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OBSERVATIONS

SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF

THE OFFICERS OF THE LOCAL INDIAN ARMY

IN REPLY TO THE

SPEECH OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA,

On the 2nd May, 1865.

[THE Committee of Officers have reprinted from *The Times*' report (in Appendix) the Speech made by Sir Charles Wood in the House of Commons, on the 2nd May, 1865, in order that the various statements made by the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, and which are deemed incorrect, or calculated to convey an erroneous impression to Members of Parliament, may be contrasted in the form in which expressed, with the counter-statements contained in the following pages. The Committee would, however, mention, that so numerous and varied are Sir C. Wood's statements opposed to the information which the Committee believe to be in their possession, as to the misleading character of these statements, that they feel constrained to state that it would occupy a large printed volume to expose the fallacies, mistakes, or errors of the words used by Sir C. Wood.]

THE Secretary of State for India endeavours to throw discredit on the petitions presented to the House of Commons by Officers of the Indian Army, by quoting a single instance in which an Officer, whose name he declined to give, who though a petitioner, had, on talking over with him the recent changes, stated that the new arrangement had very much improved his position, and when he was called on to name the party who had made such a statement, so as to deny his right to have had any petition presented to the House, Sir C. Wood shrunk from giving up the name, and it can only be ascertained by the Select Committee, which Captain Jervis at once gave notice of his intention of moving for, and the intended motion has since been placed on the motion paper. Sir Charles Wood did not say that the Officer repudiated the particular grievance he complained of.

Admitting that Sir Charles Wood has, during the last four years, had the good luck to have found one Officer out of the large numbers who have actually memorialized, petitioned or complained against the injuries arising out of his acts, to call on him, and make such an avowal, is it fair to insinuate that the numerous petitions presented have been repudiated by the mass of Officers of the Local Army whose signatures they bear?

The Committee acting on behalf of the Officers of the Local Army utterly deny that they are aware of such cases. They utterly deny that any petitions which passed through their hands, more than 700 in this Session of Parliament are not *bonâ fide*. Most of them were accompanied by letters from the petitioners; including the 700 petitions already presented this Session, there appear, by the reports on the petitions, to have been in all 1251 presented since 1863.

An analysis of the Petitions, and Memorials already sent in, being herewith appended, will show that Officers of all Ranks, from the Lieutenant of not less than 7 years' service to the Major-General of years, have set forth the grievance either specifically, or generally which they complain of; it is unreasonable to allege, at this date; that such an accumulation of representations from Officers of all ranks, of all arms, and of various degrees of Service from the distant India, could have been made to the Parliament of England without solid cause, and still more unjust to throw out such an unfounded imputation, when the Secretary of State well knows, that, representations from the highest authorities in India, still unpublished, would prove most clearly that, besides the Officers interested, there are others, whose opinions are entitled to be heard, and who are not interested or personally affected, bold and decided, in denouncing the acts which have caused these complaints. A full and thorough investigation into the grounds of the complaints of the Officers of the Indian Army by an impartial Committee, has earnestly, though unsuccessfully, been prayed for, in order that the injuries alleged to have been inflicted, and the asserted facts, may be proved or gainsaid by oral evidence, and the whole truth about Indian Army mismanagement openly ascertained.

The Officers of the Indian Army have had unusual difficulties to overcome in stating their cases, mainly from having to petition individually; many petitions presented last year having been returned (some even this Session) owing to their not complying with the rules of the House of Commons, arising from ignorance of those in India with these rules; the Committee had a form drawn up for the guidance of those desiring to petition; their duty was simply to assist their brother Officers, and to that they strictly adhered. They desire to repudiate, in words suitable to their characters, the gross wickedness attributed by Sir C. Wood, that they have been the instigators of complaints, and they publicly deny that they have invented grievances.

The Committee feel called on, now publicly to bring to the notice of all interested in seeing that just and fair means are afforded to Officers in a far

distant land to have their complaints and grievances represented and investigated in a right manner, the very different course pursued towards the Officers of the Indian Army, and that followed in respect to the grievances of the Officers of the Royal Marine Corps, when they complained of certain grievances. A petition from the Officers of that Corps having been presented to the House of Commons, a Commission was in 1838 named by the Queen, presided over by the Duke of Wellington, and fairly composed of impartial Statesmen and qualified Officers, the fullest means being afforded by the Duke for the Marine Officers, as a body, to state their grievances, and Colonel Sir R. Williams, an Officer in the Marine Corps, and one of the Commissioners, was at once requested to support the case his brother-officers, and desired to make it out by the production of oral evidence; this like course, to inquire into the Indian Officers' grievances, though solicited by the Committee for the India Officers, was not allowed, though the mode of investigation, as in the inquiry into the discontent of the Royal Marines, is the only just and right course to adopt. Further, whilst individuals were constrained to petition against some specific injury, the Commission viewed the grievances as general, and refused to hear complaints from Officers, or to take evidence on the classified heads.

The Commission issued by the Queen to the Commissioners for inquiring into the complaints of the Marine Corps is in marked contrast with that issued to the Commissioners for inquiring into the complaints of the Indian Officers. The former was prepared by writ of Privy Seal, entirely independent of the head of the department under whom the Marines served, whereas Sir C. Wood prepared, signed, and issued the Commission for the India inquiry, and necessarily defined the course of the inquiry so as virtually to cover his own acts; the terms of the Commission were also markedly different, the Marine Commissioners were called on to report in a far wider range on the discontent of the Marines than permitted to the Commissioners on the Indian Officers' grievances; the remedies, in the case of the Marines, were also to be stated, but not as respects the remedies for the Indian Officers' grievances.

Before mentioning the case of Lieut.-Col. Kelso, Sir Charles Wood stated to the House the case of Colonel Cherry, of the Madras Native Cavalry, and read a note from that Officer, explaining that a pamphlet had been printed without his knowledge, authority, or consent, in which his (Col. C.'s) name was introduced, as he said, in a most unwarrantable manner, as he has no grievance, has not petitioned, and is very much annoyed at his name having been used. The Committee of Officers are quite ignorant of the pamphlet, never having seen it, and they are at a loss to trace any connection of Col. C.'s denial with the proceedings under the consideration of the House, seeing that this Officer is not a petitioner. It is however convenient to have had this Officer's denial of any grievance read out, as it enables the Committee to explain that Col. Cherry is a very old Officer, has been a Lieut.-Colonel for upwards of ten years, is of forty years' length of service, and is a Colonel of eight years' standing, and has been the Senior of the Madras Cavalry Lieut.-Colonels since 1862. The Committee can only guess at the character of the "grievance" imputed in the pamphlet to Col. Cherry, *viz.* that he ought now to be in the Cavalry a Regimental Colonel, in the receipt of Colonel's allowance,

instead of commanding a Regiment. Now, Col. Cherry not being remarkable for intelligence, has mistaken the grievance which he causes to others by not being in his right position of a Colonel without employ, or he tries to keep in favour with the authorities, by denying that which he has not been accused of feeling, and from interested motives, seeing that he receives more rupees in his present position than he would as a Colonel.

It is quite allowable for the Secretary of State to claim any credit that may be fairly obtained from the promotion gained by Lieut.-Col. Kelso. This Officer was ineligible to join the Staff Corps, and he may have been greatly benefited by the measures ordered by the Secretary of State for India, in gaining his promotion to Regimental Lieut.-Colonel much sooner than he would have done, but Sir C. Wood's benefits were not the result of measures calculated to improve Lieut.-Colonel Kelso's position, but to get rid of his seniors, who were in Sir C. Wood's way; and had none of his seniors been induced to retire by the offer of increased pensions, Lieut.-Colonel Kelso would not have had the benefits now claimed; but though a partial revelation of this Officer's previous service has been made by Sir C. Wood, in order to prejudice the claim he has since preferred for all the benefits the service rules allow, yet the whole case has not been fully given, and the Committee now supply the facts omitted. In July, 1861, this Officer was only a regimental Captain, he was, however, of such long service as to be a Brevet-Major of some standing, and was then of 31 years' service, nearly half of which he had spent in the Subaltern grade; the since rapid rise to his regimental Lieutenant-Colonelcy even as mentioned, did not compensate him for his previous slow rise, and the benefit he accidentally derived from Sir C. Wood's act of pensioning off old Officers, in no way deprives him of his undoubted right to claim the promotion arising from *all* retirements or casualties, from whatever cause induced, provided that the rules of the Service, under which Lieut.-Col. Kelso had previously so long been retarded in his promotion, justify him in petitioning for their fulfilment, when they can benefit him.

At the present date Lieut.-Col. Kelso has five years' longer service than when Col. Baker of the India Council obtained his Colonel's Allowances, and longer service than when Major-General Sir R. Vivian, also a Member of Council, obtained that great Prize of the Service; and if Lieut.-Col. Kelso only petitions to obtain the enforcement of rules under which these Officers rose in the Army, he only seeks for the fulfilment of those promises and pledges which the Court of Directors invariably respected, and which the British Parliament guaranteed. The solitary instance in respect to the payment of a Bonus to induce Lieut.-Col. Kelso to retire from the Army, is also adduced by Sir Charles Wood to prove the continuance, as he asserts, of the Bonus payments in the Indian Army; but this one payment in question was entirely owing to Sir C. Wood's arrangements having so culminated as to make several contending interests operate in inducing some Officers to pay money for this one step. These payments have, however, been recognized, encouraged, and praised by the Government under whom Lieut.-Col. Kelso has served, as hereafter fully shown, and the mere mention cannot be viewed in any other light, than intended to prejudice the minds of Members against the real merits of this Officer's claim.

The cases of Captain Winsin, Major Spottiswood, and Lieut.-Col. Cooper were quoted merely to illustrate the general nature of the supersession that had been caused. Lieutenants Brown and McNeil have recently left the Service. So far as regards the future, Sir C. Wood states, and in this instance truly, that "he has given orders that no Officer shall serve under his junior, unless with his own consent." But this order has only recently been issued, consequent on the appeals for redress, against the course now forbidden, after having occasioned great sufferings, and left a permanent injury, which cannot now be redressed, for it was issued at a time when the Bengal Army, consisting of 105 Regiments, are thus distributed amongst local and Staff Corps Officers; 28 are commanded by 28 Local Officers, viz. 15 Colonels, 7 Majors, and 6 Captains; and 77 Regiments, by 77 Staff-Corps Officers, whose regimental rank in the Local Service, that is, in the cadres of their respective Regiments, is as follows, viz. 5 Majors, 68 Captains, and 6 Lieutenants.

The Local Service Officers, senior to the above Captains and Lieutenants commanding Regiments, are thus of necessity permanently deprived of those commands and allowances for which they have entered a seniority service. The Government Despatch alluded to by Sir C. Wood finds all these important military posts already occupied, and likely to be so filled for many years to come, almost exclusively by a body of junior Officers of the Staff Corps, and, consequently, unless a senior local Officer chooses to swallow his disgust, he must serve under a junior, or remain unemployed altogether. Of these Captains and Lieutenants, placed in command of Regiments, 4 are Captains in the Royal Army, and 2 of these, viz. Topham and Gordon, are still Captains in the 7th Hussars and 46th Foot, while 17 of them are commanded by Captains of the Madras Army. The inference to be drawn from this is, that out of 28 unemployed Local Service Lieut.-Colonels, and 10 Majors in the Bengal Army alone, many of whom possess decorations for field service, not one is found fit for command unless he places himself under a Junior Officer; and here it may once for all be distinctly stated, that it was a rare instance for a Senior Officer to serve under a Junior, and that the few cases, opposed thereto, Sir C. Wood is able to adduce from the India Office Records, during a long series of years, confirmed this experience.

Sir C. Wood assured the House, in respect to the Proceedings of the Commission, over which the Lord Cranworth presided, that "the Commissioners very properly made the Officers aware of all the cases mentioned by the Secretary of State." The Officers have all along asserted, and they still maintain, that they were not allowed the opportunity of seeing and replying to the statements laid before the Royal Commission by Sir C. Wood. The Commission report as follows in the 4th Para. of their Report: "The Secretary of State declining to sanction the communication of the papers which he had thus transmitted to us to the Committee acting on behalf of the Memorialists, we thought it right to call their attention to the material facts and observations which those papers contained, requesting to be informed whether they admitted their accuracy or had any observations to make upon their bearing on the questions now in discussion."

A reference to Appendix D of the Report of Lord Cranworth's Commission will prove, that the heads of the subjects sent by the Commission to the Memorialists are of the briefest character, affording no clue to the opinions, or assertions, or evidence advanced by Sir C. Wood in support of what the Commission accepted as "facts." Moreover, amongst these material "facts and observations," there is no mention, whatever, made of what Sir C. Wood had stated with respect to one important cause of grievance, the Bonus system. The Commissioners were evidently unaware of the total inaccuracy of the statements made by the India Office on this one head. The Committee would also point out that though Sir C. Wood claims credit for that Commission having made known to the Committee the heads of the subjects in the India Office Statement, yet the information afforded (*vide* Appendix D of the Report) was of the most general character as to the real contents of the India Office Paper. The case drawn out on behalf of the "India Officers" was, however, sent by the Commissioners to the India Office for comment; without ascertaining the wishes of the Committee of Officers acting on behalf of the India Officers. But the Commissioners listened to the dictum of Sir C. Wood, to deny to the Officers the like advantage of having an opportunity of exposing the fallacies in the statement and counterstatement prepared at the India Office; a full, fair, and impartial investigation was prayed for on behalf of the Indian Officers, and this having been denied by the Commissioners as above explained, and this, combined with the refusal of the Commissioners to hear the evidence of competent Officers, whose names were tendered to the Commissioners, many points of great moment to the Indian Officers have been left in doubt, and will yet have to be discussed, in order that justice may be rendered.

There are in particular two important subjects on which the Officers of the Indian Army felt that they have been aggrieved, and these two, as well as others, have not, in the opinion of the Committee of Officers, been fully inquired into and considered by the Lord Cranworth Commission—these are the Bonus payments, and the Colonel's allowances; the failure, on the part of the Commissioners to search into the real merits of these two questions, of a complicated and technical character, specially to be understood by those who have belonged to the Indian Service, may be attributed to the Commissioners, having overlooked that part of the Commission instructions, to examine "all persons competent by reason of their knowledge, habits, or experience, to afford it.

There were two prominent modes of providing for Senior Officers of the Indian Army up to 1861, the year of changes in the Army system of India. As a general rule, and one very strictly applied, every Military Officer of the Indian service was on an equal and uniform footing, in respect to the amount of remuneration he would receive from the State on retiring from the Service, or on ceasing to perform the active duties of his profession. The system of rewarding Officers of good service, by extra pensions or other rewards, as in the British Army, had, it may be said, no existence. A few Officers of very distinguished service, such as Sir John Malcolm, Sir G. Pollock, Sir J. Nott, have had special pensions granted for Military services, but the practice was so rarely followed that

the rule, which gave to all the like hope and certainty of fixed money results on attaining certain positions in the Service, was only by these few exceptions, the more markedly impressed on the minds of all Ranks in the Service, and so universally was this felt, that probably no Government was so little inconvenienced, as the Indian Government, by Senior and deserving Officers applying for rewards, extra to those which the rules entitled them to draw.

No doubt the fact of the Government of India having originally been carried on by a body of Directors engaged in commercial pursuits, led to the commercial system being applied to all classes of their servants in India, of inducing them to look to the fair remuneration granted for the discharge of their duties, as a means of providing for themselves additional aid on retirement; but the Court of Directors also encouraged a provision for the families of their Civil, Military, and Medical servants, by the formation of funds, kept up mainly by the subscriptions of Officers, aided by direct and indirect contributions from Government. Under the immediate control of the State, the Officers, Civil and Medical, supported, by very liberal payments, funds, which were required by Government to be subscribed to by all, for the express purpose of providing retiring pensions, in excess of those which the State, on the completion of the fixed periods of service, granted alike to all.

The Committee of Officers may here add their belief that all who have any knowledge of the useful operation of these Funds, will agree that the Public Service was in many ways greatly benefited by their existence, and that their abrogation and modification will, from experience to be hereafter gained, yet be freely admitted to have been a blunder. The payments therefrom made to enable old Officers to retire to their native country, relieved the Service of aged and worn-out Officers, and their existence allowed of a pressure being put on those whose inefficiency had arisen from failing health, to leave a Service for which they were no longer qualified. The Officers thereby aided, by subscriptions, the Executive Administration in effecting an object, for which the Government should have supplied funds.

Amongst other arrangements the practice of contributing a purse, to enable an old, but perhaps not wealthy military Officer to retire from the active duties of his profession, had for many years existed. It had its origin in that remarkable Despatch of Lord Cornwallis, dated 7 Nov., 1794, to the address of the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, and First Commissioner for the Affairs of India, by which the great Army, changes of 1796 were mainly regulated. In several parts of that important Despatch the sale of the commission, by an old Officer on retiring, was distinctly and strongly urged as a means for an extra provision, during his last years in his native country.

This practice of a purse had prevailed, more or less, from the time the changes of 1796 came into operation up to 1830,—but in a moderate degree,—owing to the rapid rise, during the first thirty years of this century, which

Officers had to Military rank; the necessity for more extensive subscriptions did not begin to be felt, in order to provide openings for advancement in rank by more retirements, until promotion in the following thirty years began to stagnate.

About that time, so prominently had the stagnation of promotion attracted the notice of the Court of Directors, that the necessity for some additional inducements for old Officers to leave the Service was felt, and as the expenditure of public moneys was then considered impracticable, the Court appealed to the Officers of the Army, by their own contributions, to relieve the State from the expense necessary to maintain an efficient body of servants, and thereupon in a despatch No. 15, dated 6th March, 1832 (Return No. 80 of 1863), which was promulgated to the Army in General Orders, expressed themselves as follows:—

“ We are very solicitous for the comfort of our Officers upon retirement, and are therefore disposed cordially to encourage the institution of Funds in furtherance of that desirable object.”

“ We regret that in the present state of the Company's affairs it is not possible for us to aid the Funds by direct contributions, but we are willing not only to bear the increased charge of retired pay that will be consequent upon their establishment, but also to sanction the grant of an interest of 6 per cent. per annum on the balances of the several Funds, and the remittance of the annuities which they may grant through our Treasury, at the rate of two shillings the rupee.”

In another Despatch, No. 15, dated 23rd December, 1835, the Court of Directors again addressed the Government of India (Return 80 of 1863), referred to the previous expressed encouragement by saying, “ We expressed our desire to encourage the institution of a Retiring Fund, framed on the principle of granting pensions proportionate to length of service.”

These Despatches were sent out to the Government of India, with the knowledge and sanction of the Board of Control, and necessarily of the Cabinet Ministers of that day, and probably of some of the statesmen now in the Administration, and being made known to the Army, the Officers, well aware of the severity of the then financial pressure on India, most patriotically and cordially responded to the invitation of the Court, and subscribed out of their own allowances the money necessary to relieve the Regiments of old and worn-out Officers; the Officers of the Ordnance Corps of the three Presidencies specially joined in creating funds, by very liberal payments, and all these contributions remained in full operation up to the year 1861; now during nearly the 30 years of their existence the money spent by the Officers to relieve the service of old Officers must have amounted to upwards of half, and nearly three quarters of a million in the Ordnance Corps alone.

The existence of the practice of such payments was, however, well known to

the Court of Directors, to the Government of India, and to the Staff of the Armies, and on an appeal, by Mémorial from the Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army, the Court of Directors, in their Despatch No. 7, dated 29th Nov., 1837 (P. Return 216, of May 6, 1862, and 80 of 1863), explicitly refused to interdict these payments, by stating, "We see no necessity for interfering with the arrangements which the junior Officers of a Regiment may make in individual cases, for adding to the comforts of a senior Officer, on his retirement from the Service upon the pension to which he may be entitled;" nay, added in strong and decided words their opinion that the practice was not financially injurious to the Government; and, as the only regulation which operated to prevent its continuance was one passed by the Court in the last century, chiefly on financial grounds, to prevent an unreasonable load of pensions, they stated that they had not enforced it, and did not desire or intend to do so, as the presumed necessity had not arisen, and this announcement of their views was ordered to be made to the armies of the three Presidencies by the publication of the Despatch in the General Orders. Many other official papers are on record, and have repeatedly been quoted to prove, that a complete recognition and encouragement of the practice of paying Bonuses to old Officers had been given by the Court of Directors, and by the Ministers or Cabinet of the day; there is a difference as to the expressions employed by the Court of Directors, in respect to their approval of fixed plans and occasional Bonuses: the formation of fixed plans was difficult, whereas the occasional arrangements made by junior Officers were considered desired objects, and were authorized.

Moreover, various other recognitions of the practice, by the authorities in India, are well known; for instance, during the time Major-General Sir R. Vivian was Adjutant-General of the Madras Army, it is believed, that confidential inquiries were instituted by Lieut.-General Sir George Berkeley, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, as to the effect of this practice on the well-being of the Service; it is also believed that Major-General Sir R. Vivian at that date advocated its continuance; in various other ways, its fullest recognition can be proved by the existence of appeals, references, permission to receive subscriptions, meetings of Officers to discuss retiring arrangements; these and many other measures, extending over many years, have taken place with the knowledge, sanction, approval, and encouragement of almost every authority connected with India.

The system therefore of contributing money to old Officers on retirement, appears to be placed on as solid a basis as that of the purchase system of the English Army, except as to the money value to be paid to the retiring Indian Officer; that amount was distinctly left by the express orders in the Despatches of the Court of Directors to the private arrangement of the Officers. In the English Army the value of each Commission is fixed, but notoriously not adhered to; and in the Guards especially, a purse is openly made up by the Officers, extra to the fixed sum, in order to recoup to Officers close on their promotion to the General's grade the sums they may have contributed in excess of the regulated amount. Various other instances could be quoted, where sums in excess of the regulated amounts are so paid, indeed; it is idle to argue about

the existence of a practice so notoriously known, and about which evidence has been given before Select Committees and Commissions.

Now the claims of the British Officers to have their payments for Commissions, and their right to receive compensation for the moneys paid for obtaining Military advancement in rank, have been as fully recognized as any other right of the British subject. Indeed, so far has this been admitted, that official calculations, showing that eight millions must be paid by the nation, to compensate individual Officers for the moneys so paid, have been laid before Parliament.

That remarkable case which Colonel Sykes quoted in his speech on the debate of the 2nd of May, wherein he pointed out that the Duke of Wellington, with a view, at first, to expedite the promotion of the Officers of the Royal Artillery, subsequently of the Royal Engineers, and extended to the Royal Marines, permitted Lieut.-Colonels, Majors, and Captains of these Seniority Corps to dispose of their commissions, and to receive as a bonus, the infantry regulated value of the commission, is an apt illustration of the Indian Bonus Fund. In 1823, when this measure was resorted to by the Duke, the financial pressure in England was as great as it was, in 1832, in India, when the Court of Directors, as above shown, encouraged the Officers to subscribe to buy out old Officers. The Duke of Wellington, as well as the Court of Directors, induced the Officers of the respective Armies to contribute the moneys necessary for effecting those retirements of old Officers, which, properly ought to have been paid out of the Funds of the State, but, as will be shown below, the Government of England has acted towards the contributors of the two Services in a very different manner.

The Duke of Wellington allowed the old Officers of these three seniority Corps to leave the Service, by infantry and cavalry Officers of a grade lower paying to the others a fixed sum of money; there were thus two sets of distinct promotions effected, indeed three sets of promotions; for the purchasers of the Artillery, Engineers, and Marine commissions were generally on full pay, serving with Regiments of Infantry and Cavalry, they, by the purchase, obtained a step in substantive rank, then necessarily ceased to belong to Regiments, and promotion thereupon was made in their Regiments. The promotions and succession to the Officers of Artillery, Engineers, and Marines, retiring by the sale of their Commissions, were also made in the respective Regiments, but with the strictest regard to the seniority system obtaining in these Corps.

The public gained by this wise and prudent measure, a relief in three ways, one in replacing the aged, and formerly efficient Officer of Artillery, Engineers, or Marines, by younger and more active Officers of these Services; it also gave a great spurt in the promotion of those Seniority Corps, and removed that deadly feeling which arises in the minds of Regimental Officers, when hopeless despondency once springs up as to gaining military advancement; further, these good results were attained without any direct expenditure by the State, and the indirect charge trifling. There can be no question that if this

arrangement had not been made, the State must have eventually provided the funds to secure efficiency by inducing the retirement of old Officers; the Government have recently been called on to provide such moneys to facilitate more retirements of old Officers of Artillery and Engineers, and the Treasury, most assuredly, must eventually supply funds to relieve the Seniority Corps of old Officers, or else raise more Brigades of Artillery to give promotion, and, further, allow more Generals to the Marine Corps—both expensive measures.

Now the Officers of Infantry and Cavalry who purchased the Artillery, Marine, and Engineer commissions, though at first placed on the half pay of the new rank, were entitled to exchange on full pay in that purchased advanced rank, and many availed themselves of the privilege, others sold out, and received the money paid by them for all their commissions, including the value paid for these Seniority Corps Commissions; and yet if the transaction had been brought within the precincts of a court of law, a decision of exactly the same character as that which Sir C. Wood brought forward in his recent speech as having been given on the India case, must have been pronounced by the judge, that the sales of these non-saleable Seniority Corps Commissions was contrary to statute law, and that the great Duke's rule could not make the transaction legal. But the question is not whether statute law allows, but whether that bond of union between Government and their servants, which is created and firmly rooted by the belief of good faith in the assurances expressed and recorded by the governing authorities, has been shaken in the India case by the course taken by Sir C. Wood, in repudiating the claims of the Officers to compensation for moneys paid at the solicitation of the Court of Directors and for a purpose which is within the province of Government; and next what would follow, if the like step was taken by the Secretary of State for War, if he repudiated the English sales, on account of their undoubted illegality,

These unattached commissions, as the rank derived from these particular Sales became designated, exist to this day, and the numbers are believed to have largely augmented, so that in reality there is a Corps of Unattached Officers, whose existence in the British Army is but little known; and as it may be likened to the Staff Corps of the Indian Army, the practice followed in posting Officers thereto may be used as a precedent. Many Officers at the present time obtain increase of substantive rank by the purchase of the Artillery, Engineer, and Marine commissions, which since 1823 have been passed on from one Officer to another, without many being aware of their origin, and all, on such purchases taking place, join this Unattached List. But none of these Officers holding these commissions will ever be found to form a notion that their right to compensation—if the State abolished the system of purchase—for the moneys spent on such commissions can ever be doubted, and all will be found to speak with certainty, of making some provision, if they so desired, for their families by the sale, in after years, of such commissions.

The useful measure which the Duke of Wellington so applied in order to relieve the Seniority Corps of the British Army of old Officers, was exactly

similar to the practice of the Army of India of buying out old Officers, who, however, went on the retired list, and ceased to be liable to be called back to the Service—purely a Seniority Service. In both Services the operation was one eminently beneficial to the Government, and especially to the Service of the Indian Army, for there the European constitution fails at a far more early period of life than in England, and consequently it induced a larger proportion of the old and sickly Officers who had, in their youth, well performed their duties, to retire without any extra charge to the State, and it brought forward younger and more efficient Officers for the duties of the Government; and looking back to the past, the 35 years' experience of the Bonus operation now establishes this important fact—that the State would have largely gained in the military efficiency of the Regiments and Divisions, had the moneys of the State been contributed in aid of the Officers' operations to effect the removal of old and worn-out Officers.

Many Indian Officers have, as before stated, largely invested moneys in providing funds for the retirement of these old Officers, either in expectation themselves of receiving a Bonus, or in attaining advancement, or in hereafter reaping the high reward of the Service—the Colonels' Allowances, by continuing in the Service; but before they have obtained the return for the moneys laid out, and which they eventually expected to receive, the sweeping and unexpected changes of Sir C. Wood, and his denial of any right in invested funds, cut off the plans previously laid.

Now a careful examination of the Official documents will prove to the satisfaction of all, that the permission accorded, the encouragement afforded, or the power under which Officers of the Indian Army acted, in subscribing for these retiring Bonuses, was based on published documentary evidence, more clearly proving the Government recognition and actual encouragement of the measure than can be claimed, from available documents, for the measures of the Duke of Wellington; but both were excellent arrangements, beneficial to good servants, and most useful to the interests of our country. The money investments of the British Officers are, however, considered sacred, whereas those of the Indian Officers are cast aside.

The plea put forward by Sir C. Wood, in his speech on the 2nd May, that the practice was irregular, because a court of law of England, bound by narrow technical rules, did not enforce payment of a promissory note of one who had been an Officer in India, and had pledged himself to pay his settled quota of money for steps, is not likely, it is believed, to be followed by any other statesman of England in now denying the fair and just obligations of the Duke's Act, which, if tried by the same Court as that to which the Indian one was subjected, would have been declared to be fully as illegal. It is to be lamented that any statesman is found to deny the obligations which the Officers of the Indian Army have on Government for the like honourable recognition for payments made in the interests of the State, and by the direct invitation of the rulers.

But Sir C. Wood by his unprecedented and totally unexpected rules of 1861, terminated the power of continuing the operation of the Bonus System, and thereby practically forfeited the claims of Officers on their invested funds, greatly lessened the chance of rising to the Colonels' Allowances, and largely deteriorated the promotion of Regimental Officers, by diminishing the inducements to retire. The Officers of the Indian Army consider that they have a just right to expect that inasmuch as the cessation of purchase for the British Army and the confiscation of the rights of British Officers, to the value of the purchased commissions of the retired Artillery, Engineer, and Marine Officers, has been admitted by men of all parties to be impracticable without the payment by the State of compensation money to the Officers who have so invested moneys, it is earnestly hoped the like respect will yet be evinced for the moneys invested by Officers of the Indian Army for the like object.

There is one other part of Sir C. Wood's changes which will bear heavily on all the Senior Officers of the Indian Army, especially on those who have not joined the Staff Corps, as also partly on those few who joined the Staff Corps in the grade of Lieutenant-Colonels, that is, in respect to the obtaining of the Colonels' Allowances. In the Indian Army, as in the British Regiments, the system obtained of remunerating the older regimental Officers by an extra payment out of Funds granted for providing the soldiers with clothing, but of a less value than the sum allowed by the State. In the British Army, every Colonel of a Regiment made, until about 10 years since, his own arrangements for supplying the soldier with clothing of a regulated quantity and quality, and provided it was passed by an Officer specially appointed to examine on behalf of the State the Regimental clothing so supplied, the Colonel retained for his own private use, the difference between what he expended and that which he drew from the Government. In the Indian Army, the Army clothing, from before the Regimental Organization of 1796, was supplied by contract, under Government arrangements, independent of any personal control by individual Colonels of Regiments; the sums allowed by the State for the clothing of soldiers of all branches of the service, were thrown into one General Fund for all India, and the total cost of clothing for all the Army being deducted from the total funds accumulated, the unexpended balance, then under the name of off-reckonings, was equally divided amongst all Regimental Colonels of Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers, and Artillery; the orders of the Court of Directors of 15th January, 1796 (Return 80, of 1863), on this head, are brief, clear, and ample to indicate their meaning and intentions. Paragraphs 55 and 56 state, that "the profits from the off-reckonings of the several Corps of Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, are to be thrown into one aggregate fund, and the amount to be divided equally between the Colonels of Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry. The clothing for all the troops is to be supplied by contract, according to the present practice."

Up to 1824, the Colonels of Regiments received what was known as a double share of those off-reckonings, owing to the Regiments then comprising two Battalions of men to one Colonel; but in that year the Court of Directors ordered the division of the Regiments into two, by the formation of the separate Bat-

talions into Regiments, and the consequent addition thereto of a Colonel to each, constrained the Government to divide the off-reckonings also into two parts, in order to give what was then designated a half share to each new Colonel appointed to each Regiment.

But here the scrupulous respect and care which the Court of Directors almost invariably displayed when individual interests were affected, on any general state change being introduced, such as that of 1824, was on this occasion markedly evinced. Many Lieutenant-Colonels necessarily became Colonels of Regiments, by this formation of Battalions into Regiments, but without taking money from the old Colonels in the receipt of a double share, the new Regimental Colonels could not draw any portion of these clothing profits. The Court of Directors solved the difficulty by deciding that all existing rights should be protected, but on the occurrence of each vacancy among the Colonels in the receipt of a double share, the two new and senior Colonels succeeded according to seniority, each to a half share of off-reckonings. Further, that each senior Officer, in the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel of each branch of the Service, who stood first, at the date assigned for this division of Battalions into Regiments, for succession to the benefits of the double share in the off-reckoning fund, and all Lieutenant-Colonels who succeeded to the Colonel's grade and to the off-reckonings within two years from the same date were allowed to draw a half share from the clothing fund, but all receiving, in addition thereto, from the Treasury of the State, an allowance equal to the difference between the amount of the share actually enjoyed by him under the new plan, and the double share which he would have been entitled to under the former system, but from such date only as would have entitled them, had that system continued.

Other arrangements were also made by the Court of Directors to protect other cases of Officers affected by this great and somewhat difficult change in the Army organization, and though the payments by the Government continued to be made for some years, after the 1824 change, yet it may be asserted that the honest and just extra expenditure by the State, was one that produced great and good results on the feelings of the Officers. It cut off almost all cause of discontent amongst old servants of the Government, and, above all, the arrangements proved to the younger Officers, the scrupulous care with which promises made to the Officers by the Government, and expectations formed in the minds of these Officers, would be honestly fulfilled; thus it was that the 1824 reform measure, involving from its character far more complications and difficulties than those which have been so unnecessarily occasioned by the mode of carrying out the 1861 changes, was actually unproductive of any material grievances, and stands in marked contrast with those now existing in respect to Sir Charles Wood's mode of shirking the claims which Officers have to succeed to these allowances.

It is in this contrasted view that Sir C. Wood's administration of Indian Affairs is deserving of the gravest attention. First, in respect to the scrupulous care with which the Court of Directors prepared their orders, so that every Officer felt as if the paragraphs of the despatches had been penned to meet his individual case, the result was, that but few despatches were ever sent in respect to the

1824 change; whereas innumerable and very complicated orders have been the necessary result of the crude and confused despatches which Sir C. Wood signed in 1861, and in the case of the Colonels' Allowances, several contradictory, and even unintelligible orders, as to the exact position of the Officers to succeed thereto, have now existence.

The singularly strong feeling which pervaded the breasts of all Officers, Civil, Military, and Medical, of India, in respect to the relative rights and duties of master and servant, was the result of the Commercial System, which being dependent for success on the activity, honesty, and zeal of the agents, constrained the master to care for the servant's interests, and hence owing to the Directors impartiality, the powerfully pervading zeal for their master's interests which actuated the minds of all Indian Officers, from never fearing for their rights—now, sad to say, destroyed; likewise constrained all to devote their whole time and talents to the public business. The consequence of an opposite course is doubt, suspicion, and uncertainty—the characteristic feelings which pervade the minds of many able, honest, and good old Officers, who without family, political, or social influence, feel that their interests are dependent on Sir C. Wood's favour and mercy.

About 16 years since the Court of Directors altered this off-reckoning fund, but changed its character so gently that it was effected without any reclamation from a single Officer; they adopted the average of 20 years' receipts by each Colonel, and fixed the same as the future annual payment for each Colonel as an annual allowance. It is specially noticeable, first, that the Court adopted a longer period for striking the average in fixing this amount, than the India Office did, in recently striking the average of years for Officers in future succeeding to this allowance; secondly, that the apparently altered character of this payment from one out of profits on soldiers' clothing to one of salary, now furnishes the Secretary of State with a pretext for interfering with its distribution, so as to deprive Officers of that advantage which they would have enjoyed, had the emoluments been drawn from the Clothing Fund. Now this infraction of a right is the more specially to be noted in connection with plans for general Retiring Funds which the Officers of the Indian Armies desired to form, but as these for effectual operation required to be brought to bear on the senior Officers of the whole Army, so as to insure entire equality of rise, such as general promotions invariably secure to all, the Court of Directors in the Despatch No. 14, of 23rd December, 1833 (Return 80, of 1863), refused their assent to one of several plans because it disturbed the system "under which the Colonels of Regiments are entitled to off-reckonings;" the Court then viewed the rights of old Officers to these off-reckonings as a fundamental objection to the carrying out of a good and useful plan for effecting retirements.

In 1861, Sir C. Wood ordered that out of every four vacancies amongst the Bengal Colonels, one should lapse, applying the reduction alike to Cavalry, Infantry of that Army, and to the Engineers and Artillery of the three Presidencies, but gave expectations to the Officers of the Staff Corps that for every

30 Officers in that body, one Colonel's allowance should eventually be granted. It was at once apparent that these orders bore with great severity on many Officers, by diminishing their chance of succeeding to the great prize of the Service, and as respecting the promise to the Staff Corps, it was found to be impracticable without at once displaying an amount of favouritism to this favoured body that it would be inexpedient to carry out.

Consequent on appeals and references, the Secretary of State modified his orders as regards the future succession of Lieutenant-Colonels to the Colonel's allowances, by instituting a new rule, declaring in the case of Regimental and Staff Corps Lieutenant-Colonels, that a period of 12 years passed in the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel should entitle all to receive the allowance; but when the rank was attained before 1862, the regular succession of those rapid in regular course followed. One only instance of such earlier succession has arisen, nor, from the character of Sir C. Wood's measures, can any more arise, excepting this one case, which has as usual been quoted by him as a marked benefit given to the Officers of the Indian Army, though he omitted to mention that the Officers had a service of 42 years, or 4 in excess of that required from the Staff Corps Officer. But so confused are the orders that it is even now uncertain whether the expectant Officers of Artillery and Engineers are included under this 12 years' rule; though there can be no doubt that the previous practice of equally apportioning the off-reckoning shares from Clothing profits to old Officers of the Ordnance Corps, in common with the shares to the Colonels of all branches, and subsequently in fixing "the annual allowance" at the same amount for the Officers of all branches of the Service, would indicate the justice of equality in respect to all Lieutenant-Colonels before 1861 of all branches, also obtaining the prize of the Service after serving the like period fixed for the favoured Staff Corps; all of whom are certain of obtaining the allowance at the close of 38 years' service; whereas the Officers not of this body are left to the uncertainty of promotion to the Regimental rank of Lieut.-Colonel, seeing that though a Brevet is given to keep them on an equality with the Staff Corps Officers, yet that this equality does not extend to the reaping of the substance as respects pay and Colonel's allowances.

The arrangements made in respect to the Colonels' allowances are claimed as having been made by Sir C. Wood on State policy grounds, financial and political, arising out of reductions in the strength of the Army of India. It is with reluctance the Committee of Officers touch on such assertions, seeing that their justification rests on reasons which must have been Cabinet secrets, as they have not been revealed. But in the present case it is necessary to allude to those State reasons assigned by the Secretary of State; briefly it may be asserted that at the present date there is, it is believed, a larger numerical military force maintained in India than was sufficient in former years to afford an allowance equal to a share of the funds formerly derived from the clothing of the soldiers, to the full number of present claimants; and as respects the Artillery, the numerical force of this arm has been largely augmented, so that the plea urged of diminished strength for depriving the Officers of their succession to Colonel's allowance is inapplicable to this branch.

As above pointed out, a calculation on the 20 years' average at the former cost of clothing for the existing Force, and of the money allowance for this Force at the rates formerly granted by the State for the soldiers' clothing, would settle the entire question as to the number of Officers to whom the Colonel's allowance ought to be paid. Further, the pleaded necessity on financial grounds to withhold from old Officers, whose service has been given to the State, the benefit of the Colonel's allowances, on the ground of having expended a quarter of a million mainly on the Staff Corps promotions, is simply an excuse like to a spendthrift, who enjoys and pays for the luxury of having young footmen, but refuses to pay the really earned wages, to his old and faithful stewards and head servants.

By Sir C. Wood fixing the period of 12 years in the grade of substantive Lieut.-Colonel for all, whether in the Staff Corps or with Regiments, to obtain the Colonels' allowances, the question has been greatly narrowed. It is, however, very favourable to the Staff Corps Officer, seeing that nearly every Officer of the Staff Corps who in 1863 attained to the substantive rank of Lieutenant-Colonel will in 12 years, and on completion of about 38 years' total Indian service, be certain of his Colonel's allowances. The arrangement was, however, accepted by the Officers as a fairer basis than the former arrangement. On the order being promulgated to the Army, it was, however, at once memorialized against on two grounds, first, as being longer, by two years, than the real average rise, and secondly, that whereas the Staff Corps Officer, in future, was certain of attaining his substantive grade of Lieut.-Colonel in 26 years, and necessarily in 12 years afterwards, *viz.* in 38 years' total service of attaining his Colonel's allowance, the Brevet rank of Lieut.-Colonel bestowed on the Regimental Officer to equalize his chance of success with the Staff Corps Officer, did not ensure him a succession in like course as to total service.

The Officers on whom the 12 years' rule bears with great heaviness are those who attained to the rank of Field Officer before the formation of the Staff Corps, including therein both classes of this grade, *viz.* many of those who in 1861 joined the Staff Corps in this Rank and all of those who have not joined but remained with Regiments. It will also bear heavily hereafter on all Captains and Subalterns who have not joined the Staff Corps. The Regimental Officers who have been slow in advancing to the grade of Substantive Field Officers will long exceed 38 years before they obtain this great Army prize; the remarkable point for observation is, that though 38 years have particularly been fixed to secure its receipt by the Staff Corps, seeing that almost all will attain to the rank of Substantive Lieutenant-Colonel in 26 years, yet the Secretary of State so arranges that from 40 or 50 years may be, and will likely be, the period before Officers not of that favoured body can obtain the prize.

It is this designedly favourable and partial leaning which rankles in the minds of many old Officers, when they see junior Officers secured in their rise to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, so as to make this step the one step which enables them to wait for the prize, and that the Brevet rank, which is to place the Regimental Officer on an equality with the Staff Officer, is not to have any effect in

his favour, and that he must look to the succession to the Regimental grade for that reward after his chances of success have been diminished by the Acts of Sir C. Wood.

The right of succession to the Colonels' allowances was one of the questions considered and reported on, though not fully investigated by the Commission over which Lord Cranworth presided; the Report stated in substance that the violation of the Parliamentary guarantee depended on, whether the number of 12 years fixed for the period has been ascertained to be a fair average, instead of 10 years, as contended for by the memorialists. The Commission, by leaving the claim of the Officers, to obtain 10 years as the average period, in a very unsettled state, as to their decided opinion on its real merits, enabled the Secretary of State for India, in his despatch of 17th June, 1864, to disregard conclusions, which, obviously, may be formed from the evidence afforded by the papers in the Report of the Commission in favour of the claim, and to place his own construction on their rather vaguely expressed views, by informing the Government of India that it is "not probable that more than a few cases can occur in which an Officer will not attain the Colonel's allowance after a shorter period of service," that is, within 12 years. Now this decision is passed in the face of a statement contained in the Report of Lord Cranworth's Commission, which showed that 10·2 years had been the average time, in the Bengal Army, Lieutenant-Colonels succeeded to their allowances; in Madras, 11·8 years; and in Bombay, 10·9 years. Now a knowledge of these averages was elicited by a loose inquiry to the India Office made by the Secretary of the Commission, and accepted without scrutiny by the Lord Cranworth Commission. But the honesty of the averages struck, by the India Office, like all other averages, depends on the periods over which the details are spread, and the branches of the Service from which the periods are taken, and, as Sir C. Wood stated in his recent speech, it is right to take "the whole of an Officer's career of promotion into account," and this sound principle, if fully and justly acted on, as all pensionary rules from the India Office of late years have rested on total service, the like course in respect to the Colonels' allowances would solve the difficulty in settling the present claims.

Appendix K. to the Report of Lord Cranworth's Commission is an informal note from Major-General Pears to Mr. Milton, and disposes of the question, as to the mode the India Office defined 12 years as the period of service a regimental Lieut.-Colonel must have served in order to attain the Colonel's allowances, in a curt manner that would not be used in respect to the claims of the humblest soldier; the Secretary to Lord Cranworth's Commission inquired of Major-General Pears on what grounds 12 years were fixed as the average rise of Lieutenant-Colonels to Colonels' allowance for the whole Indian Army; the reply in explanation shows, that the Madras Army average of rise was the highest, and the 12 years which was adopted and fixed for all India was still higher than that of Madras, though it was longer than the average period found to exist in the Armies of the other two Presidencies, the Madras Army being, moreover, in the proportion of one-third of the other two Armies, and it is highest owing partly to its having had less exposure and consequently fewer casualties during many years than the other

Armies. It was also attained by striking the average on 15 years' experience, from 1845 to 1861, commencing when a stagnation of rise began to be felt consequent on the promotion of the Madras Lieutenant-Colonels prior to 1845, having been materially advanced by the operation of a special Bonus Fund in existence for a few years in the Madras Army, these being then, in 1845, necessarily young; and on the cessation of the operations and good direct effects of that fund, about 1845, the further average number of retirements gradually diminished; the restricted average period of a 15 years is also markedly in contrast with the far juster average of 20 years adopted by the Court of Directors for fixing the amount to be paid as the Colonel's allowance, in substitution of the profits on the soldiers' clothing.

There are three Officers, Generals Vivian, Clarke, and Col. Baker, holding prominent positions in respect to all these Indian questions, whose cases, particularly in respect to the succession to Colonel's allowances, may be taken as good examples of success in attaining this Army prize, and how markedly these Officers have joined in fixing on an average unfavourable—judging by their own rise—to their brother Officers; these cases also show how a limited average such as that struck for the 12 years' rule may be affected by the good luck of a few Officers, and it is useful here to bring the cases of these three Officers under notice, and to state that if the average of rise be struck from the periods, these three obtained the prize of the service, then instead of 12 years' service in the regimental grade of Lieutenant-Colonel the average could only be 8 years', and about 31 years' total service.

Major-General Sir R. Vivian, one of Sir C. Wood's Council, attained to the Colonel's allowance in 32 years after entering the Army, and in 10 years after promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. But this Officer's good luck in obtaining his early promotion to the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel and to the Colonel's allowance, unusually rapid, was owing, it is understood, to his having originally subscribed a purse for his Senior Officer to retire from the Service; his rise from Major to Lieutenant-Colonel was also accelerated by the payment out of a general Fund, formed in the Madras Army during the time he was in the Major's grade, and to which it is believed he subscribed, for paying Bonuses to induce old Lieutenant-Colonels of the Madras Army to retire from the Service; the dates of his Commission as Major will show that the period passed in this grade was far less than the average of the period prior to or after the Fund operations.

Major-General A. Clarke, also of the Madras Army, who served on both the Commissions over which Lord Hotham and Lord Cranworth presided, also obtained his Colonel's allowance in 10 years from the date of promotion to the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, and in 35 years from the date of entering the army; this Officer's advancement through the grade of Major was also greatly accelerated by the General Fund for buying out Lieutenant-Colonels, which was in operation for a few years, and then ceased; but by its operation it effected an extensive removal of very old Officers, in a short space of time, from the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, brought many Majors of short service, relatively, amongst the grade of Lieut-

tenant-Colonel, and these naturally diminished the chance of after rise to the other Field Officers; the fortunate and rapid attainment of the Colonel's allowances by these two Officers, as also by others, necessarily caused the recently fixed average of the 15 years' period, Lieutenant-Colonels obtained the Colonel's allowances as deduced from that of the Lieutenant-Colonels of the Madras Army, to be so high as 11·8 years, and by beginning with the year 1845, the India Office commenced when the stagnation in the Lieutenant-Colonels' grade of the Madras Army began to exist.

Colonel Baker, of the Bengal Engineers, a member of Sir C. Wood's Council, is, however, a remarkable illustration to adduce: this Officer attained his Colonel's allowance in 30 years from the date of entering the Service; in 3 years from the date of receiving the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. But this rapid promotion was due to the Bonus Fund in existence in his regiment, for buying out Senior Officers, and his special and remarkable quick rise to the Colonel's allowance was owing to a novel purchase made in his regiment of buying out—contrary to the fixed rules of the Fund—a regimental Colonel in receipt of the Colonel's allowance: to accomplish which Colonel Baker, it is believed, specially contributed, a considerable sum, in excess of the regular regimental subscription to secure the retirement of the Colonel, whose vacancy at once advanced Colonel Baker from the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to that of Colonel, in the receipt of Colonel's allowance, and in modern days, in an unprecedented short period; now it is obvious that this Officer's early success must retard others in winning the prize of the Service.

Now the effect of the Madras fund in raising the average of the Madras Army Lieutenant-Colonels to the succession of the Colonel's allowances must have been well known to both Sir R. Vivian and Gen. Clarke. Moreover, with the traditions of the India Office, in fixing a 20 years' average for determining the sum to be paid to the Colonels, the Secretary of State had a previous practice given for his guidance; but as it would have probably, if followed, been a gain to the Officers, it was not in this instance adopted. If the like period of 20 years had been taken for the average rise, then the rapid rise between 1840 and 1845 of Generals Vivian, Clarke, and others, to their Colonels' allowances, would have reduced the Madras average to below 12 years, and made it approximate to the ten years of the Bengal Army,

Moreover the average total service by which hitherto all pensionary allowances to the Indian Officers have been based, would, if deduced from the total service of the three Officers above quoted, be nearly seven years under the 38 years as recently fixed for their Brother Officers. And as in his speech on the 2nd May, Sir C. Wood specially laid down the rule that it is not fair to attack him, "on what occurs in a particular rank, while an Officer's career of promotion ought to be taken," it is to be hoped that the total service will be looked at, instead of averages of service in any grade, so liable to be affected by numerous causes, productive of irregularities.

The great personal advantage derived by Colonel Baker from this early

success, may usefully be stated,—at the time of the purchasing out of the Colonel, it happened that, the then, Lieut.-Colonel Baker was in England, either serving or about to serve in the India Office, and as his Lieut.-Colonel's pay must have ceased at the close of two years after leaving India, and his stay in England in the grade of Lieut.-Colonel could not have extended over five years without entailing retirement from the Service, that is, if the Service rules enforcement retirement had remained on the old footing, then the successful buying out of a Colonel, not only placed him at once on full pay with Colonel's allowance, but enabled him to remain in England without forfeiting his position in his Regiment; in 1860 his emoluments thereby instead of being only 1,200*l.* a year were upwards of 2,300*l.*

This purchase illustrates the two most remarkable features in the India Service as to the good the seller and purchaser derive from these transactions. It is true that few Officers have in recent years proved so lucky as Colonel Baker in securing the prize of the Service after so short a service, but it shows that money spent by him in buying out his Senior has benefited the Officer who accepted the Bonus, and reproduced to him, on his investment, a most advantageous return. And if the other two Officers ever invested any money in aiding the retirement of old Officers, they also now gain that which Officers of far longer service must wait for years in gaining.

At the same time it well deserves consideration, whether under the financial pressure which Sir C. Wood avows, as a justification for withholding from old Officers the allowances their services entitled them to expect, within the fair period of service which the former average. "of the career of promotion of Officers" shows to be reasonable, it is just or right to allow Officers who have, as in Colonel Baker's case, so early succeeded to the prize of the Service, to escape being called on to contribute a portion of their early gains, so that the confiscation practised may be spread over a larger number of Officers, and be less felt by all. An annual contribution of £50 from each of the Officers who have attained the Colonel's allowances in less than 12 years' service in the grade of Regimental Lieutenant-Colonel, and who were of less than 38 years' total service, would enable the Secretary of State to pay the Colonel's allowance all the Officers entitled to claim payment, either from 38 years' total service, or from more than 10 years' service in the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel; whether Brevet or substantive rank.

Further, no one can judge better than Major-Gen. Pears as to the inequality of rise to Colonels' allowances in the Engineer and Artillery Corps; a rapid rise in these two Corps to the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel has shown that a retarded obtaining of the Colonels' Allowances necessarily follows, whereas a long time passed in the junior Ranks often gives, as recently in his own regiment, a rapid succession thereto, after attaining Lieutenant-Colonel's grade, and a single purchase, as shown in respect to Major-Gen. Pears' own case, brings an Officer into the receipt of Colonel's allowances, who otherwise must have waited for years.

It has been above shown, that in 1824, on the great Army change being carried out, that the Court of Directors carefully protected the expectations which old Officers had been led to form in respect to the double share of off-reckonings, by liberally contributing from the State funds to make good the deficiency. Now it has often been asserted by the Secretary of State, that in respect to the recent changes, he has not done more to affect the interests of individuals than the Court could and would have done; but the Court, as records prove, studiously abstained from entering into conflict with their servants, by ordering, or if ordering, by carrying out measures as Sir C. Wood has done, in a way calculated to create feelings of injury amongst many hundreds of good servants. No doubt the Court might have done many harsh acts injurious to the interests of their servants, but the answer is, that they did not do so; and when they had a fair opening for acting harshly, as Sir Charles Wood considers he has had a plea for so acting, they abstained. The openings for exhibiting such forbearance during the administration of India by the Court, it is true, were few in number, because the Directors well knew the indirect money value derived by the State from making their servants feel, that the acts of the masters were not intended to be one-sided. A few openings during the administration, however, unavoidably arose for the Directors, if they had seen, fit acting harshly, and these, by not being seized hold of, only contrast Sir C. Wood's course in the stronger light.

In 1824 the Court of Directors formed the 3 European Regiments of India into 6 Regiments, each of 5 Companies, and appointed a Colonel to each. In 5 years after they ordered the 6 Regiments to be amalgamated into 3 Regiments, but the Court of Directors, on this limited scale of amalgamation, allowed the 3 Supernumerary Colonels to be retained, receiving their Colonel's allowances, and so continued up to 1861. In 1830 the Government amalgamated two Brigades of Horse Artillery into one Brigade, but the Court of Directors, again on this amalgamation, retained the Supernumerary Colonel, till 1861. Betwixt the 1824 changes and the Mutiny, several Bengal Regiments were broken, but the Colonels were maintained. The two Regiments of Bombay Infantry, the 8th Regiment of Madras Cavalry, the 19th Bengal Infantry, were broken, at or before the Mutiny, but the Court still retained the Supernumerary Colonels as well as the Colonels of the reformed Regiments of European Cavalry and Infantry. Colonel Cherry's case which Sir C. Wood quoted in his recent speech, as one without a grievance, is an illustration of the way an Officer may prevent justice being done to others, by having some compensating advantage, and then saying that he has no grievance. In 1861, there were 8 Regimental Colonels allowed to the Madras Cavalry, now there are only 6, and as Colonel Cherry is still only a Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel, though the senior of the grade, there are two Officers in the Colonel's grade whose vacancies have not been filled up, consequently those below Col. Cherry, must be impeded in obtaining that advancement which they prize, but which Col. Cherry does not at present care for, seeing that he is gaining in his present employment as Commanding Officer of a Regiment more rupees than he would receive if made a Colonel with the Colonel's allowances. But for which command there can be no doubt, that after 40 years' Indian service it is time for the man, and the

service of the Army, for an Officer to quit, and the bestowal of the Colonel's allowance would at once cause him to give up his Régimental command.

There are many ungenerous measures which undoubtedly a Government can do towards servants, but the question is wisely asked, Is it wise, just, or right so to act as to create inimical feelings in the breasts of servants? The antagonism which has been created by the recent measures connected with the Indian Army, between the servants of the State and the Government, is one of the most lamentable consequences of the new mode of administering the affairs of our great Empire in India. However wise or sagacious the views of the Statesman are who planned these measure may be considered, it evinces but little tact and knowledge of the way of governing the minds of men for that Statesman so to act towards a good body of servants, as to give rise to discontent on those minor details, and to raise up an opposition which cannot but injure the principles on which the measures are based. The distrust, fear, and anxiety pervading the minds of all Officers—even the Staff Corps Officers—lest further uncalled-for invasions of customary rights and privileges, or the further introduction of novel arrangements confounding and perplexing all, as to their meaning and object, distract the attention of the servants, from the affairs of the Service, to their own personal affairs; and that zealous and devoted concentration of thought for the public business, which the commercial character of the East India Company so forcibly imbued into the minds of their servants, as an essential element of good service, is now weakened if not destroyed, and Indian service, instead of being loved, is loathed. The Committee of Officers can only earnestly beseech all interested in the common good of our country, to endeavour to restore the former contentment by affording a full and open, but just inquiry into the complaints of the Officers.

An examination of the various official papers laid before Parliament containing suggestions from experienced Officers, will show that respect for the rights of old Officers to succeed to the benefit of Colonels' allowances has been inculcated by all who have written on the Army arrangements; there is one collection of papers laid before Parliament, No. 330, of 1860, on the motion of Sir C. Wood, which, therefore, from that one cause, attracts special notice, but the more so as the contents of that collection were used to prepare the public mind for the alterations which Sir C. Wood subsequently made in the Army system of India. The evidence afforded by these papers favourable for his object having been used, the parts favourable to the claims of the Officers of the Army ought fairly to be used. All the writers of the papers of that collection, without exception, have expressed unusually strong opinions on the head of respect for the fair claims, recognized by the rules established by Government and created by the performance of good Service, urging the authorities to be scrupulously careful in allowing to the existing ranks those benefits they had expected to derive from the Service. Indeed, Sir W. Mansfield (page 173 of 330 of 1860) very expressively states that "the business of the senior Officers is more difficult and more ticklish;" and in the subsequent page, he adds, "it is but fair to the present generation of Officers that it should benefit by the non-effective

“allowances possessed by the old Generals, it being in fact part of the bargain of the Act of Parliament, therefore the most equitable, as well as the easiest plan, will be to let the Officers of the Army thoroughly understand that until the last man of them has been absorbed, either by death or full-pay retirement, they will not have lost their chance of the emoluments now held by the old Generals as Colonels of Regiments. To get rid of the anomaly of Colonels of Regiments, the latter having no existence, there should be an establishment of a given number of General Officers, entitled to receive a consolidated retiring allowance of £950 per annum.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Norman, who originally suggested to Sir C. Wood the idea of a Staff Corps, plainly and explicitly (page 190 of No. 330 of 1860) showed unanswerable arguments in an entire Section, No. XI, devoted to this one part of the Army question, as to the rights and claims of old Officers to enjoy the Colonels' allowances, and closed the Section by urging the Secretary of State “not to deprive the Officers of that for which they have toiled as their eventual reward after years of exile.” And Lord Hotham's Committee (Report No. 30, of 1861, House of Lords' Return; also House of Commons, No. 77, March 5, 1861) earnestly advised the Secretary of State, to respect the expectations long entertained by old Officers; that they would eventually obtain the Colonels' allowances, the great prize, for which, for forty years of exile and service, they had toiled in the hopes of reaping the fruits of such labour.

The Commission over which Lord Cranworth presided devoted a considerable portion of their Report to prove the limited extent to which injury would be sustained by some individual Officers, from the acts of Sir C. Wood, and that the mass of Officers suffer no injury; but the argument, if in any way just, ought to have induced this Commission either to inquire into such individual grievances, or else to express some opinion as to the principle on which they ought to be settled. The argument only proves that the acts of the Court of Directors in the 1824 arrangements, when the interests of some individual Officers were also in question, were, as the Court's Original Despatches show, as guardedly looked after and compensated for, as those of the general mass, and that the Court's voluntary precautions in favour of individual cases are in great contrast with those of the measures of 1861, ordered by Sir C. Wood, which ignored these individual cases, and left the complainants entirely at his mercy:

But the grievances of the Indian Army are made up of individual grievances, and whilst they have been constrained to appeal as individuals and not as a body, the Lord Cranworth Commission reversed the course, and considered the grievances in groups, ignoring all individual complaints. By this course the individual as well as the Army case, has been damnified by both being exposed to the assaults of Sir C. Wood, which one skilled in the use of words can so easily make most telling; by being able first to decry a few individual appeals, and then to impute to all in like classes the discredit, only due, if at all, to a portion of the appeals. Now in the Army, the regulations entitle a soldier to complain of any individual grievance, and enjoin on the General who inspects

the Regiment, to investigate and report fully on every individual complaint preferred, and Lord Cranworth's Commission was formed so to inquire and report, but did not fulfil either the office of investigator of individual grievances, nor an inquiring and deciding authority for fixing the conditions on which the few complaints they admit to exist could be disposed of, and Sir C. Wood has availed himself of the afforded opening, to give an insufficient measure of redress for the wrongs suffered by the Officers.

Further, the claim which Sir C. Wood makes, that he has incurred a large expenditure in improving the position of the Officers of the Indian Army is but little to be taken into account, when it is known that, that outlay has mainly been caused by giving extensive military advancement to Staff Corps Officers, already well provided for in their Staff allowances, whilst the relatively small outlay needed to satisfy old and worn-out Officers in their fair claim to Colonels' allowances, is withheld.

Judging from the Army Lists, there are, but relatively, few Lieut.-Colonels promoted before 1861, and those few are of long service; even if these were allowed the rule which Sir C. Wood has fixed for the Staff Corps Officers, and which will eventually apply to all Officers of this favoured Corps, that 38 years' total service is sufficient to entitle them to the prize of the Service; then if he were to apply the like period to the Lieut.-Colonels of the Indian Army of date before 1861, the policy would only be in harmony with that liberality which the Court of Directors practised in 1824. The 38 years' average is far in excess of the average which could be struck, on the period of service passed by all Colonels who in this century have obtained the Colonel's allowance.

The question is in this unsatisfactory state, that it has been left by the Lord Cranworth Commission unsettled; though the general principle of 12 years on which the Secretary of State's most recent rule is based has not been approved; the Commission failed to inquire into the individual sufferings merely because they were stated to be few in number, and the Secretary of State in his 194 Despatch of 1864, virtually announces that, because he has been liberal to younger Officers of the Staff Corps it is not necessary to be just to the old Officers.

The course followed in respect to an inquiry into transactions connected with the claims of upwards of 6,000 Officers of the Indian Army, exhibit a peculiarly distinctive feature in the mode of investigating the grievances arising out of the details of measures of the present Secretary of State for India, that course exhibits a marked difference between the one followed and the open and fair inquiry which the Government have accorded to the claims of other Officers of the British Army.

For instance, the question of purchase in the Army, so deeply affecting the interests of all Officers, was investigated in the most open manner, and evidence from all classes of Officers taken on the subject—the inquiry into the claims of a few old Officers, known as the "Army Generals," who, after a lapse of 40 years, had their case publicly inquired into by a Select Committee of the House of

Commons—of the case known as the “Distinguished Officers,” was also publicly and openly inquired into, and the great advocate of the claims of this small class of Officers, Major-General Lindsay, was appointed one of the Commissioners, who received and heard with patience the evidence to be given by individual claimants; the most recent case, that of the “Quarter-Masters,” is, however, one of the most marked,—a Commission was fairly selected, composed of Officers, the majority acquainted with the Service, interested in the good feeling of this small but deserving class, and was presided over by Major-General Eyre, distinguished for his considerate character in all Army arrangements. The Officers composing the names of the majority of the Commission, on the case of the Quarter-Masters, are all Officers well acquainted with the Military Service; the minority of the Commission, appointed on behalf of the War Office, being also sufficient in number and character to ensure an impartial inquiry on behalf of the Government. The Commission allowed General Sir F. Smith to appear before them to plead the claims of the Quarter-Masters, and likewise heard the evidence of a number of Quarter-Masters, deputed to give evidence and to meet objections of any kind urged against their claims. Now this class, only about 200 in number for the whole Army, most, if not all, advanced from the ranks, have had their grievances listened to, in a form more in accord with an impartial trial, than the course followed in respect to the grievances of 6,000 Indian Officers.

Further, the manner in which any encroachment on the rights and position of the Officers of the Royal Artillery by the attempt of the Secretary of State for War to incorporate a Militia Corps of Artillery with the Royal Artillery, to which Captain Jervis alluded in his speech of the 2nd May, exhibits, in a marked manner, the power of resistance which the Royal Artillery Officers possess, from their social and political influence to set aside, the most favourite scheme of a Secretary of State.

Now of the names of the 14 Commissioners who served on the two recent Commissions connected with the Indian Army, only three out of the whole number belong to the Indian Service, and none of these three can be said to be regimental Officers, for all served long on the Staff; the large majority of the Commissioners were entirely unconnected with India, excepting always Lord Ellenborough, and few of the English statesmen selected have had any Indian experience; moreover, though the questions were numerous, and the individual complaints still more numerous, also deeply affecting the Cavalry, Engineers, and Artillery, yet no Officers of these branches belonged to the Commission, and no one was called to clear up doubts, nor any one Officer allowed to appear before the Commission on behalf of the absent Officers.

The statements made by the India Office and sent to the Lord Cranworth Commission against the cases of the Indian Officers, were withheld from the Committee of Officers acting on behalf of the absent Officers, though the statements prepared by the Committee and sent to the Lord Cranworth Commission were given to the India Office by Lord Cranworth for criticism. To the earnest solicitation of the Committee to allow evidence to be given in support of or in

explanation of claims prepared by individual Officers, the Commissioners saw fit to withhold assent, nay, even to refuse a reply to this request. Contrast the course followed in 1838 by the Duke of Wellington, as chairman of the Commission on the grievances of the Marine Officers, whose discontent as set forth in a Petition presented to Parliament, was fairly and fully inquired into, and Sir R. Williams, Colonel of Marines, a member of the Commission, was first examined as the organ of the Officers, and invited by the Duke to produce oral evidence in support of the case; thereupon he brought forward several Officers of Marines whose evidence was justly taken and recorded. A most careful investigation was followed by an elaborately prepared Report, as a reference to this valuable document will prove. It is a model Report for all after Reports, supported as it is by the great Duke's authority. It was, though of an elaborate character, yet finished on March 26, 1840, and at once laid before both Houses of Parliament.

It will be clear, from the character of the above explanation, that it is of the greatest importance to enable all to judge rightly, to expose separately the nature of the detailed measures which have given rise to the discontent of the Officers of the Indian Army. Without this, it is almost impossible to clear away the confusion which the Secretary of State for India creates by pleading that the discontent springs out of general causes, arising out of measures of State policy, whereas his explanations are in defence of detailed Orders he has issued, solely from which, as the Officers maintain, have arisen these grievances; for instance, the very broad terms "Amalgamation," "Changes of Organization," and "Reduction of Strength," "Formation of Irregular Regiments," so freely asserted by Sir C. Wood as the cause of the Indian grievances, are all words applicable to complicated State questions of the highest order, with which the Government have an undoubted right to deal; but, inasmuch that Sir C. Wood first employs words suitable to one term of a general character, then at another time uses words as convenient, suitable to an explanation of his detailed orders, and as the former or State terms, to which Sir C. Wood finds it sometimes useful to impute the cause of all the grievances, are words strongly calculated to convey to the minds of English statesmen, the very unjust imputation, that the Officers of the Indian Army seek to constrain Government to make concessions on important principles, which would be wrong for any Government to yield, it is therefore incumbent on the Committee of Officers to disavow, in the most explicit manner, that the Officers of the Indian Army seek in any form or shape, to obtain from the State any concessions in violation of the just rights of Government; the Committee have all along desired to narrow the discussion of these individual grievances to those injuries from the details of the arrangements out of which, as the Petitions and Memorials prove, the complaints of individual Officers have actually arisen; the question as to the correctness of the measures in principle, may safely be left to statesmen and time to prove their fitness.

No doubt it would be a highly advantageous measure in favour of the case of the Officers, if a Commission could be formed of the ablest and most experienced statesmen and soldiers of our native land to review the whole course

of State Policy followed by Sir C. Wood, and then to judge how far the interests of Officers have been unnecessarily affected, by the necessary measure which the State for the public good had seen fit to enforce, and how far these measures needed modifying, so as, without injury to the public good, the wronged interests of the servants of the State could be protected or compensated. The Committee acting on behalf of the Officers in India proudly assert that devotion and respect for the public weal are as strongly implanted in the breasts of the Officers of the Indian Army, and as sincerely displayed for the public weal as by any other class of British subjects, and all that they ask is, that for good services they may receive the honest and just treatment which the nation so readily awards to all who have well served, and that measures of State policy may not be allowed to bear harshly or unjustly on men who have served long and faithfully.

It is of great importance here to point out that the transfer of the Army to the Crown did not necessarily entail on Sir C. Wood any alteration in the Military system, such as he has made, not only in details, but on the great basis of the Service; this is shown by the fact that the transfer did not require the Army to be placed under the command of the General commanding Her Majesty's forces at the Horse Guards, for, by a return moved for by the Right Honourable Mr. Horsman (471 of 1860), the claim preferred by the General-Commanding-in-Chief in 1858 to exercise the control over the Indian forces, though supported by the Secretary of State for War, was refused by the Secretary of State for India, who declared that the Act 21 & 22 Vict., cap. 106, merely declared the forces of the East India Company to be the India forces of Her Majesty, and practically the transfer was made from one governing authority to another, and the system of the Indian Army continued for 1858, without necessarily involving any of the radical changes ordered by Sir C. Wood in 1861.

This explanation is necessary, seeing that the term "Amalgamation," for instance, has often been employed to denote the main source of all the grievances of the Officers of the Indian Army; it is necessary, once for all, to state that this word was originally applied to the transfer of the Army of India from the East India Directors to Her Majesty, whereby it became a part of the Military Forces of Her Majesty, and thereby "Amalgamated." Now no individual grievance whatever, as far as the Committee are aware, has been based on this portion of the change in the Military system of India; the resumption by Her Majesty of the direct rule of India necessarily caused the transfer of the Army from the East India Company to the Crown, and the Officers of the Indian Army too well knew and practised the willing obedience they owe to the Queen to presume to raise any claim, arising out of the change. The grave question as to whether the Secretary of State for India should retain the control over the Indian Forces, or whether the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief should exercise the control, is one that the Officers have never mooted in Petitions, opinions they hold as to the fitness of the existing arrangement, and they have a right to their opinions about rendering obedience to the constituted authorities,

The further plea of "great reductions" in the Native Army, invariably urged by Sir C. Wood in defence of the course of policy pursued by him in respect to the military changes in India, was again prominently put forward in reply to Captain Jervis, as one of the causes of the grievances complained of. "There are other questions besides the amalgamation, there is the alteration of the whole organization of the Indian Army, and the extraordinary reduction of that Army, and many of the complaints which have been ascribed to the amalgamation are really referable to the reduction." Here again the Secretary of State blends two distinct principles; the changes in the organization which were ordered by the Secretary of State, contrary, as Colonel Durand stated in a recorded Minute, to the views of Lord Canning, the Governor-General, and opposed, as Mr. Willoughby stated, to sound policy, and by both shown to be in violation of Military organization and of sound financial reasons; whereas the reductions in numerical strength were ordered by Lord Canning, and carried out by him in his own mode, without even having a single complaint from any Officer; the detailed orders for violent and unprecedented changes in the Indian Army organization were prescribed by Sir C. Wood in 1861, and it is against the arrangements springing out of details connected with the changes in organization that the Officers appeal and pray to be allowed to show that they have entailed on individuals an amount of suffering, not necessary for the public good.

Now in several other parts of his speech, Sir C. Wood refers to the "Reduction" in the strength of the Indian Army as the origin of the grievances, claims credit for having effected it, and states that "in the Indian Army, as it existed before the Mutiny,—and that is the fairest period to take, looking to the original state of things,—there were 176 Regular and 108 Irregular Regiments, the difference being in the number of Officers," &c. In another part of his speech, he states "that our whole force, including the Native Army and Contingent, numbered, previous to the Mutiny, 265,000 men. We therefore reduced the Native Army by 135,000 men, or by 135 Regiments, of which 50 to 75 were regular troops. Consequent upon this reduction there would naturally be a number of supernumerary Officers." The explanation below given will show how far the claimed merit of reduction of strength, which is popular with every statesman of England, can be claimed by Sir C. Wood in support of his novel organization.

The official Reports, laid before the House of Commons by the India Office, vary so much in the nature, character, and arrangement of their information, that it becomes doubtful how far one Return can be used to throw discredit on another. There is, however, one Return which was laid before the House on the motion of Mr. H. Baillie (No. 201, of 1858), which does not bear out Sir C. Wood's statement of the former strength of the Native Army, or the number of Regiments of Irregulars. It shows that in 1857 there were 176 Regular Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry—*viz.* 155 of Regular Infantry, and 21 of Regular Cavalry. Their total number, 176, tallies with Sir C. Wood's statement, but the same Return only shows 78 Irregular Infantry and Cavalry Regiments instead of 108 as stated by

Sir C. Wood, while the strength of the Native Army, instead of being 265,000 men, is given as follows:—

	REGIMENTS.	MEN.
Regular Cavalry	21	9,532
„ Infantry	155	149,832
Irregular Cavalry	33	20,941
„ Infantry	45	35,215
Total	254	215,520

The difference between Sir C. Wood's numbers and those of the official Return is 30 Regiments and 50,000 men. No doubt the discrepancy may be susceptible of reconciliation, but it can only be done by those who have access to official documents, not before Parliament.

Now there is, perhaps, every reason to suppose that this marked discrepancy between a statement made by the Secretary of State in 1865 to justify the changes made within the last few years, and a Return compiled nine years since, may be reconciled, by showing that there were other Corps or bodies of men existing in 1857 besides those entered in that Return; but if this be admitted, then there are at present other Forces of Natives which must be added to the existing Native Military Force, which will largely swell its strength. In the 1855 Return No. 201, the Battalions and Regiments then employed as Police Corps are included, and, necessarily, for the sake of right comparison, those men now employed as Constabulary and Police ought also to be included in the total of the existing strength of the Native Force. By a Return (No. 67, of 1865) moved for by Mr. Seymour, the number of these Police at this date is stated at 154,435 men; and from the same Return we learn that the Native Force in India is as follows:—

	CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.	TOTAL.
Native Troops	17,490	95,291	= 112,781
Organized Levies	1,469	3,976	= 5,445
Contingents	4,693	9,148	= 13,841
	<u>23,652</u>	<u>108,415</u>	<u>= 132,067</u>
Native Police	= 154,435
Ggrand Total at present	<u>= 286,502</u>

It may be admitted that the inclusion of the Police Force of 154,435 men with the present Native Military strength, involves for correct comparison a similar inclusion of that Police of the former period; but as the Returns laid before Parliament do not afford the information immediately before the Mutiny, a reference to Return 174, of 1855, moved for by Sir Erskine Perry, shows 24,015 organized Military Police about the year 1855. This Return also shows that there

were 233,699. Native Troops and 30,882 Subsidiary Troops and Contingents, giving, with the Police, about the year 1855, a grand total of 288,596 men, including all classes, *viz.* Native Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, Invalids, and Veterans. But as Sir C. Wood's recent statement, obviously, only refers to Cavalry and Infantry, then if we allow a deduction of 30,000 for all the other branches of the Service, we obtain a total of 258,000 Cavalry, Infantry, and Police, as existing in 1855. But the abstract from Return No. 67, of 1865, shows, however, that there is at present a total of 286,502 of Cavalry, Infantry, and Police, which is 28,000 more than existed ten years ago! Moreover, this present total of 286,000 men is 21,000 in excess of 265,000, at which Sir C. Wood states in his recent speech it stood previous to the Mutiny; and it is obvious that the Native Force has thus, according to these returns, been increased instead of reduced, whereas Sir C. Wood states: "We have reduced the Native Army by 135,000 men."

Sir C. Wood also stated, in his recent speech, that there were before the Mutiny 176 Regular and 108 Irregular Regiments, in all 284, and that he reduced 135 of these Regiments, necessarily leaving only 149 Regiments existing at present; but on examining the Army Lists, there appear to be at present 189 Regiments of Native Cavalry and Native Infantry in India.

In his speech, Sir C. Wood also stated that he had substituted Irregular for Regular Regiments. Now it is of importance to bear in mind that the Government of India has invariably raised or disbanded Irregular Regiments at the pleasure of Government, without ever engendering any complaints from Officers; but the reduction of Regular Regiments has always been cautiously dealt with, and has been admitted by the ablest statesmen to be one of the special and peculiar difficulties connected with our Indian rule, and advisedly deserving of cautious treatment such as the late measures do not bear any evidence of.

Here it is necessary to explain that prior to the Mutiny, there were, as in 1861 when Sir C. Wood made the changes, only establishments of Officers sufficient for 176 Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry, that is, there were, instead of 23 Officers to each, as he recently stated, as many as 26 Officers for each Regiment of Native Infantry, in different Ranks, rising by seniority in each Regiment as vacancies occurred. The Court of Directors did in 1824 fix the establishment of Officers for all arms of the service at 23 for each battalion, but at that time only two or three Officers were needed for the general purposes of the State to be taken from Regimental duty. At the present date there are, therefore, actually more Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry than there were Regular Regiments in 1857, for whom complete establishments of Officers were allowed.

However numerous the number of Irregular Regiments might be, the few Officers needed for their discipline were drawn from the fixed establishment of Officers of the 176 Regular Regiments. But these Irregular Corps, as well as

General Staff employment, being lucrative offices, and far more popular than doing Regimental duty with the 176 Regular Service Corps, the Officers needed for their occupation and discipline were appointed by Government, and were at once withdrawn as needed by the State from the Regular Service Regiments, without much regard to the efficiency or number of the Officers left behind.

Sir C. Wood in his recent speech defended the formation of the Staff Corps on the plea stated that the practice of withdrawing Officers from Regiments had been described as the ruin almost of the Indian Army, and that the Officers left with Regiments were discouraged and kept back by such withdrawals, but he omitted to state that it was not the withdrawal of 2 or 3 Officers from each Regiment of Regulars, for if the withdrawals had been restricted to that number the Act would have been a most useful stimulus to the remaining Officers to qualify for Staff employments; and, as Sir John Lawrence so pointedly stated in one of his replies, that nothing could be more depressing or injurious to the efficiency of the Officers and of the Army, than the cessation of this practice. But it was the excessive numbers withdrawn, even more than 7 Officers out of the limited establishment of each Regular Regiment (*vide* Return 194 of Sept. 2, of 1857) which caused the injury.

The necessity for withdrawing many Officers from each Regiment had largely increased since 1824, and was occasioned by the very evil which Sir C. Wood has extended, *viz.* the increasing number of Irregular Regiments, as also Civil duties, the best Officers for Military qualities being occasionally the first to be selected by Commanding Officers for these Irregular Corps, whereby the withdrawals were felt. The want of a sufficient establishment of Officers for Regiments proportionate to the increased calls was therefore the real evil, against which the Indian authorities contended.

The Committee, therefore, acting on behalf of the Indian Officers call special attention to this important fact, and to express their belief that, so far from the saving of 330,000*l.* which Sir C. Wood claims as having been effected by the employment of Irregular, in lieu of Regular Regiments, that the cost of these Corps will eventually be in excess of the former real charge for Regular Regiments, seeing that whatever number of Officers may be fixed on as those to be effective, and present with these Irregular Corps, and possessed of special aptitude, must be drawn from a body of Officers greater in number than the former establishment of Officers.

But the last act of the Court of Directors prior to the Mutiny to correct the evil of insufficiency of Officers was set forth in a Despatch of 10 September, 1856 (Return 194 of 1857), reviewing in an elaborate manner the practice of withdrawing Officers from Regiments, and as it quoted the opinions of Sir C. Napier, of Lord Dalhousie, and others, the Despatch may be viewed as containing the concentrated essence of all the wisdom derived from the 60 years' experience of the Regimental organization, created on the advice of the Marquis Cornwallis.

Under that Despatch, the establishment of Officers of Regiments was added to, in order to meet the increasing demands which the public service for Officers caused to be withdrawn, and very properly ends, in enjoining the presence, always in time of peace, with regular Regiments, of 13 Officers of experience, knowledge, and character, besides the young Ensigns; and, in time of war, the Court directed every available Officer detached from the Regiment should forthwith rejoin it. As Sir C. Wood, in the recent debate, quoted the name of the late Lord Dalhousie as being in favour of Irregular Regiments, and as this kind of organization is mixed up with the idea that a few Officers, from 2 to 6, are the usual complement, it is of great importance to bear in mind that the above Despatch, fixing 13 trained Officers as the requisite complement of effectives, is evidently based on advice given by Lord Dalhousie.

The arbitrary alteration recently made by Sir C. Wood of the name from "Regular" with many Officers, to "Irregular" with few Officers, vitiates the standard of comparison which before existed as to the real nature of the Native Army kept up. The Directors' Despatch, above quoted, rightly defined the character of the Irregular Service "to be of two kinds, first, 'Local Corps,' not "only raised but recruited from among the people in newly-acquired territory; "secondly, 'Irregulars;' in either case, with a complement of three or at most "four Officers, selected solely on account of their perfect qualifications for a "peculiar but very effective Service." It is deserving of notice, that in the last century, the establishment of effective Officers, with each Battalion of 640 Sepoys was 10 Officers, and that this number being considered insufficient, the 1796 organization was passed in order to increase the number. The 1861 legislation provides for only half of the number of combatant Officers deemed insufficient 65 years before.

But Sir C. Wood desires to impress on the Members of the House of Commons, that, besides reductions in numerical strength, which he states as one cause of grievance, that the "Irregular" System of Organization, described as the child of Sir John Lawrence, is also one cause of the grievances of the Officers, but he omits to state, that accepting the principle on which this organization is based, as having been decided on just Military grounds—of which there is no proof—then by the mode he has followed in ordering it to be carried out, whereby he of necessity must convert two-thirds of the number of all the Indian Regular Regiments, which existed in 1857, into Irregulars, he thereby exposed all Officers on their fixed establishment to the irregular and partial treatment which selection for Staff duties in former years, so often attended the withdrawal of Officers from their Regiments.

The Committee of Officers maintain that while the principle of the "Irregular" measure is open for discussion by statesmen, as recently so clearly done by Lord Ellenborough, yet that inasmuch as the grievances of the Officers spring out of the detailed orders issued by Sir C. Wood for making this conversion, whereby the Regimental Officers were put aside, and Staff Corps Officers preferred, and have had all their expectations, privileges, and rights entirely destroyed, as the

state of the Commands of Irregular Corps in the Bengal Army proves, that they are entitled to complain of the course of action, and to seek for redress of grievances unduly and unnecessarily inflicted, or if inflicted from State necessity, that a favourable view be taken of their case.

Some explanation is needed in respect to the practice of mixing up of Police with purely military troops, which formerly so constantly prevailed in India; to this end it must not be lost sight of, that a great, and it is hoped, permanent revolution has recently taken place in respect to the cessation of the employment on Police duties of the Native Military Force in India. Formerly the Regular and Irregular Troops were constantly employed in various miscellaneous duties, which, in the opinion of the late Sir C. Napier, and of other distinguished authorities, entailed on them great and serious deterioration in discipline. That remarkable report, dated 27th November, 1849, of Sir C. Napier to the Duke of Wellington, on the Military State of India (Return 219, of 1857), clearly, and almost with a prophetic vision, urged "that a Constabulary Force should be formed that leaves the Military to their own duties," and it is to be regretted that the advice had not been attended to before the Mutiny.

In that most important Despatch above quoted, dated 10th September, 1856 (Return 194, of 1857), which the Court of Directors ever penned, they gave orders, unfortunately eight years after Sir C. Napier wrote—which had not been carried out when the Mutiny of 1857 broke out—that the employment of ordinary Police Guards or Guards of Irregular Corps should be resorted to in preference to the employment of Regular Troops, and urged, that by this and other means, "the number of men necessary for service might be diminished."

When this Despatch was received, Lord Dalhousie had returned to Europe, and the difficulties connected with the after Mutiny began to be felt, otherwise had the Government enjoyed leisure, so as to have attended to this advice, there can be no doubt that the measures urged in this Despatch, would have had great and important bearings on the fidelity of the Military Force in India, and would have resulted in a considerable diminution of strength, prior to the Mutiny, of the purely Military Force of India.

It was owing to the great change after the Mutiny effected by Lord Canning, in the creation of a Police or Constabulary Force, separately administered, and entirely distinct from the Army Force, which enabled his Government to form the plans for diminishing largely the strength of the Native Army; but this great reform had been in progress, and had been planned for all India, before those changes, in the organization of the Army, to which the Petitioners ascribe their grievances, had ever been ordered by Sir C. Wood.

It is of great importance to show that this reduction of strength actually preceded, or was planned by the Government of India, before the Secretary of State's Orders of January, 1861, and out of which have sprung the complaints of the Officers. Return No. 599, of 1861, moved for by Col. Sykes, shows that the

Military Finance Commission, in the 164th Para. of their Report, dated 30th April, 1860, some months before Lord Hotham's Commission assembled, reported, that by the progress, up to November, 1859, of the new Police or Constabulary arrangements in the Madras Presidency, 31 out of 91 Detachments of Regular Native Infantry had been relieved by Police, and that as the Police arrangements proceeded, the remaining 60 Detachments would also be relieved. Also, that the total strength of these 91 Detachments was calculated to be about 120 Companies, or equal to about 15 Regiments.

Return No. 201, of 1858, shows that in 1857 there were no Irregular Regiments in the Madras Presidency, and that the Regular Regiments, comprising Cavalry and Infantry, were 60 in number, and that at present, according to the Army Lists, there are only 44; the reduction of 16 Regiments, since ordered in Madras, having, according to available official documents, been rendered quite practicable by this transfer of duties from the Military to the Police, at least 15 months before Sir C. Wood caused the Staff Corps to be created, and that this reduction had been contemplated antecedent to November, 1859, and therefore irrespective of alterations which Sir C. Wood planned in the organization; it is therefore not from diminution of Military strength, but out of the special rules laid down by him for the very favourable advancement of the Corps of Staff Officers, formed for Staff duties, and for the Irregular Regiments, that the Regimental Officers sustain relative disadvantages.

As Sir C. Wood strongly puts forward the plea that he has greatly benefited the Regimental Officers by the recent changes, it is only just to admit that since 1861 the Regimental Officers have doubtless gained some advantages, but the Committee confidently assert that, if the original orders of January, 1861, had not been appealed against, some, if not all, of these advantages would not have been obtained. Further, that many of the benefits have resulted from accident, and not from design. Moreover, the acceleration of promotion for which Sir C. Wood recently claimed credit, in the Field Officers' grades of the Indian Army, is not borne out by a very detailed and excellent statement which Mr. Melvill, the Military Secretary of the Indian Office, laid before the Commission on Army Purchase, on 30th May, 1856.

It is therefore justifiable to assert, that if the Court of Directors' Orders of 1856 had been carried out before the Mutiny in 1857, by the purely Military Force being freed from the numerous miscellaneous duties which impaired its discipline, such as escorting treasure, guarding gaols, convicts, &c., and its entire strength disposable for military purposes exclusively, and if this result had then been brought about by the introduction of the more recently established Police or Constabulary system then, the strength of the Police Force, as now existing, should either be included in the present total military strength of the Indian Army, or if excluded, then the portion of the military force existing before the Mutiny, and employed as the Court of Directors stated, as Police, should for exact comparison be also stated, so as to allow of the numbers maintained, for like purposes at different periods, being clearly seen,

It is therefore hoped that the above explanation will show that in 1856, the Court of Directors, though foreseeing and instigating great reductions in the Military strength, actually in the same Despatch contemplated and ordered important measures to improve the then regular Regimental system of the Indian Army. The injunctions in that same Despatch, so far from contemplating a departure from the Regimental organization, materially strengthened it, and actually enjoined the more strict enforcement of the quality and number of Officers serving with regular Regiments, as the one great good which Sir C. Napier and Lord Dalhousie had maturely advised, as the great desideratum for rendering our military system efficient.

The present Staff Corps formed by Sir C. Wood as a counter remedy to the one devised by the Court of Directors is therefore a novel experiment, based on no Military authority amongst the past able administrators of India, and being without that solid foundation, on which the former Regimental organization of India, as also that of every other Army, has ever rested, it will yet have to be reconsidered, in order that its inherent defects may be corrected, if possible.

Its entire success depends on the source from whence efficient Officers can be obtained. So far back as 1859 Sir W. Mansfield, in a letter to Lord De Grey (Return 330 of 1860, page 172), intimated that "each Royal Regiment should have an establishment of Supernumerary Officers to supply the constant drafts for Staff appointments." The drain, therefore, for Officers for the 189 Native Indian Regiments still kept up, and for the Staff duties of India, instead of being as formerly drawn from the establishment allowed to the 176 Regular Regiments of India, must fall on the establishment maintained for the British Regiments, and must be paid for; thus the irregular system becomes dependent on a new source, which will be fully as expensive to India as the former one, nay, far more so, for out of every 25 Officers serving with a Regiment of European Troops, if Officers from that source can be obtained, equal to those who have made the irregular system famous, the Government will be specially fortunate, and will have to maintain 25 Officers with each Regiment, in order to receive a supply of five or seven Officers.

In order that there may be no doubt as to the character of the Forces existing prior to the Mutiny, Return No. 21, of 1863, moved for by Mr. Kinnaird, proves that the Regiment of Bhagulpoor Hill Rangers, one of the Military Regiments before the Mutiny, was, on the occasion of making the 1861 reductions in the Military Forces, absorbed into the Police, as were also the Mhairwarrah Local Battalion and the Arracan Battalion. And it is believed that a number of other Corps formerly kept on the Rolls of the Army were transferred to the Constabulary Force.

Another and distinct view of the reductions in strength to which Sir C. Wood attributes the changes in the organization of the Indian Army, and out of which he states have sprung the grievances of the Officers, should be taken with particular and special regard to the dates when the measures involving these changes were first taken into consideration by Sir C. Wood.

By Return 330, of 24th May, 1860, page 180, it appears that on the 2nd February, 1860, Lieut.-Col. Norman, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, being then in England on furlough, submitted, by desire of Sir C. Wood, suggestions on various points connected with the Indian Army. Now the first time that any mention is made in any official document, hitherto laid before Parliament, of any intended departure from the established and thoroughly recognized principle of succession rise by Regimental seniority, from the grade of Ensign to that of Field Officer, is set forth at page 184 of Lieut.-Col. Norman's scheme. The change, from regular rise by seniority, to promotion by purely length of service, is therein strongly advocated. The number of years' service to entitle an Officer to rise, through the various grades between Ensign and Colonel, is exactly the same as that which Lord Hotham's Committee subsequently set forth in their Report to the Secretary of State.

On the 30th July, 1860, Sir C. Wood appointed a Commission for the purpose of preparing suggestions for the various detailed measures for effecting the amalgamation of the Line and Indian Armies with that of the Crown. The members of that Committee were:—

Lieut.-Gen. the Lord Hotham,	Colonel Sir P. Melvill, Indian Service.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Yorke,	Lieut.-Col. Wetherall,
Major-Gen. Clarke, Indian Service.	Lieut.-Col. Norman, Indian Service.
Brigadier-Gen. Russell,	

An examination of the characters, previous service, and general fitness of members of former Commissions assembled on many previous occasions to investigate analogous subjects connected with the British Army, though often of far less magnitude to the whole body of Officers than those connected with the Indian Army, laid before the above Commissioners, will afford a most marked contrast, in favour of the selection of the Members composing the British Army Commissions as to their suitableness, by previous training for the inquiries, than can be said to arise from the like examination of the names and services of the above Commissioners.

This Committee submitted their Report on the 30th August, one month after appointment. It embraces all branches of the Indian Service, and advises alterations on the principles and details of every Military arrangement, which for 65 years had been under consideration of the ablest and most experienced Statesmen and Soldiers, the Indian Empire has ever had; it is sufficient to say that the Report suggests thorough changes in nearly all the Military arrangements of the Empire.

But there is no trace of any evidence having been taken, nor the opinions of a single Officer of India asked for, nor any inquiries made by the Commissioners, of any human being, on the momentous questions reported on. Experience has already proved that the Report of this Commission has seriously affected the great interests of the Indian Empire, as also those of upwards of 6,000 British Officers.

Probably, there never has, in history, ever been so vast a departure advised from all previously recognized principles of Military organization, nor by any nation accepted and carried out, on such brief investigation, so little inquiry, and by a body of Officers so little experienced in the country and services to which the questions discussed appertained.

The Commission commenced in their Report by prominently and strongly recommending an entire change of the system of promotion from the Regimental rise established in 1796, to one of mere length of service, such as now characterizes the Staff Corps organization. The various periods of service for Promotion, mentioned in Lord Hotham's Report, as sufficient in this novel Corps, viz. 12 years' service for attaining the substantive rank of Captain, 20 years that of Major, 26 years that of Lieutenant-Colonel, and 5 more that of Colonel, so exactly agreed with those suggested to Sir C. Wood, in the previous month of February, by Lieut.-Col. Norman, it may be reasonably presumed that the Committee adopted that Officer's previous expressed views, and advised the Secretary of State to carry them out.

It is essentially important to notice that this advised change of the Indian Military organization, and in the long established system of promotion by Regimental rise to one of mere service by numbers of years, does not appear to have been made by the Committee in connection with, or in reference to, the future strength of the Indian Army, or to any specific reduction therein. The alteration suggested was fully as applicable to the large strength existing at the date of the report, as to the smaller force, which was in existence in 1861, when carried into effect.

In the month of January, 1861, or 6 months after the Report of Lord Hotham's Committee, Sir C. Wood, in Despatch dated 18th January, 1861, to the Government of India, ordered the formation of the Staff Corps, in which the promotion was to be regulated by length of service, the periods being the same as those suggested by Lieut.-Col. Norman and recommended by Lord Hotham's Committee,

But no allusion is made in this Despatch by Sir C. Wood either to that Officer's recommendation, or to the Report of Lord Hotham's Committee, and as the Report in question was not presented to Parliament until March, 1861 (House of Lords' Return, 30, of 4th March, 1861; House of Commons, 77, of 5th March, 1861), nor until long after the Despatches had reached India, no action could be taken by Parliament, before the orders were carried out, to prevent the infringement of the guarantee which had been given to the Officers of the Indian Army, such as is now declared by Lord Cranworth's Committee to have followed from the advice contained in the Report of Lord Hotham's Committee,

It is true that the advice tendered was adopted by Sir C. Wood without any acknowledgment as to the originators, and it was ordered to be carried out in

India, by the Government, without any freedom of action, as to modifications in respect to minor details. The entire responsibility rests on Sir C. Wood; indeed, all the Despatches of January, 1861, conveying the orders for the entire subversion of the Military system of India, are written in the name, and expressed by the authority of, Her Majesty's Government—the Council of India was not even alluded to in any one of the Despatches. This fact is in opposition to the statement made by Sir C. Wood in his speech to the House of Commons of the 2nd May, wherein he claimed that “his general course of policy had been pursued by the Secretary of State in Council.

Though the formation of a separate Constabulary Force was then at the date of the arrival of the Despatches, actively proceeding, and reductions in numerical strength contemplated, indeed actually in progress, yet up to the time of the receipt in India of Sir C. Wood's Despatch of January, 1861, there had been comparatively very few reductions in the Military strength of the Native Forces, and the order by the Government of India, of 10th April, 1861, carrying into effect the specific and detailed instructions of Sir C. Wood, for the formation of this Staff Corps, had actually been put in force before the orders for the great reduction of the Native Forces had been issued.

A reference to Parliamentary Return, 298, of 1862, page 139, will show that on the 3rd May, 1861, the Government of India issued an order reducing the strength of Native Infantry Regiments, and a further general order (page 149) was issued on the 31st May, 1861, reducing the strength and number of Regiments of the Native Cavalry of the Indian Armies; the number of Irregular Regiments of the Bengal Army and the disembodied Regular Regiments of that Presidency, and the Army strength, were also diminished, but all the measures necessary to this had been planned, and were in progress, before the orders for the great change in the Regimental organization had been received, and the reductions might have been commenced and carried out, without entailing on Government the necessity for considering the complicated and expensive changes which the new orders gave rise to.

Sir C. Wood argues in favour of the Government having the right and power to reduce its Military Force, and thereupon asserts that as the grievances complained of by the Indian Officers arise out of the exercise of this right and power—and—as excepting through the consequences of that exercise—they have no cause of complaint. But the Officers of the Indian Army never have questioned, and do not now question, the right and power of Government to increase or decrease its Military Forces, and they pray of the House of Commons to see that their interests are not wantonly disregarded and their positions injured, by the adoption of ill-considered schemes; they, however, do deny the right of Sir Charles Wood to set aside without due consideration, the conditions of the service of India, and to disregard pledges given by Parliament, that these conditions would be respected and guaranteed; the Officers point out that very recently Sir C. Wood indicated that the Officers of the Indian Army might have been placed on half pay, as in the case of British Officers, as may be seen

stated in the 24th paragraph of his letter to the Government of India, 194, dated 17th June, 1864 (*vide* Return No. 427 of 1864); now no authority has ever so viewed the Service rules as allowing of this measure, and Sir W. Mansfield had previously, so far back as September 26, 1859, in a letter to Lord de Grey (page 172 of 330 of 1860), denied the existence of such right on the part of the Secretary of State, and that "to inflict half pay, on the present generation of Officers, would therefore be a Breach of Covenant and Parliamentary Guarantee."

The Committee of Officers have endeavoured to show, in the foregoing statement, that the novel and unexampled system of Military promotion introduced by Sir C. Wood into the Indian Army by the formation of a Staff Corps, from the rules of which the Officers' chief grievances from supersession by junior Officers in substantive rank arises, had no connection whatever, either with the Amalgamation or transfer of the Indian Army to the Crown, or with the reductions in the numerical strength of the Military Forces of India; seeing that the reductions in strength, though made subsequent to the formation of the Staff Corps, were actually ordered by the Court of Directors in 1856, and after the Mutiny planned by the Government of India before they had any orders to create a Staff Corps, not only without the slightest intention of disturbing the then Regimental organization, but with the avowed intention of improving that organization; finally, that from the mode Sir Charles Wood has seen fit to arrange the details connected with the officering of the "Irregular Corps," he has caused great and unnecessary wrong to fall on the Regimental Officers.

The Committee of Officers of the Indian Army therefore deprecate in the strongest manner the unfair plea urged by Sir C. Wood, that they ever questioned the great constitutional right of Government to reduce its Army, or that they ever complained of any of the consequences of the fair and just exercise of that right. The Committee have, from the first, endeavoured to show, that, whether the Government exercised its power to increase or reduce its Army, there was a system of promotion in it, which had always prevailed, which was in its main principles guaranteed to the Officers, and which was changed for another organization, such as exists in no Army, and could not be supposed to be conceived by anyone experienced in Military affairs; that by this novel system, one small class of Indian Officers was so extensively favoured, that another and the larger class had their interests deeply affected by such favours being granted; that the cause of the principal grievances of the Officers was this change of system of promotion, not necessarily arising out of the reduction of the Army strength to which Sir C. Wood is desirous they should be attributed; the Officers further believe that no one knows better than Sir Charles Wood that the actual reductions took place mainly after the formation of the Staff Corps, though planned before the orders were received for its formation, and that the scheme of this Staff Corps was advised by Lieut-Col. Norman and Lord Hotham's Committee, irrespective of the question of the Army strength.

The innovation and departure from an old system of organization was the

more severely felt, owing to the great and prominent feature, in respect to the entire revolution in the Military system of advancement, which had regulated the advancement of the European Officers of the Indian Army for upwards of 60 years; this consisted in an entire assimilation, so as to ensure equal chances of advancement in Military rank, in a uniform establishment of grades and numbers in fixed proportions, common to all Regimental Officers of all the four branches, —Engineers, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry.

So strongly had this perfect equality of chances of promotion been imbued in the minds of all the Officers, by the system created and rigidly enforced, through a long course of years, by the Board of Control, Court of Directors, and Governments of India, that in many instances (all of which could be stated) whenever departures have, from State necessity, occasionally been made, that one branch of the Service has been augmented in Officers, so as to alter the fixed proportions of grades, whilst the boon has been withheld from the other branches, such as the additional Captains to the Native Infantry, but withheld from the six Regiments of European Infantry, the augmentation has subsequently been granted, in order to restore to all Officers of all branches of the Service, that equality of chance for Military rise so deeply important to Regimental Officers.

No doubt some inconvenience has been occasioned to the State, by the endeavour to equalize the chances of promotion in the several branches of the Service, but there were many, and great, compensating advantages derived by a rigid adherence to such a system. The Officers, in the first place, were perfectly satisfied when they found all grades, of all branches, placed on exactly the same level, as to chances of rise. Moreover, the Government were able, in many instances, to deny to some branches, and to some grades, the fair claims for changes in organization, which were often strongly put forward.

For instance, the Engineer and Artillery services were formed, in proportions as to ranks and numbers, on exactly the same basis as the Infantry and Cavalry, their total number of Officers, divided into grades, bearing a fixed proportion to the total number and grades of Officers of Cavalry and Infantry; the fair claims which the Ordnance Corps had to obtain the additional grades, of second Colonel, second Captain, to have the rank of Major abolished, and the junior grades largely diminished, in assimilation with the Engineer and Artillery Corps of England, were, until 1858, successfully resisted by Government. The vast expense of 130,000*l.*, which Sir C. Wood stated to the House of Commons, on the 2nd May, as having been incurred on account of the altered organization in the Indian Artillery and Engineer services, was placed by him to the credit of the recent changes in the organization he has applied to the Indian Forces, but this outlay was formerly saved by the rigid enforcement of the rule of the Court of Directors, as to equality of chances of promotion between Officers of the Line and Ordnance Corps, and as it was incurred recently, not on account of any favour arising out of Sir C. Wood's changes in the Indian Army, as stated, but to place the Ordnance Corps of India on the more expensive organization.

peculiar to the Ordnance Corps of Britain, and to give the Officers equality of rank.

Further, the recommendation which Lord Hardinge gave to the Court of Directors, to afford to the Officers of the Indian Army the great boon which he had obtained for those of the English Army, of having one Captain to two Subalterns of Infantry, instead of, as in India, three Subalterns to one Captain of Infantry, whereby the chance of advancement to the rank of Captain was in the Indian Army greatly lessened, was for many years withheld, though at length, only partially granted to India, entirely owing to the difficulty the Court of Directors experienced, lest they might be constrained still further to apply the proportions as to grades, which were so favourable to the advancement of Officers, in other branches of the Service, such as in the Artillery and Engineer Corps of England.

The power of refusing these partial claims in favour of particular branches, or in favour of some classes of Officers, obviously afforded the Government great compensating advantages for some of the few evils which unavoidably arose, but the strict maintenance of the universal rule of equality of chance was an essential part of the general contentment, with the old Indian system of rise, which the Officers felt towards the scheme of Promotion, then prevailing, partly Regimental and partly by Line or Seniority rise,

Sir C. Wood, in his recent speech, adduced instances of apparent departures from the regular strict gradation rise during the administration of the Court of Directors, and mentioned the filling up of vacancies in Regiments whose losses in the Cabool operations had been considerable. Now this case has been fully explained in the original statement drawn up by the Committee, and shown to be groundless of any real wrong to individuals.

Here it may be useful to advert to that part of Sir C. Wood's speech, wherein he states, that—"In 1824 the East India Company divided a Native Regiment into two, and appointed half of the Officers into a new Regiment, to which they rose in rank above their seniors in the old Regiment." This is also stated to endeavour to show to the House of Commons that the strict Seniority system was not enforced, or universally applied, under the Court of Directors; but the instance is a most unfortunate selection, for no other course, than the one adopted by the Court, can be brought forward more favourable in proof that the old system of Seniority rise in Regiments was fully respected, than the 1824 arrangements, which Sir C. Wood quotes, to prove the contrary practice,

In 1824 the Court of Directors were moved to sanction a great change in the Regimental system of India, by the Regiments being doubled in number, thereby extensive promotion was given, mainly, to Senior Officers. But the Court in authorizing this altered organization, acted on the spirit, and according to the letter of the orders which they issued in 1796, when first creating the Regimental organization. In their Despatch dated January 15, 1796 (Return 80 of 1863),

the orders, Paragraph 55, were the very reverse of those issued by Sir C. Wood in 1861, that "all Staff Officers whatever are to be on the strength of the Regiments or battalions, and promoted accordingly; but in placing these Officers, care must be taken to station them according to their proper rank in the Service, and not by any Brevet or temporary rank they may hold in consequence of Civil employments or Staff appointments."

Now the 1796 course was effected by forming into two separate Regiments, the one establishment of Officers for one Regiment (allowed for two Battalions of Sepoys), and who were nearly equal, in numbers and grades, to those allowed in 1794 for a Line Regiment of the British Army; the Officers of each of the Regiments were divided into two equal parts, with the most scrupulous respect to rights and Regimental position claims of individual Officers; indeed, as the change was general and equally affecting the Military Officers in all India, and as the State in no way suffered by respecting claims in making a general and uniform alteration in the Military system, it might naturally be thought that a Government would act fairly, so as to be in harmony with the feelings and claims of deserving and good servants.

Moreover, the change introduced in 1824, though affecting directly the Infantry alone, yet it was in principle also applied to the Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers. It is owing to this uniform and equable system of legislating, for all their Officers, that the Court of Directors' plans have proved so successful, and are so justly appreciated, as to stand in marked contrast with the recent class or partial legislation, of the Secretary of State.

Under the 1824 organization, the main feature in the new system were the additional Colonels, the numbers of Captains and Subalterns were not much increased. Now, before the Captains and Subalterns of each Regiment were divided into two parts, the senior Officers were promoted, that is, the Senior Lieut.-Colonels in the whole of the Infantry were in one List, made Colonels, to complete the fixed number of Colonels for the extra or new Regiments, the Senior Majors on the Infantry List became Lieut.-Colonels, and in lieu of the promoted Majors the senior Captains became Majors, to complete the established number. It was only after these promotions that the Regimental Captains then remaining unpromoted were posted to the two separate Regiments, into which the Officers of one Regiment were divided.

After a Captain became a Major of Infantry, it was impossible for supersession to take place, for all the Majors were in one list, rising in succession to the grade of Lieut.-Colonel, and then through that grade to Regimental Colonel. It was only in the grades of Captain and Subaltern that any supersession was risked by this division. The Government, in making the division of the Captains, to the two Regiments, acted impartially, by posting the Senior Captain of the Regiment as Senior Captain of the half Corps, but with a Major nearest in succession to the grade of Lieut.-Colonel, on whose subsequent promotion to the Lieut.-Colonelcy, the Senior Captain became Major, and so on with all the Senior Captains of all

the separate Regiments. Then they posted the Second Captains as Seniors of the divided Regiment, but with Majors next in succession to the previous Majors; and so on, they alternated the Captains and Subalterns, with the most rigid regard to Seniority.

The above outline is believed, at this distance of time, to have been the course followed in this great change of 1824 in the Indian Army organization, and it is useful to have this detailed explanation of the 1824 arrangements to prove to all, the importance of the advice (afterwards stated) contained in Lord Hotham's report, but entirely disregarded, that the Government of India should have an opportunity of protecting the individual interests of Officers by following the usual course, in posting Officers, so well known when raising new regiments. The 1824 changes, quoted by Sir C. Wood, as a precedent for his late orders, to do injury to Officers, is, on the contrary, a strong fact in favour of the claim which the Officers make to have had the fair and impartial example of 1824 adhered to in the 1861 changes.

But in order to show the good faith of the Government, it is necessary to state an important feature in this great change of 1824 which Major-General Sir R. Vivian, one of the Council of India, ought to be well aware of, but which the India Records can fully show; indeed it is scarcely possible for Sir C. Wood not to have been informed of it, when inquiring into the 1824 changes, especially as these, and the 1796 organization, are the two great landmarks of the Indian Military system of promotion, from which Sir C. Wood has so strangely departed in the 1861 changes.

It so happened that in 1824 there were two Officers of the name of Waugh in the same Regiment, and that one was the European Regiment then belonging to the Madras Army; the one Waugh was Major, and the other was Senior Captain. The Major was, at the date of the arrival of the order of the Court of Directors for changing the organization, absent at the Mauritius on Sick Certificate, and there entered a mercantile house as a partner, the usual house circular notifying his admission as a partner, and bearing his signature was issued, and a copy received at Madras. It was, of course, at once laid before Government, and the Officer who engaged in mercantile pursuits was by an old rule of the East India Company, under the trading jealousy of that corporation, declared to have forfeited his position in the service. The important point to decide was the date from which this Officer's Commission ceased to have effect.

Between the date of the affixing of the Officer's signature to the circular announcing him to be a partner of the trading firm in the Mauritius, and the date of its receipt at Madras, some time elapsed, in the then slow state of the communications. In the interval the orders for the division of the Regiments had been received and carried out. Now, though the Officers of Native Regiments formed one body, yet, the two Battalions of men were as divided as if they were separate Regiments, and it was rare to find the two Battalions at one station, and generally

the one Battalion was in the field and the other in garrison at great distances apart; so that in the changes, consequent on the posting of the Captains and Subalterns, the transfers of Officers from one Battalion to another were numerous, long in being effected, owing to the great distances, and necessarily expensive; but all changes had been ordered, and partially made, when the case of the two Waughs arose.

At the Military Head-quarters of the Madras Army it was maintained, that the date of the receipt of the Mercantile circular at the Head-quarters was the date of the casualty of the Major Waugh, and that this was a casualty which ought to be given to the Officers after the division of Regiments. But the Captain (Waugh) claimed, that the Officer had by his own act become a casualty, as respects the Army, on the day he signed the Mercantile letter declaring himself a merchant, and not a soldier, and that this casualty was due prior to the re-organization, and ought to have been given, prior to the division of Regiments, whereby he would have stood as a Major, and consequently have gained a great rise to his Lieutenant-Colonelcy, instead of being left, after the division, as only a Captain, with then but little chance of attaining his Field Officer's rank.

For nearly two years, the case was under consideration, the Army Head-quarters upholding their view, that the casualty was after, and not before the division of Regiments. But Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras, thoroughly experienced in the principles and system of Military organization, from the early rising of our power in India, decided that the casualty was due from the date of signing, and that Captain Waugh was entitled to the rank of Major, prior to the division of the Regiments.

It so happened, that the Major Waugh who had become a trader was well up in the general list of Majors of Infantry, and as he became a casualty just before the division, the new Major Waugh was necessarily at the date of the division the junior Major of the Infantry. This result occasioned an almost entire change in the posting of the Majors, and consequent on this re-posting of this grade, the re-posting of Captains to be next to the Majors whose standing was highest, again became necessary; and, after nearly two years, extensive re-transfers of Officers from one Battalion to another became necessary. But Sir T. Munro did not hesitate; the rights and fair claims of one Officer were involved, and though the Government incurred a very heavy charge, to give what he considered justice, yet it was unhesitatingly carried out.

Now a stronger instance of respect for the rights of an Officer and the equality of rise than this could not be shown; it is one well known to Major-General Sir R. Vivian and the old Officers of the Madras Army; moreover, it is only one of the many cases so frequently occurring, even in England, of the dissatisfaction which the violation of promotion rules give rise to, the acts are those, on which the feelings of all Officers of all Armies are certain of being most strongly roused. In India, the feelings are fully as strong, and it might have been expected that the neglect and indifference evinced in the 1861

arrangements to these feelings of the Officers of the Indian Army would have effectually moved the minds of the suffering Officers to appeal for redress, and they have been forced to appeal to Parliament instead of resorting to the far more effective mode followed in England, of bringing powerful social influences to bear on the ruling authorities.

Sir Charles Wood has strongly and frequently asserted "that the formation of a Staff Corps was a matter of absolute necessity," and he refers to the opinions of various Officers of rank in support of the measure, such as "Lord Clyde, Sir William Mansfield, Sir Hugh Rose, and Sir William Napier," who agreed to the formation of a Staff Corps. Now, excepting from Sir W. Mansfield, no trace in any papers laid before Parliament can be found of opinions expressed of the character attributed to the Officers named, in favour of the formation of a Staff Corps, of the description formed by Sir C. Wood.

It is quite true that, as set forth at page 171 of Parliamentary Report, 330, of 26th May, 1860, Sir W. Mansfield proposed to place Officers on Staff employ on an unattached list, but it was done with a view to relieve Regiments from the heavy drain occasioned by the employment of the Regimental Officers on the Staff, but he gave no indications, in detail, as to the mode in which transfers to this list should be made, so as to prevent those complications in respect to Regimental Rise, so inevitable, if the inexpedient course had been followed of merely striking the names of Staff Officers out of the Regimental list.

There is one suggestion made by Sir W. Mansfield, which Sir C. Wood disregarded, that the names of Officers on the unattached list shall not be on a regimental list; this advice was similar to that subsequently given by Lord Hotham's Committee, and, with like results, set aside by Sir C. Wood. It is from a disregard of advice of this character that has arisen all the difficulties occasioned by the formation of a Staff Corps. What was needed was some arrangement such as Sir John Lawrence indicated of a separate list of inefficient Officers, entailing their removal from Regimental or Staff duty.

The authority, however, most strongly relied on by Sir C. Wood, in favour of the formation of a Staff Corps, is in the Report of the Commission over which Lord Hotham presided, and Sir C. Wood, in his place in the House of Commons, read what he distinctly stated to be an extract from the Committee's Report. Now, after an examination of the noble Lord's Committee Report, we are able to state that the extract, as read to the House, is made up of scraps, little calculated to afford the House a true insight into the real opinions expressed by the Committee. For instance, the last sentence of the extract as read: *viz.* "We conceive, however, that Officers so circumstanced must hold a "Commission for their substantive Rank, in lieu of their former Regimental Commission," is to be found at page 7 (House of Lords' Return, No. 30, of 1861) of the Report, whereas all the quoted parts preceding this sentence are in page 8 of the Report; the passage immediately above it, *viz.* "The whole of the Officers of the Irregular Native Corps to be on the Staff List," is low down in page 8

of the Committee's Report ; moreover important passages, intermediately recorded by the Committee, are left out in Sir C. Wood's quoted extract. The last part of the quoted extract is, however, of the utmost value, when Lord Hotham's Report says that :—" Officers so circumstanced must hold a commission for their substantive commission in lieu of their former regimental commission." This passage can only be understood in one sense ; that the Officer, no longer being commissioned to a particular regiment, ceased to belong to it.

There are important portions of this Committee's Report, but not alluded to by Sir C. Wood, such as those to be found in section 2, page 6 of the Committee's Report, wherein they state, " We have carefully considered the proposed formation of a Staff Corps" Also, in the third Paragraph of this Section, same page, they add, " We understand it to be intended to form the Staff Corps." Now none of these have been quoted by Sir C. Wood, but they are useful, as these expressions show that the idea of a Staff Corps did not originate with Lord Hotham's Committee, but with other parties. In the memorandum annexed to Sir C. Wood's letter appointing the Committee, certain suggestions for the formation of a Staff Corps is laid by him before the Committee, showing that he had already entertained the idea of a Staff Corps.

In the first, and indeed only official document (Return 330 of 1860, page 180) which, within the past 10 years, has been laid before Parliament, connected with the formation of a separate Staff Corps of Officers of the peculiar character of that now in India, is to be found recorded in a letter and memorandum sent to Sir C. Wood on 2nd February, 1860, containing a detailed proposal from Lieut.-Col. Norman, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, to form a Staff or Unattached List of Officers, and as this Officer was a member of Lord Hotham's Committee, the Committee may point out that the specific arrangements detailed in the report for the formation of this body of Officers, were suggested by this Officer in the previous February, and are exactly like those made by the Committee in August, 1860, even to the objection which the Committee urged against the use by Sir C. Wood of the designation " Corps" instead of " Staff List," as Lieut.-Col. Norman in the month of February had employed ; the idea of a Staff Corps may therefore justly be imputed to Lieut.-Col. Norman, but adopted by the Secretary of State without acknowledging the source.

But excepting Colonel Sir P. Melvill, K.C.B., or Lieut.-Col. Norman, there was no other member of Lord Hotham's Committee, qualified by previous professional training, by recent experience, and executive knowledge, of the then rules and state of the Indian Service, to draw up detailed suggestions of the intricate and technical character such as those which Lord Hotham, and the majority of the Committee recorded in their Report, for the formation of a Staff Body ; but as Sir P. Melvill also recorded his opinion in opposition to the Report, and stated that the formation of such a body, as since proved by experience, would entail on the Government serious embarrassments, we may with justice consider that Lord Hotham and the majority of his Committee accepted Sir C. Wood's dictum that there must be a Staff Corps, and in setting forth the detailed rules for the forma-

tion of this Staff Body, were inspired by the detailed views which Lieut.-Col. Norman had, only six months previously, stated to Sir C. Wood.

An examination of Lieut.-Col. Norman's letter will show that in all essential points, excepting in one, the detailed suggestions of the Committee are exactly the same as those which Lieut.-Col. Norman had previously proposed. The one exception in the Report of Lord Hotham's Committee is of such great and vital importance that it requires to be fully quoted, as follows, and to be marked for close attention by being in italics. It will be found at the end of Paragraph 5, page 10, of the Report. "*In filling up the vacancies occasioned by the drafting off to the Staff List, regard must be paid to the inequality of promotion to the several Regiments that must arise if arrangements be not made to meet and correct it. Probably the Indian Government will be able to effect such arrangements without much difficulty, by applying the principles that have been laid down and are well understood in raising new Regiments, and generally in all Army augmentations.*"

This advice would, if adopted, have entailed the removal of the names of the Officers from the Regimental List. There cannot be a doubt that if this passage of the Report had been communicated to the Governor-General as a rule for guidance by Sir C. Wood, in his Despatches of January 18, 1861, when ordering the formation of a Staff Corps, the confusion, heartburnings, expenditure, and complaints which have arisen in India, from the formation of this Staff Corps, even on the conditions which Lieut.-Col. Norman and Lord Hotham's Committee had suggested, would have been with a certainty prevented, or the evils to individuals so mitigated as to have been brought under manageable disposal, or the Government of India would have found that the Staff Corps rules as enjoined could not be applied.

It is the more necessary to state the above, in order that it may be distinctly seen that, admitting the formation of a Staff Corps to have been a State necessity, it was not carried out in accordance with the views of Lord Hotham's Committee, and it was ordered in disregard of the advice of Sir W. Mansfield, not to keep the names of Officers on two lists. The case which might be put in parallel with the course actually followed by Sir C. Wood, might have followed if the names of the Officers of Infantry and Cavalry who purchased the commissions of Artillery, Engineers, and Marine Officers, had been continued on their Regimental, as well as in the Unattached lists, and thus to have held two substantive commissions; and yet the absurdity with which such a supposed English arrangement would be viewed at the Horse Guards is now paralleled in 176 Regimental lists of the Indian Army. The Committee of Officers, therefore, do appeal to the Military experience of India to say whether a vicious and absurd measure in England can be right and proper in India.

In several parts of Lieut.-Col. Norman's Original Paper of 2nd February, 1860, as sent to Sir C. Wood, as also in the dissent recorded by Sir P. Melvill to the suggestions of Lord Hotham's Committee regarding the formation of this Staff Corps, there are, as also in the Committee's Report, many passages which avow

a necessity for respecting the existing status of Regimental Rise and suggestions for guarding those Officers from injury, who might continue to belong to Regiments after the formation of this Staff Corps; moreover, Sir P. Melvill's thorough experience in the Secretariat of Bombay, as well as Lieut.-Col. Norman's knowledge, of the strict care and impartiality, with which the Governments of England and India, had hitherto invariably viewed changes in the carrying out of Army augmentations and reductions, as they affected the position of individual Officers; are certain indications that Lord Hotham's Committee's advice of caution, in making the advised changes, was fully intended for Sir C. Wood's guidance, though most unfortunately disregarded.

Amongst the printed papers laid before Parliament, there are suggestions from several experienced Officers, which would, if they had been understood by Sir C. Wood, have prevented the serious and numerous complications which his instructions have occasioned, if not wholly, at least, to a great extent, from arising; but none of the suggestions except the one of not forming any Staff Corps, would have been found so effectual as the one recommendation of Lord Hotham's Committee, as above quoted, which so clearly, so fully, and so soundly urged, though ignored by Sir C. Wood, the adoption of those precautionary measures, so well known to the Government of India, in raising new Corps, and which would have prevented the expensive, complicated, and wearying results which have followed the measure, so very objectionable, as ordered by Sir C. Wood.

Sir C. Wood, as on many former occasions, has again recently in the House of Commons asserted, that he had acted with the approved sanction of his Council and by the advice of experienced Officers. Now, the means of having access to the dissents of the members of Sir C. Wood's Council are such that all the advice tendered cannot be known; but the records, moved for and laid before Parliament, show that on almost every measure affecting the Army of India, Sir C. Wood has had strong and forcible dissents, from the ordered arrangements, recorded by every member of the Council appointed by Parliament, to advise the Secretary of State for India, always excepting one member, whose one signature is notably withheld.

The documents in Return 242 of 1860 (House of Lords' Paper) show that nearly all the members of the Council of India protested against the attempt of Sir C. Wood to carry out Military measures without consultation with his Council, and in a series of minutes by Mr. Willoughby and almost every member of the Council, the Secretary of State's acts and proceedings were strongly protested against. More powerfully reasoned minutes than those of Colonel Durand and Mr. Willoughby in opposition to the Despatches of January, 1861, could not have been written; and yet in the recent speech of May 2, Sir C. Wood, in his place in Parliament, rose to state "the general course of Policy pursued by the Secretary of State in Council, upon the various questions connected with the Indian Army," when he must have been well aware, that of the five Despatches numbered from 27 to 31, all dated January 18, 1861, ordering those sweeping changes in the organization and constitution of the Indian Army, none of these

are written in the name of the Council, all avow that the Secretary of State and Her Majesty's Government decide on the measures ordered.

It becomes necessary, as regards this Staff Corps formation, to show that, as to acting under the advice of experienced Officers, excepting Lieut.-Col. Norman, and the majority of Lord Hotham's Committee, no one has ever ventured to advise the formation of a Staff Corps as Sir C. Wood has created it, and none would ever have concurred in the detailed course pursued without requiring the application of a corrective measure, such as that which Lieut.-Col. Norman and the other members of Lord Hotham's Committee put forward. But even in Lord Hotham's Committee one member, Sir P. Melvill, warned them against advising on the putting in practice a difficult and complicated measure, the end of which could not be foreseen.

Leut.-General Sir P. Grant, an Officer thoroughly experienced in the principles on which the military system of the Indian Army was based, and strongly impressed with the necessity of providing efficient Officers for regimental duty, advised (page 175 of 330, of 1860) that the Captains and Subalterns should be formed into one general gradation list before any other changes were introduced, and doubtless had this apparently simple course been followed, the general complications would certainly have been checked if not prevented, but whether the good anticipated would have been the result, is another question.

Further, Colonel Durand, C.B., one of Sir C. Wood's Council, an Officer specially selected by Lord Canning (having his entire confidence) to investigate the measures connected with changes in the organization of the Indian Army, apparently was called on by Sir C. Wood for an opinion on the suggestions contained in Lieutenant-Colonel Norman's letter (page 180 of 330 of 1860) of 2nd February, 1860; and in a letter to Sir C. Wood, dated 1st March, 1860 (*vide* page 99 of 330 of 1860), Colonel Durand strongly opposed the "radical changes" which Sir C. Wood had sent for his consideration.

Further, on Sir C. Wood laying before his Council the despatches dated January, 1861, to the Governor-General, ordering the Staff Corps to be formed, both Mr. Willoughby and Colonel Durand, in separate Minutes, strongly and explicitly protested against the measure; warned the Secretary of State of its impolicy—of its violation of the guarantee given by Parliament—of its expense—of the probability of claims for compensation for moneys spent by Officers in obtaining promotion and on as good grounds as Officers of the Royal Army would possess were their system of purchase abruptly interfered with; the Act of 1860 did not authorize the formation of a "monster Staff Corps as a means for the extinction of "the Regimental organization of the Indian Native Forces, and for the arbitrary "alteration of the relative position of every Officer in the Indian Armies." "Such "dislocation of an organization sanctioned by Parliament, by long usage, and by the "example of the British and Foreign Armies, being not only unnecessary, costly, "and contrary to the recommendation of Her Majesty's Viceroy in India, but, "incompatible with a *bonâ-fide* fulfilment of Clause 56 of 21 & 22 Vict., cap. 106, "and of the pledge with which the Bill passed last Session closes,"

Finally, about one month prior to the letter from Sir C. Wood, nominating Lord Hotham's Committee, that is, on 26th May, 1860, the Military Finance Commission of India, then consisting of the present Major-General Jameson, now Auditor of the Home Indian Accounts, and Colonel Balfour, C.B., late Chief of the Military Finance Department of India, reported to the Governor-General (Parliamentary Return, 240, of 5th May, 1863) on the question referred to them, "as to the practicability or otherwise of establishing a Staff Corps or unattached body of Officers, that it was a question beset with many difficulties, arising from the numerous considerations and conditions involved therein;" that out of the numerous plans submitted to Government, "none of the plans yet devised have afforded a satisfactory solution of these difficulties;" and that "careful observation and inquiry have led us to the conclusion that the formation of a separate Staff Corps of Officers for the Staff, necessarily requiring lines of promotion distinct from the other branches of the Army, and probably entailing special provision for increased pay, rewards for services, and retiring pensions, would at present involve great complication, arising from various causes, and must undoubtedly lead to a great increase of military expenditure."

The above opinions, expressed to the Government of India in 1860 by two Officers of experience and knowledge of the Indian Army organization, have been fulfilled in every particular; indeed, the complications and discontent occasioned by the Staff Corps formation, are an inevitable result of the nature of the conditions on which the attainment of Staff Corps rank is based. Never before in any Army has the grade of Captain, of Major, of Lieutenant-Colonel, and of Colonel, been guaranteed to a large body of military Officers, on the simple measure of length of service, of 12, 20, 26, and 31 years; and as it thereby secured to a previously favoured class of Staff Officers of the Indian Service, the rank and pay of the military designations above specified, with almost the monopoly of all Staff employments, it is natural to expect, that those whose relative position is made inferior to that of those who were their juniors, should now be roused, to prefer complaints against the wrong done.

The arbitrary fixation of periods of service, *viz.* 12 years in the Subaltern grade, of 8 more years in that of Captain, of 6 more years in that of Major, and of 5 years more in that of Lieutenant-Colonel, when the highest grade of Army Colonel is attained, was founded on no just or reasonable grounds, either as respects previous averages of the Indian Regimental rise—far in excess of those periods—nor on the averages of length of service of the several grades of Officers of the British Army, seeing that when Lieut.-Col. Norman proposed, in 1860, the above scale, the average of the Line promotion was considerably less than those periods selected by him for the Indian service. Further, these periods being less than the length of service of most of the Indian Regimental Officers who did not, or were not allowed to, join the Staff Corps, and who were dependent on further rise by regular succession from actual casualties amongst their Seniors in the Regiment, necessarily placed the Staff Corps Officers on a relative far higher position, both as respects rank, pay, and position in the Service generally.

The inevitable and necessary result of a sudden change in a regular organized system of Army promotion for Officers, is to create jealousies and heart-burnings between those who gain least and those who gain most by the change; now in the Indian Army, where all Officers of all grades were dependent for rise to rank, pay, and other advantages, on the casualties amongst seniors arising from two causes—retirement from service and death—they might and did, as Officers of all Armies have done and will, impute blame for their slow rise; but it was attributed, not to the Government, but to their bad luck. The creation of this Staff Corps body must alone have caused jealousy from the way in which they were specially chosen, and to the exclusion of the large mass of Officers; and here it is necessary to gainsay that part of Sir C. Wood's speech, that "he offered to all the Officers of the Indian Army who had been a certain time in India, the option of joining the Staff Corps," is totally incorrect, only those who were Staff Officers or had been on the Staff a short time before were allowed to join; the retention of the names of the Officers of this new Staff Corps in the cadre list of their old Regiments—not to do good, but to bar the rise of the Regimental Officers—was a standing and glaring indication in the minds of the Regimental Officers, of the animus to impede the advancement of Officers remaining with their Regiments, by the retention of men's names on the rolls of a Regiment to which they no longer belonged,

But the introduction of the Staff Corps system of promotion was made at a time when the minds of all grades of Officers were expectant of great improvements in the existing Regimental organization, and that the defects which, before the Mutiny, were fully recognized to exist in the Indian Service, would be remedied, such as the objectionable retention in the service of old and worn-out Officers, whose removal the authorities alone could rightly effect, though for whose retirement the Officers so liberally subscribed; that this and all other defects which the terrible trials through which India had passed, had shown to exist in the organization would be corrected. This expectation was mainly caused by the Court's Despatch of 10th September, 1856, which specified and distinctly laid down the conditions necessary for a good Regimental organization, and all that was needed was the entire carrying out of the views therein expressed to the fullest extent; and in the reform of the further defects which the Mutiny had brought to light.

Few, if any, ever anticipated the certainly very novel conditions on which the Staff Corps Officers were declared entitled to be advanced in rank; the Officers without any previous announcement saw the Regimental gradation rise, which for upwards of sixty years had been introduced into India, and during the whole of these years had been upheld by the ablest Officers as the great want of the Service, suddenly condemned and set aside for a system, which had been set aside, when the 1796 reorganization took place, and at once threw a portion of the Officers, intended for Indian service, into one large mass, arranged in advanced grades of rank, due solely to length of service, owing to the fact of having had Staff employment. This new class of Officers were made to be great gainers, in respect to more speedy promotion and higher pay, merely because they had

had the previous favour shown them of leaving the wearisome duty with Regiments to undertake the pleasant, and lucrative, Staff duties. It was natural to the Regimental Officers to feel that their position was, relatively with that of the new Staff Corps Officers, placed in a very depressed condition, not as before from bad luck, but from a mere novel rule of service, ordered by the Secretary of State, without, as far as published records show, the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces, or of any high Military authority connected with the Indian Army.

It was the more galling to every Regimental Officer in the service when they saw the names of two or more Staff Corps Officers, retained on the list of the Regiment to which they no longer were commissioned or belonged, either to impede the rise in rank which the vacancies would give, or, if juniors in the Regiment, to show to their former senior, that they were now superior in rank, by reason of the sudden promotion obtained, on joining the Staff Corps.

Let all Members of the two Houses of Parliament conceive in their own minds; the consequences of the Crown deciding on withdrawing the Corps of Marines from under the direct orders of the Admiralty, and placing the Corps under the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces; and after having so done, then suddenly introducing the purchase system, whereby some few officers of this excellent, but far from wealthy corps, obtained rank over the heads of their former Seniors.

Again, suppose the Officers of the Artillery and Engineer Corps were suddenly allowed to purchase promotion, on the sales of the commissions of their senior Officers, so that those who had no money to obtain military advancement would be superseded by their juniors? Now this course might have been followed in 1823 and following years, when the Duke of Wellington first applied the system of sales to Artillery Officers' commissions, in order to expedite the rise in that corps, when the promotion was stagnant, and the ages of the Officers rapidly increasing; the like measure, also subsequently applied to both Engineer and Marine Corps, might have been applied as precedents in favour of universal buying of Promotions in these several Corps.

In these three Corps, the Duke, it is true, allowed Officers in the grades of Captains, Majors, and Lieut.-Colonels, to sell their commissions, and in numbers, to a considerable extent, but instead of permitting supersession in these respective corps, by allowing the junior Officers of these several corps to purchase the commission of the senior-selling Officers, in accordance with the practice followed in the Cavalry and Infantry of the Line, the Duke of Wellington carefully guarded against any cause of discontent, by confining the power of purchase to Officers of Infantry and Cavalry, who then serving, say in the Major's grades, were permitted to pay the Marine or Engineer, or Artillery Lieutenant-Colonel, the sum of money fixed as the value of that higher grade; thereupon the name of the seller was struck out of the Corps of Marines, Artillery, or Engineers; the purchaser obtained the substantive grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, but not only

was his name not introduced into the list of the Regiment of the Officer whose commission he had bought, but he was not allowed to remain in the Regiment in which he was then serving, for he went on the Unattached List, in his advanced substantive Rank, and the promotions in lieu of his regimental vacancy were strictly given in accordance with fixed rules.

By this arrangement all trace of the transaction so entirely disappeared, that this system of sale and purchase, which has had, and continues to have, a great and important bearing on the military system of England, is but little known to the Officers of the Army.

The marked difference, between the Duke of Wellington's measure and the one which Sir C. Wood has introduced into the Indian Service, was that the great Duke, having all a soldier's instincts, and being alive to the terrible nature of the passions which Officers feel, by any novel or unprecedented supersessions, studiously excluded from the character of the operation, all real cause for complaint, either, on the part of the Officers of the Corps, to which the Officer who purchased belonged, or of the Officers of the Corps of the seller, by the names of both parties being removed from both Regimental Lists.

Sir C. Wood's new system of making the rank of Captain's grade obtainable provided an Officer had been 12 years in the service and 4 of them on the Staff, and 20 years for the Major's rank, then the fortunate Staff Officer, thus pitchforked into the higher rank, left, as the list of cadres will show, Regimental fellows, in the humble grades of Lieutenant, with the names of the favoured one on the list of the Corps, and to show his good luck with his high rank of Major specified in the Regimental Roll. Now this is equally as galling to the Indian Officers, as the one above supposed would have been, [if the above transactions in the British Corps had left the names on the lists of the corps.

Sir C. Wood's measure thereby studiously stereotyped, if it may be so called, the grievance of the Officers of Indian Regiments, in having perpetually present to their sight on the Rolls of the Regiment, the names of Officers who no longer belonged to or were commissioned in the Regiment; though still borne on the Regimental Rolls, it was not to benefit the individual Officers who were independent of the Regimental rise, but to impede the Regimental rise of the Officers who remained with the Corps, or to be to them a standing beacon to show that these Juniors' names, though only in the cadre list of Lieutenants of the Regiment, were substantive Majors in the Staff Corps.

The grievance was the greater, as this rise was felt as not being the result of any marked superiority of talent on the part of the successful Officers, or owing to an efficient performance of Regimental duty, or to a fair and impartial selection, but merely because the juniors, whilst perhaps still young, and totally inexperienced in the Service, wearied of Regimental duty and with the strictness with which the Commanding Officer enforced attention to orders, had, through some letter of introduction or other medium, obtained some insignificant employment away from his Regiment.

No doubt amongst the many Officers so withdrawn, there are many good Officers trained in the practice of high employments, but to characterize all, as Sir C. Wood recently did, as being the "elite" of the Indian Officers, is to deny to all who have served in India the right to believe that the original selection of most of the Officers for the Staff duties, was made otherwise than by interest:

The grievance is one that is perpetuated, ever existing, never ceasing, except with life itself or when the Service is given up; even a total removal of names of Staff Corps Officers would have given some rest to the discontented Memorialists, but both causes of irritation are kept in full operation, and so long as the names are retained on the cadres will continue to keep alive the irritation; but how to remove the names of the Officers, without causing great confusion, is now the difficult problem to solve.

One of the questions most prominently under the consideration of the Lord Cranworth Commission, was as respects the grievances sustained by the Regimental Officers, arising out of the formation of the Staff Corps. The Commissioners, in their Report (Para. 43), set forth that "We have to state our opinion that there are solid grounds for this complaint;" and they detail, in clear and forcible words, the considerations which have induced them to state how "keenly Officers feel the being superseded by their juniors, and how much their interests may be thereby affected. We cannot be surprised at the complaints which are made on this subject, and we are of opinion that, in this respect, the Parliamentary assurance has not been adhered to."

No opinion could be more decisive or more clearly expressed than the above; nor could any words be more completely condemnatory of the proceedings of the Secretary of State. Unfortunately, however, owing to the very restricted and guarded nature of the "Commission" issued by Sir Charles Wood, the Commissioners appear to have felt that though they were able to inquire and report as "to the justice of the complaints," and though empowered "to obtain information thereupon, by the examination of all persons most competent, by reason of their knowledge, habits, or experience, to afford it," yet as they failed to exercise this power of calling for such evidence, notwithstanding the earnest request of the Committee of Officers, who in their "case" tendered to the Commissioners the names of Officers competent to give such evidence; it may be presumed that the Commissioners hesitated to act, lest they might be obliged to show the Secretary of State how to act so as to undo the wrong inflicted.

Now, excepting Colonel Sir P. Melvill, one of Lord Cranworth's Commission, there was no one on the Commission qualified, by any previous "knowledge, habit, or experience," to advise on the intimate technical questions involved in the details, which the Commissioners so unnecessarily discuss, as to the defects of imaginary Army arrangements, on the occasion of the formation of this new Corps; they have justly exposed their essays on these details to the imputation of ignorant and defective views as to the old practice of the Indian Service, on occasion of new Corps being formed.

The Report of Lord Hotham's Commission contained a passage which is quoted above, giving advice to Sir C. Wood as to the precautions to be taken in the formation of the Staff Corps, and advises that the principles on which Officers are posted, so well known in India, on occasions of forming new Corps, should be followed; but this advice neglected by Sir Charles Wood, was also disregarded by the Lord Cranworth Commission; the applicability of the remarks of the last Commission, about the intent and meaning of the Act of Parliament to sanction this course or that course of arrangement, or about the retention of the names of Officers on two Regiments or Corps, depends on whether the advice of Lord Hotham's Commission, as to the existence of a special practice in the Indian Army in posting Officers to new Corps, did or did not exist; and as to whether the names of Officers ever were kept in any Army on the rolls of two Corps,

Many witnesses, of the foremost Indian experience, were at the time of sitting of the Lord Cranworth's Commission, all available for examination; now, if the able Officers in England had been called on for opinions, the mistaken notions recorded by the Commissioners, as to the quantity of extraordinary promotion, which some Officers would have obtained by the suppositious transfers, adduced by the Commissioners, would have been exposed, as being according to the Indian rules, without the slightest foundation.

The fact which the Commissioners had to inquire into was, whether it was the practice of the Indian, or any other Army, to retain the names of Officers in different substantive ranks, on two lists of Regiments. The special pleadings of the Commissioners, that by not keeping the names of Staff Corps Officers on the two lists, because certain results must have followed, which the Commissioners considered objectionable, may at once be set at rest, by showing that the bad results need not have followed, if Sir Charles Wood had followed the advice of Lord Hotham's Commission, and the Lord Cranworth Commission need not have fallen into great blunders, had the available qualified witnesses been examined.

Further, the advice of experienced Officers of the British Army would have shown, that neither in the British or Indian Army, has it been a practice to retain names of Officers on two Regimental lists, as at present obtaining for the Staff Corps Officers of India. Many new Corps have been formed, both in England and in India, prior to 1861, and fixed rules have existed, as laid down, for preventing these defects, which the Commissioners so unnecessarily anticipate, as inevitable, by the formation of the Indian Staff Corps. In the British Service, when Officers of Regiments join the Commissariat, their names disappear from the Regimental list. A Military Train, considerable in numbers of Officers, is formed in England, but the Officers, who joined, ceased to belong to their former Regiments. There exists a large list of Unattached Officers holding Substantive rank, though but little known, and the names of these on it, cease to appear on Regimental lists. A number of distinguished Officers serving with Regiments with high Brevet or Army rank are offered Substantive rank in reward for services, but their names, on acceptance, are removed from their Regiments,

The Lord Cranworth Commission Report is thus shown to be deficient in that full and complete inquiry into facts for which they were specially assembled, and whilst they failed to elicit those points, which would have been useful in guiding the future course, they equally failed in indicating the particular remedy to be applied to remove the grievance which they declared the Officers had solid grounds for complaining of; and the Secretary of State, in his Despatch of June, 1864, availed himself of the omission to adopt those insufficient measures which fail to fulfil the "Parliamentary assurance" as the Guarantee of an Act of Parliament is designated by the Report of Lord Cranworth's Commission.

The Secretary of State in his recent speech has made most important and grave admissions, in that part where he stated that he, Sir C. Wood, "thought "the only mode of reconciling the evil" (meaning the supersession arising out of the Staff Corps organization) "was by giving those Officers who have been "passed over the rank to which they are entitled." Then he adds, "I consulted his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief upon the question, because "it was one which not only affected the promotion of the Officers of the Indian "Army, but also the Officers of the line." "The Duke of Cambridge has shown "the greatest consideration for the Indian Officers, and has done his utmost to "consult their interests in every way, and he expressed his opinion that there "should be no supersedence in rank, and from the day of the formation of the "Staff Corps every Officer in the Indian Army has been promoted, precisely at "the same time, as other Officers throughout the whole of the Service."

Here, then, the Committee of Officers, acting on behalf of their absent brothers, obtain the assurance that the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's British Forces, though the command of Her Majesty's India Forces has been withheld from him, distinctly expressed an opinion, on a grave military question, which will be accepted by every mind with military experience, that supersedence in rank so long sustained by the Officers of the Indian Army, is not to be inflicted without Officers seeking redress. The kind of injury is occasionally suffered by individuals, but it is only by the award of a court-martial for some military neglect. In India it has been awarded by the orders of the Secretary of State.

The characteristic trait in Sir C. Wood's explanation of his entire course of action as stated in the above speech, is the implication he conveys to the House of Commons, that this supersedence has from the formation of the Staff Corps, that is, from the 18th February, 1861, been carefully secured by his own regulations, whereas the protection, such as it is, against the wrong inflicted on and after that date, was only extended to the Officers of the Indian Army, by his Despatch of No. 194, 17th June, 1864 (Return No. 427, of 1864), that is to say, though the superseded Officers have received Army, rank ante-dated, yet it is only after suffering supersession for three and a half years and more, even now it is limited in its nature, and partial in its remedy, and such as it is, it has solely been brought about by the appeals, remonstrances, and agitation of the Officers, against the injustice of seeing junior Officers of the same regiment superseding their seniors.

For upwards of three and a half years, the Regimental Officers of the Indian Army, and those of the Line, as the Duke of Cambridge pointed out to Sir C. Wood, have been subjected to be repeatedly placed under those now declared to be junior in rank, during all this time, creating feelings of a character which those alone can rightly judge of, who, when bearing the burden of a grievous wrong, inflicted by one who has the power and will to enforce the injury, yet prevents not only the expression of thought, but requires prompt and willing obedience.

It is now necessary to show that this wrong has not been fully and entirely remedied, as Sir C. Wood asserts.

In his Despatch of June, 1864, in Paragraphs 65 to 72, the mode of effecting the alteration in the rank of the Officers so as to guard against this supersession is described briefly. It may be stated that Sir C. Wood's admission as to the evils of supersession, though so strongly and decidedly recorded in the Report of the Lord Cranworth Commission, is yet in the Despatch to India very mildly set forth in the quiet words that "the extensive promotion made under the Staff Corps' rules gave superior rank to many of the Indian Officers selected for those corps, and caused extensive supersession of the Officers remaining with their regiments." And though the Secretary of State has not fully stated all the opinions recorded by the Lord Cranworth Commission, there is a sufficient admission in the above expression to show that supersession had been caused by his acts.

This supersession is felt in two forms, one of which, by the Secretary of State's orders in the above quoted Despatch, is alone remedied, and that is, in respect to the bestowal of Brevet or Army rank; this is so different indeed, and so far short of the benefit derived by the Staff Corps Officers, from having Regimental or substantive rank, that some explanation is necessary.

As several Members of Parliament have asked what is the difference between Brevet or Army rank, and Regimental or Substantive rank, it is necessary to explain the same, in order to show the delusive or partial character of the recent remedy which the Secretary of State asserts removes all cause of complaint, and justifies him in maintaining that he has carried out the views of the Commission.

An Officer on joining his regiment is commissioned by the Queen to serve in that regiment in a particular rank, receiving the pay, emoluments, and advantages fixed for that grade, now, this is designated Substantive or Regimental rank. But if, say a Captain of the Regiment, he may so distinguish himself as to be deemed worthy of reward, and if honoured by an advance in rank, without removal from the Regiment, then this is designated Army or Brevet rank; but the extra pay or emoluments in addition to his Regimental rank pay, for this increased rank, are trifling. Or in the course of long service as a Captain, the Queen, to reward him and others of like long service, was

formerly in the habit of making general promotions throughout the whole Army, whereby extra rank was given to old Officers who had long served in one grade; of late years, a regular seniority succession to Army rank is now in force, whereby a casualty amongst the Generals ensures to the senior Army officer of each grade below Colonel throughout the whole Army, and Marines, an advancement in rank; now this continues to be designated, Army or Brevet rank, and there are other openings by which it is attained. The Officer so advanced, and serving with a regiment, continues to serve in his Regimental or Substantive rank, still receiving only the pay allowed for that rank; for instance, he may have the Army or Brevet rank of Colonel, with only Regimental rank as Captain—and there have been some few such instances, or, as there are, several with the Army rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, many with that of Major, but the duty he performs as a Regimental Officer, is that of Captain. In all purely Regimental associations of any kind: at mess, on Court-Martial, on Committees, he ranks with his brother-officers of the Regiment, according to his standing in the Regiment as a Captain, even if holding the Army or Brevet rank of Colonel, or of Lieutenant-Colonel or Major. Whereas, in all associations of Officers of a general or Army character, such as are called together by Officers in general command, there the Officer of the highest Military rank, whether substantive or Brevet, takes the precedence, irrespective of the Regimental position held.

To describe all the rights and privileges springing out of these two kinds of rank, as the recognized rights of the respective holders, would necessitate the writing of a treatise which must require the whole of the Organization and Military System of England to be fully discussed, but it is essential, for a clear view of the Secretary of State's recent Indian Arrangements to explain that Regimental Officers with superior Brevet or Army rank, are, outside their Regiments, or on duties of a general nature, invariably recognized in the superior rank, but on occasion of service with these Regiments, the senior Regimental Officers are alone recognized.

Thus two Captains of the same Regiment may be serving on a General Court Martial, or on an Army Committee, and the junior Regimental Captain having superior Brevet rank, such as Army Major, or Army Lieutenant-Colonel, then the senior Regimental Captain is the subordinate of his junior Regimental Officer. A Regiment may have in its ranks a Captain with the Brevet or Army rank of Lieut.-Colonel or Colonel, and the Regiment may, on marching away from its private or Regimental parade, have the Captain in its ranks in command of his Company, and whilst so marching to the general parade or place of assembly of all the Regiments in the locality, may be receiving from the Regimental Commanding Officer (the Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment), a censure for some neglect of duty, but after proceeding on its march a few yards, the Regiment arrives within the area occupied by the other Regiments, and forthwith the Captain, by virtue of his Army or Brevet rank, quits his Company, mounts his horse, and takes the general command of his own, and other Regiments, and if he sees fit, expresses censure to his Commanding Officer for some observed neglect perhaps existing in the Captain's own Company. But all this time the Brevetted

Officer only draws the pay of his subordinate or Regimental rank, and thus whilst obliged often to perform two descriptions of duties, he is not entirely free from much care, and expense, in their performance.

But to detail all the anomalies, inconsistencies, and absurdities arising out of the possession, by one and the same Officer, whilst actually serving with a Regiment from having Army and Brevet rank superior to his Regimental or Substantive rank, and to enumerate the perplexities, the confusion, the heart-burnings, and the evils, occasioned to the Service of the Army, and the difficulties experienced by Staff Officers, who have to arrange for the employment of such Officers on the numerous duties of the Regiment and Army, so as to smooth away the interminable clashings of one duty with another, would require a volume to be written. Napoleon justly condemned the existence of the two ranks, as antagonistic in their action and calculated to destroy Military discipline—their continued existence in the British Army has only been borne with, by the, until lately, restricted nature of the numbers holding the two ranks, and the care shown at the Horse Guards to diminish their injurious effects.

But Sir C. Wood, in order to remedy one great and mischievous evil, in the extensive advancement given to the Officers of the Staff Corps by his violation of the "Parliamentary assurance," and which was the result of his own orders, in the special Rules framed by him in 1861, for the formation of the Staff Corps has in his Despatch of June, 1864, so greatly extended the Brevet or Army rank in India, that it may be said, every Officer in India does or will eventually hold, a rank superior to that of his substantive or Regimental rank. So extensive will be the alterations in rank, both that of present and former ranks, that but few minds are fit to take in the whole scope of its actual application, and the mental omissions, can only be expected to be brought to light, when some special and perhaps serious clashing arises.

The Secretary of State in his Despatch of June, 1864, states that the prevention of supersession "can be effectually attained by an extension of a system "which has for many years existed in India, of giving Brevet rank by a length "of service heretofore applicable only to the promotion of subalterns." This was a practice introduced into the Indian Army in 1796, when the Regimental organization was established, and it was by Par. 42, Despatch of January 15, 1796 (Return 80 of 1863), stated, to be intended to provide for the retarded promotion of "many subalterns of long standing;" on whom "the Brevet rank of "Captain is to be granted at present to every Lieutenant who has been 15 years "in the Company's Service, but he is only to receive the pay and emoluments of "Lieutenant, until he comes upon the regular establishment."

The fact of the Brevet Captaincy having existed, has misled Sir C. Wood into a measure of difficulty. The Horse Guards never acknowledged this Brevet rank, either when held by the Officers of the India Army or their own; and though they recognized the former grade of Captain-Lieutenant in the Ordnance Corps, and the still existing grade of Second Captain of their Corps, as giving to

the holders all the privileges of Army rank, yet no persuasion could induce the British Military Authorities to admit the claims of any Indian Brevet-Captains, and on an Officer of the British Army leaving India, this rank if he had held it, was withdrawn, and he reverted to his Subaltern rank.

Under this rule the promotions have since 1796 been made and the like advancement extended to the Officers of the British Army; the date of service reckoning for promotion commences from that of the first Commission, and in practice it was given to all Subalterns of both Armies, whether the British Officer had served on full or had been on half pay, so that many Subalterns of the British Army, who about 35 years since joined regiments in India after they had been on half-pay for many years, were, on arriving in India, at once made Brevet Captains, with such dates of rank to their Brevet Captains' commissions as placed them on equality with the Brevet Captains of the Indian Army, and often very high in the gradation list of Captains, sometimes with some personal advantage for their position, but generally attended with trouble and expense.

The bestowal of this rank on old subalterns was a consolation in the midst of their dreary life, they enjoyed some rights, inasmuch as they were placed in the general duties of the Army amongst the Captains' grade, though required to perform all their regimental duties as Subalterns. But the Court of Directors always deprecated the extension of Brevet rank, they too well knew the evils arising out of its existence, and in Despatches 19th February, 1831, No. 7, and No. 15, of 23rd December, 1835, they curtly refused to apply for any extension of the system of Brevet promotion, beyond that already existing, to the rank of Captain.

But limited as was the sphere within which this Army rank was felt, yet when the number of Brevet-Captains was excessively great—as at one time the numbers were—the service of the army was not carried on without difficulties, from the clashing of duties, and many disputes of a serious character often sprung up, out of the way the Rolster for duty was worked.

All Officers now serving in India are, by the order in the June Despatch, now entitled to obtain the Army or Brevet rank of Captain on completion of 12 years' standing in the Army from the date of first Commission; the rank of Major after 20 years; of Lieut.-Colonel after 26 years, and on and after 18th February, 1866, all Officers who have served 31 years on full pay, 5 of which in the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, to be promoted to the rank of Colonel.

The entire assimilation which Sir C. Wood orders in his 1864 Despatch with the Brevet Captain principle of total service, entitling to rank from date of first commission, is not carried out, seeing that Officers must have been 31 years Officers on full pay to entitle them to the Colonels' grade, and this difference will eventually lead to great complications. The Despatch also provides for an Officer obtaining the Brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel from the 18th February, 1861, when first Commissions bear date on or before the 18th February, 1835.

Now as there are many of that Service, the 'Gazette' omits to provide for the clashing of claims to command by reason of the Officer of longest service being in the position of having his Major's and Captain's commissions, of more recent dates than those of his junior Officer, so that the latter, having the same date of rank as Lieut.-Colonel, would, by seniority of Major's rank, take precedence; in fact, one anomaly brings on another.

The Despatch further states, "That His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has expressed his intention of recommending Her Majesty, that the Officers of the British Army serving in India, including the Ordnance Corps, shall have Army Local Rank in India conferred upon them after precisely the same periods of service and under the same rules, special provision being also made in cases where Line and India Officers may serve together elsewhere." Now, though the Secretary of State's Orders of June, 1864, have long been carried out as respects the bestowal of Army or Brevet rank on the Officers of the India Forces, yet to this date the like rank has not been bestowed on the Officers of the British Army in India, nor on the Officers of the Ordnance Corps.

Indeed, were it not that Sir C. Wood in the June, 1864, Despatch, reports to the Governor-General that the length of Service Rules, entitling the Officers of the India and British Forces to the advancement in Brevet or Army rank, "the adoption of which has, with the concurrence of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, been determined upon," it would be almost incredible that such a measure could have been viewed by His Royal Highness as one suitable for any Army; no one knows better than his Royal Highness,—for few Officers of superior rank direct their attention so closely, so scrupulously, and so cheerfully as His Royal Highness to those innumerable Army details which in their combination form the great military machine,—that the effect of Brevet or Army rank, day after day, entails on the military authorities the greatest amount of anxiety and perplexity, in order to reconcile the conflicting interests so created.

The Army combinations are made up of numerous minor parts, and these require to be adjusted as carefully as the different parts of a great steam-engine; and as a defect of an apparently small character in an engine will force its working to cease; so, in an Army, the attention is ever needed, as shown by His Royal Highness' practice, to the removal of the friction which so constantly arises in the vast human machine. Now as the local rank assured to the British Officers in India, to prevent supersession by the Officers of the Staff Corps, has as yet not been published in the Horse Guards orders, and this delay being so totally at variance with the usual promptness in the promotion department of the Horse Guards, it may rightly be assumed that His Royal Highness does not entertain the sanguine expectations that Sir C. Wood so conclusively, and, which is characteristic of ignorance, so dogmatically states, that such army rank will "entirely remove" all ground for complaint upon this head.

All who watched the effects of the Secretary of State's orders of 1861 well

knew that the sweeping scope of his changes, from their unmilitary character, would bring on Government and the Service most serious embarrassments in respect both to the Officers of the Indian Army as also those of the British Army. And though it is notorious that complications of the most serious character have already arisen in India, and that many more are anticipated, and as His Royal Highness has for the first time become responsible for advice and concurrence with novel measures, he on calm reflection cannot fail to perceive that bad results are certain to follow from these measures. It is true that up to June of last year, the questions involving interests of the British and India Army Officers had been staved off, or their joint action delayed; but it is difficult to believe that their injurious and dangerous results can much longer be checked; their bad working can only be proved by some calamity.

His Royal Highness the Field Marshal is now stated to have concurred in the large extension of Brevet rank to all Officers, British and Indian, but in the case of the British Officer it is only to be local, instead of permanent rank as to the Indian Officer. It will therefore be withdrawn as the Brevet Captaincy was on the British Officer leaving India, except in the case of coming into contact with Indian Officers serving "elsewhere," then the Despatch declares that special provision will be made. The result will follow that the difficulty of employing an Indian officer "elsewhere" will be so seriously enhanced, by the necessity of placing all other Officers of the British Army, of equal or greater length of service, on an equality as to rank, that the advantage which the Empire was stated to acquire, from having Indian Officers of experience available to employ on general Army duties, will be lost.

But the greatest of all evils will be felt by His Royal Highness when the Officers of the British Army return to England, and find themselves reduced to the humble grade of regimental Captain, or Subaltern, instead of the high rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and Major, which they enjoyed in India. A Subaltern of 20, a Captain of 26 years, and a Major of 35 years' service were not rare specimens, in former years, of the standing of Regimental Officers of the British Army, and all these periods would entitle the holders to become Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Colonels. Now if peace continues, then the previous slow rise is now more apparently certain from the crowded state of the senior ranks, and from their comparative young ages, as well as from the equality of ages, and if this same result can reasonably be expected, consequently Officers who held the rank of Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Major in numbers in India, will be found on returning to England, resuming the lower grade of Major, Captain, and Subalterns; the poor unfriended Brevet-Captain who had no money, no friends to interest the Horse Guards in his favour, suffered in silence, though not with patient forbearance, the withdrawal of his Indian rank, but it is not likely that the social influences which connect the British Officers of rank with the drawing-rooms of London will patiently bear with the deprivation of rank on the part of fathers, brothers, husbands, nephews, cousins, and those of dearer or hoped-for closer connections; no one is less inclined than His Royal Highness to face the attacks which he would have to bear with, when meeting with relatives of rank-deprived Officers.

There are sufficient number of Officers, Indian and British, who can well remember the distressing difficulties arising out of the equalization of rank, which the promotions, termed the "Fane Major-Generals," gave rise to. The Courts Martial, threatenings of Courts Martial, the giving up of Commands, rather than allow Officers to serve under junior Officers; the stigma on those who preferred money to dignity by so serving, are all but slight indications of the few cases which will be created by the bestowal of this rank, and had as the former disputes were, they will appear few in contrast with those dissensions which will follow from the far more extensive Brevet rank which is now stated to have been concurred in and approved by His Royal Highness.

The evil is not, however, at an end. The strange mixture of commissions which will prevail would puzzle the smartest Adjutant-General to reconcile. A Staff Corps Officer may be a substantive Captain in the Staff Corps, with one date of rank, a Brevet-Major with another rank, and he may be a Lieutenant in the cadre of his Régiment. Another Lieutenant of that same cadre may be junior in the cadre of the other, but senior as a Brevet Major. A British Officer may be a Captain in his Regiment, a Brevet-Major of one date from distinguished service, and be a local Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel. It is also quite possible for three classes of Officers, all Majors, under the Secretary of State's arrangements to have them associated together so as to find a Major in the Staff Corps drawing the pay of that rank, though only a Lieutenant in his cadre, and serving with a British Line Officer of superior service, drawing Captain's pay, and these two serving with a local India Officer of a Regiment, drawing only Lieutenant's pay, but with the Brevet of Major, and yet, that the Brevet of Major of this last being by length of service, will give him the right to seniority of all three, but with the least pay.

The repeated assertion has been made by the Secretary of State, and in the recent debate in the House of Lords, that the bestowal of this Brevet rank entirely removes the grievance for which the Lord Cranworth's Report states that the Officers had "solid grounds for this complaint." Now in the far East, Officers are influenced, as in service in Europe, by rank, honours, ribbons, and orders; but they also look to a return to their native country as the greatest of all gains, and their hearts cling to the idea that they may, in their old age, have the pecuniary means wherewith they may solace their last years, for the extended banishment they have so long borne; but when they see that junior Officers of the same Regiment are rewarded, equally with themselves, with the rank which they obtain merely because their juniors have obtained it, and that these juniors have, in addition, received the substantial benefit of larger Regimental rank pay, which will add to the competence and comfort of their last years, it is beyond the bounds of human patience for such distinctions to be received with equanimity; the universal bestowal of rank by Brevet renders its possession of comparatively but little value, but when one favoured class enjoy substantive advantages in the shape of increased pay, and have the largest opening for active and high employment, then the stigma of the mere Brevet rank becomes the more galling.

It is therefore a gross delusion to assert that the Regimental Officer and the young Officer not on the Staff, are on an equality with the Staff Corps Officer. The latter has a Corps; he is one who is set apart for good employments, and his antecedents on the Staff give him a right and a claim to be further employed by Government; he has the credit of his former services in his favour, he knows, absolutely, that he will rise from substantive rank to substantive rank without thought or care, and will terminate his career in 38 years by securing the prize of the service, which his former Senior Regimental Officer will have to wait for years to obtain. The Regimental Officer's services are forgotten with the breaking up of his Regiment, or its conversion into an irregular Corps; his services, however good, are cast on the waters, without hope of their reaching a haven; his home is broken up; his Brevet rank is a mockery when its possession is contrasted with the pecuniary gains with the rank which his Junior cadre Officer also obtains. A Return, moved for by Colonel Sykes (213 of 1865), shows there are 41 Colonels and Field Officers, 119 Captains, 247 Majors, and 3 Ensigns unemployed by reason, not of a deficiency of employment, but because younger and perhaps less able Officers of the Staff Corps are filling the posts which they might have filled with credit to the Government and benefit to themselves; many of them are drawing less pay than their juniors of the Staff Corps, and are without the hope of succeeding to the prize of the service like those of the Staff Corps; they see their families in Europe living in an humble manner, whilst the families of their Junior cadre Officers are in comfort from the higher pay which the Staff Corps Officer receives with his rank.

Finally, Sir Charles Wood, in his place in Parliament, reads out a letter from Sir Hugh Rose, which opens out the important fact that the Bombay Authorities meaning thereby, Sir Bartle Frere, one of the ablest of India statesmen, Sir Willian Mansfield, the Officer specially selected by Sir Charles Wood for the command of the army in India, desired to suspend the application of the Brevet rank. Further, it is rumoured that the Madras Authorities have also desired to abstain from carrying out the orders from Sir Charles Wood, and if rumours can be relied on, there are reports in the India Office, which show that the confusion occasioned by Sir C. Wood's orders, have increased the supersession evils many times greater than before; in fact, total disorganization may follow from the India Office measures, unless they are arrested in time.

SPEECH of SIR C. WOOD, in reply to Capt. JERVIS, as reported in 'The Times' of May 3, 1865.

Sir C. WOOD.—I have sometimes been accused of being unwilling to rise until late in these discussions, but on this occasion I am desirous of presenting myself to the House at the earliest possible moment, not only to answer the motion of the hon. and gallant gentleman, but to state the general course of policy pursued by the Secretary of State in Council upon the various questions connected with the Indian army. For there are other questions besides the amalgamation—there is the alteration of the whole organization of the Indian army, and the extraordinary reduction of that army, and many of the complaints which have been ascribed to the amalgamation are really referable to the reduction. I entirely concur in the high terms in which the hon. and gallant gentleman has spoken of the officers of the Indian army. They were entitled to the greatest consideration from the Government, and if I could admit for a moment that the Government had behaved to them in the manner in which the hon. and gallant gentleman states, I should feel myself most guilty in the eyes of this House. But I do not hesitate to say—and before I sit down I shall prove it—that the result of the measures taken by the Government on the whole have placed the officers of the Indian army in a far better position as regards pay and promotion than they ever were before. I am anxious to state this, not only to remove the false impression which exists, but also for the sake of those officers of my Council by whose advice and with whose concurrence all these measures have been taken, and who, connected as they are with the Indian army by sympathy and by services, have been accused of neglecting the interests and feelings of that army. The hon. and gallant gentleman has said a great deal about the number of petitions which have been presented, and if I supposed that these petitions were the really expressed opinions of the officers whose names they bear I should attach more weight to them. If I thought that the grievances were not repudiated by some of the officers in whose behalf they are put forward (“Name, name”), I should think them of more importance. The hon. gentleman knows perfectly well that a system of invitation to sign petitions has been going on for some time past. Not very long ago an officer came to me and talked over the changes which had been made, and said that the new arrangement had very much improved his position. Soon after that the petitions were inspected and it was found that his name was signed to one of them. (“Name, name.”) Certainly not, I shall not give the name.

Captain JERVIS.—Then it will be my duty to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances under which this officer's name was attached to the petition. (Hear, hear.)

Sir C. WOOD.—In a matter of this sort I shall certainly not shrink from the hon. and gallant member. Not long ago I received a letter from an officer whose name I will give. It is from Colonel Cherry, a lieutenant-colonel commanding a regiment in the Madras army. He writes to me thus:—

“Saugor, Central India, March 22.

“Sir,—I write to inform you that a pamphlet headed ‘Another Grievance,’ has been printed, in which the author has used my name in the most unwarrantable manner, citing my case as a grievance. I beg to state it was composed and printed entirely without my knowledge, authority, or consent. I

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“ never knew anything of it till a printed copy was sent me. It is quite illegal, “ as the printer’s name is not put on the pamphlet. I have no grievance, and “ have never petitioned, and am very much annoyed at my name being so used.

“ Believe me, &c.,

“ P. G. CHERRY,

“ Colonel 4th Madras Light Cavalry.”

The hon. and gallant member will not say that I have not given the name there. Next on the list to Colonel Cherry is the name of Colonel Kelso, and when it is stated that our measures with regard to promotion have injured every officer in the service, I would call attention to the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelso, who is a petitioner. In July, 1861, Colonel Cherry was Lieutenant-Colonel, and Mr. Kelso was a Captain; but in consequence of the accelerated promotion which our measures have produced, in six months from that time Captain Kelso became a Lieutenant-Colonel, passing over altogether the rank of Major. Three years after—namely, in the spring of this year—Captain Kelso retires. Now he happened to be in a peculiar position. In consequence of the arrangement which I made last year, he rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and three regiments had an interest in getting him to retire. The system of bonus, of paying for retirements, has not ceased in the Madras army—for the Madras papers represent those sales as going on—and three regiments benefited to a considerable extent by inducing him to retire. He does retire on a lieutenant-colonel’s pension, and then he petitions the House of Commons, says he is hardly used, and names certain officers retiring on special bonus who have not been removed from the list, whereas, if they had been he would have been in the receipt of a colonel’s pension. Now, in the Madras army the ordinary time in which an officer passes from the rank of captain to that of major is seven years, and the ordinary time which it takes for him to reach the rank of lieutenant-colonel is 12 years more. Therefore, if nothing had been done out of the ordinary course, in all probability this officer would have reached his colonelcy in 19 years; yet he now petitions Parliament on the ground that what has been done does not enable him to obtain a colonel’s allowance in four years from the time of his being captain. (Hear.) I don’t think that is what Parliament will consider a legitimate grievance. A statement was sent round to members of Parliament a few days ago in which two or three cases are specially referred to. I should be glad if the House would permit me to enter into those cases as a specimen of the grievances which those officers have to endure. The first grievance on this list is stated in these terms:—

“ Captain W. Winson, a captain in the Bengal Staff Corps, now commands “ the 18th Regiment Native Infantry, and has under him Major R. Larkin, of the “ late 49th Regiment of Native Infantry.”

Now, if that has any meaning at all, its meaning is this,—that, contrary to the practice of the Indian army, we have superseded a particular major. Supposing we did what is alleged, it would not be contrary to the practice of the Indian army, because it was always the custom in the East India Company’s service to disregard rank in the command of irregular regiments. I find in a report made in the very year before the mutiny that the 3rd Irregular Cavalry was commanded by a lieutenant, the second in command being a captain; and that the 14th Irregular Regiment was commanded by a captain, a major being second in command. If, therefore, we had done what is alleged in this statement; we should only have been acting in accordance with old practice; but it so happens that we have done quite the contrary. We have given orders that no officer shall serve under his junior unless with own consent; so that if this major suffered the grievance of serving under his captain it must have been entirely with his own consent. (Hear, hear.) The next case is that of Major Spottiswood, who was superseded by a lieutenant; but, for the reasons I have just stated, the lieutenant could not have been put in command over him. The third case is thus stated:—

“ In the 46th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, the third captain, Alfred

“Cooper, was superseded not only by two captains junior to him, but also by the senior-lieutenant, A. McNeill, who was made a substantive major in the Staff Corps.”

Now, what is stated with respect to this case is directly the reverse of the fact, because the rule of precedence as regards army rank and substantive rank makes it impossible that the grievance complained of could have arisen. (Hear.) It has been charged against the Secretary of State that he withheld from the officers all knowledge of the points which he was bringing under the notice of the Commission; but on reference to the report and appendix, it will be found that the Commissioners very properly made the officers aware of all the cases mentioned by the Secretary of State, and called upon them for their explanations. (Hear, hear.) I am not going at this present moment into the question of bonus; but the Commission has distinctly reported that on that point there has been no breach of the guarantee. The hon. and gallant officer says that I misled the Commission by stating that the bonus was an irregular proceeding: Now, of course, I did not state that upon my own authority or my own legal opinion. I stated it on the authority of two decisions in the Court of Queen's Bench, both of which had been reported. The hon. and gallant officer shakes his head; but he will find the cases reported in the newspapers. In both cases there was an action by an officer to obtain payment of the amount of a bonus which was refused by the officer who had undertaken to pay it, the defence of the latter being that the transaction was an illegal one. I have the report of one of the cases before me, and I find the statement of the defendant to be substantially this,—“I won't pay the money, though I promised to do so, because it was an illegal transaction; you cannot compel me to perform an illegal bargain.” I say nothing of the conduct of the officer who made that defence (hear); but that was the defence, and I refer to it and the judgment of the Court to show that I was justified in giving the opinion by which the hon. and gallant gentleman says I misled the Commission. The Lord Chief Justice, in giving judgment, said:—

“The Court must take cognizance of what offices were legally saleable, and they knew that a commission in the East India Company's service was not legally saleable, and no rule of the Indian service could repeal the statute. There must be judgment for the defendant.”

In *The Times* newspaper I find this account of a case which came before the Court on the 4th of June, 1855:—

“A rule was immediately obtained for a new trial in the Court of Exchequer. After taking time to consider, judgment was given by the Judges on the 4th of June, 1855. In the unanimous opinion of the Bench, the transaction by which a sum of money was secured to the major of the regiment to which these officers belonged, to induce his retirement, was illegal, and the bond given by the defendant could not be enforced by law. The transaction amounted to the gift of a money consideration to an officer holding a commission in the East India service to induce him to leave it. It behoved the Court to let it go forth that, in its opinion, any tampering with the sale of a public office not only rendered the transaction void; but subjected the parties concerned to the penalties consequent on the commission of a misdemeanour. There must, therefore, be judgment for the defendant.”

Well, Sir, I beg to say that I don't think I misled the Commission, and I don't think I misled the House, by what I said on the subject of the payment of bonuses, when a Court of Law had stated in language as strong as any which could be used, that it was illegal. (Hear, hear.) I am not speaking in favour of the officers who made the defence; I am speaking of the illegality of the transaction. (Hear, hear.) The hon. and gallant officer has not gone very much into detail with respect to the cases in which he says I have not fulfilled the promise I made to accept the opinion of the Commission. I will state what has been done. The whole of the documents and despatches were laid before the law officers of the Crown. We did not make a case for them, we merely submitted the papers to them and asked whether there was anything in the instructions we had given contrary to law. After some consideration, the then Attorney and Solicitor-General

and the counsel for the East India Company stated their opinion to be that there was nothing we had proposed to do which might not have been done by the East India Company, and whatever the East India Company might have done it was within our power to do. Fortified in our opinion by that answer to our question, we proceeded in the course we had taken with considerable confidence. But when these various complaints were made I did not at all wish to be bound by a mere legal and technical construction of the words of the documents, and I therefore referred the question to the Commission which has been alluded to. I don't know whether blame has been attached to me for having appointed a law lord to the chairmanship of that Commission, but I may state that when the state of Lord Dalhousie's health precluded him from attending their sittings, the commissioners themselves asked me to appoint a law officer to the vacant place, and therefore, in nominating Lord Cranworth to the position, I merely complied with their request. I am sure the House will be of opinion that no fairer or more impartial person could have been appointed chairman than Lord Cranworth (hear, hear), and I am glad of having the opportunity of expressing my obligations to that noble lord and to the rest of the commissioners for the care and attention they bestowed upon the matter. (Hear.) It is perfectly true, as the hon. and gallant gentleman says, that the Commission classed the alleged breaches of the guarantee under thirteen heads. They stated that in eight of these there was no just cause of complaint, and that in three others there was cause of complaint, and that in two others there might have been cause of complaint. I can frankly and fairly state my belief that in the three cases in which the Commission reported actual causes of complaint I have effectually met the grievances complained of. In one of the two cases, in which the committee stated that causes of complaint might have existed, it is quite impossible that up to this time any such grievances could have been felt. In the cases where there were grounds for complaint the commissioners stated their opinion that it was incumbent upon me to afford compensation, and I trust before I sit down I shall show that more than ample compensation has been given, as the acceleration of promotion and the amount of additional pay given to the Indian army during the last four years has been unexampled. In speaking of the three measures with which we had to deal, I shall endeavour to keep them entirely distinct. As to the first measure, which is termed amalgamation, I think I shall be able to show that no real cause of complaint can exist with reference to it; and in making that statement I am entitled to rely upon the admissions of the officers themselves, that no cause of complaint has arisen out of it. The word amalgamation is not exactly fitted to express what was done in the matter, but what really was done was this. The three old European regiments of infantry in the three Indian presidencies were invited to volunteer for general service, they being already Queen's troops by the measure of the noble lord. The soldiers, almost to a man, and nearly the whole of the officers, accepted the proposal; out of 119 of the latter 99 volunteered, and of the remainder 8 were already on the Staff, leaving only 12 who declined to volunteer. The regiments thus formed were added to the regular army. A similar course was taken with regard to the cavalry regiments, who also volunteered. Every man who joined did so of his own free will, and I must therefore be permitted to say that, although I have seen some newspapers endeavouring to invent grievances for them, I don't see what possible cause of complaint they can have. It was a voluntary proceeding on their part, and they have retained the privileges of the old Indian officers as to retirement and pensions. Upon the whole, therefore, I think the House will agree with me, that these officers have been considerable gainers by the alterations which are now complained of. The increased pay to the Artillery who volunteered from the altered organization amounts to £75,000 per annum, while the Engineers receive about £55,000 per annum additional. Some cause of complaint might, however, arise with reference to promotion, but up to the present time no such grievance has arisen. In the case referred to by the commissioners with regard to the Staff Corps, we have complied with their recommendations. The other two measures we had to carry out were the changes in the organization and a very large reduction in the army. It will be obvious that it must have been within the power of

the East India Company to effect both these changes, and that the power which they possessed was transferred to us in all its entirety. On that point the Commissioners said :—

“ It could not have been intended to prevent the Crown, if in the interests of India and of the empire at large, it should deem it necessary, from reducing the numbers of the Indian army or altering its organization. It would have been in the power of the Company to make such reductions and changes, and a similar power was transferred to the Crown.”

The hon. and gallant officer has talked of the Staff Corps as if it were an extraordinary thing; but now let us see how that matter stands. In the Indian army as it existed before the mutiny—and that is the fairest period to take, looking to the original state of things—there were 176 regular and 108 irregular regiments, the difference being in the number of officers. We have substituted irregular for regular regiments throughout the army of Bengal and Bombay, and intend doing so with the army of Madras. Under the old system of the Indian regular army there were 23 officers to each regiment, of whom five were placed there for Staff employment. The officers of the whole irregular regiments were affected by the withdrawal of officers from their own regiments to be placed on Staff employment. It will be remembered that was described as the ruin almost of the Indian army. It was stated that the *élite* of the officers—the best picked men—were taken away from their regiments, and those who were left were discouraged and kept back. I might quote the opinions of very distinguished officers to that effect, but I do not wish to do so, because it might be painful to some to hear the expressions that were used. But I may be permitted to quote a short paragraph of a letter from Lord Elphinstone, which will be found in one of the papers on the table of the House, and which states the case very shortly. Lord Elphinstone says :—

“ The best regiments in Bengal were the Irregular Cavalry, and the same holds good throughout India. In these regiments you had only three or four English officers, but they were picked men, and so were the native officers. I would apply this system to the whole native army—infantry as well as cavalry. The saving of expense would be great, for, if I am not mistaken, one regular native cavalry regiment costs as much as three times the number of irregulars. But the saving of expense would be nothing compared to the gain in efficiency.”

That is the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, who had been Governor of Madras and Lieutenant-Governor of Bombay—a man of very considerable experience, and who showed by his conduct during the mutiny that he well understood this subject. That extract shows that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the army was improved, and no inconsiderable expense saved. And at that time the saving of expense was no trifling consideration. In the state of Indian finance at that time, with a yearly deficit, the saving effected by substituting irregular for regular regiments was no less than 330,000*l.* per annum. This was no measure of mine. The great advocate of the change was Sir John Lawrence. The question was, where were officers to be found for the Indian army? Lord Clyde, Sir William Mansfield, Sir Hugh Rose, and Sir William Napier agreed that the only means of doing so was by the formation of a Staff Corps. Lord Dalhousie was anxious to carry it into effect when the army existed in its original state; but when the whole Bengal army ceased to exist there seemed no other resource, and we acted on the opinion of Sir John Lawrence, and put the army on the irregular system. The formation of a Staff Corps was a matter of absolute necessity. The first question, then, was how they should be promoted. The Staff Corps must vary with the demands of the service, and there could be no possible mode of promotion except by length of service. The Commission to which the hon. and gallant member referred, which was presided over by my noble friend opposite (Lord Hotham), dealing with the question of amalgamation, made a report, from which I will read an extract. They said :—

“ A Staff Corps to be formed for service in India, to consist of an unlimited number of officers of all ranks. All officers of the local armies and of the Line now holding permanent staff or detached appointments, excepting such as are

“purely military, but including service with irregulars, to have the option, subject to the approval of the Indian Government, of being transferred to the Staff Corps or returning to regimental duty. Promotion in the Staff Corps to be governed by length of service, and to be irrespective of departmental position. The whole of the officers of irregular Native Corps to be on the Staff list. We conceive, however, that officers so circumstanced must hold a commission for their substantive rank in lieu of their former regimental commission.”

We did exactly that. We offered to all the officers of the Indian army who had been a certain time in India the option of going into the Staff Corps. We went one step further. We thought it not unfair to give to those officers who had been on Staff employment the benefit of that service as regards promotion as if the Staff Corps had been formed when they went on Staff employment. I admit the scheme gave supersession in army rank which did put them above those who had been their seniors before they left their regiments. I may be permitted to say, in justification of the course which we took, that there are examples enough of this having been done in India. When my hon. and gallant friend talks of the recognition of the indisputable rights of the Indian officers, he seems to forget that on several occasions the East India Company by their acts seemed not to admit these rights. I fully admit that it was only in extraordinary cases that the general practice of promotion by regimental seniority was interrupted. But if the East India Company thought right on extraordinary cases, for the good of the public service, to depart from the rule, that is enough to show that seniority was not acknowledged as a clear and indisputable right. There are examples given in the memorials of the officers themselves in which regimental seniority is entirely excluded. It is stated that some regiments lost a great number of officers. One regiment lost four, another five. (Hear.) Four does not seem to be a very great loss in a regiment of 18 or 20. Were the officers in the regiment always allowed to rise by seniority in India? (“Yes.”) No, they were not. There is a case stated by the officers themselves, who show that in four or five regiments officers from one corps were placed over senior officers in another corps. In the Bengal Cavalry four lieutenants were placed above cornets in that way.

Colonel SYKES.—They were boys.

Sir C. WOOD.—Does the hon. and gallant member mean to say that an officer has not a right of promotion because he is a young man? In the Native Infantry there were a captain and five lieutenants from another regiment placed above ensigns. In all these cases the officers, according to the proposition of my hon. and gallant friend behind me, had an indisputable and unquestionable right to be raised by regimental seniority; but they were deprived of that right by the East India Company, and officers from other regiments put over their heads in their own. We, however, have done nothing of the kind, and I only mention these facts to show that the statements put forward on the question of rights are not so sound as they are asserted to be. We have not in the slightest degree interfered with regimental seniority. The officers in the Indian army rise step by step on that qualification. The cadet who went into the army in 1860, who perhaps would never see a day's service, will rise to the rank of colonel or general officer in a regular course by seniority, by successive steps, and without any interruption from the day he enters. When the Royal Artillery went to India the East India Company thought it desirable to promote the majors, and they gave the majors of the Artillery and Engineers the rank of lieutenant-colonels. The effect of this was that these officers superseded at one step 118 majors of the cavalry of the East India Company. In 1824 the East India Company divided a native regiment into two, and appointed half of the officers into a new regiment, in which they rose in rank above their seniors in the old regiments, and, further than that, a lieutenant-colonel might be moved from one regiment to another, according to the practice of the East India Company, and be put in command of an officer who had been his senior. We have done nothing of this kind. We have issued a positive prohibition against

any officer being put in command of a regiment containing a man who is his senior in rank. We are accused of departing from the practice of the East India Company by superseding senior officers by juniors, while we have actually prohibited that being done. I mention this to show that the Government had some justification for the course they pursued regarding the grievances of which the officers had a fair right to complain. I thought the only mode of reconciling the evil was by giving those officers who have been passed over the rank to which they are entitled. I consulted his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief upon the question, because it was one which not only affected the promotion of the officers of the Indian army, but also the officers of the Line. The Duke of Cambridge has shown the greatest consideration for the Indian officers, and has done his utmost to consult their interest in every way, and he expressed his opinion that there should be no supersedure in rank, and from the day of the formation of the Staff Corps every officer in the Indian army has been promoted precisely at the same rate as other officers throughout the whole of the service, by seniority. Sir Hugh Rose, an officer who has taken the greatest possible pains with the whole of this question for four or five years, has reported upon it, and I may be permitted to read his opinion upon the mode of meeting the grievances complained of. It is as follows:—

“ Under the measures directed by the Right Hon. the Secretary of State, the chief cause of complaint, as frequently brought to the notice of Government by his Excellency—*viz.* the supersession of regimental officers by their juniors of the Staff Corps—has been removed entirely. It may at the same time be observed that, while some officers will continue to suffer supersession, the privileges now conferred on the army generally are specially advantageous to the officers who have not joined the Staff Corps, and to those who have been unfortunate in their promotion. It is not for the Commander-in-Chief to question or discuss the measures deliberately sanctioned and directed by Her Majesty’s Government in redress of the grievances of the officers of the Indian service, but his Excellency may be permitted to say that, without cancelling the amalgamation arrangements altogether, he does not think that a more equitable scheme could have been devised than that which the Bombay authorities desire to suspend.”

The Government of India, in forwarding a copy of the above letter, say:—

“ It is scarcely possible that extensive changes in the army should ever be made without unfavourably affecting the position of some individuals relatively—*i.e.* as compared with that of some others—and the instance in question is no exception to this rule. But we think that there can be no doubt that, by the measures ordered in your despatch, substantial hardship in the matter of promotion is avoided.”

I do not know that anything could be more satisfactory or could be urged more strongly than that opinion of Sir Hugh Rose. I do not think, therefore, that I need say anything more upon that subject, and, as I beg the House again to observe, if this be so, the three cases in which the Commissioners reported there was just cause of complaint are entirely remedied by the measures adopted. In two of these cases this was admitted by the officers themselves, and in the third I think that I have shown good reason for the course which has been followed. And now I come to the last measure which we took, and out of which arose two contingent grievances, if I may so call them—the reduction of the Indian Army. It was within the power of the East India Company to have reduced their army as it was within our power, and it would have been their duty if the Company had been in existence, as it was our duty, to effect that reduction. I doubt whether the House is at all aware of the extent of that reduction. Our whole force, including the native army and contingent, numbered previous to the mutiny 265,000 men. Now, the whole source of danger arose from our native army, because the princes and people were all faithful, and it was therefore incumbent upon us to reduce that army. The only way to do this was to replace the native army by a smaller force, more costly it is true, but more faithful. We therefore reduced the native army by 135,000 men, or by 135 regiments, of which 50 to 75 were regular troops. Consequent upon this reduction there would naturally be a

number of supernumerary officers, to whom retiring allowances in some proportion to their pay would have to be made. In the case of the reduction of the St. Helena force the retirements were made upon rather more than the pensions of the ranks of those who retired. The first question that arose was as to the possible reduction of the number of colonels' allowances. Upon this subject the Committee to which I have referred reported to the following effect:—

“ If in the process of passing from a war to a peace establishment any regiments are reduced absolutely, and the strength of the army reduced to a corresponding extent, then the number of colonels must necessarily be reduced also, and the number of allowances at the same time.”

We did propose gradually to reduce the number of colonels' allowances, and our arrangements have tended to that effect. We also reduced each regiment by two lieutenants, and kept these officers as supernumeraries in their regiments until they could be absorbed. In consequence, too, of the scheme of retirement which we introduced, 49 officers were promoted to be lieutenant-colonels, 87 to be majors, 123 to be captains, and 190 to be lieutenants. I think, Sir, that I may fairly say that we have in every instance exhibited a generous and liberal treatment towards these Indian officers. The charge imposed upon the revenue of India consequent upon the increased promotions and pensions has amounted to a little more than a quarter of a million. That charge will of course be diminished as these pensions fall off, but the immediate effect of our measure was to increase the pay, pensions, and emoluments in one shape or another of the existing officers. But now, as to promotion, I must say that it is not fair to attack us with what occurs in one particular rank. The whole of an officer's career of promotion should be taken into account, and I will state to the House two or three examples of the extent to which promotion has been accelerated by the measures we have adopted. The officers requested that a system of promotion should be adopted which would have led to extraordinary irregularities, and it is not a little remarkable that those who now complain of supersession by our measures should have themselves proposed a measure which must have led to a far more unequal supersession. Since our measures have come into operation promotion has become much more rapid. With the rank of colonel of course we have nothing to do, as promotion in that rank is beyond our efforts. The time of service for lieutenant-colonels in the three Indian armies on the 1st of January, 1857, and the 1st of January, 1865, respectively were:—In the cavalry—Bengal, 37 years 6 months and 37 years 3 months; Madras, 37 years 6 months and 35 years 3 months; Bombay, 33 years 3 months and 28 years. In the infantry—Bengal, 36 years and 35 years respectively; Madras, 38 years and 37 years; Bombay, 36 years and 34 years. Then, coming to the case of majors, I find that the average service has diminished in the cavalry—Bengal, from 33 years and 4 months to 22 years and 6 months; Madras, 34 years 4 months to 25 years 6 months; Bombay, 33 years to 29 years. So with regard to the infantry, there has been a diminution in the average period of service of from four to five years, so that a considerable acceleration of promotion is clearly traceable to the operation of our measures. In 1857 I find that the 20 junior colonels of Bengal infantry had obtained that rank in 44 years and 9 months. In 1865 20 junior lieutenant-colonels would attain the rank of colonel under the 12 years' rule in 38 years nine months—a saving of six years, or equal to two years' higher pay. Then, let me take the number of promotions to substantive rank in the three Indian armies in the four years ending 1857 and the four years ending 1865, being the last four years of the ordinary state of India before the mutiny, and the last four years since the constitution of the Staff Corps, and I think the House will be astonished to find what an acceleration of promotion has taken place. I find that there have been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the first period, 84, and in the last 223; to the rank of major, 142 and 534; and to the rank of captain, 585 and 616 respectively; but of the 585 no less than 176 are due to augmentations of the army, leaving the natural promotions at the number of 409. I think I have shown to the House that in respect of pay, pension, retirement, and promotion, the position of the Indian