under the authority of this Act the Navy Department has set up a Merchant Marine Naval Reserve the members of which must be officers or seamen in active service on merchant vessels, must pass a physical examination and must be citizens of the United States. The Act provided that persons enrolled in this Merchant Marine Naval Reserve should receive, subject to appropriation by Congress, one month's base pay of the grade, rank or rate of the regular Navy corresponding in each case to the member's status on the merchant vessel on which he was employed. No appropriations, however, have been made by Congress to provide this pay. At the present time about 2000 officers on merchant vessels have been enrolled in the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve.² In the absence of the necessary appropriations the Navy Department has not made any great effort to enroll merchant seamen.

Among the advantages which American ship operators are expected to derive from the establishment of the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve are better discipline and increased technical training of crews and reduced labor turnover. It is

¹ Statement of Commander Lynn R. Rutter, U.S.N.R., "Proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, p. 179.

² *Idem.*

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also anticipated that the grant of one month's pay in addition to the wages regularly paid will, when put into effect, attract American citizens in greater numbers into seafaring occupations.

PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CREWS

One of the factors impairing the value of the merchant marine as an instrument of national defense has been the large proportion of foreign citizens serving on American

TABLE 34: NATIONALITY OF SEAMEN IN AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE, 1926-1928, INCLUSIVE
(Source: "Merchant Marine Statistics")

Nationality	Number of Seamen Shipped and Reshipped by Shipping Commissioners, by Collectors of Customs and by American Consuls during Fiscal Years Ended June 30th		
	1926	1927	1928
American (native)	115,062	128,567	129,421
American (naturalized)	30,034	29,541	32,454
British	34,506	33,277	31,537
German	19,426	19,810	20,573
Spanish	14,026	13,659	13,446
Chinese	13,341	13,920	15,260
Norwegian	8,257	7,559	7,617
Filipino	5,784	6,739	8,163
South American	5,607	6,054	9,578
Swedish	5,284	5,237	4,874
Dutch	5,011	5,150	4,753
All other	27,654	26,922	25,131
Total	283,992	296,415	302,807
Per cent American	51.0	53.3	53.5

vessels. Under the registry laws only the officers on board merchant vessels under the American flag must be citizens of the United States. But, in the case of ships employed in the carriage of mail under the contracts authorized by the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, one-half of the crew must be American citizens during the next four years, thereafter, two-thirds. As indicated in Table 34, a large number of seamen of other nationalities are now employed on American vessels. The percentage of Americans, including both native and naturalized, was 51.0 in 1926 and 53.5 in 1928. Seamen employed on vessels engaged in the coastwise and

intercoastal trades are included in those figures. The percentage of American seamen was 69.9 of the total number of seamen in the coastal trades in 1928. Since vessels in the coastwise trade may to some extent be used for national defense purposes and more particularly since American seamen in all trades are eligible for enrollment in the naval reserve, it is not necessary to consider exclusively the situation with respect to foreign trade. But it is nevertheless important to note that the data would seem to indicate that to a considerable extent the foreign trade vessels, which are in general those most suitable for naval auxiliary purposes, are manned by the citizens of foreign nations. Great Britain, Germany, Spain and China are particularly well represented.

ACTIVITIES OF SEA SERVICE SECTION

The problem of manning American vessels with American citizens is partly a question of providing sufficient wage inducement, and partly a matter of arousing a more general interest in maritime occupations. The granting of naval reserve pay is intended to provide the wage incentive. The activities of the Sea Service Section, a department of the United States Shipping Board, are directed toward creating an interest in shipping and placing American citizens on American vessels. The Sea Service Section maintains offices in twelve American ports. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, it placed 59,930 persons on American vessels of whom eighty-nine per cent were American citizens. It has exhibited particular interest in the placement of inexperienced youths between the ages of 18 and 23 who are rated as "deck boys" and paid \$25 a month. It is intended that these "deck boys" should be trained in seamanship and navigation and advanced to higher ratings as they attain the required proficiency. During the last fiscal year, 1,481 such "deck boys" were placed on American vessels.¹

While the present situation with respect to both the Americanization of crews and the amount of merchant shipping now available for use as cruisers, transports, etc., is unsatisfactory, some improvement may be anticipated in the future

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1928, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

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as a result of the twenty-two mail contracts already made by the Post Office Department under the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928. Ultimately, two-thirds of the crews on the vessels operating under those contracts will be American citizens. Moreover, those contracts provide for the construction of thirty-two new vessels to replace the older or slower vessels now operated and to improve the mail services. These new vessels must be constructed in accordance with plans approved by the Navy Department so that their usefulness as auxiliary ships is assured. Moreover, the construction of those vessels, together with the contracts for naval construction secured from the Government by private shipyards, will assist in maintaining the shipbuilding industry as an effective instrument of national defense.

PART II

**FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE FACTORS
AFFECTING THE MAINTENANCE OF AN
AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE**

CHAPTER VII

NATURAL AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES

IN THE preceding chapters the major aspects of the present situation with respect to the shipping and shipbuilding industries have been described. It is now necessary to examine the various factors which have handicapped in the past, or will influence in the future, the maintenance and development of an American merchant marine. Past experience has clearly indicated that, whatever advantages in the shipping field the United States may have had, they have been outweighed by the disadvantages. The enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 has, to some extent at least, brought about a readjustment of the competitive position of the American merchant marine. But it is contended that there is need for other measures designed to provide additional assistance to American shipowners. The justification for such measures depends to a considerable degree upon the balance or lack of balance between the favorable and adverse factors, both natural and artificial, in the present situation. The present and immediately following chapters will discuss in turn each of the more important classes or groups of those factors.

NATURAL RESOURCES

The fact that the United States has certain natural and economic advantages which should contribute to the maintenance of her position as a maritime nation is frequently overlooked. Some of these advantages are possessed to an equal or greater extent by other maritime countries. But in some respects the United States is better situated than several of its competitors in the shipping field.

One of the essentials for the development of shipping is the possession of a sea coast. That of the United States is not only extensive, but it borders on both the Atlantic and Pacific

Oceans as well as on the Gulf of Mexico and has numerous harbors. Moreover, those harbors are open at all seasons and are not, as in the case of the ports of Russia and eastern Canada, blocked by ice during considerable periods of the year. If sea coast and harbors were the determining factor in the development of a merchant marine, the United States would probably be the leading maritime nation of the world.

The possession of extensive natural resources, particularly iron, coal and petroleum, are likewise an asset in the development of ocean shipping. In the days before the advent of the iron steamship, the supremacy of the United States on the sea was due in large part to the fact that she had extensive forests and was one of the chief sources of shipbuilding materials. The use of iron, and subsequently steel, in ship construction placed this country at a disadvantage, not because of the lack of iron ores or of the coal required for the production of steel, but rather because at the time when iron came into use the American iron and steel industry was not fully developed. Although at the present time Great Britain, Germany and France are probably able to produce iron and steel at a somewhat lower cost than the United States, largely because of lower wage scales, nevertheless, this country has an advantage over such maritime countries as Italy, Spain and Norway, which are all deficient in iron and coal.

The introduction of oil as fuel for steamships and the invention of the Diesel engine have given added importance to the possession of petroleum resources. Oil-burning vessels have several advantages over coal burners. They can be more quickly refuelled. They have more room for cargo because oil takes up less space than coal. They have a wider cruising radius for the same reason. The motorship, likewise, has these advantages together with the additional advantage of reduced oil consumption. In the operation of oil-using vessels of either type, that nation which possesses extensive petroleum resources is placed in a superior position. The United States at the present time produces about seventy per cent of the world's supply of petroleum, whereas, the other maritime nations of the world produce practically none within their own borders. As long as the use of oil as fuel is justified by the price relationship between coal and oil,

and until American petroleum resources approach exhaustion, this country will have an advantage over its maritime competitors which may be expected to contribute to the maintenance of an American merchant marine.

CAPITAL

Surplus capital is also required by any nation proposing to maintain a substantial merchant marine. The numerous risks as well as the highly competitive situation which normally prevails in the field of world shipping make the investment of capital in that field relatively unprofitable in comparison with investment in other forms of business enterprise. Where capital is scarce, or where the available capital can all be profitably used in the exploitation of natural resources, shipping remains relatively undeveloped, as, for example, in the case of South American countries. The decline of the American merchant marine during the period from 1860 to 1914 was probably due in part to the fact that the exploitation of natural resources, railroad construction and the rapid growth of manufacturing caused a diversion of capital from the shipping and shipbuilding industries, although other factors were undoubtedly more directly responsible for that decline. At the present time the United States has a surplus of capital as shown in the increase in investments abroad and the private loans to foreign nations. In this respect, this country has an advantage over most of the other maritime nations and is in a better position to support a merchant marine.

BUSINESS INITIATIVE

Business ingenuity and initiative are required for the successful conduct of shipbuilding and shipping enterprises as in other fields of industry. It is generally acknowledged that American industrialists lead the world in organizing and managerial ability. By the application of mass-production methods and by the invention and use of labor-saving devices, American manufacturers have been able in many fields to meet competition in foreign markets despite the initial disadvantage of a high wage level. To the extent that the

qualities or characteristics which make for business success and that the methods of large-scale production can be applied to shipping and shipbuilding, the United States is in a favorable position for the development and maintenance of a merchant marine. Unfortunately, those two industries do not offer the opportunities for the adoption of the large-scale, mass-production methods applied, for example, in the automobile industry. American shipyards have never, except during the war period, operated under conditions of quantity production. In relatively few instances have duplicate ships been constructed. Until a more favorable situation in American shipyards is brought about by the establishment of a steady demand for the construction of vessels of the same type, little can be expected in the direction of mass-production methods. But even under the most favorable circumstances, it seems unlikely that the shipbuilding industry would achieve the results already obtained in other fields.¹

EXTENSIVE FOREIGN TRADE

Finally, the volume of American foreign trade and the fact that the greater part of that trade is ocean-borne constitute an advantage not possessed to as great an extent by some of the other maritime nations. The foreign trade of the United States, measured by value, is exceeded only by that of the United Kingdom. In 1927 American imports constituted 12.3% of the world's total and American exports 15.5%. The imports of the United Kingdom represented 17.4% and the exports 12.8%. The trade of other maritime countries was considerably below that of the United States and the United Kingdom, and in the case of Norway the figures were only 0.8% and 0.6% respectively.² At the present time the average annual cargo tonnage of American ocean-borne exports and imports combined is in excess of eighty million tons. While other factors in the situation, which will be subsequently discussed, make it difficult for American shipowners to furnish service equivalent to that of their competitors at the same

¹ On this point, see address of Mr. H. L. Ferguson, "Proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, pp. 28-33.

² U. S. Department of Commerce, "Commerce Year Book, 1928," Washington, D. C., 1928, Vol. II, p. 72.

cost to shippers, yet it should be recognized that the volume of American commerce is favorable to the development and maintenance of an American merchant marine. Moreover, to the extent that the foreign trade of the United States comprises manufactured goods or raw materials of high value in proportion to the bulk, the opportunity for profit is increased because those commodities can stand a higher rate than bulky low-valued commodities.

While these various natural and economic advantages have not in recent years been sufficient to overcome the adverse factors in the situation, they may prove of greater importance in the future. This applies particularly to the advantage arising out of the ability of American industrialists in the organization and management of private business enterprises. There is no reason to expect that private initiative and the American genius for organization will prove less energetic in the field of ship operation, when the incentive for the exercise of that initiative and genius arrives, than in other industrial fields. However, during the past fifty years these natural and economic advantages have not been sufficient to maintain more than a small merchant marine, notwithstanding various governmental measures which have been adopted from time to time with a view to stimulating private effort.

CHAPTER VIII

GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS FAVORABLE TO AN AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE

IN addition to the favorable elements in the situation discussed in the preceding chapter, the American merchant marine has certain other aids to its development arising out of the various governmental measures which have already been adopted to encourage and protect the American shipping industry. These measures include the exclusion of foreign shipping from the coastwise and intercoastal trades, the admission of foreign-built vessels to American registry subject to the provision that they must be used exclusively in foreign trade, and the assistance afforded under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.

RESERVATION OF THE COASTWISE TRADE

The ships of foreign nations have been excluded from the coasting trade of the United States since 1789. This policy was originally enforced by the imposition of a discriminatory tonnage tax which was effective in excluding foreign vessels. In 1817, Congress substituted a specific prohibition which has since remained in force. This prohibition has been extended to cover trade between the United States and its possessions, including Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico. Trade between this country and the Philippine Islands is, however, open to all vessels.¹

The reservation of the coasting trade was largely responsible for the maintenance of an American merchant marine during the period prior to the World War when American vessels had practically disappeared from the overseas foreign trades. It also contributed to the preservation of the Amer-

¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid to Merchant Shipping," Revised Edition, Washington, D. C., 1923, pp. 37 and 268. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provided for the extension of the coastwise law to the Philippines, but this provision has not been put in force. The questions involved will be subsequently discussed.

ican shipbuilding industry which, however, was chiefly dependent upon the construction of naval vessels. At the present time the tonnage of American shipping in the coastwise and intercoastal trades is greater than that of the entire merchant marine of any maritime nation with the exception of Great Britain. On January 1, 1929, the coastwise fleet of the United States comprised 714 vessels of 1000 gross tons and over with a total gross tonnage of 3,490,319 tons.¹ While the larger number of these vessels are not suitable for use in overseas trades or for national defense purposes, there are a few noteworthy exceptions. The *California* of 20,325 gross tons and with a speed of eighteen knots and the *Malolo* of 17,231 gross tons and a speed of twenty-one knots are both recent additions to the coastal trade which could in an emergency be shifted into foreign trade or utilized as cruisers or transports. The fact that these two vessels, as well as all other ships built since the war for coastwise service, would undoubtedly not have been constructed but for the assurance of protection against foreign competition afforded by the policy of exclusion is indicative of the importance of that policy as a factor in the maintenance of an American merchant marine.

FREE SHIPS

The admission of foreign-built vessels to American registry for use in foreign trade is intended to relieve ship operators of the burden resulting from the higher cost of ship construction in American shipyards. Prior to 1912, the only vessels which could be documented under the American flag were those built in the United States. In that year, this exclusive policy was modified by the provisions of the Panama Canal Act which permitted the registration of foreign-built ships not over five years old. Such vessels, however, could not be employed in the coasting trade. Subsequently, the age limitation was removed by the Ship Registry Act of August 18, 1914. In 1917, emergency legislation was passed permitting foreign vessels admitted under the

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, Bureau of Research, Division of Statistics, "Quarterly Report on the Employment of American Merchant Marine Vessels," Report D. S. No. 300, January 1, 1929. Lake and river tonnage was excluded.

Ship Registry Act to operate in the coasting trade for limited periods and under specified conditions. This permission was withdrawn by Section 22 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which, however, provided that registered foreign-built vessels owned by American citizens on February 1, 1920, or by the United States on June 5, 1920, when sold to American citizens, might engage in the coasting trade.¹ The law as it now stands allows American ship operators to purchase vessels abroad and bring them under American registry for employment solely in foreign trade.

While the privilege of purchasing ships where they can be obtained most cheaply is an advantage from the viewpoint of the ship operator, the American shipbuilding industry is adversely affected through direct exposure to foreign competition except in the case of vessels intended for coastal service.² Moreover, only during the war period, when circumstances made it expedient for American shipowners to bring their foreign registered ships under the American flag, has any considerable amount of foreign-built shipping been added under the provisions of the Ship Registry Act. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, only twenty-six foreign vessels totaling 9,926 gross tons were admitted to American registry, of which but three were over 5,000 gross tons, while twelve were under 100 gross tons in size. Fourteen of the twenty-six vessels were yachts.³

AIDS PROVIDED BY MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1928

The most important contribution toward the development and maintenance of an American merchant marine is the direct assistance provided in the Merchant Marine Act of 1928. The two chief features of that Act are the extension of a larger measure of assistance in connection with the

¹ The foreign-built shipping made eligible by this legislation for use in the coasting trade amounted to nearly one million gross tons. See, U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid to Merchant Shipping," *op. cit.*, p. 429.

² It should also be noted that the absence of restrictions on the use of American-built vessels may induce a ship operator to purchase such a vessel rather than a cheaper foreign vessel even though he intends to use it in foreign trade because the foreign-built vessel would not have as wide a market for possible subsequent sale and could not be transferred to the coasting trade if operation in foreign trade proved unprofitable.

³ "Merchant Marine Statistics," 1928, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

granting of construction loans and the authorization of a system of mail contracts.

Construction Loans

The construction loan fund was originally created under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Section 11, which provided for the setting aside out of the revenues of the Shipping Board during a period of five years a sum not exceeding \$25,000,000 to be used in aiding American citizens in the construction of vessels in private American shipyards. The provisions regarding the use of this fund were made explicit by amendatory legislation enacted in 1924,¹ which extended the period for another five years and prescribed that the interest to be charged on loans made by the Shipping Board should be not less than $5\frac{1}{4}\%$ per annum during any period when the vessel on which the loan was made was either inactive or operated exclusively in the coastwise trade, and $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ during the employment of the vessel in foreign trade. The Act of 1924 also permitted loans for the reconditioning or improvement of vessels already built and made the loan fund provisions applicable to vessels built or reconditioned in the navy yards as well as in private American shipyards. Another amendatory act in 1927² removed the five-year limit, increased the size of the fund to \$125,000,000, and specified that the fund itself should be revolving. In both the original Act and the amendment of 1924, it was provided that in no case should the amount of the loan exceed two-thirds of the cost of the vessel and that proper security should be provided to insure the repayment of all loans.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1928, under Title III, restates these provisions relating to the construction loan fund, with several important changes. The Shipping Board is again permitted to set aside as a loan fund \$125,000,000 out of revenues from sales. A future increase to \$250,000,000 through Congressional appropriation is also authorized, but the Act itself makes no appropriations. The maximum amount which the Board may loan on any vessel is raised to

¹ Public No. 205, 68th Congress, Approved June 6, 1924.

² Public No. 806, 69th Congress, Approved March 4, 1927.

three-fourths of the cost of that vessel and the interest to be charged during the operation of the vessel in foreign trade is reduced to that rate which represents the lowest rate of yield of any government obligation, except postal savings bonds, issued subsequent to April 6, 1917. Loans may be made for periods not to exceed twenty years¹ and shall be repayable in equal annual instalments or in full with accrued interest, at any time on thirty days' notice by the borrower. It is also provided that all vessels on which government loans are made shall remain documented under the laws of the United States at least twenty years and as long as any principal or interest on account of the loan remains due or unpaid.

The changes in the construction loan policy are designed to provide somewhat greater assistance to shipping interests than was afforded under the earlier legislation. It is believed that the low rate of interest charged during the periods when the vessel is engaged in foreign trade will help to offset the initial disadvantages which higher construction costs in the United States produce. In so far as stimulus is given to ship construction, the American shipbuilding industry will be benefited and the American merchant marine will be modernized and made more efficient. It is difficult to foresee to what extent these expectations will be realized. The administration of the loan fund is in the hands of the Shipping Board. It remains to be seen whether that agency by a wise and prudent exercise of its discretionary powers will avoid both the difficulties which loans to inexperienced persons might produce and the more serious danger of favoritism.

Mail Contracts

The other and most significant group of provisions in the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 comprises those dealing with the ocean mail service and fixing the terms on which government contracts for such service may be made. Before attempting to analyze these provisions, however, it is necessary to review briefly the conditions under which the ocean mail service has been heretofore conducted in order to indicate more clearly the changes introduced and the extent to which

¹ Prior to this Act the maximum duration of a loan was fifteen years.

governmental assistance to shipping is provided in the new mail contract system.

The Ocean Mail Act of 1891¹ authorized the Postmaster General to enter into contracts of not less than five or more than ten years' duration for carrying of mail to foreign countries, other than Canada, on certain prescribed terms. The vessels operating under such contracts were to be American-built, of approved design, and owned and officered by American citizens. It was also provided that during the first two years of the contract, one-fourth of the crew must be citizens; during the next three years, one-third; and for the rest of the term, one-half. Compensation was fixed on the basis of the size and speed of the vessels, and ranged from sixty-six and two-thirds cents per mile² for vessels of not less than 1,500 gross tons and a minimum speed of twelve knots to four dollars for vessels over 8,000 gross tons in size and with a speed of twenty knots. Although this legislation was in force from 1891 to 1928, relatively few contracts were made under it. Out of the total of \$41,962,930 paid for the carrying of foreign mails during the period from 1912 to 1921, only \$8,721,574 represented payments under the Act of 1891.³

The failure to make more general use of the contract provisions of the Act of 1891 is ascribed to the fact that its classification of vessels soon became antiquated and its fixed compensation rates were considered inadequate for the service required.⁴ To remedy the latter defect, supplementary provisions regarding mail contracts were included in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Section 24 of that Act empowered the Postmaster General to enter into contracts with the owners of American-built ships documented under the laws of the United States for mail service on the basis of just and reasonable rates determined upon jointly by the Postmaster General and the Shipping Board. Such contracts, however, were

¹ This Act was repealed by Section 414 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.

² For the outward voyage only.

³ U. S. 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 181.

⁴ The policy of the Post Office Department during the years preceding the World War was to use the vessels under contract whenever possible, particularly for heavy packets. As a result the amount paid during the fiscal year 1914-1915 for contract service was less than the amount which would have been paid for the same service if the vessels had not been under contract. U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid to Merchant Shipping," *op. cit.*, p. 43.

subject to the restriction that they should be within the limits of the appropriations made by Congress. The subsequent failure of Congress to make the appropriations required by long-time contracts rendered the effect of this legislation negligible. For many years the greater part of the foreign mail of the United States has been carried at rates of compensation fixed on the basis of weight. Vessels of American registry have been allowed eighty cents a pound for letters and postcards and eight cents a pound for other articles. Foreign vessels receive about thirty-five cents and four and one-half cents a pound for the two classes of mail, respectively, under the rates established by the Universal Postal Union.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1928, in the provisions under Title IV, establishes a new series of regulations and conditions governing contractual ocean mail service. Section 401 specifies that all ocean-borne mails of the United States shall, if practicable, be carried on vessels in respect of which a contract has been made under the provisions of this legislation.¹ Under Section 402, the Postmaster General is directed to certify to the United States Shipping Board what ocean mail routes, equitably distributed among the ports of the United States, should be established, the present and probable future volume of mail on such routes, the frequency of the service deemed advisable and other requirements necessary to provide adequate postal service. In the succeeding Section the Shipping Board is directed to determine the type, size and speed of the vessels which should be employed on the routes certified to meet the indicated service requirements. Sections 404 to 407 specify the conditions which shall govern the making of all mail contracts. It is provided that performance under a contract shall begin not more than three years after the contract is let and that the term of the contract shall not exceed ten years.² Vessels employed in ocean

¹ This and other corresponding provisions of the Act are not applicable to mail service between the United States and Canadian ports, other than those in Nova Scotia, or to service between American ports wherever the restrictions with respect to coastwise trade apply.

² In reply to a request for an interpretation of this provision made by the Postmaster General, the Comptroller General expressed the opinion that the Postmaster General was not authorized to enter into two contracts with the same company, one contract for ten years to go into effect at the end of three years, the other contract to operate during the three year period. *United States Daily*, August 6, 1928, p. 2.

mail service under such a contract shall be steel, steam or motor vessels and, with certain exceptions, must be American-built. The exceptions are vessels registered under the laws of the United States not later than February 1, 1928, and vessels actually ordered and under construction for the account of American citizens prior to that date. All vessels employed under these mail contracts must be registered under the laws of the United States during the entire time of such employment. Vessels built subsequent to the enactment of this legislation must either be constructed according to plans and specifications approved by the Secretary of the Navy or be otherwise useful in time of national emergency. It is also provided that a certain proportion of the crews on these vessels, in addition to all of the officers, must be American citizens. During the four years following the enactment of this law, this proportion is fixed at one-half of all employees of the ship, other than officers; thereafter, two-thirds. It is also provided that all proposed contracts shall be open to competitive bidding. Before making any contract, the Postmaster General is required to give public notice by advertisement calling for bids once a week for three weeks in selected newspapers of certain specified cities. Each contract shall be awarded to the lowest qualified bidder. While these restrictions upon the procedure of the Post Office Department are designed to protect the public interests and may be expected to prevent the evils which might occur under a policy of secret negotiation, competitive bidding has not played an important part in the actual making of mail contracts.

Sections 408 and 409 deal with the compensation to be allowed under these mail contracts. Provision is made for the division of the vessels employed in ocean mail service into seven classes on the basis of speed and tonnage and the maximum compensation allowed for each class is specified.¹ The minimum rate of speed at sea in ordinary weather and the minimum gross registered tonnage for each class of vessels together with maximum rate of compensation per nautical mile in each case are as follows:

¹ The Postmaster General may base the classification of vessel solely upon speed in cases where speed on a particular route is important and no other suitable vessel is available.

Class	Speed	Gross Tonnage	Compensation per Nautical Mile of 6,080 Feet
Class 7.....	10 knots	2,500 tons	\$1.50
Class 6.....	10 "	4,000 "	2.50
Class 5.....	13 "	8,000 "	4.00
Class 4.....	16 "	10,000 "	6.00
Class 3.....	18 "	12,000 "	8.00
Class 2.....	20 "	16,000 "	10.00
Class 1.....	24 "	20,000 "	12.00

It is provided that in each case the number of nautical miles by the shortest practicable route between the ports involved shall be determined and that payment shall be made on that basis for each outward voyage regardless of the mileage actually travelled. Additional compensation may be paid to vessels in Class 1, capable of maintaining a speed in excess of 24 knots, but the total compensation allowed in such case must not exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to \$12.00 as the speed of the vessel bears to 24 knots. The Postmaster General is also authorized to grant special compensation for airplane service in conjunction with vessels, provided the airplanes are American-built and owned and operated by citizens of the United States.

Other provisions relating to the contract mail service deal, respectively, with the action to be taken in case of the failure of the ship operator to maintain the service required, with the provision of suitable accommodations for mail messengers, and with the repeal of earlier legislation relating to ocean mail transportation.

Following the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 the Postmaster General proceeded to put the provisions relating to mail contracts into effect. At the end of 1928, twenty-two contracts had been made involving an annual expenditure of approximately eleven and one-half million dollars. It is estimated that this expenditure is about eight million dollars in excess of the previous cost of payment on the basis of weight. It has been the policy of the Post Office Department to insert in the contracts a provision requiring the construction in the future of new vessels. Thirty-two new vessels are thus provided for in the contracts already made.¹ Several applications for loans from the Shipping

¹ Statement of Mr. I. B. Campbell, "Proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, p. 73.

Board's construction loan fund have been made by the recipients of mail contracts, some of which had already been acted upon at the end of 1928. Prior to the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, no loans to aid in the construction of vessels intended for use in overseas foreign trade had been made from that fund. The first loan of that character was that granted on October 23, 1928 to the Export Steamship Corporation, which had already entered into a contract for the carriage of mail under the provisions of the new legislation. This loan amounted to about \$4,500,000 and represented three-fourths of the cost of four passenger and cargo vessels of about 8,200 gross tons each.¹ It is thus evident that the Act of 1928 has already given some stimulus to the American shipping and shipbuilding industries.

In certain respects the assistance already provided is considered inadequate by some American ship operators. In particular, those operators who are not in a position to obtain mail contracts, either because they operate cargo vessels not suited for mail service or because an American competitor in the same trade route has already been granted the contract for mail service, may be at a disadvantage. Furthermore, the mail contract system makes no provision for additional aid in the event of an increase or change in the amount, character or severity of the competition encountered by companies operating under mail contracts. The American Steamship Owners' Association favors legislation which will provide assistance for ship operators not under the mail contract system and recommends the amendment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 to authorize the Postmaster General, upon the Shipping Board's recommendation, to increase the payments under mail contracts when a change in the competitive situation makes such an increase necessary in order to insure the maintenance of a service.

¹ *New York Times*, October 24, 1928.

CHAPTER IX

DISADVANTAGES ARISING OUT OF WORLD COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS

THE factors favorable to the maintenance of an American merchant marine discussed in the preceding chapters are offset by numerous unfavorable factors. Except so far as the situation has been modified by the governmental assistance afforded under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, the competitive status of American vessels operating in foreign trade is not conducive to the expansion or even to the continued operation of the foreign shipping services now maintained under the American flag. Higher costs of ship construction and operation, restrictive governmental regulation, the competition of government-owned vessels, the aid received by competitors under foreign subsidy policies, the relative lack of experience in the shipping field and the present low freight rate level, all contribute to handicap American ship operators.

AMERICAN COSTS OF SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

The higher cost of ship construction in the United States in comparison with the cost in foreign countries necessitates a larger initial investment on the part of the American ship operator purchasing American-built vessels. This handicap may be avoided by buying foreign vessels for operation in foreign trade, but such a policy is not helpful to the maintenance of American shipyards. In the case of vessels purchased from the United States Shipping Board, the handicap of construction costs has been eliminated because, except in the initial sales, the prices paid for such vessels have been considerably below their cost of construction either here or abroad. Likewise, the general rise in money values has modified the situation with respect to vessels purchased prior to the World War. But the future maintenance of the Amer-

ican Merchant Marine and of the shipbuilding industry will require the replacement of ageing vessels with ships built in American shipyards, thereby re-introducing the cost differential which has been one of the handicaps upon ship operation for many years.

That the cost of constructing ships in American shipyards is greater than in most other countries is clearly established. The higher wage rates paid to shipyard employees and the higher cost of many of the materials required explain the higher construction costs.¹ But for purposes of this report the determination of the actual differences in cost is beset with difficulties. In the first place, comparisons of bids by American and foreign shipbuilding concerns do not show accurately the difference in construction costs unless those bids are made on identical plans, and even then the value of the comparison may be lessened by the fact that one of the bidders may, with a view to obtaining the business, figure on a smaller percentage of profit than his competitor. In the second place, the difference between American and foreign construction costs varies with different types of vessel, so that no single arbitrary figure can be assumed to represent the amount or degree of competitive advantage of foreign shipyards over those in the United States. Finally, American shipyards have been inactive, or engaged chiefly in repair work, for so long a period that it is impossible to determine what their construction costs would be in the event that improved conditions enabled them to operate at full capacity.

Estimates made some years ago indicated that then the cost of construction in American shipyards was about 25 per cent above that of British yards.² Recent estimates,

¹ An investigation of hourly wage rate in foreign countries of various classes of shipyard labor as of November and December, 1927, was made by the National Council of American Shipbuilders. It was found that the rates paid in the United States were approximately double those in Great Britain, which in turn were in most cases considerably in excess of those in other foreign countries. The price of steel was also found to be lower in Great Britain than in this country. National Council of American Shipbuilders, "Shipbuilding Data," 1928, Exhibits XIII and XV.

² "Government Aid to Merchant Shipping, A Study Prepared Under Direction United States Shipping Board," in 67th Congress, 2d Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 107. See, also, estimates made by the committee of National Merchant Marine Conference of 1925, in 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, pp. 849-852.

however, show a much greater differential. In a report issued in 1928, a comparison of American and British costs of construction for seven different vessels varying in type or size is presented which shows the American cost to be from 50% to 66% greater than the British cost.¹ These estimates correspond approximately with those made by the National Council of American Shipbuilders in 1926. The latter estimates were based upon the assumption that both the foreign and American shipyards were operating with a normal volume of work. Three types of oil-burning vessels were included in the survey of comparative costs, a cargo steamer of 10,000 deadweight tons, a tank steamer of 9,850 deadweight tons, and a passenger and cargo steamer of 7,057 gross tons. Data covering the various items of material and labor costs were obtained, in the case of the American estimates, from five large shipyards in this country; in the case of the British estimates, from foreign trade publications, American consulates and other sources. The man-hours of labor and the percentages of overhead expense and profit were assumed to be the same in both countries. The final results showed a higher domestic cost of 59% in the case of the cargo vessel, 60% in the case of the tanker and 54% in the case of the passenger and cargo steamer.² The cost differential at the present time is said to be no lower and is probably higher, because private American shipyards are operating below capacity, while many British yards are operating at from normal to full capacity.³ A committee representing the shipbuilding and shipowning interests is now engaged in an attempt to discover some way of reducing that differential.

The larger investment required of the American ship-operator who purchases an American-built vessel increases

¹ H. N. Laurie, "The American Merchant Marine," Vol. I, p. 14. An independent report in mimeographed form prepared for the United States Shipping Board and released March 4, 1928. The data on ship construction costs, it is stated, have been taken from a report by Alfred H. Haag. It should be noted that the percentage figures in the original data show the differences in cost as percentages of the higher American costs and range from 33% to 40%.

² "Shipbuilding Data," *op. cit.*, Exhibit XIII.

³ Statement of Mr. H. G. Smith, Vice-President of the National Council of American Shipbuilders at the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine, "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, p. 23.

the overhead items in his operating costs, particularly in connection with the fixed charges of interest, depreciation and insurance. In the absence of governmental assistance in the form of construction loans at a low rate of interest, American and foreign shipowners must provide for the payment of approximately six per cent on the capital borrowed, either from banking interests or through the sale of securities, for purposes of ship construction. The average life of a vessel is estimated at twenty years so that an additional annual allowance of five per cent must be made for depreciation. The hazards of fire and shipwreck necessitate insurance which involves a yearly charge of at least four per cent of the ship's value. During the first year of operation, therefore, approximately fifteen per cent on the invested capital must be set aside from the earnings to take care of these fixed charges. Assuming that an American shipowner operates a vessel costing \$1,500,000 and his British competitor a similar vessel costing \$1,000,000, the former during the first year has fixed charges amounting to \$225,000, or \$75,000 more than his British competitor. In subsequent years the amount of the fixed charges in each case would be reduced, but the relationship between them would remain the same.

In addition to the matter of fixed charges, there is another differential in the cost of operating American ships arising out of the higher standards of wages and subsistence on American vessels. Data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that in 1926 the monthly wage rate of able seamen was \$62 on the vessels of the United States Shipping Board, \$60 on those of private American operators, \$44 on British vessels and \$17 and \$22 on French and German vessels, respectively. The wage rates for other shipping occupations were substantially higher on American vessels than those on British vessels, except in the case of ship carpenters, where the British and private American were rated the same. British rates in turn were higher than those of the other maritime countries.¹ A comparison of monthly wage and subsistence costs in 1927 based on statements obtained from the United States Shipping Board showed a combined monthly

¹ U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Monthly Labor Review*, August, 1927, pp. 125-129.

cost of \$4,041 on an American oil-burning cargo vessel of 9,001 deadweight tons, as compared with a cost of \$2,690.42 on a similar British vessel of approximately the same size.¹ With respect to subsistence costs alone it has been estimated that the average cost of food per man per day in 1925 was 45 cents on British vessels and 57 cents on American vessels.² The maximum allowance on vessels operated under the control of the United States Shipping Board is 60 cents per man per day.³

Another item of expense regarded by American ship operators as of minor importance in comparison with those already discussed is related to repairs. As in the case of ship construction, the labor element in connection with the making of repairs in American ports tends to increase the cost. Moreover, under a provision of the Tariff Act of 1922,⁴ a duty of 50 per cent is imposed on the cost of all repairs made in foreign ports. While this tax may be refunded if it can be shown that the repairs in question were necessary to enable the ship to continue its voyage, the effect of this legislation on the whole tends to increase repair costs. These costs constitute an item of some importance in connection with ship operation. In the case of the Export Steamship Corporation, repairs, during the year 1927, covering four voyages for each of the twenty-one vessels operated, cost approximately \$160,000 or an average of \$7,619 for each vessel.⁵ In the case of the government-owned shipping operated under the control of the Merchant Fleet Corporation, the total expenditures for the maintenance of the active cargo fleet during the fiscal year 1927 were \$3,740,000.⁶ These figures indicate that, while the differential arising out of repair costs does not

¹ "Recommendations of the American Steamship Owners' Association, Pacific American Steamship Association and Shipowners' Association of the Pacific Coast for the Permanent Establishment of an American Merchant Marine in Foreign Trade made to the United States Shipping Board, January 10, 1928," Appendix A, pp. 14-15.

² Report of National Merchant Marine Conference, 1925, in 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 856.

³ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1928, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁴ Section 466.

⁵ U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 87.

⁶ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1927, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

constitute as great a handicap upon ship operation under the American flag as the differential of construction and wage cost, it is nevertheless a factor contributing to the competitive inequality between American and foreign shipowners.

REGULATORY LEGISLATION

Among the factors tending to increase the operating costs of American vessels are the various governmental regulatory measures applied to shipping, particularly the La Follette Seamen's Act of 1915. It is sometimes asserted that that Act constitutes the chief handicap upon the successful operation of shipping under the American flag.¹ The principal features of the Seamen's Act are: (1) the provision that seventy-five per cent of the crew in each department shall be able to understand any order given by the officers; (2) the provision that sixty-five per cent of the deck crew exclusive of licensed officers and apprentices shall be able-bodied seamen; (3) the provision that at each port upon demand seamen shall be paid one-half of the wages then earned; and (4) the requirement that while at sea, the sailors be divided into at least two and the firemen, oilers and water-tenders into at least three watches. The first of these provisions has the effect of preventing the employment of aliens who do not understand the English language, particularly Orientals, who otherwise would probably be employed to a larger extent by American vessels operating on the Pacific. The second provision compels the employment of experienced seamen and restricts the labor supply of American ship operators.² The third requirement facilitates desertion and contributes to undermine discipline. It is stated that sea-

¹ A. H. Ulm, "American Ships under Foreign Flags," *Barron's, the National Financial Weekly*, April 23, 1928, p. 5; Robert Phillips, "Our Merchant Marine Problem," *Barron's*, September 24, 1928, p. 5. See, also, address by Mr. James A. Farrell on "American Maritime Policy," in 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 319. Immediately after the enactment of the Seamen's Act, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company abandoned its trans-Pacific service and sold several of its ships, contending that it could not operate under the provisions of that law.

² It has been alleged by the President of the International Seamen's Union of America, Mr. Andrew Furnseth, that this provision is not properly enforced and that able seamen's certificates are given to men who are not really able seamen. See, 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 159.

men, having been paid as required at foreign ports, not infrequently desert or return to their ships in a condition which renders them unfit to perform their duties. The American Steamship Owners' Association has suggested that provision be made by amendment of the law for the retention by the master of a vessel of the wages due at foreign ports in cases where the previous record of a seaman evidences the need of such action.¹ The provision regarding the division of the crew into watches has been held to apply to all sailors on board. Shipowners are, therefore, not permitted "to employ during the daytime and to lay off at night, sailors not needed for the navigation of the ship but only required for its upkeep. This has not only increased the costs of operation to the owner, but has produced a situation equally unsatisfactory to the men."²

GOVERNMENT COMPETITION

In addition to the burden of higher operating costs and restrictive governmental regulation, private American shipowners in foreign trade are faced with governmental competition in two forms, first, that resulting from the operation of the government-owned vessels of the United States Shipping Board and, secondly, that arising out of the subsidization of competitors by foreign governments.

It would be impossible to determine to what extent private American shipping interests have been adversely affected by the operation of the government-owned fleet. Prior to 1923, direct competition between government-owned and privately-owned shipping appears to have existed in some instances. The operation of four government vessels in the coastwise trade from 1920 to 1923 is a case in point.³ Direct competition is also indicated in the statement in the Shipping Board's report for 1922 that "while the trade from the United States, North Atlantic to the west coast of South America was in a measure served by privately-owned American-flag steamers, adequately to meet the requirements, a monthly service was

¹ "Recommendations of the American Steamship Owners' Association," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

² *Idem.*

³ U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1923, p. 72.

also maintained with Shipping Board vessels."¹ In recent years, direct competition between private lines and those operated under the supervision of the Merchant Fleet Corporation has been theoretically avoided. A Congressional investigating committee reported in 1925 that there was no evidence of such competition.² But the existence of direct competition in at least one instance is evidenced by the rate war, involving the American-owned Isthmian Line as well as several foreign lines, which resulted from the establishment by the Shipping Board in 1927 of a service between New York and India.³ Moreover, indirect competition is equally unfair to private American ship operators. It seems probable that at least part of the trade carried, usually at a loss, by government-owned vessels would have been secured by private American interests in the absence of the Shipping Board competition. Then, too, the allegation that the operations of the Shipping Board have been instrumental in keeping down shipping rates suggests that perhaps American exporters have profited at the expense of American as well as foreign shipowners. It is asserted that instances are not lacking where the agent operators of Shipping Board Lines have cut rates in competition with private American lines.⁴ Another particular case of rate reduction viewed with disfavor by private shipping interests is that made by the government-owned Panama Railroad Steamship Line in the carriage of freight for the Government. Such freight is carried at twenty-five per cent below the commercial rates. It is also charged that the Panama Steamship Line, by extending its operations to the West Indies in an effort to obtain return cargoes, has entered into direct competition with private lines.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, 1922, p. 112.

² U. S., 69th Congress, 1st Session, "Report of the Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations, Policies and Affairs of the United States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation," House Report No. 2, Washington, D. C., 1925, p. 18.

³ U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 222; *Journal of Commerce*, August 14, 1928, p. 1; *Daily Freight Record*, August 10, 1928; U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1928, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Nation's Business*, July, 1927, p. 90.

⁵ Chester Leasure, "Bureaucracy Puts Out to Sea," *Nation's Business*, August, 1927, p. 41. See, also, "Our Unfair Government," by the same writer, *Nation's Business*, January, 1929.

The question of whether or not direct competition exists between the government-owned shipping and that of private operators is, however, subordinate to the broader aspects of the situation. Private shipping interests would have no reason to fear government competition if the government-owned ships were operated on a business basis. But the competitive relationship will remain unequal as long as the government operations are conducted without regard to profit or loss. Not only unfair competition, but the very fear of it created by continued government ownership, has probably tended to paralyze the development of a privately-operated merchant marine. The uncertainty regarding future governmental policy toward the merchant marine problem has contributed not a little toward bringing about the present unsatisfactory situation in the shipping field.

FOREIGN SUBSIDY POLICIES

The American merchant marine has, to some extent at least, encountered a further obstacle as a result of the fact that foreign competitors have been assisted in various ways by their respective governments. It is difficult to determine how far the special favors enjoyed by foreign shipping interests have placed American shipowners in a disadvantageous position. In the first place, the amount of financial assistance granted in each case, either directly or indirectly, can not be accurately measured, not only because the details of the arrangements between foreign governments and individual shipping concerns are not always disclosed, but also because certain services are frequently required on the part of the shipowner which may partially offset the financial consideration. In the second place, a substantial part of the assistance given by foreign governments goes to shipping interests which are not directly competing with American companies. Since it is not possible to segregate the amount of aid received by actual competitors, the extent to which the various policies of foreign countries in aiding the development of their respective merchant marines impose a competitive handicap upon American shipping can not be determined. But the existence of such a handicap is nevertheless apparent

and justifies a brief survey of some of these foreign governmental policies.

Several nations have aided or are now aiding their shipping and shipbuilding industries through the medium of loans for ship construction purposes. The British Government, in 1903, advanced 2,600,000 pounds sterling to the Cunard Steamship Company at $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent to enable it to build the *Mauretania* and *Lusitania*.¹ Under the Trade Facilities Act of 1921, provision was made for loans to shipbuilders to encourage ship construction in British yards. Since 1922, the policy of the Government has been to guarantee loans raised from private sources rather than to advance government funds.² France grants similar aid to her shipbuilding industry through an arrangement made in 1928 with the Credit Foncier de France, under which the Government assumes part of the interest charges, thus reducing the rate to 4% on loans for the construction of vessels in French shipyards, provided the engines and boilers are also constructed in France.³ Sweden maintains a construction loan fund of 23,000,000 crowns from which loans at 5% are made which are payable in ten years.⁴ Spain and Italy grant construction bounties to encourage domestic shipbuilding and shipping.⁵

Subsidies or subventions are paid to individual shipping companies by a number of countries on condition that certain services shall be maintained. This policy has been followed for many years by Great Britain, one of the chief recipients of such aid being the Cunard Steamship Company.⁶ France, likewise, subsidizes several of the important French

¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid to Merchant Shipping," *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 291. One of the conditions imposed was that the Cunard Line should remain British.

² Report of the National Merchant Marine Conference, 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 868.

³ *Commerce Reports*, June 4, 1928, p. 587; *ibid.*, August 13, 1928, p. 436.

⁴ *Ibid.*, September 3, 1928, p. 600. Loans were formerly made at four per cent. During the first two years of the loan only payment of the interest is required.

⁵ R. W. Baker, "New Subsidies for Spanish Shipping and Shipbuilding," *Commerce Reports*, October 19, 1925, p. 157; *ibid.*, July 18, 1927, p. 151; E. T. Chamberlain, "Italian Ship-Subsidy System," U. S. Department of Commerce, *Trade Information Bulletin*, No. 529, Washington, D. C., 1928, pp. 12-14.

⁶ U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid," *op. cit.*, p. 302.

steamship companies.¹ Approximately one-half of the shipping tonnage of Italy is subsidized under a system recently adopted by that country and calling for an estimated annual expenditure of about \$9,083,000.² Japan, which formerly granted general navigation bounties, now restricts such bounties to particular companies maintaining important services.³ Brazil recently granted an annual subsidy of about \$2,250,000 to the Lloyd Brasileiro Navigation Company to support the maintenance of passenger service to Europe and freight services from Brazil to Liverpool, New York and New Orleans.⁴ Chile has adopted a subsidy policy which may be applied to private shipowners as well as to the national steamship companies.⁵ These are outstanding examples of the foreign subsidization of steamship lines.

Discriminations of various types have also been employed as a method of giving indirect assistance to national shipping interests. Before the war, the German system included the granting of preferential rates on the government railroads to exports carried on certain German steamship lines. The abandonment of such discrimination was required, however, under the terms of the Peace Treaty. The imposition of higher tariff rates on goods imported or exported in foreign ships has also been tried in the past by various countries. At the present time the only country making extensive use of that policy is Portugal. That country, under legislation adopted in 1922, grants a reduction of 10% in the export charges on merchandise exported in Portuguese ships to Portuguese colonies, and a reduction of 20% in the case of exports to foreign countries carried in Portuguese vessels. Foreign ships are also required to pay all duties and changes in pounds sterling at par value, while Portuguese

¹ See in regard to the contract with the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, *Commerce Reports*, August 13, 1928, p. 436. The contract with the Compagnie de Navigation Sud-Atlantique is described in *Commerce Reports*, September 3, 1928, p. 600.

² Chamberlain, *op. cit.*, p. 17. The chief recipients are the steamship lines maintaining services between Italy and her colonies.

³ H. A. Butts, "Japanese Shipping Subsidies," *Commerce Reports*, December 12, 1927, p. 673. Subsidized vessels are subject to governmental regulation of freight rates.

⁴ *Commerce Reports*, March 12, 1928, p. 709; *ibid.*, September, 1928, p. 807. The maintenance of coastwise services was also included.

⁵ *Ibid.*, March 26, 1928, p. 837.

ships are permitted to pay in the depreciated domestic currency. A tax is also imposed on passenger fares in the case of foreign vessels.¹

While Portugal is the only country making general use of the policy of preferential treatment as a method of aiding merchant marine development, instances of discrimination against foreign vessels or of special favors to national shipping interests are found in the case of other countries. Complaint has been made that the Italian Government permits the visaing without charge of the passports of persons traveling to Italy on Italian ships.² Under Australian customs regulations, imports from the United States are subject to a lower valuation and consequently lower duties if transported through a Canadian port than when imported directly from the United States.³ The Canadian customs law limits the application of certain preferential tariffs on imports to commodities imported directly through Canadian ports.⁴

In addition to the various measures of government aid to foreign shipping outlined above, the policy of the German Government in dealing with the situation in the German shipping industry following the war, although not strictly a system of government aid, merits consideration because of its effect upon the competitive status of German ship operations. As a result of the war, during which a large amount of German shipping was destroyed or seized by the Allied Nations, and as a consequence of compliance with the reparation requirement of the Peace Treaty, the German merchant marine was greatly depleted. By an arrangement made between the Government and the German shipowners, the latter were partially indemnified for their losses provided they built or purchased a specified amount of shipping tonnage.⁵ This arrangement has resulted in a remarkable expansion in recent years of the total tonnage under the German flag. Germany in 1928 ranked fourth in the amount of shipping tonnage owned and had practically replaced its lost

¹ U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid," *op. cit.*, p. 403.

² U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1928, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18. See, also, *New York Times*, January 30, 1929.

⁵ U. S. Department of Commerce, "Government Aid," *op. cit.*, p. 377.

tonnage. Moreover, the present German merchant marine consists almost entirely of new vessels embodying the latest improvements in ship construction. A large number of these vessels are motor ships which can be more economically operated than other types of shipping. This serves to give to German ship operators a special advantage over their foreign competitors.

RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE

A further handicap upon the maintenance of an American merchant marine is that arising out of the relative inexperience of American shipping interests in comparison with their competitors. A few American companies have been established for many years, but in the overseas trades practically all of the services under the American flag are of recent origin. Competing foreign steamship lines have in most instances been in business for a considerable period of years and have not only an established reputation but also a highly developed business organization both abroad and in the United States. Moreover, in such allied fields as marine insurance, foreign countries, particularly Great Britain, have considerably more experience.¹ This general lack of experience is undoubtedly somewhat of a handicap upon the maintenance of an American merchant marine, but unlike most of the other unfavorable factors in the situation it may be eliminated by the lapse of time.

WORLD SURPLUS OF SHIPPING

Another handicap, likewise more or less temporary in character, is the present highly competitive situation in the shipping field brought about largely by the surplus of shipping facilities. It is generally admitted that at the present time there is an excess of shipping in comparison with the requirements of international trade.² In a recent report by

¹ The question of whether or not American ship operators are being subjected to unfair discrimination with respect to either hull or cargo insurance is a matter of considerable controversy.

² See, League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section, International Economic Conference, Documentation, "Shipbuilding," Geneva, Switzerland, 1927, p. 7; also, *European Finance*, London, England, February 8, 1929, p. 89.

the British Chamber of Shipping it is pointed out that the combined entrances and clearances in 1928 of the ships of seven countries, representing seventy per cent of the world's shipping, show an increase of thirty-three per cent in comparison with 1913, while it is estimated that the total volume of sea-borne trade has not increased more than ten per cent.¹ This excess of shipping is reflected in the present relatively low level of ocean freight rates.² The continued activity of foreign shipyards would seem to indicate that there will be no readjustment of the situation in the immediate future. In 1928 the total world tonnage of merchant vessels launched during the year was 2,669,239 gross tons as compared with 2,285,679 gross tons in 1927.³ The addition of new and fast foreign vessels in the transatlantic service is already assured. It seems probable, therefore, that American ship-owners operating in foreign trade will encounter the keenest kind of competition for years to come.

It is evident from this survey of the situation that the competitive status of the American merchant marine in foreign trade is in many respects unfavorable. However, the governmental assistance provided under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 may be expected to place American ship operators in a better position to meet foreign competition. But certain types of cargo carriers, including tankers, receive no benefit from the mail contract system. Moreover, whether or not that assistance will prove sufficient to overcome the indicated obstacles in the case of the recipients of mail contracts can not be foreseen at the present time.

¹ *The Economist*, London, England, March 2, 1929, p. 435.

² Indices of freight rates for tramp shipping are given regularly by the *Economist* and the *Statist*, both published in London, England. No satisfactory index of liner rates is available.

³ *Commerce and Finance*, February 13, 1929, p. 365. A summary of the figures issued by Lloyds.

CHAPTER X

DISADVANTAGES ARISING OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SITUATION

IN attempting to maintain a merchant marine, the United States is handicapped not only by the specific unfavorable competitive factors described in the preceding chapter, but also by certain general elements in the foreign trade situation. The profitable operation of ships and particularly the maintenance of regular liner services is possible only under conditions which assure a relatively large and constant volume of incoming and outgoing cargo. Any factor or change in the trade relations between this country and foreign countries which tends to diminish or render uncertain the volume of American exports or imports reacts unfavorably upon the shipping employed in the carriage of those exports and imports. Tariff policies and international financial relationships play an important part in determining the character and volume of world trade and indirectly affect the distribution of world shipping. The present chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the unfavorable influence of American trade relationships and the financial position of the United States upon the maintenance of an American merchant marine.¹

AMERICAN TARIFF POLICY

The tariff policy of the United States is at least theoretically an obstacle to foreign trade upon which the maintenance of a merchant marine largely depends. The theory of protection is based upon the belief that the development of the domestic market is of greater importance than the development of foreign markets. Experience seems to have fully justified this belief so far as manufacturing is concerned. But

¹ Other aspects of the present situation are more fully discussed elsewhere. See National Industrial Conference Board, "The International Financial Position of the United States" and "The Foreign Trade of the United States."

the American merchant marine, with the exception of vessels engaged in the coastal trade, has no interest in the development of the domestic market. On the contrary, shipping in foreign trade depends upon the cultivation of foreign markets and upon the international exchange of commodities. If the American protective policy were carried to the extreme limit by the imposition of prohibitive import duties upon all foreign commodities, whether in the nature of raw materials or manufactured articles, which competed directly or indirectly with commodities produced or manufactured in the United States, the volume of imports would be greatly reduced, the inability of foreign countries to offer commodities in exchange for American exports would substantially lessen the volume of those exports and the maintenance of an American merchant marine would not be feasible. While the adoption of such an extreme tariff policy is highly improbable, the imaginary situation described illustrates the possible adverse influence of a protectionist policy upon the operation of shipping in foreign trade.

In actual practice, the American tariff policy does not seem to have had any appreciable effect upon the total volume of American exports and imports. This is probably due in part to the fact that there is a wide range of commodities upon which no duties are imposed, and in part to the increased demand for imported raw materials on the part of domestic manufacturing industries stimulated by tariff protection. But the policy of protection has modified the volume and character of the trade between the United States and individual foreign countries and has contributed to bring about a lack of balance between the volume of exports and the volume of imports on certain trade routes. Where this unbalanced situation occurs the operation of direct steamship services may be handicapped since the limited amount of cargo in one direction may necessitate the unprofitable use of ballast. For example, the imposition of duties on the manufactured products of Europe, has undoubtedly reduced the volume of imports from that part of the world. If those commodities were admitted free of duty, the increase in import cargo tonnage would contribute to remedy the unbalanced situation arising out of the fact that the volume of American exports

to Europe, which comprise chiefly bulky foodstuffs and raw materials, is greatly in excess of imports. Similarly, the exclusion of wheat, wool and meat from Argentina and Australia has continued to render unbalanced the trade of the United States with those countries. The protective tariff is not solely responsible for the lack of balance in American foreign trade, but it is undoubtedly a factor in the situation.

But the tariff policy of the United States may also be considered as an unfavorable factor in relation to the maintenance of an American merchant marine because, while the policy of protection is firmly established, the duties levied under that policy are subject to constant change. An increase in the duty on certain commodities, or the imposition of new duties on articles previously admitted free of duty, may have a disturbing influence upon the trade between the United States and particular countries. This is especially true where the tariff change affects a commodity imported in considerable quantity from one country or region of the world. For example, any increase in the duty on sugar which would be effective in cutting down the importation of that commodity would seriously affect trade with Cuba. The total volume of imports from that country amounted to 4,551,289 tons during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, of which 2,877,619 tons consisted of sugar and 1,033,710 tons of molasses.¹ If a similar duty were placed upon sugar from the Philippines, trade with those islands would likewise be materially reduced. Jute and jute manufactures constitute nearly one-half of the import tonnage from India; pulpwood and wood pulp approximately two-thirds of the import tonnage from Sweden. Tariff changes which restricted the importation of those commodities would have a disturbing effect upon trade with those two countries. These are outstanding examples of the dependence of trade upon the continued importation of the products of other countries. They emphasize the need for a stable tariff policy and for the avoidance of frequent changes if the development of an American merchant marine is undertaken. The maintenance of direct services between

¹ U. S. Shipping Board, Bureau of Research, "Imports and Exports of Commodities by United States Coastal Districts and Foreign Trade Regions," Report D. S. No. 275.

the United States and foreign countries can be successfully achieved only if there is assurance that trade will not be subjected to unduly disturbing influences.

Finally, the tariff policy of the United States is in part responsible for the use of the services provided by foreign ship operators. Foreign trade consists of an exchange of goods, services and securities, and this country must accept the products of other countries or their equivalent in service or securities in order to retain a market for American exports. The exclusion of foreign manufactured products under the protective tariff policy makes it necessary for the United States to use or rely upon foreign services to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case. It is estimated that the present value of all such services represents more than fourteen per cent of the total value of the combined items on the import or debit side of the balance of payments in American foreign trade.¹ Shipping is one of the forms of foreign service. An increase in the use of foreign shipping for the transportation of American commerce would increase the purchasing power of foreign countries and thus expand the market for American exports. The development of a large merchant marine would, on the other hand, deprive foreign countries, to some extent, of the opportunity of providing shipping service in exchange for American exports of goods and services. Furthermore, any increase in tariff schedules tending to lessen the present volume of imports would react unfavorably on the foreign market for American exports unless foreign purchasing power were maintained by the increased acceptance of foreign services including shipping or securities. But the payments made by American exporters and importers to foreign ship operators constitute a relatively small item in the list of what are classed as services rendered by foreign countries. The invisible import in the form of ocean and Great Lakes freight costs in 1927 has been estimated at \$149,000,000,² or about 10.3 per cent of the combined value of all foreign services and about 1.5 per cent of the total visible

¹ See, National Industrial Conference Board, "International Financial Position of the United States."

² Ray Hall, "The Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1927," U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Trade Information Bulletin*, No. 552, Washington, D. C., 1928, p. 7.

and invisible import items. The expenditures of Americans overseas, which are treated as a service item, were more than three times as large in 1927 and 1928 as the payments for foreign shipping service.¹ It is evident, therefore, that unless there are other substantial changes in the existing financial and trade relationships of the United States, neither the increased or decreased use of foreign shipping services would seriously affect the situation.

CREDITOR POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

It is possible, however, that the present creditor position of the United States will ultimately effect certain changes which might introduce economic pressure in the direction of a greater use of foreign shipping services. The repayment of foreign indebtedness, private and governmental, has thus far had no noteworthy influence upon the trade relations of this country because the sale of foreign securities in the United States has obviated the increased importation of foreign commodities or the increased use of foreign services. But the accumulation of investments abroad will in time probably involve substantial interest payments to the United States in the form of either goods or services. The completion of the economic recovery of Europe may be expected to curtail American investments abroad. Likewise, a contraction of credit or a recession of prosperity in this country would restrict the purchase of foreign securities. In either case, economic forces would bring about the payment of European interest or debt obligations at least in part in the form of goods or services. Since the tariff is an obstacle to any expansion in the volume of imports from the debtor countries of Europe, the rendering of services would play an increasingly important part in the adjustment of the trade balance between the United States and the rest of the world. In the event that there was a reduction in the expenditures of American tourists abroad or in the remittances of immigrants—and such reductions would naturally follow any lessening of existing

¹ Overseas tourist expenditures, including those in the West Indies, amounted to \$465 millions in 1927 and \$518 millions in 1928. In addition, the expenditures of American tourists in Canada and Mexico are estimated at \$231 millions in 1927 and \$264 millions in 1928.

prosperity in this country—shipping might conceivably become an important medium for the payment of foreign indebtedness to the United States.¹ To take advantage of this situation and to protect their gold reserves, the debtor nations which are leading maritime nations, might be expected to increase the subsidization of their respective merchant fleets in order to enable them to secure increased American patronage. This would intensify competition in the shipping field and further handicap the American merchant marine.

The future course of events may prove that the international financial and trade relationships between the United States and foreign countries are less unfavorable to the operation of shipping in foreign trade under the American flag than has been indicated. But it is evident that those relationships constitute an aspect of the problem and must be recognized in the formulation of a proper public policy. In particular a stable tariff and a method for the settlement of foreign indebtedness appear to be necessary if this country is to develop and maintain a substantial merchant marine.

¹ For a more exhaustive discussion of the subject of foreign indebtedness, see, National Industrial Conference Board, "The International Financial Position of the United States."

PART III
SUGGESTED MEANS FOR IMPROVING THE
AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE AND
ITS SERVICES

CHAPTER XI

SUBSIDIES AND SUBVENTIONS

ALTHOUGH governmental assistance has been provided through the construction loan and mail contract policies established by the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, that assistance is not considered fully adequate by many merchant marine advocates. While construction loans are available on the prescribed terms to all American ship operators, the number of possible mail contracts is limited. Where two or more American operators maintain services over practically the same trade route, only one of them can be aided by the mail contract system. Moreover, the ordinary cargo vessel does not have the speed required for mail service and is not in a position to secure the benefit of a mail contract unless other faster vessels are not available. The differential in construction and operating costs is higher for that type of vessel than for the large passenger liner, so that the former has greater need for governmental assistance. Under these circumstances, it is urged that additional aid, either direct or indirect, is required to insure the maintenance of adequate shipping services under the American flag. The present chapter is a discussion of the various forms of direct aid which have been suggested to supplement the assistance provided under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.

GENERAL NAVIGATION BOUNTIES

General navigation bounties have frequently been proposed as a method of aiding American shipping. In 1922, a bill embodying that type of assistance was introduced in Congress and was passed by the House of Representatives but failed of adoption in the Senate. The enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 has removed from the field of discussion the subject of general bounties, but it is still suggested that such aid might properly be granted to the owners of American vessels operating in foreign trade which

are not performing mail service under contract for the Government.¹ General navigation bounties usually take the form of direct payments to shipowners, the amount in each case being determined on the basis of the tonnage or speed of the vessel, the mileage covered or any combination of these factors. It may be assumed in the absence of any specific proposal that the same method would be applied if the bounty system was not general in character but was restricted to ships not engaged in mail service. But regardless of the amount of direct aid or the method of payment, such aid would not be compensation for services rendered to the Government except in so far as the vessels aided might in the future be used for naval auxiliary purposes.

This type of direct aid to shipping without an equivalent return in service to the Government is advocated primarily on the theory that the shipping industry should be given the same amount of protection against foreign competition as manufacturing industries under the protective tariff. All American vessels engaged in foreign trade, it is argued, are entitled to governmental assistance in some form, since they are all under the same handicap of higher operating costs as compared with their foreign competitors. But even if this view is not accepted, such aid is considered justified on the ground that general cargo vessels and tankers not suitable for mail service are nevertheless important both as naval auxiliaries and as an instrumentality for the development of foreign trade. Furthermore, the opinion has been expressed that the small-scale operators who own individually only a few freighters form the backbone of the nation's merchant marine and exhibit the greatest efficiency.² If this is the case, it might be argued that these small owners who are not in a position to obtain mail contracts should be given the encouragement of governmental protection. This, in brief, is a statement of the case in behalf of direct aid not contingent upon the performance of specific service for the Government.

¹ Such aid was said to be favored by the American Steamship Owners' Association in a statement by Mr. H. B. Walker, its President, before the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine. See, "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, p. 119.

² See statement of Mr. C. D. Mallory, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 1257.

On the other hand, the case against such direct aid as a supplement to the mail contract system comprises some forceful arguments. In the first place, the adoption of any policy involving the giving by the Government of direct financial assistance to private enterprise, except as compensation for services rendered, would establish a precedent for other demands upon the public treasury. Moreover, it is argued, subsidies or bounties tend to encourage inefficiency. For example, persons without experience would be induced by the assurance of government aid to enter the shipping field. Finally, bounties or subsidies in addition to the contract payments for mail service would produce an excessive artificial stimulation of shipping industry. An over-development of shipping facilities might reasonably be anticipated to result from any unrestricted payment of bounties on the basis of tonnage or mileage covered. Such over-development would increase competition in the shipping field to the detriment of American ship operators, thereby giving rise to demands for additional governmental aid.

TRADE ROUTE SUBVENTIONS

Another policy of direct aid which might be used to supplement the mail contract system is represented by the trade route contract under which the Government would agree to pay a specified amount of subsidy on the condition that regular shipping service was maintained by the shipowner to designated foreign ports. Such subsidies would presumably be given in cases where the amount of mail was not sufficient to justify a mail contract, where the vessels operated were unsuited to mail service or where an American competitor was already performing that service. But in each case the grant of a subsidy would depend upon whether or not the maintenance of the particular shipping service was desirable from the viewpoint of the development of American foreign trade.

It may be argued in support of the trade route contract system that it introduces some degree of control over subsidy expenditures. It involves a consideration of trade interests as well as of the handicaps to American ship opera-

tion. It avoids the over-stimulation to shipping which might result from navigation bounties to all shipowners not aided by the mail contract system. It promises some specific return to the general welfare through the development of trade and therefore can not be used as a general excuse for measures intended to divert government funds to the use and benefit of private enterprise in other fields. The records of lines operated under government control would furnish the comparative data needed to determine the amount of aid required to overcome the obstacles met on individual trade routes. These are the chief arguments in support of this method of limited subsidization.

But the trade route method is also open to certain objections. In some respects, the granting of financial assistance to a limited number of shipping companies might produce even more undesirable effects than would any general system of government aid. The power given to the Shipping Board or any other agency to determine which trade routes should be subsidized would afford greater opportunity for favoritism in the distribution of aid. Moreover, political considerations might play an important if not a dominant part in the determination of the trade routes to be aided and developed, because every American sea coast city with any port facilities would put in a claim for the establishment of shipping services. On these grounds, it may be argued that the trade route subsidy method does not provide a means of escaping the evils associated with any bounty system.

NAVAL RESERVE AID

Another method whereby additional governmental aid might be given to American shipowners relates to the establishment of a naval reserve force of men and vessels. Unlike the policies discussed above, it may be assumed that this method would not be restricted in its application to those ship operators not under the mail contract system, since it would be unwise to discriminate against those vessels which would probably be most useful for national defense purposes and the crews of which it would be most important to enroll in the naval reserve force. The governmental assistance

granted would, therefore, fail to remedy the inequalities between American shipowners arising out of the mail contract system, but it might, if sufficient in amount, offset the competitive advantage of foreign ship operators.

Government aid for the purpose of maintaining a naval reserve might be given in the form of direct payments to the owners of vessels which were considered suitable for national defense purposes. In order to insure the immediate availability of such vessels in time of emergency, their owners might be required to employ officers and seamen who were enrolled in the naval reserve force. Likewise, in the case of vessels constructed subsequent to the adoption of this policy, it would be desirable to require that the construction plans be approved by the proper naval authorities. If an American merchant marine is regarded as necessary, primarily because it is an instrument of national defense, the granting of naval subventions probably constitutes the most direct and satisfactory method of attaining the end desired. That method would have many of the weaknesses associated with any method of direct aid and its successful application would require an honest and intelligent administrative policy.

The proposal to establish a paid naval reserve force is also a national defense measure which at the same time affords a certain amount of assistance to shipping. As already noted in the chapter dealing with the question of national defense, a naval reserve force has been created but no appropriations have been made to cover the pay authorized. If the necessary appropriations were made, American shipowners would undoubtedly secure certain indirect benefits but these would not be equal to the direct assistance afforded by a naval subvention. If, however, the Government extended that policy and assumed a part of the wage burden of American ship operators on condition that their officers and seamen joined the naval reserve force, the assistance which would result would be substantial.

A policy of governmental aid to shipping based upon the relation of a merchant marine to national defense would seem to afford a satisfactory solution of the problem, provided that the nation's specific needs for naval auxiliaries and naval re-

serves were definitely ascertained and supplied. A basis for such a course of action is provided for in the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 in the requirement that vessels hereafter constructed shall be entitled to assistance under the mail contract system, only if they have been approved by the Secretary of the Navy or if they would be useful in time of national emergency. The formulation of definite standards in accord with ascertained national defense requirements by the Navy Department and the administrative application of those standards in the making of mail contracts in the future is, however, essential. By closely correlating the two policies of merchant marine development and of naval defense, the governmental expenditures involved in the maintenance of a merchant fleet could be offset by a reduction in the peacetime expenditures for naval vessels. In other words, an American merchant marine might be developed within reasonable limits and on a sound economic basis without exceeding the expenditure required by any other program of adequate preparedness.

CHAPTER XII

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF AMERICAN VESSELS

THE subsidy and subvention policies discussed in the preceding chapter are all designed to provide a method for giving a certain amount of financial assistance to American shipping interests. Certain other policies have been advocated to attain the same object, namely, the surmounting of the competitive handicaps of the American merchant marine, without, however, involving the Government in any system of direct financial aid to private enterprise. Such policies include the granting of preferential railroad rates on commodities consigned to, or received from, American vessels, the establishment of discriminating duties on imports, the imposition of higher tonnage dues on foreign ships, and the regulation of immigration to secure for American vessels a larger share of that traffic. Many of these proposals are supported by the advocates of subsidy or subvention measures, who regard such indirect methods as necessary to supplement direct governmental assistance. The chief argument in support of the suggested indirect methods, however, is that they do not in themselves require the expenditure of public funds on behalf of any special private enterprise. Moreover, in so far as any of these methods provides a stimulus to ship operation under the American flag and tends to equalize American and foreign operating costs, the need for subsidization is decreased. For these reasons, the proposals under discussion may be considered as substitutes for the policies discussed in the two preceding chapters.

PREFERENTIAL RAILROAD RATES

The policy of preferential railroad rates upon commodities consigned to, or received from, American vessels was in effect embodied in Section 28 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

That section provides that it shall be unlawful for the railroads of the United States to grant lower rates on export and import traffic than those applied to domestic shipments between the same points unless the export and import shipments are to be or have been carried in vessels of American registry. The Interstate Commerce Commission is, however, authorized to suspend the application of this provision upon certification by the Shipping Board that adequate facilities are not provided by American vessels. Because of the opposition of railroads and shippers to rate changes which might produce disturbing effects upon the distribution of export and import traffic, the prohibition of Section 28 has never been put into effect.¹ Under the existing railroad rate structure, exports and imports are frequently granted lower rates than those placed upon similar domestic commodities carried between the same points in the United States. In particular, those railroads or railroad systems connecting the Middle West with South Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific ports have been permitted to quote special rates on exports and imports in order to meet the competition of roads running to North Atlantic ports.² These differentials now apply equally to commodities carried on foreign and on American vessels. The application of the prohibition of Section 28 would necessitate either the complete abandonment of the policy of special rates or the withdrawal of such special rates on shipments involving the use of foreign vessels. In the latter case, export and import cargoes would either be diverted to American ships, giving them an advantage over their foreign competitors, or be sent through North Atlantic ports where American and foreign ships would be practically on an equal basis because the special export and import rates to those ports apply to relatively few commodities.

Section 28 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and the policy of preferential freight rates which that section exem-

¹ In 1924 the Shipping Board certified that American tonnage was sufficient to take care of the traffic, except grain, to or from specified trade districts. The Interstate Commerce Commission then issued an order applying the provisions of Section 28 to the designated traffic. As a result of the objections raised, the Shipping Board withdrew its certification and the Commission cancelled its order. U. S. Shipping Board, "Annual Report," 1924, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

² For more detailed discussion of the rate differential situation, see Calvin and Stuart, *op. cit.*, Chap. V.

plifies have been the subject of considerable controversy. On the one hand, it is contended that such a policy would afford substantial assistance to the American merchant marine as a whole without placing any burden either on the railroads or on American taxpayers. While some temporary inconvenience to shippers might arise, the advantage secured by American shipowners would enable them to provide adequate facilities within a reasonable time. Only by putting Section 28 into force, it is argued, can this policy be given a fair trial. On the other hand, the critics of this piece of legislation feel that its enforcement would produce disturbing complications without affording material assistance to American shipping. In the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the ultimate effect would be "merely to divert traffic from certain ports to others with little or no gain in tonnage for United States vessels."¹ The chief objection to the adoption of any general system of preferential railroad rates, however, is the possibility that similar measures might be applied by foreign countries as a method of retaliation.² It is not certain that the application of the prohibition of Section 28 would have that effect. The countries trading with the United States through the North Atlantic ports might not be seriously handicapped. The view has been expressed that the principal merchant marine affected would be that of Japan.³ Nevertheless, the possibility of retaliation must be taken under consideration. Regardless of the effect of such retaliation upon American shipping, it would be unwise to institute a policy which might have a disturbing influence upon international trade relationships and upon the domestic railroad structure.

DISCRIMINATING DUTIES

The proposal to establish a system of discriminating duties on imports is another method of providing preferential treat-

¹ U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission, "Thirty-fifth Annual Report," Washington, D. C., 1921, p. 14.

² Under the treaty of Versailles, Germany was prohibited from applying this preferential policy.

³ Stuart Dagggett, "The Railroad Rate Discrimination Provision of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. XCIV, March, 1921, pp. 196, 198.

ment to American vessels in the foreign trade field. This proposal has assumed various forms all of which, however, provide for the imposition of higher custom duties on imports brought to this country in foreign vessels. One form of discrimination would apply the higher rates only to imports dutiable under the existing tariff. Another form would include commodities on the free list. Still another form would restrict the application of the discriminating duties to commodities carried by foreign vessels in the indirect trades, for example, English vessels operating between the United States and ports of South America. The discriminating duty policy as applied by Portugal includes exports as well as imports, but the United States under the Federal Constitution is deprived of the power to impose export duties.

General Policy

The method of discriminating duties is advocated on the ground that it provides for the extension of the protective policy to the shipping industry. The higher duties on imports carried in foreign vessels would increase the cost of carriage in such vessels and thereby enable the American merchant marine to secure a larger share of the import trade. The discriminating system could be easily applied and would not involve the objectionable features attributed to any policy of direct financial assistance to private enterprise. The growth of American shipping during the period of 1789 to 1818, when discriminating duties were in force, is pointed to as evidence of the probable success which would result from the adoption of that policy. These are the chief arguments advanced in support of the general policy of discriminating duties as a method of developing and maintaining an American merchant marine.

The arguments in opposition to any such policy of discrimination against foreign shipping are more numerous.¹ It is pointed out that the increase in import duties on commodities carried in foreign vessels would bear no relation to the differential in operating costs upon which American ship-

¹ For a detailed discussion of discriminating duties by an adverse critic, see, Lloyd W. Maxwell, "Discriminating Duties and the American Merchant Marine," New York, 1926.

owners based their claim for government protection and assistance. A flat rate of increase in such duties would be more discriminating in some cases than others, the degree of discrimination depending upon the distance covered or the value of the cargo. In some instances, the extra duty might exceed the freight charge. In other instances, the duties on cargoes of equal bulk might not be sufficient to give American vessels an advantage which foreign competitors could not meet by a reduction in freight rates.¹

Greater emphasis, however, has been placed by the opponents of discriminating duties upon the consequences resulting from retaliatory measures which might be adopted by foreign countries. Assuming that the effect of such a policy would be to divert import cargoes to the vessels of the country which adopted it, the application of similar discriminating duties by foreign countries would deprive American vessels of export cargoes. The fact that the value of American exports exceeds that of imports—and this is particularly true of our trade with the leading maritime countries—gives foreign nations a distinct advantage if they choose to meet such discriminating duties by the adoption of identical measures. Further, it is pointed out, the adoption of the discriminatory policy by the United States would necessitate the termination of treaty provisions preventing such action.² This would create a situation in which foreign countries would consider themselves free to apply such discriminations against American shipping and commerce as seemed desirable.

Indirect Trade

A modification of the policy of general discrimination against all foreign vessels through the imposition of higher import duties on commodities imported in those vessels is represented in the proposal to apply such discrimination only against foreign vessels operated in indirect trades. For ex-

¹U. S. Tariff Commission, "Dictionary of Tariff Information," Washington, D. C., 1924, p. 663.

²For a digest of such treaty provisions, see, Charles C. Thach, "Survey of the Treaty Stipulations Limiting the Right of the United States to Levy Discriminatory Tonnage and Customs Duties in Favor of United States Vessels," U. S., 68th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 138, Washington, D. C., 1924.

ample, British vessels operating between the United States and Great Britain or her possessions would receive the same treatment as American vessels, but the cargoes of British vessels in the trade between the United States and South American countries would be subject to discriminating import duties. This restricted form of discrimination is advocated as being free from the objections raised against the policy of general discrimination. Higher duties on the cargoes of foreign vessels in indirect trades would merely be a method of making those vessels pay for the privilege of sharing in traffic which their country has not helped to create. Moreover, it is argued, the provision against such discrimination by this country in the treaty with Great Britain is specifically limited to articles produced or manufactured in the United Kingdom so that there would be no violation of treaty obligations in the case of the country whose shipping would be most affected. The same policy is in effect applied by Canada by the imposition of a higher tariff on goods brought in through ports of the United States. Finally, it is pointed out, the application of extra duties in the indirect trades would provide at least part of the funds required to meet the extra expenditures of the Post Office Department under the mail contract system.¹

The arguments against the restricted policy of discriminating duties may be briefly stated as follows. The system suggested could be circumvented by changing the nationality of foreign vessels. For example, British companies might operate ships under the flag of one or another of the South American countries and in this way continue in the trade without incurring the burden of discriminating duties. Then, too, the proposed system would, if it included commodities on the free list—and this would be necessary in order to make it effective—increase the cost of imported foodstuffs and raw materials to the American consumer, since it may be assumed that foreign vessels would continue to operate to some extent in indirect trades. Finally, the treaty problem would still exist because most of the commercial treaties be-

¹ These, in substance, were the arguments advanced in support of this policy by Vice-Chairman Edward C. Plummer, of the United States Shipping Board, in an address before the Second National Conference on the Merchant Marine. See "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

tween the United States and foreign nations, including that with Great Britain, contain the most favored nation clause which might be a bar to any discrimination against the shipping of those nations as long as the United States by a specific provision in any treaty was prevented from imposing discriminating duties even in indirect trade on the vessels of the nation in question.¹

DISCRIMINATING TONNAGE DUES

Discrimination in tonnage dues, which comprise the taxes levied on all vessels entering American ports from foreign ports, is sometimes suggested as an alternative method. The United States, it is argued, might impose higher tonnage taxes on foreign vessels than on American vessels with less danger of retaliation than in the case of discriminating duties. Even if similar measures were applied by foreign nations against American shipping they would not be burdensome and would not impair trade relations with non-maritime countries. There is some truth in these arguments, but, nevertheless, it can not be assumed that the retaliatory measures of foreign countries would be limited to the same type of discrimination against American vessels. The adoption of a system of discriminating tonnage dues is, therefore, open to the same general objections raised against discriminating duties.

Both of the policies of general discrimination have received the legislative approval of Congress, but the probability that they will ever be put into effect remains doubtful. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 contains the following provision:

"That in the judgment of Congress, articles or provisions in treaties or conventions to which the United States is a party, which restrict the right of the United States to impose discriminating customs duties on imports entering the United States in foreign vessels and in vessels of the United States, and which also restrict the right of the United States to impose discriminatory tonnage dues on foreign vessels and on vessels of the United States should be terminated, and the Presi-

¹ For example, the treaty with Belgium provides that "Objects of any kind soever introduced into the ports of either of the two States under the flags of the other, whatever may be their origin and from what country soever the importation there of may have been made, shall not pay other or higher entrance duties, nor shall be subjected to other charges or restrictions than they would pay or be subject to were they imported under the national flag." See, Thach, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

dent is hereby authorized and directed within ninety days after this Act becomes law to give notice to the several Governments respectively, parties to such treaties or conventions, that so much thereof as imposes any such restriction on the United States will terminate on the expiration of such periods as may be required for the giving of such notice by the provisions of such treaties or conventions."¹

The purpose of this legislation was to make possible the application of the discriminating duty provision of the Tariff Act of 1913. That Act provided² for the allowance of a five per cent discount from the regular import duties on all commodities imported in American vessels on condition that this provision should not be construed to conflict with the reciprocal commercial treaties between the United States and foreign countries. The United States Supreme Court in the Five Per Cent Discount Cases held that this limitation rendered the discriminatory provision inoperative.³ Congress, therefore, in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 sought to do away with the restrictions imposed upon congressional action by the commercial treaties with other countries. But thus far presidential support has not been secured for this policy and no steps have been taken toward terminating treaty provisions, because it was considered inexpedient to disturb existing reciprocal arrangements. Moreover, the power of the United States to terminate particular provisions of various commercial treaties without thereby subjecting the treaties as a whole to probable nullification is questioned. The policy of discriminating duties in indirect trades is now being advocated in place of the policy of general discrimination.

Another method aimed at bringing about the same results as discriminating duties or tonnage dues was put forward in the Subsidy Bill of 1922.⁴ Section 301 of that measure provided that in the computation of income taxes, either corporate or individual, a deduction of five per cent of the ocean freight charges paid by the person taxed might be made from the amount otherwise constituting the tax if such freight charges had been paid to American vessels for the transpor-

¹ Merchant Marine Act, 1920, Public No. 261, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Sec. 34.

² Section 4, par. J, subsection 7.

³ 243 U. S. 97 (1917).

⁴ U. S., 67th Congress, 2nd Session, S. 3217, and H. R. 10644.

tation of goods between American and foreign ports. The primary object of this proposal was to provide an incentive to importers and exporters to use American ships. Ship-owners would receive no direct return other than an increase in cargoes. Since the tax deduction would apply to both exports and imports, greater stimulus to the employment of American shipping would be given than under discriminating duties which would apply only to certain imports. Finally, this policy would not run counter to the terms of commercial treaties. These are the chief arguments advanced in support of this particular proposition.

On the other hand, it may be suggested that this proposal does not entirely eliminate the possibility of retaliatory action by foreign nations. The effect of the proposed tax deductions might be offset, for example, by the increased subsidization of foreign shipping which would permit the lowering of rates on foreign vessels or the granting of rebates to American exporters and importers. But a more serious objection to the proposed policy arises out of the fact that it represents a modification of the income tax system which has no relation to taxation problems. It proposes to give a special exemption to a particular group of taxpayers. It would further complicate the already intricate tax system, and would result in a considerable reduction in the revenues of the national Government.¹ These considerations, it may be argued, furnish adequate grounds for rejecting this tax deduction policy regardless of the possibility of retaliatory measures on the part of foreign nations.

DIVERSION OF IMMIGRANT TRAFFIC

It has also been suggested that American shipping could be aided by the adoption of a provision requiring the entry in American vessels of at least one-half of the immigrant quota of each foreign nation.² This restriction, it is con-

¹ It was estimated that shippers would obtain deductions to the extent of from eight to ten million dollars. See testimony of Mr. W. L. Marvin, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 1,017. But it was contended that this loss would be more than balanced by the income tax returns from American ship-owners, since each dollar deducted would represent twenty dollars paid to ship operators by shippers. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

² This proposal was included in the Subsidy Bill of 1922. U. S., 67th Congress, 2nd Session, S. 3217 and H. R. 10644, Title IV.

tended, would divert to American ships a reasonable share of the profitable immigrant traffic. The division of such traffic could be effected through a system of control at ports of embarkation. Where proper facilities for immigrants were not provided by American vessels, it would of course be necessary to suspend the application of the restriction. In the North Atlantic passenger trade, the third-class traffic is of considerable importance. The traffic is now controlled almost entirely by foreign steamship lines, aided by their respective governments. But the proposal to regulate immigration for the benefit of American shipping raises the question whether that benefit would be sufficient to justify the administrative expenditures involved. Only those lines running to European ports would be in a position to obtain any considerable amount of immigrant traffic. Moreover, the ordinary cargo vessel is not equipped to transport immigrants.

All these methods of affording preferential treatment to American vessels have objectionable features which must be weighed against possible benefits. In special cases where American shipowners are being subjected to unfair foreign discrimination or excluded from particular trades by the interference of foreign combinations or foreign governments, the restricted use of one or another of these policies might be justified. But there are sound reasons for refraining from the general application of preferential treatment in any form until it has been demonstrated that other measures are inadequate.

CHAPTER XIII

SPECIAL MEASURES OF LIMITED SCOPE

IN addition to the proposals of governmental assistance in the form of subsidies or of preferential treatment for American vessels, various suggestions have been made in regard to certain special features of the present situation in the shipping field. None of these suggestions would, if put into effect, afford to shipping the amount of aid represented in the subsidy or discriminating duty policies. They should, however, be taken into consideration in any general discussion of the merchant marine problem.

REVISION OF THE NAVIGATION LAWS

In the first place, it is contended that the laws regulating ship operation are in need of revision. The objections raised against certain provisions of the La Follette Seamen's Act have already been noted. In view of the fact that the ship-owners themselves recommend that "no change should be made which would reduce the standards of wages and living of American seamen, or affect the safety or economic operation of the ships,"¹ it may be assumed that the basic competitive disadvantages of American ship operators would remain even if the desired changes in the Seamen's Act were secured. Nevertheless, the modification of the provisions of that Act must be given careful consideration in dealing with the problem of removing the obstacles to successful ship operation under the American flag.

There is also a need for the general revision of the navigation laws. Those laws, which consist of legislative measures and amendments some of which were originally enacted more than a hundred years ago, are in need of codification. Such codification has been undertaken but has not as yet

¹ American Steamship Owners' Association, "Recommendations," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

received the approval of Congress.¹ But there is also need for substantial changes and additions to existing laws to render them applicable to modern conditions. Load-line legislation providing that marks be placed on a vessel's side to indicate the depth to which it may be safely loaded is generally regarded as desirable. This legislation is important not only because it is needed to prevent overloading but also because the regulations of foreign countries are applied to American vessels in foreign ports in the absence of American regulations. Legislation on this matter is now before Congress.² Likewise, legislation is required to cover the inspection of motor ships which, except in one instance, are not specifically included within the scope of the navigation laws.³ Some of the laws now on the statute books are practically obsolete. For example, one provision of the laws relating to the documentation of vessels provides for the presentation by the shipowner of "a certificate under the hand of the principal or master carpenter, by whom or under whose direction the vessel has been built."⁴ This particular provision is but one illustration of the numerous instances in which regulations based on former methods of ship construction have become obsolete. It emphasizes the necessity of a careful technical revision of the navigation laws as a whole.

TAXATION OF SHIPPING INDUSTRY

Some modification of existing tax legislation as applied to shipping is also considered desirable. It has been suggested that there is need for permitting shipowners to make larger deductions for depreciation in the case of vessels purchased during the war at exceptionally high prices. The Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury Department has no special rule applicable to the earnings of vessels, and it is proposed that the regulations governing the computation of net earn-

¹ U. S., 69th Congress, 2nd Session, "Codification of the Navigation Laws," Senate Document, No. 188, Washington, D. C., 1927.

² The load-line bill, S. 1781, was passed, and approved by the President on March 2, 1929. See, *United States Daily*, February 23 and March 4, 1929.

³ U. S. Commissioner of Navigation, "Annual Report," 1927, p. 2. The one provision applying specifically to motor ships is 4426 R. S. U. S. C., Title 46, Sec. 404.

⁴ U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 838.

ings should be made by the United States Shipping Board and should be applied to vessels now in operation as well as to earnings invested in new ship construction.¹ Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, American shipowners were exempted from the payment of war-profits and excess-profits taxes, provided that an amount equivalent to those taxes was invested in new vessels, and provided that this allowance did not exceed one-third the cost of such vessels. Profits arising out of the sale of American vessels built prior to 1914 were also exempted from taxation for a period of ten years, on condition that the money that would otherwise be paid to the Government was invested in ship construction. The first of these provisions is no longer operative; the second has been of little importance. The Merchant Marine Conference of 1925 expressed the view that, because of the fluctuations in the shipping business and in the values of vessels, there would be justification for the adoption of a system of depreciation charges and computation of income taxes over a period of years which would be applicable to the peculiar conditions in the industry.²

GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICES

The abandonment of the policy of maintaining transport services under governmental ownership and operation has also been proposed on the ground that these services could be adequately performed by private shipping interests. It is not contended that the services maintained by the Army and Navy Departments enter into direct competition with private enterprise but merely that such governmental operation deprives American vessels of cargo which might properly and without loss to the Government be turned over to them. That the traffic arising out of the transport of troops and supplies is considerable is indicated by the statement in the report of the Secretary of War that, during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, Army transports carried 48,568 pas-

¹ U. S., 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 135, "Government Aid to Merchant Shipping. A study prepared under Direction of United States Shipping Board."

² U. S., 70th Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings on the Merchant Marine," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 863. National Merchant Marine Conference.

sengers, 510 animals, 179,919 tons of freight and 680,264 pounds of mail.¹ The diversion of such traffic to privately-owned American vessels and the retirement of the Army and Navy Departments from the shipping business would, it is argued, "simply be giving adherence to a wise and successful policy adopted and practiced for many years by other governments whose needs and conditions are similar to our own."² The government steamship services in question are condemned as being unnecessary and uneconomical, as well as unfair to private enterprise.³

On the other hand, military authorities contend that it would be unwise to abandon the operation of the government transport services. A considerable number of troops are transported each year to and from Hawaii and the Philippine Islands. These troops require better facilities than those provided in the third class accommodation on the private American lines operating from Pacific ports. Moreover, space on private vessels might not be available in emergency situations and the maintenance of government ships for transport purposes is, therefore, essential as a national defense measure.⁴ It is also pointed out that the carriage of certain military supplies, particularly explosives, is hazardous and could not be undertaken by the ordinary passenger and cargo vessels.⁵ Finally, it is contended that the Government saves money through the operation of its own transport services. This saving for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, was estimated at \$2,609,436.72.⁶ The Government's method of computing such savings has, however, been criticized by private ship operators.

INCLUSION OF PHILIPPINES UNDER COASTWISE LAW

The inclusion of the Philippine Islands under the laws restricting the coastwise trade to American vessels is another

¹ "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1928," Washington, D. C., 1928, p. 251.

² Statement of Mr. W. L. Marvin, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 2456, 2458.

³ *Idem.* See, also, statement of Mr. R. H. Patchin, representing the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. *Ibid.*, pp. 2459-2462.

⁴ See statement of Gen. G. W. Downey, Chief of Transportation of the Army. *Ibid.*, p. 2464.

⁵ Statement of Captain A. W. Marshall. *Ibid.*, p. 2445.

⁶ "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1928," *op. cit.*, p. 252.

proposed measure of limited scope which has been advocated on the ground that such action would give the proper encouragement to the development of American shipping services on the Pacific. The coastwise restrictions, it is argued, have been successfully applied in the case of Hawaii and Porto Rico and there is no reason why they should not be extended to all of the insular possessions of the United States.¹ This policy, however, has not been regarded with favor by the Filipinos. The extension of the coastwise laws to the Philippine Islands would, it is argued, give to American shipping a monopoly of the trade and result in an increase in rates. More particularly, however, objection is made on the ground that such action would be contrary to the policy of ultimate independence.²

Section 21 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provided that the coastwise laws should be extended on February 1, 1922 to the island territories and possessions not already covered. But this provision as applied to the Philippine Islands was not to take effect until the President after investigation declared that adequate shipping service had been established. Thus far no such declaration has been made. The status of the Philippines as a semi-independent possession to which the United States has pledged ultimate independence would seem to render inexpedient the enforcement of the provisions of Section 21 in the face of opposition on the part of the Filipinos themselves. This situation would, of course, be changed if the present policy looking toward ultimate self-government were discarded.

CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS IN PRIVATE YARDS

Still another policy of some indirect importance to ship operators is that relating to the construction of naval vessels in private shipyards rather than in the government navy yards. The work on naval vessels is, of course, of the utmost importance to the private American shipbuilding industry,

¹ See the brief on this subject presented by the American Steamship Owners' Association, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, "Joint Hearings," *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1561-1564.

² Statement of Hon. Isauro Gabaldon, Resident Commissioner from the Philippines to the United States. *Ibid.*, p. 1558, also pp. 1543-1557.

but the shipping industry would profit only to the extent that the increased activity of the shipyards, brought about by the construction of naval vessels, would reduce overhead costs in the construction of merchant ships. In view, however, of the present depressed condition of the shipbuilding industry, the contribution of naval work to the reduction of such overhead costs would be considerable.

For a number of years the government navy yards have engaged in the construction of naval vessels in competition with privately-owned shipyards. In the recently enacted Cruiser Bill,¹ it was specified, in what is known as the Dallinger Amendment, that eight of the fifteen cruisers authorized should be built in the navy shipyards. This policy has been the subject of considerable controversy and, since it has an indirect effect upon the cost of merchant ships, a brief statement of the arguments on both sides of the question may properly be included in the present discussion of the merchant marine problem.

The private shipbuilding interests of the United States have opposed the extensive shipbuilding activities of the government navy yards, and more particularly the policy expressed in the Dallinger Amendment to the Cruiser Bill, on the following grounds;² first, that it costs more to build a cruiser in a government navy yard than in a private shipyard; secondly, that governmental ship construction threatens the existence of the private shipbuilding industry which is an essential instrument of national defense; and, finally, that government competition with private business is unfair.

On the other hand, it is assumed by the advocates of navy yard construction that ships can be constructed as cheaply or more cheaply by the government than by private shipbuilders. It is also argued, that construction work is necessary in order to insure the continuous operation of the navy shipyards, and to develop and maintain the necessary technical staffs. Finally, it is pointed out that changes during the course of construction may be made without giving rise to

¹ U. S., 70th Congress, 2nd Session, H. R. 11526, approved by the President on March 13, 1929.

² For a fuller exposition of the arguments against the Dallinger Amendment, see National Council of American Shipbuilders, "Statement Opposing Construction of Cruisers in Government Navy Yards," mimeographed.

disputes over the cost when the vessels are government-built.

From the viewpoint of private American shipping interests, it would seem desirable to give to the private shipyards at least the major part of the work of constructing naval vessels in order to bring about the full use of private American shipbuilding facilities and the resulting decrease in overhead charges in connection with the building of merchant ships. The view that governmental costs as compared with private costs in any field of business activity can be lower has never been clearly demonstrated and the data presented by the shipbuilding interests strongly support the opposite view in the present case. While a certain amount of navy yard shipbuilding may be desirable for the purpose of experimentation or other special reasons, it is extremely important that the Government should utilize the facilities of private shipbuilders to the fullest possible extent and so contribute to the reduction of American shipbuilding costs.

CHAPTER XIV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

IT IS generally agreed that the competitive status of American vessels in world trade is unfavorable and that, in the absence of governmental protection and aid, relatively few private American shipowners would survive. It is recognized that it is desirable for the United States to maintain a certain amount of ocean-going shipping facilities for the support of foreign trade. It is likewise recognized that a merchant marine and the shipbuilding industry which it would help to support are both important instruments of national defense.

But beyond this point there are numerous issues in regard to which divergent opinions exist. Should governmental assistance be granted to American ship operators who are not in a position to secure mail contracts? Should the mail contract system be extended to include all of the services now maintained by the United States Shipping Board, provided that those services were sold to private interests? Should the aid now given to shipping be supplemented by subsidies or by some system of preferential treatment for American vessels? These are all controversial questions.

The crux of the controversy rests on the fact that there are two conceptions in regard to the purpose of governmental assistance. On the one hand, it is frequently assumed that government aid should be granted with a view to providing an equivalent of tariff protection in the case of shipping, in order to maintain the shipping industries as a part of the industrial activity of the nation. On the basis of this assumption, the construction and operation of shipping might be fostered without special regard to the essential requirements for national defense or for the protection and development of American foreign trade. The other view in regard to the basis of public policy is that governmental assistance represents an expenditure for the purpose of main-

taining as a public utility the shipping needed for foreign trade and national defense and that, as in the case of any governmental expenditure, the amount should not exceed that required to achieve the desired result. It was primarily on this theory that the mail contract system of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 was established.

Two considerations lead to the acceptance of the latter of these opposing views of the fundamental basis of public policy toward shipping. First, the existing highly competitive condition in the field of world shipping and the world surplus of shipping facilities makes advisable, for the present at least, a policy of specifically determined government aid for the maintenance of an American merchant marine. A large expenditure might be justified to insure the maintenance of the shipping needed for national defense and trade needs, but any policy which resulted in an expansion of facilities beyond actual needs would only serve to intensify competition and to place American ship operators in a still more unsatisfactory position. A second, but less important consideration is that of the creditor status of the United States in its relations with the leading foreign maritime nations. As a creditor nation, this country must accept in part foreign goods and services in payment of the interest or principal of loans or investments abroad, although such repayment may for a time be deferred by reinvestments in foreign countries. Since the American protective tariff restricts the ability of the European debtor nations to make payments in goods, foreign services including shipping must be accepted as a partial substitute. The present financial and economic position of the United States, and of the world shipping industries, therefore, makes questionable the adoption of any policy which would encourage the development of an American merchant marine larger than that required for national defense and foreign trade and which would to an unreasonable extent lessen the use of foreign shipping services.

The requirements for naval auxiliaries and trained naval personnel from the point of view of national defense are difficult to determine in advance precisely, but in general it is believed that these requirements would be met by shipping facilities ample to care for the demonstrated trade needs of

the country. Whatever the particular measures which may be adopted, therefore, future policy should be based upon consideration of the existing deficiencies of American foreign trade shipping, the extent to which American foreign commerce is now carried in American vessels, and the fact that the permanent government ownership or operation of American shipping services is undesirable.

In taking stock of the present situation with respect to the American merchant fleet in foreign trade, the fact which stands out most clearly is that the only distinct advantage which American shipping has over its foreign competitors lies in the possession of a very considerable amount of oil-burning tonnage, an advantage which is at all times contingent upon the relationship between the price of oil and the price of coal. With respect to age and speed, the American merchant fleet is not on a par with the fleets of other countries. There are relatively few old vessels in the American marine, but there are still fewer of recent construction. A large proportion of American ships are low-speed vessels, principally those built during the War. Moreover, the large number of motorships—a type of vessel in which this country is particularly deficient—which have been added to the merchant fleets of foreign countries in recent years is contributing to increase the relative inferiority of the American merchant marine. The larger part of the American vessels engaged in foreign trade will soon need to be replaced with faster and more modern ships in order to make this merchant fleet an effective instrument of national defense or an efficient agency for the development and protection of foreign trade interests. Some steps in that direction have already been taken as a result of the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.

The unsatisfactory competitive position of the shipping operating in foreign trade under the American flag has been largely responsible for the decrease in recent years in the proportion of American commerce carried by American ships. Only in the case of import tanker cargoes, have American vessels continuously secured more than fifty per cent of the cargo. On a few trade routes, nearly all to nearby foreign ports, a substantial part of American trade is carried under

the American flag. But the situation in general is indicative of the competitive weakness of the American merchant marine. This weakness is even more noticeable in the case of passenger traffic in which, due largely to the lack of fast passenger liners, the participation of American shipping is relatively small.

An American merchant marine which was considered adequate from the viewpoint of national defense would probably carry a larger proportion of American commerce than is being carried at the present time. Whether that proportion would reach or exceed fifty per cent, the amount usually set as the minimum requirement, can not be predicted. It would seem more important that the shipping services maintained by private enterprise with government aid should meet well defined needs. If those needs were fully satisfied, the protection of American foreign trade interests would be assured.

Finally, the solution of the American merchant marine problem requires the early withdrawal of the United States Shipping Board from the field of ship operation. Government ownership is a wasteful and uneconomic method of providing the shipping facilities required by national interests in foreign trade and national defense. Whenever the government engages in business activities, there is necessarily an element of unfair competition. The United States Shipping Board has undoubtedly endeavored to avoid direct competition with private American ship operators, but it is nevertheless evident that a merchant marine, partly government-owned, partly in private hands, is not likely to prove successful.

The Shipping Board in recent years has shown itself favorable to the termination of its operating activities. The sale of the United States and American Merchant Lines is a long step in the right direction. The remaining services of the Board are being offered for sale. It would seem advisable to give consideration to the curtailment or discontinuance of those for which purchasers can not be found. When this termination of operating activities has been accomplished, the remaining problem will be that relating to the disposal of the laid-up fleet. All of the idle government-owned ton-

nage which is unfit for service might properly be disposed of or at least withdrawn from registry and held for use only in the event of a national emergency. The gradual sale of all the useful vessels, regardless of price but conditioned upon their improvement by the purchaser, would bring to an end the vast expenditures which the continued maintenance of this idle tonnage has entailed.

When a public policy with these objectives in view has been put into effect, the American merchant marine problem will approach solution. The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 may be regarded as a partial recognition of the fundamental basis of a sound policy. The aids provided under that Act are fairly specific in character and are already having a stimulating effect, although the shipbuilding industry is still confronted with serious problems of reorganization and economy required to meet the higher levels of costs which prevail in this country. The method of providing any additional assistance required to maintain essential shipping facilities under the American flag ought to be in accord with the sound business principles which should govern the conduct of governmental affairs as well as those of private enterprise.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF TECHNICAL TERMS

Documentation or registry.—In common usage these terms are interchangeable and signify the nationality of a vessel. As applied to American vessels, the term "documentation" is strictly speaking more comprehensive than "registry," since a vessel "documented under the American flag" may be either registered, enrolled or licensed. The transfer of an American documented vessel to foreign registry requires the consent of the United States Shipping Board.

Registration.—Under the laws of the United States certificates of registry are required for American vessels operating in foreign ocean-borne trade, in trade with American insular possessions (except Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico), or in the whale fisheries.

Enrolment.—The laws of the United States provide for the enrolment of American vessels of twenty gross tons and over engaged exclusively on Great Lakes or in the coasting, inland and fishing (except whale) trades.

License.—The laws of the United States provide for the licensing of vessels of more than five but less than twenty gross tons which are engaged exclusively on the Great Lakes or in the coasting, inland and fishing (except whale) trades.

Indirect trade.—The carrying of passengers or cargo between two countries by the vessels of any other country is designated as indirect trade as to the transportation.

Coasting or coastwise trade.—These terms refer to the operation of vessels between ports of the same country. In the case of the United States, foreign vessels are excluded by law from the coasting trade which also includes trade between the United States and Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico.

Intercoastal trade.—This term is used to indicate trade between the Atlantic or Gulf and the Pacific ports of the United States.

Register tonnage.—Register tonnage is applicable to both gross and net, in other words it can be expressed as gross register tonnage or net register tonnage. However, as a general rule it is ordinarily used with reference to net tonnage.

Gross tonnage.—The entire internal cubic capacity of the ship below the upper deck to the hull and closed in spaces on or above this deck expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton, except certain spaces which are exempted, such as:

Peak and other tanks for water ballast	Anchor gear
Open fore-castle bridge and poop	Steering gear
Excess of hatchways	Wheel house
Certain light and air spaces	Galley
Domes and skylights	Cabins for passengers
Condenser	(when on decks not to hull)

and other items.¹

¹ As enumerated in "Measurement of Vessels," published by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation.

Net tonnage.—The tonnage of a ship remaining after certain deductions have been made from the gross tonnage expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton. Among the deductions are:

Crew spaces
Master's cabin
Navigation spaces

Donkey engine and boiler
Allowance for propelling power

and other items.

Deadweight tonnage.—The weight, expressed in tons of 2,240 pounds, required to depress a vessel from the light water line to the load line is designated as deadweight tonnage. It represents the total weight of the cargo, fuel, stores, water, crew, etc., which vessel is designated to carry with safety.

Knot.—The speed of a vessel is expressed in knots, one knot being equivalent to a speed of one nautical mile in an hour.

Nautical mile.—A nautical mile is defined in the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 as meaning 6,080 feet.

Cargo ton.—As used in this report a cargo ton represents 2,240 pounds of cargo.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF AMERICAN COMPANIES OPERATING PRIVATELY-OWNED AMERICAN VESSELS

Divided into Common and Industrial Carriers by Number and Gross Tonnage, Overseas
and Nearby Trades and Those Owned by United States Shipping Board

As of Calendar Year 1928

Common Carriers

Name of Company and / or Owner	Total		Overseas		Nearby Trade		Formerly U. S. Shipping Board	
	No.	Gross	No.	Gross	No.	Gross	No.	Gross
Alaska S. S. Co. (Owner).....	7	20,909	7	20,909	3	10,424
American Export S. S. Co. Export S. S. Co. (Owner).....	22	114,959	22	114,959	22	114,959
American Mail Line Admiral Oriental Line (Owner).....	5	57,223	5	57,223	5	57,223
Dollar S. S. Line (Owner).....	9	83,374	9	83,374	9	83,374
Atlantic Transport Co. (Owner).....	2	15,542	2	15,542
American Palmette Line South Atlantic S. S. Co. (Owner).....	9	45,720	9	45,720	9	45,720
American Scantic Line Moore & McCormack (Owner).....	8	40,419	8	40,419	8	40,419
American South African Line (Owner).....	5	28,272	5	28,272	5	28,272
American West African Line (Owner).....	10	54,362	10	54,362	10	54,362
Atlantic Transport Co. (Owner).....	1	17,281	1	17,281
Bull Insular Line A. H. Bull & Co. (Owner).....	3	13,505	3	13,505	2	5,632
Carriso Inc. (Owner).....	1	3,894	1	3,894	1	3,894
Clegg Shipowning Corp. (Owner).....	2	6,864	2	6,864	2	6,864
Clyde Line New York & Miami S. S. Co. (Owner).....	2	12,418	2	12,418
Nova Scotia S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,043	1	5,043

LIST OF AMERICAN COMPANIES OPERATING PRIVATELY-OWNED AMERICAN VESSELS—
(Continued)

Common Carriers

Name of Company and / or owner	Total		Overseas		Nearby Trade		Formerly U. S. Shipping Board	
	No.	Gross	No.	Gross	No.	Gross	No.	Gross
Colombian S. S. Co. (Owner).....	5	12,948	5	12,948	5	12,948
Commercial S. S. Lines								
Moore & McCormack S. S. Co. (Owner).....	3	14,002	2	9,369	1	4,633	3	14,002
Cowley Gulf Line (Owner).....	1	2,264	1	2,264	1	2,264
Dollar (Around the World) Line (Owner).....	8	95,119	8	95,119	8	95,119
Eastern S. S. Lines (Owners).....	1	3,826	1	3,826
Nova Scotia S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,043	1	5,043
Grace S. S. Co. (Owner).....	11	65,672	11	65,672	5	26,338
Atlantic & Pacific S. S. Co. (Owner).....	1	4,665	1	4,665
New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. (Owner).....	1	4,661	1	4,661
Gulf Pacific Line (Owners).....	7	22,988	7	22,988	7	22,988
Swayne & Hoyt (Owners).....	2	4,391	2	4,391	2	4,391
Horace X. Baxter S. S. Co. (Owner).....	2	3,731	2	3,731	1	2,428
Isthmian Services								
Mystic S. S. Co. (Owner).....	4	23,378	4	23,378
Fairfield S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,988	1	5,988	1	5,988
Greylock S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	1	7,604	1	7,604	1	7,604
Lancaster S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,871	1	5,871	1	5,871
Planet S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	6	34,251	5	27,903	1	6,348
James Griffiths (Owner).....	2	7,351	2	7,351	2	7,351
Coastwise S. S. & Barge Co. (Owner).....	1	3,545	1	3,545
Kingsley Nav. Corp. (Owner).....	1	2,477	1	2,477	1	2,477
Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. (Owner).....	6	20,821	6	20,821	6	20,821
Mobile, Miami & Gulf S. S. Co. (Owner).....	3	6,650	3	6,650	3	6,650
Lake Giltedge S. S. Co. (Owner).....	1	2,664	1	2,664	1	2,664
Lake Treba S. S. Co. (Owner).....	1	2,606	1	2,606	1	2,606
Munson South American Line								
Munson S. S. Line (Owner).....	7	67,320	7	67,320	4	54,948

Munson S. S. Line (Owner)	6	21,401	6	21,401	3	14,818
Redman S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	3,285	1	3,285	1	3,285
Redbird S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	3,285	1	3,285	1	3,285
Nosa Line (Owner)	2	4,980	2	4,980	1	2,488
Grace S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	2,718	1	2,718	1	2,718
Ocean Dominion S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,606	1	2,606	1	2,606
Oceanic S. S. Co. (Owner)	3	17,994	3	17,994
Oceanic and Oriental Nav. Co. (Owner)	21	128,385	21	128,385	21	128,385
P. and C. S. S. Co. (Owner)	3	6,735	3	6,735
Florida East Coast Car Ferry (Owner)	3	7,744	3	7,744
Pacific S. S. Co. (Owner)	6	22,138	6	22,138
Dollar S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	8,138	1	8,138
Pacific Argentine Brazil Line (Owner)	6	33,617	6	33,617	6	33,617
Pacific Motorship Co. (Owner)	2	5,484	2	5,484
Panama Mail Line (Owner)	4	18,801	4	18,801
Grace S. S. Co. (Owner)	2	9,715	2	9,715
Panama Pacific Line								
American Line S. S. Corp. (Owner)	2	41,098	2	41,098
Atlantic Transport Co. (Owner)	2	30,886	2	30,886
Panama Railroad Co. (Owner)	4	24,445	4	24,445
Porto Rico Line								
New York and Porto Rico S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	6,576	1	6,576
Cosmo S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	7,057	1	7,057
Puget Sound Nav. Co. (Owner)	2	2,852	2	2,852
Red "D" Line								
Atlantic & Caribbean S. S. Co. (Owner)	6	16,359	6	16,359	3	7,946
Santo Domingo Line								
Clyde S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	3,318	1	3,318
States S. S. Co. (Owner)	11	61,819	11	61,819	11	61,819
Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co. (Owner)	7	53,182	7	53,182	7	53,182
W. B. Fox (Owner)	1	2,013	1	2,013	1	2,013
Ward Line								
New York and Cuba Mail S. S. Co. (Owner)	7	35,537	7	35,537
Mallory S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	6,069	1	6,069
Atlantic Gulf and W. I. S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	6,678	1	6,678
Total	275	1,544,536	166	1,082,284	109	462,252	186	1,064,763

LIST OF AMERICAN COMPANIES OPERATING PRIVATELY-OWNED AMERICAN VESSELS—
(Continued)

Industrial Carriers ¹

Name of Company and / or Owner	Total		Overseas		Nearby Trade		Formerly U. S. Shipping Board	
	No.	Gross	No.	Gross	No.	Gross	No.	Gross
American Sugar Transit Corp. (Owner)	5	19,322	5	19,322	3	12,048
Anglo-Chilean Consolidated Nitrate Corp. (Owner)	1	4,767	1	4,767	1	4,767
Associated Oil Co. (Owner)	1	7,120	1	7,120	1	7,120
Atlantic Gulf & West Indies S. S. Co. (Owner)	2	17,724	2	17,724
Guaranty Trust Co. (Owner)	1	8,024	1	8,024
Atlantic Nav. Corp. (Owner)
Callabaras S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,220	1	2,220	1	2,220
Cananova S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	1,925	1	1,925
Cayo Mambi S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	1,925	1	1,925
Glendola S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,246	1	2,246	1	2,246
Glendoyle S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,246	1	2,246	1	2,246
Norma S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,648	1	2,648	1	2,648
Atlantic Refining Co. (Owner)	8	50,871	4	22,946	4	27,925	5	30,455
Banana Sales Corp.
Atlantic Fruit Co. (Owner)	2	2,582	2	2,582
Boston Molasses Co. (Owner)	1	3,101	1	3,101
California Petr. S. S. Corp. (Owner)	2	14,086	2	14,086	2	14,086
C. D. Mallory & Co.
Malabar S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	8,374	1	8,374
Malacca S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	7,051	1	7,051	1	7,051
Matinicock S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	6,769	1	6,769
Ardmore S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	7,035	1	7,035
Charles Kurz & Co.
Adelphia S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,397	1	2,397
Antietam S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	6,972	1	6,972	1	6,972
Dannedaiké S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	4,310	1	4,310	1	4,310
Chile S. S. Corp. (Owner)	4	20,632	4	20,632	3	15,241
Cities Service Transportation Co. (Owner)	3	20,014	1	7,805	2	12,209	1	6,866
Cuba Distilling Co. (Owner)	3	14,806	3	14,806	2	10,060
Ford Motor Co. (Owner)	6 ^a	20,313	4	15,695
Galena Nav. Co. (Owner)	1	2,841	1	2,841
Gallagher and Co. (Owner)	2	10,375	2	10,375	2	10,375
Kobul S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	5,036	1	5,036	1	5,036

	Gladstone Transportation Co. (Owner)	3	19,791	3	19,791	3	19,791
	Gulf Refining Co. (Owner)	10	78,531	10	78,531	3	20,817
	Huguenot S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	6,964	1	6,964	1	6,964
	Malston Co. (Owner)	2	13,860	2	13,860	2	13,860
	Manatawny S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
	New England Oil S. S. Co. (Owner)	4	32,824	4	32,824
	Oil Transport Co. (Owner)	3	22,676	3	22,676	2	15,170
	Ore S. S. Co. (Owner)	8	67,481	8	67,481
	Pan American Petr. & Transportation Co. (Owner)	21	129,353	1	8,880	20	120,473
	Petroleum Navigation Co. (Owner)	4	18,583	1	4,469	3	14,114	2	9,525
	Pure Oil S. S. Co. (Owner)	3	20,936	3	20,936	2	14,120
	Sinclair Nav. Co. (Owner)	3	9,380	3	9,380
	Southern Pacific Co. (Owner)	3	21,238	3	21,238
	Standard Fruit & S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	4,095	1	4,095
	Standard Oil Co. of Calif. (Owner)	8	32,087	8	32,087
	Standard Shipping Co. (Owner)	15	126,790	15	126,790
	Standard Transportation Co. (Owner)	13	95,463	9	71,068	4	24,395
	Sun Oil Co. (Owner)	3	17,227	1	7,050	2	10,177
	Texas Co. (Owner)	9	56,454	6	35,654	3	20,800	2	13,787
167	Tidewater Associated Transport Corp. (Owner)	3	23,585	3	23,585
	Tidewater Oil Co. (Owner)	2	14,773	2	14,773
	Trimountain S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	6,385	1	6,385	1	6,385
	U. S. Tank Ship Corp.								
	Steamer Castana Corp. (Owner)	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
	Steamer Cedarhurst Corp. (Owner)	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
	Steamer Kishacoquillas Corp. (Owner)	1	5,039	1	5,039	1	5,039
	Steamer Romulus Corp. (Owner)	1	5,104	1	5,104	1	5,104
	Steamer Vaba Corp. (Owner)	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
	Union Oil Co. (Owner)	6	43,226	2	16,360	4	26,866	3	18,594
	United Fruit Co. (Owner)	23	98,000	23	98,000
	United Fruit Tanker Corp. (Owner)	1	6,653	1	6,653
	Oriental Nav. Co. (Owner)	2	2,724	2	2,724
	United States Steel Products (Owner)	37	194,762	32	181,896	5	112,886
	Vacuum Oil Co. (Owner)	1	6,960	1	6,960
	Total	252	1,478,816	81	515,988	165	942,515	59	328,718

¹ The list is of those generally regarded as industrial carriers. However, the Shipping Board cannot definitely determine that all cargo carried by them is their own.

² No regular service. Carried in total but not divided into trades.

LIST OF AMERICAN COMPANIES OPERATING PRIVATELY-OWNED AMERICAN VESSELS—
(Continued)

Industrial Carriers ¹

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Anglo-Chilean Consolidated Nitrate Corp. (Owner)	1	4,767	1	4,767	1	4,767
Associated Oil Co. (Owner)	1	7,120	1	7,120	1	7,120
Atlantic Gulf & West Indies S. S. Co. (Owner)	2	17,724	2	17,724
Guaranty Trust Co. (Owner)	1	8,024	1	8,024
Atlantic Nav. Corp. (Owner)
Callabasa S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,220	1	2,220	1	2,220
Cananova S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	1,925	1	1,925
Cayo Mambi S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	1,925	1	1,925
Glendola S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,246	1	2,246	1	2,246
Glendoyle S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,246	1	2,246	1	2,246
Norma S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,648	1	2,648	1	2,648
Atlantic Refining Co. (Owner)	8	50,871	4	22,946	4	27,925	5	30,455
Banana Sales Corp.
Atlantic Fruit Co. (Owner)	2	2,582	2	2,582
Boston Molasses Co. (Owner)	1	3,101	1	3,101
California Petr. S. S. Corp. (Owner)	2	14,086	2	14,086	2	14,086
C. D. Mallory & Co.
Malabar S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	8,374	1	8,374
Malacca S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	7,051	1	7,051	1	7,051
Matinicock S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	6,769	1	6,769
Ardmore S. S. Co. (Owner)	1	7,035	1	7,035
Charles Kurz & Co.
Adelphia S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	2,397	1	2,397
Antietam S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	6,972	1	6,972	1	6,972
Dannedaik S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	4,310	1	4,310	1	4,310
Chile S. S. Corp. (Owner)	4	20,632	4	20,632	3	15,241
Cities Service Transportation Co. (Owner)	3	20,014	1	7,805	2	12,209	1	6,866
Cuba Distilling Co. (Owner)	3	14,806	3	14,806	2	10,060
Ford Motor Co. (Owner)	6 ^a	20,313	4	15,695
Galena Nav. Co. (Owner)	1	2,841	1	2,841
Gallagher and Co. (Owner)	2	10,375	2	10,375	2	10,375
Kobul S. S. Corp. (Owner)	1	5,036	1	5,036	1	5,036

	3	19,791	3	19,791	3	19,791
Gladstone Transportation Co. (Owner).....	10	78,531	10	78,531	3	20,817
Gulf Refining Co. (Owner).....	1	6,964	1	6,964	1	6,964
Huguenot S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	2	13,860	2	13,860	2	13,860
Malston Co. (Owner).....	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
Manatawny S. S. Co. (Owner).....	4	32,824	4	32,824
New England Oil S. S. Co. (Owner).....	3	22,676	3	22,676	2	15,170
Oil Transport Co. (Owner).....	8	67,481	8	67,481
Ore S. S. Co. (Owner).....	21	129,353	1	8,880	20	120,473
Pan American Petr. & Transportation Co. (Owner).....	4	18,583	1	4,469	3	14,114	2	9,525
Petroleum Navigation Co. (Owner).....	3	20,936	3	20,936	2	14,120
Pure Oil S. S. Co. (Owner).....	3	9,380	3	9,380
Sinclair Nav. Co. (Owner).....	3	21,238	3	21,238
Southern Pacific Co. (Owner).....	1	4,095	1	4,095
Standard Fruit & S. S. Co. (Owner).....	8	32,087	8	32,087
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. (Owner).....	15	126,790	15	126,790
Standard Shipping Co. (Owner).....	13	95,463	9	71,068	4	24,395
Standard Transportation Co. (Owner).....	3	17,227	1	7,050	2	10,177
Sun Oil Co. (Owner).....	9	56,454	6	35,654	3	20,800	2	13,787
Texas Co. (Owner).....	3	23,585	3	23,585
Tidewater Associated Transport Corp. (Owner).....	2	14,773	2	14,773
Tidewater Oil Co. (Owner).....	1	6,385	1	6,385	1	6,385
Trimountain S. S. Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
U. S. Tank Ship Corp.	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
Steamer Castana Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,039	1	5,039	1	5,039
Steamer Cedarhurst Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,104	1	5,104	1	5,104
Steamer Kishacoquillas Corp. (Owner).....	1	5,030	1	5,030	1	5,030
Steamer Romulus Corp. (Owner).....	6	43,226	2	16,360	4	26,866	3	18,594
Steamer Vaba Corp. (Owner).....	23	98,000	23	98,000
Union Oil Co. (Owner).....	1	6,653	1	6,653
United Fruit Co. (Owner).....	2	2,724	2	2,724
United Fruit Tanker Corp. (Owner).....	37	194,762	32	181,896	5	112,886
Oriental Nav. Co. (Owner).....	1	6,960	1	6,960
United States Steel Products (Owner).....	1
Vacuum Oil Co. (Owner).....
Total	252	1,478,816	81	515,988	165	942,515	59	328,718

¹ The list is of those generally regarded as industrial carriers. However, the Shipping Board cannot definitely determine that all cargo carried by them is their own.

² No regular service. Carried in total but not divided into trades.

2

**THE
NATIONAL INCOME
1924**

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**THE
NATIONAL INCOME
1924**

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
INCOME OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
IN 1911 AND 1924**

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INTRODUCTION

IT has been desirable for several years to obtain an adequate estimate of the change in the national income that resulted from the war and its immediate consequences, but till recently it has not been possible for three reasons. In the first place, the rapid changes of the value of money made every calculation ephemeral, if not illusory, till the beginning of 1922 ; secondly, the instability of industry, especially that part which is specially dependent on foreign markets, again prevented the construction of any estimate that would have a reasonable degree of permanence ; thirdly, the main basis of every account of income is the report of the Income-Tax Commissioners, and a very important part of the total for which they account is formed by the average of trading profits of the preceding three years, so that it is not till the fiscal year 1924-5 that disentanglement is possible from the figures of the year 1921, which was exceptional in several respects. The statistics for 1925-6 are not yet available, and we have therefore endeavoured to examine thoroughly the data and to present a reasoned estimate of the national income in the year 1924-5. A slight modification will be sufficient, when the facts are accessible, to account for 1925-6 ; but thereafter there will again be a short interval, till the effects of the coal stoppage no longer influence the Income-Tax returns, before a further estimate can readily be made.

National Income can be defined in many different ways, even when it is limited to income that can be measured in money. The constituents of the various concepts are examined briefly in Chapter V, and different totals are given, corresponding to the different purposes for which estimates of national income are useful. The margin between these totals is much greater now than it was before the war, in other countries as well as this, owing to the increase of taxation to meet debt charges, and to the increasing expenditure for social purposes. In considering any estimates it is now

essential to know how the various moot questions, formerly only of academic interest, have been treated.

Even within the terms of a definition chosen as that most suitable for statistical analysis, there is a considerable region where only broad approximation is possible, and a smaller region where this approximation degenerates into conjecture. We can only reach a scientific result if we can assign definite limits to the possible effects of mistakes or misfits in the detailed estimates, and this we have attempted throughout the analysis. The result is that we can give that total which after a review of all the evidence seems to be the most probable, and at the same time assign a margin within which there is good reason to hold that the true value must fall, while we define as closely as is necessary the content of national income as we have measured it.

In some respects greater accuracy can be contained in a measurement of the growth of income than in one of the amount at a single date. Any want of correspondence between the measurable income and that which is theoretically defined is likely to be in the same direction and of proportionate magnitude at both dates. Actual mistakes in estimate, e. g. of agricultural incomes, will tend to result in similar errors in the totals, and therefore very small errors in the comparison, if the same methods are followed at the two dates. We have therefore followed as far as was practicable the methods of the estimate for 1911, published under the title *The Division of the Product of Industry*, making any necessary adjustment in it to correspond to the various concepts of national income with which we deal. In this comparison it is necessary either to exclude the income of Southern Ireland at the earlier date, and so introduce an additional element of uncertainty, or to recognize that the two results relate to different areas.

This additional security of estimate, of course, applies only to money values. When we come to consider the change in 'real' income we have to make allowance for the reduced purchasing power of £1 sterling. The rise in wholesale prices from 1913 to 1924 was about 66 per cent., and in the cost of living index about 75 per cent., and some number related

to these must evidently be applied, with further correction for the period 1911 to 1914. The result must remain a little vague, if only because the assessed value of houses has not moved in the same proportion as prices in general.

In 1911 it was possible to criticize the results in the light afforded by the Census of Production of 1906, which also formed an important source of data. When the results of the new Census of Production (for 1924) are available it will again afford help in explaining our new total. Meanwhile, we can make certain comparisons by means of an index of 'physical production' which measures (so far as the facts are known) the change in the volume of production apart from the change of prices.

There are very many problems which could be elucidated by estimates of total income if sufficient details of its constituents were known. For example, we want to know the relative proportion of wages, salaries, other earned income, rents, interest, profits, &c., to the whole. Within the aggregate of wages there has, no doubt, been a shifting, and the relative levels in different occupations have altered. There may have been a change in the general distribution of wealth, in the direction of less inequality of incomes or the opposite. The incidence of taxation is probably modified. Some of these questions are considered in the final chapter, but the immediate evidence is not sufficient for us to go very far in such directions, and we only hope that the broad results attained may facilitate analysis in further investigations.

CHAPTER I

THE NUMBER OF INCOMES

TOTAL AND OCCUPIED POPULATION.

THE Census of 1921 records the number of persons present in Great Britain on the 30th June, and the Registrar-General's reports on births and deaths, together with estimates of net emigration, indicate an increase of 2 per cent. to mid 1924. A census of the population of Northern Ireland was taken on the 18th April 1926, and by means of the records of births and deaths in the previous years its size can be estimated also in 1924 and 1921.

CENSUS POPULATION (000s).

Middle of year.	1921.	1924.
Great Britain	42,769	43,629
Northern Ireland	1,224	1,242
United Kingdom	43,993	44,871

Details by age, sex, and occupation are available only for Great Britain and in the year 1921. It may be estimated that the occupied male population increased 2 per cent., and the occupied female occupation 3 per cent. in the three years 1921-4, and that we should add 2.8 per cent. to the whole occupied population to include Northern Ireland. It is assumed that there has been no significant change in the proportions of the various categories of occupied persons with whom we are concerned, and on this basis the figures in the second of the following tables are estimated.

POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 1921 (000s).

<i>Occupied.</i>	Men & boys.	Women & girls.
Wage-earners	10,526	4,182
Salaried	1,637	1,071
Independent workers	841	366
Employers, farmers, professional	652	83
Total occupied	13,656	5,702

THE NUMBER OF INCOMES

<i>Unoccupied.</i>	Men & boys.	Women & girls.
Under 10 years	3,935	3,864
10 and under 14 years	1,628	1,616
14 and under 20 years	384	873
Others: single	} 828	{ 1,247
married or widowed		
Total unoccupied	6,775	16,635
<i>Total population</i>	20,431	22,337

ESTIMATED OCCUPIED POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1924 (000s).

	Men & boys.	Women & girls.
Wage-earners	11,000	4,400
Salaried	1,700	1,100
Independent workers	900	400
Employers, farmers, professional	700	100
Total occupied	14,300	6,000

In the former account the numbers of occupied persons were classified as in the following table. It is probable that on the stricter classification possible in 1924 a number of persons would have been transferred to the heading 'Salaried' from the subsequent classes. The subtraction of Southern Ireland decreases especially the number of farmers. These two considerations destroy the comparability of the numbers of independent workers, employers, &c., at the two dates. To determine whether these classes have actually diminished or not would need a special investigation (not wanted in our present inquiry). The increase in the number of salaried persons is, however, definitely established, though it is probably not so great as the figures here given suggest.

ESTIMATED OCCUPIED POPULATION OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, 1911 (000s).

	Men & boys.	Women & girls.
Wage-earners	11,000	4,650
Salaried	1,120	550
Independent workers	650	} 650
Employers, farmers, professional	1,530	
Total occupied	14,300	5,850
<i>Less</i> South Ireland	1,060	390
Present area of U.K.	13,240	5,460

The population thus estimated includes foreigners and other visitors present in the United Kingdom, against whom we may balance persons obtaining their income here but absent on business or pleasure. It will be necessary, however, to add an estimate for soldiers and sailors abroad when the total income is computed.

The Census distinguishes employers, employed, and independent workers (i. e. persons working on their own account without paid help), but from the nature of the case the definitions are not rigid. The division of employed persons into wage-earners and salaried can only be made by considering the nature of the occupation stated, and here again there is a margin of uncertainty. But we obtain sufficient security by accounting for every occupied person in one category or another, for the difference between the small salaries and relatively high wages of the persons in the marginal classes is small, and we may, so far as the total income is concerned, estimate for them in either group. Similarly, a person working directly for the market without assistance presumably makes an income comparable with that of a wage-earner, and it is nearly immaterial where we class him.

The Census returns of occupations depend on unverified statements of householders, and include persons out of work, ill, incapacitated, elderly, and no doubt in some cases superannuated. Definite allowance is made for all these causes of deficiency of wages in the wage-estimate in Chapter IV, and in the treatment of small salaries in Chapter III a small arbitrary reduction is made for the same purpose.

OCCUPATIONS AND INCOMES.

Every person, with the exceptions just named, classed as occupied in the Census may be assumed to be in receipt of an income arising from his occupation, or to have an income from property if in fact his occupation is not remunerative. Women's activities in their own households are not counted technically as occupations. But the total number of occupied is less than the total number of incomes, so far as any persons in receipt of income from property have no stated occupation.

THE NUMBER OF INCOMES

Estimates of National Income are made by considering separately the three groups, Incomes assessed to Income-Tax, Wages, and Intermediate Income, that is Income (other than wages) below the exemption limit of taxation. In subsequent chapters these groups are considered separately. The only reason why we need to know the number of incomes is for criticism of the numbers estimated to be in the Intermediate Income Class, and the following analysis is helpful for this purpose.

The data may be put in the following form :

United Kingdom, 1924.	
Estimated number of persons with incomes ¹ above exemption limit	4,700,000
Estimated number of manual wage-earners included	1,600,000
(a) Non-wage-earners assessed to tax	3,100,000
(b) Estimated number of wage-earners, assessed to tax or not	15,400,000
(c) Total number of incomes (a) and (b)	18,500,000
(d) Number of occupied persons	20,300,000.
(e) Excess of (d) over (c)	1,800,000

This number, (e), 1,800,000 is the minimum estimate for the number of Intermediate Incomes if we assume that all occupied persons have incomes. We have to add to it the number of taxpayers (x) who do not state that they are occupied, for this must be added to the number (d) to make it the total number of incomes to be brought into the reckoning. Now the number of 'unoccupied' men between the ages 20 and 65 in Great Britain in 1921 was 376,000 and above the age 65 was 452,000. These numbers include all those incapacitated by physical or mental disability or old age, and the great majority of these have not an independent income over £135.² It is otherwise known that the majority of rich men are in receipt of some earned income and nearly all would

¹ Whether allowances for children, &c., lead to a complete remission of tax or not.

² In the 1911 Census of England and Wales, among males 352,000 are classed as 'Retired from Business (not Army or Navy)', 23,000 as Old Age Pensioners, 70,500 as other Pensioners, 52,000 as 'Private Means', while for 147,000 other males over 20 years no occupation or further classification is specified.

return themselves as occupied. The number of unoccupied women assessed to income-tax is not known, but since the great majority of married women are not assessed separately, and do not enter into any of the totals, their contribution to the number in question is only the small number of single or widowed unoccupied women whose income is over £135. So far as can be guessed the number (x) is in the neighbourhood of 200,000. So far, therefore, the number of persons other than wage-earners whose income is below the exemption limit appears to be about 2,000,000.

But we have still to consider the position of (say (y)) persons (other than wage-earners) earning less than £150, but assessed to tax because income from property brings them above the exemption limit. They are already included in (a), and their incomes will be included in the total of incomes in the Income group (Chapter III). Now when we come to compute from other sources the number of the Intermediate Class, we shall automatically include these and get $1,800,000 + x + y$. The number obtained should be greater than $1,800,000 + x$, but we must only include the incomes of the number $1,800,000 + x$ since those of y will already have been reckoned.

CHAPTER II

INCOME ASSESSED TO INCOME-TAX

THE 68th Report of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue gives the actual Gross Income reviewed for the fiscal year 1923-4 for Great Britain and Northern Ireland as £2,913 millions, and the estimate for 1924-5 as £2,900 millions. To get the 'Actual Income' they deduct certain 'exemptions' for income accruing to persons (with total incomes under the exemption limit, e. g. from small dividends and rents), for the income of charities and hospitals, for dividends coming from abroad, *through* this country, flowing out to persons not resident here. They also take off the rental value of empty property and make deductions for repairs to property and wear and tear of machinery and plant.

The 'Actual Income' was £2,303 millions for 1923-4 (against an estimate in the previous Report of £2,300 millions), and £2,310 millions as an estimate for 1924-5. The year to April 1925 may be taken as virtually identical with the calendar year 1924, on the evidence of the two years together. It would be identical for Schedules A and B, and is closely similar for Schedules C and E. As regards Schedule D the assessments in question are based upon accounts running to many different dates, but the mean terminal date for the total assessed in 1924-5 is not removed from the 31st December 1923 by more than a few days.¹ This 'actual income' is reckoned before taking off the various personal allowances which are involved in the machinery of assessment before computing taxable income. The term conforms as nearly as possible to money Income in the sense employed in the estimate of National Income. The important section under Schedule D assessed upon an average of three or five preceding years amounts to about £1,110 millions (Table 66). A very large sample of actual profits in such assessments shows that the ratio of the average of those preceding years to the actual profits of 1924-5 was 100 to 113.8, and on this basis £153 millions must be added to the above figure of 1,110.

¹ *British Incomes and Property*, p. 177.

INCOME ASSESSED TO INCOME-TAX 17

The 'Actual Income' of the liable classes for the Calendar year 1924 was therefore £2,463 millions. There were, however, two exemption limits : £150 for income from work, and £135 for incomes from investment and property, and in practice this gives an intermediate figure as the exemption limit for a 'mixed income'.

Thus	30 wages		145 wages
A	108 property	B	4½ property
	£138		£149½

are both exempt incomes.

The average exemption limit of incomes in general is about £147, for the number of cases of very small earnings (cases of the *A* type) becoming liable by a *much* larger income from property is relatively small compared with the number of cases of *B* type, in which the investment income is unimportant. If the exemption limit were uniformly £150 for all kinds of income the total Actual Income above stated would be reduced by about £35 millions (\pm £5 millions). The 'Actual Income' adjusted therefore to correct the preceding three years average and also the exemption limit was £2,428 millions. 'Income-Tax' income *exceeds* ordinary income under certain heads, since it includes *inter alia* various losses which do not come out in the assessment.¹ It is *less* than true income when evasion and fraud keep income out of assessment.² The amount under this head is more difficult to estimate than formerly, but it has certainly risen more than in proportion to the increase in assessed income, and, considering the facts in those fields of income where evasion is possible or prevalent, we reach an estimate of £75±15 millions. The extent of 'over-assessment' referred to is now less in proportion, say £50 millions, and, on the balance, £25±15 millions is added, which is carried forward as £15 millions on home income and £10 millions on income from abroad. We thus reach a total of £2,453 millions.

It should be noted that Schedule A is taken as it stands because there had been recently a complete reassessment,

¹ For a summary and estimates see *British Incomes*, pp. 178-203.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

18 INCOME ASSESSED TO INCOME-TAX

and that Schedule B, treating the income as equal to the rent, required no such correction as was necessary before 1914. The 'Income-Tax' income, unlike the 'Super-tax income', includes all sums put to reserve by limited companies out of the profits, and is not identical with the aggregate of *individual* incomes. For the purposes of an estimate of total national income it is necessary to add the incomes of charities, hospitals, friendly societies, exempt from income-tax, some £30 millions, making £2,483 millions. For some purposes it is proper to deduct assessed income going to people living abroad, which may be estimated at between £20 millions and £30 millions, say £25 millions.

We have still to add £25 millions, a rough estimate of income on War Loan and on certain external loans which is tax-free and not included in the assessment named above. Our total becomes £2,508 millions.

The totals so far given include £290 millions derived from wages of about 1,600,000 manual workers. When we come to assemble the elements of income in Chapter VI this sum will be included under wages. The residue, £2,218 millions, is then the actual income of persons *other than wage-earners* whose income was over £150 in 1924-5, together with incomes of exempt charities, &c. For residents in the United Kingdom the total is £2,183 millions.

Of this sum it is estimated that £205 millions is derived from possessions or activities abroad, including the income evading tax. (Income accruing abroad, but not remitted, was formerly not liable to tax at all.) The net income from abroad is then £180 millions, i.e. this £205 millions less the £25 millions going to individuals abroad. Any error in this estimate is much more likely to be by deficiency than excess.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERMEDIATE CLASS OF INCOMES

THE method of estimating the numbers and incomes of non-manual workers who are not assessed to income-tax is to divide all occupied persons other than manual workers into classes, and estimate the proportion in each class whose earned incomes are less than £150. It is impossible to obtain precision in many of the classes, and therefore it is useless to strive after accuracy in detail. It will be unnecessary, for example, to pay attention to changes in the proportions between the classes as we pass from Great Britain to the United Kingdom or from 1921 to 1924. The following table is obtained from a study of the Census of England and Wales and of Scotland in 1921, the figures being raised 4·8 per cent. for males and 5·8 per cent. for females (see p. 11) to bring them up to date and include Northern Ireland.

OCCUPIED PERSONS, OTHER THAN MANUAL WAGE-EARNERS, IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1924.

	(000s.)					
	<i>Salaried.</i>		<i>Employers.</i>		<i>Independent.</i>	
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
Agriculture and						
Fishing	27	2	176	13	192	14
Industry	441	206	213	19	219	106
Commerce and						
Finance	481	250	198	28	282	108
Professions	189	179	32	4	62	46
Army and Navy	20	—	—	—	—	—
Transport	170	28	19	—	46	1
Central Government	169	102	—	—	—	—
Local Government :						
Teaching	57	172	—	—	—	—
Others	95	68	—	—	—	—
Personal service	34	104	44	24	75	112
Miscellaneous	32	21	1	—	5	—
Total	1,715	1,132	683	88	881	387

The numbers are not known as precisely as the table suggests, and will be rounded off in the sequel, as they were on p. 12.

SALARIES.

In order to obtain information about the numbers of salaries below £150, the procedure of the Inquiry by the Committee of the British Association (Sec. F) in 1910-11 was followed, and a questionnaire was prepared and sent to the principal statutory authorities employing clerks and to a number of private firms.¹ The latter were selected so as to include large employers in most of the important industries. The essential questions were: (A) number of partners, managers, clerks, &c., who draw more than £150 per annum, and (B) number who draw £150 or less, and their total receipts. A supplementary question asked for their numbers under (B) whose salaries were under £40, £40 to £60, &c. It was made clear that all manual wage-earners were to be excluded. In response to about 750 forms issued we received about 260 completed returns, relating to about 170,000 men and 78,000 women, and so accounting for about 9 per cent. of the salaried persons in Great Britain. The returns do not bear a uniform proportion to the totals in the different categories. The numbers for which we have definite information are 32 per cent. of all in Transport, 16 per cent. for Teachers and for Clerks, &c., employed by Local Authorities, 9 per cent. in Commerce, and 2½ per cent. in Industry. We have other information for Defence and Central Government Services, and some guidance for the numbers included in Professions and in Personal Service where incomes were less than £150. These sources of information, which are discussed in detail below, lead to the estimates on page 21.

The information about the employees of *Local Authorities* is more satisfactory than in any other category. The low average of the few male teachers who receive less than £150 is due to the inclusion of a number of pupil teachers and others who receive less than £40; among the women teachers

¹ We are indebted to Mr. Jack of Glasgow University, Professor Clay of Manchester, Professor Carr-Saunders of Liverpool, and Professor J. C. Smith of Birmingham for help in this inquiry, and especially to Miss W. A. Elkin, who took charge of this part of the investigation and assisted in the estimates of the numbers occupied and of wages. The cost was met by a grant from the Laura-Spelman Rockefeller Trust.

SALARIES

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there is a perceptible number of adults who receive from £80 to £150.

In other classes also, which are included in the table, the income £150 is a long way up women's scale of payment, but near the tail of men's pay where it includes a majority of young beginners. Consequently, when the averages of these curtate groups are taken, that for women is often higher than for men.

SALARIED PERSONS.

	<i>Number in Returns.</i>		<i>Under £150.</i>			
	<i>Over £150.</i>	<i>Under £150.</i>	<i>Per- centage of all, 100 b. ÷ (a + b).</i>	<i>Number in United Kingdom, viz. c. applied to previous table. d</i>	<i>Average income. e</i>	<i>Aggre- gate income. e x d. f</i>
	a	b	c	d	e	f
MALES.						
				£	£000's	
Local Authorities :						
Teachers	19,701	648	3.2	18,200	65	1,200
Others	21,428	3,170	12.9	12,300	90	1,100
Industrial clerks, &c.	10,890	2,986	21.5	94,800	91	8,600
Commerce :						
Banking	22,751	7,735	25.4	16,000	101	1,600
Insurance	16,683	1,737	9.4	4,700	91	400
Others	3,913	1,315	25.1	92,400	81	7,500
Transport	47,452	11,554	19.6	33,300	103	3,400
Central Government	—	—	15	25,400	100	2,500
Army and Navy	—	—	0	—	—	—
Professions	—	—	15	28,300	90	2,500
Personal services	—	—	20	6,800	90	600
Agriculture and miscel- laneous	—	—	20	11,800	90	1,100
Total	—	—	—	344,000	—	30,500
FEMALES.						
					£000's	
Local Authorities :						
Teachers	41,815	8,561	17.0	29,200	117	3,400
Others	3,085	3,298	52.5	35,700	97	3,500
Industrial clerks, &c.	368	2,575	87.5	180,400	92	16,600
Commerce :						
Banking	4,773	2,178	31.3	6,300	128	800
Insurance	1,445	3,304	69.6	19,900	114	2,300
Others	174	1,106	86.4	173,900	90	15,700
Transport	981	4,823	83.1	23,300	101	2,400
Central Government	—	—	60	61,200	100	6,100
Professions	—	—	80	143,200	80	11,500
Personal service	—	—	85	88,400	80	7,100
Miscellaneous	—	—	85	19,500	80	1,600
Total	—	—	—	781,000	—	71,000

22 THE INTERMEDIATE CLASS OF INCOMES

In *Transport* we have complete returns of two of the largest railway companies, which may be taken as typical of railways. The group also includes the merchant service and all others engaged in non-governmental transport and communication; in the former the great majority of salaried persons receive more than £150, while among the latter there are probably enough who receive less to bring the proportion of the two together near to that in the railways. The percentage obtained in the Railways is therefore taken as typical of the whole group.

Industry and Commerce may be considered together in the light of the returns we have received. We are dealing with offices, large or small, in which are groups of men or women in all grades of maturity and advancement of salary. Now, though we have only a few more than 100 separate records, including only 5 or 6 per cent. of all salaried clerks in these categories, it became evident on examination of the returns that there is a definite type for men and another for women, round which the proportions cluster, and the inclusion of more returns would be quite unlikely to shift this type or average through any great difference. The statistics have just that character which a correctly drawn random sample presents, and such a sample is known to have considerable precision.

FIRMS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTIONS OF SALARIED MANAGERS, CLERKS, &C., RECEIVING LESS OR MORE THAN £150 PER ANNUM.

Scale of percentage of males and of females receiving less than £150.

	1 & under 10	10 & under 20	20 & under 30	30 & under 40	40 & under 50	50 & under 60	60 & under 70	70 & under 80	80 & under 90	90 & under 100	100
0											
	Number of firms employing males.										
7	17	22	32	22	8	4	1	1	0	0	0
	Number of firms employing females.										
6	4	0	3	3	1	9	8	15	20	17	20
						For males.			For females.		
	Median percentage					22			82		
	Unweighted average percentage					23			72		
	Average percentage weighted as in returns					20			52		
	Average percentage with census weights					23			84		

24 THE INTERMEDIATE CLASS OF INCOMES

Though there is a great deal of information available about the salaries and numbers of salaried employees of the *Central Government* it has been found to be impossible to apply it directly to the numbers obtained from the Census of 1921, for which we have to account, owing both to differences of definition and classification and to the great reduction in the numbers soon after the date of the Census. There is evidence that both among men and women the standard of education and therefore of salary is higher than that in industry and commerce as a whole, many grades being paid well above the minimum £150. A reasonable estimate seems to be to apply the proportions 15 per cent. to the males and 60 per cent. to the females included in the Census. In the *Army and Navy* the number of salaries less than £150 appears to be negligible.

In the remaining categories we have very little information, except that obtained by studying the Census sub-classification. Under the heading *professions* are included the clergy (very few of whom are below the minimum), teachers other than those employed by local authorities, professional sportsmen, and clerks attached to professional men. Among the women a very large entry is that of nurses, the great majority of whom receive less than £150 cash. It seems reasonable to apply the percentages 15 and 80 to the Census numbers of men and women respectively.

In the other classes, *Personal service*, *Agriculture*, and *Miscellaneous*, we cannot do better than estimate 20 per cent. for the males and 85 per cent. for the females, since there is nothing to show that the classes included do better or worse than salaried persons in business offices, so far as the lower scales of pay are concerned.

Reference is made to the probable precision of the resulting estimate at the end of this chapter.

2. EMPLOYERS AND INDEPENDENT WORKERS.

The most important class under these headings is farmers, in respect of whom we can only proceed by some broad assumptions.

Detail of the number and size of holdings may be summarized thus :

EMPLOYERS AND INDEPENDENT WORKERS 25

Agricultural holdings in Great Britain (England and Wales, 1923, Scotland, 1924).

	Number (000s).	Area (000 acres).
Under 10 acres	150	698
10 to 100 acres	242	8,777
100 acres and over	96	23,455
	488	32,930

According to the Census of 1921 the number of farmers was 352,000. We assume that all holdings of 9 acres or less were occupied by non-farmers, and that the income from them is included under other headings in the account of Income-Tax incomes. Farmers were in 1923-4 assessed at the annual value, i.e. the Rent, of their lands. From the Assessments to Income-Tax, Schedule B, we have the first column in the following table :

1923-4, Great Britain.

	Whole amount.	Amount per acre cultivated.
	£	£
Gross income	49,500,000	1·5
Reductions and discharges	9,100,000	·3
	40,400,000	1·2

Assume that farmers with holdings of 100 acres or more were assessed at having incomes over £150, which corresponds to an average rent of 30s. an acre. Possibly the limit should be raised to 120 acres with a resulting slight decrease in the number assessed to tax. We then take the number of holdings from 9 to 100 acres as the number of farmers in the Intermediate Class. This, including Ulster, may be put at 260,000, of whom 20,000 may be women. The average holding in this group is about 36 acres and a house, and if we assume that the income from this is £100, the whole contribution to Intermediate Income is £26 millions.

Among *employers*, other than farmers, who number 507,000 males and 75,000 females, the great majority no doubt earn over £150 per annum. In industry those with smaller incomes would be found in small metal, motor or electrical undertakings, carpenters' shops, and among dress-makers. In Transport we should include some carriers by road or canal. In Commerce we have the smallest shopkeepers. After studying the total numbers in each Census category

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we are of opinion that the maxima to be assigned as under £150 would be 40,000 males and 60,000 females, and we will use these numbers, together with estimates of average income of the former as £125 and the latter £100.

Under the heading independent workers (other than farmers) we have to account for 689,000 males and 373,000 females. In Industry and Transport a male worker on his own account, probably helped by his family but not employing any one else, may be ranked with skilled wage-earners, and more than half of them may be expected to be earning over £3 weekly and to be assessed to tax. Similarly in commerce and finance the majority will be small traders helped by their families, and hawkers of all kinds will be included. We suggest that about one-third of this group make less than £150 per annum. We can ignore the small proportion of professional men below the limit, and estimate that about one-third of those classed under personal are below. Of the women in the corresponding classes probably only a small proportion earn £150. These assumptions result in the estimate that in the whole group 220,000 (32 per cent.) among the men, and 300,000 (80 per cent.) among the women are not assessed to tax, and that the men average £130 and the women £85.

3. ALL INTERMEDIATE INCOMES.

The aggregate number and aggregate income of the Intermediate Group are on these assumptions as follows :

Occupied persons other than wage-earners. United Kingdom, 1924.

	<i>Males.</i>			<i>Females.</i>		
	All Number.	Under £150. Number. Aggregate income.		All Number.	Under £150. Number. Aggregate income.	
	000s.	000s.	£ Mn.	000s.	000s.	£ Mn.
Salaried	1,715	344	30	1,132	781	71
Farmers	368	240	24	27	20	2
Employers	507	40	5	75	60	6
Independent workers	689	220	26	373	300	26
Total	3,279	844	85	1,607	1,161	105

We have then 2,005,000 persons other than wage-earners, with an income of less than £150, whose aggregate income is £190,000,000. It is evident that the most important risk of error is in the group 'independent workers', and since there is no means of improving the estimate here it is futile to work further at the detail of the other lines. Now in Chapter I it was estimated that the number of intermediate incomes was about 2,000,000, together with a small number of earned incomes under £150, which were brought above the exemption limit by income from property. The small discrepancy between this and the number just given suggests that the number of independent workers earning less than £150 may be somewhat greater than estimated above. On the other hand, we have made no allowance for loss of income owing to illness or superannuation or unemployment among persons described as occupied.

Taking all these factors into consideration we estimate the amount to be included in the National Income for the Intermediate Group to be between £180 millions and £220 millions, and consider that £190 millions is the best approximation to make.

The number of persons in this group is roughly 2,000,000. It is naturally smaller than the estimate for the Intermediate Group in 1911, viz. 3,600,000 with incomes less than £160, since owing to the rise of prices an income of £150 now is only equivalent to an income of about £90 in 1911, and only about 2,000,000 persons would have been included as below that level. In passing from 1911 to 1924 the exclusion of Southern Ireland is to be balanced against the increase of population. The rough estimate made is thus consistent with all known facts, and cannot be radically altered. The possibility of error can hardly be as great as 15 per cent. of the estimate, or say 1 per cent. of the aggregate national income.

CHAPTER IV

WAGES

THE original basis of the estimate of the National Wages Bill is the investigation by the Board of Trade in 1906 of earnings and hours in the principal industries. The resulting statistics were completed and brought up to date by all available information to give an estimate for the United Kingdom in 1911,¹ which it is believed possesses very fair precision. The total received in wages, including earnings of shop assistants and a small element of payment in kind, and making allowance for sickness, holidays, unemployment, short-time and overtime, was estimated at £782 millions, together with £20 millions for the earnings of soldiers and sailors abroad. This 1911 estimate is the basis of the present calculation.

We have to estimate not only the change in rates of wages but also the change in actual earnings ; we have to allow for the differing growths of the numbers occupied in various industries, as well as the general increase in the number of wage-earners ; we must estimate any variation in unemployment, sickness or holidays ; and, finally, we must exclude South Ireland from the total.

The data available for estimating numbers are the Population Censuses of 1911 and 1921, and the numbers of insured persons since 1921. For changes in wage-rates we have accounts every month in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, which have been worked up for various purposes at different times, and the summary of these changes given from time to time in the *Gazette*. For coal and some other industries there have been special investigations, and during 1926 the results of a new inquiry into wages and hours in important industries have been published in the *Labour Gazette*.² There is also much miscellaneous information bearing on the subject. Though the mass of material is very considerable, it is unco-ordinated and incomplete ; it is very difficult to piece it together and to give due allowance to all factors, and there

¹ *The Division of the Product of Industry*, p. 30.

² Only those issued in December, 1926, or earlier have been available for this estimate.

are some complete *lacunae*, the effect of which on the precision of the result has to be estimated.

Recent comparisons have generally been based on wages in 1914, and it is first necessary to shift the starting-point from 1911 to 1914. The increase of population and the rise in wages during these three years is estimated to add 8 per cent. to aggregate earnings, all other factors being assumed unchanged.

NATIONAL WAGE BILL. UNITED KINGDOM.

	<i>Males.</i>	<i>Females.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
	£ Mn.	£ Mn.	£ Mn.
1911	631	151	782
1914	682	163	845

Actually employment was rather better in 1914 than in 1911, and the total should be raised about 1 per cent., but this change is presently merged in the factor for unemployment used below.

Next, the change in average earnings from 1914 to 1924, analysed in the following pages, is applied to the 1914 estimates.

NATIONAL WAGE BILL. UNADJUSTED.

	<i>Males.</i>	<i>Females.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
1914 £ Mn.	682	163	845
Average increase per person	90.6 %	112 %	—
1924.			
Ignoring change in numbers £ Mn.	1,300	346	1,646
Effective change in numbers 1914-24	+7.5 %	-3.3 % ¹	—
1924 £ Mn.	1,397	334	1,731

This total aggregate £1,731 millions is reduced by about £76 millions by the inclusion of South Ireland, giving about £1,655 millions.

Unemployment was reckoned as reducing wages by 3.8 per cent. in 1911. In 1924 the corresponding reduction is estimated as 8.3 per cent. Increased holidays (other than holidays with pay) probably lead to a reduction of 1 per cent. There appears to have been no significant change in absence through sickness when 1924 is compared with 1911, and in

¹ This fall is due to the reduction in the number of servants. There was a large increase in the number of clerks, &c., so that the whole number of occupied women increased 5 per cent. in the decade.

both years it is taken as averaging 1.68 weeks. By taking off 5.5 per cent. for increased unemployment and holidays from £1,655 millions, we reach the final estimate £1,564 millions for the total earnings of the manual working class (including shop assistants, excluding soldiers and sailors abroad) actually in Great Britain or North Ireland in 1924. The estimate probably is correct within 5 per cent., and may be safely written as between £1,490 millions and £1,640 millions. In 1925 a very slight increase in wage-rates and population was balanced by increased unemployment, and the total remains nearly unchanged.

We now add an estimate for the wages of soldiers and sailors abroad, viz. about £40 millions (as compared with £20 millions in 1911), and we reach, finally, in round numbers £1,600 millions, with a possible margin \pm £80, but it is believed that \pm £40 millions is really sufficient, at least in comparison with 1911.

This total does not include receipts from the national insurance organizations for sickness and unemployment, but *per contra* it does include the workmen's contributions to the scheme. The excess value of the receipts due to employers' contributions are brought into account in Chapters V and VI.

The main purpose of this study was to estimate this aggregate, but some other statistics may be given. The average earnings of males of all ages classed as wage-earners is estimated in 1924 at £115, the average number of weeks worked at 44 (allowing for sickness, unemployment, and holidays), and the average earnings at full work at 52*s.* a week. In these averages boys are included, together with some superannuated workers and some casuals not attached to any industry; if these are excluded we find that the average man at full work in 1924 obtained about 60*s.* a week. The corresponding figure for 1914 is 32*s.* The working-week has been reduced about 10 per cent. in the period, and average *hourly* earnings of men have increased from about 7½*d.* to 15½*d.*

There are in round numbers 8,000,000 working-class households in the existing United Kingdom, and the number of workers per 100 households is 188 approximately. The income from wages per house was in 1924 near £190 per annum;

or £210 if there was no unemployment or absence owing to sickness during the year.

Average earnings of all wage-earners for a full working-week are estimated to have increased 94 per cent. between 1914 and 1924, while the Cost of Living Index rose 75 per cent. Real *weekly* earnings measured on this basis therefore rose about 11 per cent. Average *annual* real earnings, however, were reduced by increased unemployment, so that the rise in them was only 5 per cent.,¹ and if the estimate errs by excess working-class households in 1924 were on the average hardly better off than in 1914. But since wages of unskilled men have increased more than those of skilled, at least in the towns, the households least well off in 1914 have improved their position. Though the number of young children had decreased by 1924 this fall had not then reached the working ages, and the number of earners per household had not changed perceptibly.²

In the *Labour Gazette*, February 1925, the general average increase in weekly full-time wages is estimated for 1924 as 70 to 75 per cent. Our estimate above, viz. 94 per cent., is greater since earnings are considered, not rates of wages, and there is definite evidence that in some of the greater industries earnings have increased much more rapidly than piece- or time-rates, and also there has been some change over from time- to piece-rates. The preliminary results obtained in the wage inquiry of 1924, considered below, support this view. Further, the 94 per cent. allows for the shifting in the relative importance of occupations in the ten years, which on the whole has been towards the better-paid occupations and industries, and has therefore raised the average.

The process of computation of the percentages already stated was necessarily indirect and involved.

Write n for the number of persons in any industry in 1914, w for the annual average earnings, $n \times w$ for aggregate earnings, $l + p$ for the ratio of the numbers in 1924 to those in

¹ See note on p. 33.

² The number of dependent children has, however, decreased, and, owing to the increase in the number of pensions, the burden of the support of older persons has also been lightened. See *Has Poverty Diminished?* P. S. King & Son. 1925.

1914, and $1+r$ for the ratio of average earnings in 1924 to those in 1914. Then aggregate earnings in any industry in 1924 were $nw(1+p)(1+r)$, and the ratio of aggregate earnings in all industries in 1924 to those in 1914 is $\frac{S[nw(1+p)(1+r)]}{S(nw)}$,

where the sums are taken over all industries. This factor, worked separately for males and for females is then to be applied to the aggregate wage bill in 1914.

The aggregate of 1914 was obtained from that of 1911 simply by applying to it the Registrar-General's estimate of the rate of increase of population and the average increase of certain rates of wages stated in the XVIIth Abstract of Labour Statistics. A slight modification was made in the detailed working to allow for some variation in the increase in the numbers in different industries in these three years.

The factor $1+p$, the change in the numbers in each industry, was estimated by a very detailed study of the occupation statistics in the censuses of England and Wales for 1911 and 1921.¹ The aggregate change $S[n(1+p)] \div S(n)$ is known, and it was only the variation between industries that affects the calculation. Meticulous accuracy was not possible, nor essential, and it was assumed that the result for England and Wales could be extended to the United Kingdom. To pass from the decade 1911-21 to the decade 1914-24, the increases already reckoned for 1911-14 were subtracted, and with the help of the recorded changes of the number of insured persons changes from 1921 to 1924 were added. By this means the effect on aggregate wages of such movements as the increase of the number of miners and metal-workers and the decrease in the number of domestic servants was brought into the calculation.

Average wages in 1914 (w) were computed roughly by taking the averages used in the 1911 estimate, which depended principally on the wage inquiry of 1906, and bringing them up to the date 1914 in correspondence with the general change of wages already used in the 1914 estimate. Considerable latitude was permissible in this operation, since w only enters as a 'weight' in the computation of the weighted

¹ See Memoranda 17 and 17 A of the London and Cambridge Economic Service.

average, and similar latitude in regard to $n \times w$ hardly affects the result.

It was convenient to separate the effect of the factors $(1+p)$ and $(1+r)$. The ratio required was written

$$\frac{S [nw (1+p) (1+r)]}{S (nw)} = \frac{S [nw (1+p)]}{S (nw)} \times S [k (1+r)], = P \times R,$$

say, where $k = \frac{nw (1+p)}{S [nw (1+p)]}$ for each industry, $R = S [k (1+r)]$,

and $P = \frac{S [nw (1+p)]}{S (nw)}$. Then P measures the increase in the

aggregate due to increase and shifting of population. It is found to be 1.075 for males and 0.967 for females, giving the +7.5 per cent. and -3.3 per cent. in the table on p. 29.

The k 's, whose aggregate is 1, affix the relative importance to the change in earnings industry by industry.

The value of P is dominated by the general increase of the number of wage-earners, which is adequately known, and only modified slightly by shifting between occupations; but R , the increase due to wage changes, depends on accurate measurements of the separate r 's in the major industries, and for it we have no aggregate control. The exact determination of nw (or rather of the ratio of a particular nw to the sum of all) is only important for any large industries, such as coal mining, where the rate of change of wages differs significantly from the general average rate.

The calculation from the details of the following table lead to the values of R , 1.906 for males, 2.12 for females, and 1.943 for all; that is increases of 90½, 112, and 94 per cent. in the 10 years.

The figure for coal is based on the statistics of the Coal Commission 1925. The great group of metals and engineering is the subject of a report in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, July and September 1926, where details of average earnings in four selected weeks in 1924 are given. These figures have been compared with the wage inquiry of 1906, industry by industry and for both sexes, and after allowing for the rise from 1906 to 1914 already included in our estimate an increase in average earnings of 87 per cent. is found. Both

the 1924 and the 1906 accounts show the effect of overtime and short-time; the increase is practically the same whether we take actual earnings or hypothetical full-time earnings.

For textiles we have a similar report in June 1926. After considering other evidence it has been thought best to take half-way between the rise in actual earnings (105 per cent. for the whole group) and that of hypothetical full-time earnings (118 per cent.). Short-time is otherwise partly allowed for. The increases have been greater than those indicated by the change of piece-rates (allowance made or reduced hours), as has generally been found to happen in these industries.

The miscellaneous group, pottery, chemicals, &c., reported on in July 1926 has been similarly treated in detail. Actual and full-time earnings here give the same result.

The paper, printing, and wood-working industries are dealt with in the *October Gazette*. The average increase for all male workers in printing and binding is found to be 164 per cent. from 1906 to 1924, or about 147 per cent. from 1914 to 1924; but other estimates of the weekly *time-rates* for compositors showed only about 113 per cent. in the ten years. This is a striking example of the difference between the increase in *time-rates* of one class and the increase in earnings of all classes together. For these groups the figures relating to actual earnings at the two dates are used in the computation.

For clothing, excluding boots and shoes and laundry (*November Gazette*), we find an increase from 1906 to 1924 for males of 117 per cent. on actual earnings and 126 per cent. for present full-time earnings; for women the increases are 140 per cent. and 146 per cent. respectively. For the period 1914 to 1924 the full-time earnings are taken, since unemployment is otherwise allowed for, and we get increases of 111 per cent. for men and 130 per cent. for women. Part of this may be due to a shifting within the industries, and it is quite possible that we have allotted too little of the increase to the pre-war years, without, however, affecting our final estimate.

For boots and shoes an estimate has been made from the returns of earnings and numbers stated each month in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette*. The report contained in the *November Gazette* confirms this estimate for men, but gives

an extremely high figure for women in comparison with 1906; as this latter has very little weight in the result it has been adopted without criticism.

The December *Gazette* gives statistics for Public Utility Services. In this case the full-time earnings at each date are used. Actual average earnings show a greater increase. The resulting change had in fact been computed before the issue of the *Gazette* with practically the same result.

It is worth while to bring together the broad results of the wage inquiry of 1924, issued in the paragraphs above, so far published, with the corresponding parts of the Wage Census of 1906. When the publication is completed it will be expedient to examine more closely the constituents of the industrial groups and to compare the methods and the detail of the two inquiries. The tabulation here given is only a partial and preliminary survey.

AVERAGE WEEK'S EARNINGS OF ALL EMPLOYED IN SELECTED WEEKS.

	1906.		1924.	
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Metals generally, incl. engineering and shipbuilding . . .	28 1	10 8	54 8	25 3
Textile industries . . .	22 11	13 5	51 6	27 11
Clothing industries . . .	24 2	11 3	54 10	27 5
Wood and furniture . . .	24 8	—	53 6	—
Paper industries . . .	24 7	10 0	57 0	26 3
Printing and binding . . .	28 6	9 0	75 3	28 8
Bricks, pottery, glass, and chemical industries . . .	25 6	10 2	56 6	24 8
Public Utility Services . . .	27 5	14 5	59 11	29 10
	1924 wages as % of 1906.		1924 wages as % of 1914.	
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
Metals generally, incl. engineering and shipbuilding . . .	195	237	182	222
Textile industries . . .	225	208	210	194
Clothing industries . . .	227	244	212	228
Wood and furniture . . .	217	—	203	—
Paper industries . . .	232	262	217	245
Printing and binding . . .	264	285	247	266
Bricks, pottery, glass, and chemical industries . . .	222	243	207	227
Public Utility Services . . .	219	207	205	193

In our method of computation we have allowed 7 per cent. for increase of average earnings from 1906 to 1914 ; the last two lower columns show the effect of this increase when the resulting presumed earnings of 1914 are divided into those of 1924. If in fact more or less than this 7 per cent. increase took place before 1914 our final estimate of aggregate wages would not be affected, but the part of the increase that accrued after 1914 would be modified.

On the *k* basis these industries account for 38 per cent. of male and 40 per cent. of female wage-earners. Their aggregate (*k* applied to the last columns) shows increases of 94 per cent. for males and 111 per cent. for females from 1914 to 1924.

For building we know in great detail the changes in time-rates ; there is probably, however, some under-estimate in applying the percentages to construction, since the wages of unskilled labour have risen faster than those of skilled.

Agricultural wages are estimated monthly by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, who also make a comparison with 1914. It is possible that with the shortened number of hours there is more overtime and piece-work done, and if this is so the +68 per cent. is an under-estimate.

For transport we depend on a mass of detail of wages of railwaymen, dockers, and road carriers. For the last named, however, the evidence is insufficient.¹

The industries so far enumerated account for 70 per cent. of men's work (on the *k* basis) ; for the remainder (for which the estimates are marked 1) we have no sufficient evidence. Reviewing them all together it has seemed reasonable to assume the same average increase as in the aggregate of metals, textiles, boots, printing, wood and building, which together show an increase of 97 per cent. (except for mining and quarrying, which have been equated to coal) ; a change of 3 points in this estimate makes only about 1 point in the general average.

¹ As these pages were going to press we received the January 1927 *Gazette*, which indicates an increase of 105 or 108 per cent. since 1906, i.e. 97 to 100 per cent. since 1914, since builder's wages rose 4 per cent. between 1906 and 1914.

INCREASE IN AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, 1914 TO 1924.
UNITED KINGDOM.

	<i>Males.</i>		<i>Females.</i>	
	Percentage increase in earnings 100 r.	Relative importance 1,000 k.	Percentage increase in earnings 100 r.	Relative importance 1,000 k.
Coal	63	121	—	—
Other mining and quarrying	63 ¹	11	—	—
Iron, steel, engineering and metal work ²	87	178	126	9
Cotton	92	19	87	18
Wool and worsted	140	7	136	6
Bleaching, &c.	106	5	120	11
Other textiles	124	8		
Pottery, china, bricks, chemicals	111	21	130	2
Boots	125	9	173	2
Other clothing	111	16	130	15
Leather, furs	97 ¹	4	—	—
Food, tobacco	97 ¹	22	108 ¹	6
Paper	123	5	145	4
Printing	147	12	—	—
Wood and furniture	103	16	—	—
Building and construction.	95	58	—	—
Other manufactures	97 ¹	10	108 ¹	6
Agriculture	68	50	—	—
Transport	101	72	—	—
Public Utility Services	105	16	—	—
Personal services	97 ¹	171	108 ¹	65
Other occupations			108 ¹	25
Together	90.6	831	112	169

$S (kr) \times 100,000 = 75,272 \text{ (Males)} + 18,988 \text{ (Females)} = 94,260.$

Average percentage increase, males and females together, 94.3.

On these estimates and hypothesis we arrive at an increase of 90.6 per cent. in the weekly average earnings of men and boys from 1914 to 1924. The average per hour had then increased about 110 per cent.

For women's earnings in industry the evidence is similar to that for men, but unfortunately this only covers 40 per cent. of their whole sphere, for their principal activities are in domestic and other personal service and in shops.³ We get some guide from Trades Boards minima, and it appears

¹ See text, p. 36.

² Including motor-cars and ships.

³ Shop-assistants are counted as wage-earners in this estimate.

that the minimum weekly rate for adult women has increased on the average from 13s. 6d. to 28s. or 108 per cent. This is less than the increase in the industries (other than cotton) dealt with in the recent *Ministry of Labour Gazette*. In the absence of other information it has been thought reasonable to assume an average increase of 108 per cent. for the aggregate of all occupations for which we have incomplete information. Such data as exist support this or a higher number.

Though we cannot make any definite statement about women's earnings as a whole, and the +112 per cent. entered is little better than an hypothesis, we can still get our required estimate for all wages with fair precision. For the earnings of females are in the aggregate only one-fifth of all earnings among manual workers, and the unknown part of their earnings only one-eighth. An error of 8 points in our hypothesis therefore only makes 1 point in the general result.

Reviewing the whole evidence, and observing that there are as many indications of under as of over estimate, we consider that the aggregate of earnings (£1,600 millions) stated above (p. 30) is the most probable estimate, that for comparison with 1911 it is probably within 2½ per cent. of the fact, and that the margin of 5 per cent. suggested is sufficient. The totals and averages have been tested in a number of ways, and no inconsistency with known evidence has been detected.

Note to p. 31.—The Cost of Living Index assumes that persons live in houses whose rent is controlled by the Rent Restriction Acts. If, however, we re-work it on the basis that one-quarter of the wage-earners paid rent 150 per cent. above that in 1914, while for the rest the excess was 47 per cent. as in the standard computation, the general index would only be raised from 175 to 179½; and since part of the increased rent goes to working-class sub-letters and in some cases the rent is for new and better houses, this seems to be an extravagant correction.

Owing to some diminution of the number of workers of under 14 years the wage-earners as a group were very slightly more mature than in 1914; this consideration does not, however, affect any of the calculations made.

CHAPTER V

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF 'TOTAL INCOME'

IT has always been highly desirable for those who employ the term 'National Income' in various connexions to have care in defining the sense in which it is being used and the content of the term, but since the war it has been a paramount necessity because the quantitative differences between the different conceptions is now so much greater.

The concept of 'income' has been fully considered elsewhere.¹ We therefore do not discuss here such distinctions as the inclusion of the 'annual value' of houses in which the owners reside and pay no rent as the money income of people, and the exclusion of an 'annual value' of furniture, pictures, motor-cars, and other long-lived assets, yielding a fund of annual satisfaction which might be, but is not in fact, regularly measurable in money. Nor need we discuss the anomalies arising from omitting the money-value of domestic services rendered by wives and daughters in their own houses,² or the hidden profit of co-operative purchasing,³ nor the value of remuneration in kind, such as food and lodging; nor the conditions set up by Rent Restriction Acts with a possible depression of certain values below their natural level measured in the currency available. There are many highly interesting and speculative questions involved in a clear definition of income. But we take the sum-total of the wages, salaries, rental values, profits and interest as the broad definition of total income in the first place, and point out in what connexion it cannot be strictly applied. 'National Income' might mean the total income arising *within*

¹ e. g. Bowley, 'The Definition of National Income', *Econ. Jnl.*, March 1922; Stamp, *British Incomes and Property*, Ch. XII; *Wealth and Taxable Capacity*, Ch. II; *Current Problems in Finance*, p. 274 *et seq.*

² Since the proportion of women 'occupied' to all women was nearly the same in 1911 and 1921 the number of women engaged in unpaid household work is probably much the same as before the war, but there is more leisure in working-class households, and more work done at home by women formerly leisured. The change in the value of this unreckoned element of service is not considerable.

³ *Vide* Report of Royal Commission on Income-Tax, 1920, p. 166.

40 DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS, 'TOTAL INCOME'

a country¹ (including income obtained by the brains and direction of people and bodies resident there). This can be called 'A', and irrespective of the people to whom it belonged, and of any outflow 'B' to owners living abroad.² $A - B$ will then be the home-produced income belonging to home residents. But those residents may have a flow of investment income from abroad 'C', so that the National Income is then really $A - B + C$, the total reaching or accruing to the residents of a country from whatever source, and reaching them individually or collectively. This is, indeed, the sense in which it has usually been employed in the past.

When discussions are proceeding upon such questions as the division of the product of industry it may be desirable to confine the comparison to $A - B$. But some adjustment of this conception is necessary when it is being used in connexion with the yield of systems of direct taxation of individuals, and discussions of the distribution of wealth and scope for savings. For a now considerable percentage of $A - B + C$ is not enjoyed by individuals at all, but is retained by Companies in reserves and undistributed profits, getting added to the capital fund without ever forming part of individual incomes at all.³ Another section belongs to charities, clubs, co-operative societies, and municipalities.⁴ For 1919, out of a total income of £2,073 millions assessed to tax £230 millions was assignable to non-personal income 'D' and income accruing to non-residents B.⁵ For the year 1924 the undistributed profits alone were in the neighbourhood of £170 millions.⁶ The total income accruing to individuals is therefore ($A - B + C - D$).

But these money measures of aggregate 'income' are a

¹ In Chapter VI this is interpreted as including the income of soldiers and sailors away at the time of the Census, but normally resident in the United Kingdom.

² Public payments, interest or reparations, are brought into account in Chapter VI.

³ Stamp, *Econ. Jnl.*, 1918, p. 277. Estimated not to exceed 118 millions in 1913.

⁴ Estimated not to exceed 60 millions for 1914, including income going abroad. *Loc. cit.*, p. 279.

⁵ *Vide* Stamp, *Wealth and Taxable Capacity*, p. 86.

⁶ Report of Commission on National Debt and Taxation, para. 47-8, 396.

DUPLICATION AND TRANSFERS OF INCOME 41

misleading picture of realities when we are considering the value of real economic goods and services produced, because they include certain income which is paid out of the proceeds of taxation, and since taxation is not a deduction in computing the income of the payers such income is duplicated in the aggregation. Formerly, these things were insignificant. The most important 'transfers' of money income or purchasing power, for which the recipient renders no current economic services, are interest on war or unproductive debt, and pensions. If allowance is not made for such transfers from all true aggregate of total money incomes, the aggregate will be fictitious, and unduly high compared with any money valuation of the annual flow of production in goods and services, such as the Census of Production set out to measure. Indeed, if it were not so, the greater the taxation and the greater the sums paid as debt interest the richer would a country appear to be.

But it is only necessary to deduct the whole of this sum E where the aggregation of individual money incomes and income in kind is complete. A partial deduction only is required from the sums aggregated in the previous chapters.

The sums corresponding to these categories are stated on p. 47.

DUPLICATION AND TRANSFERS OF INCOME

IF we take as the definition of the aggregate we wish to measure

Social Income = consumption and saving in a year
= aggregate of U.K. individual and collective incomes, less incomes received by compulsory reductions from other incomes in return for no services or services not rendered in the year in question ¹ ($A - B + C - E$ in the preceding notation), we have to make certain adjustments in the total that comes from adding together the three estimates of Chapters II, III and IV. These adjustments are partly the elimination of duplication, which affects the total, and partly transfers from one class of income to another, and in one case an addition of income not yet brought into account.

¹ *Economic Journal*, March 1922, p. 10.

42 DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS, 'TOTAL INCOME'

Duplication. The interest on the National Debt, excluding payments to the United States, is, so far as the debt is held in this country, paid by tax-payers to holders in return for no current services. It has been counted twice over in the total, just as it would be if an individual paid it to himself, and this sum should be subtracted from the totals both in 1911 and 1924. On the other hand, pensions to persons whose income after receiving them are less than about £135 per annum have not been included in any part of the estimate, and the small part ranking for income-tax may be ignored in the total. Generally, the sums named in the following paragraphs have not been counted in the incomes of the recipients.

Transfers.

EXPENDITURE FROM TAXES AND RATES.

	Great Britain only. ¹	
	1911-12	1924-5
	£ Mn.	£ Mn.
Pensions: War Office and Admiralty	8	} 69.3
Ministry of Pensions	—	
Old Age Pensions	10	24
Health Insurance: Parliamentary Votes	5	7.0
Unemployment Insurance: Parliamentary Votes	—	12.8
Poor Relief	13	39.4
Education, elementary and higher, Great Britain (expenditure by local authorities)	30	81.2
Public Health, Lunacy and Housing, &c.	2	20.3

The sums named above are in the main deducted compulsorily from the incomes above the tax-exemption limit and do not provide for any services rendered to the payer in the year, as contrasted with expenditure on Highways, Police, &c.

If we wish to compare the aggregate income of the relatively well-to-do with that of the intermediate or working-class, the greater part of these sums should be subtracted from the former and some part added to the latter.

There is no doubt about the position of Pensions in such a calculation, but some questions arise under the other headings. The Insurance expenditure includes administration

¹ *Vide* H. of C. paper, 205, 1926.

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and some contribution to the funds. Workmen's contributions have been included in the wage estimates, which are of wage-rates prior to reduction for stamps ; but the benefits which accrue at least principally to wage-earners are, approximately, of the value of the Government, Employers' and Workmen's contributions, less perhaps the expense of administration. The employers' contributions have been nowhere included in the estimate, since they are subtractive as costs in returns for income-tax. There is therefore an addition to working-class income and to the aggregate income of the annual amount of employers' contributions, perhaps £35 millions under both schemes, and also a transfer by means of taxes to working-class income. Against this must be set a relatively small sum contributed by the working-class, principally in rates, for services which do not benefit them.

Poor Relief is mainly a transfer of goods from those that have to those that have not.

Public expenditure by local authorities on education is to the extent of over £60 millions spent on elementary education mainly a transference from the general body of rate- and tax-payers for the benefit of working-class families in the first instance. But here and in the case of Public Health expenditure (other than on housing perhaps) it is rather for the benefit of the future community as a whole than for that of any class.

CHAPTER VI
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

THE accompanying tables, pp. 46-7, bring together the results of the previous chapters with some additional items and further analysis. Before considering the totals there are a number of details that must be cleared up to avoid misconceptions.

The 1911 statistics are taken from p. 14 of *The Division of the Product of Industry* with some modifications. The total is increased by £8 millions War Pensions, not then included, and the unallotted Agricultural income is classed under Occupation of Lands together with the entry for Schedule B. Some estimates of minor quantities are made for comparison of certain totals in 1924. When it has been necessary to allow for the exclusion of Southern Ireland to make comparison with 1924 there has been subtracted 4 per cent. of the income originating at home.

The total under Schedule A, Lands and Buildings, has not been divided, since the appropriation of the deductions for small incomes to the headings separately was too hazardous.¹

The figures in the Table for Occupation of Land (£41 millions and £30 millions) are not comparable. The former includes Southern Ireland. The basis of assessment in 1911 was one-third of the assessed value (or rent), but in 1924 it was the whole assessed value. This affects the amount that

¹ Statistics before the exemptions and abatements for small incomes are subtracted are :

Great Britain, Schedule A.	£ millions.	
	1911-12.	1923-4.
Lands, less repairs, &c.	36.2	40.5
Houses and other property, less repairs, &c.	185.0	242.5
	221.2	283.0
Less Empty property	7.4	3.5
Other discharges, &c.	8.9	33.0
	204.9	246.5
Remainder		

'Lands' includes the value of farmhouse. 'Houses' includes the value of the plots on which they stand.

was counted in the intermediate class instead of in income-tax income, and a very large amount was exempted on appeal in 1924 in consequence of the higher assessment. In any case the estimate of the income from agricultural occupation is very hazardous ; in the 1911 estimate it was taken as equal to the rent, but the total yield was checked by the inquiry undertaken in connexion with the Census of Production in 1906-7. If South Ireland is excluded in 1911 the estimates included under the Income-Tax and Intermediate Classes together are very nearly the same in sterling in 1911 and 1924 as were the rental values (see note, p. 44). It follows that owing to the rise in prices the *real* income obtained from farming is, as here estimated, much lower in the latter year. The question cannot be cleared up till we have another estimate of farmers' income comparable with that of 1906-7. In considering the final margin of error we have included the possibility that this income is £10 millions in defect. The effect on Aggregate Income is relatively very small.

The increase under Government securities is, of course, due to the War Loans, and it is subtracted as a 'transfer' when we come to social income.

With the lowered value of money and the rise of salaries in currency the new income-tax exemption limit is relatively much lower than in 1911. The total under salaries in the income-tax and intermediate class together is £214 millions in 1911 and £742 millions in 1924, while the estimated number of salaried persons increased from 1,670,000 to 2,800,000 ; the average estimated salary was therefore £128 in 1911 and £265 in 1921. The increase in number is equally divided between men and women. The figures are by no means certain, since it is very difficult to distinguish in the Occupation Census (especially in 1911) between salaried and wage-earners, and salaried and employers or independent workers. There has certainly been a very large increase of women clerks and teachers, and a considerable increase in the number of men employed by the Central and Local Government ; but it is believed that a considerable part of the apparent great change in the number of salaried males is due to the unavoidable hazard of classification.

CONSTITUENTS OF NATIONAL INCOME, 1911 & 1924

UNITED KINGDOM. I. AGGREGATE.

	1911.	1924.
	Including S. Ireland.	Excluding S. Ireland.
<i>Income, other than wages, above the exemption limit</i> (£160 in 1911, £150 in 1924).		
	£ millions.	
Lands and buildings . . .	178	222
Occupation of land . . .	41	30
Government securities . . .	48	145
Government securities: not subject to tax . . .	—	25
Trades and professions . . .	528	1,130
Salaries	130	641
Net difference between assessed and full income . . .	37	25
	— 962	— 2,218
<i>Intermediate Income.</i>		
Salaries	84	101
Other earned income . . .	180	89
Dividends, &c.	50	77
	— 314	— 267
<i>Wages.</i>		
Wages	802	1,600
<i>Other Income.</i>		
War Pensions	8	69
Old Age Pensions	12	24
Employers' contribution to insurance funds	—	35
	— 20	— 128
Total:—Aggregate Income.	2,098	4,218
Subtract income belonging to foreigners	—	25
Subtract payment to United States, less Reparations . . .	—	24 ¹
Subtract 4 per cent. of Home produced income for S. Ireland	76	—
Disposable² income in Great Britain and N. Ireland	2,022	4,164 A—B+C³

¹ Taking payments to U.S.A. as £31 millions and receipts from Reparations as £7 millions in 1924-5.

² Disposable in the sense that the income comes into the possession of individuals or corporations in the United Kingdom, and can be disposed in private or public expenditure or saved at their choice.

³ These letters indicate the corresponding classification in Chapter V. See foot of next page.

UNITED KINGDOM. II. RE-CLASSIFICATIONS.

	1911.	1924.	
	Including S. Ireland.	Excluding S. Ireland.	
<i>Home and Foreign.</i>	£ millions.		
Income originating at home	1,904	4,008	A
Income from abroad, less income belonging to foreigners	194	156	C-B
	<u>2,098</u>	<u>4,164</u>	A+C-B
<i>Individual and Corporate.</i>			
Personal income belonging to residents	1,983	3,959	{ A+C- B-D
Corporations income and un- divided profits	115	205	D
	<u>2,098</u>	<u>4,164</u>	A+C-B
<i>Earned and Unearned.</i>			
Earned income :			
Below exemption limit	1,066	1,790	
Salaries above exemption limit	130	641	
Farmers	41	30	
Under Schedule D	172	399	
	<u>1,409</u>	<u>2,860</u>	
Unearned income :			
Home produced	475	1,020	
From abroad, net	194	180	
	<u>669</u>	<u>1,200</u>	
Pensions, &c.	20	128	
(Ignoring Foreign Debt and reparations)	2,098	4,188	
<i>Social Income.</i>			
Aggregate income	2,098	4,174	
<i>Less transfers :</i>			
Pensions	20	93	
National Debt Interest	16	268	
	<u>36</u>	<u>361</u>	E
Social income	2,062		
Correction for S. Ireland	74		
Great Britain and N. Ireland	1,988	3,803	{ A+C- B-E
<i>Taxable Income.</i>			
United Kingdom	2,104	4,230	A+C
Excluding S. Ireland	1,994		
<i>Amounts corresponding to classification in Chapter V.</i>			
A. Total income arising with- in United Kingdom	1,904	4,008	
B. Income belonging to non- residents	6	56	
C. Income from abroad	200	212	
D. Corporate and undivided income	115	205	
E. Transfers without actual service in the year	36	361	

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

The number of occupied persons included in the two years, as shown on p. 12, are classified thus :

UNITED KINGDOM.

	Including S. Ireland. 1911.		Excluding S. Ireland. 1924.	
	Thousands.			
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
Wage-earners	11,000	4,650	11,000	4,400
Salaried	1,120	550	1,700	1,100
Employers, farmers, independent workers . . .	2,180	650	1,600	500
	<u>14,300</u>	<u>5,850</u>	<u>14,300</u>	<u>6,000</u>

The reduction in the number of female wage-earners is definitely due to the diminution of domestic service and the increase of clerical work. But the reduction in the entry 'employers, &c.' is probably in part due to the inclusion in 1911 of many who were in fact salaried.

Since every occupied person is counted under one heading or another, and the incomes of the worse-paid clerks, of small employers and of the better-paid workmen are in the same range, the aggregate income is not affected by the accident of classification.

In 1911 the income belonging to foreigners was subtracted from the income accruing from abroad before the latter was included in the total; hence, there is no entry against this category in the first column of the table; it is taken as £6 millions, as a rough estimate in the one case (Taxable Income) where it is necessary to use it separately.

The content of the various aggregates that may be termed National Income was discussed in Chapter V, and the various headings are recapitulated with their estimated values at the foot of the tables.

We first obtain the total of all the elements of income, individual or corporate, accruing to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, which may be termed aggregate or disposable income, since the recipients as a body are free to dispose it in private or public expenditure or to save it. The payment of interest to the United States (less reparations paid to the United Kingdom) is subtracted; an equally

intelligible total would be reached if it had been ignored, viz. the total income accruing to individuals or corporations in the year.

In the second part of the table the figures are rearranged in various ways, so as to provide totals for analyses for different purposes. Thus, in considering the productivity of this country we must separate off income from abroad. For income spendable by individuals we must exclude incomes of charities, clubs, &c., and undivided profits. On the other hand, income open to taxation is the greatest total ($A + C$) before any sections are subtracted. All the totals so far named include the duplicate entries discussed in the last chapter, and Social Income, reached by subtracting the transfers, gives the most important total in the table, for this is the amount really available for consumption or saving on the part of residents in this country in the year ($A + C - B - E$). Whereas we estimate that aggregate income in Great Britain and North Ireland increased 105 per cent. in the thirteen years, social income increased only 90 per cent.

The accuracy of the different items was discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV. Altogether in 1924 about £150 millions is in doubt, but it is very unlikely that the extreme error has been reached in all cases—in particular in wages where £80 millions is allowed—and still more unlikely that all the errors are in the same direction. We consider that £100 millions is a sufficient margin to allow in the total under the definition of National Income used; there is, of course, a further margin between the measurable part of income and the more strictly defined income which includes unpaid services.

The estimate in 1911 is subject to a similar aggregate error of, say, £60 millions; but since item by item the errors are likely to be in the same direction at both dates, we should not in comparison push one to the minimum and the other to the maximum. We consider that the increase of aggregate money income (no attention being paid to price changes) in Great Britain and North Ireland may be truly expressed as 105 ± 5 per cent., and of social income as 90 ± 5 per cent.

Per head of the population of the United Kingdom the social income in 1911 was $\text{£}45 \pm 2$, and in 1924 $\text{£}84 \pm 2$, and

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

the increase was 85 ± 5 per cent. Per occupied person the social incomes were £101 and £185; per family, about £200 and £365.

We will first consider some results that are independent of any estimate of the depreciated value of money.

UNITED KINGDOM.

	1911. Including S. Ireland.	1924. Excluding S. Ireland.
Aggregate income originating at home (a)	£1904 Mn.	£4008 Mn. (less Interest to U.S.A.)
Home produced social income (b) ¹	£1868 Mn.	£3647 Mn. (less Interest to U.S.A.)
Wages	£802 Mn.	£1600
Total earned income	£1409	£2860
Wages as % of aggregate income (a)	42	40
Wages as % of social income (b)	43	44 ± 1
Earned income as % of aggregate income (a)	74	71
Earned incomes as % of social income (b)	75½	78

We may assume that only a very small part of the 'transfers' are obtained by taxation from wage-earners, and that therefore the natural total with which to compare wages is Social Income, excluding income from abroad. The estimates indicate that wage-earners obtained 43 per cent. of the whole of income originating at home in 1911 and 44 per cent. in 1924, that is the same proportion within the limits of error of the figures. This result has been reached in spite of a reduction of the working-week by about 10 per cent., and in spite of an increase of unemployment by one-twentieth of the normally occupied population. In addition they get the value of the employers' contribution to the insurance funds (if these had been included the percentage would be 45) and any excess of the Government's contribution over the expense of administration. Further, the increased amount of Old Age Pensions is principally for the benefit of the manual working-class, as is a large proportion of the expenditure on education and

¹ Obtained by subtracting the whole of the 'transfers' from (a).

health ; against these sums we should put for some purposes a part of taxation and rates.

Other 'earned' income appears to be a very slightly greater proportion (34 per cent. against 32½ per cent.) of home-produced Social Income.¹ 'Earned' income is used in the technical sense employed in assessing income-tax, and includes the whole income derived by persons from the employment of their own capital as well as salaries and wages. Since there has been a tendency for private firms to become private companies there has been a transference of income from the earned to the unearned category without any real change in its source. If allowance could be made for this it will probably be found that the proportion of earned income (other than wages) to the total had increased more in the thirteen years. The result would be more accurate if we could subtract in both years a sum equivalent to the interest on the capital privately employed, but there appears to be no method of making a valid estimate. As the figures stand we find that earned income (so defined) as a whole is nearly the same proportion (75½ and 78 per cent.) of home-produced social income at the two dates. If we take the denominator

¹ There is now no direct evidence as to the amount of income which is 'unearned' in the sense used by the taxing authorities (viz. that derived from the possession of property and investments, excluding the capital employed by the owner of a private business), because there are no longer differential rates of tax, as the basis of the statistics, but the taxing distinction was achieved by an allowance from income up to a fixed maximum of £200 per person. Moreover, the official statistics do not now distinguish assessments upon public companies. The best estimate of *unearned* income accruing to residents in the United Kingdom we can suggest is on the following lines :

	£ Million
Practically all Schedule A ; Schedule C ; under Schedule D, Railways, Interest of all kinds, Investment income of people with under £150 per annum	593
Schedule D. <i>Profits</i> . Manufacturing, Production, Mining Ind- ustries : 75 per cent. of all ; Distribution, Transport and Communications : 60 per cent. of all ; Finance, Professions and other profits : 33 per cent. of all ; with pro rata adjust- ment for deductions and evasions	607
	1200

This estimate is necessarily very rough, though the percentages taken under Schedule D are derived from actual data in past years.

as home-produced aggregate or disposable income the proportion is found to have fallen from 74 per cent. to 71 per cent., owing to the inclusion of duplications in the total at the latter date. Finally, if we take for denominator the whole income, whether produced at home or derived from abroad, and include the duplications, and further include War and Old Age Pensions, and employers' contributions to insurance funds as earned, the proportions are, in 1911, 68 earned to 32 unearned, and in 1924 71½ earned to 28½ unearned. These last-named proportions correspond most nearly to the popular idea of the sources of individual incomes; but if we are considering the division of the product of industry we should rather take the first account, viz.:

	1911.	1924.
Earned	75½	78
State Pensions, &c.	1	3½
Unearned (less transfers)	23½	18½
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

and remember that 'earned' income includes the results of employment of private capital, relatively smaller in 1924 than in 1911. But the margin of possible error in the 1924 estimates must lead to caution in these comparisons.

While the aggregate of money income and several of its principal subdivisions have approximately doubled in the period there are two notable exceptions. The assessed income from real property has only increased 15 per cent., and that part of it which goes to persons above the income-tax limit only 23 per cent.; for the assessed value of lands has hardly increased, and that of houses has been kept down by the Rent Restriction Acts, and new houses are usually assessed by comparison with similar pre-war houses.

Again, income from abroad only amounts to about the same sterling value in 1924 as in 1911, and has diminished relatively till it is only 5 per cent. of the total instead of 9 or 10 per cent. This is in part due to the selling of foreign securities during the war, in part to the failure of payments from some countries, in part to the inclusion of interest fixed in sterling or foreign currencies.

The total of Taxes and Rates paid in the United Kingdom in 1911 was $\pounds 157 + 77 = 234$ millions, which amounts to $7.5 + 3.5 = 11$ per cent. of the then Taxable Income. In 1924-5 the total was $\pounds 690 + 165 = \pounds 855$ millions approximately, that is, $16.3 + 3.9 = 20.2$ per cent. of the Taxable Income. This, of course, includes the sums ultimately paid to holders of the National Debt, War Pensions and Old Age Pensions, amounting to 7.7 of Taxable Income; if we cut out these the residual relative increase in rates and taxes is not large.

We now come to the important question, what has been the change in the National Income when the fall in the value of money is eliminated?

The relevant Index-numbers of Prices to 1924-5 are:

WHOLESALE PRICES (1913=100).

	<i>Board of Trade.</i>	<i>Statist.</i>	<i>Imports (net).</i>	<i>Exports.</i>
Food	169	173	157	—
Manufactures	—	—	171	190
Materials	165	162	—	177
All	167	166	158	189

Cost of Living Index (1914=100).

Rent	147
Food	170
Clothing	227
Fuel and light	186
Miscellaneous	180
All	175

From 1911 to 1913 the *Statist* numbers give an increase of 2 per cent. in food, $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in materials, 6.7 per cent. in all; from 1911 to 1914 the increases are 7 per cent., $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., 7 per cent.

From 1911 to 1924 the cost to the employer of one hour's labour was rather more than doubled.

We have therefore a range of price changes from 47 per cent. increase in controlled rent and 57 per cent. in eleven years (60 per cent. in the thirteen years) in the price of imported food to over 100 per cent. in the price of an hour's labour. It is evident that under these conditions no accurate comparison is possible.

A possible method of procedure is as follows. The income in 1911 may be divided in the following rough proportions, in tenths of the total: manufacture 4, agriculture 1, houses 1, services, including transport, 3, income from abroad 1. For manufacture we take, by considering the rise from 1911 to 1914 and the index-numbers for exported manufactures and the retail price of clothing and miscellaneous items, an increase of price of 105 per cent.; for agriculture 60 per cent. as for imported food; for the assessed value of houses 15 per cent., the change in the assessed value less an allowance for the increase of buildings; for services 110 per cent.; and for income from abroad 60 per cent. from the general import index-number. This system gives an increase of 92 per cent. in currency values for home income, and 88½ per cent. for all income from 1911 to 1924; the numbers are 80 and 76 per cent. from 1914 to 1924.

Apply these numbers to the Social Income of Great Britain and North Ireland in 1911, viz. £1,988 millions in total and £1,800 home-produced, and we find that in 1924 currency there would have been £3,750 millions and £3,460 millions respectively. The actual social income in 1924-5 is estimated as £3,803 millions in all, and £3,647 millions as home-produced. If the income of 1911 had increased exactly in proportion to population the totals would have become £4,000 millions and £3,690 millions respectively. On this hypothesis of the change of the value of currency, viz. that £1 in 1924 was of the value 10s. 7d. in 1911 currency and 11s. 4d. in 1914 currency, the total social real income of Great Britain and Ireland increased 1 or 2 per cent. in the thirteen years, while the income per head diminished 5 per cent. The income per head resulting from home activities was very nearly the same at the two dates, the fall being due to the lessened value of income from abroad.

The margin of uncertainty in the estimates of aggregate income results in a margin of 5 per cent. in this comparison, so that it is possible, on the one hand, that there was no increase in the aggregate home-produced real income and, on the other hand, that the increase was 10 per cent. The price index-number can hardly be shifted more than 10 points

down or 5 points up, and it seems unlikely that the margin indicated in the last sentence would be exceeded, since the errors in the price and income measurements are not likely to be at their maximum in the same direction. After reviewing all the evidence so far adduced we think that the *real home-produced income per head (when duplication is eliminated) in 1924 did not differ appreciably from that in 1911.*

In 1924 unemployment resulted in a loss of about one-twentieth of the possible output in addition to the loss in 1911, and the working-week was about one-tenth shorter. Under these circumstances it is very remarkable that the results just stated should have been attained.

So satisfactory a result would hardly have been anticipated from such statistics of production as are available. The London and Cambridge Economic Service (e. g. Bulletin for June 1926, pp. 16 seq.) has computed an index of the volume of production, which is admittedly of an experimental nature till the results of the new Census of Production are published. For the whole sphere of productive and manufacturing industry (including agriculture, excluding transport) this index shows a fall of 3·8 per cent. from 1911 to 1924. Since dependence is necessarily placed on the amount of materials used and on those products which are readily standardized and measured, the index fails to allow sufficiently for additional complexity and refinement in manufacture, especially in engineering products for which the index depends principally on the amounts of iron and steel used. If a very liberal allowance is made for this factor, however, the index still barely reaches its level in 1911. The *Economist* newspaper, however, would raise the number till it exceeded the 1911 level by 5 per cent. ; but the arguments adduced in the Bulletin just named suggest that this is an over-estimate, and that the volume of 1924 production in fact did not differ appreciably from that of 1911.

Now this index of production relates to material goods, such as formed the subject of the 1906-7 Census of Production, and their total value accounts for rather more than half (about 55 per cent.) of national income, the remainder consisting of the value of the services of transport, dealing,

finance, &c., professional and other personal services, together with the annual value of residential buildings, &c. If we take the estimate that the total of material production was the same in 1924 and 1911, and assume that numbers of persons rendering services and of buildings has increased 6·7 per cent., as has population (which is not an over-estimate), and that their efficiency has not decreased, we should apply this increase of 6·7 per cent. to 45 per cent. of the former income, and so find that real income as a whole had increased 3 per cent. This estimate covers the same field as that given above for home-produced social income, viz. £3,460 millions in 1911 reckoned at 1924 values and £3,647 millions in 1924, which gives an increase of 5 per cent. The difference between these ratios, 1·03 and 1·05, is well within our margin of error, and consequently the estimates based on income and on production are not inconsistent with each other.

The result of this further evidence is to modify the statement on p. 55 so that it reads *the real home-produced income per head (when duplication is eliminated) was very nearly the same in 1911 and 1924; it is improbable that it was any greater in the latter year, and it may have been 4 per cent. less.* Owing to the fall in the value of income from abroad, and the excess of payments to the United States over Reparation payments received, the income available for spending or saving was approximately the same in the aggregate, and 5 to 10 per cent. less per head.

The question of the amount of savings in 1924 was dealt with in evidence before the Royal Commission on National Debt and Taxation, the report of which is anticipated while this pamphlet is in the press. In 1911 the total saving was estimated roughly as £330 millions, of which £230 millions were invested at home, £100 millions abroad; hence, since home-produced income was about £1,900 millions, savings for home use amounted to about 12 per cent. of that income. Total savings are even more difficult to estimate in 1924, but if we adopt the figures finding most acceptance, £450 millions is a minimum and £500 millions is a maximum. These totals include £135 millions for overseas investment, so that the amount allotted

to home investment is about £350 millions, not quite 10 per cent. of home-produced social income (i. e. aggregate income less transfers). Total savings expressed as a proportion of total social income was on the same estimates, 16 per cent. in 1911 and 12 or 13 per cent. in 1924. If the unemployed are absorbed in industry, and we reach a year of good trade, the pre-war proportion of saving may well be again attained.

The Aggregate Income (A - B + C) may now be set out in the following divisions, the amounts in 1911 being diminished by 4 per cent. for South Ireland.

GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTH IRELAND.

Approximate estimate, £ millions.

	1911.	1924.
Saved	320	475
Paid in rates and taxes	225	855
Spent freely	1475	<u>2835</u>
Total	2020	4165

Though we cannot make a definite estimate of the incidence of taxation, or allot savings, it is clear that the amount spent by wage-earners is more than half the total spent freely at each date, and a further considerable fraction is spent by earners of salaries. The average sum 'spent freely' per family was about £140 per annum in 1911 and £270 in 1924. Average earnings per wage-earning family were about £95 and £190,¹ an unknown part of which went in taxes and rates.

It would require a lengthy analysis, even if the necessary data were available, to go into much further detail of the distribution of income according to its amount, but we may learn something from the numbers of incomes assessed to super-tax. The proportion of the national income in 1911 which belonged to individuals with incomes over £5,000 was about £160 millions or 8 per cent. of the aggregate Income. The income of super-tax payers with £5,000 and upwards in 1924-5 is not yet published, but it seems probable that it will be approximately the same as for 1922, say, £345 millions

¹ There were in 1924 about 188 wage-earners per 100 working-class households.

(allowing for evasion), or just over 8 per cent. But if we take the equivalent of the £5,000 limit in 1911 as being 90 per cent. higher (see p. 54), on account of the change in price-level, we should substitute a comparative level of £9,500, and the income above this would not exceed £230 millions, or about $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. It would appear, therefore, that, measured by percentage, and allowing for legal avoidance of super-tax, some ground has been lost by this section in the period of 13 years. If deduction is made for the greater progression in the present direct taxation, the percentage of *net* income going to this richer section is considerably less than it was in 1911.

The principal results of that part of the investigation that relates to the comparison between 1911 and 1924 may be thus summarized.

The Aggregate Income of the inhabitants of Great Britain and North Ireland was rather more than doubled, measured in sterling at both dates, but when duplicate reckonings are excluded it is found that the remaining income (here called the Social Income) increased only 90 per cent.

The effective increase of prices was about 90 per cent., and consequently the real Social Income was very nearly the same at the two dates. The real income per head decreased 5 or 10 per cent., since population had grown about 7 per cent. This decrease is attributable to the falling off of income from abroad. Real home-produced income was very nearly the same per head in spite of increased unemployment and the reduced working-week.

The distribution of income between wage-earners, other earners and unearned income was changed slightly in favour of the earning classes. Manual workers on the average make slightly increased real earnings, and there have also been transfers for their benefit in insurance schemes and other public expenditure. In addition they have the advantage of a reduction of about one-tenth of the working-week. This change can be connected with the reduction in the real income derived from house property and investments bearing fixed rates of interest. The indications are that profits as a whole, reckoned before tax is paid, form nearly the same proportion to total income at the two dates. Within the

wage-earning classes women and unskilled workers have received a substantial real advance in wages ; the great majority of skilled workers made at least as much (after allowing for the rise of prices) in 1924 as in 1911.

When the full effects of taxation are taken into account the real income available for saving or expenditure in the hands of the rich is definitely less than before the war. The sum devoted to luxurious expenditure is (allowing for the rise of prices) definitely less than in 1911, but it is still sufficient to bulk large in the eyes of the public, since it is concentrated in small areas, enlarged by the spending of visitors from overseas, and advertised by the newspapers. It is, however, equally evident, if we are to depend on appearances instead of on statistics, that there is a great deal of income available for cheaper amusements, and that the standard of living reached by the lower-paid regular wage-earners has, when they are not suffering from unemployment, definitely risen.

**THE TREATMENT OF NATIVE
AND OTHER POPULATIONS
IN THE
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
OF
GERMANY AND ENGLAND**

**AN ANSWER
TO THE
ENGLISH BLUE BOOK OF AUGUST 1918:
"REPORT ON THE NATIVES OF SOUTH-
WEST AFRICA AND THEIR TREATMENT
BY GERMANY"**

PUBLISHED BY THE GERMAN COLONIAL OFFICE

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

**ON SALE BY
HANS ROBERT ENGELMANN
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INTRODUCTION.

IT is clear to all the world that the British Government has cast desirous eyes upon the German Protectorates which are at present occupied by its troops, and that it wishes to incorporate them in the British Empire. Hence, true to its immemorial practices, it searches for ways and means which would serve to veil its true intentions and obviate the painful confession that nothing less than a wholesale annexation of German territory has been planned. No efforts are being spared in the attempt to lull the world into the belief that England is actuated not by selfish ends, but by lofty moral motives in thus stretching out her hand for the property of the German People. For this purpose alone has the idea been promulgated—that Germany was unworthy to possess colonies. The public opinion of the world, to which England and her organisations of propaganda and misrepresentation have such easy access, has been and is being persistently belaboured in this direction.

The world, however, has learned through experience precisely what to expect whenever Britain opens up a press campaign with such disquisitions upon humanity, morals and civilization. The defamation of the opponent and the discrediting of his motives and his actions are part and parcel of British politics and are intensified or diminished entirely according to the exigencies of the hour, as these in turn are judged wholly from the viewpoint of the most unscrupulous

treatment by Germany. During a time in which the peaceful tribes of Africa were afflicted with all the horrors and sufferings entailed by the colonial war which the enemies of Germany had unloosed in these lands, during a time when the forcibly conscripted natives were sacrificed by the hundred thousand upon the European battlefields as cannon fodder against the Germans, the concocters of this "Blue Book" attempted to prove that Germany had forfeited its right to colonies through its maltreatment of the natives! Compiled with all the care and cunning of an attorney's brief and suffused with all that spirit of unctuous rectitude, expedient moral indignation and *camouflage* of fair play in which the Briton patriotically and practically bent upon aspersing an opponent, has proved himself an adept, it is not unlikely that this patchwork piece of evidence has succeeded in impressing the inexperienced and insufficiently informed. In raking among the archives of German court proceedings, it was not even always necessary to falsify or invent evidence in order to create the desired impression—it was only necessary to select, to misapply and to misinterpret.

And now a hoary device, through constant repetition already much the worse for wear, was once more brought into play. At a signal from the Government, the entire English press pounced upon this delectable morsel and varied the theme with the pre-arranged conclusion that England would convict herself of immorality did she permit Germany to keep a single square foot of her colonial territory, thereby affording her the opportunity of subjecting her native populations to further ill-treatment. While the "Blue Book"

itself was still withheld from the public, excerpts from its contents were freely distributed among the press. By this means a timely and efficacious repudiation was to be forestalled, and telegraph and wireless were to be given due time to arouse moral indignation to order throughout the world.

The British Government is labouring under an error if it believe that this all too well-known method can make any permanent impression outside of England. The point of this weapon like the others will in time be turned against England. For the so-called disclosures of the "Blue Book" are nothing less than a challenge to the putting of these questions:—*How did the Briton formerly, in contradistinction to today, judge the work of German colonization? What is the truth regarding the charges preferred in the matter of South-West Africa? And finally, how has England proceeded and how does she still proceed in the matter of her own protégés?*

The answer to these three questions will thereupon furnish the correct response to a fourth: Is England of all nations called upon to sit in judgment upon questions affecting the treatment of native populations?

I.

ENGLISH PRE-WAR TRIBUTES TO GERMAN COLONIZATION WORK BEFORE THE WAR.

THE English "Blue Book" upon South-West Africa is in remarkable contradiction to the fact that during the years preceding the World War and immediately before its outbreak, many eminent English colonial authorities had paid splendid tributes to the methods of German colonization, and in certain respects had held up the German colonist as a model for the English. Indeed these English authorities openly declared that the German methods were such as to make desirable their extension over a still greater part of Africa—even though this be at the expense of the present allies of England. The same opinion had been expressed by eminent Americans.

Even Theodore Roosevelt, who developed into so rabid a Teutophobe during the war, might be cited in this connection, as for example in his book "African Game Trails," (1910) in a passage referring to the German planters, civil officials and officers whom he had met:

"They are first-class men, these English and Germans; both are doing in East Africa a work of worth to the whole world; there is ample room for both, and no possible cause for any but a thoroughly friendly rivalry; and it is earnestly to be wished, in the interests both of them and of outsiders too, that their relations will grow, as they ought to grow, steadily better—and not only in East Africa, but everywhere else."

A countryman of Theodore Roosevelt's, Mr. E. A. Forbes, who was able to survey a far vaster field of African ac-

tivities than the ex-President, formulates his judgment in a far more detailed manner in an article in the *American Review of Reviews* in the year 1911. Mr. Forbes spent considerable time in Africa and his verdicts may be regarded as authoritative and impartial. After extolling certain features of the French administration, he goes on to say:

"The German has the *clearest title and the cleanest hands* of all the overlords of Africa. His invasion has been marked by the most astute diplomacy, but his bitterest foe can hardly claim that he has not played the game fairly."

Of particular interest, in view of the deliberate misrepresentations and distortions of the English "Blue Book," are the observations and opinions of this American expert regarding the ways and means adopted by Germany for training and educating the natives:

"Without the blowing of horns and the noise of the press-agent, the German is training the young African in his own way—and making a pretty good job of it. The writer has watched the German closely in his relations to these half-wild protégés on the west coast. The administration of government there is largely a matter of temperament and the men from the Rhine country are probably less easily driven into irritability than other white men. . . . After observing the white men of many nations at the task of regenerating Africa, one cannot escape a conviction that the German native will rise as high in the scale, if not higher, than any other within the same belt."

Against such evidence as this the bolstered-up charges and distortions of the "Blue Book," the isolated instances of wrongs or errors committed, and duly punished by process of law in the German African courts, betray that spurious ring which is inseparable from the malignant motives which inspired the compilation of this work—not love of the native, but hatred of the German, reinforced by the desire to seize his property.

Another important English witness to the efficacy of German colonial methods is Mr. Henry Samuel, one of the

best-known authorities in South African questions, and an intimate friend of Cecil Rhodes. Mr. Samuel devoted considerable attention to the German colonial system and expressed his opinion in various articles in the English press. With respect to the activities of Germany in her South-West African colonies, he wrote as follows in the *Observer*, sometime during the autumn of 1911:

“Considering the fact that the Germans have been in possession of their colonial lands for only thirty years, whereas England has occupied her overseas lands for at least a century, the progress of German South-West Africa is by no means to be regarded as small. I know this country for over thirty years and I prophesy for it a future similar to that of British Kaffarias, which was likewise colonized by German emigrants . . .

Germany must however give up the attempt to reform the South-West African natives who belong to the lowest types of the human race. That was a hopeless way to begin. The Hereros must be concentrated on reservations according to the Australian system, and pensioned. The development of the colony could be expected only from settlement by whites.”

In the same article Mr. Samuel advocated a railway connection between Cape Colony and German South-West Africa and spoke sympathetically of the German prospects of acquiring Angola. Such, then, is the opinion of an English expert upon South-West Africa regarding the natives of the German colonies—written three years before the war. These natives, he declares, belong to the lowest types of the human race. *After* the outbreak of the war, the “Blue Book” finds it convenient to present a touching and highly-coloured picture of these same Hereros and Hottentots, depicting them as blacks of the most idealistic nature—over whom, naturally, Germany is quite unfit to rule, and whose land, equally naturally, would be administered much better by others, that is to say, by the nation at whose command the “Blue Book” was compiled.

The well-known work of another eminent authority upon African problems—“The History of African Colonization”

by Sir Harry H. Johnston,—might likewise be cited in defense of German order and justice in Africa. Referring to certain abuses which had been committed by company employés upon natives in the Cameroons and East Africa, Sir Harry remarks:

"Germany wisely did not hush up these affairs, but investigated them in an open court and punished the guilty. It will be seen, I fancy, when history takes a review of the foundation of these African states, that the unmixed Teuton—Dutchman or German—is on first contact with subject races apt to be harsh and even brutal, but that he is no fool and wins the respect of the negro or the Asiatic, who admire rude strength; while his own good nature in time induces a softening of manners when the native has ceased to rebel and begun to submit. There is this that is hopeful and wholesome about the Germans. They are quick to realize their own defects and equally quick to amend them."

The same writer published an article in the *Daily Chronicle* of September 28, 1903, in which he declared:

"There are no doubt bad Belgians, as there have been bad, cruel and wicked Englishmen and Scotchmen amongst African pioneers. In the early days of African enterprise I have seen too many misdeeds of my own countrymen in Africa to be very keen about denouncing other nations for similar faults."

Truly a very sensible and broad-minded utterance which might well have served as a motto for the compilation of that eminent and noble-spirited work, the English "Blue Book" upon South-West Africa. Unfortunately it was impossible for the authors of this bulky bit of propaganda to recognize sentiments of this nature since their express purpose was not to prove so clear and patent a truth as that there might conceivably also be "bad, cruel and wicked Englishmen and Scotchmen amongst African pioneers," but simply to prove that the German pioneers were fiends incarnate and that it was the bounden moral duty of impeccable England to take away the South-West African colony of wicked Germany.

During the first session of the Royal Colonial Institute on January 13, 1914, Viscount Milner, acting as Chairman, spoke as follows, after a lecture delivered by Professor Bonn of Munich:

“Great Britain has had a long and very diversified experience as a colonizing country. Germany is a comparative newcomer in the colonial field, but having entered, she has thrown herself into the unfamiliar task with characteristic thoroughness and energy. It would be a great mistake to think that we have nothing to learn from her experience in that field, as she, admittedly, has much to learn—something, at any rate—from our long history as a colonizing people. Proud as we are of our long record in that respect, he would be a very inexperienced, or a very superficial person who thought that we knew everything there was to be known about Colonial Policy, or that we could afford to disregard the efforts and the experiences of other nations in dealing with the problems with which we ourselves are, or have been, confronted.

“We have all got our hands full in this particular respect, too full to leave time or excuse for hostility and jealousy. There is plenty of room, on the other hand, for honourable rivalry in developing the material resources of these rich countries, and in upholding the credit of European civilization among their backward people.”

The Hon. George Foster, M. P., and Canadian Minister of Commerce, declared upon the same occasion:

“We have always been led to believe that the British Empire and the British people were a great colonizing people, and certainly their record has been a proud and very wide one; but the vigour and strength and system with which Germany, not to mention other European countries, has of late years thrown herself into the work of outside colonization, has been very marked and notable. I had some idea of that before, and I am glad to know that I shall have a much more intelligent idea from this time forward.”

Robert Melville, Esq., agreed with the aspiration “that the colonizing nations should engage in united efforts instead of, as at present, working and struggling against each other. Reference had been made to the scientific manner in which Germany had developed her resources. There was no question that Germany would continue to make

enormous strides. . . The amount of work Germany had done in colonising, while at the same time developing her own resources, was most creditable to her."

The last three opinions are printed in the February 1914 number of the *United Empire*, a monthly magazine, published in London. The issue of July 1913 contained an article by the well-known student of colonial matters, Mr. Louis Hamilton, upon the German colonies in the years 1911 to 1912. A passage from this might prove illuminating:

"Wherever the German may be, the school-master is abroad. With the missionaries, the colonial governments have developed education to quite an astonishing extent. The number of native children attending schools is rapidly on the increase, and this is chiefly due to the peaceful and harmonious manner in which the missions and the administration have supported one another's efforts. The Government's administrative work in hinterland districts has been much facilitated by the help of missionaries, and we have the pleasing spectacle of the government, the missionaries, and the troops working without friction hand in hand, in the administration of the colonies and the education of the natives."

It is certainly not illogical if, in view of such excellent opinions of German colonial methods entertained by English authorities before the war, such authorities should come to the independent and non-partisan decision that the area of the German colonial territory should be increased. In an interesting volume published in London in 1914, under the title of "Dawn in Darkest Africa," the author, a well-known missionary, Mr. John H. Harris by name, declared that France and Belgium should be induced to cede a part or the whole of the Congo to Germany. Furthermore:

"Experience has shewn us that commerce need have no fear, for Germany welcomes and treats fairly the commercial houses of all nations. No favour is granted to a German firm which is prejudicial to the representatives of other Powers, whereas to-day the notorious fact is that merchants refuse to extend their commercial enterprises in the French and Belgian Congo owing to the restrictions and irritating dues and charges which are imposed.

The remaining difficulty and the chief one is that of the treatment of the natives. Doubtless if it were possible to consult them, they would in both colonies vote for a transfer.

On the whole, both from the commercial and native standpoint, the Congo Basin stands to gain by a transfer to the German Empire."

The London *Times*, in spite of its incendiary and hateful attitude towards all things German, gave expression to the following judgments in its "Commercial Supplement" of so recent a date as January 13, 1913:

"Where can the merchant look for new fields to conquer? In French Dahomey or in the French Congo? Ten years ago one would have said that nothing but failure awaited the British merchants wherever the tri-colour floated, and even now any but Frenchmen find little consideration. *Blind selfishness does not characterize the German, as some would have us believe, for if he acquires a colony, he invites all, German or Englishman, Portuguese or Frenchman, to bring their capital and trade into the land. In the whole of the West African colonies the merchant is nowhere more warmly encouraged than in German Togo and the Cameroons, where Liberty, Equality and Fraternity is the motto of the ruling Power.* In Duala I was informed by an English merchant that the Governor calls officials, merchants and missionaries into consultation twice a year. Imagine the English Governor of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, or Southern Nigeria, taking so radical a step, and, moreover inviting Germans to confer with him! What questions would be asked in the House of Commons!

With regard to internal regulations, the German in Togo and may appear to be arbitrary in that he legislates for domestic, if not personal, cleanliness—a discarded tin in the backyard, a broken jug half filled with water, the haunt of fever-carrying mosquitoes, an unswept doorstep or a defective roof will subject the delinquent to a fine of £ 1. The results are that even the most fastidious may find enjoyment in a promenade in any part of Lome."

A verdict such as the foregoing must of necessity prove irritating, to say the least, to such passionate champions of humanity and dispassionate critics of an enemy country's efficiency in the matter of colonisation as the authors of the "Blue Book." For the set purpose of these patriots was to prove by hook or crook that Germany's entire policy

towards the natives was evil and barbaric. Many other English voices might be cited to refute the soft impeachment of these disinterested and worthy gentlemen—voices of praise and appreciation of Germany's work, dating from that cleaner and saner period before the war when it had not yet become the task of British imperialism to prove that it was Britain's moral duty to annex the colonial possessions of the German people in the name of outraged humanity.

Two English officials in Northern Rhodesia, Messrs. Frank A. Melland and Edward H. Cholmeley, devoted their holiday in 1907 to traversing parts of East Africa *via* Bismarckburg-Muansa, thence down the Nile to Europe. The overland march through German East Africa and the judgment passed upon the German colonies occupy some 90 pages of their book "Through the Heart of Africa" (London 1912). It is interesting to note what these two observers write of the natives in the German colonies:

"The natives are very friendly and respectful to the stranger, and never failed to treat us with courtesy in all their dealings with us. They seem a contented and fairly prosperous community in spite of the poor country in which they have to spend their lives, and there was at any rate no apparent chafing at the German rule.

A residence of but six weeks in a foreign protectorate does not seem, on the face of it, to provide a very adequate equipment for critic and historian, but the fact that German East Africa is a next-door neighbour to us in Northern Rhodesia, the close similarity of the local conditions to those with which we have been familiar for some years and the frank welcome and open discussion that we everywhere enjoyed, encourages us to offer our commentary without apology or misgiving.

The common impression that we should not find much to learn from the German administration of East Africa is founded on a superficial or out-of-date knowledge of the facts, and recalls a passage in Sir Charles Eliot's work on the East Africa Protectorate dealing with the German colony:—

'I would not, however', he says, 'have us lay any flattering unction to our souls, and congratulate ourselves, as we are wont to do, on managing everything better than all other nations.'

Naturally enough we judged the German system by our own, and in some ways found it wanting: as a nation we have had far greater experience in ruling tropical dependencies, and we were quick to notice what we considered the weak points in the German administration; but at the same time we saw much to admire, and *the general verdict must, we think, be one of congratulation to our neighbours.*

The most outstanding feature of the German administration is without doubt the thorough way in which they investigate and experiment on the possibilities of the territory. The way in which they have fostered and organized trade up country deserves every praise. The roads that have been made are excellent, and the manner in which they have been pushing on railway construction calls for a good deal of admiration. Thoroughly and systematically conducted, it presents a rather marked contrast to the usual haphazard British methods. The somewhat rigid systems and unbreakable rules in force at their stations may strike an Englishman as a trifle pointless, but nevertheless in an administration of a country discipline and system are of the greatest importance, and probably some mean between the German rigidity and our own casual elasticity would produce the best results. We should study each other's methods and choose which can be adopted with profit and which discarded. The Germans are openly and admittedly learning from us with our greater colonial experience. We, on the other hand, need not think that we have nothing to learn from them; on the whole, considering how new colonial work is to the German nation, *they have every reason to be proud of what they are doing in their East African Protectorate.*"

Sir Charles Eliot, Royal Commissioner for British East Africa from 1901 to 1904, has made various interesting and illuminating comparisons between British and German East Africa in his book: "The East Africa Protectorate," (London 1905).

"The differences in the administration of German and British East Africa are mainly due to the fact that, whereas we have devoted our time and attention chiefly to the construction of the Uganda Railway, and show extreme parsimony and indifference in other respects, the Germans have done little in the way of railway construction, but have devoted themselves to the methodical development of the colony with a systematic thoroughness characteristic of the race, and a lavishness due to the determination to establish a colonial empire at any price . . .

As might be expected, the scientific departments, which have been almost entirely neglected in the British possessions, have received great

attention. Elaborate and costly experiments have been made, with a view of ascertaining what products are likely to prove a success, and the Government plantations, especially at Kwai, in Western Usambara, are said to be on an extensive scale. There is a museum at Dar-es-Salaam, meteorological observations are recorded at about twenty stations, and considerable progress has been made in surveying and mapping the country. In this respect we are deplorably backward. When I was Commissioner of the Protectorate, I habitually consulted a German map, which took some account of the districts on our side of the boundary, and nourished myself, so to speak, on the crumbs which fell from the Teutonic table. They were better than any repast which our own cartographers could provide . . . *Natives are said to immigrate into German territory from the Congo Free State and the Portuguese dominions, so that they cannot find the régime very distasteful.*

More attention is paid to education than with us. Whereas there are no Government schools in British East Africa, instruction being entirely in the hands of the missionaries, the Germans have eight, in addition to various community schools . . ."

Shortly before the war, Sir Harry H. Johnston, as the guest of the German nation, delivered a lecture upon colonization at Stuttgart. And on that occasion he uttered these words:

"When we deal with the great colonial peoples of the world, it is difficult to make a distinction between the Germans and the English."

After the war, to be sure, Sir Harry rather suddenly changed his mind as to whether the Germans were worthy of possessing colonies in Africa. Whatever the cause may have been—whether an adherence to that most immoral of all political concepts, "My country, right or wrong" which most Britons find it so easy in time of war to reconcile with their consciences and their deeper convictions, or whether the incalculable floods of defamation which, like some deluge of mire, the British press unloosed upon the entire German nation, overbore even *his* better judgment, need not be investigated here. The fact, however, remains that Sir Harry's change of mind was based as little upon argument

and reason as were the false deductions which the compilers of the "Blue Book" sought to draw and suggest from the pathetic and melodramatic chamber of horrors with which they strove to shock the world into the belief that the German people were henceforth unfit to own and administer their colonies.

It would be too much in a press-strangled and falsehood-sodden world to expect that justice should be done an enemy, and few indeed have been the instances of sanity and magnanimity to which the German people might point on the part of their foes. And yet even during the war this phenomenon occurred in the shape of a just if by no means friendly judgment upon the German African colonial system—in *The African World* of October 30th, 1915:

"It has become the fashion of late to condemn Germany and all that is German, a condemnation which her action in Europe has possibly justified. But the criticism recently extended to her Colonial Administration in Africa must be largely discounted by those acquainted with the working of that system on the spot. If the German was not popular with the native races, he was always respected by them; his measures frequently failed, but they were prompted by the best of intentions."

The author of this article, despite his obvious hostility, is nevertheless fair enough to credit the German monster with good intentions—a concession which, however feeble, was rendered utterly impossible to the judicious-minded gentlemen who, obedient to the mandate from headquarters that the German administration must be blackened under all circumstances, were fearful of spoiling the far too uniform inkiness of their made-to-order picture with any concessions to sweet reasonableness.

After this display of manly chivalry in politics, it might not prove out of place to quote the personal experiences in the German colonies of an esteemed English authoress,

Mrs. Gaunt. The extracts are taken from an admirable book of hers which bears the title: "Alone in West Africa."

"I can only say that no one has been kinder to me than those Germans of Togo, and for their sakes I have a very soft corner in my heart for all their nation, and when we English do not like them, I can only think it is because of some misunderstanding that a little better knowledge on both sides would clear away.

Lome is the most charming town I have seen in West Africa. It is neat and tidy and clean. It is beautifully laid out, and the buildings are such as would do credit to any nation. Very evident it is that the German does not consider himself an exile, but counts himself lucky to possess so fine a country, and is bent on making the best of it. For Lome has certainly been made the very best of.

Lome is almost surrounded by swamp; its very streets are rescued from it, but with German thoroughness these streets are well laid-out, the roads well-made, well-kept and planted with trees.

Indeed, I could find no words to express my admiration for this German capital which compared so very favourably with the English capital I had left but a short time before.

Very, very wisely, it seems to me have the Germans laid the foundations of their colony, and though it has not paid in the past, it is paying now, and in the future it will pay well . . .

As a Briton I write it with the deepest regret, but the difference between an English village and a German village is as the difference between the model village of Edensor and the grimy town of Hanley in the Black Country. Here, in this first little village on the Togo side, all the ground between the houses was smoothed and swept, the houses themselves looked trim and neat; great, beautiful, spreading shade-trees of the order *figus elasticus* were planted at regular intervals in the main street, and underneath them were ranged logs, so that the people who lounge away the heat of the day in the shade may have seats. Even the goats and the sheep have a neater look, which perhaps is no wonder, for here is no filthy litter or offal among which they may lie.

As I passed on, my wonder increased. Here was exactly the same country, exactly the same natives, and all the difference between order and neatness and slatternly untidiness . . .

Now I had come into that country without a letter or a credential of any sort, a foreigner, speaking not one word of the language, and I wondered what sort of reception I should meet with. I tried to explain (to a German colonist) that I was looking for a rest-house, but he waved my remarks aside with a smile, made me understand that his wife was

up in the house on the hill, and that if I would go there she could speak English and would make me welcome. And so I went on. And when I got to the top of the hill I was at the prettiest of brown bungalows, and down the steps of the verandah came a rosy-cheeked, pretty girl, ready to welcome the stranger.

'Of course, you will stay with us', she said in the kindness of her hospitable heart.

Those Germans were good to me. I feel I can never be grateful enough for such a warm welcome, and always, for the sake of those two there in the outlands, shall I think kindly of the people of the Fatherland.

During my stay in German territory I never slept under a mosquito curtain, and I never saw that abomination, a mosquito-proof room. The Germans evidently think it easier to do away with the mosquito.

I can but see that there is something much to be admired in the thorough German methods . . .

They were very good carriers, but since I have heard so much about the German's inconsiderateness to the native, I must put it on record that when we came to a steep part of the road, and it was very steep, though a most excellent road, that German not only got out and walked himself, but expected me to do the same. I did so, of course, but many and many a time have I made my men carry me over worse places, and many an Englishman have I seen doing likewise."

We do not know whether this English lady, succumbing perhaps to the same war-malady as Sir Harry Johnston, has subsequently discovered that she had seen the Germans of Togo and Togo itself through false spectacles. We trust not, however. We also venture to hope that Professor Macmillan Brown of Canterbury University in New Zealand, who described his experiences in the German South Sea Islands in the *Daily Telegraph* of March 27, 1913, has not deemed it necessary for reasons of patriotism to recant the judgment which he had expressed in black and white.

"The Germans," said the Professor, "are dealing very kindly with the natives of the Carolines and the Marshalls. I travelled with the Governor, Dr. Kersting, and saw a great deal of his methods. He has quick sympathy with the natives, and gets into close touch with them. He does his best to make them prosperous and healthy, and I can imagine no better administrator of a native community than he is."

Truth uttered and established once cannot be withdrawn nor annulled even at the bidding of a venomous press or an insatiable imperialism. An English witness may also be summoned to offer valuable testimony as to the achievements of the Germans in China before the war. This witness is Mr. Louis Hamilton, who has already been cited in this paper. In the September number of the *United Empire* (1912) Mr. Hamilton introduces his article upon "The German Colony in China" with the following words:

"Little attention seems to be paid in the heart of the Empire to the foothold of Germany in China, and (apparently) almost none in the great Dominions. Yet surely the future of China and the part that Germany may play in the evolution of 400 millions of the world's population are matters which vitally concern every section of the British Empire. Australasia especially should take interest in this question. For the rest, old colonising nation that we are—using the word colonising in its modern sense—we have not learnt all our lessons yet. We can learn much from what Germany is doing quietly and unostentatiously in China. Her introduction of order, health, system, education, and afforestation are respect-compelling factors which speak eloquently to awakening China of a country which to her is a new world-power risen out of obscurity. She no longer looks upon Kiao-chau as a thorn in her side, but as a sound spot, from which the health-giving example of Occidental civilisation radiates through the Celestial Empire."

We shall, however, refrain from quoting further English encomiums upon German colonial policy before the war—not that there is any lack of significant material, but because the opinions already given should suffice. Naturally, however, they suffice only if a *just* judgment be sought. For truly that unjust judgment which seeks material in order to justify its dishonest itch for the possessions of other nations, cannot be influenced by even the most incontrovertible testimony in the world. Even England's present allies in days when they themselves had the best of reasons to fear English greed, had seen through the all-too-transparent English manœuvre.

Formerly it was not the Germans but the Belgians upon whose property England had cast covetous eyes. A Belgian publication, "La Vérité sur le Congo," No. 10, 1914 (pages 64—66) brought home to the English the drastic truth that their charges against the colonial methods of other nations were easily comprehensible in view of that psychological trait which is so conspicuously in evidence with certain English colonial politicians, namely, *the habit of painting everything that happens in foreign colonies in the blackest of colours.*

"This is a truly British propensity which is not met with elsewhere. It is not an uncommon occurrence for the foreign press to bestow deserved eulogy upon the German colonial administration. The *Temps* recently commended its correctness, intelligent foresight and energy.

But on the other side of the Channel matters are altogether different. Instead of being justified in criticising others, how many reforms might not the British realize in their own colonies! Those who have read our series of articles entitled "Beauties of English Colonisation" ought to be abundantly informed upon this theme. But the inability to recollect the parable of the mote and the beam is an inveterate defect with Englishmen. We observe that they judge German colonisation precisely as they do Congolese colonisation. The revolt of the natives in German South-West Africa afforded the English press, beginning with the *Times*, an excellent opportunity of giving vent to its hostile feelings. The arrogance of the British impels them to blacken and disparage the work of others both in South-West Africa and in the Congo."

Their arrogance, or—as one might add in view of that masterpiece of colonial-political Pharisaism, the "Blue Book" upon South-West Africa,—their *rapacity* in desiring an uninterrupted extension of their monster colonial empire already embracing half the world. And then the sublimity of the method adopted to bring this about!—the disguising of common materialistic greed in the dishonestly borrowed garment of a moral duty and its fulfilment!

This unedifying combination of the traditional view-point of the freebooter and the shabby extenuations of the Pharisee

as the basis for the colonial politics of a great nation would make it appear that all the lessons of the war and its unhappy origins, had been taught in vain. It signifies that so far as the incorrigible imperialism of England is concerned, the nations cannot and dare not fulfil the great and almost universal desire of suffering humanity—that the black and tragic period of the past shall be superseded by a better and nobler period of the future.

SECOND PART

THE "EVIDENCE"
OF THE
BRITISH BLUE BOOK

II.

THE "EVIDENCE" OF THE BRITISH BLUE BOOK.

I. THE PROTECTORATE TREATIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GERMAN DOMINION.

IT is the intention of English policy to prevent by hook or crook Germany's recovery of her colony of South-West Africa. England therefore does her utmost to furnish proof that the Germans do not deserve to have the colonies restored to them. To this end the Blue Book upon South-West Africa has been compiled. This purpose is twice unmistakably indicated at the close of the preface on page eleven. Cunning, but all too transparent is the intention. "Native opinion here is unanimously against any idea of ever being handed back to the tender mercies of Germany, and any suggestion of the possibility of an act of that kind on the part of Great Britain produces the utmost consternation." The gentleman who wrote these words and who bears as the exponent of an insatiable policy of imperialism, the not inappropriate name of Gorges, must assuredly have penned them with his tongue in his cheek. The intention behind these words becomes clearer and clearer on every succeeding page of the Blue Book.

The text and illustrations of this specious document have no other purpose in view than to make propaganda for the idea that South-West Africa should be incorporated in the colonial empire of Great Britain. It is therefore *ab initio* impossible to expect that the selection and the utilization

presentation remains the same, page after page—namely, to represent the Germans as the exploiters and oppressors of the highly-developed, harmless and good-natured natives, Hereros as well as Hottentots. He who is unaware of the real relations of things must necessarily come to the conclusion that the natives, apart from occasional minor feuds, had led a peaceful and happy life prior to the German occupation, that the laws of property were clear and well-defined, and all rights duly regulated, so that it would have been an easy matter to introduce a normal economic development when German rule was established.

Should anyone undertake to depict in this manner the establishment of British rule in Rhodesia, in Australia or in India, and to investigate every individual trait, every action of the British agents, officials and officers in so pronouncedly partisan a manner—to paint everything that the Englishman did in the blackest of colours, whilst constantly representing the natives as heroes and as innocent victims of British treachery, there would be unrolled such a picture of English colonial methods as would horrify the world. The authors who could write the Blue Book in the manner in which it is written, must either have been totally ignorant of the character of the natives of South-West Africa or have been singularly lacking in good faith.

He who knows the South African Hottentot can only shrug his shoulders over the grotesque idealization which the Blue Book has the impudence to foist upon the public. It is quite possible that the Hottentots were a vigorous tribe in bygone centuries, with customs and conceptions of law which for a primitive people were worthy of all praise. These traits, however, they were bound in a large degree to lose during the remorseless process of oppression and through the expulsion from their original homes in Cape

Colony. Of their better characteristics only remnants remained. The country that was later destined to become German South-West Africa was for them in the main a land of refuge, in which only a small and scattered residue of the once powerful tribe maintained itself. When one considers what had been done to the Hottentots in Cape Colony, and that by no means only during the early rule of the Dutch, but also later under the English, one must regard it as a shining example of crass self-righteousness to misrepresent the foundation of German authority among the Hottentot tribes of South-West Africa by such a caricature as we find in the pages of the British Blue Book.

Already before the coming of the Germans, the remnants of the Hottentots, who had in part retreated from Cape Colony into South-West Africa, were doomed to degeneration and extinction. They were for the most part indolent, underhanded and treacherous, and lived, wherever possible, by loot and thievery. The most feared among the Hottentot chieftains of that time was Hendrik Witbooi. Through campaigns extending over many years he had obtained the mastery over most of the tribes, and had thereby depopulated the already exhausted Namaland in the south of the south-west African colony through continual butcheries. Of the herds of cattle which formerly existed in the country, only a few pitiful vestiges remained, the greater part had been robbed and slaughtered. Only in the neighbourhood of the mission stations were the Hottentot fields tilled and the gardens planted. The Witboois paid still less attention to these matters. Although millions of acres of fertile pastureland were at hand, they had no idea of systematic cattle-raising.

The Witboois lived chiefly by freebooting expeditions against the Hereros. Hendrik Witbooi was accustomed to

boast openly that he and his tribe had no need to work, since the Hereros had hitherto been perfectly satisfactory in the capacity of his cattle-raisers and had always provided him with abundant tribute. For decades Witbooi was the holy terror of the land. He would descend like lightning upon the werfts of the Hereros, would order the women and children to be butchered and would then send the captured herds of cattle towards the south, to his rocky retreat Hornkranz, where a body of his henchmen would be waiting to receive them. He and his robber bands would thereupon turn their attention to the next Herero werft, where the same butchery of human beings and the same theft of cattle would be repeated. It was only after the Hereros in the larger villages had received tidings through runners and had thrown themselves upon their horses in order to cut off Witbooi's retreat that he would once more withdraw into the cloven mountain ranges of the South. Whenever Hereros met upon the veld, they would greet each other from afar with the cry: "Where is Witbooi?" Fear and terror of him reigned far and wide.

After Captain von François had attacked Hornkranz and had cleared out that robbers' nest, jubilation spread like a running fire through the entire country of the Hereros. Night after night the sounds of rejoicing of the Hereros, dancing beside their rinderkraals, now happily rendered secure, echoed through the mountains and over the plains. During the entire time in which Witbooi and his robber bands devastated Namaland and Hereroland, they were supplied with munitions, arms and horses by English traders from Cape Colony. It would have been an easy matter for the government of that country to prevent these murderous campaigns of the Hottentots by placing an embargo upon the export of arms. But—"business was business." The great

numbers of stolen cattle which Witbooi gave in exchange for the weapons furnished him were a welcome addition to the economic life of the Colony. The concept "work" was recognized by no Hottentot, for since generations the majority had spent their lives in laziness, vagabondage, looting and robbery.

The noble historians of the British Blue Book worked themselves up into a special access of spitefulness in depicting the expedition of Captain von François against Witbooi's robber's den, Hornkranz, in 1893. It is charged that the campaign took place without any warning, and that in the attack upon the werft the Germans had fired without compunction upon non-belligerents. Witbooi, however, had been summoned by Captain von François to recognize the German authority, and had refused to do this. The Blue Book historians appear to draw from this the remarkable conclusion that the German commander should resignedly have accepted the outlaw's decree. Let us ask them this question, and let them strive hard to give an honest answer: Would Englishmen have shown such resignation when their object was to bring a new territory under their colonial dominion? Let us endeavour to refresh the memories of these strangely partisan chroniclers.

In the year 1878 the Governor of Natal sent word to Cetawayo, up to that time an independent chieftain of the Zulus, that he was to pay damages for certain unwarranted actions, and that he was to receive British missionaries and a British Resident. Cetawayo returned no answer to this demand. This case bore a close resemblance to that between von François and Witbooi. The Britons in no wise refrained from forcing their will upon Cetawayo, but immediately dispatched troops against the Zulu chieftain. After the first English forces had been beaten by the Zulus, new levies of troops were

brought from England and from India, General Wolseley was placed in command and carried on the war until Cetawayo was taken prisoner and the annexation of Zululand by Natal was accomplished. During these battles the British troops devastated by rifle-fire a far greater number of Zulu kraals, filled with women and children, than the one solitary instance of Hornkranz in the case of the Germans. The only difference is this—the “Hornkranz Massacre,” as the immaculate British propagandists deliberately call it, is now to serve as a pretext for its being the bounden moral duty of the English to see that German South-West Africa becomes henceforth a British instead of a German colony. The value of the evidence of the Blue Book and of the intellectual integrity of its compilers may be gathered from the fact that scarcely a word is said of Witbooi as a robber and murderer. The sentimental string which British propagandists have become so adroit in working whenever the character of an opponent is to be blackened by atrocity tales, is fearlessly and unabashedly plucked. Witbooi appears in these delectable pages as “the old patriot,” the “old statesman,” etc. It is literally said of him:

“His conscience was clear; he was at peace with the Hereros and with everyone else. He ruled his people, settled disputes, conducted Church services, preached and prayed and wrote letters.”

That in addition to his character as a freebooter, Hendrik Witbooi was obsessed by a kind of Old Testamentarian faith, to the effect that God gave him success in his wars; that he was well-versed in religious forms of speech; and that he had a passion for writing letters, is well-known. He had formerly been a Mission school-teacher and was fond of astonishing people with his knowledge of the Bible and with the unctuous phraseology which he had acquired in the school. But this in no wise interfered with his passion

for freebooting and larceny. He was forced to conclude peace with the Hereros in 1891 because he had met with a heavy defeat at their hands at Okatumba on the Nosob,—a defeat more severe than any he had ever suffered before. At all events he required time for recuperation. To count upon the permanence of his desire for peace was impossible for the simple reason that his people demanded food from him. And sustenance to the Witbooi was synonymous with the robbing and slaughtering of livestock. Therefore the robbing expeditions were sure to begin again sooner or later. The understanding of this problem as manifested in the Blue Book is primitive, to say the least, as when it is solemnly remarked on page 26 that “the peace of Rehoboth between the Hereros and the Hottentots had rendered German military intervention unnecessary,” and surprise is expressed that the German garrison had been increased to 250 men! Are the responsible authors of the Blue Book unaware of the fact that the British Commissioner Palgrave who had recommended the annexation of South-West Africa to the government at Westminster, had demanded troops to the number of 500 for the subjugation of the Hereros alone? *That* was naturally accepted as a matter of course, and it proves that the British government placed little faith in the element of moral suasion so far as its relations with the natives were concerned. When, however, the boot is on the other leg, that is the German, it is indubitably a patriotic duty to give every petty detail a maleficent twist.

The glaring unfairness and inconsistency of the British representation are shown by consideration of the following simple fact:

If the entire colonial policy of Germany in South-West Africa was to have any significance whatsoever, it was in-

dubitably necessary for the Germans to secure peace within the country and to obtain from the native chieftains the recognition of German authority. Colonisation in these parts might pursue two goals: the settlement of German farmers in the country, and the utilization of the cattle-herds,—the only natural and immediate resources of the country,—through the medium of trade. When the English came to Cape Colony the natives had for the greater part been removed from the country or had been subjugated—the soil was therefore free for purposes of settlement. In South-West Africa the Hereros had devoted their lands to an extremely extensive and wasteful form of cattle-raising. The true Herero was but little disposed to sell cattle. The enormous herds served chiefly to furnish the tribe with milk.

The allegation that a native tribe such as the Hereros possessed an inviolable divine or moral right to carry on this irrational method of cattle-breeding, and that for this reason no White settlers were to be permitted to establish farms, would be absurd, especially from the lips of the British, *for no other European race has driven out the native aboriginal tribes from such enormous tracts of territory in order to make them accessible to cultivation by the white man, as precisely the British.* Despite this, the compilers of the Blue Book in their polemic against things German in South-West Africa pretend, from the very start, that it was moral monstrosity on the part of Germany that she should have sent armed forces into her colony or demanded the subjection of the native chieftains!

That British commanders had not the slightest scruples against making a sudden attack upon native kraals (with women and children) whenever it was to their purpose to score some signal victory over the natives, may, for example, be seen in the occasional descriptions furnished by such

writers as Thomson in his book "Rhodesia and its Government," (London, 1898)—a work which will more or less occupy us subsequently. On page 148 *et seq.*, Thomson relates how during the revolt of the Matabeles in 1896, Captain De Moleyn made a surprise attack with machine-guns and artillery at dawn upon a village of the Mashonas. The Mashonas were frightened out of their sleep when the English onslaught came—in the same manner as the Witboois at Hornkranz,—and even the compilers of the British Blue Book would scarcely venture to dispute our assumption that in this attack, as at Hornkranz; women and children lost their lives. "Women and children!"—words infinitely dear to the human race in general, and yet through their abuse for what the Northcliffe press terms "the Uses of Hatred," rendered almost nauseous in the nostrils of fair-minded men. For if one were to judge by the misuse these three words have suffered at the hands of British propagandists during the war—consideration for the lives and welfare of "women and children" is a peculiar, God-given monopoly of the British race.

The Hereros, like their brothers, the Hottentots, are also forced to undergo an idealisation at the hands of the humanitarians of the Blue Book. The large brown-black Herero is radically different from the small yellow Hottentot. The aversion to work is, however, equally pronounced in both races,—with the exception that the poorer classes among the Hereros are more adaptable to the pursuit of cattle-raising. The Herero of the better class formerly did no work whatsoever, for since generations the Hereros had devoted themselves wholly to the breeding of cattle. The herds remained at pasture year in, year out, and were tended by the Berg-Damaras, who are the serfs of the Hereros, and also by the poorer class of Hereros. Of real work the Herero had no conception. He

likewise regarded it as beneath his dignity. The cultivation of fields and gardens was to him an unknown thing. When the milk became scarce during the long season of the drought, then the entire tribe hungered—including the chieftain. When oxen were slaughtered they were devoured on the same day. The Hereros themselves have this saying: "Yes, we are like the hyenas—where there is food it must be gobbled up." A few days afterwards they would be hungry again, and would beg. That which the white man regards as insincerity and falsehood appears not only permissible to the Herero, but eminently natural so long as he may derive some momentary advantage from it.

One of the German leaders who was particularly fond of the natives, General von Estorff, nevertheless declared: "The insincerity and untruthfulness of the Herero are abysmal." When, therefore, the compilers of the Blue Book point with pride to the fact that the natives may be sworn in court and that their evidence is accepted at the same face value as that of whites, one need simply reply that such a practice may be possible in colonies in which the natives had been christianized and educated for generation after generation, but that this would have been a degradation of the sanctity of the oath in a region such as South-West Africa. The person who furnished the various chapters of the Blue Book which relate to the natives, makes repeated reference to the period in which the Germans first entered the country and came into contact with the natives for the first time. Had he been true to the facts rather than to his orders, *he would have depicted the natives as they were at that time*. This naturally would have proved highly inconvenient for carrying out the express purpose of the Blue Book—namely, the justification of a piratical imperialist policy of annexation of German property—upon the traditional moral pretext.

It is not easy for a European to picture to himself the horrible cruelties which were formerly perpetrated by the natives in general and by the Hereros in particular. During the battles of the Hereros against the Hottentots, the Herero women would usually follow close upon the heels of their fighting men. In a successful fight the Hereros would overwhelm the Hottentots and then leave the wounded to the tender mercies of the women who came storming behind and who would then torture the helpless to death in a manner which no pen could venture to describe. After one of these battles the Herero mænads brought home the cut-off genitals of twelve Hottentots and decorated with these the drinking vessel of the paramount chieftain Kamaherero who drank in public from this festive goblet!

In 1896 when the chieftain Kahimemua was captured on the edge of the Kalahari (he did not surrender voluntarily, as the Blue Book asserts) and after he had been sentenced to death by a court composed of whites and blacks which had met in repeated session, Kahimemua begged to be shot rather than to have his throat cut with a blunt knife. This had been his own method of administering punishment whenever prisoners, cattle-thieves and the like, were to be butchered. The Hereros invariably punished the stealing of cattle with death,—rich Hereros were able to escape even the death penalty for murder by payment in heads of cattle. A Herero headman of Upper Swakop who is still with the English and whom they know well, was accustomed to execute the death penalty upon cattle-thieves in the following manner. He would have them bound to trees and would then plunge a long, old iron ramrod into their mouths and force this down until it emerged at their hindquarters—whereupon the victims would be left to their fate.

Upon reading the Blue Book, one cannot escape the impression that the Hereros and the Hottentots were imbued with a particularly lofty conception of the sanctity of female virtue. This, however, if we except certain instances among the baptised natives, is by no means in accordance with the facts. The question which Herero girls and women are wont to ask in an astonished tone of voice whenever they are reproached with their libidinous mode of life, is well-known in South-West Africa: "What, is that wrong? Don't our finest cows allow themselves to be covered by every bull?"

Well aware of the unfailing effect of the sentimental sexual appeal as manifested many a time during the war, these British propagandists could scarcely be expected to forego the magnificent opportunity of displaying a feverish moral indignation over the threatened virtue of these Herero vestals at the hands of the Germans.

Every just representation of native conditions and of the establishment of German authority in South-West Africa must begin with a correct idea of the real nature of these natives, how they fought and slaughtered one another and how impossible it was to create and uphold order in the land and to make the most of the resources in the country for the common benefit, without establishing some kind of fixed authority over the different native tribes.

After the first introductory chapters, the Blue Book offers a survey of the Protectorate agreements which the Germans concluded with the native chieftains, and upon which the German dominion in South-West Africa was built up. The compilers venture to asperse the policy of Governor Leutwein, and, strangely enough, upon the grounds that it was based upon the well-known British principle of *Divide et impera*—divide and rule. This expression is used more than once by Leutwein in his book: "Elf Jahre Gouverneur in

Südwestafrika," ("Eleven Years as Governor in South-West Africa").

Leutwein relates how the German administration was equipped with very scanty forces, because public opinion in Germany demanded an economical colonial policy. There was therefore nothing else left to do than to win over a part of the natives to the German cause, and to make use of their help against the rebellious elements. It would naturally have been more to the purpose had the administration been able from the very beginning to exert its authority throughout the entire land. But German colonial policy was at that time still in its early stages and had as yet accumulated no experience. The end in view was to create such conditions by the most economical means as would ensure a healthy trade development. To achieve this goal, German immigration was necessary, and the development of all the available auxiliary forces of the country. It must be clear to every thinking judge of colonial-political questions that it was useless to expect that such primitive savage tribes as the Hereros and most of the other aboriginal breeds would make room for the requirements of modern commercial development without being forced to do so by outward compulsion and regulative force.

Precisely the same thing which the rigorous moralists and self-appointed judges of the Blue Book condemn in Governor Leutwein and in German policy, becomes a matter for eulogy where it has been carried into effect—and upon what an infinitely greater scale!—by British colonizers for the greater glory and advantage of Britain. The entire history of the earlier British colonial policy in India may be summed up in those three words "*Divide et impera!*" By skilfully taking advantage of the passions, the conflicting interests and the weaknesses of the native princes, by playing

the one against the other, by the payment of subsidies and the bestowal of gifts in order to win the support of native against native—by such means as these were the first and successful representatives of British power in India enabled to prepare the ground for the subsequent Anglo-Indian empire. In the course of this process there took place such abominable maltreatment of the natives, such ruthless bloodshed and robbery, such unbelievable acts of violence, that the foremost exponent of these British colonial methods in India, Warren Hastings, was forced to undergo a trial after his return to England. Despite his obvious guilt and the crushing weight of evidence against him, he was acquitted after a trial which lasted several years.

Thomas Macaulay has treated these proceedings in some of his most brilliant pages; he hushes up none of the atrocities committed by Hastings, and yet he arrives at the final judgment that this monster of cruelty was not only one of the most successful but also one of the greatest statesmen which England had ever produced!

Such is an English verdict *when the interests of England are concerned*. When, however, the attitude of a German Colonial Governor under far pettier conditions is to be called into question, and his attitude—not towards a people of a high and ancient culture such as the Indians,—but towards savage aboriginal tribes, is to be condemned, then, to be sure, the determining point is not the white-washing of a tool of British imperialism, but the arousing of sentiment against the return of the property of the German People to its rightful owners. And therefore we have the crude and immemorial expedient of the policy of plunder—that what is white for the Briton must perforce be black for the German.

Preceding the chapters which deal with the various native tribes of South-West Africa and their alleged maltreatment by the Germans, the Blue Book offers certain statistics. For instance, the estimates for the year 1904 are contrasted with the official census of the year 1911, and the deduction made that a population of 130,000 had sunk to some 38,000, thereby implying a decrease of some 92,000 souls. The error made here—and apparently *purposely* made—is that casual estimate and careful census should both be accepted at the same value. All those who have experience in African affairs know that casual estimates of the native population invariably result too high. The English have been able to convince themselves of the truth of this through their own experience both in East and in West Africa.

Such figures as 80,000 souls for the Hereros, 20,000 for the Hottentots and 30,000 for the Berg-Damaras before the war, are all in excess of the real figures. Since the days of Palgrave all the writers upon South-West Africa have indiscriminately accepted these figures one from the other. A census or even a rough counting had never occurred in former times. In 1874 Palgrave estimated the numbers of the Hereros at 80,000 or a little more—an estimate in which Leutwein concurred later—in 1894. If this be accepted as a basic figure, then all subsequent estimates must take into consideration the fact that the Hereros decreased considerably in numbers during the rinderpest of 1897. On page 41 the Blue Book declares that before the pest, the Hereros had possessed over 150,000 cattle and that they had presumably lost one-half of this number through the pest. This is an impossibly optimistic assumption. *Only a small fraction of the unvaccinated cattle of the Hereros, not exceeding 5%, survived the scourge.* Inasmuch as the negroes lived chiefly on milk, the loss of almost their entire stock

of cattle occasioned a terrible famine. The Hereros died by the thousand of hunger typhus. They dug up putrid carcasses which had lain in the ground for weeks and devoured them. The tribes eked out a wretched existence on roots and berries and similar fruits of the field. Most of the Hereros who survived the famine were kept alive through their connection with the whites, with the Government, with merchants and with farmers, and the succour which these brought them. Since the supply of draught-oxen had been reduced to the extreme limit through the rinderpest and there were as yet no railways leading from the coast into the interior, it was impossible to bring help to the entire people. The supplies of provisions in the country were totally inadequate.

Before the revolt of 1904, it may be estimated that some 50,000 head of cattle had again accrued. If the number of Hereros existent at the period immediately before the revolt be given as 80,000, it should be obvious that such a figure must, in consequence of the losses occasioned by the rinderpest, be far too high. In addition to this, a conscientious computation should have added to the German census of 1911 the numbers of those Hereros who had succeeded in escaping to British Bechuanaland and to the Transvaal during the revolt. Their numbers were by no means negligible, and they included above all many headmen with their following, among them the paramount chieftain, Samuel Maharero.

With regard to the Hottentots it is also certain that from the time of Leutwein's estimates in the year 1894 up to the period of the revolt, that is to say in the course of a decade, their numbers had been greatly diminished, in consequence of their general degeneration and the pronounced ravages of sexual disease. Their numbers were con-

stantly on the decrease; and the birth-rate among most of the tribes was very low. The procedure of the Blue Book with regard to the comparison of statistics concerning the numbers of Berg-Damaras is, however, far more reprehensible. The estimate of 1904, giving 30,000 souls, is repeated without any attempt to base this number upon facts. The result of the German census of 1911 is given as 12,831. In reality, however, it was 19,581, that is to say, about 20,000. It cannot in reality have exceeded this figure ten years before, for the Berg-Damaras in the meantime, contrary to the statements made in the Blue Book, had sustained no losses but had been protected and cared for. The figure given in the Blue Book, 12,831 instead of 19,581, is explained by the simple fact that the 6,750 children given in the German census are omitted. Why? It would not be pleasant to assume that an intentional falsification had taken place here. But if there be no falsification, one would at least be justified in assuming a reprehensible superficiality, all the more so since, upon figures which have been established in such a manner, the most serious moral charges have been based.

It may be remarked in this connection that the Blue Book is guilty of another gross numerical inexactitude in another place. On page 41 the value of the cattle exported from South-West Africa in 1903, that is to say, the last year before the uprising, is given at "23,337,682 marks, more than one million pounds sterling." How this number can have been arrived at is inexplicable. The actual value of the cattle exports, according to the official yearly report of the Colonial Administration for 1903, amounted to only 1,023,637 marks, that is to say, *not a twentieth part of the sum stated in the Blue Book*. The entire export took place to Cape Colony. One might content oneself with assuming that this

error in an important official British document was due to gross negligence, were it not clear that the falsely and so extravagantly over-estimated export value is once more merely to serve as a basis for the disparagement and discrediting of German colonization. The manœuvre is adopted of placing the number of cattle which belonged to the Hereros in 1902 (about 46,000 head) and those belonging to the Germans (about the same number) side by side in order to imply that the supposedly splendid export trade in cattle from South-West Africa depended upon the robbing of the Hereros by the whites!

Immediately after the statement of this false figure, the manipulators of facts and figures in the Blue Book proceed to describe how the Germans, in particular the traders, had robbed the Hereros of their cattle and had thereby driven them to desperation. The exposition of the Blue Book concerning the later period of the German Administration, that is to say, concerning the revolt of the natives, is just as one-sided and distorted as the introductory chapters. This is immediately confirmed by the description of the revolt of the Hereros. Under the title of "Confiscation of Herero Cattle by the German Government," we are treated to a chapter which deals in the main with the question of the succession to the chieftainship of the Hereros after the death of Kamaherero. The Germans are accused of having illegally appointed Samuel, the weak son of Kamaherero, to be paramount chieftain, contrary to the laws and rights of the Hereros, who had not hitherto known a paramount chief, and who had demanded as a successor to Kamaherero for Kamaherero's tribe a collateral relative of the name of Nikodemus.

Machiavellian motives are attributed to the Germans, and the entire policy of expediency which the English have universally practised in their colonization and which is sometimes

so essential to the maintenance and the progress of the white man in the tropics, is lost sight of in a mass of indiscriminate charges, misinterpretations of motives and unfounded suspicions. It stands to reason that the European power which acquires a colony of this kind must create conditions among the natives which permit of an orderly administration. The recognition of a paramount chieftancy by as great a number of native groups as possible is a necessary premiss—a simple means of progressing from less orderly to better-regulated conditions. Policies may be mistaken, but their moral value can be judged only according to the purpose that inspired them.

The British Colonial Administration in Africa adopts without hesitation exactly the same method which the authors of the Blue Book find so very reprehensible in the case of Governor Leutwein. The *London Gazette* of August 25, 1904, contains a report of Governor Egerton of South Nigeria as quoted in the Belgian publication "*La Vérité sur le Congo*," (1905, No. 24). Egerton reckons up no less than nine warlike expeditions which had been sent against the natives from September, 1903 to May, 1904, that is, within the space of nine months. In comment upon this we read:

"Osea was an important town of from 4,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, which had always been powerful enough to resist the Bida Mussulman slave-dealers at the time of their raids through this part of the country. None of the other neighbouring towns had been able to do this, not even Agbede, for instance, where the Bida people settled a Mussulman chief with orders to subdue the territory. This man was far from achieving his object when the English arrived. More intelligent than his heathen chiefs, he at once placed his forces at England's disposal, complied with all her demands for work and money and was finally named paramount chief of the whole country, the villages of Osea, Oriri and Ndoto included.

These villages recognized the English authorities but refused to obey the Sultan, their bitterest enemy. The authorities passed over their objections and in 1903 decided that all the villages which, by the new

decree, were under the Sultan of Agbede, should pay tribute to him.* Osea refused to submit to this and so the District Commissioner, Mr. Raikes, with a force of 50 men came to collect the tribute by force. The Osea people resisted and repulsed the small troop. Osea was destroyed and is now but a heap of ruins. Its survivors, however, are under the Sultan of Agbede and pay tribute to him."

What was it that took place here under the English Colonial Administration? Something which is almost analogous to the proceeding of the Germans in the case of the paramount chieftaincy of the Hereros in South-West Africa. This, of course, does not prevent the self-righteous moralists of the Blue Book from blackening the German action, whilst an almost identical action on the part of the English is accepted as a matter of course. The misinterpretation of the enemy's purpose and the smirching of the enemy's name are regarded as sanctified means of warfare so long as the one end be kept in view—the maintenance of the British thesis that the British and not the Germans are destined by natural and God-given rights to own German South-West Africa.

The gentlemen of the Blue Book refer to a publication by Dr. Felix Meyer, Privy Councillor of the Superior Court, which bears the title of "Trade and Laws of the Hereros" ("Wirtschaft und Recht der Herero," 1905), and quote from this a passage to the effect that at the time of the German occupation of South-West Africa there had been no recognized paramount chief over all the tribes of the Hereros. This may have been so in former times. Kamaherero had, on the contrary, actually laid claim to the paramount chieftaincy, and had been acknowledged, in spite of the opposition of certain other chiefs, as the authoritative head throughout the land. Kamaherero received tribute of oxen

* Ifou 1903, Native Council rule relating to head tax.

from the whole of Hereroland—based upon the peculiar and expedient theory that it was his right to dispose of all the land upon which the cattle of the Herero grazed, that the grass which these cattle ate also belonged to him and that payment must be made for it in the form of a tribute of oxen. Before his death Kamaherero designated his oldest son Samuel as his successor. The German Governor recognized that candidate for the paramount chieftaincy who had been appointed by Kamaherero, and from whom it was to be expected that he would respect the German authority upon which his own must be based. To reproach the Governor for this most natural step, is absurd. It was also natural that after Nikodemus had taken up arms and allied himself with the Khauas Hottentots, and been captured, he should be treated as a rebel. This happened in the summer of 1896.

The authors of the Blue Book, forgetting the crimson trail of Britain across the world, indulge in the most acrimonious language regarding this "tragedy," and the "brutality and tyranny of Germany" towards the Hereros. They forget, we repeat, their own colonial history from which, not to cite far worse examples of the "brutality and tyranny of Britain," abundant instances might be drawn to prove that the British in similar circumstances acted in exactly the same way—something which was accepted and commended as self-understood. Have we not just read how the villages in Nigeria which refused to acknowledge the Head Chief who had been selected by England, had been brought to obedience, not by chivalrous appeals, but by sheer brute force?

After this interlude the Blue Book proceeds to describe how the Germans in the wickedness of their souls had sequestered the cattle and the land of the Hereros and

had thereby brought on the great revolt of 1904. The preceding chapters are largely devoted to expatiating upon the villainy of the German administration which is charged with attempts to confine the natives within closer limits by deceitful and forcible measures, in order that room might be made for farm-settlements. The traders had thereupon contributed their bit by means of cattle-robbery and usury under the guise of trade, to possess themselves of the property of the Hereros.

He who would form a just and correct judgment upon the revolt of the Hereros, must first obtain a clear idea of the great difficulties which were under the circumstances connected with the task of striking a balance between the habitual mode of life and the traditional claims of the natives on the one hand, and the just demands of the whites and of white colonization on the other. The Herero rising finds a parallel in the Matabele rising in British South Africa which had broken out eight years previously. Here, too, the resistance of the natives clashed with the penetration of the white man and all that this implies, as well as with the interests of a colonial policy. The results were identical: secret preparations by the natives, a sudden attack upon the settlers, a great massacre, and then—punishment. Regarding the rising of the Matabeles, H. C. Thomson remarks in his book "Rhodesia and its Government," (pages 118—119) that Chief Lobengula had wished to become a direct subject of the Queen, and then proceeds:

"The Queen sent a gracious reply, but the Chartered Company, before four years were over, had forced him into war, and obtained possession of his land. Lobengula was brutally cruel both to his own people and to the Mashonas, but nothing can justify the way in which he was treated by the Company. If anyone doubts this, let him read the blue books, and read also what has been said about it by Mr. Mackenzie, who, more than anyone else, was in a position to know the truth.

"Is it to be wondered at that the natives all over Africa are beginning to lose the faith they once had in English honour, and in English fair-dealing, and to believe that their interests count for nothing in the commercial scale?"

This is an honest and upright English utterance. It reveals the fact that "by command of Her Majesty," certain Blue Books had once been submitted to Parliament—books which dealt with acts of violence by the English in South Africa. These acts had provoked a wide-spread revolt on the part of the natives. But surely no one ever heard that the English had therefore come to the conclusion that England or the South African Company were thenceforward unfit to remain in possession of Matabeleland and Mashonaland?

It has never been contended, least of all by the German administration in South-West Africa and by Governor Leutwein, that the relation of the traders to the Hereros had not given rise to various evils and abuses. But energetic measures were taken against these evils and abuses. The order issued by the Central Administration at Berlin to the effect that all the claims of the traders against the Hereros were to be regulated at a year's notice, was a political error, since the shortness of the period caused great perturbation among both the natives and the traders—but the intention behind the order was certainly a beneficent one, since it was meant to protect the interests of the natives.

It is also true that prior to the rising of the Hereros reservation lands had been prepared for them, and in this reservation the sale of land to whites would naturally have been prohibited. The revolt of the Hereros broke out because the Protectorate troops had been drawn to the south, owing to the rising of the Bondelzwarts. It is significant that Hereros themselves should have afterwards confessed that they had been considerably encouraged by the report

that Englishmen were shooting at Germans along the banks of the Orange River. This report was occasioned by the fact that a German detachment under Captain Böttlin which had been forced across the river during the fighting with the Hottentots, was disarmed upon the English bank. The Hottentots who were witnesses of this, were unable to interpret this in any other way than that the English had gone over to their side. It was natural that the delicate points of formal international law as carried out by one white power in relation to another during a war with natives, should have been incomprehensible to the blacks. Exaggerated versions of this simple incident found their way towards the north and made a remarkable impression upon the Hereros who were in a state of great fermentation owing to the withdrawal of the German troops for the purpose for quelling the revolt of the Bondelzwarts. The compilers of the Blue Book, who quote so copiously from South-West African sources when the citations may be twisted to the disadvantage of Germany, might conceivably have also registered this fact.

Those who are curious to learn how a great revolt of natives burst into flame in South Africa—and that not against the German but against the *English* rule, might be referred to the story of the Matabele insurrection of 1896. Thomson, who gives us so much reliable information, has a good deal to say about this matter. On page 253 he relates that the Head Chieftain Lobengula as early as July 28, 1893, that is, three years before the uprising, had thus complained:

“I thought you came to dig gold, but it seems that you have come not only to dig the gold, *but to rob me of my people and country as well.*”

Why are words similar to these, when uttered by South-West African natives, regarded as acceptable evidence that

the Germans are unworthy of colonizing South-West Africa, whilst there can be no doubt that Lobengula would scarcely be regarded as an acceptable witness to attest that the English were unworthy of governing Matabeleland and Mashonaland?

The Rev. John White, in a letter to the publisher of the *Methodist Times*, dated January, 1897, (reproduced in Thomson's book, pages 232—240) gives as the causes of the Matabele uprising:—abuses in the administration of native affairs, arbitrary action on the part of the native police, acts of injustice committed by the white settlers, rinderpest and locusts, the influence of the native witch doctors and the absence of the Protectorate troops (for Dr. Jameson's raid against the Transvaal). Were one to imitate the *modus operandi* of the Blue Book in the matter of the Herero uprising, and to provide this list of derelictions with a one-sided and spiteful commentary, it would be no difficult matter to deduce from this an annihilating verdict upon English rule in South Africa. "There was no excuse," Thomson writes, "for the treatment of the Matabele before the rising.

"It forced the Matabele into insurrection, and converted the Mashonas from a people who welcomed us as deliverers from Matabele oppression into a people who have dared death in its most abhorrent form in the hope of shaking off our rule."

The Blue Book devotes more or less space to the attempts made by Governor Leutwein to bring the Hereros within narrower limits in order to gain room for settlement through whites, and to restrict the unfortunate results of the traders' proceedings. We refer our critics to certain pages of Thomson's, in which they may learn how the Matabele were treated in this regard. The unrest among the natives in South Africa, Thomson declares, is usually caused by the fact that *under one pretext or another, they are robbed of their land.*

The *Financial Record* in April 1894, that is to say, before the rising, threw a great deal of light upon this question by casting doubts upon English honesty which was supposed to be exemplified in the treatment of the Matabele question by Sir Henry Loch and Lord Ripon and to lead to the prosperity of the land. The *Financial Record* remarks:

"If this means that the Matabele are to be deprived or sixed of their farms, that is of all those that are worth anything, and driven into locations within the boundaries of which they will find it difficult to subsist, we may take it for granted that the native trouble in the Northern Transvaal will have its replica in Matabeleland."

And that is what really happened. According to a statement of Mr. Carnegie's, two districts were, to be sure, reserved as dwelling-places for the Matabele and the Mashonas. The natives, however, did not take possession of these, since experience had taught them to dread the fever there. (Thomson, page 89).

Earl Grey likewise uttered his mind about this matter in an article in the *Nineteenth Century*, (1880) as follows:

"Throughout this part of the British dominions, the coloured people are generally looked upon by the whites as an inferior race, whose interests ought to be systematically disregarded when they come into competition with their own, and who ought to be governed mainly with a view to the advantage of the superior race. And for this advantage two things are considered to be especially necessary: first, that facilities should be offered to the white colonists for obtaining possession of land heretofore occupied by the native tribes; and secondly, that the Kaffir population should be made to furnish as large and as cheap a supply of labour as possible . . . This desire for cheap labour, and what has been well called 'the hunger for land,' has led settlers of European descent to deal harshly and unjustly with uncivilized tribes."

(Thomson, page 190—191.)

In addition to land robbery, forced labour was introduced. Once more Mr. Thomson furnishes a pointed comment upon this theme:

"Although there may be no objection to the temporary imposition of compulsory labour for the needs of a colony in time of famine or drought, it is a very different matter if it is to be enforced regularly, and if the men are to be employed, not by the State, but to be handed over to the various companies for the development of their mines and other properties."

Earl Grey had disputed that compulsory labour had been imposed on the natives in Rhodesia. Thomson's answer to this is that this charge had been confirmed from many sides, for instance, by M. H. J. Taylor, the Head Commissioner of Matabeleland (page 185). Mr. Carnegie is also of the opinion that the risings certainly had some connection with the imposition of compulsory labour, for, as he declares:

"A proud, hitherto unconquered Matabele cannot be tamed in a month or a year into a useful servant by kicks, sjamboks or blows. You cannot civilise him by quarrelling with him a few days before his pay is due, by stoning, or unjustly beating him, by cursing him for not understanding an order given in English, by being too kind to him. Let it be abundantly understood that none of these charges can be brought against many employers, but there were those guilty of such acts, and under the system of Government labour supply the natives were unable to choose their employers. There are many details connected with the treatment of natives, personally known to myself, which prove conclusively that the wrong men were often chosen for handling such raw material, both in the mines, on the farms, and in the Government service. Speaking then from their point of view, the natives practically said: 'Our country is gone, our cattle have gone, our people are scattered, we have nothing to live for, our women are deserting us, the white man does as he likes with them; we are the slaves of the white men, we are nobody, and have no rights or laws of any kind.' Many reasoned thus among themselves, rightly or wrongly.

Could there be a sadder commentary upon the result of our occupation of Matabeleland?"

So much as to Thomson's views upon the origins of the rising. How easily might these facts, furbished up with a show of moral indignation, have been used, according to the delectable habit of the Blue Book, for demanding the elimination of all English dominion over Rhodesia! Mr. Thomson's statements are confirmed by First-Lieutenant

Alderson in his book: "With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force, 1896." In this we may read, on page 11:

"Apparently no one in Mashonaland had even dreamt it was possible that the Mashonas might rise, every one had got so used to two or three men going to a kraal, when anything wrong had been done by the natives, and demanding to see the chief, and when that individual came forth, if it appeared good to them, breaking his own cooking-pot over his head, or threatening him with, and even using the sjambok on him. That the worm might turn did not seem to have occurred to them, and the saying, 'You only want a sjambok and a box of matches to take any Mashona kraal,' had become proverbial."

Alderson in this book of his also furnishes us with a detailed description of the manner in which the revolt was crushed. Some 263 pages are devoted to accounts of fired villages, inhabited and uninhabited, of raids for the purpose of looting the grain-supplies of the natives, of devastations of the land in order to prevent the sowing of seed, and similar gentle attentions and merciful dispensations on the part of British imperialism when rampant among "the lesser breeds without the law." The English even entrusted the carrying-out of these operations to native troops. On page 206 of his book, Alderson writes:

"I then sent the Native Contingent in to complete the incendiary work, which was a congenial operation to them, as it meant loot as well."

On page 112 Alderson describes how the English lighted sulphur in the caves in order to suffocate the natives who had retreated to them, and on page 258 how rock-caverns in which natives lay hidden, were blown up with dynamite. It might be remarked that according to Thomson dynamite was also employed when *women and children* had taken refuge in the caverns.

Surely with such testimony from English lips as to the manner in which the harassed, robbed and tormented natives

of British South Africa were driven to revolt through the evils of the administration and the injustice of the whites, the compilers of the Blue Book upon South-West Africa might have exercised enough discrimination and good taste in their account of the Herero rising to refrain from attributing the entire blame to the Germans—and that, for the greater part, upon the sworn testimony of the natives themselves, poor, primitive creatures who have no conception of the nature of an oath. Instead of a just and correct historical painting of the preliminary turbulence and clash of races in an unsettled colony, a painting done in the proper colours, and with the requisite light and shade, we have a hideous travesty of the truth, a grotesque caricature cunningly and with malice aforethought constructed to justify the moralizings of greed when bent upon alienating the property of others.

Are the British propagandists unaware of what Lord Lansdowne said when speaking in the House of Lords on May 9, 1905, upon the cruel treatment of the natives in West Australia? Let us recall his words to their memories:

“I read this report, as the Most Rev. Prelate had done, with feelings of deep indignation, and also with feelings of humiliation, because we had always believed that evils of the kind which they were discussing were of rarer occurrence under British rule than under the rule of any other civilized power. Holding that belief we had not unfrequently taken others to task for breaches of those laws of humanity which we ourselves so sincerely respected. One of the most mortifying features of these incidents was that they would in the future deprive our remonstrances of a good deal of the force that they had hitherto commanded.”

The misgivings of the honourable and conscience-stricken Lord Lansdowne, occasioned by a rude lifting of that veil of complacent belief in the unselfish and benevolent rule of Britain with which even the most sincere Britons beguile themselves, seem to have exercised no deterrent effect upon the authors of the Blue Book.

When difficulties arise in a German colony owing to the need felt by the white man for land for carrying on his important and valuable tasks—land which the half-savage black possesses in abundance—then the concoctors of this publication wax wroth and eloquent over German greed, faithlessness and coercion. Unmoved by any similar desire to besmirch an opponent unjustly, or by any inclination to play the unprofitable game of the pot and the kettle—even were the onus of blame *equal* on both sides—we are nevertheless again and again constrained to ask, and to demand an answer to, this question: What, under similar circumstances, has been the action of the English? We have given in the foregoing the testimony in relation to Rhodesia. Let us proceed to uncover more skeletons in the British colonial cupboard.

In 1913 the Parliament of the Union of South Africa passed a law which was put into execution by the Governor-General. This law decreed that the whites and the blacks in Natal and the Transvaal be separated not only in the cities but also in the country. The blacks were to be permitted to live upon the farms of the whites only upon condition that they agree to perform work for a period of not less than ninety days. The natives were to receive no other recompense for their labour. In this way the right of leasehold which had up to then prevailed was abrogated in the most arbitrary manner. Through this cruel, inhuman law the natives who had become attached to their holdings through long years, were robbed of the most indispensable fruits of their toil, and in case they did not accept the demands of the farmers, driven from their homes. Countless native families suffered this harsh fate. Not even the missionaries were permitted to offer shelter or succour to the homeless, but were forced to

reject these unfortunates, even when they were members of their own mission parishes. In these dire straits the President of the Congress of Natives, a negro clergyman by the name of John Dube, addressed to the white population of Natal a letter from which the following is an extract. We quote from the *Ilanga Lase Natal*, Olwesihlanu. August 22, 1913:

"..... While you are sitting happy and comfortable in your bright and wealthy homes, just give one thought to the hundreds of native families, men, women and little children, even at this moment, being ruthlessly evicted from their humble homes, where perchance they were born, turned homeless, helpless and hopeless, on to the roads, wandering in misery about the land of their forefathers in search of any wretched spot whereon to live and rest. And then, think you, that at the very moment this calamity is overwhelming them, your Government and your representatives actually come forward and block the way of these wretched people to raise for themselves a new home on any farm-land. And the farm-lands are nine-elevenths of the total surface of this Province.

"Why, I ask, should you treat us thus? We do not ask any social equality or intercourse with your race. We do not ask anything the most fastidious of you would call unreasonable. We do not ask for anything even the lowest and vilest of your own race does not already possess. We do not ask for anything the most niggardly among you could honestly refuse us.

"We ask for freedom to purchase land wherever opportunities occur, and our sparse means permit. We ask that we be permitted to build for ourselves a home wheresoever a landlord is agreeable. Who can affirm that such requests are unreasonable or impossible? On behalf of my suffering countrymen, I appeal to you, the British community of Natal. I appeal to you because we are dwellers in the same Province, and it is your duty in a special manner to protect us. I appeal to you because misery and injustice are being suffered in your land, and are being inflicted by your brother colonists. What, I ask again, have we done you or your race that you should be so harsh to us? You must know that everyone of us has been born in this land, and that we have no other. You must know that for untold generations this land was solely ours—long before your fathers had put a foot on our shores.

"Have we not humbly submitted to your might, and given up to you the possessions and the wealth and the government of our fatherland? Have we not since then, willingly and cheerfully, done for you all the

hard and uncongenial work you would not do for yourselves, of your industries, your commerce, your homes? Have we not re-spent our small earnings to your own profit, bringing you considerable trade, pouring our money back into your coffers, faithfully paying you rack-rents of £10, £15 and £20 a year for the mere right of squatting on your farms, which were originally *our* farms?

"In what have we harmed or angered you, that you should now turn upon us with the pitilessness of men devoid of hearts, with the despotism born of tyrants? Yes, such is our reward, and all we need hope for—and from a British people in a British land! All the benevolent wishes of our dead good Queen towards her native subjects, all the hopes her name inspired, all the promises her Ministers gave us—are now trampled under-foot as mere anachronous drivels. And she is not yet twenty years in her grave. No hearts more for us, no sympathy now for the weak, the poor, the helpless, inarticulate downtrodden in a British land. Only God now left to help us and protect us!"

This moving and just appeal of the Rev. John Dube's is in itself an epitome of the methods of English colonization wherever English greed has found it profitable to violate all those dictates of justice and humanity which British protagonists so clamorously defend when, in relation to other nations, it is equally to their profit to uphold—and with what unctuous complacency they *do* uphold—these dictates! A letter such as that of the negro pastor on behalf of his hapless people tears away the mask which even many honest-minded and conscientious Englishmen have, at the bidding of their government, accepted as the visage of Truth in transfiguration.

The natives in the eastern part of Cape Colony have a motto with regard to the English: "*The men who protect with one hand and kill with the other.*" This also sums up in a pregnant and pithy phrase the grim experience undergone by the splendid Maoris of New Zealand owing to the land-greed of the English settlers and the British government. At the beginning of the year 1835 there were in New Zealand about 2,000 English settlers. Commencing

with 1840 there began a systematic settlement and a ruthless crowding-out of the native Maoris. The settlers bought on paper enormous tracts of land from the natives in exchange for guns, cloth and hatchets. An English writer, Mr. J. Hight, describes this episode of British Colonial history in his book, "The English as a Colonizing Nation"—as follows:

"It was on January 22nd, 1840, that the first body of immigrants arrived at Port Nicholson, and on the 29th, Captain Hobson, who had been sent out by the British Government, arrived at the Bay of Islands. The following day he hoisted the British flag and read the commission under the great seal of the United Kingdom by which the boundaries of New South Wales were extended to include New Zealand, and also the commission appointing him Lieutenant-Governor of the Queen's territories in New Zealand. He had been specially instructed to protect the rights of the natives to their lands; and, assembling a number of the chiefs at Waitangi, he explained clearly to them the nature of the treaty he was about to ask them to sign. About fifty chiefs signed the famous Treaty of Waitangi on February 5th, 1840, and at the end of about six months it bore the signatures of 512, including that of almost every chief of the highest rank in the island.

"The treaty contained three clauses. In the first, the chiefs of New Zealand yielded to Her Majesty, the Queen of England, all their rights and powers of sovereignty. In the second, Her Majesty guaranteed to the chiefs and their tribes full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands, forests, fisheries, and other properties. If at any time the chiefs and tribes should wish to sell their land, they were to offer it first to the British Government. The third clause gave, in the name of Her Majesty, all the rights and privileges of British subjects to the natives of New Zealand."

In Chapter XIII of his book Mr. Hight tells the story of how England broke that treaty:

"In 1860, Governor Browne was responsible for the outbreak of the second native war. He wished to buy some land at the mouth of the Waitara River, in Taranaki. A chief, who had previously stood staunchly by the English, as head chief of the tribes most directly concerned in the bargain, vetoed the sale. The Governor persisted in ignoring his claim, which was a just one according to Maori customs, the exercise of which had been recognised by the Treaty of Waitangi. He quite passed over it and the chief began hostilities."

A war of many years' duration followed and this led to the extermination of a great part of the Maoris. In this wise did Britain respect the treaty which had stipulated the rights of the natives in their own country.

The Blue Book then proceeds to depict the quarrels which took place between the Hereros and the dealers who came into the country to buy cattle,—oxen for export to Cape Colony and cows for the farms. A Herero of the old school would as a matter of principle never sell female cattle. But during the settlement by the Germans, the Hereros, because of the trade that was carried on, had already begun to feel the need of certain supplies. Originally these had been offered by English traders. The authors of the Blue Book contend that these traders had been forced out by the Germans. That, however, is a false statement. The German Government had issued an order forbidding the importation of arms to the Hereros. Hereupon the English traders declared that if they could not obtain permits for the importation of guns and cartridges, there would be little profit in the entire trade, and so they remained away. Some of the Hereros had become Christians and these, as well as those who emulated their habits, felt the need of clothes, boots, hats, cloth and the like. In order to obtain these things the new generation of Hereros was willing to part even with its beloved cattle. The older people remonstrated, but in vain. Those dealers who came laden with tempting wares found many opportunities for lucrative trade. The Herero, however, was seldom disposed to prompt payment. A pernicious system of credit was the consequence. Those who would arrive at a correct and judicious judgment regarding the question of the traders, must not fail to remember that even the Hereros differed in opinion as to this matter. It is true that the dealers were guilty of abuses,

and the German Administration was devoting its utmost efforts to do away with these abuses. And there is no doubt that the Administration would have succeeded in this, had not an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances, above all the transference of the Protectorate troops to the south, encouraged the Hereros to venture upon a revolt—precisely as was the case with the Matabeles in *their* revolt.

2. THE CRUSHING OF THE NATIVE REVOLTS.

With an exceedingly energetic display of gusto and enthusiasm the compilers of the Blue Book devote much attention and detail to the alleged cruelties of the Germans in their war against the Hereros and the Hottentots, 1904 to 1906. Here, too, and perhaps in a degree accentuated by a kind of sadistic psychological tendency,—possibly of considerable interest to the pathologist,—we meet with the same artificially engendered moral indignation, the same indiscriminate heaping together of irrelevant and haphazard material as in other sections of this masterpiece of English *Tartufferie*. We have had a glimpse through English eyes of what has occurred in English colonial wars. We have seen how relentlessly the Matabele were persecuted. We have seen how caverns into which they had fled were blown up with dynamite and smothered with sulphur-fumes—regardless of whether there were women and children in them or not.

Immediately after the rising of the Matabele in 1897, the Bechuanas who lived north of the Orange River, rose in revolt. The reason for this was the passing of a law by the government of Cape Colony to the effect that certain native territory in Bechuanaland was withdrawn from the natives for the purpose of peopling it with whites. The

expulsion of the natives from the reserved lands which had been "inalienably" assigned to them in 1886, led to the insurrection.

The military operations undertaken for the purpose of crushing the Bechuanas were reported in full detail by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalgety who commanded the Bechuana Field Force. His reports were published in the *Cape Parliamentary Papers* (G. 3. 1898). They reveal the same monotonous and desolate picture and record of burnt villages, of slaughtered natives, of killed or captured women, as are evidenced in all of England's colonial wars. (Pages 5, 6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 40, 50, 54, 59, *et seq.*)

On May 17, 1897, the Government had issued the following orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Dalgety:

"It is essentially necessary that you should harass and threaten the natives in every possible way, attacking wherever you can."

On page 65 of his General Report Dalgety describes how he interpreted and fulfilled these orders:

"The only means of harassing a native enemy that I am aware of is to burn his kraals, destroy his crops, and, by constant forays, prevent his moving about in safety. At this time practically every hut (some 800) had been burnt between Oliphant's Kloof and Gamaluse, what little remained of their crops, destroyed as far as possible."

On page 51 of his Report, Dalgety remarks:

"On the same day (May 6, 1897) I destroyed all crops of both loyal and rebels in the vicinity, with a view of preventing the latter from obtaining food supplies after our departure north."

Of particular significance are the measures which were taken against the rebellious Bechuanas *after* their subjugation. They call to mind the transportation of defeated peoples into slavery and captivity.

More than 3,000 natives—men, women and children—whom Dalgety had hounded into the hilly district of Lange-

burg in the course of more than three months, were transported to Kuruman, where they were handed over to the Commissioner of Natives. This gentleman in an official report (*Cape Parl. Papers*, G. 4, 1898, page 1) describes the condition in which the Bechuanas found themselves, as follows: "Many were in a miserable state of starvation. Dysentery was rife, children especially being the sufferers. All were without stock or grain of any description."

Such were the consequences of a campaign the first victims of which were women and children. These natives had not been taken into custody because they had taken part in the revolt; there had not even been a judicial inquiry instituted against them. The dismissal of a few of them was thought to suffice. All the others, however, including the women and children, were treated as rebels. The following proclamation was issued in Capetown on August 18, 1897, and is nothing more nor less than the advertisement of a slave market:

NOTICE.

NATIVE LABOURERS

It is hereby notified, for the information of farmers and others, that a number of surrendered Bechuana rebels will be available as farm servants, etc. on and after the 28th inst.

Applications should be sent to the superintendent of Native Affairs, Cape Town, from whom all particulars can be obtained.

J. R. Innes,

Deputy Superintendent for Native Affairs.

The former Attorney-General of Cape Colony, Mr. Rose Innes, has expressed his opinion of the measures taken against these "rebels" in the following terms:

"It had been the boast of every Englishman, and it was their boast that all men were equal before the law and that no man could be punished without a fair trial, and that every man not convicted of a crime was a

free man and could go and sell his labour to whom he chose. These things lay at the root of their freedom and they must be very jealous of their principles if they wished to hand them down to their children, he contended that those principles had been absolutely violated by the policy which had been adopted. These criminals had been punished without a trial. If they were criminals they should be put upon their trial. If they were not criminals, they should walk out free . . . The Government, through its officials, went and said to those men, you either stand your trial for high treason or else come down here and serve for five years with a western farmer. Of course the prisoners chose the lesser of two evils and the moment it was chosen, it was said: 'Hurra for freedom of contract!'—a contract concluded under lock and key and by men who were under the guard of the law! If that was freedom of contract he would like some lawyer to tell him what was duress."

On August 28, 1905, the Colony of Natal imposed a poll tax of a pound sterling upon every male native of at least 18 years of age. The result of this tax was a revolt on the part of these natives. At the beginning of the year 1906, Colonel Mackenzie received orders to re-establish order throughout the country by means of armed force.

A Blue Book (Cd. 2905) was published regarding these military operations and was submitted to Parliament. It gives a detailed description of the British mode of warfare against the natives. The kraals and villages of the natives were burned down, being frequently set aflame by artillery fire (pages 12, 24, 30, 40, *et seq.*). The arming of native troops and their employment as auxiliaries is repeatedly mentioned (pages 12, 14, 17, 20). The British troops employed Dum-dum bullets. The official report of Colonel Mackenzie upon the operations against the Zulus and the attack upon the camp of Chief Nathuveli, reads as follows (in re-translation):

"At dawn my columns, marching from various directions, occupied the surrounding hills and the enemy was soon cut off from all means of escape. I put the principal part of the valley under light artillery fire and thereupon ordered the hunting of the natives to begin. This hunt was a perfect

success—574 rebels were killed. We took two or three rifles; most of the enemy were only armed with lance and shield. There were no losses on our side. All our troops did good service.”

The English method of warfare was such that the Government of Natal refused all permission to newspaper correspondents to go to the front. In spite of this precaution, numerous details of this campaign have become known. According to the *Johannesburg Times* some 3,000 natives were killed *after* the battle in the Mohe Valley. The head of Chief Bambata was cut off by a Dr. Platt and exposed for two days before it was buried. *Major Nicolay of the Light Transvaal Artillery in a letter to a friend declared that no pardon was given during the entire course of the campaign. The troops raided the country, shot at every native whom they met, burnt up the kraals and carried away the cattle. Other private letters betray the fact that great numbers of soldiers felt an intense revulsion against the shooting of the prisoners after the breaking-up of the camps.*

The *Daily Mail* in republishing these reports demanded an immediate investigation regarding these cruelties, which were unworthy of the English name. The *London Tribune* of May 16, 1906, declared:

“The sport of kraal-burning in Natal will proceed without let or hindrance from the Colonial Office.”

These specimens of British methods, when it comes to fighting the revolts of the natives in South Africa, ought to suffice. Of peculiar significance is the communication that during the rising in Natal no pardon was given to the negroes, and that the prisoners in the lagers were massacred obviously by order of the Commander and to the extreme repugnance of the British troops. Let us compare with this the pages upon pages of fiery moral indignation which the writers of the Blue Book devote to the execration of a

similar order on the part of General von Trotha. It is not unlikely that an order of this sort, even though not a *formal* order, may have been temporarily issued during the Herero war. The authors of the Blue Book surpass themselves in heaping terms of violent abuse and detestation upon the head of General von Trotha—whose principles of combatting the Herero rising were certainly *not* approved by the German Government. The gentlemen of the Blue Book cannot surely be ignorant of the sinister title conferred upon General Kitchener by the English themselves. He was called the “Butcher” because of the massacres he instituted among thousands of wounded Mahdis and Dervishes after the Battle of Omdurman, during the re-conquest of the Soudan in 1898. Comparatively mild—far milder than the reality—is the description offered by Ernest N. Bennett in the *Contemporary Review* of January, 1899:

“But no justification whatever exists for the butchery of *unarmed* or manifestly helpless men lying wounded on the ground. This certainly took place after the battle of Omdurman. *Dervishes who lay with shattered legs or arms, absolutely without weapons, were bayoneted and shot without mercy. This unsoldierly work was not even left to the exclusive control of the black troops; our own British soldiers took part in it.*

No attempt was made, either on the day of the battle or next day, to do anything for the wounded Dervishes. Thousands of these, who had feigned death or else escaped it by having fallen well out of the line of our advance, were left lying on the desert without food or surgical help—and worst of all, without water. To lie for two days without water in the heat of a Soudan August is bad enough, but when the natural thirst is augmented by the fever which invariably accompanies gunshot wounds, the torture must be terrible.

There was another feature in our capture of Omdurman which was truly deplorable. By the time we had repulsed the last Dervish attack and were rapidly advancing upon Omdurman, the streets leading to the southern exits of the town were crowded with fugitives.

Orders were given to fire upon the fugitives, and as the artillerymen on the gun-boats from their raised positions could see well over the walls, a deadly fire was opened upon the crowded thoroughfares.

It is, of course, perfectly permissible for a victorious army to fire upon a flying enemy, or to send cavalry in pursuit. But when a vast crowd of non-combatants accompanies the flight of the soldiery, a terrible responsibility is undertaken in opening Maxim fire on such a multitude indiscriminately. *Next day some five hundred dead bodies lay scattered about the streets of Omdurman, and amongst them were corpses of women and little children. Two women were bending over a dead Dervish when a non-commissioned officer came up and shot one of them with his revolver.*"

Surely these heinous acts must prove black and uncomfortable truths for the honourable authors of the Blue Book who never let pass an opportunity of accusing the blood-thirsty and barbaric German (suddenly conjured forth out of the insane phantasy of a world bloated with falsehood and hatred), of taking a special delight in dispatching women and children during the native revolt in South-West Africa!

It is a well-known historical fact that Lord Kitchener, the leader of these "Soldiers of Humanity," did not hesitate to desecrate even graves. He ordered the grave of the Mahdi to be opened, the head to be decapitated and the parts to be flung into the Nile. Lord Morley flayed this act in the House of Commons on Feb. 3, 1899, in the following words:

"An occurrence, horrifying in itself, a disgrace for any commander who ordered it and a blot upon the nation's fair name." *(re-translated.)*

And Winston Churchill, at that time a journalist, denounced Kitchener's butcheries as *vandalism and madness*.

So much for Omdurman and of the things that happened there—for which Lord Kitchener bore full responsibility. The conquest of Egypt was attended by much of this same typical and cold-blooded brutality. The methods adopted by the English when they seized this country and beat down the justifiable resistance of the Egyptians, may best be judged by the witness borne by their own countrymen. Sir William Butler who took part in the battle of Tel el-Kebir, describes his impressions of that battle as follows:

"The attack surprised the Egyptians, as lightning surprises a sleeping man. They were betrayed in every possible way, nevertheless they fought like lions. A melancholy and eloquent witness to the heroic end of these great patriots. Peace to their ashes! They sleep their last sleep in the sand of the lonely desert—10,000, we are assured—and this was Wulsey's express command—no wounded, no prisoners, only dead!"

In South-West Africa most of the German detachments, especially those under the leadership of experienced African officers, simply and silently refrained from carrying out the command of General von Trotha. In those isolated instances in which captured Hereros were actually killed, this was due to the great bitterness engendered in the soldiers through the fate of the white settlers and of their own comrades who were massacred in the most cruel manner by the Hereros at the outbreak of the revolt. That those Hereros who had been subject to Christian influences spared the white women and children for the greater part, is true, even though there were lamentable exceptions. But all the white men were butchered in the most barbaric manner.

In the construction of their evidence regarding the alleged cruelties of the Germans against the Hereros, the authors of the Blue Book rely for the greater part upon "sworn" utterances of the natives. How little these are worth is known throughout the length and breadth of South-West Africa. We shall return to this point later on and expatiate upon it in a more thorough manner in connection with another matter.

It is remarkable that apparently only a few *white* witnesses were examined in the matter of the Herero rising. In addition to this the English pretend that it was only through the records at Windhuk that they were able to obtain details regarding the Herero campaign. This is not true, for the British Government had a representative in the German Headquarters, at first Lieutenant-Colonel French, and later

Major Wade. Every possible opportunity was given these gentlemen to inform themselves with respect to every feature of the campaign. The British Ambassador at Berlin, addressed the following note to the Imperial Secretary for Foreign Affairs on May 20, 1907:

... "In making this communication to your Excellency, I am to add that His Majesty's Government are desirous of conveying an expression of their thanks to the Imperial German Government for the facilities which have been accorded to Major Wade and his predecessors in the appointment, and for the courtesy which has been shown these officers."

Why—if the British Government be so fervently and, one might add, so suddenly moved to compassion over the fate of the Hereros—why did it not long ago make public the reports of these two Gentlemen? The obvious answer is this: *the British government did not venture to make use of this direct and professional evidence of the British officers, because their reports could only have been favourable.* These British officers had in fact expressed the most appreciative opinions of the German campaign in South-West Africa, not only to the staff of General von Trotha, but also to other German officers whom they had met in London clubs.

The Blue Book repeatedly ventures the charge that *in the pursuit of the enemy*, thousands of women and children, of wounded and weakened natives, were killed by the Germans. The mere fact that in the compilation of the Blue Book testimony of this sort could be accepted and published, proves that the English authors had no conception of the way in which the Herero war was really conducted—otherwise, if we accept the irresistible tendency to disparagement, we might do their intelligence the honour of assuming that they would have rejected such testimony, and recognized the plain fact that the natives were lying. As a matter of fact the pursuing German troops seldom caught sight of

fleeing natives, much less thousands or even hundreds. It is true that stragglers, especially the sick, remained behind, but these seldom remained upon the ways or trails but hid themselves in the bush. During the pursuit following the battle of Waterberg, it was impossible to establish contact with the fleeing Hereros even by the utmost exertions of the troops. All those who went through the revolt of the natives in South-West Africa, know how frequently it occurred that women, and above all little children who were unable to go further, were taken up by the soldiers and brought to places of safety. The love of children is one of the most characteristic traits of the average German—soldier or civilian,—and is so well-known that the foul slanders which have sought during the war to depict him as a kind of ogre battenng upon infant blood, chopped-off hands and the like, expose merely the ferocious imaginations and abysmal shamelessness of his traducers,—as the light of returning sanity will reveal even to the dupes of these monstrous lies.

To this category of "atrocitv yarn" must be assigned the narrative of the Bastard Jan Cloete to the effect that a German soldier had thrown a native child of nine months into the air and then caught it upon his bayonet amid the applause and laughter of his comrades! The fact that the mere unsubstantiated evidence of an uneducated black who cannot have the slightest conception of the nature of an oath, should be accepted at face value, proves how little sufficed for the authors of the Blue Book of Calumny to charge German soldiers with the perpetration of such an unspeakable bestiality. Regarding brutalities against babies, it is neither our desire nor our need to go back so far as the Sack of Limerick, during which fearful massacre, *following upon the promise of immunity*, the infants of the

hapless Irish were tossed into the air and caught upon the bayonets of the English soldiery in precisely the fashion attributed to the German trooper in Africa, and amidst the cries of "Nits will be lice!" We may, however, be excused for quoting an incident which is distinctly apropos, and which has the advantage of being creditable, since it is confirmed by an English author.

In a book published in London in 1890, and bearing the title of "The Aborigines of Tasmania," Mr. H. Ling Roth relates on pages 170-71, the following:

"A number of blacks, with the women and children, were congregated in a gully near the town of . . . and the men had formed themselves into a ring round a large fire. While the women were cooking the evening meal of opossums and handicoots, they were surprised by a party of soldiers, who, without giving warning, fired upon them as they sat, and rushing up to the scene of slaughter, found there wounded men and women, and a little child crawling near its dying mother. One soldier drove his bayonet through the body of the child, and pitchforked it into the flames; '*It was only a child,*' he said!"

Those who are familiar with African psychology know how the natives love to indulge their fancies with sanguinary atrocity stories and how they invent these in the most senseless fashion, even where there is not the slightest foundation for their imaginings. For example:—during the beginning of the Herero rising, Frau Adele Hoth, the wife of a farmer in the neighbourhood of Okahandja, was wounded in the leg by a shot fired by a Herero. The injury was not a severe one and a few days later Frau Hoth was able to go to Windhuk. Shortly before her arrival a captured Kaffir who had belonged to the Herero band that had attacked the Hoth farm, declared that he had seen how Frau Hoth, whom he knew well, had been decapitated and her head, with her eye-glasses upon the nose, placed upon the corrugated iron roof of the homestead! Not a word of

this was, of course, true. The negro, however, felt the instinctive need of telling something gruesome and he knew that his reports would be in consonance with the bitter and excited feelings which prevailed against the Hereros at that time. Many similar instances might be quoted. It is therefore nothing less than the most reprehensible superficiality for an official publication, such as the English Blue Book, to make use of such native utterances—utterances the untruthfulness and the tendency of which must be plain to all—in order to soil the name of the German soldiers who fought in South-West Africa.

It is significant that only a single "white" man is brought forward with a similar charge. This is Daniel Dixon, a transport driver, who is designated on page 66 as a "European." This, however, is a falsehood. Dixon was *not* a European, but a so-called Cape Boy, that is a South African with coloured blood. He was not accepted as a white, yet was disposed to brag of his English sympathies. That this man should now, in order to please his English friends, tell a highly-coloured story hostile to the Germans, occasions no surprise to any one who knew him.

The rest of the material which is strung together in the Blue Book to prove the fiendish cruelty of the Germans, consists of six quotations from a *romance* by Gustav Frenssen called "Peter Moor's Journey to South-West." Frenssen had never been in South Africa, and wrote his book in the form of a novel, from scraps of stories and descriptions which were sent him. And it is with such evidence as this that the British Government would establish the fact that Germany had made itself unworthy of owning a colony such as South-West Africa!

The feelings that are aroused in Europeans when their fellow-countrymen are murdered by natives are strikingly

exemplified by the effect of the Indian Revolution upon the English. After Nana Sahib had ordered the Europeans in Cawnpore to be murdered, a cry arose in England as well as in India that not only every convicted "rebel," but every *suspected* one should be mercilessly dispatched. *Englishmen of standing demanded that captured insurrectionists should be impaled or burnt alive.* Disraeli, later Lord Beaconsfield, counselled reasonableness and justice, and protested against the idea that British officers should imitate the example of Nana Sahib. This humane advice met with strong public opposition and it was with great satisfaction that the news of hundreds of captured rebels being shot and of dozens being "blown into the air" from the mouths of cannon, was received in England!

The native witnesses in whose testimony the English authors of the Blue Book place so remarkable and, for Englishmen, so unusual a reliance, repeatedly make the statement that the Hereros after the battle of Waterberg had begged for peace, but had received the answer that there could be no peace and that they must all die. No more damning proof of the incapacity of the authors of the Blue Book to understand the events upon which they presume to sit in judgment nor of their lack of all real knowledge of the actual occurrences, could be advanced than their evident willingness to believe such statements and their eagerness to chronicle them. It was precisely after Waterberg that everybody in South-West Africa hoped that the Hereros would learn a lesson from this defeat and sue for peace. Had the blacks done this, peace would have been granted them only too gladly, for it was all too well-known that pursuit in the sand-desert would prove a hopeless undertaking, and that most serious damage would result to the colony should the Hereros and their cattle perish. An opportunity for negotiations, however, never presented itself. The Hereros fled farther and farther,

as they hoped to escape through the Kalahari. A number actually succeeded in achieving this.

The foregoing example proves how little critical judgment and *bona fides* are exercised by the authors of the Blue Book, how little they are deterred by facts or even commonsense from making or countenancing the most absurd charges in their zeal for blackening the Germans at every turn.

Through this entire mass of misrepresentation and *suggestio falsi*, compiled for no other purpose than to prove that England and not Germany is worthy to possess this colony of the German People, there runs like a red and by no means too delicate thread, the now furtive, now openly-expressed pre-supposition that the natives of South-West Africa are an honest, trustworthy, good-natured people who lived peacefully in the enjoyment of their rights, until the Germans came to annex the land and maltreat the inhabitants. The long treatises upon the history, the customs and character of the natives which precede each section treating of German wickedness, and are meant to give a "scientific" air to the whole, are intended to deepen this impression. Whoever is responsible for these chapters either did not know the natives, or deliberately decided to distort the facts.

The Blue Book devotes a special section to alleged treacherous actions on the part of the Germans towards the natives. The case of the Herero chieftain Saul of Otjenga and his companions excites a great show of moral indignation and many strong expressions. During the Herero rising, these natives are supposed to have come in good faith to the Germans believing that they had been promised immunity in case of their surrender, and were then shot. The case of Saul is not fully cleared up. Assuming, however, that a German commander had acted wrongly in this instance, we are once more justified in asking this question:

Have not similar things occurred among the English in native wars? And, having occurred, was the same conclusion drawn which the Blue Book endeavours to make valid for South-West Africa, namely that a people guilty of such acts could no longer be deserving of a colony in South Africa? Thomson narrates in the book already quoted, (page 105 *et seq.*) the story of Chieftain Makoni during the Matabele rising.

On July 26, 1896, Colonel Alderson attacked Makoni's kraal with 350 men. Makoni fled to a cavern behind the kraal; the troops burnt his village and drove away the cattle. Fifty men of the West Riding Regiment and a few volunteers remained in the vicinity of Makoni's hiding-place. On August 13 Makoni sent two of his head men and offered to surrender if his life be spared, and on August 26 he repeated this offer. The English commander made another attempt to force an issue and directed another attack against the position. But he was unable to capture Makoni. Hereupon a Cape Boy by name of Tom who served as interpreter, was repeatedly sent to Makoni to tell him that he should surrender, and that his life would be spared. Finally, on the 3rd of September, after Tom, under official orders, had once more endeavoured to persuade him, Makoni consented. He came out of his cave, but one of the officers of the English volunteers seized him by the arm and dragged him forwards, claiming to have taken him prisoner. Makoni's men also came out of the cave, which had previously been attacked with dynamite by the British and was full of corpses spreading a horrible stench. Makoni was shoved into a hut, and as it was feared that he would escape, a court-martial was summoned and this condemned him to death as a rebel. The sentence was immediately carried out. He died like a hero—proud and self-contained. An Englishman, referring to this, remarked to Thomson:

"I know of nothing grander than Makoni's death, than the quiet way in which he spoke to his people, and told them to abstain from further resistance; for himself he only begged that he might be buried decently. 'And now,' he said, 'you shall see how Makoni can die.'

He fell dead at once, and was buried under a tobacco-tree close by where he was shot.

He complained bitterly at his trial that he had not been given a fair chance."

The Major was called upon to answer for his conduct, but this was found to have been "justifiable."

Here we have a clear English parallel to the alleged German proceedings in the case of the Herero chieftain Saul. Had the authors been actuated by the slightest desire to be mentally honest and fair, they would naturally be constrained to apply equally opprobrious terms in condemning the conduct of their own countrymen in the instance of Makoni as they have heaped upon the heads of the Germans in the case of Saul. A double system of moral weights and measures cannot be accepted. But where is the Englishman who, because of such happenings, would decree that his countrymen are unfit to own colonies? It is alleged in the Blue Book that the natives had lost all faith in the Germans because of the treatment of Saul. Let us cite further English evidence regarding the treatment of Makoni. Thomson remarks:

"However one may try to palliate what was done to Makoni, it is impossible to blind oneself to its injustice, or to the effect likely to be produced upon the other chiefs. Naturally they were afraid to give up their arms, or to surrender when attacked; they preferred to take the chance of escape, or to be dynamited in their caves. They have lost all faith that we will keep our plighted word, for in common with many of the white people, they believe Makoni was coming out under the impression that he had been promised his life, and it will be a difficult matter to regain their confidence." (Page 113.)

The logical conclusion of this indictment would be that the British flag should no longer wave over Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

The same method used in depicting the actions of the Germans in the Herero campaign is applied in the case of Governor Leutwein, in his undertakings against the Hottentots. Relying for its facts principally upon Governor Leutwein's book "Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Südwestafrika," the Blue book rehearses the origin of the protectorate treaties with each separate tribe, and devotes particular detailed attention to the subjugation of the Witboois in the battles in the hills of Naukluft.

Almost every one of these 20 pages (77—97) is a model of special pleading and deliberate misrepresentation. Here too the Blue Book lives up to its strenuous endeavour to represent the Hottentots as liberty-loving, noble and chivalrous figures. They are exclusively and inevitably in the right, they alone are worthy of sympathy. Only through brute force and faithlessness are they subjugated by the Germans. Governor Leutwein is represented as a cynical figure, his methods are characterized as "typically German."

This habit of painting the Hottentots and their marauding, cruel chieftains as honest folk and innocent victims, is not only knavish, but grotesque. When we consider that Governor Leutwein had finally succeeded, after years of painstaking effort and with comparatively small sacrifices, in establishing the authority of the German administration over the degenerate Hottentot tribes, it is nothing less than the most dishonourable tactics to depict him as a cheat and an oppressor of noble heroes.

The compilers, or rather the concocters of these chapters of the Blue Book, take a special delight—perhaps through some underlying current of sympathy with these peculiar moral effusions?—in quoting at great length from the correspondence of Hendrik Witbooi letters in which the Hottentot, as was his habit, poured forth a flood of sanc-

timonious phrases in order to justify his handiwork and to impress the addressees. This peculiar correspondence is sufficiently illuminated when we recall how Witbooi was wont to designate himself as the elected instrument of God in his robber-raids and his butcheries among the Hereros, which he undertook in order to feed his lazy people and to indulge his passion for cruelty. The kind of mentality which thinks it worth while to republish in an official document of the British government the long and tedious unctuousness of this robber-chieftain, merely in order to incite public opinion against the Germans, stands self-exposed and self-condemned.

Other chieftains who were forced to submit to German rule are represented as great men, akin to Witbooi in spirit, though less clever and tenacious than he. The opportunistic humanitarians of the Blue Book pay a moving tribute of pity to each of these chieftains, offset by mocking or spiteful remarks concerning the Germans.

The story of the revolt of the Bondelzwart Hottentots in 1903—1907 is told in the same style and dominated by the same spirit. The presentation is based for the greater part upon lengthy "sworn" *verbatim* statements of the natives, who are designated ostentatiously as chiefs, magistrates, commandants and similar dignitaries. The Hottentot chiefs are accustomed to borrow these titulations from the Boers and to make use of them in a boastful manner. The witness borne by natives of this calibre forms the chief evidence furnished by the Blue Book for ascribing the blame for the outbreak of the revolt in 1903 to the Germans.

Witbooi was a courageous fellow—he and his tribe, like all Hottentots, loved freedom. Their attempt to free themselves from German rule by means of a general rising during the Herero War, would from this point of view be deserving

of sympathy. One might assume that this would make a particular appeal to an Englishman. Governor Leutwein likewise paid a warm tribute to Witbooi after his death. But to champion the cause of the Hereros against the Germans, and against the evidence of historical facts, is something which is explicable only through the transparent tendency to put everything German in as sinister a light as possible and, *per contra*, to demonstrate, if only by suggestion, England's immaculate character and consequently her right to the possession of South-West Africa.

The chapter which bears the heading: "The value set on native life by the Germans" (pages 52—55) is constructed in the customary specious manner. In this section we are at once confronted with a table compiled by Governor Leutwein, according to which murder and homicide committed by natives upon the whites is far more severely punished than the corresponding crime committed by the whites upon the natives. Great detail is lavished upon the case of a non-commissioned officer (Dietrich) who, whilst in a condition of drunkenness and under the illusion of being pursued, began a wild and indiscriminate shooting, through which a Herero woman, who was sleeping in her wagon, was killed. For this the Non-com. received a sentence of 3 years. Much moral indignation is vented upon the declaration of Dr. Karl Dove to the effect that because the Hereros were more numerous than the Germans it was necessary to inflict severer punishments upon them—leniency towards the natives—i. e., in the case of offences against the whites—being cruelty towards the whites.

The principle that a small minority of whites must in the case of a great majority of warlike and barbaric blacks, depend upon a stern and rigid policy, is one which has been rigorously upheld by the English wherever they

have found themselves in a similar situation amidst primitive conditions. English colonial history is packed with instances which prove that, officially and unofficially, the lives of the natives have been estimated at a lower value than the lives of the whites, and not only valued lower, but often regarded as of absolutely no value at all.

A recent proof of this is the notorious Denshawai case in Egypt. During a conflict between Englishmen and Egyptian peasants, an English officer succumbed to the heat and exhaustion resultant upon his exertions whilst running. The cause of the quarrel was the shooting of the tame pigeons of the fellaheen—their solitary possessions—by the English. Four peasants were condemned to death and immediately hanged, six were given incredibly long terms of imprisonment and all of them corporal punishment to the extent of 50 lashes.

During the thirties of the 19th century, there existed in New South Wales a law by virtue of which he who was instrumental in the conviction of a negro who had murdered a white man would receive a premium of £100, but he who was instrumental in convicting a white man who had murdered a negro, only £25. In 1839 a society was formed in Sidney for the protection of the natives and, after overcoming great difficulties, it succeeded in getting a law passed authorizing the appointment of native commissions.

These protective measures aroused the resentment of the white settlers to such a degree that they one day sallied forth on horseback and, in order to prove that they would not surrender their arbitrary right over the life and death of the natives, drove 30 men, women and children from a native camp into a hut. *Here they were fastened to a rope and butchered in cold blood, one after the other.* The Governor was a man possessed of a true sense of justice, and finally succeeded in having a death sentence imposed upon the

white murderers. He was nevertheless forced to contend against the public opinion of the entire colony.

Still more characteristic of the value placed upon the lives of the native population of Australia at that time, is the report given by H. Ling Roth in the book already quoted, "The Aborigines of Tasmania," (London 1890) page 171:

"... it was a favourite amusement to hunt the aborigines; that a day would be selected, and the neighbouring settlers invited, with their families, to a picnic. After dinner, all would be gaiety and merriment, whilst the gentlemen of the party would take their guns and dogs, and, accompanied by two or three convict servants, wander through the bush in search of black fellows. Sometimes they would return without sport; at others they would succeed in killing a woman, or, if lucky, maybe a man or two."

Another example of the way in which the English settler regarded the lives, loves and liberties of the natives when his own lusts were concerned, is given by the same author:

"... a man named Carrots killed a native in his attempt to carry off his wife, and having cut off the dead man's head, he obliged the woman to follow him, with it suspended round her neck, and to use it as a plaything!"

It would not be difficult to select many such examples from English colonial literature. Thomson, for example, gives us (on page 115) an illuminating instance of the manner in which the ordinary English settler in South Africa regarded the lives of the natives there,—by repeating the remark made by one of his informants in Rhodesia, a man of good standing:

"I look upon the natives as merely superior baboons, and the sooner they are exterminated the better."

Were one to apply to all these cases, point for point, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, the invariable conclusion of the Blue Book with regard to South-West Africa, it is certain that the world would agree that the

English had forfeited the right to possess colonies, not only in this or that quarter of the world, but anywhere whatsoever.

The impresarios of the Blue Book devote much attention to the treatment meted out to the natives, Hereros and Hottentots, after the quelling of the insurrection. Numerous witnesses are marshalled forth to prove that the prisoners captured during the revolt and those who surrendered at the close of it, were maltreated, that no succour was given them and that the mortality among them was very great. That permission to keep cattle without the approval of the Governor should have been refused the natives after the revolt, is censured as a particular cruelty. This measure was actually decided upon, but that it was to be only temporary and provisional was well known throughout South-West Africa. During the session of the Landesrat of South-West Africa in 1914, the question of abrogating the measure was brought up and several proposals made in this direction. There was some opposition which may be explained by the Herero folk-saying: "Cows are warriors," that is to say, he who owns many cattle is able to gather many followers about him and to feed them. In issuing the order forbidding the keeping of cattle, the German Administration was moved by the desire of preventing a new native war. No restrictions were placed upon the natives in the keeping of sheep and goats, and instances might be cited in which natives who worked on South-West African farms after the rising bred as many as 500 head of small stock. Many farmers were forced to dismiss their cattle-herders for the reason that they became too prosperous and cared more for their own herds than for the farm, at the same time permitting their own beasts to graze off extensive tracts of the master's farmland.

A hundred head of small stock necessitate 50 to 100 hectares, of pasture-land, in the southern part of the colony considerably more. It cannot therefore be denied that the permission to keep small stock proved a wide-reaching compensation for the law forbidding the keeping of large livestock. In addition to this, it is of special interest to note that the regulation of the German Governor forbidding the natives to keep large stock, was deemed an exceedingly happy innovation, well worthy of emulation by the farmers of *British South-West Africa*. They declared that the material existence of the natives was amply provided for by the maintenance of small stock. In so far as the natives were not permitted to keep cows and bullocks, there would be stronger economic and political security for the white settlers. Hence there is little reason for decrying as barbaric the measure of the German authorities, a measure which, as already stated, was not even supposed to be permanent.

As to the charges of the Blue Book respecting the treatment of the prisoners, their assignment as labourers upon farms, the prisons, and the deportations, it is not to be denied that hardships may have occurred in this or that instance—owing to the extraordinary lack of labour, the faulty state of the means of transport and the bitter resentment of the soldiers and settlers. These exceptional cases, however, are presented in the Blue Book in an exaggerated and spiteful manner. The array of witnesses and the piling-up of evidence in this British publication, are designed above all to serve, not an objective summary analysis or presentation of facts, but to prove that inasmuch as certain Germans have done such things or condoned them, the German people as a whole are unfit to remain in possession of their colonies! Such is, in fact, the avowed intention of this specious catalogue of German colonial sins—as indeed pro-

claimed by the editor in the introduction. This principle—if principle it may be called—in the case of England, is little less than suicidal, since one need merely apply the English condemnation of German wrongs or errors to infinitely greater and more numerous English wrongs and errors.

One need only recall to mind England's behaviour in native wars, or the manner in which England treated its prisoners under similar circumstances. The most terrible example of this is the agonizing death of the 26,379 women and children in the concentration camps of the Boer War. The descriptions given by English writers of the conditions in the concentration camp aroused the horror of the entire civilized world at that time—and not least that of humanitarian circles in England itself.

We repeat, it is not at all difficult to summon witnesses, and English witnesses at that, to utter a damning judgment upon England's treatment of the natives in her colonies. The arrogance and the arbitrariness of the officials is notorious. Mr. John Harris, missionary and writer upon African topics, declares in his book "Dawn in Darkest Africa" (1912) page 151:

"Carriers too are demanded in numbers and for distances which violate every native restriction. It is but two years ago that a British official in Southern Nigeria decided to start off upon a journey on Sunday morning, and because the carriers did not come quickly enough, he marched into the two nearest churches and seized the congregations, including the native minister, and to demonstrate further his petty authority and repugnance of loftier ideals, insisted on this native clergyman carrying a box containing his whisky. At this distance it is the ludicrous which probably strikes the imagination, but it is an entirely different matter locally. The missionaries of Southern Nigeria, no matter what their denomination, are of a very devout and noble-minded order; they have instilled into the minds of the natives a deep reverence of all things pertaining to worship, and nothing will ever efface from the native mind that—to say the least—irreverent conduct of the representative of the Christian Government of Great Britain."

The Blue Book fulminates in virtuous indignation over the evils in the treatment of prisoners, as well as in the prison system of South-West Africa under German administration. The *African World* of June 3rd, 1905, however, affords us an interesting glimpse of conditions in the prisons of Southern Nigeria:

"In the Calabar jail the prisoners are suffering from dysentery; and are dying at the rate of five or six per week from the disease. The jail has for a long time been affected with it and the Government doctors have met with considerable difficulty in coping with the disease. In my humble opinion, the reason for its prevalence is to be found in the fact that the jail is very much overcrowded. There are *always* from 400 to 500 prisoners in the place, and the majority of them are crowded into cells at the rate of twenty-six per cell; in fact, some cells house every night no fewer than thirty five prisoners. One can imagine what sort of physical and moral health can be expected under such circumstances. I am told on very good authority that out of 200 prisoners who were sent round from Asaba at the beginning of last year there are now only *five living.*"

It is plain to see that the British Colonial Administration which drives the wretched prisoners to this form of death, is inspired by nothing that is paternal; it is not even humane. Yet these are the people who deem themselves fit arbiters over the actions of others and justified in flinging not only stones, but mud!

A German District Chief in the Cameroons reports as follows concerning practices which were the order of the day in British Nigeria, immediately adjacent to the German colony:

An English Captain was on the march in June 1914 with soldiers and carriers north of the Cross River in his own district of Munchiland. On arriving late in the afternoon at the village in which he intended to spend the night, it happened that the carriers and the escort soldiers had remained behind and reached the camp only

after sunset. Captain M. H. issued orders that the soldiers were each to receive 25 lashes of the whip. When his attention was called to the fact that punishment of soldiers by whipping had long ago been forbidden in the German colonies, he declared that this was also the case in Nigeria and added: "Well, it is simply this way—there is no need of entering the punishment in the books."

Mr. Ralph A. Durand in the *Monthly Review* for August 1904 (page 91) gives us the following example of English justice in Mashonaland:

"Shortly after the rebellion in Mashonaland, when a desperate rebel and murderer was at large, a native commissioner arrested every woman and child in his district, and commandeered all the live stock and grain. As a result, the men in the district, having no one to cook their food or till their gardens, bestirred themselves to such effect that the murderer was captured and brought in within forty-eight hours."

Almost unbelievable are the conditions under the present-day colonial régime in Western Australia. As late as the year 1905 Captain H. C. Barclay, who travelled for over 30 years through the interior of Australia, and who is one of the earliest pioneers of the land, expressed himself as follows in the May issue of the *Review of Reviews for Australasia*:

"Such, in short, is the country in which the Central aborigines have for untold generations resided, a bold, active, intelligent people, who may well be termed the Highlanders of Australia in comparison with the coastal tribes or those inhabiting less favoured parts of the continent. Here they must have had happy hunting grounds indeed, until disturbed by the ever fatal advance of the white man, which seems certain to improve them from off the face of the earth unless prompt steps are taken to ameliorate the condition of the remaining remnant. Looking back a quarter of a century, strong tribes existed where now there are but a few isolated, and too frequently childless families to be found, and, sad to relate, this unhappy state of affairs is coexistent with the advent of civilisation, in the diluted form in which it has percolated through to these far distant regions."

According to this the chief period for the extermination of the natives of Australia would be from 1880 on—that is about the time of the beginning of German colonization. The way in which this process of merciless extermination was carried on, is described by Mr. J. F. Hogan, a British colonial writer, in his book “The Irish in Australia,” (page 312):

“In these early days the unfortunate aborigines were treated as worse than dogs by the white men who had dispossessed them of their hunting grounds. They were indiscriminately shot down on the slightest provocation. The loss of a sheep or bullock was deemed sufficient justification for murdering every black that could be found for miles around It is absolutely and literally true that during the first half-century of Australian colonization most of the aborigines were either shot down, deliberately poisoned or fell victims to the drink and diseases introduced by the Christian and civilising whites. It is the darkest and most shameful chapter in Australian history.”

It is not our intention to imitate the methods employed by the authors of the Blue Book in compiling odd scraps of incriminating evidence in order to damn the entire administration of a great nation. No, our purpose is to prove, upon the basis of incontrovertible facts and upon statements made, acknowledged and substantiated by the English themselves that whatever may have been the faults of the first German attempts at colonization, these faults may be found aggravated and multiplied in all *English* colonial history; and that no nation with such a record is entitled in the person of its subjects to adopt a lofty moral tone and sit in judgment upon the Germans. The lack of objectivity and the gross injustice of these self-appointed judges and critics is obvious in all their charges. It is particularly noticeable in their deliberate neglect to make any distinction between the difficulties of carrying on colonial policy and colonial work in regions in which the *climate is permanently bearable only by the natives*, and in portions of the globe in which the

white settler finds ready to hand a soil and a climate in which he may take root and form permanent settlements.

In the first instance, there is no tendency of the settlers to dispute the possession of the soil with the black man—in the latter instance, the settlers are disposed to extend their possessions at the cost of the natives. Britain owns a great number of colonies which were originally peopled by native races and in which to-day flourishing communities of whites exist. Such colonies as Australia, the islands of New Zealand, Tasmania, and extensive parts of British South Africa, demonstrate the fact that the living together of the white and the black race under the English flag meant as a rule nothing less than the practical extermination of the blacks,

In the face of these flaming facts, by what right or reason does England arrogate to itself authority to enact the rôle of judge, jury and executioner in the question of German colonial policy?

3. THE BERG-DAMARAS, THE BASTARDS, OVAMBOS AND BUSHMEN.

The British propagandists would have left gaps in the fabric of their vilification of Teuton colonial methods had they confined themselves merely to the Hottentots and Hereros, and not proved or rather striven to prove that the other native tribes of South-West Africa were likewise suffering from the tyrannies of German rule and as clamorously desirous of shaking this off and embracing the mild and beneficent overlordship of those master colonizers—the English. And therefore the special pleaders of the Blue Book busied themselves also with the Berg-Damaras, the Bastards of Rehoboth, the Ovambos and the Bushmen—in order to gather further evidence to prove that it was the “duty”

of England to protect these tribes—by preventing the Germans from recovering their property—a merciful, humanitarian measure which John Bull in his insatiable greed for the lands of others might best achieve by simply pocketing the property of the German People. And who so skilled as he in convincing himself and others that there was no difference between a moral principle and a material expedient, so long as the pretext was impudently upheld in the face of overwhelming fact and monumental justice?

Therefore, with this end in view, Truth is violated in as gross a manner in the chapters treating of the other tribes of the German colony (21, 23, 24 and 25) as in the preceding sections, and all *bona fides* in relation to the opponent as recklessly broken as before.

The Berg-Damaras had never revolted against German rule. They had always proved themselves peaceful, loyal subjects and were blessed with a prosperity which was steadily on the increase. The authors of the Blue Book were certainly aware of this fact and yet they declare on page 107 that the Germans had “accidentally” exterminated the greater part of the Berg-Damaras, since during the Herero war, the ignorant German soldiers could not tell the difference between a Berg-Damara and a Herero and had destroyed them by the thousand!

This kind of “proof” does full honour to the perspicacity of this English document of state. The Berg-Damaras, as stands to reason, naturally avoided the danger of being mistaken for Hereros, by simply running away at the beginning of the war—in so far as they were still in the service of the Hereros. During the entire Herero Campaign they sided with and took service under the Germans, for, first of all, they considered them the stronger, and secondly they had never experienced anything but good at their hands.

After the Hereros had immigrated into German South-West Africa, they found there an undersized, little-developed, dark-skinned people, possibly of Bantu extraction; but who spoke Nama—the so-called Berg-Damaras. They were subjugated by the Hereros and since then have in part served them as cowherds and servants—or have been scattered throughout the land in small colonies with their own herds of cattle. The oldest and largest of these settlements was established in Okombahe, others in Ghaub, in Aais and in the immediate vicinity of the settlements of the whites.

In the year 1894 Governor Leutwein visited the Berg-Damara settlement in Okombahe for the first time. This place which lies in Damaraland belonged at that time to the Hereros and not, as the Blue Book states, to the Berg-Damaras. The Hereros tolerated the Berg-Damaras only in Okombahe and have repeatedly refused them permission even to water their cattle there. In order to free the Berg-Damaras from the oppression of the Hereros, Governor Leutwein at the time made arrangements with Manasse, Captain of the Hereros in Omaruru, whereby the place called Okombahe and a tract of pasture land was to be ceded to the German Government. Hereupon Governor Leutwein by a treaty signed Nov. 30th, 1894, turned Okombahe over to the Berg-Damaras. This treaty reads:

Omaruru, Nov. 30th, 1894.

“Kornelius, Captain of the Berg-Damaras of Okombahe hereby acknowledges to have received from the German Government at Windhuk the place called Okombahe as settled by the following lines of demarcation—for the purposes of utilization. (*Follow the limits of demarcation*).

The Captain pledges himself as recompense to provide whenever necessary as many labourers as the Government

may demand and as may lie within his powers. The Government agrees to feed these labourers and to transport them to their place of work and to pay them the prevailing rate of wages. The Government further pledges itself, as far as possible, in requisitioning these labourers to consider the question of their own requirements in harvest-time. The Government has granted leave to the Hereros who are at present living at Okombahe to continue to live there undisturbed. Captain Kornelius also accepts this condition for himself and for his successors in office.

Both Captain Kornelius of the Berg-Damaras and Captain Daniel of the Hereros recognize the laws and regulations to be issued by the German Government for the maintenance of law and order in the district of Okombahe, as binding upon themselves, their successors in office and their people.

With regard to the matter of jurisdiction, this is to remain as it was settled by the stipulations of the protectorate treaty concluded with the Captain of Omaruru—with one exception—that in all cases of differences between the Hereros and the Berg-Damaras living in Okombahe, the jurisdiction of the Imperial German Court is to prevail.

(signed) Leutwein,
Imperial Captain and Governor.

(signed) Daniel,
Captain of the Hereros.

(signed) Volkmann,
District Chief.

Captain Kornelius,
Captain of the Berg-Damaras,
+ His Mark.

(signed) Bernsmann,
Missionary and Interpreter.

The purpose of this agreement is revealed by Governor Leutwein in his report of Dec. 11th, 1899 to the Foreign Office, Colonial Department: "Through the Berg-Damaras of Okombahe having as a closed community directly accepted

German sovereignty, we shall not only have a body of labourers at our disposal, but have also made a beginning towards the gradual severance and liberation of the Berg-Damaras from their oppressors, the Hereros."

The misrepresentations of the writers of the Blue Book regarding the origin of the Berg-Damara Reservation of Okombahe, is but another shining example of the speciousness and inexactitude with which these men went to work wherever it became a matter of twisting something to the disadvantage of the Germans. The motive is invariably the same—England wishes to seize this property of the German people, but desires to mask what would be bare-faced robbery with some pretence of moral impulse or humanitarian duty. The formula is one which though time-worn has been frequently successful—but it is one which is not likely to deceive the world in this unscrupulous attempt to increase England's stupendous colonial possessions through robbing the German People of their small and so indispensable colonial territory.

Every older settler in South-West Africa during the Leutwein period knows how the Germans liberated the Klip-Kaffirs of Okombahe from the oppression of the Hereros, and brought them into possession of the place. Men so enamoured of detail—when *unfavourable* to the Germans—ought certainly to have been aware of this fact.

The administrators of German South-West Africa followed in principle a policy which was devoted to bettering the lot of the Berg-Damaras. Under date of August 29th, 1895, Governor Leutwein reported:

"I have appointed Johannes Krüger of Ghaub to act as Captain of the Berg-Damaras and the Bushmen living in the district of Grootfontein. Thereby another centre is created for the Berg-Damaras."

Krüger, a Cape Bastard, proved later on to be most untrustworthy. During the beginning of the Herero rising he was under suspicion of having murdered a white farmer named Merkel, and was ordered to go to Grootfontein with his people, so as to remain under surveillance. His attitude continued to give cause for suspicion.

Further treaties with the Berg-Damaras were not brought to the point of conclusion before the outbreak of the Herero rising. The Berg-Damaras remained true to the Germans during the subjugation of the rebellious Hereros. They left their masters, the Hereros, and entered the service of the Germans in ever-increasing numbers. The Blue Book, ever seeing or smelling evil where evil there is none, makes bold to declare that the Berg-Damaras remained loyal, because the Germans had taken away their guns. The Blue Book authority for this assumption is a Berg-Damara by name of Choresib, who likewise adds to the gospel-like veracity of the Blue Book by contributing a long, wild and fantastic story (given *verbatim*) about the promises which Governor Leutwein made to the Berg-Damaras and never kept. The statement of this black to the effect that the Berg-Damaras were "disarmed" by the Germans, must prove ridiculous to all who were familiar with South-West African conditions before the rising, for the Berg-Damaras were at no time in possession of any great number of fire-arms—since their condition had always been poverty-stricken. During the rising thousands of them served in the provision columns and in the relay formations of the German troops and were entirely content with their lot, since never before had they been so well-fed and cared for as then. Hence they increased in numbers and in prosperity.

How recklessly the Blue Book outrages truth in the matter of the Berg-Damara question has already been touched upon

in our criticism of the English statistics concerning the natives. By simply omitting the number of children from the German census of 1911, by placing the number of Berg-Damaras at only 12,831 and by making the rash statement that the Berg-Damaras, who had never been counted previous to the war, numbered at that time some 30,000 souls, the manipulators of facts for the Blue Book reach their unjustifiable conclusion that the difference between these two figures had been destroyed by the Germans in the Herero rising!

The declaration of the Blue Book (page 110) that the Germans had treated the Berg-Damaras after the Herero rising as they had treated the rebellious troops, is likewise false. Such a charge could be made only through malice or through ignorance. After the conclusion of the Herero war the Berg-Damaras were rewarded for their faithfulness by grants of land and by liberal donations of food at Christmas. On May 21, 1906, Governor von Lindequist reported from Okombahe: "I have confirmed the grant of the entire garden and pasture land of Okombahe to the Berg-Damaras in recognition of the loyalty which they displayed during the war."

Similar grants of land took place in other places.

False likewise is the statement in the Blue Book (pages 108 and 110) to the effect that the Berg-Damaras in Okombahe had no courts to which they could appeal. A glance into the court records of the Bezirksamt of Omaruru would have proved to the author of this document that the Bezirksamtman of Omaruru visited Okombahe every second month and tried cases arising from disputes between the natives. The false statements contained in this delectable work, statements such as the constant refrain put into the mouths of the Berg-Damaras called as witnesses—(page 110) "I don't wish to see Germans ruling this land again—" are, of course,

suggested, devised and interpolated for the sole purpose of clothing England's naked lust for annexation with the pure white mantle of humanity and justice.

A mere knowledge of human nature ought to be sufficient to disembowel such testimony and strip it of every shred of value as evidence. For what treatment might the Berg-Damara witnesses expect from the British had they answered the question put to them by declaring that they would rather see the Germans come back? Such methods can deceive no one who has recognized the true visage of England in history, who knows how vast is her unappeasable rage for gain, how fathomless her greed; who still hears the cries, groans and whimperings, the death-rattle of the wretched aboriginal tribes which, one by one, her iron heel has crushed to death or decimated throughout the length and breadth of Darkest Africa,—made darker by these deeds.

Who has forgotten, who shall ever forget that terrible monument of British ruthlessness, built up of the bodies of 26,379 innocent Boer women and children done to a slow and agonizing death in the murderous concentration camps—simply because British greed had decided that the Land of the Boers should become English? Or, if later and still more horrible examples be necessary to point a cold and accusing finger at these strange protagonists of humanity, one need think only of that pale multitude of German women and children, of the aged and the ailing whom England's infamous and lawless hunger blockade doomed to a slow, if not uniform death during the war. If one feel disposed to question England's treatment of the humble blacks in her colonies, one need think only of England's treatment of those noble, self-sacrificing and refined Christian gentlemen, the German missionaries, who were forced to

endure incredible tortures, both mental and physical, and every degradation which satanic ingenuity could invent.

The English representation regarding the Bastards of Rehoboth and the establishment and development of their small community, is in general correct. The Bastards of Rehoboth have been loyal subjects of Germany up to the outbreak of the World War and have but seldom given cause for complaint to the Administration of the Protectorate.

The English version of the causes and the development of the Bastard rising of April 1915 is nevertheless untrue. This version is essentially based upon statements of the Bastards and chiefly upon those made by the leaders of the revolt, who, for the sake of giving their testimony the appearance of reliability, were, as usual, put under oath by the English authorities. Nor can the English story of the revolt make any pretence to fairness or objectivity for the simple reason that it was the English themselves who, soon after the beginning of the war, incited the Bastards to disobedience and insurrection against the Germans.

To smother this fact with silence and yet to accuse the Germans as faithless oppressors of the Bastards, is not only a procedure which is outrageously unfair, but one which is in violation of every feeling of decency. The authors of the Blue Book sink in this chapter to the depths of moral perfidy.

The cause of the Bastard rising was not, as falsely stated by the Blue Book, the alleged ill-treatment of the Bastards by the German Government—for surely this Government, in view of the tremendous preponderance of the English forces, would have done nothing to increase the precariousness of its situation by risking a revolt in the interior. To utilize the Bastards as fighting men against the white English was also not the intention of the German

Kommando, because this would have contravened the principles of German native policy. The British, however, in their invasion of the German colony, had told the Bastards that they would treat them as rebels and confiscate their property in case they, the English, should take any prisoners among the Bastards with the German Protectorate troops. This lawless procedure the British sought to justify with the gross sophistry that the Bastards some 50 years ago (!) had left Cape Colony upon being refused ownership of land. On July 26, 1895, the German Government had concluded a treaty of military service with the Bastards by which these had pledged themselves to help defend the colony against enemies. As the Blue Book itself concedes, (page 126) General Botha had a meeting with the Bastard Captain Nels van Wyk as early as March 1915. The consequence of this treasonable consultation was that the Bastard company refused obedience to the German commanders in the middle of April 1915, and that the Bastards murdered numerous defenceless German farmers in the district of Rehoboth and looted their farms.

These facts are confirmed by the testimony of Sergeant of the Medical Corps, Günther Ziegenhorn, who returned to Germany in 1916, and who up to 1915 had lived for years in the Bastard country and knew most of the leaders of the Bastards personally.

Sergeant Ziegenhorn reports as follows as to the reasons and causes of the revolt:

“The Rehoboth Bastards showed even at the beginning of the war that they did not wish to incur the enmity of the English. When the Governor ordered the mobilization of the Bastard soldiers according to the stipulation of the treaty, they demurred. The headmen of the tribe were told at the Bezirksamt that they would not be used against the

English, but were to do service behind the front in defending themselves and in particular their land against native enemies. Upon this the headmen offered no further objection, and the mobilization of the Bastards began. They were mustered in a very considerate manner by the police officials of the district in the presence of a Ratsmann. Every native was to bring his rifle and when possible, a horse. The horses were paid for by the Government, or if preferred, remained the property of the particular Bastard—in which case he received hire-money. The drilling of the Bastard squads proceeded smoothly.

“The good humour in the Bastard sections, however, soon began to wear off. The men became more and more intractable. (This is conceivable, since English bribery and English threats had begun to operate). The English prisoners of war, who were, in part, guarded by the Bastards, used this opportunity in order to prejudice the Bastards against the German Government.

“When we withdrew from the southern districts of the colony at the end of March and the beginning of April 1915, several transports of troops and fugitives would daily pass the prisoners’ camp at Uitdraai—which lay close to the railway. The prisoners would belabour the Bastards with such talk as this: ‘The land will become English, the power of the German Government is already broken. You will never see the Germans again. Those who are still living after the conquest of the country will be sent to an island.’

“This induced the Bastard soldiers to send a letter to the headman to the effect that now was the best time to strike. They would regret it, did they not take action now. This letter was seen after the rising by the native wife of a German farmer, Frau Kaluza, who belonged to the Bastard

tribe,—lying in a book at the home of her relations in Rehoboth, during August or September 1915.

“There are proofs that Nels van Wyk, the Captain of the Bastards, had himself undertaken preliminary steps in the matter of the revolt. At the beginning of March 1915, he drove in an ox-team to the Kuiseb (he had received a permit from the Bezirksamt at Rehoboth) and there met General Botha, the Commander in chief of the English troops. Three Bastard soldiers who had been ordered to a post of observation at Schwarzfontein deserted during the night of March 10—11, 1915. Their traces followed those of the Captain and led, like his, to Walfish Bay.

“Regarding the beginning of the rising of the Bastards, I have the following to report from my own experiences:

“On April 13, 1915, I arrived at Windhuk with a transport of sick from Keetmanshoop. At three o'clock on the morning of April 18, the garrison of Windhuk (which consisted of nearly all the local business men) was alarmed. This Windhuk company then took a special train to Rehoboth about half-past 5 o'clock. Later on I heard that something was brewing at Rehoboth—the Bastards were said to be growing refractory. On Tuesday, the 20th of April, I myself went by train to Rehoboth. At the station of Bergland I was told by station-master Carstens that there was no doubt about the Bastards becoming rebellious. The Bastards of Nabitsaus and those living along the Aub Rivier had already gone to the assembly-places. A letter from the Headmen had been found in which these summoned the entire people to ‘trek’—for the affair with the Germans was ‘clear.’

“I reached Rehoboth on the afternoon of April 20th. With the exception of the loyal families of Zwarts, Benzs, old Klaasen and the native servants at the Bezirksamt, no

Bastard or native was to be seen—they had all left with bag and baggage during the night of the 17th to the 18th and during the morning of the 18th. Bezirksamtmann Hiller von Gaertringen told me that I might ride to Hornkranz in the evening and on the way thither report to farmers Sievers, Kaluza, Herrman, Bieder, Günther and Eberhardt regarding the situation at Rehoboth and warn them to be careful. Rehoboth had as yet had no inkling of the fact that Rogge, Hefner, Schubert, Putzier and Wenzel *had been murdered by the Bastards the day before.*

“On the afternoon of April 22, all attempts to negotiate with the Bastards were broken off and military operations began. Another company had been fetched from Karibib and certain detachments which were on the way from Aus and Maltahöhe to the north, were directed towards Rehoboth. Among these was the Hensel Battery *which found the body of Sergeant Rogge whom the Bastards had murdered at Büllsport.*

“Furthermore 12 police officials were called from Windhuk to take part in the patrols. On Friday, the 23rd of April. I rode off with Captain von Gaertringen's detachment—we numbered 18 rifles,—and headed for the west. The patrols were kept up until the 1st of May. The places and farms of the Bastards were abandoned—*we found the corpses of several white men who had been butchered by the Bastards.*

“After the occupation of Windhuk by the English on May 12th, 1915, I returned to Bastardland in order to study the feeling among the natives and to get information regarding the murderers, the stolen property and the general state of things in the country. I made notes of everything that might prove of value and took these with me to Windhuk. I made another such trip during September-October, 1915, and another in January-February, 1916.

I cannot, however, remember all the details. The sentiment among the Bastards after the English occupation was, in general, as follows:

“Those who had remained loyal were very glad of this, for they had suffered no harm—the others were greatly worried about what the future might bring. They also said that the revolt had brought them nothing good. Many Bastards had got booty by plundering farms in the west—but those who lived in the east had sacrificed nearly everything they possessed and had also lost their ox-teams and their cattle during the fights.

“At the beginning of the rising Dirk van Wyk had called upon the native workers on the white farms to join the Bastards—he threatened them with shooting in case they remained with their white masters. He promised them rewards in land and cattle in case they helped.

“Many natives who had gone over to the Bastards showed their dissatisfaction because the Bastards had not kept their promises of giving them freedom, land and cattle in return for their help in the rising. The Berg-Damaras were anxious for the return of former conditions under the German Government, for then they had enjoyed greater liberties and had not been subject to such oppression by the Bastards.

“The Bastards of Gurumanas and Nareis had not wished to take part in the rising, and were fetched personally by Dirk van Wyk on the 22nd. The Bastard Grot Gil Diergard told me, among other things: ‘We knew that the English would treat us as rebels in case we were captured with the German troops. We would then have lost our property and very likely would also have been shot.’

“The murder of farmer Eberhardt of Marienhof took place in the following manner: At 11 o'clock on the morning of April 21st, Eberhardt drove away from the farm with several

wagons. He himself drove the first cart which contained his housekeeper and the children. At a distance of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers from the house, several shots were fired at him from a distance of 20 to 30 meters. He raised his hands and cried: "Halt!" Before leaving the farm he had declared that he would surrender in case he were attacked, as there was no hope of a successful defence. The rifles were lying under his feet in the front of the cart—he held no weapon in his hands. The first shots struck Eberhardt's little son George, who was sitting next to his father, in the head and in the arm. Suddenly one of the wheels of the cart came loose, the cart tipped over and threw out the occupants, and the horses bolted with the cart. Several further shots were now fired and Eberhardt was hit in the head and neck. The nurse-girl and the children burst into tears, bent over him and wiped away the blood. He said: 'Do not leave my children.' Then the Bastards came up, pushed away the *Fräulein* and the children, and said: 'There's our man!'

"Then Petrus Diergard, son of Grot Gill Diergard, Isaak Puhlmann and the Hottentot Bastard Beukes *put their guns to his back and fired—and a hole as big as a plate was blown through his chest.* This atrocious murder of Eberhardt the Bastards called a just *oorlog* (war) but the execution of the son of Cornelius van Wyk by sentence of court-martial they denounced as deliberate murder and so hounded the British against the Germans. That proves how cunning these fellows are. They also know how to lie whilst putting on the most innocent face in the world, so that you would think that you are dealing with the most honest men alive. None of the farmers of Rehoboth thought that the Bastards could be capable of such horrible murders—they had merely imagined that they would desert to the English, and steal

cattle. When the Bastards now declare that it was only the disarming of a band of their men at Sandpütz during the middle of April 1915, which brought about the rising, they simply lie. The revolt would have taken place even without this—and the communications with the English, the steps taken by their Captain and other indications are unmistakeable proofs of this.”

So far the testimony of Günther Ziegenhorn. His evidence clearly establishes the fact that the rising of the Bastards was carefully prepared. The murders which were committed upon white settlers by the Bastards during this revolt have become notorious throughout all South-West Africa. The Blue Book, nevertheless, does not scruple to produce the “sworn” statement of the Bastard Samuel Beukes (page 131) who “honestly and truly states” that during the “disturbances” (that is to say, during the revolt of the Bastards) no German, German woman, or child “was assaulted, robbed, or harmed by us.” (!) The falsity of this assertion is so palpable that it is really difficult to understand how the authors and the publishers of the Blue Book could have ventured to accept this passage in the statement of Samuel Beukes, inasmuch as it must inevitably call into question the reliability of the entire evidence and discredit all the other Bastard statements. Apparently these modern Solons did not trouble to make any other investigations whatsoever, but blindly wrote down whatever the Bastards told them. This method, laid bare and directly demonstrable in this particular passage, is characteristic of the entire chapter relating to the Bastards and of the Blue Book in general.

From the Bastards of Rehoboth the Blue Book passes on to the Ovambos. Up to the outbreak of the war the German Government had not taken Amboland under its administration nor opened up the country to settlement.

The authors of the Blue Book were therefore confronted by a predicament in the attempt to prove that the Germans had also misconducted themselves in Ovambo. Notwithstanding this they fulfil their duty by this characteristic sentence: "Had Germany succeeded in getting a foothold in Ovamboland, there is not the slightest doubt that another repetition of the Herero massacre would, sooner or later, have taken place, etc."

It was not fear of the Ovambos, as the Blue Book in its abysmal prejudice declares, which led the Germans to refrain from occupying Amboland, but purely practical considerations. The Administration of the Protectorate needed its funds and its time for more important and immediate tasks than the occupation of Amboland—separated from Hereroland by a waterless steppe some 80 kilometers wide. As early as April 24, 1902 the *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* wrote:

"In view of the fact that so much territory is still unoccupied, the time for the occupation of Amboland has not yet arrived. The means which would be expended upon an expedition to Amboland might well be utilized for more important objects."

In addition to this, repeated investigations regarding the possibilities of Amboland had led to the conclusion that this part of the Protectorate was by nature scarcely suited for settlement by whites—at least for a long time to come, —but that it might form a valuable reservoir of labourers.

The German Government therefore confined its policy in relation to Amboland to the following goals: the establishment of friendly relations with the chieftains of the Ovambos and their people and the maintenance and development of the aforesaid valuable reservoir of human labour.

In pursuance of this policy, the Home Colonial Office had forbidden the governors of German South-West Africa, from the very beginning down to the most recent times, to undertake any military expeditions into the Land of the Ovambos. On December 22, 1894, the Imperial Chancellor wrote to the then Landeshauptmann Leutwein:

"The carrying-out of a military expedition to Ovambo-land, lying as this does beyond the narrower confines of the Protectorate, does not appear desirable to me because of the danger of warlike complications. Should it, however, be the intention of your Honour to induce the Ovambos to accept German protective rule by peaceful means, I would make free to suggest that the negotiations leading up to this be first prepared for beforehand through the cultivation of friendly relations. Your Honour will therefore be so good as to consider whether the co-operation of the Finnish missionaries might not be advantageously employed towards this end, since they would be in a position to judge whether there be any inclination among the Ovambos to place themselves under German protection."

In accordance with these instructions friendly relations were established with the chiefs of the Ovambos during the ensuing years by means of occasional visits of deputies of the Governor. The statement in the Blue Book that these visits were always received in an unfriendly manner, is untrue. Dr. Gerber, for example, reports concerning his reception by Chief Uejulu in 1902: "Uejulu showed the same friendly demeanour as of old and acknowledged our presents by sending us an ox and by furnishing us with guides for continuing our journey."

Even after the subjugation of the Hereros, who had become rebellious in 1904, the German Government did not alter its friendly and peaceable attitude towards the Ovami-

bos—an attitude which the authors of the Blue Book seek by means of deliberate distortions of facts to represent as aggressive. An order of the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office, dated March 20, 1905, reads, literally, as follows:

“A war against the Ovambos could only lead to the annihilation of the Ovambo tribes which would not only prove an irreparable loss for Ovamboland itself but also for the rest of the Protectorate.”

In order to protect the Ovambos against exploitation and to avoid every possibility of warlike complications with this tribe, the Governor, after consultation with the Governmental Council, issued an ordinance dated January 25, 1906, concerning traffic to the Amboland and within it. By means of this regulation the intercourse of whites with that district was subjected to numerous limitations and the presence of white men, especially of the so-called itinerant “field-traders,” in the Ovambo Land was made dependant upon the permission of the Governor. In his instruction to the officials entrusted with the carrying-out of these orders, the Governor remarks:

“All possibilities which might lead to quarrels between the Ovambos and the whites should be avoided. The purpose of the order is to prevent all uneasiness among the Ovambo tribes. The chief object to be kept in view by the authorities of the frontier districts is to win the confidence of the Ovambos and to make them more and more amenable to the service of the whites.”

This pacifistic policy justified itself and proved a good investment. Even during the Herero War the Ovambos displayed their confidence in the Germans by furnishing numerous labourers for the building of the Otavi Railway—1904 to 1906. After the completion of this railway, it was chiefly

Ovambo labourers who helped in the reconstruction of the copper mines at Tsumeb and Guchab and of the Khan Copper Pit. In one week, as for example, in March 1908, after the final opening of the mine, almost 1,000 Ovambos were given fresh employment at Tsumeb. Subsequently the Ovambos began to flock into the Hereroland in ever-growing numbers and sought service with the German settlers in the villages and on the farms in the north. A great number of Ovambo families settled in the district of Outjo on a reservation of some 10,000 hektares (one hektare equals 2.47 acres) which had been assigned them by the Government. In July 1908 five Ovambo chieftains—Kambonde-Ondunga, Nechumbo-Ukuambi, Schaanika-Ongandjera, Jitaa-Ukualuizi and Nande-Ukuanjama,—proclaimed their faith in the Germans by expressly acknowledging German sovereignty and placing themselves and their people under German protection. Every year since then, the Governor of German South-West Africa has sent a Native Commissioner familiar with the language and the customs of the Ovambos, to make a tour of their land and in this way to cultivate friendly relations with the native chieftains. The confidence of these chieftains in the Germans grew from year to year—they habitually received in the friendliest manner the officials sent by the Governor and heaped presents upon them.

The confidence of the Ovambos in the Germans was likewise increased by the circumstance that the Government and the mining companies always sent great quantities of food to the mission-stations of Amboland as a gift to the hungry people during the periodically recurrent famines in that country. During the great famine of 1908—09 the Ovambos were presented with considerable supplies of food—as may be seen by the following list:

STATEMENT
of the Food Supplies Delivered for the Relief of Hunger in
Ovamboland.

No.	Date of Delivery	Weight	Article
1	October 12, 1908	8,000 kilograms	Flour
2	November 15, 1908	13,000 "	Rice
3	" 20, 1908	30,000 "	"
4	" 20, 1908	20,000 "	Flour
5	December 30, 1908	500 "	Dried Vegetables
6	" 30, 1908	1,000 "	Chocolate
7	January 9, 1909	10,000 "	Rice
8	" 9, 1909	10,000 "	Flour
9	February 23, 1909	90,000 "	Tinned Vegetables
10	" 23, 1909	10,000 "	Peas

Certified as correct.

L. S. (signed) *Gruschka*,

Windhuk, March 15, 1909.

It is very significant, and worthy of being stigmatized as a special sign of the hatefulness which inspired the compilation of the Blue Book, that neither these deliveries of food supplies nor the friendly reception of the Government commissioners by the Ovambo chieftains, are mentioned in this work. Nor is there a word said of the great yearly increase in the immigration of Ovambo labourers, even though all these facts must have been perfectly clear to the lynx-like eyes which went prying among the German official records.

When the diamond mines in the district of Lüderitzbucht began to flourish, there ensued a great demand for native labour. A single intimation of this need to the chieftains sufficed, and by the summer of 1910 there were some 5,000 Ovambos working in the Lüderitzbucht diamond fields. This fact is in itself one of the best refutations of the false

allegation of the English Blue Book that the Ovambos were filled with the deepest distrust of the aggressive Germans.

For the protection of the Ovambo workers in the diamond fields, the following measures were taken in accordance with the principles of modern German Workman's Legislation: By an ordinance dated the 16th of December, 1911, regarding the enrolment of the Ovambos and the conditions under which they should work, the rights and duties of the employers were exactly defined and the Ovambos protected against exploitation and unjust treatment. A Finnish missionary who had been active for many years in Ambo-land, was appointed Native Commissioner in the diamond fields. In order to shield the Ovambos against pulmonary disease in the raw climate of the coast, the diamond companies were obliged to provide every Ovambo workman with good quarters, as well as with two woollen blankets and a suit of clothes. Two doctors were stationed in the diamond fields and every plant employing more than 200 workmen was obliged to maintain a native hospital.

Such was the condition of things at the outbreak of the World War. It is but another instance of the one-sided spitefulness of the Blue Book that its authors conclude their observations upon the Ovambos with such a sentence as the following, (page 142): "A return of this country to the Germans spells for the Ovambos only one thing, and it is that the fate of the Hereros will, sooner or later, inevitably overtake them, etc." The authors thereby wilfully suppress the fact that the English protectorate administration undertook, in 1916, that is to say, one year after the occupation of German South-West Africa, a military expedition against the Ovambos, the details of which have, very characteristically, been kept strictly secret. Instead of wasting words over things which were not calculated to

make the annexation of South-West Africa appear as a moral duty on the part of England, such as the help rendered the Ovambos by the German Government during the famine, the recognition of German sovereignty by the Ovambo chieftains, and the actual incorporation of Ovamboland in the economic organization of the colony—the Blue Book furbishes up a trivial and prejudiced *feuilleton* which endeavours to entertain the English and American reader with an account of how the clever and valiant Ovambos had succeeded in keeping off the Germans—from whom, of course, they had nothing but evil to expect.

The last of the native tribes of South-West Africa treated of in the Blue Book are the Bushmen. The fate of these aboriginal inhabitants of South Africa is as tragic and as pitiful as that of the Indians and the Australian negroes. The Boers and the Britons had systematically exterminated and driven them out. The raids of the whites against the Bushmen occur again and again in the history of South Africa from the year 1865 on. In 1774 the Dutch Government of the Cape proclaimed the Bushmen outlaws. Commandos which were sent against them, shot them down like wild beasts, and their numbers rapidly melted away.*

Colonel Collins in his "Report upon the Relations between the Cape Colonists and the Kaffirs and Bushmen, 1908/09," relates that at that time, that is to say, a decade after the actual beginning of English rule at the Cape, over 3,000 Bushmen were killed in a short time in operations undertaken against them in the eastern part of the colony. Their last remaining remnants had taken refuge in the Kalahari. The Kung and Heikum Bushmen, living in the

* Schulze, "Aus Namaland und Kalahari", page 677 *et seq.* and Fritsch, "Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas," page 465.

northeastern districts of German South-West Africa, also belong to this tribe.

True to the ancient principle of English policy, to attribute its own villainies to the enemy, the English Blue Book unblushingly alleges that the *Germans* in South-West Africa had declared the Bushmen to be outlaws, had regarded them as wild beasts and had slain them wholesale!

This crude charge is repudiated by the simple fact that the German Protectorate Administration, during the entire history of German South-West Africa, had never permitted, *that a single armed expedition be undertaken against the Bushmen*. Even the grossly partisan compilers of the English Blue Book would be unable to conjure up any such. The falsity of the aforesaid allegation is further demonstrated by the fact, acknowledged even by the Blue Book, that in the district of Grootfontein—which comes principally into consideration here,—there are living some seven to eight thousand Bushmen, of whom a great proportion were in the service of the whites as farm labourers. In 1912, these numbered about 600, in 1913, about 1,500. The numbers varied considerably from time to time, since the unstable and liberty-loving Bushman can no longer be held to his work once Nature offers him a sufficiency of water and field fruits. It is not only a falsehood but a distinct misconstruing of the nature of the Bushman for the authors of the English Blue Book to assume that this fluctuation in the numbers of the workmen was occasioned by ill-treatment on the part of the German farmers. In consequence of the ever-increasing number of settlers in German South-West Africa, the demand for native farm workers has for some years been so great that every farmer does his utmost to keep his native workmen satisfied, so that they may remain in his service. Cases of ill-treatment were fortunately rare.

The policy of the German Government with regard to the Bushmen was fundamentally the same as that with regard to the Ovambos: *their preservation and gradual training to service*. In accordance with this policy, the Colonial Administration appointed and confirmed captains among the Bushmen who had taken up a fixed abode—this in order to have an intermediary and adviser in all affairs connected with these tribes. Thus Governor Leutwein, on August 31st, 1895, confirmed the Bastard Johannes Krüger as Captain at Ghaub and on September 17th, 1895, Aribib of Naidaus as Captain of the Bushmen in the eastern and western part of the district of Grootfontein.

In order to become more familiar with the manner of thought, the habits and customs of these primitive children of Nature, the German Government subsequently and repeatedly encouraged researches among the Bushmen through representatives of German science and Protectorate officials. These studies were supported by Government funds. The thorough and scientific works of Fritsch, "Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas;" of Passarge, "Die Buschmänner der Kalahari;" of Schulze "Aus Namaland und Kalahari" and the publications of Schinz, Werner*, Gentz**, Vedder***, and others prove with what loving and scholarly devotion the German *savants* during the short period of German colonial activity, devoted their attention to the Bushmen. These eminent works appear to be utterly unknown to the compilers of the English Blue Book.

The more intimate knowledge of the character of these primitive tribes gained through such investigations, gave the government officials and the settlers of German South-West Africa valuable hints for the correct treatment of the

* "Zeitschrift für Ethnologie," 1906, pages 241 *et seq.*

** "Globus" 1903.

*** "Allgemeine Missionszeitschrift," 1912, pages 403 *et seq.*

natives. Grootfontein is the only district which contains a large population of Bushmen. The splendid results achieved in this district in gradually accustoming the Bushmen to work are described by that experienced student of the Bushmen, the well-known and highly-esteemed missionary, Herr Vedder of Grootfontein, in the "*Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift*," 1912, (pages 403 *et seq.*) as follows:

"Extensive tracts of the territory of the Bushmen in German South-West Africa have been divided up into farms during the recent years. Unfortunately the thefts of cattle which gave rise to the war of annihilation against the Bushmen in South Africa, are also in evidence here. But to the credit of the Government and the greater part of the farming population be it said that they proceed against the Bushmen only in the wisest and most considerate manner in order to educate them and to keep them as useful servants, and gradually to wean them away from their irregular mode of life. Thefts of cattle are equitably punished. Numerous farmers have considerable Bushman settlements living upon their farms. In case they require labourers, they find as a rule that the men are quite willing to work for a few months. When they have grown tired of work no obstacles against their taking a holiday of a few months are placed in their way—on condition that the men in question furnish a substitute. There are at present some 600 Bushmen working in the district of Grootfontein—who therefore represent a third of the working population of this district. Others are working in the copper mines in Tsumeb or on the railway. Such favourable results achieved within the space of a few years, justify high hopes for the future and are destined to cause many an oblique judgment as to the notorious indolence and shyness towards work attributed to the Bushmen, to be revised."

The art of defaming even with praise is excellently understood by the persons responsible for the facts, figures and fancies of the Blue Book. For instance, on page 147 there is an untrue statement to the effect that the Bezirksamtman of Grootfontein who had been in office since 1907 was hated by the settlers because of his equitable treatment of the natives, and that he was an exception among the officials of the Protectorate. The Blue Book also suppresses the fact that the proposal made by this Bezirksamtman in his report to the Governor dated January 1912 (quoted in the Blue Book), that the Bushmen should be gradually accustomed to work, received the approval of the Governor.

On page 146 the charge is ventured that many of the German settlers had forcibly robbed the Bushmen of their wives, and that these had in consequence revenged themselves by murdering German farmers and stealing their cattle. This is deliberate exaggeration on both points. The murder of whites by Bushmen was an extremely rare occurrence. Thefts of cattle occur whenever the Bushman is hungry. He does not consider this wrong. Nor can it in commonsense be denied that white men may have occasionally alienated the affections of some Bushman's wife by means of presents.

This is a common occurrence in British South Africa and in every other country containing a white and a black population. During the period in which there were as few white women in the British colonies as in the remote farming districts of South-West Africa, such instances were at least as frequent as in the German colony. Cases in which the wives and girls of the natives have been violated or taken away by *English* settlers may be found in such numbers in the literature of the British colonies, that it would scarcely pay to cite them. This fact cannot, of course, be unknown to the

conscientious moral censors of the Blue Book,—but its frank recognition would not, to be sure, have suited the plan and purpose of their propaganda.

Surely that nation which not only exterminated almost the entire race of the Bushmen and the negroes of Australasia, but also decimated in the cruellest fashion the Zulus, the Mashonas and the Matabeles, is of all others the least entitled to sit in judgment upon other peoples. When the authors of the Blue Book wax indignant over the severe punishment meted out to the cattle-thieves among the Bushmen, let them remember that in similar cases the English settlers in Australia were wont to organize regular man-hunts and to poison the natives with the envenomed carcasses of animals. A just analysis of the charges made against the German Administration and colonisation in South-West Africa results in this particular instance as in all the others:—we find in full force the spirit of spitefulness and of mental obliquity, of exaggeration and misrepresentation and distortion, and the utilization of unreliable native evidence, such as that of the notorious Bastard Johannes Krüger, not to speak of the Bushmen. And all this farrago of speciousness, dissimulation and dishonesty for the sole and sinister purpose of trumping up a case against the Germans and demonstrating the righteousness of England's itch for annexation!

4. THE NATIVES AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

In the section which bears this title the authors of the Blue Book busy themselves with the penal code in connection with the natives, and also with the legal protection which was theirs under German rule as well as that which is now vouchsafed them under the English.

The tendency of this particular chapter is directed towards an attempt to prove that wrongs committed upon the natives by the Germans were less rigorously punished than wrongs committed upon Germans by the natives. The German criminal law and the decisions of German courts are supposed to provide proof of this. The argument is superficial and deceptive, because the punishments of the Germans and the natives are contrasted according to a preconceived scheme and without paying any regard to the purpose which actuated the law-givers. Pursuant to the law the punishment is to be measured according to the degree of criminal intent displayed in the punishable act; it is meant to operate in an educative sense and to serve as a warning against a repetition of the crime or misdemeanour. The scale for estimating the degree of criminal will is given chiefly through the degree in which property or rights have been violated. The degree of punishment must therefore be so meted out that in every individual case the purpose of the punishment should be achieved.

In those cases in which the courts of South-West Africa have uttered a more rigorous sentence upon natives than upon whites, the reason is to be sought not in that the legal rights and properties of the blacks (life, health, etc.) were to receive less legal protection than those of the whites, but simply in the fact that the character and natural disposition of the natives conditioned severer disciplinary measures in order to maintain law and order and protect the population against excesses. The natives of South-West Africa still stand upon a very low mental and moral plane. All Englishmen who have experience in South-African affairs and who are not labouring under a crushing weight of prejudice and political tendency, honestly and openly acknowledge this most obvious fact. We have, for example, already

cited in the foregoing pages the judgment of Henry Samuel, Esq., to the effect that the natives of South-West Africa stood so low in the human scale that nothing was to be done with them but to put them into reservations. The German Administration did not, however, choose to take such extreme measures. Punishments which would have a strong deterrent effect upon a European make almost no impression upon a native, and therefore fail to achieve their purpose.

Would anyone, merely in order to establish a kind of outward equality, go so far as to say that the moral and mental character of the delinquent counted for nothing, and that the deed alone was to be judged? Should the European who may have acted during a stress of excitement receive the same punishment as the native who is driven to perpetrate his deed by some barbarous impulse? When the basis of guilt is the same on both sides then the basis for an identical judgment is also given. To utter a just verdict is not to decree the same punishment in a blind manner, but to estimate the measure of punishment according to the personal culpability of the delinquent. This principle is recognized in all civilized lands. One might assume that it is also acted upon in England. In the Blue Book, to be sure, this clear principle suffers violence and denial,—since the end in view is not the establishment of judicial equity, but the propagation of political prejudices for imperialistic ends.

We have seen that the very premises necessary for correctly judging German penal jurisprudence are grossly erroneous in the Blue Book, and it is no less clear, as evidenced by the other judgments delivered by the authors; that their knowledge of German criminal law is far too limited to enable them to make any authoritative criticism. Their incapacity for interpreting foreign laws is also pain-

fully evident. They criticize the German Penal Code in that it defines punishable acts singly and separately according to circumstance and that it establishes limits of punishment. In contrast to this, admiration is expressed for the "elasticity" of other systems—among them the English. The Blue Book men disapprove of the fact that the crime of murder is more narrowly defined in German law than in English, and that, for instance, the crime of polluting a corpse is not punishable in German law. Casual, haphazard observations such as these, are, as everybody knows, utterly worthless for arriving at a correct solution of the questions at issue;—in this case the obvious and rather jejune intention is to prove the superiority of English to German law.

It is inevitable that the laws of different countries should differ from each other and that they should even differ from English law. Every country makes its laws in accordance with the needs and the peculiarities of its people. That the pollution of corpses is not punishable in Germany is chiefly to be attributed to the fact that this strange crime is practically unknown in Germany and that it therefore requires no combatting by means of a special law. If England interprets the concept of murder in a wider sense than Germany, the unavoidable conclusion must be that England believes it necessary to establish a stronger safeguard for protecting the lives of its citizens against murder than does Germany. It betrays a not unamusing arrogance to set up as the single touchstone for the excellence of a foreign law its coincidence with English law. It does not seem to have occurred to the authors that only investigations upon a scientific basis can give any value to a judgment passed upon a law. We shall see later how this principle of "elasticity," so highly commended in this part of the

Blue Book, is treated by the compilers in cases in which this quality is contained in *German*, as contradistinguished from English law.

Hitherto no code of material punishment nor any formal criminal procedure for the natives has been introduced into the German protectorates. The only regulation extant is the enactment of the Imperial Chancellor of April 22, 1896 with regard to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary punishment, in connection with the ordinance (November 8, 1896) of the Landeshauptmann of South-West Africa concerning the legal status of the natives with respect to criminal law. These regulate the competence of the authorities in the matter of penal jurisprudence, determine what punishments are permissible and confer upon the officials entrusted with the exercise of judicial functions certain disciplinary rights over native workmen and servants. Conditions among the natives are as yet too unstable, their mental and economic development is still too much in a condition of flux, their habits and customs not yet everywhere sufficiently established. The time for creating a special code of laws for the natives did not, therefore, appear to have arrived.

The complete introduction of the German criminal code and the German criminal procedure was likewise inadvisable, since these laws which are adapted to a people of lofty mental and moral standards, were ill-suited in all particulars for application to a primitive people still largely inured to barbaric habits. They would nevertheless prove eminently useful as guiding lines for a German judge in helping him to shape his verdicts. The rudimentary concepts of wrongdoing contained in the criminal code might, on the other hand, be assumed to be familiar to the natives. What chiefly mattered was that the judge should be sufficiently familiar with their habits and customs in order correctly to estimate

the influence of these upon their ideas of right and wrong. The investigations and proceedings in the criminal courts were conducted according to the model of the German criminal procedure and it was according to the principles of this that the judges proceeded—insofar as no disadvantages might thereby accrue to the natives.

An expert judicial decision necessitated, as already remarked, a thorough knowledge of the customs, habits and ideas of right and wrong of the natives. Judicial powers could for this reason be conferred only upon an official who was in the position of being able to remain in close contact with the native population. *This was the case with the administrative official (Bezirksamtman, etc.)* These men live in the midst of the natives; they are their advisers, are pledged to look after their welfare and are able by virtue of their official activity to obtain many deep glimpses into the thoughts and emotions of their charges. *It was therefore to the interests of the natives themselves that the exercise of judicial functions should be placed in the hands of the administration officials and not in the hands of a judge standing more or less remote from actuality.* The Bezirksamtman is the confidant of the natives of the district, or Bezirk.

The separation of the functions of justice and administration is certainly a goal worth striving for. But it is a goal which cannot be achieved for the mere sake of a principle or a theory—for the question must always be asked: do the interests of the population demand or even permit of such a separation? So far as the natives of the German Protectorates are concerned, this question must for the present be answered in the negative.

Since, for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing, no written penal law has been created for the natives, there is no basis for a legal threat of punishment. Legal pro-

cedure was in consequence generally limited to determining permissible forms of punishment (corporeal punishment, fines, death) as provided for in the aforesaid enactment of the Imperial Chancellor. The choice of the form of punishment and the fixing of the degree are left to the discrimination and the sense of duty of the judge. It is here that the law becomes "elastic." But as it is German law which is under consideration here, the English authors of the Blue Book suddenly forget their praise of "elasticity" when appertaining to English law, and find this "elasticity" no longer admirable but exceedingly wicked! They believe or assume to believe that the degree of punishment is left entirely to the "whim" of the judge, since there is nothing contained in the law which would hinder him from inflicting any punishment he choose for any misdemeanour—from the fine of a shilling to the death penalty. It is natural that elasticity of the law should give the judge a certain latitude. But only ignorance of German law or direct malevolence would go so far as to say (as the authors of the Blue Book say) that the fixing of the punishment is left to the mere *whim* of the judge.

The German Penal Code, to which the official is subject, provides (Paragraph 336) for a penalty of five years imprisonment for any perversion of the law to the disadvantage of one of the parties. The official who decrees a severer punishment than is compatible with the case, is guilty of perversion of the law and commits a serious crime. Here once again the error and evil intent of which the Blue Book is compact, force one to wonder how these detractors of Germany could venture to think that their criticisms would receive a respectful hearing in view of the fact that they are lacking in the first essentials for a clear and honest judgment—knowledge and understanding of the things and

the institutions they venture to criticize. The malice engendered by the political motive is so great that it does not hesitate to discredit before the entire world a whole body of officials, esteemed for their honesty and integrity.

Moreover, these officials are obliged to issue a protocol regarding every case of punishment. This heightens their conscientiousness and enables the examining authorities to exercise an effective supervision. Hence the remark that the natives are subject to the moods and arbitrary will of the officiating judges is false.

The Blue Book disapproves further of another "elastic" decree of the German law: this is the regulation whereby natives of "a better class," may be exempted from the application of corporeal punishment in law. The authors assert that this regulation is a loop-hole for abuses, since the interpretation of the words "better class" is left exclusively to the judge. This is a surprising objection and does not speak well for the juristic knowledge of the objectors. Are they ignorant of the fact that *there is scarcely a single law which is not capable of manifold interpretations* and which does not require interpretation through the judge? The interpretation of the law is precisely the highest as well as the most difficult task of the judge. What is that gives rise to the countless differences in questions of law? Surely only the fact that it is technically and juristically impossible to find a form of expression for all the phenomena in the field of law which would preclude differences of opinion. The law-givers, in this instance, wished to protect from corporeal punishment such natives as enjoyed esteem among their fellows, either by reason of their social position or their mental superiority. Since no special class recognizable through outward signs came into consideration here, but only individuals who now and then happened to reach the requisite

standards, it was necessary to choose an elastic, comprehensive term, and to leave each separate case to the discretion of the judge as to whether the accused belonged to "the better classes" or not. Every law is liable to an unintelligent or erroneous interpretation and offers loop-holes to an unconscientious judge. The German lawgiver may place an unqualified confidence in the conscientiousness of his officials and need not therefore be frightened by decrees such as the foregoing. It is significant that prominent English officials should think that the form in which a law is expressed was designed to leave a loop-hole for abuse, and it speaks little for their experience with the law nor for that of which they deem it capable.

The disciplinarian measures which were intended for undutiful, lazy, and disobedient servants arouse the particular indignation of the writers of the Blue Book. Here, too, the adverse criticism is based upon an unintelligent interpretation of the law. The German Administration considers that disciplinary laws for the natives are necessary. Experience, especially the experience of English colonists, has proved that the frequent laziness and insubordination of native workers or servants make such measures absolutely indispensable. In order to ensure just punishment this can be exercised only through a judge. According to a practice established by the verdicts of independent courts, the only right conferred upon a master is that of exercising a light paternal correction. Despite the fact that these critics of German methods are particularly acrimonious in their comment upon this right, it has proved to be of the greatest service in the German colonies and the results have in the main been very favourable. Punishment in serious cases is left exclusively to the courts. The master or employer who deems disciplinary punishment necessary applies to the

official entrusted with the exercise of this function' and furnishes him with the facts of the case. The official investigates these facts and in case they justify punishment he issues an order for the requisite chastisement; otherwise he refuses the application of the master.

These simple facts are distorted by the authors of the Blue Book to such a degree as to make it appear that this disciplinary punishment is a regular official institution which can be brought into play without investigation at the simple request of the master. This is but another example of the senseless way in which ignorance of the laws which Germany has applied to the natives, furnishes the basis for the bitterest attacks upon German policy in South-West Africa. The official does not decree punishments on behalf of the masters, but simply carries out his functions as judge in native affairs. The application of the master or employer has the same significance as the preliminaries to a process at law, that is to say, the judge cannot take up the matter upon his own initiative, but only upon application of the master. The application has no influence upon the decision. The investigation of the case is conducted according to the general principles governing a trial by law, and the verdict is formed wholly upon the basis of the conviction of the judge. The judge bears all responsibility for the sentence of punishment. Should he violate his oath of office as a judge, he immediately becomes liable to the punishment for the crime provided for by Paragraph 336 of the Penal Code. The lack of ordered disciplinary measures in the English colonies leads to innumerable excesses in these lands. Of these little is said, but they are known to all who have lived in English, African and Australian colonies. Here punishment is taken into the hands of the individual instead of being subject to a decision by a judge. Examples

of such cases are in number beyond compute, but we will content ourselves for the present with quoting the few that follow—further choice specimens will be found in the last section of this book.

1. Female prisoners in the prison at Calabar were given 25 lashes by a native woman overseer upon the oral authorisation of Prison Director Grey.
2. In the year 1914, a certain English Captain, according to evidence furnished by a German government official, issued orders that a number of soldiers who had been delayed in the camp north of the Cross River in a district of Munchiland in Nigeria, and who had arrived only after sundown, be punished with 25 lashes each. When the remark was made that the whipping of soldiers had been abolished for a long time in the German colonies, this officer replied that it was also not permitted in Nigeria—but the matter amounted simply to this—there would be no need of entering the punishment in the books.
3. In Southern Nigeria one Taylor, agent of the Nigeria Rubber Syndicate, who had been in the district of Ikon along the Cross River from 1906 to 1908, punished a native by thrusting him into an empty oil-barrel, fastening down the head and then letting the barrel roll down the banks into the river.
4. A German merchant from Nigeria, relates in the course of an official examination: "My boy whose veracity I had frequently proved during a period of over 15 months, told me one evening after he had been summoned to act as a substitute for the boy of an English railway engineer, who happened to have fallen ill, that he would never again work for Englishmen, since they acted in

the most brutal and inhuman manner towards their servants. After I had threatened him with dismissal in case he should refuse, he told me the following: Some time previously he had been in the service of an English railway surveyor as a cook. One evening after returning home this man had fired two shots at him with a fowling-piece from the first story of his house, because the evening meal took five minutes longer to cook. This Englishman was most bestially drunk every evening and would go about with blood-shot, staring eyes, brutalizing his black servants in the most atrocious manner. The boy showed me his body—with my own eyes I saw the badly-healed scars of 17 pellets of shot, 2 knife cuts and several welts.

5. A German who had been resident in the English colonies of West Africa before the war, reports: He had frequently taken the train from Kano to Zaria. Underway the train would halt to let the section-workers get off. In case any complaint was made by the natives they were beaten over the head and body with whips of rhinoceros-hide by the attendant police. Because of the bad treatment there had been no volunteer labourers for working on the railway. In consequence they had been arrested upon the streets and taken thither by force.
6. Herr H., a merchant, reports: In 1912 an English doctor was desirous of crossing the river near the factory of Messrs. Bey and Zimmer at Siloko, with his caravan and demanded that the natives transport him across the stream free of charge. Because the natives refused to comply with this demand, this doctor took the canoe-owner along to the next station, promising to pay him

there. Instead of paying him the money due him, he ordered him to be given a sound thrashing by the black policeman. The skin burst and the blood ran down the legs of the unfortunate man.

7. An Australian settler, Mr. W. Malcolmson, wrote to the *Times* on April 2, 1904: In Mallina I have seen how the local Justice of Peace struck down his servant with an iron-bound lath for some slight trespass. During the last two years two doctors in Perth have brought instances of the maltreatment of natives to public notice. One of them had observed how at Murchison (Gold Fields) one of the judges at that place had tied a lad to a pillar of his veranda and had thrashed him with a riding-whip.

Such characteristic instances might be cited indefinitely.

The authors of the Blue Book profess to be particularly shocked over the fact that according to the disciplinary measures of the Germans, an insubordinate *female* servant might be punished by being placed in chains for a fortnight. This is true, but only ignorance or ill-will would imply that this punishment would be inflicted for any trespass other than one which richly merited it. The lesser misdemeanours on the part of the female natives remain unpunished by German law, *simply because no punishment had been provided for them*. Logical conclusions of this sort are naturally not in favour with the Blue Book propagandists.

Regarding the punishment of the lash in general, one can only say that the necessity of using this means of discipline must be regretted. England likewise sees no contradiction between its application and morality and justice. England makes extensive use of the lash as a means of punishment. If punishment have the purpose of deterrent

and improvement, it must be so carried out that it achieves the end in view. The particular circumstances of each case are decisive here, as well as the character of the culprit.

The Blue Book declares that the German administers more frequent and more severe punishments by whipping than the Englishman. This, however, has nothing to do with the question at issue, which is: does the German, in view of the character of the natives of South-West Africa, abuse this form of punishment? No information is furnished as to the specific trespasses which called for corporeal punishment in the German and in the English colonies. The German records afford merely a brief description of the nature of the offense, such as "theft," "disobedience," etc. There is likewise no information regarding the spirit in which the offence was committed, nor of the character of the individual delinquent. Above all there are no details which inform us if and why the severer punishment decreed should exceed the limits of the punishment provided for.

The Germans naturally pronounce only such punishments as are deemed necessary in order to achieve the corrective end in view. These punishments are deemed excessive by the Blue Book merely because England believes that it is able to get along with its natives by means of less severe punishments. If no better arguments be forthcoming, this conclusion must be incontinently rejected. Germany has, for instance, refrained from imposing any form of corporeal punishment upon the natives of Samoa, who are eminently superior to the blacks of South Africa.

How can it be proved that the English method is effective, or even as effective as the German? It is indisputable that the population would naturally welcome the milder form of punishment, but this has nothing to do with its efficacy. The chief point to consider is—which punishment is desirable

in the interests of maintaining order and discipline? To declare that the Germans, in imposing the heavier forms of punishment, are actuated not by a sense of justice, but by an inherent cruelty, is to descend to mere base slander and wanton, unfounded accusation. When men yield to such tendencies, logic is withered within them. Otherwise the authors of the Blue Book might have remembered that they held it to be a praiseworthy feature of the English Criminal Code that the concept of murder should be more widely interpreted therein than is the case in the German Criminal Code—that is to say, those who in German law would be found guilty only of homicide or bodily assault with deadly issue, would be adjudged in English law to be guilty of murder and punished far more rigorously than in Germany. Are we therefore to conclude that this is done only out of cruelty?

The robbery of cattle, the plundering of farms and other acts of violence on the part of the natives were the order of the day in South-West Africa. Employers were constantly and arduously forced to contend against laziness, disobedience and insubordination. In order to bring about orderly conditions it was indispensable to introduce effective corrective measures. The intelligent and enlightened circles of England have always shown a thorough understanding of these things, and many voices are uplifted there which declare that it is a blessing for the natives that their faults and their vices are met with rigorous corrective measures.

Mr. Thomson, for example, writes thus of conditions in Rhodesia in his book "Rhodesia and its Government," (page 82):

"I asked Mr. Taberer, the chief native commissioner for Mashonaland, under what authority the native commissioners are empowered to flog? He replied that they are strictly prohibited from doing so, that it is illegal,

and that they can be punished for it. I said that I had heard from prospectors and transport riders all the way up the road that they do flog however illegal it may be. I was told that if a boy will not work, or tries to run away, the usual thing is to take him to the native commissioner, and have him given twenty-five, and I found that the word 'twenty-five' said in English to any of the boys was sufficient to make them grin in a sickly way—they quite understood what it meant . . . and he assured me it is the only way to treat natives."

According to Paragraph 13 of the German Regulations the native Captain or his representative is to be present at all trials. The Blue Book advances the charge that this rule was habitually violated in practice. Upon what basis this assumption is made is not revealed. Should it arise from the fact that nothing is said in the protocols of the presence of the Captains, this inference would be unfounded. The Administration has the greatest interest in having the trials attended by representatives of the natives, and has always placed great weight upon this point. It is only by such means that the confidence of the natives in the courts may be strengthened and the authority and reputation of the Captains be increased. Those authorities who should act contrary to these precepts would injure the interests of the Administration.

The remarks of the Blue Book upon the regulation contained in Paragraph 74 of the Penal Code regarding the imposition of one inclusive punishment (*Gesamtstrafe*) in cases in which several punishable actions coincided (*Real-konkurrenz*) proves once again how completely lacking in understanding of the essentials of German law were the authors of this remarkable document. The regulation demands that a special penalty be fixed for every punishable act and that the separate punishments be comprised within one inclusive punishment which must not exceed the sum of the single punishments.

It is assumed that the mere addition of the penalties would result in too harsh a punishment, since if the first crime remain unexpiated, the resistance to the criminal intent will have diminished. This, however, has nothing to do with the estimating of the so-called "Einsatzstrafe" or basic penalty. The limits of this are determined by general principles of penal law. The stronger the criminal intent and the more inimical to common welfare the deed, the more severe would the basic penalty prove. Persistent criminal misdeeds expressive of a particularly low morale on the part of the evil-doer, would consequently induce a punishment considerably more severe than in the case of a single transgression. A thief guilty of theft a single time, may be given a few days' imprisonment. But the thief who steals as a matter of habit or of profession, may under certain circumstances be given as many months or even years. A native who proves to be an incorrigible and dangerous robber, might under certain circumstances be given the supreme legal penalty in order to preserve the community from his depredations, that is—the death sentence. Naturally this could not be imposed as an inclusive penalty (*Gesamtstrafe*) but only as a basic penalty. In the event of a death sentence the establishment of an inclusive penalty is, of course, precluded. In cases in which there are advantageous conditions for the establishment of an inclusive penalty, the same procedure prevails in the case of natives as in the case of Germans.

Since the process of punitive law with reference to the natives has as a whole never been regulated, so, as a matter of principle, isolated sections such as the taking of evidence, and the defence in native cases have also undergone no regulation. Here, too, recourse must be had to the rules of the German code of penal procedure. The accused native

enjoys the same rights of defence as the white. The court procedure does not, as the Blue Book implies, hang in the air, nor can the presiding official "do as he pleases." He is obliged to conduct the proceedings according to German law—giving due consideration to the low degree of education of the blacks and the restrictions this makes necessary. This appertains also to the taking of testimony, which is dominated by the principle that the judge is by his very office obliged to investigate the truth and that he must make use of all the means at his command in order to achieve this.

According to the German point of view only direct, personal speech with the accused and with the witnesses can create a correct picture of the substance of the case or the events that led up to it. The most elaborate reports cannot reproduce the actual living impression of the proceeding itself. Hence, when the authors of the Blue Book cite two cases (a verdict dated June 9, 1913 and another dated September 18, 1914), in which the sentence of death does not seem to be justified by the contents of the protocol, it must be borne in mind that the brief records given here, especially that relating to the military court affair, are but little calculated to afford one an adequate impression of the proceedings as a whole. The writers assert that no Englishman would have been convinced of the guilt of the accused in the cases mentioned. These cases dealt with natives who had been found in the possession of stolen domestic animals and in company of their accomplices.

The English manner of procedure under somewhat similar circumstances is proved by the following instance: Colour-Sergeant P. of the German Protectorate troops was condemned to death by an English court-martial in the Cameroons on November 7, 1915, because his Boy had been found to be in possession of a belt full of hunting-cartridges upon

both being taken prisoner. The Colour-Sergeant himself possessed only regulation ammunition. The Bôy declared that Colour-Sergeant P. had never made use of the hunting cartridges in battle, but had merely used them for shooting game. He was nevertheless sentenced to death upon the pretext that the ammunition belt with the big-game cartridges was in his possession when fighting against the British troops. The sentence was commuted to 20 years' imprisonment and his liberation was finally achieved by means of threatened reprisals.

A most welcome opportunity for the disparagement of German justice in relation to cases of conflict between whites and blacks, is afforded the authors of the Blue Book by the Cramer case. This occupies almost a third of the section devoted to questions of law. Cramer was a man of ill-balanced mind who, to his own great misfortune, came to Africa where he had to do with natives whose nature he did not understand. He was on bad terms with his entire staff of workers, which he was constantly changing, and he was under the obsession that the natives were persistently bent upon poisoning him. In order to force confessions as to which natives were guilty, where the poison was hidden, etc., he beat a native girl and an old woman so long and so hard that large wounds resulted and both had to be taken to the hospital at Gobabis. One of the women died two weeks after entering the hospital, the other was afterwards dismissed and died some six months later. The first verdict against Cramer called for 21 months' imprisonment, the second, in the court of appeals, for 4 months' prison and a fine of 2,700 marks.

The second verdict met with strong criticism on the part of the public in South-West Africa. Almost everybody considered the sentence to be far too light, in spite of certain

mitigating circumstances which some professed to see in Cramer's well-known abnormality of mind. This point of view is surely comprehensible, especially to the judicial layman. The Blue Book declares that it will present and treat this case from a juristic point of view. But the author of this particular section displays no great earnestness in this direction, or at least no ability. His elucidations are in the highest degree amateur, however he seek to disguise the fact with a flow of juristic phraseology.

The Blue Book, in order to proceed properly with this case, would have been obliged to accept as its premiss Paragraph 211 of the German Criminal Code. This paragraph decrees: "Whosoever intentionally kill a human being and perform this killing with deliberation, shall be punished with death for murder." Murder is therefore a killing which has been carried out intentionally and deliberately. The killing is intentional when the murderer desired the murderous deed and was conscious of the fact that it would bring about death. The murderer acts with deliberation when he is of normal mind, that is to say, when he does not act in a state of excitement, nor anger, nor any other exaltation, nor in a condition of apathy. It must be proved that he acted with deliberation, otherwise he is guilty only of homicide. If his intention was only to produce a bodily injury, and this has nevertheless brought about death,—something which did not occur to the doer as a consequence of his act,—then he can be adjudged guilty only of bodily injury with fatal result. If death has ensued without its being possible to prove that this has been the result of the bodily injury, then only a charge of assault and battery may be brought.

Such are the sharp demarcations of the German Criminal Code—which need not be regarded as assailable merely

because they do not meet with the approval of the gentlemen who got up the English Blue Book. Their disapproval should properly have been preceded by an explanation as to where the logical and moral fault lay. At all events the German judge was bound by these legal regulations and could not wilfully depart from them. It is from this viewpoint alone that the judgment against Cramer must be considered.

The death of the two maltreated women could not, according to the expert medical evidence, be proved to have resulted from the chastisements which had previously taken place. A charge of murder or homicide, or of causing grievous bodily harm with fatal results could not therefore be legally established. Neither could there be any question of an abortion, as the Blue Book assumes. For this crime to have been committed it would be necessary as a premiss to assume that it was Cramer's deliberate intention to induce an abortion in the pregnant woman by means of bodily injury. No sensible person would, in view of the circumstances of the case, arrive at the conclusion that this was the intention of the accused. Cramer whipped the women in order to hurt them and thereby force them to a confession, and not in order to produce a miscarriage in the pregnant woman.

The layman may not be satisfied with such a verdict, but the judge cannot ignore the facts, nor the evidence of the medical experts, unless there be special reasons for doing so. In particular, he must not allow himself to be misled by appearances to the contrary, into giving way to a universal human impulse. Judicial verdicts would thereby sacrifice every trace of reliability. The Blue Book takes up a different point of view. It is sufficient for the authors that a woman died some time after the maltreatment, in order to establish a connection between the two events.

Without possessing the requisite medical knowledge, or understanding the development of the fatal illness, the authors feel called upon to declare that a death which ensued six months later was the result of the ill-treatment. This may be permissible according to an English point of view—a German judge cannot proceed on such lines. Even though now and then a case may arise in which the accused obtain an unjustifiable advantage because the facts may be otherwise than they have appeared to be, there can be no doubt that in countless other cases an unjustifiable punishment is averted,—which is, after all, the more important point.

The entire ignorance and lack of understanding which the Blue Book displays with regard to German law, is further revealed by its disquisitions upon the oath of witness. The oath of witness is the solemn confirmation of the truth of a statement made in court. It is intended to impress upon the witness that he must take seriously his duty to speak the truth and nothing but the truth. The taking of an oath can serve a purpose only when the witness possesses the mental qualities necessary for giving reliable evidence and when he sufficiently realizes the meaning of an oath. Neither of these two premises are fulfilled in the case of the great majority of the natives living in the German protectorates. An unbridled phantasy usually distorts their vision of reality, transforms it in their memory and permits it to become manifest in their evidence in a form which appears to the native witness,—susceptible as he is to outward influences,—to fit most readily into the frame of the transaction.

The taking of an oath does not alter this tendency. It cannot put the witness in possession of the lacking attributes. The violation of an oath, that is to say, perjury, is attended with severe penalties. The native, who has no

clear conception of the nature of an oath and who usually conceives of it as a mere outward form, should not be exposed to this danger. He suffers no disadvantage through this. The assumption made by the Blue Book that the oath binds the judge and forces him to accept the statement which has been sworn to as a truth, is a fallacy, and can be explained only by the fact that those who cherish it labour under a complete ignorance of the German legal procedure. In almost every important process-at-law, the judge is confronted by the fact that a number of the witnesses contradict one another in their evidence, without this evidence necessarily bearing directly upon the defence or the prosecution. Were the judge bound to the sworn testimony, a conclusive judgment would be impossible in such instances. A statute so senseless could not survive. At all events it forms no part of any German law. On the contrary, Paragraph 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which seems to be unknown to the experts of the Blue Book, expressly declares: "The court decides upon the result of the evidence according to its free convictions arising out of the aggregate of the proceedings."

The judge has therefore to form his decision, taking into account all the circumstances as revealed by the oral proceedings. The law not only places no restriction upon him in this matter, but makes it incumbent upon him to be bound by no rules. He has therefore to test the sworn and unsworn evidence entirely according to its inherent value and content of truth and is obliged, according to circumstances, to deny all credence to the sworn evidence and to base his decision upon the unsworn evidence. It is precisely the verdict given against Cramer which should have taught the authors of the Blue Book that their valuation of the oath in German legal procedure was an erroneous

one. The grounds of the judgment repeat the comprehensive deliberations made by the presiding judge in order to gain a true picture of the reality. The utterance of every individual witness is tested for its content of truth by means of irrefutable objective facts, and after exhausting every possible means of proof, the opinion is expressed (in favour of the natives) that the assumption of the accused that these had wished to poison him, was erroneous.

Precisely for the reason that an oath does not necessarily impress the seal of unassailable veracity upon a piece of evidence, the native cannot be said to be placed at a disadvantage by not being permitted to swear. His evidence, even though unsworn, counts for as much as its credibility deserves. His being put under oath would not augment his value as a witness if his personal qualities did not cause him to appear reliable. The author of this section of the Blue Book claims to have had favourable experiences in this connection with the natives of various countries. The personal championship of the author in support of a contrary opinion,—an opinion which also has its protagonists in Germany,—cannot, of course, carry any weight in the question at issue. The German Administration has kept this question steadily to the fore and has repeatedly brought it up for fresh discussion. After the most careful deliberations it has again and again decided not to place the natives of the Protectorate under oath—and this chiefly in their own interests. The Administration assumes the full responsibility for this decision. Whilst paying due deference to all outside opinions, it cannot accept these as the guide-lines for its own actions.

The German Administration has neither any reason nor any desire to palliate the conduct of Farmer Cramer. On the contrary, it is inspired by the same moral indignation

as the English critic in the Blue Book with regard to the excesses of which this man was guilty and the havoc which he caused. It can only express the most intense regret that such persons should make their way to the colonies and injure the German name through their actions. But surely such things do not occur only in *German* colonies?

Surely the atrocities committed by the Belgians in the Congo, by the British in Egypt and in India, by the French in West Africa and Morocco and elsewhere have given far greater cause for complaint and accusation? Have England, Belgium and France given up their colonial activities because subjects of these nations have been guilty of unheard-of outrages? Have they been persuaded by such excesses that they are unfit to partake in the task of spreading civilization in these regions of the globe? In order to judge whether a people be capable and worthy of accomplishing colonization work, the achievements of this people as a whole must be considered, and the good which it has produced must be weighed in the balance against the evil which has been done by a few isolated individuals.

Reverence for the inviolability of the judge forbids, according to German views, all official criticism of a delivered judgment—and we do not wish to depart from this principle even here. And yet we may for once assume the viewpoint of the Blue Book to be correct—that the crimes of Cramer met with no sufficient expiation. On the other hand—does it *never* occur in England that mild sentences arouse dissatisfaction among the public! Is it *not* a common phenomenon in all lands that judicial verdicts are frequently at variance with the general sentiment of the populace? The Blue Book itself agrees in the case under consideration that the German judge had thoroughly and carefully illuminated and considered all the factors. This judge must be given credit for in-

investigating each separate instance with the most scrupulous conscientiousness and for discussing them with the most unrestricted frankness. He did not confine his endeavours merely to ascertaining the outward facts, but went so far as to analyze the inmost thoughts and illusions of Cramer. After the most exhaustive deliberations he declined to accept the statement of the accused that he had been menaced by attempts at poisoning, and characterized this belief as erroneous. The natives were herein given full justice—contrary to the imputation which the Blue Book constantly makes to the effect that the natives in comparison to the whites receive no justice at the hands of the German judges.

Were that true precisely *this* case would have been bound to result differently. For even to this day a great number of the farmers of South-West Africa are convinced that Cramer was actually in danger of his life from attacks on the part of the natives. So far as the approximation of the penalty was concerned the judge could not ignore the fact that Cramer had obviously acted under the illusion that his life was actually threatened through poison by the natives. His excesses were for that reason not mere outgrowths of brutality, but also—naturally highly reprehensible—aberrations of a kind of persecution-mania. According to German law this fact would lead to preventing the full rigour of the law from being applied in his case. The decision of the judge is hereby neither approved nor disapproved—we have simply striven to illuminate it according to the principles of German law.

One fact must, however, be mentioned, namely that the government of the Protectorate, in view of Cramer's misdeeds, refused to grant him any further permission to keep labourers on his farm. Considered practically, this was an extraordinarily severe punishment for Cramer, since it meant nothing

more nor less than the destruction of the entire activities on his farm. Had the compilers of the Blue Book been actuated by clean principles of intellectual honesty they would in the spirit of decency not have failed to mention this fact. Of course that by which they *were* actuated did not permit them to reconcile such honesty with the kind of work they had in hand.

In addition to the Cramer case the Blue Book also devotes considerable space to the Sichtermann and the Böhmer cases. According to the representation of the Blue Book, Dr. Sichtermann, a member of the staff of a mining company, ordered two natives to be manhandled in such a way as to produce their death soon afterwards. The motive was again an attempt at murder by means of poison. Certain natives had accused other natives of trying to poison them and Sichtermann was anxious to compel a confession by means of blows. There was no process of law in this instance. The only evidence consists of statements subsequently collected by the English. Böhmer was sentenced at Windhuk for the maltreatment of natives—insufficiently sentenced, according to the Blue Book. The actual truth concerning these two cases cannot be established here—because the official documents are not available. Excesses of all kinds have always been rigorously condemned by the German authorities. In view of the entire drift of the Blue Book, its partisan distortions, its misrepresentations and its general unreliability, it is more than probable that the real circumstances of these cases differ materially from the versions therein presented.

The natural inference to be drawn from the citation of such cases, designed to asperse German morals, German justice and German laws, must surely be that the history of the English colonies shows no similar instances, that England's record here is immaculate. But what is the reality?

The *Daily News* of December 11, 1918, reports the following instance of British humanity to the natives:

FLOGGED TO DEATH.

Revolt Story from East Africa.

From East Africa the Government has received information of a revolting incident happily rare in British Colonial history. A correspondent writes: An East African native some time last year was discovered stealing flour or corn from the store of a white man—Mr. H. E. Watts, of Lumbwa. The native was then subjected to the most frightful floggings.

According to the evidence in the court, the man was first flogged by Mr. Watts, and later on an employec, another white man, named Betschart, associated himself with the punishment. After the first flogging, it was stated in evidence, the native was thrown into a pond and taken out and flogged, this treatment being repeated until the native was unable to stand. He was then carried to the house of the white man, Betschart, where he was "spread-eagled" under a bed, each hand and foot being tied to one of the bed-posts. During the night Betschart was seen carrying away from the farm the body of a native, and on the next day was observed taking a can of petroleum and some wood and making a fire, upon which it ultimately transpired he attempted to burn the body.

In September Watts and Betschart were placed on their trial at Nakuru, when the jury rejected the charge of murder brought against them, and found them guilty only of "simple hurt" and "hurt" respectively. The judge then bound over Betschart in a sum of 1,500 rupees for good behaviour for twelve months, and Watts was fined 1,000 rupees, or six months, rigorous imprisonment. The fine in the latter case has, it is understood, been paid.

Any comment upon this would be superfluous. And yet these be the people who raise a hue and cry over the inadequacy of the far more severe punishment meted out to Cramer!

In a section devoted to the relations between the whites and the negroes since the occupation, the Blue Book records a number of cases in which Germans had been sentenced for acts of violence, especially the killing of natives. We make no attempt to condone or extenuate these acts. If they really occurred in the manner described by the Blue Book, they were well worthy of punishment, and it is quite in

order that the evil-doers should be summoned to account. But the question as to whether such individual cases are of the slightest value in drawing an unfavourable conclusion as to the character and the disposition of the Germans in South-West Africa, can only be answered from the following standpoint:

These stories and descriptions emanate from *British*, that is to say, from *hostile* sources, and were compiled whilst the war was being waged with full intensity. They cannot therefore, from the very nature of the circumstances, be accepted as unbiassed and objective. The British seized the country, and wish to keep it, as the Blue Book plainly proves. It is clear that they would wish to establish some effective title of right to excuse their appropriation of German soil and that they naturally regard the declaration of the negroes that they would rather be under British than German rule as a means to this end. -England for this reason has every cause to adopt as benevolent an attitude as possible towards the native population in order to persuade it that it would be better off under British than under German rule. This cunning purpose is best achieved in that the English show themselves, as hitherto, hostile to the Germans and friendly to the natives.

The native population naturally soon became aware and appreciative of this and did not hesitate to make the most of the opportunity. The natives ceased to fear the Germans as their masters; they became disobedient and rebellious and no longer exercised the least restraint in their depredations upon the property of their employers. This was bound to lead to strained relations, particularly at the beginning, before both parties had become accustomed to the new conditions. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the year 1915 which discloses the greatest number of cases in which Germans have been tried for acts committed upon the natives.

Behind all this lies a great wrong which England in its cruel and insensate hatred and under the incitement of its satanic press, perpetrated against the white race as a whole. For all reports from the African theatres of war agree in this,—namely that the English not only gave a free hand to the blacks in the humiliation and maltreatment of Germans, but that they directly encouraged them in this. The detestable motive that actuated this was, of course, the desire to destroy the good name of the Germans, root and branch, and to give the blacks the satisfaction of committing crimes and outrages upon Germans without incurring any punishment. That raw animalism of this sort was bound to find a fertile soil among the blacks is evident to all who understand African psychology.

The natives were certain to let no opportunity pass of showing contempt of and insolence towards the Germans. This was certain to drive the Germans to extreme irritation. As they could hope for no protection from the English, their anger and rage continued to smoulder within their hearts. The constant exasperation under which these unfortunate men lived would then frequently break forth into some act of violence upon the first occasion when patience and dignity could no longer bear the terrible provocations. The consequences were such cases as the Blue Book would now, with smug hypocrisy, hold up to the world as examples of German blood-thirstiness and cruelty! No trace of the inner history of these cases appears in the English protocols. Nor is this surprising, for first of all a protocol gives one only a very imperfect idea of a trial, and secondly the English were naturally interested in suppressing all the mitigating circumstances in these cases.

An example of England's traditional procedure in such cases as these is contained in the publication of J. C. Smuts, the former Public Prosecutor of the South African Republic,

and now a member of the British Cabinet. It bears the title of "A Century of Wrong." Smuts writes:

"The British Government wounded the Afrikanders in their most sensitive feelings in that, in numberless cases, it favoured the cause of the natives in preference to that of the Boers. For instance, the Boers were obliged to witness the painful spectacle of the laying waste of their homes and property by the natives without being in a position to defend themselves, since the British Government had robbed them even of their ammunition. The free-born Boer was guarded by police composed of Hottentots, the most degraded of all the native races of South Africa."

In connection with this damning accusation against English "chivalry", Smuts describes the "terrible event" of March 9, 1816. A number of Boers, driven to desperation by the brutality of the English, had risen in armed revolt. The revolt was crushed. By command of the British Government, six Boers were hanged at Slachternek in the most inhuman manner and *in the enforced presence of their wives and children*. The wretched men were only *half-hanged*, for the gallows broke, whereupon the victims, already in their death-throes, were once more hoisted into the air and strangled.

The name of Slachternek ought to be familiar to such experts upon South African atrocities (of other nations) as the authors of the Blue Book. This publication makes a special show of photographs of executions of natives by the Germans, and remarks that regular gallows do not seem to have been used, and that the procedure was frequently so primitive that the result could only have been slow strangulation. It is true that the Germans did not carry gallows with them on their military expeditions, and that they were obliged to have recourse to primitive means whenever it became necessary to inflict the death penalty in the interior parts of the Protectorate. What conclusions are to be drawn from these facts? Surely these legal German executions cannot for a moment compare in barbarity with the

horrible incident narrated by General Smuts. The reproductions of these official German photographs are not designed to prove that the Germans were guilty of irregular conduct in these hangings, but simply to show that the Germans hanged negroes in their colonies. The pictures are meant to make a cheap and gruesome appeal to the ignorance of the masses and to work upon their nerves and imaginations.

An equally cunning and shabby trick is played in producing pictures of fettered prisoners and of manacles for the hands and feet as used in the administration of justice in South-West Africa. Much ado is also made of the fettering of native prisoners. And yet the authors of the Blue book *cannot deny that they know* that such manacles for the hand and feet are used regularly and abundantly in the English colonies, not only to prevent flight but also to inflict punishment. In Nigeria, for instance, convicts who bear fetters both on the arms and the legs, fetters which are not removed even during a march, are forced to perform the heaviest labour on the roads from morning until night. The things that happen in Australia in this connection are repeatedly referred to in Part Three of this book.

The charges and accusations levelled against the German Administration in the English Blue Book are repudiated, annulled and disproved in all *their essential points*. Human nature is imperfect and human error is universal. Insofar as such errors have been committed in the German colonies, they may be said to be overwhelmingly outnumbered and outweighed by England's infinitely longer and blacker record in her colonies. If these English moralists be held to the postulate they have set up, the inexorable conclusion must be drawn, *by virtue of their own arguments*, that England has irretrievably lost all right to the possession of any colonial land whatsoever.

PART THREE

**TREATMENT OF NATIVES
IN THE
BRITISH COLONIES**

III.

TREATMENT OF NATIVES IN THE BRITISH COLONIES.

I N the foregoing pages we have had the opportunity of citing various English opinions and judgments with reference to the methods of administration in the British colonies in order to demonstrate that the zealous, if not over-particular authors of the Blue Book would have been more wisely occupied in busying themselves with the flaws and faults of their own colonial system, rather than with the disparagement of Germany's, which so many English authorities had acclaimed as exemplary—before the war.

In order in some degree to complete our necessary and, let us hope, illuminating task, we shall proceed to quote in the following pages certain frank and honest opinions of the English press regarding the colonial possessions of England. Only a small selection has been made, and the quotations might be indefinitely prolonged.

1. EGYPT.

If we compare conditions in Egypt before and after its occupation by England, there can be no doubt that an external progress in every field of administration becomes evident. The financial system has been well regulated in contrast to conditions in Ismail's time when the state was bankrupt; the courts perform their functions in forms that are at least outwardly correct, whilst formerly he who had the most *baksheesh* to offer would usually carry off the jud-

icial victory. The productivity of the soil and the extension of the arable area have been furthered, and the productions of the land considerably increased. The educational system has succeeded in making some progress against illiteracy—even though very slow progress. At the same time we are confronted by two questions concerning these things: does this progress bear any relation to the time and money expended by the occupying power?—furthermore, have these things accrued to the advantage of the country or to the advantage of the usurper of the country?

If we begin with the discussion of the most important of Egyptian problems—the reformation of the educational system, we find the actual progress made during 35 years of British control to be practically negligible. *At the present day 91% of the entire population are unable to read or write!* When we consider that formerly 95% of the Egyptians of both sexes were sunk in this deplorable state of analphabetism, we must conclude that the “progress” made during thirty-five years of English “education” is exceedingly lamentable. All attempts to explain away these annihilating figures are mere sorry and irrelevant subterfuges. England would have been able to provide for the education of the Egyptians had she so desired. But she did *not* so desire, since it was to her interest to be able to rule over an ignorant people, a people mentally unequipped. Great Britain remained true to her Indian methods.

She erected large, ostentatious government schools in the large cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. In these schools a desolate kind of tuition was doled out in English, adapted wholly to the use of government clerks, and by teachers who, for the greater part, were ignorant of the language of the country and whose one purpose was to train their pupils to become docile and humble petty officials in the

service of England. The same conditions which prevailed in the primary schools, also prevailed in the faculties of the high schools, in the technical schools and those devoted to the study of law and medicine. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge was taboo in these institutions. Only one end was kept in view—the conversion of the young Egyptians into dependable machines for the benefit of their English masters. Sir Eldon Gorst naively confesses to this magnificent ideal in his Report for 1908: “The education which is bestowed by the State is designed chiefly for those who wish to enter the Government service, or to take up a profession.” Popular education *per se* may therefore be said to form no part of the program of the English educational system in Egypt.

English school-teachers stand far below the intellectual average necessary to procure this title on the Continent. The salaries of these ladies and gentlemen are, however, in inverse ratio to the quality of their accomplishments. Hence, the fact that the Expense Budget of the Ministry of Education shows a sevenfold increase over the original annual expenditure of 81,000 pounds, proves nothing more (in view of the stagnation of illiteracy) than that steadily-increasing numbers of pedagogic parasites have been imported from England to Egypt. In order to mention only one instance, there were as a matter of fact among the 46 teachers of three high-schools for boys in Cairo, only 3 Egyptians as against 43 Britons! The ridiculous number of three government schools of the higher grade in a city of over 700,000 inhabitants, coincided relatively with the number of schools supported by the government in the entire country. There are but 68 primary and secondary schools for a population of over 11 millions, under the direct control of the Ministry of Public Instruction, that is to say, one school

for each 160,000 of the population! The number of higher schools has *decreased fivefold since the British occupation*. Surely a splendid testimonial to the zeal for education manifested by the British usurpers! The fact that the native Arabic tongue is completely neglected in favour of the English has already been alluded to. The pupils who leave these schools have consequently become strangers in their own land. How little value the English teachers place upon the Arabic language is clearly revealed in the fact that in the course of 13 years only 154 European teachers passed the elementary examination, 13 the advanced courses, and only 1 the final examination!

During the period of Egyptian independence, education through the schools was entirely free of cost. Since the occupying power has descended upon the land, expensive school fees have been introduced everywhere, so that those of modest means were unable to attend school. This measure explains the extraordinary decrease in the number of attendances at the high-schools and also why great numbers of Egyptians study in Europe.

Before the World War there were not more than 20 pupils enrolled at the Medical High School at Cairo and the number of instructors was frequently in excess of the total number of students.

A particularly wretched condition of things is revealed in the administration of the *Kuttabs*, or elementary schools. These number about 4000 and the overwhelming majority of them owe their origin to private initiative. The method of instruction pursued in them makes a mock of all pedagogy. The teacher is frequently blind, and often himself hardly capable of reading or writing. His chief activity consists in inculcating in the children under him a superficial knowledge of the Koran and the Arabic alphabet by rote—

chiefly through the manipulation of a cunningly-devised instrument of castigation—the *falaka*. In the majority of cases there is no instruction beyond these rudiments, and the Annual Report of the British Consul-General was constantly wont to register a self-complacent regret in connection with this depressing fact. The Mosque of Azhar, formerly the University of Islam, was a *Kuttab* in the higher sense of the word. This institution, erstwhile the seat of Mohammedan learning, has now sunk to a mere intellectual tread-mill devoted to a dry and deadly scholastic routine. All that earlier centuries have created through the strivings of a free and aspiring Mohammedan culture is now presented in a petrified form, mildewed with dogma and tradition for the indiscriminating adoration of a posterity which has been systematically impoverished in spirit. Whenever enlightened Islamic circles protest against this, whenever the learned men of the Azhar Mosque themselves cry out for reforms, the British powers of occupation, fortified by the Mohammedan orthodoxy, oppose these aspirations by their *quod non*, or, as in the case of the strike of the Azhar students in 1910, by their armed forces.

Let us now proceed to cast a glance at the activities of the Egyptian courts with regard to the progress these have made under British rule. It must be conceded as a fact that before the British occupation, great corruption reigned here, as in all other branches of the service. We will also concede that conditions have been bettered. But is there an Anglo-Egyptian court official who dare affirm that an Egyptian court—we are not speaking of international courts of law—is free of corruption? That there does not exist at Cairo and Alexandria the institution of venal and professional perjurers? We are prepared to prove this. Would

the Egyptian Department of Justice venture to dispute the fact that criminality has been steadily on the increase since the occupation? Would the Anglo-Egyptian Government deny that justice and equity are made secondary to political expediency? Did not Lord Cromer, "the maker of modern Egypt," euphemistically acknowledge that "the unfortunate Denshawai incident resulted in a number of accused persons being condemned to sentences which, though not unjust, were, I may now readily admit, unduly severe?" The infamous Denshawai affair will blacken British justice forever. It occurred as follows:

On the 13th of June, 1906, several English officers went shooting pigeons on private lands in the neighbourhood of Denshawai in the Delta. An old peasant warned the interpreter who accompanied the officers, that already during the previous year the natives had been made restless through the shooting of their pigeons by English officers, and that it was not advisable to repeat such an adventure. Despite this warning the shooting began. The pigeons were not wild, but *tame* and were the property of the villagers, in many cases the *only* property of these poor people. After the shooting had gone on for some time a woman was wounded and a peasant's house set on fire. The fellaheen came running up from all sides and there was a fight in which three Egyptians were injured by the English and three English officers by the natives. Captain Bull, one of the injured officers, withdrew from the scrimmage and ran more than three miles at topmost speed under a sun which registered a temperature of 138 degrees Fahrenheit! The man fell dead through sun-stroke. When the British soldiers heard what had happened to their officers, they attacked a village in the neighbourhood of Denshawai and killed a peasant by cleaving his skull.

Such are the facts. They had no sooner been made known than the British authorities lost their heads and appeared horrified to see that the Egyptians ventured to defend their lives and property. Instead of considering the affair in a calm, objective manner, as is the custom in such cases, they began to exaggerate things and long before the verdict was given, the pro-British press announced that the punishment which would be inflicted was to serve as a terrible example. That is to say, *there was not to be justice, but a remorseless revenge.*

The Minister of the Interior at the request of the British legal advisor, Mr. Matchell, published an official notice a week before the trial, in which he piled up the charges against the accused, and deliberately sought to prejudice the judge and English public opinion—a punishable offence (contempt of court) according to British law. One of the pro-British sheets went so far in its contempt for justice as to declare that timber for gallows had been brought to Denshawai. The horrified population hereupon asked itself what kind of judgment would follow a demonstration so gruesome as this?

The court was convened on June 24th. The judges of this extraordinary tribunal sympathized almost entirely with the English side of the case. They were empowered to proceed with all the authority of a military court (“to act under no law”) and to inflict any penalty they chose without *possibility of appeal or pardon.* The investigations lasted three days. It was *clearly proved* that the British officers had provoked the peasants in that they had shot at the pigeons, the property of the peasants, and wounded a woman, and that the peasants had attacked the Englishmen, not as British officers, but as poaching sportsmen. British doctors testified that Captain Bull had died of heat apoplexy and that his

injuries could not have sufficed to produce his death. *A half-hour sufficed the Court for examining more than 50 defendants.* The Court refused to hear a police official who declared that the British officers had fired upon the farmers, and it based its verdict exclusively upon the statements of the officers who had provoked the trouble.

Sentence was passed on June 25th. Four Egyptians were condemned to be hanged, two to forced labour for life, one to 15 years forced labour and another to 7; three to a year's imprisonment and public whipping, and five to whippings—each of them to 50 lashes with the five-tailed “cat.” The execution took place on the following day, so that only 14 days elapsed between the event and the carrying out of the sentence.

At four o'clock in the morning the four men who had been condemned to death, and the eight who had been sentenced to whippings, were transported to the village of Choubada, two or three miles from Denshawai. Here for more than nine hours the martyred men were kept waiting for the terrible revenge that was to be taken upon them. They were then taken to Denshawai. With refined cruelty the British authorities insisted that the execution take place upon the same spot where the attack had occurred and at the same hour of the day. A circle of about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles in circumference was roped off. The gallows stood within this enclosure. The doomed men were under escort of British dragoons and these in turn were protected by Egyptian cavalry. Mr. Matchell and the Provincial Governor were present at the execution. The son of the first man who was to be hanged begged permission to hear the last wishes of his father. *This request was refused.* At half-past one o'clock the British troops mounted their horses and drew their sabres. A minute afterwards the hangings began.

One of the men was hanged. His family, his relatives and all the villagers stood without the enclosure and filled the air with their piteous lamentations. The next two men were then mercilessly whipped *in front of the corpse*, and this scene was repeated three times, until four men had been hanged and eight whipped. This horrible drama lasted a full hour—a spectacle as barbaric and revolting as any that had ever taken place anywhere—a scene which wrung tears of pity and horror from the eyes of every European present. All of them, upon leaving the spot, repeated the words which one of the hanged men had cried at the last moment: “Curse upon the tyrants! Curse upon the tyrants!”

This unutterably bestial murder by law aroused tremendous indignation throughout the entire land and contributed materially to strengthening the nationalistic opposition in Egypt. The growth of the movement for independence, which at first expressed itself by purely legal methods, such as press and party agitation, was met by the Egyptian government with a series of draconic laws against the freedom of the press and the right of assembly. The nationalistic press, which demanded nothing more than a form of government based upon democracy and justice and free from external influences, that is to say, merely those things which England herself had promised in innumerable official declarations to establish—was robbed of every possibility of existence. Spies and informers were encouraged and began to flourish everywhere.

In February 1910, after the rage and despair of the Egyptians had culminated in the assassination by a young passionate Egyptian patriot, Ibrahim el Wardani, of the then Prime Minister, a Copt by name of Boutros Pasha, there followed a fresh series of persecutions and prosecutions of the leaders of the Young Egyptian movement, many of whom were

forced to leave the country. The will and voice of the Egyptian people were, of course, not considered in the slightest in the passing of these laws, any more than in shaping the laws of the country or the courts. England, which has filled the world with boasts of its parliamentary system and its liberties of the people, has remained deaf to the incessantly-repeated demands of the Egyptians for a true representative government.

When the British first set foot in Egypt, an Egyptian Parliament had been created by a decree of the Khedive, but this Parliament was never able to meet. In its place Egypt, up to the year 1913, possessed a "Law-giving Council," and a "National Assembly" both of which enjoyed merely an advisory voice in the making of laws. The actual governing power was in the hands of the Ministerial Council, appointed *pro forma* by the Khedive, but actually appointed by the British diplomatic agents. The Ministers were again supported by English "advisers," without whose assent and countersignature no law or proclamation was legal. The whole system was in fact, nothing more than a most ridiculous travesty of a popular government, and nothing less than the absolute dictatorship of the English rulers and usurpers. In order to quiet in some degree the steadily-growing opposition of the people to this tedious and threadbare farce, a new constitutional principle was proclaimed in 1913 under Lord Kitchener's *régime*, in which a "Law-giving Assembly" in place of the old corporations was provided for. This Assembly, which is composed of the Ministers, of 66 elected and 17 appointed members, still exists. So far as its authority is concerned, it is little more than a fruitless debating society. It enjoys, as in the former councils, the privilege of "advising," and, as a new concession, the right of interpel-

lation of the Government, without the Ministers being compelled to answer the questions of the representatives of the people. The solitary improvement consists in this: that in all affairs relating to taxes, the consent of the Assembly is necessary before the proposal of the Government can become law. Inasmuch as 24 members are in part to belong to the Government and in part to be selected by it, efficient means have been taken to prevent the liberties and aspirations of this sham parliament from attaining supernal heights.

In violating every canon of international law in Egypt after the outbreak of the World War, Britain merely acted according to its immemorial practices. The Suez Canal was international. England fortified it and used it as a strategic line. Egypt had issued a declaration of neutrality. A day later England enforced its recall. The German and Austrian-Hungarian judges who had been given office in the law-courts by virtue of solemn treaties, were removed and the private property of the citizens of these countries confiscated. The Capitulations had not been suspended and in view of this it was naturally to be supposed that in all questions relating to the business of the German and Austro-Hungarian Consulates, the neutral countries who were in charge of the interests of these nations, should be entitled to represent them. Nevertheless the English persisted in establishing departments for enemy aliens in their own consulates, and in these judgments were pronounced by English judges.

The English High Command also attempted to exert as much influence as possible upon the verdicts of the mixed courts. So far as these attempts were confined to the lower courts they were invariably successful. Various judgments were pronounced to the effect that Germans could not sue

by process of law, though they themselves were subject to being sued. The Germans, it was contended, merited such treatment as punishment for belonging to a nation which, it was alleged, had been guilty of violations of private and international law! These monstrous judgments, in which all the rancour and the blind rage of an insensate hatred found characteristic expression, were, however, not confirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The much and loudly-vaunted reforms in the domain of Egyptian agriculture and irrigation of which England makes such capital as a sign and symbol of her civilization, are revealed upon closer investigation to be anything but noble works of disinterestedness. It is true that the area of cultivated land has been considerably increased since the occupation. But to whom does the chief advantage accrue? Not to the Egyptian farmer, but to the merchant and mill-owner of Manchester. As a result of the one-sided favouring of cotton culture and the ban placed upon certain other cultures, such as tobacco, Egypt, which depends entirely upon the cultivation of its soil, is forced to stake its all upon the results of the cotton harvest and upon the prevailing condition of the English market. The land which at one time was accounted the granary of the world *is today forced to import grain for bread!* Of the four great dams intended to regulate the overflow of the Nile, one—the barrage of Kaljub—was already in existence before the occupation. Of the three others, the largest, the dam at Assouam, must be regarded as a colossal failure. Twice already has it become necessary to reinforce and raise this gigantic structure at an enormous expense in order to make it sufficiently high and strong to bear the tremendous masses of water. The costs of these huge repairs were always borne by the Egyptian people. The irrigation service itself is dominated by

arbitrariness, patronage and bribery, as proved by the frequent scandals and suits at law.

The Anglo-Egyptian agrarian policy was most questionable in connection with the Soudan. After the British Administration had become aware that there were tremendous possibilities for the cultivation of cotton in the wide Soudanese plains, it proceeded in the interests of the home industry, to exploit these regions absolutely indifferent as to whether these activities seriously damaged Egyptian agriculture or not. Owing to the dams and locks along the Upper Nile in the Soudan, the river is frequently deprived of the volumes of water and the fertilizing elements necessary for the welfare of Egyptian agriculture. The price of the Egyptian cotton is also seriously affected through competition. Through the establishment of Port Soudan Egypt is no longer in a position to enjoy even the benefits of the transit trade.

So far as social welfare for the country proletariat is concerned—a proletariat city population does not exist in view of the almost complete absence of industries—England has done practically nothing. The small farmer is almost without exception up to his ears in debt and is subjected to the most outrageous robbery at the hands of usurers. The legal announcements of forced sales of small country holdings occupy an appalling amount of space in the newspapers. During the year 1910 the Agricultural Bank proceeded to the forced sale of the property of some 40,000 debtors—most of the demands being for sums less than £ 50.

The fellah is almost without exception so poverty-stricken that he is driven to mortgage his harvest at usurious rates merely to obtain money for seed-grain. Should a bad harvest, illness or some other untoward circumstance cause the

surplus to fall below the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor and to cover the farmer's own needs, catastrophe becomes inevitable. In order to do away with these evil conditions and to make himself popular with the people, Lord Kitchener, disregarding the advice of all experts, issued the "Five Feddan Law," which proved to be a total failure. This unfortunate attempt forcibly to protect the small farmer against the aggressions of the usurers, led to the fellah being deprived of all legitimate sources of credit, without which, under prevailing conditions, it was impossible for him to cultivate his field—and on the other hand it opened the door to all kinds of evasions of the law through sham purchases and similar manœuvres.

The regulation of the financial system of Egypt is undoubtedly a signal service on the part of England. But in this field, too, England rakes in the direct and the indirect profits. England holds first place in the export and the import trade of the land. If Egypt to-day be productive and prosperous, it is the English manufacturer and merchant who derive the greatest benefit from this. The greater part of all goods delivered for the Egyptian Government comes from England, despite the fact that the system of free international competition is in operation. But since the government is not pledged to award competitive contracts to the lowest bidder for the same quality of goods, the so-called equalization of all nations is a mere sham. The payment of the vast horde of British officials and the maintenance of the army of occupation is exclusively at the expense of the Egyptian finances. We are confronted here with the grotesque paradox that the unfortunate country is forced to *pay* and *support* its unwelcome task-masters and exploiters. And the salaries of these persons are in most cases most

generously estimated and stand in no relation to the salary and the services of the native Egyptian official of equal rank.

Although Egypt is not obliged to maintain a large standing army—this consists of only 18,000 men who are also largely used as working troops—although the budget of the Ministry of Education, after the entire abolishment of free tuition, amounts to only £550,000; although, furthermore, the burden of taxes placed upon the people is an extraordinarily heavy one (the land tax in Egypt amounts to almost 40 shillings per *hectare*, the inhabited house duty to 10^o/_o of the annual rent, that is, more than the *rent for a whole month*)—although the balance of trade is permanently favourable and the private property of Ismail Pasha was liquidated at about 6½ millions of pounds—the *burden of debt borne by Egypt has increased during the occupation*.

The explanation for this remarkable state of affairs is to be sought for chiefly in the Soudanese policy of the Government. In the Soudan there exists an Anglo-Egyptian co-government,—that is to say, England has the government and Egypt the duty of paying the expenses. During the first ten years following upon the reconquest of the Soudan, the costs of administering the land which were placed upon Egypt were estimated by England at £4,200,000. These costs were, however, estimated by the Egyptians at not less than £18,700,000! In this connection it will prove illuminating to quote a passage from a recent book by Mr. Steele Hardy, "Thirty-five Years of British Rule in Egypt." It throws a remarkable light upon Egyptian finances and upon a procedure which in the business world is described as "doctoring the balance."

"It happened that, by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, certain Reserve Funds for Budget surpluses and the *Caisse* were merged into

one, and the British representatives, having undertaken to adjust matters by paying the coupon, (as it was fully expected) the sum of £13,000,000 would accrue to the Egyptian Treasury. A further £13,000,000 should have accrued from other surpluses during the succeeding five years, bringing the total of funds in the Treasury at that time to not less than £26,000,000. According to the official statement, however, the amount in all was only £6,000,000, the remaining £20,000,000 being till the present moment unaccounted for in any official return. Where are the £20,000,000? Were they expended upon the Soudan and this amount restored to the Treasury in order to balance the deficit, which had been hidden from the nation? All manner of hypotheses were advanced, but the truth has not been revealed."

Equally strange was the behaviour of the Egyptian Government in the question, not to say the scandal, of the extension of the Suez Canal Concessions. The Egyptian Government had offered the Canal Company an extension of 40 years beyond the original date of expiration in 1968 for a payment of 4 million pounds. In this wise Egypt resigned all rights to exploit the most important water-way in the world for more than a generation, to a company more than one-third of whose stock was in British hands, merely to avoid transitory financial embarrassments and to enable responsible British officials to "regulate" their dubious accounts! This plan did not remain secret, and owing to pressure of public opinion and the guilty conscience of the Government, a general conference was called which rejected the nefarious project by a vote of 66 to 1. This attempt to bolster up Egyptian finances cost the chief protagonist of English interests, Boutros Pasha, his life a few months later—when the wrath of the Egyptian Nationalists had already been aroused by other causes.

In conclusion we shall throw a glance at what is perhaps the most shameful chapter in the history of the British occupation—the sanitary conditions. Every European who has ever travelled in Egypt has observed the unspeakably

sad conditions under which masses of the population live, both in the cities and the country. Apart from the comparatively few well-to-do natives in the cities and a small number of large landed owners, the people vegetate in hovels unworthy the name of human habitations amidst filth and hygienic conditions that beggar all description. There is scarcely any police control of buildings; domestic hygiene is an unknown term; sewage-systems are nowhere to be seen. In the country man and beast live together in foul and primitive huts of clay. As a result Egypt was and still is a hot-bed of all sorts of plagues and pestilences. The last epidemic of cholera (1902) demanded a toll of 34,000 lives; the plague which had completely disappeared since 1853, has once more become endemic since 1899,—4000 cases occurred in 1913. A further spread of this disease was to be observed during the war. Spotted fever, typhoid, small-pox and dysentery are never absent.

Terrible is the mortality among children. Although the mothers always suckle their babies, the infant mortality during the first year of life amounts to 30 to 40 per cent. Of all large cities Cairo has the highest infant death-rate. The blame for this must be attributed exclusively to the miserable conditions of life and the dirt in which the poorer classes live today—despite all the blessings of English civilisation. There is no government institution for the care of children—merely a few well-meant but wholly inadequate funds got up by Mohammedan divines and small private groups of Europeans. The British government of occupation has also practically done nothing to combat ophthalmia, since time immemorial the curse of Egypt. Absolutely not a single measure was adopted to alleviate this terrible scourge until the year 1902. Since then through the personal initiative of Sir Ernest Cassel, and after overcoming great obstacles,

14 eye-hospitals were founded with the help of native notables. The extent of this relief in comparison with the need, may be estimated by the following figures. The population suffers from chronic eye-disease to the extent of 95 per cent; hundreds of thousands are infected every year with aggravated inflammation of the eyes, resulting in constant emission of matter. For this reason the statistics of blindness are appalling. According to the estimates of the English eye-surgeon, Dr. MacCollum, there are some 200,000 blind persons in Egypt and 400,000 with but one eye,—that is to say, over 5 per cent of the entire population as against 0·008 in Prussia.

Leprosy is one of the diseases which are endemic in Egypt. Though even "the rotten Turkish Government" has erected homes for lepers in Palastine, such are entirely unknown to the model government of Egypt. Some 6,000 lepers live in Egypt in undisturbed intercourse with the rest of the population.

Rigorous laws against the importation of hasheesh and opium exist, to be sure—on paper. Nevertheless at present 8 percent of the mental diseases registered in the lunatic asylums are to be attributed to indulgence in these poisons. A stroll through the notorious Fish Market of Cairo or the Genena Quarter of Alexandria will reveal to every stranger to what an extent open indulgence in these drugs is tolerated by the government police. In these quarters too there festers—absolutely unhindered by the government of the usually so prudish and moralistic Albion—a prostitution more horrifying in its forms than in any other spot on the globe. Here human flesh lies exposed to sale behind bars, as in cages, living chattels from every land of the Orient and the Occident, of all ages and colours, of the female sex and the male, offered as bargains for carnal

joys. No glimmer of art redeems these dens of vice. Amidst them thrive gambling hells, hasheesh holes and cafés chantant of the lowest order. And at night you may see moving amidst this inferno ladies and gentlemen concupiscently curious, conducted by guides duly authorized by the state!

Let us now sum up from the foregoing the inevitable and damning conclusion: A powerful nation, disregarding all sacred treaties and taking advantage of the weakness of a small nation, fell upon it in the very midst of peace. It occupied this country in spite of the protest of the protectorate power and it has continued to occupy it despite the protest of the native population. With consummate and revolting hypocrisy this nation has again and again declared that it would evacuate the country, at first under no other condition than the re-establishment of the regular authority, which was nowhere threatened save in the phantasy of the occupying power, and later, when this pretext could no longer be maintained, under the pretense of carrying out reforms whose realization never lay in the intention of the usurpers. When at length a welcome opportunity presented itself for seizing the land permanently under cover of the most transparent and shameful sophistry, the occupying power did not hesitate to commit even this ultimate outrage. All the reasons which this power advanced for remaining in Egypt for the sake of general progress have become null and void after 35 years of failure.

Egypt, basing her claim upon eternal justice, demands the right of determining her own independence. She does not beg, she demands. All nations, above all the Entente, have proclaimed this right. If there be any people entitled to demand its land from the usurper, that people is the Egyptian people and that usurper is England!

2. CENTRAL AFRICA.

FORCED LABOUR.

That the government in Nigeria considers that it has a perfect right to force the natives to labour upon *public works*, is proved by certain passages in a book "The White Man in Nigeria," (1905, page 119) published by a Mr. Hazeldine, Secretary to the Governor of Nigeria, Sir F. Lugard. The author maintains the principle that, when the government needs workmen for public works, it should order the village chieftains to assemble, and arrange with them for a supply of workmen. This requisitioning of workmen for public works is to be regarded simply as a "return" for the protection afforded by the government through its administration of the country. The author remarks dryly that the work is sometimes fully paid with *6d.* or *9d.* per day, and sometimes it is not paid at all.

Joseph Chamberlain, the famous Colonial Minister, declared it to be in the interests of the natives that forced labour should exist. Speaking in the House of Commons on August 6, 1901, he said:

"It think it is a good thing for him (*i. e.*, the native) to be industrious, and by every means in our power we must teach him to work... No people ever have lived in the world's history who would not work. In the interests of the natives all over Africa, we have to teach them to work."

Again, March 19, 1903. "We are all of us taxed and taxed heavily; is that a system of forced labour?.... To say that because we put a tax on the native, therefore he is reduced to a condition of servitude and of forced labour is, to my mind, absolutely ridiculous.... It is a perfectly fair thing to my mind that the native should contribute something towards the cost of administrating the country."

Finally, House of Commons, March 24, 1903: "If that really is the last word of civilization, if we are to proceed on the assumption that the nearer the native or any human being comes to a pig the more desirable

is his condition, of course I have nothing to say. I must continue to believe that, at all events, the progress of the native in civilization will not be secured until he has been convinced of the necessity and the dignity of labour. Therefore, I think that anything we reasonably can do to induce the native to labour is a desirable thing."

The *Aborigines' Friend* wrote as follows in March 1898 on the question of forced labour on the Gold Coast:

"The Gold Coast Compulsory Labour Ordinance against which ineffective protests were made by the Society last year and which Mr. Chamberlain excused on the grounds that the forced labour legalised by it, 'cannot fairly be described as a form of slavery,' and that 'it is quite as necessary at the present time to obtain a supply of carriers as it was at the time of the Ashanti expedition, was renewed last December for another term of twelve months. Evidence of the working of this most oppressive ordinance is furnished by the following extracts from a report of the Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce, dated 28th November 1897, to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce which is now in correspondence with the Colonial Office on the subject:—

"On the 28th instant the Government had some fifty loads of goods to despatch to Kumasi, and, as they had no carriers to take them, Captain Kitson, Commissioner of the Gold Coast Police, issued orders to the policemen of Cape Coast and a small detachment of Hausas, to go into the streets and capture people to do the work. This they did in a very rough manner, and at ten o'clock that morning the whole town was in disturbance. The police and Hausas seized indiscriminately men and women, traders and carriers, and hauled them away, with threats and blows, to the common prison yard, where they were locked up. The result of this procedure was to break up the public market, stop all trade, and frighten traders and carriers away to the nearest place they could find to hide themselves and from there—when the raiding ceased—away into the bush. The news was quickly carried into the bush by those strangers who had run away from town. Traders coming in stopped on their way and returned from whence they came. Carriers who had been hired by the traders dropped their loads and bolted when they heard the news; thus the owners of the produce were left to look after it as best they could and were without means of getting it to Cape Coast. . . .

"If this were an exceptional instance of the Compulsory Labour Ordinance being put into force the Chamber would not have taken so much note of it; but ever since the Ordinance became law, it has been constantly enforced in all manner of ways and places. Government

officials and officers travelling between Kumasi and Cape Coast constantly impress men, either because they are short of carriers, or because for some reason or other their men have run away. This has been going on since the 1895 expedition, and the result is that traders, when possible steer clear of the road between Kumasi and Cape Coast."

H. W. Johnson, Director of Agriculture on the Gold Coast, writes of road-making in his book on the colony. The colony possesses 1,100 miles of roads, which are kept up in the following manner:

"By Ordinance No. 13, year 1894, every chief is obliged to make his subjects build the roads which pass through his district and keep them in good order. The chiefs receive as pay for this 10 shillings per mile quarterly. The native labour, on the other hand, is free."

CRUEL TREATMENT OF NATIVES.

The punishment of the lash is allowed in all English colonies. In rummaging among the records found in German Protectorates, it was therefore easy for the English experts in such matters to find written evidence as to the number of whippings which had been ordered. But let us take a peep at the official documents of the West African courts! One of the first things we shall discover is that in Nigeria, for example, female prisoners were whipped, something which was strictly forbidden in every German colony.

In latter years we have forbidden the whipping of native troops, and this is also supposed to be the case with English native troops. But the case cited on page 88 shows that where there is a will to whip a native, there is also a way.

We have never attempted to deny that cases of cruelty have occurred in our colonies, most of them committed by Europeans who in consequence of alcoholism had become victims to the chronic irascibility of the tropics. Similar cases have occurred in English colonies up to the most recent times, and have been at least equally numerous.

One Taylor, the agent of the Nigeria Rubber Syndicate in South Nigeria, which from 1906 to 1908 had its headquarters in the district of Ikon on the Cross River, punished a native in the following fashion: He had him thrust into an empty oil barrel, replaced the lid, and then allowed the barrel to roll down the slope into the river.

The few cases given below have not been especially hunted up, but came accidentally into our hands. They are based upon the sworn statements of Germans who lived in British West Africa until the outbreak of the war and have just returned home from English prison-camps.

"In Zaria the judicial authorities were very strict with the natives, who would be severely punished for slight offences. Black workmen who had exchanged some large cow-hides which were spread out to dry for smaller ones, were punished by two years' imprisonment. During this term of imprisonment the natives were forced to wear chains about the neck, arms and legs, and in these to work at road-making from 6 a. m. to 5 p. m.

"If the natives who were employed on the railway ventured to complain, they were struck on the head and body by the policeman on guard with a whip of rhinoceros hide. Workmen were needed for the railway to Kaduna. Since very few volunteers applied, on account of the bad treatment and the evil climate, the workmen were commandeered from the streets and brought to work by force. Regularly every morning labourers would be missing, having made off on the way to work."

A trader from Nigeria, whose evidence was officially taken, declared: "In the year 1912 a new District Commissioner came to Benin City. In order to secure the respect of the natives, he was accustomed to give every native who did not salute him a cut in the face with his stick."

"Furthermore, since the English persistently disseminate lies about the treatment of the natives by the German authorities, especially condemning the infliction of the punishment of the lash by German courts of law as an instance of barbarity, I should like to state plainly that it is precisely the English who have used the punishment of the lash in the most unrestricted fashion."

"When I was in the Concentration Camp at Ibadan (Nigeria), the black prisoners, who were obliged to do the roughest work, were whipped by the overseer until the blood flowed and for the least fault. Sometimes this sickening spectacle was repeated several times a day. The head of the camp, an Englishman named Rheder, thought nothing of striking a negro in the face with a cane. A negro who had brought us English papers to read from the office was most severely punished. He was first whipped until blood flowed. Then he was bound to a stake and kept thus the whole night."

"In Broomassi (Gold Coast) when the negroes gave the slightest cause for complaint, they were chained up in front of the house of the Director of the Mining Company and received 25 strokes; in addition to this their entire wages for the month were stopped."

"An Australian shot a native, who died of the wound 14 days later. The white man paid £ 200 bail and was then set free. His employer gave him a hint, acting upon which he fled over the frontier to Togo. This occurred in the year 1906 in the Abontiakoon Mine."

"When the natives in the mining districts of the Gold Coast wish to build themselves a house, they must first obtain permission from the Mining Company. Should they obtain this permission, they may, upon payment of £ 5, proceed with the building of the house. The natives must

pay for the building materials used, but the owner of the house must pay 5 shillings rent for it. Should the native leave the mine, his house becomes the property of the Company, but he receives no recompense or payment.

"As a civilian prisoner of the English in the Prisoners' Camp at Ibadan, (Nigeria) I observed the following occurrence (November, 1914):

"A negro who in company with certain other labourers was charged with the cleaning of the camp, did not obey some order given by Alibaba, the black overseer, with sufficient promptitude, whereupon he was hauled before the English officer in charge. The Englishman ordered the lash for the workman, and the punishment was immediately carried out. The delinquent was obliged to lie full length face downwards on the ground, and was held in this position by four strong negroes, who took hold of his arms and legs. The instrument of punishment was a long cane, loosely wound with steel wire. At every one of the many blows inflicted, the wire penetrated the flesh of the helpless man, so that at the conclusion of the punishment his back was a mass of blood.

"After this torture was over, the condemned man was ordered to rise in order that he might be led out. He did not stand up quickly enough, in consequence of the pain, and there was a dispute between him and Alibaba, which the latter sought to conclude by throwing a handful of sand and dirt in the face of his victim, already drawn with pain. The unfortunate man could neither see nor speak, his eyes and mouth were full of sand. He was now left to his fate for some time and then led off to prison, where I heard that he would be kept for three days without food."

An article in the *Monthly Review* (August, 1904) signed Ralph A. Durand, reports the following, (page 92):

"In a British Central African Court, a native witness convicted of gross perjury will be laid on the floor and receive half a dozen strokes with a whip before resuming his evidence, a proceeding which greatly facilitates the proper administration of Justice".

SANGUINARY PUNITIVE EXPEDITIONS.

Everyone will agree that punitive expeditions undertaken by protectorate troops against rebellious native tribes are things which cannot be avoided. That the English, of all people, should level severe reproaches against such expeditions on Germany's part, might certainly occasion some surprise. One need only glance through the records of English colonial history, in order to be able to compile massive volumes respecting the innumerable expeditions, the "little frontier wars" of the British protectorate troops in British West and East Africa. We shall proceed to give a few examples.

The *Etoile Belge* wrote on July 24th, 1906:

"The revolt which broke out recently in Sokoto and which has only been overcome after several bloody fights was, according to telegraphic information sent to the English papers, due to a renewal of religious fanaticism.

"The papers of the African coast which have just reached Europe give us another version. The *Lagos Weekly Record* informs us that a traveller who arrived from Sokoto, states that the revolt has been caused by the collection of the poll-tax for which 800 head of cattle had been seized in one tribe. The exasperated natives rebelled and we all know the bloody suppression which ensued."

La Vérité sur le Congo (1903, No. 3) gives the following horrible account of scenes of bloodshed in British West Africa:

"Since the Ashanti war in 1873, more than fifty English military expeditions may be counted up in this part of Africa. It is impossible to total even approximately the hecatombs of natives that they have occasioned, for it is only in exceptional cases that the documents indicate the enemy's losses. But the few details that we are going to borrow from the official texts permit of our declaring that there has been a sacrifice of human life that surpasses all imagination.

“Without going so far back as the Ashanti war in 1873 which led to rivers of blood being shed, and the piling-up of ruins of towns and villages, bombarded, burnt, destroyed from pillar to base, and without giving details of a warfare the sole enumeration of which would suffice to fill these columns, let us mention some of the exploits of the apostles of civilization.

“In 1898, the natives of the district situated to the south of Gambaga, having committed acts of hostility against British subjects, a column of 100 Haussa soldiers under the command of Colonel Northcott with two cannon was sent to punish them.

“In March 1900, the Ashantis revolted against the new Governor, Sir F. Hodgson. This gave rise to several expeditions which, however sanguinary, did not result in the suppression of the rebellion. A column of 800 regulars, 200 native allies, 1,560 carriers with seven guns under the command of Colonel Willcocks, met the enemy one mile from Coomassie, and after opening on him a violent artillery and musketry fire, attacked him with the bayonet and drove him from his position. The corpses torn by the shells, and the numerous pools of blood everywhere, left no doubt that the enemy had suffered considerable losses. The expeditionary column, having been reformed, was then directed towards the Coomassie plateau. Everywhere burnt houses and putrefied corpses which spread a horrible stench were to be seen. The relief of Coomassie only terminated the war in an incomplete manner, and several further military expeditions of relative importance were necessary to reduce the rebels. Finally, on the 1st of October, Colonel Willcocks gained at Obassa a decisive victory over the enemy's forces which he cut to pieces after a desperate resistance. The natives had 150 killed, including 6 chiefs, and a very much larger number of wounded.

“In January 1892, there was an expedition to the Gambia which was terminated by the capture and destruction of the fortified town of Toniataba. In 1894, a further expedition occurred. The fortified place Gonjur was bombarded by the fleet, and then evacuated by the natives. At Sierra Leone in 1887, the destruction of the stronghold of Robari took place. In 1888, the destruction of the stronghold of Largah. In 1894, an expedition against the Sofa surprised them near Bagbwuma, killed 200 of their men and shot 70 of them in the forest surrounding the town.

“In 1898, there was a sanguinary repression of an insurrection in the colony provoked by the imposition of the Hut Tax. In the interval troubles broke out in the districts of Kivaia and Bumpe, and before long the insurrection had become general. The town of Kivaia was burnt by Captain Moore. Colonel Marshall burnt the towns of Masimirah, Yonnipe and Mabanhara. Captain Godwin destroyed the towns of Yohari, Runtunk,

Mampu and Chosuolo, whilst Colonel Cunningham fought several bloody combats in the Karene district. The different columns returned to Free-town at the end of 1899 after having "pacified" the country.

In the Lagos expedition against the Jebus 400 natives were killed of whom 20 were chiefs; in 1895, troubles were repressed by the killing of the king of Oyo, and the burning down of the towns of Oyo and Okeho.

"In Nigeria in 1894 occurred the Brass expedition (the burning of Nimbi and destruction of Fishton); the people of Brass were compelled to pay a fine of £500. In the same year an expedition took place against the chief Nana. The town of Brohémé where he resided was bombarded. Nana was arrested. Five hundred of his men were killed. In 1902, the English colonial press called for his pardon and restoration to his country, avowing that the hostilities directed against him in 1894 had been provoked by the ill-timed action of a naval officer who had attacked the town of Brohémé without orders.

"In 1895, there was an expedition to the Cross River to punish the natives for impeding commerce. The chief having refused a palaver, the town of Ediba was bombarded and burnt; "some little towns" of the region were also burnt.

"In the following year a fresh expedition was undertaken against Ediba-Bilu. Eleven towns and villages were destroyed, two chiefs were hanged, and many natives butchered.

"In 1898, expeditions continually took place against Ibo, Onitisha, Ilorin, Kuka and two other places, all of which were burnt down.

"In Nigeria alone nearly thirty expeditions may be counted in less than nine years! Under the pretext of reminding the natives of the respect due to the English flag there were endless conflagrations, massacres and cannonades.

"The Sokoto Expedition which is far from being over (1906) was not the least murderous of these. It began by the capture of the village of Gignac, by assault after bombardment, the enemy losing over 100 men in this affair. The large town of Lidu was occupied and burnt down. On the 3rd of February last, after a long series of engagements (in one the natives had 300 killed, including 11 chiefs) there occurred the bombardment of Kano (300 more killed). At Durmi there was a fresh engagement, with the same total of killed. According to recent news given by the Colonial Office, an English expedition composed of 30 whites and 500 native soldiers with six guns captured on 27th July last the town of Burmi, and completely destroyed it. The enemy lost 700 men including the former Sultan of Sokoto and a large number of chiefs."

A report of Governor Egerton from Southern Nigeria in the year 1904 goes to show to what an extent punitive expeditions were undertaken in a single colony. This official report takes account of nine expeditions in the course of nine months, that is to say, from September 1903 to May 1904. The Report is published in the *London Gazette* of August 25th, 1904.

Against this brief account of facts—an account which could be prolonged indefinitely—we will set the following English statement on the punitive expedition in our colony of Togo. It throws a peculiar light upon English reverence for facts when confronted by the ordeal of narrating alleged occurrences in the German colonies.* A well-known English missionary, Harris by name, declares: that according to the *Gold Coast Leader* of June 2nd, 1910, the German Colonial Secretary had acknowledged that 105,000 natives had been killed through punitive expeditions in Togoland from 1903 to 1913!

When a man permits himself to make so monstrous a statement merely upon the authority of a third-rate sheet of very doubtful reputation, and makes no effort to secure further proof, he certainly lays himself open to a charge of considerable unscrupulousness.

The truth is that during the period from 1903 to 1913 there were absolutely no punitive expeditions in Togo. Unlike the Gold Coast, Togo possessed no protectorate troops, but only a small police force, which fully sufficed to maintain order. The yearly official reports bear witness to the fact that Togo is in fact the most peaceful of all the African colonies. At the highest estimate, perhaps a dozen natives may in the course of these ten years have lost their lives through

* Taken from *Die Koloniale Rundschau*, 1916, Vol. 6 and 7.

police measures. On the English Gold Coast, on the contrary, sanguinary campaigns on a large scale had taken place. But these Mr. Harris calmly ignores.

As regards East Africa, Major Thurston furnishes a report of the operations in Unyoro during the years 1894 and 1895 in his book "African Incidents, Personal Experiences in Egypt and Unyoro", chapter IV, (London 1900). This chapter is entitled: The Unyoro Expedition: or "*chasse aux nègres.*"

An asterisk refers the reader to the following foot-note:

"Some purists may object to the title of this chapter, but as a missionary once said to me: '*On ne fait pas la guerre en Afrique, ce qui s'y fait, c'est la chasse aux nègres.*' Honesty has convinced me that the good Father's definition accurately describes my 'warlike' operations, and honesty has made it the title of this chapter."

We will not lay stress on the minor incidents of these operations. For instance, a harmless native is met on the march and in order to force him to speak out, the author has him bastinadoed (p. 156). It became the rule, every time they met a Wunyoroan carrying a gun, to shoot him (p. 173). A guide who refuses to advance is coolly killed by order of Major Thurston (p. 222). Three natives found in a hut during a night march are silently bayoneted, lest they should give an alarm (p. 225). "This transaction, I know," says the humanitarian author, "comes very near to mere assassination," but he avows it was necessary,—moreover they learned "later" that these natives had been posted to warn the enemy of the approach of the English. Some may be inclined to call all this "war" . . . or rather "*la chasse aux nègres.*" But we will not presume to test the point.

During 1893, the King of the Wunyoros had attacked the British posts in Uganda and his warriors had killed some

natives who were bringing supplies to the British. The latter decided to invade Unyoro; but as they disposed of only 600 soldiers and as there were reasons for fearing trouble in Uganda:

“The Colonel decided that the best way to prevent any disturbances occurring behind his back was to take care that there was no one left to create them. This plan had the additional advantage of gratifying the warlike inclinations of the Waganda. He therefore instructed Mwanga to order the whole of the available male population to mobilise, and become the army of invasion. Mwanga, who was equally afraid of disturbances which might deprive him of his throne, was delighted to comply. His subjects, too, were well pleased, for invasions of Unyoro had always been a periodic and agreeable method of giving themselves a holiday, with the opportunity of collecting a certain amount of property, and of replenishing their harems and slave establishments. In fact, these invasions were almost as popular as a civil war! Besides, as there is nothing a Waganda likes so well as burning somebody else’s house and destroying his plantation, they were an innocent means of indulging these destructive propensities (pp. 128 and 129).”

The remainder of the campaign is made up of scenes of ransacking, incendiarism and devastation.

“The next day we were well in Unyoro, and met the whole of the Waganda army, who were in camp and waiting for us. They numbered from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and their camp consisted of about 5000 beehive-shaped grass huts. The country was devastated for miles around, banana plantations cut down, sweet potato gardens torn up, and houses burnt’” (page 132).

Such were the amiable allies of the equally amiable English, such were the scenes upon which that emblem of freedom and civilisation, the English flag, looked down! The author resumes:

“We had come to a place where the road took a sharp turn to the left, so I could not see any distance in front of me, but I heard a cheerful voice singing and another one laughing; we turned the corner and I saw a tall straight Unyoro youth with his gun over his shoulder, and by his side a well-grown Unyoro girl. He was singing, and had one arm round her neck and was tickling her under the chin—she was laughing and smiling, and he had tied a wreath of flowers around her head. Before

I could fully realise what I was seeing, one of my guard put up his rifle and fired; the youth threw up his arms, and fell on his face quite dead" . . . (pp. 173 and 174).

"I saw a movement in the grass; some Waganda who were close to me, uttered a short cry of excitement and were off in a minute. I then perceived that they were hunting an Unyoro; the chase was short, and soon I saw him fall. I followed them up, and found that four of them had pinned him to the ground with their spears by the two arms and the thigh, and some more were stabbing him through and through. The poor wretch was still writhing when I came up, but too late to save him, for he died immediately afterwards. I was much struck with the faces of the Waganda whilst they were performing this butchery. They were cheerful without being excited, and had the air of satisfaction which one would attribute to an honest Chicago workman when he had slaughtered the last ox of his daily task." (pp. 222 and 223).

Major Thurston, after describing a battle which was fought close to the Mapala Hill in Uganda, writes as follows:

"Our loss was fortunately small—only eight men wounded. In spite of my instructions, no quarter was given, though it was frequently asked for. Many pitiable scenes occurred which I could not prevent. A wounded chief asked me, as I passed, to spare his life, and I ordered the soldiers behind me to leave him; but soon I heard a shot fired, and afterwards, on my way back, I found him dead. In the middle of the action I saw a soldier standing over a wounded Unyoro, who was holding up his hands and asking for mercy. The soldier shot him in the stomach. Though such conduct is barbarous and quite unjustifiable, it must be remembered that the soldiers themselves are barbarians, fighting against barbarians, and were they to fall into the hands of their enemies, their fate would be a similar one." (p. 209).

The gentle author does not however, say a word as to any Waganda having been punished in the slightest for such acts as he has described.

As Major Thurston was making preparations to return to England, he wrote: "I was disgusted with the robbing and slaughtering, and I heaved a sigh of relief to think that I was through with them." (page 219, retranslated).

The *Daily Mail* of October 24th, 1904, contains the following report:

"A military expedition, consisting of 4 officers and 100 soldiers of the King's African Rifles, left Zinja Busoga, on Lake Victoria, on September 21st, to punish the natives in the Mount Elgon district of the Uganda Protectorate, who refuse to pay the hut tax."

The *African Standard*, of Mombasa, dated November 19th, 1904, refers to this:

"The punitive expedition from the Mount Elgon district secured over 5000 head of cattle."

To take 5000 head of cattle from a pastoral tribe is depriving it of all its possessions, starving it, in fact, and all this merely because it had failed or had been unable to pay the tax!

According to the "Précis of Information Concerning the Uganda Protectorate" of September 1902, the English were accustomed to employ uncivilized, wholly savage natives upon these "punitive expeditions." These auxiliary troops were armed with lances, arrows and knives; they fought according to their established native practices and in this way rendered "valuable services."

What these "valuable services" really were may be seen from the account that follows, (pages 8 and 9 of the report):

"A few years ago, rinderpest carried off a large proportion of the flocks and herds of the Masai (a native tribe of the Uganda). In order to replenish their stock, the Masai raided their neighbours far and wide.

"At present they are contented and at rest, but there is always a tendency to raid, especially towards the German territory."

The English have never hesitated to make use of these ferocious savages, for Major Woodward adds:

"Of late years they (the Masai) have frequently been employed by the Uganda Administration as auxiliaries in punitive expeditions, and on each occasion are reported to have rendered valuable service."

Referring to Elgumu, a leader of the Baringo fighting men, the Major speaks in terms of praise of this savage who

"did good service during the recent expeditions against the Nandi and Suk-Turkana, when he was in command of a detachment of 70 spearmen."

The official guide adds this commentary:

"In the event of a punitive expedition against the people of Nandi, Lumbwa, or Kamasia, the services of a detachment under their leader Elgumu would be valuable as these men are well acquainted with all the cattle tracks of the surrounding tribes and make excellent scouts."

Then again:

"The Enjamesi can muster about 150 spearmen, and have on one or two occasions fought for the Government against offending tribes. They are armed with long stabbing spears, very neatly made. Some carry bows and arrows."

The points of the arrows and heads of the spears, as in the case of the Wandorobbo (page 9), are usually *poisoned*.

All men acquainted with the habits of savages who during a fight spare neither women nor children and indulge in the most horrible atrocities, may easily imagine the manner in which these auxiliary fighting men go to work in order to render their "valuable services."

These "punitive expeditions" of savage troops armed as described in the foregoing, are commanded by *white* men. For instance, the expedition against Wandagara and his son Chiga, in July 1901 was commanded by the Collector of Ankole.

"The natives offered some resistance," says the official publication, blandly, "and the chief, his son, and many of their followers were killed." (Page 67).

In October 1900, the same Collector collected a force of 5000 men, armed with spears and bows and arrows, to "assist" him in his expedition against Buchika. He ordered them to punish the inhabitants of Buchika who had attacked a trading caravan.

In the operations against the Nandi people in 1900, Lieut.-Colonel Evatt was placed in command of a force consisting of about 400 regular troops and 300 Masai spear-

men (page 85). "This force operated in a series of small columns, which traversed the country in all directions and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy."

Further, in 1901, in an expedition under Major Delmé Radcliffe, the regular troops engaged in these operations were "assisted" by a levy of 100 Waganda. The operations which lasted five months, "were completely successful, and the "mutineers were practically all killed or captured." The native auxiliary troops, armed in negro fashion, undoubtedly therefore form part of the police system in Uganda. This is in fact officially recorded by Major Woodward who remarks (page 92) that:

"In addition to the forces (regular) above enumerated the Representative of His Majesty's Government is enabled by treaty-right with the King of Uganda to call upon the able-bodied Waganda, in their King's name, to perform military service in times of emergency."

In exercise of this right, 3000 Waganda were called, in 1901 to "aid" in the expedition against the Nandi and their co-operation "materially assisted in bringing the war to an abrupt conclusion."

THE REMOVAL OF AN ENTIRE TRIBE FROM ITS TERRITORY.

When the English settled on the shores of Lake Victoria, some eight years ago, the Nandi tribe, according to the special correspondent of the *African World* (March 24th, 1906), refused most decidedly to place themselves under British "protection." Sir Clement Hill promised to respect their independence so long as they continued to behave.

The English, for all that, made use of the opportunity presented by the conduct of British officials towards the Nandi, to declare that the tribe had not fulfilled the conditions.

"This tribe, (wrote the correspondent of *The African World*) like the neighbouring tribes, and indeed like the Highlanders in Scotland not *so* very many years ago, when not actually at war with any other tribe in particular, were wont to find an outlet for their superfluous energies in cattle raiding from one or other of the surrounding tribes, sometimes raiding and at other times being raided. Even after the advent of the British, the neighbouring protected tribes and the Nandis continued to indulge, to a moderate extent, in this inter-tribal amusement, and more or less fair play prevailed.

"In recent years a change gradually took place. *If a protected tax-paying tribe did any raiding on the Nandis, nobody said anything.* The thieves, naturally, were silent, and the victims, the unsubdued Nandis, refused to consider the question of a third or judicial party coming in, in the shape of a European. But now when they gave blow for blow, they were met with rifles and Maxims, and invariably got the worst of it."

The truth of the whole matter amounted to this: that England protected the Nandis' enemies, and did not prevent them from waging war against this tribe, whilst at the same time preventing the Nandis from defending themselves. In order not to disturb what is called the "*pax Britannica*" (surely an ironical expression!), the proud Nandis were forced to witness the raiding of their cattle and to allow themselves to be murdered without protesting!

British designs against the Nandis are of long standing, for we find in Major Woodward's "Précis," compiled about four years ago in the Intelligence Department of the War Office, information of means to be used in the event of "punitive expeditions" against the Nandis. The author of the "Précis," openly advocates the services of native auxiliaries (p. 17), notwithstanding the fearful outrages which usually ensue.

We were thus warned years ago of the fate which awaited the Nandis.

This unfortunate tribe, driven into a corner, would occasionally kill some of its black aggressors from ambush, and retaliate on the white man by stealing lengths of the railway metals or by laying stones on the railway line.

As a punishment for these offences, the English decreed that henceforth they were to pay a poll-tax of two rupees. The Nandis naturally refused. Small punitive expeditions were organised against them from time to time, and their condition became steadily worse.

In the second half of the year 1905, the English issued an arbitrary decree, that the whole tribe should leave the country, and be placed in a reservation eighty miles distant, where they were henceforth to dwell.

In this manner the rich and fertile Nandi land lying along the railway, and close to Port Florence, came into the hands of the British. The blacks, the lawful owners, were given a month to effect the change. (*African World*, March 24, 1906).

Since the Nandis refused to obey this order:

“Five columns of troops were sent against them. Their huts and crops were burned, with practically no opposition, and a *huge drive* was organised, their cattle, or many of them, taken and sold by auction to rascally Somali . . . Some fighting took place, and many were killed (the *Press Association* says one thousand); and many more died of hunger and cold, for one must remember that much of their country is from 6,000 to 8,000 feet above the sea level.”
(*The African World*.)

This information is confirmed by other independent sources. The *Times*, on the 17th of March informed its readers, that according to a letter addressed to Sir Claude de Crespigny by his son Captain V. de Crespigny, who was with the Nandi expedition as a volunteer, “*over a thousand natives have been killed in operations to drive them into the Reserve.*”

A telegram which was published in the “*Vérité sur le Congo*” in its issue of March 15, 1906 (page 144) stated that 10,300 cattle and 18,000 sheep and goats had been captured.

This profitable expedition against the Nandis brought the British fresh tracts of land and a rich booty.

(*From La Vérité sur le Congo, 1906, page 188, et seq.*)

DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOL AMONG THE NATIVES.

In 1914 the English occupied a part of the German colony of Togo and installed their own administration. Three years later, in 1917, they declared that the colony had developed in a most satisfactory fashion under their administration, and that this was proved by the figures of the revenue returns. Apart from the fact that we have to do here with a deliberate falsification—since Togo under German administration had long since arrived at a stage of development when it could exist without pecuniary aid from the home government—we must also consider the fact that such statistics, when subjected to a close examination, often prove deceptive, or speciously constructed. For example, whence did the high revenues paid by the colony of Lagos in Nigeria about the year 1900 originate? They were due to the highly moral circumstance that the supply of alcohol to the natives constituted the principal article of commerce. The income derived from this liquor trade at this time made up 65% to 67% of the total returns!

In 1901—1902, the Colony of Lagos had a revenue of £257,124 being a considerable increase over the previous years.

The principal paper of the Colony, the *Lagos Standard*, which is reputed to be favourable to the Government, said on this subject:

“It would appear that the chief and ruling tendency of the successive administrations has been to draw from the Colony the fullest possible revenue, the greater part of which is spent in salaries of the officials. Every effort has been made in that direction and no resource that ingenuity can appeal to was spared in order to achieve that purpose . . .”

The revenue derived from import duties on spirits, gin, rum, alcohol, whisky, reached 65.53% of the total revenue

of the Colony*. To this must be added the licenses for the sale of spirits**, which brings up the contributive share of spirits in the budgets receipts to 67·53%.

The year 1901—1902 is not an exceptional one. The statistics of imports show that since 1896, Lagos had imported annually a quantity of spirits in excess of 881,057 gallons and that the revenue derived therefrom by the Government has never been below £120,000 and that at the present time it most likely comes up to £200,000.

Alcohol is the great staple of trade. When visiting Lagos, one would be disposed to believe that it is practically the only one. Everywhere on the huge quay which stretches for several miles and along which the large business houses stand,—on the wharfs, in the warehouses, mountains of green cases and pyramids of demijohns lie piled:—gin and rum! All the important shops have the same signboard bearing in large letters the words: “*Wholesale Spirit Merchants*” and from morning to night, on every day of the week, there is a continual traffic on the lagoon of large steamers coming in to discharge their cargo and leaving again empty. On the quay there is a perpetual movement of black porters carrying cases of spirits on their heads which they either pile up by thousands in the warehouses, or remove therefrom in order to load the boats. These powerful launches belong to the native traders who spread the poison all over the markets of the villages that lie along the lagoon and its affluents.

The quality of these disgusting wares has been too often described to render it necessary to revert again to the sub-

* Message of the Governor to the Legislative Council, February 26, 1903, p. 9.

** Blue Book, 1902, p. 21.

ject. Their price is sufficient evidence of this: $4\frac{1}{2}$ d. per litre, bottle and packing included! The Government analyst found them to contain that strong poison known under the name of fusel oil, in the enormous proportion of 1.46 to 4.31% of the bulk*. Is it to be wondered at that criminality is on the increase, the birth-rate on the decrease, and that this magnificent race of Yoruba agriculturists is rapidly degenerating?

The *Lagos Weekly Record* published last year a description of the deplorable situation of the Badagry District, situated on the lagoon, half a day's journey by steamer from the capital, where murder and robbery are on the increase:

"Many causes, we are told, have contributed to make the Badagry native what he is. The chief trade of the place is the sale of spirits which is a great temptation to the natives. This propensity to drink, coupled with lazy habits and a quarrelsome disposition, have led them to completely addict themselves to the influence of liquor. Nowadays, if the native makes up his mind to work, it is only to earn a little money to squander in drink. These habits have caused him to become an unendurable menace to the peaceful inhabitants."

The Blue Books of the Colony attest with appalling clearness the fact that from 1893 to 1899, *the death-rate showed a steady and considerable increase:*

Death rate per 1,000 inhabitants at Lagos:

1893	41°/∞
1894	45
1895	53
1896	52
1897	59
1898	58
1899	66.3

* Message of the Governor, p. 8.

Bishops Tugwell and Oluwole have brought up the liquor question in Lagos. They have denounced the havoc which alcohol wreaks upon the population, and the immorality of a financial system based on the poisoning of the people. They came into conflict with the officials who at first contented themselves with denials and afterwards employed passive resistance. The Governor, Sir William MacGregor, in 1901 denied that there was any danger in importing annually 1,101,322 gallons of trade spirits into a small colony of 3,000,000 inhabitants, and said:

"This is a question in which sentimentality comes in to a large extent. As a consequence, it is occasionally spoken of in terms which it is hard to reconcile with the reality of the facts."*

Two years later, however, he was compelled to admit the seriousness of the question, though confessing his inability to settle it by affirming that: "a joint action of all the Colonies of the coast is really necessary in the matter." This statement was wrong; for Lagos is surrounded on the North and East by British Colonies which, like Lagos itself, are entirely controlled by the Colonial Office in London.

Moreover, if such an action were necessary, England, who was so prompt in taking the initiative on humanitarian grounds in regard to the Congo, had here a much better opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Powers a state of things detrimental to the negro. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, having been requested by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to make application to the Powers with a view to regulating the importation of spirits in a uniform manner replied that he did not consider it to be possible at that time.

* Lagos Institute, Proceedings of the Inaugural Meeting, 16th October 1901.

The truth has been summed up in a motion passed last year by the United Committee for Preventing the Demoralization of Native Races by the Liquor Traffic:

"Bishop Oluwole moved that the introduction into West Africa of concentrated forms of alcohol, often containing quantities of fusel oil, was a grave scandal, and that the Government should seek to secure an international agreement to prohibit these forms of alcohol, and generally to restrict the West African liquor trade. They in Lagos had hoped, he said, that their Governor (MacGregor) would prohibit liquor as he had done in New Guinea, but he did not, on the ground that he *had to find means for carrying on the Government*. The Government could, as a matter of fact, put a stop to the evil with a stroke of the pen.'

Neither are any steps taken in Sierra Leone to elevate or civilize the hapless natives; on the contrary, everything possible is done according to British traditions of the alcoholic elevation of primitive races, in order to lower their moral and physical status and thus lead to their extirpation. *West Africa* writes:

"Immense quantities of poisonous gin and rum now find their way into the interior, making the people less industrious, and degrading them.

A chief who had sold a quantity of palm-nuts to a merchant, drew a large sum of money, which he spent in the purchase of rum and gin. He and his friends spent several weeks in drinking and dancing, and the party did not return to work until the liquor was exhausted.

The Protectorate Liquor law is a farce. It contains a provision that only a certain quantity of rum is to be sold to any one native at a time. What is to prevent a native sending different individuals to buy his rum many times a day?

Natives themselves have become traders in spirits."

The paragraph closes as follows:

"Alcohol with all its attendant evils is threatening the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, and only time is required to reduce the people to the same condition as the degraded tribes of the coast line. They will become more lazy and indifferent, and filthy, and new epidemic diseases, hitherto unknown in this country, will attack them."

(From *La Vérité sur le Congo*, 1904 No. 14 and 1905 No. 18.)

3. SOUTH AFRICA.

ENGLAND'S CRIMES AGAINST THE BOERS.

From the Dutch of General J. C. Smuts.

When England in 1899 began her robber war against the two free Republics of the Boer people, the Transvaal Government published a small memorial bearing the dramatic title of "A Century of Wrong." This memorial gave a survey of the history of the Boers from the days when English rule first descended upon South Africa, and it forms one of the most damning indictments levelled against England in modern times. The author of this memorial was the State Procurator of the South African Republic,—at present a member of the British cabinet—General Jan C. Smuts.

The document begins with the year 1806 when the English first obtained a foothold on the Cape. The Prince of Orange, who had been deposed by Napoleon I, and who had fled to England, had sold the Cape country to England for a sum of 6,000,000 pounds sterling—*against the express will and wish of the population*. The Congress of Vienna in 1814 confirmed this acquisition of territory. Soon afterwards there began the systematic oppression of the Boer people—who had been living in the Cape country since the year 1652. Smuts writes as follows of the persecutions and the outrages which the British Government inflicted upon his people;—the citation has already been used in another section of this book, but it will bear repeating:

"The British Government wounded the Afrikaners in their most sensitive feelings in that, in numberless cases, it favoured the cause of the natives in preference to that of the Boers. For instance, the Boers were obliged to witness the painful spectacle of the laying waste of their homes and property by the natives without being in a position to defend themselves, since the British Government had robbed them even of their

ammunition. The free-born Boer was guarded by police composed of Hottentots, the most degraded of all the native races of South Africa!

“Small wonder, then, that in 1815 a part of the Boer people were driven to revolt—a revolt which was crushed through the terrible event of the 9th of March, 1816. On this day 6 Boers were hanged in the most inhuman fashion at Slachtersnek by the English Government, *in the enforced presence of their wives and children*. These men were only half-hanged at first, for the gallows broke, whereupon the men, who were already writhing in the throes of death, were once more hoisted into the air and strangled. It was at Slachtersnek that the first bloody token which marks the boundary-line between Boer and Briton in South Africa was erected. Since then the eyes of succeeding generations have been fixed with horror upon this place of murder.”

The memory of this British butchery has never passed away in South Africa. On the 9th of March, 1916, a hundred years after the atrocity had been perpetrated, a monument dedicated to the memory of the martyrs of this first revolt against British tyranny was solemnly unveiled at Slachtersnek in Cape Colony in the presence of thousands of Boers. Smuts proceeds:

“The Boers were the owners of slaves who, for the greater part, had been brought to the country in English ships and sold by the English to the Boers. The British Government now decided to abolish slavery. We had no objection to make against this proposal which in itself was an excellent one; we nevertheless had the right to expect that we would be reimbursed against loss. But of the £20,000,000 which the British Parliament had voted for this purpose, only 13/4 million pounds was intended for us, although our slaves had been estimated by English officials to have a value of £3,000,000. And the money was made payable *in London*. The Boers could not go thither. So we sold our rights for a mess of pottage to agents, many gave up all their claims as hopeless in view of the great difficulties. Old men and widows who had been living in affluence died as beggars. Slowly the Boers became convinced that they could expect no justice from England.

Froude, the English historian, rightly declares in his book “Oceana”, (page 34) as quoted by Smuts:

“The slaves in the Cape country were attached more to the home than to the soil. Scandals such as those of East India were unknown. As the

Dutch are a slow people and showed no enthusiasm for our new ideas, they fell into our bad graces. The unfavourable impression which they made upon us is a tradition of the English press and has unfortunately also become a tradition of our Foreign Office. We have treated them unjustly and unintelligently and we never forgive those whom we have wronged.'

"At the time the English obtained Cape Colony the eastern boundary was formed by the Fish River. From time to time the Kaffirs would make inroads into Cape Colony—especially during the year 1834. They would murder, rob and maltreat the helpless colonists, the women and their children, in the cruellest, most unspeakable manner. The governor was finally persuaded to take measures to prevent their further inroads into this district. This took place with the help of the Boers. But Lord Glenelg, Colonial Secretary at that time, returned the whole district to the Kaffirs and reviled the Boers as he had formerly reviled the missionaries of the London Missionary Society. He sided with the Kaffirs openly against the Boers. The Boers had taken back the cattle which had been stolen from them by the Kaffirs. They were nevertheless forced to endure that their own cattle were sold at auction by the British in order to cover the cost of the expedition! There was indeed no justice to be expected from Englishmen. There was no security for life or property under the flag of a government which openly took the part of wrong.

"But it was not only in connection with the natives that the Boers were oppressed and robbed of their rights.

"When Cape Colony was ceded to England in 1806, the use of their language was guaranteed to the inhabitants. This promise was to be broken just like the later treaties and agreements which our people entered into with England. England, the violator of treaties, fulfilled this promise by decreeing in 1825 that all official documents were to be written in English. Petitions in the language of the country were rejected. The Boers were excluded from juries, and were forced to accept their judgments from English juries which were quite alien to them. The natives were employed as police against them and were supplied with firearms and ammunition to be used against them.

"In consequence of this oppression by the British our people were forced in 1836 to leave Cape Colony and all that was dear and precious to them, and to seek a refuge in the unknown north. . ."

THE FOUNDING OF NATAL.

"After their victory over the Zulu chieftain Dingaan on December 16, 1838, the Boer people founded the Republic of Natal. This Republic, however, was not long destined to endure. The English Colonial Office

pursued us. At first the British Government decided upon a military occupation of Natal. This was only for the purpose of oppressing the Boers and, as openly conceded by Governor Napier in his Report to Lord Glenelg of June 16, 1838, to prevent the Boers from obtaining powder and founding an independent Republic. On April 10, 1842, Lord Stanley instructed Governor Napier to cut off the Boer emigrants from all communication and to tell them that the British Government would treat them as rebels and support the natives against them. The British annexed the young Republic after the Boers had made it habitable for a civilized people. . . . We then trekked over the Drakensberge to the Orange Free State, where part of the emigrants remained, whilst the remainder crossed the Vaal River and went towards the north."

THE ORANGE FREE STATE.

"The Boers who had been driven out of Natal founded the Orange Free State under Pretorius. This state was likewise annexed by the British Governor at the Cape, Sir Harry Smith, on February 7, 1848, as the 'Orange River Sovereignty,' under the pretext that four-fifths of the inhabitants were in favour of English rule and were merely intimidated by the might of Pretorius. The British Resident, however, soon fell out with the great and crafty Chief of the Basutos, Mosesh. The Resident called upon the Boers to help, but of the 1000 called upon only 75 answered the summons, and the British suffered a defeat. The existence of the Orange Free State, as the Resident now reported to his government, depended upon Pretorius upon whose head Sir Harry Smith had set a price of £2000. Earl Grey disapproved of Smith's action . . .

"A new Governor, Sir George Cathcart, was dispatched with two special Commissioners and in 1854 a contract between England and the Orange Free State was signed, *by which the Orange Free State was guaranteed complete independence and England agreed not to enter into any relations with the native tribes north of the Orange River . . .*

"This treaty was scarcely 15 years old when it was broken by England. After the Basutos had murdered the Free State Boers, had violated their women and committed innumerable barbarities, and the Boers, after a war lasting three years, had succeeded in punishing the Basutos, the British interfered in favour of the Basutos—in 1869. At the Aliwal Convention the English once more declared that they did not wish to interfere.

"The ink upon this treaty was scarcely dry when *diamonds* were discovered in the hitherto undisputed part of the Orange Free State between the Groot and Vaal Rivers. Instead of the British Government openly declaring that it was the stronger and that for this reason it demanded the richest

diamond mine in the world, it set up the hypocritical pretext that this land belonged to a certain native and that it was therefore no part of the Orange Free State, even though the falseness of this statement was confirmed by an *English* court.

“‘The idea was,’ writes Froude, ‘that the most splendid diamond mine in the world must belong to England. The land was taken away from the Boers, and from this day on the Boer of South Africa is able to place less faith than ever in English promises.’ Froude, who did not live to see the Jameson raid, describes this as ‘*most likely the greatest blot of shame in the history of the English colonies.*’

“Later, when President Brand went to England, England acknowledged its guilt and paid in damages the sum of £90,000—for the richest diamond mine in the world, a mine whose daily output usually exceeds this sum!

“In spite of the Free State Convention of 1854 and in spite of the repeated promises made at the Aliwal Convention, the Orange Free State was fated to suffer a third outrageous breach of treaty on the part of England. Thousands of rifles were brought from Cape Colony to Kimberley and there sold to the Kaffirs who had surrounded and were threatening the two Boer Republics. The Commander-in-Chief of the British troops in South Africa, Sir Arthur Cunyngham, said that 400,000 guns had been sold to the Kaffirs during his regime. The protests of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were of no avail. When the Orange Free State exercised its indubitable rights and held up wagons full of rifles on their way to the Free State, it was obliged to pay compensation to the British Government!

“Froude remarks that the Orange Free State paid this compensation under protest and with an old-fashioned appeal to the God of justice, whom, strangely enough, the Boers consider to be a reality.”

That He is certainly *not* a reality in English politics, as Smuts implies, the dark and bloody trail which English history has drawn across the world, proves all too plainly and conclusively.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

“On the 13th of May, 1852, Sir George Cathcart, Governor of the Cape, issued a Proclamation in which he expressed his satisfaction that one of his first official acts should be the ratification of the Zand River Convention of 1852 by means of which the Boers living in the Transvaal were guaranteed complete independence.

“The Transvaal Republic was now in the possession of a treaty which seemed to ensure it a quiet future. In addition to this recognition by

England, the Republic was also recognized by Holland, France, Germany, Belgium and above all by the United States of North America . . .

"But there was no depending upon England's words even in a treaty officially signed by her. Less than 17 years after this Convention, when diamonds chanced to be discovered in Orange Free State, England laid claim to a piece of Transvaal territory which bordered upon the land which had been taken away from the Orange Free State. It was decided to submit this question to a court of arbitration. The judges were unable to come to a conclusion, and the presiding judge, Governor Keate of Natal, gave judgment against the Transvaal. It was now disclosed that the English judge had bought 12,000 acres of land from the Kaffir Captain Waterboer for the price of a slice of bread and butter, and that Governor Keate, contrary to the stipulations of the Zand River Treaty, had already conferred British nationality upon Waterboer.

"Even Dr. Moffat, who was no friend of the Boers, protested against this in a letter to the *London Times*, since the piece of land in question had always belonged to the Transvaal. But this was only *one* of the violations of the treaty. When the 400,000 rifles were sold to the blacks at Kimberley, as attested by Moodie and Cunyngham, the Transvaal in 1872 made a decided protest against this to the Chief Commissioner at Cape Town. But the Republic was forced to be content with a brutal answer from Sir Henry Barkly.

"To crown England's acts of infamy, there followed on April 12th, 1877, the annexation of the Transvaal by Shepstone. Lord Carnarvon sent Sir Bartle Frere to Cape Town as Governor. In addition to this he sent Shepstone to the Transvaal to annex this land, in case the National Council or the majority of the inhabitants agreed. The National Council and the President *protested* against the annexation.*

"Of some 8,000 burghers, 6,800 made their protests, but all was in vain.

"The English bishop Colenso declared that the dishonest, treacherous manner in which the Transvaal had been annexed, was unworthy of the English name."

* The means employed by Shepstone in order to make the Transvaal Government amenable to his wishes, are described by the Dutch author Jorissen in his "Memories of the Transvaal," 1898, p. 22:

"Shepstone, the British Commissioner, said in an interview with the President and the Executive Council of the Transvaal in 1877: 'Do not forget, I have until now kept my hand upon Chief Ketchwayo, but should I withdraw it . . . ' I will not enter into the question as to whether this threat had any great influence, but I establish the fact that Britain's representative was not ashamed to threaten the whites with an incursion of the blacks."

The right reverend gentleman must surely have been in error, for history has proved that these methods were fully worthy the English name, that they are in fact the very essence of English policy. Bishop Colenso furthermore declared:

“By crooked ways, like a thief in the night, did we achieve the annexation of the Transvaal.’ The Orange Free State expressed its profound regret at the annexation.

“Gladstone himself expressed his disapproval and said that in this case the free subjects of a kingdom oppressed the free citizens of a republic, and *forced them against their wills to accept an alien nationality.*

“But all this availed nothing.

“Sir Garnet Wolseley declared: ‘As long as the sun shines, the Transvaal will remain English,’ and that ‘the Vaal River will sooner flow back to its source over the Drakensberge than that England will give up the Transvaal . . .’

“The British Foreign Secretary naturally found it difficult to reconcile his instructions ‘to annex only in case a majority of the people should agree to it,’ with the fact that 6,800 burghers out of 8,000 had protested against it, but Shepstone and Carnarvon declared, without vouchsafing any reasons, that the signatures to the protest had been obtained by threats! *Precisely the contrary was true.* When the meeting at which the protest was to be signed took place at Pretoria, Shepstone *ordered the cannon to be trained upon the assembled crowds.* And not satisfied even with this, he issued a warning and threatening proclamation against the signing of the protest.

“As these reasons could not be considered as valid, recourse was had to a *fait accompli.* Carnarvon declared that he would merely be leading the deputation of Boers astray were he to give them any hope of a restoration of the country. Gladstone repeated this and added that he could not advise the Queen to give up her suzerainty over the Transvaal.”

We have here two magnificent instances of how the Briton seeks to cover up or extenuate his most ruthless, unscrupulous and unforgivable political and imperialistic crimes with a show of some minor private or personal virtue, such as, in these instances, a final frankness towards his victims,—not to be distinguished from callous cynicism,—

and of open-hearted loyalty toward his sovereign,—in convenient consonance with the undeviating policy of greed and plunder.

“When the Boers called attention to the fact that the annexation of the Transvaal was a gross violation of the Zand River Treaty of 1852, Sir Bartle Frere declared in 1879, that if one were to go back to the Zand River Treaty, one might as well go back to the Creation.”

On April 16, 1879, the National Committee of the Boers in Kleinfontein directed a petition to the Queen of England, which (see Jorissen, page 109, *et seq.*) contained the following passages:

“... Two years ago, on the 12th of April, 1877, our free and independent Republic was annexed in the name of Your Majesty by Sir Thomas Shepstone.

“This terrible fact, the oppression of a poor, weak and peaceable people, is without parallel in history. This fact stands in direct contradiction to the solemn promises of Your Majesty’s Government, in contradiction to the sacred faith which is due to the treaty which was concluded by Your Majesty’s representatives at the Zand River in 1852 with representatives of our people.

“Your Majesty has yourself through the mouth of your highest representative in South Africa, repeatedly and expressly agreed to honour the letter and the spirit of this treaty of 1852...

“How was Shepstone able to annex the land without meeting the armed resistance of the burghers? We profoundly regret to say that he did this by means of cunning, deceit and threats. After he had entered the country with the solemn asseveration that he came as the representative of Your Majesty, as a friend among friends, in order to remove all cause for complaint, and after he had been overwhelmed in this capacity with tokens of friendship by us, he shortly after, in the Executive Council, threatened our land and our people with those barbarians with whom Your Majesty’s troops are now waging a sanguinary war in Zululand.

“At the same place and on the same occasion, he likewise threatened us with the armed might of the British troops which he had assembled upon the frontiers, and to whom, on the day of annexation, he gave orders to march in. And yet he wrote to Your Majesty’s Government that he had strictly refrained from everything which might have the appearance of a threat...

"Must we seize the sword? We cannot conceal from Your Majesty what is at this moment taking place in Pretoria, the ancient capital of our Republic. It is an open city full of families with women and children. A handful of Your Majesty's troops are stationed there. Your representatives there have ordered or permitted that breast-works and barricades be erected in the open streets. Private houses have been provided with loop-holes. Why, and against what enemy? Against us—the veritable people of the South African Republic!"

This touching and dignified protest to the head of the British nation, was like all the others, in vain. Smuts proceeds:

"The tract of land which according to the judgment uttered by Keate in 1870, had been declared to be lying outside the Republic of Transvaal, was now incorporated as a part of the Transvaal as annexed by England . . .

"That the British Government had always cherished the intention of seizing a favourable opportunity of annihilating the Transvaal by using the Zulu-Kaffirs to this end, is proved by a letter written by the Chief Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere, to Sir Robert Herbert:

"The English were very much inclined to help the Zulus against the Boers. It was a surprise to me to discover how far the interferences of the present Natal Government went in supporting the Zulus against the Boers. John Dunn declares that he supplied rifles to the Zulus with the knowledge of the Government. (Another violation of the Zand River Treaty). It is beyond doubt that the sympathies in Natal were strongly on the side of the Zulus and against the Boers, and that they unfortunately are still so.'

"Under conditions such as these the annexation of the Transvaal was completed. Again the English were not ashamed to employ the help of Kaffirs against the Boers, as in the fight at Boomplaats in the Orange Free State in 1848 . . ."

THE JAMESON RAID.

In the year 1886, rich deposits of *gold* were found at Witwatersrand near Johannesburg in the Transvaal. On December 30th, 1895, Jameson made his notorious raid. He who knows British history will be able to realize the intimate relationship between these two dates and these two events. Smuts proceeds with his indictment, thus:

"It is unnecessary to discuss this raid in all its details. The world has not yet forgotten how the Administrator of a British territory, in order to carry out a conspiracy behind which stood the foremost minister of Cape Colony, broke into the South African Republic with armed forces in order to help the capitalistic revolution in Johannesburg and to overthrow the Boer Government. Nor how this raid and the revolution were frustrated through the vigilance of the Boers; nor how Jameson and his robber band were delivered over to England to be tried by process of law, even though the Boers had the right as well as the power to shoot them. Nor how the entire crowd of Johannesburg capitalists were found guilty of high treason and insurrection, nor how the Transvaal Government, instead of confiscating the property of the rebels and thus forever destroying the power of the capitalists in South Africa, pardoned them—an act of magnanimity which, three years later, they repaid by a still more dangerous agitation against the Republic. Nor how, at the instigation of the Afrikaner Party of Cape Colony, an investigation was held regarding the causes of the conflict, nor how this investigation degenerated into a low attack upon the Government of the grossly-insulted Republic of the Transvaal. Nor how, after the Boers had finally carried the day and had traced the conspiracy up to its very sources in the British Cabinet, the Commission suddenly decided not to publish the compromising documents!

"We behold here to what depths the great tradition of the British Constitution had sunk under the influence of the ever-growing and all-drowning spirit of money, and in the hands of a wholesale jobber who, like Cleon in ancient times, had thrust himself forward as a statesman."

The manner in which Britain hereupon began systematically to prepare for her infamous war against the peaceable Boer Republic of the Transvaal, and how she finally unloosed this war in 1899, is something which is graven deep and red within the memories of men and deep and black in the annals of human history.

THE BOER WAR AND THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

THE DESTRUCTION OF FARMS AND VILLAGES.

When England took Bloemfontain in May 1900 and incorporated the Orange Free State in the British Empire, the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, began oper-

ations by issuing orders to his troops systematically to destroy the farmhouses and villages of the Boers, together with their cattle and provisions. E. W. Smith, the correspondent of the *Morning Leader*, wrote as follows in the issue of April 29th, 1900:

"General French and General Pole-Carew, at the head of the Guards and 18th Brigade, are marching in, burning practically everything on the road. The brigade is followed by about 3500 head of loot, cattle and sheep. Hundreds of tons of corn and forage have been destroyed. The troops engaged in the work are Roberts' Horse, the Canadians and Australians. I hear to-day that General Rundle burnt his way up to Dewetsdorp. At one farm only women were left. Still rifles were found under the mattress. Orders were inexorable. The woman threw her arms round the officer's neck, and begged that the homestead might be spared. When the flames burst from the doomed place, the poor woman threw herself on her knees, tore open her bodice, and bared her breasts, screaming, 'Shoot me, shoot me! I've nothing more to live for, now that my husband is gone, and our farm is burnt, and our cattle taken!'"

The destruction of the farms and homes was so thorough and systematic that already on May 28th 1900 the special correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle* reported: "From end to end the Orange River Colony now lies ruined and starving."

The object of this barbaric destruction was to reduce the Boer families to a state of necessity and thereby to induce the fighting men to put an end to the war. The following official English document gives irrefutable proof of this:

V. R.

PUBLIC NOTICE.

It is hereby notified for information, that unless the men at present on commando belonging to families in the town and district of Krugersdorp surrender themselves and hand in their arms to the imperial authorities by 20th July, the whole of their property will be confiscated and their families turned out destitute and homeless.

By order,

Krugersdorp, 9th July, 1900.

G. H. M. REICHS,
Capt. K. HOASE, Dist. Supt. Police.

The book entitled "The Brunt of the War," (1902) by Miss Emily Hobhouse, from which these pieces of evidence are taken, reprints numerous proclamations of a similar nature. An Englishman, Captain March Phillips, in his book "With Rimington," (Letter XXIII, page 187) describes the procedure at the burning of a Boer farm:

Hospital, Kroonstad, Sept. 6.

"..... The various columns that are now marching about the country are carrying on the work of destruction pretty indiscriminately, and we have burnt and destroyed by now many scores of farms. Ruin, with great hardships and want, which may ultimately border on starvation, must be the result to many families.... I had to go myself the other day, at the General's bidding, to burn a farm near the line of march. We got to the place, and I gave the inmates, three women and some children, ten minutes to clear their clothes and things out of the house, and my men then fetched bundles of straw and we proceeded to burn it down. The old grandmother was very angry. She told me though I was making a fine blaze now it was nothing compared to the flames that I myself should be consumed in hereafter. Most of them, however, were too miserable to curse. The women cried, and the children stood by holding on to them and looking with large frightened eyes at the burning house. They won't forget that sight, I'll bet a sovereign, not even when they grow up. We rode away and left them, a forlorn little group, standing among their household goods—beds, furniture, and gimcracks strewn about the veld; the crackling of the fire in their ears, and smoke and flame streaming overhead. The worst moment is when you first come to the house. The people thought we had called for refreshments, and one of the women went to get milk. Then we had to tell them that we had come to burn the place down. I simply didn't know which way to look...."

On page 41 of Miss Hobhouse's book, an English Lieutenant named Morrison describes his doings in the Transvaal in a letter dated Nov. 21, from which we take the following extract: "We moved on from valley to valley, 'lifting' cattle and sheep, burning, looting, and turning out the women and children to sit and cry beside the ruins of their once beautiful farmsteads.... It was a terrible thing to see...."

THE THREAT TO EVICT WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

The military object to be served by these cruel measures taken against non-combatants was, in the main, the cowardly endeavour to cause anxiety to the Boers in the field as to the fate of the homeless and penniless women and children, whom they were naturally powerless to help. The following letter written by Lord Roberts immediately after the declaration of the annexation of the Transvaal Republic to the Commander-in-chief of the Transvaal army clearly indicates this:

" . . . In connection with the foregoing, the time has also arrived when I must again refer to my despatch C. in C., 670 of August 5, 1900,* which your Honour answered on August 15. I feel that when the war has once entered upon the stage of irregular or guerilla fighting, I should be neglecting my duty towards the national interests if I continued to allow the families of those who still fight against us to live in towns which are guarded by our forces. This is no longer a matter of commissariat, but rather of policy, and in order to protect ourselves against the transmission of news to our enemies. I would therefore consider it a favour if your Honour would warn all burghers on commando whose families are living in districts occupied by our troops, to make timely preparation for receiving and sheltering their families. The expulsion of these families will commence within a few days, a start being made with those now in Pretoria. They will travel by rail to the British outposts, to be then transferred to the person whom your Honour might appoint for their reception. I will keep your Honour informed of the number that may be excepted from day to day, and I take this opportunity of informing your Honour that since nearly all the carriages of the Netherlands South African Railway Company have been removed eastwards, the families, to my regret, will mostly have to travel in open trucks. I will endeavour to provide Mrs. Krüger, Mrs. Botha, and as many of the other ladies as possible with closed carriages, but as I am not certain of succeeding in finding one, I desire to suggest to your Honour that you

* The above-mentioned letter of Lord Roberts, dated August 5, 1900, referred to the sending of about 1500 Boer women and children into the Boers' camp. This took place in August. The reason given for this measure was that the families, most of which belonged to Johannesburg, were without means of support. The Boers found them shelter in the small town of Baberton, of which at that time, they were still in possession.

should forward suitable carriages for them. I need not tell you how repugnant these measures are to me, but I am obliged to resort to the same by the evidently firm resolve on the part of yourself and your burghers to continue the war, although any doubt as to the ultimate result thereof has now ceased to exist.—I have the honour to be your obedient servant.”

In order to understand the significance of the measure so politely threatened here, it must be borne in mind *that the region to which Lord Roberts intended to send the women and children was the still perfectly wild northern Bush region of the Transvaal, full of fever, snakes and wild animals. The threatened measure was therefore nothing less than an exposure to abject privation, helplessness,—and death.*

By the end of September 1900, Lord Roberts had already altered his plans. Instead of continuing the work, already under way, of evicting the Boer families from the villages held by the British troops, the Boer women and children from both Republics were forced as prisoners to enter concentration camps. They thus formed a valuable pawn in hand, and through this means a mighty pressure could be brought to bear upon the obstinate enemy,—the heroic Boer farmers defending their lives, their land and their liberties against their gigantic oppressor.

ERECTION OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

General Maxwell, whose name has been rendered execrable through his later cruelties in Ireland, issued on September 22nd, 1900, the order for the erection of these concentration camps. From this time on English troops and armed Kaffir commandos began the work of collecting the women and children and bringing them to the camps—euphemistically called by the English “Refugee Camps.” The women had premonitions of what awaited them in these camps, and attempted to avoid capture by flight. The English divisions

on several occasions *directed rifle-fire, sometimes even gun-fire* upon the fugitives, in order to lay hold upon them. President Steyn's letter to Lord Kitchener, dated August 15, 1901, gives us a vivid picture of these horrible actions:

THE SEIZURE OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

In the Field, August 15, 1901.

" With regard to the 74,000 women and children whom your Excellency declares to be at present supported in your Camps, it appears to me that your Excellency is not aware of the barbarous manner in which these unfortunate and defenceless creatures were torn from their homes by the English troops, and all their goods and chattels destroyed. How many of these innocent victims of the war have fled from the oncoming enemy troops in wind and weather, by day and night, as far as their strength would carry them, so that they might not fall into the hands of your soldiers!

Your Excellency's troops have not even hesitated to direct rifle and gunfire upon these helpless beings, in order to enforce their surrender, although these troops were perfectly well aware that they had to do *only with women and children*. Many a woman and many a child has been killed or wounded in this way. This happened only a short time ago in Graspan near Reitz. On the 6th of June, 1901, a women's camp—*not*, as was reported to you, a convoy—was captured by the English troops, and re-taken by us, during which time *your troops took cover behind the women*. When your reserves came up, they fired on this women's camp with cannon and rifles.

I could mention hundreds of such cases, but I do not think it necessary to do so; for if your Excellency will take the trouble to question any upright soldier, he will surely confirm my words. To say that these people are in camps of their own free will is altogether contrary to the facts, and to assert that these women were brought to the camps because the Boers refused to provide for their families (as the Minister of War is said to have done recently in Parliament), is a slander which wounds us less than the slanderer, and which I feel sure will never bear away your Excellency's approval.

M. T. STEYN."

An equally eloquent witness to the cruel circumstances attending the forcible removal of the women and children from their farms and homesteads is afforded by the follow-

ing petition sent by the women of Klerksdorp camp to the Cape Congress.

Klerksdorp, Women's Laager, January 5, 1901.

To the President of the Great Congress, held at Worcester, Cape Colony, on the 6th of December 1900.

Honoured Sir and Brother:

"In the name of the undersigned sisters and of us all, resident in the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, we beg you and all those who took part in the Congress to accept our heartfelt thanks for all you have done in our most holy cause.

"It gave us great joy, comfort and consolation to hear our brethren express themselves so freely against this unjust war. Be assured that all of us are still animated with undaunted courage, and that we are determined to fight to the bitter end, whatever happens. For ours is a just cause, and we know that the God of our Fathers will not allow the triumph of Mammon. This conviction gives us the strength to bear whatever our enemy thinks fit to make us endure.

"The sympathy which you have shown us gives us confidence in placing before you the facts which show the cruel and barbarous manner in which defenceless women and children are being treated by British officers and men.

"Wherever the enemy passed, destruction and misery followed in his steps. At first the enemy thought that this cruel oppression of women and children and the destruction of property would be sufficient to discourage our fighting burghers, and would force them to lay down their arms. But he soon found out his mistake.

"The enemy commenced by burning down our homesteads and destroying other property. We were questioned by the officers in a rude manner as to our husbands and rifles. Rough soldiers visited our houses. All the necessaries of life were taken from us, and all the things which could not be conveniently carried away, such as flour, corn, etc., were scattered over the veld. All vehicles of every kind which they could not take with them were also burnt. Pictures, furniture, and household utensils were first broken to pieces and then set fire to, together with our homes. We were not even allowed to take some blankets and clothes with us for ourselves and our children. Everything was thrown into the flames. The clothes of our men were taken away for the British troops. In some cases even the children were left naked.

"In this condition we stood under the bare sky, without shelter, without food, exposed to the rain, the cold, or burning heat. This, however, did

not yet satisfy the enemy. The crops, which, in the absence of the male population with the commandoes, we had sown ourselves, were to be destroyed or burnt. All the implements of agriculture, such as ploughs, harrows, and others wherewith we could have again provided for our existence, were carried away or destroyed. All the poultry was killed and the cattle removed. In one word, the whole country was turned into a desert. Ah! we find no words to describe these horrors!

“The barbarity of the enemy went further still: they carried the women and children off as prisoners. Even old, grey-haired, and impotent women did not escape from their ill-treatment. We will state a few cases.

“A certain number of women had been taken prisoners in and around Potchefstroom, and conducted to Welverdiend Station, a distance of about four hours’ ride on horseback. The troops were accompanied on this march by some coloured women. The latter were allowed to sit on the waggons, but the Boer women had to go on foot, and were driven on by the Kaffirs. The consequence was that some fell down dead by the road, and that one woman gave birth to a child. *On this occasion Kaffirs were used, and they equalled the English soldiers in cruelty and barbarity.*

“The women knelt before these Kaffirs and begged for mercy, but they were roughly shaken off, and had to endure even more impudent language and rude behaviour. Their clothes were even torn from their bodies. In some cases they had to suffer a harder lot still. The mothers were taken away from their children. The very small children were left behind, because some were ill in bed. The mothers were not even allowed to take leave of their dear treasures. When they begged the soldiers to take pity on their children, the reply was, ‘Get along; they must all come to an end.’ Luckily, some women who were left behind took pity on the infants and nursed them. *When the mothers were driven like cattle through the streets of Potchefstroom by the Kaffirs, the cries and lamentations of the children filled the air. The Kaffirs then jeered and cried, ‘Move on: till now you were the masters; but now we will make your women our wives.’* In this fearful state were the women obliged to march for four hours.

“About six miles north of Potchefstroom lived the wife of Thomas van Graan, who since February 1900 had been in exile with General Cronje. At first she had received permission to remain with her children on the farm. Quite unexpectedly, a British force arrived in the neighbourhood and at the farm. The soldiers kicked open the doors and broke the furniture to pieces. In a violent thunderstorm, Mrs. Van Graan was placed with her little children in an uncovered waggon. These unwarranted proceedings were taken because it was supposed that Chief-Commandant De Wet had spent a night at the farm.

"A great number of women along the Mooi River were also victims of the cruelty of the English. A woman whose child was dying was removed by force, notwithstanding her heartrending entreaties. At a farm on the banks of the Vaal a woman refused to follow the soldiers. She was dragged along for a considerable distance over the veld, until at last they were obliged to leave her behind. Two young girls—this was also along the banks of the Vaal River—whose mother had already been carried away, were in danger of being violated, but managed to take shelter with a neighbour. The soldiers followed in pursuit, but the girls refused to open the door. They were in great danger, but the saving hand of God protected them, and they escaped this ignominy; one of the girls made her escape, and walked a distance of six hours' ride. The sufferings of these women must have been excruciating: words fail us to describe them.

"On the Witwatersrand there was another fearful attempt at violation. In the struggle the woman's neck was twisted in such a manner that it will never come right again. Her daughter rushed to her assistance, but the ruffian drew his sabre and cut open her breast.

"We could add many other instances to these, but we think you will now have an idea of the cruel and barbarous manner in which the British officers and soldiers behave towards defenceless women and children.

"We therefore implore your further assistance and your prayers for us to God.

"Relying upon these, we remain," etc.

(Here follow the signatures.)

CONDITIONS IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

The misery which reigned in the concentration camps as early as the end of 1900, soon aroused the attention of right-thinking men in all parts of the world. In spite of the English censor, it began to be known in Europe and America that the conditions in the camps were unspeakable. Mothers had been parted from their children; women with young children had not been permitted to take a cow with them. The food portions were absolutely insufficient and were served out raw, without the necessary firing for cooking them. The official English ration-lists show that the "families who had members in the field" (the so-called

“undesirables”) received considerably less than the others. *Even children under six years of age were not excepted from this rule!* The women and children, even sick and pregnant women, were obliged to lie in leaky tents on the bare ground, without sufficient protection from the rain and the piercing cold of the South African winter nights.

The misery and the high death-rate in the camps aroused right-thinking men throughout the whole of Europe and America, England not excepted, and various schemes of help were instituted. A Charity Committee formed in England sent Miss Emily Hobhouse to South Africa at the close of the year 1900 to investigate matters on the spot and to render all possible aid. Miss Hobhouse arrived in Capetown on the 27th of December 1900, and visited the Women's Camps in the southern part of the war zone during January to June 1901. Lord Kitchener refused her permission to visit the camps north of Bloemfontein. Her reports constitute one of the most damning and unanswerable charges against the inhumanity of English methods of warfare.

Below we give some extracts from her descriptions of the condition of the imprisoned women and children. The number in the concentration camps in August 1901 was estimated at 105,000.

1. Camp at Bloemfontein, 26th of January, 1901.

“There are nearly 2000 people in this one camp, among them only a few men and over 900 children . . . The tents are like a furnace. On rainy nights the water pours through the linen and streams into the tents, as only rain in this country can stream, and the woollen blankets on which the people lie become wet through . . . Mrs. P. expects her confinement in three weeks, but she must lie on the bare ground until she is stiff and sore. For two months she has had nothing to sit upon, and crouches upon a rolled-up blanket . . . I call the whole camp system cruelty on a large scale. It will never, never be effaced from the memories of these

people. The children are hit the hardest by it. They wither away in the frightful heat and in consequence of the insufficient and unsuitable food. Thousands, bodily weak, are faced with conditions of life, which, in their weakened condition, they are unable to endure. They are face to face with hopeless ruin. There are cases in which whole families have been parted and sent to various places, they do not know whither . . . If the English people would only try to picture the whole hopeless state of things! The population of whole villages and districts torn from the soil to which they clung with all the roots and fibres of their being, and thrust into another barren spot! To keep up this kind of camp is nothing less than child-murder! . . .

"We have a good deal of typhoid and fear an epidemic. On this account I brought my whole energies to bear upon seeing that the water of the Modder River should be boiled. The doctors say one might as well swallow pure typhoid bacillus cultures as drink this water. And yet all of them cannot boil their water, because heating materials are so scarce. The quantity given out every week is not sufficient to cook *one* warm meal a day . . . In the next tent a girl of 21 lay dying on a stretcher. The father, a tall, mild-looking Boer, knelt beside her, while in the neighbouring tent his wife watched over a six-year old child which was also dying, and a five-year old child which was pining away. This couple had already lost 3 children in the Hospital.

2. *Camp at Norval's Pont, 10th of February, 1901.*

"The heat in the tents was very great. Even the large, cool, airy tents were often up to 104 degrees Fahrenheit, and in the small tents, made of ordinary sail-cloth, the temperature rose to 108° and 113°. The doctor said he could not use his fever thermometer in these tents, since it would not fall at all.

3. *Camp at Aliwal North, 12th of February, 1901.*

"The scarcest of all is soap. Neither in this camp nor in Norval's Pont has soap been given out, and those who have no money can neither wash themselves nor their clothes.

4. *Camp at Bloemfontein, 17th of February, 1901.*

"I am quite distressed by the lack of mattresses. If the military authorities will only give me hay or straw, I will soon have the people making their own . . . The great majority are obliged to lie on the bare ground.

5. *Camp at Bloemfontein, 18th of February, 1901.*

"It is an absolutely false idea, rotten to the core, to create everywhere in these Boer states great, dismal settlements of these people who are officially called refugees, and are supposed to be under our protection, but who consider themselves prisoners of war, who are held by force and loathe this protection.

6. *Camp at Bloemfontein, 27th of February, 1901.*

"Five rows of corrugated iron huts (houses they could not be called) have been erected, 2 rows of single rooms, back to back, 10 in a row. 20 in a building, and every one of these rooms shelters one or more families. About 100 families are sheltered thus. The iron dividing walls do not reach to the roof, so that noise, draughts and infection run riot through the whole building.

7. *Camp at Springfontein, 4th of March, 1901.*

"The people here are worse off for the merest necessities than I have previously experienced anywhere. Fortunately I had three chests full of clothes with me, but it is only a drop in this ocean of misery. I sat the whole day on the verandah of a farmhouse. One after another every family was brought out of its tent and ranged before me. I could give them just so many clothes as would suffice to cover their nakedness. . . The worst necessity in this camp is the want of heating materials. There is no wood. A little coal was given out, but so little that on many days the people were unable to do any cooking at all. But the raw rations served out cannot be prepared without fire.

8. *Camp at Kimberley, 13th of March, 1901.*

"This is the smallest camp which I have seen as yet. The camps are too near together, and the whole enclosed by an eight-foot barbed wire fence . . . no matron. A large, unfurnished, empty tent, which is perhaps a hospital. Overfilled tents. Measles and whooping-cough are raging, the camp is dirty and smells foully. An army doctor, who naturally understands little about children's ailments. Firing, almost none. The wife of a commander is here with six children. Her youngest child suffered a tragic fate. An English general came with his company to her farm to order her removal. The child was only 17 days old when the troops arrived, and she herself was very weak. The child pined away from lack of milk and died when 3 months old. It seemed to me like the realization of the words about the "slaughter of the innocents."

9. *Camp at Mafeking, 11th of April, 1901.*

"An old lady with whom I talked, was a real character. She was completely broken down, something I had found in no other instance. She described to me the whole history of her being taken prisoner, and the doings of the English general, how she threw herself flat on the verandah and begged him to trample her underfoot and kill her. She showed me the clothes she had brought with her. The white bundle contained nothing but her shroud. She evidently thought that was all she would need in the camp.

10. *Camp at Kimberley, 13th to 15th of April, 1901.*

"240 human beings have been brought here in one train, half of them in open coal trucks. When I arrived, I saw the Commandant who was to receive the arrivals. He told me that he had succeeded in begging, borrowing and buying about 25 tents for these 240 people. So it will be worse yet. . . . 7 children died during the few days while I was in Capetown, and 2 more since my return. . . . Mrs. — — has been taken to the City Hospital, she is very ill in consequence of a blow in the stomach given her by a drunken soldier; something internal . . . when it rains at night, everything leaks through the tents and makes little pools on the floor. No wonder the children fall ill and die.

11. *Camp at Bloemfontein, 20th of April, 1901.*

"There are now over 4,000 people here, that is twice as many as there were 6 weeks ago. At Springfontein station I saw a train with 600 more. It is miserable to see them, jammed together in the train, many of them in open trucks. It was bitterly cold. It had poured in torrents all night, and there were puddles everywhere. They tried to dry themselves and their clothes on the wet ground. Some of the women attempted to mount the platform in order to buy food for their children. The soldiers would not allow it; I remonstrated. They said, they were very sorry, but they had strict orders. . . . More and more women and children arrived. A new razzia has begun, with the result that hundreds and thousands of these unhappy people are either put into an already overfilled camp, or they are set out somewhere or other, where it is intended to establish a new camp, but where nothing is ready to receive them. . . . No wonder sickness increases. Since I left, 6 weeks ago, there have been 62 deaths in the camp, and the doctor himself is ill of a fever."

In June 1901, Miss Hobhouse concluded her Report with the following summary: "Among the things which are felt most oppressively and which undermine the health and constitution of the women, are the following:

"Scarcity of Firing: The meat cannot be cooked and the bread is soggy, because it does not get baked sufficiently. *Scarcity of Beds and Mattresses:* The great majority lie on the ground. *Scarcity of Soap:* No camp gives out a sufficient quantity. *Diet:* The food is always the same and unsuitable for children. In addition, bad water, overcrowding, scarcity of clothing and quite insufficient sanitary arrangements.

"The first thing to be done is to release the people. Most of them are now completely ruined; but those who have friends or means of their own should be allowed to go. Above all one must hope that the commonsense, if not the mercifulness of the English will be aroused against the continuation of this cruel system, which has such a destructive effect upon the old, the weak and the children. The least one can do is to rescind the order to bring more people into the camps!

"Was ever a whole people led away into captivity since the days of the Old Testament?"

(Re-translated.)

The proposals made by Miss Hobhouse were unfortunately not carried out by the English military authorities. On the contrary, the intrepid woman was arrested in the moment of her landing for the second time in South Africa, in order to continue her work of mercy. The same intense passion for truth and justice also impelled Miss Hobhouse to investigate conditions in Belgium during the World War, and the impartial accounts made by this fearless champion of humanity, raised as before storms of indignation and denunciation on the part of the English press and politicians.

THE DEATH RATE IN THE CAMPS.

On page 327 of her book, Miss Hobhouse gives statistics of the death rate in the camps from January 1901 to February 1902. The figures are appalling.

The total number of women and children who died in the camps, according to English statistics, and perpetuated on the large National monument unveiled in 1913 at Bloemfontein, was

26,379.

The camps usually contained from 90,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. "There is grave reason to fear," says Miss Hobhouse, "that many more deaths have taken place than appear in these official returns."

The yearly death rate per 1,000 in England is 18

Total deaths per 1,000 in the camps 264

Children's deaths in the camps 433

From this we see that *more than one-fourth of the human beings confined in the camps between the end of 1900 and the spring of 1902 perished—the victims of British ruthlessness.*

The physician in charge of these concentration camps, who was responsible for the sanitary and hygienic conditions in the camps, was **Sir Kendal Franks**, an English doctor in Johannesburg, now a member of the South African Parliament. At a dinner given at the house of the then Portuguese Consul in Pretoria, Cinnati, someone called the attention of this man, Sir Kendal Franks, who was present, to the frightful rate of mortality in the concentration camps, whereupon he received the humane answer: "The more of them die, the better for us." The then German Consul, Reimer, who was one of the guests at this dinner, vouches for the truth of this episode. General Maxwell, Governor of Pretoria at that time, was visited by a Boer Deputation

which called his attention to the high death-rate in the Concentration Camps. He replied: "The Boers should surrender, then things would improve at once."

The two reports of General Delarey and General Smuts, later Ministers of the South African Union, to President Kruger, present a moving picture of conditions in the two Boer Republics at the end of 1901 and in January 1902. The two reports show that the English finally began *systematically to organize and arm the negroes and to employ them on a large scale in their operations against the Boers. This is the most unpardonable crime which the white man in Africa can commit against his fellow white man.* Extracts from the Report follow:—

Report of General Delarey, Assistant General-Kommandant for the Western Districts of the South African Republic, to President Kruger:

In the Field, December, 1901.

"Our land is one heap of ruins.

"Nothing remains but the walls of buildings, except where even these were blown up with dynamite. Nothing has escaped this destruction. *The property of neutrals as well as of burghers killed in battle and of those who are now prisoners of war, and of the widows and orphans—everything has been destroyed.*

"Neither churches nor parsonages nor schools have been spared.

"In my division the villages of Wolmaransstad, Bloemhof, Schweizer-Reneke, and Hartebeestfontein, which have *not* been occupied by the enemy, have been totally burnt.

"It is exactly the same in the Eastern Districts of the South African Republic, where General Botha is at present.

"The treatment of *women and children*, poor, defenceless creatures, is really the darkest page among the many dark pages of this sad war. At first hundreds of our women who were living in the villages were taken prisoners and sent to the commandoes. We formed women's camps at several places, where our women and children were taken care of. But soon the enemy changed his conduct. Our women, who had been taken prisoners after the homesteads had been burped, were sometimes carried

along with the columns on trolleys for weeks. At night the women were placed around the laagers as a protection against a night attack from our side. When the women realised what was the object of the enemy, they tried to escape, but were pursued. They were even fired upon, with rifles and Krupp guns. Sometimes they were caught again and then they were removed to greater distances, and placed in tents. But from the camps hundreds of sweet messages reach us, telling us not to worry about them, but to continue the struggle for our country.

"Many women have already lost their lives either from bullet-wounds or from the misery they have endured. My own wife was ordered by Lord Methuen to leave her home and everything she possessed. She has been wandering about the country for over twelve months with six small children". My mother, an old woman of eighty-three, who has been a widow for nine years, has been carried away as a prisoner. All her cattle have been taken away, and her house burnt. She has been removed to Klerksdorp. The following women have been killed:

"At Rietfontein the wife of Stoffel Fourie and a Miss Diedricks were killed under the verandah before their own door by a Maxim shell, and that at a time when no man was near the house. The wife of L. van der Merwe was shot through the head at the farm Groenfontein. She was left lying wounded in a field shanty, and her house burnt.

"In Schweizer-Reneke a daughter of Sonnikus' was shot dead and another badly wounded; I enclose a sworn statement of this.

"In the district of Potschefstroom, at Gatstrand, the wife of Hans Briets was struck in her waggon by a shell and killed.

"Our wounded have a hard time of it. I set up various field-hospitals, but in most cases they were not respected by the enemy, who in fact carried off the wounded, burnt everything up and even carried off all the medicines and bandaging materials. Under present circumstances, there is nothing for the wounded to do when the enemy approaches but to flee, however hard it may be for them. I have begged for medicines and offered to pay for them, but up to now my plea has always been rejected.

"In case the enemy should deny having armed the blacks against us, I give here some proofs. On the 29th of September 1901, a women's camp in the district of Rustenburg was attacked by a Kafir commando

* Boer Commandoes found her in a Kafir hut. The man, however, whose wife had suffered so much, sent the man who had turned this poor woman out of house and home, his own wife to nurse him, and telegraphed her (Lady Methuen) to relieve her anxiety as to her husband's fate.

accompanying Kekewich. Two burghers were killed and five wounded. Among the wounded was Stoffel Fourie, the President's son-in-law. He was struck by three bullets, but is nevertheless recovering. A daughter of Jean Eloff was hit by two bullets.

"On the 27th of November we were obliged to shoot 10 blacks whom we had caught in possession of weapons. General Beyers reports that in the northern districts he is continually being attacked by the English, accompanied by Kaffir commandoes. In my district the tribes of Mantsua and Mosheth have also taken up arms against us.

"The garrisons in the western districts, that is in the villages (occupied by the enemy) consist almost entirely of half-breeds."

General Smuts, Report, January, 1902:

van Rhynsdorp, K. K. January, 1902.

His Honour, President S. J. P. Krüger:

"..... Towards the close of 1900 Lord Kitchener began to carry out in both Republics a policy distinguished by unheard-of barbarity and cruelty and by a disregard of the most elementary principles of all international laws of war. The consequence was that in the winter of 1901 our unfortunate country and people were plunged into a state of ruin and misery which beggars all description. Almost all the farms and villages in both Republics were ruined and burnt, the grain all destroyed, all the cattle which had fallen into the enemy's hands, killed or rather ruthlessly butchered.

"The great majority of our women and children were salting their bread with their tears in the prison-camps of our enemies, and those who were still at liberty wandered in the bush and in the mountains among Kaffirs and wild animals. The grassy veld had been set on fire in both Republics by the enemy. Everything was black as far as the eye could see, so that one might imagine Nature herself to have gone into mourning over the immeasurable misery of our people. ... The basic idea behind Lord Kitchener's war tactics was, not only to conquer through direct operations against the fighting commandoes, *but to force our people into surrender and despair through the indirect means of putting the pressure of the war upon defenceless women and children.* The unhappy creatures were pitilessly persecuted and oppressed, in order to reduce to despair the hearts of those who were still in the field. ...

"When the enemy found that even the destruction of their homes and property did not break the spirit of the Boers, they sought and found *a new means of torture in the capture and ill-treatment of women and children.*

The enemy thought here to touch our people in their most sensitive feelings. They thought, much as the Boer may love his country, and his freedom, he loves his wife and children more. If one take these away from him, he will surrender. And an unheard-of persecution of the women and children began. You know how the persecution of the women and children had already begun in the districts occupied by the enemy at the time when you were here with us. It was intended to shake the courage of our forces.

"You know, too, what a dark prospect opened before us as a result of these proceedings. . . . *No pen can describe the sufferings which have been endured since March 1900 by the heroines of our people. Flying from the enemy, hiding themselves in the bush and in the hills, where many a bleaching skeleton now cries to heaven as witness of the barbarities of the Bantu negroes and the still more barbaric Britons; seeking protection with their little ones, standing knee-deep in water in the tall reeds, where, as happened to the wife and children of Commandant Wolmarans of Poteschefstroom, they are fired upon with Lee-Metford and Maxim guns by the enemy and driven out into the villages; after months of vain flight, brought at last into the enemy's prison-camps where, sick to death themselves, they carried their beloved little ones to the grave; suffering the pangs of hunger, because they were unable to eat the bad meat and the still worse flour, and without wood to cook their food; week by week, month by month, year by year sitting in confinement, consumed by longing and anxiety for the husbands and sons, perhaps long since fallen in the war; is that not a picture of woe such as was never yet unrolled before a horrified world?*

"However hard the lot of the men in the field may have been, it was a merry life, compared with the trials of their captive loved ones.

"Since the ill-treatment of the women and children produced no effect upon the Boers other than to render their conduct of the war more energetic, and their resistance more determined, the enemy bethought himself of a still more terrible weapon. I mean by this *the organization and arming of natives*. You will remember the arrogant disdain with which Lord Roberts disposed of our protest against the arming of the Linchwe Tribe and the horrible murder at Derdeport at an earlier period of the war. His successor has followed only too closely in his footsteps. When the enemy pushed forward northwards at the beginning of the winter of 1901 and took Peylstroom and Pietersburg, he sent word to the native chiefs of Waterberg and Zoutpansberg and presented them with gifts and weapons. *Soon after there suddenly occurred the most horrible massacre of women, children and old people which we have experienced since the days of Dingaan and Moselekatse. At the same time about 72 women and children*

were slaughtered in Swaziland, having fled there from the murderous bands of General French's troops who were devastating the high veld. These murders and misdeeds were committed by natives who up to this time had been friendly towards us, but whose attitude had been changed under the influence of the enemy's agents. In consequence of the enemy's provocative action the Sekkuni folk have now also risen in revolt.

"In Cape Colony, the English told the uncivilised blacks that if the Boers obtained the victory, they would re-establish slavery in Cape Colony, and that the cruel Boers would harness the blacks before their carts and ploughs. In order to make a still deeper impression upon them, they were promised that if they joined the English, the Boer farms should become theirs; the Boers would be obliged to work for them and they should marry the Boer women. Fear and greed combined to urge thousands of coloured men in Cape Colony to take up arms and enter the service of the English. Most of the enemy columns in Cape Colony and the Orange Free State contained a considerable percentage of armed negroes, who invariably made it their particular business to insult the white population and who, through their bumptious manners and boasting, might well cause earnest anxiety as to the future of the white race in South Africa.

"The enemy himself is ashamed that in spite of his well-known colossal superiority in numbers, he should have been forced to make use of such auxiliary troops. It is for this reason that the military commanders and the British Government officially deny having armed the negroes and permitted them to engage in hostilities . . . *This is the greatest crime ever committed against the white race in South Africa . . .*"

J. C. SMUTS,

Assistant Kommandant-General of the South African Republic.

SURRENDER OF THE BOERS FROM FEAR OF EXTINCTION.

It is a well-known fact that the principal factors which induced the Boers to surrender and to accept the English terms of peace were the *frightful mortality rate in the concentration camps*, statistics of which were purposely transmitted from time to time to the Boers in the field by the English, and the *arming of the Kaffirs*. As Miss Hobhouse reports, at the time of the conference in Vereeniging which resulted in 1902 in the surrender of the Boers, there were still about 10,000 women and children in the eastern Trans-

vaal who were not in the English concentration camps. These women were in a frightful position. Their homes and all their food had been destroyed. Their husbands had been able to provide them with food, *but the English at once sent out divisions of armed natives to take these provisions from the women and children.* These armed natives took from the women all their food and clothing, and destroyed their cooking utensils. The women were absolutely at the mercy of the Kaffirs . . . Many women were nearly naked when their husbands rejoined them. Many were discovered living in Kaffir huts.

The historic protest issued and sent to Lord Kitchener by the Boer leaders assembled at Vereeniging on the 30th of May 1902 before their acceptance of the English conditions of peace, gives the three principal reasons for their surrender, as follows:

1. "The nature of the English methods of warfare has reduced our country to absolute ruin; the burning-down of the farms and villages and the destruction of all means of life has exhausted all sources of provision for our families and our army.
2. "The confinement of our families in concentration camps has led to a state of misery and disease such as has never before been heard of; so that within a comparatively short period of time, some 26,000 of our nearest and dearest died in the laagers, and we stand confronted by the terrible prospect of seeing our entire people exterminated through a further prolongation of the war.
3. "The Kaffir tribes in the two Republics and the surrounding territory have all been armed and are taking part in the war against us, burning and murdering as they go."

TREATMENT OF THE TRANSVAAL NATIVES BY THE ENGLISH.

When Britain undertook her atrocious war against the two Boer Republics, she announced with that magnificent gesture of defending the weak and helpless which is the invariable

accompaniment of all her wars of conquest, that one of her reasons for waging war upon this people was to free the natives of these lands from the unjust and inhuman treatment which they had suffered at the hands of the Boers. When English prisoners captured during the Boer war were asked what they were fighting for, they not infrequently replied: "For equal rights for the blacks and whites." The set, ready-made and emotionalized war-phrase had been prepared for patriotic consumption in those days as efficiently as during a later and vaster war.

A few years after the close of the Boer War, conditions were brought to light which proved that the treatment of the native workmen in the notorious "compounds" of the Transvaal Gold Mines was so bad under English rule and the mortality so appalling that *the natives themselves declared that their lot had been far better under the rule of the Boers.*

At the beginning of April, 1905, a large deputation of negroes appeared before Lord Selbourne at Johannesburg in order to protest against the treatment of the negroes under English rule in the Transvaal. The deputation called special attention to the fact that the Government refused the natives all right to possess even the tiniest patch of ground—and yet England during the war had promised the natives of the Transvaal Republic that the Golden Age was about to dawn for them! The deputation in conclusion declared that the negroes had been treated infinitely better under the régime of the Boers and that if no improvement of conditions ensued, a revolt would inevitably break out.

The House of Commons on May 5, 1904, occupied itself in detail with the condition of these natives (*Times*, May 6, 1904):

"The Secretary of State for the Colonies was asked questions by two Members of the majority, Major Seely and Mr. Churchill, relating to facts revealed in a recent report of Mr. Brownlee, well-known in South Africa. The Secretary of State, in answering the question, was compelled to acknowledge the existence of such serious abuse that his own words form a terrible indictment against the persons responsible for this abuse.

"The discussion bore upon three kinds of facts:

1. The natives are grossly cheated by their employers and only receive wages far lower than the agreed scale;
2. the natives are ill-treated and are left, without any check, in the arbitrary hands of their overseers who manage them with the whip;
3. the rate of mortality amongst mine-labourers has reached an excessive figure, condemning in itself the conditions to which they are subject.

"The Secretary of State was obliged to admit 'that there was evidence on both sides' and simply sought to attenuate the effect which Mr. Brownlee's statements must necessarily produce.

"Upon the first point (fraud connected with wages), Major Seely declared that 'The Commission proceeded to Johannesburg, and there was an unanimous opinion that there had been unfair and improper treatment in respect of the wages being paid at a less rate than was promised. Mr. Stamford, assistant chief magistrate, who forwarded the whole report and summed up its conclusions, said that misrepresentations with regard to wages were made by the labour agents; that occasionally wrongful deductions were made."

"The complaint was, Mr. Churchill added, that the men had been paid at a very much lower rate than that which was promised to them by the recruiting agents. Mr. Brownlee said that in the great majority of the compounds visited, this complaint was made, and that, although the Labour Association authorities strenuously insisted that this state of things did not exist, he was satisfied that it did exist.

"Is this sufficiently clear? The Secretary of State contented himself with quoting the individual opinion of one or two witnesses examined on the investigation and with contending that the Labour Association are not responsible for abuses committed by their recruiting Agents.

"As to the ill-treatment inflicted on the natives (being the second point indicated above), a characteristic incident took place when the Commission proceeded down the compounds. Mr. Churchill remarked that the Commission were afforded all possible facilities by the Government of the

Transvaal for making themselves thoroughly acquainted with the whole state of affairs. One of the first things they noticed was that "at various compounds the boys complained of being hurried by means of the application of the gentle stimulus of cowhide." The Commission said that they thought there was no doubt that there were grounds for this complaint, because at one of the compounds the native policeman in their presence began an impartial administration of this form of stimulus to the crowd which surrounded him, and when asked why he did so replied that he wished thereby to show his respect for the members of the Commission and to remove the crowd, which, he said, he thought was causing them annoyance. Whether this practice was universal or not, at any rate they noticed that the compound police carried *sjamboks*.

"In a passage of his report, Mr. Brownlee says—"he himself introduces the necessary corrective to this opinion by stating that the administration of a certain amount of corporal correction by the compound managers exists." On page 27, the report goes on to say "that labourers proceeding to Johannesburg were also badly treated, that they were packed in trucks, and were not regarded as human beings."

"Further, the Secretary of State for the Colonies read out himself the following passage of a witness' evidence (p. 27 of the report):

"The labourers complain that their wages should be raised, and that those who fall sick should be allowed to go home and that their friends should be allowed to take them. The people were well-paid when the Transvaal was under the Dutch, and now the English, who are our friends, rule they should be paid better still. I think myself the wages of the labourers should be raised, and that Zulu policemen should not be allowed to ill-treat and beat the natives."

"Then remains the third point, namely the question of the death-rate amongst natives employed in the mines. On this subject, Major Seely expressed himself very strongly in terms warranted by the facts, viz.: "For the last year that rate averaged 80 %, and during the last six months it had increased to nearly 90 %. That was nearly 20 times the rate of mortality in English mines. What was the cause? There was no other employment in any part of the world which showed such a terrible mortality.

"It was evident that a state of affairs prevailed on the Rand which was a discredit to South Africa and to this country, which allowed it to continue.

"The gravity of these facts appears from the words uttered by the Secretary of State for the Colonies: 'I fully agree that the mortality in the mines is a very grave matter.' He endeavoured to prove, by means

of certain calculations, that the rate of mortality only amounts to 57 %, but if one considers that the death-rate in England is about 18 %, does that figure of 57 % not appear conspicuously enormous, even allowing for differences of race, climate and profession?

“We will suppose this figure to be correct. It displays a deplorable state of things, which the British Government, if they care about the life and health of the natives, should put a stop to at any cost.

“Major Seely seems, moreover, to have answered peremptorily by pointing out that ‘those higher figures (90 %) were given on the authority of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which stated that the deaths in a year were 5,000 out of under 70,000 employed, making an average of 80 per 1,000 per annum.’

“To this statement no reply was given and Major Seely’s words closed the debate.”

Further evidence respecting the kind of treatment meted out to the natives in the mines of the Transvaal is furnished by Mr. Macnamara, M. P., in his book: “Chinese Labour,” (1905). The following conversation between Zwedala, a native chieftain in the District of Lady Frere, and the Chairman of the Transvaal Commission for Native Labour, is reproduced in this work:

“Have you had any complaints from people returning who have been working here?”

“They complain of the treatment which they say is bad; since the war it was very bad, much more so than when the Boers ruled this country.”

“How is it now, do you know?”

“On my way here this time I met 40 men at Sterkstroom; they say the cat-o-nine-tails was placed on a fellow’s back every day without being taken before the magistrate; the Managers do it.”

THE CHINESE ATROCITIES IN THE TRANSVAAL 1904—1907.

In order to relieve the lack of labour in the Transvaal, especially in the gold-mines of Johannesburg, the Transvaal Government in May 1904, passed a law permitting the

importation of Chinese coolies. The first shipment of Chinese arrived at Durban, Natal, in June 1904 for the Witwatersrand mines. In the year 1905 there were some 41,400 Chinese employed in the gold-mines of the Transvaal, in the year 1907 there were 53,856. Soon after the arrival of the Chinese, the inhabitants of the Witwatersrand and the adjacent districts were greatly disquieted by the numerous crimes which were being committed by the Chinese.

The Chinese were kept confined in isolated compounds which they could leave only once a month and then only by means of a pass. Gangs of Chinese broke out of the compounds, attacked solitary houses and farms, looted them completely and murdered the owners whenever these ventured to defend themselves. The High Commissioner for South Africa, Lord Selborne, expressed the opinion that a great part of these crimes was to be ascribed to the bad treatment given the Chinese. The Chinese Government had requested the British Government to issue an order forbidding the employers and overseers of the imported Chinese from using the lash upon them. The British, however, regarded such an order as superfluous in view of the fact that the imported labourers were subject to the laws of the land, according to which corporeal punishment could be sanctioned only by the authorities or by a judge. A Liberal Member of Parliament actually brought in a vote of censure against Lord Milner because, without obtaining the permission of the Colonial Secretary, he had issued an authorisation to inflict corporeal punishment, in violation of the law and of contract stipulations. The House nevertheless concluded that, while expressing its condemnation of the illegal infliction of corporeal punishment, it was desirable, in the interests of peace and conciliation in South Africa, to refrain from passing a vote of censure upon individuals.

The manner in which the whipping of the Chinese coolies in the gold-mines of Johannesburg was in reality carried out, was described by P. H. Wilson in the *Daily News* of September 20th, 1905, as follows:

"I now propose to tell you, from the evidence of my own eyes and from the descriptions given by men who ordered floggings in innumerable cases, how various kinds of punishment were being and are being inflicted.

"Take the Witwatersrand Mine, for instance. The average number of coolies flogged daily in one month early in 1905 was 42, Sundays included. This information was given me by the official whose duty it was to make a record of the registered numbers of those men who were punished.

"In another form of flogging, practised, if not at the Witwatersrand Mine, at the Witwatersrand Deep, a short bamboo was used. The coolie would strip to the waist and go down on his knees with his head on the floor.

"His castigator would then squat beside him, and strike him across the shoulders with lightning rapidity. The blows, though apparently light, always fell on the one spot, and raised a large red weal before cutting the flesh.

"During the first quarter of this year no fewer than 56 coolies were whipped after eight p. m. one evening at the Witwatersrand Mine, the dose varying from 5 to 15 strokes.

"At the Nourse Deep severe punishment was meted out. Every boy who did not drill his 36 inches per shift was liable to be, and actually was, whipped unless he were ill, and could show that it was a physical impossibility for him to do a day's work.

"A *sjambok* was used; it was laid on relentlessly by Chinese policemen, the part of the body selected being the muscles and tendons at the back of the thighs.

"Even the sight of blood did not matter. The policeman would go right on to the last stroke. Having been thus punished, the coolie could walk away; but after sitting down for a time the bruised tendons would refuse to work. Many of the coolies were sent to hospital to recover." (Mr. F. C. Boland, *Morning Leader*, September 6th, 1904).

"I said that flogging was not the worst. Note this from the same source:—

"Meanwhile, the management issued instructions, because of advices from England, that flogging should be stopped so far as possible, but asking that other forms of punishment should be substituted.

"A more refined form of torture was to bind a coolie's left wrist with a piece of fine rope, which was then put through a ring in a beam about 9 ft. from the ground. This rope was then made taut, so that the unhappy coolie, with his left arm pulled up perpendicularly, had to stand on his tip-toes. In this position he was kept, as a rule, for two hours, during which time, if he tried to get down on his heels, he must dangle in the air hanging from the left wrist."

Another form of punishment consisted in binding the Chinese absolutely naked by their pigtails to a stake, thus exposing them to the derision of their countrymen and the vicissitudes of the weather.

The *Étoile Belge* writes under date of September 27th, 1905:

"The latest tidings from South Africa bring us more terrible details of the Chinese atrocities than it was possible to assume up to now from the brief telegraphic despatches. More than a thousand runaways are overrunning the land, murdering and plundering as they go. They are being hounded from all sides and slaughtered like rabbits. The survivors revenge themselves to the utmost. The entirely insufficient police force organize regular battues. The natives murder as many Chinese as possible, not only because these take away their work, but also because they are alleged to devour their children. The Boers suffer most under these conditions, because they live isolated—they fire openly upon the Chinese. The Government has given them back their weapons for this purpose. In one place the Chinese had barricaded themselves in a blockhouse, where they were forced to undergo a regular siege; in another spot, 38 Chinese were killed in an open fight."

In view of these conditions the opposition to coolie labour grew steadily stronger in England and in the Transvaal.

The Bishop of Hereford wrote as follows to the *Times* on September 5th, 1905:

"This ugly blotch of 50,000 serfs on the fair face of our Empire turns what was to have been a prosperous and growing community of British workmen and their families, another new England for our emigrants, into

a term of reproach throughout every colony of the Empire and beyond it; and we feel, as we think of it all, what a stupendous political blunder the Government and their advisers committed when they sanctioned this Chinese labour and its servile conditions, and how grave an injury has been done to our working-class population by thus closing the door of access to the mining industries of the Transvaal.

"But, putting this aside, it is pathetic to see English *gentlemen* like the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary bound down by some cruel and mocking fate to the defence of a system so abhorrent to all our notions of freedom, humanity, good government, and decent social conditions; and we keep hoping that, in the light of experience, they may have the courage to declare that the experiment has proved a mistake and shall cease before it is too late to remedy the mischief already done. At any rate, I feel confident that the time is not far distant when all right-thinking men and women amongst us, of every degree, will say this ill-advised and unhappy business must be brought to an end.

"Your Johannesburg Correspondent speaks of some persons as opposing Chinese labour in order to make political capital out of it. He may rest assured that here in England this is no mere question of party politics. The objection to it lies deeper and is shared by men and women of all parties. We object to this yellow labour Ordinance, because its conditions partake of slavery; we object to it because it is bringing discredit on the good name of our country, because it inflicts grave injury on our overflowing working-class population, and because it runs so directly counter to that spirit of freedom, humanity, and social purity, which has hitherto been the traditional and guiding spirit of all English policy."

Numerous complaints of this kind were made in England. Mr. MacNamara M. P., eloquently remarks at the close of his pamphlet "Chinese Labour:"

"Through the centuries the Union Jack has been the Sanctuary of the Oppressed and the Covenant of Hope for the Down-trodden. In these degenerate days it is to be made the Cloak of Tyranny, the Cover for Inhumanity, and the Screen for Greedy Lust."

On the 6th of December, 1906, the further importation of Chinese was forbidden by the Transvaal Government as in the highest degree inimical to the interests of the country. At the beginning of 1910 the last Chinese coolie was sent home from the Transvaal.

4. AUSTRALIA.

MALTREATMENT OF NATIVES IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

The question of the cruel treatment of the natives of Western Australia was brought up for discussion in the House of Lords in the session of May 9, 1905. The occasion for this was an Official Report by Commissioner W. E. Roth who had been deputed by the Government of West-Australia to examine the condition of the natives.

The first speaker, the Bishop of Canterbury, summarized the most important facts established by the Commissioner, and then observed:

"It was a statement unique in modern records of administrative work in any portion of the Empire.

"The conditions in West-Australia bear *many of the characteristics of slavery.*

"A general system of treatment of natives, which seemed to belong to an age utterly different from that in which we lived."

Lord Lansdowne likewise expressed his indignation at this revelation of the real inwardness of British Colonial practice:

"I read this report, as the Most Rev. Prelate had done, with feelings of deep indignation, and also with feelings of humiliation, because we had always believed that evils of the kind which they were discussing were of rarer occurrence under British rule than under the rule of any other civilized power. Holding that belief, we had not unfrequently taken others to task for breaches of those laws of humanity which we ourselves so sincerely respected. *One of the most mortifying features of these incidents was that they would in the future deprive our remonstrances of a good deal of the force that they had hitherto commanded.*"

These protests and declarations in the House of Lords were based upon the disclosures which had been made by Commissioner Roth in his Report regarding the desperate situation of the few remaining natives of Western Australia.

The following extract from Roth's Report will tend to dispel some of the illusions which may have been entertained by those who believe that the Briton applies his no doubt frequently captivating social amenities to his policies of colonial exploitation, human and material:

"A grave responsibility rests upon the Executive in pursuing a policy of allowing large areas of country to be taken up and occupied without the slightest provision being made for the natives, who are thus dispossessed of their hunting grounds.

"If the natives continue to be dispossessed of the country upon which they are dependant for their food and water supplies, by their lands being rented for grazing rights at a nominal figure—lands from which the lessees naturally desire to drive them—bloodshed and retribution will be certain to ensue.

"The interests of the native are certainly not protected against the fitness or unfitness of his future employer, *there being nothing to prevent the greatest scoundrel unhung, European or Asiatic, putting under contract any blacks he pleases . . .* Wages are not stipulated for in the contract, and it is only in about one case out of seven that they are alleged to be paid. A total of 369 contracts is known to the Chief Protector of the natives, while the number in receipt of wages according to their contract is 53; on the other hand, he has no means of satisfying himself whether the wages are actually being paid. . . According to the evidence brought before your Commissioner, *none of these natives, throughout the North-West of the Colony, receive wages.*"

The darkest sides of the West-Australian system are the native police and the treatment of negro prisoners. The natives who have been robbed of their hunting-grounds occasionally commit depredations upon cattle. The following-up of these offences is left to the native police who, incidentally are all drafted men, forcibly enrolled in the service. These native police are paid according to the number of prisoners and witnesses which they bring home, and according to the number of days they guard them. The police receive between 1 shilling, 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. and 2 shillings per day. They themselves confess that every captive native means so much money in their pockets.

There is nothing to prevent the policeman from arresting as many natives as he pleases. No limit is set to the number of witnesses he may produce. Thus it happens that small boys are brought forward as witnesses, that children of 10 to 16 years are prosecuted by law for killing cattle, that many natives have not the slightest idea why they are sentenced and that old and feeble natives may be delivered up in a state of utter exhaustion, followed, as has already happened, by death soon afterwards.

One of the policemen under examination, Mr. Roth declares, did nothing to prevent the cattle-breeders and the drovers who help the police, from indulging in sexual intercourse with the female witnesses.

The police who are so concerned in producing witnesses, never produce any witnesses for the defence. Such witnesses were never examined. A policeman, who was examined by Commissioner Roth, and who had dragged over a hundred native prisoners before the courts, was unable to recall a *single* instance in which there had been an acquittal.

On page 18, Mr. Roth cites as a particular striking example of the brutality of the system the case of a judge who had condemned a child of 10 years to 6 months' hard labour because, on September 10, 1904, this child had taken away and killed a piece of livestock belonging to S. Muggleton at Cartridge Springs.

On page 19 of his report, Commissioner Roth describes the method of carrying out punishment adopted in Western Australia:

"The prisoner is neck-chained from the day he comes into gaol until the day he leaves it, sometimes from two to three years and upwards, according to sentence. Still neck-chained, the prisoners work on the roads, as much as eight hours daily, under the tropical sun and in such a parched country as is Western Australia."

The report of Commissioner Roth occasioned considerable stir throughout England. The *Times* of May 10, 1905, published an editorial agreeing with Lord Lansdowne's declarations in the Upper House and acknowledging that these West-Australian atrocities had brought great discredit upon the British Administration.

The atrocities of Western Australia agitated the English press for a considerable period. A great deal of light was shed upon the condition of the natives in that country by the following two letters addressed to the *Times* under date of April 2, and April 8, 1914:

I.

Sir,

"A correspondent in the *Melbourne Age* wrote that he had seen the Warden (principal magistrate) of Pilbarra Goldfield brutally flog his own little native boy with a knotted rope. I saw a J. P. (Justice of the Peace) at Mallina flog his indentured servant with an iron-tipped swingle-tree for a trivial error. Within the past year two medical men wrote in Perth papers of cruelties to natives. One in the Murchison Goldfield had seen the resident magistrate tie his little native boy up to a verandah post and flog him brutally with a riding-whip.

"About a year ago the *Sunday Times*, Perth, mentioned the case of a squatter J. P. who had annexed the wife of an aboriginal. When the native came to demand his woman, this "Justice of the Peace" fired both barrels of a shot-gun into the native's legs and left him to crawl away and die as he liked.

"The starving natives on Nor'-West stations eat offal and filth because their "masters" do not supply them with enough decent food to satisfy their hunger. On many Nor'-West stations the natives are naked, both men and women, because they have no European clothes to wear. Cruelty exists wherever the indenture is in force. The natives get a holiday whenever the owner has no particular work for them to do, he then turns them into the "bush" to hunt and beg their food from travellers. I wrote both in the *Age* and *Bulletin*, the latter the most widely-read paper in Australasia, and gave numerous cases of gross cruelties."

WALTER MALCOLMSON.

II.

Sir,

"The various letters on the above subject (the people of Australia and the Aborigines) have interested me greatly. I have had 15 years' experience in the Australian "bush," and have worked in the "black blocks" of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and South and Western Australia. *In Victoria, South Australia (excepting northern territory), and New South Wales the Aborigines have almost been civilized out of existence.* There is still a good number left in Queensland and in Westralia.

"The 'Protector' of Aborigines, in his last report, estimates the number of known natives in Western Australia at 12,000. The greater number of these 12,000 unfortunates are 'indentured' to the squatters. *They are paid no wages, and are very badly treated.* After an experience of several years of the north-west district of Western Australia, I consider *the Aborigines there are worse off than the negro was in American slave days. I have repeatedly seen the natives flogged with horsewhips and sticks by their 'masters' for trivial faults, and I have often seen 'indentured' servants in stations eating offal to satisfy their hunger.*

"The police troopers are supplied with chains to drag back runaway servants. When captured one end of the chain is padlocked around the native's neck; the other secured to the trooper's saddle. *Chained in couples by the neck, native prisoners are worked on the Government tram line connecting Cossack and Roeburne.* Most of the justices (?) are squatters employing these slaves. A J. P. sitting alone on the bench can upon conviction—by Westralian law—sentence a native up to three years. When Governor of Western Australia, Sir Gerard Smith wrote the Secretary of State (Mr. Chamberlain) about the Aborigines being 'flogged and imprisoned with a severity out of all proportion to the nature of the offences committed.'

"Bishop Reily, of Perth (Western Australia), after personal examination on the spot, reported to the Governor of Western Australia that 'the indenture system was a form of slavery.' In a letter to me written in May, 1901, after studying the subject for six years, Bishop Reily wrote me: 'A most important trial has just taken place in Perth. But for pressure the natives would have been tried in the north, where naturally they would have little justice.'

"I offered to give evidence on oath before the Commonwealth Government Parliament and furnish full particulars of numerous acts of cruelty, &c., witnessed by myself, *but my evidence was not desired.* Western Australia is the one slave State in the Commonwealth. The Record of the 'indenture' system there is a black stain on British justice and a *foul crime against suffering humanity.*

"I wish from my heart that the last Aboriginal of Western Australia was at rest. He has nothing much to thank the white man for.

I am, Sir, yours truly

WALTER MALCOLMSON.

11. *Marine Parade, Holywood, near Belfast.*

Bishop Matthew Gibney of Perth in Western Australia, a man of the purest nobility of character and one of the most competent judges of conditions among the natives of Australia, wrote as follows in the *West-Australian Record* of April 23, 1904:

"My blood boils when I think of the cruelties that have been practised by our prison authorities. The treatment to which aboriginal prisoners have been subjected in 'doing time' in Broome and Derby for the alleged crime of sheepstealing or desertion would, in the opinion of any witnesses believing in the earthly justice of an all-seeing God, be sufficient of itself to bring a curse upon the country.

"Sentenced to terms of three, six, or twelve months' imprisonment, these unfortunate creatures are constantly kept in irons or chains day and night. They work under a tropical sun and the blistering heat of the roads chained by the neck one to the other, and also by the legs. As they sat in that manner breaking stones, I saw the blisters on their necks from the heat and working of the chains. And even when the poor wretches fall sick they are not loosed from their manacles—death alone in many cases releases them.

"This is a part of what the 'ministering angels' of the North have been doing for the coast tribes and others. What wonder that there is not half the black population around the towns along the North-west coast that existed there when the white settlers took possession of their territory—and with that their native means of living—as when I first visited the coast fourteen years ago?"

Bishop Gibney then proceeds to describe the following instance of the treatment which the natives of Western Australia receive at the hands of the Anglo-Saxon squatters in those parts:

"A certain squatter, having a large number of natives in his employ near the coast, took cattle into the interior personally, with the assistance of some of his natives and Chinamen, and returned with about 20 captives, more than half being females, captured for the native youths in order to

keep the latter from wandering away or deserting their employment. These captured ones were not, I am told, chained, but they were surrounded and continually watched by the tame natives and Chinamen employés of the settler, so that they had little chance to escape.

"My informant came across this group encamped, and was shown signs of an encounter that had taken place the night previous with the members of the tribe from which the natives, male and female, were taken; they had followed in the wake of their captors to attempt to rescue at least their stolen girls. The settler himself had a spear driven through his arm, a few saddles (that, in anticipation of an attack, were dressed up as dummy men asleep) were riddled with spears, and a couple of native employés were killed in the surprise.

"Enough was seen by and told to the witness (whose departure was hastened by the cautious settler) to confirm this event as one of the many cases of kidnapping of females which a long experience in the Northwest brought under his notice.

"And now comes the other aspect of that event. When this settler reached town, in order to cover his kidnapping depredations, he promptly reported to the police authorities that an attack had been made upon his expedition and cattle by the blacks. The result was that the authorities some time afterwards brought in a number of native prisoners said to be guilty of the alleged offences, and they were all sentenced to various terms of barrow-chained imprisonment."

THE EXTERMINATION AND ENSLAVEMENT OF THE NATIVES OF QUEENSLAND.

The same cruelty and inhumanity displayed by the English in their extermination of the unfortunate aborigines of the other parts of Australia, were also adopted by them in slaughtering off the natives of Queensland, which had been settled since 1840 by free emigrants. The plan put into execution was based upon a system of deliberate and ruthless extermination. Mr. H. F. Hatton, formerly a squatter in Queensland, gives an insight into these methods in a letter published in the *Times* of March 16, 1904:

"I merely wish to deal with facts, and I unhesitatingly declare that *the blacks of Queensland have been almost entirely exterminated by a system carefully planned and deliberately carried out by the Government of the country.*

"For this purpose a body of "native police" were organised. Their members were recruited from the wild blacks themselves, officered by white men. The "black trackers" were simply human bloodhounds, gifted with extraordinary faculties for following a trail, and with all the ferocious animosity of the renegade, sharpened by the knowledge that, if they ever attempted to rejoin the tribe they had deserted, they would be instantly killed. When sent on a punitive expedition against the wild blacks, never more than one white man accompanied them. A black's evidence is not received in a Queensland Court of law, and therefore there could be no legal evidence of any atrocities committed.

"The euphemism for this kind of business is "dispersing" the blacks. The official account would be that Mr. So-and So with a company of black trackers has succeeded in dispersing the blacks in the neighbourhood of Aramac, who have lately caused much annoyance by spearing cattle.

"The white man in charge knows quite well that, according to the law of the land, if he kills a black, except in self-defence, he is liable to be hanged. He knows equally well that, *if in "dispersing" a mob of blacks he does not manage to kill a fair number, his services will be dispensed with, and he will be replaced by some one who better understands the wishes of his superiors at headquarters.*

"The only pause in *this systematic work of extermination* that I can remember was during the great influx of Chinamen into Queensland occasioned by the discovery of gold on the Palmer river. Chinamen were at no time popular in the colony, and when the blacks took to killing them wholesale the whites looked on, and the blacks secured for themselves a temporary immunity from the animosity of the authorities."

Regarding the fate of the few surviving remnants of the natives of Queensland, we obtain some light from English official sources.

According to these official English sources, there existed up to recent times a system of selling children and a slavelike treatment of the natives. The Yearly Report of "The Protector of Natives" (1902) in that country declares as follows:

"It is known that in past years a most obnoxious practice grew up of the police supplying their friends, &c., with aboriginal children. This 'tracking' in children is still going on. 'Settlers in outside districts'—I am quoting Protector Galbraith— 'who have plenty of myalls about their country are

often importuned by town residents and others to bring them in a boy or a girl. In due time the child arrives. How the children are separated from their parents is a subject of conjecture and surmise."

A peculiarly atrocious form of slavery practised along the coast of Queensland is the sale of children to fishermen who employ them for the purposes of diving. The Report of the Protector which has been quoted above, remarks as follows upon this: (page 2 *et seq.*).

"On the coast, the white fishermen embark native divers and when their services are no longer required, disembark and abandon them on some shore far distant from their native land. They wander about and become the slave of the first white man they meet. This master, should he think it necessary, hands them on again to his neighbour . . .

"Georgie was taken away from Cooktown when a boy by a Mr. A . . . , and handed over to Dr. H . . . in Townsville, who subsequently handed him to a man named C . . . , a resident of Mackay. C . . . left about two years ago for Brisbane, and turned the boy adrift.

"This diving work is about the most dangerous to be undertaken and causes an immense number of deaths, even amongst full-grown men. The chief of a tribe is bribed, however, and by dint of presents, yields up the children to the fishermen . . .

"On board the Agnes and the Goldfinch, we found six boys from the Flinders and Night Island . . . the boys had apparently been on these two boats for periods varying from a year to fifteen months. . . .

"On the vessels Yaru and Bluejacket, we found four Flinders and Night Island boys. *These poor wretches had been working continuously on these two boats for the past two-and-a-quarter years.*

"They doubtless would have been obliged to dive until thoroughly exhausted, had the Protector not interfered. And yet, the captains of the vessels were only sentenced to a fine of £9!" (page 8).

The Report of the Protector of Natives also mentions cases in which natives have been murdered by the government police:

"On the 1st June I made a report to the Minister *re* a police-party shooting aboriginals, Peter Johnny, Old Bob, and Topsy's father, at a waterhole about 20 miles N. E. of Moreton E. T. O., on or about the 8th

April, 1902. The Minister deemed it best that the Commissioner of Police should go North and hold a magisterial inquiry after the nature of an inquest of death.

"The depositions were forwarded to the Attorney-General, who, in the course of his minute, dated 1st November, 1902, stated: 'I am satisfied, though the evidence is not sufficient to justify a conviction on a charge of murder or manslaughter, that the deaths of at least two (and probably four) aboriginals, whose remains were found, were caused by one or more of the native troopers who accompanied Constable Hoole on the 8th April last . . . I am glad to learn that this constable has been dismissed the service, and the four trackers deported to a Southern reserve.'

One result of the land policy in operation is the annihilation of the aboriginal tribes. The plains, which are very destitute of water, form the hunting-grounds of the natives, and are leased out to the cattle-breeders for pasture at a few shillings a year. When a drought comes, the breeders at once seize the water-holes for their cattle and drive away the natives who come to slake their thirst. The Protector comments upon this in the following terms:

"The whole question resolves itself into one of either sacrificing many human lives, or losing a few pounds derived from rents. So long as the land can be taken up at a few shillings per square mile, and no provision made for the dependent blacks who can and are being hunted off it, there certainly will be trouble. I blush in shame that I should be personally powerless to remedy such a state of affairs."

The Annual Report of the Protector of Natives of Queensland for the year 1904 proves that these conditions were still existing at that time. In many cases the natives received absolutely no wages whatsoever. On page 3 the Report gives expression to the fear that the cases of sale, exchange or kidnapping of children were on the increase. It complains of the general demoralisation of the natives through alcohol and through *the traffic in opium which is legalized by the authorities*. In connection with this the Protector writes:

"I still sincerely trust that some definite action may shortly be taken to release the Aboriginal Department from the equivocal position in which it has been placed by the issue and continued existence of the so-called 'permits' for the sale of opium.

"At the present moment, there are two hundred and twelve of these permits in force and they allow both wholesale and retail trade. During the year, the quantity of opium imported into the State was 14,680 lbs."

THE EXTERMINATION OF THE TASMANIANS 1823 TO 1876.

England took possession of Tasmania in 1803. In 1823 Tasmania was separated from New South Wales and declared to be an independent colony with a population of some 12,000 whites and 7,000 natives. From this began the systematic extermination of this magnificent tribe of aborigines. In 1876 the execrable task had been completed—the race had been wiped from the face of the earth. The manner in which the British extirpated these harmless children of nature is thus described by Elisée Reclus, the famous French geographer in his "Géographie Universelle" (XIV, page 758 *et seq.*):

"Tasmania, the first of the Australian colonies, has been swept bare through the systematic extermination of its aboriginal population which on the advent of the whites numbered about 7,000 souls. And this race is said to have been of an extraordinary gentleness. On the 28th of December, 1834, the last surviving remnants of the natives, who had been hunted like wild animals, were captured at the outmost spur of a range of foot-hills, and this event was celebrated as a great triumph.

"One of these noble hunters by name of Robinson, received a reward in the shape of 400 hectares of land and a large sum of money. Apart from this a public collection was instituted in his favour which brought him about 200,000 francs.

"The natives were at first dragged about from one small island to another. The entire number of Tasmanians, some 200, were then thrown into a swampy valley on Flinders Island. They were given food and instruction in catechism.(!) They were even shown off as a model and a proof of the progress made by Christian civilization. After some ten years' stay in this place of exile over three-fourths of these deported ones were dead. Then pity suddenly made itself felt. The surviving 12 men,

22 women and 10 children, nearly all of them half-breeds, were brought back to the neighbourhood of Hobart, that is to say, to a small peninsula, Oyster Cove, and there placed under the supervision of guards who enriched themselves at the expense of their charges. In 1860 only 16 Tasmanians were still alive. The last man died in 1869, the last woman in 1876. This was Queen Iruganina whom the English called Lalla Rookh. A few half-breeds still exist. A female 'Tasmanian' received a building permit in 1864 from the Parliament at Hobart.'

There is no lack of English testimony as to the extermination of the Tasmanians. An English author, Mr. J. Hight, describes this in his book "The English as a Colonising Nation:"

"It was during Arthur's rule that the natives were finally driven from the island. Soldiers and settlers formed a line of beaters extending over a great part of the island . . . After two months' march, the lines converged on a strip of coast, and found not even one native before them. It had been an easy matter for the blacks, skilled in bush lore, to slip unobserved through the lines. Arthur then employed other methods. A man named Robinson had distinguished himself by the ease with which he had gained the confidence of natives. He was sent into the bush; and, assisted by friendly chiefs, he worked so well that in four years nearly all the natives had followed him into Hobart. Thence they were sent to Flinders Island on the north-east, where they died off rapidly. The survivors were then brought near Hobart, where some of them lingered forty years. The race ceased to exist in 1876."

5. BRITISH INDIA.

The very maltreatment of the natives in Australia and in Africa as well as the atrocities perpetrated upon the defenseless families of the Boers, would compel every honourable colonial power to reject and repudiate the idea of England arrogating to herself the authority of a judge in matters concerning the treatment of colonial peoples. But in the exercise of her rule over India, England has given the world nothing less than a black and monumental example of the way in which subject people must not be treated. It is an example which would

demonstrate the abject and absolute incapacity of the white race to rule and lead other groups of races—were the English régime in India and the white race identical in significance. That, fortunately for the race, is not the case.

In order to be able to estimate correctly the system which England brings into play in its treatment of India, it is necessary to proceed from another point of view than that which determines the judgment of the treatment meted out to the aboriginals of Africa and Australia. The end, to be sure, is the same in both cases—to subject the soil as well as the population of the colonies to a process of unlimited exploitation by England. It is only the methods which lead to this end which are different.

In Africa and Australia brutal force is employed, the separate manifestations of which bear the stamp of a wrong and lawlessness that is obvious to all. The champions of this method are frequently individual British colonists or large groups of British interests, and the guilt of *official* England in these instances lies in the circumstance that it tolerates these acts of violence only when they are subservient to the purpose mentioned above, and that it condemns and hinders them only when they are prejudicial to this purpose, or when the advantage to be derived from them is in no relation to the damage which they would inflict upon the moral prestige of England. But the fact that even *official* England does not hesitate to commit such acts of violence, that, on the contrary, this England even ventures to trample the most elementary rules of morality and humanity underfoot and to decree that the most terrible atrocities be carried out whenever and wherever it be a matter of furthering its boundless lust for domination, has been proved by such monstrous acts as the sacrifice of the 26,000 helpless women and children, the kith and kin of the heroic Boers.

The system of which England makes use in India is essentially different from the foregoing. The period of lawless and criminal outrages and atrocities perpetrated by individual Britons or large groups of British interests (in particular the East India Company) which during the 18th and part of the 19th century consisted in the cruel and forcible oppression of untold thousands of Indians, the extortion of huge fortunes, the butchery of entire tribes, the deposing of many legal rulers, the robbery of the greater part of India and in an endless series of bloody wars—a period which expresses its acme of infamy in the names of Clive, Warren Hastings, and Dalhousie—this period was ended by the repression of the revolt of 1857—1858 and by the dissolution of the East India Company. The last act was well worthy of the whole shameful epoch:—the massacre of all Indians who chanced to come before the bayonets of the British soldiery, the “blowing” of the leaders of the revolt from the mouths of cannon, and the wanton and cowardly murder of two sons and a grandson of the last Emperor of the Moghul dynasty by a British officer without the verdict of any court of law.

Since this period India has been “pacified.” The administration of India which had been formerly exercised by the East India Company, was now assumed by *official England*. The system of lawlessness, oppression and exploitation thereby came to an end. In its place, however, there arose the most pernicious system which has ever been imposed upon organised humanity—*the violation of law and justice by the law-givers themselves—the legalized despoilation of the entire people by means of a subtle and systematized method of law-making and its interpretation*. There now took place something which finds no counterpart in the history of humanity. Invested by and in part hidden behind the nimbus of the

“*Pax Britannica*” which blinded the vision of those who stood at a distance, England, clutching its prey, now proceeded to commit upon a nation of 300 million people *the greatest wrong which one nation can perpetrate upon another*,—its complete and abject enslavement! The full extent of this heinous act which England committed against India will be revealed to us with an appalling clearness by the evidence contained in the following pages.

The things which England achieved in India, judged purely by their scope and their success, represent an incomparable feat. But judged according to their moral values and their significance in the light of historical and evolutionary progress, there is no aberration in the annals of mankind which calls for more relentless condemnation than this. To retrace the path of crime and evil, and to retrace it in a manner which would have some appearance of sincerity and not be a mere sham, would be a difficult, one might almost say an impossible task for England. Official England knew this long ago.

With all the cunning means in which centuries of political experience have made it such an adept, England strives to conceal from the civilized world the truth concerning its treatment of India and the Indian People, and the effects this treatment has produced. It seeks to postpone the judgment of civilized humanity and of *its own guilty conscience*. This endeavour is in vain.

A brief respite may still be granted to the accused—ere the world’s judgment be delivered. But the incontrovertible proofs have for long been in the hands of the judges and there can be no doubt that the verdict of the world will prove to be as unanimous as is that which has already been rendered in secret by England’s own conscience. When this open judgment is to be pronounced and what the punishment

shall be, may be left to history. In that day history may also do justice to whatever good may have accrued to India under English rule, whether this was due to England's good will or not. The harvest will be as the sowing was, and the harvest will be an evil one for England.

It is impossible within the limits of space conditioned by the probable patience of the reader of these pages, to give any conception of the real extent of the material which India alone furnishes us, in order to damn utterly and forever the unfathomable, unheard-of Pharisical arrogance of England in attempting by means of this or that Blue Book to stigmatize Germany or any other nation as "unworthy" to exercise dominion over native races. The selection of material which we present will, for all that, and despite its brevity, suffice for the purpose it is meant to serve. The proofs of England's guilt have been established long ago, *and it is precisely Englishmen who know India and the British system of rule who have confirmed this guilt in the most striking and irrefutable manner.* There exists a vast literature of books, of pamphlets, of newspaper and review articles, of speeches in Parliament and of memorials written and spoken by Englishmen which unite in damning the rule which England exerts over India. It is therefore impossible even to register these here. We shall mention only the most important books—works which are familiar to every statesman and student of history:

1. W. W. Hunter, "The Indian Empire, its History, People and Products." London, 1882.
2. William Digby, "India for the Indians—and for England." London, 1885.
3. H. M. Hyndman, "The Bankruptcy of India. An Enquiry into the Administration of India under the Crown." London, 1886.

4. William Digby, "'Prosperous' British India." A Revelation from Official Records. London, 1901.
5. C. J. O'Donnel, "The Failure of Lord Curzon. A Study in 'Imperialism'." Third Edition. London, 1903.
6. J. Keir Hardie, "India, Impressions and Suggestions." London, 1909.
7. J. Ramsay MacDonald, "The Awakening of India." London, 1910.

To these English books we add one by an eminent American:

8. William Jennings Bryan, "British Rule in India." 1906.

Mr. W. J. Bryan was Secretary of State of the United States—there can be no doubt of his ability as a statesman, the honesty of his convictions and the impartiality of his spirit. Mr. Bryan went to India expecting to find there a perfect form of colonial administration which would serve the United States as a model for its administration of the Philippines. He was terribly disillusioned. The clear results of his observations possess for this reason a special value as evidence and no one should venture to form a judgment upon English rule in India who has not read the book of this dispassionate neutral statesman. The moral value of this document is confirmed in a still greater degree by the fact that the British censor sought to prevent the distribution of this book and that the United States government forbade its exportation beyond the limits of the United States during the war.

To those who have a taste for French literature we would recommend the reading of the brilliant book of one of the most distinguished French

authors of to-day, a book which bears in its very title its condemnation of British rule in India:

9. Pierre Loti, "L'Inde (sans les Anglais)." 1903.

We likewise add the titles of four books which have been written or compiled by Indian patriots:

10. Lala Lajpat Rai, "Reflections on the Political Situation in India." Edited and issued by the Indian Nationalist Committee (European Centre). Leipzig, 1917. (Also in German.)

The author of the foregoing work, a well-known Indian Nationalist of moderate tendencies, lived until recently in India.

11. "Self-Government for India." Demanded by the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League. Lucknow, December, 1916. Published by the European Central Committee of the Indian Nationalists. Stockholm.

This book contains some of the most important speeches of the Presidents and the participants at this famous and epoch-making double Congress.

12. "Is India Loyal?" Published by the Indian National Party.

13. "British Rule in India." Condemned by the British Themselves. Published by the Indian National Party. Berlin, 1916. (Also in German.)

This book is of particular value as evidence, because it contains over 150 judgments from *English* sources, judgments which have been written and delivered in the course of more than a hundred years and which unite in most severely condemning the rule of the English in India. These critics

number more than fifty and are for the greater part statesmen, Viceroys, Governors and other high officials in the Anglo-Indian service.

The small selection of paragraphs from English, American and Indian books, periodicals, newspapers, speeches in Parliament, memorials and the like which we quote in connection with the British system in India, constitutes only a hundredth, one might even say only a thousandth part of the literature on hand. We have divided these into two groups, as follows:

1. THE FIRST GROUP DEMONSTRATES THAT ENGLAND'S RULE OVER INDIA IS NOTHING LESS THAN A SYSTEM OF SLAVERY;
2. THE SECOND GROUP DEMONSTRATES THAT THE SO-CALLED "PAX BRITANNICA" WHICH IS AGAIN AND AGAIN ADVANCED IN JUSTIFICATION OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA, IS NOTHING MORE THAN A FICTION.

I.

ENGLAND'S RULE OVER INDIA A SYSTEM OF SLAVERY.

Some fifty years ago the United States, under the guidance of a wise and humane President, and from reasons of pure humanity, decided upon the by no means easy step of freeing its negroes—an uneducated, primitive race, displaying little aptitude for any progress in civilization—and of placing them upon a basis of political equality with its white citizens. England, originally the motherland of this young and progressive country, during this same period carried out an experiment which in a cultural and evolutionary sense, was diametrically opposed to this act of liberation. For

during this same period England purely for purposes of egoism and greed, brought under its yoke and degraded to a condition of slavery a people which as a whole had never been dominated by any foreign power during the three thousand years of its history.

This people was not composed of a few millions of uncultivated blacks, but of three hundred millions of human beings, of whom, it is true, a large part lived in a state of ignorance and half-civilization, but whose higher classes represented the most elevated culture of Asia in philosophy, science, literature and morality, and, so far as the mental and spiritual penetration of the great problems of earthly existence is concerned, the supreme achievements of the human intellect. It is a people the composition of which, it is true, shows considerable differences and deficiencies owing to the mixture of races, but which nevertheless represents as a whole a perfectly self-contained area of civilization and which therefore *has the right to demand that it be left to lead its own life and to determine its own destiny*—if any meaning whatsoever is to be attached to the phrase about the right of self-determination of the peoples.

England has annulled this right of self-determination for India. With the exception of the religious cults and the usages of caste,* England has deprived the people of India of all right of self-determination. The deliberate subordination of the (“coloured”) natives of the country, the despotic form of government, the refusal of self-government, the arbitrary system of laws, the law forbidding the carrying of arms, the recruiting, organisation and treatment of the native troops, the muzzling of the Indian press, the prevention of popular education through the forbidding of free

* England has tolerated these exceptions merely because they served her own interests.

public schools, the inhuman taxation of agriculture, the wanton destruction of the old native industries, the indescribable impoverishment of the people arising from the last two causes, and the horrible famines and pestilences originating from this impoverishment—scourges which are unparalleled in our day even among the savage races of Africa, and which have swept away over 50 millions of human lives since the beginning of *official* British rule—all these form the most striking proofs for the physical and moral perniciousness of the slavery which England has imposed upon this hapless land and people.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE SYSTEMATIC SUBORDINATION OF THE "COLOURED" POPULATION.

"An almost insurmountable colour bar has been drawn up that runs through almost every department of the State which the children of the soil are forbidden to cross. The entire administration is divided into two compartments, one Imperial and the other Provincial. The boxes are all reserved and it is only the pit which is open to the people. Competition, the most effective test of merit, has been superseded by nomination, and offices are largely distributed as mere patronage. The services are visibly deteriorating and, strange as it may sound, a Government which finds in the caste system of the people such a serious obstacle to their national advancement, is sedulously building up an official caste almost as rigid and as exclusive as the Brahmanical hierarchy ever was. The officials have generally lost all touch with the people, and there is now no greater passport to public employment than a hereditary claim which grows by what it feeds on. Fusion is the first principle of national growth, but disintegration is the policy of a bureaucracy to counteract that growth."

From a Speech made at the 31st Session of the Indian Nationalist Congress by the President, Babu Ambica Charan Muzumdar.

"Is India fit for freedom? We, who are present here to-day know full well that from the Indian standpoint there can be but one answer. Our critics would probably challenge our conviction. Our only reply to them would be to go forward and put the matter to the proof. After all,

what is the test of fitness? If we turn to history, we find that in the past, only those people have been declared to have been fit for freedom who fought for it and attained it. We are living in different times. Peace has its victory. We are fighting and can only fight constitutional battles. This peaceful struggle is not and will not be wanting in the quality of vigour and sacrifice: and we are determined to convince the British Empire that we are fit for the place of a partner within the Empire, and nothing less will satisfy India."

From a Speech made by the President of the All-India Moslem League, Mr. Jinnah, at Lucknow, Dec. 1916.

"One of the glaring injustices in connection with the administration of India is the way in which qualified young Indians are shut out of the higher paid posts in the civil service. Dr. J. Sunderland is responsible for the statement that 8,000 European Anglo-Indian officials draw yearly salaries totalling £13,930,554, whilst 130,000 Native-Indians, also included in the civil service, receive only £3,284,163. If it be alleged that this is due to the superior ability of the European official, then I can only reply that all the facts are against such an assumption."

J. Keir Hardie, "India, Impressions and Suggestions," p. 71.

"Why is there lack of intelligence among the Indians? Have they not had the blessings of British rule for several generations? Why have they not been fitted for self-government?"

"Gladstone, whose greatness of head and heart shed a lustre upon all Europe, said: 'It is liberty alone which fits men for liberty. This proposition, like every other in politics, has its bounds, but it is far safer than the counter-doctrine: wait till they are fit.'

"How long will it take to fit the Indians for self-government when they are denied the benefits of experience? They are excluded from the higher Civil Service (ostensibly open to them) by cunningly devised systems of examinations, which make it impossible for them to enter.

"Not only are the people thus robbed of opportunities which rightfully belong to them, but the country is deprived of the accumulated wisdom that would come with service, for the alien officials return to Europe at the end of their service, carrying back their wisdom and earnings, not to speak of the pensions which they then begin to draw."

W. J. Bryan, "British Rule in India."

"After the Indian mutiny the Queen in a proclamation, promised that natives should be freely and impartially admitted to offices, 'the duties of which they might be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity

to discharge.' Lord Lytton, a Viceroy of India, in a confidential document which got into print, speaking of the pledges of the Sovereign and the Parliament of England, said:

"We all know that these claims and expectations never can or will be fulfilled. We have had to choose between prohibiting them [the natives of India] and cheating them, and we have chosen the least straight-forward course.'

"And again:

"Since I am writing confidentially, I do not hesitate to say that both the governments of England and of India appear to me, up to the present moment, unable to answer satisfactorily the charge of having taken every means in their power of breaking to the heart the words of promise they had uttered to the ear.'"

W. J. Bryan, "British Rule in India."

Let it not be forgotten that it is a British Viceroy who utters this annihilating judgment upon the perfidy and the incompetence of his government.

"For more than twenty years an Indian National Congress has been pleading for a modified form of representative government—not for a severing of the tie that binds India to Great Britain, but for an increased voice in their local affairs.

"This request cannot be granted. Why? Because a local government, composed of natives selected by the people, would protest against so large an army, reduce the taxes, and put Indians at lower salaries into places now held by Europeans.

"It is the fear of what an Indian local government would do that prevents the experiment, although two other reasons, both insufficient, are given. One of these is that the Indian people are not intelligent enough and that they must be protected from themselves by denying them a voice in their own affairs. The other is that the Indians are so divided into tribes and religious sects that they cannot act harmoniously.

"The first argument will not impress any unprejudiced traveller who has come into contact with the educated classes. There are enough informed, college-trained men in India, not to speak of those who, like our own ancestors a few centuries ago, have practical sense and good judgment without book learning to guide public opinion."

W. J. Bryan, "British Rule in India."

It should be remarked with reference to the foregoing, that the institution of the "colour bar," so grossly insult-

ing to the native inhabitants, is a direct product of the *official* British régime. In the days of the East India Company, instances in which Englishmen married the daughters of aristocratic Indians, and aristocratic Indians married Englishwomen, were by no means rare. But to-day the bar is insurmountable, and even cultured Indians of good birth are treated as though they were negroes.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE DESPOTIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

"It is now a matter of history that when a company of merchants introduced British rule in India in the middle of the 18th century, it was an absolutely despotic form of government that was established in the country.

"After a hundred years of misrule it was at last overthrown by a military rising which transferred the government of the country from the Company to the Crown. From this time a system of government was established in the country which gave altogether a new complexion to the administration. This government was designated a "benevolent despotism," an expression which though not exactly a contradiction in terms, was sufficient to indicate that the form of government was still essentially a despotism.

"But having exhausted all the resources which a personal benevolence could supply, it has slowly and imperceptibly yielded to the infirmities of its nature, and by a process of natural evolution has resolved itself into a system of barren and sterilizing bureaucracy. Despotism has done in this country what despotism has done elsewhere, and if it has failed to do more, in the exercise of its beneficent influence it reached a stage and attained a height beyond which it was not possible for despotism to ascend. *The bureaucracy which now rules the country is despotism condensed and crystallised.* In it the Service is so firmly and indissolubly combined with the State that for all practical purposes the one may be said to be completely merged in the other—a combination which is infinitely more dangerous than the combination of the judicial and the executive functions of which we have heard so much. *It is certainly not accountable to the people, and the service and the state being one and the same it is responsible only to itself.* It is essentially conservative in its temperament and thoroughly unprogressive in its character. Its efficiency is indisputable, its honesty and integrity beyond all question; but it is bound hand and foot to form

a precedent lacking in life and soul. It can contract but it cannot expand. It holds all the threads of the administration within the hollow of its palm and can ill afford either to release or to relax any one of them. It is extremely jealous of its powers and intolerant of criticism. It has its idea of beauty and its Chinese shoe to give effect to it, however painful to its subject the operation may be. Like Narcissus of old it is so much entranced with the loveliness of its own shadow that it has neither the leisure nor the inclination to contemplate beauty in others.

“But the people have completely outgrown this system and a new spirit has arisen in the country.

“Call it visionary, call it impatient idealism, call it intoxication if you choose. That spirit is the manifestation of a democratic force which is transforming the destinies of an old world to the new order of things. Under the pressure of its irresistible force, time-honoured kingdoms and constitutions are crumbling to pieces and giving place to new ones, and hereditary monarchs of ancient and even celestial origin are quietly taking their exit, as on a stage, without shedding a tear or a drop of blood.

“Portugal, Turkey, Persia and China all have felt the breath of this force. It is agitating Egypt and is pulsating the life of India. In India it has fortunately been of normal growth. This new spirit may be impulsive but it is perfectly genuine and intensely patriotic. If sympathetically treated it may be directed in a proper channel, but it would be unwise either to ignore or try to repress it. Old ideas are changing faster than one can realize and it is no fault of the Indian people if they are unable to reconcile themselves to a patriarchal or a paternal form of government.

“The present form of government, whatever its claims for the maintenance of an orderly administration may be, is more or less an anachronism. Sir Henry Cotton who recalls with just pride that for three generations his family has been associated with the bureaucratic service in India, said that “the Indian Civil Service, as at present constituted, is doomed.” While still in service, he formulated a scheme of reconstruction which the Indian Public Service Commission of 1887 considered as “visionary.” Now that another Royal Commission has been appointed to enquire into the Indian Public Services, Sir Henry Cotton has again returned to the charge. Writing in the *Contemporary Review* and commenting on the terms of reference to the Commission, which apparently assume the existing constitution as the permanent basis of Indian administration, Sir Henry Cotton says:—‘But what is wanted now is no scheme for bolstering up the decaying fabric of a service adapted only to obsolete conditions which have passed away and never can return.’”

From a Speech delivered by President Babu Ambica Charan Muzundar at the 31st Session of the Indian National Congress.

"Such, then, is the Government of India, bureaucratic in form, and, as a consequence, harsh and exacting in all its relations towards the people. To the heads of departments the people of India are but so many seeds in an oil-mill, to be crushed for the oil they yield."

J. Keir Hardie, "India, Impressions and Suggestions," p. 83.

"The Government of India in its present form resembles a huge military despotism tempered somewhat by a civil bureaucracy. Every attempt to win even the smallest modicum of popular rights is regarded by the Olympians who inhabit the heights of Simla (the summer capital of the Government) as a menace to the stability of the Empire."

J. Keir Hardie, "India, Impressions and Suggestions," p. 71.

"Up to the present moment the Government has been an autocracy, a despotism. On the governing and administrative authorities representatives of the subject have been in a minority; their powers of criticism have been strictly confined within the narrowest limits; government officials have held the offices which carried real power. Up till now there has been hardly a shadow of self-government in India."

J. R. MacDonald, "The Awakening of India," p. 232.

"The government of India is as arbitrary and despotic as the government of Russia ever was, and in two respects it is worse. First, it is administered by an alien people, whereas the officials of Russia are Russians. Secondly, it drains a large part of the taxes out of the country, whereas the Russian government spends at home the money which it collects from the people."

W. J. Bryan.

"British rule in India is the despotism of a line of kings whose reigns are limited by climatic causes to five years."

Marquis of Salisbury, former Prime Minister of Great Britain.

"Bureaucracy has accomplished its work. It has established order and tranquillity. But it has outgrown itself. Its continued existence is fraught with mischief and, unable to cope with the rising forces of popular opinion and with the demands created by the new spirit, it has had recourse to a policy which has excited grave public discontent. What then is to be the remedy? That remedy is what has been so effectively applied in other countries similarly circumstanced; and the remedy which suggests itself to the Indian mind as it occurred to John Stuart Mill and to Edmund Burke, lies in the grant of self-government.

“The question to be answered is,—have the Indian people given fair proof of their capacity for self-government? I do not like to indulge in theories. Let facts answer.

“India possesses an area of 1,800,000 square miles with a population of 316 millions, of which over 700,000 square miles, or more than one-third of this area, with a population of over 70 millions, or close upon one-fourth, belong to the Independent Native States. Now, these States are entirely managed by the Indian administrators, and it has to be admitted that some of them are marching ahead of British India in certain directions, particularly in respect of education, judicial reforms and industrial development, which are the most sacred functions of a constitutional government. It must be borne in mind that not a few of these distinguished administrators who have achieved such brilliant results in the administration of these States are sometimes drawn from British India.

“Men like Sir Salar Jung, Sir Dinkar Rao, Sir T. Madhavrao, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, Rao Bahadur Sirdar Sansar Chandra Sen, Dewan Bahadur Raghunath Rao, Mr. Romesh Chandra Dutt, Sir Seshiah Shastri, Mr. Ranga Charlu, Mr. Gauri Shankar Ojha, Mr. Seshadri Aiyer, Mr. B. L. Gupta, Mr. Nilambar Mukherjee and Mr. A. R. Banerjee who have governed various Native States with such consummate ability and conspicuous success, have indisputably vindicated the capacity of their countrymen for the highest administrative offices. They have shown that they were fit to hold any portfolio in the Government of India. If these distinguished administrators had their lot cast solely in British India, many of them would have in all probability ended their careers as Deputy-Magistrates, a few as District Officers and fewer still as officiating Commissioners of Divisions.

“Then, have not Indians in British India given practical proof of their administrative capacity to qualify themselves for self-government? Have they not in charge of districts both as judicial and executive officers, and have they not in charge of divisions or of a board of revenue, or in the intricate department of audit and account given sufficient evidence of their ability and capacity for efficient administration? Have they not been tried in the humbler stages of local self-government as well as in the higher legislative assemblies? They have been tried in the inner circles of the provincial as well as the Imperial administration and they have been also tried at the real seat of authority in Whitehall. True, Sir S. P. Sinha might never have aspired to the chair occupied by Maine and Macaulay; but has England sent any more Maines and Macaulays to fill that chair? Or was Sir S. P. Sinha or Sir Syed Ali Imam an altogether unworthy successor of Sir James Stephen or Sir C. P. Ilbert? In the great department of administration of justice they have been tried in the

highest tribunals of the land where they have acted and are acting as Chief Justices with as much credit and distinction as any brought out from England, while in the domain of education they have as Vice-Chancellors managed important universities in a way which has extorted the admiration, if not the envy, of the most captious critics. They have also managed with remarkable success the affairs of one of the foremost, if not the foremost, corporations, in the country. All these they have done, and if they have not done more, it is their misfortune and not their fault."

From a Speech delivered by President Babu Ambica Charan Muzundar at the 31st Session of the Indian National Congress.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA—AS PROVED BY THE DESPOTIC SYSTEM OF LAWS.

"The greatest defect in the administration of criminal justice in this country lies in the fusion and combination of the judicial and the executive function—a system in which the prosecutor and the judge, the man who works up a charge and the man who sits in judgment over that charge are rolled into one. For thirty years the Congress has cried itself hoarse for the separation of this unholy combination; hundreds of cases from unimpeachable and unchallenged records have been cited from year to year to illustrate the baneful results of the system which is calculated more than anything else to shake the confidence of the people in the integrity of the administration of justice. Cases have occurred—and they are not few and far between—where racial considerations have outweighed the demands of justice, and *the life of an Indian has not received greater consideration than that of a crab or a tortoise*. There are, of course, men who are strong enough to challenge and drive discontent underground, but no one has the power to see underground and watch the secret progress which such discontent silently works in its subterranean course. One complete generation has passed away since the Indian National Congress first drew the attention of the Government to the danger underlying this inequitable system. One Viceroy considered his duty discharged by calling the proposal of the Congress a 'counsel of perfection': two successive Secretaries of State vied with each other in their pious wish to inaugurate this reform; while at least one Indian administrator denounced the existing system as being unworthy of 'rational beings'. But the system still continues and seems to possess a charmed life which defies both a natural and a violent death."

From a Speech delivered by President Babu Ambica Charan Muzundar at the 31st Session of the Indian National Congress.

“English despotism is the cause of Indian crimes. The Penal Law set up by the English in India is defective to a degree that never was surpassed, and very rarely has ever been equalled.”

John Stuart Mill, "History of India," vol. III, p. 316.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, AS PROVED BY THE LAW FORBIDDING THE BEARING OF ARMS.

“The whole world is free to keep arms and use arms. Every civilized nation is interested in giving a military training to her boys and citizens and in teaching them the use of arms and other military tactics. Some countries do this by conscription, others do it on a voluntary basis. No Government entitled to be called sane ever thinks of denying arms to such of its people as want to use them for legitimate purposes. The free possession of arms and free training in military tactics for purposes of individual and national defence is the birthright of every son of a mother.

“Nations are vying with each other in their military preparations and in giving military training to their citizens. Even China is thinking of introducing conscription. In Japan military training is compulsory. In some places even the girls learn the use of arms and practise fencing. In the United States as well as in other states of America the negroes and the American Indians can keep arms and receive military training. But the Indians of India can not keep arms. Every nation is interested in the manufacture of arms and ammunition and in inventing effective methods of dealing with their enemies. Governments give every encouragement to those who invent new arms or improve old ones. All this is denied to the Indians. Why? Because they are a subject people. Their Government cannot trust them.

“The ludicrous extent to which the prohibition to keep and use arms has been carried will be better illustrated by the following incident reported by the *Bengalee* of Calcutta: “A five year old boy of Munshi Ganj Road, Kidderpore, had a toy pistol purchased for one anna. On the 8th August last the child was playing with it but could not explode the paper caps. A thirteen year old lad showed him how to do it. The boy was at once arrested by a beat constable and marched off to the Watganj thana with the firearm. The boy was eventually sent up for trial at Alipur and the court fined him three rupees.

“In the matter of arms, the present situation in India is this. One may steal arms, one may smuggle them; one may illicitly purchase them from

those who have the freedom of possessing them, for the purpose of committing crime, but one cannot have them for defending his life and property, the life and honour of his family (his wife, his mother, his sisters, and his daughters). It is this which gives awful power to the lawless portions of society and which explains the losses and hardships of those who have suffered from the depredations of the latter and are suffering from dacoities and robberies and murders in Bengal and Punjab and elsewhere. There are plenty of arms in the country for the criminal but none for the peace-loving (who only want them for defensive purposes). All this because the Government of India is a foreign Government who cannot trust their subjects and who do not believe in their loyalty. In the light of this fact all talk about the extraordinary outburst of loyalty becomes stale. So long as this state of things continues it is useless for the Government to expect that the people can accept it, and treat this as if it was their own national Government. Never before since the introduction of British rule in India was the sense of helplessness that arises of the consciousness of being a disarmed people, brought home to the people of India so vividly and strongly as during the war."

*From "The Political Situation in India,"
by Lala Lajpat Rai, Lahore, 1917.*

"The Indian Arms Act is another source of irritation which has estranged the feeling between the people and the governing class. Apart from the invidious and irritating character of this measure it has emasculated a whole nation, degraded them not only in their own estimation, but also in the estimation of other races not in any way superior to them, and reduced them to a condition of absolute helplessness. It has stunted the growth of a people, dwarfed its mental stature and debased its moral character, by depriving it of its sense of national self-respect. It has reduced it to the position of political pariahs smarting under disgrace and without any sense of responsibility. Maharaja Zabbar Jung Bahadur may not carry a single revolver for his own protection; but his driver Jones may have any number of them for his pastime, for purposes of illicit sale, and for shooting not only pheasants but also sometimes poor Indian peasants whom he may easily mistake for pigs. But all bad measures are like the devil's engine which must at one time or other recoil back on him who uses it, and this is what has happened. It is easy to govern a country by disarming its entire population and converting a whole country into a jail. Anarchism has reared its head and there has been a recrudescence of lawlessness in some parts of the country. Assassinations are committed in crowded cities in broad daylight and daring robberies are committed like candle-light performances in an Opera House.

"The reply to all this which has so far been vouchsafed, is that the people are cowards and are unable to help themselves! But whose fault is it if the people are cowards? Is it of the people who have been made cowards and helpless, or of those who have made them so? It is quite refreshing to hear of people seriously advised to arm themselves with brickbats and bamboo *lathies* to face an armed band of robbers and assassins equipped with Martini rifles and Mauser revolvers. Example is said to be better than precept, and those who indulge in ludicrous advice of this sort would do infinitely better to set an example themselves before they can persuade others to follow them.

"The Arms Act has been practically reduced to a dead letter, for the lawless few are never in want of any firearms, but it is the law-abiding many that have been deprived of the use of them. A great empire and a little mind are said to go ill together. And where the spirit of confidence is wanting in an administration its means and measures must be weak and self-contradictory and thus ultimately defeat its own end."

*Babu Ambica Charan Mozumdar, President,
Indian National Congress, Lucknow, Dec. 1916.*

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE RECRUITING, ORGANISATION AND TREATMENT OF THE NATIVE TROOPS.

From a German newspaper we retranslate into English the following article taken from the *New Review*, a Socialist publication of New York. The author is a member of the Radical Hindoo Party and the article, which bears the title "India Sullen," is signed with the pseudonym "Baghi." It begins with a comment upon the words written by James Bryce in 1913 in his book "The Roman and the British Empire in India," with reference to the possibility of a growing radical movement in this land:—"fortunately for England and India such questions are for the moment purely theoretical."

"Today, "Baghi," declares, India is more sullen and dissatisfied than ever. It is true that the newspapers write of the loyalty of all classes. They advance three different proofs of this: the courageous bearing of the Hindoo soldiers, the gifts of the Maraharajahs and the nawabs and

the addresses of loyalty by the representatives of the educated middle classes. These facts are not to be denied, but they necessitate interpretation, and they must be viewed in their real relationship and in the proper perspective. Above all the fighting spirit and the loyalty of the soldiers must be examined more closely.

"The Gurkhas, the Sikhs and the Pathans are in the strictest sense of the word, mercenaries. They are recruited at a very early age and are continually drilled until they become perfect fighting-machines. They may be compared to the Cossacks. Their consciences dwell in their knives. But the spirit of the times has not left even these pariahs untouched. They too have begun to feel for their country and to recognize *the inequality of the system*. Since 1905 insubordination and disloyalty have increased. In 1907 the soldiers of the Punjab were on the brink of revolution. During last year the attitude of the Canadian authorities towards the Indian workmen aroused anti-British feelings. *From 6 to 10% of the emigrants were pressed into military service.*

"The government did something which no sensible government would have done: it sent the dangerous soldiers to Europe, though this venture was accompanied by all kinds of positive and negative precautions,—secret movements of the troops, various promises, and the raising of the monthly pay from 9 rupees to 11 rupees. The women of "England and France," as "Baghi," discreetly and mischievously remarks, "aided their governments in this work in that they delighted the soldiers with smiles and hand-clasps, with flowers and kisses." But earthly joys were not all. Every native regiment received a staff of field-preachers, Hindoos and Mohammedans who from morning until night edified their yawning audiences with descriptions of "Swarga" and "Bahischt," the Indian and the Mohammedan Paradise which would open their portals to all those who fell fighting for the British Empire!

"The crafty Sikh priests (the Granthi) outdid the devil himself in their distortions of the sacred scripture. They declared, for instance, that Teg Bahadur, the ninth Prophet, had proclaimed that the Sikhs under the leadership of the English, were to conquer the world!

"*One of the duties of these native priests was the invention and dissemination of the most monstrous and grotesque stories of German atrocities.* What the oriental phantasy would accomplish in this direction may be imagined. The desperate resistance which these Hindoos make in battle is thereby explained. After a certain fight only 100 out of about 1000 Hindoos were left alive and these were captured by the Germans. These men who had fought as though they had cherished no thought of surrender, suddenly fell upon their knees and began to make signs to their captors to shoot them but not to tear them into pieces!

"Baghi" is also able to contribute evidence from his own experiences. "What do you think of the Germans?" I asked several wounded Hindoo soldiers after the battle of Neuve-Chapelle. They answered: "Their artillery is devilish good, their exactness beyond compare. Their shells land exactly in our midst and annihilate us. But we are their superiors in a hand-to-hand fight." "But why do you attack them so fiercely?" They looked at me for a moment. Then, as they saw the real purport of my question, they nodded understandingly and said: 'We understand. But what can we do? We are helpless. You see, we are always sent into the front lines. *Just behind us are the British troops who simply drive us toward the enemy trenches. Whenever we appear to hesitate in the slightest degree, we are shot down from behind.*'

"Taken all in all, the Indian soldier at the front does not appear to be in a very joyous mood. He complains of injustice and harsh treatment. The soldiers say: '*The government (sarker) has broken its word. When we left India our officers pledged us their word of honour that in case of our being wounded we were to be sent home. Instead of that they send us afresh into the battle after we have hardly recovered from our wounds. When we are damaged for good and no longer fit for service, we are sent to Marseilles or elsewhere and are forced to drudge over some stupid work or other. To prevent us from leaving the service, the government holds back our pay. The last time we were paid was when we left India. Since then we have not received a single cent. We are poor men, and risk our lives for money. If we were rich, like you, we would not sell ourselves, body and soul, for 11 rupees.*'

"Such are the pet troops of Lord Kitchener."

From the "Pester Lloyd," December 24, 1916.

SLAVE-HUNTS FOR INDIAN LABOUR BATTALIONS

"A week ago Mr. Candler of the English Mesopotamian army sent an idyllic description of how the happy and contented Santal labourers toiled joyously, quietly and happily, in brief of how they led a life of undisturbed felicity. The article pictured the Indian labour-troops as ideal human beings. Contrary to this we read the following in the Anglo-Indian papers which have just arrived:

"Recently several British recruiting officers went from Calcutta to the State of Mohurbhani with the intention of recruiting Santal coolies for the labour battalions. The Santals, however, did not take kindly to this idea and became very recalcitrant. About 500 of them gathered at Rupsa on the Bengal-Nagpur Raliway (130 miles from Calcutta and

12 from Balasore) and drove away the English recruiting agent by making use of their bows and arrows. Hereupon the District Magistrate of Balasore with a squad of armed policemen marched to the scene of the uproar. But even these did not succeed in intimidating the Indian mob which still continued to make use of its bows. On the evening of the same day the special train of the Mohurhani State Railway which had brought up money, was attacked by the Santals who had now increased to about 1000. They had torn up the rails beforehand and once more fired volleys with their bows and arrows. After they had taken the money from the train, the Santals proceeded to the palace at Mohurbhani which they plundered after a battle with the palace watchmen.

"Two days later these events became known in Calcutta. Three hundred men from Fort William, and volunteers from Kharagpur and Howrah were sent to the scene of the riots by special train. Order was finally restored. The examining magistrate discovered that two grievances were cherished by the Santals: first, *that they were forced against their wills and against the will of their Maharajah, to go to France*, and second, that they were being forced to contribute to the war loan. We shall have to revise our tribute to the contented Santal Indians."

"The World," July 3, 1916 (re-translated).

"The strength of the native army in India cannot exceed a certain proportion of the British army; they cannot handle the artillery; and numerous other restrictions are imposed upon the possession and use of arms by them. Why? Are they not fit to handle arms? Are they not brave? Are they intemperate? No Indian can get a commissioned rank, however high by birth or social position, however fit by education. No Indian can be admitted into a Military College in India or in Great Britain. Why? Are they unfit, or intellectually and physically imbeciles? The truth is that the Government of India not being their own Government, they cannot be trusted. They can be enrolled as mere soldiers and that only in certain numbers. Beyond that they cannot get any military training or military rank. Nor can the civil population be trusted to keep arms, much less to manufacture them. Much fuss has been made of the Indians having been allowed to participate in the European war. Some Indians have gone mad over the incident as if that was the greatest boon that could be conferred on them. The truth is that the step was actuated by and taken purely in British interests.

"Without the Indian contingent, Great Britain could not send a decent expeditionary force to France. The whole of the European army could not be removed from India. In removing large numbers of them, it

was necessary to remove proportionately large numbers of the native army also. The British Government is always distrustful of the native army. No amount of false statements and fallacious reasoning can conceal the fact that the British in India cannot allow the Indians to manufacture arms or carry arms, cannot give them a military training, cannot even keep a large native army (more than double the strength of the permanent British garrison) because, being foreigners, they cannot trust them. They fear that some day the arms or military training given them, may be used against themselves. Looking at it from their point of view, it cannot be said that they are not right. But then, why ask the Indians to accept that the Government is national and that they are the equal subjects of the Crown; why hide the truth and make false and hypocritical declarations to the contrary?"

"Considerations upon the Political Situation in India."
by Lala Lajpat Rai, Lahore.

„Lieutenant of the Reserve Schöphaus of the 2nd Reserve Battalion of the Infantry Regiment 39, as officially announced by Wolff's Telegraph Bureau, has made the following service report to his troop division:

“During my holding the post of vice-adjutant of the Commando at the railway station of Opladen, I had an opportunity on October 8th and 9th of conversing with English and French prisoners who had fallen into our hands during the battles round Loos at the beginning of the month. Being conversant with the English language through my long residence in England, I began to discuss the last engagements in Flanders, and northern France with these English officers of Kitchener's army. A First Lieutenant of a London regiment conveyed to me some very significant information respecting the utilization of coloured races in the English army and the value which the English place upon the lives of these troops. During the battle round Loos, he declared, the English, after heavy artillery fire and the blowing-off of poisonous gases, had sent forward the Indian troops under the assumption that the German positions were ripe for attack. But when these troops began to receive a strong fire and to suffer heavy losses during their advance, *additional clouds of poisonous gas were sent forward quite regardless of the great number of wounded and the remnants of the living, so that the wounded and the others perished miserably.* It was only then that the English soldiers were sent forward. When I asked this British First Lieutenant whether such ruthless treatment of one's own troops was not wicked, he remarked cynically: “*Oh, they are only Indians!*”

From the "B. Z. am Mittag," Berlin, November 15, 1915.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, AS PROVED BY THE MUZZLING OF THE PRESS AND THE STRANGLING OF CIVIC LIBERTY.

"The next point of conflict between the bureaucracy and the people has reference to the liberty of the Press. The Press is entirely a Western institution so firmly ingrafted with Western education and incorporated with Western methods of administration, that it is now impossible to retain the one and remove the other. In every civilised country the Press has played the double rôle of the educator of the public and the interpreter to the Government.

"In India the Press, with all its defects and lapses, as well as its numerous difficulties and disabilities has played an important part in the evolution of national life, and its chequered history is no mean evidence of the firm hold it has over the public mind and the sustaining energies of a growing people. It is not necessary to pursue that history. Suffice it to say that since the repeal of Lord Lytton's Gagging Act of 1878 the Indian Press steadily grew into a power which with a little more sympathetic treatment might easily have been converted into a useful adjunct of the administration. Unfortunately, however, the Anglo-Indian Press began to be jealous of its formidable rival and the bureaucracy grew nervous of its strength. An ugly development for which the Indian Press was not responsible, furnished an excuse and afforded an opportunity for again muzzling the Press in a way unprecedented in the history of any civilised country where a public press exists.

"The Press Act of 1910, conceived in a spirit of repression, has reduced the Indian Press from its position as an independent critic of the Government to that of an institution entirely dependent upon sufferance. Within this short period of less than seven years there has been a regular carnival of press prosecutions in which newspapers have been suppressed, printing presses have been confiscated and their securities forfeited to an extent which has bewildered the public and alarmed the journalists. According to a statement furnished by Sir Reginald Craddock, in February last there were no less than six press prosecutions and in no less than five cases securities of newspapers were enhanced and no less than two hundred and twenty newspapers, both English and vernacular, ceased publication since the outbreak of that date. The liberty of the Indian Press is practically gone and the highest tribunals in the land have declared themselves powerless to protect it. When the Act was passed the extreme rigour of the measure was admitted, but an assurance was given that it would be administered with care and consideration. Whether that assurance has been honoured more in the breach than in the observance may be left to the judgment of the

public. And last, but not least, an extraordinary woman, Irish by birth, English by marriage and Indian by adoption, has been caught in the meshes of this Act. And the provisions of the Defence Act are set in operation to coerce and restrain her.

“One Government has under cover of the latter interdicted Mrs. Besant from profaning its sacred territories with the touch of her feet, while another Government, acting under the former, not content with forfeiting the security of an old press, has demanded an exorbitant security for her paper which threatens it with extinction. Gentlemen, how fast doth contagion spread! Before I could finish writing these pages another Government has issued orders prohibiting her at the eleventh hour from attending a religious conference held within its territories. I should not be surprised if the British public were to doubt the accuracy of this statement. The lame excuses offered by the Central Provinces Government for its extraordinary action have, however, failed to satisfy the Indian public.”

From a Speech by Babu Ambica Charan Muzumdar President of the Indian National Congress, Lucknow, 1916.

“*Liberty* of speech, of the Press and of the person has been completely suppressed in India, particularly during the last twelve years by a series of arbitrary legislative enactments.

- a) *Regulation 3* of 1818 by which any person might be deported without reason assigned and without trial,
- b) *Press Act*,
- c) *Seditious Meetings Act*,
- d) *Criminal Law Amendment Act* which provides for a magisterial trial before three judges *in Camera* without a jury,
- e) *Arms Act* by which no Indian may carry any weapon whatsoever,
- f) *Explosives Act*,
- g) Since the outbreak of the war, the *Defense of India Act*, granting unlimited power to British officials. Under this Act alone, thousands of men have been interned.”

From “Self-Government for India,” (Appendix).

THE EXPORT OF COOLIES FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES.

In the *Times of India* of Jan. 20, 1917 a Mr. C. J. Andrew appeals to public opinion in the hope of forcing the authorities to put a stop to the present system of recruiting coolies, which he describes as *in every way immoral in the*

highest degree. The writer felt himself obliged to take this step because it was publicly announced in the colony of Fiji that the assurance had been received from London that the present system *should remain in force for another five years.*

This system is characterized as follows in a Government Report issued by the Indian government on October 15th, 1915:

“The opinion prevails most decidedly in this country, and as it appears, not without considerable foundation, that the female emigrants only too often lead an immoral life. Partly on pecuniary grounds, partly as a result of the exercise of force on the part of superiors, they are at the service of the other coolies, or even of the lower officials.”

This Government statement has never been contradicted, and neither have the detailed facts which Mr. Andrew himself observed and also published. These were of so serious a nature that they offered the clearest proof that this system, whereby the proportion of men to women was as three to one, amounted to nothing less than a kind of legalized prostitution. Mr. Andrew says: “Not a moment should be lost in doing away with the whole system.”

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE PREVENTION OF SPIRITUAL AND CULTURAL PROGRESS.

“The illiteracy of the Indian people is a disgrace to the proud nation which, for a century and a half, has controlled their destiny. The editor of the *Indian World*, a Calcutta magazine, says in last February’s number:

“If India has not yet been fit for free institutions, it is certainly not her fault. If, after one and a half centuries of British rule, India remains where she was in the Middle Ages, what a sad commentary must it be upon the civilizing influences of that rule!

“When the English came to India, this country was the leader of Asiatic civilization and the undisputed centre of light in the Asiatic world. Japan was nowhere.

“ ‘Now, in fifty years, Japan has revolutionized her history with the aid of modern arts of progress, and India, with 150 years of English rule, is still condemned to tutelage.’

“Who will answer the argument presented by this Indian editor? And he might have made it stronger.

“Japan, the arbiter of her own destiny and the guardian of her own people, has in half a century bounded from illiteracy to a position where 90 per cent of her people can read and write, and is now thought worthy to enter into an Anglo-Japanese alliance; while India, condemned to political servitude and sacrificed for the commercial advantage of another nation, still sits in darkness, less than 1 per cent of her women able to read and write, and less than 10 per cent of her total population sufficiently advanced to communicate with each other by letter or to gather knowledge from the printed page.”

“British Rule in India,” by W. J. Bryan.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.

ILLITERACY DESPITE HIGH TAXES.

“Mr. Gokhale estimates that four villages out of every five are without a schoolhouse, and this, too, in the country where the people stagger under an enormous burden of taxation. The published statement for 1904-5 shows that the general government appropriated but \$6,500,000 for education, while more than \$90,000,000 were appropriated for “army services, and the revised estimate for the next year shows an increase of a little more than \$500,000 for education, while the army received an increase of more than \$12,000,000.

“The Government has, it is true, built a number of colleges (with money raised by taxation), and it is gradually extending the system of primary and secondary schools (also with taxes), but the progress is exceedingly slow and the number of schools grossly inadequate. Benevolent Englishmen have also aided the cause of education by establishing private schools and colleges under church and other control, but the amount returned to India in this way is insignificant when compared with the amount drawn by England from India.

“It is not scarcity of money that delays the spread of education in India, but the deliberate misappropriation of taxes collected, and the system which permits this disregard of the welfare of the subjects, and the subordination of their industries to the supposed advancement of another nation’s trade is as indefensible upon political and economic grounds as upon moral grounds.”

“British Rule in India,” by W. J. Bryan.

"It is unspeakably mean of us to place this burden on the Indian's back simply because he must bear any load we put upon him. Nine-tenths of the charge of the army in India is an Imperial charge. Canada, South-Africa, and Australia should bear it as much as India. It is a piece of the most bitter cynicism to find the Imperial doors of our colonies shut in the faces of these poor people, who bear such an inordinate share of the cost of Imperial maintenance, and at whose expense these dominions are protected from the fear of war. If £18,000,000 of the army charges were met by the whole Empire, we might look the Indian taxpayer in the face as honest men. . . .

"On the other hand, a little over a million and a half pounds spent on education is ridiculous! The small state of Baroda, with a population of 2,000,000 souls, spends £660,000 on this, and has committed itself to a policy which will soon cost £1,000,000 per annum. In Baroda, education has been compulsory since 1904—5; while 90 per cent of the males and 99 per cent of the females in British India are illiterate!

"Our expenditure on education, however, is only typical. We spend far too much of the income of India on Imperial purposes and far too little on Indian development.

"On the whole, I think two charges can be substantiated against us. Our Government is extravagant, and *we have behaved meanly to India*. We charge the Indian taxpayer with the cost of the India office in White-hall—even with the cost of building it: we would never think of making such a charge against our colonies; India has to pay for Aden—and for Imperial embassies into different parts of Asia; but the depth of meanness was surely touched when we tried to charge India with £7,000, the cost of the representatives and guests from India who took part in the coronation ceremonies of the late king." . . .

*J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P., "The Awakening of India,"
pp. 145—148.*

This may, in truth, be called the very peak and culmination of official shamelessness!

"England's educational policy in India is a blight on civilization. I have studied the problem pretty closely. In the latter part of the eighteenth century Wilberforce, the English philanthropist, proposed to send school teachers to India, but a Director of the East India Company objected, saying: 'We have just lost America from our folly in having allowed the establishment of schools and colleges, and it would not do for us to repeat the same act of folly in regard to India.'

“There are no free public schools in India and no compulsory system of primary education. Young Indians are hungry for education; and it is our duty to do whatever we can to help the spread of education in that great country of ancient culture and wonderful philosophy.

“England is like a huge crocodile, and it opens its mouth wide and crushes everything that comes between its jaws.”

Dr. William T. Harris,

Former United States Commissioner of Education.

(From a Speech before the National Council of Education during its session in Cleveland, 1908.)

“What we have done for education in India is another boast frequently heard. Here, also, so far at least as the older provinces of India are concerned, the boast is ill-founded. The total number of children attending schools in the whole of India, including the Native States, is only about five millions, and the cost which the Government of India spends upon education works out at about $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. per head! . . . Max Müller on the strength of official documents and a missionary report concerning education in Bengal prior to the British occupation, asserts that there were then 80,000 native schools in Bengal, or one for every 400 of the population. Ludlow, in his *History of British India*, says, that ‘in every Hindoo village which has retained its old form I am assured that the children generally are able to read, write and cipher, but where we have swept away the village system as in Bengal, there the village school also has disappeared.’ That, I think, disposes effectively of the boast that we are beginning to give education to the people of India.”

J. Keir Hardie, “India, Impressions and Suggestions,” Page 5.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE INHUMAN TAXATION.

“A meeting of the Hyderabad (Sind) Citizens’ Association attended by between 3,000 and 4,000 people, comprising all classes, creeds and professions, was held on Monday to protest against the heavy and unwarranted rise in the income-tax. The meeting passed the following two resolutions:

1. That the citizens of Hyderabad (Sind) strongly and emphatically protest against the arbitrary and unsympathetic way in which the income-tax has been assessed by the assessing officer. It has been enhanced at least 200 per cent, without the least regard to the hard times in which people are living. The necessaries of life have gone up more than 100 per cent and incomes have

gone down in the same proportion. This meeting, therefore, respectfully begs His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, to cancel the present list of assessment and order a fresh assessment after proper inquiry.

2. That copies of this resolution be submitted by telegram to His Excellency the Viceroy, the Governor of Bombay, the Commissioner in Sind and to the leading papers in India."

"Times of India," Jan. 20, 1917.

"A feeling of discontent and dissatisfaction exists among every class, on account of the constant increase of taxation which has for years been going on."

Lord Mayo, late Viceroy of India, "Minute of the Viceroy on Military Expenditure, October 3, 1870."

"The people of India are taxed, but they have no voice in the amount to be collected or in the use to be made of the revenue. They pay into the government nearly \$ 225,000,000 a year, and of this nearly \$ 100,000,000 is expended upon an army in which Indians cannot be officers.

"It is not necessary to keep such an army merely to hold the people in subjection if the Indians are really satisfied with English rule, and if the army is intended to keep Russia from taking India, as is sometimes claimed, why should not the British government bear a part of the burden? Would it not be wiser so to attach the Indian people to the British government that they would themselves resist annexation to Russia?

"The Home Charges, as they are called, absorb practically one-third of the entire revenues. About \$ 100,000,000 goes out of India to England every year; more than \$ 15,000,000 is paid to European officials in the civil employ. What nation could stand such a drain without impoverishment?

"Taxation is nearly twice as heavy in India as in England in proportion to the income of the people. Compared with the people of other countries, the Indian's income is on the average one-twentieth of the average English income, one-seventh of the average Spaniard's income, one-sixth of the average Italian's income, one-fifth of the (European) Russian's income, and one-half of the income of the Turk.

"Sir Henry Cotton shows that the average per capita deposit in banks in England is \$ 100, while the average per capita deposit in India is 50 cents; but how can the Indian be expected to have a large bank account when the average yearly income is \$ 10?"

"British Rule in India," by W. J. Bryan.

"The average income of the Indian people is only 40 Shillings per head per annum. If the peasants, who form 85 per cent of the people are separated from the business and official classes, the income works out at 25 Shillings."

Keir Hardie.

"The Indian people are the poorest people in the world and they are growing poorer every day under British Rule.

"The following is a table of incomes for the British Empire as given by Sir Robert Giffen:—

Country	Total Income per annum in Million £ Sterling	Average Income per head per annum
United Kingdom.....	£ 1,751	£ 42
India	£ 600	£ 2
Canada.....	£ 270	£ 50
Australia	£ 210	£ 41
South Africa	£ 100	£ 38
<i>Capital per head:</i> United Kingdom £ 361		
India		
		£ 10

"The *Land revenue* is exorbitant, being often as much as 65 per cent of the net produce. If we exclude Bengal (where the revenue was permanently settled in 1793) and the Indian States, the percentage exacted from the peasants is much higher.

"The revenue is enhanced at each assessment and in British India, contrary to the practice in the Indian States, there is no remission of taxation in bad years.

Example. In the famine years 1912—13 the total value of crops was estimated at £ 54,000,000, and the total land revenue was £ 21,000,000 (Statesman's Year Book 1915.)

*"Self-Government for India," published by the European
Central Committee of the Indian Nationalists.*

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE INCREDIBLE FLOW OF MONEY FROM INDIA TO ENGLAND.

"Excluding commercial profits and fortunes of private persons, the British Government has been *draining from India* for the last 75 years a sum variously estimated by English economists at £ 30,000,000 to

£ 45,000,000 a year, for which India receives no return whatsoever. The following are the chief channels of this depletion of India's wealth:—

The India Office established in London,
Pensions and Furloughs,
Private Remittances of Government servants,
Recruitment of Soldiers in England,
Interest on Debt, Railway Capital &c., all raised in England."

"Self-Government for India."

"Again and again attention has been called to the effects of the heavy and constant drain of wealth from India to England. . . This drain from India has been going on and steadily increasing for more than two centuries. There is no country in the world that could endure such a steady loss of wealth without becoming impoverished."

Rev. J. T. Sunderland (an Englishman) in the "New England Magazine" for September 1900, vol. XXIII. No. 1.

"With reference to its economical effects upon the condition of India, the tribute paid to Great Britain is by far the most objectionable feature in our existing policy. . . . The Indian tribute, whether weighed in the scales of Justice or viewed in the light of our true interest will be found to be at variance with humanity, with commonsense, and with the received maxims of economical science.

"Were India to be relieved of this cruel burden of tribute and the whole of the taxes raised in India to be spent in India, the revenue of that country would soon acquire a degree of elasticity of which we have at present no expectation."

Major Wingate, "Our Financial Relations with India," pp. 54—64.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE HOPELESS IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE.

"Of the total amount raised from taxation each year about 40 per cent is raised from land, and the rate is so heavy that the people cannot save enough when the crops are good to feed themselves when the crops are bad. More than 10 per cent of the total tax is collected on salt, which now pays about five-eighths of a cent a pound.

This is not only a heavy rate, when compared with the original cost of the salt, but it is especially burdensome to the poor. The salt tax has been as high as one cent a pound, and when at that rate materially reduced the amount of salt consumed by the people.

"The poverty of the people of India is distressing in the extreme: millions live on the verge of starvation all the time, and one would think that their very appearance would plead successfully in their behalf."

"British Rule in India," by W. J. Bryan.

"... That the people of India are growing poorer and poorer; that taxation is not only actually but relatively far heavier, that each successive scarcity widens the area of impoverishment, and renders famines more frequent; that most of the trade is but an index to the poverty and crushing over-taxation of the people; that a high organized foreign rule constitutes by itself a most terrible drain upon the country."

H. M. Hyndman, "Bankruptcy of India," p. 74.

"The fact that at the end of two hundred years of commercial dominance and of more than forty years of absolute political sway, we are confronted with such indescribable poverty of the people, and with famine after famine of such magnitude and severity as to make the world stand aghast, seems to prove beyond answer that England in all these years has not made the welfare of India her first aim, but has subordinated India's good to her own enrichment. We denounce ancient Rome for impoverishing Gaul and Egypt and Sicily and Palestine and her other conquered provinces by draining away their wealth to enrich herself. We denounce Spain for robbing the New World in the same way. But England is doing exactly the same thing in India, and on a much larger scale; only she is doing it skilfully, adroitly, by modern and 'enlightened' modes of procedure, under business and judicial forms, and with so many pretences of 'governing India for her advantage, and enriching her by civilized methods' that the world has been largely blinded to what has been really going on."

Rev. J. T. Sunderland (an Englishman), "New England Magazine," for September 1900, vol. XXIII, No. 1.

THE STATE OF BENGAL AFTER TWENTY YEARS OF BRITISH RULE.

"I am sorry to be obliged to say that the agricultural and internal commerce have for many years been gradually declining, and that at present, excepting the class of Shroffs and Bunyas, who reside almost entirely in great towns, the inhabitants of these provinces were advancing hastily to a general state of poverty and wretchedness."

Lord Cornwallis, Governor General of India, "Extract from his Minute, 2nd August, 1789."

"The long and dismal record of British prosperity heightened at the expense of daily increasing poverty to more millions in India than the British Isles contain, will continue. Some day, however, a catastrophe more terrible than aught yet experienced, will occur. What form it will take no man can positively tell. . . The English people will learn by one way only. They would not displace the company of merchants from supreme rule in India until there had been a frightful mutiny due to misgovernment: In like manner the reform for which India is ripe, which our experience in that country has shown to be above and beyond all things necessary, . . . but it will not come until a great 'shedding of blood' procures remission."

*William Digby, "India for the Indians—
and for England," p. 258.*

"The result of Mr. Kemble's inquiries on the Nepal frontier is discouraging, in that, after very fairly weighing the respective advantages and disadvantages of both, he comes to the conclusion that the condition of the Nepal ryot (peasant) is on the whole better than that of the British ryot."

Sir George Campbell, K. C. S. I., M. P. in one of his official reports as Lieutenant-governor of Bengal, quoted in his book, "The Ruin of an Indian Province. An Indian Famine Explained." 1880.

"Briefly, it is that all persons of the labouring classes, and ten per cent of the cultivating and artisan classes, or *forty-five per cent of the total population* are insufficiently clothed, or insufficiently fed, or both. It follows that nearly one hundred millions of people in British India are living in extreme poverty."

*Grierson's statistics summed up by the "Pioneer,"
a British semi-official paper in India, in 1893.*

"I assert that the abject poverty of the cultivator of this district is beyond the belief of any one who has not seen it. He is simply a slave to the soil and to the Government."

Hatney, of the Indian Civil Service. (Official Report.)

"India is the most wretched of countries."

*General A. G. Gordon, "Letters of General A. G.
Gordon to his Sister," p. 208.*

"India is becoming feebler and feebler. The very life-blood of the great multitude under our rule is slowly, yet ever faster, ebbing away."

H. M. Hyndman, "The Bankruptcy of India," p. 152.

"In my own missionary experience I once carefully investigated the earnings of a congregation of 300, and found the average amounted to less than a farthing a head per day. They did not live, they eked out an existence. I have been in huts where the people were living on carrion. I have taken photographs of famine groups which are enough for most people; yet in all these cases there was no (official) recognized famine."

Rev. I. Knowles, London Missionary Society, Southern India, in a Letter to the "Manchester Guardian" in 1890.

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF INDIA, AS PROVED BY THE HORRIFYING INCREASE OF FAMINE, PESTILENCE AND THE DEATH-RATE.

"But this drain must be staunched; taxation must be lowered; more Indians must be employed; . . . with one accord Sir James Caird, Mr. Buck, Mr. Harman, and Mr. Robertson, all skilled agriculturists, declare that the soil of India is undergoing steady and permanent deterioration. Mr. Robertson puts the deterioration in Coimbatore at thirty per cent in thirty years, and points out how the people are driven to grow cotton for sale instead of food to eat, and literally to starve themselves in order to pay the Government assessment owing to this deterioration. . . . From all the provinces comes the same sad cry. . . . A deteriorated race of men, an inferior description of bullocks, bear witness to the truth of what they say. . . ."

"Thus on every side the prospect is gloomy and overcast, and in the opinion of the ablest observers we are drawing nearer and nearer to an almost overwhelming disaster. Year after year we take from India agricultural produce which she cannot spare, because we are the masters of the country, and, paying ourselves handsomely all around, leave those who depend upon us for safety to perish from want. Whilst we are disputing about the defence of the empire—we ourselves are preparing its ruin; the knocking will come through the darkness, from without, the murder within will be done."

H. M. Hyndman, "England for all," p. 144.

"Official figures show over one million deaths on the average per annum during the past ten years, or, two British subjects passed away from starvation or starvation-induced diseases every minute of every day and every night from January 1, 1889, to September 30, 1901!"

W. Digby, "'Prosperous' British India," p. 130.

“The chronic and abject poverty of the people has so undermined their constitutions that they are unable to resist *diseases* which is becoming endemic.

a) The figures given in the following Table show that the deaths from preventable diseases alone, such as cholera, small pox, dysentery, plague, fever, &c. average 5 millions a year:—

	Total deaths from disease	Deaths from fever alone
1910.....	5,738,939	4,341,392
1911.....	6,330,936	4,207,356
1912.....	5,236,200	3,936,085

(*Indian Year Book 1916.*)

b) For every death there are three cases of sickness. At this rate the number constantly sick among the 232,000,000 of British India amount to nearly 28,000,000 (Census 1901).

(*Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909.*)

Mortality. The excess of births over deaths is only 5—6 in British India, and this excess is steadily diminishing. That is, the birth rate is on the decrease and the death rate on the increase. The following table compares India with other countries:—

	Natural increase per 1,000 of population
Bulgaria.....	18·2
Holland.....	15·5
Germany.....	14·9
Australia.....	14·5
Roumania.....	13·8
United Kingdom (Gr. Britain and Ireland)..	11·4
Japan.....	10·9
Sweden.....	10·6
Italy.....	10·6
India.....	5·6.

The expenditure on *Sanitation* for 1916 was only £ 1¹/₂ million Sterling. (The Military expenditure for the same year was £ 23 million Sterling.)

“*Self-Government for India.*”

“The Government assessment does not leave enough food to the cultivator to support himself and his family throughout the year.”

Sir William Hunter, a former member of the Viceroy's Council, in 1879 in a speech.

"There remain forty millions of people in India who go through life on insufficient food."

Sir William Hunter, in a Speech at Birmingham in 1880.

"Sir William Hunter said that 40,000,000 Indians go through life with insufficient food; Sir Charles Elliot estimated that one-half of the agricultural population never satisfied hunger fully from one year's end to another. From thirty to fifty million families live in India on an income which does not exceed 3½d per day. *The poverty of India is not an opinion, it is a fact.*"

J. R. MacDonald, "The Awakening of India," p. 150.

"On the question, then, whether the impression that the greater proportion of the people of India suffer from a daily insufficiency of food is wholly untrue. . . My own belief, after a good deal of study of the closely connected question of agricultural indebtedness (*vide* my five chapters on Economic Reform in Rural India in the *Calcutta Review*, 1882—85), is that the impression is perfectly true as regards a varying, but always considerable part of the year in the greater part of India."

A. H. Harington, Commissioner of Fyzabad in "An Enquiry into the Economic Condition of the Agricultural and Labouring Classes in the north-western Provinces and Oudh, 1888."

"In studying famine, one must begin by grasping what it is and how it presents itself. Even in the worst times now there is no scarcity of grain in the famine-stricken districts. At the very worst time in the Guzerat famine of 1900, it was shown by the official returns that there was 'sufficient grain to last for a couple of years in the hands of the grain-dealers of the district. It is, therefore, not scarcity of grain that causes famines.' In recent time famine has been caused by destruction of capital and the consequent cessation of the demand for labour. High prices coincide with low wages and unemployment, and people starve in the midst of plenty."

J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P., "The Awakening of India."

"So great has been the drain, the injustice to the people, and the tax upon the resources of the country, that famines have increased in frequency and severity. Mr. Gokhale, one of the ablest of India's public men, presided over the meeting of the last Indian National Congress held in December, and declared in his opening speech that the death rate had steadily risen from 24 to the 1,000 in 1882—84, to 30 in 1892—94, and to 34 at the present time.

"I have more than once, within the last month, heard the plague referred to as a providential remedy for over-population. Think of it! British

rule justified because "it keeps the people from killing each other," and the plague praised because it removes those whom the government has saved from slaughter!

"The railroads, with all their advantages, have been charged with adding to the weight of famine by carrying away the surplus grain in good years, leaving no residue for the years of drought. While grain can now be carried back more easily in times of scarcity, the people are too poor to buy it with two freights added. The storage of grain by the government at central points until the new crop is safe would bring some relief but it has not been attempted.

"If it is argued that the railroads have raised the price of grain in the interior by furnishing a cheaper outlet to the sea, it must be remembered that the benefit has accrued, not to the people, *but to the landlords, the government being the largest holder.*"

"British Rule in India," by W. J. Bryan.

On account of the crushing taxation and the colossal drain the country is the victim of ever-recurring famines, which tend to increase in number and intensity:

a) *Death from Famines.*

From 1800 to 1900 died 32 millions, of which 19 millions between 1891 and 1900. (Digby.)

b) *Frequency of Famines.*

18th century	1st half—4 cases	
	2nd half—4 cases	
19th century	1st half—12 cases	
	2nd half—35 cases.	(Digby.)

Since the beginning of the 20th century, famines have become chronic and recur almost yearly.

c) *They are famines of money, not of food.*

In the famine year 1912—13, food-stuffs to the value of £52,000,000 were exported from India. (Lord George Hamilton.)

d) According to Sir William Hunter 40 millions and according to William Digby 70 millions of the Indian people go through life on insufficient food,

"Self-Government for India."

"A mere recital of recent famine statistics is enough to appall one."

J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P., "The Awakening of India."

"For some time past the number of deaths from plague has again become extraordinarily great. During last week there was even a further spread of the epidemic to be recorded. No fewer than 10,245 persons died from this distemper during the third week in December. In the Presidency of Bombay alone there were 4,318 deaths and in Hyderabad 1,983. As the majority of doctors are serving with the army, it is extraordinarily difficult to carry out thorough-going measures."

"Times of India," January 6, 1917.
(re-translated).

"During a trial in connection with a revolt of starving peasants at Behar, Mr. W. Irwin, the Manager of the Motihari Stock Company, gave evidence to the effect that *this Stock Company owned 6 plantations with 30,000 tenants.*"

From "The Civil and Military Gazette," July 28, 1917.

Thirty thousand *Indian* husbands and fathers toil and sweat in tilling the *Indian* soil for the benefit of a foreign company and know not wherewith they are to appease the pangs of hunger suffered by their families!

Lord Hardinge recently gave an interview to a newspaper correspondent respecting conditions in India, and represented matters in such a way as to lead one to believe that peace and quiet reigned throughout the entire land and that the only disturbances possible were those occasioned by the enthusiasm with which the population rushed to arms to fight, to conquer or to die for the Mother-, or rather the Step-motherland.

Any other kind of representation would indeed have occasioned surprise. For even were chaos to reign in India no English statesman who had formerly occupied the post of a Viceroy of India could afford, or would be permitted, to trumpet forth this truth so long as the slightest possibility existed for keeping it secret. An honest utterance free from all ulterior motives, was hardly to be expected during this war. A judgment of *recent* date, that is to say, just before

the war, may, however, be considered authoritative, and *this judgment may be said to have all the more weight when uttered by an expert, and an English expert at that.*

Such a judgment lies before us. It is contained in a long article by Shaw Desmond, one of the leading authorities upon India, in one of England's most popular publications, the *London Magazine* of March, 1914—republished in the *Tägliche Rundschau* of May 30, 1916 and re-translated from this. At that time no one thought that a European war was so soon to break out. The opinions of Mr. Desmond were therefore not trimmed to fit the war, still less the present war-situation. His judgment is simply annihilating with reference to conditions in India, and hence for the British Government. The whole article is a single cry of warning based upon hard facts and bitter truths—truths which this English writer would certainly have refrained from publishing had he reckoned with even the slightest possibility of war in that same year.

The very title of the article is significant. It reads: "Are We to Lose India?"

The lengthy explanatory note under this title speaks volumes for the conditions in India as well as the value of official English pronouncements regarding these conditions (even in peace time). This introduction reads:

"The bond between Great Britain and India may break at any moment. *The great brown continent has gradually become so overloaded with inflammable matter that an explosion is only a matter of time, unless Great Britain awake to a knowledge of the truth and by means of thorough-going reforms sets her Indian house in order. The Indian Office at home knows as little of the actual internal conditions of India as the Viceroy himself (sic!). For a gigantic conspiracy of silence prevails.*"

The author accuses the officials not only of ignorance but bluntly declares that the official bulletins from India are systematically coloured and falsified and naturally only in

a manner favourable to the Government. And it is very likely, he adds, that Great Britain will one day be forced to pay a terrible price in blood and tears for these official bulletins. The author states the ultimate cause of the Indian peoples' discontent to be the constant scourges of plague, poverty and famine. He then declares, basing his statement upon his yearlong experience, that the plague in its final analysis is nothing but a "poverty-disease." This poverty, however, is called forth by the brutal manner in which England sucks the marrow from the bones of its colony—a charge which in no uncertain terms has repeatedly been levelled against England by certain eminent writers of the last century. These charges have been persistent and to the point, but England's cold and indurate heart has remained unmoved.

We herewith present some of the figures and details given by Mr. Desmond:

"The Indian peasant, that is to say, more than 80 per cent of the entire population, is driven by the cat-o'-nine-tails into revolution through levies which have no counterpart in history and which constitute three-quarters of the entire production of the land. Before the English had taken possession of the country, the Indian peasant paid one-third of his production.

"It is universally conceded that India had never known such horrors of plague and famine before the English took possession. Here are the gruesome figures:—according to official estimates the plague (that is to say the "poverty-disease" which the author declares is due to the parasitic exhaustion of the land by the British) has carried off more than 6,000,000 Indians in the interval from 1900 to 1914. And this relative proportion is rapidly on the increase. In the Punjab alone more than 75,000 persons died of plague during a certain period. Between 1860 and 1900 a whole nation perished of famine—a nation of more than 30,000,000 human beings!

"Some 8,000 European officials in India draw salaries aggregating £13,900,544 yearly—whereas some 130,000 Indians who are also employed in the Civil Service must struggle for a beggarly £3,284,163!

"Every living human being in England earns 16 shillings the week—the Indian *ryot*, according to Lord Curzon himself, receives 26 shillings—the *year!* According to non-official sources he enjoys life on 12 shillings

and sixpence a year. Even if we grant all the differences in the conditions of life, the fact remains that he is gradually sucked out of existence by the vampire of poverty and that he falls an easy prey to the plague."

Mr. Desmond characterizes the manifold manifestations of the intolerable racial megalomania of the British towards the Indian natives as another cause of the discontent of the Indians. This arrogance makes no halt even before independent Indian rulers who are accustomed to being addressed as "Your Majesty," eminent rulers such as the Emir of Afghanistan. The writer cites an instance in which the members of an English club in Bombay made a protest against the Emir of Afghanistan being received as a guest at even a single dinner! Mr. Desmond remarks:

"It is certain that this insult, like thousands of others, will never be forgotten. The Indian never forgets!"

He furthermore declares that England will no longer be able to rule India by means of the artificially maintained religious differences, and that

"Hindoos, Mohammedans, Sikhs and Parsees are uniting themselves for one common end — the shaking-off of the English yoke!"

It is sufficiently clear from these statements what value is to be placed upon the assurances of Lord Hardinge as to the faithfulness and sympathy of the Indian population — and the loyalty of the mighty Emir of Afghanistan. The former Viceroy had also said that the discontented element was incorporated only in a few anarchists. Mr. Desmond definitely and emphatically declares:

"Let it be made clear once and for all time that the Indian secret societies are something very different from isolated crowds of fools. It is obvious that there is a powerful organisation behind them... Nor is it correct to assume that the Indian revolutionaries originate from the lowest and least-educated classes. I have myself spoken with Indian leaders and they proved themselves to be masters of European languages with a fine knowledge of European literature — men of gentle speech

and cultured manners... But the chief hot-beds of the Revolution are to be sought outside of India — in the various British, Continental and American centres of disaffection which maintain a constant and secret communication with India."

The writer also refers to the fact that the headquarters of the impending Indian Revolution are situated in California and that the Indian leaders keep up a permanent connection with Ireland.

"I am convinced that one of the most terrible bombs which will land in the self-satisfied camp of English officialdom, will be the attitude of the so-called "loyal" native states... The explosive matter in the huge Indian powder magazine grows from hour to hour. What is to prevent the explosion?"

This leads the author to take up the subject of the Indian army his comments upon which he prefaces with the significant and pregnant words: "*British rule over India depends more and more upon the older generations of Indians.*"

He then observes that England will be able to retain India only by means of armies of Indians. But Lord Morley has himself given us to understand that the Sikh regiments would have mutinied during the Bengal disturbances, had not a certain leader been arrested and sent away... The Indian army consists of 325,000 men, among them 75,000 Englishmen—and these are to keep a people of 300,000,000 in bounds!... What if this quarter million should not be loyal? The writer then quotes various opinions from Indian newspapers which were even at that time crying out against the British yoke and declaring that the Indian people would swim through a sea of blood in order to attain their goal.

Perhaps the most damning charge which could be preferred against the ruthlessness, the lack of conscience and the shortsightedness of the English, is contained in the conclusion of the article in question:

"It is a fact that the superiority of the whites has to a large extent ceased to exist for the Indians. The victories of the Japanese over a white power have stirred the Indians to the very depths of their being."

Such is the grim and uncoloured truth concerning conditions in India as revealed by an English writer familiar with the land and the people, a writer who at that time was entirely uninfluenced by the mental and publicistic strictures of the war. It is not likely that England instituted any great reforms in the interval between March 1914 and August 1914. And it is still less likely that popular sentiment in India has been improved during the war. The policy of hush and suppression, of false and misleading statement and of propagandistic prevarication which was pursued in relation to India (as well as Ireland) during the war, will one day be exposed in full measure. The world will then at last learn the truth—the truth which English fear and English guilt sought to strangle or to seal up hermetically through the operation of the gigantic apparatus which England has created for this purpose.

II.

THE "PAX BRITANNICA" A MERE FICTION.

It is the task and the duty of every enlightened colonial power to develop its colonial peoples according to the best educational and economic principles and to lead them upwards and onwards along the path of progress. This duty has not been fulfilled by England towards India. What excuse is there left for England?

The English and for that matter certain foreign defenders of the British system who are ignorant of the true conditions in India, make this reply: "The *Pax Britannica!*" England,

they aver, has brought peace to India. Before British rule was introduced war raged in India; the Empire of the Moghuls had collapsed—one prince fought against the other—and the religious differences between Hindoos, Mohammedans, Sikhs, and other religious communities led to constant battles in which much blood was shed. Since the year 1858, however, peace prevails throughout the land, with the exception of little wars (the Burmese War, the Revolt of the Afridis, etc.) and all men may go unmolested about their business.

Such in the main are the arguments advanced by those who endeavour to justify Britain's dominion over India. This attempt at justification is, however, no longer valid. Nor is it our purpose in this place to investigate whether the wars which were waged in India during the last three centuries, have taken a *greater* toll of human lives than the last fifty years of famine and plague under British rule. We shall merely ask this simple question: can peace ever justify the ruination of an entire land and people? Such a question can only be answered with an emphatic and unqualified No! That peace which the rule of the British has imposed upon India is comparable only to the peace of a graveyard. Death, not Life reigns within and above its graves. "They made a desolation and called it peace."

This comparison is not a new one—it has been made again and again by the critics and the censors of British rule. And yet it is a comparison that is lame, for were one to carry it to its logical conclusion one would be forced to say that India is a graveyard whose quiet is perpetually broken by sinister elements who plunder the graves. *For it is not true that peace and quiet reign in India; in India, on the contrary, there reign discord and unrest.*

And this discord, this unrest are not to be ascribed to the character and the temperament of the Indian people, but wholly and solely to the account of the English masters. They are entirely the inevitable result of the unendurable economic and moral pressure inflicted by British tyranny upon this people, a people which is by nature one of the most patient and docile in the world. All India is in a state of fermentation, a condition of things which, ever since the partition of the province of Bengal in 1905, has begun to assume a menacing character for the continuance of British rule. The signs of inner unrest have increased from year to year since this time and no measures of the government have been able to avert the evil. The discontent of the people has steadily grown greater, more general; the safeguards of public security have broken down more and more. The more rigorous the laws by means of which England sought to ban the threatening spectre, the more audaciously the forces hostile to England raised their heads throughout the land, the greater the numbers of those who became affected by unrest, the more discontent spread over the country and the greater became the growth of lawlessness and crime.

Such was the condition of India before the outbreak of the world war, and it is this condition which has been so admirably portrayed by Mr. Shaw Desmond in *The London Magazine* of March, 1914, from which we have already quoted in the foregoing pages.

This state of unrest and disorder has grown so much worse in India during the war, that one might well say that there is scarcely a region in India which is free from uproars and disorder. The whole vast empire is filled with the noise of anarchy, and merely the circumstance that the Indians are deprived of all kinds of weapons has averted

the shedding of streams of blood. There can be no doubt that if only one adult Indian in every hundred possessed a modern fire-arm, not an Englishman would be left alive in India to-day.

He who knows the people of India, their patience under affliction, their marvellous self-command grown to be second nature through the discipline of three thousand years, cannot be sufficiently astonished at the thousandfold evidences of discontent which the war and the consequent hopes of shattering the British fetters have aroused through the length and the breadth of the land. Day after day the papers are full of reports of riots, conspiracies, trials for high treason, mutinies, the murder of officials, plunderings, secret stores of arms, assaults by day and by night in the country as well as in the crowded cities, and many similar phenomena. Every day brings some new report. And these reports come from all parts of the country.

Such to-day is the condition of India. It attests with an infallible and deadly logic the moral bankruptcy of British rule. It proves that the 300 millions of Indians are a people plunged into abject misery, since they are a people who have been robbed of their right of determining their own destinies. It proves that these people are actuated by the undeviating will to be rid of British bondage for good.

The apologists of British oppression, it is true, point to the many evidences of loyalty, to the contributions of money and gifts made by the Indian princes, to the expressions of sympathy of certain classes of the population, especially the rich Mohammedans, to the pro-English and anti-German articles of various Indian newspapers, to the patriotic speeches of Indian officials and the like.

But all such expressions of loyalty prove nothing, for all these circles are either dependant upon the British

usurper or affiliated with British capital. The true feeling of the people is shown in the resolutions passed by the two largest, most influential societies, both recognized as exponents of Indian nationality—The Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League. The first of these two organisations has existed for over 33 years, the second for some 12 years. The best men of the entire nation are united in these two societies; thousands appear yearly at the great congresses and what they demand from the British government is what the people of all India demand:

Self-government for India! India for the Indians!

THE FIASCO OF THE LAST VICEROY.

Reviewing the five years' reign of Lord Hardinge, the well-known loyalist paper, *Amerika Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta, wrote, as quoted in the *New York Times* of July 8, 1916:

"When Lord Minto left these shores he, too, was lauded up to the skies by a few flunkies. In his farewell speech at the Council he (Lord Hardinge) did not conceal his contempt for those who have raised the cry of "Home Rule for India!" within a reasonable period. Have not new fetters been forged during the viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge? What about the Conspiracy Act and the Public Safety Act, which have spread alarm and consternation throughout the length and breadth of the country? What about the police and C. J. D. rule, which sits like a dread nightmare on the breasts of the people? What ghastly work has the Press Act done during the Government of Lord Hardinge? What about the oppression of the *Comrade* and *Zemindar* newspapers and the internment of their worthy editors? What about the arrest of men and their conviction without a regular trial? Was the liberty of a subject ever placed under a greater danger than it has been during the administration of the present Viceroy (Hardinge)?"

Thus writes one of the foremost and recognised Hindu leaders whom Hardinge says he has taken into confidence.

Lord Hardinge lets the cat out of the bag himself when he says: "Since the outbreak of the war all political controversies concerning India have been suspended by the educated and political classes, with the object

of not increasing the difficulties of the Government's task." This is a diplomatic way of saying that the Government has compelled the "educated and political classes" to suspend all "controversies" in order to save themselves from any "difficulties." The educated classes, thus gagged, turned to secret propaganda and conspiracy, as evidenced by the formidable Benares conspiracy trial, in which the conspirators were all highly educated men, college professors, school teachers, etc., who had seen the "hopelessness of accomplishing anything by constitutional methods."

Among all the viceroys which have been imposed upon India, Lord Hardinge, because of his high sense of honour and his personal humanity, may be said to have been the most popular, so far as one may speak of popularity in connection with any British viceroy.

ACTS OF VIOLENCE, CONSPIRACIES, RIOTS, MUTINIES AS DAILY OCCURENCES.

Of the thousands of newspaper accounts which have reached Europe during the war belatedly and in spite of the postal blockade, it is possible to give only a few specimens in this place. We call express attention to the fact that everything which was published in India during the war was subjected to the most rigorous British censorship, and that the world has consequently heard only an *infinitesimal fraction* of the things that really happened in India. It was in consonance with the policy of British oppression to keep up the illusion of a quiet and loyal India, and hence the truth was suppressed according to Britain's immemorial method. The full truth must, however, sooner or later become known.

One single newspaper, *The Bengalee*, publishes the following items in the interval from the 2nd to the 12th of February, 1916. They deal chiefly with "dacoities"—that is political acts of violence, frequently robberies with no other purpose

than to obtain money for carrying on the anti-British propaganda:

BALLARSHAH: Whilst dacoities were formerly unknown here, they have now increased in an epidemic manner in the lower castes of the Mohammedans.

ASANSOL: The police station at Gorindapur was the scene of a riot in which members of the better classes took part. Severe injuries resulted among both parties of belligerents.

MOHONPUR: As a result of the recent riot 13 persons were arrested, whose complicity in guilt is to be determined in the course of a seven days' session. The evidence of numerous witnesses brought about an acquittal against which the judge protested and bound over 8 of the accused to the court at Calcutta.

WADARI: The crimes which are systematically carried out here brought a gang of 12 dacoits into the defendant's box. Their machinations were found to be connected with a political conspiracy originating in Bombay which dictates that the *Swaraj* or self-government movement be furthered by dacoities. The proceedings have already taken 28 days.

MUMENSING: Among those accused of murder in Bazipur is the son of the Chairman of the Municipality, Syama Charan Roy, a well-known attorney and Secretary of the Ananda Mahan College. Another son has already been sentenced to 10 years' banishment in the Barisal Conspiracy case. Further sensational arrests are to be expected.

BARRACKPUR: Burglaries, robberies and dacoities were the order of the day here—the police investigations resulted in nothing. An organisation has now been uncovered which has been carrying on its activities for almost two years and which is under the leadership of the overseer of a jute factory, Dharamdas by name. The political crimes in Sukchar, Bandipur, Panihati, Belghoria, Agarpura, Khardah, Titagarh, Nilganj, Naihathi, Nawabganj and other places are to be attributed to the agitation of this society. Numerous arrests have been made, and others are impending. Important revelations are expected.

CALCUTTA: The three local newspapers, *Iddam*, *Risalat* and *Tarjumen* were forbidden to be circulated in the provinces.

“The police of Faridpur received information that certain persons were suspected to be in possession of weapons and ammunition without a license. Three houses were searched in which guns, revolvers and ammunition as well as percussion caps were found. The occupants of these houses have been arrested.”

"Sham Suhozza Khan, a sub-inspector of the Khargur Police, was shot yesterday afternoon with a pistol by Tillak Dhari Ram. The murderer immediately committed suicide."

"Four political prisoners broke out of Brahmanbaria Gaol last night, and escaped. They removed the iron bars of the window, let themselves down by means of a rope and then climbed over the high prison wall."

"A young Bengali student by name of Jugal Kissore Dutt, was arrested during a raid upon a house in Dompara Lane, during which several anarchists attacked the police with arms and fired upon them."

"The Calcutta police searched a house in Dompara Lane in which apparently anarchists politically suspect who had rented the house for their secret meetings, were concealed. When these men saw the police—led by their European officers—advance, they fired upon them with pistols and a fight took place. A number of the anarchists escaped; some of them were captured. The trials are under way; new revelations are awaited."

"The Englishman," September 1, 1916.

On a single day, that is, the 11th of August, 1916, *The Statesman* published the following items:

"A serious dacoity is reported to have been committed recently in the residence of Nilmadhav Chatterji, a landowner of Hatanagar village, in the Burdwan district. The gang, composed of some twenty up-countrymen, ransacked the house with the aid of torches and tortured the inmates before getting away with Rs. 4,000 in cash and G. C. notes and jewellery valued at Rs. 2,000."

"Twenty-three young Bengalis of Sibpur (here follow the names) who were arrested (under the Defence Act) about a fortnight ago in connection with the recent dacoities at Howrah, were on Monday placed before Mr. Hopkyns, District Magistrate of Howrah."

"According to an Indian contemporary, several orthodox pundits from Delhi have been delivering lectures on loyalty at various famous Hindoo shrines. . . . The Pundits are unquestionably on the right tack, and by taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by these religious gatherings they are probably adopting the most effective method of counteracting the *propaganda of terrorism and sedition, etc.*"

"Receiving information to the effect that a dacoity was to be attempted at Sodepur railway station, a strong force of Bengal and Calcutta C. I. D. officers was sent to Sodepur on Tuesday evening. At 9.30 p. m. a number of up-countrymen alighted from a train and were at once surrounded. As the men were unable to give a satisfactory account of themselves the

police endeavoured to take the whole party into custody. A free fight ensued and, while some of the suspects managed to escape, eight were arrested and taken to the lock-up. An inquiry is being held."

"As the result of the inquiry into the circumstances attending the cases of heat-stroke which occurred on the troop train carrying the newly-arrived drafts from Karachi to the Punjab,—the following officers have been removed from their appointments:—Major-General Shaw, Commanding the Karachi Brigade; Brigadier-General Roe, Deputy Quartermaster-General, Army Headquarters; Lieut.-General Macnamara, Assistant Director, Medical Services, Karachi Brigade.

(Editorial comment: The Indian government has at last taken steps to punish the responsible blunderers. A Simla telegram reports the dismissal of the men responsible for the unfortunate railway transport of June 5, in which 136 men died of heat-stroke on the journey from Karachi. The public became acquainted with this terrible catastrophe only on June 21, a fortnight later! The censor did his best to suppress everything, thereby arousing all the more suspicion among the populace.)"

Another newspaper, *The Englishman*, reports on the *same* day, the 11th of August, 1916:

"On receipt of information to the effect that an unlicensed gun, ammunition, etc., were in possession of one Chandi Charan Bowali of village Belegam, near Rajore, Babu Probodh Chandra Mazumdar, Sub-Inspector, applied for search warrant to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Madaripur, and on the April 28th last Chandu Charan's house which is a *pucca* building, rather an unusual thing among people of his caste, was searched by the police, headed by the Sub-Inspector.

"As a result of the search, an unlicensed single-barrelled gun, a quantity of gunpowder, several percussion caps and some shot were found inside a small dark room under the staircase leading up to the roof of the building.

"Chandi Charan Bowali, together with his brothers Sudhanya and Chaitanya, all three being the managing members of the joint family, were placed on their trial before a Deputy Magistrate at Madaripur who, in committing the accused to the Sessions Court, made the following remarks in the commitment order:—"The offence is highly penal and considering the present disturbed condition of the Sub-Division and the proximity of the place of occurrence to the village Khalia, a reputed centre of the anarchist movement—the offence requires the maximum sentence of imprisonment provided by law'."

"Kali Prosonno and Devi Prosonno, two brothers, inmates of a house in Upper Chitpore Road, were arrested early on Tuesday morning by

some members of the Criminal Investigation Department—assisted by some officers and men of the Calcutta Police. Their house was searched, and, it is said, the arrests of these two brothers were in consequence of the seizure of some documents which incriminated them in connection with the murder of Superintendent Chatterjee, though no definite charge was given out either to the persons arrested and their relatives and friends or the representatives of the press.”

“Yesterday some officers of the Special Branch of the Calcutta C. I. D. searched the residence of a Bengali medical student situated in a lane off Ahiritola Street. The raid ended in the seizure of a human skull, some false beards, moustaches, wigs, and a quantity of goods suspected to have been stolen from a European firm. The suspect wanted was not at the house at the time.”

“One Birendra Chandra Pal, son of a well-known jute merchant at Mymensingh, has been ordered to be interned at Harirampur in Dacca.”

“On Monday, Mr. Chotzner, I. C. S., presiding over the Howrah Criminal Sessions, took up the hearing of the case in which one Sheik Khalif was charged with murdering head-constable Sew Mangal in Khettra Lane, Golabari, Howrah.”

“A pamphlet entitled ‘Why India is in Revolt Against British Rule’, is proscribed under the Sea Customs Act.”

“The Governor-General has refused to consider the petitions for pardoning the conspirators who had been condemned to lifelong banishment in the Lahore trials.”

Further significant extracts from Anglo-Indian papers are quoted below—all of them of recent date:

“Replying to Mr. S. K. Sahay at the meeting of the Bihar and Orissa Council on November 29th, the Hon. Mr. McPherson said that, according to available information, 124 villages were looted in Shahabad, 28 in Gaya and one in Patna. The first information reports indicate that property of the alleged value of seven lakhs in Shahabad and one lakh in Gaya were carried away by the rioters. Forty-one persons are known to have been killed and 176 injured in the course of the disturbances, but it is probable that these figures are incomplete.

“Proceedings have been instituted against 1,800 persons in Shahabad, 400 in Gaya and 38 in Patna, and a large number of accused are still absconding. Government were unable, he said, to supply in greater detail the information desired by Mr. Sahay partly because it was not expedient

to do so while the cases were under trial and partly because the police investigations were not yet completed.

"To another question on the same subject by Mr. Ahmad Husain, the Chief Secretary replied that the Criminal Investigation Department was not yet aware of any organisation of rioters before the outbreak of the disturbances and that to prevent similar disturbances in the areas which were affected a force of additional police would be stationed in them."

"The Civil and Military Gazette," December 15, 1917.

Be it observed that this official statement was issued 11 months after the outbreak of the disturbances.

Further light is thrown upon these riots by the official answer made in Parliament by Mr. Fisher to a question put by Sir J. D. Rees (Nottingham): It is interesting in view of the policy of palliation and suppression by silence pursued by the home government:

"The disturbances in Behar were of a local character, being confined to parts of the Shahabad district, and of the neighbouring districts of Patna and Gaya, and arose out of disagreements between Hindoos and Mohammedans about the celebration by the latter of the Bakr-Id festival. At this festival it was customary to sacrifice kine and other animals. Riots occurred in several villages, in the course of which there was some destruction and pillaging of property and loss of life and conflicts with the civil police. To restore normal conditions it was found necessary to patrol the disturbed area by a considerable force of Military Police and regular troops. The Viceroy reported on October 20 that since the 14th of that month no disturbances had taken place, and that the troops were being gradually withdrawn."

"The Times," December 6, 1917.

But even the *Times* must finally concede the truth. A month later, on the 29th of January, 1918, it publishes a report of the proceedings of the court at Shahabad, during which the Government Commissioner declared:

"The disturbances were altogether beyond the resources of the police, military and district, to cope with. There was an absolute defiance of law and order and of the ordinary decencies of life in a civilized community. Those of the accused who belonged to the more powerful and

better educated classes were clearly far more guilty than their dupes. Except for the former it would have been impossible for many thousands from all the surrounding country to have assembled at one time and place in the way they did."

Here an English court confesses to the damning fact that the British Government for more than eight months was absolutely powerless to prevent this daily defiance of law, order and the decencies of civilization. What, under conditions such as these, remains of the much-vaunted "*pax Britannica?*" And even if it were true that the religious animosities between Hindoos and Mohammedans were the cause of these disturbances, upon whom must the blame fall for not clearly limiting the rights of these two religious communities in relation to each other? If the higher castes were responsible for inciting the marauders, who is responsible for the fact that the higher castes could sink so low?

In spite of the fact that these revelations concerning social conditions in India were profoundly disgraceful to England, the proceedings in connection with the Behar disturbances were most exhaustively presented in the Anglo-Indian press and discussed in the most minute detail during a whole year. For what purpose? Clearly for the purpose of inciting all the Mohammedans in the country against the Hindoos and to drive a wedge into the political unification of these two groups of the population. *Divide et impera!* It may even be assumed that it was precisely for such ends that the government tolerated the disturbances for over 8 months. For can it be possible that mighty Britain does not possess sufficient power and authority to enable it to get the upper hand of a few isolated crowds of unarmed Indians? Whatever interpretation be placed upon the matter, the fact remains that the Behar disturbances of 1917 constitute an indelible blot of shame upon the

escutcheon of England. The fact remains that these things prove that British rule over India is immoral through and through, and that the "*pax Britannica*" is but a cant phrase to conceal an inconceivable oppression and a gigantic fraud.

Let us proceed to throw a little more light upon the real inner aspect of India—allegedly so happy, contented, prosperous and quiet under the English heel:

"Some 90 additional witnesses have been heard in the Lahore Conspiracy case and furnished unanimous evidence respecting the revolutionary activity of the "Gadhr Society" in Vancouver. The most important testimony was furnished by an employé in the British Consular Service in Manila, by name of Permanand Charma. He gave evidence to the effect that a branch of the Gadhr Party had been established at Manila and that this consisted of men from the Punjab whose headquarters were in San Francisco. This branch of the Gadhr Party likewise carried on a most extensive revolutionary propaganda in the Philippines and distributed leaflets of a seditious nature against the British government. It preached insurrection, conspiracy and murder. The accused, Hafiz Abdulah, was its leader in Manila. This Manila Party was desirous of transferring its headquarters to Bangkok in order to foment insurrection and revolution in India from there, and so various envoys were sent thither as well as to Burmah, from which places they worked for sedition in India."

*From "The Statesman," Dec. 1, 1915.
(re-translated).*

CALCUTTA: "The police yesterday searched 62 houses in Dacca (Eastern Bengal) and arrested 75 suspected persons, the majority of them students, but also a number of school-teachers, attorneys and clergymen."

*From "The Morning Post," September 17, 1916.
(re-translated).*

The social position of these patriotic-minded Indians is also very significant in estimating the value to be placed upon the revolutionary movement in India. For example, among the citizens recently arrested at Dacca, Naraingunge, and Chitagong, the following names were given, as well as some of the professions represented,—according to *The Englishman* of September 22, 1916: Kanailal Ganguli, son

of the Post Director of Dacca; Aswini Kumar De, owner of the *Sakka* press; Panchanon Chakraverty, a teacher; Surenara Kumar Das, student of the Jagganath High School; Srish Chandra Bose, Mukhtear; Nripendra Nath Gosh, student of medicine; Pirindra Chandra Chakrawarty, student, son of an attorney;—followed by a long list of the names of students who belong to the better classes.

It is typical of the British policy and system of defamation of political enemies, that these cultured and public-spirited men whose only crime is their desire to see India free and governed by its own people, should invariably be referred to in the Anglo-Indian press as “anarchists!”

KARACHI: “The Government of Bombay have sanctioned the deportation of a large number of Hurs, a criminal tribe, from Sind to Ahmednagar, where they will not be interned but kept under supervision and allowed to follow useful occupations.”

“The Civil and Military Gazette,” December 14, 1915.

“Criminal” or “Robber Tribes” of this sort are very numerous throughout the land and they carried on their operations before as well as during the war. In districts in which their depredations are especially to be feared, it is the custom even for Europeans to engage a member of one of these robber castes to act as night watchman for a small monthly wage. The European can then rest assured that his property will be spared by the robbers. Such conditions remind one of Southern Italy and Sicily. *The British government has never earnestly attempted to do away with these conditions.* That it is capable of doing away with them is proved by the successful suppression of the murderous sect of the Thugs during the first half of the 19th century. This, to be sure, called for a great expenditure of money. A great deal of attention was also aroused by the suppression of the Maravar revolt. The robber castes,

notwithstanding, remained unmolested in so far as they merely robbed native houses or the goods of native travellers and merchants. *But whenever they attacked the person or the property of Englishmen, the British police system was put into most rigorous operation in order to apprehend the criminals.* The robbers were aware of this and refrained from molesting the English, since then the English police would not molest them. Such were the conditions *before* the war. Since then they appear to have become immeasurably worse.

London papers of July 25, 1916, report the following — received by indirect wire:

“Details regarding the mutinies and disturbances which recently broke out in India have now become known in London. On June 15th, mutinous Sepoys blew up a railway bridge between Karachi and Lahore, whereby a train consisting of a military transport, met with disaster. Over 100 people were killed in this and a large number wounded, among them 13 European officers. The railway traffic between Karachi and Pandshaw was suspended.

“The cause of this Sepoy Mutiny is to be sought for in the large parades which were to take place in memory of Lord Kitchener. Several Sepoy regiments had refused obedience when called upon to march in this parade. The disciplinary measures adopted in consequence of this insubordination led to the outbreak of the revolt. For months no Indian troops have been sent to Europe. Only a few reserve detachments were sent to regiments lying in Egypt and Saloniki. Individual Indian regiments in which the spirit of revolt was particularly strong, were transferred to Australia. Some 5,000 Indian troops have arrived at Melbourne.

“The *Japanese officers* who entered the Anglo-Indian service are hated by the Indian troops for religious reasons and have repeatedly been the cause of insubordination and flagrant violations of discipline. General Oka of the Japanese army, who arrived at Bombay some time ago, was to solve the question of bringing about a better relation between the Japanese, the European and the Indian troops. But this mission was also a failure. Oka died suddenly after his return to Tokio on July 2. It is rumored in India that he was murdered.”

“Two policemen by name of Surendra Bhusan and Rohini Muckerjee whose duty it was to guard the political suspects among the anarchists

at Dacca, were shot in the city by Bengalis. The crime took place in the evening about 7 o'clock whilst there was much traffic upon the street."

*From "The Englishman" of July 30, 1916.
(re-translated).*

"The shocking murder of Mr. B. K. Chatterjee, the Bengali detective officer, has inevitably been the subject of wide discussion in India, and public opinion does not appear to have been greatly impressed by the statement on the subject made by Lord Carmichael to his Council. His account of what has been done by way of internment is set against the admission that the anarchist organisation is still in existence, and little consolation is drawn from the plea that the state of Bengal might have been worse, or from the hope that it may be better in the future.

"The views of the Press may, perhaps, be summed up in the bitter gibe that in Bengal it is safer to be an anarchist than a policeman. We need not reproduce in detail the criticisms directed against the administration of Bengal. The Government is blamed for failing to protect its officers, but concrete measures of protection are not put forward. In other parts of India they sometimes catch murderers, and even hang them, but apparently Calcutta has given up hoping for any such result in the case of a police-murder, and to our mind that is the worst feature of the whole deplorable business."

"The Indian," August 11, 1916.

"In the Mandalay Conspiracy case judgment was delivered this morning by Justice Robinson, President of the Special Tribunal, in the case of the remaining thirteen accused, whose trial started on 6th March last.

"Twelve accused, namely Harnamsingh, Chetram, Jewansingh, Challiaram, Basawasingh, Kapursingh, Hardilhsingh, Narayansingh, Narinjansingh, Pallasingh, Kirpa Ram and Budha Singh were found guilty both of conspiracy and abetment. Seven of them, namely, Harnamsingh, Challiaram, Basawasingh, Narayansingh, Narinjansingh, Pallasingh and Kirpa Ram were sentenced to death, Challiaram with a recommendation to mercy. The other five were sentenced to transportation for life.

"The remaining accused, Gran Chand, was convicted only of conspiracy and sentenced to seven years' transportation, with a recommendation to mercy. The forfeiture of property was pronounced in the case of the first twelve."

"The Statesman," July 28, 1916.

"Crime in Burma. The Police Report of the Province of Burma shows an increase in crime of fully 10% for the year 1915—16. The reasons for this are said to be: poverty in consequence of the stoppage

of trade through the war and the poor markets, the sending of the best policemen to the front and the inadequate pay, of the minor police officials."

*From the "Times of India," Bombay.
(re-translated).*

SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

"At a session of the Acting Corporations of Bengal the Governor made a speech of over an hour, in which he justified the government measures taken against the revolutionary movement in Bengal. The public thereby for the first time obtained information of this very extensive movement and of the counter-measures taken by England. According to the Governor an enormous number of *school-teachers, professors, priests and journalists are suspect and for the greater part in custody*. The rooms of the clubs, associations, hotels, etc., were furnished as meeting-places of the movement. *About a thousand accused have in part confessed their guilt and in part they have been committed on clear evidence*. The police have confiscated large stores of arms and munitions in more than sixty places."

"The Times," (date uncertain).

THE OVER-CROWDING OF JAILS.

"The Government of Bengal resolution on Jail Administration in Bengal for the last year says that there was a marked increase in the number of prisoners in all jails, the number of inmates being 81,801 as compared with 69,204 in 1914, and an average daily population of 14,473 against 12,469 in the previous year. Nearly all the jails were in consequence seriously over-crowded at various times. Arrangements have been made for the erection of temporary wards in some of the jails. The increase in jail population is probably due, at any rate in part, to special causes which will cease to operate when normal conditions are restored.

"The over-crowding of jails considerably increased the labour and responsibilities of the jail staff in maintaining discipline. A serious outbreak occurred in the Patuakhali Sub-jail in June, when 42 undertrial prisoners overpowered the jail staff and forced their way out. All except two were recaptured.

"The daily average number of prisoners in hospitals was 765 as compared with 582 in the previous year. There was a serious outbreak of dysentery at Midnapore and Dinajpur. The difficulty of coping with outbreaks of disease both at Midnapore and at Dinajpur seems to have been aggravated by the inexperience of the jail staff, and the absence of

experienced jail superintendents, who have been temporarily recalled to military duty, has been much felt in this and in other respects."

"The Civil and Military Gazette," June 9, 1916.

"The Indian Law provides that in certain cases crimes are punished by immediate banishment, yet of 355 persons who were sentenced in the Punjab during 1915 to punishment by banishment, only 138 were actually transported. There are no less than 1,220 criminals who have been sentenced to banishment on hand—for the present these are still sitting in the over-crowded prisons of the Punjab."

*From "The Englishman," July 28, 1916.
(re-translated).*

"The Annual Report of the Jail Administration in the Punjab shows that in consequence of the revolutionary movement the deliveries in the Punjab jails have been increased by over 10,000 persons during the past year. Owing to the reception of over 50,000 prisoners by the jails and a daily population of over 17,000 it is not surprising that the service has lost in efficiency, since the best and most experienced wardens and superintendents have been called up for military service. Among the prisoners there are great numbers of the most dangerous and daring criminals who stand in closest touch with conspirators and the revolutionary movement and who cannot be too sharply watched. The question of accommodation in the jails is growing steadily more serious. The jails in the Punjab can accommodate 14,729 prisoners, but last year there was an average of 2,000 more to house."

*From "The Times of India," July 29, 1916.
(re-translated).*

Let these few casual newspaper cuttings suffice. They reveal the true conditions which exist in India under British rule and they prove conclusively and irrefutably that the boasted "*pax Britannica*" which is so frequently dragged forth to justify and extenuate British slavery in that land, is little more than an empty fiction.

Though loath to coin a cant phrase such as is used by the British in advertisement of their system of exploitation in India, it will not prove inapropos nor uninteresting here to refer to what might, with far more justification than

British rule in India, be called the "*pax Germanica*" in East Africa. And, strangely enough it is of the Indian subjects of Germany that our witness speaks here. And the witness himself is an Indian prince who stands in high repute with the English government, the Aga Khan, spiritual head of the Hindoo-Mohammedan Kojia communities. In 1899 the Aga Khan made a journey from Bombay to German East Africa in order to visit his Indian co-religionists who lived under German rule. His impressions he recorded in a letter to the *Times of India*, published in the issue of November 25, 1899:

..... "I had rare and exceptional opportunities of studying the Indian question on the spot, both the officials and all classes of Indian compatriots speaking freely to me on the subject. When in India I had heard many stories about the severity of German rule, and while staying at Zanzibar (before visiting the German Coast) I continued to hear the same tales, and naturally went to German East Africa thoroughly prejudiced against German colonial administration. After studying the whole question, I am convinced of the justice of the German rule, and that the present officials are influenced by high moral ideals in their administration.....

"The Indians do not understand the difference between rates and taxes. For the taxes in German East Africa they get absolute security of life and property, an expeditious system of justice, excellent roads and water, and all the other benefits of a civilised Government. In ten years the Germans have transformed Dar-es-Salam from a dirty African village into a splendid modern civilised town, and have laid the foundations of a great city for the future. Even small provincial places are beautifully clean, well-lighted, with very wide streets, and are splendidly policed. The average Indian does not understand that he must pay in order to enjoy these benefits. He does not comprehend that police charges are an insurance against theft, brigandage and murder. He expects his European rulers to give him all this without taxation—the old story of making omelets without breaking eggs.....

"I do not know how things were managed in Major von Wissmann's time. I certainly know, however, how things are managed under the able direction of that most popular Governor-General, Liebert. I know, also, that the present Governor and all the official hierarchy are anxious to have as many Indians as possible, and to make things as comfortable and

agreeable as is consistent with the principles of German Colonial administration. The German Government over and over again tried to find out what could reasonably be done to satisfy the Indians. In my humble opinion it would be a good thing if the Indians who desire to live in German East Africa would learn the German language, adapt themselves to Continental social ideas, and be more courteous in their manner with the rulers.

"I cannot adequately praise the splendid public works, the beautiful free hospitals, the excellent and numerous Police force that the Germans have introduced in the short period of their rule. Good schools are distributed in many parts of the country. The flora and fauna of the country have been thoroughly classified, while the great agricultural and mineral possibilities of the country are good hope for the future. The extreme justice, liberality, and wide views of the present German officials, from Governor-General Liebert downwards, leave nothing to be desired, and if the Indians in German East Africa are not satisfied, it is most certainly no fault of the German Government."

THE RISING IN CEYLON IN 1915.

We append a report from Ceylon which furnishes proof that this colony, which has long been directly subject to the British crown, is governed with the same brutal injustice as is neighbouring India:

"The revolt broke out on May 29 in Kandy and several of the surrounding villages as a result of religious quarrels between Buddhistic Sinhalese and Mohammedans. A commercial motive was mixed up with the religious one; the trade in the higher-lying districts of the land is chiefly in the hands of Mohammedans who come from Southern India and return thither. They are usually regarded with ill-favour by the inhabitants as strangers who enrich themselves at their cost and who exploit needy creditors. The hostile feeling between the two religions was prepared by sharp attacks in native papers;—certain proceedings in local Temperance Societies whose activities no longer serve their original purposes, operated in the same direction.

"*There was not the slightest trace of German incitement of these disturbances, nor were the attacks directed against the government or the Europeans, even though on certain occasions European property may have suffered during the efforts of the police or the government troops to restore peace. In certain cases the Sinhalese made use of the war feeling in order to spread*

the rumour that all Mohammedans were to be expelled from Ceylon as enemies of the government, an idea which the government, of course, emphatically contradicted.

"The Governor. Sir Robert Chalmers, at first hoped to be able to suppress the rising by police measures, but after the disturbances spread from the hills to the plains and the rising began to assume the ugly character of a general pillage, he felt obliged to place the provinces in question under martial law on June 2 and on the days following. Martial law was not suspended until the 30th of August. *Some 412 persons were tried in special military courts—of these persons 83 were sentenced to death and 34 actually executed; 44 of the accused were acquitted; the others condemned to long terms of imprisonment.* During the disturbances 63 persons were killed by the military and the police; 39 by the rebels. The damage done, for which the sufferers are to be recompensed, amounts to 368,516 pounds. The Colonial Minister has voiced his appreciation to Governor Chalmers. The Governor has however given up his post and taken over the office of a Secretary of the Treasury."

*From "The Indiaman," Feb. 11, 1916.
(re-translated).*

The following moving appeal of the Sinhalese delegates which appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* of August 28, 1917, is not only a human document of great significance in the annals of colonial history, but also a terrible indictment of the inexorable ruthlessness that characterizes British justice whenever it is given the opportunity of wreaking vengeance upon the unwilling victims of its imperialistic policy.

"For two years the people of Ceylon have been appealing to the Imperial Government. They have asked for nothing extraordinary—their prayer has been simply a prayer for *justice*. And they appealed confidently, for they have been taught that the Empire spells justice for subject-peoples. Yet this prayer has been refused—not once, but repeatedly. A small people with a great past has been vitally wronged, and the Imperial Government refuses to right the wrong. In these circumstances we—who are commissioned to speak for our fellow-countrymen—have no alternative but to carry the appeal from the Colonial Office to the masters of the Colonial Office—to the people of Britain. The facts are well established and can be summarised in a few paragraphs:—

In 1915 there were religious riots in Ceylon. Had the disturbances been dealt with in the ordinary way *at once* they would have been suppressed quite easily and nothing more would have been heard of them. The authorities, however, were lax, and they suffered the riots to become considerable. Then martial law was proclaimed, even in those parts of the island which had not been disturbed. Martial law became a reign of terror, and was continued for three months after the disorder.

(1) Days after the disturbances were over, Sinhalese men were shot in cold blood, without any sort of trial, and hundreds of others were flogged, also without trial.

(2) Civilian Sinhalese, tried by field general courts-martial, were sentenced to death and penal servitude for life on charges of "treason," although no seditious act was charged or proved, and no evidence was forthcoming of any organisation or previous preparation for the purposes of rioting.

(3) Prominent Sinhalese—mostly Buddhist temperance leaders,—whose houses had first been searched by soldiers and policemen without any incriminating evidence being discovered, were nevertheless arrested under *lettres de cachet* more than a fortnight after the restoration of order and kept in strict and solitary confinement in convict cells. They were not brought to trial, but after several weeks of imprisonment they were released, only, however, upon entering into bonds and depositing cash securities of large value.

(4) Sinhalese men were arrested and threatened and detained in custody without charge or trial in order to procure evidence in riot cases, while Sinhalese women of respectability were arrested and held as hostages until members of their families surrendered themselves to arrest.

(5) A number of Sinhalese skilled workmen were arrested and, although neither charged nor tried, were banished to a part of the island where it was practically impossible for them to find work. They suffered much, and their sufferings extended to their families.

(6) Heavy money payments were exacted from the Sinhalese under threats of arrest and prosecution.

(7) Forced contributions were levied indiscriminately from the Sinhalese in order to compensate the Mohammedans for damage done to their property during the riots.

Such are the facts. We bring them confidently before the supreme tribunal of British public opinion, and we ask for a thorough inquiry by an independent Commission.—Yours, &c.

EDWARD W. PERERA. D. B. JAYATILAKA.

Sinhalese Delegates.

Temple, London, August 22.

We will conclude these disquisitions upon the blessings of the "*pax Britannica*" with the words of that humanitarian American statesman, William Jennings Bryan upon "India and Colonialism" in his treatise "British Rule in India:"

"Let no one cite India as an argument in defence of colonialism. On the Ganges and the Indus the Briton, in spite of his many noble qualities and his large contributions to the world's advancement, has demonstrated, as many have before, man's inability to exercise with wisdom and justice, irresponsible power over helpless people. He has conferred some benefits upon India, but he has extorted a tremendous price for them.

"While he has boasted of bringing peace to the living he has led millions to the peace of the grave; while he has dwelt upon order established between warring troops, he has impoverished the country by legalized pillage. Pillage is a strong word, but no refinement of language can purge the present system of its iniquity."

CONCLUSION.

Our compilation of the opinions and the testimony of dispassionate and reputable witnesses relative to the treatment of native populations by the British, is herewith brought to an end. It is true that the casual critic might object that many of the most unforgivable abominations of the British policy of force and aggression are not mentioned in this work.

The appalling depopulation of Ireland—that unhappy European colony of England—by fire, sword and famine during seven centuries of horror, and the partial extermination of a gifted and loveable white race,—might well have been educed as a by no means negligible counterpart to the 65,000 Hereros for whom we are made responsible with such a show of virtuous wrath.

The Putumayo atrocities, one of the most terrible instances of the capitalistic extermination of a poor, defenceless people, which has ever blackened civilization, would more than outweigh whatever excesses may have been committed in the German Protectorates. The mere fact that after the frightful

disclosures which resulted from the investigations made by Sir Roger Casement, the British Government undertook no steps whatever to prevent these indescribable tortures of human beings being perpetrated in the interests of British finance, might furnish occasion for luminous comment upon the quality of British justice.

The offer made by the English to the Red Indians during the war of American Independence—five dollars for the bleeding scalp of every American settler, man or woman; the Massacre of Glencoe; the unspeakable infamies of the Opium War and the like, are phenomena of which only English history can boast.

We have held up a mirror in which England may behold her own visage, *and it is for the greater part an English mirror.* For it is to be accounted to the credit of this land that there have never been lacking honourable and courageous Englishmen to lift their voices in protest against the crimes of their government. Alas! that their championship of truth, justice and humanity has usually served only to make clearer but not to hinder these crimes! Innumerable are the free peoples who have sunk wailing under the cruel heel of the most gigantic oppressor the world has ever known. The myriad victims of the policy of greed and conquest inaugurated by Tudor England have been piled into towering mountains of the slain, the tortured, the starved and the plundered. Their blood has soaked the soil of every continent and stained the waters of every sea. Such is the record written in red of that nation which would now, before the tribunal of the world, stigmatize Germany's colonial policy as cruel, tyrannical and inefficient!

From a just and incorruptible tribunal the colonial policy of Germany has indeed little to fear—despite the slanders of its enemy, dictated by hatred and covetousness. Coming from such an accuser, every accusation is morally nullified in advance.

The world can but regard such presumption with amazement and scorn, and remark in irony: "Physician, heal thyself!"

We have striven to confine ourselves to the subject in hand, and have therefore made almost no reference to England's culminating crime of crimes—her relentless persecution and vituperation of a peace-loving, industrious and highly-cultivated European nation of 70 million souls. In comparison with the monstrous and incredible wrongs which she has perpetrated against this people, those she has committed upon her colonial populations may almost be said to fade into insignificance. And yet some reference to the World War is inevitable here. For in this war the dispassionate historian of the future will find repeated—*in an intensified form and upon an infinitely vaster scale, all the methods, the pretenses and above all the moral pretexts whereby England has always sought first to discredit and then to destroy her victims and her rivals, and to justify her crimes in the name of punishment.*

Blind and deaf to the demands of the newly-awakened conscience of a stricken world, to the ideals of a new era which *must* succeed the old, and to the only basis for a true community of nations, England still persists in adhering to the dark and bloody doctrines and traditions of the bankrupt past. Her clamorous prophets of progress, democracy and humanity now unmask themselves as men mad with the poison of conquest and despoilation and betray not only their professed ideals, but their own people and the peace of future generations.

These men have learned nothing from the unutterably tragic lessons of the World War. At this moment they are cold-bloodedly contemplating an act of historical infamy and ill-omen—the robbery of the German colonies, the property of the German People. These colonies, as the world knows, were acquired by peaceful means and built up by German

enterprise and industry under a colonial policy of the utmost liberality towards other nations and, after the initial errors of inexperience, of enlightened humanity towards the natives. The possession of colonies is for a great European nation such as Germany an indispensable factor of existence. True and far-sighted statesmanship must see that it is in the highest degree dangerous when a nation with a continuously increasing population has no outlet for the peaceful overflow of its surplus energies.

To deprive the German Republic of its modest colonial possessions would not only be an act of monumental injustice which history would forever condemn, but also an act of political folly. It would engender in the hearts of the German People ineradicable feelings of bitterness and revenge which would prove ruinous to the future welfare of all Europe. If the wisdom and foresight of her enlightened spirits and not the blind greed and hatred of her imperialists are to prevail in England, then such wise considerations must outweigh the slight material gain entailed by the annexation of the German colonies by powers already in possession of such vast colonial empires as England and France.

We are, we repeat, conscious of omissions in these pages. But he who is disposed to regret these must remember that this work was never intended as an *attack*, but merely as a *defence*. For what in truth could be more alien to the German character than the compilation of political propaganda based upon atrocities! It was purely the necessity of self-defence against a nation to which such scruples are unknown which forced us to furnish proof out of England's own mouth, that England's assertion that Germany is unworthy to possess colonies, is nothing but a lie.

We now leave it to the reader to judge whether we have or have not succeeded in establishing this proof.

WHERE IS THE FLAG OF ENGLAND?

Let the winds of the world make answer!
 North, south, east and west—
 Where'er there is wealth to covet
 Or land to be possessed;
 Where'er there are savage nations
 To coddle, coerce or scare,
 You may look for the vaunted emblem—
 The flag of England is there.

Ay, it waves o'er the blazing hovels
 Whence its African victims fly
 To be shot by explosive bullets,
 Or wretchedly starve and die;
 Or where the beachcomber harrows
 The isles of the southern sea,
 From the peak of his hellish vessel,
 The English flag flies free.

The Maori, full of hate, spurns it
 With his fleeting, dying breath,
 And the Arab hath hissed his curses
 As he spat at its folds in death.
 The hapless fellah hath feared it
 On 'Tel el Kebir's parched plain,
 And the blood of the Zulu hath stained it
 With a deep, indelible stain.

It has floated o'er scenes of pillage
 And flaunted o'er deeds of shame;
 It has waved o'er the fell marauder
 As he ravished with sword and flame;
 It has looked on ruthless slaughter
 And assassination, dire and grim,
 And has heard the shrieks of its victims
 Drown even the Jingo hymn.

Where is the flag of England?
 Seek the land where the natives rot
 And decay, and assured extinction
 Must soon be the peoples' lot.
 Go to the once fair island
 Where disease and death are rife,
 And the greed of colossal commerce
 Now fattens on human life.

Where is the flag of England?
 Go sail where rich galleons come
 With their shoddy and loaded cotton,
 And beer, and Bibles and rum.
 Seek the land where brute force has triumphed
 And hypocrisy hath its lair,
 And your question will thus be answered—
 For the flag of England is there.

HENRY LABOUCHÈRE, in *London Truth*,
 during the Boer War.