


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1. Select Committee on Army (India + the Colonies) —  
Report, Minutes of Evidence &c (478) 1867
2. 50 India 1867
3. Copies of Minutes, Despatches &c relating to the  
European + Native Troops in India (500) 1867  
(Parliamentary Paper)
4. Correspondence on the Increase of the Army in India  
(Parl. Paper) (332) 1887

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## LIST OF APPENDIX.

### Appendix, No. 1.

	Page
Return of Answers which have been received to the Questions transmitted by the Committee to Persons in high official Positions in India and the Colonies - - - -	209

### Appendix, No. 2.

Papers handed in by Colonel Norman, 9 March 1867 :

(A.) Memorandum of Composition of the Native Army as respects Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of its principal Branches - - - -	260
(B.) Bengal.—Pay and Allowances and Charges for different Corps, exclusive of Commissariat, Clothing, Ordnance and Barrack Charges, Capitation Allowance, &c. -	261

### Appendix, No. 3.

Papers handed in by Major General Pears :

Memorandum, No. 1500 B., dated 7 January 1865 - - - -	262
Estimate of the Annual Cost that would devolve upon the British Government by the Employment in China of the two existing Regiments of Sikh Infantry - - -	263
Statement showing the Sickness and Mortality among the Native Troops in Burmah and Port Blair, for the years 1864 and 1865 - - - -	267
Statement taken from the Sanitary Reports of the Army Medical Department presented to Parliament, showing the Sickness and Mortality among the Native Troops serving in China during the Second War, and the Regiments garrisoning Hong Kong and Shanghai subsequently - - - -	267

### Appendix, No. 4.

Papers received from the Horse Guards :

Return of the Movement of Regiments during the last 20 Years to and from India, the Cape, and all Colonies East of the Cape, and of the Time passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period - - - -	268
Return of the Movement of Regiments during the last 20 Years to and from the West Indies and the Bermudas, and of the Time passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period - - - -	279

### Appendix, No. 5.

Paper handed in by Lieutenant General Sir Hope Grant :

Return of the Number of Troops in the Colonies and Dependencies borne on the Strength of the Army - - - -	282
---	-----

### Appendix, No. 6.

Paper handed in by Mr. Taylor, 9 April 1867 :

Return of the Local Militia, Volunteers, and Military Police in the West India Colonies, actually Embodied and Effective - - - -	284
--	-----

### Appendix, No. 7.

Papers handed in by Captain Mends, R. N. :

Extract from the Regulations for Her Majesty's Transport Service - - - -	285
Estimate prepared in the Transport Department of the Comparative Expense of the Overland and Cape Routes between England and India, for Conveyance of 14,400 Soldiers, with Officers and Families (concurring in by the Secretary of State for India) - - - -	286

Appendix, No. 7—*continued.*

Papers handed in by Captain Mends, R.N.— <i>continued.</i>	Page
Net cost per Soldier of the Transport of Troops with Officers and Families between certain Stations and Great Britain, after deducting the regulated Mess and Ration Stoppages; in Hired Ships, based on the Payments made for the Numbers conveyed during Five years; and, in Her Majesty's Troop Ships, on the Cost of the Conveyance of a Battalion with Officers and Families, including the Cost of Coals, Wages, and Victuals for the Crew, and a per-centage charge (at the rate of Eight per Cent. per Annum) for wear and tear of a Troop Ship of the "Tamar" class, calculated for the Average Period of Voyage - - - - -	287
Numbers of European and Native Indian Troops conveyed in Hired Ships between India and China during Five Years, and of the Cost per Soldier of all Expenses of Transport - - - - -	288
Estimate of the Cost for Transport of a Battalion to Hong Kong from England in a Hired Sailing Ship, for a Voyage of 125 Days - - - - -	289
Estimate of the Cost of the same Service by Her Majesty's Troop Ship "Tamar" for a Voyage of 90 days - - - - -	289

Appendix, No. 8.

Paper handed in by Colonel Shadwell:	
Approximate Estimate of the Annual Cost of maintaining a Battalion of Infantry, consisting of 788, all Ranks, at certain Stations East of the Cape - - - - -	290

Appendix, No. 9.

Paper handed in by Colonel Shadwell:	
Approximate Estimate of the Annual Cost of Maintaining a Battalion of European Infantry, consisting of 788 all Ranks, at the Cape of Good Hope - - - - -	291

Appendix, No. 10.

Paper put in by Mr. H. Taylor:	
Extract from "Notices sur les Colonies Francaises" publiés par ordre de S. Exc. le Marquis de Chasseloup-Jaubat, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies - - - - -	292

Appendix, No. 11.

Paper put in by Sir James Fergusson:	
Copy of a Letter from the Adjutant General to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 18 March 1867 - - - - -	293

Appendix, No. 12.

Papers received from the War Office:	
Annual cost of granting 2 <i>d.</i> a Day Extra Pay to the Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of a Battalion of Infantry, 788, all ranks - - - - -	299

Appendix, No. 13.

Papers put in by Mr. Fonblanque:	
Extracts from the Appendix to the Report of the Commissioners appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into the Military Expenditure and Establishments of Ceylon, 1865 - - - - -	300

Appendix, No. 14.

Paper received from the India Office:	
Memorandum on the Employment of Native Troops from India in the Colonies - - - - -	319

Appendix, No. 15.

	Page
Paper handed in by Major General Balfour, c. b., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867 :	
Letter addressed to the Secretary of the Government of India, in the Military Department, as to the Employment of Native Soldiers on Foreign Service on Duties which might be performed by Policemen; dated 6 August 1861 - - -	321

Appendix, No. 16.

Papers referred to by Major General Balfour, c. b., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.	
Minute by the Governor General, dated 13 September 1854 - - -	325
Minute by the Governor General, dated 5 February 1856 - - -	327

Appendix, No. 17.

Papers handed in by Major General Balfour, c. b., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867 :	
Fixed Strength, also Pay and Cost of Infantry of the Line for Service in India -	334

Appendix, No. 18.

Papers handed in by Major General Balfour, c. b., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867 :	
Return of Native Troops on Foreign Service, on 1 April 1857, Extracted from the Parliamentary Return, No. 56, of 1858 - - -	335

Appendix, No. 19.

Paper handed in by Major General Balfour, c. b., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867 :	
Distribution Statement of the Infantry of the Line - - -	337

Appendix, No. 20.

Paper handed in by Major General Balfour, c. b., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867 :	
General Enlistment Orders - - -	339

Appendix, No. 21.

Return received from the Admiralty :	
Cost incurred in moving certain Regiments between England, India, and the Colonies	341

## A P P E N D I X.

### Appendix, No. 1.

RETURN of ANSWERS which have been received to the QUESTIONS transmitted by App. No. 1.  
the Committee to Persons in high official Positions in India and the Colonies.

#### INDEX TO ANSWERS.

	PAGE
The Right Hon. Sir J. L. Lawrence, Bart., Viceroy and Governor General of India - - -	211
His Excellency General Sir W. R. Mansfield, K.C.B. and G.C.S.I., Commander in Chief in India -	220
Sir Henry Durand - - - - -	221
Sir R. Temple, Hyderabad - - - - -	223
Lieutenant Colonel Merewether, C.B., Resident, Aden - - - - -	227
Colonel Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B. - - - - -	228
Major General Hodgson, Commanding Her Majesty's Forces, Ceylon - - - - -	232
Lieutenant General Sir J. Gaspard Le Marchant, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Madras Army -	233
Sir Henry Barkly, K.C.B., Governor of the Mauritius - - - - -	234
Colonel H. St. George Ord, C.B., R.E., Governor of the Straits Settlements - - - - -	235
Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, C.B., Governor of Hong Kong - - - - -	236
Sir H. G. R. Robinson, Governor of Ceylon - - - - -	237
Lieutenant General Grant, Governor and Commander in Chief, Malta - - - - -	238
Major General Guy, Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China and Japan - - - - -	240
Colonel Browne, Commanding the Troops, Natal - - - - -	241
Lieutenant General Douglas, Lieutenant Governor of the Cape of Good Hope - - - - -	242
Lieutenant General Sir R. Napier, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay - - - - -	243

Answers from the following Commanding Officers of certain Regiments in the Bombay Army  
were transmitted to the Committee by Sir R. Napier :—

Colonel Sherbrooke Gell, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army - - - - -	245
Lieutenant Colonel Thacker, Commanding the Marine Battalion - - - - -	248
Lieutenant Colonel Adams, Commanding 13th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry - - - - -	249
Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, Commanding 3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry - - - - -	250
Lieutenant Colonel Field, Commanding 10th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry - - - - -	251
Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, Commanding 5th Bombay Native Light Infantry - - - - -	251
Major Little, Commanding 25th Bombay Native Light Infantry - - - - -	252
Major Beville, Commanding 1st Belooch Battalion - - - - -	253
Captain Nicholett, Commanding 2nd Belooch Battalion - - - - -	254
Colonel Beale, Commanding 22nd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry - - - - -	256
Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Green, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commandant in Chief, Sind Frontier Field Forces	257
Colonel Schneider, Commanding 2nd Regiment Grenadiers, Native Infantry - - - - -	258
Major Thomson, Commanding 26th Regiment, Native Infantry - - - - -	259

#### Q U E S T I O N S.

1. WHAT is your opinion as to the expediency of substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in time of peace ?

2. State in which of our Colonial possessions you would propose to employ them.

3. Have you any special knowledge, from residence, of the Colonies referred to by you ?—If so, state it.

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4. If it were determined to employ natives of India for service in the following Colonies, what races would be best adapted for such a duty :—

a. South Africa.

b. Mauritius.

c. Ceylon.

d. Straits Settlements.

e. China.

f. Malta.

g. Gibraltar.

h. West Indies.

i. New Zealand.

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App No. 1.

5. What arrangements with respect to reliefs would be necessary, supposing them to be employed in any of the Colonies named in the last question?

6. State whether there are any special difficulties that would hinder the races you have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea, either in respect to religious prejudices or social habits; and whether those difficulties are insuperable in their nature, or could be overcome by an increase of the advantages offered to the soldier?

7. What amount of pay and other advantages, over and above those at present enjoyed by the soldiers of the native Indian army, would, in your opinion, be necessary to procure native troops for such a service?

8. Would native Indian troops be a sufficient garrison in the above-named Colonies in time of peace—

- a. Wholly unsupported by British troops?
- b. Supported by British garrison artillery only?
- c. If not, what proportion of British infantry would be necessary to support them?

9. Would they afford thus entirely, or partially unsupported, sufficient protection to the Cape Colony against the frontier tribes; or against internal disturbances in the following Colonies:—

- a. South Africa.
- b. Mauritius.
- c. Ceylon.
- d. Hong Kong.
- e. West Indies.

10. What is your opinion of the expediency of employing Indian troops in these Colonies in time of war, either in substitution for Europeans or as a supplement to them?

11. Could they be sufficiently relied upon for such a service as materially to lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war?

12. Would they be capable of protecting the above Colonies against an attack by a civilised Power as adequately as the existing garrisons? And if not, in what proportion do you think that it would be necessary to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons in order to attain that object?

13. In case of pressure at home, would it be more advantageous to withdraw European regiments that might be wanted in England, from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India, or to withdraw them from India?

14. Would the effect of garrison service in these Colonies in time of peace upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier after his return to India be advantageous, or otherwise?

15. Would it be better—

- a. In the interests of India—
- b. In the interests of the Colonies above named—

to take for such a service regiments from the native Indian army according to their turn; or to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service?

16. Are you of opinion that the presence of British troops in neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of an emergency?

17. State from what Colonies troops could be withdrawn in such a case; and whether it would be easier to obtain reinforcements from England than from those Colonies.

18. Would Indian troops, in your judgment, be more efficient for the protection of—

- a. South Africa,
- b. Mauritius,
- c. Ceylon,
- d. Hong Kong,
- e. West Indies,

against either external or internal danger, than troops locally raised from the native populations in or near those Colonies; and would their greater efficiency, if any, counterbalance the greater cost which the transport of the Indian troops from India would involve?

19. Do native soldiers recruited since 1856 believe that they are practically liable to service beyond seas; and if not, would it be desirable to enforce the obligation imposed upon them by their present terms of enlistment?

20. If so, do you think the present a favourable moment for effecting such a change?

21. Now that India belongs to the Crown, do you think that the native army would draw a distinction between service in Aden and Burmah, and the Mauritius and China; and, if so, what distinction would they draw?

22. Give, so far as you know them, any cases of discontent that have come to your knowledge in consequence of the employment of native soldiers on Colonial duty or beyond the seas, whether in territories belonging to the Government of India for the time being or to the Crown, and give the causes of such discontent.

23. State whether you think that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would tend to give to it more of the character and feeling of an Imperial army; and whether, in your opinion, such a result would be desirable.

24. Would it be possible, or desirable, to recruit from the native population of the Colony in which you reside, regiments for general service?

25. State your opinion as to the policy of employing, either in India or in the Colonies, troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian, distinguishing between considerations of a military, civil, and political character.

## ANSWERS.

ANSWERS of the Right Hon. Sir *J. L. Lawrence*, Bart., G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor General of India.

1. I THINK that this would only be expedient to a very moderate extent, and ought to be limited to colonies of an oriental climate and type. Considering how few are the English troops in such colonies, I would rather advocate that these troops should be in addition to, than in substitution for, the English troops, so as to enable the authorities to keep the latter in the most salubrious positions, and to save them from as much exposure in times of peace as may be practicable.

2. In time of peace, I would only employ native troops, if actually required, in the Straits Settlements and in China; but, as a temporary measure, during war, they might also be sent to Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Northern Coast of Africa, the Coast of Arabia, and Egypt.

3. I have very little personal knowledge of the colonies, but I have been at the Cape and in Ceylon.

4. I do not advocate the sending Indian troops to any places except those which I have named; but if it be decided to employ such troops in any, or all of the colonies mentioned, I am of opinion that the most suitable races would be Mahomedans, such as the Beloochees of Sind, the Pathans of the Punjab frontier, the Mahomedans of the interior of the Punjab and of the North-west Provinces. All should be volunteers for the special duty.

I do not think that men of the Hindoo races, such as Seikhs, Ghorkas, Rajpoots, Brahmins, or the like, are well suited for colonial service; but if any volunteered for such service, and were in all respects fitted for the duties of a soldier, I would not reject them.

I mention Mahomedans as best suited for colonial service, because they have no religious or social prejudices against going across the seas; and they can also readily accommodate themselves to the circumstances of a foreign life. Hindoos, on the other hand, have a strong feeling against travelling by sea, and have many difficulties and prejudices to overcome in so doing. In other respects, the Seikh, from his martial qualities and strong constitution, is well adapted to a colonial life.

I have no doubt, however, that many Mahomedans and Seikhs would volunteer for colonial service; the want of military employment being very strongly felt in India, more particularly at the present time. I think, however, that gradually such service, in times of peace, would cease to be popular.

5. I think that all corps so employed should be relieved every three years. To do this, it would be necessary to have double the number of corps enlisted for such service, so that one corps might be in India near their homes, while another was in a colony, supposing that regiments specially raised for foreign service are only so employed.

6. I have already replied to this question; the difficulties of colonial service in the minds of native soldiers of India could, no doubt to a considerable extent, be overcome by increased advantages.

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7. The native troops who went to China during the last war in that country received full rations free, besides Indian pay and full batta. A statement of the cost of a native infantry in China is attached to this paper, and the same scale would apply to any other colony. But I am not prepared to say that even this would make the service popular, particularly for troops raised expressly for this employment.

8. I would in no case place Indian troops in a colony without British soldiers. And I would not consider that British garrison artillery would suffice. The proportion of British troops to native soldiers should not be less than one-half, but rather more.

9. I consider that native troops, such as I have described, would afford sufficient protection to the Colonies named both from frontier tribes and internal enemies, when joined with British troops.

10. I would prefer employing native Indian troops in the Colonies in time of war, rather than in time of peace, if they were limited to those places I have named, and as a supplement to British troops.

11. Subject to my limitation, they might be relied on, to the extent suggested, if well managed and well commanded. But the extent of relief would scarcely be of consequence to the resources of Great Britain, if properly organised.

12. I do not consider that either a native garrison, or one composed partly of native and partly of British troops in a colony would be as effective against the attack of a civilised power as an equal number of British troops. On such occasions there would always be also more or less distrust of the native troops, which of itself would be a cause of weakness. On an expedition, on the contrary, a mixed force would, I believe, prove more efficient than if composed solely of English soldiers.

I could not say in what proportion a garrison should be increased when partly composed of native troops, so as to render it as effective as at present. This would of course depend on the quality of the native troops thus employed, their fighting qualities being so different.

13. It would not in my judgment be expedient to reduce the British troops either in India or in the Colonies to any appreciable extent, in the event of any pressure at home. In India, China, Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Straits Settlements, the circumstance that England was in danger would act on these countries and colonies. But South Africa and New Zealand ought, in such a contingency, to be able to spare a portion of their British troops, supplying their place by volunteers of English race.

With due deference I would here say that if England desires to retain a firm hold of her Asiatic and African Colonies in times of danger, and also to be safe at home, she must make adequate arrangements by wise measures for this object; she ought not to look to India or these Colonies for any important assistance, though no



App. No. 1.

doubt the authorities in these countries would do all in their power loyally to assist her.

Of the two alternatives, it would probably be better to withdraw some British troops at such times from India than from colonies of an Oriental character. Much would, however, depend on the state of feeling at the time in India.

14. I do not think that the effect of garrison service in these colonies in time of peace would have much influence one way or the other on the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier. If well treated and contented, the general effect might be considered beneficial, otherwise the case would be reversed. I do not consider, however, that the result of service in a colony of a European population would be good, for the native soldier would there gradually learn a good deal to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and which might lessen his estimate of European institutions and habits. On the other hand, in a colony, the main population of which was Oriental, the evils which he would find would be similar in character to those which he was accustomed to in his own country.

15. It would be better for the colonies on the whole to raise regiments especially and exclusively for colonial service, rather than by turn to supply them from the Indian army generally,—

*First.* Because in that case the men would all be volunteers; and,

*Secondly.* Because, as a body, they would be better suited to such service. On the other hand, to the Government of India it would be convenient that these regiments, if few in number, were taken from the native Indian army. Hitherto the Madras army has furnished two regiments for the Straits, and the Bombay army for a time one, and sometimes two, for China.

16. I do not think that this is of much importance to the defence of India, if the country has a sufficient garrison of its own.

17. The only colonies which could readily supply British troops for India in an emergency would be Ceylon, China, and the Mauritius. But these colonies, perhaps, with the exception of the last-named one, with their present garrisons, could hardly with safety spare any appreciable body.

18. With a suitable proportion of British troops in each colony, I should consider that native troops raised in these colonies, or in their vicinity, in moderate numbers, ought to be more efficient for service in them, than Indian troops, but probably they would not be considered so trustworthy. Service in South Africa and the West Indies would surely prove very unpopular with Indian troops, and even in Hong Kong and Ceylon such service would in the long run be distasteful; but not to the extent that it would be in the other places.

19. I do not think that the native troops of this Presidency generally think that they are liable to service beyond seas, nor would it be desirable to enforce this obligation. On the contrary, it would in my opinion, be extremely imprudent to do so. General service, in their minds, means service on the continent of India and the adjoining countries.

20. This question is answered in the preceding one. I am not in favour of any change; but if one must be made, this is as good an opportunity as any other which is likely to occur.

21. The native troops in such a matter would not be influenced by the circumstance that India belongs to the Crown. Service in Aden and Burmah is employment in the vicinity of India; while service in the Mauritius and China is employment at a considerable distance from their own country, and, in the case of the Mauritius, a novelty. The number of native troops at Aden also is so small as hardly to be of any account.

22. The only case of the kind of which I have heard was at Java, shortly after the conquest of that island, during the war with France. The details I don't know; but I have understood that a good deal of discontent was at that time expressed by the Indian troops who were kept there in garrison. Indian troops from the Bengal Presidency have been so little employed beyond seas, that it is impossible to judge from actual occurrences what would be the effect of such employment on their minds. But these troops, as well as those of the old native army of Bengal, do not like service even in India and the adjacent countries at a long distance from their homes, more especially as regards the majority of the present army, in times of peace. Service in Burmah, in Assam, and even in Bengal Proper, is not popular among either the native soldiers of the Punjab and that border, or among those of Hindoostan. The Madras native soldier is much more accustomed to such service, and so are to some extent those of the Bombay Army; but even as regards the former, there has, in general, been a pressure put upon the authorities to bring back native regiments from China, as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities.

23. I do not think that such employment would have much effect in this way. I do not myself see what the native soldier is likely to gain by such employment.

24. This question does not appear to apply to India.

25. I am not in favour of employing Chinese, Malays, Africans, or other races not Indian, in India. Such troops would be very distasteful to our Indian troops, as showing our distrust of them, and as giving away to strangers employment which is much coveted by themselves; and it would not engender much confidence among our own countrymen. Of the different races enumerated, perhaps African soldiers would prove the most suitable. Such men, however, would probably become Mahomedans in course of time, and gradually fraternise more or less with those of India.

As regards the Colonies, perhaps a small number of Chinese and Malays might be employed with advantage in South Africa, and African troops in China and Ceylon. But I have little doubt that English Colonists, in times of commotion, would only repose confidence in British soldiers.

I have now replied, to the best of my ability, to the questions which have been put to me; but I think it right to add a few remarks bearing on this very important subject: first, as to the number and composition of the troops which are required for the secure tenure of India; and, secondly, as regards the policy of employing native Indian troops in British colonies.

On the first point, I am very strongly of opinion that no important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, would be politic. The actual returns of that force are now below 60,000 rank and file. We can, indeed,

deed, spare some Artillery, and one regiment of cavalry, and, if necessary, two regiments of infantry; but I would prefer retaining the latter.

For a few months, for an expedition in any emergency, we could manage to do without 3,000 or 4,000 British troops, but not more. In the event of a war in Europe, in which England was engaged, particularly if hardly pressed, no doubt the influence of such circumstances would extend to, and be felt in India.

No Asiatic or African troops could, with advantage, be substituted for any of the British troops; none could supply their place satisfactorily; on none would the confidence of Englishmen in India be placed in times of commotion and great danger. The British troops are necessary in India in considerable strength, not only for their fighting powers, but for the value of their very presence. They overawe our enemies, and give confidence to our friends and supporters. At all times have the European population in India been liable to sudden panics, and especially so since the mutiny of 1857. Such panics are, it is evident, calculated to do much mischief; they spread over India, and extend to Europe, and bring the Government of India into disrepute; they are only to be allayed by the presence of English troops in sufficient force, in good strategic and central positions.

It is, I consider, a very serious, but a very general error, that the number of native troops now maintained in India is much too large; and that, but for this system, the strength of the British troops could be largely reduced. This is undoubtedly a mistake. If we had fewer native troops in India, we must either overwork the English regiments, or add to their strength. No doubt the British troops act as a counterpoise to the native forces; but this is no evidence that we could do with much fewer of the latter.

The fact is, that the area of India is so vast and so diversified, its population so numerous, its frontier so extensive, and in many parts so accessible to predatory attack, that the number of British and native troops which are maintained for the security of our power in India, only suffice for the work, owing to the high qualities of these troops, the great efficiency of their equipment, the large resources at their command, and the beneficial character of the civil and political administration of the country. Even with these advantages, it must also be admitted, that the docile and gentle character of the mass of the population, and their general respect for authority have much to do with the success of our rule, and the order and obedience which are maintained.

It has been said that a British force of moderate strength could march from one end of India to another, with little danger of much opposition; and no doubt this is true; but to hold so great an area as we now do, to overawe and subject so mighty a population, even with the best system of government which may be practicable, must, in the nature of things, require what appears to be a large physical force.

The higher are the physical and moral qualities of our native troops, the more we draw on the northern races of India and the border countries for such soldiers, the more necessary it must be to have a fair proportion of English soldiers. On the other hand, if we prefer numbers to quality as regards the native troops, the case will hardly be different. It was mainly the great number of our native troops in 1857, the vast disproportion between them and the British troops, that led to that

disastrous outbreak. As bearing on this question of the number and composition of the army required to hold India, I shall forward with my reply, copy of a memorandum which Colonel Norman, the Military Secretary to the Government of India has drawn up, in answer to a late work by Colonel Sir Henry Havelock. In Colonel Norman's views I fully concur.

As regards the employment of Indian native troops in British Colonies, I do not think that much can be done with advantage. The climate of those peopled by English and European races would often prove ungenial and insalubrious. The social condition of things would also be quite unsuited to them. Neither would the English colonists like Indian troops, nor would these soldiers feel happy with such a population. The case would be different with people of the Oriental type; but in colonies of that kind, the distance from their homes, the long voyages which in most cases would be necessary, would greatly militate against the advantages of such service. While thus employed, the native soldier would long to visit his home. The want of military employment among the martial races of the country is now so great, that many will volunteer for such service, while I am by no means sure that it will long continue popular. On the whole, I would say, if such troops are required, their employment in the Colonies I have indicated, should be tried, in the first instance, at any rate, on a very moderate scale.

The mode in which native troops destined for colonial service shall be raised and officered, is a point of much importance. It would hardly be expedient that they should be entertained by officers who have little knowledge of the people of India, and practically independent of the Government of this country; while perhaps the opposite system would not be acceptable to the authorities in England.

Then, again, the officers of such corps should be men who have been accustomed to native troops, and who not only understand their language, but who have a sympathy and respect for them, and such officers would naturally expect to retain Indian pay and allowances; for these reasons, it will probably be the best course to take such regiments from the Government of India, rather than to raise regiments for such service, even though, on the whole, the quality of such troops may prove inferior to that which might be raised by careful selection.

Further, it must be borne in mind that we cannot spare permanently from India more than three or four native regiments; while that, if such regiments be raised especially for service beyond seas, we will have to reduce an equal number of native regiments, thus leading to discontent, as only one-half of the former should be at the same time in the colonies. Should the expense also of the new corps prove greater than that of the same number on the present Establishment in India, the Government of England ought to bear the additional cost.

Lastly, it is quite possible that some cause of discontent might give rise to ill-feeling among the native troops in the Colonies, which would certainly re-act very strongly on those in India, and might lead to the latter in their turn, demurring to embark for such service.

*John Lawrence,*  
Govr. Genl. of India

27 May 1867.

App. No. 1.

(No. 1500 B.)

## STATEMENT of the Cost of SIKH TROOPS in INDIA.

## MEMORANDUM.

WITH reference to Military Department letter, No. 132, of 4th March last, and to Schedule No. 98, Case 1, the papers relating to which are herewith returned, the undersigned begs to submit the statements called for of the estimated cost of two Sikh regiments of the present established strength, if employed in China.

2. The cost during employment would be nearly the same, whether the regiments were taken from the regular establishment or specially raised for such service; the only difference would be, that in the latter case the bulk of the privates would be short-service men. In the non-effective charges this would be more than counterbalanced, as the amount of the gratuities payable on discharge would exceed the value of the pensions entailed by an ordinary term of service.

3. The actual amount payable in China, for the full strength employed in that country, is shown in Statement A., aggregating 5,68,626 rupees for the two regiments, and includes pay, extra batta, ration money, hutting money, and half-passage money, and also sea provisions to and fro.

4. This would give an average of Rs. 399. 3., or, say, in round numbers 400 rupees for each native commissioned or non-commissioned officer and private.

5. Statement B. shows the amount payable in India for the same body, for clothing, half-passage money, and sea provisions, &c., as also for the maintenance of a dépôt for each regiment, equal to the strength of a company, so as to admit of the corps being kept at their full establishment abroad. The wear and tear of equipments is likewise included, based on the regulated period of duration, together with the cost of the annual supply of ammunition and medical stores.

6. The total of these charges is 1,76,979 rupees, which, for the full establishment, would give an average of Rs. 124. 2. per man, of all grades.

7. Lastly, Statement C. exhibits the non-effective charges; viz., an estimate of the proportion of pensions and gratuities fairly chargeable to the Imperial Government, as also transport charges in India, to and from port of embarkation, and extra furlough allowances for three months, a boon to which the men might be fairly considered entitled after a tour of foreign service, together with a sum of 5,000 rupees per regi-

ment for contingencies. The total of these charges would be 24,011 rupees per regiment, or an average of Rs. 33. 7. per man.

8. The undersigned, on the foregoing data, would suggest that if the Imperial Government bore all the charges payable in China for pay, rations, hutting money, and half the passage money, and sea provisions included in Statement A., an annual capitation sum of 125 rupees per man on the average strength in China, for the effective services payable in India, and of 35 rupees for non-effective services, would cover all certain charges, and allow a fair margin for unforeseen contingencies, whilst such an arrangement would materially simplify the adjustment of the expenditure.

9. It will be noted that the establishment of European officers is in excess of that allowed in India, but it corresponds in a great measure to that which has been sanctioned on former occasions; viz., one officer per company in addition to the Staff.

10. As regards passage and hutting money, the calculation is made on a triennial relief; but, in addition to passage for the whole corps, passage to and fro annually for 10 per cent. of strength, to allow for men invalided and on sick leave and to replace them, has been provided for, as also for two European officers per regiment annually.

11. The rates assumed, and two-thirds those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which, it is considered, would afford a fair average, and cover the freight of clothing, ammunition, &c.; and the calculation has been made, that half of the passage money and sea provisions would be paid in China and half in India.

12. In the allowance for clothing, provision is made for a cost of trousers annually, as also for a pair of ankle boots, all of which may be considered as necessary for service in China.

13. The money ration has been calculated at the ordinary rate of Rs. 3. 8. for each fighting man, and Rs. 2. 8. for establishment followers.

(signed) A. Broome, Colonel,  
Accountant General,  
Military Department.

Military Department, Accountant's Branch,  
7 January 1865.

ESTIMATE of the ANNUAL COST that would devolve upon the British Government by the Employment in China of the Two existing Regiments of Sikh Infantry.

STATEMENT (A.)  
CHARGES payable in CHINA.

	Military Pay.	Staff Salary.	Total per Mensem for 1 Regiment.		Rates.	Total per Mensem for 1 Regiment.
	Rs. a p.	Rs. a p.	Rs. a p.		Rs. a p.	Rs. a p.
<b>I. European Officers:</b>				<b>VI. Contract and other Allowances:</b>		
1 Commandant	640 14	600	1,240 14	1 Adjutant's allowance	50	50
1 Second in command	374 1 6	270	644 1 6	8 Company payment allowance	20	160
1 Adjutant	225 12	200	425 12	1 Repair of camp equipage	25	25
1 Quartermaster	225 12	150	375 12	1 School shed	5	5
8 Doing-duty officers	225 12	100	2,606	1 Butts and targets	4	4
1 Medical officer			600	1 Subadar major's allowance	25	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>		<b>5,892 7 6</b>	1 Drill havildar	5	5
				1 Drill naick	2 8	2 8
				8 Pay havildars	5	40
				8 Colour havildars	2	16
				1 Drum major	7	7
				1 Fife major	5	5
				1 Mess allowance	100	100
				1 Band	100	100
				Order of merit pay	50	50
				<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>	<b>594 8</b>
<b>II. Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men:</b>				<b>Ration Money:</b>		
2 Subadars	100	15	230	712 Native commissioned and non-commissioned rank and file	3 8	2,492
2 ditto	80	15	190	56 Non-combatants	2 8	140
4 ditto	67	15	328	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>	<b>2,632</b>
4 Jemadars	35	7 8	170			
4 ditto	30	7 8	150	Field establishment of dooley bearers		438
40 Havildars	14	5	760	Half-passage money to and fro for two officers annually		1,480
40 Naicks	12	5	680	Ditto, for 10 per cent. sick annually		8,540
16 Drummers	7	3 8	168	Board ship provision equipment for ditto		1,450
100 Sepoys	9	3 8	1,250	<b>TOTAL Annual Expenditure for 1 Regiment</b>	<b>Rs.</b>	<b>2,44,713 10</b>
200 ditto	8	3 8	2,300			
300 ditto	7	3 8	3,150	<b>Hutting Money:</b>		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>		<b>9,376</b>	8 Subadars	30	240
				8 Jemadars	15	120
				80 Havildars and naicks	10	800
				616 Drummers and sepoy Non-combatants	3	1,848
				Half of passage money to and from for an entire regiment, to be relieved every three years		1,01,164
				Board ship provision and equipment for ditto		14,470
				<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>	<b>1,18,802</b>
<b>III. Educational Staff:</b>				<b>Proportion for 1 Year</b>		
1 Moonshes	20	3 8	23 8			39,600
1 Grunthees	10	3 8	13 8			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>		<b>37</b>	<b>GRAND TOTAL of Annual Charges for 1 Regiment, payable in China</b>		<b>2,84,313 10</b>
				Ditto ditto for 2 Regiments	<b>Rs.</b>	<b>5,68,626 4</b>
<b>IV. Native Followers:</b>						
1 Tindal	9 8	3 8	13			
4 Lascars	5 12	2 8	33			
16 Bhistees	5	2 8	120			
8 Sweepers	4		32			
16 Cooks	5		80			
1 Chowdry	11	3 8	14 8			
1 Mutsuddy	5	3 8	8 8			
2 Weighmen	3	3 8	13			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>		<b>314</b>			
<b>V. Medical and Hospital Establishment:</b>						
2 Native doctors	20		45			
2 Cooks	15		10			
2 Bhistees	4		10			
1 Head sweeper	4		7			
4 Sweepers	6		20			
1 Goorgah	4		5			
1 Shop coolie	4		6			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs.</b>		<b>103</b>			

ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost that would devolve upon the British Government, &c.—*continued.*

## STATEMENT (B.)

	Rate.	TOTAL.		Rate.	TOTAL.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
<b>Clothing :</b>			<b>Non-Combatants :</b>		
8 Subadars - - - - -	17 - 9	136 6 -	1 Lascar - - - - -	5 12 -	5 12 -
8 Jemadars - - - - -	15 15 4	127 10 8	2 Bhistees - - - - -	5 - - -	10 - - -
40 Havildars - - - - -	11 2 -	445 - - -	2 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - - -	8 - - -
40 Naicks - - - - -	9 - 10	362 1 4	2 Cooks - - - - -	5 - - -	10 - - -
1 Drum major - - - - -	14 12 11	14 12 11	1 Mutsuddy - - - - -	5 - - -	5 - - -
1 Fife major - - - - -	11 2 -	11 2 -	2 Weighmen - - - - -	3 - - -	6 - - -
614 Drummers and sepoy - - - - -	9 - 4	5,538 12 8			
Boots for all ranks - - - - -	5 - - -	3,560 - - -			
			<b>Medical and Hospital Establishment :</b>		
			1 Medical charge - - - - -	30 - - -	30 - - -
			1 Native doctor - - - - -	20 - - -	20 - - -
			1 Cook - - - - -	4 - - -	4 - - -
			1 Bhistee - - - - -	4 - - -	4 - - -
			1 Sweeper - - - - -	4 - - -	4 - - -
			1 Coolie - - - - -	5 - - -	5 - - -
			<b>Non-Effective Allowances :</b>		
			1 Company payment allowance - - - - -	20 - - -	20 - - -
			1 Repair of camp equipage - - - - -	2 8 - -	2 8 - -
			1 Butts and targets - - - - -	4 - - -	4 - - -
			1 Drill muck - - - - -	5 - - -	5 - - -
			1 Pay havildar - - - - -	5 - - -	5 - - -
			<b>TOTAL Pay and Allowances of Depot - - - - -</b>		
					1,258 - - -
			<b>Ditto - per annum - - - - - Rs.</b>		
					15,096 - - -
			<b>Wear and tear of arms and accoutrements - - - - -</b>		
					4,358 - - -
			<b>Wear and tear of camp equipage - - - - -</b>		
					428 - - -
			<b>Annual expenditure of ammunition, &amp;c. - - - - -</b>		
					5,878 - - -
			<b>Annual expenditure of medical stores - - - - -</b>		
					1,852 - - -
			<b>Clothing for depot company - - - - -</b>		
					1,170 - - -
			<b>TOTAL of STATEMENT B. - - - - -</b>		
					88,489 13 7
			<b>TOTAL for 2 Corps - - - - - Rs.</b>		
					1,76,979 11 2
<b>Depôt Charges :</b>					
1 Lieutenant in charge - - - - -	325 12 -	325 12 -			
1 Subadar - - - - -	80 - - -	80 - - -			
1 Jemadar - - - - -	35 - - -	35 - - -			
5 Havildars - - - - -	14 - - -	70 - - -			
5 Naicks - - - - -	12 - - -	60 - - -			
2 Drummers - - - - -	7 - - -	14 - - -			
75 Sepoys - - - - -	7 - - -	525 - - -			

## STATEMENT (C.)

	Annual Amount.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
<b>Non-Effective Charges :</b>	
Pensions and gratuities - - - - -	1,720 - - -
Annual proportion of transport charges in India - - - - -	11,573 - - -
Ditto - - - of three months' leave, pay to the corps on relief after three years - - - - -	5,718 - - -
Contingencies - - - - -	5,000 - - -
<b>TOTAL of STATEMENT (C.) - - - - -</b>	<b>24,011 - - -</b>
<b>TOTAL for 2 Corps - - - - - Rs.</b>	<b>48,022 - - -</b>

(signed) - A. Broome, Colonel,  
Accountant General, Military Department.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel Norman on Sir Henry Havelock's Book, referred to in Reply to the 25th Question. App. No. 1.

THE object of that portion of Sir Henry Havelock's book which relates to India is to show,—

I.—That we have too many British troops in India under any circumstances; but that the reduction which is now feasible could be carried to a greater extent by substituting a force of mounted riflemen for some of our present troops; and in arguing on this matter he assumes that we maintain our present force of British soldier here to provide a reserve force for England.

II.—That by adopting his views, India would be held not only more cheaply than at present, but in far more security. Sir Henry actually asserting (*see* page 31) that the establishment of a body of mounted riflemen in sufficient numbers would secure us at once and for ever against the contingency of another revolt in India; and the sufficient numbers are elsewhere shown to mean about 7,890 men.

III.—That the saving of expense by adopting his proposals would enable England to maintain a reserve force at home.

IV.—That the native army in India is too large, and should be reduced.

In drawing out these arguments, Sir Henry falls into various errors which seriously damage their force, while, on other grounds, his views appear unsound on several points.

I will not allude here to his system of a home reserve, or of special enlistments for India (*see* page 15); but the latter would be of difficult application as the roster and even periods of foreign service must always be liable to derangement when exigencies arise for the employment of troops in different parts of the world; just as of late we have seen the formerly insignificant force in New Zealand raised for a time to ten regiments, again to be reduced to one, while the force in British North America has been nearly quadrupled.

To proceed to the purely Indian part of the book, it seems necessary, in the first place, to protest against the assumption put forth by Sir H. Havelock, that the present British Force in India is maintained at what he considers an excessive amount, solely to provide a reserve for England; this is quite an error. The question of what amount of British Force will suffice for India, has been carefully gone into in the most minute manner by the various Governors General, Commanders-in-Chief, and other of the most competent authorities in India, and has been fixed on the most extended information with reference to the wants of India alone; and, as circumstances change from year to year (I may say every year since 1859), reductions have been made where they seem feasible on Indian grounds, and on Indian grounds alone.

The army in India is believed to be not a man in excess of our wants; though, doubtless for a campaign, a few thousand British soldiers with a respectable native force might be temporarily spared for what may be called semi-Indian purposes in China, Japan, or Egypt.

But then Sir H. Havelock's estimate of the force in India is so erroneous that his argument as to excess, even on his own grounds, breaks down.

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At page 115 he quotes the British Force in India as 73,000 men. The present actual strength of non-commissioned officers, drummers, farriers and privates, is under 59,000, although the establishment is 62,000. This includes, of course, sick men, men about to be invalided, and men recovering their strength at convalescent depôts, so that probably not more than 50,000 cavalry, artillery and infantry could be turned out in all India (including Burmah and Aden) to-morrow; that is, 50,000 men fit for the field.

Sir Henry's proposals, indeed, extend to the reduction of 20,000 men, leaving us with 53,000; but as we have barely 60,000 men, the force he considers proper for India would only involve a reduction of 7,000 men.

Whether we have too many troops or not in India must, to a certain extent, be a matter of opinion; but certainly the weight of authority is entirely against Sir H. Havelock; while, as above shown, a reference to actual facts proves that admitting his views to be correct as to the actual force needed, the reduction would only amount to a third of what he proposes.

To proceed to the second point, viz., that by adopting Sir Henry's views, India would be held not only more cheaply but far more securely than at present, the security being gained by the employment of 15 small regiments of mounted riflemen as part of our British army in India:—

The idea of any sufficient saving arising from Sir H. Havelock's proposals may be at once dismissed, as his calculations on this head are erroneous.

His estimate at page 31, that a reduction of even 18,000 men in India would allow 2,500,000*l.* to be applied to other purposes, is strangely inaccurate.

He states that 68,000 men (exclusive of officers) in India cost 15,774,456*l.*, but the real fact is that this 15,774,456*l.* maintains not only the whole British army in India but the depôts in England, alluded to at page 30 by Sir H. Havelock, and amounting to 9,000 or 10,000 men, a native army of 124,000 men, all the staff establishments, cattle and equipment for the united British and native army in India, and the heavy pension list and non-effective charges of the Indian army, enormously heavy just now in proportion to the strength of the army, owing to special inducements having been held out to officers to retire on the reduction of a large proportion of the native army, besides a large contribution towards the non-effective charges of the British army.

The saving really to be effected would be comparatively small, as shown in a Statement appended to this paper; so that, in point of fact, Sir H. Havelock's proposals would reduce the army by several thousand British soldiers, and make no sufficient saving available for the reserve to be kept in England.

Thus, one of the main objects of the book, that of providing a reserve army at home, will fail to be met by the very proposals purposely made to meet that object.

This, therefore, disposes of the third point, viz., that a sum could be made available from India, by the adoption of his views, which would maintain a large home reserve.

But we have still to meet part of the second argument, viz., that with a force constituted as he

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proposes,

App. No. 1.

proposes, we would hold India far more securely than at present, and render revolt impossible.

This desirable end is to be attained by the employment of about 8,000 mounted riflemen, in place of a much larger force of British cavalry and infantry; I say cavalry and infantry, for his estimate of cavalry and horse artillery for India is only 6,000; and as we have 3,000 horse artillery, and I do not perceive that he proposes a reduction in this arm, and as we have 5,000 cavalry at present, I assume that 2,000 are to be reduced. If, however, Sir Henry means to retain the present force of cavalry as well as 8,000 mounted riflemen as part of his 53,000, the total cost under his proposals would be considerably larger than the cost of the present army.

I will now proceed to the arguments used to show the alleged great advantages to arise from the use of a force of mounted riflemen; but before doing this I would observe that I think this description of force would be useful in India to a certain extent, and an experiment might be tried of employing two or three regiments in substitution of a similar number of our present dragoons. In fact, they could be our present dragoons, altered as to arms and equipment, and trained to act on foot when wanted. The expediency of officering such troops from the officers "doing general duty" will be doubted by many in India (see page 202).

To suppose that we would reap such advantages from a force of this description, as Sir H. Havelock imagines, is, I think, out of the question; but to show this we must examine the subject in detail.

In the first place, there are vast tracts of country in India, such as the mountains to which our campaigns have of late years been confined, where mounted riflemen would be useless; where, in fact, they could not act, and where their horses would perish for want of forage; so in Assam and Bumah, and parts of Bengal, mounted troops could not move during the greater part of the year, and the horses would, for the most part, die from exposure and climate.

Then, again, India is so vast that, even if fifteen regiments of mounted rifles were posted in the most judicious manner, revolt might break out at places far distant from the nearest corps, and where railways are not even thought of.

Again for protecting lines of railway, if in case of insurrection people are bent on destroying railways, we can never keep them uninjured by any force of mounted riflemen; and, in fact, for this purpose, good British troops would be of no more use than the cheaper and more abundant element of good native cavalry.

On the Calcutta and Delhi line, a line of a thousand miles, with branch railways running off at various points, could the whole force of mounted rifles for all India, say 6,000 effective men (for Sir H. Havelock's force must be subject, as all other forces are, to considerable deductions for sickness, &c.) secure us against removals of rails, &c., which can be quietly effected at any point, at night, by a few men?

The powers of rapid movement supposed to be possessed by mounted riflemen will not bear close examination. Mounted riflemen, like other British troops, require food and comforts of a nature not to be had, save from the Commissariat; and provision must be made to carry these comforts, and to carry those who fall sick or may be wounded.

Of course, for an enterprise lasting for three or

four days everything might be carried by the men, or be dispensed with; but, for a longer period, baggage animals and doolies, or ambulances, must be taken, and with these, or even I may say without these, 20 miles a day would not be maintained for many days.

The feat of 5,000 riflemen riding from one end of India to the other at the rate of 25 miles a day (stated to be possible, at page 112), carrying all before them, is simply impossible.

This march would last for a hundred days; and supposing they carried all before them, including forts, &c., what time would have been left to clear the country on the flanks of the line of march? What possible impression would have been made by such a mode of campaigning? What would have become of the sick and wounded, of the numerous lame horses (for every one who has served knows that, even on a second day's 25-miles' march, many horses will have fallen lame, or will have sore backs, out of 5,000)? How are the grass-cutters to obtain grass if day after day they have to march 25 miles; and how are meat, rum, and bread to be obtained for the men?

Any such style of movement would be impracticable; still less "the power of moving over the surface of India at a uniform rate of 30 or 40 miles a day continuously," or that where "14,000 men (cavalry and horse artillery) are able to move 30 miles a day for weeks together." Has Sir H. Havelock ever seen or read of such movements?

It is quite certain that no force of British troops in India could move continuously for more than 20 miles a day, and after ten days they certainly would require a halt, even if going at this rate.

Native troops can do more, as they have less incumbrances; but, even by these, I believe the best march on authentic record (not alluded to by Sir H. Havelock), that of the guide cavalry and infantry from Murdan to Delhi only averaged about 26½ miles a day for 22 days, and this was in a country the resources of which were entirely at their disposal, aided by a settled British civil administration; the corps, moreover, being full of zeal to reach Delhi, and commanded by a very active officer.

It may be noted that the celebrated march of cavalry and horse artillery under General Smith in 1805, so praised and thought so much of by Sir H. Havelock (see page 140), was made at an average of only 16½ miles a day, a rate that was over and over again exceeded by forces of all arms during 1857-58. Lord Lake is quoted as having got over 405 miles in 43 days. Why, this is the rate of ordinary relief marching! It seems very clear that the mounted riflemen would not be able to move for a continuance any faster than our troops can at present.

Sir H. Havelock finds fault with the size of our Native army, and thinks it might be reduced from 135,000 (it is about 124,000, including the Hyderabad contingent) to 80,000. Probably he is not well informed as to the heavy duties that devolve on it, notwithstanding reductions of guards, escorts, &c. Nor is he aware how difficult it is for our border campaigns to get together, anywhere, more than 5,000 or 6,000 men. Very competent authorities, with good means of forming a judgment, believe that our Native as well as our European force is at a minimum, and that a reduction of either British or Natives would have to be followed by an increase of the other description.

tion of force; so nicely are the duties and requirements of the public service balanced.

Sir H. Havelock's allusion to the French having only some 10,200 Natives in Algeria seems unfortunate as an argument for our doing with fewer than we have, as it appears that, with such a small province, a limited frontier compared to that of India, no Native states with armies in the heart of their territory, and the possibility of in a week having a reinforcement of 20,000 or 30,000 men from Marseilles and Toulon, they keep 65,000 to 70,000 French troops. I take it that if we had Algiers, and held it on the Indian system, we should probably have 30,000 Natives and 15,000 British soldiers at the outside, instead of 80,000 men, of whom seven-eighths are Europeans.

In truth, though we hold India, I believe with sufficiently secure grasp, it costs England less to keep, while Algiers is, and probably ever will be, a drain on France.

I purposely abstain here from remarking on Sir Henry Havelock's criticisms on various Indian regiments, but would observe that some of his strictures appear open to easy reply, founded as they are on inaccurate statements of facts, of which I give but two specimens.

At page 160 he says that Lord Clyde had at his disposal nearly 3,600 most efficient native cavalry. The returns published in G. O. show that, of all ranks, the native cavalry under Lord Clyde at the commencement of the siege amounted to 1,997, combined on the 4th March by 397 under General Franks, a total of 2,394 instead of 3,600, and Sir H. Havelock ought to know that some of these were hardly trained and certainly not most efficient.

Again in an account of the affair in the Raptée on the 31st December 1858 (to which exception may be taken on other grounds), he says the force engaged was "about ten horsed guns, the 7th Hussars, the 6th Carabineers, about 1,200 excellent native horse (amongst them Hughes's splendid regiment of Irregulars, the 1st Punjab Cavalry)," &c.

From this it would be believed that two regiments of British cavalry were present, say 800 sabres, or 2,000 cavalry in all, and ten horsed guns. In reality there were only six horsed guns with Lord Clyde's column; the Carabineers had but one squadron, three squadrons being in quite a different part of the country, and 50 men detached with another column, while the native cavalry consisted only of Hughes's regiment and a small detachment of Hodson's horse under Sir H. Havelock himself.

Thus there were barely 1,000 sabres in the field instead of 2,000, as would be gathered from Sir Henry's book.

Before concluding, however, I would say that it seems odd that Sir H. Havelock should have failed to refer to the Camel corps formed by Lord Clyde in 1858, and which, for campaigning purposes, was most useful. It was composed of 400 camels, each camel having a driver, armed with a carbine. For each camel there was also a soldier who, in a few days, became quite accustomed to the camel's motion, and could stand the longest marches with little fatigue. Two hundred admirable soldiers of the Rifle Brigade, and 200 Punjab Infantry made up this corps of 400 men, besides drivers.

Under an active and intelligent commander, the corps made some extraordinary marches; and, as provision for the men's comfort could be carried on the camels, while no forage was necessary

to be taken for the animals, the powers of movement of such a corps were far superior to any that could be expected of mounted riflemen.

The 400 drivers could at all times protect the animals, and 400 excellent infantry were thus capable of being brought fifty miles in a night and thrown into action without leaving a man with the animals that carried them. A record of the marches of this corps would be most interesting; but at the end of the war it was not thought desirable to keep it up in time of peace. At the battle of Calpee it bore a conspicuous part, and it rendered other valuable service.

Such a corps, or several such corps, doubtless, would be formed again when wanted, and would, I think, be at least equal in value to any mounted rifle regiments.

17 May 1867. H. W. N.

RELATIVE COST of a British Force of 53,000 Men (including Officers) proposed for India by Sir H. Havelock, and the present Army of 60,000 Men.

Cost of Sir H. Havelock's Force:		£ per ann.
20 Batteries of Horse Artillery, 3,000 men, average cost 19,480 l. per battery	- - - - -	396,600
44 Horse field batteries, 6,600 men, 17,680 l. per battery	- - - - -	777,920
7 Heavy field batteries, 560 men, 12,560 l. per battery	- - - - -	87,920
60 Garrison batteries, 4,800 men, 8,323 l. per battery	- - - - -	499,380
7 Regiments cavalry, 3,451 men, 68,836 l. per corps	- - - - -	481,852
15 Regiments mounted Riflemen, 7,395 men, 68,836 l. per regiment	- - - - -	1,032,540
30 Regiments British infantry, 26,970 men, 80,100 l. per regiment	- - - - -	2,403,000
52,776 Officers and men, at - - - - -	- - - - -	5,679,212
Add cost of 224 mounted Riflemen, at 80 l. per annum, to complete to 53,000 men	- - - - -	17,920
Add annual cost of remounts, to keep up 5,700 additional horses on Indian establishment, 684 horses, at 60 l. each	- - - - -	41,040
	£.	5,738,172
Cost of present British Force in India:		
20 Batteries Horse Artillery, 3,000 men	- - - - -	396,600
44 Horse field batteries, 6,600 men	- - - - -	777,920
7 Heavy field batteries, 560 men	- - - - -	87,920
24 Garrison batteries, 1,920 men	- - - - -	199,752
11 Regiments British cavalry, 5,423 men	- - - - -	757,196
52 Regiments British infantry, 46,748 men	- - - - -	4,165,200
64,251 Officers and men, for - - - - -	- - - - -	6,384,588
Deduct, say 4,000 non-commissioned officers and men wanting to complete, at the low average of 60 l. each	- - - - -	240,000
	£.	6,144,588

Apparent less cost of Sir H. Havelock's force, 406,416 l., instead of 2,500,000 l.; and on the other side it must be recollected that there would be a first outlay of probably 600,000 l. to mount, arm, and equip the Mounted Rifles, while the decrease of 7,000 men would reduce the Indian payment to the British Exchequer for the maintenance of depôts, &c., by 94,500 l. annually.

NOTE.

In neither calculation have I added the cost of the head quarter staff of brigades of Artillery, which I do not exactly know.

To simplify calculations I have estimated the corps of Mounted Rifles at the present strength of cavalry regiments, viz. 493 men, and have added 224 men to make up 53,000. This slight deviation from Sir H. Havelock's numbers of riflemen makes the calculation more favourable to him.



App. No. i.

He estimates for 12,000 field and garrison artillery. By counting only the present strength of field artillery out of the 12,000, the calculation is more favourable to him than if the present proportions of field and garrison artillery were preserved.

I have estimated for seven regiments of cavalry, under the view taken at page 4 of the memorandum.

In all cases I have estimated for the capitation

allowances paid to the British Government for maintenance of depôts, for pensions, &c.

My estimate, besides capitation allowance covers (for all ranks) pay and allowances, cost of followers, commissariat charges, feed of cattle, medical and hospital charges, clothing, barrack and ordnance charges, and all miscellaneous expenses; but not the cost of purchasing or providing horses or other cattle.

17 May 1867.

H. W. N.

ANSWERS of His Excellency General Sir *W. R. Mansfield*, K. C. B. and G. C. S. I.,  
Commander in Chief in India.

1. My opinion is very decidedly against the proposal.

2. I would not employ them at all except in settlements of an Indian or Chinese character.

3. I have no experience of colonies planted by British settlers. But I served formerly in the Mediterranean.

4.—(a.) Men from the Punjaub, but none should be so employed.

(b.) Bombay regiments.

(c.) Either Bombay or Madras regiments.

(d.) - - ditto - - ditto.

(e.) - - ditto - - ditto.

(f.) (g.) (h.) (i.) I consider all these out of the question for any of the Indian races in time of peace

5. They should be relieved regularly every three years.

6. I do not believe in any insuperable religious difficulties. But there are many things in the habits, motives and impulses of natives which might easily alienate British colonists from them and cause blood feuds between the colonists and the sepoys. For instance, revenge on a wife for infidelity taking the form of mutilation; assaults on prostitutes of British blood for assumed infidelity or misconduct; anti-conservancy habits. If native troops were called out to aid the civil power in putting down a riot, they would never be forgiven either in South Africa or New Zealand.

7. I should think it would be necessary to give about nine (9) rupees a month to the private soldiers, with free rations. I rather think they enjoyed some such rates when serving in Hong Kong.

8. As I cannot conceive any measure more strangely impolitic than the use of native troops in European or British colonial garrisons, I have a difficulty in answering the question. If, however, they should be employed, the rule should be followed which is observed in India, viz., to keep the proportion of Europeans and natives about equal, the artillery being British.

9. Never having served in these colonies, it is better for me not to commit myself to a reply.

10. For service in the field it is possible that a proportion might do useful service as a supplement, but certainly not in entire substitution for European troops.

11. No; I think not, except in the East, e. g., Persia, China, and so forth.

12. No; I do not think that any increase in the numerical strength of garrisons could com-

pensate for the capital error of substituting Indian sepoys for British soldiers.

13. This is a question which can only be answered at the time with regard to the particular circumstances of India and the colonies. It would, with the exception of Indian and Chinese stations, be better to depend on volunteer forces or special corps raised in the colonies than Indian troops.

14. In all probability his loyalty would not be affected by it after his return. But there is no doubt that the original detachment on such service would be distasteful to the vast majority of the men.

15. I think that in the interests of both it would be better to take regiments from India according to such orders as the Government of India might deem it expedient to issue. This would give the means of relief and of discontinuing the experiment without much difficulty or expense if it failed. The Government of India would besides I should think, strongly object to the raising of soldiers in India on terms and rates differing from those of its own armies, or under any authority but its own. Such measures must be viewed with relation to the impressions they would create on the existing Indian armies, as also on the mind of the classes from which the sepoys come.

16 and 17. India should not again be left in a state which can render such a case of emergency possible. Probably troops might be spared from the Cape, but, according to existing arrangements, I know of no other source.

18. I have little doubt of the superior expediency of raising local troops in South Africa, Ceylon, and the West Indies. Perhaps for Hong Kong Indian regiments would be better than locally raised regiments. I cannot answer as to Mauritius.

19 and 20. There is now no limitation in the sense of these questions, but I should think the employment of them as proposed extremely impolitic except in Chinese or Indian stations, as before said.

21. Yes. China is essentially foreign service, whereas Aden and Burmah are recognised by the troops as part of India, as being under the Indian Government.

22. I cannot give instances in detail; but every one knows the aversion of the Indian to cross the water, more especially in the case of the Hindoos, who fast, as it were, the whole time that they are at sea. They are, besides, separated from their families, and during the term of such service their domestic relations would be entirely broken up.

therefore Question 7 that any such result is affirmative. At that time established by the of troops througher enter into the heads of and therefore re Mauritius, or the such proposals. It should Now, if no Indian populations consist of Suez route es and religious castes. If you speedily efficient army, you must ensure message to political measures through the set regime, and not attempt to introduce time. signers. To do the latter, would be 18. dication in the minds of the population or that that which is so often alleged in the prints had come to pass, viz., that our res were dwindling, and our prestige had from us. In conclusion, I would say that, after a most rious domestic convulsion, the object of which as to drive the British out of India, the country

was finally reduced to order at the end of 1859, with the result of the temporary disruption of those feelings of regard for the British rule, which in many parts had existed for a century. It cannot be believed that the feelings of animosity generated by the struggle have yet been altogether allayed. On the contrary, signs are not wanting that such is not the case. We cannot hope for anything else till a generation shall have passed away. In the meantime, we must hold the country strongly; and we must on no account lessen our influence, or weaken the idea of our prestige and resources by entertaining such notions as those suggested by these questions.

W. R. Mansfield,  
General.

Head-quarters, Simla,  
27 May 1867.

### ANSWERS of Sir Henry Durand.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. With reference to Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4, I have no acquaintance with any of the colonies specified in question 4, except such very superficial knowledge of them as a short residence at the Cape many years ago, and frequent voyages to and from England afford to a passenger at Gibraltar, Malta, and Ceylon. Of the Mauritius, China, the West Indies, and New Zealand, I have no practical knowledge whatever.

6. With respect to Question 6, quite independently of considerations of creed, race, and moral habits, there is one point common to every race in India, which is greatly opposed to their permanent employment as mercenary troops out of India, or out of the countries bordering India, and within easy reach of its shores, such as Burmah. The practice of early marriages is, it may be said, universal, and although there may be differences in the degree to which wives and families are actually present with the native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in their military cantonments in India, it is merely a question of degree. They are nearly all married men, with families dependent upon them for support; and much moral turpitude attaches to the sepoy who neglects the maintenance of his family. They may be always with the soldier, as in the Madras Army, or more partially so in the Bombay Army, or, comparatively speaking, rarely so in the Bengal army; this is a point depending much on the habits of the particular army, and the districts and races from which recruits are drawn, as also on the areas over which the cantonments of the various armies are dotted, and on reliefs and the distances marched over; still, the normal fact remains the same, and pervades the whole, namely, that the responsibility of wives and families lies, as a rule, upon the whole body of our native troops, and that their social habits and feelings have, on this point, to be met either by the families being with the men, or by frequent and long furloughs to their homes. This is a condition essentially different from the present constitution of our own European army, and it is one of those radical conditions which render all comparison difficult. Where such a condition exists incidentally, to a certain extent, as in armies formed on the Prussian system, the necessity of accepting the considerations it imposes is met by 0.58.

the short periods of service, and the arrangements which seldom call out the second and third lines, or reserves, save in case of absolute urgency. Now this is a very material consideration, and one imperatively essential prominently to keep in view, when the idea of employing Indian troops at a distance from India is discussed. No Indian experience is required in order to give weight to such a vital consideration, and any Members of the Select Committee who have a practical acquaintance with the feelings of Prussian or French married conscripts of the line, are as able to form a judgment as an officer of Indian experience, except that the latter superadds a knowledge of points of character due to creed and caste, which greatly intensify the dislike of the Mussulman, the Hindoo, and the Sikh, to protracted service beyond seas. Those who know French troops, or indeed any European troops but our own English line, must be aware of the feelings with which they embark for service beyond seas, and of the aversion they entertain to ship-board. French officers make no secret of the fact as one which is a point of remarkable difference between the French and the English soldier. Intensify this feeling fifty-fold, and you have the measure of the Mussulman's aversion to being long separated from his family; intensify the feeling a hundred-fold, and it may approach the deep disgust and sense of defilement with which, from a caste point of view, the Hindoo regards board-a-ship life, and service beyond seas, and separation from his family. The aversion of the Sikh, if of a respectable village family, is hardly less than that of the Mussulman; of any of these three main classes of our native subjects, the "Free Lances," or material for such, are very small in number as compared with former times. This is a consequence of the peace, the internal peace and good order of the empire, the security to life and property, and the greatly increased value of land; the old state of things and the habits it engendered, has passed away; but even when the Maharrattas under the Bhonsla, Holkar, or Scindia could sweep with hordes over the country, or the Pindarees pass over it like locusts destroying everything, the "Free Lances" of all these worthies had India for their field, not lands beyond the ocean, and in no country in the world, considering

App. No. 1.

considering the extent of its coasts, and the great value of its products, has the spirit of adventure at sea been so little developed as in India. Its agricultural millions are essentially a land loving people, and the sea, or service beyond seas, repugnant to their social habits, to their creeds, to their feelings, and every aspiration of their lives, for the present, or, in the case of the Hindoo, for the future. Except the off-scourings of the cities, the "budmashes" of towns or cantonments, not by any means fit material for soldiery, I know of no class whose repugnance to protracted service beyond seas could be compensated really by such an increase of advantages to the soldier as would be within reason, and not render their employment more costly and troublesome than is at all contemplated by those who propose the measure. The scum of our cities and cantonments is not worth enlisting at any price; they are worthless; and even "budmashes" would demand pay and advantages quite disproportionate to the value of their services, for in peace they would be a nuisance, and in war a weakness.

7. Nothing but actual experience would enable any answer to be given to Question 7.

8. Knowing nothing of the colonies I am unable to offer an opinion on Question 8, except, that wherever you have British artillery it should have a support of British infantry, and not be left to the sole support of native troops. For the foregoing reason, ignorance of the colonies—

9. I can offer no opinion on Question 9.

10. With regard to Questions 10 and 11, we have employed native troops in Egypt, the Mauritius, and China in time of war; and if properly organized I see no reason why native troops should not again be made useful, when associated with European troops, for active operations in any of those quarters, although their aversion is great to protracted service, mere garrison service, beyond seas, under the emergency of war, with its prospects of rewards, promotion, and foreign service claims, the feeling is different, it is regarded as an exceptional incidence of their contract, a necessity which justifies Government in employing regiments beyond sea, and which, when the regiments are not too long absent from India, confers renown and credit, besides usually being accompanied by more solid advantages. In hot countries, native troops properly officered, may be of great utility as auxiliaries to the European troops; much of the wearing fatigue duties of an army can be better taken in hot countries by the native than by the European troops. The mere friction of war in trying climates falls heavily on English troops, and much of this destructive friction can be avoided where native troops are a component of the force. Their utility in this respect is great, quite independently of their fighting power or value.

12. With regard to Question 12, I cannot conceive any British colony left to depend for its defence entirely on mercenary native troops.

13. So many and very various considerations are involved in Question 13, that it would take much time and writing to reply in a suitable manner. Much must depend on circumstances whether one or other alternative were had recourse to. The nature and danger of the pressure at home, the sphere and character of the war, actual, or im-

pending, the special British Government for colonies, the state of the pensions, &c. the time, the command with regard to Egypt and the circumstances would bear in vital peril, the withdrawal would, probably, prove too slow the emergency.

14. With respect to Question 14, reply to Question 6 will have shown the patriation of native regiments for garrison in the Colonies would not, in my opinion, be popular with our native troops, or their conditions in India; therefore, so far as loyalty depends on the measures of Government being acceptable to the people, it hardly seems likely, considering the possibility of Colonial Governments occasionally failing to understand the temper, prejudice and peculiarities of native troops from India, that the result should be increase of loyalty here. Every cause of discontent which arose in a Colony would be echoed and exaggerated by their relatives in India, and its Government would, though powerless to interfere, be held responsible for the treatment its native subjects met with when beyond its control.

15. In reply to Question 15, I must remark that India has no native troops redundant, and that to introduce a system of Colonial service and of Colonial reliefs, would necessitate a large increase to the Indian armies, and many consequent sources of augmented expenditure which the Colonial military budgets would not meet. Moreover, such a system of Colonial service and reliefs would render our service very unpopular, and commanding officers would find the recruiting more difficult than it is at present; for the men know that at the expiration of three years they can now obtain their discharge if they please, and do so to an extent of which commanding officers complain much; but such a facility for obtaining discharge could not endure compatibly with a system of Colonial service and reliefs except at great cost and inconvenience if maintained, great discontent and distrust if abrogated. I am therefore of opinion that it would be better to raise regiments in India exclusively for Colonial service, and quite distinct from our existing Indian armies, the present organisation of which is, in my opinion, unsuited to Colonial service. The British Government could organize and officer these regiments as it pleased, and would have to bear all the expenses of raising, of furloughs, of pensions, &c. I do not think either course advisable; but of the two the raising fresh regiments, unhampered by the traditions of our native armies, unsaddled with native commissioned officers, and having to conform to a system which must mould and adapt itself to the exigencies of a distinct service, seems far the most preferable course. Her Majesty's European regiments who have served or are serving in India could provide the nucleus of European officers, having some acquaintance with native soldier classes, on which to build up, gradually, such fresh regiments; it must be fully understood that the experiment would be a serious one.

16, 17. On more than one occasion, India has had to apply to neighbouring Colonies for the immediate assistance of European troops; and therefore

therefore Question 18 must be answered in the affirmative. At that time, however, the dispatch of troops through Egypt had not been arranged, and therefore regiments could be drawn from the Mauritius, or the Cape sooner than from England. Now, if no pressure were on England, and the Suez route open, reinforcements can be more speedily obtained from England. A telegraph message to Malta, or Gibraltar, or England, could set regiments moving for India in very short time.

18. I have but slight knowledge of South Africa or its races, nor do I know the estimation in which the Cape Mounted Rifles were held; except as settlers in our own provinces on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, I have had no opportunity of judging of the Chinese or Malays. The question how the Chinese or mixed Tartar and Chinese of the northern coasts of China would stand our discipline is a problem untried; but they are represented as being fine men in some of the provinces, and there should be fair material for native troops on that coast. Both in South Africa, and on the coast of China, the experiment of raising native troops from the native populations in or near those Colonies, seems preferable to that of introducing Colonial service and Colonial reliefs into our native armies, or of raising fresh regiments in India for Colonial service. In reply to Question 18, therefore, I should say that the advantages, if it can be safely done, of raising a few corps in South Africa, and on the coast of China, are very great.

19, 20. I have already answered Question 19, when I stated that the native soldier regards his liability to service beyond seas as an incident to which under his contract he is bound; but as being one practically limited to the emergencies of war, our native armies being so reduced as barely to meet the requirements of our occupation of India. In case of war, the obligation would have to be enforced, and their utility in hot countries as auxiliaries to European troops, has already been touched upon; but except for war, and beyond the ordinary reliefs in British Burma, Aden, and the Straits, it is not desirable to enforce the obligation with our weak armies.

21. In reply to Question 21, I do not think that the fact of India being directly under the Crown, instead of indirectly as formerly was the case, makes the smallest difference in the feeling of native troops towards service beyond seas.

22. In reply to Question 22, I must observe

that beyond a reluctance on the part of some Madras regiments to embark for China on the occurrence of the first war in China, and a reluctance on the part of a Bengal regiment to embark for Burmah in the time of Lord Dalhousie, I have known no instances of discontent; on neither occasion was the reluctance very serious, or insurmountable.

23, 24. With regard to Question 23, it must be borne in mind that India is a vast empire, and that its races having more or less the feeling of the fact, are apt to consider that the sovereignty of this country when acquired, of itself confers an Imperial diadem. Service in petty Colonies would most assuredly lower, rather than raise their idea of our power. They can understand England ruling India, and holding it in part with native troops, for this is in strict accordance with the practice and traditions of former conquerors; but the poverty of resources in men which calls for the occupation by native troops of distant Colonies, like the Mauritius, Hong Kong, West Indies, &c., can produce but one effect, and that an effect far from favourable to their sense of our military means and power which cannot find men for what they will regard as dwarf territories.

25. I have answered Question 25 previously. It is a matter which actual experiment can alone prove. As far as India is concerned, the feeling of our native armies since 1857, is that they are not trusted; and the introduction of Chinese, African, or Malay troops, would augment this feeling, and do harm. In India we are better without such foreign troops, upon which no greater reliance could be placed than upon our own Indian races, whom it is not good policy thus to alienate. Nor would the substitution of such troops enable us materially to reduce our English garrison. If the magnitude of the Indian empire, the millions it contains, and the growing wealth of the country are considered, the European garrison of India is in my opinion moderate, and not more than a country like England can and should bear without murmur. On the contrary, what with the alienation of the Indian troops, and the resentments that might crop up, besides the peculiar temper of Chinese, Africans, and Malays, which renders them in some respects more difficult to manage than Indians, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, we should be compelled to maintain an equal, if not superior, European force to watch the experiment.

H. Durand.

Simla, 29 May 1867.

### ANSWERS of Sir R. Temple, Hyderabad.

1. I AM decidedly in favour of making the experiment of substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in time of peace. The measure would afford some, though not great relief to the English army in time of peace. The system thus established could be expanded in time of war, so as to form an appreciable, though not very considerable, addition to our military resources, and if good Indian troops were selected, as I believe they might be for this service, then the circumstance would add something to our national

Q.58:

prestige in the estimation of other military countries.

2. I would propose to employ, to a limited extent, Indian troops in Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, China, New Zealand, Mauritius, South Africa, Malta and Gibraltar; but I would not propose to employ them in Australia, because they would probably not get on well with the colonists; and I feel doubts about employing them in the West Indies. I speak with diffidence, but I should fear there might arise ill blood between

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tween

App. No. 1. tween them and the coloured races; and their morale and ideas might deteriorate from the political influences of those regions. The British North American possessions are doubtless out of the question.

3. I have not any special knowledge from residence of any of the Colonies.

4. This question relates to the races of India who might be best employed as soldiers in the following Colonies, viz.:

- a. South Africa.
- b. Mauritius.
- c. Ceylon.
- d. Straits Settlements.
- e. China.
- f. Malta.
- g. Gibraltar.
- h. West Indies.
- i. New Zealand.

I believe that Madras regiments could always be employed in Ceylon and the Straits Settlements, perhaps also in the Mauritius; they have, as is well known, been already employed in the Straits Settlements; but I would not recommend them for employment in any other of the Colonies. The Madras troops are drawn from the southern portion of the Indian Peninsula, of Telooogo and Tamil speaking races. Bombay troops have already been employed in China, and might be permanently so employed; perhaps also they might be employed in the Mauritius. The Bombay troops are drawn from the Western Deccan and coast districts, that is, from Mahratta races, partly also from Goojerat and from Central India, with a mixture also of Hindoostanees.

As already stated, I cannot recommend any class of Indian troops as suited for the West Indies. There remain South Africa, New Zealand, Malta, Gibraltar. For employment in these I would propose Punjaabee troops, and besides them I know of no races in India adapted for such a duty. The Punjaabees would also be well suited for service in China; indeed, as is well known, they did good service there in the last war. Having served in various capacities in the Punjaub, I have necessarily a special knowledge of that province and people. By Punjaabees are meant not only Sikhs, but Mahomedans, natives of the Punjaub and especially of the Trans-Indus frontier. I have for years past heard military officers both of the Royal army and the late Company's army, who had seen the Punjaabees on service and in action, speak in the highest terms of the soldierly qualities of these troops. Indeed, I never heard but one opinion expressed on this subject. In physical power and endurance, owing to the severer climate wherein they are born, and in martial spirit, owing to a variety of circumstances, they altogether surpass all other Indian races. Especially also they can well bear frost and even snow. In New Zealand and in South Africa they would render capital service, in such wars as those which have of late years occurred in those regions. In Malta and Gibraltar they could certainly take a part of the garrison duty. Their bearing and appearance would be such as might well bear to be exhibited before European nations. And if their appearance were to be thus approved of, then the consideration that there must be plenty more where they came from, might add something to our repute as a military empire. In time of

need they would not equal the Zouaves, but they might not be much inferior to Turkish troops. Even in such a war as the Crimean war, a small contingent of Punjaabee troops would not be much less valuable than a Turkish contingent. If well managed and cared for, the Punjaabees would stand much inclement weather and climate. And in the event of operations in Egypt, a body of Punjaabee troops would be useful auxiliaries to the British troops, even in the face of an European enemy. I assume in this answer that the troops to be employed would be infantry; but, if required, the Punjaabee cavalry would go to any country where the infantry went. As is well known, in the last China war the Punjaub horse did excellently well up to the very walls of Peking. I should here, perhaps, allude to the Hyderabad contingent under my control. Though a very fine body of irregular troops, they would not (so far as I can learn) be suited for service in the colonies. Though they comprise many races, still the majority are Deccanee; and their ideas and traditions are all bound up with the Deccan itself.

5. The reliefs would have to be at short intervals not exceeding two years. The affording of frequent reliefs indeed is the main, if not the only practical, difficulty in this matter. If this could not be managed, or if to manage it would prove too expensive, then the whole scheme would fall to the ground. The well-assured certainty of frequent reliefs would be particularly essential. Though eager to go to distant places for a time, for excitement, for enterprise, for advantage and for hard work in which they might take interest, the Punjaabees are not patient of monotony. They even soon tire of uneventful service in Bengal Proper. With the steam transport services, now existing and now further organized with a view to military reliefs, there could be no difficulty whatever in respect to Indian troops serving in the Mediterranean. Probably similar facilities could be secured in regard to China.

As regards New Zealand and South Africa and the Mauritius, there might be more of difficulty, but it would probably not be insuperable. The reasons necessitating frequency of relief are probably too well known to require mention here. It may be added that the Punjaabee and the Bombay troops would be without their families. The Madrassee troops would have their families with them; and with the Madras army the intervals of relief have always been much longer than with the other Indian armies.

6. There are no special difficulties whatever in respect to the races mentioned in Answer 4. Advantages would certainly have to be allowed, and some expense would be necessary; but probably not any such expense as would counterbalance or seriously detract from the advantages of the plan.

In a word, I should say that the Punjaabees would go with pleasure anywhere, provided they thought the expedition would not last too long and would afford excitement and advantage.

7. Sepoys employed on service out of India should have, extra to their pay, batta of Rs. 1. 8. each per mensem, and free rations; this is granted to the Madras troops when on service in Burmah, China, or the Straits. This is the lowest scale of remuneration which I could suggest. I cannot, of course, tell what the rations would cost in the colonies, but taking an average at one-half the Indian rate of European rations, which might suffice

• suffice for Indian troops anywhere, the extra cost to an Indian battalion of 1,000 men of all ranks would be, per mensem :

	For 1 Man per Mensem. <i>Rs. a. p.</i>	For 1,000 Men per Mensem. <i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Batta - - -	1 8 -	1,500 - -
Rations - - -	3 4 -	3,250 - -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>Rs. 4 12 -</b>	<b>4,750 - -</b>

Or, per annum - *Rs.* 57,000, or *£.* 5,750.

These figures represent nothing more than an approximation; but the aggregate does not seem great, while, on the other hand, the rate per man would be a sensible addition to the sepoy's income as an inducement to go on distant service.

8. Indian troops would not be a sufficient garrison in time of peace in the colonies above mentioned, either (a) wholly unsupported by British troops or (b) supported by English garrison artillery only. The proportion of English troops necessary to support them would vary in different colonies. Speaking roundly, I should say that in the Mediterranean one-fourth of the garrison might be Indian; in New Zealand and South Africa one-half (assuming that one of the main troubles in these two colonies will be from native tribes); in China and the Mauritius one-third; in Ceylon two-thirds. The only exception would be the Straits Settlements, where probably Indian troops supported by English garrison Artillery might suffice.

9. I should think Indian troops only partially supported (but not entirely unsupported) would suffice to suppress internal disturbances in Ceylon, the Mauritius and Hong Kong. Under the same conditions Punjaabee troops would be able to cope with Kaffirs in South Africa or with Maories in New Zealand. But I do not think that the last-named work should be entrusted to any Indian troops except Punjaabees.

10. I should think it quite expedient to employ Indian troops in the Colonies mentioned in the

foregoing answers as supplementary or as auxiliaries to the English troops. I hesitate to recommend such employment in substitution of English troops, to any large extent, but this might be done to some slight extent.

11. They could not be relied on in such a service, as to materially lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war. They might do so to some slight extent, perhaps. In time of peace a total strength of ten or twelve thousand Indian troops might be employed out in India in the places above described. In a general war with European Powers, the above strength might be increased to fifteen or sixteen thousand. But this would partly depend on our power and position at the time. If we were waging a doubtful or at all a losing contest in any part of the world, then the case under discussion becomes altered as regards Indian troops.

12. They would not be able to protect the Colonies above-mentioned as well as the existing garrisons, and therefore some increase of numbers would be necessary in a mixed English and Indian garrison, as compared with a purely English garrison; but not to such an extent as to neutralise or impair the advantages of the measure.

In South Africa there appear, according to the latest Army List, to be

4 British Regiments	-	4,000 men of all ranks.
5 " in New Zealand	5,000	"
2 " in China	-	2,000 "
1 " in Ceylon	-	1,000 "
2 " in Mauritius	-	2,000 "
4 " in Malta	-	4,000 "
4 " in Gibraltar	-	4,000 "

On these data I should suppose that the present English garrison, contrasted with a mixed garrison of English and Indian troops, might be something as follows, numerically, including men of all ranks :

COLONY.	Number of Regiments.	Present Strength, English.	Proposed Strength.			Saving of English.	Increase of Strength proposed over present.
			English.	Indian.	Total.		
South Africa - - -	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
New Zealand - - -	5	5,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	2,000	-
China - - - - -	2	2,000	1,500	1,000	2,500	500	500
Ceylon - - - - -	1	1,000	500	1,000	1,500	500	500
Mauritius - - - -	2	2,000	1,000	2,000	3,000	1,000	1,000
Malta - - - - -	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
Gibraltar - - - -	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22,000</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>12,000</b>	<b>27,000</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>5,000</b>

N.B.—The Straits Settlements are omitted from the above calculation, as no British infantry are stationed there.

App. No. 1.

This increase in total strength would not cause any increase of expenditure, because Indian troops are so much less expensive than English. There would indeed, on the contrary, be some saving of expense by the arrangement.

13. Inasmuch as our English garrison in India is, or ought to be, no more than what is really necessary, the thought of English regiments being withdrawn from India, in case of pressure at home, cannot be contemplated, save with serious concern. Writing in India, I must say that if such pressure arose, it were better to withdraw English regiments from the Colonies, filling up their places by Indian troops, than to withdraw English regiments from India; but then, on the other hand, if the Colonies in particular were threatened by an European enemy, any considerable substitution of Indian for English troops might not be practicable there.

14. The effect of service in the Colonies above named would no doubt enlarge the ideas of the Indian troops employed. It has been thought, in 1857 and subsequent years, that to employ Indian sepoys in a great variety of distant stations imperilizes their minds, so to speak, and renders them less amenable to the dominant influence of their European masters. But in the case now put, I hardly see that any prejudicial effect would be produced; and even, on the contrary, sepoys might after such service return home with some notion of our world-wide power.

15. In answer to this question, I should say that for this Colonial service the best plan would be to select regiments composed of the particular races required, which corps might possess the requisite qualities, and might be imbued with the spirit that is needed for such a duty. It would be practicable, and also desirable, to ascertain beforehand whether the corps selected would be for the most part volunteers for the work. This mode would be preferable, as regards efficiency, to either of the modes proposed in the question, namely, taking regiments from the Indian army according to their turn, or raising fresh regiments in India for Colonial service. In this point of view it would be better, both in the interests of India and in the interests of the Colonies. Indeed, assuming that Punjaubees are mainly to be the troops employed, I do not perceive how any plan could be perfectly arranged by the roster of turn, because in the Bengal army the Punjaubec regiments are not numbered consecutively, but bear various numbers scattered about in the list. Moreover, some of the regiments most likely to be chosen would be those of the Punjaub irregular force, which are not in the Bengal regular army at all.

16. I do not think that the presence of British troops in the neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of emergency. Some assistance was indeed derived in this way in 1857. (I do not include the China force at that time so fortunately diverted from its destination.) But nothing material could, as a rule, be reckoned on.

17. Understanding that the English troops in the Colonies are or will be kept at only such strength as is absolutely required, I could not venture to name any Colony whence reinforcements could be expected for India in time of need.

18. I am not able to answer this question with confidence, not having personal knowledge of the

Colonies; but I should suppose that well-selected Indian troops would be much superior for the defence internal or external of these Colonies than any levies that could be raised from the local population. Indian troops are known to be capable of attaining a high state of organisation and discipline. Probably the same could not be said of native levies raised locally in the Colonies; with a few exceptions, at all events; and if there be this superiority on the part of Indian troops, it would be worth the incurring of the extra cost of transport in order to obtain them.

19. I apprehend that native soldiers on enlistment give little thought to the obligation they have now incurred of foreign service. If this were found to be the case, then I would try to avoid having to enforce the obligation, however clear it might be. A few discontented men might make the duty of foreign service unpopular with the corps generally. I understand that in the Madras army the sepoys whose regiments are ordered on foreign service, are usually, as a matter of grace, permitted to have the option of leaving the regiment if they do not like to accompany it, and no inconvenience seems to arise from this indulgence.

20. I would not alter the present system. I would continue to enlist them for general service anywhere, but I would try to avoid having to make them go on important service beyond the seas against their will; especially if, as I should hope, it be possible by offering inducements and by selecting regiments, to get men to go willingly.

21. I should not think the Indian troops would now draw any distinction between service in Aden and Burmah on the one hand and China and the Mauritius on the other. They certainly would go to China without hesitation; indeed they have gone in recent times and have won distinction there. I am not so positive about the Mauritius, but inasmuch as thousands of Indian labourers go there annually, it seems probable that Indian troops would go there, too, without difficulty.

22. I have seldom heard of any instances of discontent of the native army when employed on colonial duties beyond the seas. I except, of course, the cases of the Bengal sepoys objecting to go to Burmah, as those instances are well known. I do not know that the sepoys made any objection when they were sent to Egypt, at the beginning of this century.

23. I certainly think that the employment on colonial service of troops belonging to the Indian army would tend somewhat to give it the feeling of an imperial army. Such a result has at times, since 1857, been regarded as objectionable. But in this case, for the reason given in my answer to Question 14, I should not regard the objection as serious.

24. As I am in India this question which relates solely to those residing in the Colonies, is not answerable by me.

25. I am not in favour of employing in India troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian. In the period following 1857, this was frequently proposed in India. It was thought that non-Indian troops would be equally inured to Asiatic heat, and just as good as Indian troops; while being removed so far from their homes, they would be more bound to us, and would serve as a check on the Indian troops.

I believe

I believe, however, that now this notion is nearly, perhaps entirely, abandoned. I suppose that as a military body, such non-Indian troops would be inferior to Indian troops, and would be more expensive and more troublesome to manage. On the other hand, the non-Indian troops would not really be more reliable; but would, on the contrary, join the Indians if the latter turned against us or otherwise went wrong. Chinese troops might not perhaps coalesce with the Indian; but the Indo-Chinese, the Malays, the non-Indian Asiatics, the Africans, could not be trusted. There are now African and Arabian troops at Hyderabad. No person of any experience on the British side would place any particular reliance on the above named, in any Indian mutiny or rebellion.

## CONCLUSION.

App. No. 1.

Having thus answered the several questions put, I would add that, as the proposed measure is of a novel and experimental character, I have recommended its adoption to only a limited extent at first. If it be tentatively worked, there will be no harm done even if it fail. But if it succeed, then it could be further developed hereafter.

(signed) *R. Temple,*  
British Resident  
at the Court of Hyderabad.

The Residency, Hyderabad,  
30 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Merewether, C.B., Resident, Aden.*

1. CARRIED out to a certain extent, it would be a most politic move. Besides relieving the English army of the heavy drain upon it which now exists, it would place the Colonies in a better position, should an European war break out, than they otherwise would be; because, in the event of such occurring, every English soldier that could possibly be taken, would be withdrawn. The Indian troops would then be something left.

2. In the Eastern Colonies, that is Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, China, and the Cape. For New Zealand, under the improved state of affairs there, I should think there would be no difficulty in raising soldiers on the spot, well suited for the purpose required. Malta and Gibraltar, I consider should always be held by English troops alone. The West Indies are provided for already in the West India regiments, which might be increased if required. Further, the great distance from India would be objectionable in arranging details.

3. None.

4. I would specify none. The Indian army might be increased to meet the new contingents, and regiments would take their tour of colonial duty. Men should be enlisted for general service, without any distinction and without any reference to caste or persuasion. They should be taken merely for their physical fitness for a soldier's life.

5. A regular systematic course of reliefs every three years, the regiments leaving their families and other impediments at fixed head-quarters, or at certain established depôts. The fixed head-quarter system would be the preferable of the two, if it could be generally introduced, and I see no reason why it should not be.

6. I know no special difficulties whatever as regards the classes in India who would enlist for general service, and the supply would be plentiful. Difficulties were encountered formerly in India, but they originated as much, indeed almost entirely, from the faulty management of the men, not from the men themselves. Extra allowances would have to be given to the men serving abroad, in the same manner as was granted to the 3rd, 5th, 22nd, and Belooch Regiments of the Bombay army lately in China.

7. Replied to in previous answer.

8. Not having any personal knowledge of the colonies, or of their requirements, it is difficult to

answer this question; but speaking generally I should say that where two English regiments are now located, one might be withdrawn, and its place supplied by one or two native Indian regiments, according to the amount of duty required of them. In some of the places, such as Ceylon, and some of the minor stations in China, native troops might be with advantage used alone. Artillery would have to be kept up in all stations as in peace time now. There is an objection with some to training native Indian artillery again, to which I in nowise hold. It would be a good opportunity to revive Indian native artillery by sending some batteries to the Colonies. These will form a good nucleus when the Indian local army has to be reorganised, as which, sooner or later, it will have to be.

9. I think so, certainly.

10. As a supplement to Europeans in time of war, the advantage would be found very great. It would be cheaper. It would allow of the Europeans being relieved of much duty which is now found to tell heavily upon them, but for which the natives are far better suited. It would economise the most expensive material, the European soldier, and it would place so many more men at the disposal of the Home Government. The chequered brigade, one European and two native regiments, forms a most effective force; would be excellent against any Asiatic enemy, and I think would not be found wanting when opposed to an European one.

11. Certainly.

12. The Indian makes an excellent soldier when well commanded and strictly disciplined; when treated for their qualifications as soldiers, not as Bramins, or what not, the Indian annals show instances of military spirit, endurance, and courage, which will bear comparison with any in the world. Merely to quote a few within the last half century. I would mention the last storm of Bhuolpoor, when a Bengal native regiment led; the battles of Korregaum, Scetabundee, Meanee, Guzerat. In the last-mentioned, natives led the cavalry attack against a very superior force, supported by English diagoons. The purposed garrisons would be as adequate as existing garrisons; but I should conclude, if the war extended to the Colonies, extra provision would have to be made.

13. Want of personal knowledge of the requirements of the Colonies prevents my answering this question



App. No. 1.

question fully. But with regard to India, I would observe, that when once the maximum European force is fixed for that country, none of the English army should on any account be withdrawn from it, unless they are replaced at once by others, to form an European local army.

14. Decidedly advantageous. It would enlarge their experience, and confirm them in the feeling that they are soldiers of the State, ready to serve anywhere.

15. It would be better for both interests, until the Colonies can provide for themselves within their own limits, that regiments should be taken from India in their turn, the Indian army being increased to meet the greater demand.

16. Now that troops are about to be sent regularly overland, India would be reinforced from England more easily and more quickly than from any of the Colonies. The presence of European troops in the Colonies for this purpose is therefore immaterial.

17. Replied to in the above.

18. Certainly, as far as we can judge from experience as regards South Africa and Ceylon. The attempt to raise local troops in both these places has been tried and failed. In Mauritius I should imagine equal difficulty would be experienced as in Africa or Ceylon. In Hong Kong, I have been told, the material at present available is quite unsuited to the purpose. The West Indies seem to be provided for already. For the four first, then, it would appear indispensably necessary; and the saving in having native troops in place of European would more than pay the cost of transport. The Europeans would equally have to be relieved with the natives, and at a much greater cost.

19. I am not quite certain how this stands with regard to the native army in Bengal; but in Bombay, the soldiers are enlisted for general service, and are ready and willing to proceed beyond seas, or anywhere. In 1860, when the 3rd and 5th W. I. were ordered to China, the announcement that they were to go was received with acclamation.

20. The rule, if it does not exist, should certainly be introduced and adhered to, that troops

should be enlisted to go wherever they are ordered, and the exigencies of the service required them to be. I know of no reason why it should not be done.

21. No; I do not.

22. From personal knowledge, I can give no cases. But the records of India, show that regiments in Bengal and some few in Madras objected to go to Burmah, and China in the former, because they considered they were not enlisted to serve anywhere out of India. They equally refused to go to Scind or Afghanistan. Till a few years ago, there were regiments in the old Bengal army who were styled volunteer regiments, because the men entered them with the understanding they were to serve out of India. I believe, however, even these did not prove a bit more willing when the time came for them to go. But this was owing to a faulty system which allowed the men to consider, or feel they had a choice in the matter. It is to be hoped such a mistake will never be fallen into again. Men should only be taken who enter the army to obey orders and go where they are bid.

23. I think it would have a very excellent effect in raising the morals of the men, and it could not fail to be of benefit by enlarging their experience.

24. The Arabs and Somallees (an African race), who form the mass of the population at Aden, are as they exist now utterly unsuited for soldiers. The Arabs are active and energetic, but they would not conform to discipline. The Somallees are the laziest most useless people on the face of the earth. A body of mounted police being required for this station, I found it necessary to recommend they should be raised in and sent from India. They could not be found at Aden.

25. Having no personal experience of these races, I can give no opinion, beyond what appears generally in the answers given above.

*W. L. Merewether*, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Resident, Aden.

Aden Residency,  
20 May 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Colonel Sir *Herbert Edwardes*, K.C.B.

1. THIS question must be looked at from two points; firstly, what is expedient for England? secondly, what is expedient for India? With regard to England, I should say that any arrangement which would economise even a single British battalion would be expedient. I have no doubt that improving the condition of the British soldier would quickly do away with the difficulties of recruiting. But, supposing this to be done, and recruits to be abundant, who would use up his best material when second best would do? Turning to India, I do not consider it a wise policy for our empire there to open new military careers for the native races. What we want is to settle the population down to peaceful pursuits, so that in a few generations they may become disused to arms. The break-up of the Sikh power in the wars of 1845-6, and 1848-9, sent thousands of soldiers in the Punjab sulkily back to the plough, whence Runjeet Singh had, only a generation

before, with great difficulty drawn their fathers. These men and their sons were the treasure-house from which we mainly drew the large Punjab levies of 1857; and it may be said that this was well for us. As it happened, it was; but they would have been equally available against us. Under the circumstances, they were invaluable to us in putting down the old Sepoy army; but that object having been effected, we must take care that the remedy is not as bad as the disease. It is quite sufficient to draw on the Sikhs, the border Pathans, and other martial races of the Punjab, for as many soldiers as we actually require to keep up the balance of races in our new native army in India, without turning whole races once more into soldiers by profession. So with the Poorbeas, who were the main body of the old Sepoy army. They have now passed, or are passing, through the wretchedness of transition from a century of hereditary soldiering to a  
future

future of agriculture. I would strongly deprecate any disturbance of the process, even if they would enlist in any numbers, to cross the sea, which, being high caste, and full of prejudice, they probably would not. Now, comparing these considerations of what is good for England and what is good for India, it is obvious that a large part of the problem before Parliament is how to diminish the British garrison in India, and I should conclude that whatever policy disarms the people of India diminishes the necessity for a European garrison; and *vice versa*. On the whole, therefore, it seems expedient to substitute Indian troops for British to a moderate extent, in a few pressing tropical colonies, but certainly not to carry out the policy on a great scale beyond the Indian seas.

2. China, the Straits, Ceylon, and Mauritius.

3. I have not lived in any of the Colonies which I have named above. I have touched several times at Ceylon; and, from having served in India since the beginning of 1841, of course I have some knowledge of all these adjacent countries.

4. (a.) South Africa.—I should have thought local races could be found here well suited to oppose those who annoy the Colony. The divisions of barbarians can always be turned to account. But if it be determined to draw on India, I would recommend half Hindoos and half Mahomedans, from the Bombay Presidency, accustomed to see their countrymen go to Aden, and come back again. The Bheels, if they would go, are a race well suited to bush-fighting. There is a large body of Eurasians in India, to whom the Cape climate would be permanently suited. A corps of these might be raised, and made locals. Recruits could be supplied, when wanted, from India.

(b.) Mauritius.—Mauritius is well suited by climate to natives of India, who go there freely as hired labourers, to cultivate sugar; stay periods of five or ten years, and return with large savings to India. Many seem to stay there for good, and I understand that they now form a moiety of the 400,000 total population of the island. These coolies come chiefly from the hill tribes of Bengal and Orissa, and the Tamils of the Madras coast.

The Orissa men would not make soldiers, but the Tamels form a good class of the Madras native army; and I should think a corps could be raised out of these on the spot, and constantly recruited, without the trouble of bringing men from India. They should be balanced by an equal number of Mahomedans from the Madras Presidency.

Mauritius is said to have good fortifications, and natives fight almost as well as Europeans behind works.

I believe there are no Aborigines in Mauritius, from whom a local corps could be raised.

(c.) Ceylon.—In Ceylon, the races are cognate with those of the southern coast of India; the climate is similar, and the distance small. In the Ceylon rifles, I believe there are many Malays (a race introduced into the island as mercenaries, by the Dutch), and that they do well.

But they are Mahomedans, and should be balanced by other races. I do not know whether any Kandians from the Ceylon hills have been enlisted, or would enlist, but if possible, they should be, as they are said to be a fine highland race.

The Telingas of Madras and the Dekhan, are well suited to service in Ceylon; at one time, they conquered it.

0.58.

(d.) Straits Settlement.—All the races which supply the Madras army, are accustomed to serve in the Straits settlements, but I should think it would be good policy also, to have some Malays of the country.

(e.) China.—In China, also, the Madras military races have been accustomed to serve cheerfully, and this is half the battle. As a rule, the Indians of the interior and upper provinces, dislike foreign service, and especially the sea, so that they should be last resorted to. Belooches, from Sindh, would be well suited to China. I should not advocate raising local corps of Chinese, because they are not our own subjects. As a race, too, they are notorious for secret conspiracy.

(f.) Malta.

(g.) Gibraltar.—My judgment would be decidedly against bringing Indian troops to Europe. It is quite enough to take them to the Indian and China seas, and among Buddhists, Mahomedans, Hindoos, and Kaffirs.

But should Parliament resolve on such a measure, then all that remains, is to bring the robustest races who can be induced to come, and I would recommend men of the Punjaub and its border, half Mahomedans and half Sikhs.

(h.) West Indies.—The special objection to sending Indian troops to the West Indies, is the great distance. But Indian coolies have gone there as sugar labourers, and if the measure be determined on at all, Madras coast Hindoos would go the most cheerfully.

(i.) New Zealand.—Here I would object, not only to the distance, but to the needlessness of sending to India for auxiliaries; and I would strongly recommend the policy so successful in India, of raising regiments from the natives of the country. The Maorees are a most martial race, and to keep them always as enemies, is not making the best use of them. At first sight, it may seem unlikely that Maorees would fight for us against their own countrymen, but those who have dealt with wild races, know the contrary. Not only does all experience in India prove it, but I would appeal to the experience of the late war in New Zealand, in which the Han-hau fanatics 200 strong, made an expedition to exterminate the Europeans in the settlement of Wanganni, were encountered by a body of friendly natives, and after a severe fight, were all either killed or dispersed. Subsequent to this, a small colonial force, with the help of a friendly native contingent, expelled the Han-haus from the east coast, and seized and carried to Aukland 30 or 40 natives implicated in the murder of the missionary Volkner. In fact, the powerful element of religion comes in aid of policy, in New Zealand, as it does not do in India. Christian Maorees would naturally take service with us, and be elevated in doing so; and the two races would be drawn more together. Again, the Maorees are at least equal, and probably superior, to the best races in India, in soldierly qualities. To bring Indians against them, would be as aggravating as enlisting them on one side would be tranquillising to the Colony.

5. The Indian troops in Colonies would require to be relieved as a rule, every three years, as the Madras troops used to be in China, the Straits, Burmah, &c., and the arrangements for making those reliefs would turn upon the way in which

Question 15 may be decided. If a Colonial regiment

App. No. 1. ment be borrowed from the Indian native army, an extra regiment will be kept up in that army, and regularly relieved in its turn. If the Colony wish to have a local corps, and can get it, it will be necessary to let one-third of the men go on furlough every year; and the corps must be one-third stronger and more costly in consequence. The native officers on furlough would then recruit for the regiment. But I do not think that any of the races of India, except Eurasians, would enlist to be made locals in any other Colony than Ceylon, which is really a fragment of their own country.

6. I have only named those races which have been accustomed for years to cross the sea on service, or would be likely to consent to do so. As a general remark, all the races of India dislike foreign service and crossing the sea; but most of them will go for a consideration. The high caste men of Oudd and the north-west provinces of Bengal refuse, in bodies, to go to sea, as they say it breaks their caste; but even these men, as individuals, when enlisted in the Bombay and Madras armies, and cut off from social prejudices, go everywhere, and do everything with their comrades, though they may talk a little about it, to keep up their own dignity. I have heard a Madras officer of experience relate his amusement and surprise at catching a high caste Hindoostanee native officer buying a "sheep's head and trotters" in the bazaar in China, because he could no longer stand the climate without animal food. When laughed at, he laughed too, and said "When I get back to Hindostan I can make it all right again with the Brahmins."

7. Experience has long shown that the terms granted by the Madras Government to its sepoy when on foreign service, quite content the men. The details can be readily got from the India Office; but the general features of the arrangement are:—

1. Provision for regular payments to the soldier's families left behind.
2. Pensions to ditto, in case of casualties abroad.
3. Free rations, in excess of Indian pay.
4. Stated reliefs.

8. In all the Colonies in the Indian and China seas, which seem to me suited for Indian garrisons, I think the Indian system, to which the natives are accustomed, should be adhered to, of having a nucleus of British troops, more or less, according to the Colony, even in times of peace. You cannot tell when war may arise in such places as the Cape and China; and the system on which you intend to fight, must be kept up in peace, if only in skeleton. I would always keep the guns in the hands of Europeans; and in other arms, one European to three native soldiers.

9. Yes; three Indian regiments brigaded with one British, and backed by British artillery, are good against all comers.

10. See answer to No. 9.

11. Ditto, ditto.

12. No one would pretend that any coloured troops in the world, whether Indians or others, are equal to British soldiers. Therefore, if you

substitute black troops for white, you must have more of them. Where it is a question of open field, I would say three for one. Where it is the defence of fortifications, two for one.

13. This would depend much on the quarter from which the pressure came. If we were at war with Russia we could not withdraw British troops from India; for Russia is very wisely closing her Asiatic frontier on our own. The only object which could repay her for all the trouble she is taking, is to have a check upon us in case of another war. When that war comes, we shall find that we are no longer free in India to turn our attention and our resources to the Baltic and the Black Sea. We shall find unaccountable intrigues springing up in the native courts of India; and if the war lasts long enough, we shall find our frontier alight, and Central Asia in commotion. Again, if the European enemy be a great maritime power, we could not denude the Colonies of British troops; though otherwise we could do so. The true policy would seem to be this, to establish in peace a system that would stand in war; to lead each Colony to undertake its own defence as far as practicable; to enlist local races as the groundwork of local defence; to back these with the minimum of British troops (*i. e.* the maximum you could spare in war), and then if necessary, and not otherwise, supplement these with Indian auxiliaries. Our home resources would then be so economised, that we could draw on them for all the demands of a European war, without making the alarm vibrate to the outer edges of the Empire, by calling home battalions from India and the Colonies.

14. This is entirely a question of treatment. The service itself must always go against the grain of the natives of India; but if it be made profitable, and not too long, so that when the soldiers return home again they may find they have saved more money than they could have done in India, there will be nothing but good feeling about it.

15. In my answer to Question 5, I have expressed my opinion that there is little choice in this matter, as it is not probable that any natives of India (unless it be Eurasians), would accept permanent service in any Colony except Ceylon. Eurasians might agree to be localised at the Cape, or in China, or indeed, anywhere. There are other obvious difficulties in such an arrangement; the greater expense entailed by furloughs and recruiting, and the officering of the local corps. On the whole I think it quite practicable for the Colonies I have named in Answer 2, to borrow regiments regularly from India, and adjust the accounts; but impracticable to raise and maintain Indian regiments of their own.

16. If the British garrison of India be kept up to its standard, this should be sufficient to meet all emergencies. In 1857, we had so few European troops in India, that we were obliged to call on the Cape for assistance. But the contingency of helping India ought not to be an argument for keeping in any colony more British troops than the colony itself requires.

17. As a question of time, Ceylon, the Straits, China, and perhaps Mauritius, could send reinforcements to India, sooner than to England.

18. From my answer to Question 4, it will be

be seen that I strongly advocate the policy of enlisting the races of the country, which has pacified many of the most troublesome parts of India. This policy is at once the easiest, cheapest, justest, and most efficient.

19. In considering this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are three presidencies, and three native armies in India. In the Bombay and Madras armies, I believe general service has always been both the theory and the practice; and notably so in the Madras army, which has habitually taken the garrison duty of China, the Straits, and the Pegu Provinces. But in the Bengal army caste and prejudice ran high, and to get the native troops on general service was always a matter of volunteering and coaxing. Previous to 1856, there were a few regiments in the Bengal native army called volunteer corps, who had accepted the conditions of general service. And in 1856, Lord Canning ordered that all future enlistments throughout the Bengal Presidency should be for general service. In the reorganisation of the native army after the mutiny of 1857, general service was, I believe, the basis; and this is so recent, that no native soldier can be unaware of it. But, having been employed on purely civil and political duties during the three years (1862, 1863, 1864) that I have been in India since the new army was organised, I am unable to speak to the feeling of the men upon this point. Terms, however, have a tendency to become obsolete if not enforced; and with the exception of Colonel Probyn's and Colonel Fane's regiments of Punjab Cavalry, who took such a distinguished part in the last China war, I cannot call to mind that any native troops from Bengal have crossed the sea. Referring to the Army List for January 1867, I find, that whereas the Madras Native Army had sent six battalions across the sea to garrisons in the Straits and the Pegu provinces, the Bombay army had sent only one to Aden, and the Bengal army not one. When then it is remembered that the Pegu provinces are a part of the Bengal Presidency, it does not look well for the general service principle in the Bengal army, that the Madras troops are still taking the sea duties. No doubt there are some good reasons for it, but they would have to be inquired into before this 19th Question could be answered satisfactorily.

20. The fewer changes you make in Indian armies the better; but if any have to be made, a time of peace like the present, is of course the best for making them; especially while there is a Governor General on the spot like Sir John Lawrence, who knows the native troops.

21. If the men like it, and see an advantage in it, they will draw no distinction. If they don't like it they will soon find a distinction, that China is further than Burmah, and Mauritius further than Aden. As far as I understand, going across the sea, has always been reconciled to the Madras troops by pecuniary advantages.

22. The only case strictly in point which I can remember during my service (i.e. since January 1841), was that of a corps of Sikh pioneers, raised in the Punjab about 1859, by Captain O'Brien, for service in the Crown colony of Ceylon. When they reached Ceylon, there proved to be a misunderstanding as to the duties on which they were to be employed. My impression is, that the

Sikhs expected to be military pioneers, but found they were required only as an organised corps of labourers on the roads. A hot dispute arose as to the terms of enlistment, ending in insubordination and commotion.

Public opinion was greatly divided about the merits of the case. Reports of harsh and unfair treatment reach the men's homes in the Punjab, and coming just after the great services of the Sikh race in the Sepoy war of 1857, created uneasiness for the time, and the experiment was dropped. The cause of the failure was a want of full understanding beforehand. The mutiny of the Bengal regiment, and discontent of some Madras regiments when ordered to Sindh, after its annexation in 1843-44, though not so literally in point, is really as much to the purpose; because what they quarrelled about was going to a distant and, to them, quite foreign country without being paid extra for it. The moral of which is, that any service far from their own homes is, in itself, distasteful to the natives of India. The reasons are obvious: Firstly, the men have to leave their families behind, and to provide for them respectably in their absence, which is difficult, precarious, and expensive. Secondly, the change of climate is feared. Thirdly, so is association with alien races and religions, and where it is a question of crossing the sea, the difficulty increases in the ratio of caste. Fourthly, furlough, which is a much-prized privilege, becomes almost impracticable. To surmount these difficulties, therefore, some solid compensation must be given.

(I have not mentioned the Barrackpore mutiny of 1824, because it was before my time; but we all know that it was caused by a mixed fear of losing caste by going to sea, and disgust at an unhealthy foreign service.)

23. Whatever raised the sentiment of loyalty to the Crown in the native army would of course be desirable. But I do not think foreign and distant service, in strange climes, would have that effect. Quite the contrary. We have only to look at home, and inquire with what feelings foreign service is regarded by our own British troops and officers, though they are supported by every sentiment of patriotism.

24. Answer not required.

25. Both in India and the Colonies, the first economical and conciliatory policy is to enlist as far as possible the people of the country. Safety can generally be given to it, by balancing local races, religions, and interests. Neglect of this precaution gave such serious proportions to the Sepoy mutiny of 1857. The Bengal army had become a great brotherhood. Even then, we raised a new native army from other martial races at our disposal, and thus enabled the handful of Europeans in the country to break the neck of the mutiny before reinforcements came from England. Local races, too, are always the most efficient. Until quite lately, the difficulty in India was to find employment; and it would have been highly unjust and impolitic to import Africans, or other foreigners. Many things have combined to work a great change in this respect. The war of 1857 finished what Clive began in 1757. It settled the question of supremacy in India. All classes accepted the fact, and settled down to the arts of peace. Lord Dalhousie's great system of railroads began to come into play, at once absorbing labour, and opening fallow districts. The introduction of tea

App. No. 1. tea cultivation, the call for cotton in consequence of the American war, and the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, have all produced a rush of European enterprise. The result is a great development of both trade and agriculture, and a wonderful rise in the prices of produce and labour.

Still, I do not anticipate that there will ever be

a scarcity of recruits for the native army; and I am quite sure that no other coloured races would prove more docile and loyal in our hands than our own native subjects in India.

*Herbert B. Edwards,*  
Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Colonel.  
14 May 1867.

### ANSWERS of Major General *Hodgson*, Commanding Troops in *Ceylon*.

1. I AM of opinion that substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies would be perfect madness, a moral suicide. Any magazines, forts, or artillery entrusted to them would be turned against us sooner or later; any moment might see our Colonies exposed to mutiny, devastation, and bloodshed. The only form in which they should be employed are as police, and even then they must be well watched by Europeans.

2. Not in one as a substitute.

3. I have special knowledge of many Colonies, but I would not trust the protection, internal or external, of a single one to natives of India.

4. Should it be finally determined upon to employ natives of India in place of Europeans in any of the Colonies named in Question No. 4, the consequences would, in my opinion, be so certainly fatal that I must decline specifying any race to commence the experiment with. Whatever the race, the fatal result would be merely a question of time and opportunity.

5. Supposing the determination carried out, these native troops must be scrupulously relieved every three years at the very least. They are very suspicious, and the slightest delay would produce serious evil, however good their conduct until then.

6. I do not consider that religious prejudices would operate in any great degree, social habits probably would. Any increased advantages would assuredly lead at some critical moment to a further demand.

7. Wherever they might go they would regard themselves as our protectors, and, as mere mercenaries, would place the highest price on their services. They would require the same pay and advantages as European soldiers, perhaps more, as they would believe themselves indispensable, and that we were bankrupt in soldiers of our own race. They would insist upon no limit to women and children, and if persuaded to embark without them on a sacred pledge of being relieved at the end of three years, and of their families during that period being supported by Government, they would ere long become discontented, from which there will be but one step to revolt.

8.—(a.) Certainly not.

(b.) Certainly not; far better be without British artillery, if unsupported by British infantry.

(c.) Just as many European troops as if there were no natives at all.

9. With a large number of European officers and non-commissioned officers, they might perhaps do some service against frontier savages, or a pusillanimous race like the Cingalese, especially if there was a prospect of pillage, but in cases of internal disturbances generally they would be as little to be trusted as the inhabitants.

10. To employ them as a substitute would be fatal, and as a supplement they would cause anxiety, instead of giving a feeling of security. If I demanded 5,000 Europeans to defend a position, and were asked how many I should require if 2,000 natives of India were sent, I should ask for 6,000 Europeans instead of 5,000.

11. Certainly not; no pay, no indulgence, no privilege, no conciliation can acquire for us their love or loyalty. Alien to us in colour, creed, and race, without one feeling in common, they have proved by the late mutiny that they regard us with unmitigated hatred, and that they cannot be relied upon.

12. Assuredly not; not if they were five to one; not if commanded by the best officers in Europe; not if led by the Sovereign in person.

13. Our military force in the Colonies is so small that it could be of little use there in the event of a war; its certain capture would add to the disaster. The Colonies may be said to be defenceless; troops are maintained chiefly for local purposes; I am of opinion, therefore, that, in the event of a great pressure at home, it would be advisable to withdraw the troops from the Colonies, not, however, filling their places by natives from India, but leaving the Colonies to their own resources.

14. Certainly not; he would be discontented and insubordinate while serving, and return to his native country with foreign vices added to his own, and probably a great deal of dangerous knowledge.

15. It would be better to raise fresh regiments in India specially for colonial service, and then they could make no complaints, as their position would be clearly defined at the period of enlistment, whereas regiments already formed might declare they had been entrapped from their original engagement.

16. The knowledge that there are British troops in the neighbouring Colonies would never prevent one of those sudden risings to which Asiatics are so prone; neither would it prevent a deep-laid conspiracy. They are only to be checked by the sight of a powerful and avenging arm upon the spot. Reduced, moreover, as the military force is in all the neighbouring Colonies, and which is well known in India, the fear of anything that could be sent would produce no practical effect.

17. I know of no Colony from whence 200 men could be conveniently withdrawn; certainly not from those where I command, *Ceylon*, *Singapore*, and the Straits.

I do not mean to imply that the withdrawal of a couple of hundred men would lead to an outbreak, but all proper military duty would collapse; the attempt to carry it on would entail such a pressure

pressure upon the troops that the loss of life among them would be great; in fact, all that makes a military body would be destroyed.

These are considerations which do not weigh with colonists in their clamour for military reductions. They are blind to all military considerations.

A few months ago there were riots in Ceylon owing to fears of a famine, and had the arrival of rice been delayed 24 hours there would assuredly have been an outbreak, in which event I must have allowed all but the capital towns to be pillaged; I could not have spared one man from head quarters. Other colonists are similarly situated; how, therefore, could British troops under such circumstances be of the slightest importance for the defence of India, in case of an emergency?

18. I utterly object to the employment of Indian troops in any of the places named; they would increase external or internal danger. Dangerous as is a purely local force, better trust to it than to natives from India.

19 and 20. I have no cognizance.

21. The Bombay and Madras troops have for many years served at Aden, Burmah, and in the Straits Settlements; they might not object to China, but they would probably consider the Mauritius too foreign.

22. I have no knowledge.

23. It would not be profitable to give to a native Indian army the character and feeling of an

Imperial army. Their patriotism and loyalty are not for us. Their belief in the stability of our power is not as strong as formerly, and to hatred of us will be added contempt if they believe we cannot find soldiers of our own race.

24. Utterly impossible, either for general or local service; I once saw a native corps raised here, but it soon collapsed amidst the jeers of the people themselves.

25. I see no objection to employing in India troops of races not Indian, but no advantage would be gained thereby. Native troops of any race or clime would combine against us if there should not be a preponderating European force at hand. An army for India, though composed of races not Indian, could never be a substitute for Europeans; it could be merely a supplement, and must be of equal strength with the present army.

Chinese, Malay, African, or other race not Indian, could not with safety be employed in any Colony without a European force amounting to at least one-third of their number, and under all circumstances native troops of whatever race should be armed with an inferior weapon to that in the hands of the European troops on the spot. If the latter have breech loaders, the former should merely have the ordinary rifle.

*Studholm Hodgson,*

Major General,

Commanding H. M. Forces in Ceylon.

Ceylon, 26 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Sir *J. Gaspard Le Marchant*, K.C.B.,  
Commander in Chief, Madras Army.

1. I THINK it most inexpedient; but if it were so decided, then in the Colonies within the Tropics, if not too far removed, and where there is never any extreme cold, the native troops of the Madras Presidency might be employed, provided distinctly that they are accompanied by a proper complement of European officers, but not with the few laid down for the existing organisation of the native army.

2. Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and Hong Kong.

I have omitted the West Indies, solely, however, on account of the distance from India. The passage would be extremely long and tedious, the men would suffer in health from their long confinement, and the changed nature of the food for so protracted a period, and the want of frequent and quick communication with their families and relations would also be an insuperable difficulty.

3. No, with the exception of the Straits Settlements, which have hitherto been garrisoned by the Madras Army under my command.

4. The classes from which the Madras infantry is recruited, are the best adapted for military duty in the Colonies specified in Answer 2. The high caste Hindoos, such as Rajpoots, &c., would not be likely to enlist for such service. Beloochees and Sikhs would only answer for warlike operations when plunder can be obtained.

5. If Madras regiments are so employed, they would expect to be relieved at the expiration of "three" years' service away from their homes.

0.58.

6. I should apprehend no special difficulties. The advantages now enjoyed by the native troops of this Presidency would, I think, be all that are required, namely, rations and batta, with pensions to the heirs of the men who die when on such service, or after their return, from disease contracted on the said service. The Madras regulations on this point are complete, and should be "scrupulously" observed.

7. In my opinion, the pay and advantages above mentioned (Answer 6), are sufficient. If there is any idea, however, of enlisting men specially for service in the Colonies without stipulating for their periodical relief triennially, the terms upon which the Pegu Sappers battalion was raised might induce some natives to enlist, but it would be to a very limited extent, probably not more than sufficient for two corps; and those who would be willing to enter such service would be men of bad character, who would take advantage of the opportunity to get out of the country.

8. I think it would be very impolitic to leave such troops by themselves in Colonies in which they had never previously served, until at all events they had acquired confidence in themselves, and a knowledge of the people. The support of a proportion of British infantry would be necessary, except perhaps in the Straits Settlements, where eventually artillery might suffice.

The proportion of British infantry and artillery must depend on local circumstances.

9. Only if duly supported by British troops, and in the Colonies mentioned in Answer No. 2.

G G

10. Not

App. No. 1.

10. Not in substitution certainly, but as a supplement to British troops, occasions might arise, when it could be done with advantage; this system is pursued in India in all foreign wars.

11. Yes; I think they could.

12. Native troops, by themselves, would be inadequate; and for such portion of the British garrison as may be replaced by native troops, at the very least two of the latter should be substituted for every one of the former withdrawn.

13. The former would, undoubtedly, be preferable; in such case the European force in India ought not to be weakened.

14. Such service would not affect the native soldier's loyalty or original disposition in any way.

15. The Madras Presidency would have to be chiefly depended upon for troops for Colonial service, and it is very doubtful whether a sufficient number of recruits could be enlisted specially and exclusively to form regiments with reliefs for such service; it would therefore be necessary to take regiments from the Indian army, according to their turn; but with the "present number" of Madras regiments the service for the Colonies could not be undertaken. The temper of the army would not bear to be harassed unduly with tours of foreign service.

16. The proximity of European troops must have a certain moral effect; but little absolute assistance could be looked for from them. During the great mutiny this was very practically illustrated, when but few were obtained from the Colonies before they were replaced from home. Those that first arrived were diverted while on their passage to China, at Singapore.

17. They could be now obtained from England more easily than elsewhere, except Ceylon, which probably would not be able to spare any of its garrison.

18. It must be chiefly a local question how far troops raised upon the spot can be wholly relied on to act against their own races in cases of internal disturbances. Against external enemies troops raised on the spot might prove in every way efficient; but, again, it requires a knowledge of the population of the Colony itself, and local experience to speak decidedly on this point.

19. The Madras native soldier knows that he is liable to service beyond seas.

20. Answered by preceding Question No. 19.

21. The Madras troops would be as willing to serve at the Mauritius or China (as they have already done at the latter place) as they now are to go to Burmah and the Straits, provided they are sent on the same terms.

I may here add, that jealousy would doubtless arise between the European officers of the Royal troops and those of the Indian army, should they be serving together on Colonial duty, in consequence of the marked disparity of the Colonial allowances of the former, as compared with the more liberal pay of the Eastern officers.

22. I personally know of none as "the consequence" of employment beyond seas.

Instances of insubordination and discontent in this army have almost invariably arisen on questions of pay and allowances.

23. Nothing of the kind; they are essentially mercenaries, and care little whether they serve the Crown or not. If the choice were now given them they would prefer to revert to what they consider the good old days of the Honourable Company.

24. See Answer No. 7, as regards Southern India.

25. It would be inexpedient, on every account, to employ such in India. Further, I doubt the practicability of embodying any force from those nations in sufficient strength or numbers to render them efficient or of importance. I have only recently returned from a tour of inspection through Singapore, the other Straits Settlements, and Burmah; Malays cannot be found even to supply the Rifle regiment in Ceylon.

The Chinese have physical and other qualities to recommend them, but these again are marred by the difficulty of the language, and the ineradicable taint of "Secret Societies," which prevail universally amongst them, and render them ineligible from its dangerous consequences for enrolment as troops.

(signed) *J. Gaspard Le Marchant*,  
Commander in Chief, Madras Army.

Head-quarters, Ootacamund,  
10 June 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Sir Henry Barkly, K. C. B., Governor of the Mauritius.

1. To a limited extent, and subject to certain restrictions, I think it might advantageously be done.

2. The West Indian Colonies, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, China, Mauritius, Natal, Cape of Good Hope, and, perhaps, New Zealand.

3. I was Governor of British Guiana, 1848-53, of Jamaica from 1853-56, and of Mauritius from 1863-67.

I have visited the Cape and Ceylon.

4, 5. For the West Indies, Mauritius, and other Colonies, containing a large population of Indian immigrants, the troops employed should in my opinion be Sikhs, Goorkas, or others of different

creeds or proclivities to those of the natives of India who emigrate.

In Mauritius especially, I should strongly deprecate the employment of a sepoy regiment, as there are a quarter of a million Hindcos in the island.

6. I am not aware of any. Regiments of Beloochees touched here last year on their way back from China, and seemed to get on well in the place.

8. No. I should not advocate the leaving of native troops entirely, without the example and check of a certain number of British soldiers. I do not think artillery would suffice for this purpose.

In

In Mauritius, one regiment of the line instead of two as now, would be essential. In Jamaica also, a European regiment should always be kept in reserve at Newcastle. In British Guiana, I believe there are now no white troops.

9. Yes, if supported as above.

10. Supported by a sufficient number of British troops, I have no doubt they would be efficient.

11. I think so. I am under the impression that sepoy formed a portion of the force which captured Mauritius.

12. As far as garrison work went they might, the Sikhs, in particular, being excellent gunners; but in the open field they could not, of course, be so much depended on as Europeans.

13. This is a question of degree. England, no doubt, must be the first consideration, India next, and then the Colonies, according to their value and capabilities for self-defence. It would be unwise under any circumstances to leave India short of British troops.

14. Advantageous as giving him an idea of the extent and power of British rule, and lessening the great ignorance stated to prevail in India on that subject.

15. I should say, to raise special regiments with a distinct understanding that they were liable to Colonial service. It would be better probably

to begin by limiting the service to the Eastern Colonies. App. No. 1.

16, 17. It certainly proved so during the mutiny. Regiments from Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape, and, I believe, even Australia, reached India sooner than any aid from England.

It may be different when a well-arranged relief system is established in regular steam transports *via* the Red Sea, but is it prudent to reckon upon that route being under all contingencies available?

18, 19. I cannot venture to pronounce any opinion as to South Africa; but with reference to the other Colonies named, I should say decidedly yes, with a slight reservation only as to native African troops in the West Indies, which, as far as I can judge, are quite as efficient in case either of external or internal danger, and probably more so in the West Indies, than Indian troops would be.

They are, however, fiercer and more cruel in warfare, and I believe that as the slave trade declines, and captures are fewer, it becomes more and more difficult to obtain recruits for our West India regiments, and if it becomes necessary to recruit largely from the Creole population of the West Indies, such regiments might, in case of internal disturbance, become dangerous.

(signed) *Henry Barkly.*

Government House, Mauritius,  
5 June 1867.

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#### ANSWERS of Colonel *H. St. George Ord*, C. B., R. E., Governor of the Straits Settlements.

1, 2, 3. My acquaintance with Indian troops is so slight that I do not feel competent to offer any opinion as to the expediency of substituting them for English troops in the Colonies in time of peace.

4. In the Straits Settlements I understand the low caste natives of Southern India are found to be very well adapted for duty as soldiers.

5, 6. They require to be relieved about once in every three years, but I believe that if it were desired to establish a local force, arrangements might be made for securing their services for longer periods, probably, in some cases, as long as was desirable, by permitting their families to accompany them.

7. No difficulties are found to exist to the employment of natives of Southern India in the Straits Settlements, and I have recommended to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that I may be permitted to organise a force of armed police in substitution of a small force of Ceylon Rifles, which it has been proposed to allocate for the service of the settlements.

8. I should not like to rely solely on native infantry in the Straits Settlements, but I believe

that the European force which has been appropriated for their defence, *viz.*, half a regiment of infantry and two batteries of garrison R. A., to be quite sufficient.

25. I have long been of opinion, and have advocated in communications to the Colonial and War Departments, the employment of Africans in the West Indies and Bermuda. I am satisfied that under proper arrangements, which I have defined, they might, to a great extent, supply the place of European troops. They can perform all garrison duties better than the latter, and in most cases would be as useful in the suppression of internal disorder. They would not be capable of protecting a Colony against an attack by a civilized force; but, from their capability of resisting exposure to the sun and night air, they would be very useful auxiliaries to European troops under such circumstances. I should be very glad to have the services of such a force in the Straits Settlements, but I presume the expense of transport would be an obstacle to their employment.

(signed) *H. St. George Ord,*  
Governor.

Singapore, 21 June 1867.

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App. No. 1.

## ANSWERS of Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, C.B., Governor of Hong Kong.

1. IN Colonies where white troops suffer from heat, such as Ceylon, the Straits, and Hong Kong, the principal part of ordinary garrison duty might be performed by Indian troops, composed of Sikhs and the hill tribes: there should not, however, be less than a battalion of English troops at Hong Kong, with a full battery of British royal artillery.

The injurious effects of night-duty upon European troops in the tropics cannot be over-estimated; moreover, the comforts required by western constitutions in these exhaustive climates, do not seem to come within the reach of present pay and allowances. The substitution of Indian for English troops, with the restriction above mentioned, would, therefore, probably be a decided improvement.

2. I can only suggest the above Colonies, because, though I have administered a government in the West Indies, and believe that Indian troops, of the quality alluded to in Reply No. 1, would be, for many reasons, preferable to negro regiments, I question if Her Majesty's Government has any serious plans on that subject, while the expense would probably prevent any change in the present arrangement for the West Indies.

3. I administered the government of St. Vincent, in the West Indies; have travelled in Ceylon; passed through the Straits Settlements, and am Governor in Chief of Hong Kong.

4. I think, as before stated, that the Sikh and hill tribes should alone be employed; it seems to me throwing money away to raise such corps as the Ceylon Rifles and Gun Lascars. I could rout the whole force (upwards of 400 men) with 115 Sikhs whom I lately caused to be raised in the Punjaub, for service in the Hong Kong police. Only recently some Chinese thieves broke open a powder magazine here, containing 48 tons of powder, watched by two sentries of the Ceylon Rifles, and carried off several of the heavy metal cases containing the powder, having first opened the cases, and emptied on the floor of the magazine the inclosed bags of powder. The thieves appear to have intended to melt the cases (which have since been recovered), and use them for coining false money. I drew the attention of the general to this very disgraceful negligence of two sentries, and there has been an inquiry, resulting in the substitution of European sentries at that post.

In fact, troops like the Ceylon Rifles and the Gun Lascars now in garrison here, are only of use where no real danger is apprehended, and where it is not essential to repose thorough confidence in their watchfulness or courage; they are given to opium-eating, and quite disqualify themselves thereby for duty.

5. I cannot undertake to do more than suggest that, for reasons of policy, a longer stay than four years of the same body of native troops in the same place does not seem expedient.

6. I have experience of Sikhs and natives from Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras; a little attention to their comfort in certain small matters connected with rations and cooking supplies will surmount the special difficulties alluded to.

7. I cannot answer this definitely; but am cer-

tain that to have good troops they must be contented, and that they will not be contented unless liberally treated. The pay in the police force here, with allowance for rations and clothes, may be regarded as equivalent, in the case of a private, to 3*l.* per mensem.

8. Native Indian troops would not alone be sufficient at Hong Kong in times of peace, nor, I believe, in any other Colony; the heart of the force should be British. Here, as above stated, one European battalion is, in my opinion as Governor, absolutely essential. The greater the number of Indian troops employed in addition, the less fatiguing will be the garrison duty to the British soldiers. Six hundred (600) native Indian troops, in addition to the English battalion and artillery would suffice. Here there is always a risk of hostilities.

10, 11. Good Indian troops have frequently behaved well both in India and China, and would again be a material aid here, as supplementary, and only as supplementary. Nothing is a substitute for British troops in moments of actual danger and emergency.

12. This question is for a military man; but I suggest that the proportion of British troops maintained in any British Colony should always be adequate to bear the brunt of either attack or defence in the event of actual hostilities.

13. Supposing the number of European regiments in the Colonies to be not in excess of the force necessary (as stated in reply No. 8), it would seem at once more advantageous and more expeditious to draw upon India for home requirements.

14. From what I see here of the willingness of the Sikhs who have already served in China, to continue service there, and from the general bearing of the men, I think their loyalty has been improved by Colonial service.

15. This is a difficult question; but having had experience of local corps, I must say that I object to them as having no "*esprit du corps*," and offering a narrow and dreary field of service. Even if a regiment was to be specially raised for Colonial service, it should still be one of the regiments of the Indian army, and its officers members of the Indian service. I trust that grave consideration will be given to the subject before more local corps are raised, such as the Cape Corps and the Ceylon Rifles; they necessarily degenerate in every way after a short time.

16. No; it is unlikely any force would be employed during peace in the Colonies, over and above what is required for ordinary service. In an emergency of an extensive kind, I could send to India the European battalion stationed here, and increase the police force, but such a course would not be safe.

17. I think the telegraph would bring reinforcements first from Europe.

18. I cannot speak as to South Africa; but I certainly consider that in all the other Colonies mentioned, and more especially at Hong Kong, Indian troops would be far superior, for reasons of policy, to any troops enlisted in those Colonies.

19, 20. I cannot

19, 20. I cannot answer these questions from my own knowledge.

21, 22, 23. I see no difficulty—though, of course, my opinion on that subject carries little personal weight—in removing the Indian army to service in climates of suitable character, and by liberal treatment making it feel more an Imperial force. Those who have served here liked it. It might be very important to popularise Colonial service with the Indian officers and soldiers, and I believe it quite practicable to do so.

24. Impossible, of course, to recruit for any portion of Her Majesty's forces at Hong Kong.

25. Chinese soldiers would not answer at all. I cannot speak personally of many Malays, except from specimens in the Ceylon Rifles; I should not rely on them in either civil or military emergencies. The African negro is brave, and physically strong; I have been more than once in action with him; but the experiment in his case has been tried by former West Indian regiments, and others can give evidence more in point on that subject.

(signed) *Richard Graves MacDonnell*,  
Governor.

App. No. 1.

### ANSWERS of Sir *H. G. R. Robinson*, Governor of Ceylon.

1. I AM of opinion that Native Indian Troops may be employed with advantage in many of our Colonies, in which there are indigenous Native populations, as a supplement to Europeans, but not in entire substitution for them, either in time of peace or war. The proportion of Native to British Infantry should not be greater than three to one, and British garrison artillery should always be supported by British infantry.

2. I would employ them in,—

Hong Kong and China.  
The Straits Settlements.  
Ceylon.  
Mauritius.  
South Africa.  
New Zealand, and the  
West Indies.

3. I have administered several West Indian governments, as well as those of Hong Kong and Ceylon, and have also been employed on special service in the Straits Settlements.

4. The Seiks and other warlike tribes in Upper India, who could probably be enlisted in considerable numbers for this service, make very good soldiers, and might be employed with advantage in all the places specified in Answer 2. I doubt whether Native troops could be effectively employed in garrison service in such places as Malta or Gibraltar. Malays make excellent soldiers, but they are difficult to get, and their social habits are inconvenient, from the number of women and children, and the aged and infirm, who are dependent on them for subsistence, and cling to them for protection and support. The Caffre regiments formerly in Ceylon are understood to have been good soldiers so long as they could be kept sober. But of all Oriental races that I have met with, the Chinese have always appeared to me to possess in the highest degree the attributes of good soldiers. They are equally brave as the Seiks, and at the same time steadier and less excitable and impulsive. They have no fear of death; are not cowed by defeat; and if well disciplined and well led, would, I believe, be found inferior only to European troops. Their cost, however, would be far above that of any Indian Native troops, and, probably, but little below that of British infantry.

The Natives of Southern India and of Ceylon do not appear to me to possess any of the essential qualities of a soldier.

Q. 58.

5. If Indian troops were sent to the Colonies, they would carry with them Indian pay and allowances, which would then have to be given to the other troops in the command. I assume, therefore, that if the proposal were carried out, Natives would be specially enlisted for colonial service. In such case they should not be employed in any Colony for more than five years at a time. They should then be moved to another station, and they should be granted leave to visit their homes, say once in every six or seven years, which might be the means also of inducing others to enlist, and so of keeping up the force.

6. I know of no prejudices, religious or otherwise, which would hinder the races I have named from undertaking military service beyond sea.

7. The cost of living varies so much in the different Colonies I have named, that in the event of a special force being raised for colonial service, I would suggest a free ration being part of the engagement. The pay and allowances which would have to be offered in addition, would depend upon the condition of the labour market from which it was determined to draw the supply for such a service.

8. Replied to in Answers 1 and 2.

9. Replied to in Answers 1 and 2.

Native Indian troops alone would certainly not afford sufficient protection against internal disturbances in Ceylon.

10. Replied to in Answer 1.

11. Yes. They could no doubt be relied on, when brought into discipline, to lighten the strain on the resources of Great Britain in time of war; but not to a greater extent than that indicated in Answer 1. In my opinion, any Native force should be held in check by Europeans.

12. The permanent defence of our Colonies depends upon the naval superiority of the mother country, and upon her retaining command of the seas. In none of the Colonies named are garrisons maintained of sufficient strength to repel, in the event of our losing the supremacy of the sea, any regularly organised naval and military expedition which might be fitted out against them by any first-class power; nor would it be within the resources of Great Britain to place its Colonies in a state of defence which would guard them against such a contingency. But while retaining

G G 3

command

App. No. 1.

command of the sea generally, it is quite possible that we might be overpowered for a moment at any particular point, and the danger which is most to be apprehended by our Colonies, and which alone it is possible to guard against, is an attack upon some important point by a small force of the enemy which had either run the gauntlet, or escaped the vigilance of our cruisers. An attack of such a kind would be made, I apprehend, not with the view of holding the position assailed, but to deal a blow at our power and prestige, and to destroy our establishments. The possession of Trincomalee, for example, is of great value to a power possessing command of the sea; but if taken by a small force during the temporary absence of our vessels, and occupied by a power not having command of the sea, we should either recapture it or blockade the port, and in either case so much of the enemy's force would be rendered harmless till the end of the war. All that can be done therefore in the way of rendering a Colony like Ceylon secure from aggression, is to place important positions like Trincomalee, Colombo, and Galle in such a state of defence as will prevent their being entirely at the mercy of a hostile frigate or two which might make a dash at them during the temporary absence of our squadron in another part of the station. For protection against such an attack, it would not be possible to compensate by an addition to the Native troops for the withdrawal of any portion of the existing European garrison of Ceylon without infringing the proportions laid down in Answer 1. For example, the garrison of Ceylon, as laid down by the military commission, is 800 European infantry, 200 artillery, and 900 Natives; total 1,900. If the European infantry were reduced to 500, the Natives could only be increased to 1,500, or 3 to 1, and the garrison would then consist of 500 European infantry, 200 artillery, and 1,500 Natives; total 2,200, against 1,900 before, or a substitution of 600 Natives for 300 Europeans, which would not be an equivalent, at all events, in repelling an attack by a civilised power. I am disposed to think, however, that in garrisons in which there may at present be no native troops, and in which therefore it may be possible to substitute three Natives for each European infantry soldier, such an increase might be adequate even in the case of a foreign attack. For example, if an existing garrison consisted of two European regiments of 1,000 each, and three Native regiments of 1,000 each were substituted for one of the European regiments, the new garrison of 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 Natives would, I think, be capable of repelling a foreign attack as effectually as the existing garrison of 2,000 Europeans.

13. This would depend very much upon the strength of the European force in India and the several Colonies. If the pressure at home were

urgent, they would, I suppose, be withdrawn from whatever quarter they could be soonest obtained, without regard to either Indian or Colonial considerations.

14. The effect of Colonial service upon the native soldier would probably be advantageous. If well paid and well cared for, his loyalty would be strengthened, and his intelligence would be enlarged by an acquaintance with other countries besides his own.

15. It would, in my opinion, for the reason I have already given in Answer 5, be better to raise fresh native troops specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. Experience has shown the presence of British troops in the neighbouring Colonies to have been of the most material importance to the defence of India in cases of emergency.

17. Having regard to the facilities now afforded by the telegraph between India and England, and by the new system of transport through Egypt, large reinforcements could be obtained from England in a much shorter time than formerly. Small detachments could, no doubt, be drawn, in the event of any very pressing emergency, from Ceylon, the Straits, and China in less time than from England, but they would have to be replaced immediately by reinforcements from England.

18. Troops locally raised from the native populations of Ceylon would, as already observed, be wholly inefficient for the protection of Ceylon against either external or internal danger.

19. The Malay soldier has never objected to serve beyond the seas, and it was a great disappointment to the whole of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment that they were not sent on to India during the mutiny.

23. I have no doubt that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would give to it more of the character and feeling of an Imperial army and be attended with advantageous results to itself, but I have already expressed the opinion that in a financial point of view it would probably be found more economical to raise separate native corps specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

24, 25. It would not be possible to recruit regiments for general service from the native populations of Ceylon, but I know of no objection to the employment of troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, or African races, in any of the Colonies named under the restrictions as regards relative numbers specified in Answer 1.

*Hercules G. R. Robinson,*  
Governor, Ceylon.

The Pavilion, Kandy,  
Ceylon, 28th June 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Grant, Governor and Commander in Chief, Malta.

1. In my opinion it would be very inexpedient.
2. If employed at all, Ceylon, Straits Settlements (local), China, New Zealand, Cape.
3. I never have resided in any of our Colonies.
4. If it should be determined to employ Natives of India in our Colonies, Sikhs and Mahomedans of the countries beyond the Indus would be best fitted for the duty.

5. I feel persuaded that none of the races of India would consent to expatriate themselves for a longer period than three years at the utmost.

6. Many special difficulties, I am confident, would arise, both in respect to religious prejudices and social habits, and I do not think that the difficulties could be overcome by any advantages that could be offered.

7. I do

7. I do not believe that the Natives of India would consent to accept employment in the Colonies for any lengthened period; but if they did, they would certainly stipulate for relief every three years, and for the usual furlough to visit their homes during that period. An increase of at least 50 per cent. to the ordinary rates of pay and allowances would also be required, and, above all, they would require that their religious prejudices and feelings should be carefully protected.

8, 9. My replies to the previous questions answer these queries.

10. If Native troops are employed in the Colonies in time of war, it could only be, having a due regard to safety and efficiency, as a supplement to Europeans.

11. I do not think they could, but certainly only as a supplement to British troops.

12. Certainly not.

13. I am not prepared to say what might be the effect upon the Colonies of withdrawing British regiments from them, and filling up their places with Native soldiers from India. But the Natives of India of all classes are so suspicious and credulous, that I should anticipate the worst effects to accrue from any attempt on the part of the Government to employ them permanently on foreign service, and I strongly hold that the British force in India never should be under seventy thousand (70,000) non-commissioned rank and file of all arms.

14. Very disadvantageous, in my opinion.

15. Of the two evils, the least would be to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. The presence of British troops in neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of an emergency; for example, the providential circumstance of the force intended for China being within reach, saved India at the commencement of the mutiny. And I ascribe the adherence of the Sikhs to our cause throughout the mutiny; 1st, to the presence in the Punjaub at that critical period of the only British force of any magnitude at our disposal in India; 2ndly, to the wise foresight of the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, whose first act on annexing the Punjaub was effectually to disarm the whole population. Of the countless stores of cannon of all calibres, of matchlocks, and arms of all descriptions, with which the country teemed previous to the annexation, not one was left in the possession of the people; so effectually was the disarming carried out, that even their swords were taken from them. Had their former vast supplies of arms been available, and had the Punjaub been denuded of British troops like every other part of India, the Sikhs, I feel convinced, would have made common cause with the mutineers. They do not love us, no native of India does; but they fear us, and we shall find them docile subjects as long as we have a large British force in the country, and abstain from interfering directly or indirectly with their religious prejudices and feelings. When these are assailed, or, which is the same thing, when they think they are in danger of being so, they never hesitate at any sacrifice to protect their faith. Experience proves too that the black man will

0.58.

always band with the black man against the white.

Notwithstanding their unceasing wars, and seemingly implacable animosity towards one another, the Affghans, with their ruler, the head of the Mahomedan religion, took part with the Sikhs against us in the last Funjaub campaign, and, despite their intense hatred of the Mahomedan race, was not the Mahomedan King of Delhi the chosen sovereign of the Hindoos who composed the majority of the insurgents during the mutiny? And again, during the recent insurrection in Jamaica, "Colour for colour," was the gathering cry amongst the Natives. So it has ever been, and so it ever will be, and in India, and in all our Colonies, a proportion of British troops must be, I conceive, our chief safeguard.

17. From England, now that the overland route for the conveyance of troops is about to be efficiently established, and that we can reckon on the militia and volunteer forces of the country for efficient auxiliary support to the troops of the line.

18. For every reason I should prefer raising troops for employment in the Colonies from the local population.

19. I am convinced that they do not believe it in the Bengal Presidency, and that, practically, recruits nominally enlisted for general service do not consider themselves obliged to proceed on foreign service. I always considered the General Order of 1856 a grave error, and one of the many causes to which the mutiny may be ascribed.

20. The change can only be effected by raising regiments for "general service." Enlisting recruits for regiments not originally raised for general service will be practically inoperative.

21. I do not think that the transfer of India to the Crown would have any effect on the native mind in those respects. Service beyond sea is always disliked by the native army of India. I know it is so in Bengal and Madras; and I believe, from all I have heard, that the tour of duty at Aden is distasteful to the native soldiers of the Bombay army.

22. The records in the India Office will exhibit numberless proofs of the noted dislike of the Bengal native soldier to proceed on service beyond sea; and I know that in the Madras native army service in Burmah is looked upon with great dread and abhorrence, notwithstanding the high rate of pay and the promise of the term of absence from their families never being protracted beyond three years.

23. I do not think that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would tend to give to it the character or feeling of an imperial army; nor, if it had this effect, should I consider such a result at all desirable.

24. It would be possible, I conceive, to recruit from the native population of a colony for local service, and I should consider that measure liable to less objection than the employment of natives of India in our Colonial possessions.

25. I have already stated, and I think adduced ample proof in support of my opinion, that, sinking all animosities of race, colour, and religion, the black man will always unite with the black against the white man; wherefore, on all considerations, military, civil, and political, I am

App. No. 1.

strongly opposed to the employment, save from the local population when absolutely necessary, either in India or the Colonies, of Asiatic troops. We must always have a native army in India to take those duties which, from exposure to the climate, would be injurious to the health of Europeans; but, in time of peace, let the native army be purely local; and, for field service abroad, call for volunteers, and they will always be forthcoming, as they were for Egypt, Ceylon, the Mauritius, Bumah, and China. I would urge that the employment of natives of India, and all coloured races, should be strictly confined to the cavalry and infantry branches, never on artillery duties of any description; and let it be a fixed and unalterable rule to place all arsenals, magazines, war materiel of every sort, and principal Commissariat depôts, under the protection of British soldiers.

It was the possession of the Delhi magazine and arsenal, with its large stores of ammunition and materiel of war of all kinds, which mainly

enabled the mutineers to protract the struggle as they did. Notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of every Commander-in-chief, from Lord Hastings to Lord Gough and Sir Charles Napier, the grand arsenal for the Upper Provinces was persistently maintained at Delhi without a single British soldier nearer to that station than Meerut, upwards of 40 miles distant. A tenable post, such as was the magazine at Delhi, held by even a small detachment of British soldiers, would have formed a safe refuge for all the Europeans at the station who were so ruthlessly butchered; and the preservation of our stores of materiel, which would have been insured, would have effectually crippled the mutineers, and brought their resistance to a speedy termination.

(signed) *Jas. Grant,*  
Lieut. General.

The Palace, Malta,  
16 May 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Major General *Guy*, Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China and Japan.

1. THE partial substitution of Indian for English troops in some of our Colonies is, in my opinion, extremely desirable.
2. In Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China.
3. A residence of nearly 10 years in Mauritius, and two years and eight months in China, convince me that the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies above mentioned would be attended with great advantage, by affording relief to European soldiers from garrison duties in those exhausting climates.
4. I consider the Sikhs superior to all other Indian troops; the Beloochees, Punjabee Musulmen, and men from the Peshawur frontier, also make excellent soldiers when properly officered.
5. Men of the races above named, might be induced to serve in the Colonies for five years, if the terms offered to them were sufficiently advantageous; as a rule, the natives of India object to serve for a long period out of their own country, as many of them are married, and they prefer not to take their families with them.
6. There are no special difficulties or religious prejudices of a nature to prevent the races above-named from undertaking garrison duty beyond sea, if sufficiently remunerated for their services. A fine body of Sikhs, 120 men, have lately arrived at Hong Kong, for enrolment in the police force of the Colony. The terms of service, and rates of pay, are as follow:—
  1. Engaged for five years certain, with option of re-engaging for another term of five years.
  2. A free passage back to India, but no bonus or gratuity at the expiration of the first term of service.
  3. After 10 years' service, they are entitled to a pension equal to a quarter of the average salary for the last three years' service.
  4. The rate of pay agreed to is 20 rupees per mensem, with the understanding that they are to be formed into three grades at 20, 25,
- and 30 rupees per month respectively, with clothing and quarters, but without rations; the Governor has, however, gratuitously granted five rupees additional for expenses of living.
7. I think the pay and allowances granted to the gun lascars at this station, viz., 13 rupees per month, with clothing, quarters, and free rations, would induce the Indian races to engage for service in the Colonies for a period of five years.
8. No.
  - (a.) No.
  - (b.) No.
  - (c.) A proportion of at least one-third British infantry as a support to native troops.
9. Not having served in South Africa, I do not offer an opinion as to the requirements at that station. In the other Colonies referred to, I think ample protection would be afforded by good Indian troops against internal disturbances, supported by British troops as before described.
10. In time of war it would not be safe to substitute Indian troops entirely for Europeans in the Colonies; as a supplement, however, to British troops, Indians might be employed in such proportion as would materially relieve the Europeans from the ordinary garrison duties.
11. I think that Sikhs employed as above would be very efficient, and, to a certain extent, might lighten the strain on the military resources of Great Britain in time of war.
12. They would not. Two native corps, at least, should be substituted for one European regiment.
13. If India were in a tranquil state, I should prefer, as a temporary measure, to withdraw a limited number of European regiments from India. I do not think the number of British troops in many of our Colonies could be safely reduced in time of war, but this question would no doubt be decided by the actual state of India at the time.
14. I think it would produce an advantageous effect upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier.
15. I think

15. I think the best plan would be to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. Certainly, in a case of emergency; this was exemplified during the late Indian mutiny.

17. From Mauritius, Ceylon, and Straits Settlements; but it would be preferable, if time admitted, to obtain reinforcements from England.

18. Indian troops, in my opinion, would be more efficient, and their greater efficiency would counterbalance the extra cost which the transport of troops from India would involve.

19, 20. I think not; neither would it, in my opinion, be desirable to enforce the obligation upon them.

21. I am not prepared to answer this question.

22. I have never heard of any cases of discontent referred to in this question.

23. I think the native troops employed in the Colonies would acquire the feeling and character of an Imperial army, and such a result would no doubt be desirable.

24. This is a most important consideration. From all I have seen and heard of Chinese, particularly of the valuable services rendered by a corps of these men, attached to the British army during the late operations in China, I have not the least doubt that it would be very advantageous to employ corps of Chinese out of their own country; in India, for instance, their services would be very efficient, and, in case of British regiments being required for European service, corps of Chinese would be the best possible substitute for them in India, as they would act as a check upon the native troops.

25. Well-disciplined and well-officered corps of Chinese would doubtless be very efficient for service in some of the Colonies, viz., the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, and Ceylon.

I am not aware of any objections that could be raised to this plan.

(signed) P. M. N. Guy,  
Major General, Comm. H. M.'s Forces  
in China and Japan.

App. No. 1.

#### ANSWERS from Colonel Browne, Commanding the Troops, Natal.

1. Not favourable, unless supported by Europeans.

2. Those eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

3. Commanded the garrisons of Hong Kong and Japan for three years; am now in command in Natal; have served in East Indies.

4. Sikhs or Belooches would probably be the best suited for any of these.

5. Regimental reliefs from three to five years.

6. None that cannot readily be met.

7. None; unless in the shape of provision for their families.

8. I am of opinion that they would not, unless supported by British troops, both Royal Artillery and Infantry.

The support required depends much on local circumstances, 1 to 2 might generally suffice.

9. Not if unsupported; a proportion of British troops will always be necessary.

10. Not favourable, unless largely supported by British.

11. Yes; in relief of British troops performing ordinary duties.

12. I do not consider that, under any circumstances, they could be relied upon without support of Europeans.

13. India would supply regiments in far less time than they could possibly be relieved and withdrawn from the Colonies. It might not be prudent at such a time to extend the protection of the Colonies to native troops.

14. Probably advantageous, if well treated.

15. Regular relief from India would be preferable, and in view of preceding questions might be productive of valuable results; the periods of relief should be short.

16. The possession of the Cape and Straits Settlements must affect India to some extent.

0.58.

17. If the Red Sea is open, assistance could be obtained easier from England. The Cape and China are next.

18. I do not think that any native troops can be relied upon unless in the presence of Europeans; regiments from India, regularly relieved, would be in every respect preferable to local levies, whose loyalty might at times be doubtful.

19, 20. I am not prepared to say.

23. I think so, and that such a feeling would carry with it increased attachment and loyalty.

24. Not at present.

25. In a military sense, good troops may be made of all these races. I do not see that any serious objection could arise from a "civil" point of view.

Politically, the introduction of such troops might give rise to jealousies, and would probably tend to lower the standard of respect in which the British laws are held.

With reference to Questions 1, 10, 18, 24, I beg to enclose some remarks from the Colonial Secretary for Native Affairs, who has great experience of this Colony.

W. Browne, Colonel, 20th,  
Commanding Troops, Natal.

1. In a Colony like Natal, whose native population is so overwhelming in point of numbers in comparison with the whites, it appears to be both inexpedient and unwise to add to the coloured force, not in apprehension of any disloyalty among the Indian troops, but that their prestige would be less with the native inhabitants, who look with very little respect upon the Indian population already introduced into Natal as labourers; it is therefore probable that the effect of the presence of such troops in a proportion much greater than white troops would, in time of peace, furnish a temptation to the natives to do that which otherwise they might not have attempted.

H H

10. I H

App. No. 1.

10. In time of war there can be no doubt that the employing of Indian troops, supplementary to European, would be effective.

18. It is but natural to suppose that Indian troops would be less likely to make common cause against the Government, with a population between which and themselves no common bonds of sympathy exist, than troops raised from that population itself; and although I believe that a most effective force might be raised in the Colony of Natal, always thoroughly reliable if officered by

white commissioned and non-commissioned officers, against any external danger, I cannot but believe also that in the nature of things they would be less reliable for the suppression of internal disturbance.

24. I think not at present, but I believe it will be possible in a few years.

T. Shepstone.

Pietermaritzburg, Natal,  
20 June 1867.

### From Lieutenant General Douglas, Lieutenant Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

Sir, Graham's Town, July 1867.

IN returning these queries, I am unable, from my little knowledge of the races in our Indian possessions, to afford information of any value in regard to the main question raised by these queries; viz., whether it would be advisable to employ any of these races in the military occupation of this Colony, in consideration of their special fitness for military service in this rather exceptionally circumstanced Colonial possession. I am in a position, however, from my knowledge of this frontier, to offer an opinion as to whether this replacing the European troops by any Asiatic levies, whether belonging to the army of India or raised especially for service in this Colony, is calculated to meet the requirements of our peculiar position; and I am decidedly of opinion that Asiatic troops are not suited to the special necessities of the Cape of Good Hope; necessities which are divisible into two distinct categories, viz., Imperial and Colonial. The former has reference to the defence of the western portion of the Colony, comprising Cape Town and the Peninsula, which contains the anchorage and naval arsenal of Simon's Bay, for offence upon, and shelter of, the immense commerce from the eastward, which, on the voyage to Europe and America, sights the eastern coast of this Colony.

The latter relates to the protection of the widely scattered European population, intersected by native tribes, possessing tribal rights, who have been placed in their present location by the Imperial Government, not by the Colonial Governors, that is to say, by the Governors of the Cape of Good Hope, in their separate and distinct capacity as High Commissioners of Her Majesty, constituting a state of things which if (as apprehended by the colonists) containing the elements of danger to the European population, it behoves the Imperial Government alone to provide all reasonable means for effecting both the feeling of security and the reality of safety.

Query No. 16 seems to me to justify my expressing my opinion how this may be effected, in a manner important to the financial benefit as well as to the defence of our Indian possessions; viz., by continuing the system, which has now largely prevailed for some time past, of constituting the Cape of Good Hope a connecting military link between England and her eastern possessions, in the matter of reliefs.

At no place could reinforcements of troops destined for the defence of India be more economically maintained than at the Cape; from no place could they be more conveniently or expeditiously transported to Indian ports; at no place short of the United Kingdom could troops who have suffered from service in India be reasonably expected to recruit more quickly and perfectly in

health than here. Experience in the cases of the 99th, 67th, 2-20th, and 2-11th regiments from China, appear to me to be conclusive upon this subject. On the other hand, it is to be presumed that the result of sending the 2-10th and 96th regiments from here to India has been satisfactory, or it would not have been subsequently determined to send the 1-9th regiment from here to Ceylon and Singapore.

Let me put a case. If one British regiment from each Indian Presidency were maintained here on Indian account, the saving in their maintenance would be very considerable, their transport to India rapid, and their replacement practicable, by a force partly native and partly European (the latter consisting of men requiring a temporary absence from India, to be formed into a depôt or provincial battalion), might serve for the purpose of frontier protection, or against internal troubles here, should circumstances be such at the Cape as not to permit the safeguard of this frontier to the burgher force, which ought now to be placed on an effective footing.

I have faith in the suggestion to maintain, and even to carry out further, the system latterly adopted in regard to the Cape of Good Hope being the connecting military link between England and her eastern possessions; and this is in the twofold consideration of affording reinforcements for the defence of India on the one hand, or of the United Kingdom on the other, whether the reinforcements of troops (who will have been maintained cheaply in the meantime) can be transported from South Africa in 28 or 30 days.

There is, moreover, reason to apprehend that, if the troops were withdrawn from the Cape, they might not continue to be available for the defence of the United Kingdom, for the simple reason that any pressure to reduce the military Estimates might result in the sudden decision to reduce such additional regiments in excess of the home garrisons heretofore kept up, under circumstances which shall appear to hold out the promise of peace in Europe.

To illustrate the latter supposed case, I would invite attention to the results of sending from here the regiment named in the margin, to the Crimea, and of those sent from hence as reinforcements to India in the great mutiny. It will be easy to ascertain whether the services of these regiments were such as to justify the opinion, that the Cape of Good Hope is, in point of climate, a good place for preserving the health of troops in a condition to fit them for general active service.

To the Crimea.

Regiments.	Time in S. Africa.
1st Batt. Rifle Br.	7 years.
To India.	
1-6th	11 years.
1-13th	1 1/2
31st	2 1/2
2-60th	6 1/2
73rd	12
80th	1 1/2
89th	1 1/2

There

There can be no question in regard to the time required to convey regiments from here to India or the United Kingdom; and the comparative cost of maintenance of troops in South Africa, India, and in England, can be readily ascertained by reference to the War Office.

If such reference issue in the results I expect, there would still remain one other source of expenditure of which to consider the fair mode of providing; and I venture to throw out the suggestion that this Colony might perhaps be able and willing to pay a fair amount for the transport of troops kept here for Colonial purposes; that is to say, for the protection of the frontier against native troubles.

I have, &c.  
R. P. Douglas,  
Lieutenant General.

Charles Eales, Esq.,  
House of Commons.

#### ANSWERS.

1. I think that the garrisons of all places should be suited for times of war, and as this query implies a doubt upon this subject, I do not think it expedient under such circumstances.

2. In the Mauritius; but as a portion of its garrison for times of war, as of peace, and in smaller proportions in South Africa and St. Helena.

3. Yes, of the Mauritius, as a Company's officer in 29th regiment, and aide-de-camp to Sir C. Colville for upwards of six years, as commander of the forces in South Africa and St. Helena.

4. Not in a position, from my antecedent services, to suggest any special races.

5. The ordinary arrangements, under which troops should not be left too long in one place.

7. Not acquainted with the rates of pay of Indian army; but I must state that any Asiatic troops should be well paid, or they would become a great embarrassment. Rice-eating Asiatics would have to be fed upon imported food. The constant droughts in South Africa forbid the hope of growing the grain for these races.

8. (a.) Not so, in my opinion; to guard against internal native troubles in South Africa.

(b.) *Idem.*

(c.) At least one-half. The peninsula, which contains the naval arsenal of Simon's Town, and the only safe anchorage in

north-west winds for vessels which make the coast of the Cape of Good Hope on the homeward voyage, should be jealously guarded by the best of our troops, *i. e.*, by regulars of the British army. App. No. 1.

9. Partially they might against the frontier tribes, who would, in my opinion, hold Asiatic troops in less dread than Europeans. The Kaffirs think themselves to be at least equal to any Colonial races.

10. If South Africa cannot be wholly garrisoned by Europeans, they may be supplemented by Indian troops for time of war. But to be maintained with due regard to the peace of this community, Indian troops should be accompanied by their wives and families, and this would lead to expense and embarrassment; and a disregard of this would probably lead to worse results.

11. I can offer no opinion.

12. In my opinion, certainly not. I can perceive nothing in the history of Indian wars to lead me to the conclusion that the Asiatic races are equal to the British as soldiers. I am of opinion that at the Cape of Good Hope Asiatics should not exceed the proportions of one-half, and that, hence, the numerical strength of the garrisons would have to be increased in order to maintain existing efficiency.

13. A difficult, almost impossible, query to answer. The expediency must depend upon the condition of matters at both extremes.

14. Cannot offer an opinion.

15. The adoption of purely Colonial regiments would not, in my opinion, be advisable.

16. Yes.

17. South Africa.

18. South African troops could not be raised nor depended upon.

19. No natives of South Africa lately enlisted. They proved an utter failure at the Cape.

24. Neither possible nor desirable.

35. I can give no opinion, but I do not think that the Cape Legislature would consent to pay for any of these races as soldiers.

R. P. Douglas, Lt. General,  
and Lt. Governor, Cape of Good Hope.

Graham's Town,  
8 July 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Sir R. Napier, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay.

1. ANY substitution of Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in order to relieve the British people from performing a part of the military duty of the empire in time of peace, would be highly objectionable.

The population of Great Britain can well afford the number of men required for the military service of the empire in time of peace, and they will be forthcoming, if a sufficient inducement is held out to them. At present the soldier's condition is in many respects inferior to that of the working classes of similar status. When he (the pensioner) is discharged without pension, or retires on an insufficient one, with few inducements to maintain a good character, he too often occupies a very low place amongst the civil working population.

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I should consider inexpedient any substitution of Indian troops which would relieve the country from the necessity of making the British soldier's condition what it ought to be, in order to bring sufficient numbers to the ranks.

But the employment of a few regiments of Indian troops in our Colonies might be very advantageous as an experimental measure, in order to train them gradually to take their place with British forces in other than Asiatic fields of warfare. If employed in the large Colonies, in doing duty with English troops, they would feel a pride in being associated with them, and would emulate them in all military spirit, proficiency, and discipline.

Should the experiment be found to answer, it might be continued until each Presidency has a

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number



App. No. 1.

number of regiments that has served in Europe, and would be prepared in time of war to give a powerful contingent as auxiliaries to our European forces.

It is doubtful if the Indian regiments would be cheaper than English ones, as they would have to be clothed and fed, in addition to their pay, and would require more frequent reliefs. In India the native soldier lives cheaply, but in a cold climate he would require meat, and at least as much clothing as the British soldier.

I think that even in our European Colonies their orderly habits, and patient obedience and good humour, would soon win the goodwill of the people; but if they were viewed with prejudice and dislike, they would feel it very much, and the service would become generally distasteful.

The soldiers of our native army throughout India are nominally enlisted for general service, excepting the remnant of the old Bengal army, but they accept this as meaning service in our Eastern possession and adjacent countries, and I think it would be necessary to give them the option of serving in Europe. In Bengal even, for service in China, it was thought necessary to call for volunteer regiments; I think it was an error, but having been done, it has settled the precedent for that Presidency. The Bombay and Madras regiments have gone to China as a matter of duty, without question.

In the first instance, the regiments which might be taken for foreign (that is, English Colonial) service, might be volunteers; but should the experiment be found to answer, and to be satisfactory on both sides, the necessity of calling for volunteers at each relief might be obviated, by forming in each Presidency a foreign legion, into which selected native regiments would be admitted on application; the distribution of these regiments would continue precisely as at present, but they should have a distinct and attractive dress, with some special badge of an ornamental character; no additional pay in India, but on embarking for Europe each man should receive a sufficient gratuity or bounty, to leave with his family if he desired it; and the foreign service pay, rations, and clothing, should be given from the day of embarkation.

These foreign legions of each Presidency would furnish regiments in regular rotation for Colonial service, European or Foreign, so that in course of time each army would have a number of regiments that had actually served in our Colonies, and others that would be prepared to do so; and thus a valuable contingent of 30,000 or 40,000 men could be rapidly furnished from India, to take their place in the field with a British force, or to reinforce our Colonies, and release a portion of British regiments for the home service.

I feel sure that the Indian regiments, properly selected, would be very proud of their association with British troops, would benefit by it in military spirit and loyalty to the empire; they would be more closely united to us in feeling. They would, of course, look for the increase of pay which they have had in our Eastern Colonies, in addition to their food and clothing, and some further consideration might be given for service in Europe; the difficulty of the measure would rest in the fact of the difference in allowances of the officers with native Indian regiments, compared to those of British regiments. If this objection were insuperable, it would preclude all Colonial service with British troops. But the difficulty must have

been overcome when an Indian and a British force met in Egypt, in the Mauritius, and in Java.

2. In time of peace. South Africa, Mauritius, China, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand.

3. China.

4. Sikhs, Hindustanees, Mahomedans, Punjaub Pathans, Rohillas, North West Frontier Hill Tribes, Goorkhas, Maharattas.

The Bombay regiments of mixed races have always done well on foreign service; our Bengal troops formerly served in the Mauritius and Java, and more recently did well in China.

5. At first, reliefs every three or four years.

6. There are no difficulties that could not and have not been easily overcome by a very little management, which would still be necessary under any advantages offered to the soldier.

7. The same pay as now given on foreign service; free rations and warm clothing; free passage back in case of invaliding.

I would add one year of European service to count as two years for pension, and no discharge from unfitness produced from service without some pension.

8. (a.) No.

(b.) No; a small support of British troops, in proportion of one British to two natives.

(c.) Generally one British to two natives; but in time of war, no doubt, additional strength might be given by adding more native troops, where an increase of British troops might not be available.

9. Considering the general result of our warfare with British troops against the Caffre tribes, I should consider an equal portion of British and Indian troops to be necessary, but I have no doubt that our best Punjab regiments or Goorkhas would meet the Caffre on equal terms.

General Nott's division in Afghanistan is a memorable example of what a force composed almost exclusively of native troops could do; still the moral support of a portion of British troops is always desirable; I would say the same in regard to internal disturbances.

10. As a supplement to British troops their services would be most valuable. In times of great emergency they might be substituted entirely for British troops, and would, I believe, fully justify the confidence placed in them; but it is always desirable, both for political considerations and on grounds of general prudence, to have a portion of Europeans.

11. I believe they could be made to form a most useful auxiliary force to Great Britain in time of war, if gradually prepared for it by some such process as I have described.

12. I do not think that any number of Asiatics would entirely compensate for the absence of Europeans; but if a Colony were considered fully garrisoned in time of war by two European corps, one European and two native corps of equal strength would add very materially to their security; the one European regiment would always be held available for the point of danger, and natives would fight side by side with it, after a little comradeship, with a pride and confidence which nothing else could give; as long as the European would

would stand, the native would stand or fall by him.

13. Certainly draw from the Colonies, and supply the vacancies with Indian regiments.

14. Most advantageous, if he should have been fairly and considerately treated.

15. I have replied to this in answering No. 1.

16. The Overland transit has rendered the presence of British troops in the Eastern Colonies of less importance: as long as the European force in India is not further reduced, I do not apprehend any emergency that could not be met with sufficient promptitude now that the main lines of railway are connected.

17. Ceylon is the only Colony that could send a support sooner than the Mediterranean; but if Egypt were closed, of course South Africa and he Mauritius would be looked to.

18. Certainly, in all but South Africa; I have no knowledge of the local troops of that Colony.

19. If the employment of Indian troops were confined to the Eastern Colonies the Madras and Bombay armies would take the duty as a matter of course, and no volunteering would be required. With regard to the Bengal army, any service to which the regiments have not been accustomed would require either volunteering or the employment of certain regiments which are known to have no objection to such duty.

Many regiments of all the Presidencies would be fit for ordinary Colonial service; but the severer kinds of service, such as in the North of China, New Zealand, South Africa, would be better suited to the harder northern races.

I believe there is so good a spirit in the Indian army generally (I can speak of Bengal and Bombay, but I am not acquainted with Madras), that any prospect of field service, any-

where, would be received with the greatest satisfaction by many regiments, irrespective of the increased pay; but many interests connected with their families, their share in their village farms, &c., depend on the pay of the native soldiers, and it is for these, and not for personal expenditure and indulgence, that higher pay becomes a necessity when on foreign service.

20. The change could only be effected safely by some such measure as I have indicated.

21. The armies of Madras and Bombay would draw none; the Bengal army would do so now; but, for war, many regiments would volunteer for any service.

22. The Bengal 47th Regiment was destroyed about 1824 or 1825, for refusing to march to Burmah; but it is believed that the origin of the discontent arose from want of consideration on the part of the Government of the day.

The mutiny of the Bengal regiments in Sindh is matter of history; dislike to the service rose to mutiny on account of reduction of pay.

The sufferings of Hindoos of high caste on board ship are always great, and a little want of consideration may make them intolerable; but they have often been borne with exemplary patience and cheerfulness.

Nothing could have been better than the spirit of the troops that went to China; they eagerly adopted every device to meet or cover the demands of their creed.

23. Certainly; employment in company with British troops, especially in Europe, would give the army more of an Imperial character, and be most desirable.

25. I am not prepared to give an opinion on this question.

(signed) *R. Napier, L. G.,*  
Commander in Chief, Bombay.

The following Answers are from the Commanding Officers of certain Regiments in the Bombay Army, and were transmitted to the Committee, with the accompanying Letter, by Lieutenant General Sir Robert Napier, Commander in Chief, Bombay.

Sir,

Poona, 8 July 1867.

I HEREWITH enclose replies to the questions contained in your communication of the 18th of April. It appeared to me that the opinions on the several questions of certain experienced commanding officers of native regiments would be valuable to the Committee. The replies were sent to me, at my desire, confidentially, and under no expectation that they would go beyond my office; but the officers concerned have consented to their being communicated to the Committee. It should be noted that these officers have experience only, with one or two exceptions, of the regiments of this Presidency, and are not acquainted with the more hardy and warlike races of the north-west frontier.

C. Eales, Esq., &c.  
House of Commons.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *R. Napier, Lieut. General.*

#### ANSWERS of Colonel *Sherbrooke Gell*, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army.

1. INDIAN troops, of the description hereafter specified, may, I think, be employed with advantage, in time of peace, as a substitute for British troops in those Colonies of which the former have some knowledge traditionally, or by experience, in which, either physically, or mentally, and morally, they have the advantage of the occupants whom they are expected to coerce, and in 0.58.

which the climate is one suited to their habits and origin. They would in such localities, I am of opinion, be found a well conducted, inoffensive, temperate, and easily satisfied garrison, easy to manage, inexpensive as compared to British troops. Trustworthy as guards, with a soldierly spirit, sufficiently capable, as soldiers, to be relied upon in all ordinary emergencies, having great powers

App. No. 1. powers of patient endurance, and would be very unlikely whilst on foreign service to cabal with occupants of Colonies against their masters. Still it never should be forgotten that they are mercenary troops, that they serve, not because they love an idle, roving, adventurous life, but, as they say themselves, "pait-ki-waste," for the belly; and, therefore, that the fault of mercenaries is their impatience of any diminution or irregularity in the issue of the remuneration they have been led to expect.

2. The Bombay army generally, in which each regiment, with the exception of two class regiments, comprises in its ranks, in greater or less numbers, all those races who, in Hindoostan, embrace the profession of arms, is adapted for duty in the following Colonies:—

Mauritius.  
Ceylon.  
The Straits Settlements.  
China.

Class regiments of Sikhs, Belooches, or Hill men from the north-west frontiers, might be useful in time of war in South Africa or New Zealand, but should be removed immediately the war was over. Malta and Gibraltar are not, in my opinion, adapted to the peculiarities of native troops of any class, and the West Indies are too far off to make it either profitable or advisable to employ these troops from this country. In effect, I would confine them to Asiatic limits, which, as Mauritius is largely cultivated by coolie emigration, would comprise that island.

3. It has been the custom to relieve native troops in China, and latterly, in Aden, every two years. I consider it of great importance, in establishing a new system for native troops, to adhere to any rule which is founded on custom; and as I do not believe that Colonial service would be palatable to the Indian army for any reason other than the opportunity it gives them of amassing more money than they could do on home service, to deprive them for a longer period than two years of the privileges of furlough, which are so liberally given in India, and so highly appreciated, and of intercourse with their families, should, I think, be avoided.

4. I do not think that the religious prejudices of Indian troops have been, or would be, any bar to their employment in the Asiatic Colonies. A long sea voyage is, of course, trying to those castes whose religion prohibits cooking on board, and are consequently obliged to subsist on parched grain, &c.; but this hardship is very much mitigated by the fact that rations on board ship are free; and I have known it voluntarily and cheerfully encountered for the sake of the advantages to be obtained by service in China. The social disabilities, such as separation from their families, is one that does not press very heavily on Indian troops, who have great facilities afforded them by Government in subsisting their families during absence. Bengal Sepoys, almost invariably, by choice and from custom, used never to permit their wives to enter the regimental lines for the whole period of their service, keeping them at their own villages, and making regular remittances for their subsistence. I am not of opinion that there are any insuperable difficulties on this score. The amount of prostitution caused by it is singularly small; nor are native troops in general likely to form permanent alliances with the women they

meet in Colonies; I believe some of the Belooch Battalion did so to a small extent; but in line regiment almost all are married at an early age, or have prospects of such connection in their own country.

5. The advantages enjoyed by the Bombay troops lately on service in China were, I believe, successful in making that on the whole a popular service, though the Sepoys there employed had to put up with much discomfort.

These advantages were free quarters and free rations, extra pay to the amount of one penny and one farthing a day, some addition to their under-clothing (*see S. O.*, page 90), flannel drawers and shirt, shoes, blankets, and a canteen. Those in the north of China received also gratis a flannel frock and service pantaloons; all were able, and most of them did save the whole of their pay. On return to Bombay, a double percentage, *viz.*, 20 instead of 10 per cent., were allowed to proceed on furlough. Like advantages would, I think, make Colonial service within the limits I have named, as to locality and period of absence, far from unpopular.

It is true that there was some difficulty in procuring recruits for some regiments of natives whilst in China, but other causes peculiar to native troops produced this result.

In order to keep the two regiments of which I speak up to their full strength, volunteers from the army at large were called for. In my own regiment, and in the one quartered in the same cantonment, when they were aware of the advantages held out, a large number of volunteers came forward, and had they been able to go by companies so as to keep together, or to return to their respective regiments after the termination of the service, they would have been more than willing to go. But becoming aware that the transfer to other regiments would be permanent, that the vacancies caused by their departure would be filled up, and that they were leaving for good the officers whom they knew, and the relations and friends who were their comrades, to hold in a new regiment the position of strangers, they gradually withdrew their names, and eventually, I think, three or four from each regiment took advantage of the opportunity. These, I feel sure, were the true reasons, not because sufficient inducement was not afforded or the service was unpopular.

6. With the exception of the Cape Colony and South Africa, for reasons hereafter detailed, Indian troops would, I think, entirely unsupported, be sufficient protection against internal disturbances in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and Hong Kong (and the West Indies, if they were not so far off); but they must be properly armed with the best weapon procurable, not as they now are with a percussion smooth-bore muzzle loader.

With respect to the Cape and South Africa, Sikhs, Puthans, Beloochees, and Hill tribes might perhaps be employed with advantage against Kaffirs, though I doubt it; but the nature of the warfare—bush fighting in a close country, the stamp of enemy are unencumbered Kaffirs of very superior physical capacity, with great activity—would be a very formidable opponent to men who require to fight under the eye of their European officers, of which the number now given is far too small to do more than exercise in general superintendence, makes me doubt whether any Indian troops would be relied upon either at the Cape or

in New Zealand to meet the natives of those Colonies in warfare.

7. I think, in time of war, with the chance of meeting a European, for supposing that there was a deficiency of British material for duty in the Colonies, that it would be highly expedient and economical to supplement the British garrisons with Indian troops; but though I am of opinion that they might be relied upon and would do good service, yet I would not substitute them entirely for English troops.

8. Yes, I am of opinion that Indian troops, in certain proportions, might be so sufficiently reliable for Colonial duty as to allow of a reduction of the ordinary garrison to be effected.

9. I do not think that Indian troops would, man for man, under all circumstances, be as capable of protecting a Colony against a civilized power as are garrisons composed of Europeans only. The Indians want the physical power, the dogged courage of Englishmen, and perhaps no numbers, in very emergent and trying cases, when such qualities alone are required to ensure success, can compensate for their absence; still, in certain proportions and for ordinary circumstances, when endurance, faithfulness, temperance, obedience, and discipline are of any avail, Sepoys, armed with weapons on a par with their antagonists and friends, would be an efficient substitute. If a garrison in time of war required a strength of 1,000 British troops, I should say that that number of Indians, with 250 English troops, would be very nearly, if not quite, an equivalent. The Sepoys, fully appreciating both the strength and the weakness of their fairer skinned comrades, would rely upon them for sure support in moments of difficulty, and think it only fair that all the more laborious duty and the inferior food should fall to their own share; whilst the Europeans, occupying the position of *corps d'élite*, would be nursed, taken care of, and held in reserve for the supreme moment, when, I think, they also would fight under better circumstances and with more bravery than they would have done as the components of a garrison entirely British.

10. I think it would be more politic, in case of pressure for troops from England, to withdraw a portion of the British garrisons in the Colonies, replacing them with a due proportion of Indian troops, than to draw English troops from this country. The natives of this country have not now to learn for the first time that from one cause or another their aid is required to supplement our home forces; as long as the British army in India is kept up to its normal strength, so long are the conditions, in their eyes, under which we hold the country not greatly dissimilar, either in peace or war with a foreign foe. That strength they are aware is sufficient to put down rebellion, and the chances of combination with the foreign enemy at the opportune moment are remote; the one is a present fact, the other a distant contingency. Should, however, a hostile civilized Power succeed in landing a force within our Indian boundaries, our strength to resist would be greater by having English troops with which to meet them, in a country so decidedly held by the sword as India is, than by having an equivalent or an additional number of native troops, who, if false to us, would be fighting on their own soil.

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The temptations to be unfaithful, to strike for their own lands, for their own rule, would be greater if they saw our enemies arrayed against us in India, than if they witnessed the same thing in a Colony, when, probably, other counterbalancing circumstances might exist; nor should it be forgotten that the employment of native troops abroad enables us to employ a larger number of our more turbulent races in this country.

11. The effect of foreign service, such as that in China, upon native troops after their return, is, I believe, highly beneficial. Whilst abroad they are relieved in some measure from the depressing enslaving power of caste. Edges are smoothed down, mutual benefits encouraged; but more than all, the English officer becomes better acquainted with and better known by his men; he occupies a place nearer their affections when in a distant land among strangers than he does when they are at home and he is abroad; they have more in common with him than with those amongst whom their sojourn is limited, who in all likelihood cannot speak their language, and who probably do not regard them with very friendly eyes.

I do not think that the Sepoy looks much to secondary causes, yet the extent of our power must have some sensible meaning even to him; and I believe it is an admitted fact that Indian troops who have seen foreign service, either in war or peace, are more rough and ready soldiers, more intelligent, and very much more loyal than those who have not had this advantage.

12. I think it would be more advisable that service in the Colonies should be carried out by rolster from the line, than by special corps raised solely for Colonial service.

In the latter case the period of service would necessarily be very limited, entailing a large number of ineffectives as recruits, and also men on furlough, thus necessitating the employment of a larger number, and consequently, on the score of economy, it would be a measure detrimental to interests of the Colony. I think it is more than doubtful that the special corps would not maintain so high a state of discipline, not improbably that they would suffer in health by being so long removed from the country of their birth. At times, too, local cause might render it difficult to obtain recruits; and I think I have already shown that in the interests of India, as inseparably united to the best interests of her native army, would be best consulted by employing it in the Colonies within the limits I have specified.

13. Yes, I believe native soldiers—the Bombay army—are fully aware that they are liable to serve beyond the sea. Still I think there are, in their opinions, limits to this sea, that they would be very much astonished if required to serve in the Mediterranean, or in the West Indies, on garrison duty. Within Asiatic limits they would now go, as they have gone, without a murmur, even if the service was unpopular, which, with the advantages referred to, would not, I think, be the case.

14. But to call on Indian troops to serve in New Zealand, the West Indies, the Mediterranean, at the present moment, would not, I think, be prudent.

The amalgamation, with its changes, is still too recent; they are, too, lately learning to serve with a not unfrequent change of officers, a change abhorrent to their peculiarities, and altogether I think, that though in many ways the amalgamation was

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App. No. 1. an era from which their position began to improve, yet they have not yet learned to look on the new arrangements as stable; and, consequently, it seems to me that native troops are not yet, if they ever will be, in a condition fit to be experimented upon.

15. I do not think any distinction would be drawn by native troops between what are now Colonies of the Crown and what were dependencies of India under the East India Company, so long as Asiatic limits were not exceeded.

16. I know of no cases of discontent caused by Colonial service amongst the natives of the Indian army; I have heard their European officers, who served in China, complain of their miserably inadequate quarters whilst there, and for which they had to pay a high rate of house rent.

17. Employment within the limits I have named would not, I think, give to the Indian army an Imperial character. They would still regard themselves as belonging to the Presidency in which they were recruited.

It would no doubt raise their moral status to be able to feel an interest in the success of the Imperial army. I do not think, however, it is attainable at present.

18. The three classes named have each a marked military disability. The Chinese want

active courage. The Malays have a proud, sulky, revengeful temper, easily provoked, difficult to allay. The African is quarrelsome, and incapable of attaining a high state of discipline.

In civil life they would be bad subjects. The Chinese are exceedingly immoral and filthy in their tastes, of a cruel disposition.

The Malays would inspire dread and dislike, from their reckless ferocity on small provocation, their too ready resort to the creese, and their improvident habits; the African, from his drunken, disorderly conduct, his proneness to women, debauch, and intrigue.

Consequently, the advantages to be gained by the employment of such troops in India, in a political point of view, as being entirely unconnected with the people of this country, an advantage of no very extended or reliable character, considering that two of them are Mahomedans in religion, would be more than counterbalanced by the distaste to our rule which disgust, contempt, and dread of their peculiarities would engender in those of our Indian subjects amongst whom they were employed.

(signed) *John S. Gell*, Colonel,  
Deputy Quartermaster General  
of the Bombay Army.

#### ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Thacker*, Commanding the Marine Battalion.

1. I CONSIDER it inexpedient to entirely substitute Indian troops for English in our Colonies in time of peace, but I think they would form a desirable supplement to European troops, say in the proportion of two-thirds natives to one-third Europeans.

2. If so determined, I consider the following races would be best adapted for such duty:—

- A. Sikhs, Punjaubees, Pathians, Beloochees,
- B. Mussulmans, and such castes of Hindoos as
- C. are employed in the Bombay and Madras
- D. armies, are, in my opinion, capable of serving
- E. in any of these Colonies. I am not suffi-
- F. ciently acquainted with the constitution of
- G. many of the Bengal regiments to pronounce
- H. an opinion as to their general adaptability for
- I. Colonial service.

3. I do not think that native troops would like to serve out of India for a longer period than three or four years at a time. The question as to the general system of relief is one which I am not competent to answer.

4. I am not aware of any special difficulties that would hinder the races I have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea. Many Bombay and Madras regiments have served in China, Aden, and elsewhere; and there has been no difficulty when the men have been liberally and fairly dealt with.

5. The present rates of pay, batta, rations, and family pensions, together with the warm clothing granted to the native troops of the Bombay army when on service beyond the seas, would, I think, amply suffice to procure troops for such service.

6. I think they would, if partially supported.

7. In time of war, I would in no case substitute Indian for European troops, but Indian troops

would form an excellent supplement to Europeans.

8. I think so.

9. I think not. I would form the garrisons in the proportion of two-thirds Europeans and one-third natives.

10. Whenever European regiments are urgently required at home, they will probably be equally required in India. I would therefore withdraw such European troops as could be spared from the Colonies, and supplement the remaining Europeans with Indian troops.

11. I think highly advantageous. I have never seen native troops which have been employed beyond the seas which have not been improved in these respects from contact with other races and an acquaintance with other countries; such service expands their minds, tends to destroy petty prejudices, and gives them an idea of the extent of our power. The 3rd, 5th, 22nd Regiments, Native Infantry, and Belooch Battalion of the Bombay army, are, I think, generally considered to have benefited by their service in China; and the 21st Regiment Native Infantry, or Marine Battalion, which has served in nearly all parts of our Eastern possessions, is extremely handy and useful.

12. I see no reason why, in the interests of both A. and B. regiments of the existing Indian army should not take service in the Colonies, according to their turn. I would not raise regiments especially and exclusively for the Colonies, as I believe such regiments would not be willing to serve out of India for a longer period at a time, or for less pay, &c., than existing regiments. The regiments of the existing Indian army would require to be better armed, and to have more European officers attached to them, before they could perform Colonial service efficiently.

13. I believe

13. I believe so. Probably, however, some Bengal troops may imagine such service beyond sea was intended only in time of war, when their services might be urgently required, and never understood it to mean protracted service in the Colonies in times of peace. Bombay and Madras troops have for years served in Aden, China, Burmah, and elsewhere, and I should say fully understand their liability to serve in what are generally considered our Eastern possessions; but I doubt if even they would consider service in the West Indies, New Zealand, Gibraltar, and Malta, as coming within the terms of their engagement. I should not, therefore, consider it prudent to enforce such service in these Colonies.

14. But I believe it is a favourable time to sound the feelings of the native troops generally as to their readiness to serve in the Colonies named in Question No. 2. The conditions of such service should be most fully explained to them, as regards pay, batta, rations, pensions to families, warm clothing, and period of foreign service; and I think Government would find that the races I have named in Answer No. 2, and the whole of the regiments composing the Bombay and Madras armies, would engage for Colonial service.

15. I do not think they would make any such distinction. It has not been made hitherto by the Bombay and Madras armies as regards China, and I do not think there would be any objection to service in the Mauritius, where so many natives of India are employed as labourers.

16. The only case of discontent within my

experience, that I can remember, was that of the 47th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, which objected to proceed to Aden about 25 years ago, in consequence of what it considered was a breach of faith on the part of Government with regard to some item of batta, rations, or family pensions; I forget which. I was Brigade Major at Aden for seven years, viz., from 1855 to 1861, and never heard of any discontent on the part of the Bombay or Madras troops quartered there during that or any former period; on the contrary, they were well satisfied, and invariably returned to India with a considerable sum of money, which they had saved during their tour of foreign service.

17. I think so, and that such a result would be highly desirable.

18. This is a very comprehensive and important question, and one which I do not consider myself competent to answer, with my limited knowledge of Chinese, Malays, Africans, and other races not Indian.

*Note.*—I consider the West Indies as too distant to be occupied by Indian troops, either efficiently or economically.

The above replies are forwarded to the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in compliance with Colonel Dillon's Memorandum, dated Mahableschwer, 24th May 1867.

(signed) S. Thacker, Lieut. Colonel,  
Commanding 21st Regt. N. I., or  
Bombay, M. Battalion.

11 June 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel Adams, Commanding 13th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. HIGHLY desirable.

2. I would recommend only South Africa, Ceylon, Mauritius, Straits Settlements, and China, to be garrisoned by Indian troops, which should be composed of the mixed races generally enlisted for the Bombay army.

3. A regiment should be relieved on the completion of five years' service; after two years a furlough should be granted, for a period of one year, to 10 per cent., with a free passage to and fro.

4. There may be certain prejudices to overcome; but if the families are allowed to accompany the men, and increased advantages offered, they would not be insuperable.

5. The pay should be the same as that of the British soldiers, with ration money, or rations when supplies are not procurable in the market; the families to be placed on the same footing with those of European troops.

6. Would not recommend the Cape Colony to be denuded of European troops; neither should South Africa, Mauritius, Ceylon, and Hong Kong be entirely unsupported by European troops.

7. As a supplement to European troops, in the proportion of two-thirds native to one-third European, I consider they would be employed with advantages.

8. Yes, perfectly so; if aided by European troops.

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9. Yes; if armed as British soldiers, and with the same complement of European officers, as under the old organisation, the garrison should be increased one-third, including a small proportion of British troops.

10. I consider it would be more advantageous to partially withdraw the European troops from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India.

11. Advantageous, rather than otherwise, as I think it would tend to dispel many of their prejudices, as well as enlighten the mind of the native soldiers.

12. Take the regiments of native infantry according to their turn of duty for foreign service.

13. They are aware they are liable to be called on to serve beyond seas; but it would be advisable to inform them of the increased advantages they would derive, and allow them to volunteer for such service.

14. Yes; the present time is as favourable as any other.

15. Sepoys being averse to sea voyage in general, the distinction they would draw between service in Aden and Burmah and the Mauritius and China would be the relative distance of each.

16. None have come to my knowledge personally, but I am aware several instances of discontent are recorded in history, arising chiefly from a misunderstanding regarding their allowances.

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17. Not

App. No. 1. 17. Not answered.

18. In a military point, it would be objectionable to entertain Chinese and Malays as soldiers, on account of their unruly dispositions, but Africans and other races, in a political point of view, might with advantage be employed in India and

the Colonies; but I would not recommend any regiment to be composed of any one race.

(signed) *H. A. Adams*, Colonel  
Commanding 13th Regiment,  
Native Infantry.

Camp, Kolapore,  
31 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Campbell*, Commanding 3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. I AM of opinion that, in time of peace the substitution of native troops for English in our Colonies would be very inexpedient and distasteful to the colonists as well as to the native troops, and attended with no advantage socially, or in a military or political point of view.

2. If it were determined to employ them, I think the races north of the Indus would be the best for all the Colonies, except Ceylon, China, and the Mauritius, to which places any native regiment might be sent.

3. The regiments should not be absent from India more than three years; and a company should be left in India as a depôt, with which the families who did not return to their own villages could remain, also the weakly and old men who are likely soon to be invalid. They should always be transported in steamers, as the long sea voyage is very distasteful to Hindoos.

4. I know of no special difficulties. They should have the pay and advantages laid down by the regulations for them when proceeding on foreign service.

5. If they are relieved every three years regularly, I think that no advantages over and above those at present enjoyed by native troops when on foreign service would be necessary. But troops who had to remain away from India for a longer period would not be procured without nearly double the pay at present enjoyed by native troops in India.

6. I think, so far as I can judge, that they would not afford sufficient protection unsupported in any of the Colonies except Ceylon.

7. I think they may be employed in time of war as a supplement to European troops, and would prove a very valuable auxiliary force.

8. They are to be relied on for such service, in my opinion, provided they are supported by Europeans, volunteers, militia, or regular troops. But they should be armed with the best weapon procurable, and be organised and officered on the same system as the Ceylon Rifle Regiment and the West Indian regiments.

9. They would not be capable of protecting the Colonies against an attack by the civilized powers as adequately as the existing European garrisons; it would be necessary to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons in the proportion of two to one of the northern races, viz., Panjaubees, Sikhs, and Beloochees, and three to one of the native infantry, as at present in the Bombay army.

10. It would be more advantageous to withdraw European troops from the Colonies, filling up their places by native troops, in the proportion I have mentioned.

11. I think it would be advantageous, so far as it would improve their minds and ideas, and give them an enlarged view of the extent of Her Majesty's dominions, and of the power of the Government they serve.

12. I think it would be better for the interests of both, that regiments should be raised specially for Colonial service.

13. The native troops are perfectly aware that they are liable to serve beyond seas, but they don't expect to be called on, except in time of war, or some great emergency.

14. There appears to me to be no necessity to effect any change; they perfectly understand the terms of their enlistment, and have only to be ordered when required.

15. I don't think they would draw any political distinction—they would draw a local distinction—because to Aden they can take their families, and are generally conveyed in steamers, and they have frequent opportunities of getting away on leave, either on urgent private affairs, or in case of sickness, which they would not have at the other places named; besides, Aden is a very short sea voyage compared with the voyage to the other places.

16. No such causes of discontent have come to my knowledge. The 3rd Regiment Native Infantry went most cheerfully to China, and were satisfied with the advantages given them, and with the arrangement made for their families. The objection is made on account of the sea voyage, which is disliked by Hindoos, who are particular about their water, and who do not cook on board a ship. To men who can cook, and who will take meat and grog rations, there can exist no objection, except that which is common to most men who are obliged to be separated from their families; but this is soon overcome, provided separation only lasts for two or three years, and the family remittances are regularly paid.

17. I think that no such feeling exists, or would be likely to exist in the native army; they know they serve the British Government and are paid regularly, and they look to their local government and their immediate superiors for all advantages and not beyond.

18. I have had no experience with troops composed of these races; I think it would be objectionable to employ regiments entirely recruited from these races, especially Malays, who are bigoted Mahomedans, of whom throughout India we already have enough. For the Colonies it would be different. The Ceylon Rifle Regiment and the West India and African regiments appear to answer very well, and have the credit of being good soldiers.

(signed) *E. Campbell*, Lieut. Col.,  
Commanding 3rd Regiment, N.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Field*, Commanding 10th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. I SHOULD be strongly in favour of the employment of sepoys on garrison duty in the Colonies, if our covenant with the native army was not opposed to the measure; the effect of such service on the men would, in all respects, be good and wholesome; it would remove them for a season from Braminical influences, break through the prejudices of caste, and give them enlarged ideas of the British dominion and power, and at the same time foster in them a manly and self-reliant spirit.

Under the present terms of enlistment, it would not be expedient to substitute Indian for English troops, for although the oath of allegiance sets forth that the sepoy will go wherever ordered, yet it is understood to apply to service in time of war only, and not to garrison duty in time of peace.

2. Men of all the races found in the native army could perform service in the Colonies, and no particular adaptability need be looked for, especially for employment in Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China. For service in South Africa, and the other stations, the best adapted would be the Seiks and Mahomedans, and next to them, Purwarrees and other low caste men.

3. The sepoys would be without their families, and it would be therefore necessary that the reliefs should take place after two, or at the most three years.

4. No special difficulties with respect to religious prejudices or social habits would be experienced; the advantages of superior pay, &c. would counterbalance all such.

5. The same pay, rations, &c. which have been usual when native regiments have been serving in China; and in addition I would suggest, that the year's service abroad should count as two years towards pension.

6. They would, unsupported, do well all the service that might be required of them at the Cape against frontier tribes, if armed with rifle, and likewise be able to quell internal disturbances when employed in the other Colonies.

7. It would not be wise to employ them thus in substitution for European troops; but as a supplement to them they would do well.

8. Yes; but they must be efficiently armed.

9. Certainly not, and no increase in the strength of the garrison would compensate for the want of

European troops; under the circumstances mentioned, native troops should only be used as a supplement to Europeans.

10. It would be better to send native troops to the Colonies, rather than withdraw European troops from India; but in time of war, as before remarked, European must be associated with native troops for the protection of the Colonies.

11. I believe it would be in all respects advantageous; and inasmuch as it would raise the sepoy in his own estimation, it would tend also to improve the spirit of the native army.

12. I consider it would be better, both in the interests of India, and also for the Colonies, that the native regiments should take their turn for employment abroad, rather than that new regiments should be raised exclusively for such duty.

13. They believe that they are liable for service beyond seas, but not for garrison duty in the Colonies in time of peace.

14. It would not be desirable at the present time to attempt to enforce such an obligation upon them.

15. I can only speak regarding Aden, which is looked upon as a station for garrison duty to which each regiment is liable to be sent in its turn.

The Mauritius and China are looked upon as foreign service.

16. No cases of discontent have come to my knowledge in consequence of the employment of native soldiers on Colonial service.

17. I think it would tend to produce this impression, and the same would be wholesome in its effect upon the minds of the native soldiers.

18. The employment of native foreign troops in India would be viewed with great jealousy by our native soldiers, and might be expected to lead to disturbances between them and the strangers. Such a policy would work injuriously also, by leading the native army as well as the people of the country to the conclusion that the Government no longer placed the same confidence as before in the native soldiers of India.

(signed) *J. Field*, Lieut. Colonel,  
Commanding 10th Regiment, N. I.

Mahableswher,  
28 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Taylor*, Commanding 5th Bombay Native Light Infantry.

1. I CONSIDER it will be highly advantageous if the native army be employed in the Colonies, but I would always keep a proportion of European troops as well.

2. From the experience I derived when the regiment under my command was in China (over three years), where we were stationed with Seiks and Beloochees, I should say that a Bombay regiment of mixed castes is just as well adapted for this duty as either of the above-mentioned castes. I found our men stood the climate of China (both hot and cold) equally as well, and we certainly

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had fewer sick. If the men are well cared for (as they were in China), and have good rations, well housed and clothed, they will do the work well. I should recommend the scale of rations being altered, and meat issued on this duty. I answer this question from what I observed of the regiment under my command in China; we are a mixed regiment, but a large proportion of the men are Mahrattas.

3. Experience would show this: at first, regiments might be relieved after three or four years' service; a lengthened service must be deprecated,

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App. No. 1



App. No. 1. from the fact that the men would be unable to take their families with them.

4. There are none that I am aware of: regiments are always available for foreign service; they would, in the same way, be available for garrison duty or foreign service.

5. I would recommend pay and batta, free rations, and all other advantages now given to regiments embarking for foreign service being continued; I would likewise recommend that every man be provided yearly with a pair of English boots (gratis), and that all articles of regimental necessaries be supplied to him by Government, at a fair cost, as the price of these articles will be, it is presumed, more expensive there than in India.

6. I would, as before mentioned, keep a proportion of European troops; after-experience would decide the number.

If native troops, well armed with the best weapon, they will do good service.

In China, I found the men did all that was required of them. I am not sufficiently acquainted with South Africa and the West Indies to answer that part of the question.

7. In case of emergency they might be altogether employed; but I should always prefer having European troops as well.

8. Yes.

9. No, certainly not.

If unsupported by Europeans, their numbers must be largely increased; at least two-thirds more.

10. Withdraw them from the Colonies.

11. I consider it would be most highly advantageous. A native regiment going on foreign service

to a civilised country returns a different regiment—the moral and tone of the regiment is highly improved—the men lose in a great manner their narrow and bigoted ideas. I consider a tour of foreign service the making of a native regiment.

12. I would, in this instance, withdraw them from the Colonies in preference to India. I do not think that it would be possible to raise regiments for exclusive duty in the Colonies, as I do not think you would be able to obtain the men if you did; I think the difficulties in keeping them up to their full strength, would be insuperable.

13. Certainly they do. *Vide* Articles of War for Native Troops, c. 1, Enlistments and Discharge, p. 3. Every man on enlistment takes an oath he will go wherever ordered by land or sea.

16. I do not think they would draw any distinction as all service beyond sea is looked on as foreign service.

17. Yes; I think it would, and I consider it a measure highly desirable.

18. It would be advantageous to employ these troops (if procurable) both in India and the Colonies.

The Chinese would make excellent soldiers, as they are fine and brave men, but I do not think they would enlist. I would not enlist Malays, as they are proverbially treacherous.

The African, from all I hear, makes a good soldier; but I have no personal knowledge of this race; I feel diffident in expressing an opinion.

(signed) *J. Taylor, Lt. Col.,*  
Commg. 5th Regt. N. L. I.

Belgaum,  
1 June 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Major *Little*, Commanding 25th Bombay Native Light Infantry.

1. I CONSIDER that Indian might be substituted for English troops in some of our Colonies in time of peace; by some I would mean all those mentioned in Question 2, excepting "Malta, Gibraltar, and the West Indies."

4. Seiks, Punjaubees, Patans, Purdasees, Mahomedans, Mahrattas, Christians, and Jews, in fact, a mixture of all races, such as the Bombay army is now composed.

5. I do not consider myself now competent to give an opinion as to the arrangement which would be necessary to be made with respect to reliefs; but I would venture to suggest that no regiment should be kept away from India for more than three years.

6. I consider that no difficulties would be raised to render the races above mentioned from undertaking garrison service beyond sea.

7. I do not think that any other advantages than those now granted to soldiers of the Indian army when on foreign service would be required to procure native troops for such service.

8. I think they should be supported.

9. I consider that Indian troops might be employed with great advantage to the State in time of war as a supplement to European troops.

11. Most certainly.

12. No; but the proportion I would recommend for garrison duty should be one-third European, and two-thirds native. In time of war two-thirds

European and one-third native. I am also strongly of opinion that a better description of arm should be issued to the native army, and two European officers given to each company.

13. In case of pressure at home, I consider it would be more advantageous to withdraw troops from the Colonies, supplying their places by native soldiers from India, than to withdraw European troops from India.

14. I consider that the effect of garrison service in the Colonies in time of peace would be highly advantageous as regards the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier on his return to India, for he would carry home to his friends enlightenment as regards the extent (hitherto but little known) of the British dominions; he would meet relations who had very probably served in other Colonies far distant from where he has served, and hence would the power and greatness of England be better known; many other reasons might be quoted, but this one point I consider would have greater weight in the minds of the native of India than almost any other.

15. I think it would be better for the interests of India to take regiments according to turn, than to raise fresh ones for such a service.

I think also for the interests of the Colonies such a system would be preferable.

19. The native soldiers recruited since 1856  
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fully aware that they are liable to serve beyond sea; but were they not so I consider it would be desirable to enforce the obligation imposed on them by their present terms of enlistment.

20. Yes, I think the present would be a favourable moment to effect such a change.

21. I do not think that the native soldier would draw any distinction between service in Aden and Burmah, and the Mauritius and China.

22. I knew of no such case.

23. I think the employment of the native army of India in some of the Colonies would tend to give it more of the character of an Imperial army, and I consider such a result would be highly desirable.

24 & 25. At the present moment I do not consider myself competent to answer these questions.

(signed) *A. B. Little*, Major  
Commg. 25th Regt., N.L.I.

App. No. 1.

#### ANSWERS of Major *Beville*, Commanding 1st Belooch Battalion.

1. Looking only on the effect it would have on the native troops, I think it would answer admirably, improving those employed, tending to rouse their pride, and at once stamping them as superior troops to those not so selected.

Politically considered, I do not think they should be employed in the Colonies named, save Ceylon, the Straits, China, and the Mauritius; they should not be employed where the bulk of the population is white (Africa, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand), or where the land is owned and the country ruled by its white settlers (West Indies), nor entrusted with the defence of important fortresses (Malta, Gibraltar), liable to attack from first-class European powers.

2. Belooches, Patans, Sikhs, Punjaubees; I am not acquainted with the native troops in the Madras Presidency.

3. The answer to this depends very much on whether the State proposes to allow families to accompany the regiment. If the men had the option, under certain arrangements, for their families being rationed at fixed rates, I think absence from India might extend to seven years, otherwise three years; but, again, very much would depend as to what furlough, if any, would be allowed to the men during such absence.

4. I consider there are no special difficulties that would hinder the races I have named from being so employed.

I know the 1st Belooches would hail with delight an order to proceed to Japan or the Mauritius.

5. No increase of pay, but men to be liberally rationed and well provided with clothing, bedding, quarters, &c. All remittances to their families to be remitted free of loss in exchange, and their correspondence "franked."

6. Well officered and properly armed, they would afford full protection to the Colonies named.

7. They would be a most valuable supplement to European troops; but even alone I believe they would render good service.

8. Most certainly.

9. This is, in fact, comparing them with European troops; the answer must be in the negative.

One-half, or perhaps two-thirds, might be composed of natives.

10. Withdraw them from Colonies, relieving them by native regiments; India cannot afford for many a day to lose a single European regiment.

11. Advantageous; the resources and power of England would become better known in India.

12. (a.) Government will in the first instance select the races deemed most fitted for colonial service; the terms and conditions will be fully explained. To all regiments in the service, recruited from the races selected, the option of volunteering should be given, either exclusively for Colonial service or for certain tours, to be relieved in turn.

If more regiments are required, I think it might be advisable to raise them specially for Colonial service; but I deem this a fitting opportunity for recording my opinion that Government must alter the enlistment for life system if they hope to obtain native troops generally for Colonial service.

(b.) I do not feel competent to give an opinion.

13, 14. I consider that if it was *bonâ fide* for "field service" they would not think of repudiating their liability; but I doubt, if merely for the purpose of garrisoning the Colonies named, they\* would consider themselves liable for such service; I should not consider it desirable to enforce the latter obligation. It would be putting an interpretation on the 1st Art. of War (Act No. xxix. of 61), which I believe was never intended to be conveyed.

\* I refer to regiments generally.

15. If they did draw a distinction, it would be in favour of Aden and Mauritius.

16. I have never heard of discontent; I have heard men of the Belooch regiments, who served in China, express disappointment at the nature of their service, as they had great expectation of seeing field service when they left India.

While complaining of the great cold and damp, they always gratefully acknowledged the care taken of them.

17. It might, perhaps; but doubtful.

18. Without a personal knowledge of the races named, it is difficult to give an opinion on the subject.

(signed) *H. Beville*,  
Major Commandant,  
1st Belooch Regiment.

Kurachee,  
11 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Captain *Nicholett*, Commander, 2nd Belooch Battalion.

App. No. 1.

1. THAT native troops might be substituted in European troops with great advantage to both European and native armies; to the European in saving the men from serving in unhealthy climates, and also in preventing necessity of sending English troops so far away from Europe and locking them up to the native army; in raising the tone of the army by showing confidence in it, in opening the men's minds, and in sending them back to India better impressed with the power of England and extent of her dominions.

All other powers that have native troops in their pay use them for imperial purposes; Russia has Cossacks and Circassians, France Turcos and Indegines, whom both made available in European wars; and there is no reason that I can see, except prejudice, why England, which has a resource in India of unlimited extent, including in the north and adjacent countries races quite equal to the southern races of Europe, and perhaps superior, should not make better use of them for imperial purposes also.

2. The best men in all service are the Northern Indian races; they are free from prejudices, more valiant, and better adapted to stand changes of climate than the more southern races.

The 2nd Belooch Regiment is composed of Sindees, Beloochees, Brahoors, Affghans, including the inhabitants of the Khybur and hills north of Peshawur, Sikhs and a few Hindoo-stance Mussulmen, Hindoos, Jews, African See-dees, &c. &c.; they were in China in time of peace, so far as our operations went, so that there was no plunder to be got. In fact, they garrisoned Shanghai for three years, having a part of the time a detachment in Japan.

The regiment stood the service remarkably well; it suffered nothing from the cold; the men were cheerful, and, though glad to return to meet their families, many of them now would be glad to return to China.

Regiments composed of these races, or some of them, should certainly be sent to the following Colonies:—

South Africa, China, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand,

because in Africa, China, and New Zealand the natives are of a more formidable character, and Gibraltar and Malta should have the best troops and those with least prejudices. In Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Straits, inferior troops would do, such as are composed of the Hindoos and less powerful men of Southern India.

Northern Indian regiments, also, should be sent to the West Indies, as the voyage is long, and troops with fewest prejudices should go, and probably Hindoos would not like it; but these Colonies are so far off that it would be hardly worth while to garrison them from India at all, on account of the reliefs.

3. Reliefs should take place at most every four years, and the regiment should be brought back straight to India. A native regiment always has a large number of women and children who must be left behind, and to whom the men wish to return.

In time probably this might be changed, either by allowing men to volunteer from other regiments into the regiments going abroad, and drafting the married people who did not wish to go, to other

regiments, or by introducing a shorter period of service, and so inducing a man to put off his marriage until his service was over; but as the service stands at present, and until service in the Colonies becomes a well-known routine, the reliefs should be as frequent as possible.

As none of the Colonies mentioned, except the West Indies, are so far off, that regiments serving in them could not be relieved from Bombay, Calcutta, or Kurrachee, in three months, it is probable that the new transport steamers might be able to carry out such reliefs between the cold weathers, when they would not be required for the overland reliefs. Reliefs should always be carried out by steamers, as the men much dislike the tedium of sailing ships.

4. There are no such difficulties. The 2nd Belooch Regiment in China were quartered in a large joss-house turned into barracks; they drew their rations from the Commissariat, they will eat and drink with Europeans, in fact, there is no obstacle to their being employed abroad. Mussulmen, of course, would not eat pork, nor Sikhs and Hindoos beef; but if this caused inconvenience, the men could always draw the money, and provide themselves.

5. The 2nd Belooch Regiment received no more pay in China than they do; indeed, the highest amount for a private, including good conduct money, being 10½ rupees per month; but they had liberal rations and warm clothing, which enabled them to remit money to their families, and they were perfectly contented. The ration was worth in China, when things were dear, about eight rupees a month.

The supply of warm clothing was but fair, as a native soldier has to provide all his necessaries at an expense of between 40 and 50 rupees, and to keep them up, and receives no bounty on enlistment.

6. The troops that kept the Peshawer frontier for a series of years, would, I should say, perfectly protect the Cape Colony against Caffirs; they would deal with any internal disturbance in Ceylon, Hong Kong, or the West Indies; and though at the Cape and Mauritius, they might meet Dutch Boors and French Creoles, yet as native troops have beaten both these races at Java and the Mauritius, they would, no doubt, do the same again.

7. I believe the best native troops might be used with great advantage in time of war; but of course the present organisation would not do against European troops. They should never be used as a substitute entirely for Europeans; but no doubt by employing them, you might dispense with these to a great extent; troops are so easily raised in India, and the supply of men so abundant, that any one of the Colonies mentioned, except the West Indies, could be flooded with them in a few weeks in such numbers as would make an attack by any force that an European power could despatch to such a distance, quite hopeless.

8. The best Indian troops are, I should say, superior to those of the southern natives of Europe, the men are more powerful and larger limbed; individually, they will readily face an Englishman, and I have known a Punjaabee fight an English soldier for half an hour. The way in which

which these people faced the English army on the Sutlej and in the campaign of 1848-9, gives every reason to suppose that they would face European troops. It is a mistake to suppose these races have any dread of an European as such. The English are their masters, and have a great prestige amongst them, but they have no very great respect for other Europeans. The 2nd Belooch Regiment met French troops in China, and were on an expedition with them; and from what I have heard, I am sure they would face them, if required. I conclude, therefore, that they might materially lighten the strain in Great Britain in time of war.

9. Not adequately, certainly, for if so, Indian troops would be as good as English, which against an European enemy they are not likely to be; for instance, no Asiatic troops would probably have stood so long the fire of Waterloo; but neither would many European nations.

However, as in case of a war, no one would be likely to attack us, except the French or Americans, whose troops are but little inferior to the British, I think an increase of one-half should be given, and here I understand that the native troops should be of the best quality, armed with the best weapons, and well officered by European officers.

N. B.—This question is a difficult one to answer; but I ground my opinion on the accounts of the Sikh wars of 1845-6. The Sikh troops there were not very superior in numbers to the British, and though they had in some of the actions a much superior artillery, still they had no European regiments or officers, and their generals could not manœuvre them. At Aliwal they had 15,000; Sir Harry Smith, 11,000, and he manœuvred skilfully, which they could not. Considering therefore the small odds on the Sikh side, Sir Harry Smith's advantages in Europeans and generalship, the Sikhs appear to have shown a fighting power which would warrant the above estimate.

10. Withdraw them from the Colonies certainly, and replace them by natives from India. If you take them from India, you may have a rebellion and lose the country; but if you lose a Colony, you may take it again from India at any time, if it is in the Indian seas; besides, by sending the native troops abroad, you reduce the proportion between the two armies in India, and they being quite in your power abroad, would be hostages for the good behaviour of their friends and relations serving in India.

Another consideration is this: once establish as a principle that India is to take its share in the common defence of the empire, and your power is almost unlimited; if you find it necessary to withdraw the few thousands that garrison the Colonies, you may throw a hundred thousand natives into them; India would easily supply them; you only want officers.

11. I believe so in every respect, if he was well treated, and not troubled and looked down upon. They are very proud of having seen foreign countries, and like to talk about them; they get Europeanised; I have heard men of the 2nd Belooch Regiment talk very intelligently about China, Ceylon, Japan, and the Mauritius, which latter place some of them touched at on the way home, and where many of them say they would like to go again.

In saying this, I do not allude to Hindoo regiments; they have more prejudices to get

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over, and I know little about them, as the few we have very soon lose them, and are no criterion. App. No. 1.

12. In the interests of both parties, it would be better to send regiments in their turn. It is doubtful if men would enlist for exclusive service in the Colonies, without much higher pay, and there would be difficulty in recruiting a regiment a little by itself; it goes at once; the men know one another, and take their house with them, but it is a very different thing to catch a raw recruit, and to get him to face the sea, to go to an unknown land.

When the 2nd Belooch Regiment was in China, I was commanding the 1st Regiment in Hyderabad, a number of men were required for the 2nd, but not a single recruit could be got throughout Sind. I was ordered to call for volunteers, and 250 men came forward, of whom 115 went; it is true each man got a bounty of 20 rupees, but such a bounty would not have got recruits.

If it should be decided to send the Sikhs and Punjabee regiments only, it would probably be necessary to raise some, but that is not for me to say. I only advert to it with reference to the reliefs, as the turn should not come round too often at first; eventually, probably, men would not be sorry to leave India again, after having been back from foreign service a few years; but it would be well to accustom the army to the change gradually.

13. Native troops know perfectly well that they are bound to go anywhere, and I have no reason to suppose they would be unwilling to do so. The 2nd Belooch Regiment went willingly, and as a matter of course, to China in 1862, though they did not know they would get anything more than their ordinary pay. Madras troops go to the Straits and Labuan, the 5th and 22nd Bombay Infantry went to China, and several regiments to Persia in 1857; and I never heard that they thought of its being anything but a matter of course.

14. Answered above.

15. I doubt if the Indian army ever did draw any distinction between Crown Colonies and Indian possessions; it all belonged to the Suka. If a native soldier went to China, he probably never inquired who Hong Kong belonged to. I never met a native soldier who knew what the "Company" meant; they know perfectly now, that everything belongs to the Queen.

16. I have never personally known such a case. I have heard that a Madras regiment, some years ago, when in Bombay for the purpose of being sent to Aden, showed a disinclination to go, and was made to do so, but it was before I came to India. A Bengal regiment refused to embark for Burmah in the last war, and was sent by land. I presume the causes were in both cases a disinclination to go to sea, and in the first case, perhaps, to going to Aden, but if it was, it soon wore off, as native troops of Madras as well as Bombay have gone there since as a matter of course.

17. No doubt such employment would give the Indian Army an Imperial character, which would be a most desirable thing to do, as it would increase its *esprit de corps*, and render it more faithful and to be depended on.

As long as the army sees nothing beyond India it remains neither more nor less than a militia. A native soldier knows all about India by hearsay, and wherever he goes he finds the country and people not foreign to him; if a Mussulman, he finds

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people

p. No 1. people of the same religion and manners as himself; if a Hindoo, the same; he sees a governor occasionally, and certain indications of British power, but his own atmosphere is not changed; the ideas that he has been brought up with remain in him; he is ignorant and credulous as ever, and just as likely to listen to the silly stories of designing men, such as drove him mad in 1857.

But take the same men abroad, let them see the power of England at Malta and Gibraltar, the fortresses and fleet, transport them in men of war, a more imposing emblem of power than anything else, send them to England itself, keep them away for a few years from their village ideas and feelings, and accustom them to totally different ones, let them feel that they are really of use, that they are really helping British soldiers to defend the empire, and I feel convinced that even if they are never to be employed in European warfare the benefit of such a treatment would be incalculable in securing the loyalty of the native army in India; opportunity, too, might be taken to introduce the sons of Indian nobles, who would educate themselves for it so as to be fit associates for British officers, like the Arab officers in the French, and the Circassian and other foreign officers in the Russian service; such men would be looked up to by

those below them, and, associating with English officers, and with minds expanded by education and foreign travel, would identify themselves with the English rule, and form a link between it and the army, the value of which cannot be over-estimated.

18. You can get better troops in India than either Chinese, Malays, or Africans, and they come from your own dominions, which the others do not; you know the home of a native of India, and can find out his family, which is a certain guarantee for his respectability.

Politically speaking, if there is any truth in the argument that England should not trust the defence of her Colonies to Indian troops, though raised from a part of the British empire, it applies still more forcibly to troops entirely mercenary and subjects of other potentates; it would be humiliating to owe the safety of our Colonies to subjects of the Emperor of China, the Rajah of Burni, or the Sultan of Muscat or Zanzibar.

(signed) G. Nichollett,  
Captain Commandant 29th or  
2nd Belooch Regiment.

Hydrabad,  
7 June 1867.

#### ANSWERS of Colonel Beale, Commanding 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.

1. THAT they should not be entirely substituted; a small body of British infantry should also be present, and British artillery of course.

2. (a.) Mahrattas from Dekhun and Konkun, Purwarrees and Mochees, and Sikhs, and a few Mahomedans and native Christians.

(b.) Ditto - - ditto.

(c.) Ditto - - ditto.

(d.) Ditto - - ditto.

(e.) Chiefly Sikhs and Beloochees.

(f.) Ditto - - ditto.

(g.) Ditto - - ditto.

(h.) As above first mentioned.

(i.) Chiefly Sikhs and Beloochees.

3. This would depend on whether raised for Colonial service or furnished from the present native Indian army. In any case five years should be the limit, and always in steam transports.

4. In the existing regiments by far the greater part of the men are married, and this would be a difficulty. Regiments being expressly raised for Colonial service single men would mostly be entertained. Religious prejudices are to be overcome, and the first objection also, by offer of superior pension on retirement at a fixed period of service, say 15 years, without stipulating that a man be pronounced unfit prior to sanctioning such pension.

5. The pay allowed in India, together with batta and free rations, with a fixed and on conditional period of service, say 15 years, for pension for a private not less than five rupees, and other ranks in proportion.

6. They might be efficiently officered, but I consider there should always be present a handful of British troops.

7. That in time of war they may always be employed as a supplement to Europeans, the number of which latter might be proportionably decreased and withdrawn for service elsewhere.

8. Whenever it is known to the regiments composing the native Indian army that war is the cause of their being called on to cross the sea, I believe they will always be found ready, and can be relied on to the extent of materially aiding the Government.

9. Supported by only a small number of British soldiers, I believe in such cases they would be found equal to the occasion, if equally well armed, with every enemy that might appear.

10. Both might be done, from India sparingly, from the Colonies liberally, leaving a small band of Europeans as a rallying point, and supplying the place of the rest with native Indian troops.

11. As a general thing the native of India is rather indifferent about such things, but by degrees they would of course appreciate the power of the country under which they serve; solid advantages derived to themselves would be a primary consideration with them.

12. Constituted as the regiments now are it would be better to raise regiments specially for Colonial service; at some future time, it might be declared that, from a specified date, not less than 10 years hence, all regiments will take their turns of foreign service, the advantages before established being equally applicable to them.

13. The terms of enlistment referred to are clear; all native Indian soldiers of the Bombay Presidency considered themselves liable for active field service beyond sea, and were most willing for it previous to the date referred to; it admits of some doubt whether they believed they would be employed on garrison duty whenever required in British Colonies unless under extraordinary circumstances.

14. No.

15. Greater distance is one distinction; no sudden employment of the native Indian army generally on tour in the British Colonies should be carried

carried out: special corps should be raised for the purpose at first.

16. I do not consider the service (garrison duty) in China was popular with the 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. They left India expecting to see field service. But I believe the chief reason for their not liking the service was the peculiar way in which they were housed in long sheds with a breadth to each man of 3 feet of surface by some 7½ in length. This, for 2½ years, it must be admitted, was trying, and long

absence from their families, about 560 of them being married men; but I never heard any expression of discontent from them. Their pay, with batta was sufficient, as they had rations free, and these were ample and very good: App. No. —

(signed) *E. C. Beale,*  
Colonel Commandant,  
22nd Regiment B. N. I.

Poonah,  
29 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieut. Colonel Sir *Henry Green*, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commandant in Chief, Sind Frontier Field Forces.

1. I AM of opinion that the general substitution of Indian native troops in our Colonies would be inexpedient either in time of peace or war.

2. If it were determined to employ native Indian troops, I consider that no particular race should be selected for any of the Colonies named, but that men should be enlisted without regard to tribe or race, having been first clearly informed of their proposed destination, and all the conditions of the Service upon which they are to be employed, and which latter should be most faithfully adhered to.

3. Reliefs should take place every three or four years.

4. If the men were enlisted, as proposed, in reply to Question 2, I do not see why any difficulties should arise.

5. The pay would have to be regulated according to the price of articles of consumption in the Colony in which the men might be stationed, unless they were fed by the State, which latter proceeding would be liable to cause difficulties, and probably much discontent.

6. I am decidedly of opinion that native Indian troops of any description would fail, if employed unsupported against the frontier tribes of the Cape Colony, or against internal disturbances in the Colonies named, but that if supported in the proportion of one British regiment to two natives, they might be of service in Ceylon and Hong Kong.

7. My opinion is, that they would not give satisfaction under either of the conditions named.

8. I think not.

9. Decidedly not. No numerical strength would make up for the withdrawal of garrisons composed of British soldiers.

10. Either course will be equally liable to lead to disaster.

11. I do not think that the native of India understands the meaning of the word loyal, in the sense that an European does; so long as we are successful in arms, and pay him well and regularly, he will be true to us, provided no severe religious pressure is brought to bear upon him; but he behaves well more from a feeling of self-interest than that of loyalty or gratitude.

12. I think that it would be better to raise fresh regiments exclusively for Colonial service.

13. Native soldiers recruited since 1856, understand that they are liable for service beyond the seas, but not for any lengthened period, and only in case of war.

14. The native soldiers would begin to consider where their employment beyond the seas would be likely to stop. Service at Aden and Burma is most unpopular amongst native troops, and China and the Mauritius would be equally so.

16. I am not quite certain of the year, but I think that it was between 1841 and 1845 that a Madras native regiment in Bombay, *en route* to Aden, refused to embark. Many similar instances can, I believe, be found on the records, both of the Bengal and Madras armies.

The real cause in all these instances, I believe, to have been the dislike to proceed beyond the seas.

17. I do not think that the employment of the Native Indian Army, as proposed, would in any way affect its feeling, with regard to being an Imperial Army, or that any real advantage would accrue by that feeling being instilled into it.

18. I am averse to the employment in India, as soldiers, of natives of other countries, when we have such a selection of material at hand; but I see no reason why Chinese, Malays, and Africans should not be employed in the Colonies in the same manner as the Indian army is in India. I have been given to understand that the Chinese make good soldiers, and if such be the case, a contingent might be raised to assist the British garrison in that Colony, and the same might be done wherever materiel exists for the purpose. Both the Ceylon rifles, composed of Malays and the West Indian regiments of Africans have, I believe, been found to answer, and such being the case, I see no reason for employing Native Indian troops, who would be far more costly, and from being unaccustomed to the climate, and manners and customs of the people, must be less useful.

(signed) *Henry Green*, Lieut. Col.  
Commandant Sind Frontier  
Field Force.

Jacobabad,  
4 June 1867.

App. No. 1.

ANSWERS of Colonel *Schneider*, Commanding Second Regiment, Grenadiers, Native Infantry.

1. I THINK it would be unwise to substitute Indian for English troops in our Colonies in time of peace, except as auxiliary troops. I doubt whether native regiments would be very effective for Colonial service under the present system of officering them.

2. If it were determined to employ natives of India in the Colonies here specified, as a general rule only men recruited from the northern parts of India, such as Beloochees, Sikhs, Punjaubee, Mahomedans, and Ghooikas should be selected for foreign service. Men from southern India, particularly Hindoos, the majority of whom do not eat meat, would probably be unable to endure the rigour of climates such as I understand may be met with in South Africa, New Zealand, &c.

3. The reliefs should be made every three years, and invariably by steamers instead of sailing transports.

4. I believe there are no difficulties that would render the races I have named from undertaking garrison service that could not be overcome by the offer of increased advantages for such service.

5. The present pay, with the addition of "double or donation batta." Free rations would also have to be issued, as in China and at Aden, together with an ample supply of warm clothing, boots, and woollen socks.

6. It would be a very hazardous experiment to rely entirely on Indian troops in their present organization for protection to the Cape Colony against the frontier tribes, or against internal disturbances in the other Colonies herein named: they should be well supported.

7. It would not do to employ Indian troops in the Colonies referred to in the preceding question as a substitution for Europeans. They might be employed to supplement them.

8. Only as a supplement to British troops. It is apprehended that the bare fact of its being known that Indian troops were employed in the place of British troops might of itself invite an attack in time of war.

9. Certainly not. No increase of numerical strength would, in my opinion, compensate for the loss of the moral effect caused by the presence of British troops.

10. It would be better to withdraw European regiments from some of our Colonies. There might be danger in reducing such garrisons as Malta and Gibraltar, which are in the vicinity of the great European Powers. Portions of garrisons withdrawn from distant Colonies might be replaced with Indian troops.

11. The loyalty of the native soldier is not diminished by foreign service. It shows him the power of the Government he serves, and in that respect must do good. He also has less regard for caste prejudices, and thus becomes a more efficient soldier.

12. It would be better, both in the interests of India and of the Colonies, if native troops are to be employed, that fresh regiments should be specially raised and officered for Colonial service. Government would thus secure, by volunteering and enlistment, a picked body of native soldiers, all of whom would thoroughly understand what was expected of them.

13. It is quite understood by the native soldier that he is required by his affirmation, to go wherever he is ordered, by land or sea. I have no doubt that every regiment in this Presidency would respond to the call of foreign service, placing entire faith in the "Sirka" that they would not be sacrificed by being required to serve in climates which by nature they are physically incapable of enduring. No possible advantage could accrue to Government by requiring its native soldiers to serve in countries unsuited to them.

14. Answered in the above reply.

15. I do not think that any distinction would be drawn, going across the sea or "Kala Paurier" is all they recognise wherever it may be; and provided they could withstand the effects of climate, and pay, rations, and clothing were sufficient, they would go where ordered.

16. I know of no such discontent having occurred, though I think that Kaye, in his "History of the Sepoy War," refers to this subject.

17. I do not think the sepoys of the native Indian army have any feeling on the subject becoming part of an imperial army. On being pensioned or discharged, they revert to the population, and to their original calling as cultivators of the soil, thinking nothing further on, but lit of the part.

18. If troops other than British are to be employed in our Colonies, it may not signify far as those Colonies are concerned, whether they be recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other tribes not Indian, provided they are commanded and amply officered by British officers accustomed to deal with native troops. But I would remark, that I have always understood three races above mentioned to be difficult to manage, and it may be regarded as a certainty, unless supplemented with British troops they would give trouble, and cause dissatisfaction among the colonists.

As there is no difficulty in providing native soldiers for service in India, I do not see that advantage would follow from employing other races not Indian, except as a matter of policy to set one race in antagonism to another, on the supposition that it would provide against the chances of another mutiny. On the other hand, the *esprit* of the native army in India might be humbled by the introduction of foreign troops other than those of their conquerors, by which side they take a pride in serving, and with which they have consolidated our empire in India. The inhabitants of India themselves, there is but little doubt the employment of Chinese, Malays, and Africans, or other races not Indian in the place of their countrymen, would be regarded with the greatest jealousy and dissatisfaction. We have only to remember that the French obtained a few years back in the Nizam's territory, when Rohillas and Arabs were extensively employed there, to judge how distasteful it would be to native residing in British territory, to see other races such as are under notice, forming a part of the Indian army.

(signed) J. W. Schneider  
Colonel Commanding 2nd Grenadiers  
Regiment, N. I.

Surat, 10 June 1867.

## ANSWERS of Major Thomson, Commander, 26th Regiment, Native Infantry.

ANSWERS respectfully submitted by Major G. L. Thomson, commanding Her Majesty's 26th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, to certain confidential Questions forwarded to him by the Military Secretary to his Excellency Sir R. Napier, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay Army, as to the advisability of employing Indian Troops in the British Colonies.

1. ADVISABLE to a certain extent.

2. Most of the regiments, as at present recruited in the Bombay army (with a few additional Punjau men), if efficiently officered, would be suitable for any of the Colonies named.

3. Not to be detained longer than three or four years at a time on Colonial service. But whatever period may be fixed upon by Government for their absence from India, should be strictly adhered to. The troops in transit should be kept at sea for as short a time as possible, on account of their caste, as they suffer more than Europeans.

4. None but what might be easily overcome, if proper arrangements are made for cooking, &c. for the different castes, and by an increase of pay and other advantages.

5. It is difficult to say, as so much would depend on the cost of provisions and other necessaries in the different Colonies, but sufficient ought to be granted to enable them to make remittances to their families in India.

In Persia they had pay, batta, and rations, and every man made considerable savings; they were thoroughly contented, and considered that Government had behaved generously to them.

6. They would do so, if efficiently commanded by an adequate number of European officers, with whom they were well acquainted, and had confidence in.

7. Most advisable as a supplement in the five Colonies named, if properly officered and armed with modern weapons.

8. I can truly say, I think they can be relied upon, as during the mutinies of 1857, 1858, and 1859, they were fully tried, more especially those men under my immediate command at Nassick and Trimbuck, as these places were the hot-beds of intrigue and discontent, and contained the relations and friends of the Nana Sahib, and also rebels of the Peait and other States; but a different mode than at present, of officering the regiments, would be required.

9. Certainly not, against a well-disciplined European or North American army. Two natives to one European would be required for garrison.

10. I think it would be better to withdraw European troops from the other Colonies named, filling up their places with Indian regiments to a certain extent, than withdraw European regiments from India, as was done during the Crimean war.

11. Decidedly advantageous, as it would not only do the native soldier good, but his experience of the power of Great Britain would be beneficially impressed on all those with whom he came in contact after his return to India.

12. It would be better, in my opinion, to take them according to roster, than raise new regiments exclusively for Colonial service, as I think it would be most difficult to get native soldiers to leave India for any long period.

13. All men on enlistment are made fully aware that they are liable for service beyond the seas.

14. As stated above, the troops being liable for foreign service no change is required.

15. I do not think they would draw any distinction.

16. I have never heard of any, except that a regiment sent to China was considered hardly used on account of its being detained there for a longer period than was at first intended.

17. Yes, I think so, and would be most beneficial in every way.

18. I do not think it would be politic to have the races named recruited for service in India, as I do not consider sufficient reliance could be placed on them, for they might easily be induced to turn against us, and their being brought into our Indian army would disgust the military races of India.

(signed) G. L. Thomson,  
Major Commanding Her Majesty's  
26th Regiment, Bombay N.I.

Camp Baroda, 15 June 1867.



Appendix, No. 2.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel Norman, 9 March 1867.

(A.)

MEMORANDUM of Composition of the NATIVE ARMY as respects Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of its principal Branches.

	NATIVES OF INDIA, EXCLUSIVE OF PUNJAUB.											PUNJAUB.				TRANS-INDUS or PERSIAN.				HILL TRIBES.		
	Christians.	Mahomedans.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Tamils.	Jats.	Telingas or Gentoos.	Mahrattas.	Bheels.	Parwarres.	Other Castes.	Mahomedans.	Hindoos.	Sikhs.	Maybees.	Afghans.	Border Tribes.	Bellooches.	Persians.	Goorkhas.	Dogra.	Other Hill Men.
Bengal Cavalry, 19 regiments.	13	2,542	404	543	-	688	2	2	-	-	159	717	204	1,745	19	329	441	147	21	2	341	31
Native Infantry Bengal Army, 49 regiments.	283	2,530	2,622	3,924	-	1,070	-	66	-	-	4,953	2,869	774	4,850	1,719	507	664	29	36	3,319	1,346	986
Punjab Cavalry, five regiments.	-	669	31	113	-	2	-	-	-	-	26	267	71	718	6	188	177	33	16	-	76	-
Punjab Infantry, 12 regiments, including Guide Corps.	5	193	103	60	-	53	-	-	-	-	57	1,629	228	2,521	6	806	1,047	16	66	538	1,009	341
Madras Infantry, 40 regiments. (b)	1,546	10,056	(a) 936	-	2,781	-	10,117	287	-	-	1,656	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bombay Cavalry, seven regiments. (c)	-	2,369	220	238	-	7	-	527	-	-	-	55	6	63	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bombay Infantry, 30 regiments. (d)	245	1,831	1,320	1,030	-	43	230	7,493	5	3,245	3,697	560	106	253	2	224	118	568	99	6	3	1

(a) Rajpoots and Brahmins are included under one head in the Madras Returns.

(b) The four regiments Madras Cavalry are nearly all Mahomedans.

(c) Thirty-nine men Bombay Cavalry unclassified.

(d) Also 246 Jews in the Bombay Infantry.

(B.)

## B E N G A L.

PAY and Allowances and Charges for different Corps, exclusive of Commissariat, Clothing, Ordnance and Barrack Charges, Capitation Allowance, &c.

			<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	
A Battery Horse Artillery (151 men)	-	-	94,994	11	-	per annum.
A Light Field Battery (151 men)	-	-	78,723	12	6	„
A Heavy Field Battery (82 men)	-	-	58,142	10	-	„
A Garrison Battery (80 men)	-	-	38,619	2	3	„
A Regiment Dragoons (493 men)	-	-	358,091	11	6	„
A Regiment Native Cavalry (465 men)	-	-	238,128	12	-	„
A Regiment British Infantry (899 men)	-	-	340,619	7	8	„
A Regiment Native Infantry (720 men)	-	-	138,132	12	-	„

There are some slight deviations from this rule in the other Presidencies.

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Appendix, No. 3.

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PAPERS handed in by Major General Pears.

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App. No. 3.

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EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Consultation for January 1865.

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(No. 615.)

MEMORANDUM, No. 1500 B.

WITH reference to Military Department Letter, No. 132, of 4th March last, and to Schedule No. 98, Case 1, the papers relating to which are herewith returned, the undersigned begs to submit the statement called for of the estimated cost of two Sikh regiments of the present established strength, if employed in China.

2. The cost during employment would be nearly the same whether the regiments were taken from the regular establishment or specially raised for such service; the only difference would be that in the latter case the bulk of the privates would be short-service men. In the non-effective charges this would be more than counterbalanced, as the amount of the gratuities payable on discharge would exceed the value of the pensions entailed by an ordinary term of service.

3. The actual amount payable in China for the full strength employed in that country is shown in Statement (A.), aggregating 5,68,626 rupees for the two regiments, and includes pay, extra batta, ration money, hutting money, and half-passages, and also sea provisions to and fro.

4. This would give an average of *Rs.* 399. 3., or say, in round numbers, 400 rupees, for each Native commissioned or non-commissioned officer and private.

5. Statement (B.) shows the amount payable in India for the same body for clothing, half-passages, and sea provisions, &c., as also for the maintenance of a depôt for each regiment equal to the strength of a company, so as to admit of the corps being kept at their full establishment abroad. The wear and tear of equipments is likewise included, based on the regulated period of duration, together with the cost of the annual supply of ammunition and medical stores.

6. The total of these charges is 1,76,979 rupees, which, for the full establishment, would give an average of *Rs.* 124. 2. per man of all grades.

7. Lastly, Statement (C.) exhibits the non-effective charges, viz., an estimate of the proportion of pensions and gratuities fairly chargeable to the Imperial Government, as also transport charges in India to and from port of embarkation, and extra furlough allowances for three months, a boon to which the men might be fairly considered entitled after a tour of foreign service, together with a sum of 5,000 rupees per regiment for contingencies. The total of these charges would be 24,011 rupees per regiment, or an average of *Rs.* 33. 7. per man.

8. The undersigned, on the foregoing data, would suggest that if the Imperial Government bore all the charges payable in China for pay, rations, hutting money, and half the passage money and sea provisions included in Statement (A.), an annual capitation sum of 125 rupees per man on the average strength in China for the effective services, payable in India, and of 35 rupees for non-effective services, would cover all certain charges, and allow a fair margin for unforeseen contingencies, whilst such an arrangement would materially simplify the adjustment of the expenditure.

9. It will be noted that the establishment of European officers is in excess of that allowed in India, but it corresponds in a great measure to that which has been sanctioned on former occasions, viz., one officer per company, in addition to the staff.

10. As regards passage and hutting money, the calculation is made on a triennial relief, but in addition to passage for the whole corps, passage to and fro annually for 10 per cent. of strength to allow for men invalided and on sick leave and to replace them, has been provided for, as also for two European officers per regiment annually. App. No. 3.

11. The rates assumed are two-thirds those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which it is considered would afford a fair average, and cover the freight of clothing, ammunition, &c.; and the calculation has been made that half of the passage money and sea provisions would be paid in China and half in India.

12. In the allowance for clothing, provision is made for a cost of trousers annually, as also for a pair of ankle boots, all of which may be considered as necessary for service in China.

13. The money ration has been calculated at the ordinary rate of Rs. 3. 8. for each fighting man, and Rs. 2. 8. for establishment followers.

(signed) A. Broome, Colonel,  
Accountant General,  
Military Department.

Military Department, Account Branch,  
7 January 1865.

ESTIMATE of the ANNUAL COST that would devolve upon the BRITISH GOVERNMENT by the Employment in *China* of the Two existing Regiments of SIKH INFANTRY.

STATEMENT (A.)—CHARGES PAYABLE IN CHINA.

	Military Pay.	Staff Salary.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
<b>I. European Officers :</b>			
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
1 Commandant - - - - -	640 14 -	600 - -	1,240 14 -
1 Second in command - - - - -	374 1 6	270 - -	644 1 6
1 Adjutant - - - - -	225 12 -	200 - -	425 12 -
1 Quartermaster - - - - -	225 12 -	150 - -	375 12 -
8 Doing-duty officers - - - - -	225 12 -	100 - -	2,606 - -
1 Medical officer - - - - -	- - -	- - -	600 - -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>- - -</b>	<b>- - -</b>	<b>5,892 7 6</b>
<b>II. Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men :</b>			
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
2 Subadars - - - - -	100 - -	15 - -	230 - -
8 { 2 " - - - - -	80 - -	15 - -	190 - -
4 " - - - - -	67 - -	15 - -	328 - -
8 { 4 " - - - - -	35 - -	7 8 -	170 - -
4 " - - - - -	30 - -	7 8 -	150 - -
40 Havildars - - - - -	14 - -	5 - -	760 - -
40 Naicks - - - - -	12 - -	5 - -	630 - -
16 Drummers - - - - -	7 - -	3 8 -	168 - -
600 { 100 Sepoys - - - - -	9 - -	3 8 -	1,250 - -
200 " - - - - -	8 - -	3 8 -	2,300 - -
300 " - - - - -	7 - -	3 8 -	3,150 - -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>- - -</b>	<b>- - -</b>	<b>9,376 - -</b>

App. No. 3.

## STATEMENT (A).—Charges Payable in China—continued.

	Pay.	Extra Batta and Extra Allowances on Foreign Service.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
<b>III. Educational Staff:</b>			
1 Moonshee - - - - -	20 - -	3 8 -	23 8 -
1 Grunthee - - - - -	10 - -	3 8 -	13 8 -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	- -	- -	<b>37 - -</b>
<b>IV. Native Followers:</b>			
1 Tindal - - - - -	9 8 -	3 8 -	13 - -
4 Lascars - - - - -	5 12 -	2 8 -	33 - -
16 Bhistees - - - - -	5 - -	2 8 -	120 - -
8 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	- -	32 - -
16 Cooks - - - - -	5 - -	- -	60 - -
1 Chowdry - - - - -	11 - -	3 8 -	14 8 -
1 Nutsuddy - - - - -	5 - -	3 8 -	8 8 -
2 Weighmen - - - - -	3 - -	3 8 -	13 - -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	- -	- -	<b>314 - -</b>
<b>V. Medical and Hospital Establishment:</b>			
2 Native Doctors - - - - -	{ 1 on 15 - - } 5 - -	- -	45 - -
2 Cooks - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	10 - -
2 Bhistees - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	10 - -
1 Head Sweeper - - - - -	6 - -	1 - -	7 - -
4 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	20 - -
1 Goorzah - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	5 - -
1 Shop cooley - - - - -	5 - -	1 - -	6 - -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	- -	- -	<b>103 - -</b>
<b>VI. Contract and other Allowances:</b>			
		Rates.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
1 Adjutant's allowance - - - - -	- - - - -	50 - -	50 - -
8 Company payment allowance - - - - -	- - - - -	20 - -	160 - -
1 Repair of camp equipage - - - - -	- - - - -	25 - -	25 - -
1 School shed - - - - -	- - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Butts and targets - - - - -	- - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Subadar major's allowance - - - - -	- - - - -	25 - -	25 - -
1 Drill havildar - - - - -	- - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Drill naick - - - - -	- - - - -	2 8 -	2 8 -
8 Pay havildars - - - - -	- - - - -	5 - -	40 - -
8 Color havildars - - - - -	- - - - -	2 - -	16 - -
1 Drum major - - - - -	- - - - -	7 - -	7 - -
1 Fife major - - - - -	- - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Mess allowance - - - - -	- - - - -	100 - -	100 - -
1 Band - - - - -	- - - - -	100 - -	100 - -
Order of merit pay - - - - -	- - - - -	50 - -	50 - -
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	- - - - -	- -	<b>594 8 -</b>

STATEMENT (A.)—Charges Payable in China—*continued.*

		Rates.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
VI. Contract and other Allowances— <i>continued.</i>			
Ration Money :		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
712 Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Rank and File		3 8 -	2,492 - -
56 Non-combatants		2 8 -	140 - -
TOTAL - - -		- - -	2,632 - -
Field Establishment of dooley bearers - - -		- - -	488 - -
Half passage money, to and fro, for two officers, annually - - -		- - -	1,480 - -
Ditto - - for ten per cent. sick, annually - - -		- - -	8,540 - -
Boardship provision, equipment for ditto - - -		- - -	1,450 - -
Total Annual Expenditure for one Regiment - - -		- - -	2,44,713 10 -
Hutting Money :			
8 Subadars - - - - -		30 - -	240 - -
8 Jemadars - - - - -		15 - -	120 - -
80 Havildars and Naicks - - - - -		10 - -	800 - -
616 Drummers and Sepoys - - - - -		3 - -	1,848 - -
Non-combatants - - - - -		- - -	160 - -
Half of passage money, to and from, for an entire regiment to be relieved every three years - - -		- - -	1,01,164 - -
Boardship provision and equipment for ditto - - -		- - -	14,470 - -
TOTAL - - -		- - -	1,18,802 - -
Proportion for one Year - - -		- - -	39,600 - -
GRAND TOTAL of Annual Charges for One Regiment, payable in China - - -		- - -	2,84,313 10 -
Ditto - - ditto - - for Two Regiments - - -		- - -	5,68,626 4 -

## STATEMENT (B.)

		Rate.	Total.
Clothing :		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
8 Subadars - - - - -		17 - 9	136 6 -
8 Jemadars - - - - -		15 15 4	127 10 8
40 Havildars - - - - -		11 2 -	445 - -
40 Naicks - - - - -		9 - 10	362. 1 4
1 Drum Major - - - - -		14 12 11	14 12 11
1 Fife Major - - - - -		11 2 -	11 2 -
614 Drummers and Sepoys - - - - -		9 - 4	5,538 12 8
Boots for all ranks - - - - -		5 - -	3,560 - -
TOTAL - - -		- - -	10,195 13 7
Half passage money for 2 officers, annually - - -		- - -	1,480 - -
Half passage money for 10 per cent sick, annually - - -		- - -	8,540 - -
Board ship provision, and equipment for ditto - - -		- - -	1,450 - -
Proportion of passage money for one year for the whole corps - - -		- - -	33,721 - -
Ditto of boardship provision and equipment - - -		- - -	4,823 - -
TOTAL - - -		- - -	50,014 - -
Depôt Charges :			
1 Lieutenant in charge - - - - -		325 12 -	325 12 -
1 Subadar - - - - -		80 - -	80 - -
1 Jemadar - - - - -		35 - -	35 - -
5 Havildars - - - - -		14 - -	70 - -
5 Naicks - - - - -		12 - -	60 - -
2 Drummers - - - - -		7 - -	14 - -
75 Sepoys - - - - -		7 - -	525 - -

App. No. 3.

## STATEMENT (B.)—Charges Payable in China—continued.

	Rate.	TOTAL
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Non-Combatants:		
1 Lascar - - - - -	5 12 -	5 12 -
2 Bhistees - - - - -	5 - -	10 - -
2 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	8 - -
2 Cooks - - - - -	5 - -	10 - -
1 Mutsuddy - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
2 Weighmen - - - - -	3 - -	6 - -
Medical and Hospital Establishment:		
1 Medical Charge - - - - -	30 - -	30 - -
1 Native Doctor - - - - -	20 - -	20 - -
1 Cook - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Bhistee - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Sweeper - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Coolie - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
Non-effective Allowances:		
1 Company Payment Allowance - - - - -	20 - -	20 - -
1 Repair of Camp Equipage - - - - -	2 8 -	2 8 -
1 Butts and Targets - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Drill Naick - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Pay Havildar - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
TOTAL Pay and Allowances of Depôt - - - - -	- - -	1,258 - -
Ditto - - - per Annum - - - - -	- - -	15,096 - -
Wear and tear of Arms and Accoutrements - - - - -	- - -	4,358 - -
Wear and tear of Camp Equipage - - - - -	- - -	428 - -
Annual expenditure of Ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- - -	5,876 - -
Annual expenditure of Medical Stores - - - - -	- - -	1,352 - -
Clothing for Depôt Company - - - - -	- - -	1,170 - -
TOTAL of Statement (B.) - - - - -	- - -	88,489 13 7
TOTAL for Two Corps - - - - -	- - -	1,76,979 11 2

## STATEMENT (C.)

	Annual Amount.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Non-effective Charges:	
Pensions and Gratuities - - - - -	1,720 - -
Annual proportion of Transport Charges in India - - - - -	11,573 - -
"    of three months' leave Pay to the Corps on relief after three years - - - - -	5,718 - -
Contingencies - - - - -	5,000 - -
TOTAL of Statement (C.) - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 24,011 - -
TOTAL for Two Corps - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 48,022 - -

India Office, Military Department,  
22 March 1867.(signed) A. Broome, Colonel,  
Accountant-General, Military Department.

STATEMENT showing the SICKNESS and MORTALITY among the NATIVE TROOPS in *Burmah* and *Port Blair*, for the Years 1864 and 1865.

Year.	Strength.	Admitted into Hospital.	Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.
1864 - - -	2,751	2,714	46	16·80 per 1,000
1865 - - -	2,577	2,150	34	13·20 „

STATEMENT taken from the Sanitary Reports of the Army Medical Department presented to Parliament, showing the SICKNESS and MORTALITY among the NATIVE TROOPS serving in *China* during the Second War, and the Regiments garrisoning *Hong Kong* and *Shanghai* subsequently.

Year.	Strength.	Admitted.	Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths.
1859 - - -	2,009	3,283	109	*53·73 per 1,000
1860 - - -	5,275	11,180	168	31·85 „
1861 - - -	3,128	3,958	82	28·45 „
1862 - - -	1,725	2,500	41	23·77 „
1863 - - -	1,562	1,842	31	19·85 „
1864 - - -	1,553	1,683	40	25·75 „

\* The deaths amongst the Natives invalided to India are not included.

India Office, Military Department,  
23 March 1867.



## Appendix, No. 4.

## PAPERS received from the Horse Guards.

App. No. 4. RETURN of the MOVEMENT of REGIMENTS during the last 20 Years to and from *India*, the *Cape*, and all Colonies East of the *Cape*, and of the Time passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.
57th Foot - - - -	Australia - - -	March 1825	March 1831	6 0
	India - - - -	March 1831	Sept. 1846	15 6
			Total -	21 6
31st Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Feb. 1825	Dec. 1846	21 10
89th Foot - - - -	Australia - - -	July 1826	July 1832	6 0
	India - - - -	July 1832	June 1847	14 11
			Total -	20 11
9th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Mauritius - - -	Nov. 1832	Oct. 1835	2 11
	India - - - -	Oct. 1835	July 1847	11 9
			Total -	14 8
62nd Foot - - - -	India - - - -	June 1830	July 1847	17 1
17th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Australia - - -	June 1830	March 1836	5 9
	India - - - -	March 1836	Aug. 1847	11 5
			Total -	17 2
63rd Foot - - - -	Australia - - -	Oct. 1828	Dec. 1833	5 2
	India - - - -	Dec. 1833	Aug. 1847	13 8
			Total -	18 10

*Note.*—The date *first* shown in the service of each regiment is intended to mark the period of embarkation from this country, and the date *last* shown, as the time of the return to this country.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.	
				—	—
12th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Mauritius - -	Aug. 1837	Mar. 1848	10	7
35th Foot - - -	Mauritius - -	Jan. 1837	April 1848	11	3
27th Foot - - -	Cape - - -	May 1835	April 1848	12	11
90th Foot - - -	Ceylon - - - Cape - - -	Nov. 1835	Feb. 1846	10	3
		Feb. 1846	April 1848	2	2
		Total -		12	5
91st Foot - - -	St. Helena - - - Cape - - -	Nov. 1835	June 1839	3	7
		June 1839	April 1848	8	10
		Total -		12	5
21st Foot, 1st Battalion -	Australia - - - India - - -	Mar. 1833	Feb. 1839	5	11
		Feb. 1839	May 1848	9	3
		Total -		15	2
28th Foot - - -	Australia - - - India - - -	July 1835	June 1842	6	11
		June 1842	May 1848	5	11
		Total -		12	10
50th Foot - - -	Australia - - - India - - -	June 1834	Jan. 1841	6	7
		Jan. 1841	June 1848	7	5
		Total -		14	-
4th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Australia - - - India - - -	Oct. 1831	Aug. 1837	5	10
		Aug. 1837	Sept. 1848	11	1
		Total -		16	11
95th Foot - - -	Ceylon - - - China - - -	Oct. 1838	Mar. 1847	8	5
		Mar. 1847	Aug. 1850	3	5
		Total -		11	10
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion -	Malta - - - Ionian Islands - - - Cape - - -	Nov. 1840	Mar. 1843	2	4
		Mar. 1843	Aug. 1846	3	5
		Aug. 1846	Aug. 1850	4	0
		Total -		9	9
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion -	Cape - - -	Jan. 1852	Jan. 1854	2	0
18th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Ceylon - - - China - - - India - - -	Jan. 1837	May 1840	3	4
		May 1840	Nov. 1847	7	6
		Nov. 1847	May 1854	6	6
		Total -		17	4

App. No. 4.

Corps.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.
80th Foot - - -	Australia - - -	Dec. 1836	Aug. 1844	7 8
	India - - -	Aug. 1844	June 1854	9 10
	Total -			17 6
94th Foot - - -	Ceylon - - -	Oct. 1838	April 1839	0 6
	India - - -	April 1839	June 1854	15 2
	Total -			15 6
51st Foot - - -	Tasmania - - -	July 1838	Aug. 1846	8 1
	India - - -	Aug. 1846	Aug. 1854	8 0
	Total -			16 1
96th Foot - - -	Australia - - -	Nov. 1840	Jan. 1843	2 2
	Tasmania - - -	Jan. 1843	Feb. 1849	6 1
	India - - -	Feb. 1849	April 1855	6 2
	Total -			14 5
15th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Ceylon - - -	Sept. 1845	May 1855	9 8
98th Foot - - -	China - - -	Dec. 1841	July 1846	4 7
	India - - -	July 1846	May 1855	8 10
	Total -			13 5
22nd Foot, 1st Battalion - -	India - - -	Jan. 1841	July 1855	14 6
25th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Cape - - -	Dec. 1839	Aug. 1842	2 8
	India - - -	Aug. 1842	Aug. 1855	13 0
	Total -			15 8
11th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Australia - - -	July 1845	Jan. 1847	1 6
	Tasmania - - -	Jan. 1847	Aug. 1848	1 7
	Australia - - -	Aug. 1848	Feb. 1858	9 6
	Total -			12 7
12th Foot, 2nd Battalion - -	Cape - - -	Nov. 1842	May 1843	0 6
	Mauritius - - -	May 1843	Aug. 1851	8 3
	Cape - - -	Aug. 1851	Sept. 1858	7 1
	Total -			15 10

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.		App. No. 4.
58th Foot	Australia	May 1844	April 1845	0	11	
	New Zealand	April 1845	Dec. 1846	1	8	
	Australia	Dec. 1846	June 1847	0	6	
	New Zealand	June 1847	March 1859	11	9	
	Total			14	10	
45th Foot	Cape	Feb. 1843	June 1859	16	4	
10th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	April 1842	July 1859	17	3	
86th Foot	India	April 1842	Aug. 1859	17	4	
82nd Foot	India	May 1846	Aug. 1859	13	3	
84th Foot	India	April 1842	Sept. 1859	17	5	
78th Foot	India	April 1842	Jan. 1857	14	9	
	Persia	Jan. 1857	May 1857	0	4	
	India	May 1857	Sept. 1859	2	4	
	Total			17	5	
29th Foot	India	April 1842	Sept. 1859	17	5	
60th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	July 1845	Aug. 1860	15	1	
53rd Foot	India	August 1844	Aug. 1860	16	0	
8th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	April 1846	Sept. 1860	14	5	
61st Foot	India	July 1845	June 1859	13	11	
	Mauritius	June 1859	Sept. 1860	1	3	
	Total			15	2	
3rd Foot, 1st Battalion	Malta	April 1851	Nov. 1854	3	7	
	Greece	Nov. 1854	Mar. 1855	0	4	
	Malta	March 1855	April 1855	0	1	
	Crimea	April 1855	May 1856	1	1	
	Ionian Isles	May 1856	Nov. 1858	2	6	
	India	Nov. 1858	Nov. 1859	1	0	
	China	Nov. 1859	April 1861	1	5	
Total			10	0		
1st Foot, 2nd Battalion	Ionian Isles	Jan. 1853	April 1855	2	3	
	Crimea	April 1855	June 1856	1	2	
	Malta	June 1856	May 1857	0	11	
	Gibraltar	May 1857	July 1858	1	2	
	China	July 1858	April 1861	2	9	
Total			8	3		

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
2nd Foot, 1st Battalion -	Cape	June 1851	March 1860	8 9
	China	March 1860	May 1861	1 2
	Total -			9 11
87th Foot - - -	India	April 1849	April 1860	11 0
	China	April 1860	June 1861	1 2
	Total -			12 2
5th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Mauritius	July 1847	May 1857	9 10
	India	May 1857	July 1861	4 2
	Total -			14 0
37th Foot - - -	Ceylon	Nov. 1846	Oct. 1857	10 11
	India	Oct. 1857	July 1861	3 9
	Total -			14 8
24th Foot, 1st Battalion -	India	May 1846	July 1861	15 2
73rd Foot - - -	Monte Video	Sept. 1845	July 1846	0 10
	Cape	July 1846	March 1858	11 8
	India	March 1858	Aug. 1861	3 5
	Total -			15 11
64th Foot - - -	India	Jan. 1849	Nov. 1856	7 10
	Persia	Nov. 1856	May 1857	0 6
	India	May 1857	Sept. 1861	4 4
	Total -			12 8
59th Foot - - -	China	June 1849	Nov. 1858	9 5
	Cape	Nov. 1858	Dec. 1861	3 1
	Total -			12 6
60th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Cape	July 1851	April 1858	6 9
	India	April 1858	Feb. 1860	1 10
	China	Feb. 1860	Feb. 1862	2 0
	Total -			10 7
83rd Foot - - -	India	Jan. 1849	May 1862	13 4
6th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Cape	Aug. 1846	Dec. 1857	11 4
	India	Dec. 1857	May 1862	4 5
	Total -			15 9
75th Foot - - -	India	May 1849	June 1862	13 1

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
92nd Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	March 1851	March 1853	2 0
	Gibraltar - - -	March 1853	Aug. 1855	2 5
	Crimea - - -	Aug. 1855	May 1856	0 9
	Gibraltar - - -	May 1856	Jan. 1858	1 8
	India - - -	Jan. 1858	May 1863	5 4
		Total -		12 2
85th Foot - - -	Mauritius - - -	Jan. 1853	May 1856	3 4
	Cape - - -	May 1856	June 1863	7 1
		Total -		10 5
31st Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Jan. 1853	May 1855	2 4
	Crimea - - -	May 1855	June 1856	1 1
	Malta - - -	June 1856	April 1857	0 10
	Gibraltar - - -	April 1857	May 1858	1 1
	Cape - - -	May 1858	Oct. 1858	0 5
	India - - -	Oct. 1858	Feb. 1860	1 4
	China - - -	Feb. 1860	Nov. 1863	3 9
		Total -		10 10
13th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Gibraltar - - -	May 1851	June 1855	4 1
	Crimea - - -	June 1855	May 1856	0 11
	Gibraltar - - -	May 1856	Aug. 1856	0 3
	Cape - - -	Aug. 1856	Aug. 1857	1 0
	India - - -	Aug. 1857	April 1864	6 8
		Total -		12 11
69th Foot - - -	India - - -	Nov. 1857	May 1864	6 6
74th Foot - - -	Cape - - -	March 1851	Nov. 1853	2 8
	India - - -	Nov. 1853	June 1864	10 7
		Total -		13 3
28th Foot - - -	Malta - - -	Feb. 1854	April 1854	0 2
	Turkey - - -	April 1854	Aug. 1854	0 4
	Crimea - - -	Aug. 1854	May 1856	1 9
	Malta - - -	May 1856	Oct. 1858	2 5
	India - - -	Oct. 1858	March 1865	6 5
		Total -		11 9
52nd Foot - - -	India - - -	June 1853	March 1865	11 9
48th Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Feb. 1853	April 1855	2 2
	Crimea - - -	April 1855	May 1856	1 1
	Malta - - -	May 1856	Aug. 1857	1 3
	Gibraltar - - -	Aug. 1857	Sept. 1858	1 1
	India - - -	Sept. 1858	April 1865	6 7
		Total -		12 2
71st Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	March 1853	Jan. 1855	1 10
	Crimea - - -	Jan. 1855	June 1856	1 5
	Malta - - -	June 1856	Jan. 1858	1 7
	India - - -	Jan. 1858	May 1865	7 4
		Total -		12 2

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
66th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Aug. 1857	June 1865	7 10
89th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - - - -	April 1854	Dec. 1854	0 8
	Crimea - - - -	Dec. 1854	May 1856	1 5
	Gibraltar - - - -	May 1856	Aug. 1856	0 3
	Cape - - - -	Aug. 1856	Aug. 1857	1 0
	India - - - -	Aug. 1857	Aug. 1865	8 0
			Total -	11 4
81st Foot - - - -	India - - - -	July 1853	Aug. 1865	12 1
65th Foot - - - -	New Zealand - - - -	May 1846	Jan. 1866	19 8
72nd Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Sept. 1857	Feb. 1866	8 5
56th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1866	8 7
44th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1860	2 7
	China - - - -	March 1860	Oct. 1861	1 7
	India - - - -	Oct. 1861	March 1866	4 5
			Total -	8 7
70th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Jan. 1849	Feb. 1861	12 1
	New Zealand - - - -	Feb. 1861	Mar. 1866	5 1
			Total -	17 2
54th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Aug. 1857	April 1866	8 8
18th Foot, 1st Battalion -	India - - - -	Nov. 1857	May 1866	8 6
68th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Dec. 1857	Nov. 1863	5 11
	New Zealand - - - -	Nov. 1863	June 1866	2 7
			Total -	8 6
80th Foot - - - -	Cape - - - -	July 1856	Nov. 1857	1 4
	India - - - -	Nov. 1857	June 1866	8 7
			Total -	9 11
43rd Foot - - - -	Cape - - - -	Oct. 1851	Dec. 1853	2 2
	India - - - -	Dec. 1853	Oct. 1863	9 10
	New Zealand - - - -	Oct. 1863	July 1866	2 9
			Total -	14 9

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
40th Foot - - - -	Australia - - -	July 1852	July 1860	8 0
	New Zealand - - -	July 1860	Sept. 1866	6 2
			Total -	14 2
67th Foot - - - -	India - - - -	Sept. 1858	Sept. 1859	1 0
	China - - - -	Sept. 1859	July 1865	5 10
	Cape - - - -	July 1865	Sept. 1866	1 2
			Total -	8 0

## Regiments now Abroad.—Service made up to March 1867.

57th Foot (expected home in 1867).	Ionian Isles - - -	Feb. 1853	Sept. 1854	1 7
	Crimea - - - -	Sept. 1854	May 1856	1 8
	Malta - - - -	May 1856	May 1858	2 0
	India - - - -	May 1858	Nov. 1860	2 6
	New Zealand - - -	Nov. 1860	March 1867	6 4
			Total -	14 1
12th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Australia - - -	July 1854	Jan. 1857	2 6
	Tasmania - - - -	Jan. 1857	April 1858	1 3
	Australia - - - -	April 1858	Sept. 1863	5 5
	New Zealand - - -	Sept. 1863	March 1867	3 6
			Total -	12 8
27th Foot expected home, 1867-68).	India - - - -	July 1854	Mar. 1867	12 8
35th Foot (expected home, 1867-68).	India - - - -	Aug. 1854	Mar. 1867	12 7
46th Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	Crimea - - - -	Oct. 1854	May 1856	1 7
	Ionian Isles - - -	May 1856	Sept. 1858	2 4
	India - - - -	Sept. 1858	Mar. 1867	8 6
			Total -	12 5
91st Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	Malta - - - -	Dec. 1854	March 1855	0 3
	Greece - - - -	Mar. 1855	Feb. 1857	1 11
	Ionian Isles - - -	Feb. 1857	Sept. 1858	1 7
	India - - - -	Sept. 1858	March 1867	8 6
			Total -	12 3
33rd Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	Mauritius - - - -	Feb. 1857	July 1857	0 5
	India - - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
			Total -	10 1
90th Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	India - - - -	April 1857	March 1867	9 11



App. No. 4.	CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	—
					<i>Yrs. ms.</i>
	82nd Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	India - - -	May 1857	March 1867	9 10
	4th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1869-70).	Mauritius - - - India - - -	May 1857 Nov. 1858	Nov. 1858 March 1867	1 0 8 4
				Total -	9 10
	23rd Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1869-70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9 9
	93rd Foot (expected home, 1869-70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9 9
	77th Foot (expected home, 1869-70).	Australia - - - India - - -	June 1857 April 1858	April 1858 March 1867	0 10 8 11
				Total -	9 9
	95th Foot (expected home, 1869-70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9 9
	50th Foot (expected home, 1869 or 1870).	Ceylon - - - New Zealand - - - Australia - - -	July 1857 Oct. 1863 Oct. 1866	Oct. 1863 Oct. 1866 Mar. 1867	6 3 3 0 0 5
				Total -	9 8
	88th Foot (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	7th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	Rifle Brigade, 3rd Battalion (expected home, 1871-72).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	1st Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	19th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	79th Foot (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	38th Foot (expected home, 1871-72).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
	20th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
	97th Foot (expected home, 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	App. No. 4.	
				Yrs.	ms.
Rifle Brigade, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1868-69).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
34th Foot (expected home 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
60th Foot, 3rd Battalion (expected home, 1871-72).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
42nd Foot (expected home, 1867-68).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
94th Foot (expected home, 1867-68).	India - - -	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9	5
98th Foot (on passage home)	India - - -	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9	5
51st Foot (on passage home) -	India - - -	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9	5
5th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Mauritius - - -	Aug. 1858	April 1863	4	8
	Cape - - -	April 1863	March 1867	3	11
			Total -	8	7
99th Foot (expected home in 1870).	India - - -	Sept. 1858	Feb. 1860	1	5
	China - - -	Feb. 1860	Feb. 1865	5	0
	Cape - - -	Feb. 1865	March 1867	2	1
			Total -	8	6
9th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1868).	Ionian Isles - - -	Oct. 1858	June 1864	5	8
	Gibraltar - - -	June 1864	Nov. 1864	0	5
	China - - -	Nov. 1864	April 1866	1	5
	Japan - - -	April 1866	March 1867	0	11
			Total -	8	5
13th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Cape - - -	Feb. 1859	March 1863	4	1
	Mauritius - - -	Mar. 1863	March 1867	4	0
			Total -	8	1
22nd Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Malta - - -	May 1859	July 1865	6	2
	Mauritius - - -	July 1865	March 1867	1	8
			Total -	7	10
10th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1871-72).	Cape - - -	Jan. 1860	Dec. 1864	4	11
	India - - -	Dec. 1864	March 1867	2	3
			Total -	7	2
9th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1870).	Ionian Isles - - -	Jan 1860	June 1864	4	5
	Gibraltar - - -	June 1864	Aug. 1865	1	2
	Cape - - -	Aug. 1865	March 1867	1	7
			Total -	7	2
24th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871-72).	Mauritius - - -	March 1860	Oct. 1865	5	7
	Burmah - - -	Oct. 1865	March 1867	1	5
			Total -	7	0
14th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1870).	New Zealand - - -	Sept. 1860	Oct. 1866	6	1
	Australia - - -	Oct. 1866	March 1867	0	5
			Total -	6	6

App. No. 4.	CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
11th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871).	Cape - - -	China - - -	July 1861	April 1865	3 9
				May 1866	1 1
				March 1867	0 10
				Total -	5 8
96 h Foot (expected home, 1873-74).	Cape - - -	India - - -	Feb. 1863	Nov. 1865	2 9
				Nov. 1865	1 4
				Total -	4 1
18th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	New Zealand - - -	April 1863	March 1867	3 11	
21st Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1874-75).	India - - -	July 1863	March 1867	3 8	
20th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	India - - -	China - - -	July 1863	Nov. 1863	0 4
				Nov. 1863	0 7
				June 1864	1 11
				May 1866	0 10
Total -	3 8				
25th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	Ceylon - - -	July 1863	March 1867	3 8	
36th Foot (expected home in 1874-75).	India - - -	Aug. 1863	March 1867	3 7	
19th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1874-75).	India - - -	Aug. 1863	March 1867	3 7	
76th Foot (expected home, 1874-75).	India - - -	Oct. 1863	March 1867	3 5	
55th Foot (expected home, 1874-75).	India - - -	Nov. 1863	March 1867	3 4	
11th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1875-76).	India - - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8	
12th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1875-76).	India - - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8	
58th Foot (expected home, 1875-76).	India - - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8	
45th Foot (expected home, 1875-76).	India - - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8	
10th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1874).	Cape - - -	Sept. 1864	March 1867	2 6	
41st Foot (expected home, 1875-76).	India - - -	July 1865	March 1867	1 8	
26th Foot (expected home, 1876-77).	India - - -	July 1865	March 1867	1 8	
49th Foot (expected home, 1876-77).	India - - -	Aug. 1865	March 1867	1 7	

Quarter Master General's Office, Horse Guards, }  
18 March 1867.

J. Hope Grant,  
Quarter Master General.

## WEST INDIES.

## ADDENDA to Return dated 18th March.

RETURN of the MOVEMENT of REGIMENTS, during the last 20 Years, to and from the *West Indies* and the *Bermudas*, and of the Time Passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
77th Foot - - - -	Malta - - -	Nov. 1837	Feb. 1842	4 3
	Ionian Isles - - -	Feb. 1842	Jan. 1843	0 11
	Jamaica - - -	Jan. 1843	Jan. 1846	3 0
	Nova Scotia - - -	Jan. 1846	Sept. 1846	0 8
	Canada - - -	Sept. 1846	June 1848	1 9
				10 7
71st Foot - - - -	Canada - - -	April 1838	Oct. 1843	5 6
	West Indies - - -	Oct. 1843	Jan. 1847	3 3
				8 9
23rd Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Nova Scotia - - -	May 1838	Oct. 1840	2 5
	Canada - - -	Oct. 1840	Sept. 1843	2 11
	West Indies - - -	Sept. 1843	Mar. 1847	3 6
	Nova Scotia - - -	March 1847	Oct. 1848	1 7
				10 5
48th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - - -	Sept. 1838	Jan. 1844	5 4
	Jamaica - - -	Jan. 1844	April 1847	3 3
				8 7
7th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Gibraltar - - -	Nov. 1839	Dec. 1844	5 1
	West Indies - - -	Dec. 1844	April 1848	3 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	April 1848	June 1850	2 2
				10 7
1st Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Gibraltar - - -	Nov. 1839	Feb. 1846	6 3
	West Indies - - -	Feb. 1846	April 1848	2 2
	Nova Scotia - - -	April 1848	Aug. 1851	3 4
				11 9
38th Foot - - - -	Ionian Isles - - -	Sept. 1840	March 1843	2 6
	Gibraltar - - -	Mar. 1843	Nov. 1845	2 8
	Jamaica - - -	Nov. 1845	March 1848	2 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	Mar. 1848	Aug. 1851	3 5
				10 11
88th Foot - - - -	Malta - - -	Dec. 1840	Jan. 1847	6 1
	West Indies - - -	Jan. 1847	May 1850	3 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	May 1850	July 1851	1 2
				10 7
42nd Foot - - - -	Ionian Isles - - -	Jan. 1841	Feb. 1843	2 1
	Malta - - -	Feb. 1843	Feb. 1847	4 0
	Bermuda - - -	Feb. 1847	June 1851	4 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	June 1851	June 1852	1 0
				11 5

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
20th Foot, 1st Battalion	Bermuda	Sept. 1841	April 1847	5 7
	Nova Scotia	April 1847	Sept. 1847	0 5
	Canada	Sept. 1847	July 1853	5 10
	Total			11 10
72nd Foot	Gibraltar	Nov. 1844	Feb. 1848	3 3
	West Indies	Feb. 1848	July 1851	3 5
	Nova Scotia	July 1851	Oct. 1854	3 3
	Total			9 11
66th Foot	Gibraltar	July 1845	Jan. 1848	2 6
	West Indies	Jan. 1848	May 1851	3 4
	Canada	May 1851	Oct. 1854	3 5
	Total			9 3
54th Foot	Gibraltar	Oct. 1845	Dec. 1846	1 2
	Malta	Dec. 1846	Dec. 1847	1 0
	West Indies	Dec. 1847	June 1851	3 6
	Canada	June 1851	Oct. 1854	3 4
	Total			9 0
19th Foot, 1st Battalion	Malta	Sept. 1840	Jan. 1843	2 4
	Ionian Isles	Jan. 1843	Dec. 1845	2 11
	West Indies	Dec. 1845	April 1848	2 4
	Canada	April 1848	July 1851	3 3
	Total			10 10
34th Foot	Ionian Isles	Oct. 1845	March 1848	2 5
	Gibraltar	March 1848	March 1850	2 0
	West Indies	March 1850	June 1853	3 3
	Total			7 8
16th Foot, 1st Battalion	Gibraltar	Jan. 1846	March 1847	1 2
	Ionian Isles	March 1847	April 1851	4 1
	Jamaica	April 1851	Sept. 1854	3 5
	Canada	Sept. 1854	July 1857	2 10
	Total			11 6
56th Foot	Gibraltar	Dec. 1846	May 1851	4 5
	Bermuda	May 1851	Jan. 1855	3 8
	Total			8 1
36th Foot	Ionian Isles	Jan. 1847	March 1851	4 2
	West Indies	March 1851	Sept. 1854	3 6
	Jamaica	Sept. 1854	July 1857	2 10
	Total			10 6
69th Foot	Malta	Nov. 1847	April 1851	3 5
	West Indies	April 1851	May 1857	6 1
	Total			9 6
67th Foot	Gibraltar	Jan. 1848	June 1851	3 5
	West Indies	June 1851	March 1857	5 9
	Total			9 2

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
26th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - - -	Mar. 1850	April 1853	3 1
	Canada - - - -	April 1853	Nov. 1854	1 7
	Bermuda - - - -	Nov. 1854	Nov. 1859	5 0
	Total -			9 8
39th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - - -	April 1854	Dec. 1854	0 8
	Crimea - - - -	Dec. 1854	May 1856	1 5
	Canada - - - -	May 1856	Oct. 1859	3 5
	Bermuda - - - -	Oct. 1859	Aug. 1864	4 10
Total -			10 4	
14th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Malta - - - -	April 1854	Jan. 1855	0 9
	Crimea - - - -	Jan. 1855	June 1856	1 5
	Malta - - - -	June 1856	Aug. 1858	2 2
	Ionian Isles - -	Aug. 1858	Feb. 1860	1 6
	Jamaica - - - -	Feb. 1860	May 1864	4 3
Total -			10 1	
21st Foot, 1st Battalion -	Crimea - - - -	Aug. 1854	May 1856	1 9
	Malta - - - -	May 1856	Mar. 1860	3 10
	West Indies - -	Mar. 1860	Aug. 1864	4 5
Total -			10 0	
49th Foot - - - -	Barbados - - -	Feb. 1857	May 1860	3 3
41st Foot - - - -	Jamaica - - - -	April 1857	May 1860	3 1
2nd Foot, 2nd Battalion -	Malta - - - -	Feb. 1858	Aug. 1858	0 6
	Ionian Isles - -	Aug. 1858	June 1862	3 10
	Gibraltar - - -	June 1862	June 1864	2 0
	Bermuda - - - -	June 1864	Nov. 1866	2 5
Total -			8 9	
3rd Foot, 2nd Battalion -	Malta - - - -	April 1858	June 1862	4 2
	Gibraltar - - -	June 1862	June 1864	2 0
	Barbados - - -	June 1864	June 1866	2 0
Total -			8 2	

## Regiments still Abroad.

6th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Gibraltar - - -	May 1858	June 1862	4 1
	Ionian Isles - -	June 1862	Mar. 1864	1 9
	Jamaica - - - -	Mar. 1864	Mar. 1867	3 0
Total -			8 10	
16th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871).	Nova Scotia - -	Dec. 1861	May 1866	5 5
	Barbados - - -	May 1866	Mar. 1867	0 10
Total -			6 3	
61st Foot (expected home in 1876).	Bermuda - - - -	Oct. 1866	Mar. 1867	0 5

Horse Guards, }  
20 March 1867. }

## Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER handed in by Lieutenant General Sir Hope Grant.

RETURN of the Number of TROOPS in the COLONIES and DEPENDENCIES borne on the Strength of the ARMY.

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops (Officers and Men) borne on Strength of Imperial Army.					
	Cavalry of the Line.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
<b>COLONIES PROPER :</b>						
<i>North American :</i>						
Canada - - - - -	504	8,449	1,095	1,848	221	12,117
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick - -	-	2,903	-	488	204	3,595
Newfoundland - - - - -	-	-	199	95	-	294
British Columbia - - - - -	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
<i>Australian Colonies :*</i>						
New South Wales - - - - -	-	356	-	111	9	476
Victoria - - - - -	-	468	-	111	-	599
South Australia - - - - -	-	185	-	-	-	185
Tasmania - - - - -	-	282	-	-	2	284
Queensland - - - - -	-	91	-	-	-	91
New Zealand* - - - - -	Military Train, 292	2,083	-	-	-	2,375
<i>South African Colonies :</i>						
Cape of Good Hope,† Natal, and British } Kaffaria - - - - -	-	3,511	491	152	213	4,367
Ceylon‡ - - - - -	-	880	853	88	5	1,826
Mauritius - - - - -	-	1,464	-	244	133	1,841
<i>West Indies :</i>						
Jamaica - - - - -	-	772	700	91	3	1,566
Honduras - - - - -	-	-	504	1	-	505
Windward and Leeward Islands, com- } prising Barbados, Trinidad, and British } Guiana - - - - -	-	754	456	104	5	1,319
	504	22,218	4,298	3,333	795	31,440
<i>Straits Settlements, Force to be about</i> - -	-	400	740	220	-	1,360

\* The force in Australia and New Zealand is to consist of three regiments only, about 2,700 ; all other troops to be withdrawn.

† The force at the Cape is to be reduced by one regiment of infantry.

‡ The force at Ceylon is to be increased by half a regiment of British infantry and one battery of artillery ; the other half of the regiment being the Straits.

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops (Officers and Men) borne on Strength of Imperial Army					
	Cavalry of the Line.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
<b>MILITARY GARRISONS, NAVAL STATIONS, CONVICT DEPÔTS, and DEPENDENCIES maintained chiefly for Objects of Imperial Policy.</b>						
<i>Mediterranean :</i>						
Malta - - - - -	- -	4,299	619	815	187	5,920
Gibraltar - - - - -	- -	3,784	- -	811	304	4,899
Ionian Islands - - - - -	- -	- -	- -	Nil.	—	—
Hong Kong - - - - -	- -	822	450	85	34	1,391
Japan - - - - -	- -	735	- -	57	- -	792
St. Helena - - - - -	- -	204	- -	71	72	347
Bermuda * - - - - -	- -	822	- -	187	310	1,319
Bahamas - - - - -	- -	- -	473	- -	1	474
Falklands - - - - -	- -	- -	- -	Nil.	—	—
Western Australia - - - - -	- -	- -	- -	Nil.	—	—
Labuan—Force to be two Companies Ceylon Rifles, out of the Force for the Straits Settlements - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>West African Settlements :</i>						
Sierra Leone - - - - -	- -	- -	590	- -	- -	590
Gambia - - - - -	- -	- -	203	- -	- -	203
Gold Coast and Lagos - - - - -	- -	- -	357	- -	- -	357
	—	10,666	2,692	2,026	908	16,292
<b>GROSS TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>32,884</b>	<b>6,990</b>	<b>5,359</b>	<b>1,703</b>	<b>47,732</b>

\* The Force at Bermuda is to be increased by one Regiment of Infantry, to be taken from New Brunswick, which will be thereby reduced one Regiment of Infantry.

Horse Guards, }  
28 March 1867. }

J. Hope Grant,  
Quartermaster General.



## Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER handed in by Mr. Taylor, 9 April 1867.

RETURN of the LOCAL MILITIA, VOLUNTEERS, and MILITARY POLICE in the WEST INDIAN COLONIES, actually Embodied and Effective.

COLONY.	Description of Forces.	Number of Officers and Men.	Field Guns.	Date of Return.	REMARKS.
Bahama Islands -	Militia Artillery -	169	5	Aug. 1862.	
Turk's Islands -	Volunteers, Infantry -	88	-	July 1862.	
	" Artillery -	33	3		
	Militia -	55	-		
Jamaica -	Volunteers, Infantry -	304	-	-	<i>Jamaica.</i> —The Militia numbers 22 regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and eight companies of artillery, or 4,991 men in all, but has not been called out or drilled since 1849.
	" Cavalry -	336	-	June 1863	
	" Artillery -	27	-	-	
Virgin Islands -	Volunteer Militia -	100	-	1860.	
Antigua -	Militia, Infantry -	55	-	Oct. 1864	<i>Antigua.</i> —From Note to October last Return, it appears that the "artillery and infantry have for some time been virtually disbanded."
	" Yeomanry -	74	-		
	" Artillery -	23	2		
Montserrat -	None -	None.	-	-	Parade once a month.
Dominica -	Militia, Rifles, and Artillery.	203	3	Jan. 1864	
Grenada -	Militia -	37	-	Jan. 1864	<i>Grenada.</i> —The term of service of the Militia having expired in 1862, there are now only 37 officers. In 1862 there were 300 riflemen and 65 gunners.
	Military Police -	30	-	July 1863.	
Nevis -	Volunteers, Infantry -	116	-		
	Police -	9	2	July 1862.	
St. Kitt's -	Volunteer Artillery -	36	2		
	Militia, Infantry -	103	-	July 1864	The Militia, 1,038 men, exists on paper only.
	" Yeomanry -	105	-		
Barbados -	Volunteers, Infantry -	174	-		
	" Yeomanry -	337	-	June 1864.	
	" Artillery -	158	10		
St. Vincent -	Volunteers, Infantry -	108	-	June 1864.	
	Militia, Infantry -	121	-		
	" Cavalry -	49	-		
	" Artillery -	53	4	June 1864.	
	Police -	50	-		
St. Lucia -	Military Police -	48	-	June 1864.	
Tobago -	Neither Militia nor Volunteers.	-	-	Aug. 1864.	
Trinidad -	- ditto - ditto -	-	-	May 1863.	
Honduras -	Nil -	-	-	July 1862	A Volunteer force has now been formed in Honduras; total number, 175; 30 of these are artillery.
British Guiana -	Militia, Infantry -	324	-	Jan. 1864.	
	" Cavalry -	9	-		
	" Artillery -	78	-		
SUMMARY.					
	Volunteers, Infantry -	790	-		
	" Cavalry -	673	-		
	" Artillery -	254	15		
	TOTAL - - -	1,717	15		
West Indian Colonies.	Militia, Infantry -	1,016	-		
	" Cavalry -	241	-		
	" Artillery -	398	11		
	TOTAL - - -	1,655	11		
	Military Police -	137	2		
	GRAND TOTAL - -	3,509	28		

Topographical Department, War Office,  
2 January 1865.(signed) F. Miller,  
Major, R. A.

## Appendix, No. 7.

PAPERS handed in by Captain *Mends*, R.N.

App. No. 7.

EXTRACT from the REGULATIONS for HER MAJESTY'S TRANSPORT SERVICE.

## ARTICLE 132.

THE regulated number of women (with their children) allowed to embark with troops, and for whom free conveyance will be provided, is as follows, viz. :—

*To and from Foreign Stations.*

1. The wives of the regimental staff serjeants.
2. The wives of the serjeants in each troop, battery, or company, in the following proportion, viz. :—

2 out of 4 or 5 serjeants.
3 out of 6 or 7 „
4 out of 8 „
3. The wives of all other non-commissioned officers and men in the proportion of 4 to 60 men; or, should a larger number of men be embarked, then in the proportion of 6 to 100 men.
4. When troops are embarked for India, China, Australia, or New Zealand, the total number of women (with their children) for whom free conveyance will be provided, will be 12 to 100 men, including staff serjeants and all others.

(signed) *W. R. Mends*,  
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

App. No. 7.

ESTIMATE prepared in the TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT of the COMPARATIVE EXPENSE of the OVERLAND and CAPE ROUTES between *England* and *India*, for Conveyance of 14,400 Soldiers, with Officers and Families (concurring in by the Secretary of State for India).

PARTICULARS.		Overland Route.	Cape Route.
		£.	£.
Total expense of Cape route, } 399,978 l. - - - - }	Freight of men, women, and children outward, at 10 l. 1 s. 6 d. per adult - - - - -	- - -	87,475
	Ditto - - ditto - homeward, at 28 l. 6 s. 4 d. per adult - - - - -	- - -	227,156
	Passage of officers outward, at 100 l. 9 s. 6 d. - - - - -	- - -	33,559
	Ditto - - ditto - homeward, at 127 l. 2 s. 10 d. - - - - -	- - -	35,600
	Medical comforts - - - - -	- - -	5,821
Working expenses of Overland } route, 209,014 l. - - - - }	Bedding - - - - -	12,510	10,367
	Wear and tear - - - - -	46,406	—
	Wages and victuals - - - - -	43,893	—
	Coals - - - - -	62,820	—
	Mess of military officers - - - - -	9,225	—
Charges upon capital and in- } surance account, 71,595 l. - }	Victualling of men, women, and children - - - - -	30,621	—
	Wages and victuals, wear and tear, and coals for tugs, and wages of boatmen - - - - -	3,539	—
	Annual charge for replacement of capital (1,007,034 l.) in 25 years	34,195	—
	Average interest upon amount of unredeemed capital at 5 per cent.	22,228	—
	Insurance upon the average value of ships, tugs, and boats, at 5 per cent. per annum - - - - -	15,172	—
Additional charges, 35,575 l. - }	Transit of the Isthmus - - - - -	25,575	—
	Expense of management; being for establishments at Home and Abroad, under the control of the Director of Transports - - - - -	10,000	—
TOTAL Amount of Working Expenses and Charges on Capital - - - - - } £.		316,184	—
Cost of Cape Route (computed on data furnished by India Office) - - - - -		- - -	399,978
Per Adult - - - - - £.		18 5 -	23 1 9
Difference in favour of Over- } land Route - - - - - } £.		4 16 9*	

\* The above rate of 4 l. 16 s. 9 d. per adult is equal to 5 l. 16 s. 5 d. per soldier (including officers, women, and children), and is irrespective of mess and ration stoppages.

W. R. Mends,  
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

RETURN of the Net Cost per SOLDIER of the TRANSPORT of TROOPS with Officers and Families between the undermentioned Stations and *Great Britain*, after deducting the regulated Mess and Ration Stoppages; in Hired Ships, based on the Payments made for the Numbers conveyed during Five Years; and, in Her Majesty's Troop Ships, on the Cost of the Conveyance of a Battalion with Officers and Families, including the Cost of Coals, Wages and Victuals for the Crew, and a per-centage charge (at the rate of Eight per Cent. per Annum) for wear and tear of a Troop Ship of the "Tamar" class, calculated for the Average Period of Voyage.

STATIONS.	Average Days' Voyage.		Cost of Transport per Soldier.			
	For Hired Sailing Ships.	For Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	OUT.		HOME.	
			In Hired Ships *	In Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	In Hired Ships	In Her Majesty's Troop Ships.
			£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
West Indies - - -	40	22	†19 18 8	4 13 7	†35 12 5	5 13 10
Mauritius - - -	85	60	14 8 6	15 6 1	33 5 -	17 2 1
Ceylon - - -	105	75	19 17 10	19 16 3	38 4 4	22 - -
Straits Settlements - -	105	80	no case -	14 19 -	no case -	17 13 3
China ( <i>see Note</i> ) - -	125	90	21 16 4	23 18 9	29 2 -	27 - 8
Japan - - -	145	100	no case -	26 9 6	no case -	29 11 4
Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand - - -	100 out 90 home	80	16 16 1	12 12 3	22 13 3	15 1 5

The transport of troops from Great Britain to India is not included, it having hitherto been undertaken by the Indian Government; but an estimate of the cost of this service by the Overland and Cape routes is annexed.

\* Should these vessels make an empty voyage home the cost would be increased.

† These rates are high, steam conveyance having been employed, and the troops proceeding *viâ* Gibraltar.

#### NOTE.

With the exception of the engagement (not included in the above statement) of the "Far East" steamer, and "White Adder," for the conveyance of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment from Hong Kong to the Cape, calling at Mauritius, and of other troops from the Cape to England, the homeward engagements in China show no marked variations from the average rate of 29 l. 2 s. per soldier.

The "Far East" and "White Adder" cost, on the numbers embarked at Hong Kong, 55 l. 4 s. 3 d. per soldier, but this is on the presumption that the same freight would have been demanded for the direct voyage to England. The rate also includes a payment for 200 men short embarked.

App. No. 7.

RETURN of Numbers of EUROPEAN and NATIVE INDIAN TROOPS conveyed in Hired Ships between *India* and *China* during Five Years, and of the Cost per Soldier of all Expenses of Transport.

	Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Rate per Soldier.
					f. s. d.
From Bombay to Hong Kong - { Europeans	-	-	-	-	-
{ Natives -	11	849	-	-	8 13 3
„ Calcutta to Hong Kong - { Europeans	36	820	84	95	33 19 8*
{ Natives -	-	-	-	-	-
„ Hong Kong to Bombay { Europeans	27	1,070	2	2	15 - 9
{ Natives -	16	1,735	1	2	9 12 10
„ Shanghai to Bombay - { Europeans	-	-	-	-	-
{ Natives -	13	1,232	13	26	13 18 7

\* This rate is exceptionally high, it having been necessary to engage a steamer for the service.

The mess and ration stoppages of the European troops have been abated.

W. R. Mends, Director of Transport Services.

#### SUMMARY.

The average cost of conveyance by sailing vessel between India and Hong Kong may be taken as follows, viz. :—

	£.	s.	d.	
For Natives - - - - -	9	10	-	per soldier.
„ Europeans - - - - -	15	-	-	„ „

The cost of conveying native troops between India and Shanghai is about 14 L., and for Europeans it is considered that it would be about 22 L. per soldier.

W. R. Mends, Director of Transport Services.

App. No

ESTIMATE of the COST for TRANSPORT of a BATTALION to *Hong Kong* from *England* in a Hired SAILING SHIP, for a Voyage of 125 Days, and for the following Numbers:

38 Officers. 750 Men.		87 Women. 160 Children.	£.
For freight - - - - -			7,746
„ mess - - - - -			2,375
„ victualling - - - - -			7,794
„ fittings - - - - -			471
„ bedding - - - - -			458
			£. 18,844
Abate mess and ration stoppages - - - - -			3,175
or 20 <i>l.</i> 17 <i>s.</i> 10 <i>d.</i> per soldier - - - - -			£. 15,669

ESTIMATE of the COST of the same Service by H. M. Troop Ship “*Tamar*,” for a Voyage of 90 Days.

	£.
For mess of officers - - - - -	1,282
„ victualling of troops - - - - -	5,237
„ bedding for troops - - - - -	458
„ wages and victuals of the crew - - - - -	3,452
„ wear and tear, at 8 per cent. per annum on first cost - - - - -	2,076
„ coals - - - - -	7,733
	£. 20,238
Abate mess and ration stoppages - - - - -	2,286
or 23 <i>l.</i> 18 <i>s.</i> 9 <i>d.</i> per soldier - - - - -	£. 17,952

*Note.*—Should the vessel make an empty voyage home, the cost would be increased.

*W. R. Mends,*  
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

## Appendix, No. 8.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Shadwell*.

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost of maintaining a Battalion of Infantry, consisting of 788 all Ranks, at the following Stations East of the Cape.

	Australia.*	Tasmania.	New Zealand.†	China.‡	Mauritius.	Ceylon.*	West Indies.	Jamaica.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.		
Regimental Pay and Allowances.	22,900	22,900	22,900	(a) 23,100	22,900	22,900	22,900	22,900	(a) One additional Assistant Surgeon.	
Military Labourers - -	-	-	-	735	840	-	2,262	730		
Special Allowances - -	2,080	2,080	2,080	7,665	5,000	7,152	1,450	1,450		
Cost of Provisions, Forage, Transport (including Wives and Children).	4,992	6,716	9,950	9,566	4,708	12,980	10,506	8,447		
Clothing - - - -	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,595	2,640	2,640	2,632	2,632		
Barrack Expenses - -	4,790	4,104	6,566	26,901	3,695	3,254	3,452	3,452		
Divine Service and Martial Law.	225	225	225	357	355	258	272	335		
Medical and Purveyor's Expenses.	1,350	1,350	(b) 2,100	4,815	2,650	5,730	3,558	3,505		(b) Two additional Assistant Surgeons.
Educational Expenses - -	185	185	185	185	(c) 250	(c) 250	(c) 200	(c) 225		
Average Cost per Annum of Arms, Accoutrements, Ammunition.	548	548	548	548	548	548	548	548		(c) Detached Schools at these Stations.
£.	30,694	40,732	47,178	76,467	49,586	55,712	47,780	44,284		
Pay of Invalids, Time-Expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the Year.	500	500	457	680	360	556	134	123		
Depôt Charges (including Recruiting Expenses), Establishment of Depôt, 140 all Ranks.	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648		
£.	46,842	47,880	54,283	83,775	50,594	62,916	54,562	51,055		
Pay of a Battalion for the period of the Voyage to and from the several Colonies.	10,036	10,036	10,036	11,292	7,526	9,408	2,760	2,760		
Average Annual Charge for Pay during the period of Relief, taking the Average Service of a Battalion abroad at 10 Years.	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,129	752	940	276	276		

\* Arrangements have only recently been completed, by which various expenses hitherto paid direct by these Colonies, will become chargeable to Imperial Funds; the information possessed at the War Office as to the exact expenditure for these services is not definite, as no accounts including the new charges have as yet been received. As the special allowances to be granted in Australia in future have not been determined upon, a sum on their account has been included, calculated at the same rate as that granted for Tasmania and New Zealand.

† As this Colony has for several years past been in a constant state of disturbance, the expenditure recently incurred there scarcely affords satisfactory data for an estimate of normal expenditure for provisions and barrack services.

‡ The expenditure in China for hire of buildings pending the construction of barracks and other arrangements is at present exceptionally high, and is the cause of the excessive charge for barrack expenses.

Note.—The Straits Settlements (Singapore) have not been included, as no returns of expenditure of any kind have been received; it is expected, however, that the expenditure will be about the same as at Ceylon.

April 1867.

William Brown, Accountant General, War Office.

## Appendix, No. 9.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Shadwell*.APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost of Maintaining a BATTALION of EUROPEAN INFANTRY, consisting of 788 All Ranks, at the Cape of Good Hope. App. No. 9

	£.
Regimental Pay and Allowances - - - - -	22,900
Military Labourers - - - - -	—
Special Allowances - - - - -	1,040
Cost of Provisions, Forage Transport (including wives and children)	5,332
Clothing - - - - -	2,575
Barrack Expenses - - - - -	3,857
Divine Service and Martial Law - - - - -	280
Medical and Purveyors' Expenses - - - - -	1,752
Educational Expenses - - - - -	185
Average Cost per Annum of Arms, Ammunition, and of their maintenance - - - - -	548
	38,469
Pay of Invalids, Time-expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the year - - - - -	235
Depôt Charges, including Recruiting Expenses - - - - -	6,648
	45,352
Pay of a Battalion for the period of the Voyage to and from the Colony	4,642
	—
Average Annual Charge for Pay during Relief, taking the average period of service of a Battalion abroad at 10 years - - - - -	464
	—

War Office,  
7 May 1867.*W. Brown,*  
Accountant General.



Appendix, No. 10.

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PAPER put in by Mr. H. Taylor.

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No. 10. EXTRACT from "Notices sur les Colonies Françaises" publiés par ordre de S. Exc. le Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies.

Les forces militaires de la Réunion se composent des troupes de la garnison et des milices locales.

L'effectif de la garnison est de 46 officiers et de 1,124 sous-officiers et soldats, répartis entre divers détachements d'infanterie et d'artillerie de la marine, de disciplinaires des Colonies, de génie, et de gendarmerie Coloniale.

Voici la composition de ces divers corps :—

*Etat-major.*—Un lieutenant de vaisseau, attaché à l'état-major général; 1 capitaine d'infanterie de marine, adjudant de place à Saint-Denis.

*Génie.*—Un chef de bataillon directeur; 1 lieutenant, et 3 gardes du génie; une compagnie indigène d'ouvriers du génie composée de 3 officiers et de 93 sous-officiers et soldats. Total: 8 officiers, 93 sous-officiers et soldats.

*Artillerie de la Marine.*—Un chef d'escadron directeur; un sous-chef ouvrier d'état; un garde d'artillerie de 1<sup>re</sup> classe; un maître armurier; une batterie d'artillerie de marine, composée de 4 officiers et de 96 sous-officiers et soldats; une section de canonniers ouvriers composée d'un officier et de 45 ouvriers. Total: 8 officiers et 144 sous-officiers et soldats.

*Infanterie de Marine* (4<sup>e</sup> régiment).—Un lieutenant colonel; 1 chef de bataillon; 1 capitaine major; 1 capitaine adjudant-major; 1 chirurgien aide-major; 1 lieutenant officier payeur; 1 sous-lieutenant chargé de l'habillement; 4 compagnies, chacune de 114 hommes, dont 3 officiers\*. Total, 19 officiers et 444 sous-officiers et soldats.

*Disciplinaires des Colonies.*—Une compagnie composée de 5 officiers et de 281 sous-officiers et soldats.

*Gendarmerie Coloniale.*—Une compagnie composée de 4 officiers et 162 sous-officiers et soldats, dont 90 à cheval, 67 à pied, et 5 enfants de troupe.

*Milice.*—L'effectif de la milice s'élevait en 1862 à 9,970 hommes, dont 295 officiers.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Station Maritime.*—La Station locale de la Réunion se compose de trois bâtiments de l'état le Lynx, aviso à hélice, de 150 chevaux et de 2 canons; les goélettes à voiles la Turquoise et la Perle, armées chacune de 2 canons.

La Réunion est aussi le centre de la division navale des côtes orientales d'Afrique.

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\* Une cinquième compagnie qui compte à la Réunion est détachée, dans les îles de Mayotte, Nossi-Bé et Sainte Marie de Madagascar.

## Appendix, No. 11.

PAPER put in by Sir James Fergusson.

COPY of a LETTER from the Adjutant General to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

App. No. 11.

Sir,

Head Quarters, Calcutta, 18 March 1867.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 302, of the 8th instant, I have the honour, by desire of the Commander in Chief, to submit his Excellency's remarks regarding the possibility of reduction of the army in India, in which, it is understood, the armies of Bombay and Madras, British and Native, are included, as well as that of the Presidency of Bengal.

2. Much time will be required to collect and reduce the returns demanded in your letter of the 1st February, which refers more particularly to questions affected by the report of the Royal Commission on recruiting.

3. The subject, however, of your letter of the 8th March, now under reply, admits of a large treatment, on consideration of the principles according to which the empire of British India is held. For this purpose round numbers, which are readily available, will suffice.

4. His Excellency would commence by the statement of certain simple facts. The British army in India, taken as a whole, numbers about 61,000 men. This figure includes the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the British corps, and the British officers in military service on the staff and with Native corps. The Native force, including the armies under the three Commanders in Chief and the forces under the several Governments, amounts to about 122,000 men. Thus in all, we have a mixed force of about 183,000 men, there being two natives to one British soldier.

The gross nominal strength, or the sanctioned establishment of British non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, is 61,257. The nominal establishment is never permitted to be exceeded, under the orders of the Secretary of State for India.

This being so, the practical consequence is obvious, that real or actual strength is never equal to nominal strength in an army, which, serving at a distance from England, receives its recruits but once a year. The causes of decrease, namely, death, invaliding, and discharge, are constant, and the results appear in the Returns from month to month.

Consequently, with rare exceptions, Her Majesty's regiments in India are always more or less incomplete in numbers, or in other words, below their nominal strength.

This is even seen in the regiments just arrived from England, and notably so in the case of those which came this year, some of them being among the weakest corps now in India.

It is therefore perfectly safe on an average of months, to reckon the actual strength of the British army in India at about six per cent. below the nominal or sanctioned establishment.

This has been done by the Commander in Chief for the purpose of this letter, in order that there may be no possible delusion with regard to the real facts which should be in the mind of Government with respect to the question put to his Excellency for report, and the military strength the Government has to rely on.

The result is, that the figure 61,000 is found sufficient to represent the average or actual strength of the British forces proper in India throughout the year, the same including the officers with Native corps and on the staff, as well as those serving with British regiments.

5. In the year before the war of the mutiny, which was also a year of peace, the forces stood as follows:—

British force about	-	45,000 men, including all officers	
Native force in Pre-		with British and	
sidency of Bengal,		Native regiments.	
about	-	160,000	”
Ditto in Madras	-	57,265	”
Ditto in Bombay	-	38,850	”
		<u>301,115</u>	

Consequently there has been a gross diminution of armed men in the peace establishment of India, if the years 1856 and 1867 be compared, amounting to about 118,000 men.

6. If we decompose the items, we find on the other hand, that there is an actual increase on the establishment of 16,000 men, while the Native establishment is diminished by 134,000 men.

7. In other words, the increase of 16,000 British soldiers is placed against a decrease of 134,000 Natives.

8. I should mention that the Bengal Native army, including those under the Commander in Chief, as well as those under Government, stands at - 65,659 per last returns.

The Madras at - - 31,524 ”

The Bombay at - - 25,345 ”

122,528\*

This excludes the Hyderabad Contingent of 8,000 men, which is not strictly speaking part of the British army, as it is paid for by the Nizam, and maintains the peace of His Highness' territories. It is not included in the Statement of Native Forces in para. 5.

\* This is the total strength. But with respect to armed strength in cantonments, we must recollect that the system of the Native Indian armies in time of peace permits of a large privilege of furlough, which weakens the regiments by 10 per cent. for periods varying from six to nine months. The effective strength is further diminished by the per-centage represented by the recruits, which may be represented at six per cent.

App. No. 11.

9. His Excellency would ask the Government now to consider the area which is thus guarded by an army of about 183,000 men, and the conditions under which the troops are posted.

10. Attention to the map is requested.

11. Peshawur is in the 71st degree of east longitude, whereas Debroghur, which is a military station also, on the confines of Assam, is in the 95th degree of east longitude.

12. Again, Peshawur is in the 34th degree of north latitude, and Cape Cormorin is in the 8th degree of north latitude.

13. In addition to the area thus roughly illustrated, the Indian armies provide garrisons for the provinces lately wrested from Burmah, as also a garrison for the important post of Aden, on the coast of Arabia. They have hitherto found garrisons for the Straits Settlements, including two batteries Royal Artillery, and two Native Infantry regiments. The latter return to India, and the batteries will now be struck off the Indian establishment.

14. If we consider the conditions under which the army is posted, the most remarkable facts of frontiers and distances present themselves. Thus, on the west and north-west, stretching from Beloochistan in the south to Peshawur and Huzarah in the north, along the entire length of the Indus, our outlying regiments, including the force at Jacobabad, the several stations occupied by the Punjab force, and the great garrison of Peshawur, are constantly fronting hostile tribes, which, but for the presence of those troops, would harry our territories without ceasing.

15. There cannot be a doubt that any native power holding such a frontier would employ at least 100,000 men for the purpose, whereas the work is done by our soldiers in numbers not much exceeding 20,000, made up as follows—

The Garrison of Peshawur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,763
The Punjab Force	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,912
The Scinde Horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,506
The 30th Native Infantry, Bombay Army	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	708
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<u>20,889</u>

16. The out-posts thus described find their supports at long distances, at Rawul Pindee in the North, at Mooltan in the South of the Punjab, and at Hyderabad and Kurrachee in Scinde.

17. His Excellency further observes that besides the mountain tribes, we have to consider the semi-hostile Government of Afghanistan, that country from which have proceeded the numerous Mahomedan invasions of India.

18. His Excellency is confident that the Government of India will agree in his opinion, that any relaxation of grasp of our frontiers on the North-West would be followed by inroads from Afghanistan, the Government of India being thus landed in an Afghan war, which would compel it, however pacifically inclined, ultimately to undertake the permanent occupation of Afghanistan.

19. Sir William Mansfield inclines strongly to the belief, that when we consider the manner in which we maintain the security of our North-West frontier, and the necessary supports to which allusion has been made, we are not merely preserving order in a recently conquered country filled with a warlike population, we are not solely keeping the police of a rugged mountainous frontier, along which every man is a warrior from his youth, but we are also staving off foreign war, which, if it ever breaks out in that direction, can hardly fail to lead to territorial extension in an uncivilized and poor country, the latter being, as his Excellency understands, entirely opposed to the existing policy of Her Majesty's Government.

20. The Northern frontier, which looks more especially to the kingdom of Nepal does not display the warlike development which, as shown above, is indispensable in the North-West.

21. Nevertheless, it must be recollected that an accident occurring to one single minister in Nepal might possibly be attended with great political change, rendering an armed attitude necessary on our part. In the meantime, Nepal is watched from the military stations lying adjacent to the East India Railway, and the Ganges, the forces in those stations maintaining the peace of the districts and the great cities of Hindustan, according to the object set forth by Government in its distribution of the troops.

22. If we travel eastward in the consideration of our frontier, his Excellency would remind Government, that whether with regard to Bhootan or to the wild tribes lying east and south of it, it has been found necessary, within the last two years, to place the Eastern frontier on a more military footing than had hitherto prevailed.

23. This was a consequence not only of the disturbances of the Bhootas, but also of the very unruly conduct of the tribes of the Kossyah Hills, and those lying North of the Brahmapootra.

Brahmapootra. Our villagers, in those distant, but very extensive districts, are constantly exposed to raids and plundering, while, on the other hand, our tea planters are spreading over the land. That frontier extends from Darjeeling to Debrogurh, a distance of not less than 700 miles as the crow flies. But with regard to existing communications, a measurement of miles conveys no idea of the distances and the difficulties to be overcome between the two points. Some five native regiments, with two batteries of native and Eurasian artillery possessing mountain guns, are employed in all, in support of the frontier police, the details of the occupation of the frontier having been settled in consultation last year by their Excellencies the Governor General and Commander in Chief, and his Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. The support of the frontier out-posts is in Calcutta itself, the communication being maintained by rail as far as Kooshteah, and then by the Brahmapootra.

24. It may be as well to mention here, that with the exception of the Peshawur Garrison and the supports at Mooltan and Rawul Pindee, the British troops proper are not employed in the system of frontier defence, unless war actually breaks out. The native troops are used for this purpose alone, because they are more fit for it, and are less liable to suffer from the necessary exposure to climate, &c.

25. Before dismissing the question of frontier defence, his Excellency would briefly allude to the Burmese Provinces, the troops there stationed being required, not only for the support of the British Government in the provinces themselves, but also to hold a check on the Court of Mandalay, and prevent the recurrence of a Burmese war. Although small in numbers, the forces under the Chief Commissioner of Burmah operate on the mind of Mandalay, as the garrisons of Peshawur and Rawul Pindee on the Ameer of Cabul.

26. His Excellency would now turn to considerations of a different character, but perhaps even of more importance than those to which he has as yet invited the notice of the Governor General in Council.

27. It will be in the recollection of Government, that before the conquest of the Punjab, the provinces of Bengal and the North-West were held as strongly by British troops as they are in the present day.

28. Thus, 25 years ago there was a strong British force at Calcutta and Dum-Dum, British troops occupied Berhampore, Dinapore, Ghazee-pore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Agra, and Meerut, in large proportions of all the arms.

29. Subsequently to the annexation of the Punjab, some of these stations ceased to have any British troops, whilst the garrisons of all were greatly weakened. The head quarters of the artillery quitted Dum-Dum; Berhampore, Ghazee-pore, and Allahabad were left without British troops; the regiment of British Dragoons left Cawnpore; Meerut was reduced by one British regiment.

30. Afterwards, when Oude was annexed, Cawnpore, instead of having 2,500 British troops as it had in former days, was, his Excellency believes, reduced to four companies of British infantry. Oude, though annexed, received, as his Excellency understands, the head quarters and six companies of a British regiment in all.

31. Without venturing to describe the causes which led to the insurrection and mutiny of 1857, it is clear to his Excellency that what had been considered the necessary means of demonstration till 1846 of British strength proper, in the North-Western provinces and Behar, ceased to be so considered after that year, the climax of the change of policy in the maintenance of a due proportion of British soldiers, with the large force of Native regiments in Oude and the old provinces, having been reached subsequently to the annexation of the former.

32. His Excellency would now draw attention once more to the figures stated in paragraphs 4 and 5. It appears that, according to existing establishments and real averages, we have an actual British force stronger by 16,000 men than we had in 1856, that being the year immediately preceding the mutiny, one of peace establishment, and also one in which, as shown above, the Government of India had reached the climax of non-demonstration of white faces in the vast tract stretching through Behar, the Doab, Rohilkund and Oude.

33. It is also necessary at this stage to advert to the fact of the enormous area comprised in the Gwalior territories, in Bundlekund, in the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, in Malwa, and in Rajpootana, which were absolutely devoid of British troops, notwithstanding that a great portion of the country was held by Princes more or less mediatised, but who possessed standing armies, and throughout whose territories the population was armed.

34. The only representation of British power was to be found in British agents and Native regiments, some belonging to the regular army, but the larger proportion of them being contingents of irregular troops under different denominations.

35. In 1857-58, the whole of that system broke up. The Native regiments and contingents had turned against us. Some of the Native Princes threw off their allegiance to the British Empire and met us in the field. Scindia was deposed by his insurgent troops, and afterwards reinstated by our arms. After a two years' campaign the vast area was

App. No. 11. again reduced to order, and security taken for the future by placing garrisons of British soldiers where they had not been seen before, viz., at Morar, Jhansi, Nowgong, Jubbulpore, Saugor and Mhow, the number of Native troops having been reduced to a bare minimum.

36. In like manner, when the war of the mutiny came to an end, the errors of too great confidence in native loyalty as briefly illustrated above, were repaired. The provinces which had been entirely denuded of British troops, in which consequently the military mutiny swelled to the proportion of civil war, British Government and administration having been for a time swept away, were occupied properly. British garrisons were given to Benares, to Allahabad, to Cawnpore, to the several stations in Rohilkund, and Oude. Although the numbers thus allotted are not nearly so great as they were at the termination of hostilities in 1859,\* a constant reduction having been in progress since that date, the country is, his Excellency thinks, now occupied in a sufficient manner.

37. It is this occupation which accounts chiefly for the difference in the amount of British force of 16,000 men, as shown in figures of 1867 and 1856.

38. His Excellency cannot believe, with the recent experience of the difficulties of 1857-58-59, that any thinking statesman could possibly revert to the military policy of the year preceding the mutiny. For that policy trusted to an occupation of India by means of an enormous Native army, without a sufficient demonstration of British forces proper, by which the people in certain vast and warlike districts could be reminded of the existence of British power.

39. In support of the above, his Excellency would briefly recapitulate the additional British forces thus distributed in great cities and countries, which, under the old and now broken up system, were entrusted to Native troops. Hazareebagh and Berhampore one regiment of infantry; Benares one regiment of cavalry, one wing of infantry; Cawnpore one regiment British infantry, instead of four companies as before the mutiny; Oude four regiments of British infantry and one regiment of cavalry, instead of one regiment of infantry as before the mutiny; Delhi, one wing British infantry; Bareilly one regiment British infantry; Shajehanpore one wing British infantry; Moradabad one wing British infantry; Roorkee one wing British infantry; Gwalior two regiments British infantry, and one of British cavalry; Jhansi one regiment British infantry, the regiment there stationed ultimately to go to Nowgong; Nagode, Jubbulpore, and Saugor, two regiments British infantry; Nusseerabad one regiment British infantry; Neemuch, one wing British infantry; Mhow one regiment British cavalry and one of British infantry.

40. Yet after all what does the addition amount to? Four regiments of cavalry and 16 regiments of infantry, the establishment of the individual regiments being now much less than in the former times.

NOTE.—The nominal establishment of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the several corps of the different arms, is—

Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	460
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	145
Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	860

41. There is one other item of calculation, which has to be considered when we investigate the full meaning of the additional British forces, as compared with those of the days preceding the mutiny.

42. About six years ago, it was determined, after the most prolonged consultation between the Secretary of State and the several Governments of India, that the experience of 1857 forbade the entrusting of artillery to native hands; accordingly the field artillery required for this empire, amounting to about 426 guns, is now entirely manned by British soldiers. Before the mutiny, the natives constituted probably three-fourths of the artillery force.

43. His Excellency has, he believes, now accounted for the difference of the European force as shown in the years 1856 and 1867.

44. It has often been stated in newspapers, and it has even been argued by men of authority in England, that we keep up an European army in India for the purpose of doing nothing; or if it does anything, that it is maintained to overawe a great unwieldy native army.

45. Yet the figures above cited show that the Native forces of all descriptions have been diminished by 134,000 men since 1856.

46. One chief employment of the Native army of the present day has been displayed in the necessary guard of the frontiers.

47. Another use is shown in the necessity of having at least one Native regiment in the vicinity of large cities, in which our policy, according to the reasoning above given, demands the presence of a British regiment proper. Many duties of guards, detachments, treasure parties, and so forth, are taken almost exclusively by the Native troops, for the purpose of encouraging health and life among the Europeans, whose constitution is unequal to the consequent exposures and fatigues in the climate of the plains of India.

48. Accordingly, if we except the hill stations, wherever we see one such British regiment, the purposes of administration require the presence of a Native one also.

49. There

\* In 1861 the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the British regiments serving in India, amounted to 82,156.

In the previous year, 1860, the strength stood at 94,829.

These figures are taken from the Report of the Royal Sanitary Commission.

49. There are a few stations in out-of-the-way districts in Bengal on our side of India, in Bombay in the west, and Burmah in the extreme east, in which a certain demonstration of military force is required, but where, for obvious reasons of climate and economy, it would not only be inconvenient, but extremely unwise and extravagant to employ Her Majesty's British regiments. App. N

50. His Excellency could name several such stations under this presidency, and the stations in Kattywar, Guzerat, Candeish, and Dharwar, in the Presidency of Bombay.

51. His Excellency is not so well acquainted with the Presidency of Madras, but it may be presumed that there are stations of similar character occupied by the native army in Madras, which the government of that presidency would be unwilling to see denuded.

52. His Excellency is reminded by reference to the two minor presidencies, that it would seem hazardous to reduce the European strength, which, if investigated, appears not to exceed what existed previous to 1856.

53. Thus, the difference of what was maintained in the Bombay Presidency, in the comparison of 1856 and 1867, is, as shown above, all devoted to what is called the Mhow Division, or in other words, Malwa and Rajpootana; in the stations of Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad. The Mhow division is a division of the Bombay army, although the country occupied by it is under the Governor General's agents.

54. In like manner it would appear, although his Excellency is not sure about it, that the extra British regiments now borne on the rolls of the Madras Presidency are devoted to Burmah, and not to Madras proper.

55. But in any case, it is to be recollected, that ten British regiments now, according to present strength, are not more than equal to eight regiments of the strength allowed to a British corps before the two last reductions in the rank and file.

56. It is therefore certain that, in the two minor presidencies, the European force is not greater than it was before the mutinies.

57. His Excellency therefore thinks that a case is made out, which entirely bars the entertainment of the notion that the army in India, whether European or native, admits of any considerable reduction.

58. On the contrary, Sir William Mansfield cannot divest himself of the strong opinion, that it is one of the most extraordinary facts in the history of modern administration and politics, that it should be possible to hold the vast area of India, with all the frontier requirements, and to preserve the most absolute internal tranquillity not only in our own territories, but among our dependent allies, by such a body as 183,000 men, of whom one-third only is recruited in the foreign country which effected the conquest.

59. It may be asserted with perfect safety, that such results of diminished military numbers in the occupation of India were impossible in former days. They have only become practicable in consequence of an improved communication on the rivers and coasts by means of steam-vessels, and through the completion of a large railway system. But for the latter, we must have still maintained a native force of considerable dimensions, not equal to that organized in 1856, but far larger than what is now found to suffice.

60. The character of the facts and the truth of the argument are displayed still more clearly, when it is recollected, that in addition to the maintenance of order amongst our own subjects, and on our frontier, we have to watch with a careful eye the limited sovereignties of the numerous native states, many of which have armed bodies at their disposal, and would be hostile if they dared, and all of which require to be awed into good behaviour.

61. It is to be observed that the notion of good behaviour of the native states and governments, includes not only abstinence from offence against us, but from internecine war between themselves.

62. As was seen in the north in Behar, the Doab, and Rohilcund, in 1857, so was it remarked in the southern Mahratta country in the south of India at the same time, that the military spirit of the people is not dead, and that it requires but opportunity to blaze up and be extremely dangerous.

63. The like will hardly be denied with respect to the Punjab, which was recently conquered, which is ready to furnish soldiers for all India, and whose late military traditions must still afford the themes of conversation in every village.

64. Such are the general considerations which his Excellency would lay before the Government of India.

65. Before closing this letter, Sir William Mansfield would allude to certain matters of detail.

66. His Excellency, in his place in Council, having been requested by the Governor General in 1865, to review the military establishments for the purpose of curtailing expenditure, he submitted, with a scheme for the reduction of the rank and file in the cavalry and infantry, - 0.58.

App. No. 11. infantry, the same having been effected, a plan for the reduction of expense in the artillery arm, which still remains in abeyance.

67. His Excellency did not consider this plan one of positive reduction of artillery strength, but rather one of modification of establishments, which, whilst diminishing the number of batteries, would have added greatly to the efficiency of all that were retained.

68. By the diminution of the number of batteries, a corresponding and not inconsiderable decrease would have been effected in the staff and the officers of the artillery in India. But there would have been but little reduction in the rank and file, which, according to his Excellency's plan, would have remained about the same as it is now in the Bengal Presidency, with a slight numerical decrease in the two minor presidencies.

69. His Excellency has always held an opinion, in common, he believes, with good artillery officers, that artillery differs in an important respect from the other arms, viz., that while you can afford to have skeleton regiments in time of peace, which are easily filled by recruits on the approach of war, it is bad policy to have skeleton batteries of artillery. The reasons of this are obvious; a certain number of men are required to work each gun; if the number of gunners barely suffices for the number of guns, a sickly season, or one sharp skirmish, renders the battery comparatively useless. And again, whereas you can make an infantry soldier in three months, and a cavalry soldier in nine, it takes three years to make an instructed gunner.

70. It is an undoubted fact that the present establishment of the field battery is a skeleton one. The same is true of the garrison battery in India. Artillery officers are unanimous in this view of their batteries. It may then be safely asserted that the existing establishments of single batteries are simply inadequate, except for mere parade purposes.

71. His Excellency therefore considered in 1865, and he still adheres to his opinion, that the modification alluded to would be advantageous; and that, while expense would be reduced if it were effected, the general efficiency of the army in India would certainly not be impaired, with regard to what is required of the artillery in peace and war.

72. With respect to native infantry and cavalry, it is believed to be impossible to effect even the slightest reduction in the army in Bengal.

73. His Excellency considers that we are absolutely without reserve. When we had to find the troops for the little Bhootan war, there was much difficulty in affording regiments for the purpose, and we were even obliged to weaken the force on the Punjab frontier. This was hardly a safe proceeding.

74. His Excellency was also compelled to suggest to Government the expediency of adding to the strength of regiments proceeding to Bhootan, which was done. On the other hand it may be observed that there is a slight reserve in the Madras and Bombay armies.

75. The Straits Settlements having been made over to the Colonies, the Secretary of State has announced that the two Madras native infantry regiments, now at Singapore and Penang, are to return to India.

76. Many authorities believe that some further reduction besides those two regiments is possible. His Excellency is disposed to concur in this view. It is probable therefore that the Madras authorities on a final review of the subject might not object to the reduction of four regiments of native infantry, and perhaps one of native cavalry.

77. In like manner, it may be said of Bombay, that the army of that presidency admits of the reduction of two regiments of native infantry. This was allowed by the Bombay authorities when two regiments returned from China in 1862-63.

78. His Excellency is aware that the late Governor of Bombay objected to the reduction of those two regiments—an objection which Sir William Mansfield himself supported on grounds of general policy, while as Commander in Chief of that presidency he admitted the reduction to be feasible.

79. Whilst, as in duty bound, his Excellency has thus indicated in what direction a slender reduction may be operated, Sir William Mansfield would suggest that it is open to question whether such a measure be one of good policy with regard to the numerous changes and reductions operated in the armies of Madras and Bombay during the last few years.

80. It is evident, he thinks, throughout the arguments pursued in this letter, that, taken as a whole, the native armies in India stand at a strangely low figure.

81. His Excellency need not remind the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council that, during the last 25 years, we have had frequent wars in China and a war with Persia.

82. We cannot be certain that similar exigencies may not arise again, thus causing demands on the forces of the two southern presidencies, at very short notice. The Bengal army, if required to furnish native regiments for foreign service, would certainly be obliged to raise men.

83. His

83. His Excellency would therefore hint that it is for Government to decide which is the more politic, viz., to trust to what the future may bring forth, and to cut down the two armies of Madras and Bombay to such an extent as has been suggested as possible, no reserve being left for contingencies; or to continue to act on the views which were believed to be sound in 1863. App. No. 11.

84. His Excellency would be inclined to recommend the preservation of the existing establishment, but that one regiment from the Bombay Presidency be offered to the Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies for service at Hong Kong, and that it be suggested that, instead of raising new troops for the Straits Settlements, the Madras Government should be invited to find what may be required for Singapore and Penang, according to the practice hitherto observed, the expense of these corps being borne by the respective Colonies while employed under Colonial Government.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *H. E. Longden,*  
Colonel, Adjutant General.

### Appendix, No. 12.

#### PAPERS received from the War Office.

ANNUAL COST of granting 2*d.* a Day EXTRA PAY to the NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS and MEN of a BATTALION of INFANTRY, 788 all Ranks. App No. 12.

50 Non-Commissioned Officers	}	750 Men, at 2 <i>d.</i> a day	-	-	-	£. 2,281
20 Trumpeters and Drummers						
680 Rank and File - - -						

Depôt, consisting of 134 Men, at 2*d.* a day - - - - £. 408

War Office, }  
May 1867. }

*W. Brown,*  
Accountant General.



## Appendix, No. 13.

PAPERS put in by Mr. *Fonblanque*.

EXTRACTS from the APPENDIX to the REPORT of the COMMISSIONERS appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into the MILITARY EXPENDITURE and ESTABLISHMENT of *Ceylon*, 1865.

## Appendix (B).

EXTRACT from the "Mauritius Blue Book" for 1864.

## COLONIAL ALLOWANCES.

THE Officers of Her Majesty's Forces in the Mauritius receive pecuniary allowances paid from the Colonial Treasury in lieu of all the ordinary allowances, which at other stations they receive in money or in kind. These allowances were established at the capture of the island in 1810, and were modified and altered from the 1st May 1858, according to Despatch, No. 40, dated 5th October 1857, and published in this colony on the 20th April 1858.

The following is the SCHEDULE now in force:—

SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES.		Amount per Menssem.	SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES.		Amount per Menssem.
		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
<i>Staff.</i>			<i>Regimental Officers.</i>		
Inclusive of lodging money, as these officers are not provided with Quarters.	Major General commanding the Forces.	125 - -	Exclusive of lodging allowance.	Colonel Commanding - - -	30 8 3
	Assistant Military Secretary, Aide-de-Camp - } Each as Captain	26 4 8		Lieutenant Colonel Commanding -	23 17 7
	Deputy Quarter Master General, Lieutenant Colonel.	39 17 10		Major - - - - -	20 17 7
	Deputy Commissary General { after five years' service, Colonel.	43 8 3		Captain and Paymaster - - -	13 4 8
	Commissary General { under five years' service, Lieutenant Colonel.	36 17 10		Lieutenant - - - - -	8 11 7
	Assistant Commissary General, Major.	29 17 10		Ensign - - - - -	8 11 7
	Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Captain.	20 4 8		Adjutant - - - - -	13 16 7
	Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Lieutenant.	13 11 7		Surgeon, as Major - - - - -	20 17 7
	Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, Lieutenant Colonel.	36 17 10		Assistant Surgeon, after six years' service, as Captain.	13 4 8
	Staff Surgeon Major, Lieutenant Colonel.	34 17 10		Ditto Lieutenant - - - - -	8 11 7
	Staff Surgeon, Major - - -	29 17 10		Quartermaster - - - - -	13 16 7
	Staff Assistant Surgeon { after six years' service, Captain.	20 4 8		Regimental school - - - - -	- 8 4
	Surgeon { under six years' service, Lieutenant.	13 11 7		Paymaster Serjeant - - - - -	1 4 -
	Purveyor to the Forces, Lieutenant	15 11 7		Regimental or Garrison Schoolmasters, 1st class, 4s. per diem.	
	Purveyor or other clerks, Ensign	13 11 7		Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - 2nd class, 2s. ditto.	
Dispenser to the Forces, Subaltern	13 11 7	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - 2s. ditto.			
Deputy Military Storekeeper, Major.	20 17 10	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - 1s. ditto.			
Barrack Master, Major - - -	20 17 10	Clerk to the Military Chaplain - - - 16s. per menssem.			
Military Store Clerk - - -	8 11 7	When Public Quarters are not provided, the following will be the Scale on account of Lodging money:—			
Clerk of Works, Royal Engineer Department, Lieutenant.	13 16 7	Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel - 11s. per menssem.			
Clerk, Royal Engineer Department, Ensign.	8 11 7	Major - - - - - 9s. ditto.			
		Captain - - - - - 7s. ditto.			
		Subaltern - - - - - 5s. ditto.			
		With 2l. additional on account of lodging, on account of departure.			
		An Officer for each horse he is required to keep is entitled to 3l. per month for Forage (provided such horse or horses be not already included in the above scale), and 2l. 5s. for each civil servant, as well as 1l. 10s. 5d., as provision allowance for a fourth servant, when such servant is allowed by Royal warrant.			
		<i>Command Allowance.</i>			
		The Officer Commanding at Mahebourg 8s. per menssem.			
		Each Officer Commanding a Corps or Post (except Mahebourg), 5l. per menssem.			
		<i>Recapitulation of the Military Expenditure during the year ended 31st December 1864.</i>			
			£. s. d.		
		By Great Britain - - - - -	105,252 18 5		
		By the Colony - - - - -	32,258 12 11		
		TOTAL - - - - - £.	137,511 11 4		

Appendix (B a).

App. No

SCALE in Detail of Colonial Allowances received by Officers serving with the Troops at Mauritius.

RANK.	Provisions.	Fuel and Light.	Forage.	Servants.	Rank Allowance.	Lodging Money.	TOTAL per Mensem.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.
Major General Commanding.	Fixed allowance	-	-	-	-	-	125 - -
Colonel - - -	1 10 5	1 12 5	6	8 5 5	13 1 -	11	41 8 3
Lieutenant Colonel -	1 10 5	1 12 5	6	6 15 -	8 - -	11	34 17 10
Major - - -	1 10 5	1 12 5	3	6 15 -	8 - -	9	29 17 10
Captain - - -	1 10 5	1 4 3	-	4 10 -	6 - -	7	20 4 8
Lieutenant and Ensign	1 10 5	- 16 2	-	2 5 -	4 - -	5	13 11 7
Adjutant - - -	1 10 5	- 16 2	3	4 10 -	4 - -	5	18 16 7
Quartermaster - - -	1 10 5	- 16 2	3	4 10 -	4 - -	5	18 16 7

REMARKS.

Lodging money is only drawn when officers are not provided with public quarters.  
 Heads of Department draw 2*l.* additional under the head of lodging money.  
 Officers of the Staff draw 3*l.* for each horse allowed by the regulations.  
 When a Subaltern is mounted he draws 2*l.* 5*s.* for an additional servant.  
 Officers entitled to four servants are allowed 1*l.* 10*s.* 5*d.*, only for the fourth servant.  
 Officers in command of Corps and in command of stations, are allowed 5*l.* per month as command allowance.  
 The Commandant at Mahebourg receives 8*l.* per month in lieu of 5*l.* as command allowance.  
 Departmental officers draw according to their relative army rank.

Appendix (D.)

REPORT on the Ceylon Commissariat Department, by *W. D. Bernard*, Deputy Commissary General, August 1865.

SECTION II.

32. HAVING thus far given a general sketch of the origin of the Ceylon Commissariat Department, and of the various modifications which it has undergone, until it has at length assumed overgrown proportions, and finds itself involved in complicated duties, in which military and civil requirements are so intimately blended as to have become almost inseparable, I proceed to point out what precise military duties it really now performs, and what civil duties would remain still to be provided for, if, under a new organisation, the military were altogether to be separated from the civil portion of the Commissariat. Military Duties

MILITARY DUTIES.

THESE consist first in the provisioning of all European troops in the island according to the authorised local scale, as noted in the margin. Of the articles named in that scale, the fresh beef and bread are obtained under annual contracts for each station separately, and therefore the advertising for, and settling the terms of all those contracts devolves upon the Deputy Commissary General, who himself is the sole party to the contracts on behalf of the local Government. But salt provisions (beef and pork) are obtained by the local Government, through the Crown agents of the colony in London, from the Naval Victualling Yard at Deptford. All charges connected with the receipt of these (including five per cent. to the Naval Department in England), and all losses upon the issues, and by wastages or deterioration, are borne by the colony. Biscuit is generally made in the colony, but not of very good quality. It is also sometimes obtained from Madras.

1½ lbs. fresh meat.  
 1 lb. salt meat.  
 1 lb. of bread, or biscuit, or ¼ quart  
 pint, or 4 oz. r  
 1 oz. salt.  
 ½ oz. tea, or 1½ coffee.  
 1½ oz. sugar.

33. The other articles named in the scale are generally purchased in Colombo without contracts, for the prices fluctuate much, and the qualities of the articles vary at different periods, so that it is usually found more advantageous to purchase them by samples from time to time, making the best bargain that the state of the market will permit, than to attempt

pp. No. 13.

attempt to enter into fixed contracts, which dealers will only undertake upon extravagant terms calculated upon contingencies the most adverse to government. At Trincomalee and Galle, contracts for rice have sometimes been made, the demands not being large; but Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, and Kornegalle, are all supplied with rice, for native as well as European troops, from Colombo, which is the chief market of the island. Purchases of rice are made here according to the wholesale prices specially reported weekly by the Customs Department to the Deputy Commissary General, with a fair addition for the cost of delivery, wastage by dust, and remeasuring, &c. The fluctuations in the prices of the chief articles of food within the last three years are given in Table IX. Salt for all purposes is obtained chiefly at Colombo from the Government salt store at Putlam, during the favourable season once, or at most twice a year, in the proportion of about 10 tons at a time, at a cost of 4 s. 8 d. per cwt., besides the expense of freight by coasting vessels, delivery, &c.

34. Until within the last few years, the provisioning of European military hospitals devolved also upon the Commissariat, but this duty has now been transferred to the Military Purveyor's Department, although all articles of equipment, bedding, clothing, fuel, &c., are still provided by the Commissariat, as will hereafter appear.

35. The ration returns of detachments and corps are made up by the Commissariat, and the settlement of accounts and recovery of stoppages is also conducted by this department, although the money recovered is credited by the treasurer in the colonial accounts and not by the Commissary. The difference between the cost of the rations and the amount of the stoppages, or clear total loss upon the provisioning of the troops, is borne by the colony.

See Table.

The statements of wastages in store and on transport are prepared by the Commissariat half-yearly, and are submitted for the sanction of the governor; but there is no distinction made between wastages for military and civil purposes.

36. With regard to native troops, they provision themselves entirely, except in the single article of rice, which is supplied to them by the Commissariat in all parts of the island, at the fixed recovery of 2 d. per quart or 5 s. 4 d. a bushel, whatever the actual cost of it may be. That cost, inclusive of the expense of transport and loss by wastage, varies at the present time from 7 s. 6 d. or even 8 s. a bushel (the rate of the best white rice in Colombo) to 15 s. 9 d. and 16 s. 6 d. in Badulla. Every man's wife (and there are nearly half as many as there are men) receives one pint of rice daily free of charge, and every half-pay boy, of whom there are 80, receives one quart of rice daily, which is paid for at the same rate as the issues to the men, viz., 2 d. a quart. The transport of the rice to stations in the interior and to the barracks in Colombo, and the recovery of the amounts due by the men at all stations, rest with the Commissary, who credits the amounts in his monthly cash accounts. Formerly the native troops purchased their own rice, recovering from the Commissariat the difference in money between the average price of best rice in the bazar, as certified monthly by the commanding officer, and the 2 d. per quart to which the liability of the soldier for the expense of his rice was limited. That practice was altered about four years ago, chiefly owing to the great increase in the cost of rice.

## APPENDICES to the Report of the Deputy Commissary General.

## No. 3.

RETURN of Rations issued to the European Troops in *Ceylon* during the Month of May 1865, showing the Number and Cost of Rations issued to the Men, Women, and Children respectively, together with the Amount of Stoppages recovered from the Troops and the Loss to Government.

## COLOMBO.

By 12,969 rations to men at 10½ d. per ration - -	£. s. d.	553 17 8½	To stoppages on 12,969 men's rations at 3½ d. per ration.	£. s. d.	189 2 7½
" 595 rations to women at 6½ d. per ration - -		32 7 3½			
" 541 rations to children above seven years at 3½ d. per ration.		7 14 ½			
" 1,986 rations to children under seven years at 2½ d. per ration.		21 4 1½	Loss to Government - - - -		426 8 9
TOTAL - - - £.		615 11 4	TOTAL - - - £.		615 11 4

## TRINCOMALEE.

By 3,954 rations to men at 11½ d. per ration - -	£. s. d.	189 9 3	To stoppages on 3,954 men's rations at 3½ d. per ration.	£. s. d.	57 13 3
" 279 rations to women - - - -		6 13 8½			
" 62 rations to children above seven years at 2 d. per ration.		- 10 4	Loss to Government - - - -		141 4 7
" 372 rations to children under seven years at 1½ d. per ration.		2 4 6½	TOTAL - - - £.		198 17 10
TOTAL - - - £.		198 17 10	TOTAL - - - £.		198 17 10

GALLE.

By 2,123 rations to men at 14 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>12</sub> d. per ration - -	£. s. d. 128 - 2	To stoppage on 2,123 men's rations at 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration	£. s. d. 30 19 2
" 124 rations to women at 7 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration - -	3 14 10	Loss to Government - - - -	103 8 11
" 62 rations to children above seven years at 4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration.	1 5 -		
" 93 rations to children under seven years at 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration.	1 8 1		
<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>134 8 1</b>	<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>134 8 1</b>

KANDY.

By 4,003 rations to men at 1 s. <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration - -	£. s. d. 205 14 1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	To stoppage on 4,003 men's rations at 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration	£. s. d. 58 7 6 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
" 327 rations to women at 6 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration - -	8 8 - <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Loss to Government - - - -	164 14 6 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
" 173 rations to children above seven years at 4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration.	2 18 11		
" 471 rations to children under seven years at 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration.	0 1 -		
<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>223 2 1</b>	<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>223 2 1</b>

NUWARA ELIYA.

By 2,040 rations to men at 1 s. 7 d. per ration - -	£. s. d. 161 10 -	To stoppage on 2,040 men's rations at 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration -	£. s. d. 29 15 -
" 93 rations to women at 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration - -	8 13 7	Loss to Government - - - -	137 17 8
" 124 rations to children under seven years at 4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> d. per ration.	2 9 1		
<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>167 12 8</b>	<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>167 12 8</b>

For one month—Total loss to Government - - - £. s. d. 973 14 5  
 Total average annual loss, about - - - - - 11,000 - -

No. 4.

Cost of the Rations of Food of a European Soldier per Day for 1865 at each Station.

	Colombo.	Trincomalee.	Galle.	Kandy.	Nuwara Eliya.
1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> lb. beef - - -	d. 5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	d. 6 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	d. 8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	d. 5 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>12</sub>	d. 9 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
1 lb. bread - - -	3	3	4	4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	7 *
4 oz. rice - - -	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>12</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>12</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>12</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>12</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>12</sub>
1 oz. salt - - -	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>32</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>32</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>
<sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> oz. tea } or	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>
1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> oz. coffee }	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>
1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> oz. sugar - - -	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>	- <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub>
<b>TOTAL Rations -</b>	<b>10 <sup>5</sup>/<sub>32</sub></b>	<b>11 <sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub></b>	<b>14 <sup>5</sup>/<sub>32</sub></b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>

\* Including cost of transport from Kandy to Nuwara Eliya.

- (1) Average cost of a man's ration - - - s. d. 1 1
- (2) Average cost of a woman's ration - - - - - 6<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>
- (3) Average cost of a child's ration above seven - - - 4<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>
- (4) Average cost of a child's ration under seven - - - 3<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>

In addition to the above, 9 lbs. of firewood are issued for each man's ration, and in proportion to the women and children also free of charge.

No. 5.

Cost of RICE issued to Native Troops throughout the Island, showing the Rate per Bushel at each Station, Cost per Man per Diem, and Total Cost for One Month (May 1865), also the Amount recovered and Loss to Government.

	At Colombo.	Trincomalee.	Galle.	Kandy.	Badulla.	Kornegalle.	Jaffna.	Hambantotte.
Rate per bushel average - - -	s. d. 7 8	s. d. 7 6	s. d. 7 8	s. d. 10 -	s. d. 16 -	s. d. 10 -	s. d. 7 6	s. d. 9 -
Proportionate cost per man per diem (1 quart).	- 3	- 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	- 2 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	- 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	- 6	- 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	- 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	- 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>8</sub>

At Colombo:	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
By issued 630 bushels 23 quarters of rice at 7 s. 8 d. per bushel.	241 15 6	To amount recovered from the men at 2 d. per ration - 142 19 8
		Loss to Government - - - - - 98 15 10
	<b>£. 241 15 6</b>	<b>£. 241 15 6</b>

No. 16.

App. No. 13.

## Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery, Military Store Department, and Gun Lascars Corps.

## SCHEDULE of "Colonial Pay and Allowances" authorised to be paid by the Commissariat in 1864, and the present Strength of the different Corps.

Colonial Pay and Allowances.		Fixed Establishment.	Provisional Salaries.	TOTAL.
<b>EUROPEAN TROOPS.</b>				
<b>Royal Artillery.</b>				
Salaries:		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s.
1 Lieutenant Colonel	- - - - -	480	- -	- -
Command allowance	- - - - -	90	- -	- -
2 Captains, at 228 £ each	- - - - -	456	- -	- -
3 Lieutenants, at 150 £ each	- - - - -	450	- -	- -
1 Adjutant and quartermaster	- - - - -	186	- -	- -
4 Pioneers, at 9 £ each	- - - - -	36	- -	- -
Contingencies:				1,008 -
Petty expenses	- - - - -	- -	- -	5 -
TOTAL, Royal Artillery		- - - £.	- - -	1,730 -
Present Strength and Cost (in August 1865).				
		£. s. d.		
1 Lieutenant Colonel	- - - - -	480	- -	
Command allowance	- - - - -	90	- -	
1 Captain	- - - - -	228	- -	
1 Lieutenant	- - - - -	150	- -	
1 Adjutant	- - - - -	186	- -	
TOTAL		- - - £.	1,134	- -
<b>Royal Engineers.</b>				
Salaries:				
1 Lieutenant Colonel	- - - - -	480	- -	- -
Command Allowance	- - - - -	90	- -	- -
2 Captains, at 228 £ each	- - - - -	456	- -	- -
Command allowance to commanding engineer, Kandy	- - - - -	180	- -	- -
4 Lieutenants, at 150 £ each	- - - - -	600	- -	- -
Contingencies:				1,806 -
Petty expenses	- - - - -	- -	- -	5 -
TOTAL, Royal Engineers		- - - £.	- - -	1,811 -
Present Strength and Cost (in August 1865).				
		£. s. d.		
1 Lieutenant Colonel	- - - - -	480	- -	
Command Allowance	- - - - -	90	- -	
1 Captain	- - - - -	228	- -	
Commanding Kandy	- - - - -	180	- -	
2 Lieutenants	- - - - -	300	- -	
TOTAL		- - - £.	1,278	- -
<b>Royal Engineer Establishment.</b>				
Salaries.				
Colombo:				
1 Assistant Royal Engineer, at 7 s. 6 d. a day	- - - - -	- -	137 5 - <sup>o</sup>	- -
Head Clerk	- - - - -	120	- -	- -
2 Clerks, at 75 £ each	- - - - -	150	- -	- -
2 Ditto, 50 £ "	- - - - -	100	- -	- -
Draftsman	- - - - -	75	- -	- -
Superintendent and Interpreter	- - - - -	90	- -	- -
2 Assistant Superintendents, at 36 £ each	- - - - -	72	- -	- -
Master Carpenter	- - - - -	48	- -	- -
Ditto Mason	- - - - -	48	- -	- -
Peon protecting military ground from trespass by cattle	- - - - -	10 18	- -	- -
Messenger	- - - - -	10 18	- -	- -
Kandy:				
2 Superintendents at 36 £ 12 s. each, or 2 s. a day	- - - - -	72 4 -	- -	- -
Master Smith	- - - - -	45	- -	- -
Ditto Carpenter	- - - - -	45	- -	- -
Ditto Mason	- - - - -	45	- -	- -
1 Additional Superintendent	- - - - -	- -	60 - - †	- -
Extra Clerk, at 3 s. a day	- - - - -	- -	54 18 - †	- -
Galle:				
1 Peon protecting military ground from cattle	- - - - -	9	- -	- -
		941 18 -	252 3 -	1,193 19 -
Contingencies:				15 - -
Postage of letters to and from India by contract packet; bookbinder for stitching papers and binding books, and petty expenses.		- -	- -	- -
TOTAL, Royal Engineer Department		- - - £.	- - -	1,208 19 -

Now chargeable against the military contribution.

† Now transferred to the fixed establishment of the Colony.

### Appendix (E.)

DOCUMENTS showing the Cost and Organisation of Indian Native Regiments, the Comparative Cost of European and Native Regiments, the Amount and Mode of Payment of Non-effective Charges, and the Rates of Indian Allowances.

#### MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

Account Branch, dated 23rd September 1865.—No. 892, D.

#### MEMORANDUM.

PAPERS received with case 2 of schedule No. 99, case 1 of schedule No. 118, and case 2 of schedule No. 141, are herewith returned.

2. In the communications from the Ceylon Government, information is sought on the following specified points:—

I. The organisation in officers and men of native regiments in infantry and artillery, and the source or sources from which they are recruited.

II. The comparative cost of native and European regiments in infantry and artillery.

III. The amount and mode of payment to the Imperial Government on account of non-effective charges, and especially the mode in which the Government of India is assessed on account of sea transport of drafts, invalids and reliefs, arms and ammunition, and clothing charges at home for depôts and recruiting, &c.

IV. The rates of Indian garrison or half batta allowances.

3. As regards heading I., two manuscript statements are attached, marked A. and B. The establishment for the infantry regiment in statement A, is that obtaining in this presidency, including the second doing duty officer recently authorised for each native corps, and the revised establishment of weighmen laid down in Government General Order No. 839 of 1865. For the artillery the establishment given is that of a light field battery of the Punjab Irregular Force, with four pieces of ordnance.

4. The undersigned notices that the account branch is not called upon for information as to the sources from which the native army is recruited.

5. The information under heading II. will be found contained in the printed statement submitted by the undersigned in August last, copy of which is also herewith forwarded.

6. With reference to the next point, the undersigned would observe, that non-effective charges on account of native troops are disbursed locally and borne entirely by the Indian Government, but a capitation rate of 3*l.* 10*s.* per man based on the average number in India, during 12 months, is paid annually to the Imperial Government for the none effective charges of the British

troops serving in India, in addition to a capitation rate of 10*l.* per man per annum to reimburse the Imperial Government for all expenses incurred on account of regiments and drafts for service in India, and for maintaining them until arrival in this country. The payment is made by the Indian Treasury at home.

7. The transport charges on account of drafts, time expired men, invalids and reliefs, are borne entirely by the Indian Government, but the disbursement is made both in India and at home; according to the existing arrangement one-third of the amount for homeward passage is payable in India for both officers and men, and one-third for officers, and two-thirds for men, on account of outward passage; the remainder in each case is payable in England, but is charged against the Indian revenues.

8. The charges on account of arms and ammunition and clothing for the depôts of regiments on the Indian establishment are borne by the Imperial Government out of the capitation rate of 10*l.* per man paid by the Indian Government, but on the men coming out to India such charges fall on the revenues of this country.

9. The garrison or half batta allowances of each grade of the several branches of the European army in India, will be found in the statements marked C. and D., but as these rates of pay have practically ceased to exist since the 1st January last, except as regards staff corps pay, which is equivalent to the infantry garrison rates, the undersigned has given in juxtaposition under each branch of the service the field rates of pay which are now drawn by all officers.

10. As regards any other information connected with organisation or rates of pay, the undersigned would refer to the detailed appendices attached to the military budget estimates of each presidency for the current official year, a copy of which might, if the Government deem it desirable, be furnished to the Ceylon Government.

(signed) *Arthur Broome*, Colonel,  
Controller General of Military  
Expenditure.

(True Copy.) *H. Burne*, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary  
to the Government of India.

App. No. 13.

(A.)—STATEMENT showing the Detail of the Establishment and Cost of a Regiment of Native Infantry in the *Bengal* Presidency.

R A N K S.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Commandant	1			640 14	A.
Second in command and wing officer	1			374 1 6	B.
Wing officer	1			374 1 6	C.
Adjutant	1			225 12	
Quartermaster	1			225 12	
Doing duty officers	2		225 12	451 8	
Medical officer	1			600	
		8			34,704 12
Subadars, 1st Class	2		100	200	
Ditto 2nd "	2		80	160	
Ditto 3rd "	4		67	268	
Jemadars, 1st Class	4		35	140	
Ditto 2nd "	4		30	120	
Havildars	40		14	560	
Naicks	40		12	480	
Drummers	16		7	112	
Sepoys	600		7	4,200	
		712			74,880
<b>TOTAL Number</b>		<b>720</b>		<b>And Pay per Annum</b>	<b>1,09,584 12</b>
<i>Command and Staff Allowances.</i>					
Commandant				600	
Second in Command and wing officer				270	
Wing officer				230	
Adjutant				200	
Ditto for office				50	
Quartermaster				150	
Doing duty officers			100	200	
Subadar major				25	
Drill havildar				5	
Drill naick				2 8	
Colour havildars			2	16	
Pay havildars			5	40	
Drum major				5	
Fife major				5	
Mess allowance				100	
Band allowance				100	
					23,982
A. If a major.					
B. If a captain.					
C. If a Lieutenant.					
<i>Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishments.</i>					
Native doctors	2		20	40	
Shop cooly	1			5	
Bheesties	2		4	8	
Goorgah	1			4	
Cooks	2		4	8	
Sweepers	2		4	8	
		10			876
<i>Native Followers.</i>					
Moonshee	1			20	
Moulvie	1			8	
Fundit	1			8	
Tindal	1			9 8	
Lascars	8		5 12	46	
Bheesties	8		5	40	
Sweepers	8		4	32	
Bildars	2		3 8	7	
Chowdry	1			11	
Mutsuddy	1			5	
Weighmen	2		4	8	
		34			2,334
<i>Contract Allowances.</i>					
Allowance to wing officers for payment and repair of arms			80	160	
Allowances to quartermaster for repair of tents				25	
Allowances for butts and targets				4	
Allowances for school shed				5	
					2,328
Add—					
Good conduct allowance					4,208 5 4
Hutting money					772 8
				<b>TOTAL per Annum</b>	<b>144,085 9 4</b>

## (B).—STATEMENT showing the Detail of the Establishment and Cost of a Battery of Punjab Artillery.

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Commandant - - - - -	1	2	- - -	433 10 -	A. - - -
Doing duty officer - - - - -	1		- - -	265 12 -	B. 8,392 8 -
Subadar - - - - -	1		- - -	80 - -	
Jemadar - - - - -	1		- - -	35 - -	
Havildars - - - - -	6		14 - -	84 - -	
Naicks - - - - -	6		12 - -	72 - -	
Buglers - - - - -	2		8 - -	16 - -	
Privates - - - - -	90		8 - -	720 - -	
Native farrier - - - - -	1		- - -	8 8 -	
		107			12,186 - -
TOTAL Number - - - - -		109	And Pay per Annum - - -		20,578 8 -
<i>Command Staff and Horse Allowances.</i>					
Commandant - - - - -				30 - -	
Commandant, horse allowance - - - - -				60 - -	
Doing duty officer (including horse allowance) - - - - -				150 - -	
Pay havildar - - - - -				5 - -	
Drill naick - - - - -				2 8 -	
					2,970 - -
A. If a 1st captain. B. If a lieutenant.					
<i>Native Artificers and Followers.</i>					
Tindal - - - - -	1			8 - -	
Tent lascars - - - - -	1			5 12 -	
Store lascars - - - - -	4		5 - -	20 - -	
Bheesties - - - - -	2		5 - -	10 - -	
Sweeper - - - - -	1		- - -	4 - -	
Salobry - - - - -	1		- - -	15 - -	
Jemadar syces - - - - -	3		10 - -	30 - -	
Syces - - - - -	80		5 - -	400 - -	
Grass cutters - - - - -	95		4 8 -	427 8 -	
Bullock drivers - - - - -	10		5 - -	50 - -	
Mistry smith - - - - -	1		- - -	12 - -	
Filemen - - - - -	2		7 - -	14 - -	
Firemen - - - - -	2		7 - -	14 - -	
Hammer men - - - - -	2		6 - -	12 - -	
Mistry carpenter - - - - -	1		- - -	14 - -	
Carpenters - - - - -	2		10 - -	20 - -	
Moochee - - - - -	1		- - -	5 - -	
Mutsuddy - - - - -	1		- - -	5 - -	
Weighman - - - - -	1		- - -	4 - -	
Langrees - - - - -	2		5 - -	10 - -	
		213			12,963 - -
<i>Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishment.</i>					
Native doctor - - - - -	1			20 - -	
Dresser - - - - -	1			6 - -	
Cook - - - - -	1			4 - -	
Sweeper - - - - -	1			5 - -	
Bheesties - - - - -	1			5 - -	
		5			480 - -
<i>Contract Allowance.</i>					
Allowance for stationery and repair of arms - - - - -				20 - -	
Allowance for four guns and waggons - - - - -			15 - -	60 - -	
Allowance for one spare carriage - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Allowance for one forge cart - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Allowance for two store carts - - - - -			5 - -	10 - -	
Allowance for shoeing 95 horses - - - - -			2 - -	190 - -	
Allowance for shoeing 32 yabooos - - - - -			2 - -	64 - -	
Allowance for repair of 88 sets of harness - - - - -			1 8 -	132 - -	
Allowance for repair of saddles - - - - -			1 - -	7 - -	
Allowance for repair of gram pots - - - - -			- - -	15 - -	
Allowance for cavassons and cotton ropes - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Allowance for eight sepoy's pauls - - - - -			10 - -	5 - -	
					6,216 - -
Add—					
Good conduct allowance - - - - -					1,228 - -
			TOTAL per Annum - - - Rs.		44,435 8 -



(C).—STATEMENT showing the Amount of Regimental Pay and Allowances of each Grade of Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File of the several Branches of the European Army serving in India.

	Horse Artillery.		Foot Artillery.		Cavalry.		Engineers.		Infantry.	
	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Colonel	1,478 7 -	1,478 7 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -	1,478 7 -	1,478 7 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -
Lieutenant Colonel	952 10 -	1,157 - -	827 14 -	1,032 4 -	952 10 -	1,157 - -	827 14 -	1,032 4 -	827 14 -	1,032 4 -
Ditto on Major's pay	781 1 10	929 6 4	640 14 6	789 3 -	-	-	-	-	640 14 -	789 3 -
Major	-	-	-	-	781 1 10	929 6 4	640 14 -	789 3 -	640 14 -	789 3 -
Captain	521 11 4	563 - 4	392 5 -	433 10 -	521 11 4	563 - 4	392 5 -	433 10 -	374 1 -	415 6 -
Second Captain	521 11 4	563 - 4	376 2 8	417 7 8	-	-	392 5 -	433 10 -	-	-
Lieutenant	334 6 -	365 4 -	234 14 -	265 12 -	334 6 -	365 4 -	234 14 -	265 12 -	225 12 -	236 10 -
Second Lieutenant	289 15 10	310 10 4	192 10 6	213 5 -	-	-	192 10 6	213 5 -	-	-
Cornet	-	-	-	-	289 15 10	310 10 4	-	-	-	-
Ensign	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	182 1 11	202 12 8
Paymaster.										
On appointment	-	-	-	-	464 8 -	535 13 -	-	-	404 8 -	445 13 -
After 5 years' service	-	-	-	-	524 15 -	566 4 -	-	-	434 15 -	476 4 -
After 10 years' service	-	-	-	-	555 6 -	596 11 -	-	-	465 6 -	506 11 -
After 15 years' service	-	-	-	-	585 13 -	627 2 -	-	-	495 13 -	537 2 -
After 20 years' service	-	-	-	-	616 4 -	657 9 -	-	-	526 4 -	567 9 -
Quartermaster.										
On appointment	366 12 4	387 10 4	290 3 11	321 1 11	328 5 10	359 8 10	-	-	244 - 8	274 14 8
After 10 years' service	362 13 9	393 11 9	308 8 2	339 6 2	352 11 6	383 9 5	-	-	268 5 9	299 3 9
After 15 years' service	370 15 7	401 13 7	316 10 -	347 8 -	370 15 7	401 13 7	-	-	285 10 -	317 8 -
Riding Master.										
Under 2 years' service	289 15 10	310 10 4	-	-	289 15 10	310 10 4	-	-	-	-
After 2 years' service	334 6 -	365 4 -	-	-	334 6 -	365 4 -	-	-	-	-
Regimental Sergeant Major	59 1 4	64 11 -	56 10 1	57 13 9	49 14 -	51 7 -	63 15 8	65 8 7	47 6 4	48 14 -
Bandmaster Sergeant	-	-	-	-	49 14 -	51 7 -	-	-	47 6 4	48 14 -
Quartermaster Sergeant	51 11 9	52 15 4	49 4 6	50 8 2	43 14 6	45 7 6	56 8 5	57 12 4	39 - 10	40 9 1
Troop Sergeant Major	51 11 9	52 15 4	49 4 6	50 8 2	41 1 10	42 10 10	-	-	-	-
Sergeant Instructor of Musketry, 2nd class.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36 - 2	39 4 1
Paymaster Sergeant										
Under 3 years' service	-	-	-	-	28 4 8	28 10 4	-	-	23 5 1	24 0 1
After 3 years' service	-	-	-	-	35 10 3	36 - -	-	-	30 11 5	31 15 -
Armourer Sergeant	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	-	-	23 5 1	24 0 1
Schoolmaster Sergeant										
Under 10 years' service	-	-	-	-	28 4 8	28 10 4	-	-	23 5 1	24 0 1
After 10 years' service	-	-	-	-	35 10 3	36 - -	-	-	30 11 5	31 15 -
Hospital Sergeant :										
On appointment	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	33 3 1	33 8 9	-	-	30 11 5	31 15 -
After 4 years' service	45 4 11	46 8 6	42 13 9	44 1 4	40 8 7	40 14 3	-	-	38 - 11	39 4 -
Orderly-room Clerk.										
Under 3 years' service	-	-	-	-	28 4 8	28 10 4	-	-	23 5 1	24 0 1
After 3 years' service	52 10 5	53 14 -	50 3 3	51 6 10	35 10 3	36 - -	-	-	26 11 5	27 15 -
Colour Sergeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30 11 5	31 15 -
Saddler Sergeant	-	-	-	-	28 4 8	28 10 4	-	-	-	-
Farrier Major	-	-	-	-	47 12 1	48 15 8	-	-	-	-
Sergeant Farrier Carriage Smith	43 12 5	45 - -	41 5 3	42 8 10	-	-	-	-	-	-
Shoing and Carriage Smith	27 3 11	28 7 6	24 12 9	26 - 4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Farrier	-	-	-	-	30 9 10	31 13 5	-	-	-	-
Collar Maker	24 2 11	25 6 6	21 11 9	22 15 4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wheeler	24 2 11	25 6 6	21 11 9	22 15 4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trumpet Major	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	-	-	-	-
Drum Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23 5 1	24 0 1
Trumpeter	25 11 5	26 15 -	23 4 3	24 7 10	14 14 8	16 7 8	-	-	-	-
Trumpeter on inferior pay	15 - -	16 3 7	12 8 10	13 12 5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drummer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11 8 2	13 1 -
Sergeant	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	36 10 5	37 14 3	23 5 1	24 0 1
Corporals	28 2 7	29 6 2	25 11 5	26 15 -	17 12 11	18 14 10	26 11 4	27 15 3	14 2 6	15 11 -
Second Corporals	-	-	-	-	-	-	22 - 10	23 4 6	-	-
Gunners	15 - -	16 8 7	12 8 10	13 12 5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bombardiers	25 11 5	26 15 -	23 4 3	24 7 10	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drivers	12 8 10	13 12 5	12 8 10	13 12 5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Privates	-	-	-	-	12 9 11	14 2 11	11 12 10	13 - 9	10 1 -	11 10 -

Note.—The separate items which constitute the Garrison Allowance of Commissioned Officers are pay, batta, regimental house rent, tentage and horse allowance; in the Foot Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, the last item is included for Field Officers only. The only difference as regards field rates is that extra batta forms component item, but not regimental house rent. The Officers are thus required to provide their own quarters and tents, and to keep up the regulation number of charges without any further assistance from Government.

(D.)—STATEMENT showing the Rates of Pay and Allowances of Medical Officers and of Subordinate Grades having Half and Full Batta Rates of Pay.

R A N K.	Years' Service.	Relative Rank.	Half Batta	Full Batta	Horse
			Rates per Mensem.	Rates per Mensem.	Allowance when attached to Horse Artillery or Cavalry.
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Surgeon Major	25	Lieutenant Colonel	888 12 -	1,093 2 -	90 - -
Ditto	20	Ditto	852 3 7	1,056 9 7	90 - -
Surgeon	15	Major	677 6 11	825 11 5	90 - -
Ditto	10	Ditto	640 14 6	789 3 -	90 - -
Assistant Surgeon	10	Captain	410 9 5	451 14 5	90 - -
Ditto	6	Ditto	392 5 2	433 10 2	90 - -
Ditto	5	Lieutenant	304 14 2	395 12 2	60 - -
Ditto	Under 5	Ditto	286 10 -	317 8 -	60 - -
Veterinary Surgeon	Under 10	2nd Lieutenant or Cornet.	229 15 10	250 10 4	- - -
Ditto	Above 10	Lieutenant	274 6 -	305 4 -	60 - -
Ditto	Above 20	Captain	431 11 4	473 - 4	90 - -
Ditto, appointed before 17th May 1851	Under 10	2nd Lieutenant or Cornet.	286 10 -	317 8 -	47 13 3
Ditto	Above 10	Lieutenant	310 15 6	341 13 6	47 13 3
Apothecary	-	-	115 7 -	145 14 -	- - -
Second Apothecary and Steward	-	-	95 14 -	126 5 -	- - -
Assistant Apothecary	-	-	55 - -	70 - -	- - -

Arthur Broome, Colonel,  
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

EUROPEAN ARMY.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the European Armies of the Three Presidencies.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	Cavalry, One Regiment.	Infantry, One Regiment.	One Battery Horse Artillery.	One Light Field Battery.	One Heavy Field Battery.	One Garrison Battery.
	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>
<b>BENGAL PRESIDENCY:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,96,162	3,81,208	98,056	81,170	58,233	38,970
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	85,972	1,53,438	24,142	24,142	12,873	12,516
Feed of horses and battery cattle	27,562	-	13,444	10,462	18,902	-
Medical, including dieting patients	7,270	12,944	2,128	2,128	1,062	1,062
Clothing, average of two years*	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding	17,676	31,543	4,977	4,977	2,643	2,574
Ordinance charges*	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>6,92,305</b>	<b>8,45,408</b>	<b>1,88,973</b>	<b>1,69,151</b>	<b>1,19,210</b>	<b>77,540</b>
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	-	-	-	-
Ditto for officers on staff employ*	5,005	7,808	-	-	-	-
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the civil and public works department.	-	858	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>22,195</b>	<b>22,750</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>NET TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>6,70,110</b>	<b>8,22,658</b>	<b>1,88,973</b>	<b>1,69,151</b>	<b>1,19,210</b>	<b>77,540</b>

\* Average for all India.

## STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the European Armies, &amp;c.—continued.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	Cavalry, One Regiment.	Infantry, One Regiment.	One Battery Horse Artillery.	One Light Field Battery.	One Heavy Field Battery.	One Garrison Battery.
<b>MADRAS PRESIDENCY:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	Rs. 3,91,017	Rs. 3,67,620	Rs. 1,03,311	Rs. 81,864	Rs. 62,430	Rs. 42,619
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	86,142	1,53,749	24,184	24,184	12,899	12,541
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - -	67,107	-	28,733	20,514	25,717	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	10,031	17,860	2,691	2,691	1,468	1,468
Clothing average of two years * - - - -	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding - - - -	14,787	26,388	4,163	4,163	2,211	2,156
Ordnance charges* - - - -	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,256
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective - -	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>7,26,747</b>	<b>8,31,886</b>	<b>2,09,308</b>	<b>1,79,688</b>	<b>1,30,222</b>	<b>81,200</b>
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	-	-	-	-
Ditto for officers on staff employ* - - - -	5,005	7,808	-	-	-	-
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers in the civil and public works department.*	-	858	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>22,195</b>	<b>22,750</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>NET TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>7,04,552</b>	<b>8,09,136</b>	<b>2,09,308</b>	<b>1,79,688</b>	<b>1,30,222</b>	<b>81,200</b>
<b>BOMBAY PRESIDENCY:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,83,238	3,71,739	1,05,162	81,680	63,126	40,360
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	86,806	1,54,928	24,374	24,374	12,998	12,637
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - -	82,810	-	39,598	30,446	47,327	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	13,485	24,011	3,618	3,618	2,241	1,973
Clothing, average of two years * - - - -	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding - - - -	13,800	24,626	3,885	3,885	2,063	2,010
Ordnance charges * - - - -	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective - -	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>7,37,802</b>	<b>8,41,579</b>	<b>22,863</b>	<b>1,90,275</b>	<b>1,53,252</b>	<b>79,398</b>
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	-	-	-	-
Ditto for officers on staff employ* - - - -	5,005	7,808	-	-	-	-
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the civil and public works department.*	-	858	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>22,195</b>	<b>22,750</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>NET TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>7,15,607</b>	<b>8,18,829</b>	<b>2,22,863</b>	<b>1,90,275</b>	<b>1,53,252</b>	<b>79,398</b>

\* Average for all India.

ON ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

NATIVE ARMY.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the Native Armies Three Presidencies.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	One Regiment of Cavalry.	One Regiment of Punjab Cavalry.	One Regiment of Infantry.	One Battery of Light Field Artillery.	One Garrison Company of Artillery.	Corps and Ant
<b>BENGAL PRESIDENCY:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	Rs. 2,41,322	Rs. 2,52,986	Rs. 1,44,252	Rs. 44,895	Rs. 11,346	
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	2,007	2,164	3,084	465	324	
Feed of horses and battery cattle	-	-	-	8,272	-	
Medical, including dieting patients	1,253	1,525	1,961	272	218	
Clothing charges	-	-	3,674	492	352	
Barrack ditto	579	625	890	134	93	
Ordnance ditto*	1,027	1,107	5,000	4,637	1,174	
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	5,556	5,988	8,554	1,272	900	
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>2,51,744</b>	<b>2,64,395</b>	<b>1,67,405</b>	<b>60,439</b>	<b>14,407</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>HYDERABAD CONTINGENT:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,87,028	-	1,39,817	39,074	-	
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	2,505	-	4,070	516	-	
Feed of horses and battery cattle	-	-	-	6,039	-	
Medical, including dieting patients	1,580	-	2,561	272	-	
Clothing charges	-	-	14,801	1,844	-	
Barrack ditto	3,808	-	6,187	777	-	
Ordnance ditto	1,280	-	6,594	4,637	-	
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>2,96,201</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1,74,030</b>	<b>53,159</b>	<b>-</b>	<b></b>
<b>MADRAS PRESIDENCY:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,88,970	-	2,24,744	-	33,288	3
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	15,466	-	28,227	-	4,571	
Feed of horses	53,469	-	-	-	-	
Medical, including dieting patients	1,092	-	1,976	-	312	
Clothing charges	4,497	-	3,988	-	794	
Barrack ditto	597	-	1,076	-	176	
Ordnance ditto*	1,107	-	5,000	-	1,174	
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	5,148	-	9,252	-	1,512	1
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>3,65,346</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2,74,263</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>41,827</b>	<b>44</b>
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.	6,858	-	5,542	-	-	
Average deduction for officers on staff employ	10,643	-	30,386	-	-	
Average deduction for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the Civil and Public Works Department.	3,456	-	4,435	-	-	
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>20,957</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>40,363</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b></b>
<b>NET TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>3,44,389</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2,33,900</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>41,827</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>BOMBAY PRESIDENCY:</b>						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,63,207	-	1,48,035	-	37,201	28
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions	22,604	-	32,284	-	3,958	5
Medical, including dieting patients	2,085	-	2,919	-	334	
Clothing charges	1,107	-	3,918	-	534	
Barrack ditto	750	-	1,068	-	132	
Ordnance ditto*	1,107	-	5,000	-	1,174	
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	6,000	-	8,832	-	1,068	1
<b>TOTAL - - - £.</b>	<b>2,95,753</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2,02,056</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>44,401</b>	<b>37</b>

\* Average for all India.

## EXTRACT FROM MADRAS MILITARY BUDGET ESTIMATE 1865-66.

## ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Head Quarters' Staff of the 17th, 20th, and 23rd Brigades, and Details of the 14th Brigade.

## DETAILS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT.

RANKS.	No.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.	RANKS.	No.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a.</i>
Colonel Commandants.	-	-	-	-	Brought forward	-	-	-	3,55,727 8
Colonels	6	1,265 5 -	7,591 14 -		<i>Educational Establishment.</i>				
Lieutenant Colonels	9	1,002 4 -	9,020 4 -		Monshees	3	30 - -	90 - -	
Lieutenant Colonels (of 14th Brigade).	2	1,002 4 -	2,004 8 -		Allowance to Librarian.	-	8 - -	24 - -	1,368 -
Lieutenant Colonels on Major's pay.	3	759 3 -	2,277 9 -		<i>Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishment:</i>				
Adjutants (Second Captains).	3	417 7 8	1,252 7 -		<i>(See Recapitulation of European Artillery).</i>				
Quartermasters	3	309 6 2	958 2 6		<i>Native Followers:</i>				
Surgeons	3	789 3 -	2,367 9 -	3,05,668 2 -	Chowdries	3	14 - -	42 - -	
Serjeant Majors	3	57 13 9	173 9 3		Peons	6	6 - -	36 - -	
Quartermaster Serjeants.	3	50 8 2	151 8 6		Horse-keepers	12	5 4 -	63 - -	
Orderly-room Clerks	3	36 11 9	110 3 3		Grass-cutters	12	4 - -	48 - -	2,268 -
Trumpet Majors	3	36 11 9	110 3 3			33			
Armourer Serjeant	1	-	36 11 9			36			
Hospital Serjeants	3	36 11 9	110 3 3	8,309 7 -	<i>Contract Allowances:</i>				
TOTAL Number	45	and Pay per Annum		3,13,977 9 -	Allowance for head and heel ropes.	2 - -	36 - -		
					Allowance for repair of saddles	1 - -	18 - -		648
Add—					<i>Add—</i>				
Five days' pay for non-commissioned officers and men				115 6 8	<i>For Spare Officers, including Officers' Batteries:</i>				
<i>Command, Staff, and Horse Allowances:</i>					Captains	9	433 10 -	3,902 10 -	
Brigade command allowance	400 - -	1,200 - -		Second Captains	9	417 7 8	3,757 5 -		
Adjutant's allowance	227 - -	681 - -		Lieutenants	18	265 12 -	4,783 8 -		
Instructors of Gunnery	150 - -	450 - -		Ditto	9	43 5 -	389 13 -	1,53,999 - -	
Quartermasters	85 - -	255 - -		Additional pay for length of service to Surgeons - -				10,704 - -	
Orderly-room Clerks	14 14 6	44 11 6		Family allowance to women and children - -				975 - -	
Provost Serjeant	9 12 9	29 6 3							
Serjeant Instructors of Gunnery.	14 14 6	89 7 -							
Hospital Writers	10 - -	30 - -							
Horse Allowance	30 - -	690 - -	41,634 9 -						
Carried forward			3,55,727 8 8				TOTAL	5,25,689 8 8	

## RECAPITULATION.

Total of Head Quarter's Staff of Brigades		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Eleven Light Field Batteries		5,25,689 8 8
One Heavy Battery		8,90,072 15 4
Ten Garrison Batteries		61,930 10 -
		4,23,892 6 6
Add—		19,01,585 8 6
Pay and Allowances of two Veterinary Surgeons for Field Batteries		9,486 - -
Ditto - ditto - of two Riding Masters for Field Brigades		8,293 - -
Pay of Non-commissioned Officers of Local Detail		8,836 - -
Deduct—		19,28,200 8 6
For Pay of Officers in Europe, &c. :-		
<i>In Europe:</i>	<i>On Staff Employ:</i>	<i>In Civil Employ:</i>
5 Colonels.	1 Colonel.	2 Lieutenant Colonels.
1 Lieutenant Colonel (as Major)	2 Lieutenant Colonels.	2 Captains.
8 Captains.	1 Captain.	3 Second Captains.
10 Second Captains.	4 Second Captains.	3 Lieutenants.
6 Lieutenants.	6 Lieutenants.	1 Lieutenant.
5 Lieutenants.	1 Lieutenant.	
		TOTAL per Annum - - -
		Rs. 15,77,040 4 6

ROYAL ARTILLERY—continued.

TEN GARRISON BATTERIES.					ROYAL ARTILLERY DIVISIONS.				
Detail of the Establishment of One Battery.									
RANKS.	Nos.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.	RANKS.	Nos.	Rate of Staff Pay per Mensem.	Total Staff Pay per Mensem.	Total Staff Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Captain	1	-	433 10 -		<i>Command and Staff Allowances:</i>				
2nd Captain	1	-	417 7 8		Commandant	1	-	300 - -	
Lieutenants	2	265 12 -	531 8 -		Ditto	1	-	200 - -	
Lieutenant	1	-	213 5 -	19,151 - -	Adjutants	3	18 5 -	543 15 -	
Staff Serjeant	1	-	50 8 2		Serjeant Majors	2	14 14 6	29 13 -	
Serjeants	4	36 11 9	146 15 -		Quartermaster serjeant.	1	-	14 14 6	
Trumpeter	1	-	24 7 10		Serjeants	5	10 - -	50 - -	
Ditto	1	-	19 12 5			18			13,663 14 -
Corporals	4	26 15 -	107 12 -		Additional Staff Allowances (detail not available) - - - - -				
Bombardiers	4	24 7 10	97 15 4		TOTAL per Annum - - - Rs. 18,074 9 -				
Gunners	60	13 12 5	826 9 -	15,215 13 -					
TOTAL Number	80	And Pay per Annum		34,366 13 -					
Add—				211 5 3					
Five day's Pay for Non-Commissioned Officers and Men									
<i>Command and Staff Allowances:</i>									
Battery command allowance - - -				30 - -					
Pay serjeant and savings' bank clerk.				7 - -					
Mess allowance - - -				40 - -					
				924 - -					
<i>Native Followers:</i>									
Tindal - - - 1				7 8 -					
Store Lascars - - - 6				96 - -					
Lascars - - - 2				5 12 -					
Puckallhes - - - 2				18 - -					
Sweepers - - - 2				8 - -					
				972 - -					
<i>Contract Allowances:</i>									
Allowance for repair of arms - - -				30 - -					
" " Petty stores - - -				- 12 -					
				369 - -					
TOTAL for One Battery per Annum - - - Rs.				36,843 - -					
TOTAL for Ten Batteries per Annum - - - Rs.				3,68,431 6 6					
Add—									
Colonial allowance for officers - - -				15,120 - -					
Allowance for educational establishment				540 - -					
Family allowance to women and children				23,905 - -					
Good conduct allowance - - -				13,200 - -					
Good shooting allowance - - -				560 - -					
				4,21,756 6 6					
<i>For Mountain Train Battery at Tounghoo:</i>									
Nineteen artificers and followers				1,848 - -					
Contract allowances - - -				288 - -					
TOTAL - - - Rs.				4,23,892 6 6					

RECAPITULATION OF ROYAL ARTILLERY.

	Royal Horse Artillery.	Royal Artillery.	Royal Artillery Divisions.	TOTAL.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Pay of Officers	2,19,441 15 -	9,70,536 2 -	- - -	11,89,978 1 -
Deduct—				
For pay of officers in Europe, &c.	46,621 14 -	3,51,160 4 -	- - -	3,97,782 2 -
Pay of non-commissioned officers, rank and file	1,72,820 1 -	6,19,375 14 -	- - -	7,92,195 15 -
Pay of Educational establishment	1,43,226 4 6	5,13,816 10 6	- - -	6,57,042 15 -
Pay of Subordinate medical and fixed hospital establishments:—	756 - -	5,208 - -	- - -	5,964 - -
Pay of 4 Second apothecaries, at Rs. 126 5 - each per mensem				
18 Assistant ditto, at " 70 - - " " "				
2 Second dressers, at " 24 8 - " " "				
117 Servants, at various rates				2,503 - -
141				
Pay of native artificers and followers	74,600 4 10	1,70,691 3 -	- - -	2,45,291 7 10
Command, staff and horse allowances	49,799 7 -	1,01,682 9 -	18,074 9 -	1,69,556 9 -
Contract allowances - - -	40,044 - -	81,426 - -	- - -	1,21,470 - -
Family allowances to women and children	12,960 - -	54,670 - -	- - -	67,630 - -
Good conduct allowance - - -	7,320 - -	29,040 - -	- - -	36,360 - -
Good shooting allowance - - -	370 - -	1,130 - -	- - -	1,500 - -
TOTAL - - - Rs.	5,01,896 1 4	15,77,040 4 6	18,074 9 -	21,29,513 14 10

## INFANTRY.

## EUROPEAN INFANTRY (TEN REGIMENTS).

## Detail of Establishment of One Regiment of Ten Companies.

RANKS.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.	RANKS.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Colonel - - -	1	- - -	1,002 4 -	- - -	Brought forward - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	3,29,219 12 9
Lieutenant Colonel - - -	2	759 3 -	1,518 6 -	- - -	<i>Educational Establishment:</i>				
Majors - - -	10	415 6 -	4,158 12 -	- - -	Trained Schoolmaster - - -	1	- - -	52 10 5	
Captains - - -	12	256 10 -	3,079 8 -	- - -	Staff Allowance to ditto - - -	- - -	- - -	29 13 1	
Lieutenants - - -	8	202 12 5	1,622 8 4	- - -	Trained Schoolmistress - - -	1	- - -	25 - - -	
Ensigns - - -	1	- - -	445 18 -	- - -	Allowance to Assistants - - -	- - -	- - -	20 - - -	
Paymaster - - -	1	- - -	256 10 -	- - -	Moonshee - - -	1	- - -	30 - - -	
Adjutant - - -	1	- - -	274 14 3	- - -	Allowance to Librarian - - -	- - -	- - -	8 - - -	
Quartermaster - - -	1	- - -	789 3 -	- - -		3			1,085 10 -
Surgeon - - -	2	317 8 -	635 - - -	1,65,331 3 -	<i>Subordinate Medical, and Fixed Hospital Establishment:</i>				
Assistant Surgeon - - -	1	- - -	46 7 2	- - -	Second Apothecary - - -	1	- - -	126 5 -	
Serjeant Major - - -	1	- - -	46 7 2	- - -	Assistant do. - - -	1	- - -	70 - - -	
Bandmaster Serjeant - - -	1	- - -	40 9 10	- - -	Second Dresser - - -	1	- - -	24 8 -	
Quartermaster Serjeant - - -	1	- - -	24 9 10	- - -	Nurse - - -	1	- - -	10 - - -	
Paymaster Serjeant - - -	1	- - -	67 5 7	- - -	Cook - - -	1	- - -	- - -	
Armourer Serjeant - - -	1	- - -	31 15 5	- - -	Cook Mate - - -	1	- - -	- - -	
Hospital Serjeant - - -	10	31 15 5	319 10 2	- - -	Cooley Mastry - - -	1	- - -	- - -	
Colour Serjeants - - -	30	24 9 10	738 7 -	- - -	Coolies, first class - - -	3	- - -	- - -	
Serjeants - - -	1	- - -	39 4 11	- - -	Do., second class - - -	8	- - -	191 14 6	
Serjeant instructor in musketry - - -	1	- - -	24 9 10	- - -	Cooley - - -	1	- - -	- - -	
Orderly room clerk - - -	1	- - -	24 9 10	- - -	Puckallies - - -	2	- - -	- - -	
Drum Major - - -	20	13 1 2	261 7 4	- - -	Sweepers - - -	3	- - -	- - -	
Drummers - - -	40	15 11 8	629 2 8	- - -	Tailors - - -	2	- - -	- - -	
Corporals - - -	810	11 10 -	9,416 4 -	1,40,531 1 -	Toty - - -	3	- - -	- - -	
Privates - - -	919	- - -	- - -	- - -	Washerwomen - - -	2	- - -	- - -	
TOTAL Number - - -	958	And Pay per Annum <i>Rs.</i>	3,05,862 4 -			31			5,072 -
Add—					<i>Native Followers:</i>				
Five days' pay of non-commissioned officers, rank and file.				1,951 12 9	Chowdry - - -	1	- - -	14 - - -	
<i>Command, Staff, and Horse Allowance:</i>					Puckallies - - -	16	10 11 10	171 13 4	
Regimental Command - - -	- - -	- - -	400 - - -	- - -	Peons - - -	2	6 - - -	12 - - -	
Company Allowance - - -	30	- - -	300 - - -	- - -	Bheesties - - -	8	7 - - -	56 - - -	
Adjutant's Allowance - - -	- - -	- - -	257 - - -	- - -		27			3,046 -
Instructor of musketry (including horse allowance) - - -	- - -	- - -	150 - - -	- - -	<i>Contract Allowance:</i>				
Paymaster's office allowance - - -	- - -	- - -	78 10 8	- - -	For repair of arms - - -	20	- - -	200 - - -	
Quartermaster's office allowance - - -	- - -	- - -	85 - - -	- - -	For repair of butts and targets - - -	4	- - -	4 - - -	
Interpreter's allowance - - -	- - -	- - -	100 - - -	- - -					2,448 - -
Drill Serjeant - - -	- - -	- - -	14 - - -	- - -	TOTAL for One Regiment per Annum - - <i>Rs.</i>				3,41,772 - 9
Drill Corporal - - -	- - -	- - -	7 - - -	- - -	TOTAL for Ten Regiments " - - "				34,17,720 7 6
Savings Bank Clerk - - -	- - -	- - -	20 - - -	- - -					
Pay Serjeants - - -	7	- - -	70 - - -	- - -					
Serjeant assistant instructor of musketry - - -	- - -	- - -	7 5 7	- - -					
Provost Serjeant - - -	- - -	- - -	9 12 9	- - -					
Store Serjeants - - -	3	8 - - -	35 - - -	- - -					
Hospital Writers - - -	- - -	- - -	10 - - -	- - -					
Mess Allowance - - -	- - -	- - -	150 - - -	- - -					
Horse Allowance for field officers - - -	30	- - -	90 - - -	- - -					
				21,405 12 -					
				Carried forward - <i>Rs.</i>					3,29,219 12 9

INFANTRY.

NATIVE INFANTRY (FORTY REGIMENTS).

Detail of the Establishment of One Regiment of Eight Companies.

RANKS.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.	RANKS.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
Colonel - - -	-	-	-	-					
Lieutenant Colonel	1	-	1,002 4 -	-					
Major - - -	1	-	759 3 -	-					
Captains - - -	7	415 6 -	2,907 10 -	-					
Lieutenants - -	11	258 10 -	2,822 14 -	-					
Ensigns - - -	5	202 12 5	1,013 14 1	-					
Surgeon - - -	1	-	800 - -	-					
Assistant Surgeon -	1	-	450 - -	-					
	27			1,17,069 13 -					
Surgeon Major -	1	-	64 - -	-					
Quartermaster Serjeant.	1	-	57 15 11	-					2,203 - -
	2			1,463 15 -					
Subadars, 1st Class	2	100 - -	200 - -	-					
Ditto, 2nd "	2	80 - -	160 - -	-					
Ditto, 3rd "	4	67 - -	268 - -	-					
Jemadars, 1st "	4	35 - -	140 - -	-					
Ditto, 2nd "	4	30 - -	120 - -	-					
Havildars - - -	41	14 - -	574 - -	-					
Naiaks - - -	40	12 - -	480 - -	-					
Drummers - - -	16	11 - -	176 - -	-					
Privates - - -	600	7 - -	4,200 - -	-					
Recruit and pension boys.	58	3 8 -	196 - -	-					
	769			78,168 - -					
TOTAL Number -	798			1,96,701 12 -					
		And Pay per Annum -							
<i>Command, Staff, and Horse Allowance :</i>									
Regimental Command -	-	-	400 - -	-					
Company Allowance -	-	30 - -	240 - -	-					
Adjutant's ditto -	-	-	192 7 -	-					
Quartermaster and Interpreter	-	-	132 - -	-					
Subadar Major -	-	-	25 - -	-					
Havildar Major -	-	-	10 - -	-					
Native Adjutants -	-	-	17 8 -	-					
Colour Havildars -	-	2 - -	16 - -	-					
Orderly Havildars -	-	1 13 10	14 14 8	-					
Drum Major -	-	-	5 13 4	-					
Fife Major -	-	-	5 13 4	-					
Drill Havildars -	-	-	5 4 -	-					
Drill Naiques -	-	-	3 8 -	-					
Mess Allowance -	-	-	120 - -	-					
Horse Allowance to Field Officers.	-	30 - -	60 - -	-					
				14,979 4 -					
<i>Educational Establishment :</i>									
Moonshee -	1	-	30 - -	-					
Allowance for Regimental School.	-	-	21 - -	-					
	1			612 - -					
<i>Subordinate Medical Establishments :</i>									
Assistant Apothecary	1	-	70 - -	-					
Second Dresser -	1	-	24 8 -	-					
	2			1,134 - -					
		Carried forward - - -		2,13,427 - -					
					<i>Native Followers :</i>				
					Chowdry - - -	1	-	14 - -	-
					Puckalies - - -	8	10 11 10	85 14 8	-
					Peons - - -	2	6 - -	12 - -	-
					Second Tindal -	1	-	7 - -	-
					Lascars - - -	8	6 5 4	50 10 8	-
					Totes - - -	2	7 - -	14 - -	-
						22			2,203 - -
					<i>Contract Allowances :</i>				
					Allowance for repair of Arms	20 - -		160 - -	1,920 - -
					TOTAL for One Regiment per Annum - - - Rs.				2,17,550 - -
					TOTAL for Forty Regiments per Annum - - - Rs.				87,02,000 - -
					Add—				
					Pay, &c., of three additional Lieutenant Colonels				37,161 - -
					Pay and Allowances of Officers doing duty:—				
					From Staff Corps -	{ 1 Lieutenant Colonel 13 Captains - - - 12 Lieutenants - -			
					From General List Infantry, and Cadres of old Corps.	{ 1 Lieutenant Colonel 8 Majors - - - 28 Captains - - - 132 Lieutenants - -			7,34,895 - -
					Additional pay for length of service of Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons.				36,600 - -
					Colonial Allowance for Officers of two Regiments serving in the Straits Settlement.				38,760 - -
					Additional Jemadar for carrying honorary colour of 20th Native Infantry.				420 - -
					Batta for Men serving in the Pegu Division and Straits Settlement.				1,12,221 - -
					Medical Establishment serving in ditto				1,180 - -
					Batta to Native Followers for ditto				3,024 - -
					Band Allowance for 36 regiments				43,200 - -
					Family Allowance -				21,354 - -
					Good Conduct Allowance -				3,08,712 - -
					Deduct—				
					For Pay of Officers in Europe, &c.:—				
					<i>In Europe :</i>		<i>In Staff Corps :</i>		<i>In Staff Employ :</i>
					6 Lt. Colonels.	19 Majors.	5 Lt. Colonels.		
					5 Majors.	137 Captains.	1 Major.		
					26 Captains.	65 Lieutenants.	7 Captains.		
					30 Lieutenants.		15 Lieutenants.		
					<i>In Civil Employ :</i>		<i>Wanting to Complete :</i>		36,83,727 - -
					1 Lieutenant Colonel.		1 Lieutenant Colonel.		
					21 Captains.		130 Lieutenants.		
					40 Lieutenants.		200 Ensigns.		
							19 Surgeons.		
							18 Assistant Surgeons.		
					TOTAL per Annum - - - Rs.				63,55,800 - -

ARMY AND GARRISON STAFF.

	Budget Estimate 1865-66.		Budget Estimate 1865-66.
<i>Divisional and Brigade Staff :</i>		<i>General Staff :</i>	
General Officer Commanding Division - - - -	Rs. a. p.	Deputy Adjutant General - - - -	Rs. a. p.
Aide-de-Camp - - - -	44,500 5 4	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General - - - -	21,035 - -
Brigadier General, 1st Class - - - -	5,918 15 -		9,468 12 9
Ditto - - - - 2nd - - - -	25,800 8 -		
Assistant Adjutant General - - - -	24,439 - -	<i>Garrison and Station Staff :</i>	
Brigade Major - - - -	11,557 12 10	Senior Officer in Command - - - -	6,000 - -
Office allowance to Assistant Adjutant General - - - -	11,546 5 4	Fort and Town Adjutant - - - -	13,655 - -
Office allowance to Brigade Major - - - -	2,040 - -		
	2,040 - -		



## Appendix (J.)

STATEMENTS put in by Mr. De Fonblanque.

## SCHEDULE II.

App. No. 13. STATEMENT showing the Estimated Cost of Services and Supplies for Maintaining a Force in Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of 203 Royal Artillery, 800 European Infantry, 816 Native Infantry, and 89 Gun Lascars.

	£.
A. Upkeep and repair of Barracks	5,000
B. Barrack furniture and equipment	4,000
C. Hospital diets and equipment	3,000
D. Provisions, including rice to native troops	16,000
E. Local transport	1,000
F. Ordnance charges	2,500
G. Native Pensions	8,000
H. Clothing	4,770
I. Travelling and incidental	2,000
J. Dépôts and recruiting	5,667
K. Non-effectives	9,027
L. Sea Transport	9,027
M. Miscellaneous home charges	1,600
	71,591
See Schedule I. { Administrative	22,333
{ Regimental Charges	66,070
	£. 159,994

## (A.)

Repairs and Upkeep of Barrack. £. 5,000.

This charge is computed to cover all repairs to barracks, hospitals, and magazines, as well as existing works, to maintain them in proper condition, and to meet unforeseen charges for temporary engineer establishments.

£. 30,000 is already voted for new constructions, and this sum will probably not be absorbed within the next four years, by which time the proceeds of military land ceded to the colony will, it is believed, be more than sufficient to meet the expenses of further new works and buildings.

## (B.)

Purchase and Repair of Barrack Furniture. £. 4,000.

This sum is calculated on the scale of barrack equipment and furniture authorised by the War Office regulations, and includes freight of stores of this description sent from England; also cost of fuel and light for the troops.

## (C.)

Hospital Diets and Equipments. £. 3,000.

This sum represents the cost of dieting the sick in Hospital and of cost and upkeep of Hospital furniture, equipment and clothing of all descriptions. The computation is based upon the actual expenditure of last year, and on the scale of equipment authorised by War Office regulations as far as it is applicable to this climate.

## (D.)

Provisions. £. 16,000.

The average annual expenditure under this head for the last three years gave about 13*l.* 10*s.* for the provisioning of each European, and 2*l.* 10*s.* for the rice of each native soldier.

The contemplated reduction of the more remote outstations will lead to some saving in the expenditure for rice, and there should be some saving effected in the provisioning of the European troops by a better system of supply and distribution under an organised imperial commissariat. On the other hand there will be some additional cost incurred by the proposed improvement in the European soldier's rations, and it may be assumed that there will be a progressive increase rather than decrease in the cost of most provisions.

The estimated rates, namely 13*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.* for each European, and 2*l.* 5*s.* for each native soldier should be fully sufficient to cover these charges.

## (E.)

Local Transport. £. 1,000.

The average annual cost of moving troops by land and sea within the command.

## (F.)

Ordnance Charges. £. 2,500.

The cost and freight of military stores of all descriptions, including gunpowder, and upkeep of all stores in the custody of the military storekeepers.

## (G.)

Native Pensions. £. 8,000.

This is quoted at nearly 1,000*l.* in excess of the present native pension list, in order to meet the amount of pensions and gratuities which will become payable in consequence of the discharge of Ceylon Riflemen to bring their numbers down to 800.

Should the scheme of two companies of Malays to garrison Singapore, with the view of forming a recruiting depot be carried out, the number of discharges will be considerably less, but under any circumstances a large number of men in the Ceylon Rifles will very soon have to be pensioned.

I would not transfer the liability of the native pension list from the Colonial to the Imperial Government, since it is only through colonial agency that the identification and payment of pensioners who are scattered all over the island could be efficiently carried out. The sum of 8,000*l.* would not therefore form a part of the colonial contributions, but is included in the estimates in order to indicate the actual outlay to be incurred by the colony.

(H.)

Clothing. £. 4,770.

The average annual cost of clothing is computed at 2 l. 10 s. per man.

In the abstract of military expenditure in Ceylon, which accompanied the Colonial Office letter of October 1863, the colony is assessed at 13,000 l. a year, under the head of "arms, clothing, recruiting expenses, depôts, &c." This estimate is based on a force of 2,634 non-commissioned officers, and rank and file of European and native troops, of which 1,118 are European, and 1,516 are natives.

The cost of clothing for this force at the above rate would give 6,685 l., leaving a balance of 6,315 l. for recruiting expenses, depôts, &c., which charge is carried forward under head J.

The charge for clothing of the proposed force at 2 l. 10 s. a man, gives a total of 4,770 l.

(J.)

Recruiting and Depôts. £ 5,667.

As shown under heading H., the sum of 6,315 l. appears as the charge due for recruiting and depôt expenses for an European force of 1,118 men, giving about 5 l. 13 s. per man.

This rate on the reduced European force proposed, gives a total of 5,667 l.

(K. and L.)

Non-effectives and Sea Transport. £18,054.

The sum of 10,000 l. is charged in the abstract referred to under each of these heads for the force quoted, and applies to European troops only, giving about 9 l. per man for each service, or for the force now proposed, a total of 9,027 l. under each head.

(M.)

Miscellaneous. £. 1,600.

The sum charged under this heading in the abstract referred to, was quoted at 2,000 l. for a force in excess, by 726 men, of that now proposed; and a reduction of 400 l. under this head would therefore appear reasonable.

(I.)

Travelling Expenses, &c. £. 2,000.

This includes in addition to travelling expenses of officers, office contingencies, postage, stationery, printing, &c.

Ceylon, November 1865.

SCHEDULE III.

STATEMENT showing the Total Estimated Cost and the Capitation Rates due under each Head of Service for the Maintenance of a Military Force of 1,908 Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File in Artillery, European Infantry, Native Infantry, and Gun Lascars.

Reference to detailed Statement.	Services or Supplies.	Charges.	Royal Artillery.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Gun Lascars.
For details see Schedule II.	Upkeep and repair of barracks - - - - -	£. 5,000	£. s. d. 2 12 5	£. s. d. 2 12 5	£. s. d. 2 12 5	£. s. d. 2 12 5
	Barrack furniture and equipment, and fuel and light - - - - -	4,000	2 2 -	2 2 -	2 2 -	2 2 -
	Hospital diets and equipment - - - - -	3,000	2 7 10	2 7 10	- 13 3	- 13 3
	Provisions, including rice to native troops - - - - -	16,000	13 18 6	13 18 6	2 5 -	2 5 -
	Local transport - - - - -	1,000	- 10 6	- 10 6	- 10 6	- 10 6
	Ordnance charges - - - - -	2,500	1 6 3	1 6 3	1 6 3	1 6 3
	Native pensions - - - - -	8,000	- - -	- - -	8 16 10	8 16 10
	Clothing - - - - -	4,770	2 10 -	2 10 -	2 10 -	2 10 -
	Travelling and incidental - - - - -	2,000	1 1 -	1 1 -	1 1 -	1 1 -
	Depôts and recruiting - - - - -	5,667	5 13 -	5 13 -	- - -	- - -
	Non-effective services - - - - -	9,027	9 - -	9 - -	- - -	- - -
	Sea transport - - - - -	9,027	9 - -	9 - -	- - -	- - -
	Miscellaneous home charges - - - - -	1,600	- 16 10	- 16 10	- 16 10	- 16 10
	TOTAL for Services and Supplies - - - - £.	71,591	50 18 4	50 18 4	22 14 1	22 14 1
See Schedule I. - {	Staff and departments - - - - -	22,333	11 14 1	11 14 1	11 14 1	11 14 1
	Regimental charges - - - - -	66,070	51 9 6	36 14 3	30 1 7	19 2 -
	TOTAL Expenditure - - - - £.	159,994	114 1 11	99 6 8	64 9 9	53 10 2

RECAPITULATION.

	£.
Royal Artillery, 203 at 114 l. 1 s. 11 d. - - - - -	23,161
European Infantry, 800 at 99 l. 6 s. 8 d. - - - - -	79,467
Native Infantry, 816 at 64 l. 9 s. 9 d. - - - - -	52,622
Gun Lascars, 89 at 53 l. 10 s. 2 d. - - - - -	4,763
TOTAL for 1,908 { Non-Commissioned Officers } Rank and File	£. 160,012

It must be borne in mind that any increase in the numbers quoted will decrease the capitation charges under the head of Staff and Departments, while any reductions in the above numbers will increase those rates; the amount chargeable under those heads being invariable, and requiring to be spread over whatever number of troops are maintained. The capitation rate of Native Infantry and Gun Lascars will be reduced by 8 l. 16 s. 10 d. if the Colony undertakes the charge for native pensions.

Ceylon, November 1865.

E. B. de Fonblanque.

App. No. 13.

## Appendix (K.)

STATEMENT put in by Mr. De Fonblanque.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Cost [under the Head of Regimental Pay and Allowances only] of a given Military Force in each of the Three Indian Presidencies, and in Ceylon.

Nos.	Description of Forces.	Ceylon.		Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
		Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.
1,000	European Infantry - -	£. 36,712	£. s. d. 36 14 3	£. 41,488	£. s. d. 41 9 9	£. 48,000	£. s. d. 48 - -	£. 40,450	£. s. d. 40 9 -
200	Ditto Artillery - -	10,295	51 9 6	10,400	53 - -	11,360	56 16 -	10,860	54 8 -
1,000	Native Infantry - -	30,079	30 1 7	20,133	20 2 8	20,017	20 4 -	20,100	20 2 -
100	Gun, Lascars or native sappers and miners.	1,900	19 2 -	2,500	25 - -	2,650	26 10 -	1,315	23 3 -
	TOTAL Regimental Charges	78,986	- -	74,521	- -	91,027	- -	72,745	- -

The foregoing calculations as regards Indian troops are based on the rates of pay and regimental allowances granted to them while serving in their own Presidencies. They would probably require a higher rate of pay if employed in Ceylon. Were the command of the forces in Ceylon placed under one of the Indian Presidencies, an officer below the rank of Major General might command on the spot and some reduction under the head of Staff and Departments could thus be contemplated, but, on the other hand, the staff allowances in India are very much higher than those in Ceylon, which would moreover have to bear its share of the general administration in India (*see* Table annexed). Under the head of services and supplies (Schedule II.) the same sums would be chargeable against an Indian as against the present force. A large saving could only be effected by the employment of an Indian force, on the supposition that a smaller number of troops would suffice to garrison Ceylon, if that colony were made a military dependency of one of the Indian Presidencies, and could therefore rely upon reinforcements being more speedily thrown into the island, on an emergency, than they would be, if required to be drawn from England. In the event of this scheme being carried out, a heavy charge would fall on the colony for the pensions to the Ceylon Rifle Regiment on its disbandment, unless arrangements could be made for transferring the services of that corps to some other command; but in the comparative statement the question of pensions has been left out of account.

E. B. De Fonblanque.

## ANNEXURE.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the Cost of Military Administrative Establishments maintained in the Three Indian Presidencies, and in Ceylon.

DEPARTMENTS.	Bengal Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 111,438.	Madras Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 48,940.	Bombay Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 39,685.	Ceylon proposed Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 1,908.
1 Military Staff - - - - -	£. 245,278	£. 122,608	£. 124,491	} £. 5,450
2 Administrative Staff - - - - -	98,652	50,352	49,236	
3 Commissariat - - - - -	191,014	65,227	63,133	} £. 3,774
4 Clothing - - - - -	7,903	4,626	3,929	
5 Barracks - - - - -	75,549	17,744	11,526	} -
6 Military Law - - - - -	19,342	14,393	8,700	
7 Medical - - - - -	169,995	75,336	54,250	} £. 4,356
8 Ordnance - - - - -	108,183	81,614	75,222	
9 Chaplains - - - - -	12,672	5,316	5,779	} £. 1,000
10 Educational - - - - -	24,570	7,135	4,418	
TOTAL - - - - -	953,158	444,351	400,684	18,276
Add for Royal Engineers - - - - -	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
TOTAL - - - - -	957,158	448,351	404,684	22,276
Average rate per Man - - - - -	£. s. d. 8 11 9	£. s. d. 9 3 2	£. s. d. 10 4 -	£. s. d. 11 14 1

The Remark Department is included under the head Ordnance.

## Appendix, No. 14.

## PAPER received from the INDIA OFFICE.

## MEMORANDUM on the Employment of NATIVE TROOPS from INDIA in the COLONIES.

I DOUBT the expediency of employing, to any extent, native troops from India in the Colonies, except under urgent and exceptional circumstances; and, in speaking of the Colonies, I allude to Ceylon, China, the Mauritius, Aden, and the South Coast of Africa. Our other possessions are, on account of climate, the length of voyage which they involve, and for other and obvious reasons, utterly unsuited as places in which to locate natives of Hindustan, and need not be discussed.

Every one who is acquainted with the natives of India is aware of their dislike to any protracted period of service at such a distance from their homes as not to admit of their visiting them, from time to time, at no very lengthy intervals. Even a short service in Lower Bengal and Assam is to a native of Upper India exceedingly distasteful; and to a sea voyage the Hindoos have an almost insuperable objection. This is not so much the case with the Mahomedans, whose manner of living is different, and consequently, while on board ship, they avoid many of the privations which the religion of the Hindoo compels him to undergo.

In the last war in China, the experiment of sending native troops from India to take a part in it was a success. But we must not be led into the error of believing that this has established a safe precedent; on the contrary, the case was, I think, entirely exceptional. The troops were quite newly raised and organised, they had acquired none of the prejudices and vices of the old Bengal army; they had a firm belief in the power and absolute will of the officers commanding them, and had not then learnt to look beyond them for redress of their grievances; they had just seen the old mutinous Bengal army scattered to the winds by the persistent courage of the British, and they were ready to have eaten the obnoxious cartridges of 1857 had they been ordered to do so.

In such a frame of mind, they were invited to go to China; the wishes of their officers were in most cases their wishes; they volunteered, and went on remarkably liberal terms. They had, I believe, Indian pay, batta, and free rations, and in the case of the two cavalry regiments, their horses were exchanged for Government stud-bred and Colonial horses, which they were afterwards allowed to retain. While in China they were employed in a campaign where they met just such an enemy, and just as much opposition from him, as suited them, and they acquired a considerable amount of plunder.

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They lived chiefly on the Government rations, saving most of their pay, and at the end of two years they returned to India, each with a considerable sum of money. Indeed, since the return of the troops so employed, so much have the tales of the wealth they brought been circulated and exaggerated among other regiments, that I believe, if another native force were now called for to proceed to China on similar terms, one-half of the Bengal army would volunteer for the service.

Very different would be the case of a regiment sent to a Colony in a time of peace. Devoid of all such continued change and excitement, without the opportunities of acquiring wealth; alone among foreigners, and confined to the dull routine of garrison duty for a lengthened period, they would, I think, be likely to become sullen and discontented, and, if not carefully managed, would probably proceed to some overt act which military discipline could not overlook; and on their relief and return to India would probably disseminate such reports as to their treatment as would induce others to decline to proceed on the same duty.

If, however, the experiment be tried, new regiments will have to be raised for the purpose, as the present native army is now probably at as low a strength as it is convenient to maintain it at; and though some consider that by arming the native soldier with a more effective weapon, such as a breech-loading rifle, that their number may be still further reduced. Yet I hold to a different opinion, and think that, for political reasons, they should never be entrusted with a better fire-arm than they now possess, which is sufficiently good for all ordinary purposes; and with reference to possible future events, it must be borne in mind that if we have to oppose Europeans in India, they must be met (to be met successfully) with a force in which the native army would form an extremely small proportion; perhaps the only exception it might be advisable to make in regard to arming them with a better class of fire-arm, would be in the case of some of the regiments or companies of the Punjab Frontier Force, who, from the peculiar kind of warfare in which it is occasionally employed, might be advantageously supplied with a better weapon.

It would not be necessary to give any regiment raised for the purpose of Colonial employ a larger proportion of European officers than corps on the irregular system now have; but they should be especially selected for the purpose. Indeed it would be essential to a prospect of success, that the English officers attached to such corps should be men thoroughly acquainted with

App. No. 14. the language, habits, customs, and prejudices of the men they are sent to command.

Probably the best method of forming such regiments would be by calling for volunteers from the commissioned and non-commissioned grades forming the present native army: each man so volunteering should receive a step in rank by promotion to a superior grade; the regiment should then be completed by recruiting; Belooches, Pathans, Afghans, Mussulmans, and Seikhs are best fitted for the purpose; Brahmins and Rajpoots I would exclude altogether.

Assuming that it is not intended that any native force should garrison or occupy any foreign station alone, but that they should be associated with and supplement British troops, I think that they should never be in a greater proportion than one-half to the number of Europeans. Circumstances might occur in which a large number would be likely to cause embarrassment.

As regards the length of time which they should remain on foreign service, I think that, with reference to the fact that while absent from India they could neither have the indulgence of furlough or leave, three years should not be exceeded.

In speaking of the European officers, I have omitted to observe that, if officers of the Indian army are employed on this duty, they will, I presume, draw Indian pay and allowances, in which case the anomaly will be presented of the officer attached to the native troops drawing a very superior rate of pay, while the officer belonging to one of Her Majesty's British regiments is confined to Colonial pay and allowances.

I have said that I doubt the success of the experiment of supplying the Colonies with native troops, and feel assured that it will be a duty

that will never be popular; but if it is to be tried, it should at first be in a very small way, with a regiment raised for the purpose; and at the time of its formation, every care should be taken that the men thoroughly understand for what purpose, and on what terms, they are enlisted; their pay, pension, clothing, any extra allowances, or rations, duration of foreign service, arrangements for their family remittances; whether barracks provided, or hutting money in lieu thereof; all should be explained and made clear to them, and every possible contingency provided for as far as practicable.

It was, I believe, a neglect of such precautions that caused the passive mutiny and consequent disbandment of the Seikh corps which was raised and sent to Ceylon, either in 1862 or 1863. In that case the men believed they were enlisted to do the duty of soldiers, but, on arrival, their arms were taken from them, and they were set to work in gangs on the roads; they refused, and were disbanded, and sent back to Calcutta at a considerable cost to Government. The men's complaint was "that they enlisted to serve Government as soldiers, but that, when they arrived in Ceylon, they wanted to make coolies of them."

In conclusion, I would urge that the strictest faith be kept with a regiment, and that no exigencies should induce the Government to keep it longer on foreign service than the time assigned it at its departure from India, and that, on its return, it should be sent to a good up-country station, and a liberal allowance of furlough extended to it.

(signed) *T. F. Wilson,*  
Lieut.-Col., 7th Bengal Cavalry.

11 June 1867.

## Appendix, No. 15.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, c.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

LETTER addressed to the Secretary of the Government of India, in the Military Department, as to the Employment of NATIVE SOLDIERS ON FOREIGN SERVICE ON DUTIES which might be performed by POLICEMEN.

App. No. 15

(No. 566 A.)

From Colonel *Balfour*, Chief of the Military Finance Department of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir,

Calcutta, 6 August 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your docket, No. 191, dated 26th February 1861, forwarding, in original, a letter and its enclosure from the Government of Madras (as per margin), submitting various proposals connected with the rationing and dieting of native and European troops on duty in Pegu and the Straits of Malacca. These propositions I proceed to review seriatim; and I trust Government will excuse the length to which my remarks extend, in consideration of the important bearing of these points on the health, efficiency, and cost of troops employed on foreign service.

Herewith returned  
From Government of Madras,  
No. 2022, dated 1st June 1860.  
To Lieut. General Sir J. H. Grant,  
Commanding in China,  
No. 62, dated 3rd July 1860.  
From Government of Madras,  
No. 400, dated 31st January 1861.

2. With regard to the proposition to sanction an establishment of cooks, for the hospital service of native regiments serving in Burmah and the Straits Settlement, I submit that I am opposed to any such addition to Government establishments; not only as entailing an increased, and I fear, unlimited expenditure on the State, but also as tending to obstruct the working of an efficient regimental system of control, which, whilst establishing a certain extent of supervision, yet leaves soldiers to act for themselves, thus encouraging in them that feeling of self-reliance so necessary to their complete efficiency.

3. I think it would be both more economical to Government and more advantageous to the soldiers, if, by means of a small grant from Government, to be laid out under regimental arrangements, convenient cooking places could be provided; so divided as to admit of separate rooms being given to different castes. This arrangement should be supplemented by a small allowance granted to each regiment, for maintaining cooks, to prepare under strict and economical regimental arrangements, food for men who are sick or absent on duty. The exact amount expended by the State on this account would be known, and the money would also, I think, be better applied than if Government provided an establishment of servants.

4. The great point is, however, to induce commanding and other officers to look carefully after the comforts of their men, when serving beyond seas. On such service, native soldiers need the greatest attention in respect to food, fully as much as European soldiers; and this attention invariably produces results highly favourable to the service. This is well known to those who have served beyond seas with natives; but the system prevailing in the continent of India, of abstaining from all interference in this respect, renders it difficult for officers, who have not had this experience, to realise the necessity for their looking to these arrangements for native soldiers when on foreign service.

5. One great difficulty connected with native troops on foreign service, is their propensity to sell the food provided for them by Government, and purchase inferior articles, as stated in the report of the Inspector General of Hospitals, forwarded to me; and it is well known that they often starve themselves, in order to hoard up money obtained by the sale of their rations.

6. This fact establishes the necessity of a reform in the present system of allowing native soldiers, on foreign service, to prepare their food without proper supervision. Great care is now taken by Government in respect to the food issued to native soldiers being of a good kind, and in proper quantities, and officers should always do their part to secure the good results that should follow on this liberal treatment, by taking care that the soldiers make a proper use of the articles supplied for keeping them in health and fit for duty. Regular hours should be established for native soldiers to cook; suitable places being provided for that purpose, and care taken to ascertain that the rations are properly cooked, and consumed by the men, not being otherwise disposed of, either before or after cooking.

App. No. 15.

7. Attention to cooking, and care to prevent food being sold, would lessen disease and mortality; and any small additional expense that may be incurred by Government in aid of this object, in the way of providing cooking places, would be amply repaid by saving in the large sums at present paid for passage from the eastward, for sick native soldiers, and in the pensions, now granted to many who are sent to the coast as worn out, and to the heirs of those who die, mainly in consequence of this system of starvation, or use of inferior food.

8. I observe that the Madras Government have now ordered a diet for native soldiers in hospital on foreign service; and would suggest that the Government of India should call for a report on the advantages resulting therefrom, to be submitted as early as possible; the measures taken to see to the efficient application of the supplies, being also stated.

9. But whilst thus dwelling strongly on the necessity of preventing the selling of rations, as inducing sickness and death amongst native soldiers on foreign service, I would wish also to see other evils leading to the same results fully inquired into; such as the exposure and excessive amount of duty to which native soldiers beyond seas are very frequently, nay, generally subjected, which are a prolific source of disease and death, and induce dislike to foreign service.

10. The papers sent for report show, that guards are often posted at very considerable distances from the soldiers' lines. At Singapore, no less than three miles off, so that the men have to go a long way for their food; and it is even sometimes impossible to allow them to leave their guards from the time they mount, until relieved.

11. I believe further that it is the practice to employ the native soldiers at Singapore and other places beyond seas so constantly as to give them only every other night in bed; and sometimes not even that. The result is, their health is seriously affected, and their desire to remain in the service diminished, whilst their craving to return to their native country is naturally increased; and not only is expense constantly incurred in sending men backwards and forwards, but the pension list is constantly augmenting. In order to show the extent of this evil, I would advise returns being obtained from the Madras Government, showing the number of men who have, during any one year of the past few years, been sent back to Madras from a few regiments in the Straits, Pegu, and Tenasserim; stating the strength of each regiment on embarking, the additions subsequently made to it, distinguishing recruits and recovered men sent to rejoin the corps, as also the number of deaths, and the numbers invalided and pensioned.

12. It is, I believe, well understood that measures tending to increase the comfort of the soldier greatly increase the popularity of the service, whilst a proportionate distaste for the service is engendered by over-work; and of late, as Government are aware, the difficulties experienced in recruiting for the Madras army have greatly increased, owing to the heavy service beyond seas, imposed on the coast army. Whilst advocating on financial grounds a great reduction of the force at present located beyond seas, I think that every effort should be made still further to reduce the military expenditure of those provinces, by adopting measures calculated to diminish to the utmost, sickness and pensioning, among the native soldiers that must be retained there.

13. One obvious measure is to relieve them as far as possible from many fatiguing duties of distant guards, on which they are now employed. It is no doubt a wise economy to attend to the wants of the soldier so as to keep him as far as possible in health, and recover him as soon as possible from sickness; but at the same time care should be taken to avoid the exposure and overtaking which forces men into hospital, and leads to their being constantly 80 or 100 sick out of a regiment of 760, whilst, with due precautions, there need be only an average of about 20 sick.

14. I deferentially submit, as an opinion, that the Straits Government should be called on to maintain a police force in sufficient strength to allow of the native soldiers being freed from all the guard duties now universally recognised as properly belonging to police; and even when on duty as a military body, the soldiers should be entirely freed from duties of watch and ward. I do not think this police force would entail any unfair burden on the Straits Settlements, as Singapore possesses a flourishing local revenue; and the inhabitants have long boasted of this as sufficient to pay the cost of administration.

15. This relief from excessive duty,—combined with the erection of proper cook rooms, whereby the establishment of regimental supervision over the proper cooking of the rations supplied by Government, would be facilitated and misappropriation prevented, with the grant of a small regimental money allowance to ensure the supply of cooked food to men in hospital, who are too unwell to cook for themselves, and to men on guard, who are unable to leave their guards to cook their food, or are too distant from their lines to procure it,—would, in my opinion, be far more efficacious in keeping the men in health, than any Government establishment of cooks; whose salaries would considerably add to the fixed charges of the State, while the waste and peculation would be likely to entail endless and uncertain expense both on the Government and on the soldier, and would in all probability diminish, instead of increasing the comfort of the latter.

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16. With the smaller number of sick that would have to be provided for, with greatly diminished exposure and fatigue, and improved arrangements for the preparation of food, there would be less objection to the grant of extra hospital supplies, to ensure the restoration of the sick to health. The Military Finance Department, whilst endeavouring to check undue profusion, have in all their reports advised the most efficient measures being taken to restore sick soldiers to health, and when the medical officers are actively employed as medical examiners, it will be safe to grant whatever they may consider necessary for the cure of the sick; but with the present large number of sick, the medical establishment have not, under the arrangements hitherto in force, had the means of exercising effective control over the supplies furnished for the sick, and too great liberality on the part of Government would lead to speculation and waste.

17. Whatever measures be adopted for adding to the comfort of the sick, should, in my opinion, be entirely carried out under regimental arrangements, and officers commanding corps and companies should be specially enjoined to see that the duties involved in such arrangements, are strictly and efficiently supervised; special instructions being issued to provide for this daily supervision.

18. With respect to the further question referred, namely, the proposed increase of rations to European troops (as noted in paras. 11 and 19 of the Report on the Straits from the Inspector General of Hospitals), I fully admit the correctness of the principle that the soldier should not be in any way stinted; but still, before increasing the rations already allowed by Government on a most liberal scale, I think that other measures should be adopted, to reduce sickness and mortality to the very lowest ratio.

19. I submit that a good and sufficient ration can always be provided, by means of a judicious substitution, according to circumstances, of other articles and equivalents, within the cost now incurred for the liberal scale of ration authorised for European soldiers. In the proceedings of the Government of Madras (referred to in para. 5 of the Order No. 399 of 31st January 1861), I observe 2 lbs. of suet are proposed to be granted to the European soldier as a part of the daily ration; but I presume this must be a clerical error. I believe 8 oz. of suet a week, or 1 oz. daily, would be an ample ration of that article.

20. A scale of equivalents, as noted in the margin, shows how much the soldier's rations may, from time to time, be varied, without increasing either cost or quantity; and at pages 71 and 72 of the English Commissariat Regulations, the following equivalents are laid down:

" $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of suet and  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of currants, or 1 lb. of raisins, is to be considered equal to 1 lb. of flour.

"1 lb. of biscuit,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. of soft bread, 1 lb. of flour, 1 lb. of rice, 1 lb. of sago, 1 lb. of Scotch pot or pearl barley, are to be considered equal to each other.

" $\frac{1}{2}$  pint of wine, 1 quart of strong beer,  $\frac{1}{2}$  gill of spirits, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 lb. of rice, 1 pint of peas, 1 pint of dhol, 1 pint of calavances, 1 quart of oatmeal,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  pints of split peas, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 oz. of chocolate, 1 oz. of cocoa, 1 oz. of coffee,  $\frac{1}{2}$  oz. of tea, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 lb. of butter, 1 lb. of sugar, are to be considered equal to each other.

"2 lbs. of cheese, 1 lb. of chocolate, 1 lb. of cocoa, 1 lb. of coffee, are to be considered equal to each other.

" $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of onions or leeks, 1 lb. of other vegetables, are to be considered equal to each other."

21. At places situated on the sea coast, such as Singapore, Cananore, Madras, Bombay, and Kurrachee, fish might frequently be issued with advantage once or twice a week, instead of meat; and in the Straits and Pegu especially, the variations of diet might be numerous, by reason of the great variety of articles procurable there. Barley, potatoes, yams, sweet potatoes, peas, onions, garlic, and various other kinds of vegetables, would all be agreeable adjuncts; as also pepper, raisins, and currants. Salt meat would also be acceptable occasionally, if judiciously served out with pease pudding; and a supply of lime juice, vinegar, and mustard, might be attended with good results.

22. The issue of salt, butter, and cheese, as proposed for Singapore, may also be admitted in substitution of a portion of the other articles of the ration. Indeed, whenever these changes may be considered advisable, and the articles can be supplied within the existing charge for ration, I think it would be well to authorise the exchange being made; but, as such changes might, if made independently of the Commissariat, lead to that department being over-taxed, it is essential that all substitutes should be fixed by communication between the commanding officer and the commissariat officer. I am quite satisfied, that with a good understanding between these two officers, there can be no difficulty in deciding on suitable substitutes; but I deprecate an arbitrary power of making changes being exercised by the commanding officer.

23. The time that substitutes are to continue in force should be defined, as also the quantity of each substitute; so that definite arrangements may be made by the commissariat

Bread $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.	} is equal to	Rice 1 lb.
or		Flour 1 lb.
Bread 1 lb. and		Biscuit 1 lb.
Rice 4 oz.	} is equal to -	Peas $\frac{1}{2}$ pint,
Flour $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.		or
		Dhol $\frac{1}{2}$ pint,
		or
		Beans $\frac{1}{2}$ pint,
		or
		Vegetables $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.
Beef 1 lb. is equal to -		Suet $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
Tea $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. is equal to -		Fish about 2 lbs.
		Coffee 1 oz.
		or
		Cocoa 1 oz.
		or
		Chocolate 1 oz.



App. No. 15.

sariat officer. It is also essential that the arrangement should be well understood by the men, and carefully attended to by the officers.

24. Under this view I do not feel justified, until further necessity for the measure be shown, in recommending Government to increase the rations in the manner stated, and to the extent proposed; which would considerably increase the cost. The Indian scale of rations is the most liberal fixed for any body of soldiers; and in support of this view I may refer Government to the remarks of the Commission on the sanitary condition of the army, and to Appendix XXVII. of that Report, on the scales of rations fixed for soldiers located in different Colonies.

25. As already observed, I fully admit that the articles to be supplied to soldiers should be of the most suitable description that can be obtained; but it is sometimes difficult to reconcile the opinions of medical officers as to what diets are best for health. In Appendix XXX., page 429 of the above Sanitary Report, I observe that soup made of head, shanks, and feet is suggested; as also hearts, fried liver, and tripe; and there can be no doubt that, with reference to the habits of the men before enlisting, these parts of the animal would be desired by some soldiers. It is also proposed that arrangements should be made for providing roast meat in all barracks; and no doubt some use might be made of all these suggestions.

26. I notice in the letter forwarded, that a better description of beef than that generally obtained by the commissariat in the Straits, can be procured from Java; I recommend that the Government of Madras be requested to call on the Commissary General, to ascertain whether this source of supply is one that can be resorted to. I am apprehensive that the source is too distant to be depended upon, or if resorted to, would only increase the already heavy charge for rationing European soldiers at Singapore; exceeding, when I last examined the accounts, 18 rupees per month, or nearly three times the cost of the ration at Secunderabad.

27. I am aware that it is exceedingly difficult for the commissariat to obtain supplies of beef at Singapore; but if further inquiries be instituted, and greater exertions made, some improvement might doubtless be effected in the rations of soldiers. I would point out that buffaloes, which are abundant in the Straits, might be made use of, for although the meat is generally too tough to be eaten, it is excellent for soup or stew, which might be served out in lieu of meat one or two days in the week; thus combining economy with a pleasing variety to the soldier, which is particularly recommended by the Commission at page 32 of the Sanitary Report.

28. Variety in the mode of cooking is also strongly urged by the Commission; and as there can be no doubt that such variety and good cooking of all kinds greatly conduces to the health of the soldiers, I recommend that greater attention be bestowed on these points. Convenient places for baking should be prepared in the European soldiers' cook-rooms, and attention should be given by the officers to the cooking being well done. The number of messes in each company may be sufficiently numerous to allow of the men having a choice; at the same time the mode of preparing the meals should not be so varied as to embarrass the cooking operations.

29. I would suggest that the Government of Madras be furnished with such parts of this Report as the Government of India may see proper to send; and be authorised to make such changes in the articles composing the soldiers' rations at Singapore, as they may see fit, as an experiment for 12 months. The changes thus authorised by the Government of Madras, or by the local authorities at Singapore, should be reported to the Government of India, showing the grounds for making them, and the results to be expected therefrom; the actual results on completion of the period being also fully stated, and the expenditure reviewed.

30. Before concluding, I would bring to the notice of Government, that the present is an instance of the incomplete way in which propositions for important changes are laid before Government. The suggestions I have here reviewed, although involving no little expense, and intimately concerning the Commissariat Department, are submitted without any report from the Commissary General and Commissariat officers, as to the departmental arrangements necessary to give effect thereto, or from the Controller of Military Finance as to the expense to be entailed by such changes; and I therefore strongly advise that it should be enjoined on all authorities, before bringing forward propositions for changes of any kind, to call for reports on points of this nature, from the heads of departments concerned on the measures proposed to be adopted. The responsibility of these officers for the outlay incurred for the services they control, should be respected; and their views should receive due consideration from Government, who will also be greatly assisted in the decision of the question by explanations of the bearing of the proposed measures.

I have, &c.  
(signed) G. Balfour, Colonel,  
Chief of the Military Finance Department.

## Appendix, No. 16.

PAPERS referred to by Major General *Balfour*, C. B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated 13th September 1854.

App. No. 16.

## WITHDRAWAL OF EUROPEAN INFANTRY FROM INDIA.

(Signed) *D.*

1. SOME time since a Despatch from the Honourable Court informed the Government of India that Her Majesty's 22nd, 25th, 96th, and 98th Regiments would this year return to England, and that Her Majesty's 27th and 35th Regiments would relieve the 22nd and 96th. The Despatch did not state that other two regiments would be named to relieve the 25th and 98th, but neither did it state that they would not be named; and thus the Government has hitherto been left in a state of uncertainty as to whether or not it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw two regiments from India, without relief at the end of this year.

2. The Commander in Chief has now transmitted to the Government a letter from the General Commander in Chief, Viscount Hardinge, from which it appears that it is his desire that the 25th and 98th Regiments should return to England this year, without relief, on the understanding that they will be relieved next year by Her Majesty's 82nd and 90th Regiments. Lord Hardinge adds, "I have understood that a communication has been made by Her Majesty's Government to the Governor General, requesting that this measure may be carried into effect, if his Excellency should consider that the force in India might, without risk, be diminished by two regiments for that time. (5 July 1854.)"

No communication of the nature alluded to by Lord Hardinge has been received by me personally, or by the Government of India. It is necessary, however, that an answer should be given to the Commander in Chief, for his Excellency's guidance in the course he is to take under the letter from the Horse Guards, which he has now submitted to the Government. I propose, therefore, to record the opinion which I should have felt it my duty to express, if the question of removing the 25th and 98th Regiments from India without relief, this year, had been referred to this Government by the Home authorities.

3. The natural impulse of my mind (springing from a long-settled and often-expressed conviction, that of European infantry soldiers the Government of India has now not a man too much,) was to inform the Commander in Chief at once that the Government entertained the strongest objection to the diminution of the European infantry arm at the present time, even as a temporary measure. But desirous of showing all deference to the declared wish of Her Majesty's Government, that with reference to "the demand for troops in Europe," two regiments might be sent

home from India, without present relief, I have postponed our reply, in order that I might again most fully, and from every point of view, consider the practicability and prudence of complying with that wish.

4. The more I have considered this grave question, the more I have reflected upon our present position in India, the more closely I have calculated the chances and the risks of the times and the circumstances in which we are placed, the more I am confirmed in my first impression, that it is the duty of the Government to object to the withdrawal of two regiments of European infantry at this moment, and most earnestly to urge that such a measure may not be resolved upon by the Home authorities, unless under circumstances of much greater exigency than can as yet be alleged to exist.

5. The imprudence and impolicy of weakening our force of European infantry at the present time will be made evident, I think, by a brief review of the amount of that force which we actually possess, of the position in which we stand, and of the contingencies and risks to which we are liable.

6. The force of European infantry in India has been very inconsiderably augmented during the last seven years, notwithstanding the great changes which have occurred in the interval. In a Minute relative to the Punjaub, recorded last year, I showed that the European infantry force was larger then, by only two regiments, than it was in the year in which I was appointed to the Government of India, although a distant kingdom had since that time been added to our empire. The same may be said now. For, although authority has been given in the meantime to raise three new regiments of Company's infantry, those regiments are still in embryo, and cannot, for some time to come, be regarded as a portion of the effective force of the army.

The available force, therefore, of European infantry in India at the present time, exceeds the force employed upon the 1st January 1847, by only two battalions.

Yet how vast a mass of territory has been acquired in the interval. The annexation of the Punjaub in 1849, calling for the presence of an immense army, whose chief station is 1,560 miles distant from the capital; the unwelcome conquest of Pegu in 1852, a province separated by 1,000 miles of sea from the rest of India, and demanding, therefore, a self-sustaining force of all arms

App. No. 16. within itself; the recent lapse of Nagpore, where formerly a regiment of European infantry was always kept; these new possessions have added immense tracts of country to the British possessions, imposing upon us the duty both of defending and of controlling them.

It is true that in the acquisition of these territories one formidable enemy has been wholly crushed, and that the power of another enemy has been greatly shaken. But the advantage thus gained in the actual diminution of hostile force which could be arrayed against us, is in a great degree counterbalanced by the larger extent of space over which our own force is of necessity spread, and the consequent diminution to us of the power of combining and concentrating our European strength.

7. Thus, partly from this cause, and partly from the condemnation of the barracks at Cawnpore as no longer fit for human habitation, the Bengal army has at present but a single European battalion intermediate between Calcutta and Agra, a distance of 800 miles.

Thus, too, the Madras army, called upon to aid in the protection of Pegu, has left within itself a force of European infantry quite incommensurate with the great extent of territory which it is called upon to control, and inadequate for the purpose.

The establishment of European infantry regiments in Madras was reduced, in 1847, to four regiments of Her Majesty's and two of the Company's infantry. Since that time two regiments have been employed in Pegu. The new 3rd European regiment is not yet in existence. Thus, for the whole vast space which the Madras army garrisons, from Nagpore to Cape Comorin, it has but four battalions of European infantry. Fort St. George and Bangalore have long had each but a single wing, and the Ceded Districts have none at all.

8. Such is the amount of European infantry now at our command, and such is its scattered condition under a necessity imposed upon us by the enormous extent of the territories with whose defence we are charged, and by the remoteness from each other of the principal points at which our precautions must be taken.

9. I confidently submit to the candour of Her Majesty's Ministers that, placed as it is amidst distances so vast, amidst multitudes so innumerable, amidst people and sects various in many things, but all alike in this, that they are the lately conquered subjects of our race, alien to them in religion, in language, in colour, in habits, in all feelings and interests, the Government of India has had solid ground for the declaration more than once made of late years, that the European force at its command is not more than adequate for preserving the empire in security and tranquillity, even in ordinary times; much more, then, has the Government solid ground for declaring that the force on which it mainly depends cannot rightly or safely be weakened now, when the course of events has led the British nation into formidable war with a race, whose enormous power is not less known, and is even more largely estimated, in the East than it is in Europe itself.

10. The war with Russia does not at present directly affect the British dominions in the East.

The navy of Russia in these seas is inconsiderable, both in numbers and force; and privateering by the universal consent of Europe and America appears to be most justly proscribed by land, the invasion of a Russian army, most doubtful at all times, is I conceive at the present time a physical impossibility.

But although the war with Russia does not directly affect our Indian dominions, yet it is unquestionably exercising at this moment a most material influence upon the minds of the people over whom we rule, and upon the feelings of the nations by which we are surrounded, and thus it is tending indirectly to affect the strength and the stability of our power.

11. The authorities in England cannot, I think, be aware of the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India. I was myself unaware of it until the events of the past year have forced upon my convictions. Letters from various parts of India have shown me that the present contest is regarded by them with the deepest interest, and that its issue is by no means considered so certain as we might desire. However mortifying to our pride it may be to know it, and however unaccountable such a belief may appear in people living amidst the visible evidences of our might, it is an unquestionable fact that it is widely believed in India, that Russia is pressing us hard, and that she will be more than a match for us at last.

12. We know by our correspondence in the East that the King of Ava has declaredly been acting on this feeling, and that influenced by it he has been delaying the despatch of the mission which many months ago he spoke of sending to Calcutta.

The flood of reports with which we are inundated from the west, bearing along rumours of Russian embassies to Khiva, and Russian treaties with Bokhara, and Russian armies in Kokan, show the same notion prevailing of approaching danger to us from that quarter.

13. Simultaneously with the exhibition of this feeling regarding Russia to the east and west of us, Nepal has begun to arm. The preparations made are ostensibly for attack on a province of Thibet; there is every reason to believe that this is their real object; but at the same time we cannot fail to remark the significant fact that Nepal armed in a similar manner on the last occasion, on which it was believed we were about to come into collision with Russia. I know privately from the Resident at Katmandoo, that great interest has been exhibited there of late in the events occurring in Europe; that there (as at Umeerapoor, and other native courts) the English newspapers are regularly translated for the durbar; that much speculation has been afoot as to the large military preparations in progress, and that there are not wanting those who hint that the army now assembling may ultimately have another destination than Lassa.

14. The Court of Directors are well aware for the events of the last seven years have given them opportunity of judging, that I am very far from being an alarmist; they will therefore, I trust, be the more disposed to place reliance on my judgment when I say that in full knowledge of the state of affairs around us, and in the face

of that feeling which I have just described to exist, it would be culpable imprudence in this Government to permit the European infantry in India to be lessened at this time by even a single man, if by remonstrance or protest it can possibly avert the measure.

15. India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance. We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so; but if European troops shall be now withdrawn from India to Europe; if countenance shall thus be given to the belief already prevalent, that we have grappled with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal to overpower us; if, by consenting to withdrawal, we shall weaken that essential element of our military strength, which has already been declared to be no more than adequate for ordinary times, and if, further, we should be called upon to despatch an army to the Persian Gulf, an event which, unlooked for now, may any day be brought about by the thralldom in which Persia is held, and by the feeble and fickle character of the Shah; then, indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express, the same confidence as before, that the security and stability of our position in the east will remain unassailed.

16. Already on a recent occasion, I have acknowledged the obligation under which we lie, and have proclaimed the desire by which we are actuated, to aid the Imperial Government in the great contest on which it has entered. Already the Government of India has given proof that these were not empty words, by placing at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ministers the four regiments of dragoons now serving in India.

But it must be borne in mind, that India has to play her own part in this contest; that, unlike Canada, and the Colonies of the Crown, she is in close proximity to some of those powers over which the influence of Russia is supposed to extend; that, although the war does not directly affect her now, yet she is already affected indirectly by the feelings to which the war has given rise; and that it is at least possible that those feelings may be quickened into hostile action, which she will then be called upon to meet by force of arms.

If this be borne in mind, I entertain a confident conviction that Her Majesty's servants, and the Honourable Court of Directors, will feel that the Government of India will have duly borne its share of this great struggle, if while contributing the four regiments, which it has already offered to the army in the field, it shall preserve the Indian empire in security and tranquillity with the means which are now at its disposal.

17. If it should be the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government to direct that the two regiments now required shall be withdrawn from India, without relief, the Government of India will of course at once obey the order, and accept whatever risks it may involve. But unalterably fixed in the belief that the European infantry force in India is not more than adequate for the ordinary purposes it has to serve, and keenly alive to the consideration that if the European force be weakened, the Government of India, unlike the Colonies of the Crown, has no element of national strength on which it can fall back; in a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers, I feel it to be a public duty to record that, in my deliberate judgment, the European infantry force in India ought in no case to be weakened by a single man, so long as England shall be engaged in her present struggle with the Russian powers.

18. I propose, if my honourable colleagues shall coincide in these views, that they should be laid before the Honourable Court of Directors by the ensuing mail.

19. If after consideration of the representations proceeding from the Government which is responsible for the safety of the Indian empire, Her Majesty's Ministers shall still require that the 25th and 98th Regiments shall be despatched to England this year without relief, orders can be received here in the month of December, so as to admit of the embarkation of both regiments at the usual season of the year.

20. The Commander in Chief should be informed of the resolution of the Government, and of the course it has proposed to take.

(signed) *Dalhousie.*

13 September 1854.

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MINUTE by the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated 5th February 1856.

(No. 2.)

Military Department.—Military Establishment in India.—European Infantry in Her Majesty's Service.

1. WHEN, 50 years ago, the Governor General revised the European military establishment of India, he thus laid down the principle by which the amount of such establishment ought to be determined:—"The only safe mode," said Lord Wellesley, "of estimating the strength of European force in India is to exhibit a detailed statement of the distribution of every corps with reference to our wants, and to the different stations which it is indispensably necessary to occupy by European troops. Great errors would arise from

fixing the European military establishment by any given proportion which may be supposed to exist generally between our European and native establishments; it would be impracticable, under the real state of the case, to devise any accurate principle by which such general proportion between our European and native troops should be regulated." \* \* \* "The most safe principle of calculation which can be used for determining the strength of our European military establishments must be derived from a detailed examination

App. No. 16. tion of the question, determining the number of European troops by a consideration of our detailed wants at every station of our armies."

I can conceive that the principle thus laid down by Lord Wellesley as the only one by which the amount of European force required for India could be safely and rightly determined, is as sound at the present day as it was half a century ago. The application of it now will differ widely from that which was given to it in 1805, but the rule itself is still one only sure and practical guide.

2. Following this guide, then, I shall endeavour to determine what are the wants of the Government of India in respect of European infantry throughout the territories for which it is responsible, and, thereafter, to show how those wants may best be supplied.

Before attempting to determine the necessary amount of European infantry, I referred to the Governors of Madras and Bombay in communication with the Commanders in Chief of those armies respectively. I have consulted also the Commander in Chief of the Army in India, his Excellency Sir W. Gomm. I believe that the proposals which I am about to make regarding European infantry in India will be substantially in accordance with the opinions which those officers held.

3. It may be assumed that it is the duty of the Governor General in council to maintain such a force of European infantry in India as shall be adequate to provide for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and, at the same time, to furnish for the field such army or armies as shall be sufficient for the effectual defence of British territory against every enemy to whose attacks it may be exposed.

4. In order to determine whether the present establishment is sufficient for these purposes, it will be necessary to examine in detail the means at the command of the Government in each of the three Presidencies, and the necessities which are to be met. In doing so, it will be convenient to treat the European infantry force, in the first instance, as a whole. The Royal infantry and the Honourable Company's infantry will afterwards be considered under separate heads.

5. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Bengal consists at the present time of 19 battalions, of which one battalion has, from temporary causes, been recalled to Europe. Those temporary causes have, in some small degree, altered the usual distribution of the several regiments; but in ordinary course the force would be distributed as follows:—

Peshawur	-	-	3*	Meerut	-	-	2
Rawul Pandee	-	-	1	Agra	-	-	1
Sealkote	-	-	1	Cawnpore	-	-	1
Lahore	-	-	1	Dinapore	-	-	1
Ferozepore	-	-	1	Calcutta	-	-	1
Jullunder	-	-	1	Pegu	-	-	2
Umballa	-	-	1				
The Hills	-	-	2	Regiments	-	-	19

6. Certain of these stations must be provided with a permanent force, which could not, at any time, be removed from it without imprudence and risk.

The province of Pegu, remote from the great body of the Bengal army, separated by a thousand miles of sea from the Presidency, recently conquered, and, as yet, liable to the risks of internal disturbance, and of hostilities from Burmah, cannot for the present be left without a

\* Including the regiment which is to be at Nowshera when the barracks are finished.

force capable of sustaining itself under any circumstances which might arise.

Although Fort William and the capital are little exposed to the risks either of internal disturbance or of war, it will be universally admitted that the fort, the arsenal, the trade, and the many important establishments of Government which are collected round Calcutta, should always have the protection of one regiment of European infantry.

Dinapore, in the close vicinity of Patna, has long been, and is still, regarded as a station which requires the presence of a European regiment at all times, if possible.

The Doab could not prudently be altogether deprived of European infantry; if the operations of war should call the main force of the army to a distance, one regiment should always be retained in that tract of country.

The protected Sikh states, still enjoying a considerable measure of independence, and more likely perhaps than any other district within our bounds to show disaffection, if a fair opportunity for doing so should offer itself, undoubtedly require that a corps of European infantry should be kept between the Jumna and the Sutlej. Similar consideration and risks would indicate the prudence of reserving one European battalion also for the plains of the Punjaub.

Thus, there are seven points† at which a necessary regard for the preservation of internal tranquillity and for the general security of our interests, would require that regiments of European infantry should be reserved whenever an army may be called upon to take the field within the Presidency of Bengal.

7. There will therefore be 12 regiments available for active operations.

8. In order to determine whether 12 battalions free to take the field do certainly constitute a sufficient European force for the Bengal Presidency, it is requisite that we should consider the number and the strength of those powers by whose hostility we may be threatened.

9. Having regard to the description of the present condition of the native states, which was given in the first of this series of Minutes on the Military Establishments of India, it may, I think, be safely assumed that our present European force is amply sufficient to meet any danger which could possibly arise among the powers which are enclosed within the limits of the British empire in India.

10. The only external powers of sufficient magnitude and resources to engage in a war with the Indian Government in this part of our dominions, are the King of Ava, the Rajah of Nepal, Maharajah Gholab Sing, of Jummoo, and the Ameer of Cabool.

11. Since all reinforcements for Pegu, in the event of a renewal of war with the King of Ava, would probably be most conveniently drawn from the Madras and Bombay armies, a war with that power may be considered as not likely to affect the available strength of the Bengal army.

12. The extreme improbability of any attack by the rulers of Jummoo has already been pointed out on a former occasion. "The hostility," I then wrote, "the hostility of Maharajah Gholab Sing,

† In Pegu, 2; Calcutta, 1; Dinapore, 1; Cawnpore or Agra, 1; Umballa, 1; Lahore or Sealkote, 1: Total, 7.

Sing, which has sometimes been anticipated, will assuredly never be exhibited, so long as he has life in himself or strength to prevent its exhibition in others. The interest of future rulers of Cashmere will hardly be less urgent than his own to induce them to cultivate friendly relations with the Government of India. If they should not be friendly, neither the wealth and power they hold, nor the character of the people they rule, are sufficient to make them formidable to us.\*

The points, then, on which attack is most probable are the frontiers of Cabool and the borders of Nepal.

13. Whatever may be the feelings of the Affghans towards us at the present time, or whatever they may become hereafter, I think it highly improbable that they would ever venture to attempt an attack in force on the British territories, of their own motive or for their own purposes only; but such an attack, at the instigation of a European power, is not so an improbable an event; and, if it should be seconded by a rising among our own subjects on the borders, closely connected with the Affghans by many ties, and if it should be further swelled by any outbreak of the old Khalsa spirit among the Sikhs of the Manjha, the occasion would call for the full exercise of all our strength.

In such an event, after providing for the several points (para. 6) which it has been shown will always require a permanent protection or control, the Government of India would be able to bring 12 regiments of European infantry into the field for the western frontier; and, as there are already 11 regiments cantoned beyond the Jumna, comparatively little time would be consumed in the assembly of that force. Once assembled, I regard it as sufficient to destroy any army which is at all likely to be brought against us in that quarter.

14. An attack upon British territories by Nepal is, at least, as improbable as an Affghan invasion. Nearly 40 years have now passed since our war with Nepal was ended. During all that time the states have been in close contact along an extensive frontier, but the peace which was framed in 1817 has never been broken. There is nothing at the present day which renders a breach more probable than at any time since the treaty was signed.

Nevertheless, such an event is not impossible, and we ought never to be unprepared for its occurrence. The propriety of this prudent precaution received strong illustration not long since. For some months in 1854 Nepal was arming. A very large force was gathering; great stores were being prepared near our Darjeeling frontier, and Jung Bahadoor had intimated that it was his intention to march a considerable body of men along the Terai from Katmandoo eastward. The durbar had announced that all those preparations were intended for the attack of a province of Thibet. There was no reason to doubt that this was their real end; but we could not fail to see that they might at any time have been diverted suddenly from that end, and might have been employed in an attack on our lower provinces.

The ultimate result of so mad an outrage

would have been beyond doubt. But it cannot be denied that at the present moment, and for many years past, the Government of India has been insufficiently prepared for promptly meeting such an attack.

Even so late as the time of Lord William Bentinck, little more than 20 years ago, after Bhurtpore had been taken, after the Burmese war had been long successfully concluded, and when our posts had already been pushed beyond the Jumna, it was thought prudent always to keep a strong force in these lower provinces. Six European infantry regiments were at that time stationed below Allahabad.\* When I assumed the government of India, I found but two regiments within that space, and the means at my command have never yet enabled me to strengthen this very insufficient force, however sensible I may have long been of the prudence and propriety of doing so.

It must further be observed, that even of the inconsiderable European force which we have in the lower provinces, one-half, viz., the regiment in Fort William, is more than 400 miles distant from the spot which is most likely to be the first threatened by the Nepalese; while the position of the great mass of our European force, far removed to the westward, would render it impossible to collect even a small army upon the lower frontier until after a long and injurious delay.

15. These considerations alone must, I think, suffice to convince any one who may consider this question, that the European infantry in Bengal ought to be reinforced. The necessity of a greater force of that arm being permanently stationed in the lower provinces will become still more apparent when it is remembered that, although in these later times the native states in India have shown little aptitude for combination against a common enemy, still such a combination is never impossible in itself. We ought, therefore, to contemplate the contingency of our being attacked by both our border neighbours at once, and, inasmuch as in such case no aid could well be given from the more distant and more critically situated positions in the west, we ought so to strengthen ourselves in good time upon the frontier where we now are weak—in the east—as to be able to present a sufficiently strong front to both our antagonists at the same time.

16. The force which is detailed below, is the least which would enable the Government of India to assume the attitude I have just described.

Battalions.		Battalions.	
Peshawur - - -	3	Neerat - - -	2
Rawul Pindee - -	1	Agra - - -	1
Sealkote - - -	1	Cawnpore - - -	1
Lahore - - -	1	Dinapore - - -	1
Ferozepore - - -	1	Calcutta - - -	1
Jullundur - - -	1	Berhampore - -	1
Umballah - - -	1	Hazarebaugh - -	1
The Hills - - -	2		
		In all - - -	19

I mention

\* Minute, 20 April 1853, para. 19.  
O.58.

\* Calcutta, 1; Chinsurah, 1; Berhampore, 1; Bhau-  
gulpore, 1; Dinapore, 1; Ghazepore, 1; Total, 6.  
T T

app. No. 16.

I mention 19 battalions as the minimum force of European infantry which ought to be maintained upon the Bengal establishment. Twenty battalions would be better, and even more would not be superfluous. If, however, this force of 19 European infantry regiments shall be allotted to the stations which I have enumerated, the Governor General in Council, by bringing up a regiment from Madras as a temporary garrison for Fort William, would have it in his power to hold securely the several districts to which I have referred above; and, at the same time, to bring into the field two armies on the frontier of Cabool and Nepal, which should each contain\* eight regiments of European infantry, or which should include† ten regiments in the one army, and six regiments in the other.

17. To maintain this force permanently would require three regiments more than are now present within the limits of the Presidency of Bengal. I proceed to state in what manner I propose that those regiments should be obtained.

18. The province of Pegu is now garrisoned jointly by the armies of Bengal and Madras. The general officer commanding the division may be selected from either army, and a Bengal and a Madras officer have already held it in succession. But considerable inconvenience seems to be involved in this permanent mingling under one general officer of the troops of two armies, differing from each other in many details of regulation and practice; obviously it would greatly simplify all arrangements and correspondence if the province were to be held by the troops of one army, the General reporting, of course, to the Supreme Government, as at present.

Accordingly, I propose that the Pegu division should be made over entirely to the Madras army. The details of the transfer will be explained when I come to consider the establishment of the Madras army in its several branches.

The transfer of Pegu will liberate two regiments of European infantry belonging to the Bengal army, which are now cantoned there, and, with the corps now temporarily withdrawn to Europe, but hereafter to be restored, will supply the three corps which are required for the proper occupation and adequate defence of the Bengal Presidency, in the manner described in paragraph 16, by an establishment of 19 battalions of European infantry.

19. I have only further to observe, with reference to the Bengal Presidency, that I have mentioned Hazareebaugh and Berhampore as the stations for the two additional regiments, because experience has proved the former to be exceedingly healthy for European troops, and because the latter already possesses excellent barracks,

* Sealkote and Umballa	-	-	-	-	2
In the Field	-	-	-	-	8
					<u>10</u>
Agra	-	-	-	-	1
In the Field	-	-	-	-	8
					<u>9</u>
					<u>19</u>
† Sealkote and Umballa	-	-	-	-	2
In the Field	-	-	-	-	10
					<u>12</u>
Agra	-	-	-	-	1
In the Field	-	-	-	-	6
					<u>7</u>
					<u>19</u>

which appear to me to have been abandoned without any sufficient cause. The final selection of stations, however, may be made hereafter.

20. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Madras, including one battalion, which is temporarily withdrawn to Europe, consists of seven battalions, which are distributed thus:

Pegu	-	-	-	-	-	2
Secunderabad	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bellary	-	-	-	-	-	1
Fort St. George	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bangalore	-	-	-	-	-	1
Cannanore and the Hills	-	-	-	-	-	1
						<u>7</u>
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	7

In the Presidency of Madras, as in that of Bengal, there are certain points which ought never to be left without the protection or control of European infantry.

So long as the Nizam retains in his service at Hyderabad the large bodies of Arabs whom he has long entertained, the presence of those formidable and lawless bands will continue to render it indispensably necessary that a regiment of European infantry should form part of the British subsidiary force which is maintained in the cantonment of Secunderabad.

For general reasons, which have been already given (para. 6), Fort St. George and the seat of Government of Madras will call for the services of one regiment; and one regiment should, in prudence, be kept to the southward, or on the western coast.

But if these points are held, as they undoubtedly ought to be, the Government of Madras could not place more than three regiments of European infantry in the field, whether in the north\* or in the south.†

21. It will be apparent, I think, that this force is inadequate to provide security against all the contingencies which belong to a tract so wide as that which is held by the army of the Madras Presidency, and that the establishment ought to be restored to the scale on which it stood previous to the reduction ordered in 1847; while such proportionate additions should be made as may be required by the subsequent conquest of the province of Pegu.

22. I have already proposed, in a previous paragraph (p. 18), that Pegu should be made over entirely to the Madras army. The force which was originally suggested for that province, and which will be fully adequate for the purpose in time of peace, was three regiments.

Wherefore the force which is detailed below is the least which can be regarded as sufficient for the military want of the Presidency of Madras:—

Pegu	-	-	-	-	-	3
Secunderabad	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bellary	-	-	-	-	-	1
Madras	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bangalore	-	-	-	-	-	1
Trichinopoly	-	-	-	-	-	1
Cannanore	-	-	-	-	-	1
						<u>9</u>
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	9

A 10th

\* Pegu, 2; Madras, 1; Cannanore and Bangalore, 1; in the Field, north, 3: Total, 7.

† Pegu, 2; Madras, 1; Secunderabad, 1; in the Field, south, 3: Total, 7.

A 10th regiment, to be stationed also at Bangalore, would render the establishment more complete. If this establishment of nine infantry regiments should be conceded, the Government of Madras will have it in its power to hold securely the several points which need protection or control, and, at the same time, to place a force in the field sufficient for any necessity which we can contemplate as likely to arise.

23. If the King of Ava should renew the war, three European regiments could be sent from the Presidency of Madras to reinforce the European troops which are ordinarily to be kept in Pegu. This aggregate force will be amply sufficient for ever purpose in Pegu. For, if five regiments of European infantry were enough to conquer the province, six regiments will assuredly be more than enough to hold it.

24. In like manner, if hostilities should occur to the northward in the state of Hyderabad, or in the Mysore and the southern countries, the Government would be able to hold the requisite points, and to place in the field a force of four battalions of European infantry, which might at once be increased to five battalions, if the garrison of Fort St. George should be temporarily supplied from the Bengal army.

25. But, to accomplish these objects, two regiments of European infantry must be added to the present Madras establishment. I propose to obtain these regiments in the following manner:

I propose that a fourth European regiment should be raised for Madras. But, inasmuch as it is desirable to avoid, if possible, all augmentation of military expense, and as the Madras regular native infantry regiments are very numerous in proportion to those of the other two armies, I have to suggest that the 4th European Infantry Regiment should be raised on the same principle on which it has already been proposed to raise the European cavalry for the company's service.

The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 51st and 52nd regiments of native infantry should be disbanded with pensions and gratuities, or should be absorbed into the other 50 regiments of the line, and the European officers of those two regiments should be transferred to the 4th European infantry, the men of which corps must, of course, be sent from England.

Thus the first regiment will be supplied.

II. The second regiment may be formed by transferring from the Bengal to the Madras establishment one regiment of Queen's Infantry, thus restoring the Madras establishment of Royal regiments to its former scale.

26. The deficiency created by this withdrawal of one Queen's regiment from the Bengal establishment may be supplied by raising a fourth regiment of European infantry for that Presidency; also transferring the European officers of the 73rd and 74th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry to the new 4th European regiment, and disbanding or absorbing the native officers and Sepoys, as before described. If 20 regiments should be allowed to Bengal, I would pursue still further the principle above mentioned, by converting the 71st and 72nd Regiments Bengal Native Infantry into a fifth European regiment.

0.58.

The proportions of European regiments in the three Presidencies would then be; five for Bengal, four for Madras, three for Bombay; while the proportions of native infantry regiments would be, 70 for Bengal, 50 for Madras, 30 for Bombay, including the Marine Battalion.

27. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Bombay consists of seven regiments, which are distributed thus:

Belgaum	-	-	-	-	-	1
Poona	-	-	-	-	-	2
Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	$\frac{1}{2}$
Aden	-	-	-	-	-	$\frac{1}{2}$
Deesa	-	-	-	-	-	1
Scinde	-	-	-	-	-	2
TOTAL						7

Of these stations, Bombay, the capital of the Presidency, and Aden, a fortified post of importance, could certainly never be left with smaller garrisons than the wing of a regiment by which each is now held.

One regiment, I apprehend, would be quite sufficient for the temporary control of the country above the Ghats; and Scinde would be perfectly safe with one European corps, now that Meer Ali Morad has been deprived of even the semblance of power, while the Punjab has become a British province.

Wherefore the Government of Bombay would have it in its power at any time to bring a force of five European infantry regiments into the field, in any part of the Presidency, or to detach a force of four such regiments beyond its bounds.

28. Under these circumstances, the European infantry force now in the Bombay Presidency does not seem to me to be inadequate for the purpose it has to serve.

29. Having thus considered the wants of the several Presidencies in succession, I am brought to the conclusion that the smallest amount of European infantry which can be relied upon as fully adequate for the defence of India, and for the preservation of internal tranquillity, is 35 battalions, of which 19 should be allotted to the Bengal Presidency, nine to Madras, and seven to Bombay.

30. The European infantry force, according to the establishment of the several Presidencies, is made up of Queen's and Company's troops, in the following proportions:

Presidencies.	Queen's Regiments.	Company's Regiments.	TOTAL.
Bengal - - - -	16	3	19
Madras - - - -	4	3	7
Bombay - - - -	4	3	7
In all India - - -	24	9	33

The European infantry force which I propose for



App. No. 16. for the Indian military establishment in future will be distributed in the following proportions :

Presidencies.	Queen's Regiments.	Company's Regiments	TOTAL.
Bengal - - - -	15	4	19
Madras - - - -	5	4	9
Bombay - - - -	4	3	7
In all India - - -	24	11	35

Thus it will be seen that the establishment of Her Majesty's regiments of infantry to be employed in the Indian territories is proposed to consist hereafter of 24 battalions, as at the present time, including two battalions which are only temporarily withdrawn; no addition to the present establishment is immediately asked for, but it is my deliberate and decided opinion that no permanent diminution of it ought to be made.

31. When in the course of years railways shall have been constructed throughout the whole of Bengal and Hindoostan, when connecting lines shall have united the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay with that of Bengal, so that their three armies shall be rendered rapidly and almost equally available in every part of these dominions, great changes may, perhaps, be made. I purposely abstain from offering any suggestions regarding a future, over which I shall have no control, and with which I have no right to meddle; my proposals refer only to the circumstances of the present period, and are intended to provide only for the necessities and contingencies by which the Government of India is now, and will still for some time to come, be affected. These proposals will in no respect hamper the free action of those who may hereafter be charged with the administration of India. They are not framed on any ideal standard of fitness, but are limited to the very minimum of sufficiency; I trust, therefore, that the Honourable Court of Directors and Her Majesty's Government will be pleased to maintain the establishment of European infantry, which I now propose as not more than is adequate and necessary for the security and defence of the Indian empire.

32. I beg further respectfully to represent, that it is of great moment that the Government of India should have confidence not only in the sufficiency of this vitally important force, but also in its permanency.

At this time the only portion of the European infantry whose services the Governor General in Council can count upon without fail, are the nine battalions in the Honourable Company's service. There is no fixed establishment of Royal infantry; any portion of it might be at any moment recalled, and although the Government of India can feel no reasonable apprehension that Her Majesty's Government would ever act on the published suggestion of a distinguished officer lately deceased, and would suddenly withdraw the Royal infantry in India to meet troubles and dangers which might have arisen in Europe, yet serious evils may readily be seen in the uncertainty of the hold which the Indian Government has upon

Royal troops, without supposing any resort to so extreme a measure as that to which I have just referred. For, since the establishment of European infantry in India is in its normal condition kept down at a minimum, even a partial and temporary reduction of it by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, must always cause great and well founded anxiety to the Indian Government, and might lead to very serious embarrassment. The supposition is by no means an imaginary one. The Government of India has already been placed in the very position I have represented.

33. I do not now propose, by way of remedy for this evil, either that the regiments of Royal infantry should be increased in number, so as to admit of some being withdrawn when they are needed, or that the European regiments in the Company's service should be largely and permanently increased, while the Royal regiments are diminished in number.

The remedy which I beg respectfully to propose is, that the number of 24 regiments of Her Majesty's infantry, already mentioned, shall be declared by Her Majesty's Government to be the establishment of Royal infantry for India, and that a formal assurance shall be given that no one of those regiments shall at any time be withdrawn without relief, unless with the full consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

34. I venture to think that there is nothing which is not reasonable in this proposal. The establishment named is that which was fixed five years since. Even half a century ago Her Majesty's army gave no less than 13 regiments of infantry to India. Having regard to the vast additions of territory which have since been made, bearing in mind that, although by conquests our enemies have been diminished in number, yet the extension of our limit has widely scattered our European troops, and has thus rendered the larger force which we now possess less compact and effectual, perhaps, than the lesser force of 50 years ago; keeping in mind that the whole maintenance of a very large proportion of the infantry of the Royal army is borne by the Indian Treasury; considering that the service in India gives to that army the richest command which it possesses, and that the chief of those commands has always been reserved hitherto exclusively for officers of the Royal army; lastly, above all, looking to the vast importance and value of these Indian possessions to the British Crown, in every point of view, military, political, and commercial, I venture to entertain a confident expectation that the suggestion which I have submitted regarding the permanency as well as the numerical amount of the Royal infantry which should be set apart for service in India, will be considered as no more than is reasonable and right.

35. If, for any reasons, it may seem good to Her Majesty's Government, or to the Honourable Court of Directors, to determine that the establishment of Royal infantry shall henceforth consist of less than 24 regiments, I would then propose that the Indian establishment should be made up to its full amount by converting a further number of regiments of native infantry of the Bengal and Madras armies into European regiments in the Company's service.

But still, and in every case, I beg permission to urge that whatever may be the number of Royal

Royal regiments attached to the Indian establishment, that number shall be fixed and unalterable, except with the consent of the Honourable Court.

36. If by thus, in many instances, converting two native regiments of infantry into one European corps, the number of native regiments should be diminished more than seemed expedient, irregular native regiments may be embodied in their room. These will serve every requisite purpose for the time, and may easily be got rid of when they are no longer needed.

37. In conclusion of this part of the question of military establishments in India, I have the honour to recommend—

1st. That the Indian establishment of European infantry shall consist, at the very least, of 35 battalions.

2nd. That the present establishment of 24 regiments of Royal infantry shall be continued.

3rd. That 15 Royal regiments shall be allotted

to the Bengal Presidency, five to Madras, and four to Bombay. App. No. 16.

4th. That the establishment of Royal regiments, whatever may be the number determined upon, shall be declared fixed, and shall not be altered without the consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

5th. That a fourth regiment of European infantry shall be added to each of the armies of Bengal and Madras, by converting two regiments of native infantry into one of European infantry, in each respectively disbanding the native officers and sepoy, and transferring the European officers to the new European corps.

(signed) *Dalhousie.*

5 February 1856.

(True copy.)

(signed) *R. J. H. Birch*, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department.

## Appendix, No. 17.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

FIXED STRENGTH, also PAY and COST of INFANTRY of the LINE for SERVICE in INDIA.

	Establishment in India According to the War Office Estimate of 1867-68.		Establishment in India according to the Military Estimates of India for 1865-66.				
	Regimental Establishment.	For 52 Regiments.	Regimental Establishment.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
Number of Regiments - - -	1	52	1	33	10	10	53
Number of Companies - - -	10	520	10	330	100	100	530
Officers - - - - -	39	2,028	39	1,287	390	390	2,067
Non-commissioned Officers - - -	49	2,549	48	1,584	480	480	2,544
Drummers - - - - -	21	1,092	21	693	210	210	1,113
Corporals - - - - -	40	2,080	40	1,320	400	400	2,120
Privates - - - - -	770	40,040	810	26,730	8,100	8,100	42,930
TOTAL of all Ranks - - -	919	47,788	958	31,614	9,580	9,580	50,774

DESIGNATIONS.	Pay of Regiments of Infantry of the Line in 1865-66.				
	Strength.	Bengal, 33 Regiments.	Madras, 10 Regiments.	Bombay, 10 Regiments.	TOTAL, INDIA, 53 REGIMENTS.
Officers - - - - -	2,067	Rs. 58,21,003	Rs. 17,12,103	Rs. 16,70,662	Rs. 92,03,768
Non-commissioned Officers - - -	2,544	6,12,856	1,86,260	1,92,659	9,91,775
Drum-Majors and Drummers - - -	1,113	1,13,284	34,329	34,329	1,81,942
Corporals - - - - -	2,120	2,49,150	75,500	75,500	4,00,150
Privates - - - - -	42,930	37,28,835	11,29,950	11,29,950	59,88,735
TOTAL Drummers, Corporals, and Privates - - - - -	46,163	40,91,269	12,39,779	12,39,779	65,70,827
TOTAL Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, Rank and File - - -	48,707	47,04,125	14,26,039	14,32,438	75,62,602
TOTAL all Ranks - - - - -	50,774	105,25,128	31,38,142	31,08,100	167,66,370
<i>Cost of Establishments for 53 Regiments:</i>					
Educational - - - - -		66,624	22,660	20,787	1,10,071
Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital - - -		3,27,170	55,562	90,142	4,72,874
Native Artificers and followers - - - - -		2,08,059	32,008	70,740	3,10,807
Command, Staff, and Horse Allowances - - -		7,10,975	2,20,257	2,07,494	11,38,726
Contract Allowances - - - - -		82,278	24,480	24,060	1,31,418
Family Allowances - - - - -		2,31,108	94,300	78,354	4,03,762
Good Conduct Allowances - - - - -		3,96,075	84,000	1,17,119	5,97,194
Good Shooting Allowances - - - - -		31,320	4,800	5,000	41,120
Hutting Money - - - - -		1,122	-	-	1,122
TOTAL Cost of Establishments - - - Rs.		20,54,731	5,38,067	6,14,296	32,07,094
GRAND TOTAL for 53 Regiments - - - Rs.		1,25,79,859	36,76,209	37,17,396	1,99,73,464
Deduct Pay of 336 Officers; viz., 230 in Europe, 89 on the Staff, 17 in the Public Works - - -		8,75,776	3,28,614	4,36,050	16,40,440
NET COST - - - Rs.		1,17,04,083	33,47,595	32,81,346	1,83,33,024
The net Regular Estimate in 1864-65, was - Rs.		1,18,00,000	33,50,000	32,00,000	1,83,50,000
The Establishments of Officers and Men being -		34,003	9,580	9,586	53,169

The pay charge in 1867-68 for the established number of Privates of Infantry (40,040), at the rate of Rs. 11. 10a. per month, is 55,85,676 rupees for the year, against 59,88,735 rupees for 42,930 Privates, the establishment in 1865-66, according to the above statement.

The pay of the 2,890 Privates, diminished from the fixed strength in 1865-66, in the establishment of 1867-68, is 4,03,059 rupees, thereby reducing the charge for non-commissioned rank and file from 75,62,602 rupees, as above, to 71,59,543 rupees; but leaving the charge for officers and other establishments of the Regiments undiminished in amount.

The pay of 42,930 Privates included in the above 1,99,73,464 rupees being 59,88,735 rupees, there remains 1,39,84,729 rupees for all other ranks and charges, or nearly 2,63,865 rupees per Regiment, per annum.

The pay of 1,000 Privates may be stated at 1,46,250 rupees per annum, and the cost of 36,000 Privates, formed into 35 Regiments, would be about 51,00,000 rupees. The pay of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, and Corporals, and all the regimental establishments may be stated at 2,63,865 rupees for each of the 35 Regiments: Total 93,00,000 rupees, making for 35 Regiments a grand total of 1,44,00,000 rupees, or 54 lacs less than at present for the 52 Regiments, and with the advantage of seconding all officers absent. This saving does not include the reduction in charges for rations, barracks, arms, stores, hospital diets, and other departmental charges, which would largely increase the saving.

Appendix, No. 18.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

RETURN OF NATIVE TROOPS ON FOREIGN SERVICE, on 1 April 1857, Extracted from the Parliamentary Return, No. 56, of 1858.

	MADRAS NATIVE TROOPS.								GRAND TOTAL.
	Regular.	Irregular.	Regular.	Irregular.	Native Artillery.			Sappers.	
	Native Cavalry.	Native Cavalry, Irregular.	Native Infantry.	Native Infantry, Irregular.	Golundaz.	Gun Lascars.	TOTAL.		
Rangoon - - - -	-	-	807	-	-	29	29	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	828	-	-	55	55	110	-
" - - - -	-	-	602	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	818	-	-	96	96	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	770	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	812	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	270	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total, Rangoon - -	-	-	4,807	-	-	180	180	110	5,097
Moulmein - - - -	-	-	793	-	-	21	21	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	414	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total, Moulmein - -	-	-	1,220	-	-	21	21	-	1,241
Sittang - - - -	-	-	278	-	-	10	10	-	288
Burmah - - - -	-	-	-	-	82	16	98	-	98
Tonghoo - - - -	-	-	825	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	764	-	-	21	21	115	-
Total Tonghoo - -	-	-	1,589	-	-	21	21	115	1,725
Thayetmyo - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	115
Padongmyo - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	109	109
Bassein - - - -	-	-	208	-	-	10	10	-	218
Thayghem - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	8
Henzadah - - - -	-	-	495	-	-	-	-	-	495
Menghee - - - -	-	-	162	-	-	-	-	-	162
Mergui - - - -	-	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	57
Tavoy - - - -	-	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	72
Beeling - - - -	-	-	73	-	-	-	-	-	73
Kyonkkee - - - -	-	-	91	-	-	-	-	-	91
Pegu - - - -	-	-	293	-	-	-	-	-	293
GRAND TOTAL in Burmah and Pegu - -	-	-	9,345	-	82	266	348	439	10,132
Penang - - - -	-	-	581	-	44	5	49	-	-
Malacca - - - -	-	-	214	-	28	6	34	-	-
Singapore - - - -	-	-	588	-	80	15	95	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	615	-	-	-	-	-	-
Labuan - - - -	-	-	115	-	25	14	39	-	-
Total in Straits - -	-	-	2,113	-	177	40	217	-	2,330
China - - - -	-	-	72	-	-	6	6	-	78
Hong Kong - - - -	-	-	326	-	-	17	17	-	343
China - - - -	-	-	167	-	-	-	-	-	167
Total in China - -	-	-	565	-	-	23	23	-	588
Persia - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	122	122
GRAND TOTAL of Madras Troops - -	-	-	12,023	-	259	329	588	561	13,172

## RETURN of Native Troops on Foreign Service, on 1 April 1857—continued.

	BOMBAY NATIVE TROOPS.								
	Native Cavalry.		Native Infantry.		Native Artillery.			Sappers.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Regular.	Irregular.	Regular.	Irregular.	Goludaz.	Gun Lascars.	TOTAL.		
Aden - - - -	-	-	830	-	-	-	122	94	1,046
Sind - - - -	-	-	1,683	-	-	-	232	-	1,915
Bushire - - - -	462	86	867	768	-	-	119	238	-
" - - - -	-	60	782	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	802	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total at Bushire - -	462	1,348	1,640	768	-	-	119	238	4,584
Mohumra - - - -	-	-	803	-	-	-	72	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	827	-	-	-	25	-	-
" " - - - -	-	-	918	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total at Mohumra - -	-	-	2,548	-	-	-	97	-	2,645
Persian Gulf - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	269	-	269
TOTAL in Persia - -	462	1,348	4,197	768	-	-	485	238	7,498
TOTAL ABROAD - - -	462	1,348	6,710	768	-	-	839	332	10,459
Add— Madras Native Troops -	-	-	12,023	-	259	829	588	561	13,172
	462	1,348	18,733	768	259	829	1,427	893	23,631
	1,810		19,501						

Appendix, No. 19.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT OF THE INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

RANK AND FILE.

DISTRIBUTION.	1. 1st January 1846.		2. 1st January 1847.		3. 1st January 1848.		4. 1st January 1849.		5. 1st January 1850.		6. 1st January 1851.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
	In Great Britain - - - -	19,220	15,293	14,860	15,008	18,800	20,535	19,740	23,073	20,580	21,298	21,400
In Ireland - - - - -	22,540	17,544	24,010	21,819	24,250	23,048	21,640	25,767	19,420	19,636	18,560	18,225
Total in United Kingdom -	41,760	32,837	38,870	37,727	43,050	43,583	41,380	48,840	40,000	40,934	39,960	39,262
Depôts of Regiments serving:												
In Colonies and on Seas - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
In India - - - - -	120	1,620	120	1,620	95	1,100	110	1,078	120	1,150	120	1,348
In United Kingdom - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total in United Kingdom -	41,880	34,457	38,990	39,347	43,145	44,683	41,490	49,918	40,120	42,084	40,100	40,610
In Colonies, and at Sea - -	29,000	28,364	28,130	28,465	27,740	27,890	28,820	29,243	26,680	28,870	26,320	27,281
GRAND TOTAL on British Establishments - - - -	70,880	62,841	67,120	67,812	70,885	72,573	70,310	79,161	66,800	70,954	66,420	67,891
In India - - - - -	23,880	23,425	23,580	21,834	13,905	19,645	21,890	23,078	23,880	24,549	23,580	23,693
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - - -	94,760	86,266	91,000	89,646	89,790	92,218	92,200	102,239	90,680	95,503	90,300	91,584
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD - - -	52,880	51,809	52,010	50,299	46,645	47,535	50,710	52,321	50,560	53,419	50,200	50,974
GRAND TOTAL at HOME - - -	41,880	34,457	38,990	39,347	43,145	44,683	41,490	49,918	40,120	42,084	41,100	40,610
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - -	94,760	86,266	91,000	89,646	89,790	92,218	92,200	102,239	90,680	95,503	90,300	91,584
DISTRIBUTION.	7. 1st January 1852.		8. 1st January 1853.		9. 1st January 1854.		10. 1st January 1855.		11. 1st January 1856.		12. 1st June 1856.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
	In Great Britain - - - -	22,890	21,003	22,860	22,237	33,800	29,144	17,750	17,283	18,150	17,141	17,360
In Ireland - - - - -	17,580	14,636	17,480	16,863	17,800	14,644	6,520	6,262	9,800	9,482	11,840	11,553
Total in United Kingdom -	40,470	35,639	40,340	39,100	51,600	43,788	24,300	23,545	27,950	26,623	29,200	28,794
Depôts of Regiments serving:												
In Colonies and on Seas - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,140	5,745	6,000	6,298	5,570	4,922
In India - - - - -	120	1,581	120	1,578	120	1,204	5,500	5,653	5,300	5,942	5,200	8,246
In United Kingdom - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,200	3,876	-	-	-	-
Total in Depôts - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,840	15,274	11,300	12,240	10,770	13,168
Total in United Kingdom -	40,600	37,120	40,460	40,678	51,720	44,992	40,140	38,819	39,250	38,863	39,970	41,962
In Colonies, or at Sea - -	29,720	30,364	29,860	29,995	27,800	26,034	38,020	35,935	35,785	33,879	30,720	31,892
GRAND TOTAL on British Establishments - - - -	70,320	67,484	70,320	70,693	79,520	71,026	78,160	74,754	75,035	72,742	70,690	73,854
In India - - - - -	23,880	23,440	23,580	23,046	23,880	22,080	46,750	45,891	45,050	43,061	41,080	39,256
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - - -	94,200	90,924	94,200	93,719	103,400	93,106	124,910	120,645	120,085	115,803	111,770	113,110
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD - - -	53,600	53,804	53,740	53,041	51,680	48,114	84,770	81,826	80,835	76,940	71,800	71,148
GRAND TOTAL at HOME - - -	40,600	37,120	40,460	40,678	51,720	44,992	40,140	38,819	39,250	38,863	39,970	41,962
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - -	94,200	90,924	94,200	93,719	103,400	93,106	124,910	120,645	120,085	115,803	111,770	113,110

App. No. 19.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT of the Infantry of the Line—*continued.*

## ALL RANKS OF INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

DISTRIBUTION.	1st January 1865.		1st January 1866.		1st June 1866.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
Infantry in Regiments:						
In Great Britain - - -	20,574	20,125	21,267	20,194	20,230	20,343
In Ireland - - - - -	7,489	7,213	11,437	11,096	13,715	13,520
Total in United Kingdom -	28,063	27,338	32,704	31,290	33,945	33,863
Depôts of Regiments serving:						
In Colonies and on Seas - -	7,189	6,794	7,029	7,351	6,532	5,878
In India - - - - -	6,648	6,814	6,407	7,053	6,285	9,473
In United Kingdom - - -	4,934	4,593	—	—	—	—
Total in Depôts in United Kingdom - - - - -	18,771	18,201	13,436	14,404	12,817	15,341
Total in United Kingdom -	46,834	45,539	46,140	45,694	46,762	49,214
In Colonies or at Sea - - -	43,488	41,203	41,201	39,083	35,685	36,811
GRAND TOTAL, on British Establishment - - - - -	90,322	86,742	87,341	84,777	82,447	86,025
In India - - - - -	52,714	51,596	50,792	48,538	46,772	44,506
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - - - -	143,036	138,338	138,133	133,315	129,219	130,531
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD - - - - -	96,202	92,799	91,993	87,621	82,457	81,317
GRAND TOTAL at HOME - - - - -	46,834	45,539	46,140	45,694	46,762	49,214
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - - - -	143,036	138,338	138,133	133,315	129,219	130,531
	Regiments.	Companies	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.
In United Kingdom - - - - -	35	350	37 <sup>6</sup> / <sub>10</sub>	438	42	430
Depôts in United Kingdom - - -	-	282	-	206	-	193
In Colonies or at Sea - - - - -	51	510	50 <sup>4</sup> / <sub>10</sub>	504	47	470
In India - - - - -	55	550	53	530	52	520
	141	1,692	141	1,678	141	1,624

## Appendix, No. 20.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867. App. No. 20.

## GENERAL ENLISTMENT ORDERS.

(No. 1012.)

GENERAL ORDER by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.—Fort William, 25th July 1856.

EVERY recruit enlisting into a native regiment, is required to take an oath, that he "will never forsake or abandon his colours," and that he "will march wherever he is ordered, within or beyond the Company's territories."

It has been the practice of the Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond the sea; and therefore whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them, but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart.

It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the native artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of native infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th and 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited.

The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, whenever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India.

Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps, to serve beyond sea.

The readiness with which they have done this, is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government.

But it has become very inconvenient to Government, and it is hurtful to the State, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the State beyond sea; and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service.

For this reason, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of Light Cavalry, of Irregular Cavalry, of Infantry of the Line, or for the *Khelat-i-Ghilzie*, *Ferozepore*, and *Loodianah* Regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not at the time of his enlistment distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the company or beyond them.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief will be requested to take the necessary measures to ensure the due fulfilment of this determination of the Governor General in Council, by enjoining officers commanding the regiments above mentioned, to be strictly careful that, from and after the 1st September next, no recruit shall be enlisted, except for general service, and that each recruit, on taking the prescribed oath, shall be made clearly to understand the conditions on which he is enlisted.

By the Commander in Chief.

2. The following rules are to be entered in the Military Regulations in substitution of the present Articles 31 and 32 of Section 31, with effect from the 1st September 1856; and the Commander in Chief will hold all officers responsible for the strictest observance of the same.

31. All recruits for Cavalry, regular or irregular, or for the Infantry of the Line, or for the corps named in the margin, are to be enlisted for general service; and no man is to be entertained for any of the above named corps who does not distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company, or beyond them.

*Kelat-i-Ghilzie*  
Regiment.  
Regiment of *Ferozepore*.  
Regiment of *Loodianah*.

32. The liability to be sent on foreign service, and the peculiar obligations in this respect under which they voluntarily place themselves, is to be distinctly explained to all such recruits at the time of their being originally entertained, and also at the time of their being required to take the prescribed oath under the colours of their regiment, upon parade. The benefits and indulgences which are accorded by the Government to men who proceed on foreign service, as detailed in the Regulations, are also invariably to be fully made known to these recruits before they are sworn in.



## Appendix, No. 21.

## RETURN received from the ADMIRALTY.

## RETURN of the COST incurred in moving the following

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	
1	61st	India	June 1859	Mauritius	-	Not performed under the directions of the Admiralty						£. s. d.
		Mauritius	18 June 1860	England	18 Sept. 1860	Donald Mackay	93	26	659	29	35	15,744 - -
2	3rd (1st Batt.)	Calcutta	13 Oct. 1859	Hong Kong	11 Nov. 1859	Armenian, Steamer	30	33	1,133	-	-	8,463 18 8
		"	15 Nov. "	"	18 Dec. "	Coromandel, I. N., Steamer.	34					
		"	15 " "	"	-	Tasmania, say -	40					
		"	11 Jan. 1860	"	13 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	34					
		China	6 Dec. "	England	24 Apr. 1861	Miles Barton, wrecked 8 Feb. 1861. Sr Wm. Peel, Steamer	-					
		"	19 Nov. "	"	16 " "	Tasmania -	149					
		"	9 Dec. "	"	16 " "	Athletas -	129					
		"	8 Jan. 1861	"	4 " "	Mauritius, Steamer -	87					
3	1st (2nd Batt.)	Gibraltar	6 July 1858	China	25 Oct. 1858	Lord Raglan	112	32	805	50	84	12,331 10 -
		China	12 Dec. 1860	England	27 April 1861	Cressy	137	25	616	5	9	7,664 18 2
		"	18 Dec. "	"	19 " "	Macduff	123					
4	2nd (1st Batt.)	England	27 June 1851	Cape	4 Sept. 1851	Sumner	70	29	667	39	45	628 17 8
		"	24 June "	"	26 Aug. "	Her Majesty's Ship Birkenhead.	64					
		"	7 July "	"	29 " "	Her Majesty's Ship Cyclops.	54					
		Cape	- Mar. 1860	China	-	Information defective.						
		China	15 Dec. "	England	16 May 1861	Alfred	153	24	678	0	4	14,446 7 1
		Hong Kong, Peiho.	15 Nov. "	"	7 " "	Indomitable	174					
5	5th (1st Batt.)	England	24 July 1847	Mauritius	6 Nov. 1847	Her Majesty's Ship Resistance.	107	42	1,122	73	87	-
		"	8 Sept. "	"	18 Dec. "	Her Majesty's Ship Apollo.	102					
		Mauritius	23 May 1857	India via Singapore.	5 July 1857	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	44	20	556	11	18	-
		India	8 Mar. 1861	England	8 July 1861	Walmer Castle	122					
		"	12 Mar. "	"	30 " "	Cambodia	140					
6	37th	England	18 Nov. 1846	Colombo	9 Mar. 1847	Minerva	112	32	1,066	68	113	9,335 7 5
		"	17 Nov. "	"	10 " "	Castle Eden	114					
		"	-	Trincomalee	23 " "		127					
		"	7 Nov. 1846	Colombo	30 " "	Sibella	144					
		"	7 " "	"	8 " "	Romeo	122					
		Ceylon	3 Nov. 1857	Calcutta	18 Nov. 1857	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	16	2	76	3	6	-
The remainder of the regiment does not appear to have proceeded under orders from the Admiralty.												
		India	20 Mar. 1861	England	10 July 1861	Matilda Atheling	112	21	535	17	20	-
		"	7 " "	"	12 " "	Nimrod	122					
7	59th	England	11 June 1849	China	11 Feb. 1850	Her Majesty's Ship Apollo.	245	17	640	46	35	2,535 15 11
		"	22 " "	"	22 Oct. 1849	Hugh Walker	123					
		Hong Kong	19 Nov. 1858	Cape	18 Jan. 1859	Lord Raglan	61	28	612	62	94	4,130 3 6
		Cape	21 Oct. 1861	England	14 Dec. 1861	Indomitable	55					
		"	20 " "	"	16 " "	Boanerges	58					
8	60th (2nd Batt.)	England	15 July 1851	East London	3 Oct. 1851	Her Majesty's Ship Retribution.	81	25	651	41	47	-
		"	15 " "	"	3 " "	Her Majesty's Ship Sidon.	81					
		Cape	- April 1858	India	-	Information defective.						

## Appendix, No. 21.

RETURN received from the ADMIRALTY.

## REGIMENTS between ENGLAND, INDIA, and the COLONIES.

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				TOTAL COST.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	Net Cost.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
-	-	-	-	-	15,744 - -	1,955 6 6	13,788 13 6	20 18 6	Nil.
1,064 4 6	-	518 7 -	915 16 2	566 10 -	11,528 16 4	1,222 3 -	10,306 13 4	9 1 11	Nil.
1,506 5 2	-	3,185 12 -	6,279 16 -	712 10 -	28,786 17 10	4,484 - 6	24,302 17 4	21 15 2	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	12,331 10 -	2,881 4 -	9,450 6 -	11 14 9	Nil.
-	-	2,549 12 -	3,415 19 6	312 15 -	13,943 4 8	2,521 4 6	11,422 - 2	18 10 10	Nil.
2,749 18 1	39 2 6	450 - -	2,204 11 10	964 5 -	6,436 15 1	1,185 1 6	5,251 13 7	7 17 5	Nil.
-	-	3,122 8 -	4,981 15 11	343 - -	22,893 11 -	3,433 7 -	19,460 4 -	28 14 11	Nil.
-	-	877 16 -	6,024 12 11	618 15 -	7,521 3 11	3,101 1 3	4,420 2 8	3 18 9	Nil.
1,149 1 -	-	330 - -	1,565 11 7	373 - -	3,417 12 7	922 18 -	2,494 14 7	3 11 5	Mess and victualling.
-	-	-	-	-	15,055 3 -	not known	Exclusive of abatement for stoppages.	27 1 7	The whole.
-	482 2 10	1,664 - -	6,877 18 10	595 5 -	18,954 14 1	4,148 7 -	14,806 7 1	13 17 10	Nil.
93 - -	-	12 - -	62 8 5	24 12 -	192 - 5	36 - -	156 - 5	2 1 1	Mess and victualling.
-	-	-	-	-	14,661 6 -	not known	Exclusive of abatement for stoppages.	27 8 1	The whole.
-	-	539 - -	5,882 - 10	266 15 -	9,223 11 9	3,695 15 3	5,527 16 6	8 12 9	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	8,555 15 -	1,261 3 6	7,294 11 6	11 6 2	Nil.
-	-	-	1,879 5 11	360 10 -	6,369 19 5	1,143 15 6	5,226 3 11	8 10 9	Nil.
4,652 4 7	-	405 - -	2,672 6 9	357 15 -	8,087 6 4	1,394 4 3	6,693 2 1	10 5 7	Nil.

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.		
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.			
8	60th - (2nd Batt.) -contd.	Calcutta	29 Feb. 1860	China	28 April 1860	Alfred	60	}32	904	-	-	£. s. d. 8,953 10 4		
		"	29 " "	"	20 " "	Indomitable	52							
		"	29 " "	"	28 " "	Hougoumont	60							
		China	1 Nov. 1861	England	25 Feb. 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	117	}25	861	-	-	3,773 8 9		
"	27 Dec. "	"	19 April "	Flying Cloud	114									
9	85th	England	27 Jan. 1853	Mauritius	16 April 1853	Marion	80	}23	604	38	61	5,800 5 6		
		"	28 " "	"	23 " "	Roman Emperor	86							
		Mauritius	18 May 1856	Cape	7 June 1856	Her Majesty's Ship Penelope.	21	19	590	-	-	-		
		Cape	24 April 1863	England	8 June 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	46	24	649	41	87	-		
10	31st	Gibraltar	27 May 1858	Cape	4 July 1858	City of Manchester	39	34	863	63	119	13,152 - -		
		East London	12 Oct. 1858	Bombay	2 Dec. 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	52	33	833	14	15	- -		
		Bombay	15 Feb. 1860	China	29 Mar. 1860	Earl of Clare	43	}30	1,096	-	-	3,069 7 -		
		"	15 " "	"	27 " "	Assaye, I. N., Steamer	42							
		"	17 " "	"	23 April "	Athletæ	67	}27	646	-	-	13,788 - -		
		"	16 " "	Singapore	16 Mar. "	Victoria, I. N., Steamer	29							
		Singapore	17 Mar. "	China	16 April "	Athletæ	31	-	-	-	-	-		
		Shanghai	29 June 1863	England	20 Nov. 1863	West Derby	145	}27	646	-	-	13,788 - -		
"	11 July "	"	30 " "	Caroline Coventry	143									
11	13th	Gibraltar	7 Aug. 1856	Cape	19 Sept. 1856	Imperatriz, Steamer	44	23	741	34	52	5,328 3 9		
		Cape	7 Nov. 1857	India	19 Jan. 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Megæra.	74	9	252	-	-	-		
The remainder of the regiment does not appear to have proceeded under orders from the Admiralty.														
12	70th	India	- July 1861	New Zealand	Not performed under the directions of the Admiralty							-	-	-
		Auckland	2 Jan. 1866	England	28 Mar. 1866	Ida Ziegler	86	}21	592	30	50	11,941 15 -		
"	5 " "	"	7 April "	Siam	93									
13	43rd	England	10 Oct. 1851	Cape	17 Dec. 1851	Her Majesty's Ship Vulcan.	69	25	652	40	65	- -		
		Cape	- Dec. 1853	India	Does not appear to have been performed under the directions of the Admiralty.							-	-	-
		India	- Oct. 1863	New Zealand	- - 1863	Lady Jocelyn, Steamer	-	}25	699	56	60	33,177 12 -		
		"	- " "	"	- " "	Light Brigade	-							
		New Zealand	16 April 1866	England	4 July 1866	Silver Eagle	80	}21	593	35	62	12,550 5 -		
"	29 Mar. "	"	7 " "	Maori	101									
14	40th	England	13 July 1852	Australia	5 Nov. 1852	Her Majesty's Ship Vulcan.	116	}25	652	79	87	1,538 6 6		
		"	29 Aug. "	"	18 Dec. "	Isabella Blyth	113							
		New Zealand	16 June 1866	England	10 Sept. 1866	Holmesdale	87	}24	539	52	105	14,549 17 -		
"	8 May "	"	10 Aug. "	Mary Shepherd	95									
15	67th	Calcutta	23 Sept. 1859	China	26 Oct. 1859	Australian, Steamer	34	}35	993	-	-	4,705 12 -		
		"	23 " "	"	- " "	Indomitable, say	40							
		"	7 Jan. 1860	"	12 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	37							
		China	1 Mar. 1865	Cape	15 April 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	46	}27	792	25	27	-		
		"	26 July "	"	13 Sept. "	- ditto	49							
		Cape	24 July 1866	England	23 Sept. 1866	Far East, Steamer	62	}23	549	34	35	12,472 2 -		
"	24 " "	"	25 " "	White Adder	64									
16	57th	Malta	12 May 1858	Alexandria	18 May 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Princess Royal.	7	19	635	-	-	-		
		The remainder of the service to India was not performed under the directions of the Admiralty.												
		Bombay	- Nov. 1860	Auckland	- - -	Star Queen	-	}22	750	-	-	18,560 10 -		
"	" "	"	- - -	Castilian	-									
Auckland	31 Mar. 1867	England	- - -	Maori	-	}22	555	54	76	14,656 - -				
"	12 April "	"	- - -	Electric	-									

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				TOTAL COST.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	NET COST.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- - -	- - -	1,472 - -	2,205 2 3	452 - -	13,082 12 7	1,666 8 -	11,416 4 7	12 12 7	Nil.
4,648 14 2	- - -	1,102 1 -	4,565 14 8	430 10 -	14,520 8 7	3,016 13 -	11,503 15 7	13 7 3	Nil.
- - -	263 3 8	966 - -	2,508 1 4	336 5 -	9,873 15 6	1,587 3 -	8,286 12 6	13 14 4	Nil.
1,035 6 -	- - -	79 16 -	627 9 3	295 - -	2,037 11 3	324 14 3	1,712 17 -	2 18 1	Nil.
3,139 11 3	- - -	414 - -	1,591 - 4	366 15 -	5,511 6 7	939 11 -	4,571 15 7	7 - 11	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	13,152 - -	1,073 9 6	12,078 10 6	13 19 11	Nil.
1,063 7 -	- - -	643 10 -	2,112 8 9	427 5 -	4,246 10 9	1,383 4 -	2,863 6 9	3 8 9	Mess and victu- alling.
4,358 9 2	- - -	1,295 4 -	2,479 6 2	548 - -	11,750 6 4	1,783 13 -	9,966 13 4	9 1 10	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	4,546 19 5	323 - -	18,657 19 5	3,005 - 6	15,652 18 11	24 4 7	Nil.
1,116 - 10	- - -	506 - -	1,700 11 3	400 10 -	9,051 5 10	992 4 -	8,059 1 10	10 17 6	Nil.
1,046 11 2	- - -	249 15 -	905 4 1	126 - -	2,327 10 3	582 15 -	1,744 15 3	6 18 6	Mess and victu- alling.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	The whole.
- - -	- - -	- - -	164 - 8	323 10 -	12,429 5 8	1,651 6 6	10,777 19 2	18 4 1	Nil.
849 1 3	- - -	345 - -	2,326 9 -	362 5 -	3,882 15 3	1,189 7 9	2,693 7 6	4 2 7	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	335 18 8	532 15 -	34,046 5 8	not known	Exclusive of abatment for stoppages.	48 14 2	23,512 6 4
- - -	- - -	- - -	164 6 2	329 10 -	13,044 1 2	1,617 - 6	11,427 - 8	19 5 5	Nil.
1,106 15 -	54 14 5	1,137 10 -	4,031 12 -	387 5 -	8,256 2 11	2,388 6 6	5,867 16 5	9 - -	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	149 6 11	321 15 -	15,020 18 11	1,619 18 6	13,401 - 5	24 17 3	Nil.
1,972 2 1	- - -	516 16 -	805 19 1	496 10 -	8,496 19 2	1,191 - 6	7,305 18 8	7 7 2	Nil.
5,006 4 5	- - -	486 - -	1,853 14 4	415 5 -	7,761 3 9	1,184 2 -	6,577 1 9	8 6 1	Nil.
- - -	287 18 11	719 - -	2,410 1 11	300 5 -	16,189 7 10	1,113 19 -	15,075 8 10	27 9 2	Nil.
275 13 -	- - -	79 16 -	217 9 1	- - -	572 18 1	134 8 -	438 10 1	- 13 10	Mess and victu- alling.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	18,560 10 -	not known	Exclusive of abatment for stoppages.	24 14 11	The whole.
- - -	- - -	- - -	153 15 7	323 10 -	15,133 5 7	1,595 5 -	13,538 - 7	24 7 10	Nil.

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	
17	77th -	England	15 June 1857	Sydney	30 Sept. 1857	Palmerston	108	} 36	728	89	88	£. s. d. 8,737 1 -
		"	17 " "	"	30 " "	Orwell	106					
		Sydney	28 April 1858	Calcutta	15 June 1858	Raby Castle	49	} 35	567	88	106	1,900 5 -
		"	20 " "	"	14 " "	Her Majesty's Ship Megara.	56					
18	50th -	England	30 June 1857	Colombo	19 Oct. 1857	Medina	112	} 33	713	45	49	10,789 11* 1
		"	2 July "	"	11 " "	Captain Cook	102					
		Colombo	9 Oct. 1863	Auckland	15 Nov. 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	38	} 17	785	51	76	-
		Auckland	3 Oct. 1866	Sydney - Brisbane	9 Oct. 1866	Auckland, Steamer - Alice Cameron -	7 20					
Australia - New Zealand	-	England	-	Estimated	-	} 400	800	} Say 700 men, with officers and families				
19	5th - (2nd Batt.)	England	11 Aug. 1858	Mauritius	8 Nov. 1858	Great Tasmania	90	30	787	57	65	9,365 1 1
		Mauritius	16 April 1863	Cape	27 April 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	12	25	791	25	42	-
20	99th -	Calcutta	11 Jan. 1860	China	12 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	33	} say 34	1,030			7,028 16 -
		"	3 Feb. "	"	-	Octavia	-					
		"	3 " "	"	-	Walmer Castle	-					
		"	4 " "	"	-	Mars	-	} 28	801	26	32	-
		Hong Kong	1 Mar. 1865	Cape	13 April 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	44					
"	26 July "	"	12 Sept. "	- ditto -	49	Say 700 men, with officers and families						
21	9th - (2nd Batt.)	Gibraltar	3 Nov. 1864	China	8 Feb. 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	98	33	840	48	85	-
		China	20 Mar. 1866	Japan	30 Mar. 1866	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	11	} 28	626	12	9	-
		"	28 April "	"	9 May "	- ditto -	12					
22	11th - (2nd Batt.)	England	6 July 1861	Cape	8 Sept. 1861	Boanerges	65	} 34	877	67	77	5,418 3 7
		"	16 " "	"	19 " "	Indomtable	66					
		"	6 " "	"	30 Aug. "	Conflict	56					
		Cape	10 April 1865	China	31 May 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	52	} 26	708	55	90	-
		China	19 May 1866	Algoa Bay	17 July 1866	White Adder	60					
"	29 " "	"	16 " "	Far East, Steamer	49	Say 450 men with officers and families						
23	20th - (2nd Batt.)	England	20 July 1863	India	-	St. Lawrence	-	} say 116	820	86	98	12,930 10 8
		"	24 " "	"	-	Conflict	-					
		"	25 " "	"	-	Blenheim	-					
		Calcutta	21 Nov. 1863	China	9 Dec. 1863	Nubia, Steamer	19	} 36	820	84	95	25,368 5 3
		"	28 Jan. 1864	"	26 Mar. 1864	Holmsdale	58					
		China	28 June 1864	Japan	15 July 1864	Queen of England	18	} 27	611			4,730 12 10
		"	28 " "	"	14 " "	Chanticleer	17					
		Japan	17 May 1866	China	27 May 1866	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	11	} 30	663	27	34	-
"	11 April "	"	19 April "	- ditto -	9							
China	-	England	-	Estimated	-	Say 600 men, with officers and families						

Note.—The information inserted has been obtained, as far as possible, from the accounts of the actual expenses, and is exclusive of the cost of conveyance. In the cases in which the ships were employed on continuous service, or in conveying other troops at the same time as those specified, the expense Majesty's ships and transports on monthly pay, it not being practicable to estimate the sum apportionable to each particular service during the

Admiralty, }  
25 July 1867. }

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				TOTAL COST.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	NET COST.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
-	-	1,923 - -	4,271 14 7	430 10 -	15,362 5 7	2,617 13 -	12,744 12 7	17 10 1	Nil.
1,795 14 5	-	719 5 -	1,856 13 2	255 - -	6,526 17 7	1,119 11 6	5,407 6 1	9 10 9	The whole cost of Raby Castle and mess, and victualling of Her Majesty's Ship Megara.
-	-	-	-	-	10,789 11 1	2,531 14 -	8,257 17 1	11 14 5	Nil.
3,939 6 -	-	527 5 -	1,553 13 5	437 - -	6,457 4 5	991 16 -	5,465 8 5	6 19 3	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	2,502 13 4	135 - -	2,367 13 4	5 8 4	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	In Her Majesty's Ships or In hired Ships	-	5,964 11 8 or 15,863 15 -	8 10 5 or 22 13 3	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	9,365 1 1	2,243 5 -	7,121 16 1	9 1 -	Nil.
611 13 8	-	112 10 -	465 5 7	418 10 -	1,607 19 3	289 16 -	1,318 3 3	1 13 4	Nil.
485 5 2	-	950 12 6	1,706 3 9	515 - -	10,685 17 5	1,261 1 -	9,424 16 5	9 3 -	Nil.
3,028 12 8	-	465 15 -	1,763 4 2	426 10 -	5,684 1 10	1,109 1 6	4,575 - 4	5 14 3	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	In Her Majesty's Ships or In hired Ships	-	5,652 10 - or 5,976 5 -	8 1 6 or 8 10 9	Nil.
5,720 4 7	-	1,212 15 -	4,229 10 7	465 5 -	11,627 15 2	2,623 19 -	9,003 16 2	10 14 4	Nil.
1,731 - -	-	122 5 -	474 5 4	192 15 -	2,520 5 4	237 14 -	2,282 11 4	3 12 11	Nil.
-	-	-	2,922 7 9	491 5 -	8,831 16 4	1,812 5 6	7,019 10 10	8 - 1	Nil.
3,425 2 -	-	526 10 -	1,984 10 1	404 - -	6,340 2 1	1,166 2 -	5,174 - 1	7 6 2	Nil.
-	204 19 4	703 - -	1,789 7 6	253 10 -	11,936 5 8	878 3 6	11,058 2 2	24 1 16	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	In Her Majesty's Ships or In hired Ships	-	3,633 15 5 or 3,841 17 6	8 1 6 or 8 10 9	Nil.
-	-	-	115 9 11	366 1 -	13,412 1 7	2,553 - -	10,859 1 7	13 4 10	Nil.
-	-	475 4 -	2,531 2 11	204 17 11	28,579 10 1	713 19 6	27,865 10 7	33 19 8	Nil.
-	322 18 4	383 16 -	489 17 6	183 6 -	6,110 10 8	353 12 -	5,756 18 8	9 8 5	Nil.
1,301 8 10	-	115 10 -	459 18 9	212 2 -	2,088 19 7	221 16 6	1,867 3 1	2 16 4	Nil.
-	-	-	-	-	In Her Majesty's Ships or In hired Ships	-	11,797 10 - or 17,460 - -	19 13 3 or 29 2 -	Nil.

of small detachments, and the passage of officers proceeding to join the corps after the arrival of the regiments at the respective stations. as been apportioned to the services with regard to the numbers conveyed and the periods of the voyages; but no charge has been inserted for fitting Her employment of the ship.

JOHN HENRY BRIGGS,  
Chief Clerk.

2

~~R/66A~~

I N D E X

S 15

TO THE

R E P O R T

FROM THE

S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E

ON

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

Printed, by the HOUSE OF COMMONS, to be sold,  
26 July 1867.

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ANALYSIS OF INDEX.

ALPHABETICAL and CLASSIFIED LIST of the PRINCIPAL HEADINGS in the following INDEX, with the Paging at which they will be respectively found.

	PAGE		PAGE
Artillery - - - - -	1	Cape of Good Hope - - - - -	10
Bengal Native Army - - - - -	6	Mutiny - - - - -	37
Burmah - - - - -	9	Caste (Native Troops) - - - - -	11
Caste - - - - -	11	Hindoos - - - - -	28
China - - - - -	13	Sikhs - - - - -	47
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops) - - - - -	17	Ceylon - - - - -	19
Furloughs - - - - -	25	Mutiny - - - - -	37
Hindoos - - - - -	28	Ceylon Rifle Corps - - - - -	13
Mauritius - - - - -	34	CHINA :	
Mutiny - - - - -	37	1. Feeling of Native Indian Troops as to Service in China; satisfactory results of their occasional employment there - - - - -	13
Officers (Native Troops) - - - - -	41	2. Question considered as to expediency of permanent Garrisons of Native Troops in Hong Kong, &c., in partial or total substitution for British Troops - - - - -	13
Straits Settlements - - - - -	49	3. Expense of Indian Troops and of British Troops respectively - - - - -	14
Bombay Native Army - - - - -	6	4. Cost of Transport - - - - -	14
Aden - - - - -	1	5. Sickness and Mortality - - - - -	14
Caste - - - - -	13	6. Barrack Accommodation - - - - -	14
China - - - - -	13	7. Means of rendering service in China more satisfactory to British Troops - - - - -	14
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops) - - - - -	17	8. Use made of the Resources of India for Operations in China - - - - -	14
Families (Native Troops) - - - - -	24	9. Effect created in China by the diversion of Troops thence to India at the time of the Mutiny - - - - -	14
Mauritius - - - - -	34	10. Strength of the Garrison of Hong Kong - - - - -	14
Officers (Native Army) - - - - -	41	Ceylon Rifle Corps - - - - -	13
Straits Settlements - - - - -	49	Transport of Troops - - - - -	52
British Army (Colonies) - - - - -	7	Chinese Troops (India, &c.) - - - - -	14
Cape of Good Hope - - - - -	10	Colonial Contributions - - - - -	16
Ceylon - - - - -	12	Australia - - - - -	2
China - - - - -	13	Cape of Good Hope - - - - -	10
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops) - - - - -	17	Ceylon - - - - -	12
Cost - - - - -	21	Demerara - - - - -	22
Duties of Troops - - - - -	23	Mauritius, 3 - - - - -	34
Malta and Gibraltar - - - - -	33	COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS) :	
Mauritius - - - - -	34	1. Legal Liability of the Native Troops to employment out of India - - - - -	17
Mutiny - - - - -	37	2. Evidence favourable to the Foreign and Colonial Service of Indian Troops under certain conditions - - - - -	17
Straits Settlements - - - - -	49	3. Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons exclusively, though Mixed Garrisons are not objected to - - - - -	18
War - - - - -	53	4. Feeling of the Natives upon the subject of Foreign Service and Garrison duties - - - - -	18
West Indies - - - - -	54		
BRITISH ARMY (INDIA) :			
1. Present European Force in India - - - - -	7		
2. Evidence in favour of a Reduction of the Force - - - - -	8		
3. Evidence opposed to any Reduction - - - - -	8		
4. Views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 and 1856 - - - - -	8		
5. Views of the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in strong disapproval of any Reduction - - - - -	8		
6. Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops - - - - -	8		
7. Question of Withdrawal of Troops in the event of a War in Europe - - - - -	9		
Artillery - - - - -	11		
Cavalry - - - - -	11		
Costs - - - - -	21		
Duties of Troops - - - - -	23		
Forts and Arsenals - - - - -	25		
Havelock, Sir Henry (the late) - - - - -	28		
Local European Army - - - - -	30		
Russia - - - - -	47		



ANALYSIS OF INDEX.

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE, &c.—continued. PAGE

5. Question of Raising Special Corps for Service out of India - - - - -	19
6. Question of calling for Volunteers for Foreign Service, or of holding the entire Native Army liable - - - - -	19
7. Great care necessary in the Application of a New System - - - - -	19
8. Expediency of any New Arrangements being put in force in time of Peace - - - - -	19
9. Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service - - - - -	19
10. Limits necessary as to the Number of Regiments to be sent out of India - - - - -	20
11. Larger number of Indian Troops than of British Troops required in any Colony - - - - -	20
12. Number of Native Troops employed out of India at the time of the Mutiny - - - - -	20
13. Views of the Governor General of India, the Commander in Chief, and other high authorities, upon the question of Native Garrisons in the Colonies - - - - -	20
den - - - - -	1
rracan - - - - -	1
rtillery - - - - -	1
engal Native Army - - - - -	6
ombay Native Army - - - - -	6
urmah - - - - -	9
ape of Good Hope - - - - -	10
aste - - - - -	11
eylon - - - - -	12
hina - - - - -	13
olonial Contributions - - - - -	16
olie Emigration - - - - -	20
st - - - - -	21
discipline - - - - -	22
uties of Troops - - - - -	23
st Indians - - - - -	23
gypt - - - - -	23
unities (Native Troops) - - - - -	24
ardinge, Lord (the late) - - - - -	28
ealth of Troops - - - - -	28
pan - - - - -	29
va - - - - -	29
adras Native Army - - - - -	32
ahomedans - - - - -	33
alta and Gibraltar - - - - -	33
auritius - - - - -	34
ry and Allowances - - - - -	42
ynjaub and Punjaub Regiments - - - - -	44
hs - - - - -	47
uits Settlements - - - - -	49
ansport of Troops - - - - -	52
ar - - - - -	53
llington, Duke of (the late) - - - - -	53
st Indies, &c. - - - - -	54

COST (BRITISH AND NATIVE TROOPS):

1. As to the relative cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies - - - - -	21
2. As to the relative cost of European and Native Troops in India - - - - -	31
Cavalry - - - - -	11
Hospital Expenses - - - - -	28
Pay and Allowances - - - - -	42
Transport of Troops - - - - -	52

DISTRIBUTION (BRITISH ARMY):

1. In India - - - - -	22
2. Generally - - - - -	22

PAGE

Local European Army - - - - -	30
Madras Native Army - - - - -	32
Arracan - - - - -	1
Burmah - - - - -	9
Ceylon - - - - -	12
China - - - - -	13
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops) - - - - -	17
Families (Native Troops) - - - - -	24
Mauritius - - - - -	34
Officers (Native Troops) - - - - -	41
Straits Settlements - - - - -	49
Malta and Gibraltar - - - - -	33
<b>MAURITIUS:</b>	
1. Conflicting evidence upon the question of substituting Native Indian Troops for European Troops - - - - -	35
2. Amount and character of the local Population - - - - -	35
3. Military Contribution by the Colony - - - - -	35
4. Question of Difficulties arising in connection with the employment of Native Indian Troops - - - - -	36
5. Question of employing Black Troops or Native Troops from South Africa - - - - -	36
6. Returns of the Strength of the European Garrison, and of the allowances in force - - - - -	36
Mutiny - - - - -	37
China - - - - -	13
Dalhousie, Lord - - - - -	22
Native Army, India - - - - -	38
Artillery - - - - -	1
Bengal Native Army - - - - -	6
Bombay Native Army - - - - -	6
Caste - - - - -	11
China - - - - -	13
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops) - - - - -	17
Cost - - - - -	21
Duties of Troops - - - - -	23
Furloughs - - - - -	25
Madras Native Army - - - - -	32
Mauritius - - - - -	34
Mutiny - - - - -	37
Officers (Native Troops) - - - - -	41
Pay and Allowances - - - - -	42
Punjaub and Punjaub Regiments - - - - -	44
Recruiting - - - - -	44
Sikhs - - - - -	47
Taxation - - - - -	50
Officers (Native Troops) - - - - -	41
Pay and Allowances (Native Troops) - - - - -	42
Cost - - - - -	21
Officers (Pay and Allowances) - - - - -	41
Pensions - - - - -	43
Rations - - - - -	44
Punjaub and Punjaub Troops - - - - -	44

DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY:

I. India - - - - -	
1. British Army - - - - -	
2. Native Army - - - - -	
II. Generally - - - - -	
Havelock, Sir Henry (the late) - - - - -	
Insurrection (India) - - - - -	
Punjaub, &c. - - - - -	
Railways - - - - -	
Russia - - - - -	

ANALYSIS OF INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>Reliefs (Native Troops on Foreign Service)</i>	46	<i>WEST INDIES AND WEST INDIA REGIMENTS:</i>	
<i>Sikhs</i>	47	1. <i>As to European and Native Indian Garrison</i>	
<i>China</i>	13	<i>sous respectively</i>	54
<i>Colonial and Foreign Service</i>	17	2. <i>Local Volunteers and Militia</i>	54
<i>Punjab</i>	44	3. <i>As to the West India Regiments</i>	54
<i>Straits Settlements</i>	49	<i>Barbadoes</i>	5
<i>Ceylon Rifle Corps</i>	12	<i>Demerara</i>	28
<i>Term of Service</i>	52	<i>Hincks, Governor</i>	28
<i>Transport of Troops</i>	52	<i>Honduras</i>	28
<i>Relief (Native Troops)</i>	46	<i>Jamaica Insurrection</i>	28
<i>War</i>	53		

## I N D E X.

*N.B.*—In this Index the Figures following the Names of the Witnesses refer to the Questions in the Evidence; and those following *App.* to the Pages in the Appendix.]

## A.

*DAMS, Lieutenant Colonel H. A.* Answers received from Lieutenant Colonel Adams commanding the 13th Regiment, Bombay Native Army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of Native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 249, 250.

*den.* In the Bombay Army service at Aden is treated as foreign service, *Pears* 768—Relative number of British and Native troops composing the garrison of Aden: great importance of this post, *Johnson* 1639-1646, 1649, 1659, 1660—Statement as to service at Aden being greatly disliked by the Native troops, *ib.* 1649-1657—Approval of the employment of European troops at Aden, the place being exceedingly healthy, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1857-1859—Approval also of Native troops taking their turn of duty at Aden, *ib.* 1971, 1973.

*Administrative Establishments (Indian Army).* Comparative statement of the cost of military administrative establishments maintained in the three Indian presidencies, and in Ceylon, *App.* 318.

*Affghans.* Explanation with reference to the number of Affghans in the Indian Army, *Norman* 222-224; and *App.* 260.

*African Troops.* See *West India Regiments.*

*Algerian Troops.* Satisfactory service in France of the Native Algerian troops, from whom all traces of caste have almost disappeared, *Lord Strathnairn* 3381.

*Allahabad.* Importance of European troops at Allahabad, *Norman* 229.

*Andaman Islands.* Explanation relative to the force at the penal establishment in the Andaman Islands, *Norman* 453-456—Mixed garrison of Madras troops and of Europeans at the penal settlements, *Pears* 771-773.

*Arracan.* Temporary difficulty in sending Madras troops to Arracan in 1824 and 1825, *Sir W. Elliott* 619. See also *Straits Settlements.*

*Artillery.* Limited force of Native Artillery employed in India; objection to any additional force, *Norman* 259-261—Non-objection to Native troops as garrison artillery in Malta or Gibraltar, *ib.* 260—Greater objection to having only Native troops with European field Artillery than with garrison Artillery, *ib.* 262-264—Explanation as to the course pursued in having European Infantry in support of European Artillery, except at Singapore, *ib.* 404, 405—Efficiency of natives as garrison Artillery or field Artillery, *ib.* 475-477.

Disapproval of a Native force of Artillery in India, though the Sikhs are excellent artillerymen, *Probyn* 941-943—Concurrence of objections to any Native troops as artillerymen, *Baker* 1059; *Johnson* 1629-1631; *Mangles* 3084, 3085—Expediency of some European troops in support of European Artillery at any colony, and of Native troops not being kept in fortified positions, *Baker* 1060-1071—Expediency of the Artillery in colonies being always European, *Keyes* 1162, 1163; *Johnson* 1629-1631.

Concurrence of opinions as to the inexpediency and danger of leaving European Artillery in any colony, supported only by foreign troops, *Sir Hope Grant* 1431-1436; *Johnson* 1529, 1589-1604, 1626-1628; *Duke of Cambridge* 2967, 2968, 2981, 2982; *Lord Strathnairn* 3394, 3405—Non-objection to garrison Artillery being unsupported by British troops, though it is highly desirable that field Artillery should be so supported, *Mackenzie* 2100-2103.

Contemplated employment of 10,000 Artillery in India, as not excessive, the present force being between 10,000 and 12,000. *Balfour* 3579-3582—Opinion as to the

*Artillery*—continued.

efficiency and fidelity of Natives as artillerymen, *Balfour* 3579. 3581—Grounds for concluding that colonies may be garrisoned with perfect safety by Native regiments and European Artillery; dissent hereon from the opinion of Lord Strathnairn, as to the importance of some European troops in addition to Artillery, *ib.* 3629-3635.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, showing the number of Artillery in the several colonies and dependencies, *App.* 282, 283.

Details of the establishment and cost of the Royal Artillery in Madras for 1865-66, *App.* 312.

*Australia.* Importance of a small European force in Australia as a nucleus for a local force, *Sir Hope Grant* 1455-1459—Decided objection of the colonists to a withdrawal of the European troops, and to their being replaced by Indian Native troops, *ib.* 1457.

Arrangement by which the military contribution by the Australian Colonies is placed at 40 *l.* a head for each European soldier, *Taylor* 2511-2516.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial Army, and stationed in the Australian Colonies, *App.* 282.

## B.

*Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Moffat.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Commanded one of the general service corps in the Bengal Army, 1015, 1016—Statement as to this corps and some other regiments of Bengal Infantry having served in the China war without any difficulties having been experienced, 1017 *et seq.*—Absence of difficulty as regards the supply of water, and the cooking, on board ship; practice of providing dry rations for Hindoos on board on account of their objection to cook at sea, 1022-1024 1040-1045.

Suggestions as to the increased pay and other privileges necessary in order to induce Native troops to go willingly on foreign service, 1029-1037. 1050-1058—Importance of the men going abroad with their own officers, 1029. 1037, 1038—Much greater cheapness of Native troops in China than of Europeans, 1039—Objection to any Native troops as artillerymen, 1059—Expediency of some European troops in support of European Artillery at any colony, and of Native troops not being kept in fortified positions, 1060-1071.

Explanation as to the general service corps in the Bengal Army having been formed expressly with a view to their serving abroad; practice of late years to enlist for the army generally with a view to foreign service if required, 1072-1077. 1098-1102—Difficulty as regards the supply of food for Native troops in Mediterranean garrisons; obstacle also on account of the separation from their families, 1080-1082. 1090-1093—Very good conduct of the Native troops on field duty and on garrison duty in China; satisfaction of the natives with the service, 1083-1089.

*Balfour, Major General George.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explains the various opportunities he has had of obtaining information connected with the foreign service of native Indian troops, 3454-3456—Has an exceedingly favourable opinion of the fitness and efficiency of Native troops for foreign service, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, 3457—Great importance of the European officers with Sepoy regiments being sufficiently numerous to look after the discipline and well-being of the men in a proper manner, 3458-3462—Importance also of Native troops on foreign service not being overburdened with duties, 3463, 3464. 3503.

Statement in favour of many of the duties now performed by soldiers in India being placed under the police; important economy thereby, whilst there would be much advantage on the score of discipline, 3465-3468—Unduly heavy duties now imposed upon the Native soldiers, 3467—Importance of abstaining from any interference with the pay and allowances to which Native troops consider themselves entitled when on foreign service, 3469, 3470—Expediency also of a proper limit upon the number of regiments sent on foreign service, 3471, 3472.

Calculation that, taking everything into consideration, the cost of one European soldier will be equal to that of two natives on foreign service, 3473, 3474—Statement in connection with the much less cost of transport of Native troops than of Europeans, 3475-3481—Great saving of hospital expenses by the employment of Native soldiers, as compared with Europeans, 3482, 3483.

Very satisfactory results of the employment of Native troops at Singapore, Penang, and Malacca since the year 1826; instance in 1842 of their bravery in action against the Malays, 3484-3494—Instance in 1839 of the efficiency of Sepoy troops against the

*Balfour, Major General George. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

the Native forces of the Nabob of Canool, 3495-3499—Great usefulness of Native Indian troops in the operations which led to the treaty of Nankin, 3500.

Difficulty as regards Madras troops going on foreign service on account of the embarkation, rather than the distance, 3501—Expediency of a positive regulation respecting the police duties of Native troops serving abroad, 3503—Expected objection by the colonists to the substitution of Native troops for British troops, 3504. 3636—Unduly large contribution by the colonists in Mauritius towards the garrison there, the number of troops in proportion to the population and the size of the island being excessive, 3504-3516—Calculation that the cost of the troops in the Mauritius is about 100 l. per man, the colony paying altogether 45,000 l.; 3508-3513.

Argument that it is most essential to lay down a limit beyond which the military expenditure or taxation of India should not go, and to leave it to the military departments to secure all possible efficiency with reference to such limit, 3516. 3548, 3549. 3573-3593-3595. 3620—Soundness of the policy pursued by Mr. Lang, when in India, as regards military expenditure, 3516. 3545-3549. 3595. 3620—Facility with which a case might be made out for the full employment of a large increase of troops both in India and the colonies; that is, by an increase of civil and police duties, 3517-3520.

Statement relative to the very inadequate force at home, and the insufficiency of the depôts, with reference to the force in India and the colonies, 3520-3541. 3598-3600—Much more satisfactory distribution of the army in 1854 than in 1866, on account of the much larger relative force then retained at home, 3520, 3521. 3625—Reference to the views of the Duke of Cambridge as to the great difficulty experienced in regard to reliefs for the regiments in India, 3541. 3599—Grounds for the conclusion that it is very important to have fewer battalions in India, with a larger proportion of rank and file, 3541-3547—Great and unnecessary expense in maintaining establishments of officers out of proportion to the rank and file, 3542.

Opinion that the British army now in India is greater than there is any military necessity for; grounds for this conclusion considered, 3548 *et seq.*—Disaffection and danger likely to arise from the imposition of new taxes necessary for the support of the present large force, 3549-3551. 3593-3596. 3713-3720—Importance attached to a certain minute by Lord Dalhousie in 1854, in which he arrives at the conclusion that thirty-five regiments of European Infantry were quite sufficient for the garrison of India; adoption by witness of this minute in all its integrity, 3552-3558. 3641.

Statement as to the total effective force of non-commissioned officers, rank and file, on 1st May 1857, having been only 37,091; ample means at home to have supplied India with the full establishment, 3559-3573—Suggestion that the British force in India might consist of 35,000 Infantry, 3,000 Cavalry, and 10,000 Artillery, irrespective of officers, 3574-3584—Great expense of European Cavalry in India, so that, for this and other reasons, witness suggests that five regiments, of 600 sabres each, should suffice, 3575-3578—Contemplated employment of 10,000 Artillery, as not excessive, the present force being between 10,000 and 12,000; 3579-3582—Opinion as to the efficiency and fidelity of natives as artillerymen, 3579. 3581.

Calculation that the present establishment of European troops is about 61,000, or about 10,000 rank and file, more than is proposed by witness, 3585-3591—Large amount of the pay of the officers of any regiment as compared with that of the non-commissioned rank and file, 3592—Belief as to the facility with which India could provide herself with an efficient army for an expense not exceeding 12,000,000 l. a-year, whilst it is extremely essential that she should not be burdened beyond this amount, 3593-3596.

Comment upon the practice of withdrawing European troops from India for operations elsewhere, as in the case of the China war of 1840; 3597. 3600. 3604—Expected withdrawal of an unduly large force from India in the event of war in Europe, 3600. 3602—Facility of increasing to 20,000 men the local European army of India at the time of the mutiny, 3603.

Statement that any assistance derived by India at the time of the mutiny from the European garrisons at the Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon was more than counterbalanced by the force previously taken from India for the Persian expedition, 3604-3607—Successful operations against the mutineers, irrespectively of the troops which came from the Mauritius, &c., 3607—Conclusion as to the entire ability of a much smaller European force than that now in India for overcoming any native force in the field, 3608—Great danger to be incurred by keeping up a very large army, on account of the oppressive taxation necessary, *ib.*

Opinion as to the exceeding impolicy of the present military system of India; that is, as regards the distinct separation between the European and Native armies, the former being under the Imperial Government, whilst the latter is under the Indian Government, 3609—Great efficiency of the old Indian Army, *ib.*—Immense advantage of the large body of trained and efficient European officers available under the former system; 478—I. deficiencies

## BALFOUR.

Report, 1867—continued.

*Balfour, Major General George. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

deficiencies of the present system on this score, 3609-3617—Direct effect of a proper supply of efficient officers in ensuring the efficiency of native troops, whether in India or the colonies, 3612-3617.

Statement in favour of largely increasing the forces and reserves at home by withdrawals from abroad, 3618-3625—Expediency of its being left entirely to the military departments to appropriate the military expenditure, the amount of such expenditure being first definitely fixed by the financial departments, 3620, 3621—Limited amount of the colonial military contribution, whilst its effect is probably to cause unnecessary expense in the employment of British troops in the colonies, 3622, 3623—Facility of adjusting the colonial contribution in any case, 3624.

Representation as to the importance of clearly providing that the duties of native troops in the colonies shall not embrace police duties of various kinds, 3626-3628—Grounds for concluding that colonies may be garrisoned with perfect safety by Native regiments and European Artillery; dissent hereon from the opinion of Lord Strathairn as to the importance of some European troops, in addition to Artillery, 3629-3635—Instances of several places in India guarded by natives exclusively where no mutiny occurred, whilst mutinies have frequently arisen in places where the European troops were the strongest, 3630-3634.

Explanation of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission of 1866 in regard to the practice of recruiting, and the enlistment of men for particular regiments; conditions subject to which the men are to be enlisted for general service, 3637, 3638, 3640—System of enlistment formerly in force in the case of the European Army of India, 3639—Valuable experience taught by the mutiny, so that we are stronger in the country than we were before, 3642, 3643—Immense preponderance of Native over British troops at the time of the mutiny, the relative proportion in Bengal being as ten to one, 3643-3646.

Objection to the substitution of natives for the British troops proposed by witness to be withdrawn from India, 3647, 3648—Approval of a Native Infantry of 90,000 privates, 3648—Loose discipline sure to follow from scattering the Native troops on small guards and escort duties away from their officers; strong opinion of Lord Clyde on this subject, 3648, 3655-3661.

Further evidence in favour of the re-formation of a local European Army of India distinct from the Royal Army, and under the control of the Government of India, 3649-3652—Extremely efficient character of the army of India, if instead of the sweeping changes made certain defects had been remedied on the score of staff appointments, &c., 3652—Data for the conclusion that no difficulty would be experienced in recruiting for an Indian army, or local European army, 3653, 3654.

Doubt as to any evil arising from the transport arrangement by which each native soldier at sea is allowed only six square feet of space, whilst a British soldier is allowed nine square feet, 3662-3670—Illustrations of the great importance of European officers for the leading of Native troops, 3671-3677—Further statement as to the colonists naturally objecting to pay the same contribution towards Native troops as towards British troops; instance in the case of the Mauritius, 3678, 3695, 3696.

Statement as to the Mauritius now paying 45,000 l. a year towards the expense of the troops, there being a garrison of 2,000 men; conclusion as to the heavy pressure involved in this payment, 3679-3700—Dissent from the views laid down by Sir John Burgoyne as to the expediency of a very large force for the protection of Mauritius; opinion that a garrison of 600 men is sufficient for internal defence, 3679, 3680, 3684-3688, 3701-3704—Pressure of taxation in Ceylon as well as in Mauritius, by reason of the large military contribution required of the colony, 3692, 3694.

Expediency of making in time of peace those arrangements as to the garrisons of the Mauritius, Ceylon, &c., which in time of war must be made, 3697—Exceptions taken to certain conclusions as to the great value of the Mauritius in the event of war; it is, however, very useful for the refitting of vessels, 3704-3712—Utter impracticability of holding the Mauritius if an enemy had the command of the sea, 3708.

Difference of about 8,000 or 10,000 men between the British force contemplated by witness for India, and the actual force now in the country, 3721-3725—Great expense involved in keeping up the officers and non-commissioned officers to the full maximum establishment, whilst the rank and file are below the establishment, 3725, 3731—Examination to the effect that the Indian authorities have had but little influence in fixing the force or establishment of the battalions in India, 3726-3736.

Great expense of British Cavalry during war in India further adverted to; admission as to the undoubted efficiency of the Cavalry regiments, 3737-3742—Explanation in connection with the relative expense of the officers and of the men in a regiment of infantry, the actual pay not representing the proportionate expense, 3743-3749—Apprehension lest a very large withdrawal of British troops from India would take place if England were at war in Europe, and were threatened at home, 3750-3753.

Approval

*Balfour, Major General George*—(Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Approval of India being called upon to pay for any reserve force necessary in England in order to keep up the force in India to such an amount as may be deemed necessary by Indian authorities, 3754-3760—Statement as to the inefficiency of the reserves and depôts in England for maintaining the force in India; instances of very unfit recruits having been sent out, 3754-3757—Opinion that a local European force, if re-established in India, should be larger than the former force, 3761, 3769—Great value of the trained and experienced officers to be obtained by means of a local European force, 3761.

Approval of a local European army of 30,000 men, and of an Imperial army of 20,000 men, 3762, 3763—Belief that with proper care no difficulty would arise in regard to the difference of pay and allowances between a local army and an Imperial army, 3764-3768—Success of the bounty given in 1861, in order to induce the Europeans of the local army to continue in service under the new arrangements, 3764, 3765—Conclusion as to the fidelity and the unquestionable efficiency of the local European troops, 3763, 3769.

[Second Examination.]—Evidence in explanation of the practice as to pay and allowances of European officers in the Colonies; great expense incurred in the shape of allowances for officers' quarters, &c., so that the system of direct money payment is more economical, 3770-3775—Reference to a certain official statement as containing a very accurate account of the cost of European and Native troops in India, 3770, 3771—Undue reduction made in the allowances to officers in the Mauritius, 3776.

Further statement upon the question of the mutiny in 1857 having been virtually overcome before the arrival of troops from the Colonies, 3777-3794—Strong objection to the maintenance of British troops in Ceylon, the Mauritius, &c., so as to provide for emergencies in India, 3781, 3795—India should, in fact, be allowed to provide for herself, 3781, 3782—Doubt whether the operations in China could have been carried on without assistance from India, 3782—Bad effect created in China through the diversion of the troops on their way thither at the time of the mutiny, 3796.

Belief that the employment of native Indian troops on foreign service may be made in the highest degree beneficial to the discipline of the Native army, 3797, 3798—Especial importance of strict discipline for Native troops, *ib.*—Comment upon the great indifference shown in the treatment of the Sepoy army, 3799—Belief that no difficulty need arise in connection with the employment of Native troops on foreign service; large extent of such employment at the time of the mutiny, 3800-3802.

Statement strongly in favour of the continued employment of Native troops in the Straits Settlements, rather than of sending out British troops; undue expense, moreover, if the latter proceeding be carried out, 3802-3806—With regard to Ceylon, witness is unable to see any necessity for the increase made in the European garrison, 3807, 3808—Small force likely to be kept in the Mauritius if the matter rested with the colonists, 3809—Efficiency of a mixed garrison of Natives and Europeans in the Mauritius, 3810.

Further statement that any system that may be determined upon should not be postponed till time of war, 3811, 3812—Doubt as to the expediency of employing Native soldiers at Malta or Gibraltar, 3813—Entire fitness of Native troops for operations in Egypt, *ib.*—Conclusion as to the very clear definition, by General Order in 1856, of the right to employ the Sepoy army on foreign service, it being most unwise to imply that such service is optional, 3814-3816—Decided disapproval of allowing men or regiments to volunteer for foreign service, 3815, 3816—Strong disapproval, also, of raising special corps for service out of India, 3817.

Reference to a statement (*App.* 337, 338) showing the distribution of the British army on 1st January in each year since 1846; 3818—Further explanation in regard to the relative cost of officers, and of non-commissioned officers and men, *ib.*

*Balfour, Major General.* Letter from Colonel Balfour in August 1861, to the secretary of the Government of India, in the Military Department, as to the employment of Native soldiers on foreign service on duties which might more properly be performed by policemen, and as to the rations and the accommodation and treatment of the men, *App.* 321-324.

*Barbadoes.* Difficulty in requiring Barbadoes to pay towards the expense of the troops stationed there, *Taylor* 2547.—See also *West Indies*, &c.

*Bareilly Insurrection* (1816). Particulars relative to the insurrection at Bareilly in 1816, as the most formidable that has occurred in India during the British rule, *Mangles* 3065, 3066.

*Barkly, Sir Henry, K. C. B.* Answers received from Sir Henry Barkly, Governor of the Mauritius, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of  
478—I. A 3 the

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Barkly, Sir Henry, K.C.B.*—continued.

the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 234, 235.

*Barrack Expenses.* The item (in a certain return) of barrack expenses in China, &c., includes the cost of hired buildings, but on this point witness will supply further information to the Committee, *Shadwell* 2627-2631. 2640-2664—Particulars, in paper submitted by Colonel Shadwell, relative to the cost of barracks at stations east of the Cape and at the Cape, *App.* 290, 291.

*Beale, Colonel, E. C.* Communication from Colonel Beale commanding the 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 256, 257.

*Belooch Corps.* Witness doubts whether the Belooch Corps for Hong Kong will be easily raised in India, *Norman* 276—Steps being taken towards raising a Beloochee regiment for service at Hong Kong, *Johnson* 1552-1554.

*Benares.* Explanation in connection with the force at Benares, *Norman* 334, 335.

*Bengal Native Army.* Evidence relative to the very satisfactory service of Bengal regiments in the China war, without any difficulties having been experienced, *Baker* 1017 *et seq.*—Explanation as to the general service corps in the Bengal army having been formed expressly with a view to their serving abroad; practice of late years to enlist for the army generally with a view to foreign service if required, *ib.* 1072-1077. 1098-1102.

Doubt whether the regiments in Bengal are prepared for a system of foreign service; lower standard of discipline in this respect than in the case of the Bombay army, *Lord Strathnairn* 3391. 3406. 3446—Strong disapproval of the option given to the men to volunteer for foreign service, *ib.* 3406. 3410. 3422.

Memorandum showing the composition of the native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Statement showing the detail of the establishment and cost of a regiment of native infantry in the Bengal Presidency, *App.* 306.

*See also* *Burmah.* *Caste.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Furloughs.* *Hindoos.* *Mauritius.* *Mutiny.* *Officers (Native Troops).* *Straits Settlements.*

*Bermuda.* Opinion that Africans might with advantage be employed at Bermuda, *Fonblanque* 2831.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army and stationed at Bermuda, *App.* 283.

*Beville Major, H.* Answers received from Major Beville, commanding the 1st Belooch Regiment, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 253.

*Black Troops.* Belief as to the black troops at Hyderabad being Abyssinians, *Norman* 470-472—Considerable number of blacks from Abyssinia, &c., on the western coast of India, who would form excellent troops; *Sir W. Elliot* 538-545.

*See also* *West Coast of Africa.* *West India and West India Regiments.*

*Bombay Native Army.* Evidence as to the willingness evinced by the Bombay army to serve in Burmah, *Norman* 19-26. 30-33; *Sir W. Elliot* 481-484—Instances of the readiness of Bombay troops to serve out of India, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389. 3406—The men are ordered for foreign service without any option being given them; inexpediency of any option in the matter, *ib.* 3389. 3406. 3410.

Answers received from the commanding officers of regiments in the Bombay army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 245-259.

Memorandum showing the composition of the native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Return showing that on 1st April 1857, there were 10,459 Bombay native troops on service out of India, *App.* 336.

*See also* *Aden.* *Caste.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Families (Native Troops).* *Mauritius.* *Officers (Native Army).* *Straits Settlements.*



Report, 1867—continued.

*Bounty (Re-enlistment).* Question considered whether it is not desirable to raise the bounty for British soldiers re-enlisted in India on discharge there, the present bounty varying from 10 *l.* to 15 *l.*, whereas the cost of bringing each man home is about 50 *l.*, *Norman* 411-415. 424-427. 437-445—Circumstance of the Government of India having been prepared to recommend an increase of the bounty in India, *ib.* 445.

Considerable expense of bringing discharged men home from India, so that it would be well to increase the bounty given in India for re-enlistment, *Sir Hope Grant* 1471-1473.

Success of the bounty given in 1861, in order to induce the Europeans of the local army to continue in service under the new arrangements, *Balfour* 3764, 3765.

#### BRITISH ARMY (COLONIES):

Importance of the Colonies having European troops to defend them in the event of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1209-1213—Imperial importance of garrisoning the Colonies with British troops, though in the event of a war in Europe it might be found necessary to bring the troops home, and to supply their places abroad with native troops, *ib.* 1291-1300. 1308-1316. 1336-1346. 1420-1430—Conclusion that for each British regiment withdrawn from any Colony two native regiments would be necessary, and that about ten or twelve British regiments might be withdrawn if the principle of mixed garrisons is adopted, *ib.* 1438-1445—Valuable reserves for India in time of emergency, as during the mutiny, through there being British garrisons in certain Colonies, *Johnson* 1665-1667. 1703-1709. 1729, 1730—Advantage of European garrisons at the Mauritius and other places, sufficient to beat off the attack of a small expeditionary force in time of war, *Taylor* 2553, 2554.

Decided objection to a reduction in the European troops at large, through the increased employment of an inferior article in the Colonies in the shape of native troops, *Duke of Cambridge* 2965, 2966. 2969-2971. 3032-3034—Grounds for concluding that if the colonial service of the British army were reduced by the increased employment of native troops in the Colonies, the aggregate strength would also be reduced, *Duke of Cambridge*, 3047-3057; *Sir H. Storks* 3296-3308.

Apprehended reduction in the British army if native soldiers were substituted for Europeans in the Colonies; strong disapproval of such reduction, *Lord Strathnairn* 3387, 3388—Important auxiliaries to our military strength in India by reason of garrisons at the Cape, Hong Kong, Mauritius, &c., *ib.* 3396-3400. 3431, 3432—Further statement that any advantages from the employment of native Indian troops in the Colonies would not counterbalance the evil of reduction of the British army, *ib.* 3420. 3433. 3444-3448.

Strong objection to the maintenance of British troops in Ceylon, the Mauritius, &c., so as to provide for emergencies in India, *Balfour* 3781. 3795—India should, in fact, be allowed to provide for herself, *ib.* 3781, 3782.

Answers received from persons in high official positions in India and the Colonies to questions as to the usefulness of British garrisons in certain Colonies for the defence of India in case of emergency. *App.* 212. 220. 222. 226. 228. 230. 232. 234 *et seq.*

Return, dated 28 March 1867, showing the number of troops in the several Colonies and dependencies borne on the strength of the Imperial army, *App.* 282, 283.

See also *Cape of Good Hope. Ceylon. China. Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops). Cost. Duties of Troops. Malta and Gibraltar. Mauritius. Mutiny. Straits Settlements. War. West Indies, &c.*

#### BRITISH ARMY (INDIA):

1. *Present European Force in India.*
2. *Evidence in favour of a Reduction of the Force.*
3. *Evidence opposed to any Reduction.*
4. *Views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 and 1856.*
5. *Views of the Governor General and Commander in Chief in India in strong disapproval of any Reduction.*
6. *Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops.*
7. *Question of Withdrawal of Troops in the event of War in Europe.*

##### 1. *Present European Force in India:*

Total of 58,212 European troops in the three Presidencies, *Norman* 3-5—Actual increase of European troops in India to the extent of only 13,000 men since the time of the mutiny, *ib.* 227—Total of 45,000 British soldiers in India at the beginning of 1857, the present number being about 58,000, *ib.* 310-314—Approval generally of the present proposition of two native soldiers to one European, *ib.* 319, 320.

Calculation that the present establishment of European troops is about 61,000, or about 10,000 rank and file more than is proposed by witness, *Balfour* 3585-3591—  
478—1. 2. *Evidence*

Report, 1867—continued.

*BRITISH ARMY (INDIA)*—continued.

2. *Evidence in favour of a Reduction of the Force:*

Expediency of there being a certain proportion of European troops in India, with reference to the native force, the present proposition being, however, excessive, *Sir G. Clerk*, 1863-1868—Statement that by governing India with justice, and by maintaining good faith towards the chiefs, greater safety will be insured than by keeping up the present large European force, *ib.* 1877, 1878. 1882. 1910-1934—Witness considers that an army of 44,000 effective British troops should suffice for all India, *ib.* 1927.

Witness submits sundry data for the conclusion that the European army in India unnecessarily large, and that no danger would be incurred in reducing both the British and native armies, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Great mistake in maintaining from 65,000 to 70,000 British troops in order chiefly to watch 135,000 native troops, there being, in truth, none else for the former to fight with, *ib.* 3067-3077. 3087-3089. 3128—Suggestion that the British army be reduced by 20,000 men, and the native army by 35,000, *ib.* 3070. 3090-3095. 3102. 3159-3164—Very little use of a large British force so far as the Nepaulese, Bhootans, Burmese, &c. are concerned, *ib.* 3072-3077—Increased control over the people by means of the improved arms now in possession of the European army, *ib.* 3085. 3095. 3128. 3148, 3149—The question of a further reduction in the aggregate of the Imperial army as a consequence of reducing the force in India should not in any way affect the latter reduction, *ib.* 3165-3167.

Opinion that the British army now in India is greater than there is any military necessity for; grounds for this conclusion considered, *Balfour* 3548 *et seq.*—Concurrence in the views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 as to the sufficiency of thirty-five regiments of European infantry, *ib.* 3552-3558. 3641—Suggestion that the British force in India might consist of 35,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, irrespective of officers, *ib.* 3574-3584—Conclusion as to the entire ability of a much smaller European force than that now in India for overcoming any native force in the field, *ib.* 3608—Difference of about 9,000 or 10,000 men between the British force contemplated by witness for India and the actual force now in the country *ib.* 3721-3721—Suggestion further, that the European troops should consist of a local European army of 30,000 men, and an Imperial army of 20,000 men, *ib.* 3762, 3763.

3. *Evidence opposed to any Reduction:*

Additional forts and arsenals now garrisoned by Europeans, the present European army being anything but excessive, *Norman* 227-229—Strong objection to any reduction of the English army in India, *Sir Hope Grant* 1268-1271—Concurrence in the objection to any reduction of the British force in India, *Johnson* 1739.

Witness strongly objects to any reduction of the European force in India without reference to the native force; obstacle, moreover, to any reduction of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 3040, 3041—Objections to any diminution in the number of English troops in India, the number being in fact too low already, *Lord Strathnairn* 3401—Regulation of the number of troops in India by the state of the country, and the duties required of the men, the duties being extremely hard, *ib.* 3449, 3450.

4. *Views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 and 1856:*

Minute by Lord Dalhousie, as Governor General of India, dated 13th September 1854, submitting reasons for objecting to the withdrawal of two European regiments from India, *App.* 325-327.

Detailed statement and suggestions in minute of Lord Dalhousie, dated 5th February 1856, in regard to the British and native forces of India, and the amount at which it is desirable to fix the limit of the Imperial troops, *App.* 327-333.

5. *Views of the Governor General and Commander in Chief in India in strong Disapproval of any Reduction:*

Grounds put forward by Sir John Lawrence for objecting to any important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, *App.* 212, 213.

Official communication setting forth the views of Sir W. Mansfield, in strong disapproval of any reduction of the British army in India, *App.* 293-299.

6. *Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops:*

Statement as to its being in contemplation to place about twelve per cent. of the European troops at the hill stations; obstacle to any further removal to the hills, *Norman* 239-241. 248-252—Distribution of the British troops with a view to massing them to some extent, and at the same time so as to hold all the more important points, *ib.* 242—Difficulty in withdrawing the troops from all stations reported to be unhealthy, *ib.*

Opinion that the bulk of the British army should be kept at frontier posts, such as Peshawur, and the rest should be located in the large cities, such as Patna, *Mangles* 3080, 3081. 3098. 3107-3109—With regard to the number of British troops now stationed

## Report, 1867—continued.

## BRITISH ARMY (INDIA)—continued.

6. *Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops*—continued. stationed at different posts and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, the Native troops being reduced at the same time, *Mangles* 3151-3156.

7. *Question of Withdrawal of Troops in the event of War in Europe:*

Contemplated withdrawal of several British regiments from India in the event of a European war, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1877. 1882. 1932-1934—Further statement as to the nature of the facilities for withdrawing troops from India in the event of their being required for a war in Europe, *ib.* 1955-1958—Expediency of raising new levies at home rather than of withdrawing British troops from India in the event of a European war, *Duke of Cambridge* 3016-3018. 3037. 3038—Inducement to withdraw British troops from India in the event of a European war; danger in so doing, *Mangles* 3111-3114—Apprehension lest a very large withdrawal of British troops from India would take place if England were at war in Europe and were threatened at home, *Balfour* 3600. 3602. 3750-3753.

See also *Artillery. Cavalry. Cost. Duties of Troops. Forts and Arsenals. Havelock, Sir Henry (the Late). Local European Army. Russia.*

*Browne, Colonel W.* Answers received from Colonel Browne commanding the troops in Natal, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 241.

*Burmah.* Evidence as to the willingness generally of the Madras troops to serve in Burmah, *Norman* 19-26. 30-33; *Sir W. Elliot* 451-484—Amount of force now kept at Rangoon, Moulmein, &c., *Norman* 453—Explanation in connection with the refusal of the 8th Regiment of Madras Cavalry to embark for Burmah in 1858, *Sir W. Elliot* 515-518.

Garrison duty in Burmah is considered foreign service in the Madras army, Bengal troops only going there on field service, *Pears* 767-770—Difficulty experienced in connection with the employment of Madras troops at Rangoon; large increase made in their pay, *Sir Hope Grant* 1233—Information relative to the number of British and native troops at Rangoon and other stations in Burmah, *Johnson* 1647, 1648—Approval of holding Burmah partly by Burmese levies, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1881. 1943-1946.

Statement showing the sickness and mortality among the Native troops in Burmah and Port Blair, for the years 1864 and 1865, *App.* 267.

## C.

*Caird, Thomas.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Had for several years official charge of the coolie emigration from Calcutta to the Mauritius and the West Indies, 1748-1751—Information relative to the extent of the coolie emigration, the wages in the Mauritius and the West Indies, and the degree of willingness on the part of the Natives to leave India for employment beyond the sea, 1752 *et seq.*—Small per-centage of married men among the emigrants; difficulty in getting their wives to accompany them, 1754-1757—Preference given to low caste men as coolies, high-caste men often concealing their caste in order to be allowed to go, 1758-1763. 1784-1788.

Limited objection shown by the coolies, in late years, to crossing the sea; adequate arrangements as to the supply of water, &c., on board, 1764-1766. 1772, 1773. 1784-1790—Frequent instances of sepoys from the mutinous regiments having gone to the Mauritius as coolies, 1767-1771—Belief that with adequate pay and judicious arrangements, Native troops would willingly leave India on colonial service in the Mauritius, &c., 1774-1782—Statement of the rate of pay which induced the Natives to emigrate to the Mauritius and the West Indies 1776-1780. 1791-1797. 1803-1807.

Opinion that for three rupees extra per month, Native troops would willingly serve in the colonies, 1781—Necessity of considering the extra expense of rations, irrespectively of extra pay, 1781, 1782—Importance of every attention being paid to the supply of water for Native troops both on board ship and on foreign service, 1807-1812. 1817, 1818—Less prejudicial effect of the climate of the Mauritius than of India itself upon natives of India, 1813-1815—Instances of complaint by coolies against the climate, &c., in the West Indies, 1815, 1816.

*Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is strongly opposed, upon military grounds, to the proposition for substituting Native for European troops in the various colonies, 2961 *et seq.*—Great danger in attempting to hold any colony unless there be at least a nucleus of British troops, 2964. 2967-2971. 2976, 478—I. B 2977-

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—continued.

2977-2980. 2985. 3032-3034—Approval of European troops being supplemented with Native troops, as is now the case in some colonies, 2965.

Decided objection to a reduction in the European troops at large through the increased employment of an inferior article in the shape of Native troops, 2965, 2966. 2969-2971. 3032-3034—Disapproval of European Artillery being left solely with Native troops in any colony, 2967, 2968. 2981, 2982—Expediency of some British troops, as well as of native Indian troops at Hong Kong, 2969. 2983-2987. 3021-3023. 3039.

Approval of the present system of scattering the army in small detachments throughout the colonies, rather than of massing the troops in positions nearer home, 2972-2975—Decided objection to the withdrawal of all European troops from so valuable a colony as the Mauritius; great importance of a garrison there of about 1,800 British troops, 2976, 2977. 3024-3031. 3051-3053—Disapproval also of the withdrawal of all British troops from Ceylon, 2978-2980. 2990, 2991.

Expediency of some British troops in addition to European garrison artillery in the Straits Settlements, 2988-2990—Contemplated occupation of Point de Galle by a wing of a European regiment, for imperial purposes, 2991—State ment as to the great inequality between the pay of officers with European regiments and of officers with Native regiments from India, when serving in the same colony; great expense involved in assimilating the pay of the former to that of the latter, 2992-3013. 3044—Objection to local corps in lieu of Indian native troops, except that in the former case no difficulty arises as to the pay and allowances of European officers and men serving in the same colony, 3004.

Contemplated employment of Indian native troops on active service in such places as Egypt, 3006, 3007. 3015—Advantage of some scheme by which European and Native troops should serve together without its being necessary to raise the pay and allowances of the former, 3008-3010—Greater facility in obtaining the services of Native troops out of India in time of war than during peace, 3014. 3018, 3019—Expediency of raising new levies at home rather than of withdrawing British troops from India, in the event of a European war, 3016-3018. 3037, 3038.

Advantage of the nucleus of British troops in the principal islands in the West Indies, 3020—Strong objection to any reduction of the European force in India; small increase made in the force since the time of the mutiny, 3035-3038—Regulation of the British force in India without reference to the Native force; obstacle moreover to any reduction of the latter, 3040, 3041—Difficulties which prevented the sending of some Sikh troops to New Zealand during the late war, 3042-3045.

Unwillingness generally of the colonists to contribute towards Native troops in substitution for British troops, 3045, 3046. 3053—Grounds for concluding that an increased employment of Native troops in the colonies will surely lead to a corresponding reduction in the aggregate of European troops in the army, 3047-3057—Desire of the authorities to shorten the term of colonial service, so that the British army may have not more two-thirds of colonial service for one-third of home service; prospect of this being arrived at, 3049, 3050. 3058-3060.

*Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel E.* Answers received from Colonel Campbell, commanding the 3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 250.

*Canada.* The present British force in Canada cannot be considered too large, *Sir H. Storks* 3249.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in Canada, *App.* 282.

*Canadian Regiment (1857).* Great expense of the Canadian regiment raised in 1857, whilst it was also an inefficient regiment, on account of the system on which established, *Sir H. Storks* 3285.

#### CAPE OF GOOD HOPE:

Importance of British troops instead of Indian native troops at the Cape, *Sir Hope Grant* 1279-1284—Danger in the garrison at the Cape being composed largely of Indian troops, *Johnson* 1711-1714. 1731, 1732.

Facilities for raising in South Africa an ample and efficient force of Kaffirs or Fingoes for the garrison of the Cape; suggestions hereon, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1831-1833. 1838-1847. 1884. 1890—Entire unfitness of Sikh troops for garrisoning South Africa in time of peace, whilst the expense would be very considerable, *ib.* 1833-1837. 1845—Importance of maintaining a European force at the Cape, the climate being excellent, and the troops being readily available for service in India, &c., *ib.* 1848-1850.

Statement in further approval of the defence of the Cape being entrusted chiefly to local levies, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1940-1942. 1960-1962—Small European force which  
witness

## Report, 1867—continued.

**CAPE OF GOOD HOPE**—continued.

witness would propose at the Cape, in addition to a force raised locally, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1977-1995—Improbability of the Kaffirs rising in rebellion if unprovoked by the colonists encroaching upon their lands, *ib.* 1990-1993—Safety in leaving the Kaffir frontier to the defence of the colonists, under the commando system; economy thereby, *ib.* 1994, 1995.

Opinion that Indian troops are far preferable to Kaffir or Fingoe levies for the defence of the Cape, *Mackenzie* 2017, 2018—Probable withdrawal of the contribution of 41,000*l.* a year by the Cape colonists if the European troops were replaced by native troops from India, *Taylor* 2504-2508—Objection to any portion of the present force at the Cape being replaced by Sikhs or other native troops from India, *Sir H. Storks* 3175-3184. 3211-3222—Advantage of employing local levies at the Cape, such as Fingoes, in addition to British troops, rather than of bringing native troops from India; efficiency of the former in the event of a Kaffir war, *ib.* 3184-3190. 3282, 3283. 3290-3292—Question whether the settlers should not be left to take care of themselves against the Kaffirs, *ib.* 3214, 3215. 3278-3281.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed at the Cape, *App.* 282.

See also *Mutiny*.

*Cape Mounted Rifles.* Very efficient character of the Cape Mounted Rifles, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1847. 1884. 1961, 1962.

*Caste (Native Troops).* Information as to the different races and religions of which the Indian native army is composed, *Norman* 6-16—Regulations in force as to the number of men of different castes in the same regiment, *ib.* 12, 13—Necessity of keeping in view the religious prejudices of the Hindoos, &c. in considering the question of their being sent across the sea, *ib.* 17. 40-47. 67. 393-400—Detailed composition of the native regiments further adverted to; approval of a mixture of races and of castes, *ib.* 110-113—Probable difficulty in the event of native troops being sent to places where their prejudices as to caste, &c. are not understood, *ib.* 283.

Advantage in the native regiments being composed of as many different elements as possible, *Sir W. Elliot* 572. 578. 579. 621-631—Aversion of high-caste natives to cook on board ship, so that it is most difficult to employ these beyond the sea, *ib.* 623, 624—Prejudice of Rajpoots, &c. against cooking at sea; this difficulty, however, being easily surmounted, *Keyes* 660-663. 686—Several high-caste men in witness's regiment, notwithstanding which no difficulty arose as to the supply of water on board ship, or as to the cooking, *Probyn* 856, 857. 907-914.

Absence of difficulty as regards the supply of water, and the cooking on board ship, in the case of a Bengal regiment sent to China, under witness's command; practice of providing dry rations for Hindoos on board, on account of their objections to cook at sea, *Baker* 1022-1024. 1040-1045—With regard to the employment of Indian troops at Burmah, Singapore, &c., witness is not aware of any difficulty having been experienced on the score of caste prejudices, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2645-2650—Much stronger existence of caste in Bengal than in Bombay or Madras, *Lord Strathnairn* 3383, 3384.

See also *Hindoos. Sikhs.*

*Cavalry (British Army).* Very considerable expense of European cavalry in India, so that for this and other reasons witness suggests that five regiments of 600 sabres each should suffice, *Balfour* 3575-3578—Great expense of British cavalry during war in India further adverted to; admission as to the undoubted efficiency of the cavalry regiments, *ib.* 3737-3742.

*Cavalry (Native Army).* Great efficiency of the Bengal cavalry regiments, *Lord Strathnairn* 3421.

*Cavenagh, Major General Orfeur.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was governor of Singapore from 1859 until the present year, 3309, 3310—Entire efficiency of the Indian native troops at Singapore in time of peace, 3312, 3313. 3316-3323—Difficulty on financial grounds in obtaining European troops at Singapore from India in case of war, 3314, 3315—Obstacle to recruiting the Ceylon Rifles from the Malay population of the Straits, 3324-3327—Rate of pay and allowances of the Indian troops at Singapore, 3328-3330—Willingness of the natives to remain at Singapore if they had not been separated from their wives and families, 3331-3333.

Opinion that the native army in India should be re-organised, with a view to its being an integral part of the Imperial army, and to its serving in the colonies; deficiencies of the present organisation, 3334-3341. 3346-3352—Except in cases of emergency, native troops should not be employed westward of the Cape, 3335. 3337—Advantage of European artillery at Singapore, though a native regiment is sufficient for internal defence, 3342-3345.

Disapproval of the employment of Chinese troops in India, 3354-3358—Increased prestige of Great Britain in India if the natives were to serve in the colonies, 3359—

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Cavenagh, Major General Orfeur. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

Particulars as to the payments made by the Straits Settlements for the garrison of Singapore, &c.; also as to the cost of the garrison to the Indian Government, 3360, 3361, 3370-3374—Explanation relative to the transfer of the Settlements to the Colonial Government, the reduced sum now paid by the colony, and the expense to the Imperial treasury through the want of longer notice of the transfer 3362-3369, 3375-3378.

**CEYLON:**

No inducements are necessary in sending Madras troops to Ceylon, *Norman* 209—Circumstance of part of Ceylon having for a long period been garrisoned by Malays without any evils having arisen, *ib.* 367-370—Grounds for concluding that it is inexpedient to garrison Ceylon with native troops exclusively; danger thereby, *Sir Hope Grant* 1207-1213, 1379-1381—Advantage of having a whole European regiment at the Sanatorium in Ceylon rather than at Galle, *ib.* 1402.

Very good and comfortable barracks in Ceylon, though not nearly so expensive as European barracks, *Macdonald* 2199—Character of the defences of Ceylon, and number of troops composing the garrison, *ib.* 2249-2255—Several parts of the island at which detachments of troops are located, *ib.* 2271, 2272.

Objection to Ceylon being garrisoned by native troops exclusively; feeling, however, of the planters that neither British nor native troops are required, *Fonblanque* 2752, 2794-2812, 2823-2825—Much greater cost of native troops in Ceylon than in the Presidencies; particulars hereon, *ib.* 2757—Amount of pay and allowances of British troops in Ceylon, *ib.* 2757, 2770-2774—Opinion in favour of barracks at Newara Elyya, as the best place in Ceylon for white troops, *ib.* 2869-2873—Nothing can be worse than the present European barracks in Ceylon, *ib.* 2889.

Disapproval of the withdrawal of all British troops from Ceylon, *Duke of Cambridge*, 2878-2980, 2990, 2991—Contemplated occupation of Point de Galle by a wing of a European regiment for Imperial purposes, *ib.* 2931

Pressure of taxation in Ceylon as well as in Mauritius, by reason of the large military contribution required of the colony, *Balfour* 3692-3694—Witness is unable to see any necessity for the increase made in the European garrison of Ceylon, *ib.* 3807, 3808.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in Ceylon, *App.* 282.

Extracts from report of the Deputy Commissary General in August 1865, relative to the provisioning of the European troops, *App.* 301, 302—Return containing particulars on the score of rations, and of stoppages from the troops, *ib.* 302, 303—Schedule of colonial pay and allowances authorised to be paid by the commissariat in 1864, *ib.* 304.

See also *Mutiny*.

**CEYLON RIFLE CORPS:**

Approval on the whole of an extension of the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps for service in Hong Kong, &c., rather than of attempting to raise a distinct corps for the purpose, *Norman* 270-277—Intention of raising the Ceylon Rifle Regiment to fourteen companies, of which eight will be stationed in the Straits, *Johnson* 1721-1724.

The Ceylon Rifle Corps is composed of Malays, with the exception of two companies of Sepoys, the full strength of the regiment being about 1,100, *Macdonald* 2107-2111—Practice of enlisting the Malays in the island as boys, *ib.* 2111, 2160-2164, 2222-2228, 2267-2270—Particulars relative to the pay, allowances, &c. of the men; advantage when serving in China of a free ration of meat, *ib.* 2112-2123, 2133-2135, 2193-2198—Absence of difficulty in regard to the men serving abroad, *ib.* 2124-2130.

Officering of the corps by natives and Europeans jointly; statement in explanation and approval of this arrangement, *Macdonald* 2131, 2132, 2145-2147, 2273-2287, 2290—Less cost of transport of men of the Ceylon Rifles than of European soldiers, *ib.* 2136, 2137—Practice as to the wives and children of the men accompanying them to China; mistake recently made on this score, *ib.* 2138-2144—Considerable sickness and mortality among the regiment in Hong Kong, the climate being too cold for Malays, *ib.* 2152-2156, 2205, 2206, 2217-2221—Entire confidence of witness in the loyalty of the Ceylon Rifles, whilst their drill and discipline are excellent, *ib.* 2157-2160, 2165-2169, 2186, 2187, 2266, 2289.

Information relative to the religious and social habits of the Malays in the regiment; little, if any, difficulty on the score of caste, *Macdonald* 2168-2180—Considerable difficulty in recruiting for the regiment; advantage of keeping some companies in Singapore and of recruiting there, the regiment being much below its proper strength, *ib.* 2181-2184, 2207-2210, 2222-2237—Probability of better barrack accommodation being required for the Ceylon Rifles than for Indian native troops when serving in China, &c., *ib.* 2200-2204—Intention of sending nine companies of the corps to Singapore, Penang, &c., and to keep five companies in Ceylon, *ib.* 2247-2249.

Belief

Report, 1867—continued.

**CEYLON RIFLE CORPS—continued.**

Belief as to its being intended to increase the Ceylon Rifle Corps and to send some companies to the Straits Settlements, *Taylor* 2518-2521—Material changes effected in the constitution of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the result being that the corps is much more expensive and much less efficient than it used to be, *Fonblanque* 2758-2763—Improvement if the regiment were again recruited chiefly from the Malayan Archipelago; difficulty hereon, *ib.* 2763-2769—Large proportion of European officers in the Ceylon Rifles as compared with the Punjab regiments, *ib.* 2815-2818—Comment upon the representations of medical officers and others in favour of the Ceylon Rifles having as much space and accommodation per man, in barracks, as European troops, *ib.* 2877-2880, 2884, 2885—Obstacles to recruiting the corps from the Malay population of the Straits, *Cavenagh* 3324-3327.

**CHINA:**

1. *Feeling of Native Indian Troops as to Service in China; Satisfactory Results of their occasional Employment there.*
2. *Question considered as to the Expediency of permanent Garrisons of Native Troops in Hong Kong, &c., in partial or total Substitution for British Troops.*
3. *Expense of Indian Troops and of British Troops respectively.*
4. *Cost of Transport.*
5. *Sickness and Mortality.*
6. *Barrack Accommodation.*
7. *Means of rendering Service in China more satisfactory to British Troops.*
8. *Use made of the Resources of India for Operations in China.*
9. *Effects created in China by the Diversion of Troops thence to India at the Time of the Mutiny.*
10. *Strength of the Garrison of Hong Kong.*

1. *Feeling of Native Indian Troops as to Service in China; Satisfactory Results of their occasional Employment there:*

Dissatisfaction caused by Madras troops being ordered to China after the war in 1845, *Norman* 59, 60—Extremely good conduct of the Malay troops in China, *Sir W. Elliot* 510-512—Willingness of Madras troops to go on service to China, except that there have been some money difficulties, *ib.* 486-512—Service of witness's regiment and of other northern regiments in China in 1860 without any difficulty having arisen, *Probyn* 854-861, 867, 907-914—Good conduct of native regiments when in garrison in China, *ib.* 915-919—Statement as to the corps commanded by witness, and some other regiments of Bengal infantry having served in the China war without any difficulties having been experienced, *Baker* 1017 *et seq.*—Very good conduct of the native troops in field duty and in garrison duty in China; satisfaction of the natives with the service, *ib.* 1083-1089.

Less difficulty as to native troops going to China than to most other colonies, *Johnson* 1672, 1673, 1696, 1697—Great advantage of the employment of native troops in garrisoning Hong Kong, Shanghai, &c. during the war, *Mackenzie* 2001-2006—Nature of the duties performed by witness's regiment at Hong Kong, *Murdonald* 2256-2259—Very satisfactory results of the employment of Punjaubees, Beloochees, and irregular horse in China during the last war; absence of difficulty as to rations on the score of religion, *Fonblanque* 2728-2749.

Excellent services rendered in China by the Loodianah regiment and the Beloochee troops, *Gordon* 2894-2901—Respect of the Chinese for the Sikhs, whereas they had contempt for the Sepoys, *ib.* 2896-2898, 2943-2947—Absence of any actual dissatisfaction in the Loodianah regiments at Shanghai, because they were kept in China longer than was agreed upon, *ib.* 2902-2912.

2. *Question considered as to the Expediency of permanent Garrisons of Native Troops in Hong Kong, &c., in partial or total Substitution for British Troops:*

Considerable difficulty apprehended as regards the permanent employment of natives of India in garrison duty in Hong Kong; large allowances necessary, *Norman* 212-217—Opinion that a sufficient supply of efficient British officers will be forthcoming for permanent service in China, with native regiments, *Probyn* 920-924—Conclusion as to the unfitness of native troops for garrisoning Hong Kong, and as to the unwillingness of the colonists to contribute to the expense, *Sir Hope Grant* 1177-1192—Objection to Hong Kong being garrisoned by European artillery, aided by native troops exclusively, *ib.* 1301-1307—Approval of a mixed garrison of European and native troops at Hong Kong; necessity of one European regiment there, *ib.* 1347-1356, 1407.

Reasons for objecting to native troops serving in garrison in China; probable prejudice on account of the climate, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1675—Approval of Hong Kong being held permanently by native troops, with the assistance only of one or two batteries of European garrison artillery, *Mackenzie* 2007-2009, 2063-2082—Opinion that Hong Kong might be garrisoned entirely by native troops, *Fonblanque* 2753, 2754—Wretched character of the Hong Kong police, *ib.* 2754-2756.

Report, 1867—continued.

CHINA—continued.

2. *Question considered as to the Expediency of permanent Garrisons, &c.*—continued.

Grounds for objecting to the employment of Chinese troops at Hong Kong in addition to European troops, *Gordon* 2930-2934—Necessity of a reserve of English troops at Hong Kong, *ib.* 2948, 2949—Expediency of some British troops as well as of native India troops at Hong Kong, *Duke of Cambridge* 2969, 2983-2987, 3021-3023, 3039—Disapproval of Hong Kong being held by native troops only; approval of a mixed force there, *Lord Strathnairn* 3405, 3447, 3448.

3. *Expense of Indian Troops and of British Troops respectively:*

Much greater cheapness of native troops in China than of Europeans, *Baker* 1039—Exceptionally high rate of payment of Indian troops serving in China in 1860 and 1861, *Fonblanque* 2721-2726—Larger allowances and expenses in China than in India, *ib.* 2890, 2891.

Statement relative to the annual cost of the employment of Sikh regiments in China, *App.* 214-216.

4. *Cost of Transport:*

Statement of the number of Europeans and native Indian troops, conveyed in hired ships between India and China during five years, and of the cost per soldier of all expenses of transport, *App.* 288.

5. *Sickness and Mortality:*

Statement showing the sickness and mortality among the native troops serving in China during the second war, and the regiments garrisoning Hong Kong and Shanghai respectively, *App.* 267.

6. *Barrack Accommodation:*

Importance attached to the erection of barracks at Kowloon, as a means of improving the health of the troops in China, *Sir Hope Grant* 1272-1274, 1288-1290—Statement relative to the barrack accommodation at Hong Kong, and the great expense of hired buildings, *Macdonald* 2260-2265—Facility of reducing the ill-health of the European troops at Hong Kong; expediency of improved barracks on an elevated site, *Lord Strathnairn* 3405, 3447, 3448.

7. *Means of rendering Service in China more satisfactory to British Troops:*

Less objection of European troops to service in China if there were improved barracks there, and if the pay and allowances were increased concurrently with a reduction in the period of service, *Sir Hope Grant* 1451-1453.

8. *Use made of the Resources of India for Operations in China:*

Comment upon the practice of withdrawing European troops from India for operations elsewhere; as in the case of the China war of 1840, *Balfour* 3567, 3600, 3604—Doubt whether the operations in China could have been carried on without assistance from India, *ib.* 3732.

9. *Effects created in China by the Diversion of the Troops thence to India at the Time of the Mutiny:*

Conclusion as to the bad effect created in China through the diversion of the troops on their way thither at the time of the mutiny; feeling of the Chinese that this was owing to military weakness, *Balfour* 3796.

10. *Strength of the Garrison of Hong Kong:*

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed at Hang Kong; total of 1,391 officers and men, *App.* 283.

See also *Ceylon Rifle Corps. Transport of Troops.*

CHINESE TROOPS (INDIA, &c.):

Impolicy of employing Chinese troops in India, whilst they would not be so cheap as native troops, *Norman* 243-247—Further evidence opposed to the employment of Chinese troops in India, whether in lieu of Europeans or of native troops; belief that it would have an extremely bad effect on the natives, and would weaken the British hold of the country, *ib.* 289-309, 358-362, 370-378—Doubt as to the fighting qualities of Chinese troops, *ib.* 290-294, 371, 372—Very objectionable practice of the Chinese in the formation of secret societies, as in the Straits Settlements, *Norman* 295-297; *Sir W. Elliott* 545.

Opinion that the employment of Chinese troops, or other foreign mercenaries in India, would not have any bad effect upon the native mind, *Sir W. Elliott* 533, 534, 625-628.

Bad



## Report, 1867—continued.

**CHINESE TROOPS, (INDIA, &c.)—continued.**

Bad feeling to be created by bringing Chinese regiments into India, *Keyes* 691-693  
—Bad moral effects apprehended as regards natives of India if Chinese troops or other foreign mercenaries were employed there, *Pears* 791-795. 827-832—The Chinese are very good material for soldiers, *ib.* 793—Disapproval of the employment of foreign mercenaries in India, *Probyn* 925, 926.

Grounds for objecting strongly to the employment of Chinese or other foreign troops in India, *Johnson* 1558, 1559; *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1860-1862; *Cavenagh* 3354-3358—Alienation of good native troops if foreign troops, such as Chinese, were introduced, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1862.

Suggested employment of a Chinese regiment in Ceylon, the Chinese making admirable soldiers when properly officered, *Fonblanque* 2776-2778—Belief that the Chinese would serve for any period abroad if they were well paid, *ib.* 2813.

Great difficulty in making the Chinese efficient soldiers in their own country, though large numbers of men might, if well paid, be induced to serve abroad, where they would make good soldiers if properly officered, *Gordon* 2913 *et seq.*—Inducement to Chinese to serve abroad if allowed to take their wives with them, *ib.* 2939, 2940—Efficiency of Chinese if well led as against other Asiatics, but not against Europeans, *ib.* 2942—Numerous European officers in the Chinese regiment under witness's command; this was essential, *ib.* 2950-2955—Great obstacle to efficiency in a Chinese regiment when under Chinese officers, *ib.* 2955-2960—Objection to the employment of Chinese troops at Singapore, *ib.* 2966, 2967.

Objection by Sir John Lawrence to the Chinese or other races, not Indian, in India, *App.* 212—Decided objection by Sir W. Mansfield to the employment of foreign mercenaries in India, *ib.* 221.

**Civil Employment (British Soldiers).** Exceptional instances of British soldiers being allowed to take temporary service with planters and others; inconvenience of this practice, *Norman* 428-432—Grounds upon which it was decided not to allow soldiers to be employed by the railway companies, *ib.* 434-436.

**Clerk, Sir George Russell, K. C. B., K. C. L. (Analysis of his Evidence.)**—Facilities for raising in South Africa an ample and efficient force of Kaffirs or Fingoes for the garrison of the Cape; suggestions hereon, 1831-1833. 1838-1847. 1884. 1890—Entire unfitness of Sikh troops for garrisoning South Africa in time of peace, whilst the expense would be very considerable, 1833-1837. 1845—Very efficient character of the Cape Mounted Rifles, 1847. 1884. 1961, 1962—Importance of maintaining a European force at the Cape, the climate being excellent, and the troops being readily available for service in India, &c., 1848-1850.

Willingness of Indian native troops to go as far as the Mauritius for three years at a time, 1851, 1852. 1873-1875—Absence of difficulty in feeding Sikh soldiers in the Mauritius, 1854-1856—Approval of the employment of European troops at Aden, the place being exceedingly healthy, 1857-1859—Grounds for objecting strongly to the employment of Chinese or other foreign troops in India, 1860-1862.

Expediency of there being a certain proportion of European troops in India with reference to the native force, the present proportion being however excessive, 1863-1868—Spread of the mutiny or insurrection of 1857, not through any want of European force, but because the British troops were chiefly in the north-west, whilst there were hardly any in Bengal, 1869-1872. 1947-1950—Difficulty in getting the best class of natives to go willingly on general service out of India, though they might go to such a place as the Mauritius, 1873-1875—Advantage of employing Malays rather than Hindoos for service in China, 1876.

Statement that by governing India with justice, and by maintaining good faith towards the chiefs, greater safety will be ensured than by maintaining the present large European force, 1877, 1878. 1882. 1910-1934—Contemplated withdrawal of several British regiments from India in the event of a European war, 1877. 1882. 1932-1934—Advantage in garrisoning certain colonies with local levies, the nucleus of which should be formed in time of peace, instead of in bringing native troops from India for the purpose, 1879-1886. 1959-1962—Approval of Indian troops for the defence of the Mauritius or Egypt in time of war, 1886-1890.

Decided objection to Indian troops for garrisoning Malta or Gibraltar, or any colony in Europe, 1891, 1892—Unfitness of sepoy for service in the West Indies, 1893—Statement as to the discontent among a regiment of Sikhs sent to Burmah seven or eight years ago, 1893-1899. 1996—Illustration of the excitable character of Sikh soldiers, 1899—Doubt as to the success of a proposal for raising Kaffir levies for service out of Africa, 1902-1905—Peculiar propensity of Sikh soldiers for plunder, so that they are willing to join in any war where there is a prospect of booty, 1908, 1909—Very effeminate character of the population of Lower Bengal, 1912-1918.

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Clerk, Sir George Russell, K.C.B., K.C.L.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Unduly large European force maintained in the Punjab; opinion that it would be better to give up the territory altogether, unless it can be safely held with a much smaller force, 1919-1934—Further reference to the outbreak of 1857 as having been to some extent a rebellion as much as a mutiny, 1929, 1935, 1936—Objection to Europeans being recruited expressly for service in India, or to colonisation by European soldiers, or pensioners, 1937-1939—Statement in further approval of the defence of the Cape being entrusted chiefly to local levies, 1940-1942, 1960-1962—Approval also of holding Burmah partly by Burmese levies, 1943-1946.

Respect in which the British Government of India has been less considerate of the prejudices of the natives in recent years, whilst we have not observed such good faith as formerly towards the people, 1951-1954—Further statement as to the nature of the facilities for withdrawing troops from India, &c., in the event of their being required for a war in Europe, 1955-1958—Opinion as to its being a mistaken policy to encourage wailike habits in the Sikhs; number of Sikhs in the native army adverted to hereon, 1963-1970.

Approval of native troops taking their turn of duty at Aden, 1971, 1973—Adequacy of Malays for garrisoning Ceylon, 1974, 1977—Reasons for objecting to native troops serving in garrison in China, 1975—Non-objection to native regiments doing duty at Singapore and the Straits, 1976, 1977—Small European force which witness would propose at the Cape, in addition to a force raised locally, 1979-1995—Improbability of the Kaffirs rising in rebellion if unprovoked by the colonists encroaching upon their lands, 1990-1993—Safety in leaving the Kaffir frontier to the defence of the colonists, under the commando system; economy thereby, 1994, 1995.

*Clifford, Colonel, The Honourable H. H. (Assistant Quartermaster General, Horse Guards).* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Supplies some information relative to the practice in regard to reliefs and movements of troops eastward of the Cape, and between England and the colonies; will furnish to the Committee a detailed return on the subject for the last twenty years, 729 *et seq.*—Very rare instances of regiments being moved from China to India, 729-735—Average of from two to five years at each foreign station, the rule being about ten years foreign service and five years at home, 739-742, 752-757.

*Climate of Colonies (Employment of Native Troops.)* Necessity of taking climatic considerations into account with reference to the employment of native troops out of India, *Sir Hope Grant* 1488-1491.

*Colondas.* Information relative to a class found all over India, called Colondas, to which class the Santals belong, and which has never been yet used as soldiers, *Sir W. Elliot* 546-550.

*Colonial Contributions.* Objection on the part of the colonists to pay towards the cost of native garrisons, *Sir Hope Grant* 1177-1182, 1204-1206, 1376-1420—Difficulty in compelling those colonies which have independent legislatures to contribute, *Taylor* 2506-2510, 2545—Very small contribution by the colonists in China towards the military establishments, *ib.* 2527—Circumstance of there being no contribution by the West Indian colonists to the military establishment, *ib.* 2539, 2540.

Increased difficulties in the withdrawal of British troops and the substitution of native troops, in those colonies where contributions are made as compared with colonies not paying anything, *Taylor* 2555-2563—Power respectively of the Crown and of the local legislatures of colonies in regard to the question of colonial payment towards the local military establishments, *ib.* 2752-2782.

Unwillingness generally of the colonists to contribute towards native troops in substitution for British troops, *Duke of Cambridge*, 3045, 3046, 3053—Objection by those colonies which pay towards the troops to the substitution of Asiatics for Europeans, *Sir H. Storks* 3275, 3276.

Expected objection by the colonists to the substitution of native troops for British troops, *Balfour* 3504, 3636—Limited amount of the colonial military contribution, whilst its effect is probably because unnecessary expense in the employment of British troops in the colonies, *ib.* 3622, 3623—Facility of adjusting the colonial contribution in any case, *ib.* 3624—Further statement as to the colonists naturally objecting to pay the same contribution towards native troops as towards British troops; instance in the case of the Mauritius, *ib.* 3678, 3695, 3696.

See also *Australia. Cape of Good Hope. Ceylon. Demerara. Mauritius, 3.*

*Colonial Corps.* Employment of only two colonial corps in the colonies, that is, in the West Indies and Ceylon; *Taylor* 2410-2412—Opinion that there is no colonial race which could be advantageously recruited for general service regiments, *Sir H. Storks* 3284, 3285—Return showing the number of colonial troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and employed in different colonies or settlements, *App.* 282, 283.

## COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS):

1. *Legal Liability of the Native Troops to Employment out of India.*
2. *Evidence favourable to the Foreign and Colonial Service of Indian Troops under certain Conditions.*
3. *Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons exclusively, though mixed Garrisons are not objected to.*
4. *Feeling of the Natives upon the Subject of Foreign Service and Garrison Duties.*
5. *Question of raising Special Corps for Service out of India.*
6. *Question of calling for Volunteers for Foreign Service, or of holding the entire Native Army liable.*
7. *Great Care necessary in the Application of a New System.*
8. *Expediency of any New Arrangements being put in force in Time of Peace.*
9. *Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service.*
10. *Limit necessary as to the Number of Regiments to be sent out of India.*
11. *Larger Number of India Troops than of British Troops required in any Colony.*
12. *Number of Native Troops employed out of India at the Time of the Mutiny.*
13. *Views of the Governor General of India, the Commander in Chief, and other High Authorities upon the Question of Native Garrisons in the Colonies.*

1. *Legal Liability of the Native Troops to Employment out of India.*

Power, legally, of sending native troops on foreign service, *Norman* 70, 71—Understanding of the men when having enlisted that they will not be sent on foreign service, though they know that they are liable to be sent, *ib.* 194-198—Conclusion as to the very clear definition by General Order in 1856 of the right to employ the Sepoy army on foreign service, it being most unwise to imply that such service is optional, *Balfour* 3814-3816.

Copy of General Enlistment Orders in 1856, in which it is clearly laid down that all natives are to be enlisted for general service, including service beyond the seas, *App.* 339.

2. *Evidence favourable to the Foreign and Colonial Service of Indian Troops under certain Conditions:*

Explanation that witness raises no objection to the employment of native troops on field service, or on occasions of emergency, out of India, the difficulty being in the case of garrison service, *Norman* 22, 68, 69, 283, 336-348—Several colonies to which troops might properly be sent for field service, *ib.* 286-288—Further approval of the employment of several native regiments out of India on field service, whilst their employment regularly on foreign garrison duty would be very objectionable, *ib.* 336-348—Necessity of having recourse largely to the Indian army in the event of war in China or Persia; objection, however, to foreign employment in time of peace, on account of the aversion of the natives to foreign garrison service, *ib.* 379-383—Prejudicial reports likely to be spread by native regiments on their return from foreign garrison duty, *ib.* 389-392.

In time of war there is no reason why some native regiments might not be employed in any part of the world, *Pears* 823—Evidence in approval of the employment of native troops on foreign service in the colonies; certain objections thereto considered, *ib.* 862 *et seq.*—Only as a last resource would witness replace British troops in the colonies by native troops in time of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1377, 1378—Advantage rather than otherwise of the effect to be produced on the natives by seeing the extent of the colonial possessions of this country, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2690-2693.

Approval generally of the employment of Sikhs and other native troops in the colonies, though probably there would be no pecuniary gain thereby, *Mangles* 3115-3127, 3168-3171—Except in cases of emergency, native troops should not be employed westward of the Cape, *Cave* 335, 3337—Increased prestige of Great Britain in India if the natives were to serve in the colonies, *ib.* 3359.

Witness considers that in principle the employment of native Indian troops out of India is very expedient, *Lord Strathnairn* 3381-3386—Tendency of service out of India to render the natives more civilised, and to diminish the liability to native revolutions, *ib.* 3382—Further approval of the policy of employing the native Indian troops on foreign service, provided it does not lead to any reduction of the European force, *ib.* 3420, 3433, 3444-3448—Entire fitness of native troops for service in the colonies in time of war, *ib.* 3421—Usefulness of native troops for garrison duties in case of war as well as for field service, *ib.* 3430.

Witness has an exceedingly favourable opinion of the fitness and efficiency of native troops for foreign service, provided certain conditions are fulfilled; suggestions hereon, *Balfour* 3457-3472—Belief that no difficulties need arise in connection with the employment of native troops on foreign service, *ib.* 3800.

Report, 1867—continued.

## COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.

## 3. Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons exclusively, though mixed Garrisons are not objected to:

Impolicy generally of entrusting colonies to the care of native troops without a nucleus of European troops, *Norman* 473, 474—Anticipated good conduct of native troops in the colonies; expediency, however, of there being also some European troops at the same stations, *Keyes* 655-659—Doubt as to the expediency of placing native troops in any colony without some European troops also, *Pears* 818-820, 838-845—Importance in all cases of locating some European troops with native troops, *Keyes* 1156.

Witness submits several objections to the exclusive employment of Indian troops in colonial garrisons, *Sir Hope Grant* 1165 *et seq.*—Unfitness of Hindostanee troops for colonial service, *ib.* 1171, 1177—Various duties which the troops in the colonies are or may be called upon to perform; considerations as to the expediency of entrusting such duties to native soldiers, *ib.* 1275-1300—Approval of mixed garrisons at Hong Kong and other places, *ib.* 1406-1408.

Objection to native regiments being taken from the roster for foreign service, the Hindostanee troops being unfit for the purpose, *Sir Hope Grant* 1415-1419—There are other objections to native garrisons independently of the military objection; but on the latter score it would be highly imprudent to denude the colonies of British troops, *ib.* 1420-1433—Examination of the circumstances of Aden, Rangoon, and Singapore having until lately been garrisoned by native troops exclusively, *ib.* 1474-1483.

Expediency of some European troops in every colony where it may be decided to employ native troops, *Johnson* 1528, 1583—Inexpediency of mixed garrisons at the Mauritius, Malta, &c., though the system is found to answer at Aden, *ib.* 1659-1671, 1695-1702.

Witness is strongly opposed, upon military grounds, to the proposition for substituting native for European troops in the various colonies, *Duke of Cambridge* 2961 *et seq.*—Great danger in attempting to hold any colony unless there be at least a nucleus of British troops, *ib.* 2964, 2967-2971, 2976, 2977-2980, 2985, 3032-3034—Approval of European troops being supplemented with native troops, as is now the case in some colonies, *ib.* 2965.

Grounds for concluding that an increased employment of native troops in the colonies will surely lead to a corresponding reduction in the aggregate of European troops in the army, *Duke of Cambridge* 3047-3057; *Sir H. Storks* 3296-3308—Disapproval of the proposed employment of Indian troops in lieu of British troops in the colonies, *Sir H. Storks* 3172-3174.

Disapproval of colonies being held by Indian troops without any European troops; the two work exceedingly well together, *Lord Strathnairn* 3393, 3394, 3398—Inexpediency of a total removal of European troops from the tropical colonies, though there might be a partial exchange for native troops, *ib.* 3404, 3444-3448.

## 4. Feeling of the Natives upon the Subject of Foreign Service and Garrison Duties.

Conclusion as to there being considerable objection in the Madras army to foreign service, *Norman* 18 *et seq.*—Facility of getting native troops to leave India on field service, the difficulty only arising in the case of garrison duty, *ib.* 22, 68, 69, 283, 336-348—Prejudicial effect upon recruiting if the men were to go on foreign service for garrison duty, *ib.* 31, 53, 54, 64, 101-109—Great dissatisfaction, more especially in Bengal, if the regiments were ordered abroad in regular rotation, *ib.* 267—Evidence to the effect that native troops would readily take their turn to serve out of India in different colonies if satisfactory arrangements were made to bring provisions; necessity, however, of increasing the native army for this purpose, *Sir W. Elliot* 486-512, 563 *et seq.*

Great discontent among the native army in India if regiments for colonial duty were not taken by the roster, *Sir Hope Grant* 1167-1176—Difficulty in getting native troops to serve regularly in China and other colonies in time of peace, *ib.* 1317-1319, 1333-1335—Unpopularity of the native army in India if it were to take the roster for foreign garrison service, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1517, 1519, 1520.

Belief that except for service in the field the native army in India would very reluctantly leave the country for foreign service, even with the inducement of increased pay, *Johnson* 1536-1550, 1623-1625, 1636-1638—Disturbing effect upon the native army if called upon for foreign service, *ib.* 1578-1580.

Belief that with adequate pay and judicious arrangements, native troops would willingly leave India on colonial service in the Mauritius, &c., *Caird* 1774-1782—Difficulty in getting the best class of natives to go willingly on general service out of India, though they might go to such a place as the Mauritius, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1873-1875—Greater facility in obtaining the services of native troops out of India in time of war than during peace, *Duke of Cambridge* 3014, 3018, 3019.

## 5. Question

Report, 1867—continued.

## COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.

## 5. Question of raising Special Corps for Service out of India :

Disapproval of special corps being raised, on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service; advantage rather of the power of sending any regiment required abroad in time of emergency, *Norman* 384-386—Approval of raising regiments expressly with a view to their serving abroad, *Sir W. Elliot* 573-581—Difficulties to be encountered respectively in raising a special regiment for foreign service, and in sending abroad a regiment of the existing army, *Pears* 807-817—Practicability of raising some special corps in India for garrison duty in the colonies, there being, however, serious objections to this plan, *Johnson* 1538, 1550-1556, 1632-1635, 1658—Strong disapproval of raising special corps for service out of India, *Balfour* 3817.

## 6. Question of calling for Volunteers for Foreign Service, or of holding the entire Native Army liable :

Importance of the power of sending any regiments of the native army abroad, *Norman* 386—Absence of necessity of calling for volunteers for field service out of India, *ib.* 387, 388—Facility of forming a regiment for foreign service by means of volunteers from different regiments, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2713-2715.

Strong objection to the native regiments being called upon to volunteer for foreign service, they having already taken the oath to serve anywhere, so that there should be no option in the matter, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389, 3406, 3410-3422—Expediency on the score of discipline of the Hindoo regiments and Sikh regiments being alike considered available for foreign service, *ib.* 3410, 3411—Decided disapproval of allowing men or regiments to volunteer for foreign service, *Balfour* 3814-3816.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that all native troops serving in the colonies should be volunteers for the special service, *App.* 211.

## 7. Great Care necessary in the Application of a New System :

Expediency of careful consultation of experienced officers before making any arrangements for employing ten or twelve native regiments on foreign service, *Norman* 266—Inexpediency of the worst colonies or stations being selected for native troops, *Probyn* 894, 938—Suggestion that service out of India be first tried on a small scale, and that the arrangements be left to the Government of India, *ib.* 1521, 2689, 2694—Great care necessary before carrying out any arrangements for the colonial service of native troops, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1517, 1521—Expediency of the employment of Indian troops in the colonies being left to the management of the Indian Government instead of the colonial governments, *ib.* 2682-2688, 2708-2712.

## 8. Expediency of any New Arrangements being put in force in Time of Peace :

Opinion that it would be better to employ the troops out of India in time of peace, rather than first to introduce the practice in time of war, *Sir W. Elliot* 527, 528—More ready and efficient service of native troops in time of war if employed on foreign service in time of peace, *Mackenzie* 2025, 2026, 2039—Expediency of settling in time of peace the details of any scheme for the employment of Indian troops in the colonies, *Sir H. Storks* 3247-3249, 3273—Concurrence in the view that the employment of native troops out of India should be commenced in time of peace, rather than postponed till war occurs, *Lord Strathnairn* 3422, 3423; *Balfour* 3697, 3811, 3812.

## 9. Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service :

Particulars as to the pay and allowances of the native troops when in India, and when on foreign service, *Norman* 88-100, 115—Large increase of pay necessary, in order to induce the natives to go freely in foreign service, *ib.* 149, 150, 181, 182, 201-217.

Character and amount of the allowances to Indian troops over and above their ordinary pay, when on service in China; in addition to full batta and free rations, pensions are given to the families of those who die or are killed, *Pears* 760-766, 805—Consideration as to the amount and character of the inducement necessary in order to obtain the willing services of native troops out of India, *ib.* 798-807—There need not be any difficulty in regard to the pay of a mixed force, *Probyn* 944, 945—Suggestion as to the increased pay and the privileges necessary in order to induce native troops to go willingly to foreign service, *Baker* 1029-1037, 1050-1058.

Necessity of considering the question of food in every colony in connection with the rate of pay of native troops sent to such colony, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1493-1506—Conclusion that with adequate pay and proper arrangement natives would willingly serve in the colonies, *Caird* 1774-1782, 1791-1797, 1803-1807—Opinion that for three rupees extra per month, native troops would willingly serve in the colonies, *ib.* 1781—Suggestion as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2695-2699, 2704-2707.

Report, 1867—continued.

**COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.**

**9. Consideration as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops, &c.—continued.**

Statement as to the inequality between the pay of officers with European regiments and of officers with native regiments from India when serving in the same colony; great expense involved in assimilating the pay of the former to that of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 2992-3013, 3016—Advantage of some scheme by which European and native troops should serve together without its being necessary to raise the pay and allowances of the former, *ib.* 3008-3010.

Slight weight attached to the objection as regards difference of pay of officers in the case of natives and British troops serving together, *Lord Strathnairn* 3435—Importance of abstaining from any interference with the pay and allowances to which native troops consider themselves entitled when on foreign service, *Balfour* 3469, 3470.

**10. Limit necessary as to the Number of Regiments to be sent out of India:**

Very few regiments which could be spared for foreign service, *Norman* 268, 269—Serious embarrassment of the Indian Government if required to send a dozen native regiments to the colonies; necessity at once of raising other regiments in lieu of them, *ib.* 284, 285—Expediency of a proper limit upon the number of regiments sent on foreign service, *Balfour* 3471, 3472.

**11. Larger Number of Indian Troops than of British Troops required in any Colony.**

Necessity of an increased number of native troops as an equivalent for a similar number of European troops withdrawn from any colony, *Pears* 794-797—Conclusion that two native regiments would be necessary for each British regiment withdrawn from any colony, *Sir Hope Grant* 1438-1445—Necessity of a larger force of native Indian troops than of British troops for the garrison of any colony, *Johnson* 1523-1527, 1587, 1588.

**12. Number of Native Troops employed out of India at the Time of the Mutiny:**

Large employment of native troops out of India at the time of the mutiny, *Balfour* 3800-3802.

Return of native troops of the Madras and Bombay armies on foreign service, in Burmah, China, Persia, &c., on the 1st April 1857; total of 23,631, *App.* 335, 336.

**13. Views of the Governor General of India, the Commander in Chief, and other High Authorities upon the Question of Native Garrisons in the Colonies:**

Official communications setting forth in detail the grounds of objection by Sir John Lawrence, Sir William Mansfield, and several other high authorities, to Indian troops being placed in any colony without European troops; several opinions on the other hand favourable to mixed garrisons under certain conditions, *App.* 211 *et seq.*

See also *Aden. Arracan. Artillery. Bengal Native Army. Bombay Native Army. Burmah. Cape of Good Hope. Caste. Ceylon. China. Colonial Contributions. Coolie Emigration. Cost. Discipline. Duties of Troops. East Indians. Egypt. Families (Native Troops). Hardinge, Lord (the late). Health of Troops. Japan. Java. Madras Native Army. Mahomedans. Malta and Gibraltar. Mauritius. Pay and Allowances. Punjaub and Punjaub Regiments. Sikhs. Straits Settlements. Transport of Troops. Wur. Wellington, Duke of (the late). West Indies, &c.*

*Colonial Service (British Troops.) See British Army (Colonies.)*

**Coolie Emigration.** Voluntary character of the coolie emigration, *Norman* 35-39—Important distinction between a coolie and a soldier as regards employment out of India, *ib.* 283—Willingness evinced by the coolies to go to the West Indies, the Mauritius, &c., *Sir W. Elliot* 602-608.

Absence of any real parallel between the emigration of coolies and the foreign service of native troops, *Johnson* 1774-1746—Great aversion of native troops to separation from their families whilst the coolies can take their families with them, *ib.* 1746, 1747.

Information relative to the extent of the coolie emigration, the wages in the Mauritius and the West Indies, and the degree of willingness on the part of the natives to leave India for employment beyond the sea, *Caird* 1752 *et seq.*—Small percentage of married men among the emigrants; difficulty of getting their wives to accompany them, *ib.* 1754-1757—Preference given to low caste men as coolies, high-caste men often concealing their caste in order to be allowed to go, *ib.* 1758-1763, 1784-1788.

Limited objection shown by the coolies in late years to crossing the sea; adequate arrangements as to the supply of water, &c. on board, *Caird* 1764-1766, 1772, 1773, 1784-1790—Frequent instances of sepoys from the mutinous regiments having gone to the Mauritius as coolies, *ib.* 1767-1771—Statement of the rate of pay which induced the natives to emigrate to the Mauritius and the West Indies, *ib.* 1776-1780, 1791-1797, 1803-1807.

*COST*

Report, 1867—continued.

**COST (BRITISH AND NATIVE TROOPS):**

1. *As to the relative Cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies.*
2. *As to the Cost of European and Native Troops in India.*

1. *As to the relative Cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies.*

Doubt as to its being cheaper to have Indian troops on foreign stations to be relieved every three years than European troops relieved every five years, *Norman* 151, 152, 156—Respect in which a native soldier on service out of India would be much cheaper than a European soldier, *Probyn* 873-878, 939, 940—Larger number of native troops than of Europeans required for garrison purposes; increased cost on this score, *Sir Hope Grant* 1340, 1341, 1371-1376—Greatly increased cost of native troops when employed out of India, *ib.* 1357-1359—Necessity of relieving Indian troops after two or three years' service; expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, *ib.* 1360, 1361, 1367-1370.

Doubt whether there would be much economy in substituting native for British troops in the colonies, *Johnson* 1583-1586, 1710—Serious expense involved in the frequent relief of native troops, *ib.* 1584, 1585, 1710, 1735, 1736.

Conclusion as to the less expense of Indian than of British troops in the colonies notwithstanding the more frequent relief of the former, *Mackenzie* 2040-2048—Witness explains sundry items contained in a certain paper showing the estimated annual cost of maintaining a battalion of infantry at different stations east of the Cape, *Shadwell* 2618 *et seq.*—Conclusion that there would be a saving of expense by substituting a native for a British regiment out of India, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389—Great diminution in the saving of expense if frequent furloughs were necessary, *ib.* 3408.

Calculation that taking everything into consideration the cost of one European will be equal to half of two natives on foreign service, *Balfour* 3473, 3474.

Estimate of the annual cost that would devolve upon the British Government by the employment in China of two Sikh regiments, *App.* 263-266.

Approximate estimate of the annual cost of maintaining a battalion of infantry, consisting of 788 men of all ranks, at certain stations east of the Cape, and at the Cape, *App.* 290, 291.

2. *As to the Cost of European and Native Troops in India.*

Impression that the cost of a European regiment in India is about double that of a native regiment, *Norman* 116-118—Reference to a memorandum showing the actual cost of a native corps and a European corps in India, *ib.* 278-282—Reference to a certain official statement as containing a very accurate account of the cost of European and native troops in India, *Balfour* 3770, 3771.

Documents showing the cost and organization of Indian native regiments, the comparative cost of European and native regiments, the amount and mode of payment of non-effective charges, and the rates of Indian allowances, *App.* 305-315—Statement showing the total annual cost of the several branches of the European armies of the three Presidencies, *ib.* 309, 310—Statement showing the total annual cost of the several branches of the native armies of the three Presidencies, *ib.* 311—Detail of the establishment and pay of one European regiment of ten companies, *ib.* 314—Detail of the establishment and pay of one native infantry regiment of eight companies, *ib.* 315.

Statement showing the estimated cost of services and supplies for maintaining a force in non-commissioned officers and rank and file of 203 Royal Artillery, 800 European infantry, 816 native infantry, and 89 gun lascars, *App.* 316, 317—Statement showing the total estimated cost and the capitation rates due under each head of service, for the maintenance of a military force of 1,908 non-commissioned officers of rank and file in the artillery, European infantry, native infantry, and gun lascars, *ib.* 317.

Comparative cost for regimental pay and allowances, of a certain military force in each of the three Presidencies and in Ceylon, *App.* 318—Comparative statement of the cost of military administrative establishments in the three presidencies and in Ceylon, *ib.*

Paper handed in by General Balfour showing the fixed strength and the pay and cost of infantry of the line for service in India, *App.* 334.

*See also Cavalry. Hospital Expenses. Pay and Allowances. Transport of Troops.*

**Crimean War.** Reference to the large withdrawal of European troops from India during the Crimean war, in spite of the strong remonstrances of Lord Dalhousie; minute of Lord Dalhousie on this subject, *Balfour* 3600, and *App.* 325-327.

## D.

*Dalhousie, Lord.* Importance attached to a certain minute by Lord Dalhousie in 1854, in which he arrives at the conclusion that thirty-five regiments of European infantry were quite sufficient for the garrison of India; adoption by witness of this minute in all its integrity, *Balfour* 3552-3558, 3641—Proposition by Lord Dalhousie in 1854 that additional Europeans should be raised, by disbanding twonative regiments for every additional European regiment, *ib.* 3736—Refusal of the foregoing proposal by the Home Government, *ib.*

Minute by Lord Dalhousie, as Governor General of India, dated the 13th September 1854, submitting reasons for objecting to the withdrawal of two European regiments from India, *App.* 325-327.

Minute by Lord Dalhousie in February 1856, with reference to the future force of European troops in Bengal and throughout India, and the alterations desirable with a view to increased efficiency, *App.* 327-333.

*Demerara.* Instance in the case of Demerara of the strong objection of colonists to the substitution of native for European troops; the objection in this case was against a West Indian regiment, *Johnson* 1530-1534, 1615-1623.

*Depôts and Reserves.* Statement relative to the very inadequate force at home, and the inefficiency of the depôts with reference to the force in India and the colonies, *Balfour* 3520-3541, 3598-3600—Reference to the views of the Duke of Cambridge as to the great difficulty experienced in regard to relief for the regiments in India, *ib.* 3541, 3599—Expediency of a concentration of reserves and regiments at home by withdrawals from the colonies, *ib.* 3618-3625—Approval of India being called upon to pay for any reserve force necessary in England, in order to keep up the force in India to such an amount as may be deemed necessary by Indian authority, *ib.* 3754-3760—Statement as to the insufficiency of the reserves and depôts in England for maintaining the force in India; instances of very unfit recruits having been set out, *ib.* 3754-3757.

*Discipline (Native Army.)* Important advantage if by service out of India the prejudices of the native soldiers in regard to caste could be mitigated or removed, so as to prevent interference with discipline, *Lord Strathnairn* 3381-3386—Statement as to the injurious effect upon the discipline by a system of volunteering for foreign service, *ib.* 3389, 3406, 3410, 3422.

Belief that the employment of native Indian troops on foreign service may be made in the highest degree beneficial to the discipline of the native army, *Balfour* 3797, 3798—Especial importance of strict discipline for native troops, *ib.*

**DISTRIBUTION (BRITISH ARMY):**

1. *In India.*
2. *Generally.*

1. *In India:*

Statement explanatory of the extent to which the British troops in India are located at hill stations; contemplated distribution in this manner of twelve per cent. of the troops, *Norman* 239-241, 248-252—Distribution of the British troops with a view to massing them to some extent, and at the same time so as to hold all the more important points, *ib.* 242—Difficulty in withdrawing the troops from all stations reported to be unhealthy, *ib.*

Opinion that the bulk of the British army should be kept at frontier posts, such as Peshawur, and that the rest should be located in the large cities, such as Patna, *Mungles* 3080, 3081, 3198, 3007-3109—With regard to the number of British troops not stationed at different posts and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, *ib.* 3151-3156.

2. *Generally:*

Objection to the practice of having a small European force in numerous colonies, it being preferable to mass the army as much as possible, *Mackenzie* 2027-2036, 2050-2052.

Approval of the present system of scattering the army in small detachments throughout the colonies rather than of massing the troops in positions nearer home, *Duke of Cambridge* 2972-2975.

Statement relative to the very inadequate force at home, and the inefficiency of the depôts with reference to the force in India and the colonies, *Balfour* 3520-3541, 3598-3600—Much more satisfactory distribution of the army in 1854 than in 1866 on account of the much larger relative force than retained at home, *ib.* 3520, 3521, 3625—Statement in favour of largely increasing the forces and reserves at home by withdrawals from abroad, *ib.* 3618-3625—The means of reinforcing the distant parts of the



**DISTRIBUTION (BRITISH ARMY)**—continued.2. *Generally*—continued.

the empire can be supplied much better from a central position than by keeping regiments located in the colonies, *Balfour* 3619.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops in the several colonies and dependencies borne on the strength of the army, *App.* 282, 283.

Statement showing the distribution of the British army on 1st January in each year since 1846, *App.* 337, 338.

*Douglas, Lieutenant General, R. P.* Letter received from General Douglas, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, dated July 1867, together with answers in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if it be decided upon, *App.* 242, 243.

*Durand, Sir Henry.* Communication from Sir Henry Durand, dated Simla, 29th May 1867, as to the inexpediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 221-223.

*Duties of Troops.* Importance of native troops on foreign service not being overburdened with duties, *Balfour* 3463, 3464, 3503—Statement in favour of many of the duties now performed by soldiers in India being placed under the police; important economy thereby, whilst there would be much advantage on the score of discipline, *ib.* 3465-3468—Unduly heavy duties now imposed upon the native soldiers, *ib.* 3467—Expediency of a positive regulation respecting the duties of native troops out of India, *ib.* 3503.

Facility with which a case might be made out for the full employment of a large increase of troops, both in India and the colonies; that is, by an increase of civil and police duties, *Balfour* 3517-3520—Further representation as to the importance of clearly providing that the duties of native troops in the colonies shall not embrace police duties of various kinds, *ib.* 3626-3628—Loose discipline sure to follow from scattering the native troops in small guards and escort duties away from their officers; strong opinion of Lord Clyde on this subject, *ib.* 3648, 3655-3661.

Views expressed by Colonel Balfour in 1861 upon the subject of imposing guard duties upon native troops on foreign service, *App.* 322.

See also *Police (India.)*

## E.

*East Indians (Half-Castes).* Suggestion that the East Indians, or half-castes, might with advantage be enrolled for service out of India, *Sir W. Elliot* 529-532.

*Edwards, Colonel, Sir Herbert, K.C.B.* Answers received from Sir Herbert Edwards, dated 14th May 1867, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 229-232.

*Egypt.* Contemplated employment of Indian native troops on active service in such places as Egypt, *Duke of Cambridge* 3006, 3007, 3015—Approval of the employment of Asiatic troops in Egypt, *Sir H. Storks* 3274—Entire fitness of Indian native troops for operations in Egypt, *Balfour* 3813.

*Elliot, Sir Walter, K.S.I.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was in the Madras Civil Service from 1822 to 1859; 478-480—Alacrity with which Madras regiments have gone on service to Burmah, 481-484—Composition of the Madras army adverted to as comprising chiefly low-caste men, there being however men of all castes, 485, 497-500, 523, 594-600—Instances of Madras sepoys having objected to go on service beyond the sea, through some difficulty about their pay or pensions; absence of difficulty on religious grounds, 486-512, 519, 520.

Recruiting of the Madras regiments chiefly from particular localities, the families living with the regiments and forming a sort of military colony, 500-503, 513, 514—Practice when the men have been serving out of India, for the family pensions to be paid directly to the families left behind, 504-506—Extremely good conduct of the Madras troops in China, 510-512—Explanation in connection with the refusal of the 8th Regiment of Madras cavalry to embark for Burmah in 1858; 515-518.

Belief that no evil would result from the employment of Madras troops in the colonies in time of peace, as well as during war, 521-528—Circumstance of caste not being recognised in the Madras army, 523—Suggestion that the East Indians or half-castes might with advantage be enrolled for service out of India, 529-532—Opinion that the employment of Chinese troops or other foreign mercenaries in India would not have any bad effect upon the native mind, 533, 534, 625-628.

478—I.

c 4

Instance

Report, 1867—continued.

*Elliot, Sir Walter, K.S.I. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

Instance of several warlike tribes in Madras from whom valuable troops or regiments might be organised, 535-537—Considerable number of blacks from Abyssinia, &c. on the Western Coast of India, who would form excellent troops, 538-545—Information relative to a class found all over India, called Colondas, to which class the Santals belong, and which has never yet been used as soldiers, 546-550—Opinion that with proper arrangement discharged European soldiers might with advantage be induced to settle in the Neilgherries and other hill districts, 551-562.

Further expression of the opinion that native troops would readily take their turn to serve out of India in different colonies if satisfactory arrangements were made as to pay and pensions; necessity, however, of increasing the native army for this purpose, 563 *et seq.*—Advantage in the native regiments being composed of as many different elements as possible, 572, 578, 579, 629-631—Approval of raising regiments expressly with a view to their serving abroad, 573-581—Fitness of native troops for garrison duties in Malta; less cost than by employing British troops, 574, 584, 585, 588, 589.

Expediency of limiting to three years the period of foreign service of Madras regiments, 575, 581-583, 591—Tact required on the part of the commanding officers in colonies where Indian troops might be employed; doubt as to any serious difficulty arising on this score, 601, 609-618—Willingness evinced by the coolies to go to the West Indies, the Mauritius, &c., 602-608—Temporary difficulty upon the occasion of sending Madras troops to Arracan in 1824 and 1825; 619—Except to China and the Straits Madras troops have not gone on garrison duty out of India, 620.

Cause of the mutiny in 1815 in connection with the sending of native troops to Java, 621, 622—Aversion of high-caste natives to cook on board ship, so that it is most difficult to employ these beyond the sea, 623, 624—Very little disaffection in the Madras army during the mutiny of 1857, though there have been several former mutinies from various causes, 629-632—Objection to enlisting Mahrattas for the Madras army, unless in connection with other castes in the same regiment, 633-635.

*Enlistment (Native Troops). See Colonial and Foreign Service, 1. Recruiting.*

*European Troops. See British Army (Colonies). British Army (India). Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops). Local European (Army India).*

## F.

*Families (Native Troops).* Considerations as to the obstacle to foreign service on account of the separation of the men from their families, whilst it would be impracticable for the latter to accompany the regiments, *Norman* 27-31, 136-150, 157 *et seq.*—Regularity with which the men transmit a portion of their pay to their families, *ib.* 124-127—Doubt as to the absence of men from their families for a period of three years leading to any gross immoralities, *ib.* 173-190, 218, 221.

Recruiting of the Madras regiments chiefly for particular localities, the families living with the regiments and forming a sort of military colony, *Sir W. Elliot* 500-503, 512, 514—Custom where the men have been serving out of India for the family pensions to be paid directly to the families left behind, *ib.* 504-506—Practice of the native troops in Burmah and Singapore to live on very scant fare, in order to save as much as possible for their families at home, *Sir Hope Grant* 1233, 1319-1323.

Great aversion of native troops to separate from their families, *Johnson* 1746—Willingness of the native troops to remain at Singapore if they had not been separated from their wives and families, *Cavenagh* 3331-3333.

*See also Coolie Emigration.*

*Fidelity (Native Garrisons).* Opinion as to the trustworthy character of Indian troops in garrison at Hong Kong, Singapore, &c. in the event of local riot, *Keyes* 1156-1161.

*Field, Lieutenant Colonel J.* Answers received from Colonel Field, commanding the 10th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 251.

*Fonblanque, Edward B. de, Deputy Commissary General. (Analysis of his Evidence).—*Has had experience of the employment of native Indian troops in the West Indies, China, and Ceylon, 2716-2719—Exceptionally high rate of payment of Indian troops serving in China in 1860 and 1861; 2721-2726—Very satisfactory results of the employment of Punjaubees, Belloochees, and irregular horse in China during the last war; absence of difficulty as to rations or on the score of religion, 2728-2749—Excellence of Punjaubees and Bellooches for garrison and sentry duties; their advantage over British troops as sentries, 2729, 2730, 2750-2752, 2792, 2793, 2881-2883.

Objection to Ceylon being garrisoned by native troops exclusively; feeling, however, of the planters that neither British nor native troops are required, 2752, 2794-2812.

2823-

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Fonblanque, Edward B. de.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

2823-2825—Opinion that Hong Kong might be garrisoned entirely by native troops, 2753, 2754—Wretched character of the Hong Kong police, 2754-2756—Much greater cost of native troops in Ceylon than in the Presidencies; particulars hereon, 2757—Amount of pay and allowances of British troops in Ceylon, 2757. 2770-2774.

Material changes effected in the constitution of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the result being that the corps is much more expensive and much less efficient than it used to be, 2758-2763—Improvement if the Ceylon regiment were again recruited chiefly from the Malayan Archipelago; difficulty hereon, 2763-2769—Approval of a Malay garrison at Singapore, 2775, 2776—Suggested employment of a Chinese regiment in Ceylon, the Chinese making admirable soldiers when properly officered, 2776-2778.

Statement showing the great misunderstanding which prevailed, and the sore feeling created, in regard to the experiment of sending 1,000 Sikhs to Ceylon, 2779-2791—Belief that the Chinese would serve for any period abroad if they were well paid, 2813—Contemplated enlistment for a period of ten years in the case of Indian troops employed in the colonies, 2814—Large proportion of European officers in the Ceylon Rifles as compared with the Punjaub regiments, 2815-2818.

Evidence as to the constitution of the West India regiments, and as to their efficiency, whilst they are much more economical than European troops, 2825-2843. 2852-2863—Opinion that African troops might be employed with advantage at Mauritius, 2831—Also at Bermuda, *ib.*—Statement as to the West India regiments being now recruited in the West Indies instead of on the west coast of Africa; difficulty in recruiting from Africa, 2832-2836. 2874, 2875—Willingness of African troops to settle in any colony if they are allowed to have their wives with them, 2838-2848.

Equal docility of Malays and Africans as of European troops, 2844. 2849-2852—Indisposition of Malays to settle in any colony, 2847, 2848—Advantage of African troops in being able to stand cold as well as heat, 2853-2862—Considerable sickness and mortality among the officers of the West Indian regiments, caused very much by indulgence in drink, 2864-2868.

Opinion in favour of barracks at Nuwara Eliya, as the best place in Ceylon for white troops, 2869-2873—Comment upon the representations of medical officers and others in favour of the Ceylon Rifles having as much space and accommodation per man in barracks as European troops, 2877-2880. 2884, 2885—Nothing can be worse than the present European barracks in Ceylon, 2886—Larger allowances and expenses in China than in India, 2890, 2891.

*Foreign Mercenaries (India).* See *Chinese Troops (India).*

*Foreign Service (British Troops).* Average of from two to five years at each foreign station, the rule being about ten years foreign service and five years at home, *Hon. H. K. Clifford* 752-757—Rule as to the regiments serving ten years in India and the colonies, and five years at home, *Sir Hope Grant* 1252, 1253—Statement showing that in numerous instances it has been found necessary to depart from the regulation of ten years' service abroad and five years at home, *ib.* 1254-1267—Further explanation relative to the system whereby it is intended that the army shall have ten years foreign service and five years home service, *ib.* 1382-1398. 1454.

Desire of the authorities to shorten the term of colonial service, so that the British army may have not more than two-thirds of colonial service for one-third of home service; prospect of this being arrived at, *Duke of Cambridge* 3049, 3050. 3058-3060—Maximum reduction already effected in the British army, so that the troops do not now get five years' service at home for ten years abroad, *Lord Strathnairn* 3433, 3434.

Return of the movement of regiments during the last twenty years to and from India, the Cape, and all colonies east of the Cape, and of the time passed by each regiment included in the above return, at each station during that period, *App.* 268-278—Return of the movement of regiments during the last twenty years to and from the West Indies and the Bermudas, and of the time passed by each regiment at each station, *ib.* 279-281.

*Foreign Service (Native Troops).* See *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).*

*Forts and Arsenals (India).* Several arsenals and forts which it is extremely desirable to hold with British troops; number of forts, &c. now garrisoned by Europeans, *Norman* 227-238—Considerable number of fortifications in India, many of which require European garrisons as guards, *ib.* 283, 284.

*Furloughs (Native Army).* Practice as to furloughs in the Bengal and Madras armies respectively; deduction made from the pay when on furlough, *Norman* 128-133. 138—Long and frequent furloughs in the Bengal regiments, *ib.* 128. 131-133.

Report, 1867—continued.

G.

*Garrisons of Colonies (Native Troops).* See *Artillery.* *Cape of Good Hope.* *Ceylon.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Cost.* *Duties of Troops.* *Egypt.* *Malta and Gibraltar.* *Mauritius.* *Mutiny.* *Straits Settlements.* *Transport of Troops.* *War.* *West Indies, &c.*

*Gell, Colonel Sherbrooke.* Answers received from Colonel Gell, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bombay army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 245-248.

*Gibraltar.* See *Malta and Gibraltar.*

*Goorka Regiments.* The men of the Goorka regiments mostly come from Nepal, but not many of them are real Goorkas, *Norman* 12-15—Peculiar difficulty in getting the Goorka regiments to serve out of India *Norman* 265; *Johnson* 1557.

*Gordon, Colonel Charles.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Went to China in 1860, and served there for four and a-half years, 2892, 2893—Excellent services rendered in China by the Loodiana regiment and the Beloochee troops, 2894-2901—Respect of the Chinese for the Sikhs, whereas they had a contempt for the Sepoys, 2896-2898. 2943-2947—Absence of any actual dissatisfaction in the Loodiana regiment at Shanghai, because they were kept in China longer than was agreed upon, 2902-2912.

Great difficulty in making the Chinese efficient soldiers in their own country, though large numbers of men might, if well paid, be induced to serve abroad where they would make good soldiers if properly officered, 2913 *et seq.*—Grounds for objecting to the employment of Chinese troops at Hong Kong, in addition to European troops, 2930-2934—Objection also, to the employment of Chinese troops at Singapore, 2936, 2937—Inducement to Chinese to serve abroad if allowed to take their wives with them, 2939, 2940.

Efficiency of Chinese troops, if well led, as against other Asiatics, but not against Europeans, 2942—Necessity of a reserve of English troops at Hong Kong, 2948, 2949—Numerous European officers in the Chinese regiments under witness's command; this was essential, 2950-2955—Great obstacle to efficiency in a Chinese regiment when under Chinese officers, 2955-2960.

*Government of India.* Argument that by governing India with justice and by observing good faith towards the chiefs greater safety will be ensured, than by maintaining the present large European Army, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1877, 1878. 1882. 1910-1934—Respects in which the British Government of India has been less considerate of the prejudices of the natives in recent years, whilst we have not observed such good faith as formerly towards the people, *ib.* 1951-1954.

*Grant, Lieut. General Sir Hope, G. C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is Quartermaster-General, 1164—Submits several objections to the proposed employment of Indian troops in colonial garrisons, 1165 *et seq.*—Great discontent among the native army in India, if regiments for colonial duty were not taken by the roster, 1167-1170. 1416, 1417—Unfitness of Hindostanee troops generally for service in the Colonies, 1171. 1177. 1418, 1419—Probable fitness of the Sikhs, Goorkas, and others for colonial garrison service, the difficulty being to get them to leave India for the purpose, 1172-1176.

Conclusion as to the unfitness of native troops for garrisoning Hong Kong, and as to the unwillingness of the colonists to contribute towards their expense, 1177-1192—Sufficiency hitherto of Madrasses for garrisoning Singapore, it being a peculiarly quiet place, 1183-1190—Approval of withdrawing British troops from Singapore in the event of a war in Europe; they might be brought home in about a month, 1193-1200—Objection to the Mauritius being garrisoned by native troops exclusively; adverse feeling of the colonists in the matter, 1201-1206. 1376.

Grounds for concluding that it is inexpedient to garrison Ceylon with native troops exclusively, 1207-1212—Importance of the Colonies having European troops to defend them in the event of war, 1209-1213—Much greater cost of transport of British troops than of natives from Madras to Singapore and Burmah, the native troops being much more crowded together on board; explanation hereon, 1214-1224. 1467, 1468—Relative fighting powers of the Sikhs, the Madrasses, and the Chinese, 1227-1232.

Difficulties experienced in connection with the employment of Madras troops at Rangoon; large increase made in their pay, 1233—Practice of the native troops in Burmah and Singapore to live on very scant fare, in order to save as much money as possible for their families at home, 1233. 1319-1323—Greater difficulty in arranging for the service of native troops in the Mauritius, or more distant places than in the Straits Settlements, 1234, 1235—Considerable expense on the score of pensions to the widows of native soldiers dying on foreign service, 1236.

Reference

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Grant, Lieut. General Sir Hope, G. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

Reference to a certain return from witness's department as showing the present number of regiments in Australia, China, Ceylon, &c., and the alterations being carried out, 1239-1251—Rule as to regiments serving ten years in India and the Colonies, and five years at home, 1252, 1253—Statement showing that, in numerous instances, it has been found necessary to depart from the regulation as to ten years' service abroad and five years at home, 1254-1267—Strong objection to any reduction of the English army in India, 1261—Popularity of service in India to British soldiers, 1268-1271.

Importance attached to the erection of barracks at Kowloon, as a means of improving the health of the troops in China, 1272-1274. 1288-1290—Various duties which the troops in the Colonies are or may be called upon to perform; conclusion as to the inexpediency of intrusting such duties to native soldiers, 1275-1300—Imperial importance of garrisoning the Colonies with British troops, though in the event of a war in Europe it might be found necessary to bring the troops home, and to supply their place abroad with native troops, 1291-1300. 1308-1316. 1336-1346. 1429 in the

Objection to Hong Kong being garrisoned by European artillery and to European exclusively, 1301-1307—Difficulty in getting native troops to see, 1530-1534. 1615- and other Colonies in time of peace, 1317-1319. 1333-1335—In- to Sikh troops, 1327-1330—Larger number of native troops in India would very reluctant for garrison purposes; increased cost on this score, 1340, inducement of increased pay, of a mixed garrison of European and native troops at, icability of raising some special European regiment there, 1347-1356. 1407. being, however, serious objections

Greatly enhanced cost of native troops when emp'teys being taken towards raising a Necessity of relieving Indian troops in two or three, 2-1554—Difficulty in obtaining a as compared with the relief of British troops every strong disapproval of the employment

Explanation as to the per-centage of wives now regiments, 1362-1366—Only as last resourc in the Colonies by native troops in time of war, 1377, 1378— the native army in India garrisoning Ceylon with native troops exclusively, 1379-1381. Dumb would be much

Further explanation relative to the system whereby it is intended that the army shall have ten years' foreign service and five years' home service, 1382-1398. 1454— Advantage of having a whole European regiment at the sanatorium in Ceylon, rather than at Galle, 1402—Expediency of a European regiment at Japan in addition to one at Hong Kong, 1403-1406—Approval of mixed garrisons at other places besides Hong Kong, 1407, 1408—Obstacles to the formation of European settlements in India as the nucleus of a local European force, 1409-1414.

Witness further objects to native regiments being taken from the roster for foreign service, the Hindostanee troops being unfit for the purpose, 1415-1419—There are other objections to native garrisons, independently of the military objection, but on the latter score it would be highly inexpedient to denude the Colonies of British troops, 1420-1430—Danger in leaving European Artillery supported only by native troops, 1431-1436—Conclusion that for each British regiment withdrawn from any Colony two native regiments would be necessary, and that about ten or twelve British regiments might be withdrawn if the principle of mixed garrisons is adopted, 1438-1445.

Decided objection to any native troops at Gibraltar or Malta, under any circumstances in time of war, 1446, 1447—Less objection to service in China if there were improved barracks there, and if the pay and allowances were increased concurrently with a reduction in the period of service, 1451-1453—Importance of a small European force in Australia as a nucleus for a local force, 1455-1459—Expediency of a European force at Singapore, 1460-1466.

Considerable expense of bringing discharged men home from India, so that it would be well to increase the bounty given in India on re-enlistment, 1471-1473.

Examination on the circumstances of Aden, Rangoon, and Singapore having until lately been garrisoned by native troops exclusively, 1474-1483—Completion of the barracks at Singapore for only one wing of a European regiment, 1484-1487—Necessity of taking climatic considerations into account with reference to the employment of native troops out of India, 1488-1491.

*Grant, Lieutenant General James.* Answers received from General Grant, Governor and Commander in Chief at Malta, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if determined upon, *App.* 238-240.

*Green, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry, C.B., K.C.S.I.* Communication from Sir Henry Green, Commandant of the Sind Frontier Field Force, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 257.

Report, 1867—continued.

*Guy, Major General.* Views of General Guy, commanding the Forces in China and Japan, upon the question of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and the best mode of carrying such employment into operation, *App.* 240, 241.

*Gwalior.* Expediency of the fort at Gwalior being garrisoned by Europeans, *Norman* 29-233.

## H.

*Hardinge, Lord. (the late).* Views of Lord Hardinge in 1845, in disapproval of foreign garrison service being forced on the native troops, *Norman* 64-66

*Havelock.* <sup>views and arguments</sup> *(the late).* Memorandum by Colonel Norman, in opposition to the army in India, as to <sup>the native army,</sup> *App.* 217-220.

*Health of Troops.* <sup>(Ana.)</sup> <sup>the native army,</sup> *App.* 217-220. that the substitution of half and unhealthy duties of British troops in the Colonies, so <sup>Advantage,</sup> *Mackenzie* 2019-2024. 2054-2089-2091—European troops is very expedient, *Taylor* 2420-2447, regards climate, by the substitution of colonial troops for a view to protecting the head—Approval of mixed garrisons in tropical colonies, with *nairn*, 3447, 3448.—See also *the British army as much as possible, Lord Strath-*

*Hill Stations (India).* Proposed *address and Mortality.* European troops on the hills, *Norman* 139-241—Obstacle to any further removal of European troops to hill stations, *ib.*

*Hinks, Governor (British Guiana).* *ib.* 248-252. <sup>of a constabulary</sup> *Taylor* 2584-2586. as a means of dispensing with European garrisons, *Taylor* 2584-2586.

*Hindoos.* Strong religious prejudice of Hindoos against service beyond the seas, *Norman* 17. 40-47. 67. 393-400—Comparatively small proportion of Hindoos in the Madras Army, *ib.* 43—Difficulty as to foreign service in the case more especially of high caste Hindoos or Brahmins, *ib.* 47-50—Unfitness of Hindoo troops generally for service in the Colonies, *Sir Hope Grant*, 1171. 1177. 1418, 1419.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence, that men of the Hindoo races are not well suited for colonial service, *App.* 211.

See also *Caste. Colonial and Foreign Service.*

*Hodgson, Major General.* Answers received from Major General Hodgson commanding the troops in Ceylon, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 232, 233.

*Honduras.* Good conduct of some black troops upon the occasion of an invasion of Honduras in November last, *Taylor* 2530-2537.

*Hong Kong.* See *China.*

*Hospital Expenses.* Great saving of hospital expenses by the employment of native soldiers as compared with Europeans on foreign service out of India, *Balfour* 3482, 3483.

## I.

*Immorality (Native Troops).* Much less immorality and drunkenness in native regiments than in European regiments, *Norman* 176-180. 185-187.

*Insurrection (India).* Witness maintains that, if the army be reduced, there need be no apprehension of an insurrection of the people of India as distinct from a mutiny; experience of the last 100 years adverted to in support of this conclusion, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Witness further repudiates the idea that any danger arises from the population of the country, *ib.* 3129-3133. 3146. 3150.

## J.

*Jamaica Insurrection.* Opinion expressed by Governor Eyre in March 1865 that black troops without European troops at hand are a source of danger in the West Indies; this was disproved during the subsequent outbreak, *Taylor* 2439-2442—Fidelity of the black troops in the Jamaica outbreak of 1865 further adverted to, *ib.* 2583.—See also *West Indies, &c.*

*Japan*

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Japan.* Expediency of an European regiment at Japan in addition to one at Hong Kong, *Sir Hope Grant*, 1403-1406—Contemplated garrison of Indian troops, with a battery or two of European Artillery, in Japan as well as Hong Kong, *Mackenzie* 2063-2074. 2097-2099.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in Japan, *App.* 283.

*Java.* Serious mutiny formerly through native troops having been kept in Java after field service was over, *Norman* 23—Cause of the mutiny in 1815 in connection with the sending of native troops to Java, *Sir W. Elliot* 621, 622.

*Johnson, Colonel Edwin B., C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is assistant Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief, 1522—Necessity of a larger force of native Indian troops than of British troops for the garrison of any Colony, 1523-1527. 1587, 1588—Expediency of some European troops in every Colony, where it may be decided to employ native troops, 1528. 1583—Inexpediency of British artillery in any Colony being supported solely by native troops, 1529. 1589-1604. 1626-1628—Instance in the case of Demerara of the strong objection of colonists to the substitution of native for European troops; the objection in this case was against a West India regiment, 1530-1534. 1615-1622.

Belief that except for service in the field the native army in India would very reluctantly leave the country for foreign service, even with the inducement of increased pay, 1536-1550. 1623-1625. 1636-1638. 1733, 1734—Practicability of raising some special corps in India for garrison duty in the Colonies, there being, however, serious objections to this plan, 1538. 1550-1556. 1632-1635. 1658—Steps being taken towards raising a Beloochee regiment for service at Hong Kong, 1552-1554—Difficulty in obtaining a supply of Goorkas for foreign service, 1557—Strong disapproval of the employment of Chinese troops in India, 1558, 1559.

Danger of native troops in the Mauritius taking part with the Coolies in the event of a rebellion, 1560-1578. 1674-1694—Disturbing effect upon the native army in India if called upon for foreign service, 1578-1580—Doubt whether there would be much economy in substituting native for British troops in the Colonies, 1583-1586. 1710—Particulars relative to the garrison at the Straits Settlements; alterations contemplated, 1600-1614.

Circumstance of there having been an unsupported battalion of European artillery at Mhow when the mutiny broke out; witness attributing the safety of Central India and the loyalty of Holkar to the influence of this battalion, 1626. 1715-1720—Objections to the employment of native artillery in the Colonies, 1629-1631—Relative number of British and native troops composing the garrison of Aden; great importance of this post, 1639-1646. 1649. 1659, 1660—Information relative to the number of British and native troops at Rangoon and other stations in Burmah, 1647, 1648.

Statement as to service at Aden being greatly disliked by the native troops, 1649-1657—Inexpediency of mixed garrisons at the Mauritius, Malta, &c., though the system is found to answer at Aden, 1659-1671. 1695-1702—Advantage of British garrisons in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements, as constituting a reserve for India in time of emergency; instance of this at the time of the mutiny, 1665-1667. 1703-1709. 1729, 1730—Less difficulty as to native troops going to China than to most other Colonies, 1672, 1673. 1696, 1697—Danger in the garrison at the Cape being composed largely of Indian troops, 1711-1714. 1731, 1732.

Intention of raising the Ceylon rifle regiment to fourteen companies, of which eight will be stationed in the Straits, 1721-1724—Great difficulty of inducing native troops to serve in the Colonies, unless under an absolute guarantee that they would be relieved every three years, 1733, 1734. 1747—Extremely unsatisfactory and expensive arrangement in garrisoning Malta and Gibraltar with Indian troops, 1735-1737—Objection to any reduction of the British force in India, 1739.

Less danger on the score of mutiny when a native regiment forms part of a mixed garrison in a Colony than when it is in India, 1740-1743—Absence of any real parallel between the emigration of coolies and the foreign service of native troops, 1744-1746—Great aversion of native troops to separation from their families, whilst the coolies can take their families with them, 1746, 1747.

## K.

*Kaffir Levies.* Doubt as to the success of a proposal for raising Kaffir levies for service out of Africa, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1902-1905.

*Keyes, Colonel C. P.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has been connected with the 1st Punjaub Infantry for eighteen years, 636, 637—The regiment is composed chiefly of Sikhs and Dogras, the latter being mostly Rajpoots, 638, 639—Belief that

Report, 1867—continued.

*Keyes, Colonel C. P.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

that men could readily be raised in the Punjaub to go on foreign service if sufficient inducement were held out, as by doubling the present pay and providing rations, 640-645. 709-722—Difficulty in inducing natives to serve abroad in garrison duty for a longer period than three years, or even for that period, 646-654. 664-679.

Anticipated good conduct of native troops in the colonies; expediency, however, of there being also some European troops at the same stations, 655-659—Prejudice of Rajpoots, &c., against cooking at sea, this difficulty, however, being easily surmounted, 660-663. 680—Fitness of the Punjaub regiments for service in cold climates, 681-686—Very little prejudice among the Pathans in regard to food, 687-690—Bad feeling to be created by bringing Chinese regiments into India, 691-693.

Doubt as to the willingness of witness's regiment to go on foreign service for three years or any indefinite time, though by liberal pay there is no doubt but men might be recruited expressly for foreign service, 697-715—Greater difficulty of late years in obtaining recruits for witness's regiment, 722-724—Considerable difficulty anticipated in providing occupation sufficient to keep Pathan soldiers contented for three or five years in a foreign colony, 725-728—Disapproval of native regiments being officered by natives, 729.

[Second Examination.]—Explanation relative to the command of the Punjaub Frontier Force, to which witness's regiment belongs; performance by the force of police duties, as well as of military duties, 1103-1119—Probable mode of accounting for the reduced number of natives of good position who now enter the army, 1120, 1121—Inexpediency of the tendency to curtail the powers of reward and punishment formerly exercised by the commanding officers of regiments in the Punjaub, 1122-1129—Advantage if commanding officers had power to give rewards on the spot for distinguished service in the field, 1127-1129. 1146-1151.

Evidence in favour of jagheers or grants of land being given to native officers for long and faithful service, 1130-1145—Gratification to many native officers if, when deserving of reward, they could come to England for a time as aides-de-camp to the Queen, 1140-1142—Amendments suggested in the system of pensions, with a view to making the service more popular to the natives, 1152-1155.

Opinion as to the trustworthy character of Indian troops in garrison at Hong Kong, Singapore, &c., in the event of local riot, 1156-1161—Importance in all cases by 'locaing some European troops with native troops, 1156—Expediency of the artillery being always European, 1162, 1163.

L.

*Laing, Mr.* Soundness of the policy pursued by Mr. Laing when in India, as regards military expenditure, *Balfour* 3516. 3545-3549. 3595. 3620.

*Lawrence, Right Hon. Sir J. L., Bart.* Feeling of Sir John Lawrence in regard to the great danger arising in India from a large native force, *Mangles* 3087-3089. 3128.

Views of Sir John Lawrence as to the very limited extent to which it is desirable to substitute native for European troops in the colonies, in time of peace or during war, *App.* 211-213—Strong objection by Sir John Lawrence to any reduction of the British force in India, *ib.* 212, 213.

*Le Marchant, Lieutenant General Sir J. Gaspard, K.C.B.* Answers received from Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, Commander in Chief in Madras, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 233, 234.

*Little, Major A. B.* Communication from Major Little, commanding the 25th Bombay Native Light Infantry, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if it be determined upon; *App.* 252, 253.

*Local European Army (India).* Objection to Europeans being recruited expressly for service in India, or to colonisation by European soldiers or pensioners, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1937-1939.

Facility of increasing to 20,000 men the local European army of India at the time of the mutiny, *Balfour* 3603—Great efficiency of the old Indian army, *ib.* 3609—Immense advantage of the large body of trained and efficient European officers available under the former system; deficiencies of the present system on this score, *ib.* 3609-3617—System of enlistment formerly in force in the case of the European army of India, *ib.* 3639.

Further evidence in favour of the re-formation of a local European army of India distinct from the Royal Army, and under the control of the Government of India, *Balfour* 3649-3652—Extremely efficient character of the army of India if, instead of the sweeping changes made, certain defects had been remedied on the score of staff appointments,



## Report, 1867—continued.

*Local European Army (India)*—continued.

appointments, &c., *Balfour* 3652—Data for the conclusion that no difficulty would be experienced in recruiting for an Indian army, or local European army, *ib.* 3653, 3654.

Opinion that a local European force, if re-established in India, should be larger than the former force, *Balfour* 3761, 3769—Approval of a local European army of 30,000 men, and of an Imperial army of 20,000 men, *ib.* 3762, 3763—Belief that with proper care no difficulty would arise in regard to the difference of pay and allowances between a local army and an Imperial army, *ib.* 3764-3768—Conclusion as to the fidelity and the unquestionable efficiency of the local European troops, *ib.* 3768, 3769.

*Local Levies (Colonies).* Advantages in garrisoning certain colonies with local levies, the nucleus of which should be formed in time of peace, instead of bringing in native troops from India for the purpose, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1879-1886, 1959-1962—Grounds for objecting to the colonies being held by levies raised locally, it being much better to garrison them with troops from India, *Mackenzie* 2013-2026, 2032-2034, 2053, 2054—Views of a former Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent, as to the difficulty of preserving discipline in a small and entirely local force, *Taylor* 2527.

Objection to local corps in lieu of Indian native troops, except that in the former case no difficulty arises as to the pay and allowance of European officers and men serving in the same colony, *Duke of Cambridge* 3004.

*Local Volunteers or Militia (Colonies.)* Probable effect of the presence of a European force and of a native force respectively, as regards the raising of volunteers and militia in any colony, *Taylor* 2568-2571.

*Lower Bengal.* Facility of overawing the population of Lower Bengal, as being very effeminate, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1914-1918.

## M.

*Macdonald, Colonel James Mitchell.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has belonged to the Ceylon Rifle Corps since 1831; 2104-2106—The regiment is composed of Malays, with the exception of two companies of sepoy, the full strength of the regiment being about 1,100; 2107-2111—Practice of enlisting the Malays in the island as boys, 2111, 2160-2164, 2222-2228, 2267-2270—Particulars relative to the pay, allowances, &c., of the men: advantage when serving in China of a free ration of meat, 2112-2123, 2133-2135, 2193-2198—Absence of difficulty in regard to the men serving abroad, 2124-2130.

Officering of the corps by natives and Europeans jointly; statement in explanation and approval of this arrangement, 2131, 2132, 2145-2147, 2273-2287, 2290—Less cost of transport of men of the Ceylon Rifles than of European soldiers, 2136, 2137—Practice as to the wives and children of the men accompanying them to China; mistake recently made on this score, 2138-2144—Considerable sickness and mortality among the regiment in Hong Kong, the climate being too cold for Malays, 2152-2156, 2205, 2206, 2217-2221.

Entire confidence of witness in the loyalty of the Ceylon Rifles, whilst their drill and discipline are excellent, 2157-2160, 2165-2169, 2186, 2187, 2266, 2289—Information relative to the religious and social habits of the Malays in the regiment; little, if any, difficulty on the score of caste; 2168-2180—Considerable difficulty in recruiting for the regiment; advantage of keeping some companies in Singapore and of recruiting there, the regiment being much below its proper strength, 2181-2184, 2207-2216, 2222-2237.

Very good and useful soldiers obtained from Malays, so that if they could be introduced into the Indian army it would be very desirable, 2185-2188—Much higher cost of rations in Ceylon than in India, 2189-2192—Very good barracks in Ceylon, 2199—Probability of better barrack accommodation being required for the Ceylon Rifles than for Indian native troops when serving in China, &c., 2200-2204—Further statement in favour of garrisoning Singapore partly with the Ceylon Rifles, it being desirable, however, to have some European troops also, 2207-2216, 2238-2246.

Intention of sending nine companies of the Ceylon Rifle Corps to Singapore, Penang, &c., and to keep five companies in Ceylon, 2247-2249—Character of the defences of Ceylon, and number of troops composing the garrison, 2249-2255, 2271, 2272—Nature of the duties performed by witness's regiment at Hong Kong, 2256-2259—Statement as to the barrack accommodation at Hong Kong, and the great expense of hired buildings, 2260-2265.

*MacDonnell, Sir Richard Graves, C.B.* Answers received from Sir Richard MacDonnell, Governor of Hong Kong, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 236, 237.

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Mackenzie, Colonel Kenneth, C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was Quartermaster General of the army in China in 1860; 1997—Much greater expense of transport of European troops to China than of Indian native troops, 1998–2000. 2037, 2038—Great advantage of the employment of native troops in garrisoning Hong Kong, Shanghai, &c., during the war, 2001–2006—Approval of Hong Kong being held permanently by native troops, with the assistance only of one or two batteries of European garrison artillery, 2007–2009. 2063–2082—Advantage also in garrisoning Singapore with native troops and European artillery, whereas it is now decided to place a wing of a European regiment there, 2009–2012. 2027–2032. 2083, 2084.

Grounds for objecting to the colonies being held by levies raised locally, it being much better to garrison them with troops from India, 2013–2026. 2032–2034. 2053, 2054—Opinion that Indian troops are far preferable to Kaffir or Fingoe levies for the defence of the Cape, 2017, 2018—Very heavy and unhealthy duties of British troops in the colonies so that the substitution of native troops is very expedient, 2019–2024. 2054. 2089–2091—More ready and efficient service of native troops in time of war, if employed on foreign service in time of peace, 2025, 2026, 2039—Objection to the practice of having a small European force in numerous colonies, it being preferable to mass the army as much as possible, 2027–2036, 2050–2052.

Disapproval of Indian troops being employed at Malta or Gibraltar, or eastward of Alexandria, 2039. 2062—Conclusion as to the less expense of Indian than of British troops for garrisons in the colonies, notwithstanding the more frequent relief of the former, 2040–2048—Mistake in having small detachments of British troops scattered over the West Indies, 2052. 2058–2061—Good discipline of the Sikh troops in the China war as compared with the French, 2055–2057.

Contemplated garrison of Indian troops, with a battery or two of European Artillery, in Japan as well as Hong Kong, 2063–2074. 2097–2099—Approval of the Mauritius being held by native troops, and some European artillery, 2085–2088—Doubt as to the expediency of garrisoning the West Indies with native troops from India, 2092–2095—Non-objection to garrison artillery being unsupported by British troops, though it is highly desirable that field artillery should be so supported, 2100–2103.

*Macpherson, Alexander Campbell.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has been in the Mauritius for about twenty years, 2291–2293—Considers that the Mauritius might be efficiently and safely garrisoned by Indian native troops exclusively, but that, on account of the large coolie population, it is desirable to have a mixed force of Europeans and natives, 2294 *et seq.*—Payment by the Colony of 44,000 *l.* towards the expense of the troops; dissatisfaction as to so large a contribution being required, it being considered that one regiment is sufficient, 2307. 2327, 2328. 2365–2368. 2382.

Very good police force at the Mauritius, so that a very small European garrison is all that is required for internal purposes, 2331–2336—Question considered as to the means of defending the island against external attack; inexpediency of a large European force being located in the fortifications, 2349 *et seq.*—Considerable importance of the Colony, so that it is very desirable properly to defend the place in time of war, 2369–2380.

*Madras Native Army.* Grounds for concluding that there is considerable objection to foreign service on the part of the men in the Madras army, *Norman 18 et seq.*—Explanation with reference to the employment of Madras troops in Burmah and the Straits Settlements without any great difficulty having been experienced, *ib.* 19–26. 30–33—Practice in the Madras army for the men's families to live with the regiment, except when on foreign service; obstacle on this score to an extended system of foreign service, *ib.* 27–31. 136–150. 157 *et seq.*

Alacrity with which Madras regiments have gone on service to Burmah, *Sir W. Elliot 481–484*—Composition of the Madras army adverted to as comprising chiefly low caste men, there being, however, men of all castes, *ib.* 485. 497–500. 523. 594–600—Instances of Madras sepoys having objected to go on service beyond the sea, through some difficulty about their pay or pensions; absence of difficulty on religious grounds, *ib.* 486–512. 519, 520. 563 *et seq.*—Belief that no evil would result from the employment of Madras troops in the colonies in time of peace, as well as during *ib.* 521–528—Circumstance of caste not being recognised in the Madras army *3*—Existence of several warlike tribes in Madras from whom valuable troops *ments might be* organised, *ib.* 535–537—Except to China and the Straits, Madras *s have not gone* troops on garrison duty out of India, *ib.* 620.

Belief that no difficulty of any moment has ever been experienced *regard to Madras* troops serving in Burmah or China, *Pears 774–776. 789. 798–800*—Inferiority of the Madras troops to the Sikh troops, *Sir Hope Grant 1327–1330*—Interference with the pay and allowances, &c., to which is owing the dislike evinced at times in the Madras army to go on foreign service, *Balfour 3469*—Excess to which calls have been made on the Madras army for foreign service, *ib.* 3471, 3472—Difficulty as regards Madras troops going

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Madras Native Army*—continued.

going on foreign service, on account of the embarkation rather than the distance, *Balfour* 3501.

Memorandum showing the composition of the native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Return showing that on 1st April 1857 there were 13,172 Madras native troops on foreign service, *App.* 335.

See also *Arracan.* *Burmah.* *Ceylon.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign*  
*Service (Native Troops).* *Families (Native Troops).* *Mauritius.* *Officers*  
*(Native Troops).* *Straits Settlements.*

*Mahomedans.* Objection of Mahomedan soldiers to foreign service, though they have not the same objection as Hindoos to cross the sea, *Norman* 52-57—Statement opposed to the view that the Mahomedan element in India is a source of much danger, *Mangles* 3129-3133. 3146-3150—Discretion necessary as regards the employment of Mahomedan troops from India in a colony where the natives are Mahomedan, *Lord Strathnairn* 3412, 3413.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that the Mahomedan races are the best for service out of India, *App.* 211.

*Mahrattas.* Very few Mahrattas in the Bengal army; explanation hereon, *Norman* 225, 226—Objection to enlisting Mahrattas for the Madras army, unless in connection with other castes in the same regiment, *Sir W. Elliot* 633-635.

*Malacca.* See *Straits Settlements.*

*Malays.* Very good and useful soldiers obtained from Malays, so that if they could be introduced into the Indian army it would be desirable, *Macdonald* 2185-2188—Advantage of employing Malays rather than Hindoos for service in China, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1876—Adequacy of Malays for garrisoning Ceylon, *ib.* 1974. 1977—Approval of a Malay garrison at Singapore, *Fonblanque* 2775, 2776—Indisposition of Malays to settle in any colony, 2847, 2848—Equal docility of Malays and Africans as of European troops, *ib.* 2848, 2849. 2852.—See also *Ceylon Rifle Corps.*

*Malta and Gibraltar.* Fitness of native Indian troops for garrison duties in Malta; less cost than by employing British troops, *Sir W. Elliot* 574. 584, 585. 588, 589—Doubt as to the policy of employing native troops on garrison duty at Malta or Gibraltar; obstacle also to the men being accompanied by their families, *Pears* 821-826—Opinion that no serious difficulty would arise on social grounds through having a mixed force of natives and Europeans in the Mediterranean, *Probyn* 943. 946-950—Difficulty as regards the supply of food for native troops in Mediterranean garrisons; obstacle also on account of the separation from their families, *Baker* 1080-1082. 1090-1093.

Decided objection to any native troops at Gibraltar or Malta, under any circumstances, in time of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1446, 1447—Extremely unsatisfactory and expensive arrangement in garrisoning Malta and Gibraltar with Indian troops, *Johnson* 1735-1737—Decided objection to Indian troops for garrisoning Malta or Gibraltar, or any colony in Europe, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1891, 1892—Disapproval of Indian troops being employed at Malta or Gibraltar, or eastward of Alexandria, *Mackenzie* 2039-2062.

Decided objection to coloured troops at Malta, except as supplemental to British troops; the latter should not in time of peace number less than 6,000 men, *Sir H. Storks* 3204-3207. 3262-3267. 3286-3289—In time of war the garrison of Malta should be 10,000, *ib.* 3206. 3288—Large garrison required at Gibraltar as well as Malta, in the event of war, *ib.* 3244-3246—In time of war the garrison of Gibraltar should be at least 7,000, *ib.* 3245—Anticipated local objections in Malta to the introduction of Asiatic troops as a permanent arrangement, *ib.* 3262-3266.

Doubt as to the expediency of employing native soldiers at Malta or Gibraltar, *Balfour* 3813.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, at Malta and Gibraltar respectively, *App.* 283.

*Mangles, Ross D.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Submits sundry data for the conclusion that the European army in India is unnecessarily large, 3061 *et seq.*—Perfect safety in reducing the European army if the native army be reduced, the latter being almost the sole cause of danger, *ib.*—Witness maintains in fact that there need be no apprehension of an insurrection of the people, as distinct from a mutiny; experience of the last 100 years adverted to in support of this conclusion, *ib.*

Statement showing that during the last mutiny there was no rising of the people, and no popular disaffection, save in the case of Oude: peculiar circumstances which accounted for the latter exception, 3061. 3063, 3064. 3085. 3089. 3104-3106. 3139-3147—Particulars relative to the insurrection at Bareilly in 1816, as the most formidable that has occurred in India during British rule, 3065, 3066—Great mistake in maintaining  
478 —I. E from

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 Report, 1867—continued.
 

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*Mangles, Ross D.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

from 65,000 to 70,000 British troops, in order chiefly to watch 135,000 native troops, there being in truth no one else for the former to fight with, 3067-3077. 3087-3089. 3128.

Contemplated reduction of their forces by Scindia and the Nizam if the British force be reduced, 3068, 3069. 3082—Suggestion that the native army be reduced to 100,000 men, that is, by about 35,000, and that the British troops be reduced by 20,000; 3070. 3090-3095. 3102. 3159-3164—Very little use of a large British force, so far as the Nepaulese, Bhootans, Burmese, &c., are concerned, 3072-3077. 3107-3109.

Sufficiency of the police force for keeping in check any insurrectionary movement of the people, if taken in time, 3077, 3078—Fallacy of the notion that danger is to be apprehended from what is termed the military police of India, 3077. 3171—Inexpediency of any reduction of the European army unless the native army be reduced, whilst the unnecessarily large strength of the latter is the only obstacle to a reduction of the former, 3078, 3079. 3110.

Opinion that the bulk of the British army should be kept at frontier posts, such as Peshawur, and that the rest should be located in the large cities, such as Patna, 3080, 3081. 3098. 3107-3109—Greater fidelity of the native army accordingly as its power for mischief is curtailed by reducing the number of men, 3083. 3086. 3102—Approval of artillery not being allowed in the hands of native troops, 3084, 3085—Increased control over the people by means of the improved arms now in possession of the European army, 3085. 3095. 3128. 3148, 3149.

Confidence of the native army in its overwhelming relative strength, as compared with the British army at the time of the mutiny, 3086. 3092-3094. 3103—Feeling of Sir John Lawrence in regard to the great danger arising from a large native force, 3087-3089. 3128—Effect of the maintenance of a large native army in fostering military habits and a warlike spirit among the population, 3097.

Inducement to withdraw British troops from India in the event of a European war; danger to India in so doing, 3111-3114—Approval generally of the employment of Sikhs and other native troops in the colonies, though probably there would be no pecuniary gain thereby, 3115-3127. 3168-3171—Statement opposed to the view that the Mahomedan element in India is a source of much danger, 3129-3133—Slight apprehension entertained by witness of any danger to India from the gradual approach of the Russian frontier, 3134, 3135—Facility of sending troops from home in time to meet a Russian invasion, 3134. 3136. 3157, 3158.

Witness further repudiates the idea that any danger arises from the population of the country, 3146. 3150—The large native army is, in fact, the real source of danger, 3146—With regard to the number of British troops now stationed at different posts, and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, the native troops being reduced at the same time, 3151-3156—The question of a further reduction in the aggregate of the Imperial army, as a consequence of reducing the force in India, should not in any way affect the latter reduction, 3165-3167.

*Mansfield, General Sir W. R., K.C.B., G.C.S.I.* Answers received from the Commander in Chief in India in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 220, 221—Strong objections made by Sir William Mansfield to any such employment, *ib.* 220.

Letter from the Adjutant General to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 18th March 1867, submitting the views of Sir William Mansfield upon the question of a reduction in the army in India; grounds for strongly objecting to any diminution, *App.* 293-299.

*Marine Battalion (Native Army).* Practice formerly of recruiting in Bengal for certain marine battalions, *Pears* 777-780—Particulars relative to the marine battalion in the Bombay army, *ib.* 784-788.

**MAURITIUS:**

1. *Conflicting Evidence upon the Question of Substituting Native Indian Troops for European Troops.*
2. *Amount and Character of the Local Population.*
3. *Military Contribution by the Colony.*
4. *Question of Difficulties arising in Connection with the Employment of Native Indian Troops.*
5. *Question of employing Black Troops or Native Troops from South Africa.*
6. *Returns of the Strength of the European Garrison, and of the Allowances in force.*

1. *Conflicting*

## MAURITIUS—continued.

1. *Conflicting Evidence upon the Question of Substituting Native Indian Troops for European Troops:*

Difficulty anticipated in substituting Native for European troops in the Mauritius; the experiment might be tried under a good commanding officer, *Norman* 165-168. 188-190—Objection to the Mauritius being garrisoned by Native troops exclusively; adverse feeling of the colonists in the matter, *Pears* 819. 838-845; *Sir Hope Grant* 1201-1206. 1376—Approval of Indian troops for the defence of the Mauritius or Egypt in time of war, *Sir G. R. Clerk*, 1886-1890—Opinion in favour of the Mauritius being held by Native troops, and some European Artillery, *Mackenzie* 2085-2088.

Witness considers that the Mauritius might be efficiently and safely garrisoned by Indian Native troops exclusively, but that on account of the large coolie population it is desirable to have a mixed force of Europeans and Natives, *Macpherson* 2294 *et seq.*—Very good police force at the Mauritius, so that a very small European garrison is all that is required for internal purposes, *ib.* 2331-2336—Question considered as to the means of defending the island against internal attack; inexpediency of a large European force being located in the fortifications, *ib.* 2349 *et seq.*—Considerable importance of the colony, so that it is very desirable properly to defend the place in time of war, *ib.* 2369-2380.

Doubt as to the policy of withdrawing the European troops from the island whilst a considerable French garrison is kept at Bourbon, *Taylor* 2474-2479. 2490-2497—Less extensive fortifications carried out at Mauritius or Port Louis than were first intended, the island being in fact easy of capture irrespectively of the garrison of about 2,000 men in Port Louis, *ib.* 2480-2486—Considerable importance of the Colony, so that it is on the whole very expedient to maintain a British garrison there, *ib.* 2598-2615.

Decided objection to the withdrawal of all European troops from so valuable a colony as the Mauritius; great importance of a garrison there of about 1,800 British troops, *Duke of Cambridge*, 2976, 2977. 3024-3031. 3051-3053—Great importance of the Mauritius in a political and military sense, so that even in time of peace it is essential to maintain a European garrison of 1,600 or 1,800 men, *Sir H. Storks* 3195-3202. 3223-3242. 3269—Strong French feeling in the Mauritius, thus rendering an adequate British garrison the more essential, *ib.* 3199. 3241, 3242. 3255, 3256—Greater reason for the maintenance of an unmixed British garrison at the Mauritius than in the Straits Settlements at Aden, *ib.* 3238-3342.

Necessity of British as well as Native troops for so important a station as Mauritius, *Lord Strathnairn* 3398-3400—Approval of the Mauritius being reinforced by native troops from India in the event of war, *ib.* 3424-3427—Want of a large garrison for the defence of Port Louis, *ib.* 3424.

Dissent from the views laid down by Sir John Burgoyne as to the expediency of a very large force for the protection of Mauritius; opinion that a garrison of 600 men is sufficient for internal defence, *Balfour* 3679, 3680—Exceptions taken to certain conclusions as to the great value of the Mauritius in the event of war; it is, however, very useful for the refitting of vessels, *ib.* 3704-3712—Utter impracticability of holding the Mauritius, if the enemy had the command of the seas, *ib.* 3708—Small force likely to be kept in the Mauritius if the matter rested with the colonists, *ib.* 3809—Efficiency of a mixed garrison of Natives and Europeans, *ib.* 3810—Witness repeats that without the command of the sea the place must soon yield to an enemy, *ib.*

2. *Amount and Character of the Local Population:*

Total of about 250,000 coolies in the Mauritius, there being about 100,000 negroes, and 4,000 whites, *Taylor* 2451-2453. 2610-2612—Docile character of the coolie population in the Mauritius, whilst they have no such strong prejudices of caste or of religion as are likely to lead to revolt, *ib.* 2457-2468—Use likely to be made of the coolie population in aid of the garrison in case of foreign attack, *Sir H. Storks*, 3198. 3230. 3250-3254.

3. *Military Contribution by the Colony:*

Payment by the Colony of 44,000 *l.* towards the expense of the troops; dissatisfaction as to so large a contribution being required, it being considered that one regiment is sufficient, *Macpherson* 2307. 2327, 2328. 2365-2368. 2382—Probable discontent of the English colonists if the European troops were withdrawn, and if a colonial contribution were required for Asiatic troops, *Taylor* 2469-2473. 2487-2490. 2501-2503—Further statement that the colonists in the Mauritius would oppose the substitution of Native for European troops, *ib.* 2579, 2580.

Considerable payment by the Mauritius towards the expense of the troops, *Sir H. Storks* 3276—Unduly large contribution by the colonists in the Mauritius towards the garrison there, the number of troops in proportion to the population and the size of the island being excessive, *Balfour* 3504-3516—Calculations that the cost of the troops in the Mauritius is about 100 *l.* per man, the Colony paying altogether 45,000 *l.* *ib.* 478—I.

Report, 1867—continued.

*MAURITIUS*—continued.

3. *Military Contribution by the Colony*—continued.

3503-3513—Statement as to the Mauritius now paying 45,000 l. a-year towards the expense of the troops, there being a garrison of 2,000 men; conclusion as to the heavy pressure involved in this payment, *Balfour* 3679-3700.

4. *Question of Difficulties arising in Connection with the Employment of Native Indian Troops.*

Difficulty, by any increase of pay, of making the Native troops contented to serve in the Mauritius, *Norman* 201-208—Greater difficulty in arranging for the service of Native troops in the Mauritius or more distant places than in the Straits Settlements, *Sir Hope Grant* 1234, 1235—Danger of Native troops in the Mauritius taking part with the coolies in the event of a rebellion, *Johnson* 1560-1578. 1674-1694.

Less prejudicial effect of the climate of the Mauritius than of India itself upon natives of India, *Caird* 1813-1815—Willingness of Indian Native troops to go as far as the Mauritius for three years at a time, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1851, 1852. 1873-1875—Absence of difficulty in feeding Sikh soldiers in the Mauritius, *ib.* 1854-1856.

5. *Question of employing Black Troops or Native Troops from South Africa:*

Reliance to be placed on West India troops in the Mauritius, *Taylor* 2450—Difficulty of raising a negro regiment in the island, *ib.* 2454-2456—Opinion that African troops might be employed with advantage at Mauritius, *Fonblanque* 2831—Objection to the employment of Fingoe levies from the Cape as part of the garrison of the island, *Sir H. Storks* 3191-3195.

6. *Returns of the Strength of the European Garrison, and of the Allowances in force:*

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed at the Mauritius, *App.* 282—Particulars of allowances in force for the several staff officers, and for the regimental officers, *ib.* 300, 301.

See also *Coolie Emigration. Mutiny.*

*Mediterranean Garrisons. See Malta and Gibraltar.*

*Mends, Captain, William Robert, R.N., C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Supplies certain particulars relative to the cost of transport of troops between England and Hong Kong; will furnish returns containing details of the cost of transport between different places, 951 *et seq.*—Explanation of the practice as to the conveyance of a certain proportion of soldiers' wives and children, and as to the rate of charge, 956-963. 990-1001—Statement of the cost of freight and victualling of Native regiments between India and China; less cost than in the case of European troops, 971-973.

Instances of the great expense of transport in hired troop-ships between India and China, and China and the Cape, 980-985—Intention still to carry out the transport service to the Mauritius and Ceylon round the Cape, irrespectively of the new arrangements for the Indian service, 1002-1010—Very little difference in the cost of transport to Singapore and to China, 1011.

[Second Examination.]—Will supply the Committee with a return showing the comparative cost of the transport of Native troops and Europeans from the different ports in India to China, and from China to India, 2616, 2617.

*Merewether, Lieutenant Colonel W. L., C.B.* Answers received from Lieutenant Colonel Merewether, Resident at Aden, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 227, 228.

*Military Expenditure (India).* Expediency of its being left entirely to the military departments to appropriate the military expenditure, the amount of such expenditure being first definitively fixed by the financial departments, *Balfour* 3516. 3548, 3549. 3593-3595. 3620, 3621.—See also *Cost. Taxation.*

*Mixed Garrisons. See Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).*

*Montgomery, Sir Robert, K.C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Difficulty in getting the best class of men in the Pujaub and the north-western provinces to leave India on foreign garrison service, 1492. 1507-1520—Necessity of considering the question of food in any colony in connection with the rate of pay of Native troops sent to such colony, 1493-1506—Reluctance of the Pathans and Sikhs to leave the neighbourhood of their homes for foreign service generally, though they would be quite ready to go for fighting service, 1507-1517.

Unpopularity of the Native army in India if it were to take the roster for foreign garrison service, 1517. 1519. 1520—Great care necessary before carrying out any arrangements for the colonial service of Native troops, 1517. 1521—Apprehension lest from  
some

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Montgomery, Sir Robert, K.C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

some cause or other the religious prejudices of Native troops serving in the colonies might be offended, and lest dissatisfaction might thus be created throughout the entire Native army, 1518, 1519—Suggestion that service out of India be first tried on a small scale, and that the arrangements be left to the Government of India, 1521.

[Second Examination.]—With regard to the employment of Indian troops at Burmah, Singapore, &c. witness is not aware of any difficulty having been experienced on the score of caste prejudices, 2645-2650—Probability of Sikhs being as willing as Natives of Madras and Bengal, if equally well paid, to serve out of India, 2651, 2652—Information relative to the employment of a "pioneer corps" of Sikhs in Ceylon; entire failure of this arrangement, the Ceylon Government having wanted the men for work, whilst the latter enlisted for the service, with a view chiefly to soldiering, 2653-2664.

Particulars as to some recent steps for raising a body of 100 Sikhs for service in Hong Kong; enhanced rate of pay and other inducements stipulated for in this case, 2665-2667, 2675-2681—Large number of police in the Punjab; way in which armed and officered, 2668-2673—Expediency of the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies being left to the management of the Indian Government instead of the Colonial Governments, 2682-2688. 2708-2712.

Small scale on which the experiment should first be tried of employing the Indian Native army on foreign service, 2689. 2694—Advantage rather than otherwise of the effect to be produced on the natives by seeing the extent of the colonial possessions of this country, 2690-2693—Importance of special care as to the command and officering of Native troops out of India, 2694. 2700-2703—Suggestion, as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with the extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, 2695-2699. 2704-2707—Facility of forming a regiment for foreign service by means of volunteers from different regiments, 2713-2715.

*Mooltan.* Importance of a European force at Mooltan, *Norman* 235, 236.

**MUTINY:**

Proportion of five sepoy to one British soldier at the time of the mutiny, whereas it is now deemed essential to keep the proportion at two to one, *Norman* 349-357—Very little disaffection in the Madras army during the mutiny of 1857, though there has been several former mutinies from various causes, *Sir W. Elliot* 629-632—Circumstance of there having been an unsupported battalion of European Artillery at Mhow when the mutiny broke out, witness attributing the safety of Central India and the loyalty of Holkar to the influence of this battalion, *Johnson* 1626. 1715-1720—Advantage of British garrisons in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements, as constituting a reserve for India in time of emergency; instance of this at the time of the mutiny, *ib.* 1665-1667. 1703-1709. 1729, 1730—Less danger on the score of mutiny when a Native regiment forms part of a mixed garrison in a Colony than when it is in India, *ib.* 1740-1743.

Spread of the mutiny or insurrection of 1857, not through any want of European force, but because the British troops were chiefly in the north-west, whilst there were hardly any in Bengal, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1869-1872. 1947-1950—Further reference to the outbreak of 1857, as having been to some extent a rebellion as much as a mutiny, *ib.* 1929. 1935, 1936.

Probability that the mutiny would never have occurred, but for the weakness of the British army in India, *Duke of Cambridge* 3038.

Statement showing that during the last mutiny there was no rising of the people, and no popular disaffection save in the case of Oude; peculiar circumstances which accounted for the latter exception, *Mangles* 3061. 3063, 3064. 3085. 3089. 3104-3106. 3139-3147—Confidence of the native army in its overwhelming relative strength as compared with the British army at the time of the mutiny, *ib.* 3086. 3092-3094. 3103.

Statement as to several former mutinies having all been occasioned by questions connected with the pay and allowances of the sepoy, *Balfour* 3469—Statement as to the total effective force of non-commissioned officers and rank and file of British troops on 1st May 1857 having been only 37,091; ample means at home to have supplied India with the full establishment, *ib.* 3559-3573—Grounds for the statement that any assistance derived by India at the time of the mutiny from the European garrisons at the Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon, was more than counterbalanced by the force previously taken from India for the Persian expedition, *ib.* 3604-3607—Successful operations against the mutineers irrespectively of the troops which came from the Mauritius, &c., *ib.* 3607.

Instances of several places in India guarded by natives exclusively where no mutiny occurred, whilst mutinies have frequently arisen in places where the European troops were the strongest, *Balfour* 3630-3634—Valuable experience taught by the mutiny, so that we are stronger in the country than we were before, *ib.* 3642, 3643—Immense preponderance of Native over British troops at the time of the mutiny, the relative proportion

## Report, 1867—continued.

*MUTINY—continued.*

portion in Bengal being as ten to one, *Balfour* 3643-3646—Further statement upon the question of the mutiny in 1857 having been virtually overcome before the arrival of troops from the Colonies, *ib.* 3777-3794.

See also *China*, 9. *Dalhousie*, Lord.

## N.

*Nankin, Treaty of.* Great usefulness of native Indian troops in the operations which led to the Treaty of Nankin, *Balfour* 3500.

*Napier, Lieutenant General Sir Robert, K.C.B.* Answers received from Sir R Napier, Commander in Chief at Bombay, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of the Native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if it be decided upon, *App.* 243-245—Grounds for strongly objecting to the proposed substitution of Native for British troops, *ib.*—Conclusions favourable to the employment of Native troops together with British troops in certain Colonies and under certain conditions, *ib.*

*NATIVE ARMY (INDIA):*

Detail of the number of Native troops in the several presidencies of India; total of 125,171 natives, including the Hyderabad and Rajpootana contingencies, *Norman* 3-5—Decrease of 10,000 in the Native army since the year 1857, *ib.* 227—Doubt as to the expediency of any reduction in the Native army, *ib.* 319, 320.

Perfect safety in reducing the European army if the Native army be reduced, the latter being almost the sole cause of danger, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Suggestion that the Native army be reduced to 100,000 men, that is by about 35,000, and that the British troops be reduced by 20,000, *ib.* 3070, 3090-3095, 3102, 3159-3164—Inexpediency of any reduction of the European army unless the Native army be reduced, whilst the unnecessarily large strength of the latter is the only obstacle to a reduction of the former, *ib.* 3078, 3079, 3110—Greater fidelity of the Native army accordingly, as its power of mischief is curtailed by reducing the number of men, *ib.* 3083, 3086, 3102—Effect of the maintenance of a large Native army in fostering military habits and a warlike spirit among the population, *ib.* 3097—The large Native army is in fact the real source of danger, *ib.* 3146.

Opinion that the Native army in India should be re-organised with a view to its being an integral part of the Imperial army, and to its serving in the Colonies; deficiencies of the present organisation, *Cavenagh* 3334-3341, 3346-3352.

Element of safety in the mixed composition of the Indian Native army, *Lord Strathnairn* 3412, 3413—Undue reduction already made in the Native army, the duties being now much too severe, *ib.* 3427-3429, 3450—Approval of the proportion of two Native soldiers to one British soldier, *ib.* 3449.

Instance in 1842 of the bravery of Indian troops when fighting against the Malays, *Balfour* 3484-3494—Instance in 1839 of the efficiency of sepoy troops against the Native forces of the Nabob of Carnool, *ib.* 3495-3499.

Opinion as to the exceeding impolicy of the present military system of India, that is, as regards the distinct separation between the European and Native armies, the former being under the Imperial Government, whilst the latter is under the Indian Government, *Balfour* 3609—Objection to the substitution of natives for the British troops proposed by witness to be withdrawn from India, *ib.* 3647, 3648—Approval of a Native infantry of 90,000 privates, *ib.* 3648—Comment upon the great indifference shown in the treatment of the sepoy army, *ib.* 3799.

Memoandum showing the composition of the Native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

See also *Artillery.* *Bengal Native Army.* *Bombay Native Army.* *Caste.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Cost.* *Duties of Troops.* *Furloughs.* *Madras Native Army.* *Mauritius.* *Mutiny.* *Officers (Native Troops).* *Pay and Allowances.* *Punjab and Punjab Regiments.* *Recruiting.* *Sikhs.* *Taxation.*

*Native Princes.* Contemplated reduction of their forces by Scindia and the Nizam if the British force be reduced, *Mangles* 3068, 3069, 3082.

*New Zealand.* Difficulties which prevented the sending of some Sikh troops to New Zealand during the late war, *Duke of Cambridge* 3042-3045.

*Nicholett, Captain G.* Answers received from Captain Nicholett, commanding the 2nd Belooch Battalion, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of Native Indian troops in British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 254-256.

*Norman,*



*Norman, Colonel Henry Wylie, C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, 1, 2—Shows in detail the number of Native and of British troops in the several Presidencies of India; total of 58,212 British soldiers, and 125,171 Natives, including the Hyderabad and Rajpootana contingents, 3-5—Information as to the different races and religions of which the Indian Native army is composed, 6-16—Regulations in force as to the number of men of different castes in the same regiments, 12, 13.

Strong religious prejudice of Hindoos against service beyond the seas, 17. 40-47. 67—Grounds for concluding that there is considerable objection to foreign service on the part of the men in the Madras army, 18 *et seq.*—Explanations with reference to the employment of Madras troops in Burmah and the Straits Settlements without any great difficulty having been experienced, 19-26. 30-33—Facility of getting Native troops to leave India on field service, the difficulty arising only in the case of garrison duty, 22. 68, 69—Serious mutiny formerly through Native troops having been kept in Java after field service was over, 23—Practice in the Madras army for the men's families to live with the regiments, except when on foreign service; obstacle on this score to an extended system of foreign service, 27-31. 136-150.

Prejudicial effect upon recruiting if the men were to go on foreign service for garrison duty, 31. 53-56. 64. 101-109—Frequent representation made for a reduction of the term of service of the Madras army; this is never beyond three years, 33, 34—Voluntary character of the coolie emigration adverted to, 35-39—Comparatively small proportion of Hindoos in the Madras army, 43.

Less unwillingness of Sikhs and Affghans than of Hindoos to go across the seas, 46. 58—Difficulty as to foreign service in the case more especially of high caste Hindoos or Brahuins, 47-50—Objection of Mahomedan soldiers to foreign service, though they have not the same objection as Hindoos to cross the sea, 52-57—Views of Lord Hardinge and the Duke of Wellington, in 1845, in disapproval of foreign garrison service being forced on the Native troops, 64-66—Power, legally, of sending the Native troops on foreign service, 70, 71—Objection to any increase of European officers when Native regiments go on foreign service, 72-82.

Information relative to the practice of recruiting in India; no bounty has hitherto been given, 83-88. 90, 91—Increased difficulty in raising recruits, on account chiefly of the smallness of the pay with reference to the increased price of provisions, 88. 101-107. 115. 197—Particulars as to the pay and allowances of the Native troops when in India and when on foreign service, 88-100. 115.

Detailed composition of the Native regiments further adverted to; approval of a mixture of races and of castes, 110-113—Very few Mahrattas in the Bengal army; explanation hereon, 114. 225, 226—Impression that the cost of a European regiment in India is about double that of a Native regiment, 116-118—Regulations as to the pensions of the Native soldiers according to length of service, 119-121—Power of the men to claim their discharge after three years' service, 122, 123—Regularity with which the men transmit a portion of their pay to their families, 124-127.

Practice as to furloughs in the Bengal and Madras armies respectively; deduction made from the pay when on furlough, 128-133. 138—Long and frequent furloughs in the Bengal regiments, 128. 131-133—Large increase of pay necessary in order to induce the natives to go freely on foreign service, 149, 150. 181, 182. 201-217.

Doubt as to its being cheaper to have Indian troops on foreign stations to be relieved every three years than European troops relieved every five years, 151, 152. 156—Further considerations as to the obstacle to foreign service on account of the separation of the men from their families, whilst it would be impracticable for the latter to accompany the regiments, 157 *et seq.*

Difficulty anticipated in substituting Native for European troops in the Mauritius; the experiment might be tried under a good commanding officer, 165-168. 188-190—Doubt as to absence of the men from their families for a period of three years leading to any gross immoralities, 173-190. 218-221—Much less immorality and drunkenness in Native regiments than in European regiments, 176-180. 185-187—Facility of finding Natives for service in Arracan and the Straits, 193. 210, 211—Understanding of the men when being enlisted that they will not be sent on foreign service, though they know that they are liable to be sent, 194-198.

Difficulty, by any increase of pay, of making the Native troops contented to serve in the Mauritius, 201-208—No inducements are necessary in sending Madras troops to Ceylon, 209—Considerable difficulty as regards the employment of Natives on garrison duty at Hong Kong, 212-217—Explanation with reference to the number of Affghans in the Indian army, 222-224.

Actual increase of European troops in India to the extent of only 13,000 men since the time of the mutiny, 227—Additional forts and arsenals now garrisoned by Europeans, the present European army being anything but excessive, 227-229—Decrease of 107,000 in the Native army since the year 1857; 227—Several arsenals

## N O R M A N.

Report, 1867—continued.

*Norman, Colonel Henry Wylie, C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

and forts which it is extremely desirable to hold with British troops, 228-238 — Expediency of the fort at Gwalior being garrisoned by Europeans, 229-233.

Proposed arrangement for stationing about twelve per cent. of the European troops on the hills, 239-241 — Distribution of the British troops with a view to massing them to some extent, and at the same time so as to hold all the more important points, 242 — Difficulty in withdrawing the troops from all stations reputed to be unhealthy, *ib.* — Impolicy of employing Chinese troops in India, whilst they would not be so cheap as Native troops, 243-247.

Obstacle to any further removal of European troops to hill stations, 248-252 — Explanation as to the withdrawal of troops from Roy Bareilly, 250, 251 — Also as to the employment of Native troops with European Artillery in the Straits Settlements, 256-259, 264 — Limited force of Native Artillery employed in India; objection to any additional force, 259-261 — Greater objection to having only Native troops with European field artillery than with garrison artillery, 262-264 — Peculiar difficulty in getting the Goorká regiments to serve out of India, 265.

Expediency of careful consultation of experienced officers before making any arrangements for employing ten or twelve Native regiments on foreign service, 266 — Great dissatisfaction if the regiments were ordered abroad in regular rotation, 267 — Very few regiments which could be spared for foreign service, 268, 269 — Approval on the whole of an extension of the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps for service in Hong Kong, &c., rather than of attempting to raise a distinct corps for the purpose, 270-277.

[Second Examination.]—Memorandum delivered in showing the composition of the Native army in the Three Presidencies, 278 — Reference also to a memorandum showing the actual cost of a Native corps and a European corps in India, 278-282.

Explanation that witness raises no objection to the employment of Native troops on field service, or on occasions of emergency, out of India, 283 — Important distinction between a coolie and a soldier as regards employment out of India, *ib.* — Probable difficulty in the event of Native troops being sent to places where their prejudices as to caste, &c., are not understood, *ib.* — Further explanation relative to the pensions of the Native troops, *ib.*

Considerable number of fortifications in India, many of which require European garrisons or guards, 283, 284 — Causes of the non-occupation of Roy Bareilly with a large force further adverted to, 284 — Serious embarrassment of the Indian Government if required to send a dozen Native regiments to the Colonies; necessity at once of raising other regiments in lieu of them, 284, 285 — Several Colonies to which Native troops might properly be sent for field service, 286-288.

Further evidence opposed to the employment of Chinese troops in India, whether in lieu of Europeans or of Native troops; belief that it would have an extremely bad effect on the natives, and would weaken the British hold of the country, 289-309, 358-362, 370-378 — Doubt as to the fighting qualities of Chinese troops, 290-294, 371, 372.

Total of 45,000 British soldiers in India at the beginning of 1857, the present number being about 58,000; 310-314 — Grounds for concluding that the railways, though very useful to some extent for the movement of troops, will not for some years be so far complete as to justify any material reduction of European troops, 315-318 — Approval generally of the present proportion of two Native soldiers to one European, 319, 320 — Inexpediency of any sensible reduction either in the Native force of 125,000, or in the British force of 60,000; 319, 320, 349-357.

Special duties required of the European troops as a check upon fanatical outbreaks in large towns, 320-329 — Statement of the force kept at Secunderabad, 330-333 — Explanation in connection with the force at Benares, 334, 335 — Approval of the employment of several native regiments out of India on field service, whilst their employment regularly on foreign garrison duty would be very objectionable, 336-348 — Proportion of five sepoy to one British soldier at the time of the mutiny, whereas it is now deemed essential to keep the proportion at two to one, 349-357.

Performance by the police of many of the duties formerly fulfilled by the Native troops else so large a reduction of the latter could not be carried out, 363-366 — Circumstance of part of Ceylon having for a long period been garrisoned by Malays without any evils having arisen, 367-370 — Necessity of having recourse largely to the Indian army in the event of war in China or Persia; objection, however, to foreign employment in time of peace on account of the aversion of the natives to foreign garrison service, 379-383.

Disapproval of special corps being raised on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service; advantage rather of the power of sending any regiment abroad in time of emergency, 384-386 — Absence of necessity for calling for volunteers for field service out of India, 387, 388 — Prejudicial reports likely to be spread by Native regiments on their return from foreign garrison duty, 389-392 — Necessity of keeping in view the religious prejudices of the Hindoos, &c., in considering the question of their being sent across the sea, 393-400.

Further

Report, 1867—continued.

*Norman, Colonel Henry Wylie, C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Further explanation as to the course pursued in having European infantry in support of European artillery, except at Singapore, 404, 405—Disapproval on the whole of any Native regiments being officered entirely by natives, 406-410—Question considered whether it is not desirable to raise the bounty for British soldiers re-enlisted in India on discharge there, the present bounty varying from 10*l.* to 15*l.*, whereas the cost of bringing each man home is about 50*l.*; 411-415. 424-427, 437-445.

Absence of any special inducement to discharged men settling in the country, 416-418—Objections to discharged soldiers settling on the north-west frontier, 419-423—Exceptional instances of British soldiers being allowed to take temporary service with planters and others; inconvenience of this practice, 428-432—Privilege to the European soldiers in being largely employed on the unattached list, as in the Public Works Department, &c., 432, 433—Grounds upon which it was decided not to allow soldiers to be employed by the railway companies, 434-436.

Circumstance of the Government of India having been prepared to recommend an increase of the bounty in India, 445—Comment on the circumstance of less space being allowed on board the transport ships for native than for British troops between India and Burmah, 446-450—Good health of the British troops in Burmah, 451, 452—Amount of force now kept at Rangoon, Moulmein, &c., 453—Explanation relative to the force at the penal establishment in the Andaman Islands, 453-456.

Further information relative to the system of recruiting in India; this system might well be adopted in the case of regiments serving out of India, 462-469—Belief as to the black troops at Hyderabad being Abyssinians, 470-472—Impolicy generally of entrusting Colonies to the care of Native troops without a nucleus of European troops, 473, 474—Efficiency of natives as garrison artillery or field artillery, 475-477

*Norman, Colonel.* Memorandum by Colonel Norman in contravention of certain conclusions arrived at by Sir Henry Havelock in favour of the reduction of the British and Native armies in India, *App.* 217-220.

*North American Colonies.* Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army and stationed in the several North American Colonies, *App.* 282, 283.

*Number of Battalions (India).* Grounds for the conclusion that it is very important to have fewer battalions in India, with a larger proportion of rank and file, *Balfour* 3541-3547—Examination to the effect that the Indian authorities have had but little influence in fixing the force or establishment of the battalions in India, *ib.* 3726-3736.

## O.

*Officers (Establishment in India).* Great and unnecessary expense involved in keeping up the officers and non-commissioned officers to the full maximum establishment, whilst the rank and file are below the establishment, *Balfour* 3542. 3725-3731.

*Officers (Native Troops).* Objection to any increase of European officers when Native regiments go on foreign service, *Norman* 72-82—Disapproval of any Native regiments being officered entirely by natives, *ib.* 406-410—Tact required on the part of commanding officers in Colonies where Indian troops might be employed; doubt as to any serious difficulty arising on this score, *Sir W. Elliot* 601. 609-618—Disapproval of Native regiments being officered by natives, *Keyes* 729.

Suggestions as to the officering of Native regiments sent on foreign service, *Probyn* 871, 872. 898-902. 936—Importance of men going abroad with their own officers, *Baker* 1029. 1037, 1038; *Sir H. Storks* 3277—Importance of special care as to the command and officering of Native troops out of India, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2694. 2700-2703—Great importance of carefully selected officers for Native regiments serving in Colonies; absence of difficulty on this score, *Lord Strathnairn* 3435-3443.

Great importance of European officers with sepoy regiments being sufficiently numerous to look after the discipline and wellbeing of the men in a proper manner, *Balfour* 3458-3462—Valuable supply of trained and efficient officers in the time of the old Indian army, *ib.* 3609, 3610—Direct effect of a proper supply of efficient officers in insuring the efficiency of Native troops, whether in India or the Colonies, *ib.* 3612-3617—Illustrations of the great importance of European officers for the leading of Native troops, *ib.* 3671-3677—Great value of the trained and experienced officers to be obtained by means of a local European force, *ib.* 3761.

*Officers (Pay and Allowances).* Statement as to the great inequality between the pay of officers with European regiments, and of officers with Native regiments from India, when serving in the same Colony; great expense involved in assimilating the pay of the former to that of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 2992-3013. 3044—Slight weight attached to the objection as regards difference of pay of officers in the case of Native and British troops serving together, *Lord Strathnairn* 3435.

Report, 1867—continued.

*Officers (Pay and Allowances)*—continued.

Large amount of the pay of the officers of any regiment in India as compared with that of the non-commissioned rank and file, *Balfour* 3592—Explanation in connection with the relative expense of the officers and of the men in a regiment of infantry, the actual pay not representing the proportionate expense, *ib.* 3743-3749.

Evidence in explanation of the practice as to pay and allowances of European officers in the Colonies; great expense incurred in the shape of allowances for officers' quarters, &c., so that the system of direct money payment is more economical, *Balfour* 3770-3775—Undue reduction made in the allowances to officers in the Mauritius, *ib.* 3776.

Further explanation in regard to the relative cost of officers and of non-commissioned officers and men, *Balfour* 3818.

*Ord, Colonel H. St. George, C.B., R.E.* Views of Colonel Ord upon the question whether the West India regiments are to be depended upon as against their own countrymen, *Taylor* 2425-2432—Answers received from Colonel Ord, Governor of the Straits Settlements, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of Native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 235.

*Overland Route.* Estimate of the cost of conveyance of troops by the Overland and Cape routes respectively; considerable difference in favour of the former, *App.* 286.

P.

*Pathans.* Very little prejudice among the Pathans in regard to food, *Keyes* 687-690—Considerable difficulty anticipated in providing occupation sufficient to keep Pathan soldiers contented for three or five years in a foreign Colony, *ib.* 725-728—Reluctance of the Pathans and Sikhs to leave the neighbourhood of their homes for foreign service generally, though they would be quite ready to go for fighting service, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1507-1517.

**PAY AND ALLOWANCES (NATIVE TROOPS):**

Particulars as to the pay and allowances of the Native troops when in India and when on foreign service, *Norman* 88-100, 115—The ordinary pay is seven rupees a month, out of which the men have to find the whole of their food, *ib.* 92, 93, 115—Large increase of pay necessary in order to induce the natives to go freely on foreign service, *ib.* 149, 150, 181, 182, 201-217.

Character and amount of the allowances to Indian troops over and above their ordinary pay when on service in China; in addition to full batta and free rations, pensions are given to the families of those who die or are killed, *Pears* 760-766, 805—Consideration as to the amount and character of the inducement necessary in order to obtain the willing services of Native troops out of India, *ib.* 798-807—There need not be any difficulty in regard to the pay of a mixed force in any Colony, *Probyn* 944, 945—Suggestion as to the increased pay and other privileges necessary in order to induce Native troops to go willingly to foreign service, *Baker* 1029-1037, 1050-1058.

Necessity of considering the question of food in any Colony in connection with the rate of pay of Native troops sent to such Colony, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1493-1506; *Caird* 1781, 1782—Conclusion that, with adequate pay and proper arrangements, natives would willingly serve in the Colonies, *Caird* 1774-1782, 1791-1797, 1803-1807—Opinion that for three rupees extra per month Native troops would willingly serve in the Colonies, *ib.* 1781—Suggestion as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with the extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2695-2699, 2704-2707.

Advantage of some scheme by which European and Native troops should serve together without its being necessary to raise the pay and allowances of the former, *Duke of Cambridge* 3008-3010—Importance of abstaining from any interference with the pay and allowances to which Native troops consider themselves entitled when on foreign service, *Balfour* 3469, 3470.

Statement of the pay and allowances and charges for different corps in the Bengal army, exclusive of commissariat, clothing, &c., *App.* 261.

Annual cost of granting 2*d.* a day extra pay to the non-commissioned officers and men of a battalion of infantry, comprising 788 men, all ranks, *App.* 299.

Particulars of the pay and allowances of Native and European regiments in India, *App.* 306-315—Statement showing the amount of regimental pay and allowances of each grade of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and rank and file of the several branches of the European army serving in India, *ib.* 308—Statement showing the rates of pay and allowances of medical officers and of subordinate grades having half and full batta rates of pay, *ib.* 309.

Statement

Report, 1867—continued.

**PAY AND ALLOWANCES (NATIVE TROOPS)**—continued.

Statement showing the comparative cost, under the head of Regimental Pay and Allowances, of a given military force in each of the Three Indian Presidencies and in Ceylon, *App.* 318.

See also *Cost. Officers (Pay and Allowances). Pensions. Rations.*

*Pears, Major-General Thomas Townsend, C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explanation that there are no returns in the India Office of the cost of removal of regiments from one Oriental port to another, 759—Offer made a few years ago to take a regiment from Hong Kong to Bombay for 5,000 *l.*, *ib.*—Character and amount of the allowances to Indian troops, over and above their ordinary pay, when on service in China; in addition to full batta and free rations, pensions are given to the families of those who die or are killed, 760–766. 805.

Garrison duty in Burmah is considered foreign service in the Madras army, Bengal troops only going there on field service, 767–770—Garrison of Madras troops and of Europeans at the penal settlements, 771–773—Belief that no difficulty of any moment has ever been experienced in regard to Madras troops serving in Burmah or China, 774–776. 789. 798–800—Practice formerly of recruiting in Bengal for certain Marine battalions, 777–780—Particulars relative to the Marine battalion in the Bombay army, 784–788.

Bad moral effect apprehended as regards the natives of India if Chinese troops or other foreign mercenaries were employed there, 791–795. 827–832—Necessity of an increased number of Native troops as an equivalent for a smaller number of European troops withdrawn from any Colony, 794–797—Considerations as to the amount and character of the inducement necessary in order to obtain the willing services of Native troops out of India, 798–807—Difficulties to be encountered respectively in raising a special regiment for foreign service, and in sending abroad a regiment of the existing army, 807–817.

Doubt as to the expediency of placing Native troops in any Colony without some European troops also, 818–820. 838–845—Exceptional character of the Straits Settlements as regards the employment of Native troops exclusively, 818–836, 837. 846—Objection to the Mauritius being garrisoned solely by Native troops, 819. 838–845—Doubt as to the policy of employing Native troops on garrison duty at Malta or Gibraltar; obstacle also to the men being accompanied by their families, 821–826—Importance of the question of time as regards the willingness of Native troops to serve out of India, 825. 834, 835.

*Pensions.* Regulations as to the pensions of the Native soldiers according to the length of service, *Norman* 119–121. 283—Practice when Native troops have been serving out of India for the family pensions to be paid directly to the families left behind, *Sir W. Elliot* 504–506—Careful consideration necessary upon the subject of pensions to the families of men going on foreign service, *Pears* 801–805—Amendment suggested in the system of pensions with a view to make the service more popular to the natives, *Keyes* 1152–1155—Considerable expense on the score of pensions to the widows of Native soldiers dying on foreign service, *Sir Hope Grant* 1236.

*Police (India).* Performance by the police of many of the duties formerly fulfilled by the Native troops, else so large a reduction of the latter could not be carried out, *Norman* 363–366.

Opinion as to the sufficiency of the police force for keeping in check any insurrectionary movement of the people, if taken in time, *Mangles* 3077, 3078—Fallacy of the notion that danger is to be apprehended from what is termed the military police of India, *ib.* 3077. 3171.

Statement in favour of many of the duties now performed by soldiers in India being placed under the police; important economy thereby, whilst there would be much advantage on the score of discipline, *Balfour* 3465–3468—Expediency of a positive regulation prohibiting the imposition of police duties on Native troops serving abroad, *ib.* 3503. 3626–3628.

*Probyn, Colonel Dighton, C.B., V.C.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has commanded a Native Cavalry regiment in India for the last ten years, comprised entirely of northern men, 852, 853—Service of witness's regiment, and of other northern regiments, in China in 1860 without any difficulty having arisen, 854–861. 867. 907–914—Several high-caste men in witness's regiment, notwithstanding which no difficulty whatever arose as to the supply of water on board ship, or as to the cooking, 856, 857. 907–914.

Belief that by certain inducements in the shape of extra pay, and of food, &c., Sikh troops would readily serve on garrison duty out of India for three years at a time, 862, 863. 868–870. 891–894. 903–906—Evidence in approval of the employment of Native troops on foreign service in the Colonies; certain objections thereto considered, 864 *et seq.*—Suggestions as to the officering of Native regiments sent on foreign service, 871, 478—1.

Report, 1867—continued.

*Probyn, Colonel Dighton, C.B., V.C.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

872. 895-902. 936—Respects in which a Native soldier on service out of India would be much cheaper than a European soldier, 873-878. 939, 940.

Inexpediency of the worst Colonies or stations being selected for Native troops, 894. 938—Good conduct of Native regiments when on garrison in China, 915-919—Opinion that a sufficient supply of British officers would be forthcoming for permanent service in China, 920-924—Disapproval of the employment of foreign mercenaries in India, 925, 926—Different castes of which witness's regiment is composed, the Sikhs having very few prejudices, 927-932.

Anticipated good conduct of Sikh soldiers on garrison duty abroad, as well as on field service, 933-937—Disapproval of a Native force of artillery, though the Sikhs are excellent artillerymen, 941-943—Opinion that no serious difficulty would arise on social grounds through having a mixed force of Natives and Europeans in the Mediterranean, 943. 946-950—Nor need there be any difficulty in regard to the pay of a mixed force, 944, 945.

*Public Works Department (India).* Privilege to the European soldiers in India in being largely employed on the unattached list, as in the Public Works Department, *Norman* 432, 433.

*Punjab, and Punjab Troops.* The 1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry is composed chiefly of Pathans, Sikhs, and Dogras, the latter being mostly Rajpoots, *Keyes* 636-639—Belief that men could readily be raised in the Punjab to go on foreign service if sufficient inducements were held out, as by doubling the present pay and providing rations, *ib.* 645. 709-722—Fitness of the Punjab regiments for service in cold countries, *ib.* 681-686—Doubt as to the willingness of witness's regiment to go on foreign service for three years, or any indefinite time, though by liberal pay there is no doubt but men might be recruited expressly for foreign service, *ib.* 697-715.

Explanation relative to the command of the Punjab frontier force, to which witness's regiment belongs; performance by the force of police duties as well as of military duties, *Keyes* 1103-1110—Probable mode of accounting for the reduced number of natives of good position who now enter the army in the Punjab, *ib.* 1120, 1121—Inexpediency of the tendency to contract the powers of reward and punishment formerly exercised by the commanding officers of regiments in the Punjab, *ib.* 1122-1129.

Difficulty in getting the best class of men in the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces to leave India on foreign garrison service, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1492. 1507-1520.

Unduly large European force maintained in the Punjab; opinion that it would be better to give up the territory altogether, unless it can be safely held with a much smaller force, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1919-1934.

Large number of police in the Punjab; way in which armed and officered, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2668-2673—Excellence of Punjaubees and Beloochees for garrison and sentry duties; their advantage over British troops as sentries, *Fonblanque* 2729, 2730. 2750-2752. 2792, 2793. 2881-2883.

Memorandum showing the composition of the Native army of the Punjab as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Statement showing the detail of the establishment and cost of a battery of Punjab artillery, *App.* 307.

## R.

*Railways (India).* Grounds for concluding that the railways in India, though very useful to some extent for the movement of troops, will not for some years be so far complete as to justify any material reduction of European troops, *Norman* 315-318.

*Rangoon.* See *Burma*.

*Rations.* Necessity of considering the extra expense of rations for Native troops in Colonies irrespectively of extra pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1493-1506; *Caird* 1781, 1782—Much higher cost of rations in Ceylon than in India, *Mucedonald* 2189-2192—Suggestions as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with the extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2685-2699. 2704-2707—Communication from Colonel Balfour in August 1861 upon the subject of the rations and the cooking for Native soldiers on foreign service, *App.* 321-324.

*Recruiting (India).* Prejudicial effect upon recruiting if the men were to go on foreign service for garrison duty, *Norman* 31. 53-56. 64. 101-109—Information relative to the practice of recruiting in India; no bounty has hitherto been given, *ib.* 83-88. 90, 91—Increased difficulty in raising recruits, on account chiefly of the smallness of the pay with reference to the increased price of provisions, *ib.* 88. 101-107. 115. 197—Further information relative to the system of recruiting in India; this system might well be

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Recruiting (India)*—continued.

be adopted in the case of regiments serving out of India, *Norman* 462-469—Greater difficulty of late years in obtaining recruits for witness's regiment (the 1st Punjab Infantry), *Keyes* 722-724.

Explanation of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission of 1866 in regard to the practice of recruiting, and the enlistment of men for particular regiments; conditions subject to which the men are to be enlisted for general service, *Balfour* 3637, 3638, 3640.

Copy of General Enlistment Orders issued in India in 1856, *App.* 339.

**REDUCTION OF ARMY:****I. India:**

1. British Army.
2. Native Army.

**II. Generally.****I. India:****1. British Army:**

Conclusion that the British force in India is now at its minimum with reference to the duties required of it; approval moreover of the proportion of one British soldier to two native soldiers, *Norman* 319-325, 349-357—Strong objection to any reduction of the English army in India, *Sir Hope Grant* 1268-1271; *Johnson* 1739.

Expediency of there being a certain proportion of European troops in India with reference to the native force, the present proportion being however excessive, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1863-1868—Statement that by governing India with justice, and by maintaining good faith towards the chiefs, greater safety will be ensured than by keeping up the present European force, *ib.* 1877, 1878, 1882, 1910-1934—Witness considers that an army of 44,000 effective British troops should suffice for all India, *ib.* 1927.

Strong objection to any reduction of the European force in India without reference to the native troops; obstacle moreover to any reduction of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 3040, 3041.

Witness submits sundry data for the conclusion that the European army in India is unnecessarily large, and that no danger would be incurred in reducing it, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Great mistake in maintaining from 65,000 to 70,000 British troops in order chiefly to watch 135,000 native troops, there being in truth no one else for the former to fight with, *ib.* 3067-3077, 3087-3089, 3128—Suggestion that the British army be reduced by 20,000 men, *ib.* 3070, 3090-3095, 3102, 3159-3164—Very little use of a large British force so far as the Nepaulese, Bhootans, Burmese, &c., are concerned, *ib.* 3072-3077—Increased control over the people by means of the improved arms now in possession of the European army, *ib.* 3085, 3095, 3128, 3148, 3149—With regard to the number of British troops now stationed at different posts, and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, the native troops being reduced at the same time, *ib.* 3151-3156.

Objection to any diminution in the number of English troops in India, the number being in fact too low already, *Lord Strathnairn* 3401—Regulation of the number of troops in India by the state of the country, and the duties required of the men, the duties being extremely hard, *ib.* 3449, 3450.

Opinion that the British army now in India is greater than there is any military necessity for; grounds for this conclusion considered, *Balfour* 3548 *et seq.*—Concurrence in the views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854, as to the sufficiency of thirty-five regiments of European infantry, *ib.* 3552-3558, 3641—Suggestion that the British force in India might consist of 35,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, irrespective of officers, *ib.* 3574-3584—Conclusion as to the entire ability of a much smaller European force than that now in India for overcoming any native force in the field, *ib.* 3608—Difference of about 9,000 or 10,000 men between the British force contemplated by witness for India, and the actual force now in the country, *ib.* 3721-3725—Suggestion that the European troops should consist of a local European army of 30,000 men, and an Imperial army of 20,000 men, *ib.* 3762, 3763.

Grounds put forward by Sir John Lawrence for objecting to any important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, *App.* 212, 213.

Official communication setting forth the views of Sir W. Mansfield in strong disapproval of any reduction of the British army, *App.* 293-299.

Detailed statement and suggestions in minute of Lord Dalhousie, dated 5th February 1856, in regard to the British and native forces of India, and the amount at which it is desirable to fix the limit of the Imperial troops, *App.* 327-333.

## REDUCTION OF ARMY—continued.

## I. India—continued.

## 2. Native Army:

Inexpediency of any sensible reduction in the native force of 125,000 on account of the increased duty to be thrown thereby upon the British troops, *Norman* 319, 320—There is a strong impression that any reduction of the native force would be an impossibility, *Duke of Cambridge* 3041.

Perfect safety in reducing the European army, if the native army be reduced, the latter being almost the sole cause of danger, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Suggestion that the native army be reduced to 100,000 men, that is by about 35,000, *ib.* 3070, 3090–3095, 3102, 3159–3164—Inexpediency of any reduction of the European army, unless the native army be reduced, whilst the unnecessarily large strength of the latter is the only obstacle to a reduction of the former, *ib.* 3078, 3079, 3110—Greater fidelity of the native army accordingly as its power of mischief is curtailed by reducing the number of men, *ib.* 3083–3086, 3102—Effect of the maintenance of a large native army in fostering military habits and a warlike spirit among the population, *ib.* 3097—The large native army is in fact the real source of danger, *ib.* 3146.

Undue reduction already made in the native army, the duties being now much too severe, *Lord Strathnairn* 3427–3429, 3450—Approval of a native infantry of 90,000 privates, *Balfour* 3648.

## II. Generally:

Decided objection to a reduction in the European troops at large, through the increased employment of an inferior article in the shape of native troops, *Duke of Cambridge* 2965, 2966, 2969–2971, 3032–3034—Grounds for concluding that an increased employment of native troops in the colonies will surely lead to a corresponding reduction in the aggregate of European troops in the army, *ib.* 3047–3057.

The question of a further reduction in the aggregate of the Imperial army, as a consequence of reducing the force in India, should not in any way affect the latter reduction, *Mangles* 3165–3167.

Conclusion that if the colonial service of the British army were reduced by the increased employment of native troops in the colonies, the aggregate strength would also be reduced, *Sir H. Storks* 3296–3308—Apprehended reduction in the British army if native soldiers were substituted for Europeans in the colonies; strong disapproval of such reduction, *Lord Strathnairn* 3387, 3388—Further statement that any advantages from the employment of native Indian troops in the colonies would not counterbalance the evil of reduction of the British army, *ib.* 3420, 3433, 3444–3448.

See also *Havelock*, *Sir Henry (the late)*. *Insurrection (India)*. *Punjab, &c.*  
*Railways*. *Russia*.

*Reliefs (British Troops)*. Witness supplies some information relative to the practice in regard to reliefs and movements of troops eastward of the Cape, and between England and the colonies, and will furnish to the Committee a detailed return on the subject for the last twenty years (*App.* 340–345); *Hon. H. K. Clifford* 729 *et seq.*—Very rare instances of regiments being moved from China to India, *ib.* 729–735.

*Reliefs (Native Troops on Foreign Service)*. Expediency of limiting to three years the period of foreign service of Madras regiments, *Sir W. Elliot* 575, 581–585, 591—Difficulty in inducing natives to serve abroad, in garrison duty, for a longer period than three years, or even for that period, *Keyes* 646–654, 664–679—Importance of the question of time as regards the willingness of native troops to serve out of India, *Pears* 825, 834, 835.

Necessity of relieving Indian troops in two or three years; serious expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, *Sir Hope Grant* 1360, 1361, 1367–1370—Serious expense involved in the frequent relief of native troops, *Johnson* 1584, 1585, 1710, 1735, 1736—Great difficulty of inducing native troops to serve in the colonies, unless under an absolute guarantee that they would be relieved every three years, *ib.* 1733, 1734, 1747.

Expediency of arrangements for the frequent relief of native troops serving out of India; increase of cost thereby, *Lord Strathnairn* 3395, 3407, 3408.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that native troops employed out of India should be relieved every three years, *App.* 211.

*Religious Prejudices (Native Troops)*. Necessity of keeping in view the religious prejudices of the Hindoos, &c., in considering the question of their being sent across the sea, *Norman* 393–400—Apprehension lest from some cause or other the religious prejudices of native troops serving in the colonies might be offended, and lest dissatisfaction might be created throughout the entire native army, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1518, 1519.

See also *Caste*.

*Reserves.*



## Report, 1867—continued.

*Reserves.* See *Depôts and Reserves.*

*Réunion.* Paper explanatory of the strength and composition of the troops in the French colony of Réunion, *App.* 292.

*Rewards (Native Troops).* Objection to the limit placed upon the powers of the commanding officers of Punjaub regiments in regard to rewards and punishments, *Keyes* 1122-1129—Advantage if commanding officers had power to give rewards on the spot for distinguished service in the field, *ib.* 1127-1129. 1146-1151—Evidence in favour of jagheers or grants of land being given to native officers for long and faithful service, *ib.* 1130-1145—Gratification to many native officers if, when deserving of reward, they could come to England for a time as aides-de-camp to the Queen, *ib.* 1140-1142.

*Robinson, Sir H. G. R.* Answers received from Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Ceylon, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 237, 238.

*Roy Bareilly.* Explanation relative to the withdrawal of troops from Roy Bareilly, *Norman* 250, 251. 284.

*Russia.* Slight apprehension entertained by witness of any danger to India from the gradual approach of the Russian frontier, *Mangles* 3134, 3135—Facility of sending troops from home in time to meet a Russian invasion, *ib.* 3134. 3136. 3157, 3158.

Reference to the dangers which are coming upon us from Russia, *Balfour* 3799.

Remarks by Lord Dalhousie, in minute of September 1854, upon the strong feeling in the native mind as to the power of Russia, *App.* 326.

## S.

*Schneider, Colonel J. W.* Answers returned from Colonel Schneider, commanding the 2nd Grenadier Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the inexpediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 258.

*Secunderabad.* Statement of the force kept at Secunderabad, *Norman* 330-333.

*Settlers in India.* Absence of any special inducement to discharged men settling in the country, *Norman* 416-418—Objection to discharged soldiers settling in the north-west frontier, *ib.* 419-423—Opinion that, with proper arrangements, discharged European soldiers might, with advantage, be induced to settle in the Neilgherries and other hill districts, *Sir W. Elliot* 551-562—Obstacles to the foundation of a European settlement in India, as the nucleus of a local European force, *Sir Hope Grant* 1409-1414.

*Shadwell, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explains sundry items contained in a certain Paper (*App.* 7), showing the estimated annual cost of maintaining a battalion of infantry at different stations east of the Cape, 2618 *et seq.*—The item of barrack expenses in China, &c., includes the cost of hired buildings, but on this point witness will supply further information to the Committee, 2627-2631. 2640-2644.

*Sickness and Mortality (Native Troops in China, &c.)* Statement showing the sickness and mortality among the native troops in Burmah and Port Blair, for the years 1864 and 1865, *App.* 267—Particulars of the amount of sickness and mortality among the native troops serving in China during each of the years 1859-64, *ib.*

*Sikhs.* Less unwillingness of Sikhs and of Affghans than of Hindoos to go across the seas, *Norman* 46. 58—Belief that by certain indemnity in the shape of extra pay, and of food, &c., Sikh troops would readily serve on garrison out of India for three years at a time, *Probyn* 862, 863. 868-870. 891-894. 903-906—Different castes of which witness's regiment is composed, Sikhs having very few prejudices, *ib.* 927-932—Anticipated good conduct of Sikh soldiers on garrison duty abroad, as well as on field service, *ib.* 933-937.

Probable fitness of the Sikhs, Goorkas, and others, for colonial garrison service, the difficulty being to get them to leave India for the purpose, *Sir Hope Grant* 1172-1176—Relative fighting powers of the Sikhs, the Hindostanees, and the Chinese, *ib.* 1227-1232.

Statement as to the discontent among a regiment of Sikhs sent to Burmah seven or eight years ago, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1893-1899. 1996—Illustration of the excitable character of Sikh soldiers, *ib.* 1899—Peculiar propensity of Sikh soldiers for plunder, so that they are willing to join in any war where there is a prospect of booty, *ib.* 1908, 1909—Opinion as to its being a mistaken policy to encourage warlike habits in the Sikhs; number of Sikhs in the native army adverted to hereon, *ib.* 1963-1970.

*Sikhs*—continued.

Good discipline of the Sikh troops in the China war as compared with the French, *Mackenzie* 2055-2057—Probability of Sikhs being as willing as natives of Madras and Bengal, if equally well paid, to serve out of India, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2651, 2652—Information relative to the employment of a "pioneer corps" of Sikhs in Ceylon; entire failure of this arrangement, the Ceylon government having wanted the men for work, whilst the latter enlisted for the service with a view chiefly to soldiering, *ib.* 2653-2664—Particulars as to some recent steps for raising a body of 100 Sikhs for service in Hong Kong; enhanced rate of pay and other inducements stipulated for in this case, *ib.* 2665-2667. 2675-2681.

Statement showing the great misunderstanding which prevailed, and the sore feeling created, in regard to the experiment of sending 1,000 Sikhs to Ceylon, *Fonblanque* 2779-2791—Willingness of the Sikhs to go anywhere for fighting and plunder, but not for garrison duty, *Mangles* 3115, 3117—Less difficulties as to food and caste in the case of Sikhs than of Hindoos; willingness also of the former to go on active service out of India, *Sir H. Storks* 3207-3210, 3271, 3272, 3293-3295.

Much less caste feeling among the Sikhs than among the Hindoos generally, *Lord Strathnairn* 3385—Conclusion as to the superiority of the Sikh soldiers over every other native soldier in India *ib.* 3411, 3440.

See also *China. Colonial and Foreign Service. Punjaub, &c.*

*Singapore.* See *Straits Settlements.*

*Special Service Corps.* Disapproval of special corps being raised in India on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service; advantage rather of the power of sending any regiment required abroad in time of emergency, *Norman* 384-386—Approval of raising regiments expressly with a view to their serving abroad, *Sir W. Elliot* 573-581—Difficulties to be encountered respectively in raising a special regiment for foreign service, and in sending abroad a regiment of the existing army, *Pears* 807-817—Practicability of raising some special corps in India for garrison duty in the colonies, there being, however, serious objections to this plan, *Johnson* 1538, 1550-1556, 1632-1635, 1658—Strong disapproval of raising special corps for service out of India, *Balfour* 3817.

*Storks, Lieutenant General, The Right Honourable Sir Henry, G.C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Disapproval of the proposed employment of Indian troops in lieu of British troops in the colonies, 3172-3174—Objection to any portion of the present force at the Cape being replaced by Sikhs or other native troops from India, 3175-3184, 3211-3222, 3268—Advantage of employing local levies at the Cape, such as Fingoes, in addition to British troops, rather than of bringing native troops from India; efficiency of the former in the event of a Kaffir war, 3184-3190, 3282, 3283, 3290-3292.

Objection to the employment of Fingoe levies as part of the garrison of the Mauritius, 3191-3195—Great importance of the Mauritius in a political and military sense, so that even in time of peace it is essential to maintain a European garrison of 1,600 or 1,800 men, 3195-3202, 3223-3242, 3269—Use likely to be made of the coolie population of the Mauritius in aid of the garrison in case of foreign attack, 3198, 3230, 3250-3254—Strong French feeling in the Mauritius, thus rendering an adequate British garrison the more essential, 3199, 3241, 3242, 3255, 3256.

Decided objection to colonial troops at Malta, except as supplemental to British troops; the latter should not in time of peace number less than 6,000 men, 3204-3207, 3262-3267, 3286-3289—Less difficulties as to food and caste in the case of Sikhs than of Hindoos; willingness also of the former to go on active service out of India, 3207, 3210, 3271, 3272, 3293-3295—Question whether as regards the Cape the settlers should not be left to take care of themselves against the Kaffirs, 3214, 3215, 3278-3281.

Greater reason for the maintenance of an unmixed British garrison at the Mauritius than in the Straits Settlements, or at Aden, 3238-3242—Large garrison required at Gibraltar as well as Malta in the event of war, 3244-3246—Expediency of settling in time of peace the details of any scheme for the employment of Indian troops in the colonies, 3247-3249, 3273—Objection to substituting Asiatic troops for black troops in the West Indies, 3257-3260—Approval of the employment of black troops on the West Coast of Africa, 3261.

Anticipated local objection in Malta to the introduction of Asiatic troops as a permanent arrangement, 3262-3266—Approval of the employment of Asiatic troops in Egypt, 3274—Objection by those colonies which pay towards the troops, to the substitution of Asiatics for Europeans, 3275, 3276—Importance of native troops in the colonies being commanded by their own officers, 3277.

Opinion that there is no colonial race which could be advantageously recruited for general service regiments, 3284, 3285—Great experience of the Canadian regiment raised in 1857; 3285—Grounds for concluding that if the colonial service of the British army were reduced by the increased employment of native troops in the colonies, the aggregate strength of the army would also be reduced, 3296-3308.

**STRAITS SETTLEMENTS:**

Facility of finding natives of India for service in Arracan and the Straits, *Norman* 193-210, 211—Explanation as to the employment of native troops with European artillery in the Straits Settlements, *ib.* 256-259. 264—Exceptional character of the Straits Settlements as regards the employment of native troops exclusively, *Pears* 818. 836, 837. 846.

Sufficiency heretofore of Madrasers for garrisoning Singapore, it being a peculiarly quiet place, *Sir Hope Grant* 1183-1190—Approval of withdrawing British troops from Singapore in the event of a war in Europe; they might be brought home in about a month, *ib.* 1183-1200—Expediency of a European garrison at Singapore, *ib.* 1460-1466—Necessity of Europeans to defend the place if a war were to break out, *ib.* 1479—Completion of the barracks at Singapore for only one wing of a European regiment, *ib.* 1484-1487.

Particulars relative to the garrison at the Straits Settlements; alterations contemplated, *Johnson* 1600-1614—Non-objection to native regiments doing duty at Singapore and the Straits, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1976, 1977—Advantage in garrisoning Singapore with native troops and European artillery, whereas it is now decided to place a wing of a European regiment there, *Mackenzie* 2009-2012. 2027-2032. 2083, 2084—Very indifferent character of the climate of Singapore, *ib.* 2030. 2049—Statement in favour of garrisoning Singapore partly with the Ceylon Rifles, it being desirable, however, to have some European troops also, *Macdonald* 2207-2216, 2238-2246.

Expediency of some British troops in addition to European garrison artillery in the Straits Settlements, *Duke of Cambridge* 2988-2990—Disapproval of there being artillery only with the native troops at Singapore, *Lord Strathnairn* 3394.

Entire efficiency of the Indian native troops at Singapore in time of peace, *Cavenagh* 3312, 3313. 3316-3323—Difficulty, on financial grounds, in obtaining European troops at Singapore from India in case of war, *ib.* 3314, 3315—Rate of pay and allowances of the Indian troops at Singapore, *ib.* 3328-3330—Advantage of European artillery at Singapore, though a native regiment is efficient for internal defence, *ib.* 3342-3345—Particulars as to the payment made by the Straits Settlements for the garrison of Singapore, &c.; also as to the cost of the garrison to the Indian Government, *ib.* 3360, 3361. 3370-3374—Explanation relative to the transfer of the Settlements to the Colonial Government, the reduced sum now paid by the colony, and the expense to the Imperial treasury, through the want of longer notice of the transfer, *ib.* 3362-3369. 3375-3378.

Very satisfactory results of the employment of native troops at Singapore, Penang, and Malacca since the year 1826; instance in 1842 of their bravery in action against the Malays, *Balfour* 3484-3494—Statement strongly in favour of the continued employment of native troops in the Straits Settlements, rather than of sending out British troops; undue expense, moreover, if the latter proceeding be carried out, *ib.* 3802-3806—Circumstance of Mr. Crauford, who has had great experience in Singapore, having asked for only 200 European artillery, in addition to a local constabulary force, *ib.* 3806.

Return showing that the force is to comprise about 1360 officers and men, *App.* 282.

See also *Ceylon Rifle Corps.*

*Strathnairn, the Right Honourable Lord.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Considers that in principle the employment of native Indian troops out of India is very expedient, 3381—Important advantage if by service out of India the prejudices of the native soldiers in regard to caste could be mitigated or removed, so as to prevent interference with discipline, 3381-3386—Satisfactory service in France of the native Algerian troops, from whom all traces of caste have almost disappeared, 3381—Tendency of service out of India to render the natives more civilised, and to diminish the liability to native revolutions, 3382.

Much stronger existence of caste in Bengal than in Bombay or Madras, 3383, 3384—Much less feeling of caste among the Sikhs than among the Hindoos generally, 3385—Apprehended reduction in the British army, if native soldiers were substituted for Europeans in the colonies; strong disapproval of such reduction, 3387, 3388—Conclusion that there would be a saving of expense by substituting a native for a British regiment out of India, 3389.

Strong objection to the native regiments being called upon to volunteer for foreign service, they having already taken the oath to serve anywhere, so that there should be no option in the matter, 3389. 3406. 3422—Instances of the readiness of Bombay troops to serve out of India, *ib.*—Improbability of Sikh troops in the West Indies coming into collision with the European or local population, 3391. 3403—Doubt whether the regiments in Bengal are prepared for a system of foreign service, 3391. 3406. 3446.

Disapproval of colonies being held by Indian troops without any European troops; the two work exceedingly well together, 3393, 3394. 3398—Objection to native troops, supported only by European artillery, 3394. 3405—Expediency of arrangements for the frequent

Report, 1867—continued.

*Strathnairn, the Right Hon. Lord.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

frequent relief of native troops serving out of India; increase of cost thereby, 3395-3407, 3408—Important auxiliaries to our military strength in India by reason of garrisons at the Cape, Hong Kong, Mauritius, &c., 3396-3400, 3431, 3432—Necessity of British as well as native troops, for so important a station as Mauritius, 3398-3400.

Objections to any diminution in the number of English troops in India, the number being in fact too low already, 3401—Approval of an interchange of West Indian and Indian troops, by way of trial, 3402, 3403, 3414-3419—Inexpediency of a total removal of European troops from the tropical colonies, though there might be a partial exchange for native troops, 3404, 3444-3448—Disapproval of Hong Kong being held by native troops only; approval of a mixed force there, 3405, 3447, 3448—Facility of reducing the ill-health of the European troops at Hong Kong, 3405.

Expediency, on the score of discipline, of the Hindoo regiments and Sikh regiments being alike considered available for foreign service, 3410, 3411—Conclusion as to the superiority of the Sikh soldier over every other native soldier in India, 3411, 3440—Discretion necessary as regards the employment of Mahomedan troops from India in a colony where the natives were Mahomedan, 3412, 3413—Element of safety in the mixed composition of the Indian native army, *ib.*—Improvement in the case of the West India regiments if they were to serve in India, 3414-3419.

Further statement that any advantages from the employment of native Indian troops in the colonies would not counterbalance the evil of reduction of the British army, 3420, 3433, 3444-3448—Entire fitness of native troops for service in the colonies in time of war, 3421—Expediency of the employment of native troops out of India being commenced in time of peace, rather than postponed till war occurs, 3422, 3423—Approval of the Mauritius being reinforced by native troops from India in the event of war, 3424-3427.

Undue reduction made in the native army, the duties being now much too severe, 3427-3429, 3450—Usefulness of native troops for garrison duties in case of war as well as for field service, 3430—Maximum reduction already effected in the British army, so that the troops do not now get five years' service at home for ten years' abroad, 3433, 3434—Slight weight attached to the objection as regards difference of pay of officers in the case of native and British troops serving together, 3435—Great importance of carefully selected officers for native regiments serving in the colonies; absence of difficulty on this score, 3435-3443.

Further approval of the policy of employing the native Indian troops on foreign service, provided it does not lead to any reduction of the European force, 3444-3448—Regulation of the number of troops in India by the state of the country, and the duties required of the men, the duties being extremely hard, 3449, 3450—Approval of the proportion to two native soldiers to one British soldier, 3449.

T.

*Taxation (India.)* Argument that it is most essential to lay down a limit beyond which the military expenditure or taxation of India should not go, and to leave it to the military departments to secure all possible efficiency with reference to such limit, *Balfour* 3516, 3548, 3549, 3573, 3593-3595, 3620, 3621—Disaffection and danger likely to arise from the imposition of new taxes necessary for the support of the present large force, *ib.* 3549-3551, 3593-3596, 3713-3720—Strong objection made by Lord Canning to the imposition of new taxes, with reference to an increased military force, *ib.* 3549—Belief as to the facility with which India could provide herself with an efficient army for an expense not exceeding 12,000,000*l.* a year, whilst it is extremely essential that she should not be burdened beyond this amount, *ib.* 3593-3596—Great danger to be incurred by keeping up a very large army, on account of the oppressive taxation necessary, *ib.* 3608.

*Taylor, Henry.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is senior clerk in the Colonial Office, 2408, 2409—Employment of only two coloured corps in the colonies, that is, in the West Indies and Ceylon, 2410-2412—Total of about 700 effective men in each of the four West India regiments stationed in the West Indies, and on the West Coast of Africa, 2412-2414—Employment of English officers in the West India regiments, 2415, 2416—Pay of the men adverted to; saving of expense on the score of reliefs and invalidings, as compared with European troops, 2417-2419—Advantage, as regards climate, of the substitution of coloured troops for Europeans, 2420-2422.

Necessary recruiting of the West India regiments at home since about the year 1853, whereas they were formerly recruited on the West Coast of Africa from liberated Africans, 2422, 2423—Question considered whether the West India troops, being now recruited from the native population are to be depended upon in the event of popular disturbance or insurrection; summary of the opinions of various governors in the West Indies on this point, 2423 *et seq.*—Conclusion arrived at by witness that on the whole the West India

## Report, 1867—continued.

*Taylor, Henry.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

India regiment can be relied upon as against their own countrymen in the event of civil tumult, 2424, 2425.

Importance attached to the efficient officering of the West India troops, as regards their services in time of local disturbances, 2424-2427.—Doubt as to the expediency of mixing Madraees with African or West Indian blacks in the same regiments; views of Governor Bayley in 1861 in favour of such mixture, 2433-2438.—Opinion expressed by Governor Eyre in March 1865 that black troops without European troops at hand are a source of danger in the West Indies; this was disproved during the subsequent outbreak, 2439-2442.—Instances of outbreaks in the West Indian, on all which occasions the black troops have shown their fidelity, 2443-2449.

Réliance to be placed on West India troops in the Mauritius, 2450.—Total of about 250,000 coolies in the Mauritius, there being about 100,000 negroes and 4,000 whites, 2451-2453. 2610-2612.—Difficulty of raising a negro regiment in the Mauritius, 2454-2456.—Docile character of the coolie population in the Mauritius, whilst they have no such strong prejudices of caste or of religion as are likely to lead to revolt, 2457-2468.

Probable discontent of the English colonists in Mauritius if the European troops were withdrawn, and if a colonial contribution were required for Asiatic troops, 2469-2473. 2487-2490. 2501-2503.—Doubt as to the policy of withdrawing the European troops from the island, whilst a considerable French garrison is kept at Bourbon, 2474-2479. 2490-2497.—Less extensive fortifications carried out at Mauritius or Port Louis, than were first intended, the island being in fact easy of capture irrespectively of the garrison of about 2,000 men in port Louis, 2480-2486.

Probable withdrawal of the contribution of 41,000*l.* a year by the Cape colonists if the European troops were replaced by native troops from India, 2504-2508.—Difficulty in compelling those colonies to contribute which have independent legislatures, 2508-2510. 2545.—Arrangement by which the military contribution by the Australian colonies is placed at 40*l.* a head for each European soldier, 2511-2518.—Belief as to its being intended to increase the Ceylon Rifle Corps, and to send some companies to the Straits Settlements, 2518-2521.—Less objection as regards deterioration of officers in the case of the Ceylon corps than of the West India regiments, 2522-2526.

Very small contribution by the colonists in China towards the military establishment, 2527.—Views of a former Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent as to the difficulty of preserving discipline in a small and entirely local force, *ib.*—Good conduct of some black troops upon the occasion of an invasion of Honduras in November last, 2530-2537.—Further statement as to the effect of climate in deteriorating the services of the officers of the West India regiments, 2530. 2536-2538.

Circumstance of there being no contribution by the West Indian colonists to the military establishment, 2539, 2540.—Except at Jamaica the duties devolving on the troops in the West Indies are almost entirely in the nature of police duties, 2541-2544.—Objection to withdrawing the troops from the West Indian stations, whilst at the same time all the islands cannot afford to bear the expense of the troops, 2545-2550.

Advantage of European garrisons at the Mauritius and other places, sufficient to beat off the attack of a small expeditionary force in time of war, 2553, 2554.—Increased difficulties in the withdrawal of British troops, and the substitution of native troops in those colonies where contributions are made, as compared with colonies not paying anything, 2555-2563.—Several instances of volunteers or militia being raised in the West Indian colonies, 2564-2567.—Probable effect of the presence of a European force, and of a native force respectively, as regards the raising of volunteers and militia, 2568-2571.—Powers respectively of the Crown, and of the local legislatures of colonies, in regard to the question of colonial payment towards the local military establishments, 2572-2582.

Further statement that the colonists in the Mauritius would oppose the substitution of native for European troops, 2579, 2580.—Fidelity of the black troops in the Jamaica outbreak of 1865; further adverted to, 2583.—Views of Governor Hincks of British Guiana, in favour of the formation of a constabulary force in the West Indies, as a means of dispensing with European garrisons, 2584-2586.

Objection by the Horse Guards to the employment of white troops in the West Indies without some black troops for performing fatigue duties; question as to there being good ground for this objection, 2587-2594.—Opinion, that as a matter of policy the withdrawal of all British troops from the West Indies is very undesirable, 2595-2597.—Considerable importance of the Mauritius colony, so that it is on the whole very expedient to maintain a British garrison there, 2598-2615.

*Taylor, Lieutenant Colonel J.* Answers received from Colonel Taylor, commanding the 5th Regiment, Bombay Native Light Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, if it be determined upon, *App.* 251, 252.

Report, 1867—continued.

*Temple, Sir R.* Communication from Sir R. Temple, British resident at Hyderabad, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 223-227.

*Term of Service (Native Troops).* Frequent representation made for a reduction of the term of service of the Madras army; this is never beyond three years, *Norman* 33, 34 — Power of the men to claim their discharge after three years' service, *ib.* 122, 123 — Expediency of limiting to three years the period of foreign service of Madras regiments, *Sir W. Elliot* 575. 581-583. 591 — Difficulty in inducing natives to serve abroad, in garrison duty, for a longer period than three years, or even for that period, *Keyes* 646-654. 664-679.

Importance of the question of time as regards the willingness of native troops to serve out of India, *Pears* 825. 834, 835 — Necessity of relieving Indian troops in two or three years; serious expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, *Sir Hope Grant* 1360, 1361. 1367-1370.

Considerable expense involved in the frequent relief of native troops, *Johnson* 1584, 1585. 1710. 1735, 1736 — Great difficulty in inducing native troops to serve in the colonies unless under the absolute guarantee that they would be relieved every three years, *ib.* 1733, 1734. 1747.

Contemplated enlistment for a period of ten years in the case of Indian troops employed in the colonies, *Fonblanque* 2814.

Expediency of arrangements for the frequent relief of native troops serving out of India; increase of cost thereby, *Lord Strathnairn* 3395. 3407, 3408.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that native troops employed out of India should be relieved every three years, *App.* 211.

*Thacker, Lieutenant Colonel S.* Answers received from Colonel Thacker, commanding the Marine Battalion, Bombay Army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, if it be decided upon, *App.* 248, 249.

*Thomson, Major G.L.* Communication from Major Thomson, commanding the 26th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 259.

*Town Garrisons (India).* Special duties required of the European troops as a check upon fanatical outbreaks in large towns, *Newman* 320-329.

*Transport of Troops.* Comment on the circumstance of less space being allowed on board the transport ships for native than for British troops between India and Burmah, *Norman* 446-450 — Offers made, a few years ago, to take a regiment from Hong Kong to Bombay for 5,000 *l.*, *Pears* 759.

Witness supplies certain particulars relative to the cost of transport of troops between England and Hong Kong, *Mends* 951 *et seq.* — Explanation of the practice as to the conveyance of a certain proportion of soldiers' wives and children, and as to the rate of charge, *ib.* 956-963. 990-1001 — Statement of the cost of freight and victualling of native regiments between India and China; less cost than in the case of European troops, 971-973 — Instances of the great expense of transport in hired transports between India and China, and China and the Cape, *ib.* 980-985 — Much less cost in Government troop ships than in hired vessels, *ib.* 982-985 — Intention still to carry out the transport service to the Mauritius and Ceylon round the Cape, irrespectively of the new arrangements for the Indian service, *ib.* 1002-1010 — Very little difference in the cost of transport to Singapore and to China, *ib.* 1011.

Much greater cost of transport of British troops than of natives from Madras to Singapore and Burmah, the native troops being much more crowded together on board; explanation hereon, *Sir Hope Grant* 1214-1224. 1467, 1468 — Larger expenses of transport of European troops to China than of Indian native troops, *Mackenzie* 1998-2000. 2037, 2038 — Statement in connection with the much less cost of transport of native troops than of Europeans, *Balfour* 3475-3481 — Doubt as to any evil arising from the transport arrangement by which each native soldier at sea is allowed only six square feet of space, whilst a British is allowed nine square feet *ib.* 3662-3670.

Extract from the regulations for the transport service in regard to the number of women and children allowed to embark with the troops, *App.* 285.

Estimate, prepared in the transport department, of the comparative expense of the overland and Cape routes between England and India, for conveyance of 14,400 soldiers, with officers and families; difference of 4 *l.* 16 *s.* 9 *d.* per adult in favour of the overland route, *App.* 286.

Return

*Transport of Troops—continued.*

Return of the net cost per soldier of the transport of troops between certain stations of Great Britain, in hired ships and in Government troop ships respectively; large saving in the latter case, *App.* 287.

Particulars of the relative cost of conveyance of British troops and of native troops between India and China, *App.* 288.

Estimate of the cost of transport of a battalion to Hong Kong from England in a hired sailing ship, for a voyage of 125 days, *App.* 289—Estimate of the cost of the same service by Her Majesty's troop ship "Tamar" for a voyage of ninety days, *ib.*—Enhanced cost per soldier in the latter case, *ib.*

Return, dated, Admiralty 25th July 1867, showing the cost incurred in moving various regiments between England, India, and the colonies, for several years past, *App.* 340-345.

See also *Relief (Native Troops)*.

## V.

*Volunteers for Foreign Service (Indian Army).* Facility of forming a regiment for foreign service by means of volunteers from different regiments, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2713-2715—Strong objection to the native regiments being called upon to volunteer for foreign service, they having already taken the oath to serve any where, so that there should be no option in the matter, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389. 3406. 3410. 3422—Decided disapproval of allowing men or regiments to volunteer for foreign service, *Balfour* 3814-3816.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that all native troops serving in the colonies should be volunteers for the special service, *App.* 211.

## W.

*War.* Importance of our colonies having European troops to defend them in the event of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1209-1213—Imperial importance of garrisoning the colonies with British troops, though in the event of a war in Europe it might be found necessary to bring the troops home, and to supply their place abroad with native troops, *ib.* 1281-1300. 1308-1316. 1420-1430—Only as a last resource would witness replace British troops in the colonies by native troops, in time of war, *ib.* 1377, 1378.

Contemplated withdrawal of several British regiments from India in the event of a European war, *Sir. G. R. Clerk* 1877. 1882. 1932-1934—Statement as to the nature of the facilities for withdrawing troops from India, &c. in the event of their being required for a war in Europe, *ib.* 1955-1958.

More ready and efficient service of native troops in time of war, if employed on foreign service in time of peace, *Mackenzie* 2025, 2026, 2039—Advantage of European garrisons at the Mauritius and other places sufficient to beat off the attack of a small expeditionary force in time of war, *Taylor* 2553, 2554.

Greater facility in obtaining the services of native troops out of India in time of war than during peace, *Duke of Cambridge* 3014. 3018, 3019—Expediency of raising new levies at home rather than of withdrawing British troops from India in the event of a European war, *ib.* 3016-3018. 3037, 3038.

Inducement to withdraw British troops from India in the event of a European war; danger to India in so doing, *Mangles* 3111-3114—Expediency of settling in time of peace the details of any scheme for the employment of Indian troops in the colonies, *Sir H. Storks* 3247-3249. 3273.

Entire fitness of native troops for service in the colonies in time of war, *Lord Strathnairn* 3421—Importance of the employment of native troops out of India being commenced in time of peace, rather than postponed till war occurs, *ib.* 3422, 3423.

Expected withdrawal of an unduly large force from India, in the event of war in Europe, or of England being threatened at home, *Balfour* 3600. 3602. 3750-3753—Expediency of making in time of peace those arrangements as to the garrisons of the Mauritius, Ceylon, &c., which in time of war must be made, *ib.* 3697. 3811, 3812.

*Water Supply (Native Troops).* Importance of every attention being paid to the supply of water for native troops, both on board ship and on foreign service, *Caird* 1807-1812. 1817, 1818.—See also *Caste*.

*Wellington, Duke of (the late).* Views of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge in 1845, in disapproval of foreign garrison service being forced on native Indian troops, *Norman* 64-66.

## Report, 1867—continued.

*West Coast of Africa.* Approval of the employment of black troops on the West Coast of Africa, *Sir H. Storks* 3261.

## WEST INDIES AND WEST INDIA REGIMENTS :

1. As to European and Native Indian Garrisons, respectively.
2. Local Volunteers and Militia.
3. As to the West India Regiments.

## 1. As to European and Native Indian Garrisons, respectively :

Instances of complaint by coolies against the climate, &c., in the West Indies, *Caird* 1815, 1816—Unfitness of sepoys for service in the West Indies, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1893—Mistake in having small detachments of British troops scattered over the West Indies, *Mackenzie* 2052, 2058-2061—Doubt as to the expediency of garrisoning the West Indies with native troops from India, *ib.* 2092-2095.

Objection to withdrawing the British troops from the West Indian stations, whilst at the same time all the islands cannot afford to bear the expense of the troops, *Taylor* 2545-2550—Except at Jamaica, the duties devolving on the troops in the West Indies are almost entirely in the nature of police duties, *ib.* 2541-2544—Objection by the House Guards to the employment of white troops in the West Indies without some black troops for performing fatigue duties; question as to there being good ground for this objection, *ib.* 2587-2594—Opinion that as a matter of policy, the withdrawal of all British troops from the West Indies is very undesirable, *ib.* 2595-2597.

Advantage of the nucleus of British troops in the principal islands in the West Indies, *Duke of Cambridge* 3020—Objection to substituting Asiatic troops for black troops in the West Indies, *Sir H. Storks* 3257-3260—Improbability of Sikh troops in the West Indies coming into collision with the European or local population, *Lord Strathnairn* 3391-3403—Approval of an interchange of West Indian troops by way of trial, *ib.* 3402, 3403, 3414-3419.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in the West Indies, *App.* 282.

## 2. Local Volunteers and Militia :

Several instances of volunteers or militia being raised in the West Indian colonies, *Taylor* 2564-2567.

Return, dated 2nd January 1865, of the local militia, volunteers, and military police in the West India colonies, actually embodied and effective, *App.* 284.

## 3. As to the West India Regiments :

Total of about 700 effective men in each of the four West India regiments stationed in the West Indies and on the West Coast of Africa, *Taylor* 2412-2414—Employment of English officers in the West India regiments, *ib.* 2415, 2416—Pay of the men adverted to; saving of expense on the score of reliefs and invalidings, as compared with European troops, *ib.* 2417-2419—Necessary recruiting of the regiments at home since about the year 1853, whereas they were formerly recruited on the West Coast of Africa from liberated Africans, *ib.* 2422, 2423.

Question considered whether the West India troops, being now recruited from the native population, are to be depended upon in the event of popular disturbance or insurrection; summary of the opinions of various governors in the West Indies on this point, *Taylor* 2423 *et seq.*—Conclusion arrived at by witness, that on the whole the West India regiments can be relied upon as against their own countrymen in the event of civil tumult, *ib.* 2424, 2425—Importance attached to the efficient officering of the West India troops, as regards their services in time of local disturbances, *ib.* 2424-2427.

Doubt as to the expediency of mixing Madrassesees with African or West Indian blacks in the same regiments; view of Governor Bayley in 1861 in favour of such mixture, *Taylor* 2433-2438—Instances of outbreaks in the West Indian, on all which occasions the black troops have shown their fidelity, *ib.* 2443-2449—Less objection as regards deterioration of officers, in the case of the Ceylon corps, than of the West India regiments, *ib.* 2522-2526—Further statement as to the effect of climate in deteriorating the services of the officers of the West India regiments, *ib.* 2530, 2536-2538.

Evidence as the constitution of the West India regiments and as to their efficiency, whilst they are much more economical than European troops, *Fonblanque* 2825-2843, 2852-2863—Statement as to the regiments being now recruited in the West Indies instead of the West Coast of Africa; difficulty in recruiting from Africa, *ib.* 2832-2836, 2874, 2875—Willingness of African troops to settle in any colony if they are allowed to have their wives with them, *ib.* 2838-2848—Docility of African troops, *ib.* 2847, 2848—Advantage of African troops in being able to stand cold as well as heat, *ib.* 2853-



**WEST INDIES AND WEST INDIA REGIMENTS**—continued.3. *As to the West India Regiments*—continued.

2853-2862—Considerable sickness and mortality among the officers of the West Indian regiments caused very much by indulgence in drink, *Fonblanque* 2864-2868.

Improvement in the case of the West India regiments if they were to serve in India; approval of an interchange between them and native Indian regiments, *Lord Strathmairn* 3402, 3403. 3414-3419.

See also *Barbadoes. Demerara. Hincks, Governor. Honduras. Jamaica Insurrection.*

*Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel, T. F.* Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, 7th Bengal Cavalry, on the question of the employment of native troops from India in the colonies; doubt as to the expediency of such employment, *App.* 319, 320.

I N D E X  
TO THE  
R E P O R T  
FROM THE  
S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E  
ON  
A R M Y ( I N D I A A N D T H E C O L O N I E S )

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
*26 July 1867.*

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[Price 8 d.]

478—I.

*Under 8 oz.*

## EAST INDIA (EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS).

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RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,  
dated 25 July 1867;—for,

- “ COPIES of the Series of MINUTES, REPORTS, DESPATCHES, and other DOCUMENTS relating to the Strength, Composition, Distribution, and Description of TROOPS, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Increase of the former and Decrease of the latter, considered to be required for the Internal Defence and Permanent Occupation of *India*, as well as for successful resistance against External Aggression, recorded by Lord *William Bentinck*, Governor General of *India*, between 1830 and 1835 : ”
- “ Of MINUTES \* on the same subject by Sir *Charles Metcalfe*, both as Governor General and as Member of the Supreme Council, by Messrs. *Prinsep*, *Ross*, *Blunt*, and Lieutenant Colonel *Morison*, as Members of the Supreme Council, and of the Governors and Commanders in Chief of *Madras* and *Bombay* : ”
- “ ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, Regular and Irregular, of every Description, such as Contingents, Subsidiary Forces, Frontier Forces, Local Corps, &c., distinguishing the European and Native, Regulars and Irregulars, as also the Arms and Grades, viz., Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Rank and File, and showing the Divisions of *India* to which belonging, the Stations at which severally located, and whether employed on actual Service on the 1st day of May 1837, 1st day of May 1847, 1st day of May 1857, and at the latest Date for which Returns are available : ”
- “ Separate RETURN of the Strength of FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Arms and Grades serving on the 1st day of May 1857, and at the latest date, in those Territories which, on the 1st day of May 1837, were not under the direct Authority of the Government of *India* : ”
- “ And, STATEMENT of the AREA and POPULATION of the several TERRITORIES acquired by the British Government between the 1st day of May 1837 and the 1st day of May 1857, and since that Date.”

\* So far as can be found.

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*Note.*—Where dates for the Returns different from those called for have been given, Returns for the 1st of May have not been available.

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India Office, }  
13 March 1868. }

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T. T. PEARS,  
Major General, Military Secretary.

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(*Mr. Henry Seymour.*)

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Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,  
1 August 1867.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

NATURE OF CORRESPONDENCE.	DATE.	SUBJECT.	PAGE.
Military Letter from the Governor General in Council.	1834: 9 Aug.	Reorganization of the Indian Army, by raising the complement of each regiment of infantry and cavalry, and reducing their number; consequent reduction of expenditure; similar plan with regard to the Artillery - - - - -	1
Minute by the Governor General (Lord William Bentinck.)	23 July	- - ditto - - ditto - - - - -	4
Appendix, No. 1 - - - -	-	Memorandum of reduction in the number of combatants in the proposed reorganization, exclusive of commissioned officers - - -	6
"    No. 2 - - - -	-	Proposed modification in the Ordnance - - -	6
Memorandum by the Governor General.	23 July	On the Regular Native Infantry - - -	7
Appendix, No. 1 - - - -	-	Showing the disposable force on 1 January and 1 August 1833 - - - - -	11
"    No. 2 - - - -	-	Coorg Field Force, from 7 April to 5 May 1834 - - - - -	18
"    No. 3 - - - -	-	Weekly state of the 31st Regiment N. I. - - -	13
"    "    "    "    "    "    "	-	"    "    of the 9th    "    "    "    "    "    "	14
"    No. 4 - - - -	-	"    "    of the Coorg Field Force - - -	14
"    No. 5 - - - -	-	Memorandum of the saving to be effected by the proposed reductions of the infantry at the three Presidencies - - - - -	15
"    No. 6 - - - -	-	Immediate and prospective saving by the reduction of the <i>Bengal</i> Native Infantry to 60 regiments of 800 privates each - - -	16
"    No. 7 - - - -	-	Immediate and prospective saving by the reduction of the <i>Madras</i> Native Infantry to 42 regiments of 800 privates each - - -	18
"    No. 8 - - - -	-	Immediate and prospective saving by the reduction of the <i>Bombay</i> Native Infantry to 21 regiments of 800 privates each - - -	20
Memorandum by the Governor General.	23 July	On the Regular Native Cavalry - - -	22
Memorandum - - - -	-	Immediate and prospective saving by the proposed reductions of cavalry in the three Presidencies - - - - -	23
Memorandum - - - -	23 July	On the Artillery of the three Presidencies - - -	29
Appendix, No. 1, Memorandum	-	- - ditto - - ditto - - - - -	33
Statement, No. 1 - - -	-	Comparison of a troop of European Horse Artillery at each Presidency - - - - -	42
"    No. 2 - - - -	-	Comparison of a troop of Native Horse Artillery - - - - -	43
"    No. 3 - - - -	-	Comparison of a battalion of European Artillery at each Presidency - - - - -	44
"    No. 4 - - - -	-	Comparison of a battalion of Golundauze at each Presidency - - - - -	45
"    No. 5 - - - -	-	Distribution of Artillery, Bengal - - -	46
"    No. 6 - - - -	-	Artillery and Ordnance at each station - - -	47
"    No. 7 - - - -	-	Duties of Director of Depôt of Instruction - - -	48
"    No. 8 - - - -	-	Distribution of Madras Artillery, 1 Sept. 1833 - - - - -	49
"    No. 9 - - - -	-	Comparison of the Ordnance Commissariat Establishments of the three Presidencies - - -	49

NATURE OF CORRESPONDENCE.	DATE.	SUBJECT.	PAGE.
Appendix, No. 2 - - -	1834 : 23 July	Present and proposed formation and strength of Artillery in gunners and privates -	50
„ No. 3 - - -	-	Financial results - - - -	51
„ No. 4 - - -	-	Rank and file of the armies of the three Presidencies - - - -	54
„ No. 5 - - -	-	Reduction in numbers by the proposed organization in the three Presidencies -	55
Minute by Colonel Morison -	7 Aug.	Reviewing the proposals of the Governor General - - - -	56
Military Letter, No. 24 - -	1835 : 26 Feb.	Forwarding Enclosures - - - -	62
Minute by the Governor General	7-Feb.	Reviewing the Minutes of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General, and of Colonel Morison - - - -	63
General Order - - -	1834 : 12 Aug.	Prohibition of night guards to European officers - - - -	66
Minute by Mr. Ross - - -	1835 : 10 Feb.	Evil of increasing the supernumerary list of commissioned and non-commissioned native officers - - - -	66
Minute by Colonel Morison -	16 Feb.	The proportion of Artillery required in India	66
Military Letter, No. 36 - -	16 Mar.	Forwarding Enclosures - - - -	68
Minute by the Governor General	13 Mar.	Composition of the Army of India - - -	68
Statement, No. 1 - - -	-	Number of officers and men wanting to complete the strength of His Majesty's regiments in the three Presidencies - -	79
„ No. 2 - - -	-	Present strength of His Majesty's regiments in India - - - -	80
„ No. 3 - - -	-	Present strength of each of the Company's European infantry regiments - - -	81
Minute by the Governor General	28 Feb.	General distribution of the Army of India, with Extracts from Sir Frederick Adam and Sir Robert O'Callaghan's Minutes -	81
Appendix - - - -	-	Bombay distribution - - - -	97
Minute of the Commander in Chief (Sir Robert O'Callaghan), and remarks by Sir Frederick Adam.	1834 : 25 Aug.	Distribution of the Madras Army - - -	100
Statement, No. 1 - - -	-	Established strength of the Madras Army -	130
„ No. 2 - - -	-	Distribution of the Madras Army - - -	131
„ No. 3 - - -	-	- ditto - - ditto - Artillery - -	132
„ No. 4 - - -	-	Troops of the Madras Army employed beyond frontier and beyond seas - - -	132
„ Nos. 5 and 6 - - -	-	Present and proposed distribution within frontier - - - -	133
„ No. 7 - - -	-	Comparison of present and proposed distribution - - - -	134
„ No. 8 - - -	-	Difference between the present and proposed distribution - - - -	135
„ No. 9 - - -	-	Number of Garrison Ordnance - - -	136
„ No. 10 - - -	-	- - ditto - - ditto - on 1 March 1813	136
„ No. 10 - - -	-	Abstract of the divisions and disposition sketch under present and proposed distributions - - - -	137
Military Letter, No. 60 - -	1835 : 1 June	Forwarding Enclosures - - - -	138
Minute by the Governor General (Sir C. T. Metcalfe).	19 Apr.	Review of the late Governor General's proposed scheme of reorganization - - -	138
Minute by Mr. Prinsep - -	19 May	- - ditto - - ditto - - - -	143
Military Letter, No. 72 - -	3 July	Forwarding Enclosures - - - -	146
Minute by the Governor General	8 May	Review of late Governor General's Minute on distribution of the Army of India -	146
Ditto - - ditto - - -	16 May	On the late Governor General's Minute on the composition of the Army - - -	154
Minute by Mr. Prinsep - -	9 June	The distribution and composition of the Armies of India - - - -	161

NATURE OF CORRESPONDENCE.	DATE.	SUBJECT.	PAGE.
Report by Sir John Malcolm -	1830 : Nov. 27	On the pay, composition, and distribution of the Bombay Army and the Army generally - - - - -	170
Appendix A.—Minute by Sir John Malcolm.	1828 : Mar. 25	State of the Bombay Army - - - - -	183
Appendices 1 to 28 -	-	Returns, letters, and quotations referred to -	192
Appendix B.—Extract from Sir John Malcolm's Minute.	1829 : Sept. 4	Advocating increase to number of Boys to each regiment - - - - -	202
Minute by Sir John Malcolm -	Sept. 14	Privileges to Native officers' sons serving in the ranks - - - - -	203
Appendix C.—Minute by Sir John Malcolm.	1828 : Nov. 2	Rewards to Native officers of long service -	204
Ditto - - - - -	1829 : Jan. 3	- Ditto " - ditto - - - - -	205
Ditto - - - - -	Oct. 3	- Ditto - - - ditto - - - - -	206
Appendix D. - - - - -	-	Native officers to command Sebundies -	207
Appendix E.—Minute by Sir John Malcolm.	1830 : Jan. 27	Recruiting the Native Army; advantages of a Native military fund - - - - -	208
Statements - - - - -	-	European and Native forces serving in the three Presidencies on 1 April 1837 :	
		<i>Bengal</i> - - - - -	214
		<i>Madras</i> - - - - -	218
		<i>Bombay</i> - - - - -	220
		European and Native forces serving in the three Presidencies on 1 May 1847 :	
		<i>Bengal</i> - - - - -	222
		<i>Madras</i> - - - - -	226
		<i>Bombay</i> - - - - -	228
		European and Native forces serving in the three Presidencies on 1 January 1857 :	
		<i>Bengal</i> - - - - -	230
		<i>Madras</i> - - - - -	234
		<i>Bombay</i> - - - - -	238
		European and Native forces serving in the three Presidencies on 1 September 1867 :	
		<i>Bengal</i> - - - - -	240
		<i>Madras</i> - - - - -	244
		<i>Bombay</i> - - - - -	246
		Strength of forces, European and Native, occupying territories in 1857, acquired since 1837 - - - - -	248
		Strength of forces, European and Native, occupying territories in 1867, acquired since 1837 - - - - -	248
		Area and Population of territories acquired between 1837 and 1857, and since - -	250

# P A P E R S

RELATING TO

## EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

LETTER from the Governor General of India, in Council, dated 9 August 1834.

WE have the honour to submit, in this Despatch, a Minute, with various memoranda and statements, recorded by the Right Honourable the Governor General, containing a full exposition of his Lordship's sentiments on the important question of re-organising the Indian Army.

2. While the plan submitted by the Governor General is calculated to improve the efficiency of the army, particularly in its infantry and cavalry branches, it will at the same time effect a considerable immediate, and a large prospective reduction of our military expenditure.

3. Without increasing or decreasing the total numerical strength as at present established, it is simply proposed to raise the complement of each regiment of infantry from 640 to 800 privates, and of cavalry from 420 to 600 troopers, both retaining their present organisation, the former of eight companies, and the latter of six troops, per regiment.

4. The number of regiments of the proposed complement required to give the total numerical strength of the army as it now exists, in infantry and cavalry, or nearly so, would be—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Bengal - - -	60	7
Madras - - -	42	5
Bombay - - -	21	2
	123	14
leaving to be reduced in		
	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Bengal - - -	14	3
Madras - - -	10	3
Bombay - - -	5	1
	29	7

Immediate Saving.						
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Infantry -	5,25,055	10	-			
Cavalry -	4,33,445	10	-			
Artillery -	4,22,869	9	-			
	Total immediate Saving -			13,81,370	13	-
Prospective Saving.						
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Infantry -	29,89,452	1	-			
Cavalry -	10,63,337	6	-			
Artillery -	6,45,952	8	6			
	Total prospective Saving			46,98,741	15	6
	Grand Total per Annum			60,80,112	12	6

	Infantry.		Cavalry.	
	Present.	Future.	Present.	Future.
Bengal -	74	60	420	600
	640	800	10	7
	47,360	48,000	4,200	4,200
Madras -	52	42	420	600
	640	800	8	5
	33,280	33,600	3,360	3,000
Bombay	26	21	420	600
	640	800	3	2
	16,640	16,800	1,260	1,200

5. The Governor General further proposes that the privates of the reduced corps shall be drafted to complete the establishment of the regiments retained; that the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers be borne as supernumeraries on the strength of the army at large, to be absorbed as casualties occur; and that the European officers be considered as forming so many skeleton corps, their promotion continuing as if their regiments still existed, but, for the purpose of duty, being attached to such of the effective regiments as Government might direct. No young officers would be posted to these skeleton corps, and the plan suggested in Colonel Salmond's reply to Mr. Villiers, dated 2nd of October 1832, might, in his Lordship's opinion, be employed

## PAPERS RELATING TO

employed with advantage in effecting the prospective saving at an earlier period.

6. With regard to the Artillery, the Governor General submits, that the same principle upon which it is proposed to re-model the infantry and cavalry, be applied to this arm likewise; the detail of the measure will be found contained in his Lordship's memorandum upon the Artillery at the three Presidencies, one of the numbers in the packet.

Packet No. 10.

7. The alterations which will be effected in the Artillery by the proposed arrangement, are as follows:

## HORSE ARTILLERY.

## BENGAL.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates:	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates:
3 Brigades of 3 European and 1 Native Troop each:	2 Brigades of 3 European and 1 Native Troop each:
9 Troops, European, of 80 Gunners each - 720	6 European Troops, of 100 Gunners each - 600
3 Ditto, Native, of 90 Privates each - 270	2 Native ditto, of 100 Privates each - 200
<u>12 Ditto, making a Total of Gunners and Privates - 990</u>	<u>8 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates - 800</u>

8. The reduction will consist of one brigade, that is, of three European troops and one Native.

## MADRAS.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates:	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates:
2 Brigades, 1 of 4 Troops of Europeans, and 1 of 2 Troops of Natives:	1 Brigade of 4 European Troops:
4 Troops, European, 84 Gunners each - 336	4 European Troops, of 100 Gunners each - 400
2 Ditto, Native, 84 Privates each - 168	
<u>6 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates - 504</u>	<u>400</u>

9. There will be a reduction of one brigade of European officers, and of two troops of Natives; it is universally admitted that the low stature and inferior strength of the Madras Sepoy totally unfit him for this arm.

## BOMBAY.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates:	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates:
1 Brigade of 4 European Troops:	1 Brigade of 4 European Troops:
4 Troops, European, 80 Gunners each - 320	4 European Troops, 100 Gunners each - 400

10. There will thus be a diminution of 120 European Artillerymen in the Bengal Horse Artillery, which will be more than met by the increase at—

Madras - - - - -	64
Bombay - - - - -	80
	<u>144</u>

11. With respect to the Foot Artillery, a modification of the existing organisation has been suggested to, and approved by, his Lordship, as referred to in his Minute, it is proposed that each battalion shall be organised after the manner of the Bengal Horse Artillery, of three companies of Europeans, and two of Natives, the two companies of Natives having the same complement of officers as one company of European Foot Artillery, and one troop of Native Horse Artillery.

Packet No. 7.

12. The advantage of this plan is, that the Europeans and Natives will always act together; and to those who are of opinion (an opinion from which the



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

3

the Governor General totally dissents), that this powerful weapon should never be entrusted to Natives, it will be satisfactory that the great majority of each battalion is European.

13. Uniformity also in the constitution of the Foot Artillery at the three Presidencies will be thus introduced.

FOOT ARTILLERY.

BENGAL.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates:	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates:
5 Battalions of 4 European Companies each: 20 Companies, European, 80 Gunners each - - - - - 1,600	6 Battalions of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: 18 European Companies, 100 Gunners each - - - - - 1,800
2 Battalions of 8 Native Companies each: 16 Companies, Native, 104 Privates each - - - - - 1,664	12 Native Companies, 100 Privates - 1,200
<u>7 Batts. 36 Cos., making a Total of - - 3,264</u>	<u>6 Batts. of 30 Cos. making a Total of - 3,000</u>

MADRAS.

3 Battalions of 4 European Companies each: 12 Companies, European, 80 Gunners each - - - - - 960	3 Battalions of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: 9 European Companies, 100 Gunners each - - - - - 900
1 Battalion of 6 Native Companies: 6 Companies, Native, 92 Privates each - - - - - 552	6 Native Companies, 100 Privates each - - - - - 600
<u>4—18, making a Total of - - - 1,512</u>	<u>3—15, making a Total of - - - 1,500</u>

BOMBAY.

2 Battalions of 4 European Companies each: 8 Companies, European, of 80 Gunners each - - - - - 640	2 Battalions of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: 6 European Companies, 100 Gunners each - - - - - 600
1 Battalion of 8 Native Companies: 8 Companies, Native, of 70 Privates each - - - - - 560	4 Native Companies, 100 Privates each - - - - - 400
<u>3—16, making a Total of - - - 1,200</u>	<u>2—10, making a Total of - - - 1,000</u>

14. In Bengal there will be an increase of 200 Europeans in the Foot Artillery, in Madras a decrease of 60, and in Bombay of 40.

15. The total number will then stand as follows, leaving five skeleton corps of Artillery officers to be prospectively reduced under the operation of the same principle as proposed for the infantry and cavalry.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

Present:	Proposed:
6 Brigades of - - - 22 Troops.	4 Brigades of - - - 16 Troops.
14 Battalions of - - 70 Companies.	11 Battalions of - - 55 Companies.
<u>20</u> <u>92</u>	<u>15</u> <u>71</u>
Europeans - - - 4,576	Europeans - - - 4,700
Natives - - - 3,214	Natives - - - 2,400
<u>TOTAL - - - 7,790</u>	<u>TOTAL - - - 7,100</u>

16. As respects the Horse Artillery in Bengal, the Governor General suggests an immediate saving, without awaiting the result of this reference, to the extent of 1,07,244 rupees per annum, by reducing the number of guns with each troop to the scale specified in his Lordship's Minute. As this measure appears judicious and cannot in any way affect the organisation of the corps, either as

## PAPERS RELATING TO

it is at present or may hereafter be constituted, we shall consider it our duty to give early effect to the suggestion.

Packets, No. 8,  
9, and 10.

17. Separate memoranda and statements, explanatory of the grounds of the proposed reductions, and exhibiting the financial results in each branch, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, form numbers in the packet. To these documents we solicit the particular attention of your Honourable Court, they are so full and explicit as leave us nothing to add to the information they contain.

Packet No. 11.

18. Colonel Morrison being of opinion that the arrangements submitted in this Despatch are injudicious, as reducing the number of corps in each arm below what, in his judgment, the public interest require should be maintained, has recorded his sentiments on the subject at considerable length in a minute, which forms a number in the packet.

19. As the view of this important question which Colonel Morrison has recorded will receive from your Honourable Court every consideration, as it has received from us, to which the deliberate opinions of an officer of his long experience and intimate knowledge of the subject so justly entitle them, we deem it necessary merely to state that with reference to that part of the minute, in which an apprehension is expressed that to draft the whole of the Native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, of the regiments to be reduced, into those intended to be increased in strength, would be liable to create dissatisfaction among the troops, his Lordship has it in intention to propose a plan for obviating this objection. The same opportunity will be taken for considering Colonel Morrison's remarks upon the organisation of the Artillery.

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(Military Department.)

MINUTE by the Governor General.

I HAVE the honour to lay before Council a plan for improving the efficiency of the Indian Army, and of effecting at the same time some immediate and a large prospective reduction of our military expenditure.

Appendix No. 1.

It is simply proposed, without interfering with the constitution of regiments of infantry or cavalry, as fixed by the Court, and without increasing or decreasing the total numerical strength of the army, to raise the complement of each regiment of infantry from 640 privates to 800, which latter number had been the average peace establishment of all the Presidencies for many years, and in the cavalry from 420 to 600 troopers; I have no data to which I can immediately refer for the exact strength of regiments in each period of peace, but as far as I am informed, the amount has never been below 750 men a regiment in the infantry and 540 in the cavalry. This process will have the effect of leaving without men the following number of corps in the three Presidencies:

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Bengal - - - -	14	3
Madras - - - -	10	3
Bombay - - - -	5	1
	<hr/> 29	<hr/> 7

and I propose that these corps shall be reduced, transferring the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers as supernumeraries, to be absorbed by vacancies in the army at large, and allowing the European officers of each regiment to remain a distinct body, obtaining their promotion as before, but doing duty with the other effective regiments of the army.

In the Artillery the same process has been followed, care being taken not to disturb the European part of the organisation; but as there exists considerable dissimilarity in the formation of the Native branch in the three armies, I have introduced

introduced an uniformity of system by taking as an example the constitution, under the Court's sanction, of the Horse Artillery in Bengal, where the European and Native troops are united in one brigade. The same principle has been adopted for the construction of the battalions, and the idea not being my own, I may venture to pronounce it a very great improvement.

The saving, immediate and prospective, will be as follows—

Immediate Saving :							
						<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a. p.</i>
Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	5,25,055	10 -
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	4,33,445	10 -
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	4,22,869	9 -
TOTAL Immediate Saving						13,81,370	13 -
Prospective Saving :							
						<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a. p.</i>
Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	29,89,452	1 -
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	10,63,337	6 -
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	6,45,952	8 6
TOTAL Prospective Saving						46,98,741	15 6
• GRAND TOTAL per Annum						60,80,112	12 6

App. Nos. 5 to 8,  
Infantry Mem.  
App. to Cav. Mem.  
App. No. 3, Art.  
Mem.

App. Nos. 5 to 8,  
Infantry Mem.  
App. to Cav. Mem.  
App. No. 3, Art.  
Mem.

The preceding propositions require the sanction of the Honourable Court prior to their execution. But there is a saving of some amount, independent of the plan I have proposed, which I would recommend to be carried into immediate effect, and that is, to reduce the number of guns with each troop of Horse Artillery within the Provinces under the Bengal Presidency; those at Meerut, Muttra, and Cawnpore to four guns each, and the troop at Dum Dum to two guns, leaving the troops which are on or beyond the frontier, viz., at Loodianah, Kurnaul, Neemuch, and Mhow to retain their full complement. This plan has, in part, been adopted by the Madras Government, at the recommendation of Mr. Lushington, and has been approved by the Court. It may perhaps appear practicable to Sir Frederick Adam to extend it further; the immediate saving will amount to 1,07,244 rupees per annum.

Appendix No. 2.

By this reduction of guns there will be disposable the horses by which they were drawn, amounting to 400. It strikes me that these horses might be transferred to the cavalry in Bengal, and an equal number of the next year's re-mounts from the Bengal stud might be allotted to the cavalry in Madras and Bombay. Estimating these horses at the moderate value of 450 rupees per horse, there will be a diminution of expenditure in the purchase of horses of about two lacs of rupees.

Colonel Morrison has suggested to me the great advantage of substituting a proportion of camels for horses for the service of the Horse Artillery in Upper India. In the open sandy plains between the Sutledge and Indus, where the communications are heavy and difficult, the transport of a part of the ammunition on the backs of animals would always be useful, and occasionally of the first importance. It would also be the substitution of a very cheap for a very dear conveyance. I have requested Colonel Morrison to prepare a paper with the details, and I have begged him also, at the same time, to give an opinion whether the establishment of horses allotted to a troop of Horse Artillery is not more than sufficient.

Appendix No. 2.

A separate Memorandum, with statements explanatory of the grounds of the proposed reductions, and exhibiting the financial results in each branch, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, is hereunto annexed.

(signed) *W. E. Bentinck.*

Ootacamund, 23 July 1864.

PAPERS RELATING TO

Appendix, No. 1.

MEMORANDUM of the Reduction in the Number of Combatants, exclusive of Commissioned Officers, European and Native which will be occasioned by the proposed Organization of the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

	EUROPEANS.					NATIVES.					GRAND TOTAL.				
	Serjeants.	Córpotals.	Bombardiers and Drummers.	Privates or Gunners.	TOTAL.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Drummers or Trumpeters.	Privates.	TOTAL.					
Bengal:															
Artillery	{ Horse	-	-	-	29	19	48	120	216	6	6	6	70	88	304
	{ Foot	-	-	-	15	10	24	-	49	35	35	10	464	542	591
Native Cavalry	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	6	81	75	42	-	198	204
Ditto Infantry	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	20	400	400	180	-	980	1,000
Madras:															
Artillery	{ Horse	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	14	14	10	168	206	216
	{ Foot	-	-	-	26	21	36	60	143	-	-	-	-	-	143
Native Cavalry	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	6	93	72	78	360	603	609
Ditto Infantry	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	20	400	400	180	-	980	1,000
Bombay:															
Artillery	{ Horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	{ Foot	-	-	-	12	10	24	40	86	26	25	10	160	221	307
Native Cavalry	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	30	24	24	60	138	140
Ditto Infantry	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	200	200	90	-	490	500
Total Reduction					-	-	-	-	568	-	-	-	-	4,446	5,014
Deduct Increase:															
Bengal Foot Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ditto Native Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	640	-	-
Madras Horse Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ditto Native Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	320	-	-
Bombay Horse Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ditto Native Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	160	-	-
					-	-	-	-	344	-	-	-	-	1,120	1,464
Net Reduction of Combatants					-	-	-	-	224	-	-	-	-	3,326	3,550

Appendix, No. 2.

SUPPOSING the distribution of the Horse Artillery to remain as it is at present, the following modification regarding the ordnance is suggested for consideration:—

BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

1 troop at Loodianah	-	-	each, 6 pieces	-	-	-	6
1 " at Kurnaul	-	-	" 6 "	-	-	-	6
1 " at Neemuch	-	-	" 6 "	-	-	-	6
1 " at Mhow	-	-	" 6 "	-	-	-	6
4 " at Meerut	-	-	" 4 "	-	-	-	16
4 " at Muttra	-	-	" 4 "	-	-	-	4
2 " at Cawnpore	-	-	" 4 "	-	-	-	8
1 " at Dum Dum	-	-	" 2 "	-	-	-	2
12						Take	54
						From	72

The complement of horses allotted to a gun in Bengal is—

For the gun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
For its waggon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
									22

Therefore the reduction of 18 pieces of ordnance with their attached waggons would admit of a reduction of the number of horses in the whole corps, amounting to 396. The expense of each horse, including his equipments, amounts monthly to Rs. 20. 12. The expense, in point of horses, therefore for one gun would be  $20\frac{3}{4} \times 22 = 456\frac{1}{2}$  per month and for 18 guns 8,217 rupees per month, or 9,860 rupees per year.

For Shoeing	-	-	-	Rs. 2	-
For Repairs of their Harness	-	-	-	2	-
For Horse-keeper	-	-	-	4	-
For Grass Cutter	-	-	-	3	8
For Feeding	-	-	-	5	8
For Re-mount 10 per cent.	-	-	-	3	12
					Rs. 12
Expense of each Horse					Rs. 20 12

For one gun, independent of wear and tear, the expense is per month for—

Tar and grease	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.
Two spare waggons	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
One cart	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
									5
For one Gun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
									18
For 18 Guns per Month	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	540
									12
Ditto - per Annum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	6,480
									6,480

The artificers allowed for a troop of six guns cost 84 rupees per month, the proportion for one gun, say 10 rupees, hence for 18 guns 180 rupees per month, or 2,100 rupees per annum.

The saving per annum therefore would amount to—

In horses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.
In guns	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	98,604
In establishment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,480
									2,160
Per Annum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	107,244
									107,244

In the purchase of horses likewise it may be considered that the saving of an immediate outlay would be the effect of the proposed measure, as it would leave 400 horses disposable, which, being valued at 450 rupees each, is equal to 1,80,000 rupees.

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department.

(No. 2.)

MEMORANDUM on the Regular Native Infantry.

THE regular infantry of the armies of the three Presidencies consists of Bengal - - 74  
152 regular regiments, each regiment formed into 8 companies of 80 men, or Madras - - 52  
640 privates. Bombay - - 26

Rs. 152

This constitution of the army was probably recommended by two considerations :

First. The establishment of officers as it stood at the conclusion of the war was thereby retained, and individual interests protected and saved.

Secondly. The skeleton of a war establishment complete in commissioned and non-commissioned officers, European and Native, was preserved, which might be filled up to any extent, and a large and effective force could be thus furnished for immediate service.

In England, similar considerations have generally, at the conclusion of a war, had their influence upon the extent of the peace establishment; but this reasoning and practice, so just at home, has been most erroneously applied to the British dominions in India. In Europe, war may break out of a sudden, the contending parties are generally in close proximity, and the greatest state of preparation may be required both for attack and defence, as the first successes often lead to important results.

In India, on the contrary, as will be hereafter explained, when the distribution of the army is considered, there is not within the large sphere controlled by our paramount authority a single chief possessing any military power whatever; and with regard to the substantive States on this side of the Indus bordering our western, northern, and eastern frontiers, they are utterly incapable of any offensive aggression, which one-fourth of our army would not easily repel.

The only enemies by which our dominion can be endangered are far distant; must come from Central Asia, or beyond it; and timely notice must always be possessed of their approach. A military organisation, therefore, formed upon the European principle of being always ready to meet the attack of enemies as powerful as ourselves, is utterly uncalled for; while the expense which it entails is a most heavy and useless burden upon our inadequate income; and further, if it were necessary to have the army in a state of extraordinary equipment and preparation, it will be clearly made to appear that its present constitution of many corps with a small complement of privates, is totally incompatible with the object in view, and renders every regiment separately, and the army collectively, inadequate to meet the demands of any exigency requiring even the most limited scale of military operations.

Appendix No. 1.

Hereunto is annexed a statement prepared by the Adjutant General of the Bengal Army, from the actual returns in 1833, showing the disposable force that could be collected upon an emergency from the principal stations of the Bengal army, after providing all the guards required for the head quarters of corps, sick, baggage, &c. Two periods have been taken, the 1st of January when all the men were present; the 1st of August when the usual proportion\* were absent on furlough. Those corps at distant out-stations in the several divisions are excluded. This statement presents the following curious results, that 45 regiments of Native Infantry, consisting of their full establishment, 31,320 drummers, rank and file, could only furnish in the first period a disposable force of 16,833, or not more than one-half; and in the second, of only 13,213. No officer coming to India for the first time can look at a return from any of the greatest stations of the army, without perfect astonishment at the multitude of men and guards that are on duty. He has seen nothing to be compared to it in Europe. No doubt the indulgence, or abuse as it may be more properly called, of complying with requisitions for guards from officers, civil and military, whether for the sake of consequence, or upon the plea of protection to public and private property, had been carried to a very unjustifiable length; but during the last few years my two immediate predecessors in command and myself had very much limited the practice; and it is subsequently to these revisions and reductions that the Adjutant General's statement has been prepared.

This great demand for the employment of Native troops is easily explained by the peculiarities of the Indian service. In this country of universal poverty, where the local resources are totally inadequate to the supply of any emergent large demand, the troops are necessarily surrounded by establishments (of course upon a minor scale) as if they were in the field. At every one  
of

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\* *Bengal*.—From corps in the Presidency, Saugor and Sirhind Divisions, and in the Malwah, Meywar, and Rajpootana Forces, 15 privates per troop or company, and from all other stations, 10 per troop or company, with a due proportion of native officers. Six months in each year is the average period during which furlough is granted, generally commencing in April, and ending in October.

*Madras*.—From each corps, 4 men per troop or company. To men belonging to the Provinces within the Madras Presidency, from January to the end of August, and to the Purdesees to the end of October.

*Bombay*.—From each corps, 5 men per troop or company throughout the year.

The native soldier throughout the Madras and Bombay armies receives the same scale of pay when on furlough as when present with his corps. A deduction is made from the Bengal soldier when on furlough, to the following amount:—Monthly, subadar, 15 rupees; semadar, 7-8 rupees; havildar, naick, or drummer, 5 rupees, and sepoy, 1-8 rupees.

of the large stations mentioned in the statement there are Government establishments of all kinds, commissariat, ordnance, magazines, public cattle, pay-office, bazaars, and other deposits of public property requiring protection, and their separate guards. The largeness of the country, its perfectly open state, the extent of jungle, and the large bands of dacoits, against whose attacks effectual means of resistance must always be at hand, require that all detachments going with treasure, or any other escort, should be large and efficient. The distance intervening also between stations is a cause of great delay in the return of such detachments to their head quarters. When, also, European troops are upon their march, with their vast amount of baggage, sick, and followers, which are exclusively protected by the Native troops, the calls of the service are very great. It is unnecessary to observe that the head quarters and staff of a large and small regiment have precisely the same regimental guards. It may also be noticed that, in many of the great cantonments, and none more than at Barrackpore, the Native infantry are extremely harassed by their duties. This effect might be in some degree remedied by a greater concentration of the force; but the main cause lies in the small establishment of privates in each corps, which leaves so small a surplus for general service, after providing for all duties of a regimental and local nature. The remark is scarcely necessary, that no greater political error can be committed than that of imposing upon the sepoy during peace excessive duty, or by tormenting him with an overstrained system of drill and discipline, which too frequently occurs. Under this hot sun the Native character, like that of the European, is disposed to inertness. The comparative slightness and weakness of the human frame in these latitudes are the best proofs of the enervating effects of the climate, particularly in Bengal proper; and with the view, that always should be uppermost, of providing the best possible security for the allegiance of the Native army, in their contentment and happiness, care should be taken when estimating the total amount of force to be required, that the ordinary duty should never fall hard upon the sepoy. We may then be assured, when the hour of trial and extra exertion arrives, that this indulgence, or rather just consideration, will be amply repaid.

The operation in Coorg appeared to me at the time likely to furnish a practical example of the correctness or otherwise of many of the preceding remarks; and, with a view to this object, I requested Sir Robert O'Callaghan to preserve for me the weekly states of each regiment during the progress of the campaign. The results afford the strongest illustration of the inconveniences of weak battalions, and show the very small proportion contrasted with the total strength, which, after deductions made for absentees from sickness or guards, remain for actual encounter with the enemy. The campaign lasted only seven weeks. The troops were very healthy, and the confined theatre of Coorg precluded the necessity of those numerous and distant detachments which are required in the ordinarily protracted and extensive course of Indian warfare.

The Return shows,—

- 1st. The total of the force.
- 2nd. The present and absent of the whole force.
- 3rd. The present and absent of two regiments, taken indiscriminately, each of which, it may be remarked, had 90 men more than its complement.

Appendix, No. 2.  
Appendix, No. 4.  
Appendix, No. 3.

From these statements it appears that the two regiments separately, and the whole force collectively, did not in any one week bring much more than one-half of their numbers into the field. In one of the weeks the amount was less than one-half. In the fifth week hostilities had terminated. The troops passed the Coorg frontier on the 2nd of April, and the Rajah gave himself up on the 12th of May. It is easy to conceive to what skeletons the whole of the regiments would have been reduced if the war had continued, and had been attended with the usual accompaniments of hard work, hard fare, and hard fighting.

I venture, therefore, to think that the inefficiency of the Native army, as at present constituted, has been indisputably proved, and it now becomes me to offer an opinion as to the best mode of correcting this defect. The complaint is not that the army is not sufficiently numerous, but that it is so organised as

to create unnecessarily an excessive multiplication of guards and duties, which reduce the disposable numbers of every regiment to so low a scale as to leave no effective force for any particular exigency. The obvious remedy would be to reform the present weak and inefficient regiments into a lesser number of large ones; and in order to do this without adding to the present numerical force of the army, it would be only necessary to reduce so many entire corps, the privates of which would exactly complete the remaining regiments to the proposed increased establishment of each.

The question then arises, what is the proper establishment for a regiment in peace and war, due regard being had to the circumstances peculiar to the Indian Service, so different from that of Europe. I have no hesitation in fixing that amount at 1,000 privates in peace, and 1,200 in war. Napoleon's establishment for a corps was 960 privates, formed into eight companies, which was calculated to give 800 men in the field. In India, the same strength would not give at first, according to preceding statements, anything like the same amount, which a continuation of the service would still greatly diminish. There are different formations of a regiment into more or less companies. I shall reserve my opinion upon this question till I come to consider the *composition* of the armies of the three Presidencies.

But though I have thought it right to state what appears to me to constitute the most suitable and efficient establishment, I am quite aware that so great and sudden a change would be productive of great inconvenience, and I would therefore recommend, as a first and immediate measure, that the strength of Native infantry regiments should be augmented from 640 to 800\* privates per regiment. This formation would make the following reduction of entire regiments in the three armies:—

Bengal	-	-	-	-	-	-	14 regiments.
Madras	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 „
Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 „
							29

Appendix, Nos. 5  
to 8.

The financial result of this plan of more efficient organisation offers, as per annexed Statements, an immediate saving of about five lacs, and a prospective one of about thirty. The principle of not injuring the interests of any of the officers, Native and European, has been adopted; the Native officers to retain their present rank and pay, and being attached to the army generally, to be admitted on the strength as vacancies may occur. The European officers to be considered as forming so many skeleton corps, their promotion continuing as if their regiments still existed, but, for the purposes of duty, being attached to such of the effective regiments as Government might direct; to these skeleton corps no young officers would in future be posted, and the plan suggested in Colonel Salmond's reply to Mr. Villiers, dated 2nd October 1832, might be advantageously employed to reduce the expense at an early period. I may return to this point hereafter.

Ootacamund,  
23 July 1834.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

\* *Note.*—During both the periods of peace, prior to the Mahratta and Burmese wars, each regiment of Native infantry in Bengal consisted of 10 companies of 80 men, or 800 privates. The present formation of eight companies is much to be preferred.

The Peace establishment of a regiment on the Madras Establishment, from 1814 to 1828, has varied from 750 to 850 men.

<i>Bengal.</i>		<i>Madras.</i>		<i>Bombay.</i>	
Present.	Future.	Present.	Future.	Present.	Future.
74	60	52	42	26	21
640	800	640	800	640	800
47,360	48,000	33,280	33,600	16,640	16,800



Appendix, No. 1.

STATEMENT showing the disposable Force that could have been collected from each of the large Stations of the Army on the 1st January and 1st August 1833; the Head Quarters of Corps, Sick, Baggage, &c. remaining at Head Quarters of Stations.

500.

B 2

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

11

	1st January 1833.									1st August 1833.							
	Europeans.				Native Commissioned Officers.	Europeans and Natives.				Europeans.				Native Commissioned Officers.	Europeans and Natives.		
	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Medical Officers.		Sergeants and Havildars.	Drummers.	Rank and File.		Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Medical Officers.		Sergeants and Havildars.	Drummers.	Rank and File.
Barrackpore - 4 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	7	11	3	39	85	1,115	Barrackpore - 6th Regiment Native Infantry - - - -	-	11	19	4	45	86	1,249		
Dum Dum - { 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	5	69	Dum Dum - { 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	4	55		
{ 6 companies European Foot Artillery - - - - -	3	3	19	4	-	25	330	{ 6 companies European Foot Artillery - - - - -	2	4	23	4	-	26	312		
{ 7 - ditto - of Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	16	24	270	{ 7 - ditto - Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	14	18	195		
Berhampore - { A detail of Native Artillery - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	2	28	Berhampore - { A detail of Native Artillery - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	2	28		
{ 1 regiment European Infantry - - - - -	1	2	12	1	-	37	540	{ 1 regiment European Infantry - - - - -	1	3	11	1	-	38	540		
{ 1 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - - -	-	3	4	2	11	25	352	{ 1 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - - -	-	2	6	2	5	11	321		
Dinapore - { 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	1	1	-	-	4	66	Dinapore - { 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	1	1	1	-	5	61		
{ Honourable Company's European Regiment - - - - -	1	3	9	1	-	36	566	{ Honourable Company's European Regiment - - - - -	1	3	6	2	-	35	550		
{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	1	2	7	2	15	27	364	{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	1	3	8	2	14	27	485		
Benares - { 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	1	2	1	-	4	54	Benares - { 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	1	2	1	-	4	56		
{ 2½ regiments of Native Infantry - - - - -	1	3	10	3	26	45	724	{ 2½ regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	2	3	12	2	17	36	510		
Allahabad - { 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	1	2	-	-	4	69	Allahabad - { 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	4	68		
{ 1½ regiment Native Infantry - - - - -	-	3	7	1	15	30	433	{ 1½ regiment Native Infantry - - - - -	-	4	7	1	14	35	474		
Caunpore - { 2 troops Horse Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	5	64	Caunpore - { 2 troops Horse Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	10	157		
{ 3 companies European and 7 companies Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	2	3	16	2	-	19	138	{ 3 companies European and 7 companies Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	3	3	10	2	8	9	173		
{ 1 regiment European Lancers - - - - -	1	4	13	1	-	40	430	{ 1 regiment of Lancers - - - - -	1	6	6	1	-	41	406		
{ 2 - ditto - Native Cavalry - - - - -	1	2	10	2	21	43	740	{ 2 - ditto - of Native Cavalry - - - - -	-	2	2	2	18	30	517		
{ 1 - ditto - European Infantry - - - - -	-	3	5	2	-	40	670	{ 1 - ditto - European Infantry - - - - -	1	4	30	2	-	41	658		
{ 3 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - - -	-	3	14	1	36	84	1,086	{ 3 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - - -	-	4	5	2	28	69	1,049		
Lucknow - { A detail Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	1	-	1	2	57	Lucknow - { A detail Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	1	-	1	4	52		
{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	1	3	13	2	24	55	708	{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	1	3	10	2	22	53	610		
Meerut - { 4 troops Horse Artillery - - - - -	1	6	18	3	1	12	184	Meerut - { 4 troops Horse Artillery - - - - -	-	2	15	1	1	17	287		
{ 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	15	206	{ 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	3	61		
{ 1 Dragoon Regiment - - - - -	1	3	16	2	-	45	441	{ 1 Dragoon Regiment - - - - -	1	5	8	2	-	40	438		
{ 1 regiment Native Cavalry - - - - -	1	-	7	1	10	21	355	{ 1 regiment Native Cavalry - - - - -	1	1	3	1	8	18	261		
{ 1 - ditto - European Infantry - - - - -	1	5	15	1	-	36	647	{ 1 - ditto - European Infantry - - - - -	1	4	12	1	-	35	600		
{ 3 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - - -	-	6	13	2	34	60	988	{ 3 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - - -	-	5	14	3	33	75	1,197		
Delhi - { 1 company Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	1	1	-	1	5	41	Delhi - { 1 company Native Foot Artillery - - - - -	-	-	1	-	1	5	47		
{ 3 regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	-	4	15	3	34	83	979	{ 3 regiments Native Infantry - - - - -	-	5	9	4	24	58	653		

STATEMENT showing the disposable Force that could have been collected from each of the large Stations of the Army on the 1st January and 1st August 1833, &c.—*continued.*

	1st January 1833.								1st August 1833.							
	Europeans.				Native Commissioned Officers.	Europeans and Natives.			Europeans.				Native Commissioned Officers.	Europeans and Natives.		
	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Medical Officers.		Serjeants and Havildars.	Drummers, Rank and File.		Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Medical Officers.		Serjeants and Havildars.	Drummers, Rank and File.	
Muttra -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	1	1	1	-	4	64	Muttra -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	1	1	1	-	4	66	
	{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	1	1	2	1	6	17		{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	1	2	5	1	9	19	
	{ 2 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	4	11	2	28	65		{ 2 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	1	5	9	1	19	39	
Agra -	{ 2 companies European Foot Artillery	1	1	7	1	-	8	125	Agra -	{ 2 companies European Foot Artillery	1	1	4	1	-	5
	{ 1 regiment European Infantry - - - -	1	7	16	1	-	30	608		{ 1 regiment European Infantry - - - -	1	6	17	1	-	36
	{ 2 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	3	13	1	21	38	617		{ 2 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	4	11	1	17	32
Bareilly -	{ A detail of Native Foot Artillery - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	3	56	Bareilly -	{ A detail Native Artillery - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	4
	{ A corps of Local Horse - - - -	1	-	2	1	24	64	207		{ A corps of Local Horse - - - -	1	-	2	1	14	39
	{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	2	7	1	23	65	984		{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	3	4	1	17	36
Kurnaul -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	-	3	7	1	-	8	83	Kurnaul -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	-	2	5	1	-	8
	{ 2 companies European Foot Artillery	-	5	17	1	-	9	124		{ 2 companies European Foot Artillery	-	5	14	1	-	10
	{ 1 regiment European Infantry - - - -	-	4	11	2	15	31	466		{ 1 regiment European Infantry - - - -	-	5	11	2	11	20
	{ 2 - ditto - of Light Cavalry - - - -	-	4	9	1	24	47	764		{ 2 - ditto - Light Cavalry - - - -	-	5	6	1	20	31
	{ 2 - ditto - of Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		{ 2 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	594
Loodhiana -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	-	1	3	1	2	4	68	Loodhiana -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	-	1	1	1	2	2
	{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	2	12	1	24	54	911		{ 2 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	2	6	3	18	31
Saugor -	{ 1 company European and detail Native In-	-	-	3	11	-	4	104	Saugor -	{ 1 company European and detail Native Ar-	-	-	2	1	-	4
	{ fantry - - - -	-	1	1	1	6	14	45		{ tillery - - - -	-	1	1	1	6	6
	{ 1 corps Local Horse - - - -	-	4	18	3	25	52	914		{ 1 corps Local Horse - - - -	-	2	6	19	3	21
	{ 3 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		{ 3 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	6	19	3	21	29
Nusseerabad -	{ 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - -	1	-	2	1	-	6	70	Nusseerabad -	{ 1 company European Foot Artillery - - - -	1	-	4	1	-	6
	{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	1	2	4	1	9	20	293		{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	1	2	4	1	5	6
	{ 4 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	5	20	4	41	90	1,401		{ 4 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	1	8	19	3	33	63
Neemuch -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	1	2	2	1	4	4	103	Neemuch -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	1	2	4	1	4	7
	{ 1 company Native Foot Artillery - - - -	1	2	3	1	7	14	191		{ 1 company Native Foot Artillery - - - -	-	3	4	1	6	11
	{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	-	1	1	1	14	32	164		{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	-	1	-	1	4	11
	{ 1 corps Local Horse - - - -	-	4	18	4	48	109	1,869		{ 1 corps Local Horse - - - -	-	6	15	3	37	64
	{ 4 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		{ 4 regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	1,222
Mhow -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	-	2	3	1	-	9	95	Mhow -	{ 1 troop Horse Artillery - - - -	-	2	4	1	-	8
	{ 1 company Native Foot Artillery - - - -	-	2	2	1	9	16	259		{ 1 company Native Foot Artillery - - - -	-	1	2	1	7	13
	{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	-	5	18	2	31	64	1,031		{ 1 regiment Light Cavalry - - - -	-	5	14	3	24	30
	{ 3 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		{ 3 - ditto - Native Infantry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	790

Adjutant General's Office,  
Presidency of Fort William,  
24 January 1834.

(signed) J. R. Lumley, Colonel,  
Adjutant General of the Army.

Appendix, No. 2.

COORG FIELD FORCE, from 7th April to 5th May 1834.

Detachments European and Native Artillery.  
 Corps of Sappers and Miners.  
 Three King's Regiments.  
 Nine Regiments Native Infantry.  
 Two Rifle Companies.  
 Wynaad Rangers, with Detachments 51st Native Infantry.

His Majesty's 39th Regiment.  
 His Majesty's 48th Regiment.  
 His Majesty's 55th Regiment.  
 European Artillery.

Golundauze and Gun Lascars.  
 Sappers and Miners.  
 4th Regiment Native Infantry.  
 9th - ditto - ditto.  
 20th - ditto - ditto.  
 31st - ditto - ditto.  
 32nd - ditto - ditto.  
 35th - ditto - ditto.

36th Regiment Native Infantry.  
 40th - ditto - ditto.  
 48th - ditto - ditto.  
 Rifle Companies 24th and 51st Native  
 Infantry.  
 Wynaad Rangers and Detachments 51st  
 Native Infantry.

Appendix, No. 3.

WEEKLY STATE of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

DATE.	FORCE.	European Officers.	Medical Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Officers.	Native Non-Commissioned, Drummers, Rank and File.
7 April 1834	Available - - - - -	5	1	2	12	530
	Sick and absent - - - - -	10	1	-	2	122
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	1	-	-	1	84
	TOTAL - - - - -	16	2	2	15	736
14 April „ -	Available - - - - -	6	1	2	9	416
	Sick and absent - - - - -	10	1	-	2	139
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	-	-	-	4	180
	TOTAL - - - - -	16	2	2	15	735
21 April „ -	Available - - - - -	7	1	2	8	393
	Sick and absent - - - - -	9	1	-	2	149
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	-	-	-	5	192
	TOTAL - - - - -	16	2	2	15	734
28 April „ -	Available - - - - -	6	1	1	11	444
	Sick and absent - - - - -	9	1	1	2	141
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	1	-	-	2	140
	TOTAL - - - - -	16	2	2	15	734
5 May „ -	Available - - - - -	6	1	1	8	428
	Sick and absent - - - - -	9	1	1	5	156
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	1	-	-	2	149
	TOTAL - - - - -	16	2	2	15	733

## WEEKLY STATE of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry.

DATE.	FORCE.	European Officers.	Medical Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Officers.	Native Non-commissioned, Drummers, Rank and File.
7 April 1834	Available - - - - -	7	1	1	11	375
	Sick and absent - - - - -	7	-	1	3	205
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	1	-	-	2	152
	<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>732</b>
14 April "	Available - - - - -	7	1	1	11	407
	Sick and absent - - - - -	7	-	1	3	226
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	1	-	-	2	99
	<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>732</b>
21 April "	Available - - - - -	6	1	1	11	398
	Sick and absent - - - - -	9	-	1	3	225
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	-	-	-	2	109
	<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>732</b>
28 April "	Available - - - - -	6	1	1	10	368
	Sick and absent - - - - -	9	-	1	4	257
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	-	-	-	2	105
	<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>730</b>
5 May "	Available - - - - -	6*	1	1	12	428
	Sick and absent - - - - -	3	-	1	3	217
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	-	-	-	1	85
	<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>730</b>

\* *N.B.*—Seven unposted Ensigns did duty with this corps from 14th April to 5th May.

## Appendix, No. 4.

## WEEKLY STATE of the Coorg Field Force.

DATE.	FORCE.	European Officers.	Medical Officers.	Native Officers.	European Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Native Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.
7 April 1834	Available for duty - - - - -	143	10	96	1,014	4,287
	Sick and absent - - - - -	87	7	37	159	1,663
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	19	1	26	200	1,279
14 April "	Available for duty - - - - -	143	24	83	906	3,878
	Sick and absent - - - - -	92	9	50	215	2,553
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	23	-	34	258	1,561
21 April "	Available for duty - - - - -	157	25	97	724	4,265
	Sick and absent - - - - -	82	8	40	319	1,891
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	17	-	32	220	1,569
28 April "	Available for duty - - - - -	82	15	56	539	2,422
	Sick and absent - - - - -	63	4	28	140	1,362
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	12	-	15	189	789
5 May "	Available for duty - - - - -	68	10	53	634	2,370
	Sick and Absent - - - - -	61	5	13	106	1,605
	Regimental and camp duty - - - - -	10	-	33	179	714

Appendix, No. 5.

MEMORANDUM of the Saving to be effected by the proposed Reductions of the Infantry in the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

		Per Annum.	TOTAL.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
<b>Immediate Saving :</b>			
Bengal	- 14 Regiments reduced - - - -	2,57,666 8 -	
Madras	- 7 Ditto on half batta, <i>Rs. 1,20,232 14</i>		
	3 Ditto on full batta, <u>58,035 -</u>	1,78,267 14 -	
Bombay	- 5 Ditto - - - - -	89,121 4 -	
Total Immediate Saving per Annum - - -			5,25,055 10 -
<b>Prospective Saving :</b>			
Bengal	- 14 Regiments reduced - - - -	15,49,607 8 -	
Madras	- 7 Ditto on half batta, <i>Rs. 6,55,131 5</i>		
	3 Ditto on full batta, <u>8,22,482 -</u>	9,77,613 5 -	
Bombay	- 5 Ditto - - - - -	4,62,231 4 -	
Total Prospective Saving per Annum - - -			29,89,452 1 -
Total Saving, Immediate and Prospective, per Annum - - -			35,14,507 11 -
<b>Cavalry :</b>			
Immediate saving - - - - -		4,33,445 10 -	
Prospective saving - - - - -		10,63,337 6 -	
Total Saving, Immediate and Prospective, per Annum - - -			14,96,783 - -
GRAND TOTAL, per Annum - - -			50,11,290 11 -

## Appendix, No. 6.

## BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate Saving* to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 60 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

	Rs. a. p.	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
		Per Month.	Per Year.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Lascars and Bheesties - - - - -	86 - -	86 - -	
Regimental command allowance - - - - -	400 - -		
Companies - ditto - ditto - - - - -	240 - -		
Allowance for repair of arms - - - - -	160 - -		
		800 - -	
Adjutant's allowance - - - - -	212 7 -		
Quartermaster's ditto - - - - -	137 - -		
Proportion of surgeon's ditto, assistant surgeon - - - - -	255 - -		
		604 7 -	
Serjeant major and quartermaster serjeant - - - - -	96 10 4	96 10 4	
8 Pay havildars - - - - -	40 - -		
1 Drill - ditto - - - - -	5 - -		
1 Drill naick - - - - -	2 8 -		
		47 8 -	
Quartermaster's establishment - - - - -	71 8 -		
Bazar - - ditto - - - - -	25 - -		
Hospital - ditto - - - - -	35 - -		
		131 8 -	
Camp equipage, repair of - - - - -	27 - -		
Proportion of allowance for a mess - - - - -	60 - -		
Doolie bearers - - - - -	21 - -		
		108 - -	
Clothing for 1 tindal and 8 lascars - - - - -		2 8 -	
		1,876 9 4	
Less—Proportion of the expense in pay and clothing of 640 privates required to complete the regiments to 800 men each - - - - -		* 342 13 8	
On 1 regiment per mensem - - - - -		1,533 11 8	
On 14 - ditto - ditto - - - - -		21,472 3 4	
Immediate Saving per Annum - - - - -		Rs. 2,57,866 8 -	

	Men.	Regts.
* Present establishment - - - - -	640	74 = 47,360
Proposed - ditto - - - - -	800	60 = 48,000

Difference, Men to be raised - - - 640

	Rs. a. p.
Pay of 640 privates, half batta - - - - -	4,480 - -
Clothing of - ditto - at 8 annas per man - - - - -	320 - -
The number of corps to be reduced - - - 14)	4,800 - -
Proportion for each Corps - - - - -	Rs. 342 13 8

BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Prospective Saving* to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 60 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	Per Year.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
European officers - - - - -	* 7,000 5 8	
Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and drummers - - - - -	1,973 - -	
Native doctors and staff allowance to the drum and fife majors	40 - -	
Clothing of the European serjeants, Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and drummers - - - - -	210 8 -	
On One Regiment per Mensem - - - - -	9,223 13 8	
On Fourteen Regiments per Mensem - - - - -	129,133 15 4	
TOTAL Proportion of Saving per annum - - - - -	Rs.	15,49,607 8 -

\* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances.	Proportion on Pay only.	Number and Rank.	Indian Pay and Allowances.	Pay only.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{2}{3}$	1 Colonel - - - - -	431 12 4	202 14 8
$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	1 Lieutenant colonel - - - - -	688 - -	81 2 8
$\frac{7}{10}$	$\frac{3}{10}$	1 Major - - - - -	552 6 8	54 12 6
4	1	5 Captains - - - - -	1,661 8 -	121 12 -
7	1	8 Lieutenants - - - - -	1,798 6 -	60 14 -
$3\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	4 Ensigns - - - - -	760 5 -	12 5 10
$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	1 Surgeon - - - - -	276 14 8	40 9 4
1	-	1 Assistant Surgeon - - - - -	256 10 -	-
			6,425 14 8	574 7 -
				6,425 14 8
		Total Saving - - - - -	Rs.	7,000 5 8

## Appendix, No. 7.

## MADRAS NATIVE INFANTRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 42 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Half Batta.	Full Batta.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
8 Puckaulies - - - - -	85 14 8	123 4 -
Adjutant's and quartermaster's allowances - - - - -	234 - -	406 - -
Surgeon's allowance (average) - - - - -	232 - -	
Serjeant-major and quartermaster serjeant - - - - -	72 10 -	81 13 6
Native adjutant, drill havildar, and drill naick staff allowances	26 4 -	809 2 8
8 Pay havildars - - - - -	14 14 8	
2 Totties, 14 rupees; moonshee, 30 rupees - - - - -	44 - -	
Mess allowances - - - - -	63 - -	
Command allowance for 8 companies - - - - -	240 - -	155 - -
Command allowance, regimental - - - - -	400 - -	
Regimental school - - - - -	21 - -	245 8 4
Vakeel and artificers - - - - -	106 - -	
Lascars and bazar servants - - - - -	160 5 4	
	1,700 - 8	1,880 12 6
Less—Proportion of expense in pay and clothing of 320 men, required to complete the regiments to 800 men each - - - - -	268 11 2	* 268 11 2
On One Regiment, per Mensem - - - - -	1,431 5 6	1,612 1 4
On 10 Regiments: 7 on half, and 3 on full } batta per Mensem - - - - -	10,019 6 6	4,836 4 -
On 10 Regiments: 7 on half, and 3 on full } batta per Annum - - - - -	120,232 14 -	58,035 - -
TOTAL Immediate Saving per Annum - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 178,267 14 -	

	Men.	Regts.
* Present establishment - - - - -	640	52 = 33,280
Proposed ditto - - - - -	800	42 = 33,600
Difference, Men to be raised - - -		320

	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Pay of 123 privates, on full batta - - - - -	1,148 - -
Ditto 197 ditto on half batta - - - - -	1,379 - -
Clothing of 320 privates, at 8 a. each - - - - -	160 - -
The number of Corps to be reduced - - -	10) 2,687 - -
Proportion for each Corps - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 268 11 2



MADRAS NATIVE INFANTRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Prospective Saving* to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 42 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Half Batta.	Full Batta.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
European officers - - - - -	* 5,664 - 3	6,407 10 8
Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers - -	1,526 - -	1,932 - -
Recruit and pension boys - - - - -	245 - -	} 270 - -
Subadar major's staff allowance - - - - -	25 - -	
Regimental havildar major - - - - -	20 8 -	22 13 4
Colour havildar - - - - -	16 - -	16 - -
Drum and fife majors, apothecary and dresser - - -	78 2 8	84 13 4
Clothing, assumed - - - - -	224 8 -	224 8 -
On one Regiment, per Mensem - - -	7,799 2 11	8,957 13 4
On 10 Regiments, 7 on half and 3 on full } batta, per Mensem - - - - -	54,594 4 5	26,873 8 -
On 10 Regiments, 7 on half and 3 on full } batta, per Annum - - - - -	655,131 5 -	3,22,483 - -
		6,55,131 5 -
TOTAL Prospective Saving per Annum - - -	<i>Rs.</i>	9,77,613 5 -

\* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances.	Proportion on Pay only.	Number and Rank.	Indian Pay and Allowances.		Pay only.
			Half Batta.	Full Batta.	
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
1/4	1/2	1 Colonel - -	323 13 4	323 13 4	152 3 -
2/3	1/3	1 Lieutenant Colonel -	551 12 -	688 - -	81 2 8
2/3	1/3	1 Major - - -	427 4 4	526 2 -	60 14 -
3 1/2	1 2/3	5 Captains - - -	1,246 14 -	1,384 9 4	202 10 8
6	2	8 Lieutenants - -	1,354 8 -	1,539 12 -	121 12 -
3 1/2	1/2	4 Ensigns - - -	637 3 9	760 6 6	12 7 10
2/3	1/3	1 Surgeon - - -	245 6 -	276 14 8	12 4 8
1	-	1 Assistant Surgeon -	225 12 -	256 10 -	-
			5,012 9 5	5,756 3 10	651 6 10
			651 6 10	651 6 10	
		TOTAL Saving - <i>Rs.</i>	5,664 - 3	6,407 10 8	

## Appendix, No. 8.

## BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate Saving* to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 21 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	Per Year.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Regimental command allowance - - - - -	400 - -	
Adjutant's allowance - - - - -	162 - -	
Quartermaster's allowance - - - - -	120 - -	
Surgeon's allowance (proportion) - - - - -	200 - -	
2 Serjeants - - - - -	52 - -	
Staff allowances to 17 Native commissioned, and European and Native non-commissioned officers - - - - -	141 3 -	
8 Puckallies - - - - -	60 - -	
Bazar chowdry and peons - - - - -	26 - -	
Artificers - - - - -	50 - -	
Pundit and regimental school - - - - -	42 2 8	
Mess - - - - -	80 - -	
Company command allowances and lights - - - - -	304 - -	
Hospital followers - - - - -	88 - -	
	<b>1,725 5 8</b>	
Less,—Proportion of expense in pay and clothing of 160 men, required to complete the regiment to 800 men, each - - - - -	*240 - -	
On One Regiment, per Mensem - - - - -	<b>1,485 5 8</b>	
On Five Regiments, per Mensem - - - - -	<b>7,426 12 4</b>	
Immediate Saving per Annum - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i>	<b>.89,121 4 -</b>

	<u>Men.</u>	<u>Regts.</u>	
* Present establishment - - - - -	640	× 26	= 16,640
Proposed ditto - - - - -	800	× 21	= 16,800
Difference, Men to be raised - - - - -			<b>160</b>

	<u>Rs.</u>
Pay of 160 privates, at 7 rupees per month - - - - -	1,120
Clothing of ditto, at 8 rupees per month - - - - -	80
The number of Corps to be reduced - - - - -	5) 1,200
Proportion of each Corps - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 240

**EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA). 21**

**BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY.**

**PARTICULARS of the Prospective Saving to be Effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 21 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.**

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	Per Year.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
European officers - - - - -	* 5,832 13 8	
Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, drummers, and fifers - - - - -	1,472 - -	
Hospital assistants - - - - -	45 - -	
Pension or recruit boys - - - - -	145 - -	
Nothing of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers -	209 - -	
On one Regiment per Mensem - - -	7,703 13 8	
On five Regiments per Mensem - - -	38,519 4 4	
Prospective Saving per Annum - - - Rs.		4,62,231 4 -

\* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances.	Proportion on Pay Only.	Number and Rank.	Indian Pay and Allowances.	Pay Only.
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1 Colonel - - - - -	259 1 -	244 8 -
$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	1 Lieutenant Colonel - - - - -	472 14 8	104 5 9
$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	1 Major - - - - -	496 6 4	40 9 -
$\frac{1}{4}$	1	5 Captains - - - - -	1,496 4 -	121 12 -
$\frac{1}{6}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	8 Lieutenants - - - - -	1,483 8 -	86 15 2
$3\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	4 Ensigns - - - - -	682 11 6	12 5 10
$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	1 Surgeon - - - - -	96 12 -	69 10 -
$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	1 Assistant Surgeon - - - - -	124 8 4	40 10 -
			<b>Rs. 5,112 1 10</b>	<b>720 11 10</b>
				<b>5,112 1 10</b>
		<b>Total Saving - - - Rs.</b>		<b>5,832 13 8</b>

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

## MEMORANDUM on the Regular Native Cavalry.

OF this arm there are in Bengal	-	-	-	-	10	regiments
„	„	Madras	-	-	8	„
„	„	Bombay	-	-	3	„
						<u>21</u> regiments,

each regiment consisting of six troops, and each troop of 70 privates.

The expense of this part of our establishment is very great. In peace its services are never required for ordinary civil or military duties, like the Native infantry, while a doubt is entertained by many whether in war they are of equal value, as a military force, with the irregular horse; and further, whether on the ground of efficiency and economy, the first cost and feed of horses, as well as of all equipments, being the same, a portion of the regular Native cavalry might not be advantageously exchanged for an addition to our European cavalry. But leaving these questions aside for the present, the preceding considerations and doubts are so many additional reasons to those which have already been given in favour of an augmentation of the strength of each infantry regiment, for dealing in like manner with the regular cavalry. Proceeding, therefore, as I did with the infantry, I shall first state my opinion that the most efficient and least expensive establishment for each regiment of cavalry would be eight troops of 100 privates each, forming four squadrons.

But with the same object of not interfering with the existing organisation, or of making too violent and sudden a change, I would recommend only that each troop should be increased from 70 to 100 privates; the same mode of disposing of the officers and men being adopted as in the infantry.

*Vide Annexed Statements.*

The immediate saving would be above four lacs, and the prospective above 10, making an aggregate of about 15 lacs. There would remain for—

	Present.	Future.
Bengal -	420 10	600 7
	4,200	4,200
Madras -	420 8	600 5
	3,360	3,000
Bombay -	420 3	600 2
	1,260	1,200

Bengal	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	regiments
Madras	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	„
Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	„
								<u>14</u> regiments.

I shall, in a future paper regarding the composition of the Indian Army, enter at length upon the very great importance of the irregular cavalry.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

Ootacamund, 23 July 1834.

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA). 23

MEMORANDUM of the Saving to be effected by the Proposed Reductions of the Cavalry  
in the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

	Per Annum.	TOTAL.
<b>Immediate Saving:</b>		
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Bengal.—3 Regiments reduced - - - - -	1,09,685 4 -	
Madras.—1 Regiment on full batta - <i>Rs. 91,465 6 -</i>		
2 Regiments on half batta - - 1,65,225 8 -	2,56,690 14 -	
Bombay.—1 Regiment on half batta - - - - -	67,069 8 -	
<b>TOTAL Immediate Saving per Annum - - -</b>		<b>4,43,445 10 -</b>
<b>Prospective Saving:</b>		
Bengal.—3 Regiments reduced - - - - -	4,34,739 12 -	
Madras.—1 Regiment on full batta - <i>Rs. 1,77,990 8 -</i>		
2 Regiments on half batta - - 3,13,032 - -	4,91,022 8 -	
Bombay.—1 Regiment on half batta - - - - -	1,37,575 2 -	
<b>TOTAL Prospective Saving per Annum - - -</b>		<b>10,63,337 6 -</b>
<b>TOTAL SAVING, Immediate and Prospective per Annum - - -</b>		<b>*14,96,783 - -</b>
<b>INFANTRY:</b>		
Immediate saving - - - - -	5,25,055 10 -	
Prospective „ - - - - -	29,89,452 1 -	
<b>TOTAL Saving, Immediate and Prospective, per Annum - - -</b>		<b>35,14,507 11 -</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i></b>		<b>50,11,290 11 -</b>

\* In this calculation the riding masters lately attached to the Madras and Bombay cavalry are not included.

BENGAL CAVALRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Proposed Reduction of the Cavalry to Seven Regiments of 6 Troops and 600 Privates each.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	Per Year.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Adjutant's allowance - - - - -	212 7 -	
Interpreter and quartermaster ditto - - - - -	137 - -	
Surgeon's ditto - - - - -	300 - -	
Serjeant major and quartermaster serjeant - - - - -	98 12 8	
Staff allowance to Native non-commissioned officers and pay havildar - - - - -	73 8 -	
Quartermaster's establishment - - - - -	158 - -	
Bazar establishment - - - - -	25 - -	
Hospital - ditto - - - - -	35 - -	
Repairs of camp equipage - - - - -	22 - -	
Mess allowance (proportion) - - - - -	80 - -	
Dooley bearers - - - - -	21 - -	
Regimental command allowance - - - - -	400 - -	
Allowance for command of troops and repair of arms - - - - -	300 - -	
Ditto - for concessions to riding master - - - - -	30 - -	
Ditto - for grain pots - - - - -	120 - -	
Syces and grass cutters of 76 supernumerary horses - - - - -	570 - -	
Remount, at 10 per cent, the horses, at 400 rupees each - - - - -	254 - -	
Feeding of 76 horses, at <i>Rs. 2. 14. 4.</i> - - - - -	210 1 4	
<b>One Regiment per Month - - - <i>Rs.</i></b>	<b>3,048 13 -</b>	
<b>One Regiment per Year - - - - -</b>		<b>36,561 12 -</b>
<b>Three Regiments for One Year - - - <i>Rs.</i></b>		<b>1,09,685 4 -</b>

## BENGAL CAVALRY.

*Particulars of the Prospective Saving in each Regiment by its Reduction, supposing  
Seven Regiments of 600 Men each to remain.*

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
European officers - - - - -	9,956 - -	1,19,472 - -
Native officers, non-commissioned officers, trumpeters and farriers - - - - -	1,682 - -	
Riding master - - - - -	122 7 -	
Trumpet major, farrier major, and native doctors - - -	65 - -	
Clothing for the reduced officers - - - - -	250 10 8	
	2,120 1 8	25,441 4 -
One regiment per Month - - -	12,076 1 8	
		1,44,913 4 -
One regiment per Year - - -		Rs. 4,34,739 12 -

\* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances.	Proportion on Pay only.	Number and Rank.	Indian Pay and Allowances.	Pay only.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
$\frac{9}{16}$	$\frac{1}{16}$	1 Colonel - - - - -	1,040 14 2	118 - -
$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{2}{8}$	1 Lieutenant Colonel - - -	694 3 3	111 - -
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1 Major - - - - -	743 8 -	46 8 -
$3\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	5 Captains - - - - -	1,970 9 2	269 - -
6	2	8 Lieutenants - - - - -	2,100 8 -	319 - -
$3\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	4 Cornets - - - - -	1,087 4 2	48 8 -
1	-	1 Surgeon - - - - -	563 - 4	-
1	-	1 Assistant Surgeon - - -	365 4 -	-
1	-	1 Veterinary Surgeon - - -	389 10 9	-
			9,044 13 10	912 - -
				9,044 13 10
		TOTAL Saving - - -	Rs.	9,956 13 10

MADRAS CAVALRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate Saving* to be Effected by the Proposed Reduction of the Cavalry to Five Regiments, of Six Troops, and 600 Privates each.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Full Batta.	Half Batta.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Adjutant's allowances - - - - -	147 - -	} 526 - -
Quartermaster's allowances - - - - -	147 - -	
Surgeon's allowances (average) - - - - -	232 - -	
Serjeant major and quartermaster serjeant - - - - -	94 1 6	70 14 -
Staff allowance to the native adjutant, havildar major, drill havildar, and drill naick - - - - -	45 - -	} 2,065 5 4
Native riding master, rough riders, and pay havildars - -	81 3 -	
Moonshee, Vakeel, gram conicopoly and measuring men -	93 - -	
Totics, artificers, bazar servants and lascars - - - - -	244 13 4	
Troop and saddle contract on 221 horses of supernumeraries, at <i>Rs. 4. 8. 9.</i> each - - - - -	1,000 5 -	
Troop command allowance, at 30 rupees each - - - - -	180 - -	
Regimental school - - - - -	21 - -	
Regimental command allowance - - - - -	400 - -	} 389 12 - 1,105 - -
Pay of 74 horsekeepers, and 221 grasscutters - - - - -	{ 560 10 4 1,620 10 8	
Pay of 6 puckallies - - - - -	92 7 -	92 7 -
Pay of 6 horsekeeper chowdries - - - - -	66 8 -	52 8 -
Pay of 6 grass cutter chowdries - - - - -	66 8 -	52 8 -
Mess allowance - - - - -	63 - -	} 2,530 - -
Feeding 221 horses, at 7 rupees per horse - - - - -	1,547 - -	
Remount assumed at 10 per cent, and at 500 rupees per horse	920 - -	
One Regiment per Mensem - - -	7,622 1 10	6,884 6 4
One Regiment per Annum - - -	91,465 6 -	82,612 12 -
One Regiment on full, and two on half } Batta per Annum - - - - - }	91,465 6 -	165,225 8 -
		91,465 6 -
TOTAL immediate Saving per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>		2,56,690 14 -

## MADRAS CAVALRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Prospective Saving* in each Regiment by its Reduction, supposing Five Regiments of 600 Men each to remain.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Full Batta.	Half Batta.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
European officers - - - - -	* 9,138 - -	8,487 10 -
Native commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and trumpeters - - - - -	2,952 - -	2,303 - -
120 troopers, at 14 rupees - - - - -	1,680 - -	1,260 - -
Recruit and pension boys - - - - -	140 - -	140 - -
Trumpet major, farrier major, farriers and veterinary pupils -	348 - -	285 14 -
Assistant apothecary and dressers - - - - -	74 8 8	60 8 -
Clothings assumed at - - - - -	500 - -	500 - -
One Regiment per Month - - -	14,832 8 8	13,043 - -
One Regiment per Year - - -	1,77,990 8 -	1,56,516 - -
One Regiment on full, and two } on half Batta per Year - }	1,77,990 8 -	3,13,032 - -
		1,77,990 8 -
TOTAL Prospective Saving per Annum - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 4,91,022 8 -	

\* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances.	Proportion on Pay only.	Number and Rank.	Indian Pay and Allowances.		Pay only.
			Full Batta.	Half Batta.	
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
$\frac{7}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	1 Colonel - - -	739 3 6	739 3 6	198 12 -
$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	1 Lieutenant Colonel	723 2 -	595 6 3	107 11 6
$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{5}$	1 Major - - -	464 11 2	390 8 11	116 6 8
$3\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	5 Captains - - -	2,111 5 3	1,956 6 6	224 3 11
6	2	8 Lieutenants - - -	2,191 8 -	2,006 4 -	218 - -
$3\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	4 Cornets - - -	771 9 10	744 15 4	146 - -
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1 Surgeon - - -	281 8 2	260 13 8	89 11 2
1	-	1 Assistant Surgeon -	365 4 -	334 6 -	-
1	-	Veterinary Surgeon -	389 10 9	358 12 9	-
			8,037 14 8	7,386 12 11	1,100 13 3
			1,100 13 3	1,100 13 3	
		-Total Saving - <i>Rs.</i>	9,138 11 11	8,487 10 2	



BOMBAY CAVALRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Proposed Reduction of the Cavalry to Two Regiments of Six Troops, and 600 Privates each.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	Per Year.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Staff allowance to commanding officer - - - -	400 - -	
Ditto - to adjutant - - - -	177 - -	
Ditto - to quartermaster - - - -	150 - -	
Ditto - to surgeon - - - -	300 - -	
Ditto - to veterinary surgeon - - - -	49 - -	
	1,076 - -	
Staff allowance to 28 Native commissioned and European non-commissioned officers - - - -	208 - -	
Serjeant-major and quartermaster serjeant - - - -	60 - -	
6 Puckalies - - - -	68 - -	
1 Bazar chowdrie - - - -	16 - -	
2 Peons - - - -	10 - -	
	94 - -	
Artificers - - - -	107 2 -	
School pundit - - - -	15 - -	
	122 2 -	
6 Maccadums of horsekeepers - - - -	60 - -	
118 Horsekeepers of supernumeraries - - - -	708 - -	
6 Maccadums of grasscutters - - - -	60 - -	
158 Grasscutters, at 5 rupees - - - -	790 - -	
Saddle and troop contract, at 4 rupees each for 158 horses - - - -	632 - -	
Mess allowance - - - -	90 - -	
Troop command allowance and lights, at 38 rupees - - - -	228 - -	
Regimental school - - - -	27 - -	
Hospital establishment - - - -	118 - -	
Feeding 158 horses, at 5 rupees per horse - - - -	790 - -	
Remount, at 10 per cent. - - - -	526 - -	
	4,029 - -	
Per Month - - - - Rs.	5,589 2 -	
	Per Year - - - - Rs.	67,069 8 -

## BOMBAY CAVALRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Prospective* Saving in each Regiment by its Reduction, supposing Two Regiments of 600 Privates each to remain.

	IN EACH REGIMENT.	
	Per Month.	Per Year.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
European officers - - - - -	* 7,877 9 6	
Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers - -	2,448 - -	
60 Troopers - - - - -	630 - -	
2 Hospital assistants - - - - -	45 - -	
Clothing - - - - -	376 - -	
Subadars major's allowance - - - - -	25 - -	
18 Boys - - - - -	63 - -	
One Regiment for One Month - - - <i>Rs.</i>	11,464 9 6	
One Regiment for One Year - - - <i>Rs.</i>		1,37,575 2 -

\* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances.	Proportion on Pay only.	Number and Rank.	Indian Pay and Allowances.	Pay only.
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
-	1	1 Colonel - - - - -	- - -	397 8 -
$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	1 Lieutenant colonel - - - - -	635 1 4	92 12 -
1	-	1 Major - - - - -	781 1 10	-
3	2	5 Captains - - - - -	1,565 2 -	358 12 8
6	2	8 Lieutenants - - - - -	2,006 4 -	219 - -
$2\frac{2}{3}$	$1\frac{1}{3}$	4 Cornets - - - - -	726 10 2	129 12 5
1	-	1 Surgeon - - - - -	521 11 -	-
$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	1 Assistant surgeon - - - - -	222 14 8	36 7 8
$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{2}{3}$	1 Veterinary surgeon - - - - -	119 9 7	64 14 2
			6,578 6 7	1,299 2 11
				6,578 6 7
		Total Saving - - - <i>Rs.</i>		7,877 9 6

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,  
Secretary to Government of India, Military Department.

MEMORANDUM ON the ARTILLERY.

THE establishment of artillery, horse and foot, at the three Presidencies, is as follows:—

HORSE ARTILLERY.

*Bengal.*—There are three brigades, each brigade consisting of four troops, three European and one native; each European troop having 80 gunners, each native troop 90 men; six guns, four 6-pounders and two 12-inch howitzers being attached to each troop, European and native. App. No. 1.

*Madras.*—Two brigades, one consisting of four European troops and one of two native troops; each troop, European and native, is composed of 84 gunners or privates. A troop beyond the frontier has six guns (all 6-pounders), and within it four guns (6-pounders). App. No. 1.

*Bombay.*—One brigade of four troops of European, constituted as in Bengal. There is no native horse artillery. Each troop has four guns (6-pounders). App. No. 1.

FOOT ARTILLERY.

*Bengal.*—Five battalions of Europeans, each battalion consisting of four companies, and each company of 80 gunners; two battalions of natives, each battalion consisting of eight companies, and each company of 104 privates. App. No. 1.

The complement of European officers is precisely the same in a regiment of infantry, of cavalry, a brigade of horse artillery, and a battalion of foot artillery.

*Madras.*—Three battalions of Europeans, constituted as in Bengal, and one of natives, consisting only of six companies instead of eight, and each company of 92 privates instead of 104, as in Bengal; but with the same complement of officers as a battalion of eight companies. App. No. 1.

*Bombay.*—Two battalions of Europeans, constituted as in Bengal, and one native battalion consisting of eight companies, and each company of 70 privates, differing both from Bengal, 104 privates, and Madras, 92 privates. App. No. 1.

It appears from the preceding statement that all the troops of European horse artillery at the three Presidencies have the same constitution,\* but the brigades differ.

In Bengal, each brigade consists of three troops of European and one native.

In Madras, one brigade consists of four European troops; the two native troops, being the remaining half of a native brigade reduced by Mr. Lushington, act separately.

In Bombay there is one brigade of four troops of Europeans, and no native troop.

I have now to submit that the same principles upon which I have proposed to remodel the infantry and cavalry shall be applied to the horse and foot artillery.

1st. That the establishment of European officers, non-commissioned officers, and bombardiers, in each troop and battalion, shall remain as at present.

2nd. That in the total number of privates in the horse and foot artillery collectively there shall be no alteration, excepting such as the systematic and uniform organization of the corps on the principle assumed may render unavoidable. (See Appendix, No. 5.)

3rd. That the total number of privates shall be formed into companies of 100 instead of 80 men each, and that the officers of the troops and companies, rendered superfluous by this consolidation, shall be disposed of in the same manner as in the infantry and cavalry.

The

\* There is a trifling difference in Madras, where each troop has four additional gunners.

The changes that this arrangement will effect are as follows :—

App. No. 2.

## HORSE ARTILLERY.

## BENGAL :

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.
3 Brigades of 3 European and 1 native troop each.	2 Brigades of 3 European and 1 native troop each.
9 Troops Europeans, of 80 gunners each - - - - - 720	6 European troops, of 100 gunners each - - - - - 600
3 Troops natives, of 90 privates each - - - - - 270	2 Native troops of 100 privates each - - - - - 200
12 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates - - - - - 990	8 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates - - - - - 800

The reduction will consist of one brigade; that is, of three European troops and one native.

App. No. 2.

## MADRAS.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.
2 Brigades; 1 of 4 troops of Europeans, and 1 of 2 troops of natives.	1 Brigade of 4 European troops.
4 Troops, Europeans, 84 gunners each - 336	4 European troops, of 100 gunners each 400
2 Ditto, natives, 84 privates each - - 168	
6 Troops, making a Total of gunners and privates - - - - - 504	400

There will be a reduction of one brigade of European officers, and of two troops of natives. It is universally admitted that the low stature and inferior strength of the Madras Sepoy totally unfit him for this arm.

App. No. 2.

## BOMBAY.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.
1 Brigade of 4 European troops.	1 Brigade of 4 European troops.
4 Troops, European, 80 gunners each - 320	4 European troops, 100 gunners each - 400
320	400
Total horse artillery - - 1,814.	Total horse artillery - - 1,600.

There will thus be a diminution of 120 European artillery-men in the Bengal Horse Artillery, which will be more than met by the increase, at—

Madras - - - - -	64
Bombay - - - - -	80
	<u>144</u>

App. No. 2.

With respect to the foot artillery, a modification of the existing organization has been suggested which strikes me as being a great improvement, while it does not interfere with the present distribution of the European officers. It is proposed that each battalion shall be composed, after the manner of the Bengal Horse Artillery, of three companies of Europeans and two of natives, the two companies of natives having the same complement of officers as one company of European foot artillery, and one troop of native horse artillery.

The advantage of this plan is that the Europeans and natives will always act together; and to those who are of opinion (an opinion from which I totally dissent) that this powerful weapon should never be entrusted to natives, it will be satisfactory that the great majority of each battalion is European.

Uniformity

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA). 31

Uniformity also in the constitution of the foot artillery in the three Presidencies will be thus introduced:—

FOOT ARTILLERY.

BENGAL.

App. No. 2.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.
6 Battalions, of 4 European Companies each :	6 Battalions, of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each :
20 Companies, Europeans, 80 gunners each - - - - - 1,600	18 European companies, 100 gunners each - - - - - 1,800
2 Battalions, of 8 Native companies each:	12 Native companies, 100 privates each - - - - - 1,200
16 Companies, Native, 104 privates each - - - - - 1,664	6—30 Companies, making a Total of - 3,000
<hr/> 7—36 Companies, making a Total of - 3,264	

MADRAS.

App. No. 2.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.
3 Battalions, of 4 European Companies each :	3 Battalions, of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each :
12 Companies, European, 80 gunners each - - - - - 960	9 European companies, 100 gunners each - - - - - 900
1 Battalion, of 6 Native companies :	6 Native companies, 100 privates each - - - - - 600
6 Companies, Native, 92 privates each - - - - - 552	3—15 Companies, making a Total of - 1,500
<hr/> 4—18 Companies, making a Total of - 1,512	

BOMBAY.

App. No. 2.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.	Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates.
2 Battalions, of 4 European Companies each :	2 Battalions, of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each :
8 Companies, of 80 gunners each - 640	6 European companies, 100 gunners each - - - - - 600
1 Battalion, of 8 Native Companies each:	4 Native companies, 100 privates each - - - - - 400
8 Companies, Native, of 70 privates each - - - - - 560	2—10 Companies, making a Total of - 1,000
<hr/> 3—16 Companies, making a Total of - 1,200	
TOTAL Foot Artillery - - - - - 5,976	TOTAL Foot Artillery - - - - - 5,500
TOTAL Horse and Foot Artillery - 7,790	TOTAL Horse and Foot Artillery - 7,100

In Bengal there will be a gain of 200 Europeans, and a loss in Madras of 60, and in Bombay of 40. The total numbers will then stand:—

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

Present:		Proposed:	
6 Brigades, of - - - - - 22 troops.		4 Brigades, of - - - - - 16 troops.	
14 Battalions, of - - - 70 companies.		11 Battalions, of - - - 55 companies.	
<hr/> 20	<hr/> 92	<hr/> 15	<hr/> 71
Europeans - - - - - 4,576		Europeans - - - - - 4,700	
Natives - - - - - 3,214		Natives - - - - - 2,400	
<hr/> TOTAL - - - - - 7,790		<hr/> TOTAL - - - - - 7,100	

The financial result of the proposed measures, as per annexed statement, exhibits an immediate saving of four lacs, 22,000 rupees, and prospective, of six lacs, 45,000 rupees, giving a total of 10 lacs, 68,000 rupees.

It only now remains to be considered how far the proposed arrangements can

App. No. 3.

## PAPERS RELATING TO

provide a force adequate to the service of that number of guns, which should be in due proportion to the strength of the army in infantry and cavalry.

The amount fixed by Napoleon, and adopted, I believe, by other powers, is four guns for every thousand men in the infantry, and an additional one-seventh for the cavalry. It might be assumed that a much smaller proportion would be sufficient for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and for the subjection of any power contiguous to our frontier; but with the immensity of our territory, and with the great, immediate, and overwhelming effect produced by artillery; I should be sorry to see any great reduction below the recognised standard in other armies, however appearances, and a reasonable calculation of probable danger, might seem to justify the measure. It must always be recollected also that the instruction and formation of good officers and men for the artillery requires science and long practice, and that upon the perfection of this arm success in modern warfare has very much depended.

In the proposed organization six guns are allotted to each troop, and eight to each company of artillery.

In the memorandum will be found a statement of the rank and file in the three Presidencies.

		BENGAL.	
		Cavalry - - - - -	5,720
		Infantry - - - - -	56,930
Guns - - -	250		<u>62,650</u>
		MADRAS.	
		Cavalry - - - - -	4,192
		Infantry - - - - -	41,972
Guns - - -	184		<u>46,164</u>
		BOMBAY.	
		Cavalry - - - - -	1,972
		Infantry - - - - -	21,304
Guns - - -	92		<u>23,276</u>
TOTAL - - -	526 pieces.		<u>          </u>

The proposed new establishment will give, for Bengal—

BENGAL.		BENGAL.	
8 Troops, 6 guns each - - -	48	Proposed - - - - -	288
30 Companies, 8 guns each - - -	240	Proportion, 4 per mille - - -	250
	<u>288</u>	Surplus - - - - -	<u>38</u>
MADRAS.		MADRAS.	
4 Troops, 6 guns each - - -	24	Propotion - - - - -	184
15 Companies, 8 guns each - - -	120	Proposed - - - - -	144
	<u>144</u>	Deficit - - - - -	<u>40</u>
BOMBAY.		BOMBAY.	
4 Troops, 6 guns each - - -	24	Proposed - - - - -	104
10 Companies, 8 guns each - - -	80	Propotion - - - - -	92
	<u>104</u>	Surplus - - - - -	<u>12</u>
Or,		Total Number required - - - - - 526	
		Total Number proposed - - - - - 536.	
		Surplus - - - - - <u>10</u>	

I do not trouble the Council with other combinations, by which results nearly similar might be obtained; I have confined myself to that plan which, after much

much consideration, seems best adapted to the double purpose of efficiency and economy.

(signed) • *W. C. Bentinck.*  
 „ *Wm Casement, Col.,*  
 „ Secretary to the Governor of India,  
 Military Department.

23 July 1834.

Appendix, No. 1.

MEMORANDUM ON the ARTILLERY of the three Presidencies.

The *personnel* of the Artillery of the armies of the three Presidencies amounts in the aggregate to—

17 Troops of European, and  
 5 Troops of Native Horse Artillery.

22 Troops of Horse Artillery.

10 Battalions of European, and  
 4 Battalions of Native Foot Artillery.

14 Battalions, consisting of 70 Companies in all.

Each Troop or Company mans 6 Field Guns, hence 552 Field Guns might be manned by this body of Artillery, giving very nearly 4 Guns for every 1,000 rank and file, European, and native, of the three armies.

The *materiel*, so far as that term is applicable to guns equipped and ready for service, cannot be exactly ascertained from any official documents or other resource to which access can be had at present. The number of guns and howitzers attached to each troop of horse artillery at the three Presidencies is known, and likewise the number of field batteries manned from the foot artillery in Bengal; but of the number of field guns thus retained in a state of preparation, or their distribution at Bombay and Madras, no precise information can be obtained without incurring the delay of references; indeed, with respect to the latter, Colonel Morison, in his able memorandum on Ordnance and Ordnance Equipment, complains that even in the call of the Supreme Government in 1831 “no returns of the light field artillery had been received, and he was therefore obliged to defer making any remarks on the existing equipment.” With regard to Bengal and Bombay, it appears from Colonel Morison’s memorandum, drawn up early in 1833, that there were 275 pieces of ordnance then in use at those Presidencies.

	BENGAL.	
48	9-Pounders	} Royal
48	6-Pounders	
20	24-Pounder Howitzers	} Pattern.
4	12-Pounders	
54	6-Pounders	
14	5½-inch Howitzers	
188		
	BOMBAY.	
85	6-Pounders.	
2	12-Pounders.	
87		
275	TOTAL.	

The complement of European officers allotted to each brigade of horse and battalion of foot artillery\* is, by the Court’s orders, the same under all the three Presidencies, and corresponds in every respect with that of a regiment of cavalry or infantry of the line. Their strength and formation, with the exception of the Golundauze, or native battalion, are also nearly the same; where differences exist, they will be noticed in considering the subject as it refers to each Presidency separately.

The immediate charge and control of the artillery at each Presidency is exercised by a commandant, who is generally the senior artillery officer present. In Bengal and Madras he is allowed an assistant adjutant general†; in Bombay, an ordnance assistant and a brigade major.

BENGAL.

THE artillery regiment in Bengal consists of three brigades of horse and seven battalions of foot artillery.‡ Each brigade of horse artillery is composed of four troops, three European and one native. Of the seven battalions, five are exclusively European, consisting of four companies each, and two, denominated Golundauze, battalions of natives, consisting of eight companies each; so that there are on the Bengal establishment 12 troops of horse and 36 companies of foot artillery. To the corps of artillery is attached

\* 1 Colonel; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel; 1 Major; 5 Captains; 8 First Lieutenants; 4 Second Lieutenants.  
 † The duty of this officer is understood to be the keeping of the accounts of stores received for the use of the corps from the arsenals, there being no “Expense Magazine” or Depot of Instruction at Bombay.  
 ‡ The complement of Officers, therefore, is: 10 Colonels; 10 Lieutenant-Colonels; 10 Majors; 50 Captains; 80 Lieutenants; 40 Second Lieutenants.

tached a body of Gun-Lascars, organised into the grades of subadar,\* jemadar, havildar, naick, and privates. They are clothed and armed as soldiers, and are entitled to the benefits of the pension establishment. Likewise a body of ordnance drivers, consisting of 48 sirdars and 44 drivers.† These (the gun lascars and drivers) are distributed amongst and attached to troops, battalions, and batteries in the proportions that will be shown hereafter.

Military Statements  
1831-32.

The established strength of a troop of European horse artillery is—

1 Captain.	2 Rough Riders.	
2 First Lieutenants.	80 Gunners.	
1 Second Lieutenant.	3 Ordnance Drivers	{ For the carts drawn by bullocks.
1 Staff Serjeant.	1 Havildar	} Gun Lascars.
6 Serjeants.	2 Naicks	
6 Corporals.	24 Privates	
10 Bombardiers.	169 Horses	
2 Trumpeters.		
2 Farriers.		

And for a Native troop, the proportion of European officers being the same—

1 Staff Serjeant	} Europeans.	2 Farriers	} Paid the same as Native Cavalry.
1 Farrier		90 Troopers	
1 Subadar	} Paid the same as Native Cavalry.	3 Drivers	
1 Jemadar		1 Havildar	} Gun Lascars.
6 Havildars		2 Naicks	
6 Naicks		24 Privates	
2 Trumpeters		169 Horses	
2 Rough Riders			

6 Guns, at 14 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84
6 Ammunition Waggon, 8 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
4 Spare ditto, 7 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
1 Staff Serjeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
2 Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
2 Farriers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
2 Rough Riders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1 Saddler Serjeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1 Native Doctor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
									169
									109
									60

Each troop, European and Native, has an establishment of syces and grass-cutters (one of each for every horse) and artificers, and each brigade a staff, consisting of—

1 Adjutant and Quartermaster.	1 Schoolmaster Serjeant.	
1 Surgeon.	1 Hospital Serjeant.	
1 Assistant Surgeon.	1 Rough Rider Serjeant.	
1 Veterinary Surgeon.	1 Farrier Major.	
1 Riding Master.	1 Trumpeter Major.	
1 Sergeant Major.	1 Drill Corporal.	
1 Quartermaster Serjeant.	3 Saddler Serjeants	} Non-effective.
1 Drill Serjeant.	3 Pay Serjeants	

Every

\* GUN LASCARS.—10 Subadars; 10 Jemadars; 52 Havildars; 62 Naicks; 1,088 Privates.

† Military Statements, 1831-32 :

Notes.—One driver is allowed for 2 bullocks and 6 spare for a battery, making 59 for each battery, viz :—

6 Guns each, 8 bullocks	-	-	-	-	48
6 Ammunition Carts, each 6	-	-	-	-	36
1 Store Cart	-	-	-	-	7
Spare	-	-	-	-	15
					106
					53
Drivers	-	-	-	-	6
Spare	-	-	-	-	
					59



**EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA). 35**

Every troop of Horse Artillery, European and Native, and in all situations, is equipped with four six-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers,\* forming a battery of 48 six-pounders, and eight ammunition carts, and one store cart, and 24 howitzers, or 72 pieces. G. O. No. 4 of 1834.

The annexed statement (No. 1) shows the comparative formation and strength of a troop of horse artillery of each Presidency.

Each of the five battalions of European foot artillery, as has been observed, consists of four companies. Its established strength is—

24 Serjeants, including four Staff Serjeants.	2 Subadars	} Gun Lascars.
20 Corporals.	2 Jemadars	
40 Bombardiers.	8 Havildars	
8 Drummers.	8 Naicks	
320 Gunners.	160 Privates	

Hence a company—

1 Staff Serjeant.	10 Bombardiers.
5 Serjeants.	2 Drummers.
5 Corporals.	80 Gunners.

**STAFF.**

1 Adjutant and Quartermaster.	1 Hospital Serjeant	} Effective.
1 Surgeon.	1 Schoolmaster ditto	
1 Assistant Surgeon.	1 Drill Corporal	
1 Serjeant Major	1 Drum Major	
1 Quartermaster Serjeant	1 Fife Major	

An establishment of golundauze to be attached to each European company was first authorised by Minutes of Council, 15th October 1798. They were formed into five companies, and a staff authorised in 1806.

Augmented to eight companies in 1808, and a captain to command, authorised in 1816. An irregular corps of golundauze was formed from those who came over from the Mahratta service.

The strength of each of the two golundauze battalions of eight companies each is) the European officers being the same as allotted to a brigade or battalion)—

1 Subadar Major.	64 Naicks.
7 Subadars.	16 Drummers.
16 Jemadars.	832 Privates.
64 Havildars.	

A company—

A Subadar.	8 Naicks.
2 Jemadars.	2 Drummers.
8 Havildars.	104 Privates.

**STAFF.**

1 Adjutant	} Effective.	1 Havildar Major	} Effective.
1 Surgeon		1 Quartermaster Havildar	
1 Assistant Surgeon		1 Drill Havildar	
1 Interpreter and Quartermaster		1 Drum Major	
1 Serjeant Major		1 Fife Major	
1 Quartermaster Serjeant		1 Native Doctor	
1 Drill Serjeant			

The pay, &c. of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of these corps is the same in every respect as that of the same grades in a regiment of Native infantry.

Independent of park guns, and guns mounted in fortresses, the number of which cannot at present be ascertained, 12 batteries of light field artillery are retained in a state of complete equipment. Ten of these batteries consist of four nine-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder Howitzers, to which are attached Europeans, and two of four six-pounders, and two Howitzers, manned by Native foot artillery drafted with their ammunition and store carts, by 106 bullocks for each battery, driven by 59 drivers. Hence, there are 72 pieces of field ordnance manned by the foot artillery and 72 by the horse, making in all 144 pieces of field ordnance.

It is believed that five battering trains are kept up and deposited in the several magazines: one of these trains consists of,

12 24-Pounders.  
12 18-Pounders.  
12 Mortars, and  
12 Howitzers.

48  
====  
240

The foot artillery batteries are distributed as follows, at—

Dum Dum - - - - 2	Delhi - - - - 1
Dinapore - - - - 1	Nusseerabad - - - - 1
Benares - - - - 1	Mhow - - - - 1
Cawnpore - - - - 1	Neemuch - - - - 1
Saugor - - - - 1	
Agra - - - - 1	12
Kurnaul - - - - 1	12

Statements Nos. 5 and 6 will show, the first, the distribution of the corps of artillery by brigades, battalions, and companies; and the second, by divisions and stations, with the ordnance at each.

The magazines under the Bengal Presidency are,

The arsenal in Fort William, under the superintendence of the principal and principal deputy commissary of ordnance.

The Expense Magazine, for the supply of the artillery at Dum Dum, superintended by a commissary.

Chunar - - - - -	by a Deputy Commissary.
Allahabad - - - - -	by a Commissary.
Cawnpore - - - - -	by a Commissary.
Agra - - - - -	by a Commissary.
Delhi - - - - -	by a Commissary.
Nesseerabad - - - - -	by a Commissary.
Saugor - - - - -	by a Deputy Commissary.
Fort Cornwallis - - - - -	by a Deputy Commissary.

#### MADRAS.

\*3 European.  
1 Native.

At Madras the artillery regiment consists of four troops of European horse artiller, and two of native, and four\* battalions of foot artillery.

Considering the six troops of horse artillery as two brigades, though, in point of fact, since the reduction of two troops of the Native brigade, they are equivalent to no more than one and a-half, the complement of officers for the whole corps is:

6 Colonels	30 Captains
6 Lieutenant Colonels	48 First Lieutenants
6 Majors	24 Second Lieutenants

Three of the battalions of foot artillery are European, of four companies each, and one battalion Native or golundauze, of six companies. There are, therefore, on the Madras establishment, six troops of horse and 18 companies of foot artillery.

GUN LASCARS.—The whole body, there, amounts to eight companies, viz : A body of gun Lascars is attached to the artillery in Madras, organized, as to rank and grades, the same as in Bengal, except that there are no Naicks.

There are no Naicks either here or at Bombay: they are in Bengal.

Military  
Statements,  
1831-32.

Two companies are attached to each battalion, European and Native, differing in the latter respect from the Bengal system, where no Lascars are attached to the Native battalions; but agreeing with Bombay, where they are. Attached to and belonging to the European foot artillery is the "Khar Khana Establishment;" its use and object is, I believe, to provide for the draughting of the artillery. The number of cattle maintained in it is not stated.

The establishment appears to consist of—

10 Dangalis,
27 Chowdries, and,
600 Drivers.

Appertaining to the artillery generally, there is an institution designated the Depôt of Instruction, under the superintendence of a director, assisted by a small establishment.

Besides instructing in the practical knowledge of their duties the young officers and men as they join the regiment, the director has many important duties to perform; they are particularized at length in Statement No. 7.

The institution likewise seems to admit of an advantageous arrangement in a division of the official duties performed in Bengal, by the assistant adjutant general of the artillery, whose duties in Madras are confined to the discipline, pay, arms and accoutrements of the regiment, the ordnance branch falling entirely to the director of the depôt, who likewise performs all the duty assigned in Bengal to the Commissary of the Presidency Expense Magazine.

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

37

HORSE ARTILLERY.

The horse brigade of artillery is of the following established effective strength:—

Military Stateme  
1831-32.

EUROPEAN.

2 Colonels.	24 Serjeants.
2 Lieutenant Colonels.	24 Corporals.
2 Majors.	48 Bombardiers.
10 Captains.	336 Gunners.
20 First Lieutenants.	8 Trumpeters.
8 Second Lieutenants.	479 Horses.
4 Troop Quartermasters.	

STAFF.

1 Adjutant.*	1 Schoolmaster Serjeant.
1 Quartermaster.*	4 Drill Corporals (non-effective).
1 Surgeon.	1 Trumpeter Major.
4 Assistant Surgeons.	1 Farrier Major.
1 Regimental Serjeant Major.	12 Farriers.
4 Troop Serjeant Majors.	8 Rough Riders.
1 Regimental Quartermaster Serjeant.	4 Pay Serjeants.
4 Troop Quartermaster Serjeants.	1 Hospital Serjeant.
1 Riding Master Serjeant.	

Non-effective.

\* These two appointments are in the same person in Bengal.

A troop then has—

1 Captain.	2 Trumpeters.
2 First Lieutenants.	120 Horses.
1 Second Lieutenant.	1 Assistant Surgeon.
*1 Troop Quartermaster.	1 Troop Serjeant Major.
6 Serjeants.	1 Troop Quartermaster Serjeant.
6 Corporals.	1 Drill Corporal.
12 Bombardiers.	3 Farriers.
84 Gunners.	

\* Troop quartermasters are warrant officers, and rank as conductors; there is no such officer either in Bengal or Bombay, attached to the horse artillery.

They cost  $161 \times 6 \times 12 = 11,592$  rupees per annum.

NATIVE, TWO TROOPS:

2 Troop Quartermasters.	12 Naicks.
6 Serjeants.	4 Trumpeters.
2 Subadars.	168 Privates.
4 Jemadars.	16 Recruit Boys.
12 Havildars.	218 Horses.

A troop, with the above proportion of European officers, has—

1 Troop Quartermaster.	6 Naicks.
3 Serjeants.	2 Trumpeters.
1 Subadar.	84 Privates.
1 Jemadar.	8 Recruit Boys.
6 Havildars.	109 Horses.
1 Assistant Surgeon.	1 Drill Naick.
1 Troop Serjeant Major.	3 Farriers.
1 Troop Quartermaster Serjeant.	1 Veterinary Pupil.
1 Troop Havildar Major.	2 Rough Riders.
1 Drill Havildar.	

STAFF.

2 Assistant Surgeons.	2 Drill Havildars.
2 Troop Serjeant Majors.	2 Drill Naicks.
2 Troop Quartermaster Serjeants.	6 Farriers.
1 Subadar Major.	2 Veterinary Pupils.
2 Troop Havildar Majors.	4 Rough Riders.

With an establishment of horse-keepers and grass-cutters, but not as in Bengal a horse-keeper for each horse, either in the European or Native Horse Artillery. No gun lascars or drivers as in Bengal and Bombay.

There are besides, an establishment of artificers, lascars, measuring men, &c., and vakeil conicopolers, bazaar men, &c.

*Vide Statement*  
No. 2, Appendix.

The proportion of officers, as above given, is that fixed by the Court, for two brigades of horse artillery of four troops each; but since the reduction of half the Native brigade, a proportion of these officers who are in effect an excess to the strength of the horse artillery corps; and the corps in general are attached to the foot artillery, though borne in the strength of the horse artillery brigade.

The horse-artillery at Madras are armed with six-pounder guns only. Three troops stationed at Nagpore, Jaulnah, and Secunderabad, having six pieces each; and the three troops within the frontier stationed at St. Thomas's Mount and Bangalore, only four guns each, making in all 30 guns.

Both at Madras and Bombay the system of manœuvring practised in the Royal Horse Artillery is, I believe, adopted as their model, whereas in Bengal they have a system of their own, introduced by Lieut.-Col. Pennington: the principal distinction between them is, that in the former the gun is unlimbered before it is wheeled into battery, the advantage of which is that the danger of upsetting is avoided, and less space required; in the latter the gun is wheeled into battery before unlimbering, having an advantage in gaining time, and therefore opening its fire sooner.

In Bengal also each horse in draught is mounted, whereas in Madras and Bombay only one horse of each pair is ridden.

#### FOOT ARTILLERY.

The three battalions of European Foot Artillery consist of four companies each, the strength of each battalion being exclusive of the European officers:—

28 Serjeants, including four Brigade Serjeants.	2 Subadars.	} Gun Lascars, two Companies.
28 Corporals.	2 Jemidars.	
40 Bombardiers.	8 Havildars.	
10 Drummers.	120 Lascars.	
320 Gunners.	16 Lascar Boys.	

#### *A Company.*

1 Brigade Serjeant.	10 Bombardiers.
6 Serjeants.	2 Drummers.
7 Corporals.	90 Gunners.

#### *Staff.*

1 Adjutant.	1 Hospital Serjeant (non-effective).
1 Quartermaster.	1 Drill Serjeant.
1 Surgeon.	4 Pay Serjeants (non-effective).
1 Assistant Surgeon.	1 Drill Corporal.
1 Serjeant Major.	2 Drum and Fife Majors.
1 Quartermaster Serjeant.	* 1 Subadar Major.
1 Schoolmaster ditto	

\* Perhaps of the  
Gun Lascars.

*Vide Statement*  
No. 3, appended.

With an establishment of moonshee, vakeel, apothecaries, artificers, bazaar men, &c.

The Golundauze, or native battalion of six companies, consists of—

6 Subadars.	70 Recruit and Pensioned Boys.	} Gun Lascars, two Companies.
12 Jemidars.	2 Subadars.	
48 Havildars.	2 Jemidars.	
48 Naicks.	12 Havildars.	
12 Drummers.	120 Lascars.	
552 Privates.	16 Lascar Boys.	

#### *A Company.*

1 Subadar.	8 Naicks.
2 Jemidars.	2 Drummers.
8 Havildars.	92 Privates.

#### *Staff.*

1 Adjutant.	1 Regimental Havildar Major.
1 Interpreter and Quartermaster.	1 Native Adjutant.
1 Surgeon.	6 Pay Havildars (non-effective).
1 Assistant Surgeon.	1 Drill Havildar.
1 Serjeant.	1 Drill Naick.
1 Quartermaster Serjeant.	6 Colour Havildars (non-effective).
1 Subadar Major.	2 Drum and Fife Majors.

*Vide Statement*  
No. 4, appended.

With an establishment of vakeel, moonshee, apothecaries, artificers, bazaar men, lascars, &c.

Hence

Hence it would appear that a company of Golundauze at Madras, has 12 privates less than a company of Golundauze in Bengal, and 22 more than in Bombay; gun lascars being attached to those battalions, both at Madras and Bombay, but not in Bengal.

Bengal 104; Madras 92, difference 12. Bombay 70; difference 22. Memo. from Colonel Cullen.

There are no guns in use, either with the horse or foot artillery, but six-pounders, with exception of the Mount; it is believed that the whole of the foot artillery is completed with guns, carriages, and cattle,\* but only about three-fourths are completed with waggons. A considerable portion of the field artillery carriages, perhaps more than a half, however, are of the old condemned pattern.

Exclusive of the guns attached to the horse artillery, there are perhaps 172 pieces of field ordnance mounted and in use, or in store; of these 90 are six-pounders, 80 of which are in use with the foot artillery, and 10 or perhaps 12 might be equipped for field service at the Mount; eight or nine pounders mounted but not in use, and about 70 of different calibres in store.

Memo. from Colonel Cullen.

The distribution of the field guns manned by the foot artillery is as follows, viz. —

At Nagpore	-	-	-	16	At Cannanore	-	-	-	8
„ Jaulush	-	-	-	8	„ Trichinopoly	-	-	-	8
„ Secunderabad	-	-	-	8	„ Palamatta	-	-	-	2
„ Musilipatam	-	-	-	8	„ Moulmein	-	-	-	8
„ Bellary	-	-	-	8					
„ Bangalore	-	-	-	8					
					TOTAL	-	-	-	80

There are also on the establishment 37 12-inch howitzers, but the state of equipment they are in is not mentioned, nor whether they are mounted or not.

With the 30 horse artillery guns there are, therefore, 110 six-pounder field pieces in a state of equipment, at the Madras Presidency.

A statement (No. 8), showing the distribution of the artillery regiment at Madras, is annexed.

The magazines under the Madras Presidency are believed to be at Fort St. George, the arsenal Bellary, Nagpore, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Trichinopoly, and Cunnanore.†

#### BOMBAY.

THE Bombay regiment of artillery consists of one brigade of horse artillery of four troops, exclusively European, two battalions of European foot artillery, and one battalion of native or Golundauze. Each battalion of European consists of four companies, and the Golundauze battalion of eight companies, so that there are four troops of horse, and 16 companies of foot artillery on the Bombay establishment.

The complement of officers for the whole corp is—

4 Colonels.	20 Captains.
4 Lieutenant Colonels.	32 First Lieutenants.
4 Majors.	16 Second Lieutenants.

The whole body of gun lascars is formed into six companies,‡ two of which are attached to each battalion of foot artillery, European and native, and a havildar's party to each troop of horse artillery. A subadar major is allowed to the body, and a pay havildar to each company, differing in its distribution and formation both from Bengal and Madras; for in Bengal there are no gun lascars attached to the Golundauze battalion, and in Madras there are none attached to the horse artillery. Neither in Bengal or Madras§ are pay havildars allowed, and in Bombay and Madras there is no grade of naick, though in Bengal there is.

Captain Johnstone's Memo.

The foot artillery guns in Bombay are drafted by hired bullocks, provided on contracts with their drivers by the Commissariat, which is found to be an economical system.||

The Depôt of Instruction at Bombay has, I believe, been abolished by orders from home.

A troop of horse artillery consists of—

1 Captain.	80 Gunners.
2 First Lieutenants.	3 Farriers.
1 Second Lieutenant.	3 Trumpeters.
6 Serjeants.	1 Havildar.
6 Corporals.	24 Privates.
12 Bombardiers.	1 Native Farrier.
	160 Horses.

Horse Artillery, Military Statement, 1831-32.

\* This is corroborated in a memo. from the commandant of artillery, wherein it is stated that “regimental guns had been attached to every company as well as troop.” The number is not given, but it is believed to be eight.

† The situation of this place on the Malabar coast suggests the idea that the magazine could be more conveniently and economically supplied from the Bombay than the Madras arsenal.

‡ It consists of 6 subadars, 6 jemadars, 28 havildars, 456 privates, 24 boys.

§ At Madras and Bombay it seems from the military statement, that a Subadar major of gun lascars is allowed at those Presidencies. There is no such officer at Bengal.

|| Mules at Booj, about 39 in number, are kept, but are to be done away.—Captain Johnstone.

## PAPERS RELATING TO

### STAFF.

1 Adjutant and Quartermaster. 1 Assistant Surgeon. 1 Serjeant Major.		1 Quartermaster Serjeant. 1 Ridingmaster Serjeant. 1 Drill Corporal. 2 Rough Riders.
--	--	---

One adjutant and quartermaster in the same person in Bengal, and an adjutant and quartermaster in Madras, are attached to each brigade, but not to each troop, as in Bombay. The extra expense is  $177 \times 4 \times 12 = 8496$  rupees per annum.

With an establishment for the hospital of horse-keepers, grass-cutters, watermen, washermen, artificers, hollalkores, &c.

And a brigade consists of—

<i>Vide Statement No. 1, Appendix.</i>	1 Colonel. 1 Lieutenant Colonel. 1 Major.		5 Captains. 8 First Lieutenants. 4 Second Lieutenants.
--	---	--	--

With the staff and establishment as detailed for each troop, and the following additional as regimental or brigade staff—

1 Interpreter.		1 Veterinary Surgeon.
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Each troop of horse artillery is equipped with four guns, 6-pounders.

A battalion of European foot artillery, exclusive of the European officers, which are the same under all the Presidencies, consists of—

<i>Foot Artillery, Military Statement, 1831-32.</i>	4 Brigade Serjeants. 16 Serjeants. 20 Corporals. 40 Bombardiers. 320 Gunners.		8 Drummers. 2 Subadars. 2 Jemidars. 8 Havildars. 120 Privates.	}	Gun Lascars.
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A company—

1 Brigade Serjeant. 4 Serjeants. 5 Corporals. 10 Bombardiers. 80 Gunners.		2 Drummers. 1 Subadar or Jemidar. 2 Havildars. 30 Privates.	}	Gun Lascars.
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### STAFF.

<i>Vide No. 3, Appendix.</i>	1 Adjutant. 1 Interpreter and Quartermaster. 1 Surgeon. 1 Serjeant Major.		1 Quartermaster Serjeant. 1 Drill Serjeant. 1 Drill Corporal. 2 Drum and Fife Majors.
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With the establishment of waterman, washermen, peons, sweepers, hollalkores and artificers.

The Golundauze battalion has eight companies, and, exclusive of officers, consists of the following effective establishment:—

8 Subadars. 16 Jemidars. 48 Havildars. 48 Naicks. 16 Drummers and Fifes. 560 Privates.		2 Subadars. 2 Jemidars. 8 Havildars. 120 Privates.	}	Gun Lascars.
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*Captain Johnstone's Memo.* A company—

1 Subadar. 2 Jemidars. 6 Havildars.		6 Naicks. 2 Drummers. 70 Privates.
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STAFF.

1 Adjutant.  
1 Interpreter and Quartermaster.  
1 Assistant Surgeon.  
2 Serjeants.

1 Native Adjutant.  
1 Havidar Major.  
1 Drill Havildar.  
2 Drum and Fife Majors.

With an establishment of artificers, &c.

The number of field guns kept in a state of equipment under the Bombay Presidency is stated to be 62 6-pounders, and eight 5½-inch howitzers, manned by the Foot Artillery. Captain Johnstone's Memo.

Their distribution is as follows :

			Six Pound.	Howitzers.	
1st Battalion, four Companies, at	- - -	Ahmednugger -	10	2	
2nd Battalion European Artillery.	{	Detachment at - - -	Belgaum - -	6	—
		Ditto at - - -	Booj - -	6	—
		Head Quarters at - - -	Bombay - -	6	4
Golundauze	{	Ditto at - - -	Ahmednugger -	14	2
		Detachment at - - -	Baroda - -	6	—
		Ditto at - - -	Hindoor - -	4	—
		Ditto at - - -	Surat - -	2	—
		Ditto at - - -	Rajcole - -	2	—
		Ditto at - - -	Malgoram -	4	—
		Ditto at - - -	Sattarah - -	2	—
TOTAL - - -			62	8	

	Guns.	Howitzers.
Bengal - - - -	96	48
Madras - - - -	110	Uncertain.
Bombay - - - -	78	8
	284	56

340

Hence the total field ordnance in use at Bombay, with the Horse and Foot Artillery, is 78 6-pounders, and eight howitzers.

The magazines and depôts are, one grand arsenal at Bombay, three principal magazines of Poonah, Belgaum, and Ahmedabad; eight depôts at Surat, Ahmednugger, Bhooj, Deesah, Rajcole, Baroda, Sholapore, and Malagaum.

Annexed (No. 9) will be found a Comparative Statement of the Ordnance Commissariat Departments of the three Presidencies.

## No. 1.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength and Formation of a Troop of European Horse Artillery at each Presidency.

Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.		Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	
							<b>STAFF :</b>
1	1	1	Captain.	Regimental	Brigade	1	Adjutant.
2	2	2	First Lieutenants.	Brigade -	1	-	Quartermaster (Warrant Officer).
				Ditto -	1	1	Assistant Surgeon.
1	1	1	Second ditto.	1	1	1	Serjeant Major, or Staff Serjeant.
				Brigade -	1	1	Quartermaster Serjeant.
6	6	6	Serjeants.	Ditto -	Brigade	1	Riding Master or Riding Master Serjeant.
6	6	6	Corporals.	Ditto -	1	-	Drill Corporal.
10	12	10	Bombardiers.	2	2	2	Rough Riders.
2	2	3	Trumpeters.	1	1	1	Pay Serjeant
2	3	3	Farriers.	1	-	-	Saddle Serjeant } Non-effective.
80	82	80	Gunners.	-	-	1	Assistant Apothecary.
1	-	1	Havildar -	1	-	-	Hospital Apprentice.
1	-	-	Naicks -	-	-	-	Native Doctor.
24	-	24	Privates -	-	-	1	<b>ESTABLISHMENT :</b>
1	-	1	Native Farrier.	-	-	1	Waterman.
2	2	-	Puckallies.	-	-	1	Washerman.
1	-	-	Hand Bheestre.	1	-	-	Peon for detecting Diseased Women.
3	-	-	Ordnance Drivers.	2	-	-	Kalalkore (Sweeper).
-	2	1	Muccadams, or Chowdries of Horse-keepers.	1	-	-	Lascar.
169	50	109	Horse-keepers, or Syces.	2	-	-	Sweepers.
-	2	1	Muccadams, or Chowdries of Grass cutters.	1	-	32	Artificers.
169	120	149	Grass cutters.	2	-	-	Maisty Carpenter.
169	120	160	Horses.	1	-	-	Carpenters.
				2	-	-	Maisty Smith.
				2	-	-	Smith.
				2	-	-	Fireman.
				2	-	-	Filemen.
				2	-	-	Armourer.
				2	-	-	Hammermen.
				-	-	1	Bellows Boy.
				-	-	1	Sicklegghur.
				1	-	1	Moochhie.



No. 2.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength and Formation of a Troop of Native Horse Artillery at each Presidency.

Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.		Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	
			Officers as in foregoing Statment, No. 1.	1	1		STAFF : Serjeant Major, or Staff Serjeant.
-	1		Troop Quartermaster.	-	2		Serjeants.
1	1		Subadars.	-	1		Quartermaster Serjeant.
1	2		Jemidars.	1	-		Farrier Serjeant.
6	6		Havildars.	2	2		Rough Riders.
6	6		Naicks.	1	-		Staff Havildar -
2	2		Trumpeters.	1	2		Pay - ditto -
2	3	No Native Horse Artillery at Bombay.	Farriers.	-	1	No Native Horse Artillery at Bombay.	Havildar Major.
90	84		Troopers.	-	1		Drill Havildar.
-	8		Recruit and Pension Boys.	-	1		Drill Naick.
-	2		Horsekeeper Chowdries.	-	1		Veternary Pupil.
169	74		Horsekeepers, or Syces.	-	1		Vakeel,
-	2		Grass-cutter Chowdries.	-	1		Assistant Apothecary.
169	109		Grass Cutters.	-	1		Totie.
1	3		Puckallies.	1	2		Gram Measuring Man.
3	-		Drivers.	1	-		Lascars.
1	-		Havildar.	11	16		Native Doctor.
1	-	Naick.			Artificers.		
24	-	Privates.					
169	109	Horses.					

## No. 3.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength, and Formation, and Establishment of a Battalion of European Artillery at each Presidency.

Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.		Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	
			The Officers are the same for all Presidencies.				STAFF :
4	4	4	Brigade or Staff Sergeants.	1	1	1	Adjutant, or Adjutant and Quartermaster.
20	24	16	Sergeants.		1	1	Quartermaster.
20	28	20	Corporals.	1	1	1	Surgeon.
40	40	40	Bombardiers.	1	1	-	Assistant Surgeon.
8	10	8	Drummers.	1	1	1	Serjeant Major.
320	320	320	Gunners.	1	1	1	Quartermaster Serjeant.
8	8	-	Puckaullies.	1	1	1	Drill Serjeant.
8	-	4	Sweepers.	1	1	-	Hospital Serjeant.
-	-	1	Head Washerman.	1	1	-	Schoolmaster Serjeant.
-	-	12	Washermen.	4	4	4	Pay Serjeants
-	-	12	Watermen.	4	-	-	Staff ditto
-	-	4	Halalkores.	1	1	1	} Non-effective.
-	-	1	Chowdry.	1	1	1	
-	-	2	Peons.	2	2	2	Drum and Life Majors.
			GUN LASCARS :	-	1	-	Moonshee.
2	2	2	Subadars.	-	1	-	Vakeel.
2	2	2	Jemidars.	-	1	-	Apothecary.
8	8	8	Havildars.	-	1	-	Second Assistant Apothecary.
8	-	-	Naicks.	-	1	-	Second Dresser.
160	120	120	Privates.	-	2	-	Toties.
-	16	-	Lascar Boys.	3	5	-	Bazaar Servants.
-	4	-	Bheestres.	-	8	7	Artificers.
			ORDNANCE DRIVERS :				
16	-	-	Sirdars.				
236	-	-	Drivers.				
4	-	-	Bheestres.				

No. 4.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength, Formation, and Establishment of a Battalion of Golundauze at each Presidency.

Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.		Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	
			The Officers are the same as for a European Battalion or Brigade.				STAFF :
1	1	1	Subadar Major.	1	1	1	Adjutant.
7	5	7	Subadars.	1	1	1	Quartermaster and Interpreter.
16	12	16	Jemidars.	-	1	-	Surgeon.
64	48	48	Havildars.	1	1	1	Assistant Surgeon.
64	48	48	Naicks.	-	1	1	Native Adjutant.
16	12	16	Drummers.	1	1	1	Serjeant Major.
832	552	560	Privates.	1	1	1	Quartermaster Serjeant.
8	14	-	Lascars.	1	-	-	Drill Serjeant.
8	12	16	Bheestres.	1	1	1	Havildar Major.
-	70	-	Recruit and Pension Boys.	1	-	-	Quartermaster Havildar.
				1	1	1	Drill Havildar.
				1	1	1	Drill Naick.
			ORDNANCE DRIVERS :	2	2	2	Drum and Fife Majors.
8	-	-	Sirdars.	8	6	8	Pay Havildars
118	-	-	Drivers.	8	-	-	Brigade ditto
2	-	-	Bheestres.	-	1	-	Vakeel.
				-	1	-	Moonshee.
				-	-	1	Pundit.
			GUN LASCARS :	-	1	1	Assistant Apothecary, or Hospital Assistant.
-	2	2	Subadars.	-	1	1	Dresser, or Assistant.
-	2	2	Jemidars.	1	-	-	Native Doctor.
-	12	8	Havildars.	-	2	-	Toties or Sweepers.
-	120	120	Lascars.	-	9	7	Artificers.
-	16	-	Lascar Boys.	5	5	-	Bazaar Servants.
-	4	4	Bheestres.	-	-	-	Regimental Lascars.
-	-	2	Pay Havildars.				

## No. 5.

## DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT of the Regiment of Artillery, Bengal.

	• Brigade or Battalion.	Commanding Officer.	Head Quarters.	Troop or Company.	Where Stationed.	Guns.			
						6-pounders.	Howitzers.		
Horse Artillery.	1st	Lieut.-Col. Boileau	Meerut	1st and 2nd European	Meerut	8	4		
				4th Native		4	2		
				3rd European		Dum Dum	4	2	
	2nd	Lieut.-Col. Whish	Cawnpore	1st and 2nd European	Cawnpore	8	4		
				3rd European	Meerut	4	2		
				4th Native	Loodianah	4	2		
	3rd	Lieut.-Col. Rodbor	Kurnaul	1st European	Kurnaul	4	2		
				2nd "	Mhow	4	2		
				3rd "	Muttra	4	2		
4th Native				Neemuch	4	2			
Foot Artillery.	1st	Lieut.-Col. Shaw	Mhow	1st Company European	Benares	Battery No. 11	L.		
				2nd "	Dinapore	" 12	M.		
				3rd "	Mhow	" 7	G.		
				4th "	Saugor	" 8	H.		
	2nd	Lieut.-Col. Briggs	Nusserabad	1st Company European	Nusserabad	" 1	A.		
				2nd "	Meerut	" -	"		
				3rd "	Kurnaul	" 5	E.		
				4th "					
	3rd	Colonel Faithfull	Cawnpore	1st Company European	Cawnpore	" 9	I.		
				2nd "					
				3rd "					
				4th "				Allahabad.	
4th	Lieut.-Col. Lindsay	Dum Dum	1st Company European	Dum Dum	No. 4	D.			
			2nd "						
			3rd "						
			4th "						
5th	Colonel Parker	Agra	1st Company European	Agra	" 10	K.			
			2nd "						
			3rd "				Dum Dum	" 3	C.
			4th "						
6th	Lieut.-Col. Pollock	Cawnpore	1st Company Native	Cawnpore.					
			3rd "						
			4th "						
			5th "						
			6th "						
			8th "						
			2nd "				Neemuch	No. 2	
			7th "				Delhi	" 6	
7th	Lieut.-Col. Frith	Dum Dum	1st Company Native	Cawnpore.					
			2nd and 3rd Co. Native						
			4th and 5th "				Dum Dum.		
			6th and 7th "						
			8th - "						

No. 6.

STATEMENT showing the Artillery and Ordnance at each Station.

Division.	Station.	Troop, or Company.	Guns.			REMARKS.
			9-pounders.	6-pounders.	Howitzers.	
Presidency	Dum Dum	3rd Troop 1st Battalion Horse Artillery.	4	-	2	The head quarters of the regiment and of the 4th and 7th Battalions furnishing detachments to Assam, Cuttack, Dacca, Berhampore, Chittagong, Arracan, Garokpore and Mullye.
		4th Battalion - - - - -	4	-	2	
		3rd and 4th Companies 5th Battalion	4	-	2	
		2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Companies, 7th Battalion.				
		Total, 1 Troop 6 Companies European and 7 Native Field Artillery - - - - -	12	-	6	
Dinapore	Dinapore	2nd Company 1st Battalion - -	4	-	2	Foot Artillery.
Benares	Benares	1st Company 1st Battalion - -	4	-	2	Foot Artillery.
Cawnpore	Cawnpore	1st and 2nd Troop 2 Brigade - -	8	-	4	Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery.
		1st 2nd and 3rd Companies, 3rd Battalion.	4	-	2	
	Allahabad	1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th Companies of the 6th, and 1st Company 7th Battalion.				
		4th Company 3rd Battalion.				
		Total, 2 Troops Horse Artillery and 11 Companies Foot Artillery - - - - -	12	-	6	
Saugor	Saugor	4th Company 1st Battalion - -	4	-	2	Foot Artillery.
Meerut	Meerut	1st and 2nd Troop European - -	8	-	4	Horse Artillery. Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery.
		4th Native 1st Brigade - - -	-	4	2	
		3rd Troop 2nd Brigade - - -	4	-	2	
		2nd Company 2nd Battalion.				
		Total, 3 European Troops, 1 Native and 1 European Company - - - - -	12	4	8	
Agra	Muttra	1st and 2nd Companies 5th Battalion	4	-	2	Foot Artillery. Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery.
		3rd Troop 3rd Brigade - - -	4	-	2	
		7th Company 6th Battalion - -	-	4	2	
Kurnaul Sirhind	Kurnaul	1st Troop 3rd Brigade - - -	4	-	2	Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery.
		3rd and 4th Companies 2nd Battalion	4	-	2	
		Total, 1 Troop and 2 Companies European - - - - -	8	-	4	
Rajpootanah Field Force.	Loodiana	4th Troop 2nd Brigade - - -	-	4	2	Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery. Horse Artillery.
	Nusserabad	1st Company 2nd Battalion - -	4	-	2	
	Neemuch	4th Troop 3rd Brigade - - -	-	4	2	
Malwa Field Force.	Mhow	2nd Troop 3rd Brigade - - -	4	-	2	Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery.
		3rd Company 1st Battalion - -	4	-	2	
		Total, 1 Troop and 1 Company European Artillery - - -	8	-	4	

## No. 7.

THE Director of the Depôt of Instruction superintends—

- 1st. The instruction in the practical knowledge of their duties of the young officers and men who arrive from Europe.
- 2nd. The annual artillery practice at head quarters.
- 3rd. The proof of all gunpowder made at the powder mills.
- 4th. The proof of all gun carriages and mortar beds constructed at the manufactory.
- 5th. All experiments.
- 6th. All laboratory works, *i. e.* the preparation of portfires, fuzes, matches, &c., for general service.

He has charge of—

- 1st. All models.
- 2nd. All drawings of artillery carriages.
- 3rd. The field train of the presidency which was removed to the Mount in 1828, now consisting of ordnance carriages, 180 of different descriptions, including mortar and other carts.

He keeps records—

- 1st. Of all proceedings, &c. of the permanent Artillery Select Committee.
  - 2nd. Of all correspondence relating to the ordnance and equipments of the regiment.
  - 3rd. Of all subjects referred from the Military Board for the Report of the Commandant of Artillery, and his reply thereto.
  - 4th. Of all plans and reports of practice at head quarters, and out-stations.
  - 5th. All indents for equipments for the use of the regiment are checked in the department, ensuring thereby regularity and economy in the regimental expenditure.
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No. 8.

DISTRIBUTION of the Madras Artillery, per Returns, 1 September 1833.

Division of the Army.	Station.	Head Quarters.	Troops.	Rank and File.	Guns, 6-prs.
Centre Division	Fort St. George	-	{ European Foot Artillery Detachment -	25	-
			{ Native " " -	54	-
	St. Thomas's Mount	Horse Artillery and Foot Artillery, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions -	{ European Horse Artillery, 2 troops -	183	8
			{ Native ditto, dismounted Detachment -	172	-
			{ European Foot Artillery, 3 companies -	295	-
	Vellore	-	-	{ Native " " -	223
Vellore	-	-	European Foot Artillery Detachment -	12	-
Vellore	-	-	Native Horse Artillery, dismounted Detachment.	100	-
Northern Division	Musulipitam	-	European Foot Artillery, 1 company -	97	8
Southern Division	Trichinopoly	-	European Foot Artillery -	76	6
	Palamootta	-	" " Detachment -	13	2
Mysore Division	Bangalore	-	{ Native Horse Artillery, 1 troop -	86	4
			{ European Foot Artillery, 1 company -	77	8
Malabar and Canara	Cannanore	-	Native Foot Artillery, 1 company -	100	8
Ceded Districts	Bellary	-	European Foot Artillery, 1 company -	78	8
Subsidiary Force	Nagpore	-	{ European Horse Artillery, 1 troop -	106	6
			{ European Foot Artillery, 2 companies -	177	16
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	Secunderabad	-	{ Native Horse Artillery, 1 troop -	94	6
		-	{ European Foot Artillery, 1 company -	110	8
	Jaulnah	-	{ European Horse Artillery, 1 troop -	97	6
		-	{ Native Foot Artillery, 1 company -	97	8
Tenasserim Provinces	Moulmein	-	European Foot Artillery, 1 company -	69	8
	Mergin	-	" " Detachment -	7	-
	Tavoy	-	" " " -	17	-
Prince of Wales Island and its Dependencies	Penang	-	{ European Foot Artillery, Detail -	48	-
	Singapore	-	{ Native " " " -	28	-
	Malacca	-	" " " -	35	-
		-	" " " -	36	-

No. 9.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the Ordnance Commissariat Establishments of the Three Presidencies.

Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	RANK.
1	1	1	Principal Commissary.
1	1	-	Deputy Principal Commissary.
-	-	1	Senior Deputy Commissary of Stores.
-	-	1	Junior Deputy Commissary of Stores.
6	7	3	Commissaries.
2	4	2	Deputy Commissaries.
5	1	-	Deputy Commissaries (Warrant Officers).
-	-	-	Assistant Commissaries.
6	2	-	Assistant Commissaries (Warrant Officers).
-	-	-	Deputy Assistant Commissaries.
4	4	3	Deputy Assistant Commissaries (Warrant Officers).
43	40	17	Conductors.
21	31	22	Sub-Conductors.

N.B.—In this number of Conductors on the Madras Establishment are included six Troop Quarter-masters attached to the Horse Artillery.

## Appendix, No. 2.

## ARTILLERY.

Present Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates.			Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates.		
<b>HORSE ARTILLERY.</b>			<b>HORSE ARTILLERY.</b>		
<b>Bengal:</b>			<b>Bengal:</b>		
Three brigades of three European and one Native troop each.			Two brigades of three European and one Native troop each.		
9 troops, European, of 80 gunners each - -	720		6 troops, European, of 100 gunners each - -	600	
3 troops, Native, of 90 privates each - -	270		2 ditto, Native, of 100 privates each - -	200	
12 troops, making a Total of - - - -		990	8 troops, making a Total of - - - -		800
<b>Madras:</b>			<b>Madras:</b>		
Two brigades, one of four troops, European, and one of two troops, Native.			One brigade of four troops, European.		
4 troops, European, of 84 gunners each - -	336		Four troops, European, of 100 gunners each - -		400
2 troops, Native, of 84 privates each - -	168				
6 troops, making a Total of - - - -		504			
<b>Bombay:</b>			<b>Bombay:</b>		
One brigade of four troops, European.			One brigade of four troops, European.		
Four troops, European, of 80 gunners each - -		320.	Four troops, of 100 gunners each - - - -		400
<b>TOTAL Horse Artillery - - - -</b>		<b>1,814</b>	<b>TOTAL Horse Artillery - - - -</b>		<b>1,600</b>
<b>FOOT ARTILLERY.</b>			<b>FOOT ARTILLERY.</b>		
<b>Bengal:</b>			<b>Bengal:</b>		
5 battalions of four European companies each.			Six battalions of three European and two Native companies each.		
20 companies, European, of 80 gunners each	1,600		Eighteen companies, European, of 100 gunners each	1,800	
2 battalions of eight Native companies each			Twelve companies, Native, of 100 privates each	1,200	
16 companies, Native, of 104 privates each -	1,664		Six battalions of 30 companies, making a Total of		3,000
7 battalions, 36 companies, making a Total of		3,264			
<b>Madras:</b>			<b>Madras:</b>		
3 battalions of four European companies each.			Three battalions of three European and two Native companies each.		
12 companies, European, of 80 gunners each	960		Nine companies, European, of 100 gunners each	900	
1 battalion of six companies, Native, of 92 privates each.	552		Six companies, Native, of 100 privates each -	600	
4 battalions of 18 companies, making a Total of		1,512	Three battalions of 15 companies, making a Total of		1,500
<b>Bombay:</b>			<b>Bombay:</b>		
2 battalions, of four European companies each.			Two battalions of three European and two Native companies each.		
8 companies, European, of 80 gunners each	640		Six companies, European, of 100 gunners each	600	
1 ditto, of 8 companies, Native, of 70 privates each.	560		Four companies, Native, of 100 privates each -	400	
3 battalions of 16 ditto, making a Total of		1,200	Two battalions of 10 companies, making a Total of		1,000
<b>TOTAL Foot Artillery - - - -</b>		<b>5,976</b>	<b>TOTAL Foot Artillery - - - -</b>		<b>5,500</b>
<b>TOTAL Horse and Foot Artillery - - - -</b>		<b>7,790</b>	<b>TOTAL Horse and Foot Artillery - - - -</b>		<b>7,100</b>
Europeans - - - - -	4,576		Europeans - - - - -	4,700	
Natives - - - - -	3,214		Native - - - - -	2,400	
<b>TOTAL - - - -</b>		<b>7,790</b>	<b>TOTAL - - - -</b>		<b>7,100</b>



Appendix, No. 3.

FINANCIAL RESULT of the 2nd Proposition.

ABSTRACT.	Increase.	Decrease.	
		Immediate.	Prospective.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Bengal Horse Artillery - - - - -	- - - - -	2,88,783 - -	1,52,052 - -
" Foot Artillery - - - - -	19,432 5 -	- - - - -	1,52,420 - -
Madras Horse Artillery - - - - -	- - - - -	80,112 15 -	1,38,677 15 6
" Foot Artillery - - - - -	- - - - -	51,951 7 -	83,886 15 -
Bombay Horse Artillery - - - - -	- - - - -	21,454 8 -	1,18,915 10 -
" Foot Artillery - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
<b>TOTAL - - - Rs.</b>	<b>19,432 5 -</b>	<b>4,42,301 14 -</b>	<b>6,45,952 8 6</b>
Deduct immediate Increase - - - - -	- - - - -	19,432 5 -	- - - - -
Net immediate Saving per year - - - - -	- - - - -	4,22,869 9 -	- - - - -
Add prospective Saving per year - - - - -	- - - - -	6,45,952 8 6	- - - - -
<b>TOTAL Immediate and Prospective Saving - Rs.</b>	- - - - -	<b>10,68,822 1 6</b>	- - - - -

The particulars of the above Abstract are shown in the annexed Schedules marked (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E).

(A.)

BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Immediate and Prospective Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Staff, and Establishments, of a Brigade of Horse Artillery.

	Immediate.	Prospective.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
The officers - - - - -	- - - - -	10,772 - -
Pay of European non-commissioned officers, farriers, and trumpeters - - -	1,896 11 -	- - - - -
Pay of syces, grass-cutters, and ordnance drivers, 3 European troops - - -	3,847 8 -	- - - - -
Contract allowance of the 3 European troops - - - - -	2,291 4 -	- - - - -
Gun lascars attached to the 3 European troops - - - - -	- - - - -	487 8 -
Artificers and establishments of 3 European troops - - - - -	438 - -	- - - - -
Allowance for tar and grease of ditto - - - - -	345 - -	- - - - -
Pay of staff and farrier sergeant of the Native troops - - - - -	101 10 4	- - - - -
Pay of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of Native troops - - -	- - - - -	406 - -
Pay of the syces, grass-cutters, and drivers of Native troops - - - - -	1,282 8 -	- - - - -
Staff and pay havildars, and troop contingent allowance of Native troops - - -	768 - -	- - - - -
Pay of gun lascars attached to the Native troops - - - - -	- - - - -	162 8 -
Artificers, tar and grease for Native troops - - - - -	213 - -	- - - - -
Allowances of the Brigade Staff, effective and non-effective, adjutant, quartermaster, &c. - - - - -	2,471 5 9	- - - - -
Brigade command allowance - - - - -	400 - -	- - - - -
Bazaar servants and quartermaster lascars - - - - -	82 - -	- - - - -
Victualling 98 non-commissioned officers, at Rs. 4. 5. 8. each - - - - -	426 11 4	- - - - -
Clothing ditto - - - - -	342 8 -	- - - - -
Clothing 128 Native non-commissioned officers - - - - -	- - - - -	108 - -
Feeding 685 horses, at Rs. 5. 8. 6. each - - - - -	3,788 14 6	- - - - -
Remount at 10 per cent. on the value, 450 rupees - - - - -	2,568 12 -	- - - - -
Hospital establishment, dooly bearers, and head money - - - - -	562 12 -	- - - - -
<b>Per Month - - Rs.</b>	<b>21,826 8 11</b>	<b>11,936 - -</b>
Pay, clothing, and victualling of 120 Europeans, reduced - - - - -	2,238 11 1	- - - - -
Pay and clothing of 70 Natives, reduced - - - - -	- - - - -	735 - -
<b>TOTAL per Month - Rs.</b>	<b>24,065 4 -</b>	<b>12,671 - -</b>

(B.)

## BENGAL FOOT ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Financial Effect of Organizing this Corps into Six Battalions, consisting of Five Companies each, Three of Europeans and Two of Natives.

	Increase.		Decrease.	
	Immediate.		Immediate.	Prospective.
	Rs.	a. p.	Rs.	a. p.
The officer of one battalion reduced - - - - -	-	-	-	7,063 3 -
Pay of the non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, and drummers of two European companies reduced - - - - -	-	-	879 6 6	-
Pay of 200 gunners increased - - - - -	2,254	1 11	-	-
Clothing and victualling of Europeans - - - - -	1,439	9 4	387 12 11	-
Puckalies, sweepers, command allowance, &c. of two companies Europeans reduced - - - - -	-	-	172 - -	-
Pay of gun lascars of two companies Europeans reduced - - - - -	-	-	-	605 8 -
Command allowance of one battalion - - - - -	-	-	400 - -	-
Allowance to European women and children - - - - -	252	- -	62 - -	-
Head money to Europeans - - - - -	50	- -	12 8 -	-
Pay of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of four companies of Golundauze - - - - -	-	-	-	1,896 - 8
Pay of 464 privates, reduced to seven rupees each - - - - -	-	-	-	3,248 - -
Lascars, bheestries, and command allowance of four companies - - - - -	-	-	243 - -	-
Mean proportion between the allowances of the effective and non-effective staff and establishments of a European and Native battalion - - - - -	-	-	666 10 1	-
Two pay sergeants and four pay havildars - - - - -	-	-	34 - -	-
Two staff sergeants and four brigade havildars - - - - -	-	-	19 8 -	-
Clothing of Golundauze reduced - - - - -	-	-	-	389 - -
Hospital established for one battalion - - - - -	500	8 -	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - - - - Rs.</b>	<b>4,496</b>	<b>8 8</b>	<b>2,876 13 6</b>	<b>12,701 11 8</b>
Deduct immediate Saving - - - - -	2,876	13 6	-	-
Immediate Increase per month - - - - -	1,619	5 9	-	-
Ditto - ditto per year - - - - -	19,432	5 -	-	-
Prospective Saving per annum - - - - -	1,52,420	12 -	-	-
<b>Net Saving per annum - - - - - Rs.</b>	<b>1,32,988</b>	<b>7 -</b>	-	-

(C.)

## MADRAS HORSE ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Immediate and Prospective Saving which would be effected by the Reduction of the Officers of one Brigade and both Native Troops, and increasing the European Troops to 100 Gunners each.

	Increase.		Decrease.	
	Immediate.		Immediate.	Prospective.
	Rs.	a. p.	Rs.	a. p.
The officers - - - - -	-	-	-	7,860 8 11½
Pay and clothing of 64 Europeans raised - - - - -	2,113	12 7	-	-
Troop quartermaster and sergeants on half batta - - - - -	-	-	501 13 1	-
Pay of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers - - - - -	-	-	-	3,246 15 -
Pay of boys, puckallies, horsekeepers, and grass-cutters - - - - -	-	-	2,403 7 -	56 - -
Effective and non-effective staff - - - - -	-	-	981 - -	-
Troop contracts for 276 horses - - - - -	-	-	768 15 -	-
Command allowance for two troops - - - - -	-	-	60 - -	-
Clothing of Europeans and Natives - - - - -	-	-	50 - -	393 - -
Feeding 276 horses, at seven rupees each - - - - -	-	-	1,932 - -	-
Remount at 10 per cent. - - - - -	-	-	1,035 - -	-
Full batta of one troop - - - - -	-	-	1,057 10 9	-
<b>TOTAL - - - - - Rs.</b>	<b>2,113</b>	<b>12 7</b>	<b>8,789 13 10</b>	<b>11,556 7 11½</b>
Deduct immediate Increase - - - - -	-	-	2,113 12 7	-
<b>Net Saving per month - - - - -</b>	-	-	<b>6,676 1 3</b>	<b>11,556 7 11½</b>
Net immediate Saving per year - - - - -	-	-	80,112 15 -	1,38,677 15 6
Add prospective Saving ditto - - - - -	-	-	1,38,677 15 6	-
<b>TOTAL Saving - - - - - Rs.</b>	-	-	<b>2,18,790 14 6</b>	-

(D.)

MADRAS FOOT ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Immediate and Prospective Financial Effect of reducing the Officers of One Battalion and organizing this Corps into Three Battalions of Five Companies, Three European, and Two Native, of 100 Gunners each, everything else remaining as at present.

	Increase.			Decrease.		
	Immediate.			Immediate.		Prospective.
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
The officers on half batta	-	-	-	-	-	6,160 5 3
Pay and clothing of the non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, and drummers of three companies, and of 60 gunners reduced	-	-	-	3,265	14	-
Pay of six puckalies for three companies	-	-	-	64	7	-
Pay of proportion of gun lascars	-	-	-	-	-	830 4 -
Mess-room allowance	-	-	-	73	8	-
Command allowance of three companies	-	-	-	90	-	-
Battalion command allowance	-	-	-	400	-	-
Pay and clothing of 48 Golundauze, raised	420	-	-	-	-	-
Mean proportion between the staff and establishment of an European and Native battalion	-	-	-	855	7	7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs. 420</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4,749</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
Deduct immediate Increase	-	-	-	420	-	-
<b>Net Decrease per month</b>	-	-	-	<b>4,329</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Net immediate Decrease per annum</b>	-	-	-	<b>51,951</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Add prospective Decrease per annum</b>	-	-	-	<b>83,886</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-</b>
				<b>Rs. 1,35,838</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-</b>

(E.)

BOMBAY ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Financial Effect of increasing the Troops of Horse Artillery to 100 Gunners each, and organizing the Foot Artillery into a Corps of Two Battalions, each Battalion to consist of Five Companies, Three European and Two Native, everything else remaining as at present.

	Decrease.					
	Immediate.			Prospective.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
The officers on half batta	-	-	-	-	-	6,518 - 2
Pay and clothing of the non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, and drummers of two companies, and of 40 gunners reduced	-	-	-	1,838	10	6
Gun lascars for two companies	-	-	-	-	-	539 8 -
Followers for two companies	-	-	-	134	12	-
Battalion command allowance	-	-	-	400	-	-
Clothing of lascars reduced	-	-	-	-	-	32 8 -
Two pay sergeants	-	-	-	14	-	-
Mean between the effective and non-effective staff followers and artificers of an European and Native battalion	-	-	-	644	15	6
Stationery and petty stores	-	-	-	90	-	-
Mess tent	-	-	-	90	-	-
<b>Native Battalion:</b>						
Pay and clothing of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of four companies, and of 160 privates	-	-	-	-	-	2,558 8 -
Pay and clothing of gun lascars	-	-	-	-	-	216 2 -
Stationery and petty stores for four companies	-	-	-	180	-	-
Pay havildars of four companies	-	-	-	20	-	-
Hospital assistants	-	-	-	-	-	45 - -
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Rs. 3,412</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3,412</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-</b>
Deduct pay and clothing of 80 Horse Artillery gunners increased	-	-	-	1,624	8	-
<b>Net Saving per month</b>	-	-	-	<b>1,787</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Net immediate Saving per year</b>	-	-	-	<b>21,454</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Add prospective Saving per year</b>	-	-	-	<b>1,18,915</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>TOTAL Saving</b>	<b>Rs. 1,40,370</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1,40,370</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>

## Appendix, No. 4.

## MEMORANDUM.

## RANK and FILE of the ARMIES of the Three Presidencies.

Bengal.—European Cavalry	-	-	-	-	1,280	
Native	„	-	-	-	4,440	5,720
European Infantry	-	-	-	-	6,612	
Native	„	-	-	-	50,320	56,930
Total	-	-	-	-	-	62,652
Madras.—European Cavalry	-	-	-	-	640	
Native	„	-	-	-	3,552	4,192
European Infantry	-	-	-	-	6,612	
Native	„	-	-	-	35,360	41,972
Total	-	-	-	-	-	46,164
Bombay.—European Cavalry	-	-	-	-	640	
Native	„	-	-	-	1,332	1,972
European Infantry	-	-	-	-	3,624	
Native	„	-	-	-	17,680	21,304
Total	-	-	-	-	-	23,276
Total of Cavalry and Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	1,32,092
„ Cavalry only	-	-	-	-	-	11,884
„ Infantry only	-	-	-	-	-	1,20,208

At the rate of four field guns for every 1,000 rank and file, according to the above statement—

The Bengal Army requires	-	-	-	-	250 guns.
The Madras	„	-	-	-	184 „
The Bombay	„	-	-	-	92 „

Total Field Ordnance - - - 526 pieces.

By the suggested organization of the Artillery, supposing each troop to man 6 and each company 8 pieces:

	Guns.	
Bengal.— 8 troops of horse artillery man	48	
30 companies of foot artillery man	240	
	288	Required 250; excess 38.
Madras.— 4 troops of horse artillery man	24	
15 companies of foot artillery man	120	
	144	Required 184; deficient 40.
Bombay.— 4 troops of horse artillery man	24	
10 companies of foot artillery man	80	
	104	Required 92; excess 12
Or, <sup>1</sup>		
Total number required, as above	526	
16 troops of horse artillery man	96	
55 companies of foot artillery man	440	
Excess	10	

**EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA). 55**

It would, therefore, appear that the suggested arrangement regarding the artillery, independent of the financial effect which it would produce, in all probability an annual saving, immediate and prospective, of 10 lacs, would likewise have the effect of making the corps much more efficient in the increased strength of the troops and companies, and not only afford the means of bringing into the field the full proportion of ordnance prescribed, with reference to the amount of rank and file composing the army, but fix an excess of that proportion when it is most likely to be called for, and the deficit when artillery is the least wanted.

The proportion of 4 guns for 1,000 men is that fixed by Napoleon for the infantry of an army; a larger number, according to his rule, would be allotted to the cavalry, but however correct or adapted this may be to European warfare, it will probably be thought that the general proportion above adopted of 4 guns for every 1,000 rank and file, cavalry and infantry, is quite sufficient for an Indian army.

**Appendix, No. 5.**

**MEMORANDUM of the Reduction in the Number of Combatants (exclusive of Commissioned Officers, European and Native), which would be occasioned by the proposed organization of the Artillery of the Three Presidencies.**

	EUROPEANS.					NATIVES.					GRAND TOTAL.	
	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers, Drummers, Farriers, &c.	Gunners.	TOTAL.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Drummers, Trumpeters, Farriers, &c.	Privates.	TOTAL.		
<b>BENGAL:</b>												
Horse Artillery - - -	29	19	48	120	216	6	6	6	70	88	304	
Foot Artillery - - -	15	10	24	-	49	35	35	10	464	544	593	
<b>MADRAS:</b>												
Horse Artillery - - -	10	-	-	-	10	14	14	10	168	206	216	
Foot Artillery - - -	26	21	36	60	143	-	-	-	-	-	143	
<b>BOMBAY:</b>												
Horse Artillery - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Foot Artillery - - -	12	10	24	40	86	26	25	10	160	221	307	
<b>TOTAL Reduction -</b>	-	-	-	-	504	-	-	-	-	1,059	1,563	
Deduct augmentation in the Bengal Foot Artillery -	-	-	-	200								
Ditto Madras Horse ditto -	-	-	-	64								
Ditto Bombay Horse ditto -	-	-	-	80								
				344								
<b>Net Reduction - - -</b>				160						1,059	1,219	

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department.

MINUTE by Colonel *Morison*.

It is with the utmost diffidence that I offer my observations on the subject of the Right honourable the Governor General's Minute of the 23rd ultimo; I am satisfied of the necessity of making great reductions, and should therefore have at once concurred in those which have been recommended if I could see that the same object could not be accomplished by other means and within a shorter period, for I am of opinion that the reduction of any of the regular regiments should be resorted to only as a last resource.

Supposing, however, that this measure should become indispensable, I am afraid that to draft the whole of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the regiments to be reduced into those intended to be increased to 800 men, would be liable to cause dissatisfaction throughout the native service, by putting a stop to all promotion in the native ranks for years to come. The old officers of every grade, and the old sepoys now looking forward to promotion, could not fail by such an event to be greatly disappointed, and even those who expect no promotion would feel for the situation of their comrades placed in such circumstances. Amongst the native officers themselves the disappointment would not be less than would be experienced by the European officers if others were placed into each of the grades above their own, stopping promotion until the drafts were absorbed by casualties; I can hardly, therefore, imagine any measure more likely to deteriorate the temper and good feeling of the native army to a degree which I fear might not be compensated by the proposed reduction. The disappointment would probably be the more felt in the native ranks by seeing that the European officers of the reduced regiments were provided for either by a gratuity or by the continuance of their proportion in skeleton regiments. If this disappointment could in any degree be prevented, either by restoring the companies which were reduced in the year 1828, officering them by the native commissioned and non-commissioned of the reduced regiments, the evil would be less, though in my mind it would still be great. On the one hand a considerable body of strangers would be introduced into every corps, where much jealousy would naturally be felt towards them, and on the other, much time would elapse before they would feel confident of receiving the same consideration from the European officers as the men long known to them by daily intercourse; in short, whatever bad feelings might arise, and it would be difficult to suppose that none such would exist under such circumstances, the same would probably be general in every native corps by consequence of the measure having simultaneous effect throughout the service.

These and other considerations induce me to suggest, if the reduction of regiments be indispensable, that not more than one of native infantry should be eventually reduced annually at each Presidency; that that corps should be divided into four parts, each consisting of two unbroken companies, to be drafted with their officers into four of the oldest regiments. These corps, which would thus consist of 10 companies, might revert to the present formation of 8 companies at some distance of time, by which means the intended reductions would be gradually accomplished, probably with less risk; while the supernumerary European officers might also be more easily disposed of without placing too many at once in the predicament of having to choose between the alternatives of remaining supernumerary or of accepting a gratuity on resigning the service. A progressive arrangement would probably not only not prolong the period by which the reductions would be finally accomplished, but would afford the opportunity of arresting at any moment the further reduction of regiments, if such should be recommended by the actual state of affairs.

I would next observe, that the Indian army is now on a far more reduced scale in point of effective strength than for many years past, and I entertain great doubt how far that strength, however modified, can be considered proper as a fixed establishment. It will, I think, be found that we have far fewer men in our ranks than any state in Europe in proportion to the population, while our position in a conquered country of vast extent, peopled by various races, all so different from ourselves, would appear to indicate the necessity of our employing a higher proportion of troops than any other country; and what country, being a foreign possession, is so peculiarly situated as our empire in India? The distribution of the regular army at the most important points  
might

might indeed be facilitated by the employment of local corps; but such corps do not add to our real military strength, nor should we run the risk of any compromise of our military character by being forced to employ irregular infantry on any important service which may occur at any time where least expected. I believe it is generally admitted that regular troops in the end are the least expensive; and if we advert to the strength of the armies of the states which have fallen under our rule, it will be found that a few of our regulars now occupy the place of many times their own number. Our system, wherever we have gone, has had the effect of reducing numerous native armies, who, with their dependants, have been driven back on the agricultural population, the effect of which has probably not yet been felt to its full extent. We ought, I think, to employ as many regular troops as we can afford to pay, while by taking them from the military classes only of our own provinces, we could the more easily and speedily provide new levies when required, and by that means attach to our interest those who are not only the most useful for military purposes, but otherwise the most likely, sooner or later, to disturb the tranquillity of our possessions.

I am quite sensible that a corps of 640 men is less effective, and, in proportion to its numbers, far more expensive than one of 800; but the former is our lowest peace establishment, and so long as we have to maintain in time of peace a war establishment of European officers, this must be the result; corps even of 800 men would not be efficient for long and extended operations, and in corps of 640 the troops individually should not be less inefficient, as the recruits ought to be more select, and as the same establishment of officers might be expected to do greater justice to the discipline of the smaller corps. If I am not mistaken, the infantry regiments in England are, or were, still further reduced than ours now are, and are probably therefore in a higher state of discipline than if they were on a full war establishment. For any casual service within confined limits, the reduced corps, if duly looked after, ought to be quite equal without any temporary increase of numerical strength. It only requires in such cases that a sufficient number of corps should be brought to act; but in the event of general war we should probably have occasion, as has been the case before, to increase the corps to 1,000 men, or even more. If, however, 29 regiments have been previously reduced, we should eventually be deficient of 29,000 men at least in the ranks of the infantry alone, when it might be necessary to re-embodied some of the reduced regiments; nor do I think it extremely improbable that circumstances may arise to occasion an increase of regiments even beyond their present numbers, which, however expensive, are probably not too many.

The same observations are applicable, less or more, to the regular regiments of cavalry, which appear to be disproportioned to the infantry, even if we include the irregulars, of whose services we can avail ourselves. In no army is it necessary that all the cavalry should be of the same description. Napoleon employed five different classes. The cavalry, including all classes, should be on the proportion of one fourth of the infantry, but it will, I think, be found that the whole are much below that proportion, and while this is the case, I feel great doubt if we should reduce any of our regiments, unless the regulars are on too high a scale in comparison with the irregulars, which we can reckon as available. I know not how it may be at the other Presidencies with regard to reliefs, but at Madras the native cavalry do not carry their families beyond the frontier, which requires their being relieved within a reasonable time. All of them indeed are expected to come back in their turn to the Carnatic, where their homes generally are, and I should hardly think it practicable to relieve the corps in the manner which has hitherto been deemed necessary, if reduced from eight to five regiments.

With regard to the artillery, which has always been considered of vital importance, it is already on a scale very far below the proportion considered necessary with regular armies in any other country. The whole of the Indian army, cavalry, and infantry, as now reduced, amount to 132,000 men, European and Native, and if one-eighth of that number, viz., 16,500, be deemed the proper proportion for the Indian army, while we have only 8,790, the deficiency, viz., 5,710, will be merely one-third of the proper complement for an army reduced to the lowest peace establishment. I should, therefore, humbly conceive that any reduction of this army, except perhaps in the native horse artillery and Golundauze, is

altogether impracticable; yet, including Mr. Lushington's reductions at Madras, it will have to contribute about one-fifth of a reduction of 60 lacs. It is true that the artillery reductions are principally in officers, equal to five corps out of 20, or one-fourth of the whole, the effect of which I shall beg leave to notice hereafter.

It is proposed to fix the equipment of light field artillery at the rate of four guns for every 1,000 men, cavalry and infantry. I see no great reason to object to this proposition generally, although, probably, on too low a scale for the cavalry, which requires to be provided with its due proportion of horse artillery, independent of the infantry; but the cavalry and infantry are already reduced to the lowest peace establishment, and it should be held in view that, although both these arms can be speedily augmented, this is not the case with the artillery, for long preparation is required both for the men and their equipments. For these reasons I would, with great deference, submit that the artillery in India, especially its European branches, ought rather to be fixed in a moderate war establishment, which seems to be only the more necessary as its strength is already so far below the most approved proportion. Whatever arguments can be adduced in support of the necessity of maintaining at all times a war establishment of European officers, the same will, I think, be found to apply even more forcibly as relates to that of the artillery; moreover, every European artillery soldier, wherever he may be placed, has an intrinsic value which more than repays his expense; and, considering the great moral effect of artillery on the minds of the people of India, this arm ought not to be viewed as the most expensive. If we were destitute of artillery, or maintained it on too reduced a scale, we should probably have to incur a still greater expense by increasing the other branches, with much less general efficiency; for that army will be the cheapest, as well as the most perfect, whose several arms are in just proportion to one another. What that proportion ought to be in India is a different question. Whatever may be the proportion of guns for every 1,000 men, or gunners for their service, I am persuaded that much advantage would arise from viewing the whole of the artillery as one regiment liable to serve, especially the Europeans, in every part of India. By the proposed distribution, however, and by allotting 288 pieces of light field artillery exclusively to Bengal, the proportion (within 25) will be five guns for every 1,000 men; Bombay, instead of 92 will have 104, being (within 12) in the proportion of five to every 1,000 men; while Madras, instead of 184, will only have 144 guns, being (within four) in the proportion of three guns only for every 1,000 men. In other words, while Bengal and Bombay will have nearly five guns for every 1,000 men, Madras will have three guns, or only three-fifths of the proportion of the other Presidencies.

The latter Presidency had long maintained 14 companies of European foot artillery, which were found inadequate, and that number was allowed by the Supreme Government, in the year 1818, to be increased by two additional, in all, 16 companies, which may not be considered too many when we advert to the extent of country, the difficulty and delay of collecting at any point, any considerable body of this most indispensable part of the corps, the difficulty of conducting the reliefs of the detachment companies, and the expediency of having upon this coast a sufficient number to meet any call for service beyond seas. But, unfortunately, instead of the additional companies of European foot artillery, sanctioned in 1818, a body of native horse artillery was then formed at more than double the cost, though not of half the value;

	English Horse.	Native Horse.	European Foot.
Former troops in companies - - -	2½	3	14
Ordered in 1824 - - - - -	4	4	12

and in 1824 two companies of the 14 were actually reduced, and 2½ additional troops of horse artillery allowed instead, apparently for the purpose of equalising the several corps of horse and foot artillery then ordered. The whole of the native horse artillery at Madras, which has thus been maintained by the sacrifice

of



of the more indispensable European foot artillery, will now probably be reduced; a brigade of the former costs more than double that of a whole battalion of the latter. It seems worthy, therefore, of consideration whether the European foot artillery should not now be completed to 16 companies, for I cannot help being of opinion, though I offer it with the utmost deference, that the nine companies now proposed for Madras, are altogether inadequate; and on this subject I beg to refer to the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th paragraphs of a minute of Sir Thomas Munro, dated the 25th July 1825, where this question and the comparative value of the European foot artillery will be found fully discussed.

With respect to our having horse artillery troops in time of peace, some with two guns, some four, and others with six guns each, I would beg to submit with the utmost deference, that it might be more convenient for reliefs that every troop should be of the same strength. If any are to have two guns only, they should perhaps be considered depôt troops, to be left at the head quarters of brigades for the purposes of instruction, but that the whole should have their guns, waggons, and harness ready in store; a complement of four pieces for every troop, as a peace establishment, would perhaps be the most efficient, while the reduction of expense would be nearly the same, although I entertain the opinion that every company of foot artillery should be of sufficient strength to manage eight light field guns, yet if a battalion is to consist of five such companies, with 40 guns, as proposed by his Lordship, it will require a higher complement of officers than at present. By the orders of 1824, when a new organisation was given to the three armies, each battalion and each horse brigade of artillery were allowed respectively the same number of officers of each rank as a regiment of cavalry or infantry, and indeed, unless this were the case, the junior officers of artillery would not on entering the service have the same prospect of promotion as those of other branches. The number of the cavalry and infantry officers is now fixed on the same scale noted in the margin.\* Every pair of guns on service should have an European commissioned officer, so that 20 pairs, the proposed equipment of a battalion, would require 20 captains and subalterns, but only 17 are now allowed; and supposing four of these officers to be absent, there will remain 13, leaving at least 14 guns of each battalion of the proposed strength destitute of officers; and it seems evident that the present strength of troops and companies, with respect to officers, must have been fixed for an equipment of six guns only. For 20 pairs of guns we should require, allowing the same proportion as above for absentees, at least 25 officers, as per margin†; but in order to preserve to the lower rank the same chance of promotion as the rest of the army, which appears to have been an object of attention with the home authorities, there should still be maintained the same proportion of field officers, so that if there be three of the latter for every 17 captains and subalterns, there ought to be 4½ field officers for every 25 captains and subalterns, or about nine for every two battalions instead of six, a result which would make a saving from the reduction of artillery officers considerably less than computed. For my own part I am inclined to the opinion that a battalion of artillery should consist of eight companies, but if such an organisation or any other be deemed inconvenient in consequence of our requiring such a number of companies as cannot be divided into equal battalions, this would seem to be of little consequence so long as each company is complete in itself, and the whole provided with the proper complement of officers.

The officers of artillery and engineers are educated at the expense of the Company on equal terms. When entertained they know not to which Presidency their services may be appropriated, and they are supposed to set out with equal prospects. It seems under such circumstances, as well as from the unequal or other disproportionate augmentations and reductions liable to take place, that the whole of the Indian artillery should form one regiment, when every rank would benefit or suffer alike when the regiment might be required to be increased or reduced, which would obviate the distaste which must be felt by young officers when posted to a Presidency where they know that their prospects are unfavourable. It would not be less advantageous if the engineers were in like manner to form one regiment, when, if any great works should be required, the scope of selection would be much extended, greatly to the advantage of Government. The whole of the artillery and engineers ought to be liable to take their turn of service in any part of India, as the royal artillery and engineers are liable to serve in any part of the globe. The experience and notions of both branches would be much improved and expanded by this arrangement.

\* For a regiment.—  
1 Colonel,  
1 Lieut.-Colonel,  
1 Major.

—  
3  
—  
5 Captains.  
8 Lieutenants.  
4 Second do.

—  
17  
—  
20

† 7 Captains,  
12 First Lieutenants,  
6 Second Lieutenants.

—  
25

The inequality above alluded to, as affecting the Indian artillery, will be briefly shown in the statement given in the margin. It is known that when the organisation of 1824 took place, the number of colonels was doubled in every branch of the service. There were then four artillery colonels in Bengal (I write from memory, and may be mistaken), and one more was added to make up the nine corps fixed by the home authorities, and a tenth corps has since been added. At Bombay the colonels were also doubled; and one added to make up the three corps ordered, to which a fourth corps has been added. At Madras the colonels were doubled only to make up the six corps, without any addition since, as at Bengal and Bombay. The proposed reductions will bring back the Bengal artillery to what it was before 1824. At Bombay there will still be one corps in excess of the establishment at the same period; while at Madras two of the former corps would fall to be reduced. The proposed artillery reductions

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
Ordered in 1824:				
Horse Brigades - - -	3	2	1	-
Battalion Foot Artillery - -	5	3	2	-
Golundause - - -	1	1	-	-
	9	6	3	18
Since ordered - - -	1	-	1	-
	10	6	4	20
Proposed to be reduced - -	2	2	1	5
Proposed Establishment - -	8	4	3	15

tions at the several Presidencies, falling in the proportion of one-fifth at Bengal, one-fourth at Bombay, and one-third at Madras.

The distribution of the army of India involves so many considerations that it will be difficult to say precisely what it ought to be, and still more so to fix its precise strength in order to meet all probable contingencies. There is one point, however, with respect to which there can hardly be much difference of opinion, which is that the three armies should be distributed as a whole without much reference to the limits of either of the Presidencies; at all events, the objections which apply to the removal of native corps far from their homes cannot apply to their European officers. If, then, the troops are considered too many at one Presidency and too few at another, a revised distribution would seem to be all that is required to remedy the error, having as little recourse as possible to augmentations at one Presidency or reduction at another. If this principle had been attended to, even after the time when the territories of the several Presidencies became united, it is probable that the relative strength of the three armies might have been very different, although I am not prepared to assert that the general number of regiments would have been less than at present.

To elucidate this question, I would, in this place, beg leave to submit a brief comparative view of the strength of the three armies, as referable only to the extent of the territory of each Presidency, including of course, the subsidized and protected states following within their limits. For this purpose I propose to consider Bombay (including Guzerat, Cutch, Sattara, &c.) as one; when Bombay will be to Madras (including Nagpore, the Nizam's country, Mysore, Travancore, &c.) as to 2, 5, 2; and Bombay will be to Bengal (including Arracan, Munipoor, Oude, Scindia and Holkar's country, the protected Sikh States, &c. &c.) as 1 to 4, 6. These results have been obtained in a rough way, but are, perhaps, sufficiently correct for my present purpose.

Supposing then the strength of the Bombay army to be as noted in the margin,\* including the European regiments as two corps of infantry, being double officered, the other two armies if in the same proportion, would stand as below, excluding fractions, and taking the nearest whole number.

* Corps :	-	28
Infantry	-	3
Cavalry -	-	4
Artillery	-	2
Engineers	-	-
Total Corps	-	37

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
BENGAL, in proportion to Bombay, would have	129	14	18	9	170
Instead of - - - - -	76	10	10	3	99
Giving a deficiency, in comparison with Bombay, of - - -	53	4	8	6	71
MADRAS, in proportion to Bombay, would have	71	8	10	5	94
Instead of - - - - -	54	8	6	2	70
Giving a deficiency, in comparison with Bombay, of - - -	17	-	4	3	24

(N.B.—Perhaps the Engineers should be excluded.)

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

61

Supposing next that the number of corps in Bengal to be sufficient, the proportion at Madras and Bombay would stand thus :—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total
MADRAS, in proportion to Bengal, instead of -	54	8	6	2	70
Would have only - - - -	42	5	5	2	54
Giving a surplus, in comparison with Bengal, of - - - -	12	3	1	-	16
BOMBAY, in proportion to Bengal, instead of -	28	3	4	2	37
Would have only - - - -	17	2	2	1	22
Giving a surplus, in comparison with Bengal, of - - - -	11	1	2	1	15

And supposing the proportion at Madras to be sufficient, the proportion at Bengal and Bombay would be as follows :—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total.
BENGAL, in proportion to Madras, would have	91	15	11	5	122
Instead of - - - - -	76	10	10	3	99
Giving a deficiency, in comparison with Madras, of - - - -	15	5	1	2	23
BOMBAY, in proportion to Madras, instead of -	28	3	4	2	37
Would have only - - - -	21	3	2	1	27
Giving a surplus, in comparison with Madras, of - - - -	7	-	2	1	10

1st. From the foregoing it appears that Bengal and Madras have fewer corps in comparison with Bombay, by 71 at the former and 24 at the latter.

2nd. That Madras and Bombay, in comparison with Bengal, have at the former a surplus of 16 corps, and at the latter 15.

3rd. That Bengal and Bombay, in comparison with Madras, the former is deficient of 23 corps, while Bombay has a surplus of 10.

It is evident therefore that the three armies, in comparison with the extent of the territory occupied by each, have been regulated under very different views. It may fairly be concluded, however, either that Madras and Bombay have too many troops, or that Bengal has too few.

But the extent of territory alone is far from affording a just criterion in deciding the question.

Madras and Bombay (the former in particular) are the quarters from whence will probably be met the demands for the service of native troops for foreign expeditions; nor can we overlook our subsidiary engagements with the Nizam, which in a measure locks up in his dominions a considerable proportion of the Madras army, while another considerable proportion is allotted to the coast of Tenasserim and the Straits of Malacca. Bombay has, besides, an exposed frontier of small extent to protect, but Bengal has a very extensive frontier on the east from Gowhatty to Cape Negrais, and on the west from Loodiana to Deesa; and I much doubt if the Bengal army be adequate to provide effectually for the defence of these frontiers consistently with the due military occupation

of the central provinces, which must always have sufficient troops to repel any aggression from Nepal, as well as to maintain tranquillity in these extensive provinces.

On the whole, then, I am induced to conclude that Bengal has too small an army, a question, however, which will be more clearly understood when the distribution of the reduced army comes under consideration, for until the distribution of the army of India can be disposed of, supposing that 41 of the present corps are to be reduced, I should hardly be prepared to concur in recommending the reduction of regiments, unless indeed the state of the finances should render the measure imperative, and that there can be found no other means of meeting the same object with less risk to our military power.

For whatever may be the necessity for reductions, I am humbly of opinion that any reduction of the number of regiments should only be had recourse to after every other practicable reduction has already been considered. When the exigencies of the State require it every individual in its service ought to share in the sacrifice necessary to be made; and I am persuaded we should meet with little discontent if every one—from the highest to the lowest, the troops only excepted—were at once reduced in the same proportion.

While the Honourable Court have before them the proposed plan for military reductions, it would seem to be advisable that they should see at the same time calculations of the time by which the reductions may probably be completed, and of the probable amount of the gratuities which would be required for the supernumerary officers. The Honourable Court should also have access to calculations of all other reductions capable of being effected, including an equal proportion from every individual engaged in the public service of the Company (the troops only excepted), in whatever way their allowances may have been fixed.

In this manner we should know what the reductions would probably amount to in a given time. If it should fall short of what may be indispensably necessary, and if the vigilance and activity of the officers of revenue cannot discover and prevent the abuses which probably exist, less or more, in every unsettled district, to the detriment of the finances, it might be preferable to reduce a proportion of officers of all ranks rather than regiments. It would be easy, if necessary, to reduce a proportion of colonels, without any gratuity, by transferring them to a senior list, without depriving them of a single advantage they now enjoy, and by fixing a period when the casualties in that list should cease to give promotion in the line. By not reducing regiments there would be no supernumerary lieutenant colonels or majors to provide for, and under such circumstances a liberal gratuity might be given to a certain extent to old captains and subalterns disposed to accept of the same on quitting the service, measures being provided for the equalization of each grade in each regiment as retirements might occur. A very considerable reduction might thus be accomplished, I should hope, without materially affecting efficiency, and still allowing the present number of regiments to remain untouched.

(signed) *W. Morison.*

Ootacamund, 7 August 1834.

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(No. 24 of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Para. 1. IN continuation of the separate letter to your Honourable Court, dated Ootacamund, the 9th August 1834, we have the honour to submit for your consideration a minute recorded by the Governor General, under date the 7th instant, offering an opinion upon the joint remarks of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the Bengal army, and upon those of Colonel Morison, on the proposed re-organisation of the armies of the three Presidencies.

2. A copy of Colonel Morison's minute, adverted to by his Lordship in the accompanying paper, was transmitted to England with the separate letter above-mentioned. We therefore deem it unnecessary on the present occasion to furnish

Cons., 24 Feb.  
1835.  
Nos. 10 to 13.

furnish another copy of the document, but we beg to forward, as numbers in the packet, copies of an explanatory minute by that gentleman, and of Mr. Ross's minute on the same subject, respectively dated the 16th and 10th current.

3. The proposed reduction of the establishment of guns with each troop of Horse Artillery adverted to in the 7th paragraph of his Lordship's minute will be carried into immediate execution, and we have to add that this measure has enabled the Bengal Government to supply 400 superior remounts for the service of the Madras and Bombay mounted corps, in the proportion of 300 to the former, and 100 to the latter Presidency. Cons. 7th January 1835, Nos. 37 to 40.

We are, &c.  
(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*  
*A. Ross.*  
*W. Morison.*

Fort William, 26 February 1835.

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MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

1. My Minute of 2nd instant contained a reply to the objections made to my proposition for equalizing the pay and allowances of the European officers of the armies of the three Presidencies. In the present paper I shall offer my opinion upon the joint remarks of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General of Bengal, and upon those of Colonel Morison upon that for the re-organization of the Indian Army.

2. I shall commence with the former, continuing in this half page an extract from their letter, and placing on the other my own observations.

(a.) "We now proceed to the consideration of your Lordship's separate minute on the organization of the army of India, and to offer such observations on that measure as are applicable to this presidency:

(b.) "The present formation of the army into 10 regiments of cavalry, and 74 weak regiments of infantry, we think is open to the objections your Lordship has enumerated, and we are not aware of any circumstances, either external or internal, that would justify the continuance of the present system, which is found to bear so heavily upon the resources of the country. The contemplated reduction of three cavalry and 14 infantry regiments, by embodying the native officers and men with the regiments to be retained, and leaving the European officers in skeleton corps, appears to us to be the most equitable and judicious way of effecting the measure, and if the suggestion offered by Colonel Salmond to The Honorable the Board of Control, regarding the mode of providing for such a portion of the officers as become supernumerary, by purchasing out those who do not feel disposed to remain in the service, be adopted, the disheartening effect of the reduction will be less felt by the European officers:

(b.) No remark.

(c.) "The adoption of the proposed new organization will leave the aggregate strength nearly the same in privates as at present, but it will have the advantage of contributing greatly towards a diminution of the duties that have long borne so heavily on the native infantry, but more particularly since two companies per regiment were reduced in 1829. This object ought still to be kept in view, and a further alleviation of the calls upon the troops effected, since it must be evident to your

Lordship that our native infantry are worn down (1) and harassed to a degree that materially interferes with their discipline and efficiency.

(d.) "We are aware that measures are in progress for relieving the native infantry from some of the frequent demands for treasure escorts, but we humbly conceive that much remains to be done in lightening the several station duties throughout the country, and putting a total stop to escorts unless when sanctioned by Government. These measures, with the change in the amount of regimental guards consequent to the new organization, will give some relief to the native infantry, but there is still in existence a mode of employing sepoys in this presidency which, we respectfully submit to your Lordship, may be put an immediate stop to; we mean the practice of night guards (1) to European officers. We do not assert that the thing exists in every corps, but we can state that it is prevalent in a certain degree, occupying from 40 to 50 men in each regiment on night duty, after the performance of which they generally go direct to a parade or field-day. We need only refer to the table showing the very small disposable force available in January and August of last year, for a confirmation of the opinion we have come to, that the aggregate strength of the infantry is barely adequate to maintain tranquillity within the widely extended territories of the presidency, with due regard to the efficiency and comfort of the troops, and nothing but the conviction that the organization proposed will, to a certain extent, relieve and partly remove these embarrassing duties, prevents us respectfully suggesting to your Lordship an establishment of 1,000 (2) men per regiment.

(e.) "In noticing such points as appear to us essentially necessary towards securing the energies and allegiance of the native troops in times of difficulty, we have been actuated by a sincere desire to make the native soldier sensible of the interest taken in his behalf, and to restore the service to the estimation it was held in when duty was less severe, and before other causes combined to make it less attractive than formerly, arising chiefly from the wide extent (1) of our empire, and the depreciated value of the pay (2).

(f.) "Your Lordship must, we presume, be aware that this Presidency never has had a regular and well organised body of light infantry or riflemen, an advantage which every other service enjoys. The utility of a force of this kind embodied in separate regiments, we believe will not be questioned, and as the natives of Upper India possess many of the qualities adapted for this description of arm, we respectfully avail ourselves of the present intention of organising the army to suggest to your Lordship that out of the sixty regiments at least five of them be formed into light infantry.

(g.) "We are also impressed with a belief that the rifles might be beneficially introduced

(1.) This is perfectly true.

(1.) This practice has been discontinued. *Vide* general order by Major General Watson, dated 12th August 1834. Copy annexed.

(2.) No native corps even in time of peace ought to be less than 1,000 men. Under all circumstances of leave of absence, which might then be extended both as to the time and numbers, of unusual sickness, or of great demands for escorts or detached service, the regiment would always be efficient and the duty never severe.

(1.) The service is certainly less attractive and the army deteriorated. There are many causes, but I should doubt the wide extent of our empire being one of them, as the Hindostanees seek service in all parts of India, and form one half of the whole Bombay army.

(2.) This is explained by the assertion of prices being higher than formerly, the correctness of which, as a general average, I doubt; and further, that upon many occasions articles were forcibly taken and not paid for, which I believe.

(f.) I entirely concur in the propriety of this recommendation. It will be found discussed in my minute upon the composition of the army in India.

(g.) This subject will also be considered in the same minute.

duced into the army of this Presidency, and beg to suggest that at least ten regiments of the line have a rifle company substituted for the present light companies. The only rifle company, as far as we are aware, which this service ever possessed belonged to the Honourable Company's European regiment, was broken up on the separation of the wings of that corps in 1824, and on the reunion of the wings, was not re-established. The opportunity which now presents itself for restoring that useful arm in the European regiment, more particularly since its present constitution of eight companies with ten captains, admits of its being done so readily, ought, we think, to be made available.

(h.) "The tables which accompany your Lordship's Minute show so clearly the immediate and prospective saving to the State, that we need not dwell on the great financial benefit which such an organisation will effect. But there is one point of view in which we contemplate the change that, we will not conceal from your Lordship, in our humble judgment is fraught with danger, that is, the throwing a body of 224 native commissioned and 1,120 non-commissioned officers at once on the supernumerary list of the army, which must be felt by that class throughout the whole body as utterly stopping promotion, and rendering every man's situation hopeless, since it affects all who look forward to advancement as the only reward for long and tried services to the State, and we cannot but fear it will give rise to a feeling of chagrin and disappointment certainly calculated to alienate the affections of that class from the service, unless some steps are devised to obviate the entire stand there must be in promotion."

(h.) The same objection is very strongly urged by Colonel Morison, and I confess myself compelled to yield to its force. I am much opposed on principle to a different mode of dealing with the European and Native officer when, in the opinion of the latter, their cases are precisely similar. I therefore recommend that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the reduced corps shall, like their European officers, continue to be borne on the strength of their former corps, and have their promotion in the same till the whole are absorbed. For the purpose of doing duty they will, like their officers, be divided amongst all the corps of the army, care being taken that in drafting the men, their choice of corps being consulted as much as possible, they shall be accompanied by a portion of the officers, European and Native, of their old regiments.

3. I now proceed to consider some of the remarks in Colonel Morison's Minute\* of the 7th August 1834.

4. Colonel Morison has proposed a different mode of reduction, but it partakes in a greater degree of the main objection to my own plan, consisting in the tardiness of the operation, and in the length of time before its results will be fully accomplished; and I shall, therefore, not further advert to it.

5. Colonel Morison has proposed a new organisation for the artillery, and the amalgamation of the three distinct corps into one. One of the objects of this plan is to place the Madras officers upon a par, in point of promotion, with those of Bengal and Bombay, who have been much more benefited by the various augmentations that have been made in former wars. I should be happy to see justice done to that meritorious body even at this late hour; but all my calculations and propositions having been made upon the existing organization, which has the great merit of uniformity in the three arms of the service, and is, I think, as good as any other, I am not disposed, for the present, to advocate any change in the established constitution of our army.

6. I will only remark, in passing, that I think Colonel Morison over-estimates the proportion of artillery required for the army of India. It is the most irresistible and imposing part of our military force; but, on the other hand, as I have often observed, there is no longer among the Native States any artillery establishment deserving of the name; and it is a curious historical fact, that almost all our great battles have been decided by the infantry alone, without the aid of a single gun. This is no reason for excluding artillery from our service, or for not rendering that which we have as efficient as possible, but it is strongly  
against

\* Copy forwarded to England with separate letter from Ootacamund, dated 9th August 1834.

against any increase, or not introducing the greatest economy into this very expensive branch.

7. One improvement upon my plan, namely, of not giving a different number of guns to the troops beyond and within the frontier, but of reducing indiscriminately, in all the horse artillery troops, their present establishment of six to four guns, has my entire assent. It will effect a somewhat larger saving, and will be very much more convenient.

\* In separate Letter from Ootacmund, 9th August 1834.

8. The intention of immediately making this change has already been announced\* to the Court, and I have only now to propose that the Military Secretary to Government, in conjunction with the Adjutant General of the Army, may be directed to prepare the details for the sanction of Government.

Calcutta, 7 February 1835.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

GENERAL ORDERS by Major General *J. Watson*, c.B.

Head Quarters, Calcutta,  
12 August 1834.

UNDER instructions from his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the Major General in command of the forces is pleased to prohibit a practice which is understood to obtain in some native regiments under this Presidency, of allowing night-guards to European officers. This custom is unauthorized, and the Major General, in directing its discontinuance, deems it necessary to declare that officers in command of regiments will be held responsible that it is not revived.

By order of Major General Watson,

(signed) *J. R. Lumley*, Colonel,  
Adjutant General of the Army.

MINUTE by Mr. *Ross*.

In regard to the merits in a military point of view of the plan proposed by the Right Honourable the Governor General for the re-organisation of the Indian army, I do not consider myself competent to give an opinion. I cannot, however, but think that the objection urged by the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the Bengal army has much weight. Those officers say that by throwing a body of commissioned and non-commissioned native officers at once on the supernumerary list of the army, and thereby utterly depriving the private soldiers of all hope of advancement, the plan must tend to alienate the affections of that class from the service. Perhaps this objection may be removed in the way proposed in the Governor General's Minute of the 7th instant. All I can say is, that if the plan would in the smallest degree deteriorate the condition of the private soldiers of the native army, that would be an objection to it, in my opinion, which the financial benefit expected from it would be insufficient to obviate.

10 February 1835.

(signed) *A. Ross.*

MINUTE by Lieutenant Colonel *Morison*.

I BEG to explain, with reference to the 6th paragraph of his Lordship's Minute of the 7th instant, now in circulation, that the proportion of artillery adverted to in my Minute of the 7th August was intended rather to show what is generally considered necessary with regular armies in other countries, than to recommend any fixed proportion for India. I remarked, in general terms, that "that army will be the cheapest as well as the most perfect, whose several arms are in just proportion to one another," adding, "what that proportion ought to be in India is a different question."

I will



I will only now beg to observe, that an army whose peace establishment of cavalry and infantry is proposed to be fixed at 132,000 rank and file, and which may possibly be required to be doubled on emergency, will, in my opinion, be very ill provided with artillery, if that corps be fixed at 8,790 men only, who are moreover to be deprived of one-fourth of their officers, whose numbers are already on a scale rather under than above the most approved standard. And even supposing that the requisite additional men for a war establishment could at once be provided, which would be conceding too much, two years would still be required for their training as they ought to be trained, in order to obtain the utmost advantage derivable from their services.

The expense of artillery in the field is no doubt very great in comparison with that of the other arms, but the extra expense is occasioned mainly by providing the means of moving the guns and their equipments, which expense in many cases need only be temporary. In time of peace, the horse and foot artillery respectively cost but little more than the cavalry and infantry, while the moral effect of the artillery on the minds of the people goes much further in proportion to numbers than either of the former, and as necessity in due proportion in time of war will not be disputed. A battle may have been gained without the aid of a single gun, and many have been gained in India with a very inadequate number on the side of the British troops, who have often with great loss been required to carry the enemy's batteries by the bayonet, and even by the sabres of the light cavalry. But every officer who has seen that operation, and remarked the broken condition of our ranks on arriving at the enemy's guns, must be well aware that it only required a small effort of cavalry at that critical moment to have accomplished our complete discomfiture; an event which sooner or later may be expected to happen if we continue to rely on the success of such attacks unsupported by a sufficient artillery.

If it be supposed in the event of the assembly of a hostile army in any part of India that it will be provided with a less proportion of guns than on former occasions, I think we shall be disappointed, nor is it our interest that it should be otherwise, because it is a system of predatory movements (which are incompatible with trains of artillery) which we have most reason to apprehend. Every petty chief in Hindostan is in possession of some field guns which may be united against us, and I doubt not that with a little pains taken to ascertain the fact, we should find that there are still many hundreds of mounted field artillery in the interior of this country, besides the extensive parks which we know of in several of the native States. But if such were not the case, we cannot maintain the tranquillity of the country by better or cheaper means than by a proper distribution of an imposing and efficient artillery. In the event of the disposable army being called to the frontier, we shall still have to maintain a complete military ascendancy in our own territories as well as in those of our protected allies, but which, should any disaster happen to the field army, might become rather a difficult task. In such an event, an efficient artillery (more especially in those districts which are destitute of fortresses) would be more than ever indispensable in support of the reduced number of regular troops left, or of the new levies that may be raised for the care of the provinces. But our artillery on the scale proposed will not, I conceive, be nearly sufficient for our permanent safety.

Nothing, in my mind, would be more conducive to the efficiency of the Indian artillery than to form the whole into one regiment, with one Ordnance Department, acting on one fixed system. Having three of each must not only entail an unnecessary heavy expense, but continue to prove subversive of that uniformity which is so essential to military efficiency and public economy. Many discrepancies now exist, which I apprehend can only be eradicated by having one corps only, and one Ordnance Department. It was with these objects in view, and not merely for the sake of the Madras artillery, whose claims are sufficiently known to the Honourable Court, that I before alluded to the expediency of forming the Indian artillery into one regiment, and I can hardly doubt that the time will arrive when the advantages of this change will be acknowledged both at home and in India. The siege of Asseergurh, and other cases might also be mentioned, exhibited the evil effects of the present system, if such it can be called, when three different divisions of artillery, separate and independent of each other, all differently equipped, and acting under different rulers, were employed together to effect one and the same object. If the public money which must have been wasted on that and other occasions were ascertained, it could not

fail to explain in a striking manner how deeply the public interests are concerned in giving uniformity to the Ordnance Department in India, both in its establishments and equipments.

Calcutta, 16 February 1835.

(signed) *W. Morison.*

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(No. 36 of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Cons. 13th March  
1835, Nos. 1 to 5,  
and No. 11.

WE do ourselves the honour to submit, for the consideration of your Honourable Court, two important Minutes by the Right Honourable the Governor General, respectively dated the 28th ultimo and the 13th instant, the former treating of the distribution, and the latter of the composition of the army of India.

2. We beg to refer to the papers themselves for his Lordship's sentiments on these highly interesting subjects.

3. The other members of the Government have not had leisure, previously to his Lordship's departure, to record their opinions on the important military arrangements suggested therein; but their sentiments on the measures proposed and recommended by the Governor General will be forwarded as early as practicable.

4. The several papers adverted to in his Lordship's Minute, including a Minute by Sir R. O'Callaghan, with remarks thereon by Sir F. Adam, are herewith transmitted.

We have, &c.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

*A. Ross.*

*W. Morison.*

Fort William, 16 March 1835.

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MINUTE by the Governor General and Commander in Chief.

COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY OF INDIA.

BEFORE I proceed to describe what the constitution of the army is, and to offer an opinion as to what it ought to be, a necessary preliminary inquiry seems to be as to the specific dangers by which our dominion may be assailed. It is easy enough to determine upon the general principles to be followed, and the great end to be attained, viz., that the military body should be so constituted and regulated, that by its imposing moral attitude, by its established fidelity and allegiance, it should render hopeless all internal rebellion; as also that by the adequacy of its numbers, and by its reputation for discipline and valour, it should be able as well in the general opinion as in reality to overcome any foreign attack.

But the elements both of our danger and of our security are of more difficult estimation, and without an exact knowledge both of the one and the other, it is very possible that the precautions adopted for our security may become the very means of our subversion.

Of internal danger, nobody I believe entertains less alarm than myself. In answer to those almost universal representations from public authorities of the existence of danger, and of the consequent necessity of maintaining a large native army, I have in vain asked to have pointed out to me what the danger is, where are the horse, foot, and artillery by which we are to be ejected. The most recent document of this kind that I have seen, is the Minute of the Commander in Chief at Madras, who describes disaffection as everywhere prevailing, and argues in consequence against any reduction of the army, and thinks necessary an augmentation of it. Indeed, there are those who contend for the same establishment now as when Hyder and Tippoo were in the plenitude of their power, and when several substantive States existed in other parts of India. But in Madras, as in Bengal, there no longer exists a single chief or combination of chiefs, who possess

possess even the semblance of a military force. Nor are there any large masses of the population who have the least disposition to rebel against our authority. A vague expression is often used, that ours is a government of opinion. Our security rests upon a very much better foundation; upon the fact, which every one from his own observation and experience is thoroughly convinced of, and which is true, that our power is irresistible.

But though no danger appears in any real or tangible shape, it must be allowed when one hundred millions of people are under the control of a Government which has no hold whatever on their affections, when out of this population is formed that army, upon the fidelity of which we rely principally for our preservation; when our European troops, of whose support under all circumstances we are alone sure, are so exceedingly limited in number and efficiency as to be of little avail against any extensive plan of insurrection; then indeed the truth of that expression of Sir John Malcolm is not without force: "That in an empire like that of India, we are always in danger, and it is impossible to conjecture the form in which it may approach." This state of uncertainty is greatly aggravated by our condition of peace, by the spread of knowledge, and by the operations of the press, all of which are tending rapidly as well to weaken the respect entertained for the European character and the prestige of British superiority, as to elevate the native character, to make them more alive to their own rights, and more sensible of their power, of the dangers of our *old* position, upon which men's minds continue to harp, and against which they see no security but the largest possible native army. I have no apprehension; but there is much more reason to fear the changes incidental to our *new* position of peace; a more enlightened state of mind, a higher elevation of character, knowledge, improved morality, courage; all concurring causes that must produce effects to be dealt with by a very different philosophy from that which has hitherto obtained. So much for internal evils.

I shall now consider the danger from without; thinking of this, as of the other, that there is no ground for present alarm, but that we do not know the time or the quarter when and where it may appear; but thinking in like manner of both, that it is by immediate preparation only that security can be obtained, and that relief will be too late if we wait, as would be most convenient, the actual occurrence of the mischief.

The following is a brief abstract of our military position.

British India may be assailed from the north by the Goorkhas; from the east by the Burmese; from the north-west by the Sikhs, the Afghans and the hordes of Central Asia, in co-operation or otherwise with Persia and Russia; from the sea on all the other sides of her territory.

An attack from the Goorkhas might partially succeed as a diversion against our hill provinces, but without cavalry or artillery their efforts on the plains could only terminate in disgrace and defeat.

The Burmese have proved themselves totally unequal to compete with our forces in the field.

An attack from the sea, even supposing a momentary superiority against us on that element, could only produce an insulated debarkation, devoid of all the necessary requisites for taking the field, or to subsist in a fixed position.

The only real danger with which we may be threatened must come from the north-west, and consequently to that important line of operation our main attention should be turned.

Under its present able and judicious leader it is not probable that the forces of the Punjab will be ever directed against us; Runjeet Singh is old and infirm, and there is no apparent probability that the wisdom of his rule will be inherited by his successor. Troubles, upon his decease, will certainly arise, and it is impossible to foresee the result, as relates to the line of conduct which we may be called upon to pursue.

The present state of Afghanistan presents no cause of alarm to India. The success that attended the wretched army of Shah Shuja under his feeble guidance, affords the best proof of the real weakness of the Afghan power. The assumption of the supremacy by Dost Mahomed Khan may possibly give greater strength and consolidation to the general confederacy. It is much to be desired that this State should acquire sufficient stability to form an intermediate barrier between India and Persia.

Persia, in its distracted state since the death of the late king, is unequal to any

great effort unassisted by Russia ; but the co-operation of 20,000 Russians from the Arras would speedily terminate the civil war, and the advance of the combined force would give them in the first campaign possession of Herat, the key of Kabul.

It is the interest of Russia to extend and strengthen the Persian empire, which occupies a central position between the double lines of operation of the Autocrat to the eastward and to the westward ; and as Persia can never be a rival of Russia, the augmentation of her strength can only increase the offensive means of Russia.

From the days of Peter the Great to the present time, the views of Russia have been turned to the obtaining possession of that part of Central Asia which is watered by the Oxus and joins the eastern shore of the Caspian. The latest accounts from Kabul state that they are building a fort between the Caspian and Khiva. This is their best line of operation against India, but it can only be considered at present as a very distant speculation.

The line of operation for a Russo-Persian army to advance upon Herat is short and easy. The distances are as follows :—

From the Arrah to Tabreez	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Miles.	60
Tabreez to Tehran	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		300
Tehran to Muschid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		601
Muschid to Herat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		228
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		1,189

In the campaigns against the Turks the army of Georgia supplied Paskewitch with 30,000 men. It may, therefore, be assumed that the same army could assist Persia with an equal number as an auxiliary force. With a good understanding between the two Governments, with time for preparation, and with good management, there could be no difficulty in transporting this force to Herat. The Russians are accustomed to move in countries similarly circumstanced. In Turkey, the Russian army always carried with it two months' supply of grain, and hand-mills for grinding it ; but they never issue any part of this supply until all other means of obtaining it have failed.

What the policy of Russia might be after taking possession of Herat, it is unnecessary now to consider ; but it is impossible to deny that she might arrive at that point in legitimate support of her ally, the King of Persia, and it is equally difficult to deny that from that point she may proclaim a crusade against British India, in which she would be joined by all the warlike restless tribes that formed the overwhelming force of Timour.

The distances from Herat to Attock, are—

Herat to Kandahar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Miles.	560
Kandahar to Ghizni	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		190
Ghizni to Kabul	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		82
Kabul to Attock	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		200
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		1,032

The Afghan confederacy, even if cordially united, would have no means to resist the power of Russia and Persia. They probably would make a virtue of necessity and join the common cause, receiving in reward for their co-operation the promise of all the possessions that had been wrested from the by Runjeet Singh, and expecting also to reap no poor harvest from the plunder of India. But however this may be, it will be sufficient to assume the possibility that a Russian force of 20,000 men fully equipped, accompanied by a body of 100,000 horse, may reach the shores of the Indus ; that Runjeet Singh has no means to resist their advance ; and that the invaders having crossed the Indus into the Punjab, would find themselves in possession of the parts of India the most fertile in resources of every kind, and secure on every side from being harassed and attacked even if they had not on their side a body of irregular cavalry much more numerous and efficient than any we have to oppose to them. I shall assume, then, that the attack against which we have to provide is to consist of the above-mentioned force.

I shall

I shall now proceed to inquire into the composition of the army of India, of the physical and moral qualities of the native armies of the different Presidencies, and the adequacy and efficiency of the present proportion of our European force to our security and defence against all dangers.

In the margin is inserted an abstract of the rank and file of all descriptions in the Native armies of the three Presidencies, their height and weight, and the countries from whence they are recruited.

It appears from the annexed statements, that the whole of the Bengal army, and one-half of that of Bombay, including all the cavalry, are Hindoostanees. The Madras army is recruited principally from their own territories, and has also a small portion of Bengal men in their ranks.

When at Ootacamund all the Governments were requested to submit to a military committee the following question:—“Whether the order of the Court of Directors issued about three years ago, “restricting the recruiting of each of the three armies to the limits of its own Presidency, had operated beneficially, or whether it would be better to permit the Madras and Bombay armies to recruit, as formerly, in the Bengal territory?” The question did not apply to the Bengal army.

The Madras Committee recommend that in the cavalry no alteration should be made, the men being chiefly Mussulmans, from the Carnatic. The number of Hindoos in each regiment amount to about 50, which it is proposed to increase to 100. In the infantry they think that a proportion of Bengal men, about 100 per regiment, might be introduced with advantage. In the Golundauze one-fourth of the whole are from the Bengal Provinces.

The Bombay Committee report that the Court's restrictive Order has been totally inoperative, because, though the Order had been so far obeyed that no recruiting parties had been sent to Bengal, yet the Bengal men having voluntarily presented themselves for enlistment, they had been engaged as before.

The only change recommended by the committee is that, for the purpose of getting a better description of men, recruiting parties shall, as before, be sent to Bengal.\*

One of the members, Major Robertson, dissents from his colleagues. He prefers recruiting exclusively from the Bombay territories, with the exception of the cavalry and Golundauze, “who, requiring a much larger description of men, must have recourse to Hindoostan.”

From the preceding statements it appears that the Hindoostanee is larger and more robust than the Native south of the Nerbudda, and the presumption must be that he is considered a more powerful, if not a better, soldier. His habits, indeed, are much more military. For not only, as appears above, does he go to seek service in Bombay, but the infantry in the service of the Rajah of Nagpore, as well as the Nizam's Contingent, consist entirely of Hindoostanees. In a late letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, he mentions that one of the Arabs, or of the horsemen from our Bengal Province of Robilcund, was equal to 10 or 20 of the other men of the Nizam's force; and, in the attempt recently made by Shah Shaja to recover his territories, it was the battalion of Hindoostanees and the Rohillas, under an officer of the name of Campbell, that were particularly distinguished.

I have not read without surprise the pretensions set forth in behalf of the Madras

Rank and File of the Three Armies.	
Regular Infantry.	
Bengal, 74 regiments	- 50,320
Madras, 52 regiments	- 35,360
Bombay, 26 regiments	- 17,680
	103,360
Regular Cavalry.	
Bengal, 10 regiments	- 4,440
Madras, 8 regiments	- 3,552
Bombay, 3 regiments	- 1,332
	9,324
Total Regular Native Troops	- 112,684
Irregulars.	
Infantry.	
Bengal, 10 regiments	- 7,504
Bombay, 1 regiment	- 680
	8,184
Cavalry.	
Bengal, 4 regiments	- 2,526
Bombay, 1 regiment	- 832
	3,358
Total Irregulars	- 11,542

Average of Heights and Weights.		
	Height.	Weight.
	<i>Ft. in.</i>	<i>St.</i>
Bengal Infantry.		
Recruited generally in the Upper Provinces of Bengal.	5 7 82	9 0 8
Madras Infantry.		
Men, formerly Recruit Boys.	5 5 36	7 9 73
Madrassees recruited	5 6 34	8 1 10
Hindoostanees recruited	5 6 59	8 5 28
Bombay Infantry.		
Men, formerly Recruit Boys.	5 4 75	8 5 25
Konkanees recruited	5 5 5	8 5 5
Deccanese recruited	5 5 5	8 9 25
Hindoostanees recruited	5 6 5	9 0 5

\*Note.—The following statement would seem to support the opinion that the Hindoostanees engaged at Bombay are inferior in stature and character to those of the Bengal Army.

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Height.</i>
Bengal	- - - - -	5 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ $\frac{2}{8}$
Bombay	- - - - -	5 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
	<i>Cavalry.</i>	
All Hindoostanees.		
Corporal punishment in four Years:		
Bengal	- - - - -	1 $\frac{1}{6}$
Bombay	- - - - -	42
A more severe discipline is supposed to prevail in the Bombay army.		

Madras army. Sir Thomas Munro, upon many occasions, advocates their occupation of the whole of the peninsula south of the Nerbudda. I submit the following extracts from his correspondence (A. D. 1820).

“ The Nerbudda is unquestionably the proper boundary between Bengal and Madras, not only on account of its natural barrier formed by the river and the broad range of hills which accompany it, but of its being the line of separation between the Deccan and Hindoostan, and between natives speaking different languages. The Bengal armies, composed of men from Hindoostan, dislike serving south of the Nerbudda, and do not readily assimilate either with the Natives of the country or with the Madras troops.”

I must presume that the Bombay army was at that time upon a very low establishment, and had no Hindoostanees in its ranks. The dislike of the Natives of Hindoostan to serve south of the Nerbudda, has subsequently been proved to be entirely unfounded. The Government and army of Bombay are quite disregarded.

Again (A. D. 1820): “ When Hyderabad and Nagpore were great foreign and independent States, and more likely to act against us than with us, the immediate control of Bengal was right, more especially as it did not affect the authority of the Madras Government over its army, of which only two battalions were for several years at Hyderabad; but both Hyderabad and Nagpore are as completely dependent upon us as Mysore; they must, at some period or other, fall entirely into our hands, and the internal administration must, in the meantime, be chiefly directed by our Resident. At present the discipline of our army is much injured by our having about 20,000 men beyond our frontiers, removed in a great measure from our control.”\*

Again (A. D. 1804): “ I am sorry to hear it reported that it has been in agitation to relieve the subsidiary force at Hyderabad with Bengal troops. I think there are many strong public grounds for having no Bengal troops either there or at Poonah. It is easier to carry on war in all the countries south of the Nerbudda from Mysore than from Bengal. Where troops are in all respects equal, there is still an advantage in having those who are to act together drawn from one and not from different establishments; but the local troops are, perhaps, in some respects, superior to those of Bengal; they are more regular, more tractable, more patient under privations, and they have been more accustomed to military operations.”

These remarks are more applicable to 1804 than to 1835; there are no enemies to war against. The greater experience in military operations now rather belongs to the Bengal troops, and the preference assigned to the Madras sepoy for certain qualities would not now be as readily admitted.

I have quoted largely from Sir Thomas Munro, because I consider his authority superior to all others; but allowance must be made in the present case for a spirit of partiality, if not of partisanship, which as a Madras officer it was natural for him to feel.

But it is impossible for any dispassionate observer who has seen the Madras sepoys, not to say that their physical defects, their small stature and delicate frame, supposing all other qualities equal, render them very inferior to the northern Hindoostanees, and that consequently, as a body of men, they are inferior to either of the other armies. The regulated standard of each army is noted in the margin.

*Bengal.*—M. C. 8th August 1796. Carol's Code, Chap. LX. sec. 42. No Sepoy is to be entertained who is not 5 feet 6 inches high, or who is under 16 or above 30 years of age, unless, in the latter case, he shall have served before.

*Madras.*—The standard of the Madras Army was raised in 1829 from 5ft. 4 in. to 5 ft. 6 in for Horse Artillery and Cavalry, and to 5 ft. 5 in. for Infantry of the Line. Before 1829 the standard for all appears to have been 5 ft. 4 in.

*Bombay.*—The lowest standard for the Cavalry is 5 ft. 6 in.; age 24 years. For Infantry, 5 ft. 3 in.; age not exceeding 22 years. For Grenadiers, 5 ft. 6 in. and upwards.

I come next to the Bombay army, composed in equal proportions of Hindostanees and of men from their own proper territories. It would have been satisfactory if the Committee, who do not recommend any change in this divided composition had stated their reasons for it. The Bombay men seem to have no advantage in strength and size over the Madras sepoy.

I have often had occasion to remark upon the expensive character of the Bombay establishment, urging always the expediency of a compulsory order for the adjustment of their expenditure to their income, and in no instance has this assertion such strong confirmation as in respect to the formation of the military establishment.

The

\* Note.—This will be in part obviated by the transfer of a general officer from ceded districts to Hyderabad.

The army of Bombay consists of—

	Rank and File.
Native Infantry - - - - -	17,680
Native Cavalry - - - - -	1,322
	<hr/> 19,012 <hr/>

To superintend this small force, they have one lieutenant general and three major generals, the same general staff as in the other Presidencies, with all the appendages of commissariat, ordnance establishments, pay and audit departments, &c. belonging to a large army.

I beg a reference to the general distribution abstract of the Bengal army furnished by the Quartermaster General, in which it will appear that there are three divisions, almost equal in amount to the whole Bombay army, under the charge of one major general, viz. :

Presidency - - - - -	17,308
Cawnpore - - - - -	11,798
Meerut - - - - -	16,551
Bombay - - - - -	19,012

This arrangement was caused by a different order of things, when the Bombay Presidency was disconnected with the others, and when separate establishments were indispensable to its efficiency. The necessity no longer exists, and it seems practicable to substitute for it another, which will save a very great charge, and will, I venture to think, not be unacceptable to all the individuals concerned.

I would propose that the Bombay army, as such, should be at once abolished, the Hindoostanee half of it being transferred in complete regiments to the Bengal army; the Bombay\* half to remain as a separate corps, to be recruited always within the territories, to be commanded by a major general, with the same staff as any other division of the army, and the commissariat and ordnance departments being incorporated with those of Bengal or Madras, as may be most convenient. I am, of course, supposing the previous adoption of the general equalization of all allowances.

To the officers I conceive that the larger field of employment and the superior healthiness of many of the stations in the Upper Provinces would be agreeable. To the men it would be much more satisfactory to be brought nearer their homes, and to be saved the dangers of the long journey which has been so fatal to many when returning on furlough. The State, besides the saving from the reduction of the staff, would also make a great gain in the comparative cheapness of all camp establishments, of followers, &c. It is an extraordinary fact, not yet accounted for, that in all the stations occupied alternately by Madras, Bombay, and Bengal troops, the bazaar prices have invariably fallen with the latter, and risen with the two former.

The Bombay division would, under this alteration, occupy only the stations within their frontier, transferring the Southern Mahratta country to Madras, Nagpore† and Deesa to Bengal.

In considering the question of internal danger, those officers most conversant with Indian affairs who were examined before the Parliamentary Committee, apprehend no danger to our dominion as long as we are assured of the fidelity of our native troops. To this opinion I entirely subscribe. But others again view

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\* As this separate corps would be liable to degenerate into a sort of militia, it might perhaps be a better arrangement to incorporate the Bombay half in the Madras army, in the same manner as the Hindoostanee half would be drafted into that of Bengal.

† The following table of distances shows that Nagpore is as conveniently placed for support from three of the great military stations in Bengal, as from Bombay, and much nearer to the divisions in Malwa and Saugor than even to Bombay :—

Nagpore to Bombay - - -	Miles. 560	Nagpore to Saugor (c) - - -	Miles. 181
"    Madras - - -	735	"    Benares - - -	446
"    Mhow (a) - - -	351	"    Allahabad - - -	450
"    Neenuch (b) - - -	505	"    Agra - - -	669

(a) Left Cantonment of the Rajpootanah Force.

(b) Centre of - - - ditto.

(c) Head quarters of Saugor Division.

in the native army itself the source of our greatest peril. In all ages the military body has been often the prime cause, but generally the instrument of all revolutions, and proverbial almost as is the fidelity of the native soldier to his chief whom he serves, more especially when he is justly and kindly treated; still we cannot be blind to the fact that many of those ties which bind other armies to their allegiance are totally wanting in this. Here is no patriotism, no community of feeling as to religion or birth-place, no influencing attachment from high consideration or great honours and rewards. Our native army also is extremely ignorant, capable of the strongest religious excitement, and very sensitive to disrespect to their persons or infringement of their customs. I shall quote from the evidence a few of those passages bearing upon this subject, which appear to me to have the greatest force and truth. Mr. Henry Russell observes: "The greatest danger we have to apprehend is from our native army. Our military force is the exclusive tenure by which we hold the government, and the fidelity of the troops of whom that force is composed is necessarily precarious. They are foreigners and mercenaries, they are attached to a Government that pays them well, and treats them kindly, &c., but we have no hold upon them through either national honour or national prejudices, and cannot expect from them what we do from English soldiers fighting for English objects. They are peculiarly susceptible of being practised upon, and may be induced, either by our own mismanagement or by the artifices of designing persons, to turn against us those very arms which now constitute our only strength." This intelligent officer makes a remark, too true at the present day, with respect to the Madras army: "The details of the army had, for the first time in India, fallen into the hands of a school which thought that everything depended on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of outward smartness and uniformity." There are parts of Mr. Holt Mackenzie's evidence well worthy of attention, for no man of his time in India possessed the same general knowledge, or could form a more accurate and enlightened judgment upon all subjects connected with our rule. He observes, "I do not think the sepoys have any attachment to the English as a nation; on the contrary, I apprehend that a considerable number of that part which consists of Moslems must generally have a national, or rather I should say, a religious dislike to the English." He thinks, "The sepoys have a great deal of attachment to their officers, but that this rests upon personal character rather than upon anything that may be called attachment to the nation generally." He thinks, "The Sepoys, as long as they are well paid, will have a strong sense of the duty of being faithful to those who so pay them; to be only overcome by some powerful cause of discontent or excitement." He thinks, "A large native army is quite essential for maintaining the tranquillity of the country, but he would be very sorry to see its defence entrusted to them without a large European force. He is not aware of any circumstance causing immediate danger, but he thinks on general principles that there is much prospective danger."

It is only since I recorded different minutes enforcing the prudence and expediency of bettering the condition of the Native army, and of preventing discontent by timely concession and precaution, that I have read a passage in a letter from Sir Thomas Munro, written in 1817, in which I find a view of our future situation, and the consequences appertaining to it, quite in unison with the sentiments I have so often expressed. He observes: "But even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to control, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the Native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and, for want of other employment, to turn it against their European masters." He concludes a long and able argument upon the question whether, in the event of our conquest of the whole of India, the condition of the people would be better than under their Native princes, which he doubts, with this remark:—"There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share in the government of their country, as in British India."

The only conclusion that I wish to establish from the preceding remarks, which contain indisputable truths, is, that in the Native army alone rests our internal danger, and that this danger may involve our complete subversion.

But



But the fidelity of our Native army, though wonderfully great, and deserving of high confidence, cannot be considered exempt from the possibility of seduction, and that an adequate European force is the sole security against this, the greatest evil that could befall us. What should be the proportion of our European to our Native force will be presently considered. The external danger comes next under review. The capability of the Native army to meet it, and the manner in which the Native military means of India can be turned to the greatest advantage, are subjects of the first magnitude.

As far as experience can teach us, the prospect is discouraging as to any great degree of direct and positive assistance in the field, that is, in actual conflict, to be expected from the sepoy in a contest with the stronger and bolder races of Central Asia with or without the co-operation of a Russian force. Mr. Holt Mackenzie has given an opinion upon the question before us, which quite coincides with my view of it:—"My impression is that, as far as regards any Indian enemy, the Native army may be considered to be very efficient. I am not equally confident of their efficiency if placed in any new and unusual position, and exposed to encounter enemies that may possibly come upon us from without. I think the result of the war with the Burmese seems to show that when brought against enemies superior in physical strength to those with whom they have been accustomed to contend, and required to surmount obstacles of a different kind from what they have been accustomed to surmount, the Native troops, however well led, will be found to want resolution and nervous vigour, so as to be inferior to European troops in a degree not ordinarily to be perceived in Indian warfare. Consequently, I should apprehend that if they were called upon to meet an European enemy in the north of India they might fail partly from the want of physical strength, and partly from the want of moral energy."

The defects of the native of India are a want of physical strength and of moral energy. The first is beyond our remedy; it only depends upon ourselves to raise the latter to a much higher standard. Our system has, I fear, tended to depress it.

The late wars have brought the sepoy in contact with enemies of a more masculine character, and have shown the justice of the preceding opinion.

Sir David Ochterlony, in his confidential report to Government during the Nepal war, has recorded his opinion that the sepoys were unequal to contend with the Ghoorkhas in the hills.

The Burmese war was exclusively carried on by British troops. The Madras troops entirely failed. It is understood that Sir Archibald Campbell was strongly prejudiced against them, and, when granting the request of their officers to be permitted to lead their men to the attack, he neglected the practice invariably adopted upon all other occasions, of joining with them a proportion of European troops. To this their ill-success may be in part owing. My own impression is also that in the short war against Coorg the Madras sepoys showed the same want of energy.

With respect to the inability of the sepoy to contend with a European enemy, the concurrent opinion of all the evidence, to which may be added the inference to be drawn from all our own conquests in India, seems to be decisive upon the question.

For my own part I am not quite disposed to come to the same desponding conclusion, because if the bolder and larger man of the north were mixed with a due proportion of European troops, and excited to acts of valor by sufficient encouragement, I know not why he should not acquire the same superior bearing as the Portugese and the Neapolitans under British and French direction.

But of the sepoys of the south of India, of those of the territories proper of Madras and Bombay, I entertain no such hope. Their case cannot be more favourably put for them than by supposing them to be Europeans and to have all the advantages of the European character, and then let it be asked if men of such physical inferiority would be received as recruits in any European army, or if an army so constituted would not be considered perfectly inefficient.

All these facts and opinions seem to me to establish incontrovertibly that a large proportion of European troops is necessary for our security under all circumstances of peace and war. It surprises me to find how little attention was paid by the Committee to one of the most important parts of the inquiry, the relative proportion between the Native and European force. But we fortunately

possess the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro, the first of authorities, confirmed by another only second to his, that of Colonel John Munro, who filled the office of Quartermaster General when I was at Madras. The opinions on both these questions are worthy of being noted :

“The native troops are in an excellent state of discipline, but of course the Europeans are always superior to the natives.”

1109.

1110.

Question 2. “What should be the relative proportions of the European infantry to the native infantry.” Answer: “I should say one-third of European, that was the proportion that was observed at Madras, indeed we had sometimes rather more, now we have considerably less. I once conversed with Sir Thomas Munro on that point, and he expressed his opinion very decidedly that there should be that proportion.” This is also my own opinion, but I think that it would suffice at present to fix it at one-fourth, being careful that the establishment should be always kept complete, and that on the most remote indication of danger it should be increased to one-third. The abstract in the margin, taken from the statements annexed to this Minute, shows the actual proportion of Europeans to Natives in the army of each Presidency, and in the whole army.

Proportion.	
Bengal Army.	
Infantry, $\frac{1}{3}$	- $\frac{3119}{8793}$
Cavalry, $\frac{1}{6}$	- $\frac{1629}{1110}$
Madras Army.	
Infantry, $\frac{1}{3}$	- $\frac{1179}{5537}$
Cavalry, $\frac{1}{6}$	- $\frac{576}{326}$
Bombay Army.	
Infantry, $\frac{1}{3}$	- $\frac{1499}{5228}$
Cavalry, $\frac{1}{6}$	- $\frac{124}{861}$
Total Infantry of India, in round numbers, as $\frac{1}{3}$ ;	
Ditto, Cavalry, as $\frac{1}{6}$ .	
Statement.	
Native Infantry	103,360
Native Cavalry	9,324
	<hr/>
	4)112,684
	<hr/>
	28,171

The raising the European proportion to one-fourth would require an establishment of 28,171 rank and file. The present establishment of King's troops consists of 20 regiments of infantry and four of cavalry. The numbers wanting to complete amount to 1,945\* rank and file, and the effective strength consists only of 15,587† rank and file. The three European regiments in the Company's service amount to 2,429‡ rank and file. They exceed their complement.

The total effective force, both King's and Company's, amounts to 18,016 rank and file, and the deficit required to complete the whole to one-fourth, would be 10,155 rank and file, of which 8,599 would be in excess of the present establishment, supposing the King's regiments to be complete, and the Company's European corps reduced to their complement.

In order to maintain the proportion of one-fourth in a state of efficiency, it is necessary to advert to the very great difference there is, and must always be, between the apparent and real force, that is, between the number of men actually borne on the rolls, and those, if the regiment took the field, who would be forthcoming. Many, from the effects of climate, must be left behind in hospital and quarters.

I called upon Dr. Burke, the Inspector General of Hospitals, an officer of great experience and intelligence, for an opinion of the deductions that ought to be made on this score: his answer gives eight per cent. for sick left behind, and four per cent. more for the effects of even a long march, or a very short service.

In order to keep up this one-fourth to its proper quota, I think the establishment of rank and file should be fixed at 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, and to effect it at the least possible charge I would raise each of our 23 regiments of infantry to 1,000 rank and file, and add to our establishment two regiments of King's infantry. The cavalry, as I have already proposed in a former Minute, should be raised to 800 rank and file, and the establishment augmented from three to five regiments, being 1,000 men short of the force proposed.

I would station these two additional regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, as follows: one of infantry at Bangalore, making three regiments at that station, which I consider as the most convenient position for a reserve, to be applicable to all exigencies in India. One regiment of infantry and one of cavalry to be placed in the great central cantonment in Rajpootana, proposed to be established on the Bunass river, and the other regiment of cavalry at Hyderabad.

In Rajpootana there are above 10,000 native troops without any European force, which I consider to be highly objectionable in many points of view.

This tract of country between the Nerbudda and Jumna, or rather between Nagpore and Agra, is by far the most important in the whole line of our military occupation.

I do not feel called upon to suggest the means by which this extra expense shall be defrayed; my duty is performed in stating the imperfections of our present military defence, and the measures that are necessary for the security of our empire. At the same time it appears to me that the reduction of one captain in every regiment of native infantry and cavalry may be made without any compromise of efficiency. When two companies were reduced in each regiment, the former complement of captains remained unaltered. I consider the

\* Statement No. 1.

† Statement No. 2.

‡ Statement No. 3.

the establishment of European officers in a native regiment to be far more than is necessary, and it is their number and high pay which swell to such an immense amount the military expenditure. Men differ very much as to the proper proportion; some contending that the amount cannot be too great; others again, that the Sepoy army was never in a better state than when there were not more than three or four officers with each corps; I am much inclined to be of this opinion. The connection between the European and native officers was much closer, their dependence upon each other greater, and a more cordial intimacy and union existed between all ranks. I believe the sepoys have never been so good as they were in the earliest part of our career; none superior to those under De Boyne; and at the present day none better than the Nizam's Contingent, where the same proportion, I believe about six officers, is maintained. There is one fact that is universally admitted, that no number of European officers will make a Sepoy corps equal to an European regiment, and in my opinion that establishment would be sufficient that assumed the presence of one officer to a company. The saving proposed would go far to meet the charge in addition to the changes that have been suggested in respect to the Bombay army.

There are two points adverted to in the reports of the Committee that are well deserving of early consideration.

Both the Madras Committee and the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the Bengal Army have recommended the augmentation of each Native corps to 1,000 men, without any increase of officers, and I would strongly support its adoption as soon as the finances will allow. It would give great relief to the duty devolving upon all sepoy corps, which is often very harassing and distressing as military duty, and increased by the interference and interruption often caused to their religious customs. This increase would permit the extension of a much valued indulgence, that of furlough, to a much larger proportion of every regiment, say one-fifth, and for a longer period, say one year. I should think it would, in any new general regulation, be advisable to reduce the amount of pay received during absence. There is at this time a great difference of practice in this respect between the Bengal sepoy and those of Madras and Bombay, to the advantage of the latter.

The same Bengal officers have urged the formation of a portion of the regular regiments into light infantry. As there is not a single chief in India, or on the frontier, who can resist us in line, an army, formed principally for that purpose, is in a great degree useless within our territories; all insurrections must be confined to hills and jungles, without we have either the Nepaul hills or the jungles and stockades of Ava, where soldiers well trained in irregular fighting, and in the expert use of a light musket, can alone be useful. I am of opinion that one cause of the defeat of the two columns in the late Coorg war may be ascribed to the ignorance of both men and officers in this species of warfare, which requires a particular and constant instruction as well as experience.

The irregular cavalry is the arm of all others in India that may be placed on a par with any of the military means that we could command for our defence against foreign invasion, not even excepting the European cavalry. I need not repeat what has been so often stated, that the Rohillas and all the other highest caste and bravest men in India, who will not enter our ranks from dislike to our rigid discipline, and from the fear of personal disrespect from our young inconsiderate officers, have no repugnance to serve in the irregular cavalry. The irregular cavalry is of peculiar importance in India; it is the favourite arm of the Native; it attaches him to our service by the strong ties of interest and affection; it prevents his being engaged against us, and, if the system were sufficiently extended, it would at a trifling expense afford us all the advantages, moral and military, which the Russians have derived from the Cossacks, who, from being the bitterest enemies of Russia in the time of Peter the Great, have become the most faithful subjects of the emperor. This force should be increased to 20,000 men.

Steam-power must be included among the most powerful means of reducing the difficulties of protection and support to such extensive and distant lines of defence, and of multiplying the military resources that we already possess. In illustration of the practical use that might be made of this power, I take the liberty of introducing here an opinion that I have elsewhere expressed: "But an efficient marine steam establishment in India is called for by considerations more powerful even than those of commercial advantage, or improved political

control. It would multiply, in a ratio little understood, the defensive means of the empire. Let me advert to an event, the particulars of which are within your recollection, the Burmese war. If five powerful steamers had then been at our command, to bring up in quick succession all necessary reinforcements and supplies, the war would probably have terminated in a few months, and many millions of treasure, many thousands of lives and extraordinary misery and sickness would have been spared. Allow me to submit another estimate of advantages, of the correctness of which you can all likewise judge. The proper station for the principal reserve of our European troops in India is at Bangalore, Madras the place of embarkation. In a few days at any period of the monsoons the same five steamers would carry this force to the most distant part of the shores of the empire. In five weeks, with the aid of the river steamers, this reserve would reach Allahabad, the most central point of our territories, one of our most commanding positions. The same steam-power that would enable us to baffle any invader in war would be ample in time of peace to carry into complete execution the whole plan of the Bengal Steam Committee, for which I continue to be a decided advocate. I will only offer a remark, that if such power be provided it should be exclusively appropriated to the transport of troops and to the maintenance of the communication with Europe. From all purposes of less utility, as passage or tug vessels, it should be interdicted as uselessly expensive, and as affecting, without any adequate return of benefit, the efficiency and readiness for constant service of the steam machinery.

I shall only now take the liberty of suggesting the advantage that would accrue from including the military establishments of Ceylon in those entertained for the defence of our Indian empire. Ceylon could well spare one regiment of infantry, which would be, *pro tanto*, a relief to her finances. For the ordinary duties of the colony a sepoy corps, at one-half of the expense, would probably answer every purpose; and, in case of more urgent service, the regiment at Trichinopoly might be held at the disposal of the Government of Ceylon, and would be able to cross the Straits in a very short time. The Ceylon regiment, if stationed at Bangalore, would be of much more extended benefit, could march down to replace the Trichinopoly regiment if necessary, and could move on to Ceylon in case of increasing urgency. There is a Malay corps in Ceylon, an element of defence not known in our Indian establishment, and which might be most usefully employed in our provinces on the eastern coast, and perhaps in the Lower Provinces, which are so hateful to the up-country sepoy. If the experiment succeeded this corps would afford a nucleus for the formation of a larger force. It is a great desideratum in our military arrangements, the obtaining a mode of defence for Bengal proper at once efficient for the State and satisfactory to the individuals employed. I had much conversation with Sir Edward Barnes on this subject. I possess, indeed, a written memorandum from him strongly concurring in the view here taken, but I cannot immediately lay my hand upon it. I regret that these observations should have run to such extreme length, but no one before me has had the opportunity of a season of peace to reflect upon the alterations that the union of our Presidencies into one government, and of our territories into one empire, imperatively call for. It would have ill become me upon a subject so momentous as the safety of this great possession to have been prevented by any motive of delicacy from the full development of my opinion. I fearlessly pronounce the Indian army to be the least efficient and most expensive in the world. The realization of the hypothesis with which I started, of the presence of 20,000 Russian infantry on the Indus, with its accompanying multitudes, would now find us in a state utterly unable to resist them. The national resources at home might possibly rescue us from the impending ruin; but we must recollect that we are not likely to have again the same large armies to supply us with great reinforcements, and that men recruited for the occasion would be very inefficient, and quite inadequate to bear the effects of the climate. But, even if we could command this aid, it would be utterly inexcusable if, with ample time for preparation, with the sum of ten millions sterling appropriated to our military establishment, we were not able to secure ourselves against every calculable danger.

Calcutta,  
13 March 1835.

(signed) W. C. Bentinck.

No. 1.

STATEMENT of the Strength of a Regiment of Cavalry and Infantry in India, showing also the Number of Officers and Men wanting to Complete each of His Majesty's Regiments serving in the Three Presidencies.

	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Staff.	Serjants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Ferriers.	Corporals.	Privates.	TOTAL.
Establishment of a Regiment of Cavalry - - -	4	8	24	7	45	8	8	32	608	744
Ditto - - ditto - - - Infantry - - -	4	9	27	6	41	13	-	36	700	836
<i>Cavalry.</i>										
Wanting to Complete:										
4th Light Dragoons - - - - -	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	35	39
11th " - - - - -	1	1	6	2	-	-	-	-	36	46
13th " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	44
16th " - - - - -	-	-	5	-	-	-	1	-	108	109
TOTAL Cavalry wanting - - -	1	1	13	2	1	-	1	1	218	238
<i>Infantry:</i>										
Wanting to Complete:										
<i>Bengal:</i>										
3rd Foot - - - - -	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	124	127
13th " - - - - -	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	11	15
16th " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	129	129
26th " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	72
31st " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
38th " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
44th " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	37
49th " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	175	176
62nd " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	252	254
TOTAL Infantry wanting - - -	-	1	5	2	1	2	-	1	600	812
Wanting to Complete:										
<i>Madras:</i>										
39th Foot - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
41st " - - - - -	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	1	87	92
45th " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	136	139
54th " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	10	11
55th " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	4
57th " - - - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	93	94
63rd " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	113	114
TOTAL wanting - - -	-	-	6	1	3	4	-	1	441	456
<i>Bombay:</i>										
2nd Foot - - - - -	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	4	94	101
6th " - - - - -	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	3	91	99
20th " - - - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	72	78
40th " - - - - -	-	-	2	1	5	-	-	3	150	161
TOTAL wanting - - -	-	-	3	1	13	1	-	14	407	439

SUMMARY of the above.

Cavalry in India, Officers and Soldiers - - - - -	238
Infantry in Bengal - - - - -	812
" Madras - - - - -	456
" Bombay - - - - -	439
TOTAL wanting - - - - -	1,945

N.B.—Colonels omitted, being General Officers.

(signed) R. Torrens,  
Colonel, A.G.K.L.

## No. 2.

## STATEMENT of the present Strength of His Majesty's Regiments serving in India.

					Present Strength.				
					Serjeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Farriers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.
<i>Bengal :</i>									
11th Dragoons	-	-	-	-	46	8	8	603	
16th "	-	-	-	-	45	8	7	537	
3rd Foot	-	-	-	-	42	13	-	614	
13th "	-	-	-	-	36	16	-	721	
16th "	-	-	-	-	42	13	-	610	
26th "	-	-	-	-	42	13	-	667	
31st "	-	-	-	-	41	13	-	817	
38th "	-	-	-	-	41	13	-	791	
44th "	-	-	-	-	42	15	-	702	
49th "	-	-	-	-	42	13	-	564	
62nd "	-	-	-	-	42	11	-	489	
TOTAL - - -					461	136	15	7,115	7,727
<i>Madras :</i>									
13th Dragoons	-	-	-	-	45	8	8	596	
39th Foot	-	-	-	-	42	11	-	739	
41st "	-	-	-	-	40	13	-	648	
45th "	-	-	-	-	41	10	-	600	
54th "	-	-	-	-	41	13	-	726	
55th "	-	-	-	-	40	13	-	778	
57th "	-	-	-	-	41	13	-	646	
63rd "	-	-	-	-	41	13	-	626	
TOTAL - - -					331	94	8	5,359	5,792
<i>Bombay :</i>									
4th Dragoons	-	-	-	-	48	8	8	604	
2nd Foot	-	-	-	-	39	12	-	638	
6th "	-	-	-	-	37	13	-	645	
20th "	-	-	-	-	43	13	-	663	
40th "	-	-	-	-	37	13	-	583	
TOTAL - - -					204	59	8	3,113	3,404
GRAND TOTAL - - -									16,921

*King's :*

Rank and File, Cavalry - - - - - 2,340  
Rank and File, Infantry - - - - - 13,247

*Company's :*

European Infantry, Rank and File - - - - - 2,429  
Total British Infantry in India, Rank and File - - - - - 15,676

(signed) R. Torrens, Colonel, A.G.K.I.

No. 3.

STATEMENT of the present Strength of each of the Honourable Company's European Infantry Regiments in India, taken from the last Returns received in the Adjutant General's Office.

	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	2nd Lieutenants or Ensigns.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Serjeant Major.	Quartermaster Serjeant.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Half Pay Drummers.	Rank and File.	REMARKS.
Bengal European Regiment -	2	2	2	10	16	8	-	1	1	1	44	18	28	768	Return dated 1st February 1835.
Madras - - ditto - -	2	2	2	10	17	8	2	-	1	1	40	19	-	934	- ditto - 1st October 1831.
Bombay - - ditto - -	2	2	2	10	16	8	1	2	1	1	35	16	-	727	- ditto - 1st October 1834.

Adjutant General's Office, 24 February 1835.

(signed) J. R. Lumley, Colonel, Adjutant General.

MINUTE by the Governor General and Commander in Chief.

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY OF INDIA.

In a former Paper \* I treated of the formation of the Army of India, and I hope satisfactorily proved, upon the concurrence of the best military authorities, that the present system of small regiments was incompatible with efficiency and economy. The distribution of the army has been regulated upon a similarly erroneous but more fatal error. The dispersion of the whole of our military force throughout every part of the country into small bodies produces universal weakness, is opposed to every established principle of military tactics, is productive of great additional expense, is injurious to discipline, and objectionable in policy. The measures I have to recommend will be founded upon the very opposite doctrine, union and concentration; that is, the collection of the troops in large bodies, and so centrally placed as to reach in the shortest time every part of the circle for the safety of which each corps is intended to be the guard, being entrusted with the military defence only of our territories, and wholly divested of any interference with civil and police duties.

\* Minute of 7 February.

I purpose beginning with the Madras Presidency, proceeding thence through the centre of India and Bombay, and terminating with Bengal.

I prefer commencing with Madras, because the subject of the disposition of the army of that Presidency has been fully discussed by Sir Frederick Adam and Sir Robert O'Callaghan; and the maxims laid down by these experienced officers are so sound and judicious, and of such general application, that it will be only left for me to express my concurrence with one or the other. There will be found a difference of opinion upon the political state of parts of the country, and of the greater or less precaution that may in consequence be required; but upon the main outline and general system of defence there is a complete harmony of sentiment.

I propose extracting from Sir Robert O'Callaghan's minute such parts as embrace the most important points in this general discussion. These I shall place on one half of the margin, and opposite Sir Frederick Adam's, with my own subjoined.

I shall take each division of the Madras army separately, giving the present and proposed force. I shall begin with the Mysore division, containing Bangalore, by far the most important military position in that Presidency. It may, indeed, be termed the key of it.

It is impossible to describe in more correct and forcible terms the advantage of this station than has been done by Sir Robert O'Callaghan, and I shall give

at length all the paragraphs of his minute relating to it. His remarks are also entitled to especial attention, as containing an epitome of the right considerations and views with which all the other great stations throughout India, for similar purposes, should be selected.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

35. IN all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore, it is impossible not most fully to concur.

And I think the concentration of troops there ought to be made to the greatest attainable extent. I am not inclined to give the weight to the dangers of conspiracy which are hinted at.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I ENTIRELY subscribe to these sentiments.

and decision at any moment that opposition is manifested, and it is known that but a few weeks or days must overpower their plans of resistance; indeed, they will see and know this to be futile when the fact is before them, that a light field detachment of formidable strength can reach them by forced marches in a few days, or weeks at most; and that almost with corresponding energy and little more time, a bettering train and siege equipment can join it. If, then, such a *corps d'armée* is desirable and advantageous, and promises to secure tranquillity within the frontiers of the Madras Presidency, and to repel attack from the north, north-west, or invasion by sea, by either coast of Malabar and Concan, or the Carnatic, where could it be so advantageously posted as at Bangalore? The position is nearly equi-distant from the capital, Madras, from Cannanore and Mangalore on the western coast, from Trichinopoly and Dindigul, in the southern division, the northern frontier of Quilon, Kurnool, Darwar, and Belgaum, North Cuddapore, and Nellore East; and each of these stations is within 200 and 250 miles, and may be reached by a light force in 12 or 15 days, as circumstances may require. Water and forage are abundant at Bangalore for such a force. The Mysore country provides all necessary supplies, and is surrounded by districts from which they may to any extent be drawn. If, then, I have shown that such a force is desirable, and that Bangalore is the fittest position, I shall next proceed to detail the force I would recommend to be concentrated at that healthy and eligible station, both for European and Native troops.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

No. 2. My view of the propriety of increasing the force at Bangalore, and maintaining it at as high numbers as possible, is not at all influenced by the argument here set forth. I have no apprehension of the kind alluded to. I must confess there appears to me throughout a tone of doubt, not to say of apprehension, for which I have discovered no sufficient cause, nor do I believe there exists any foundation for alarm.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely agree in this opinion.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

35. UPON every principle of military defence, as well as of sound policy, it is of the first importance to have a large, commanding, and disposable force, competently equipped for immediate field service, in a suitable position, to be equally available for prompt and active service in any direction, where either an external or internal enemy can appear, and to be able to detach instantly any commanding force necessary to quell insurrection, rebellion, mutiny, or conspiracy. A country is never so strong, or its inhabitants and contributors so cautious, as when it is a matter of notoriety that the State is prepared to act with vigour

It is also an influential argument in favour of increasing the European force at Bangalore, that it will at once stop the progress of those conspiracies which have been instigated by the disaffected inhabitants in Mysore; a point of much importance to the stability of that attachment we have so much right to appreciate in our Native troops, but which allegiance may become matter of anxiety to the State if the designs of the discontented to tamper with them are suffered to be so often repeated. The troops of the Mysore Rajah will, I calculate, soon become equal to secure the tranquillity of the north-west frontier of Mysore, and to effect the collection of the revenue, and then the necessity for a corps at the French Rocks, and a detachment of it at Mysore will become unnecessary; as the Commissioner progresses in the settlement of the country, then the whole force may be concentrated, and the corps at Shirkapore, Hurryhur, and French Rocks become unnecessary; and until these desirable objects are completed, those posts may be occupied by part of the Bangalore force a space of time which will be requisite to prepare quarters and accommodation for the augmented force; there is ample accommodation



*Sir Frederick Adam.*

No. 3. I doubt the present barracks being worth it. They are faulty in plan, and by no means fit for European troops. The additional barracks required ought to be on a better construction.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

New barracks ought to be constructed. It will form a separate proposition in conclusion.

Present Force.	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Dragoons (96 men dismounted) -	640
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
1 Troop Native Horse Artillery (4 guns) -	90
1 Company European Foot Artillery (8 guns)	97
1 Regiment European Infantry -	736
3 Regiments Native Infantry (4 is the complement)	2,040
	<b>4,047</b>

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

No. 4. The head quarters of the sappers and miners, and their school of practical instruction, should be at Bangalore.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I agree in this opinion.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

70, 71. I cordially concur in all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore. Its position, favoured as it is by a climate so salubrious, is a most happy coincidence, and ought to be turned to all the profit which such a fortunate combination admits of.

The camp of Bangalore ought to be the practical school of the Madras army.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely agree.

blage of men, for, besides water, forage and provisions being abundant, it is healthy and well adapted for Europeans, and for the exercise of large numbers of troops; and it will be found that at the distance of only 30 miles from this cantonment that, with this as a centre, and with a radius of 155 miles, if a circle be described, the country comprised within the circumference will equal in extent one-half the area of the Madras Presidency, will include Mysore, Ceded Districts, nearly the entire Carnatic, one-half of Malabar and Kanara, part of the country beyond our territory, and, consequently, all the discontented populations within the Madras Presidency (except the Northern Division), may be reached and overpowered by detachments from this force in from 7 to 20 days, according to the extent of the disturbances to be put down requiring larger or smaller bodies to be put in motion. The distance of this force from the subsidised troops with the Nizam will be found within 200 miles. The Northern Division has been hitherto looked to to reinforce the advanced troops, but from the peculiar formation of the country, and duties required from the

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

dition for all the artillery in the horse and foot artillery lines. The barrack for the European regiment, originally built for 1,000 men, may, at no very heavy expense, be increased to hold two regiments. The cavalry place of arms and lines may in like manner be increased, and all that will be required in addition as quarters are places of arms for six Native regiments and the detachment of sappers and miners."

36. Under these impressions, I beg to suggest that a concentrated disposable force be assembled at Bangalore, consisting, at least, of 10,000 rank and file, and be composed as follows:—

	Rank and File.
Dragoons - - - - -	500
Light Cavalry (2 regiments) - - -	888
Horse Artillery { 1 European troop - - -	102
{ 1 Native troop - - -	90
(6 guns each.)	
Foot Artillery, 2 companies (16 guns) - -	194
Sappers and Miners - - - - -	166
European Infantry (2 regiments) - - -	1,472
10 Regiments Native Infantry of the Line -	6,800
<b>Total Rank and File - - -</b>	<b>10,212</b>

Of this force the whole will be disposable for any temporary contingency, as the sick and convalescent and details of corps might garrison the fort and cantonment, but in case of any distant or protracted service, one wing of an European regiment and four battalions will be required for the duties of Mysore." Again—

70. The ceded districts, Mysore, and that part of Kanara bordering on the Southern Mahratta country, being the districts from whence discontent is likely to manifest itself, shows the necessity of having a larger body of troops assembled at some convenient situation; and for the military reasons assigned of masses of troops being collected, points out the necessity of some central situation being fixed on, from whence troops could be moved to the disturbed parts in the shortest possible time and by the shortest possible routes. Bangalore is a cantonment peculiarly well adapted for such an assem-

## PAPERS RELATING TO

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

troops, effectual reinforcements cannot be furnished by the Northern Division to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

71. The large force at Bangalore would in every way be well adapted for a reserve for the troops at Secunderabad; the distance is not too great, for re-inforcements could be united at Hyderabad in the course of 30 days, or light detachments even in a shorter period of time, but for a large force to be required to be put in motion, Mysore is, beyond measure, better adapted than the Northern Division for equipping with cattle and followers such a force."

CEDED DISTRICTS.

The next division I shall notice is the Ceded Districts, forming, before the cession, a part of Mysore, and intimately connected with it in every respect.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

37. The force of these Districts at present consists of—

1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
1 Company European Artillery - - -	97
1 Regiment European Infantry - - -	736
3 Regiments Native Infantry - - -	2,040
Total Rank and File - - -	3,317

These are distributed—

At Bellary—	
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
1 Company European Artillery - - -	97
1 European Regiment Infantry - - -	736
2 Regiments Native Infantry - - -	1,360
	2,637

At Cuddapah—

1 Regiment Native Infantry, 680 rank and file; and these two stations furnish detachments, periodically relieved as follows:

	Rank and File.
From Bellary to Gooty - - - - -	170
From Cuddapah to Cumbum - - - - -	84

Assuming that the Bangalore force will be augmented as I have recommended, I shall only propose—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Cavalry - - - - -	444
1 Company European Artillery - - - - -	97
1 Regiment European Infantry - - - - -	736
1 Regiment Native Infantry - - - - -	680
Total - - -	1,957

for the garrison of Bellary.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

I would withdraw the European regiment from Bellary (as well as the regiment Native infantry proposed) to add to the force at Bangalore; and this arrangement is more available as Hyderabad is to have a second European regiment attached to the subsidiary force.

The Ceded Districts ought no longer to be a division. The force at Bellary ought to be a detachment of the Mysore division, and the general officer now at Bellary would be more usefully employed in command of Hyderabad, with the Nagpore force under

38. The regiment light cavalry, the European company of artillery, and 300 rank and file of European infantry, may be considered a disposable force.

**CUDDAPAH.**

One regiment of Native infantry at Cuddapah, giving one company to occupy Gooty, and one for the duties at Cumbum, leaving six companies at head quarters at Cuddapah. This is as great a reduction of force in this district as can with safety be recommended, and is only offered or is justifiable by the supposed presence of the disposable

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

under his inspection; or, if Belgaum be substituted, then with that station as part of his inspection.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

disposable field force recommended to be maintained at Bangalore."

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely concur in this opinion; a separate resolution will be proposed upon it.

MALABAR AND CANARA.

These provinces are placed at the foot of the Mysore position, and, in a military point of view, are completely dependent upon it.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

22. The present strength of these provinces (exclusive of His Majesty's 48th Regiment, under orders for Europe) is as per margin, and distributed as follows:

	Rank and File.
1 Company of Golundause - - - -	100
1 Regiment European Infantry - - - -	736
3 Regiments Native Infantry - - - -	2,040
	<hr/> 2,876

At Head Quarters, Cannanore,—

3/4 Company Golundause - -	75
1 Regiment European Infantry	736
2 Regiments Native Infantry -	1,360

Total - - 2,171

Mangalore, one regiment of Native Infantry, 680.

24. These provinces comprehend a line of sea-coast of 282 miles in extent, from Sedasheghur, north, to Trichore, south, where they connect with Travancore, and are bounded to the east by the western range of ghauts.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

I presume [this alludes to the event at Sircie, which was a mere momentary ebullition, and of no consequence, connected, too, with the Nuggur revolt.

25. The northern part of the provinces of Malabar has of late been considerably agitated by internal commotion; but the collector has, I believe, reported the restoration of tranquillity, and the consequent inutilty of further military aid. During every part of the year that ships can come on the coast, the ghauts are open and practicable for the march of troops, and Bangalore is the point from whence any required reinforcements would be furnished; and as the march to Cannanore and Mangalore is nearly equidistant, the ghauts could be occupied by a light force from Bangalore in 14 days, and it could be on the coast in 21 days or thereabouts; sooner, if necessary. I do not, therefore, propose to increase the force in these provinces more than one battalion; and this is rendered necessary to give effect to the measure I propose of placing a battalion at Paulghaut to relieve the Travancore regiment of the Cochin and Trichore detachments, and to furnish those of South Malabar, as well as with a view to keep one battalion as complete as practicable in Canara in case of any sudden emergency.

The brigade which I propose to be stationed at Quilon will furnish the details for these places.

28. I am not persuaded of the military necessity of an European battalion at Cannanore, though, from its being a very healthy station, it may be advisable to have it there. Hereafter, should good barracks be erected at Bangalore for an additional European corps, the force in Cannanore ought to be removed thither; and as soon as the road through Coorg is rendered practicable down the Western ghauts, a small European

28. Cannanore is the head quarters of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, and I propose to station there, as at present,—

	Rank and File.
1 Company of Golundause -	100
1 Regiment European Infantry -	736
2 Regiments Native Infantry -	1,360

and

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

European detachment is all that can be required at Cannanore, if even that is necessary.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely agree.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

Mangalore ought to be the head quarters of a regiment of Native infantry, furnishing the two detachments, but on the smallest scale.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I quite agree.

The Centre Division, including Fort St. George, and comprising the whole of the Carnatic, holds the same relation to the commanding military position of Mysore as Malabar and Canara. As long as a powerful force is kept at Bangalore no domestic insurrection can prevail for any time; but not even an European enemy sea-borne, however strong, could maintain itself upon either coast; they could bring neither cavalry nor field artillery with them; and a commander of the least skill, without hazarding a battle, would, in a very short space of time, force the invader to return to his ships, even if he had the command of the seas.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

and that it shall furnish the following detachments: Tellicherry, one company, and, anticipating the probable reduction of the present Wynaad Rangers, 200 rank and file, I shall include in the detachments from Cannanore two companies at Manantoddy. This will leave 13 companies, or 1,105 rank and file of Native infantry, for the garrison and regimental duties of Cannanore, the head quarters of the provinces, and for all extra demands, occasional detachments, escorts, and contingencies.

29. Mangalore, one battalion of Native infantry, giving a detachment of two companies for the post of Honawar, from which a jemadar's party will be sufficient to occupy the post of Sedasheghur. This will relieve the regiment of the Mysore Division, now at Shirkapore, from furnishing 212 rank and file, or 2½ companies, to occupy the posts of Honawar and Sedasheghur.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

39. Centre Division, including Fort St. George.

The present strength of this division, including Fort St. George, consists of 10,359 rank and file, and is distributed as follows:—

	Rank and File.
<b>Fort St. George:</b>	
Body Guard - - - - -	102
(On the strength of regiments.)	
1 Company European foot artillery - - -	79
1 Regiment European infantry - - -	736
1 Regiment Native veterans - - -	1,080
2 Regiments Native infantry - - -	1,360
<b>Total - - -</b>	<b>3,357</b>
<b>Poonamalee:</b>	
½ Regiment European infantry disposable.	
<b>St. Thomas's Mount:</b>	
2 Troops European horse artillery - - -	204
2½ Companies European foot artillery - - -	242
2½ Companies Golundauze - - -	225
2 Dismounted troops of supernumerary Native horse artillery - - -	
<b>Palaveram:</b>	
3 Regiments Native infantry - - -	2,040
<b>Wallajahbad:</b>	
1 Regiment Native veterans - - -	1,080
<b>Vellore:</b>	
3 Regiments Native infantry - - -	2,040

44. *Fort St. George.*—No reduction of this force can be made. It is perhaps equal to the performance of the duties of the garrison,

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

44. Perhaps four battalions is not more than sufficient, as this must be looked upon as the source from whence any troops going seaward are to be drawn.

The detachments of the veteran battalion may be reduced, and the orderlies attached to the staff reduced in number, and in some instances, perhaps, done away.

The details furnished from Palaveram have in some degree been reduced, and may be still more so.

45. I am inclined to a different opinion, and believe considerable reductions may take place, and that two instead of three regiments will suffice.

46. Certainly.

500.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

risen, but not without considerable detriment to the discipline of the two Native corps so employed, and I am of opinion they should be annually relieved, or their strength augmented.

44. *Palaveram.*—The original intention of this cantonment was, corresponding with that at Barrackpore, to furnish by monthly reliefs the Native troops for the garrison of Fort St. George. It was intended to have four battalions at all times stationed there, and it may be considered the Presidency cantonment. In former times a force was generally maintained at Wallajahbad for the duties of the Centre Division, and to cover the capital in case of any sudden exigency arising.

At present there is only the head quarters of a veteran battalion with a few men at Wallajahbad, the whole corps being dispersed in detachments and small details through the Centre Division; and Palaveram has since its establishment in 1822 been considered the disposable force of the Centre Division, and the depôt for preparing troops for embarkation to the eastward, and for refitting the relieved regiments on their return. It is now reduced to three battalions, or 2,040 rank and file, although besides 271 rank and file for detached posts in the Centre Division, it gives 130 rank and file for monthly and weekly duties at Madras in excess of the garrison and town duties of that garrison.

45. *Vellore.*—This garrison has now three regiments of Native infantry. Its general duties require 314 rank and file for daily duty; and the regimental duties for three corps will take at least 120 rank and file. These numbers added to occasional detachments, sick, furlough, and wanting to complete, exclusive of 536 rank and file on detached periodical duties, will give a total of 500 rank and file on duty, &c.; and when it is considered that in this fortress the family of the late Tippoo Sultan and the Coorg Rajah are State prisoners, it will be manifest that the duties are as limited as safety and precaution will sanction; and that three regiments, or 2,040 rank and file, are not more than a competent garrison for a fortress containing such a charge.

46. Considering the great population of Madras, and the character of the inhabitants of Triplicane, Vellore, and Arcot, I cannot consider 6,000 rank and file of effective Native infantry too great a force of that arm to be maintained in this division; and I accordingly recommend that another regiment of Native infantry be added to the Palaveram brigade, and that all the periodical detachments of the Centre Division be furnished by annual relief from that cantonment, thus leaving Fort St. George and Vellore only liable to occasional calls for treasure and other escorts, and marching detachments.

47. *Arcot.*—Adverting to my proposal to increase the light cavalry at Bangalore to two regiments, I should recommend one only to be stationed at Arcot, where there is now two regiments allotted (the 2nd and 5th, the latter not yet relieved from Jaulnah).

48. Eight

48. By

## PAPERS RELATING TO

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

48. Eight regiments of Native infantry will suffice. I am more than doubtful of the value of the veteran battalion; and other arrangements of the artillery would be expedient.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I believe the veteran battalions to be utterly useless; they ought to be exclusively employed as guards to collectors' treasuries, and gaols, if they must be kept embodied.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

48. By this distribution, allowing for the increase proposed, the Centre Division would consist of—

	Rank and File.
Body guard (on the strength of regiments)	100
1 Regiment light cavalry	444
1 Troop European horse artillery (six guns)	102
1½ Companies European foot artillery (12 guns)	145
2½ Companies Golundauze	225
1 Regiment European infantry (the wing of the 41st at Poonamalee not included)	736
2 Regiments Native veterans	2,160
9 Regiments Native infantry	6,120
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10,082</b>

50. Of the force in this division—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment light cavalry	444
1 Troop European horse artillery	102
1 Company European foot artillery	97
2 Companies Golundauze	200
A wing European infantry	300
3 Regiments Native infantry	2,040
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,183</b>

may be considered a disposable force.

## SOUTHERN DIVISION AND TRAVANCORE.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

11. The present strength of this division consists of—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment light cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
Artillery	97
1 Regiment European infantry	736
6 Regiments Native infantry	4,080
4 Companies of sappers and miners	332
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,689</b>

and it is distributed by corps, as follows:—

At Head Quarters.	Rank and File.
<b>Trichinopoly:</b>	
1 Regiment light cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
¾ Company artillery (six guns)	72
1 Regiment European infantry	736
4 Regiments Native infantry	2,720
<b>Dindigul:</b>	
1 Regiment Native infantry	680
<b>Palamcottah:</b>	
¾ Company European foot artillery (two guns)	24
1 Regiment Native infantry	680

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

12. All these detachments to be done away with, and the only military guards to be over Hazoor treasuries and gaols.

I would add one regiment of native infantry to the disposable force, in addition to which one battalion, and in case of need, two, may be withdrawn from Quilon.

13. The detachment required for Dindigul to be furnished from head quarters (Trichinopoly), and the same as to that at Paulhautcherry, as also at Salem, which may be reduced to 100 men.

14. I propose the withdrawal of this force; that at Quilon, within 132 miles, is equally applicable for any purposes of internal tranquillity.

The detachment at Ramnad I consider unnecessary; that at Madura can be reduced to 50 men, and the one at Oodegherry will, if absolutely required, be furnished from Quilon.

With regard to the Southern Polygars, the most recent reports show that they are perfectly tranquil, and no symptoms of a contrary tendency exist.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

A particular report from the Collectors of these districts was called for when I was at Ootacamund, and nothing could be more satisfactory than their report, both as to their present state and any apprehension of future disturbance.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

The artillery to be removed to Quilon.

15. The severity of duty now existing can and ought to be diminished. In the first place, all the small detachments for civil purposes ought at once to be done away with, and it ought to be established as a general rule, that without a special sanction of Government, no detachment ought to be furnished for civil, ordinary, and permanent duties, except the guards strictly necessary for treasuries (Hazoor) and gaols; and the amount of them ought to be fixed in communication with, and under the control of, the general officer commanding the division, who will of course determine on their amount, after hearing the report of a competent staff officer sent to the spot, who, in conjunction with the civil officer, will fix it

500.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

12. Extracts:—There are some detachments furnished from the corps at division head quarters, amounting to 96 rank and file. These, added to general and regimental duties and occasional detachments, require 590 rank and file, and reduce the effective strength of the garrison to 2,120 rank and file.

13. Dindigul, 18th Regiment, Native Infantry.—This battalion furnishes 315 rank and file:

	Rank and File.
Salem - - - -	231
Paulhautcherry - - -	84
	<hr/>
	315

which leaves 265 rank and file for station and regimental duties, occasional escorts, for sick men on furlough, wanting to complete it, which is so considerably more than half its established strength on command, that it cannot relieve its outposts without distress and fatiguing duty at head-quarters.

14. Palamcottah, 1st Regiment Native Infantry.

This battalion has its head quarters at Palamcottah, and furnishes detachments amounting to 313 rank and file:—

Ramnad - - - -	83
Madura - - - -	154
Oodegherry, Travancore	76
	<hr/>
Total - - - -	313

Leaving 367 rank and file at regimental head quarters. Its detachments are so equally divided with its established strength, that it can just relieve the outposts periodically, provided there is no treasure escort or other call upon it at the time. But when the great population and wealth of Palamcottah is considered, and the characters of the Southern Polygars, subdued as they are, I cannot but offer my opinion that our southern possessions are thinly garrisoned, and with a very limited and inadequate disposable force, considering that the reduced strength of all the outposts and garrisons leaves nothing available for any sudden emergency.

½ Company artillery, with two guns, is also stationed at Palamcottah.

15. The severity of duty to which the native army of this Presidency has been exposed for a series of years past has been constantly represented by all its officers, and is not only detrimental to its discipline, but must more or less affect the good feeling and attachment of the troops. I am, therefore, anxious on this occasion to apply a fair remedy to an evil of so much consequence; and while I fully feel the necessity of economy, I trust that in the arrangements I shall recommend, it will not be found that I lose sight of that principle, while I provide against an evil that has run its course too long, and the consequences of which may give a pretext to the disaffected to make our native troops discontented; and it

M

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

the precise number of sentinels required for the public objects; and that no more be ever given can easily be controlled by the weekly report to be called for from the officer commanding the detachment. It is essential that all civil duties should be performed without the intervention of troops, and the officers in the civil departments must, from their peons, by a proper distribution of them, come to this. I hold this to be a principle not more essential to the good order of the troops than to the proper administration of the civil (revenue more especially) departments.

All the small detachments now furnished, and under non-commissioned officers, must be done away with, and the strength of the detachments at the following places may be greatly reduced: Salem, Coimbatore, Negapatam, Combaconum, Tanjore.

21. Paulghautcherry is no doubt a very important point, for the reasons stated; but it does not appear necessary to occupy it by anything more than a detachment furnished by the Southern Division, or the Malabar one, under present circumstances.

The detachments at Cochin, &c. ought to be furnished from the Quilon force.

I propose the force at Quilon to be composed of a brigade of three battalions, and two or four guns of field artillery. This I propose as a military disposition of the troops, instead of having any either at Palamcottah or Dindigul.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely concur in the expediency of this measure.

The troops will be quite as useful for the protection of the more southern parts of the Southern Division as if they were placed within the division itself; while the money expended within Travancore by the troops will greatly facilitate the realisation of the revenue required for the payment of the subsidy.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

it must be kept in mind that sound policy and justice require that so important a duty should never be out of mind in fixing the military force necessary for external and internal defence.

17. The present force is distributed at three stations—Trichinopoly, Dindigul, and Palamcottah; and independently of small details on detachments from them, there are no less than 12 companies on outpost duties; I therefore recommend that another battalion be added to the effective force at Trichinopoly.

18, 19, 20. Contain an alteration in the detailed distribution, but, as being mere details, do not require notice.

21. I have not included the station of Paulghautcherry in the Southern Division, as it appears more conveniently to belong to Malabar and Canara, both as regards the disposability of the force, supplies, and communication.

#### TRAVANCORE.

The subsidiary force was withdrawn in 1830.

10. "I would recommend that the battalion stationed at Quilon should be at all times kept complete, and that the necessary posts dependent upon it, Cochin and Trichore, be furnished by periodical reliefs annually from Canara."

#### THE NORTHERN DIVISION.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

Force:

	Rank and File.
1 Company European foot artillery	97
1 Company Golundanze	75
1 Company sappers and miners	83
1 Regiment European infantry	738
1 Battalion European veterans, 1 wing artillery.	
No fixed establishment	216
10 Regiments Native infantry	6,800
Total	8,007



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

91

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

The European regiment withdrawn, and none now in this division.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

Disposition, Masulipatam :

	Rank and File.
Masulipatam :	
1 Company European foot artillery - - -	97
1 Regiment European infantry - - -	736
2 Regiments Native infantry - - -	1,360
Ellore :	
1 Regiment Native infantry - - -	680
Samulcottah :	
1 Regiment Native infantry - - -	680
Vizianagram :	
2 Regiments Native infantry - - -	1,360
Vizagapatam :	
1 Regiment European veterans - - -	216
1 Regiment Native infantry - - -	680
Chicacole :	
½ Company Golundauze - - -	75
1 Regiment Native infantry - - -	680
Kienedey :	
1 Company sappers and miners - - -	83
1 Regiment Native infantry - - -	680
Berhampore :	
1 Regiment Native infantry - - -	680

Extract.

53. I conceive, after the approaching north-eastern monsoon, if affairs remain on their present footing, as I think there is reason to expect they will, two regiments of native infantry may be withdrawn, besides the European regiment (His Majesty's 62nd), which has already left Masulipatam.

Another distribution of the troops will be required, so as to concentrate larger numbers, and, above all, an additional force of sappers and miners, in order to complete the roads into Kienedey and the other districts, which have hitherto been considered impenetrable to troops. The improved communication into these districts will, of course, allow of a diminution of detachments, and by such an arrangement of the force as will render it applicable to several points, the aggregate may be diminished.

53. I consider that there is little probability of even prospective reduction, as long as the regiments of native infantry are maintained upon their present reduced establishment. Ten regiments, native infantry, will appear a large force; but it must be kept in mind that it only gives, when all are present and complete, 6,800 rank and file; and I should say, from the general history of the northern division, the character of the chiefs and hill tributaries, as well as of the surrounding district, that 7,000 rank and file of native infantry is the lowest establishment that will be found to give security to the country, divided, as the force is, and subdivided into many permanent detached posts and parties, requiring two regiments to give those details, exclusively of occasional escorts, which are numerous and frequent. I cannot, therefore, recommend any reduction of force in the northern division; but, on the contrary, were I not restrained by a knowledge of the economy now indispensably necessary, I would not hesitate to recommend 8,000 rank and file of native infantry for the duties of this division.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

73 to 75. I do not consider, under existing circumstances, that any augmentation of force, as suggested, is required. The actual force distributed in the most advantageous manner is equal to all present objects; for I repeat that a war involving chances of attack from sea, combined (as it probably would be) with assault on one or more of our land frontiers, is not the case under consideration.

73 to 75. Sir Robert O'Callaghan's Minute concludes with a "sketch of the disposition of the inhabitants," which presents a very unfavourable feature of the feelings of the Mussulman population in Mysore, the ceded districts, and the Carnatic. Sir Frederick Adam's observations upon this subject have my entire concurrence. Upon these data Sir Robert, in the course of his statement, has recommended that the troops now stationed within the Madras Presidency, amounting to 30,256 rank and file, should be increased to 37,932 rank and file; and he shows that the number thus recommended is in the proportion of one soldier to

*Lord William Bentinck.*

350 inhabitants in the most disaffected districts, and of one to 500 in Malabar and Canara, that is, among the Hindoo population. It is not said from whence this estimate of military force to the population is taken; but no calculation of this kind, formed upon numbers of the inhabitants, without reference to their courage, their means of resistance in mountain fastnesses and unhealthy jungles, or upon foreign aid, can be deserving of much consideration. Sir Frederick Adam's general observations contain his opinion of the most proper distribution of the force within the Presidency; and he takes the opportunity of considering the advantage of an exchange of stations between the Governments of Madras and Bombay, of Nagpore and Belgaum. It will be more convenient for the reader that my opinions on Sir Frederick's propositions should be given in the order he has placed them, and on the same sheet. This discussion leads us out of the Madras Presidency, and to that central tract of the peninsula which lies between the Madras limits on the Kistna and those of Bengal on the Nerbudda. It is filled by the territories of the Nizam and the Rajah of Nagpore, the two capitals of whose states are the principal stations, and form the connecting links of the great line of defence of our Indian Empire. It includes also the principal part of the Bombay Presidency.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

General Observation.

1. The increase of the force at Hydrabad makes it a fit command for a general officer, and I think it would be highly advantageous to place one there, giving him a supervising authority over the contingent at Nagpore; I mean to the extent of making inspections and reports on the discipline, &c., but no direct military command.

2. The general officer at Hydrabad would be found in the reduction of the ceded districts as a military division, adding the ceded districts to the Mysore Division, and making Bellary a brigadier's command, under Bangalore. I am satisfied that this is an arrangement fraught with advantage. The Hydrabad force is one which requires a general officer, and the supervision of a general officer is essential to the well-being of the other great detached force.

3. In considering the distribution of the army of Fort St. George, it is impossible not to be struck with the advantage, as to mere distribution, whether military or economical, which the occupation of Belgaum instead of Nagpore would offer; and I should propose that arrangement. I am aware, however, that a great feeling exists in the Madras army with regard to the occupation of Nagpore. It is considered as a sort of point of honour, and its abandonment to occupy Belgaum, though the latter is a very favourite station too, would be looked upon by the officers of the Madras army, as I am led to understand, as a sort of degradation. It would be tantamount, in their minds, to a declaration that the Madras army was no longer a field army.

4. Besides these considerations, there are others which cannot be without weight. Nagpore is a full-batta station. Belgaum is not, and, I believe, has never been. No doubt this is an element that enters largely into the estimate of those concerned.

5. It may be worth while under this view to consider whether the time is yet come for proposing such a measure, for of its

1 and 2. There can be no doubt of the necessity of placing the forces at Hydrabad and Nagpore under the superintendence of a general officer, which, by the abolition of the Bellary Division, can be provided without any additional charge. The same opinion was strongly expressed by Major General Sleigh, in his Inspection Report upon the cavalry in Madras and Bombay, at these and the dependent stations.

3. Hydrabad is to the northern circars and to the southern Mahratta country, that is, to Belgaum, what Bangalore is to Malabar, and Canara, and the Carnatic. A disposable force, from 5,000 to 10,000, could at any moment march from Hydrabad to one or the other, if occasion required. The value of great bodies of reserves centrally placed, so as to support every part of its own circle, and to move up, in order to strengthen any part of the main line that may be attacked, or where danger threatens, seems never to be considered in the general distribution. Each division, like each Presidency, is to have its separate corps or army, of sufficient force to make it independent of all its neighbours; but the useless waste of men and money that is thus caused is sufficiently obvious.

4. Sir Frederick may be assured that he has hit the right nail upon the head, and that the full batta, together with a fear of reduction of regiments, and the consequent progress of absorption, is the whole and sole element of this estimate.

5. The system of self-delusion, if it were instead of the more reasonable apprehension adverted to in the last paragraph, would be

as

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

its advantages I apprehend there can be no doubt; and as little doubt can there be that, unless there shall be hostile attempts from sea, the Madras army cannot be considered as in the first line; it is ludicrous to go on in a system of self-delusion upon this subject in opposition to the nature of things, and the force of circumstances beyond our control. Madras has no frontier, and its army, therefore, cannot under ordinary circumstances be an advanced force. It does not follow from thence that it is to dwindle into a mere militia; on the contrary it is and ought to be considered as the great reserve of the army of India. Its geographical situation precludes it from being a field army under any probable combination, but its strength, its efficiency, and its organization render it more valuable as a reserve.

It may be worthy of consideration whether these considerations of mere personal advantage and feeling are or are not of sufficient weight to overbalance the benefits to be derived from a more compact and economical distribution of the army.

The following distribution is that which I would propose:—

	Dragoons.	Native Cavalry.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.
Travancore - - -	-	-	-	3
Trichinopoly - - -	-	1	1	5
Malabar and Cannanore - - -	-	-	1	3
Coorg - - -	-	-	-	1
Mysore - - -	1	2	2	9
Bellary - - -	-	1	-	1
Cuddapah - - -	-	-	-	1
Centre Division - - -	-	1	1	8
Northern Division - - -	-	-	-	8
Hydrabad - - -	-	2	2	7
Nagpore - - -	-	1	1	4
Malacca and Penang - - -	-	-	-	2
Moulmeyn - - -	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>52</b>

\* The European regiment to be transferred to Bangalore eventually.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

as Sir Frederick observes, truly judicious, and ought not to have any consideration when opposed, as it is, to the advantage of the public service, and to the inconvenience of all the individuals concerned. The distance of Nagpore from the head-quarters of the Madras army, and its detached position, put it quite out of sight of the general controlling authority; whereas from Bombay it is little more than half the distance, and from Poona about 355 miles; and with regard to individuals, both European and native, if the same advantage of batta were presented at half the distance, the choice would not be for a moment matter of hesitation. It is the fear of losing it altogether that alarms. The desirable object is to place all the armies upon an equal footing in every particular. This effected, there will no longer be any obstacle to the most economical and compact distribution. On one point only am I disposed not entirely to concur with Sir Frederick, and that is in designating the Madras troops as the *grand reserve* of the army of India. The Madras troops, supposing that danger can only approach from the north, can only come in the third line. The second line must be occupied by the Bombay army, for which they are very much more fitted by the superiority of the materials of which they are composed. The Madras troops, from their inferiority of strength and stature, are utterly incapable of coping with an European enemy. But in the event of such attack, their duty will be sufficiently arduous and honourable in maintaining order and tranquillity, and filling up the void that would be occasioned by the advance of the Bombay army.

I will proceed with the distribution of the Bombay and Bengal armies.

**BOMBAY ARMY.**

I HAVE little to remark upon the distribution of the troops in this Presidency, which will be found in the Adjutant General's memorandum marked No. 6,\* and forming an enclosure in the letter of the Secretary to Government, under date the 11th September 1832. The same system of dispersion seems to prevail, but not having the same knowledge of the territories of Bombay as of Bengal and Madras, I am unable to speak with any certainty upon the existing arrangement, which, though decidedly defective in principle, may still be rendered necessary by local circumstances. My doubts are perhaps strengthened by the fact, so often appearing upon our records, of the urgent call of civil and political authorities for an increase of military force—calls that have been almost uniformly rejected, and proved by subsequent experience to have been unfounded.

\* See also Abstract marked "Bombay Distribution," in Appendix.

I beg at the same time to call the attention of Council to the opinion contained in the last paragraph of the Adjutant General's letter, which the Commander in Chief, Sir Colin Halkett, considers "in every respect worthy of consideration."

"I trust I may be permitted to say a few words upon the subject comprised in the 2nd paragraph of the minute before referred to, particularly as the con-

cluding part of it relates to the efficiency and better discipline of the army—matters which directly concern the details of the department under my control.

On entering upon this subject, I beg to be understood to do so with great diffidence, aware as I am that the question, as a compound one, involves considerations of no less importance to the statesman and politician than it does to the soldier, anxious to promote the efficiency of the professional body to which he belongs; but that the advantages of better discipline, and greater efficiency, would be most effectually attained by the concentration of the troops in a central or other commanding position within such division, it is presumed, will not be disputed; the high state of efficiency and correct military feeling and habits which are only to be acquired by officers of subordinate rank in large cantonments, where opportunities are afforded them of mixing, not unfrequently, with the higher description of military characters, can never exist in an army broken up into small brigades, and still smaller stations, commands, and detachments. If therefore the important object of security was not to be endangered by an abandonment of the existing system which causes so great a distribution of the army, the proposition embraced in this paragraph appears to me to be well worthy of the most serious attention, as one affecting important military interests."

It would be desirable that the Governor in Council at Bombay should be requested to obtain from the Commander in Chief a statement of that distribution, keeping always in view the indispensable demand of the Civil Department, which would best promote the objects of military discipline and efficiency, and it would be satisfactory to request at the same time the sentiments of the Governor in Council, upon a measure which in that stage of it may be considered to have reference more to military than political considerations. I would also propose that a copy of this minute should be sent to all the Presidencies, that, as far as practicable, the principles approved by the Council of India may have general application.

	<i>Miles.</i>	
Nagpore to Madras	- 722	
Nagpore to Bombay	- 535	
Nagpore to Bangalore	- 670	
Nagpore to Poona	- 440	
I consider Bangalore and Poona as the proper head quarters of their respective armies.		
	<i>Miles.</i>	
Belgaum to Poona	- 230	
Belgaum to Hydrabad	- 350	
	<i>Rank and File.</i>	
Subsidiary Force	- 6,629	
Nizam's Contingent	- 8,880	
	- 15,109	

To which another European corps is about to be added.

I advocate in the strongest manner the occupation of Nagpore by the Bombay troops. The table in the margin will show how much more conveniently reliefs could be afforded and control exercised by the latter. With respect to Belgaum there is some small difference of distance in favour of the retention of that station by Bombay, but Hydrabad, having been lately reinforced by the Jaulnah force, has in its immediate neighbourhood a larger collection of British troops than any other station in India, amounting to near two-thirds of the whole Bombay army, and I therefore consider Hydrabad as the parent military station of the Southern Mahratta country. It will be easy to adjust an equal distribution of full batta advantages without the necessity for sacrificing a plan of the greatest public convenience for personal considerations.

Nagpore is an important point as connecting Southern India with Hindoostan, but its character is more that of a fortress than of a *corps d'armée*, because it has no frontier to defend. The population of the Nagpore state being almost entirely Hindoo, and the most orderly in India, requires no guard for its own tranquillity, and all our provinces to the east, the northern part of the Circars, Cuttack and Ramghur territories intervening between Bundelcund and Bancoorah and Midnapore, are so separated by hills and unhealthy jungles, as to cut off all communication and assistance in case of necessity from the Nagpore force.

Nagpore, however, is a very useful *point d'appui* to three different lines of military occupation in the Bengal Presidency.

1st. From Midnapore, through the Saugor and Jubbulpore division to the Nerbudda.

2nd. From Agra by Gwalior and Bhopal to the Nerbudda.

3rd. The more advanced lines of Nusseerabad, Neemuch and Mhow.

The distances are in the margin.

In war, there ought not to be less than 10,000 men at Nagpore. In peace, it is not necessary to add to it, because no demand for aid is likely to be made upon it, and, if it were, the Poona reserve could march up to supply its place if necessary.

I have now to cross the Nerbudda, and to enter the provinces subject to the Bengal Presidency. But before entering upon the Bengal distribution, I must notice the Bombay station of Deesa, which I would strongly recommend to be transferred to Bengal. It is beyond the frontier, inaccessible from Bombay for several

several months of the year, from the inundated state of the intervening districts in the direct line, as well as from the unhealthy jungles by the most circuitous route. The natural support to Deesa is the force in Rajpootana and Malwa. Deesa is a very important point, and ought in the next cold season to be augmented by two battalions of native infantry, making a total of one European regiment, and three regiments of native infantry. The presence of an imposing force at this point will awe the Ameers of Scinde, and will tend more than anything else to secure the tranquil navigation of the Indus. I do not comprehend upon what principle an European regiment could be detached at this distance with only one native infantry corps in its company, the greater part of which, in the case of marching and service, must be left behind, either for the care of the cantonment, or detached for the protection on the march of stores, baggage, sick, &c. Besides, European regiments should only be employed as the support of Native troops, and there should be never less than three or four of the latter to one of the former. Another strong reason for having Bengal troops at Deesa is the much greater expense of all the establishments of the Bombay army, which, in the late preparations against Joudpore, precluded the employment of the Deesa force, though so conveniently posted for the purpose.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

THE accompanying statement of the Quartermaster General shows the strength and disposition of the Bengal army in January 1834 and February 1835. It will be observed that some detached stations have been abolished, which has admitted the concentration of all the troops in Oude, and the collecting an efficient force at Agra, the most prominent military station on our frontier. An abstract of the present distribution is inserted in the margin.

To this document is annexed a memorandum from the same officer, and approved by the Adjutant General, proposing the extension of the same principle of concentration to other divisions of the army.

The most important of these, and one which I have long had in contemplation, is the collection of the troops at the three stations of Mhow, Neemuch and Nusseerabad in one central position; that the force so assembled should consist of a regiment of European infantry, one of European cavalry, and so many men of other arms as to give a total force of 10,000 rank and file. The disadvantages of these detached stations is obvious. When the troops are ordered on service, each cantonment, so far removed as they are from all support, and situated in a country so liable to be overrun by plunderers of all descriptions, would require for its protection nearly as large a force as the whole united. Discipline would be better enforced, the effect more imposing, and the charge of so many multiplied establishments saved. It struck me that Neemuch would give that more central position, that the agencies of Rajpootana and Malwa might be vested in one officer, and that his residence might be fixed at Neemuch. But upon talking with the heads of the staff, and with others acquainted with these parts, it would appear that both forage and water would be wanting for a force of this magnitude, and that a desirable site could only be found on the banks of the Bunass river. I shall have an estimate made out of the expense and saving of this plan, which I would recommend should be transmitted for the sanction of the Court of Directors, and in the meantime it would be right that the country should be surveyed, and a committee of officers, consisting of an officer of the Quartermaster General's Department, an engineer officer of experience and some other officer, should be deputed to examine the different sites, and to report upon their different degrees of eligibility.

The memorandum of the Quartermaster General recommends other arrangements, which will be found in the margin numbered by the paragraphs in his own letter, with my opinion upon them on the opposite side.

Paragraph 9. Recommends the withdrawal of the regiment of native infantry at Mirzapore to Benares.

9. Entirely approved.

10 and 11. Proposals for concentrating the force in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories.

10 and 11. Approved.

12. Recommends

12. I concur

ABSTRACT Distribution of the Bengal Army in February 1835.

Disposition.	Rank and File.	Number of Guns.
Presidency Division	17,308	36
Dinapore "	4,439	10
Benares "	4,676	8
Allahabad Fortress -	1,472	-
Cawnpore Division -	11,798	28
Meerut "	16,551	52
Sirhind "	6,838	18
Saugor "	5,455	12
Rajpootana Force -	3,940	6
Meywar "	3,973	12
Malwa "	3,426	12
	79,876	194

N.B.—One regiment of European infantry, of 736 rank and file, has been added to the establishment within the past year from Madras.

12. Recommends the abandonment of Hansi, which has proved extremely unhealthy.

13. States the advantages of Loodiana as a position for a larger force, from the abundance and cheapness of provisions and forage.

14. Recommends the continuance of the corps at Alygurh.

15. Thinks the regiment at Gorruckpore should be continued.

12. I concur in this proposition, as well as in the opinion that Skinner's Horse is the best description of guard for these outposts. The regiment of Native infantry should be removed to Delhi.

13. It was, I think, an error placing so small a force in so advanced a position. It may be a question whether the great body stationed at Kurnaul would not have been better in a more advanced position in the Sikh-protected states, equidistant from the Sutlej and the Jumna, having outposts of cavalry at Loodiana and Ferozepoor. But the expense of buildings being now incurred, there is not sufficient reason to make any change in the present arrangements.

14. I dissent from this opinion. There is not the least necessity for the presence of a regiment.

15. Considering the contiguity of the often disturbed districts of Oude rather than of those of Nepaul, from which we have never any annoyance, I think this regiment should remain.

The regiment at Berhampore has been ordered to Chinsurah.

It is proposed also to relieve the Madras troops at Moulmein by a Bengal corps.

The question of substituting Bengal for Madras corps to the eastward will be separately considered.

Having confined myself, in other papers relating to the army already recorded, to the improvement of things as they are, and in this paper to the distribution of the actual force under the existing condition of general tranquillity, and not of an army differently constituted, or upon an hypothesis of any specific internal danger or foreign attack, I shall here close my remarks.

In another Minute upon the composition of the army I shall assume a greater license, and shall describe my opinion of the dangers to be apprehended, the inadequacy of our present means to meet them, and that alteration of our establishments which will best secure the stability of our empire under all circumstances of domestic insurrection and of foreign invasion.

Calcutta, 28 February 1835.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

APPENDIX.

ABSTRACT, BOMBAY DISTRIBUTION.

PRESIDENCY GARRISON.

FORCE.	Rank and File.
Head Quarters Battery :	
Foot artillery (European, 189; Native, 137) - - - - -	326
1 Regiment, European infantry - - - - -	693
2 Regiments, Native infantry - - - - -	1,362
1 Marine battalion - - - - -	648
TOTAL - - -	3,029

Detachments 3, and marines for the Navy, amounting to 377 rank and file, furnished by Marine battalion.

SOUTHERN DIVISION.

FORCE.	Rank and File.
1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 99; Native, 23) - * - - -	122
1 Company, foot artillery (European, 75; Native 55) - - - - -	130
Detachment, engineer corps - - - - -	50
1 Regiment, Native cavalry - - - - -	464
1 Regiment, European infantry - - - - -	728
6 Regiments, Native infantry - - - - -	4,139
1 Company, European veterans - - - - -	23
1 Batalion, Native veterans - - - - -	709
TOTAL - - -	6,365

Disposition.

Belgaum Division, Head Quarters :	
1 Company, foot artillery (European, 75; Native, 55) - - - - -	130
Detachment, engineer corps - - - - -	50
1 Regiment, European infantry - - - - -	728
2 Regiments, Native infantry - - - - -	1,310
	2,218
Dharwar :	
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	720
Kulludghee :	
1 Troop, Native cavalry - - - - -	58
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	731
	789
Sholapore :	
1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 99; native, 23) - - - - -	122
1 Regiment, Native cavalry - - - - -	*406
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	661
	1,189
Dapoolie :	
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	736
1 Battalion, Native veterans - - - - -	709
	1,445
Severndroog :	
1 Company, European veterans - - - - -	—

\* Less the troop at Kulludghee.

Detachments in this Division:—1 cavalry, 15 Native infantry: amounting to 798 rank and file, Native infantry; 20 Native Veteran Battalions.

## POONA DIVISION.

FORCE.		Rank and File.
2 Troops, horse artillery (Europeans, 195; Native, 46)	- - - -	241
1 Battalion, foot artillery (European, 531; Native, 252)	- - - -	783
Head-quarters battalion, Golundauze	- - - -	504
1 Regiment, dragoons and engineer corps	- - - -	453
2 Regiments, European infantry	- - - -	630
6 Regiments, Native infantry	- - - -	1,302
		4,036
TOTAL		7,949
I		
Poona, Division Head Quarters Disposition.		
2 Troops, horse artillery (European	rs :	
Detachment, engineer corps	, 195; Native, 46)	241
2 Regiments, European infantry	- - - -	64
2 Regiments, Native infantry	- - - -	1,302
		1,350
		2,957
Kirkee:		
1 Regiment, dragoons	- - - -	630
Seroor :		
Head quarters, engineer corps	- - - -	290
Head quarters, Poona horse	- - - -	155
		445
Ahmednuggur :		
1 Battalion, foot artillery (Europe	an, 531; Native, 252)	783
Head quarters, ditto, Golundauze	- - - -	443
Detachment, engineer corps	- - - -	51
1 Regiment, Native infantry	- - - -	683
		1,960
Malligaum:		
2 Regiments, Native infantry	- - - -	1,354
Bhewndy :		
1 Regiment, Native infantry	- - - -	649

Detachments in this division:—Engineer corps, 4; Golundauze, 1; Native infantry, 16: amounting to 634 rank and file, Native infantry.

## NORTHERN DIVISION.

FORCE.		Rank and File.
1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 97; Native, 14)	- - - -	121
1 Company, foot artillery (European, 75; Native, 81)	- - - -	154
Detachments Golundauze	- - - -	346
Detachments engineer corps	- - - -	13
2 Regiments, Native cavalry	- - - -	900
1 Regiment, European infantry	- - - -	728
10 Regiments, Native infantry	- - - -	7,041
Guzerat Provincial Battalion	- - - -	480
TOTAL		9,783
Disposition :		
Ahmedabad, Division Head Quarters:		
Detachment, engineer corps	- - - -	13
2 Regiments, Native infantry	- - - -	1,394
		1,407



Northern Division—*continued.*

FORCE.	Rank and File.
<b>Hursole :</b>	
1 Wing, Native cavalry - - - - -	212
Detachment Golundauze - - - - -	95
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	704
	1,011
<b>Kaira :</b>	
Guzerat Provincial Battalion - - - - -	480
<b>Surat :</b>	
Detachment Golundauze - - - - -	63
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	770
	833
<b>Baroda :</b>	
Detachment Golundauze - - - - -	122
3 Regiments, Native infantry - - - - -	2,052
	2,174
<b>Rajkote :</b>	
1 Wing, Native cavalry - - - - -	252
Detachment Golundauze - - - - -	56
Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	856
	1,169
<b>Bhooj :</b>	
1 Company, foot artillery (European, 73; Native, 81) - - - - -	154
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	680
	834
<b>Deesa :</b>	
1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 97; Native, 24) - - - - -	121
1 Regiment, Native cavalry - - - - -	464
1 Regiment, European infantry - - - - -	728
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	619
	1,932

Detachments in this division :— Engineer corps, 1; Golundauze, 3; Native cavalry, 1; Native infantry, 15: amounting to 977 rank and file of the line. Guzerat battalion, 9.

SATTARA SUBSIDIARY.

FORCE.	Rank and File.
Detachment Golundauze - - - - -	42
1 Regiment, Native infantry - - - - -	661
<b>TOTAL</b> - - -	703

Detachments from this force, 2: amounting to 141 rank and file.

ASSEERGHUR FORTRESS.

1 Regiment, Native infantry, 680.

Detachment from this corps, 1, of 20 rank and file.

N.B.—The strength of the several corps is taken as they stood on 1st February 1834, when some were under, but most of the Native infantry regiments above, their establishment.

MINUTE of the Commander in Chief.

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I now, in obedience to the desire of Government expressed in Mr. Secretary Clerke's letter of the 10th August 1832, proceed to offer my sentiments on the Right Honourable the Governor General's Minute of the 29th June 1831.

REMARKS by the Right Honourable Sir  
*Frederick Adam*, on the present Minute  
of the Commander in Chief.

2. The present amount of the several branches of the Madras Army, and their numerical strength in rank and file, is detailed in Appendix No. 1, and the distribution of that force as per last Return made up to 30th June 1834, is exhibited in Nos. 2 and 3, showing the distribution of the horse and foot artillery by troops and companies, with cattle attached.

3. No 4, the amount in rank and file of cavalry, European and Native infantry and artillery, employed beyond the limits of this Presidency, but in which I have not included either the troops in Mysore or Travancore, regarding them as being by treaty in all material points disposable.

4. The subsidiary forces of Hyderabad and Nagpore do not come under the review which the Governor General has called for, but it is very material that an allotment of battering guns and heavy field artillery, and small arms, as well as guns in position for Seetabuldee, should be fixed for those forces, in order to determine the supplies and allotments of stores, and to effect a well regulated economy in the Ordnance Department without infringing an efficiency. The question is one so exclusively dependent on the Subsidiary Treaties, and the policy of the Supreme Government of India, that by its authority alone, I imagine, such points can be determined.

5. The amount of the forces furnished from this Presidency to the Tenasserim Coast, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, is also beyond the limit to which my attention is drawn, but I trust I shall not fall into error by stating that the duties required of them are beyond the usual routine, and, consequently, affect their discipline, and infringe on the usual repose and comfort of soldiers in time of peace. They are as follows :

ON TENASSERIM COAST.

One wing returned to the Coast.  
Furnishing detachments to the Mergui Tavvy and Amherst Town.

	Rank and File.
One Regiment of European Infantry	- 736
One Company of European Artillery	- 97
One Regiment of Native Infantry	- 680
	In

Treat Moulmein as no longer ours.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

In the STRAITS.

One half Company of European Artillery	50	Divided at Penang, Singapore, Malacca, and giving detachments in the interior of the Malacca territory, and for province Wellesley.
One Company of Golundauze	100	
Two Regiments of Native Infantry	1,360	

6. By a Resolution of Council, dated 27th September 1833, this Government, with the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, authorised 80 additional privates to be supplied annually for each of the regiments serving at Penang, Malacca, and Singapore; these for the first year have been completed, and I should recommend the same additional strength to the corps at Moulmein. Even these supernumeraries will not keep the corps serving to the eastward more than complete in effective men, equal to their establishment of 680 rank and file.

Addition, 80 recruits per regiment, annually.

7. I shall now proceed to state my opinion of the amount of force necessary for the duties, defence, and disposable force of this army within frontier, and shall commence with the southern portion of the territory dependent on Fort St. George.

TRAVANCORE.

8. Reduce Trichoor and the detachments at Trivandrum.

8. Travancore is occupied by one battalion of Native infantry of 680 rank and file, disposed of as per margin.

	Rank and File.
Cochin - - -	128
Trichore - - -	85
Resident's escort - -	46
Protecting public buildings at Trivandrum and Augengo - - -	23
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>282</b>

9. Our political relations with the Ranees are generally believed to be on an amicable footing, and certainly no symptom of turbulence or discontent affecting the amount of force necessary to maintain our interests in that quarter has been manifested since the subsidiary force was reduced in 1830 to one battalion, but still it is not improbable that it may, and in the event of even the most partial agitation, whether in the character of political conspiracy, party intrigue, or the momentary discontent of a mob, the single battalion reduced, as it must be under present circumstances, by detachments, has no disposable force at its head quarters; 398 rank and file for general and regimental guards, and all occasional demands at regimental head quarters, to render any effectual assistance to the Resident's authority, or to maintain itself in security in its position at Quilon.

10. I propose the force at Quilon to be composed of a brigade of three battalions and two or four guns of field artillery. This I propose as a military disposition of the troops, instead of having any either at Palamcottah or Dindigul.

10. I would therefore recommend that the battalion stationed at Quilon should be at all times kept complete, and that the necessary posts dependent upon it, Cochin and Trichore, be furnished

nished by periodical reliefs annually from Canara.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

### SOUTHERN DIVISION.

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
Artillery	97
1 European Infantry	736
6 Regiments N. I.	4,080
4 Companies of Sappers	332
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,689</b>

11. The present strength of this division consists as per margin, and it is distributed by corps as follows:—

#### At HEAD QUARTERS.

	Rank and File.
Trichinopoly:	
1st Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted.)	444
½ Company Artillery (6 guns.)	72
1 Regiment European Infantry	736
4 Regiments Native Infantry	2,720
Dindigul:	
1 Regiment Native Infantry	630
Palamecottah:	
½ Company European Foot Artillery (2 guns.)	24
1 Regiment Native Infantry	680

	Rank and File.
Truvaloor Talook	
Cutcherry	10
Kevaloor Cutcherry	10
Munagoody do.	13
Puttecottah do.	13
Seeroovady do.	10
Nunelam do.	10
Vellungaum do.	10
Nordasarall Salt	
Cutcherry	7
Singaputty Cutcherry	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96</b>

12. The detachment of Native Infantry detailed in the margin are furnished by periodical reliefs from the corps at division head quarters, Trichinopoly, and amount by last Returns (June 1834) to 96 rank and file; added to this, the general duties of the station, and regimental guards, amount, the former to not less than 200 rank and file, and the latter 200; making a total of men on command and on general duty (exclusive of sick, absent on furlough, and wanting to complete with occasional detachments) of 490; but these occasional calls may be estimated at an average of 100 rank and file, which deducts from the effective strength 590 rank and file on the lowest average, and reduces the effective strength of the garrison in Native infantry to 2,120 rank and file as a disposable force, available for all contingencies south of the Penar, and westward to the Ghauts. This force cannot in my opinion, with safety, bear any considerable reduction to its Native infantry, although it may as at present constituted, spare one battalion of 680 rank and file occasionally for any emergent service. The disposable force of this division may thus be estimated as per margin,\* for service beyond its limits.

12. All those detachments to be done away, and the only military guards to be over Hoזור Treasuries and gaols.

There is also detached from a garrison 14 rank and file of Light Cavalry, as an escort to the Resident at Travancore; if it could be dispensed with, it is desirable, as the wear and tear of horses and appointments on such duties is considerable.

	Rank and File.
*1 Regiment Light Cavalry	444
½ Company Artillery (4 guns)	48
1 European Regt.	736
1 Regiment N. I.	680
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,908</b>

#### DINDIGUL 18th Regiment, N. I.

	Rank and File.
Salem	231
Paulghautcherry	84
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>315</b>

13. This battalion furnishes, as per margin,† 315 rank and file, which leaves 265 rank and file for station and regimental duties, occasional escorts, for sick, men on furlough, wanting to complete, &c., which is so considerably more than half its established strength on

I would add one regiment of Native infantry to the disposable; making a total of 2,588 for any emergency, while in addition to which, one battalion, and in case of need two, may be withdrawn from Quilon.

13. The detachment required for Dindigul to be furnished from head quarters (Trichinopoly), and the same as to that at Paulgautcherry as also at Salem, which may be reduced to 100 men.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

on command, that it cannot relieve its out-posts without distress, and fatiguing duty at head quarters

PALAMCOTTAH 1st Regiment, N. I.

14. I propose the withdrawal of this force; that at Quilon within 132 miles is equally applicable for any purposes of internal tranquillity.

The detachment at Ramnad I consider unnecessary; that at Madura can be reduced to 50 men, and the one at Oodegherry will, if absolutely required, be furnished from Quilon.

With regard to the Southern Polygars, the most recent reports show that they are perfectly tranquil, and no symptoms of a contrary tendency exist.

The Artillery to be removed to Quilon.

15. The severity of duty now existing can and ought to be diminished. In the first place all the small detachments for civil purposes ought to be at once done away with, and it ought to be established as a general rule, that without a special sanction of Government no detachment ought to be furnished for civil ordinary and permanent duties, except the Guards, strictly necessary for the treasuries (hozoor) and gaols, and the amount of them ought to be fixed in communication and under the control of the General officer commanding the division, who will of course determine on their amount after having the report of a competent staff officer sent to the spot, who, in conjunction with the civil officer, will fix the precise number of sentinels required for the public objects, and that no more be ever given; can easily be controlled, by the weekly report to be called for from the officer in command of the detachment. It is essential that all civil duties should be performed without the intervention of troops, and the officers in the Civil Departments must, from their peons, by a proper distribution of them, come to this. I hold this to be a principle not more essential to the good order of the troops, than to the proper administration of the Civil (Revenue more especially) Departments.

14. This battalion has its head quarters at Palamcottah, and furnishes the detachments noted in the margin, amounting to 313 rank and file, leaving 367 rank and file at regimental head quarters; its detachments are so equally divided with its established strength, that it can just relieve the out-posts periodically, provided there is no treasure escort or other call upon it at the time, but when the great population and wealth of Palamcottah is considered, and the character of the southern Polygars, subdued as they are, I cannot but offer my opinion that our southern possessions are thinly garrisoned, and with a very limited and inadequate disposable force, considering that the very reduced strength of all the out-posts and garrisons leaves nothing available for any sudden emergency.

One-fourth company of Artillery with two guns, is also stationed at Palamcottah.

15. The severity of duty to which the Native army of this Presidency has been exposed for a series of years past, has been constantly represented by all its officers, and is not only detrimental to its discipline, but must more or less affect the good feeling and attachment of the troops. I am, therefore, anxious on this occasion, to apply a fair remedy to an evil of so much consequence; and while I fully feel the necessity of economy, I trust that in the arrangements I shall recommend, it will not be found that I lose sight of that principle, while I provide against an evil that has run its course too long, and the consequences of which may give a pretext to the disaffected to make our Native troops discontented; and it must be kept in mind, that sound policy and justice require, that so important a duty should never be out of mind in fixing the military force necessary for external and internal defence.

16. I have shewn in the above statements the present strength and distribution of the southern division of the army, and I now proceed to express my opinion of the amount of force required for its security, and the distribution I would recommend.

	Rank and File.
Ramnad - - -	83
Madura - - -	154
Oodegherry in Travancore - - -	76
TOTAL - - -	313

‡ Company Artillery, 24 (2 guns).

17. The present force is distributed at three stations, Trichinopoly, Dindigul, and Palamcottah, and independently of small details on detachment from them, there are no less than 12 complete companies on out-post duties; I therefore would recommend that another battalion be added to the effective force at Trichinopoly, in order to reduce the detachments from Palamcottah and Dindigul, and to furnish by annual reliefs the out posts, which consist of one or more companies. This will affect some economy in the expense of reliefs, which are now made every six months, and the smaller detachments, consisting of less than a company and without an European officer, may be conducted as at present, every six months. By this arrangement, the force in the southern division would consist of

	Rank and File.		Rank and File.
		1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
Truvaloor Talook		1 Company Artillery - - -	97
Cutcherry - -	10	1 European Regiment - - -	736
Kevaloor Cutcherry	10	7 Regiments Native Infantry - - -	4,760
Munagoody do. -	13		
Putticottah do. -	13	TOTAL - - -	6,037
Seerovady do. -	10		
Nunelam do. -	10		
Vellungaum do. -	10		
Nordasarall Salt			
Cutcherry - -	7		
Singaputty Cutcherry	13		
TOTAL - -	96		

and the following would be the distribution of them, exclusive of small details less than a company, as per margin.

#### 17a. At Trichinopoly

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted).	444
$\frac{3}{4}$ Company Artillery (6 guns)	73
1 European Regiment - - -	736
5 Native Regiments - - -	3,400

giving eight complete companies of Native infantry for the annual relief of out-posts, viz.,

To Salim - - -	Three Companies N. I.
To Coimbatore - - -	One - ditto.
To Negapatam - - -	Two - ditto.
To Combaconum - - -	One - ditto.
To Tanjore - - -	One - ditto.

18. At Dindigul one regiment Native infantry, giving for the annual relief of out-posts

To Madura, two companies Native infantry.

19. At Palamcottah,  $\frac{1}{4}$  Company European foot artillery, 24 rank and file (two guns), one regiment Native infantry, giving for the annual relief of out-posts.

To Ramnad, one company Native infantry.

To

#### REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

All the small detachments now furnished and under Native commissioned officers must be done away with, and the strength of the detachments at the following places may be greatly reduced: Salém, Coimbatore, Negapatam, Combaconum, Tanjore.

Already disposed of; I hold it not only as a general military principle that a smaller concentrated force is of more real strength than a larger one disseminated, but I also consider that, as regards the preservation of internal tranquillity, the same principle holds; and this principle is peculiarly applicable to our position in all the provinces of this country where our rule has been long established, and where no actual disturbance exists. In newly acquired territories, where public tranquillity has been recently disturbed, and where our rule is unknown, it may frequently be necessary to occupy many different points with detachments sufficient

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

sufficient to keep each point in subjection; for one disturbance not instantly checked may lead to others; but not so where the population are sufficiently aware of our power, and they know how rapidly the element of that power, our military force, can be brought to any point where it is required.

It is on this principle that I suggest the distribution of our force in the Southern Division into two principal masses, with the means of moving a portion of each on the shortest notice; for a very few additional days will give the means of moving the whole, which is not required to remain as permanent garrison.

The natives are sufficiently aware of this, and it is the effect of this knowledge on the evil intentioned, which, in my opinion, renders such a distribution as effective to maintain tranquillity, as it is much more efficient to suppress disturbance should it unfortunately arise.

I do not, in the above arrangement, take into consideration the existence of a war to be carried on from seaward, because that is an hypothesis which involves a completely distinct arrangement and combination of means from the question at present under review; and it must be determined on a variety of considerations, as involving the state of relations with powers which might attack our empire from its assailable land frontiers; my present consideration is such a distribution of the force as shall maintain tranquillity, leave the largest number of disposable men for application to any emergency, and shall, at the same time, be most conducive to the discipline, good order, and comfort of the troops; all these last most important considerations are combined in a system of concentration.

Paulghautcherry is no doubt a very important point for the reasons stated, but it does not appear necessary to occupy it by anything more than a detachment furnished by the Southern Division, or the Malabar one, under the present circumstances. The detachments at Cochin ought to be furnished from the Quilon force.

To Oodagherry in Travancore, one company Native infantry.

20. This will leave the battalions at Dindigul and Palamcottah with about 500 rank and file each at regimental head quarters, without reducing the effective force at Trichinopoly, but on the contrary leaving it more complete and disposable for general or divisional service.

21. I have not included the station of Paulgautcherry, in the Southern Division, as it appears more conveniently to belong to Malabar and Canara, both as regards the disposability of its force, supplies, and communications. In the event of war with an European maritime power, the force maintained at Trichinopoly is the only disposable force to guard the coast from Cuddalore to Cape Comorin, a distance of 261 miles. I shall hereafter speak of the established strength of corps, but to guard against any misconception of my calculations, it must be kept in mind that our regiments of light cavalry are now reduced to six troops each, of 444 rank and file, and that 72 men of that number are dismounted  
 O that

that our troops of European horse artillery are only 102 rank and file, and the Native troops 90 rank and file; the companies of foot artillery are only 97 rank and file, and the Golundauze 100 rank and file; his Majesty's regiments of infantry 736 rank and file, and a regiment of Native infantry 680 rank and file. Thus the force I have recommended for the protection of the Southern Division, to take all its detachments, and afford a small disposable force, is —

	Rank and File.
Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) -	444
Artillery - - - - -	97
European Infantry - - - - -	736
Native Infantry - - - - -	4,760
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>6,037</b>

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

#### MALABAR AND CANARA.

22. The present strength of these provinces (exclusive of his Majesty's 48th Regiment, under orders for Europe) is as per margin, and distributed as follows:

	Rank and File.
1 Company of Golundauze - - -	100
1 Regt. European Infantry - - -	736
3 Regiments N. I. - - -	2,040
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>2,876</b>

#### At Head Quarters.

	Rank and File.
$\frac{3}{4}$ Company, Golundauze - - -	75
1 Regiment European Infantry - - -	736
2 Regiments Native Infantry - - -	1,860
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>2,171</b>

Cannanore.

Calicut - - -	212
Tellicherry - - -	62

Mangalore, 1 Regiment of Native Infantry 680.

23. The detachments of Native infantry, as per margin, are at present furnished by periodical reliefs from Cannanore. The regiment of Native infantry at Mangalore is complete, and the 2nd Regiment, Native Infantry, at Shikarpore, in Mysore, gives the detachments of 130 rank and file to Honawar, and 85 rank and file to Sedasheghur.

There is also one-fourth of the company of Golundauze now detached to Coorg.

24. These provinces comprehend a line of sea coast of 282 miles in extent from Sedashegur, north, to Trichore, south, where they connect with Travancore, and are bounded to the east by the western range of ghauts.

25. The northern part of the provinces of Malabar has of late been considerably agitated by internal commotion, but the Collector has, I believe, reported the restoration of tranquillity, and the consequent inutility of further military aid. During every part of the year that ships can come on the coast, the ghauts are open and practicable for

I presume this alludes to the event at Sircee, which was a mere momentary ebullition, and of no consequence, connected too, with the Nuggur revolt.

for



REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

The Brigade which I propose to be stationed at Quilon will furnish the details for these places.

27. Three companies are more than sufficient for Calicut; there is no occasion for a jemadar's party on the Neilherries.

I am not persuaded of the military necessity of a European battalion at Cannanore, though, from its being a very healthy station, it may be advisable to have it there. Hereafter, should good barracks be erected at Bangalore for an additional European corps, the force in Cannanore ought to be removed hither, and as soon as the road through Coorg is rendered practicable down the Western ghauts, a small European detachment is all that can be required at Cannanore if even that is necessary.

500.

for the march of troops, and Bangalore is the point from whence any required reinforcements would be furnished, and as the march to Cannanore and Mangalore are nearly equidistant, the ghauts could be occupied by a light force from Bangalore in 14 days, and it could be on the coast in 21, or thereabouts; sooner, if necessary. I do not therefore propose to increase the force in these provinces more than one battalion; and this is rendered necessary to give effect to the measure. I propose placing a battalion at Paulghaut, to relieve the Travancore regiment of the Cochin and Trichore detachments, and to furnish those of South Malabar, as well as with a view to keep one battalion as complete as practicable in Canara, in case of any sudden emergency.

26. This will be effected by having six companies at Mangalore and two at Honawar, but even with this alteration in the distribution, and an increase of the Paulghaut corps, and decrease of 212 rank and file now furnished from Shikapore, these provinces cannot be considered a point from which more than half a company of Golundauze, and half a regiment of European infantry can at any time be considered disposable.

27. Under this view of the defences and distribution of Malabar and Canara, I propose that one regiment Native infantry be stationed at Paulghautcherry, furnishing—

- 1 Company, Native infantry - To Cochin.
- 1 Company - ditto - - To Trichore.
- 3 Companies - ditto - - To Calicut.

A Native officer's guard for the Neilherries, leaving about three companies at Paulghautcherry, which is an advantageous post to occupy, with reference to Travancore, and the relief of out-posts in Malabar and Cochin, and in case of any emergency, requiring the corps to move into Travancore it could at least call in half of its detachments within a very short notice.

28. Cannanore is the head quarters of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, and I propose to station there, as at present,—

	Rank and File.
1 Company, Golundauze - -	100
1 Regiment, European Infantry -	736
2 Regiments, Native Infantry -	1,360

and that it shall furnish the following detachments:

O 2

tachments: Tellichery, 1 company; and, anticipating the probable reduction of the present Wynaad Rangers 200 rank and file, I shall include in the detachments from Cannanore two companies at Manantoddy. This will leave 13 companies, or 1,105 rank and file of Native infantry for the garrison and regimental duties of Cannanore, the head quarters of the provinces, and for all extra demands, occasional detachments, escorts, and contingencies.

29. One battalion of Native infantry, giving a detachment of two companies for the post of Honawar, from which a Jemadar's party will be sufficient to occupy the post of Sedashegur. This will relieve the regiment of the Mysore Division, now at Shirkapore, from furnishing 212 rank and file, or 2½ companies, to occupy the posts of Honawar and Sedashegur.

30. Coorg has not yet been allotted to any division; it is occupied by a fourth of a company of Golundauze, 25 rank and file belonging to Cannanore, and one regiment of Native infantry. I am not prepared to offer any opinion as to the amount of force necessary for its defence and tranquillity; but assuming the present allotment fixed by superior authority as sufficient, I shall estimate it at one regiment of Native infantry, but recommend that the artillery be relieved from the mount, as a complete company ought always to be present at Cannanore.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

MANGALORE.

Mangalore ought to be the head-quarters of a regiment of Native infantry, furnishing the two detachments, but on the smallest scale.

MYSORE DIVISION.

31. The present strength of the Mysore division of the army is—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Dragoons (96 men dismounted)	640
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
1 Troop Native Horse Artillery (4 guns)	90
1 Company European Foot Artillery (8 guns)	97
1 Company Sappers and Miners	83
1 Regiment European Infantry	736
6 Regiments Native Infantry	4,080
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,170</b>

The force is distributed as follows:—

	Rank and File.
Bangalore: 1 Regiment Light Dragoons (96 men dismounted)	640
” 1 Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted)	444
” 1 Troop Native Horse Artillery (4 guns)	90
” 1 Company European Foot Artillery (8 guns)	97*
” 1 Regiment of European Infantry	736
” 3 Regiments Native Infantry (4 is the complement)	2,040
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,047</b>

French Rocks, near Mysore: 1 Regiment Native Infantry - - - - 680  
 Shirkapore: 1 Regiment Native Infantry - - - - - 680  
 Hurryhur: 1 Regiment Native Infantry - - - - - 680

32. From this force the following detachments are furnished by periodical reliefs:—

	Rank and File.
From Bangalore to Resident's Escort :-	22 of Light Cavalry.
From French Rocks to Mysore -	2 Companies Native Infantry
To Resident's Escort -	1 Company Native Infantry, or 100 rank and file at the resident's option.
From Shirkapore to Sircee -	100 rank and file.
To Terrikerry -	160 rank and file.

This

This corps also now furnishes the detachments to Honawar and Sedasheghur in Malabar, but I have included them in the Malabar and Canara distribution.

33. The company of sappers and miners is at Ossoor and Salem. There are just now two regiments of light cavalry at Bangalore, but the 7th is destined for Saulnah, to relieve the 5th to go to Arcot, and so they are accounted for in the distribution. It would be very desirable if the Resident's escort of light cavalry can be dispensed with, and Sillidar Horse substituted.

34. The force in Mysore is subsidiary, but available by treaty for general purposes, and may be considered as an integral part of the defensive and disposable force of the Madras Presidency. Compared with other divisions of the army, it is in general less liable to be called upon for detached duties within the Mysore territory than any other division, and partakes therefore more of the character of a disposable force.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

35. In all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore, it is impossible not most fully to concur, and I think the concentration of troops there ought to be made to the greatest attainable extent.

I am not inclined to give the weight to the danger of conspiracy which is hinted at.

35. Upon every principle of military defence, as well as of sound policy, it is of the first importance to have a large commanding and disposable force completely equipped for immediate field service, in a suitable position to be equally available for prompt and active service in any direction, where either an external or internal enemy can appear, and be able to detach instantly any commanding force necessary to quell insurrection, rebellion, mutiny, or conspiracy. A country is never so strong, or its inhabitants and tributaries so cautious, as when it is a matter of notoriety that the State is prepared to act with vigour and decision at any moment that opposition is manifested, and it is known that but a few weeks or days must overpower their plans of resistance; indeed they will see and know this to be futile when the fact is before them that a light field detachment of formidable strength can reach them by forced marches in a few days, or weeks at most, and that almost with corresponding energy and little more time a battering train and siege equipment can join it. If then such a *corps d'armée* is desirable and advantageous, and promises to secure tranquillity within the frontiers of the Madras Presidency, and to repel attack from the north, north-west, or invasion by sea by either coast of Malabar and Canara, or the Carnatic, where could it be so advantageously posted as at Bangalore? The position is nearly equidistant from the capital, Madras, from Cannanore and Mangalore on the western coast, from Trichinopoly and Dindigul in the southern division. The northern frontier of Quilon, Kurnool, Durwar, and Belgaum, North Cuddapah and Nellore East, and each

of these stations is within 200 and 250 miles, and may be reached by a light force in 12 or 15 days, as circumstances may require. Water and forage are abundant at Bangalore for such a force; the Mysore country provides all necessary supplies, and is surrounded by districts from which they may, to any extent, be drawn. If, then, I have shown that such a force is desirable, and that Bangalore is the fittest position for it, I shall next proceed to detail the force I would recommend to be concentrated at that healthy and eligible station, both for European and Native troops. It is also an influential argument in favour of increasing the European force at Bangalore, that it will at once stop the progress of those conspiracies which have been instigated by the disaffected inhabitants in Mysore—a point of the first importance to the stability of that attachment we have so much right to appreciate in our Native troops, but whose allegiance may become matter of anxiety to the State if the designs of the discontented to tamper with them are suffered to be too often repeated. The troops of the Mysore rajah will, I calculate, soon become equal to secure the internal tranquillity of the north-west frontier of Mysore, and to effect the collection of the revenue, and then the necessity for a corps at the French Rocks, and a detachment of it at Mysore, will become unnecessary; as the Commissioner progresses in the settlement of the country, then the whole force may be concentrated, and the corps at Shirkapore, Hurryhur, and French Rocks become unnecessary, and until these desirable objects are completed, those posts may be occupied by part of the Bangalore force, a space of time which will be requisite to prepare quarters and accommodation for the augmented force, there is ample accommodation for all the artillery in the horse and foot artillery lines. The barrack of the European regiment, originally built for 1,000 men, may, at no very heavy expense, be increased to hold two regiments. The cavalry place of arms and lines may, in like manner, be increased, and all that will be required in addition as quarters, are places of arms for six Native regiments and the detachments of sappers and miners.

36. Under these impressions, I beg to suggest that a concentrated disposable force be assembled at Bangalore, consisting at least of 10,000 rank

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

My view of the propriety of increasing the force at Bangalore, and maintaining it at as high numbers as possible, is not at all influenced by the argument here set forth; I have no apprehension of the kind alluded to. I must confess there appears to me throughout a tone of doubt, not to say of apprehension, for which I have discovered no sufficient cause, nor do I believe there exists any foundation for alarm.

I doubt the present barracks being worth it; they are faulty in plan, and by no means fit for European troops. The additional barracks required ought to be on a better construction.

**EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA). 111**

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

rank and file, and be composed as follows :—

	Rank and File.
Dragoons - - - -	500
Light Cavalry (2 regiments) - -	888
Horse Artillery :	
1 European troop (6 guns) -	102
1 Native troop (6 guns) -	90
Foot Artillery, 2 companies (16 guns)	194
Sappers and Miners - - -	166
European Infantry (2 regiments) -	1,472
Ten Regiments Native Infantry of the Line.	6,800
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>10,212</b>

The head quarters of the Sappers and Miners and their School of Practical Instructions should be at Bangalore.

Of this force the whole will be disposable for any temporary contingency, as the sick and convalescent and details of corps might garrison the fort and cantonment, but in case of any distant or protracted service, one wing of an European regiment and four battalions will be required for the duties of Mysore.

**CEDED DISTRICTS.**

37. The force of these districts at present consists of—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted).	444
1 Company European Artillery -	97
1 Regiment European Infantry -	736
3 Regiments Native Infantry -	2,040
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>3,317</b>

I would withdraw the European regiment from Bellary (as well as the regiment of Native infantry proposed) to add to the force at Bangalore; and this arrangement is more available, as Hyderabad is to have a second European regiment attached to the subsidiary force. The ceded districts ought no longer to be a division. The force at Bellary ought to be a detachment of the Mysore Division, and the general officer now at Bellary would be more usefully employed in command of Hyderabad with the Nagpore Force under his inspection, or if Belgaum be substituted, then with that station as a part of his inspection.

These are distributed—

	Rank and File.
At Bellary :	
1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted).	444
1 Company European Artillery	97
1 European Regiment of Infantry	736
2 Native Regiments of Infantry	1,360
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>2,637</b>

At Cuddapah, one regiment Native infantry, 680 rank and file, and these two stations furnish detachments periodically relieved as follows :—

	Rank and File.
From Bellary to Gooty - - -	170
From Cuddapah to Cumbum - -	84

Assuming that the Bangalore force will be augmented as I have recommended, I shall only propose—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Cavalry - -	444
1 Company European Artillery -	97
1 Regiment European Infantry -	736
1 Regiment of Native Infantry -	680
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>1,957</b>

for the garrison of Bellary.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

38. The regiment of light cavalry, the European company of artillery, and 300 rank and file of European infantry, may be considered a disposable force.

Cuddapah—One regiment Native infantry at Cuddapah, giving one company to occupy Gooty and one for the duties at Cumbum, leaving six companies at head quarters at Cuddapah. This is as great a reduction of force in this district as can with safety be recommended, and is only offered or is justifiable by the supposed presence of the disposable field force recommended to be maintained at Bangalore.

CENTRE DIVISION, INCLUDING FORT ST. GEORGE.

	Rank and File.		Rank and File.
2 Regiments Light Cavalry (144 men dismounted)	888	39. The present strength of this division, including Fort St. George, consists, as per margin, and is distributed by corps as follows:—	
Body Guard (on the strength of Regiments)	102	Fort St. George:	
2 Troops European Horse Artillery	204	Body Guard (on the strength of regiments).	102
3½ Companies European Ft. Artillery	340	1 Company European Foot Artillery.	79
2½ Companies Golundauze	225	1 Regiment European Infantry	736
2 Dismounted Troops of Supernumerary Native Horse Artillery	-	1 Regiment Native Veterans	1,080
1½ Regiments European Infantry about	1,000	2 Regiments Native Infantry	1,360
2 Regiments Native Veterans	2,160	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,357</b>
8 Regiments Native Infantry	5,440		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10,359</b>	Poonamallee, half Regiment European Infantry (disposable.)	

	Rank and File.
St. Thomas's Mount:	
2 Troops European Horse Artillery.	204
2½ Companies European Foot Artillery.	242
2½ Companies Golundauze	225
2 Dismounted Troops of Supernumerary Native Horse Artillery.	—
Palavaram, 3 Regiments Native Infantry.	
Wallajahbad, 1 Regiment Native Veterans.	1,080
Nellore, 3 Regiments Native Infantry	2,040

	Rank and File.	
Nellore	119	40. The detachments of Native Infantry, detailed in the margin, are furnished by periodical reliefs from the corps at Nellore and Pallaveram, and amount, as per last returns (June 1834) to 807 rank and file, exclusive of Native veterans furnished from Wallajahbad.
Poonamallee	152	
Cuddalore	252	
Chittoor	169	
Chingleput	89	
Canjeveram	32	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>807</b>	

These detachments admit of considerable reductions; nearly one half may be diminished.

41. The regimental duties of this division may be estimated at about 50 rank and file per regiment, and the general daily duties at Nellore amount to about 320 rank and file, and at Palaveram 80 rank and file; this is exclusive

The duties of Nellore, I apprehend, may be considerably reduced, and the garrison reduced from three to two regiments Native infantry.

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

clusive of occasional treasure escorts and detachments, mensick, on furlough, and wanting to complete.

42. In this division I have included the garrison of Fort St. George, in order that that portion of the army may be exhibited in the amount of force and disposition for defence, although the garrison of Fort St. George forms no part of the army under my command, yet it must be provided from that army, and of course is a component part of it, and inseparable from the general question of what force is necessary to be maintained for the defences and disposable force of the Madras territory within frontier.

FORT ST. GEORGE.

43. Is now garrisoned by—

	Rank and File.
1 Company of European Foot Artillery.	97
1 Regiment European Infantry	- 736
1 Battalion Native veterans	- 1,080
2 Regiments of Native Infantry	- 1,360

The veterans are merely a nominal part of the garrison; they are of no efficiency.

No reduction of this force can be made; it is perhaps equal to the performance of the duties of the garrison, but not without considerable detriment to the discipline of the two Native corps so employed, and I am of opinion they should be annually relieved or their strength augmented.

PALAVARAM.

Perhaps four battalions is not more than sufficient, as this must be looked upon as the source from whence any troops going seaward are to be drawn.

The detachments of the veteran battalion may be reduced, and the orderlies attached to the staff reduced in number, and in some instances perhaps done away.

The details furnished from Palaveram have in some degree been reduced, and may be still more so.

44. The original intention of this cantonment was, corresponding with that at Barrackpore, to furnish by monthly reliefs the Native troops for the garrison duties of Fort St. George. It was intended to have four battalions at all times stationed there, and it may be considered the Presidency cantonment. In former times, a force was generally maintained at Wallajahbad for the duties of the Centre Division, and to cover the capital in case of any sudden exigency arising; at present there is only the head quarters of a veteran battalion, with a few men at Wallajahbad, the whole corps being dispersed in detachments and small details, as per margin, through the Centre Division; and Palaveram has, since its establishment in 1822, been considered the disposable force of the

	Rank and File.
Nellore	- 248
Ongole	- 82
Guntoor	- 240
Chingleput	- 44
Amsee	- 29
Tripasore	- 21
Adjutant General of the Army	- 14
Quartermaster General of the Army	- 7
Inspector General, H. M's Hospitals	2
Judge Advocate General	- 6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>693</b>

Centre Division and the depôt for preparing troops for embarkation to the eastward, and for refitting the relieved regiments on their return. It is now reduced to three battalions, or 2,040 rank and file, although besides furnishing 271 rank and file for detached posts in the Centre Division, it gives 130 rank and file for monthly and weekly duties at Madras in excess of the garrison guards and town duties of that garrison.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

#### VELLORE.

45. This garrison has now three regiments of Native infantry. Its general duties require 314 rank and file for daily duty, and the regimental duties for three corps will take at least 120 rank and file. These numbers added to occasional detachments, sick, furlough, and wanting to complete, exclusive of 536 rank and file on detached periodical duties, will give a total of 500 rank and file on duty, &c.; and when it is considered that in this fortress the family of the late Tippoo Sultan and the Coorg Rajah are State prisoners, it will be manifest that the duties are as limited as safety and precaution will sanction, and that three regiments, or 2,040 rank and file, is not more than a competent garrison for a fortress containing such a charge.

I am inclined to a different opinion, and believe considerable reductions of duties may take place, and that two instead of three regiments will suffice.

46. Considering the great population of Madras and the character of the inhabitants of Triplicane, Vellore, and Arcot, I cannot consider 6,000 rank and file of effective Native infantry, too great a force of that arm to be maintained in this division, and I accordingly recommend that another regiment of Native infantry be added to the Palaveram Brigade, and that all the periodical detachments of the Centre Division be furnished by annual relief from that cantonment, thus leaving Fort St. George and Vellore only liable to occasional calls for treasure and other escorts, and marching detachments.

Certainly.

#### ARCOT.

47. Adverting to my proposal to increase the Light Cavalry at Bangalore to two regiments, I should recommend one only to be stationed at Arcot, where there are now two regiments allotted (the 2nd and 5th, the latter not yet relieved from Jaulnah).

48. By



REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

48. Eight regiments of Native Infantry will suffice. I am more than doubtful of the value of the veteran battalions; and another arrangement of the Artillery would be expedient.

48. By this distribution, allowing for the increase proposed, the Centre Division would consist of--

	Rank and File.
Body Guards (on the strength of regiments)	100
1 Regiment Light Cavalry	444
1 Troop European Horse Artillery (6 guns)	102
1½ Companies of European Foot Artillery (1½ guns).	145
2½ Companies Golundauze	225
1 Regiment European Infantry, the wing of 41st Foot at Poonamallee not included	736
2 Regiments Native veterans	2,160
9 Regiments Native infantry	6,120
	<hr/> 10,032

49. Exclusive of the wing of his Majesty's 41st, or Welsh Regiment of Infantry, and two troops dismounted supernumerary Native Horse Artillery.

50. Of the force in this Division,—

	Rank and File.
1 Regiment Light Cavalry	444
1 Troop European Horse Artillery	102
1 Company European Foot Artillery	97
2 Companies Golundauze	200
A wing European Infantry	300
3 Regiments Native Infantry	2,040
TOTAL	<hr/> 3,183

may be considered a disposable force.

NORTHERN DIVISION.

51. This division is occupied at present by the following force :

	Rank and File.
1 Company European Foot Artillery	97
Company of Golundauze	75
Company Sappers and Miners	83
1 Regiment European Infantry	736
1 Battalion European veterans, one wing Artillery no fixed establishment.	216
10 Regiments of Native Infantry	6,800
TOTAL	<hr/> 8,007

which is disposed of as follows :

	Rank and File.
Masulipatam - 1 Company European Foot Artillery.	97
1 Regiment European Infantry.	736
2 Regiments Native Infantry.	1,360
Ellore - 1 Regiment Native Infantry.	680
Samulcottah - 1 Regiment Native Infantry.	680
Vizianagram - 2 Regiments Native Infantry.	1,360
Vizagapatam - 1 Regiment European Veterans.	216
1 Regiment Native Infantry.	680
Chicacole - ½ Company Golundauze	75
1 Regiment Native Infantry.	680
Kemmedy - 1 Company Sappers and Miners.	83
1 Regiment Native Infantry.	680
Berhampore - 1 Regiment Native Infantry.	680

52. The permanent detachments of this division furnished by corps of Native

The European regiment withdrawn, and none now in this division.

Native infantry by periodical reliefs are as follows, exclusive of station and regimental guards, occasional escorts, sick men on furlough, wanting to complete, &c. &c.

I do not believe that any reduction can with safety be made :

49th Regiment N. I., Aska	-	85	} From Berham- pore.
Collector's Cutchery	-	13	
Ganjam	-	11	
			109
21st Regiment N. I., Banga-			} Kemedly.
rettypoor	-	76	
Waranassy	-	77	
Battaly	-	22	
Oopaland	-	64	
			239
41st Regiment N. I., escort duty			} Chicacola.
with Commissioners	-	23	
3rd Regiment L. I., Field			} Vizianagram.
Post, Ueerogathum	-	125	
Ditto - ditto Gopaupilly	-	62	
			187
8th Regiment N. I., Palcondah	-	260	- ditto.
10th Regiment N. I., Cassucottah	-	150	Vizagapatam.
47th Regiment N. I., Rajah-			} Samulcottah.
mendry	-	154	
Cocandra Collector's			
Cutcherry	-	20	
			174
43rd Regiment N. I., Field			} Ellore.
Force, Ragapore	-	68	
Candafully	-	111	
			179
			1,321

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

53. The rebellion which has of late agitated this division and kept the troops always on the alert, and a great portion of them in constant motion in jungles most prejudicial to their health and vigour of constitution, does not authorise me to recommend any reduction of the force; on the contrary, the principal portion of it, the Native infantry, has most harassing duties, and the success which has hitherto attended their exertions cannot warrant any relaxation of the most efficient state of preparation for field service, more particularly as I consider there is little probability of even prospective reduction as long as the regiments of Native infantry are maintained upon their present reduced establishment. Ten regiments Native infantry will appear a large force, but it must be kept in mind that it only gives, when all are present and complete, 6,800 rank and file; and I should say, from the general history of the Northern Division, the character of the chiefs and hill tributaries, as well as of the surrounding districts, that 7,000 rank and file of Native infantry is the lowest establishment that will be found to give security to the country, divided as the force is, and subdivided into many permanent detached posts and parties, requiring two regiments to give those details, exclusively of occasional escorts, which are numerous and frequent. I cannot, therefore, recommend any reduction of force on the Northern Division, but, on the contrary, were I not restrained by a knowledge of the economy now indispensably necessary, I would not hesitate to recommend 8,000 rank and file of Native infantry for the duties of this division.

I conceive, after the approaching north-east monsoon, if affairs remain on their present footing, as I think there is reason to expect they will, two regiments of Native infantry may be withdrawn, besides the European regiment (Her Majesty's 62nd) which has already left Masulipatam. Another distribution of the troops will be required so as to concentrate larger numbers, and, above all, an additional force of sappers and miners, in order to complete the roads into Kimmedy and the other districts, which have been hitherto considered impenetrable to troops. The improved communications into those districts will of course allow of a diminution of detachments, and by such an arrangement of the force as will render it applicable to several points, the aggregate may be diminished.

54. His Majesty's 62nd Regiment at Masulipatam I have estimated

estimated, as in all other cases, at the fixed establishment of the corps, though it at present is not half that strength; but when a complete regiment is in the Fort of Masulipatam, the disposable force may be estimated at—

	Rank and File.
1 Company of European Foot Artillery -	97
A wing of the European Regiment -	300

55. In the event of taking away the company of European foot artillery from the Northern Division, which nothing but necessity should sanction, the Invalid Artillery attached to the Carnatic European Veteran Battalion may supply its place as a temporary measure.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

The Wynaad Rangers are ordered to be reduced. One company of regulars will suffice to replace them at Manantoddy, for the duty of detecting smugglers is not one on which the troops ought to be employed.

The peons of the Collector are the proper instruments; neither the one or the other will be effectual to the object. The cure for smuggling is to be found in measures of a different character.

IRREGULARS.

56. There is no force of this description in the pay of the Madras Government except two companies of the Wynaad Rangers, 200 rank and file, and these may, without inconvenience or detriment to the service, be reduced, as regular troops are much more efficient and very little more expensive. The only argument in favour of the Wynaad Rangers is the expertness they are said to have attained in detecting and checking smugglers, but

it is a question whether their cost does not exceed even this advantage; and I see no reason why regular troops should not be equally applicable for such a duty, since the detection of smuggling and discovering the haunts and retreats of the smuggler is a duty which more fittingly belongs to the peon of the civil authorities, by whom the aid of the military should be called in to act upon their information and support their authority and objects. There are no classes of men on this side of India between the sepoy and the peon, and, therefore, irregular troops, organised, paid, armed, and equipped as our rangers are, may be calculated to cost 9-10ths of the average expenses of regular troops.

MYSORE TROOPS.

This question is before the Supreme Government, and need not be discussed here.

57. The Mysore Sillidar Horse are about 3,500, and may be considered as an auxiliary force, but their fitness for any active field service is much to be questioned in their present condition, and cannot be calculated on as a dis-

posable force on which much dependence can be placed, either for offensive or defensive operations; they are very inferior to the Hyderabad and Poona Auxiliary Cavalry, and their comparative efficiency may be best estimated by contrasting the pay of the one with the other.

The Mysore Sillidar has for himself and horse about half a rupee a day net pay, which is about one-third of the pay the Hyderabad and Poona irregular horseman receives, hence the comparison must be conclusive of the inferiority of the Mysore Sillidar; but perhaps a corps equal to about one-third of the present strength might be formed and maintained upon an efficient footing, at an expense to the State not exceeding the present disbursement; but I fancy the whole system must be

revised, and great changes effected in the composition of the corps, before its attachment to the British Government can be more than questionable.

58. The Mysore infantry is not in any way to be calculated upon in our disposition for defence or disposable troops; and the Travancore artillery and infantry are equally unavailable and inapplicable.

59. Readiness of the Troops to move on Field Service.—The whole of the horse and artillery, dragoons and light cavalry, the European foot artillery and infantry, and half the Native infantry of each division of the Madras Army, within frontier, are prepared to move at the shortest notice. Camp equipage, sick carriage cattle, and followers are maintained for the above proportion of force at the head quarters of each division of the army, and the troops can move within a week or 10 days, as circumstances may require, that is, as soon as the cattle can be brought in from the grazing farms.

The troops beyond frontier are all equipped and in readiness for active field service at the shortest notice, but those beyond sea are in position and can have no equipments for field service.

#### SKETCH OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE INHABITANTS.

60. The Madras Army within the frontier is scattered over a tract of country extending 790 miles from Cape Comorin to Ganjam on the coast of Coromandel, 673 miles from Ganjam to Sedashegur on the Malabar coast, and 430 from Sedashegur to Cape Comorin, forming a triangle whose area contains 144,700 square miles, but allowing for the part of the ocean comprised within the sides of the triangle, the estimated area is 133,756 square miles, with a population of 16,917,316 inhabitants, and an army of 33,116 rank and file, cavalry and infantry, European and Native, being one soldier to every 510·8 inhabitants, and a sea coast of 1,322 miles in length.

61. At the extreme points of the triangle, rebellion and commotions have prevailed; the one requiring large bodies of troops to suppress, the other disturbing a large tract of country and keeping small but numerous detachments in constant motion. In the very centre of the triangle sedition and conspiracies have been hatched, and some slight advantages have alone been wanting to lead to formidable and extensive insurrections.

#### REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

Defective information seems to me to have caused erroneous impressions of the dangers imagined to exist. That the Government should vigilantly watch the appearances and variations of the Native feeling is no more than prudence exacts, but that there is any cause for alarm I am far from being persuaded, nor do I believe that, unless moved by external impulse, there is any ground for apprehension from the Native population.

62. The cause producing these feelings may be easily ascertained, and are in the Circars attributable mainly to the numerous ancient families dispossessed of their lands, whose followers, owning and regarding their chiefs with that devotion and attachment peculiar to hill people, have united to recover for their leaders the lands possessed by their families for ages; their hills, unhealthy jungles, and numerous fastnesses, opposing difficulties to troops penetrating and establishing authority, gave confidence and consistency to their power, which the simultaneous and extensive operations of troops in that district have only, after two years, been able to subdue; but the history of the Northern Circars since the establishment of the English power in India only proves the existence of continued discontents, and such may be expected to endure until the hills and jungles

jungles are opened by fine military roads, and the people by daily contact learn to dread our authority, and place reliance on our justice.

63. Along the side of the triangle, from the Ganjam district to Shedashegur, the frontier borders on the Nizam's dominions and Mahratta States, affording harbour to the discontented of all classes of our own subjects as well as among those of our allies, who are ever on the watch to aid and augment the slightest appearance of insurrection.

In Kanara, bordering on the Mahratta country, large bodies of men were reported by the Collector of that district to have assembled within our territory during the late operations in Coorg, and kept the country in a state of restlessness, until the planting of the British flag on Muddukary deprived them of all hope of successfully carrying on their plans. Within the frontier of Mysore, the chiefs have for several years past employed two considerable detachments and kept three regiments in a state of constant activity.

64. The internal discontents prevailing in Mysore may be expected now to subside, since the assumption of the government by the British; for the ryots or cultivators, who were the disaffected people, will, from the justice of the British, obtain that protection sufficient alone to induce them to yield ready subjection to our power. But, again, all those in authority under the late Native government, knowing that power must now be withdrawn, and galled at the prospect of sinking to that state of obscurity so usual for chiefs within our provinces, whose ancestors held extensive sway under their ancient princes, will ever be ready by their intrigues to excite conspiracies for the overthrow of our authority; and however hopeless such effects may prove, or however little the chance of success may appear, still the invariable results of our assumption of rule in this country confirm the probability of such attempts being made in the Mysore country.

65. The Travancore State in the southern part of the peninsula may eventually fall under our sway, either from the infatuation of the Government, and consequent opposition to our power, or from the misgovernment, natural to all Native governments, supported though not ruled by us; but insignificant as such a State must be to overcome, many powerful families and the independent and proud heirs must be expected to oppose all their efforts to the eventual establishment of the British sway.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

I cannot but feel that this is a highly-coloured picture. I shall not enter upon the commonplace of the causes which render our rule peculiarly unpopular to the Mussulmans. I conceive that there are many and easily-perceived reasons why those of that religion in the south of India (Mysore particularly) should entertain hostile feelings in a more vivid form. Their fall is recent. They have not yet lost the relish for power, the sweets of which many amongst them yet living have tasted; but I do not believe they are capable, without internal excitement, of any combined plan, and from partial attempts our power, as a state, has nothing to fear, but to prevent such partial efforts is the interest as it is the duty of the Government. Everything in our most extraordinary position in this country points to that duty, which consists

500.

66. The numerous petty Polygars inhabiting strong and difficult places in the southern part of the peninsula, and retaining all their warlike feelings and peculiar habits, and hating or fearing that Government so fatal to their race, must ever be expected to seize with avidity any opportunity to attack our authority.

The hereditary feelings and prejudices peculiar to this class of people must be expected to sway all their actions, and notwithstanding the many defeats experienced by these chiefs in all their encounters with the British authorities, complete destruction of their power and removal of the ring-leaders from their own lands has alone succeeded

succeeded in quieting their followers and subjecting them to our authority.

67. The remainder of the Carnatic having been so long subject to our authority, comprises a greater degree of obedience amongst the cultivators than any other part of the Madras Presidency; this may chiefly have arisen from the removal of all the military classes and powerful families, and to the knowledge the people possess of the English power, moderation, and justice.

68. The religious feelings displayed of late years by the Mussulman in Mysore, Ceded Districts, and Centre Division,\* and the known hostility of this race to our sway, their unfitness for other employment than that of the sword, the great decrease of the military under the British and neighbouring chiefs, all render probable the planning of measures by this class dangerous to our government; and religious pretexts which have lately hatched dangerous conspiracies should induce us to guard and watch those places where such plans may be expected to be contrived. Cud-dapah, Kurnaul, Mysore, Vellore, Arcot, and Triplicane, the hotbeds of such sedition and conspiracies, the resorts of the Mussulmen, and the discontented classes of all kinds, require troops to be prepared and ready to put down their first attempts.

69. The moderation and justice of our laws must be expected eventually to act beneficially on all our subjects, but more especially on the ryots and poorer classes, who, whilst enjoying protection from oppression and moderate taxation, are peaceable and obedient under any government granting such freedom; but, unacquainted with their habits and feelings, and ignorant of the action of our laws, from our intercourse with them being so limited and so formal, their sentiments and designs are alike unknown to us, and require us in consequence to be more or less on our guard against those sudden disturbances which are created and require to be suppressed in a manner peculiar to India. Experience shows how often commotions in India have arisen from causes the most trivial, the remarkable manner such insurrections have increased by the overpowering of even a small detachment of military, and how great such success has extended the disaffected feelings over a great extent of country, and we ought, therefore, to distrust appearances of tranquillity, and be prepared to act with promptitude to crush the conspiracies at once with overwhelming power, ere the contagion can spread.

70. The Ceded Districts, Mysore, and that part of Kanara bordering on the Southern Mahratta country, being the districts from whence discontent is likely to manifest itself, shows the necessity of having a larger body of troops assembled at some convenient situation, and for the military reasons assigned of masses of troops being collected, point out the necessity of some central situation

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

in vigilance, and being prepared, but it is a vigilance which must not be apparent lest it betray suspicion, and it is a preparation which must not be obtrusive or it will be construed into alarm.

To follow out these suggestions would be a useless waste of time.

I cordially concur in all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore. Its position, favoured as it is by a climate so salubrious, is a most happy coincidence, and ought to be turned to all the profit which such a fortunate combination admits of. The camp of Bangalore ought to be the practical school of the Madras army.

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\* In the Centre Division and Ceded Districts, and on the line from Kurnaul to Hyderabad, there is a very disaffected population, and being chiefly without employment, or means of comfortable and certain subsistence, are, of course, very discontented, and ready to engage in every plot and conspiracy formed against the Government. Religion is their favourite subject, and no other could be so formidable, or likely to work their objects of making our troops and subjects both discontented and distrustful of Government; and it is remarkable that for many years scarcely one has passed without some plausible and industriously circulated plot to favour a conspiracy, on the pretext of innovation on the religion, customs, and privileges of caste of our Native soldiers and subjects.

situation being fixed on, whence troops could be moved to the disturbed parts in the shortest possible time. and by the shortest possible routes. Bangalore is a cantonment peculiarly well adapted for such an assemblage of men, for, besides water, forage, and provisions being abundant, it is healthy and well adapted for Europeans and for the exercise of large numbers of troops; and it will be found that at the distance of only 30 miles from this cantonment, that, with this as a centre, and with a radius of 155 miles, if a circle be described, the country comprised within the circumference will equal in extent one-half the area of the Madras Presidency, will include Mysore, Ceded Districts, nearly the entire Carnatic, one-half of Malabar and Kanara, part of the country beyond our territory; and consequently all the discontented populations within the Madras Presidency (except the Northern Division) may be reached and overpowered by detachments from this force in from seven to 20 days, according to the extent of the disturbances to be put down requiring larger or smaller bodies to be put in motion. The distance of this force from the subsidised troops with the Nizam will be found within 200 miles. The Northern Division has been hitherto looked to to reinforce the advanced troops, but from the peculiar formation of the country, and duties required from the troops, effectual reinforcements cannot be furnished by the Northern Division to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

71. The large force at Bangalore would, in every way, be well adapted for a reserve for the troops at Secunderabad. The distance is not too great, for reinforcements could be united at Hyderabad in the course of 30 days, or light detachments even in a shorter period of time; but for a large force to be required to be put in motion, Mysore is beyond measure better adapted than the Northern Division for equipping with cattle and followers such a force.

72. In deciding on the number of soldiers requisite for the occupation of any portion of this Presidency, the turbulence of the inhabitants, the revenues of the district, the area, and the population, are the principal points necessary to be known, to determine the allotment of rank and file of soldiers.

73. In classing the divisions of this Presidency, they will be found to be as follows:—

I. In Area.	II. In Population.	III. In Revenue.	IV. In Turbulence.
1. Southern Division	1. Southern Division	1. Southern Division	1. Northern Division.
2. Ceded Districts -	2. Mysore Division -	2. Centre Division -	2. Mysore Division.
3. Centre Division -	3. Northern Division	3. Mysore Division -	3. Ceded Districts.
4. Mysore Division -	4. Centre Division -	4. Northern Division	4. Malabar and Kanara.
5. Northern Division	5. Ceded Districts -	5. Ceded Districts -	5. Travancore.
6. Malabar and Kanara	6. Malabar and Kanara	6. Malabar and Kanara	6. Southern Division.
7. Travancore - -	7. Travancore - -	7. Travancore - -	7. Centre Division.

and each division will be

	I.	II.	III.	IV.
Southern Division - - - -	1	1	1	6
Travancore - - - -	7	7	7	5
Malabar and Kanara - - - -	6	6	6	4
Mysore Division - - - -	4	2	3	2
Ceded Districts - - - -	2	5	5	3
Centre Division - - - -	3	4	2	7
Northern Division - - - -	5	3	4	1

bearing in mind the nature of the duties more particularly demanded from the troops in the Southern Division, being those connected with the collection of the revenue, and a reserve sufficient to overawe the restless Nairs of the Travancore state, and the Polygars occupying the southern part of the division. That in the Centre Division the garrisons of Fort St. George and Vellore, require large garrisons, the duties of the troops being numerous in the Civil Department, and a reserve for the Presidency.

74. The importance of the divisions may be arranged as follows, in a military point of view :—

Mysore and Ceded districts.  
Northern Division.  
Centre Division.  
Southern Division and Travancore.  
Malabar and Kanara.

75. I have already shown that 37,932, rank and file\* are requisite for the internal tranquillity of this Presidency. Now if for the Southern Division, Travancore, and Centre Division, one soldier for every five miles be given, with an increase of 3,000 men for the garrisons in the Centre Division; and, if for Mysore and Ceded Districts and Northern Division, one soldier for 350 inhabitants be allowed, and 500 inhabitants to each soldier in Malabar and Kanara, then the distribution will be as follows :—

—	Area.	Population.	Rank and File.	Number of Square Miles to each Soldier.	Number of Inhabitants to each Soldier.
Southern Division - Travancore and Cochin.	29,502	6,131,895	5,900	5	500
Malabar and Kanara	14,653	1,669,118	3,338	-	500
Mysore - - -	29,508	2,573,500	12,864	-	350
Ceded Districts -	24,000	1,928,814			
Centre Division -	18,900	2,095,790	6,780	5	-
Northern Division -	14,200	2,518,199	7,194	-	350
Total - - -	130,755	16,917,316	37,932 or 36,081	3 5	45,243

And from the data above laid down, the number of troops for each division will be seen to correspond with the numbers decided by the wants of the service to be actually requisite for the performance

#### REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

I do not consider, under existing circumstances, that any augmentation of force as suggested is required. The actual force distributed in the most advantageous manner is equal to all present objects; for I repeat that a war involving chances of attack from sea, combined (as it probably would be), with assault on one or more of our land frontiers, is not the case under consideration.

#### General Observations.

The increase of the force at Hydrabad makes it a fit command for a general officer, and I think it would be highly advantageous to place one there, giving him a supervising authority over the Contingent at Nagpore—I mean to the extent of making inspections and reports on the discipline, &c., but no direct military command. The general officer for Hydrabad would be found in the reduction of the Ceded Districts as a military division, adding the Ceded Districts to the Mysore division, and making Bellary a Brigadier's Command under Bangalore. I am satisfied that this is an arrangement fraught with advantage: the Hydrabad force is one which requires a general officer, and the supervision of a general officer is essential to the well-being of the other great detached force.

In considering the distribution of the army of Fort St. George, it is impossible not to be struck with the advantage as to mere distribution, whether military or economical, which the occupation of Belgaum instead of Nagpore would offer, and I should propose that arrangement. I am aware, however, that a great feeling exists in the Madras army with regard to the occupation of Nagpore.

It is considered as a sort of point of honour, and its abandonment to occupy Belgaum, though the latter is a very favourite station too, would be looked upon by the officers of the Madras army, as I am led to understand, as a kind of degradation. It would be tantamount, in their minds, to a declaration that the Madras army was no longer a field army.

Besides these considerations, there are others which cannot be without weight. Nagpore is a full Batta Station; Belgaum is not, and I believe has never been: no doubt this is an element that enters largely into the estimate of those concerned.

It may be worth while, under this view, to consider whether the time is yet come for proposing such a measure; for of its advantages I apprehend there can be no doubt, and as little doubt can there be that, unless there shall be hostile attempts from the sea, the Madras army cannot be considered as in the first line: it is ludicrous to go on in a system of self-delusion upon this subject in opposition to the nature of things, and the force of circumstances beyond our control. Madras has no frontier, and its army therefore cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be an advanced force. It does not follow from

\* This includes European and Native Cavalry and Infantry.



REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

from thence that it is to dwindle down into mere a Militia; on the contrary, it is and ought to be considered as the great reserve of the army of India. Its geographical situation precludes it from being a field army under any probable combination; but its strength, its efficiency, and its organization, render it most valuable as a reserve. It may be worthy of consideration, however, whether these considerations of mere personal advantage and feeling are or are not of weight sufficient to overbalance the benefits to be derived by a more compact and economical distribution of the army.

The following distribution is that which I would propose:—

	Dragoons.	Native Cavalry.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.
Travancore - - -	-	-	-	3
Trichinopoly - - -	-	1	1	5
Malabar and Kanara*	-	-	1	3
Coorg - - - - -	-	-	-	1
Mysore - - - - -	1	2	2	9
Bellary - - - - -	-	1	-	1
Cuddapah - - - -	-	-	-	1
Centre Division -	-	1	1	8
Northern Division	-	-	-	8
Hydrabad - - - -	-	2	2	7
Nagpore - - - - -	-	1	1	4
Malacca and Penang	-	-	-	2
Moulmein - - - -	-	-	-	-
Total - - - - -	1	8	8	52

\*The European regiment to be transferred to Bangalore eventually.

TRAVANCORE.

The two corps from Palamcotta, and Dindigul, with the one now in Travancore, will furnish the proposed allotment.

TRICHINOPOLY.

The corps from Moulmein with the four now at Trichinopoly will make up the proposed allotment.

MYSORE.

A regiment of Native Cavalry withdrawn from Arcot, one of European and one of Native Infantry from Bellary, and two of the Native Infantry, from the Northern Division, will complete the additional force proposed to be stationed in Mysore.

PALAVARAM.

One of the three Native corps now at Nellore to be withdrawn, for the allotment proposed for Palaveram.

ARTILLERY.

I differ in the proportions of artillery to be allotted to troops. Four pieces for a thousand men is a proportion, I believe, far beyond what has ever been brought into as the complement.

I agree with the suggestion that the European Horse Artillery should be complete 500.

performance of the duties at present entailed on the troops within frontier.

76. The Artillery of Madras is organised entirely as field artillery, but available for garrisons and sieges, as well as for the field. Thirty horse and 144 foot artillery guns are the complement of field pieces established for the army.

2. The Horse Artillery have invariably been equipped and organised

in a manner hefitting the expense attendant on this branch of the arm, and no changes can I recommend in this force, other than to equalise all the troops in men, guns, cattle, and natures of ordnance.

3. The establishment for the Foot Artillery is calculated to give 144 field pieces—that is 18 companies, estimated at eight guns and ammunition waggons each; but neither in men or cattle are these companies capable of manning, working, or moving their guns; and therefore the number of field pieces capable of being brought efficiently into the field can only be estimated at 54.

For of the 10 artillery kharkhanahs, consisting of 1,200 bullocks and 600 drivers, seven only have the full complement of 132 bullocks and 66 drivers each; while the other three have only 92 bullocks and 46 drivers each; consequently, there are only kharkhanah bullocks for  $8\frac{1}{2}$  companies of artillery, with their waggons complete, without in any way providing for spare cattle for forage and artificers' carts, and draughts of spare carriages, therefore the kharkhanah bullock establishments of the artillery of the Madras army can only just move, on the field of exercise, 68 field pieces instead of 144 field guns, with their full equipments, and could not do more than bring 54 field pieces fully organised and equipped into the field of battle; and this calculation supposes all those field pieces to be of the smallest calibre.

4. Under this calculation the artillery of the Madras Army can only, with its present establishments, bring 84 field pieces capable of efficient movement into the field; that is, 30 field pieces of horse artillery and 54 of foot; total 84.

This amount of artillery can only be viewed as a very limited and insufficient establishment, bearing no proportion to the cavalry and infantry of the army, which, estimated in round numbers at 45,000 men, ought to be provided with at least 180 pieces of artillery, and of which number 96 pieces are deficient.

5. Under the present financial difficulties I could not press an opinion that so expensive an increase is indispensably necessary, but

REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

plete in all its equipments, horses, guns, &c.; and for the present the Native Horse Artillery which is now mounted and equipped to be kept so for the present.

Under the projected organisation of the artillery of the Indian Army, when on the Madras establishment, none but European Horse Artillery are to be maintained; the whole of the guns of that arm should be kept complete.

Sixty pieces of ordnance—or, if the batteries be considered the basis of organisation, eight batteries (64 pieces)—is ample to be kept in a state of equipment; thus giving 94 pieces of ordnance fit for service, which is two per 1,000 men; and I fancy it will be found practically that few armies have had larger proportions in the field.

I think the suggestions regarding the distribution of the field officers of Artillery good, and ought to be attended to, except that a field officer at Bellary will no longer be necessary, nor is one at Masulipatam required; the number of field officers generally present with the artillery would hardly allow of the larger number.

With regard to the various suggestions respecting the nature of ordnance which ought to be adopted, I consider it unnecessary to enter on that wide field of discussion. It is perfectly absurd that the armies of the three Presidencies should continue, as at present, without any.

And I conceive an end must at once be put to so ludicrous an anomaly. I see but one way of coming to a right understanding, and that is by forming a Board of Artillery officers selected from each Presidency, and directing them to discuss fully the whole points at issue, and then the superior authorities to come to a determination which shall regulate the whole matter.

I avoid all observations on the nature of artillery as a useless discussion in the present state of the question.

but certainly this valuable arm is now in a very disorganised, incomplete, and inefficient state, from the want of defined natures of ordnance, and the means of transports; and I cannot consider less than a full equipment for 120 of the most efficient field pieces a suitable provision for this branch of the Madras Army, with reference to the possible events which may call it into action either for offensive or defensive operations.

6. The organisation of our artillery is at present on the most expensive scale, without adding in any way to its efficiency; small corps of four companies each, fritter away the services of field officers, accumulate staff, both commissioned and non-commissioned, remove officers from company duty, add unnecessarily to establishments, artificers, and all attachés of a corps, without producing any one corresponding advantage. Artillery must be viewed as a corps composed of horse and foot, and divided into batteries, and their composition must be viewed differently to other arms; they are more detached and act in separate bodies, and therefore do not require the compact organisation of infantry; their returns and reports, their registers and pay accounts, and all the internal economy, as a corps, may be preserved with fewer staff and establishments than at present, while their field officers are more urgently required with its component parts in a detached state, and might be more profitably employed in commanding the artillery of divisions than skeleton battalions at its head quarters.

At present we see at St. Thomas's Mount—

2 Troops of Horse Artillery,  
2½ Companies of Foot Artillery,  
2¼ Companies of Golundauze,

Employing—

4 Field Officers,  
8 Regimental Commanding Staff,  
16 Regimental Non-Commanding Staff,  
4 Medical Officers, with—  
4 Bazar Establishments, and—  
4 Sets of Artificers;

and there is no probability of their commands being increased, for detachments are more likely to be augmented than diminished. Efficiency certainly does not recommend such an organisation. The economy of the time by no means warrants it, and the great want of officers with companies, and in detached commands, imperatively urge a distribution more consonant with the discipline of the troops, and the pursuit of scientific and professional objects at out stations.

7. With these views, I would recommend that the whole of the European Foot Artillery be formed into one regiment, to be denominated the regiment of European Foot Artillery.

That all the troops, Native and European, be as at present "a Brigade of Horse Artillery," and the Golundauze Companies, one Battalion of Golundauze; and that the whole of the Gun Lascars and dismounted Horse Artillery be incorporated into the Golundauze Battalion. This will at once reduce one-half of the regimental commands, commissioned and non-commissioned staff, military and medical, bazar establishments, artificers, and all the attachés of three corps, whilst every object connected with internal economy accounts, &c. will be equally attained.

8. The field officers of the corps of artillery, although proportionate to the allotment for other branches of the service, are fewer than in the Royal Artillery, and it would be as detrimental to the science and efficiency of this valuable arm, as unjust, to

make

make any reduction, but they may be more appropriately and beneficially distributed and employed, and this is the object I have in view. The artillery of each subsidiary or field force, and of every division of the army commanded by a general officer, and having a depôt of ordnance and magazine of stores, should be commanded by a field officer of artillery, with an adjutant and serjeant major, and this staff will not only maintain the discipline and science of the detachments of artillery in their respective divisions, but must be made answerable for the efficiency of the ordnance and stores in use, for the cattle attached, and for all the component parts of the ordnance field equipments in use with corps or detachments. The field officer commanding may also be made eminently useful in superintending and controlling, under the divisional commanding officer, the ordnance depôt, the ordnance on works, and in store, and all the ammunitions, small stores, arms and accoutrements, and in examining, checking, and reporting to the divisional officer the state of the books and accounts, the due employment of the ordnance officers and establishments; and as he must be senior to the commissary of ordnance, whose commission is in abeyance while so employed, there can be no objection to this controlling power over the stores under the authority of the divisional commanding officer and the military Board; by this plan the following number of field officers, adjutants, and serjeant majors, would be required—

	Field Officers.	Adjutant.	Serjeant Major.
Nagpore - - - - -	1	1	1
Hydrabad - - - - -	1	1	1
Northern Division - - - - -	1	1	1
Southern „ - - - - -	1	1	1
Mysore „ - - - - -	1	1	1
Ceded Districts - - - - -	1	1	1
Fort St. George - - - - -	1	1	1
Head Quarters (3 corps) - - - - -	3	3	3
TOTAL - - - - -	10	10	10

We have now 12 field officers, five adjutants, five quartermasters, besides those belonging to troops. Three quartermasters will be required for the three corps, but the difference of pay between the two that will be replaced by adjutants and the present division adjutants will about square it; this arrangement will be much more efficient and respectable than the present.

9. The nature of ordnance to be allotted for the field artillery is alone determinable by the Supreme Government; but I would urge on the attention of the Governor General, that the most efficient pieces are the best and least expensive to the State, and that as doubts have justly been attached to the efficiency of the pieces denominated 9-pounder guns, and 24-pounder howitzers of reduced weight, introduced lately into Bengal, it appears to me far preferable that the English natures of these calibres should be adopted in preference to all others of doubtful efficiency, and therefore I recommend that the 5-pounder gun and 12-pounder howitzer be allotted to the horse artillery batteries, and that the standard pieces for the foot artillery batteries should be the 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers, either of the English pattern or of some pieces of approved modified weight.

10. The number of pieces of ordnance to compose a battery rests also with the Supreme Government; but in reference to economy,

economy, simplicity, and real efficiency, and for the advantages of sub-division, eight pieces are the preferable number, for of whatever number of pieces a battery may consist, the number of pieces for the whole army, if formed on just proportions, will not be affected by the number of batteries; and whilst such determined number of pieces would require a certain number of men and cattle to work and move them, the unnecessary expenses and incumbrances, created by forming batteries of six instead of eight pieces, would be the difference of officers, reserve men, reserve cattle, extra establishments of artificers, carts, forges, &c., exceeding the number necessary for batteries of eight pieces by the subdivision into batteries of six pieces; and I believe all the best authorities of the present age, from Napoleon to the last proceedings of the Royal Artillery Sub-Committee, which obtained the approval of Wellington, sanction my recommendation, for the reasons I have assigned, for economy, efficiency, and concentrated fire.

11. The number of men and cattle in each troop and company, European or Native, for the sake of uniformity and discipline, ought to be equal, and that each battery should be made as imposing and efficient in itself as possible.

12. The latest fixed establishment of ordnance for the garrisons and for the heavy field artillery is specified in Appendix; but the variety of natures of ordnance therein established, consisting of—

#### Guns—

42-pounders, 32-pounders, 24-pounders, 20-pounders, 18-pounders, 12-pounders, 9-pounders, 6-pounders, 4-pounders, 3-pounders, 1-pounder.

#### Mortars—

13, 10, 8, 5½, and 4½ inches.

Howitzers—I strongly urge on the attention of the Governor General the immediate revision of this branch of the ordnance; for the multiplicity of every description of stores consequent on the numerous natures of ordnance, the expense, the loss, waste and confusion created by such masses and variety of stores, prove the necessity of immediate simplification of the natures of ordnance, and a reduction in the number of natures will give efficiency and economy, increased in proportion to the simplification.

The natures of the ordnance I will not now enumerate, being dependent on the general military system of India, and consequently to be decided on by the Supreme Government; but I would mention the advantages resulting from combining the natures of garrison, heavy and light field ordnance as much as possible, and thereby reducing the artillery to four or, to the utmost, five natures of ordnance.

#### REMARKS by Sir Frederick Adam.

I cannot agree; 80,000 stand quite ample; the expenditure has been most wasteful, but even then it has never exceeded 9,000 stand a year, so that if 150,000 were to be in store, we should have nearly 15 years' supply.

#### ALLOTMENT OF SMALL ARMS.

The number of small arms to be kept up in the magazines of the advanced forces beyond frontier, must be determined on considerations not affecting this army; but I would recommend that arms for not more than one-fourth the complement of the effective, subsidiary forces be retained.

The grand depôt of Fort St. George is capable and well adapted for containing nearly 120,000 stand of arms ; and, considering the establishment of the Madras army reduced, if not below, to the lowest possible numbers, and therefore the probability of new levies being made, and the liability of sudden and great demands to organise and supply with arms the people of other States and countries, besides new levies at home, induced me to recommend the complement of 100,000 arms being always kept up in the arsenal of Fort St. George, and 50,000 in the magazines within the frontier, and with a corresponding number of pistols, swords, and fusils. This may appear a large allotment of small arms for an army under 50,000 infantry, but it must be kept in mind that an extended territory must not depend on any one source of supply, that by fire or other accident even the general depôts may be destroyed, as was the case at Fort William and Allahabad ; and that demands to arm new levies, the population, and our own immediate tributaries, may be multiplied by demands upon the Indian Government from Persia, Cabool, and other allies in north of Asia, or for the Eastern Archipelago.

#### CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, I feel it impossible to close this Minute without adverting to the present strength and organisation of the cavalry and infantry of the Indian Army, which is defective as it regards both efficiency and economy, by the low establishment fixed for corps, by which all the additional expenses of staff and establishments are maintained for most reduced numbers of rank and file.

#### REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

It is unnecessary to discuss the weak establishments of the several corps of infantry and cavalry ; my opinions are already recorded, but I think we ought at once to keep up the horses to the full complement.

#### DRAGOONS.

There is but one regiment on the establishment, but its organisation is correct and applicable if kept complete in men and horses ; but the Governor General is aware that His Majesty's 13th Dragoons has never, since its arrival in India, been quite complete in rank and file, and that by local regulations it is kept deficient 96 horses less than its effective strength of men for duty in India. The European light dragoon must be considered as the heavy cavalry or reserve of that arm in India, and should be kept complete in men and horses, not only to be prepared for field service, but in the event of any combinations or conspiracies calling forth the energies of the European part of our force.

#### LIGHT CAVALRY.

There are eight regiments of six troops each, amounting to 444 rank and file each, but cavalry may be calculated by swords, more expressive for its real strength than rank and file.

These regiments, therefore, may be estimated at 500 swords each, but of which effective force there are in each corps 72 men dismounted, and the body-guard to be deducted, which leaves little more than 408 mounted swords in each regiment, or a total of 3,264 effective cavalry.

If economy is an object, combined with efficiency, I should recommend strong regiments of eight troops each, and that the whole be kept complete in horses, with the exception of 40 horses of the dragoons and 20 of each regiment of light cavalry to be kept deficient, as there are always invalids, sick and absent men to that amount, and therefore it seems only necessary to horse them up to the full complement when field operations are in contemplation.

## EUROPEAN INFANTRY.

This arm was never at so reduced an establishment as at present; in

1802	we had	14,400	rank and file.
1812	„	12,000	ditto.
1822	„	7,234	ditto.
1832	„	6,592	ditto.

This, however, is the establishment, but it is by no means complete, and includes the Honourable East India Company's European Regiment. I do not think that our European infantry force should be less than 10,000 men, and that no regiment should consist of less than 10 companies of 95 rank and file. It is obvious that our present European force is not more than equal to the maintenance of our interests in profound peace and tranquillity, and that their want would be severely felt if internal commotions or external demands should suddenly arise, and, in those events, where are we to look for reinforcements?

## NATIVE INFANTRY.

The regiments of this line of the service are now complete skeletons, and the commonest demands for detachments and ordinary duties leave but the name of a regiment or a colour reserve. Economy, as well as efficiency, prescribe strong and complete corps; we have now 35,560 rank and file of Native infantry, divided into 52 regiments of 680 rank and file each; how great a saving might be effected, if the amount of Native infantry required for this army, which I estimate at 40,000 men, were collected into 40 regiments of 1,000 strong each, and I do not think that any Native infantry regiment of less than 1,000 men can be considered an effective body, and fit to take its place in line of battle, or to maintain its discipline perfect even in garrison, after providing for those detachments, guards, escorts, and absentees, which must fall to be furnished, more or less, by every corps of Native infantry.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

I do not concur in this opinion. I have not seen that these corps are of the efficiency stated, and if not they cannot be economical.

## VETERAN BATTALIONS.

It is much to be regretted that this useful, efficient, and economical branch of the infantry was ever reduced. We have now only two battalions of Native veterans, but there should be one in each division to take the minor details of duty, and in proportion as this force is maintained, so will be the efficiency of the regiments of the line, both in material and discipline, and they are the cheapest corps we can embody.

Ootacamund,  
25 August 1834.

(signed) *R. W. O'Callaghan*,  
Lieutenant General and  
Commander in Chief.

## No. 1.

RETURN of the ESTABLISHED STRENGTH of the MADRAS ARMY, without reference to the Number Wanting to Complete, made up to 30th June 1834.

	Total Rank and File.	Total of each Arm.	TOTAL Strength of the Army.
<b>CAVALRY :</b>			
His Majesty's 13th Light Dragoons - - -	640		
Eight Regiments, Light Cavalry - - -	3,552	4,192	
<b>ARTILLERY :</b>			
Four Troops European Horse Artillery - - -	408		
Two Troops Native Horse Artillery - - -	180		
Twelve Companies of European Foot Artillery - -	1,164		
Six Companies of Native Foot Artillery - - -	600	2,352	
<b>EUROPEAN INFANTRY :</b>			
*Eight King's Regiments of Foot - - - -	5,888		
One Company's European Regiment - - - -	680	6,568	
Sappers and Miners - - - - -	664	664	
<b>NATIVE INFANTRY :</b>			
Fifty-two Regiments Native Infantry - - - -	-	35,360	
<b>IRREGULAR CORPS :</b>			
Wynaad Rangers - - - - -	200	200	
Residents' Escorts - - - - -	-		
<b>VETERANS :</b>			
Carnatic European Veteran Battalion - - -	217	-	
Two Native Veteran Battalions - - - -	2,160	2,377	
Gun Lascars - - - - -	-	-	51,713
Drivers - - - - -	-	-	480
			600
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>			<b>52,793</b>

\* There are at present nine King's corps on this establishment, but eight only are included, one being under orders of draft.



## DISTRIBUTION of the Amount of the several Branches of the MADRAS ARMY, and their Numerical Strength in Rank and File, made up to 30th June 1834.

	Regiments.					Artillery.			Companies of Sappers.	Veteran Battalions.		Ordnance.			Dragoons.		Light Cavalry.		Total of Cavalry.		Infantry.		TOTAL of European and Native Infantry.	Veterans.		Sappers.		Grand Total of Cavalry and Infantry.	
	His Majesty's Dragoons.	Light Cavalry.	His Majesty's Infantry.	Madras European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Troops.	Companies.	TOTAL.		European.	Native.	Horse.	Foot.	TOTAL.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	Horses.
Travancore - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	680	680	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Southern Division -	-	1	1	-	6	-	1	1	4	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	4,080	4,816	-	-	-	332	-	
Malabar and Canara -	-	-	1	-	3	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	2,040	2,776	-	-	-	-	-	
Coorg - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	680	680	-	-	-	-	-	
Mysore - - -	1	1	1	-	6	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	4	8	12	640	701	444	506	1,084	1,207	736	4,080	4,816	-	-	83	-	
Ceded Districts -	-	1	1	-	3	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	2,040	2,776	-	-	-	-	-	
Centre Division -	-	2	1	-	8	2	5½	7½	-	-	2	-	8	-	8	-	-	888	1,012	888	1,012	736	5,440	6,176	-	2,160	-	-	
Northern Division -	-	-	1	-	10	-	1½	1½	1	1	-	-	14	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	6,800	7,536	217	-	-	83	-	
Beyond frontier -	-	3	1	1	11	3	4	7	2	-	-	-	18	32	50	-	-	1,332	1,518	1,332	1,518	1,416	7,480	8,896	-	-	150	-	
Beyond seas - - -	-	-	1	-	3	-	2½	2½	-	-	-	-	20	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	2,040	2,776	-	-	-	16	-	
TOTALS - - -	1	8	8	1	52	6	18	24	8	1	2	30	98	128	640	701	3,552	4,048	4,192	4,749	6,568	35,360	41,928	217	2,160	-	664	-	

N.B.—Nine King's Regiments on the rolls of the Army; one under orders for England; body guard included in cavalry regiments. For the Foot Artillery guns there are organised kharkanas of bullocks for seven batteries of eight guns each, and three small kharkanas for the draft of eight guns each, but not for the draft of ammunition.

No. 3.

DISTRIBUTION of the MADRAS ARTILLERY.

STATION.	Nature of Troops.	Troops and Companies.		Rank and File.	6-Pounders Attached.		Horses Attached.	Bullocks.	Rank and File of Gun Mascars.	Rank and File of Drivers.	REMARKS.
		Horse.	Foot.		Horse.	Foot.					
St. Thomas Mount -	Head Quarters of Horse Brigade	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100 Native Artillery, 20 European, 20 Gun Lascars, furnished monthly to the Garrison of Fort St. George, and 25 Natives to Nellore, as included in this. Two dismounted troops of Horse Artillery.
	Head Quarters of 2nd Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Head Quarters of 3rd Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Head Quarters of 4th Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Horse Artillery, European	-	-	204	8	-	238	-	-	-	
	Foot Artillery, European	-	3½	335	-	not fixed	-	92	120	46	
	Foot Artillery, Native	-	2½	225	-	not fixed	-	92	65	46	
	Dismounted Details of Horse Artillery.	-	none	185	-	none	-	-	-	-	
Trichinopoly -	Foot Artillery, European	-	¾	71	-	6	-	98	20	49	
Palamecotta -	Foot Artillery, European	-	¾	26	-	2	-	34	10	17	
Bangalore -	Horse Artillery, Native	1	-	90	4	-	126	-	-	-	
	Foot Artillery, European	-	1	97	-	8	-	132	30	66	
Cannanore -	Foot Artillery, Native	-	¾	75	-	6	-	-	10	-	
Coorg Field Force -	Foot Artillery, Native	-	¼	25	-	not known	-	-	10	-	
Bellary -	Foot Artillery, European	-	1	97	-	8	-	132	30	66	
Masulipatam -	Foot Artillery, European	-	1	97	-	8	-	66	30	33	
Chicacole -	Foot Artillery, Native	-	¾	75	-	none	-	66	20	33	
Secunderabad -	Head Quarters, 1st Battalion, European.	-	1	97	-	8	-	132	30	66	
	Horse Artillery, Native	1	-	90	6	-	150	-	-	-	
Jaulnah -	Horse Artillery, European	1	-	102	6	-	163	-	-	-	
	Foot Artillery, Native	-	1	100	-	8	-	-	20	-	
Nagpore -	Foot Artillery, European	-	2	194	-	16	-	264	60	132	
	Horse Artillery, European	1	-	102	6	-	163	-	-	-	
Coast of Tenasserim:											
Mergin -	Foot Artillery, European	-	1	97	-	not fixed	-	-	30	-	
Tunoy -		-	1	97	-	not fixed	-	-	30	-	
Moulmein -		-	1	97	-	not fixed	-	-	30	-	
Penang -	Foot Artillery, European	-	¼	53	-	not fixed	-	-	-	-	
	Foot Artillery, Native	-	1	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Singapore -	Foot Artillery, Native	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Malacca -	Foot Artillery, Native	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL Fixed Establishment		6	18	2,537	30	70	840	1,200	480	600	

MEMORANDUM of ARTILLERY beyond the Frontier and beyond Seas.

Hydrabad Subsidiary Force.	Head Quarters of 1st Battalion	-	1	97	-	8	-	132	30	66
	Foot Artillery, European.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Horse Artillery, Native	1	-	90	6	-	150	-	-	-
Nagpore Subsidiary Force.	Foot Artillery, Native	-	1	100	-	8	-	-	20	-
	Horse Artillery, European	1	-	102	6	-	163	-	-	-
	Foot Artillery, European	-	1	102	6	-	163	-	-	-
Coast of Tenasserim	Foot Artillery, European	-	2	194	-	16	-	264	-	132
Penang -	Foot Artillery, European	-	1	97	-	not fixed	-	-	30	-
Singapore -		-	¾	53	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malacca -		-	1	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		3	6½	935	18	32	476	396	80	198

N.B.—Out of the 18 Companies of Foot Artillery, each with 8 guns, 7 have bullocks attached to move guns, waggons, and store carts, and for the guns alone.

Foot Artillery batteries equipped, 56; and 3 batteries of 8 guns, without ammunition, or 3 of 4-gun batteries, 12:—Total, 68.

No. 4.

RETURN of TROOPS of the MADRAS ARMY Employed beyond the Frontier and beyond Seas, the Subsidiary Forces of Mysore and Travancore not included.

	Regiments.				Artillery.			Companies of Sappers.	Ordnance.			Light Cavalry.		Total of Cavalry.		Infantry.		Total of European and Native Infantry.		Saj.
	Light Cavalry.	His Majesty's Infantry.	Madrass European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Troops	Companies.	TOTAL.		Horse.	Foot.	TOTAL.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	
Subsidiary Forces								No.	No.	No.										
Secunderabad -	1	1	-	4	1	1	2	2	6	8	14	444	506	444	506	736	2,720	3,456	-	
Nizam -	1	-	-	3	1	1	2	-	6	8	14	444	6	444	506	-	2,040	2,040	-	
Nagpore -	1	-	1	4	1	2	3	-	6	16	22	444	506	444	506	680	2,720	3,400	-	
Tenasserim Coast -	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	8	8	-	-	-	-	736	680	1,416	-		
Straits of Malacca -	-	-	-	2	-	1½	1½	-	-	12	12	-	-	-	-	1,360	-	1,360	-	
TOTAL	3	2	1	14	3	6½	9½	2	18	52	70	1,332	1,518	1,332	1,518	2,152	9,520	11,672	-	

N.B.—The number of Foot Artillery guns as established are inserted, but the Foot Artillery battery at Jaulnah is supplied with hired cattle for the draft of the guns.

PRESENT and PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of FORCES within FRONTIER.

	Regiments.					Artillery.			Companies of Sappers.	Veteran Battalions.		Ordnance.			Dragoons.		Light Cavalry.		Total of Cavalry.		Infantry.		Total European and Native Infantry.	Veterans.		Sappers.		Grand Total of Cavalry and Infantry.	
	Her Majesty's Dragoons.	Light Cavalry.	Her Majesty's Infantry.	Madras European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Troops.	Companies.	TOTAL.		European.	Native.	Horse.	Foot.	TOTAL.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	Horses.
<i>No. 5.</i>																													
<i>Present Distribution:</i>																													
Travancore	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	680	680	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Southern Division	-	1	1	-	6	-	1	1	4	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	4,080	4,816	-	-	-	832	-	
Malabar and Canara	-	-	1	-	3	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	2,040	2,776	-	-	-	-	-	
Coorg	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	680	680	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mysore	1	1	1	-	6	1	1	2	1	-	-	4	8	12	640	701	444	506	1,084	1,207	736	4,080	4,816	-	-	-	83	-	
Ceded Districts	-	1	1	-	3	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	2,040	2,766	-	-	-	-	-	
Centre Division	-	2	1	-	8	2	5½	7½	-	-	2	8	-	8	-	-	888	1,012	888	1,012	736	5,440	6,176	-	2,160	-	-	-	
Northern Division	-	-	1	-	10	-	1½	1½	1	1	-	-	14	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	6,800	7,536	216	-	-	83	-	
TOTAL	1	5	6	-	38	3	11½	14½	6	1	2	12	46	58	640	701	2,220	2,530	2,860	3,231	4,416	25,840	30,256	216	2,160	-	498	-	
<i>No. 6.</i>																													
<i>Proposed Distribution:</i>																													
Travancore	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	680	680	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Southern Division	-	1	1	-	7	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	4,760	5,496	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malabar and Canara	-	-	1	-	4	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	2,720	3,456	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coorg	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	680	680	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mysore	1	2	2	-	10	2	2	4	2	-	-	12	16	28	640	701	888	1,012	1,528	1,719	1,472	6,800	8,272	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ceded Districts	-	1	1	-	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	1,960	2,096	-	-	-	-	-	-
Centre Division	-	1	1	-	9	1	4½	5½	-	-	2	6	28	34	-	-	444	506	444	506	736	6,120	6,856	-	2,160	-	-	-	-
Northern Division	-	-	1	-	10	-	1½	1½	1	1	-	-	14	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	6,800	7,536	216	-	-	83	-	-
TOTAL	1	5	7	-	44	3	11½	14½	3	1	2	18	62	100	640	701	2,220	2,530	2,660	3,231	5,152	29,920	35,072	216	2,160	-	83	-	-

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).



No. 7.

DIFFERENCE between the PRESENT and PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY.

	Regiments.					Artillery.			Companies of Sappers.	Veteran Battalions.		Ordnance.			Dragoons.		Light Cavalry.		Total of Cavalry.		Infantry.		Total of European and Native Infantry.	Veterans.		Sappers.		Grand Total, Cavalry and Infantry.	
	His Majesty's Dragoons.	Light Cavalry.	His Majesty's Infantry.	Madras European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Troops.	Companies.	TOTAL.		European.	Native.	Horse.	Foot.	TOTAL.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Rank and File.	Horses.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	European Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Rank and File.	Horses.
Southern Division											No.	No.	No.																
Malabar and Canara					1							2	2								680	680							
Coorg												2	2																
Mysore		1	1		4	1	1	2	1			8	8	16			444	506	444	506	796	2,720	3,456				89		
Ceded Districts					1																680	680							
Centre Division		1				1	1	2								444	506	444	506										
Within Frontier	At Present	1	5	6	38	3	11½	14½	6	1	2	12	46	58	640	701	2,220	2,530	2,860	3,231	4,416	25,840	30,256	216	2,160		498		
	Proposed	1	5	7	44	3	11½	14½		1	2	18	82	100	640	701	2,220	2,530	2,860	3,231	5,152	29,920	35,072	216	2,160				
	Increase			1	6							6	36	42							796	4,080	4,816						

## No. 8.

RETURN of the Number of GARRISON ORDNANCE, with the GARRISONS AND FORCES of the  
Madras Army.

	42-Pounders.	32-Pounders.	24-Pounders.	20-Pounders.	18-Pounders.	12-Pounders.	9-Pounders.	6-Pounders.	4-Pounders.	3-Pounders.	1-Pounder.	Mortars, 13-inch.	Mortars, 10-inch.	Mortars, 8-inch.	Mortars, 5½-inch.	Mortars, 4½-inch.
Arsenal of Bellary - - -	-	-	-	-	8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6	-
„ Bangalore - - -	-	-	1	-	10	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	-
„ Vellore - - -	-	-	3	-	18	2	5	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
„ Cannanore - - -	-	-	4	-	42	18	4	4	11	2	-	-	1	-	2	-
„ Masulipatam - - -	-	-	22	15	17	16	21	3	-	-	-	1	1	1	9	-
„ Fort St. George - - -	21	135	154	-	169	211	104	38	1	-	-	8	4	15	23	-
Mount Artillery Depôt - - -	-	-	7	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	6	8	3	1
Palamecottah - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trichinopoly - - -	-	-	12	-	18	15	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6	7	-
Vizigapatam - - -	-	-	5	-	-	10	5	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jaulnah - - -	-	-	-	-	7	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-
Moulmein - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Nagpore - - -	-	-	2	-	7	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	2	-
Secunderabad - - -	-	-	-	-	8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	6	-
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>1</b>

## No. 9.

LIST showing the Number of GARRISON ORDNANCE mentioned by Order of Government in their  
Letter of 1st March 1813.

	32-Pounders.	24-Pounders.	20-Pounders.	18-Pounders.	12-Pounders.	9-Pounders.	6-Pounders.	Mortars, 13-inch.	Mortars, 10-inch.	Mortars, 8-inch.	Mortars, 5½-inch.
Arsenal of Bellary - - -	-	-	-	15	15	-	20	-	2	-	6
„ Gooty - - -	-	-	-	10	10	-	16	-	2	-	2
„ Dindigul - - -	-	-	-	-	6	-	6	-	-	-	-
„ Bangalore - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	20	-	-	-	2
„ Ryacottah - - -	-	2	-	-	10	-	12	-	-	-	4
„ Paulhautcherry - - -	-	-	-	10	-	-	10	-	-	-	2
„ Vellore - - -	-	-	-	24	6	-	20	-	-	6	4
„ Chittledroog - - -	-	-	-	6	10	-	20	-	-	-	8
„ Seringapatam - - -	-	30	-	120	100	-	150	6	10	10	24
„ Cannanore - - -	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
„ Masulipatam - - -	-	20	10	10	-	30	-	-	2	6	2
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>54</b>

No. 10.

ABSTRACT of the DIVISIONS.

	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Revenues.	Number of Rank and File of Soldiers.	Proportion		
					Of Soldiers to Square Miles.	Of Soldiers to Population.	
<b>Present Distribution :</b>							
I. Southern Division - - -	23,936	5,238,895	15,576,916	5,260	1 to 456	1 to 996	
II. Travancore and Cochln - - -	9,400	893,000	3,946,720	680	1 to 13'82	1 to 5685'6	
III. Malabar and Kanara - - -	13,780	1,669,118	5,502,894	2,776	1 to 4'9	1 to 601'3	
IV. Mysore - - -	27,300	2,573,500	8,000,000	5,900	1 to 4'63	1 to 436'2	
V. Coorg - - -	2,200	-	-	680	1 to 3'2	-	
VI. Ceded Districts - - -	24,000	1,928,814	5,513,169	3,222	1 to 7'45	1 to 698'6	
VII. Centre Division - - -	18,900	2,095,790	10,550,240	7,064	* 1 to 2'67	1 to 296'6	
VIII. Northern Division - - -	14,200	2,518,199	6,388,937	7,536	1 to 1'88	1 to 334'1	
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>133,756</b>	<b>16,917,316</b>	<b>55,478,876</b>	<b>33,118</b>	<b>1 to 403</b>	<b>1 to 510'8</b>	
<b>Proposed Distribution :</b>							
I. Southern Division - - -	20,102	4,393,292	12,975,841	5,940	1 to 3'38	1 to 751'4	
II. Travancore and Cochln - - -	9,400	893,000	3,946,720	680	1 to 13'82	1 to 5685'6	
III. Malabar and Kanara - - -	17,654	2,514,721	8,103,969	3,456	1 to 5'10	1 to 727'6	
IV. Mysore - - -	27,300	2,573,500	8,000,000	9,800	1 to 2'78	1 to 262'6	
V. Coorg - - -	2,200	-	-	680	1 to 3'2	-	
VI. Ceded Districts - - -	24,000	1,928,814	5,513,169	2,540	1 to 9'45	1 to 759'3	
VII. Centre Division - - -	18,900	2,095,790	10,550,240	7,300	1 to 2'59	1 to 687	
VIII. Northern Division - - -	14,200	2,518,199	6,388,937	7,536	1 to 1'88	1 to 334'1	
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>133,756</b>	<b>16,917,316</b>	<b>*55,478,876</b>	<b>37,932</b>	<b>1 to 35</b>	<b>1 to 44'6</b>	

Allowing 3,000 rank and file for garrisons of Vellore and Fort Saint George, the proportion of soldiers to the area will then be 1 to 4'65 miles.

DISPOSITION SKETCH of the MADRAS ARMY.

On No. 1. PRESENT DISTRIBUTION.						On No. 2. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION.					
	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Number of Rank and File of Cavalry and Infantry.	Ordnance Horsed.			Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Number of Rank and File of Cavalry and Infantry.	Ordnance Horsed.	
				Horse.	Foot.					Horse.	Foot.
Triangle - - -	144,700	13,746,500	33,116	12	44	Triangle - - -	144,700	*13,746,500	37,932	18	92
Circle - - -	75,970	7,217,150	20,580	12	34	Circle - - -	75,970	7,217,150	24,749	18	60
Centre Division - - -	18,900	2,095,790	7,064	8	12	Centre Division - - -	18,900	2,095,790	7,300	6	30
Southern Division - - -	23,976	5,238,895	5,260	-	8	Southern Division - - -	20,102	4,393,290	5,940	-	8
Travancore - - -	9,400	893,000	680	-	-	Travancore - - -	9,400	893,000	680	-	-
Malabar and Kanara - - -	13,780	1,669,118	2,776	-	-	Malabar and Kanara - - -	17,654	2,514,721	3,456	-	-
Coorg - - -	2,200	209,000	680	-	-	Coorg - - -	2,200	209,000	680	-	-
Mysore Division - - -	27,300	2,573,500	5,900	4	8	Mysore Division - - -	27,300	2,573,500	9,800	12	16
Ceded Districts - - -	24,000	1,928,814	3,222	-	8	Ceded Districts - - -	24,000	1,928,814	2,540	-	8
Northern Division - - -	14,200	2,518,199	7,536	-	8	Northern Division - - -	14,200	2,518,199	-	-	-
Nizam's Dominions - - -	108,800	-	6,384	12	8	Nizam's Dominions - - -	108,800	-	-	-	-
Nagpore - - -	64,270	3,000,000	3,844	6	16	Nagpore - - -	64,270	3,000,000	-	-	-
Tenasserim - - -	15,000	-	1,416	-	-	Tenasserim - - -	15,000	-	-	-	-
Straits - - -	1,230	45,070	1,360	-	-	Straits - - -	1,230	45,079	-	-	-

Note.—These statements accompany a map of early date (1835), which it is presumed will not be required.

(No. 60, of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Consultation, 25th  
May 1835, Nos.  
17 and 18.

IN continuation of the separate letter to your Honourable Court, dated Ootacamund, the 9th August 1834, and with reference to our separate letter, No. 24, dated the 26th February last, we have the honour to forward herewith, for the consideration of your Honourable Court, Minutes by the Governor General and Mr. Prinsep, dated 19th April and 29th May 1835, offering observations on the late Governor General's Minutes, proposing a re-organization of the Indian Army.

We have, &c.  
(signed) C. T. Metcalfe.  
A. Ross.  
W. Morison.  
H. T. Prinsep.

Fort William, 1 June 1835.

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 MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

Military Department, 19 April 1835.

ON taking my seat as Governor General in the Council of India, I found several Minutes, recently recorded by the Right Honourable the late Governor General, relating to the army, and, consequently, to our most vital interests; for on the army, I need hardly say, depends our existence in this country.

These documents have been transmitted, I believe, to the Honourable the Court of Directors, and I am not sure that they are properly before this Government for consideration. Nevertheless, the importance of the subject induces me to offer such opinions as occur to me on the plans which they develop. Such of them as I propose to discuss I shall take seriatim, beginning with that dated Ootacamund, 23rd July 1834, which yields to none in importance.

In that Minute the reduction is proposed of 29 regiments of infantry, seven regiments of cavalry, and a large proportion of artillery, in the armies of the several Presidencies.

It is proposed to effect this reduction without diminution of the total numerical strength of the army, and a saving is thereby contemplated immediately of Rs. 13,81,370. 13., and respectively of Rs. 46,98,741. 15. 6.: Total Rs. 60,80,112. 12. 6.

This is a fascinating plan with reference to the saving proposed, and if the result were certain, and our situation in India fixed, I know not how it could be resisted. But, considering the moveable character of our power in India, considering that in the nature of things it can hardly remain stationary, that we must either advance or retreat, and that a retreat would be the commencement of ruin, there are, in my mind, the strongest objections to any scheme which has the appearance of a retrograde movement, objections far outweighing the uncertain prospect of a saving which may not, and, I venture to prophesy, will not be realized; for, before it can come into effect, events will probably have occurred which will overthrow and nullify all the calculations of the scheme; not specific events which I pretend to foresee, but events setting foresight at defiance, to which, in our precarious state in India, we are always liable.

The whole plan seems to me to be founded on a supposition which I conceive to be erroneous, that our military force is too large, and will admit of reduction. My opinion is totally opposed to this: I apprehend that our force is too small, and that we must keep in view the certainty of increase rather than the possibility of reduction.

Increase is the inevitable tendency of our condition in India. It always has been so, and until we know the fixed unalterable limits of our empire it always must be so. Experience has shown that every attempt at permanent reductions has been futile, or of fleeting effect. Every attempt at reduction has been followed



followed in a few years, if not sooner, by an increase. Reductions at the end of a war, either immediate or gradual, are necessary to shake off a crushing expenditure incurred by increase during the war; but such reductions ought always to be made in a manner which will produce the best possible disorganization of the existing army, and facilitate its increase whenever this may become necessary.

On this principle our present peace establishment was formed. Reduction was made in the numerical strength of regiments as far as it could be carried, with regard to efficiency, thus leaving the organization of the army unaffected, and affording the means of increase in the most expeditious manner, whenever increase might become necessary.

This plan of a peace establishment is approved by the late Governor General, as applied to England, where the practice itself, and the reasoning on which it is founded, are admitted by his Lordship to be just, but is considered by him to be most erroneously applied to India, on the ground that, although war may break out suddenly in Europe, and the greatest state of preparation is there required, no such preparation is necessary in India, there being no power capable of any offensive aggression which one-fourth of our army would not easily repel, and the only enemies by which our dominions can be endangered being far distant, of whose approach we must have timely intelligence, so as to render a state of preparation to meet attack utterly needless.

In this reasoning I cannot concur; we have repeatedly been in a state of similar confidence, which has been suddenly disturbed by an unexpected war. In 1802 a large reduction of the army took place, under the expectation of continued peace. This was followed by a war in 1803, which lasted to 1806, requiring all our energies, and exhausting our resources. Before the Goorkha war we despised our enemies, and thought them utterly powerless. Nevertheless, they proved to be the best soldiers that we had ever had to deal with. Three divisions of our army out of four were defeated, and baffled for a whole campaign; and two-thirds of the infantry of the Bengal army were employed for a long time unsuccessfully against a foe, whom we previously thought incapable of resistance, which same foe we shall some day have to meet again, perhaps, when we may be fully occupied elsewhere. The Marquis of Hastings, whom that war unexpectedly greeted on his arrival in India, left this country in a state of peace, little supposing that he had bequeathed to his successor another war, the most expensive that we have ever had, which required the employment, on an unusual and immense proportion, of our European force, alarmed the minds of our native troops, and filled all India with the hope of our downfall, notwithstanding the then recent triumphs and successes of Lord Hastings' administration. Those very triumphs and successes were gained over powers who were supposed to have been subdued in a former war, who were, in fact, our allies; whose co-operation was due; whose neutrality, at least, was confidently relied on, and who came upon us as enemies unexpectedly, when we were marching to attack and destroy a predatory power that ravaged their territories as well as our own, and whom they ought to have blessed us for eradicating, if the predominating feeling of hatred to our rule had not induced them to run the risk which ended in their own destruction.

There cannot, I conceive, be a greater mistake than to imagine that our situation in India is without danger, or that our only danger is from distant enemies. I do not even think that our greatest danger is at a distance. Our danger is round about us, in the very heart of our own empire, and in every State of India. If there were not this danger in the interior of our dominions, and in every allied and neighbouring State, dependent or independent, we might then indeed calculate what would be requisite to encounter successfully our supposed distant enemies, and reduce our army accordingly, if even then it would admit of reduction; but if we recollect that when we want to send troops to meet external enemies we need troops most at home, and that in time of war, when our force is carried out of our territories, it is most required within them, the argument which would lead us to disregard the necessity of being in a state to make rapid preparation to meet any sudden emergency appears to me to be most fallacious. The fact is, that under no organization of our army can the preparation of regular troops be rapid enough; and it will always be a difficulty when we enter into war, how to supply with sufficient celerity, within our dominions, any description of troops, to be substituted for the preservation of order and tranquillity, in lieu of those that must, on the exigency, be sent away.

I regard the army, in its present state, as consisting of so many regiments on a peace establishment, which may be completed to any strength deemed requisite for a war establishment, whenever the occasion rendering that completion necessary may arise.

I do not profess to consider a regiment of 640 strong in privates as equal to a regiment 800 strong; quite the contrary. But I regard so many regiments more on the former establishment, during peace, as better than so many less on the latter, because they are more easily and more speedily convertible into a sufficient force on the approach of war. I would prefer the 800 to the 640, even as a peace establishment, if we could afford to pay them, because I am satisfied that our force is too small, not too large. But I regard the present reduced scale of regiments as an evil which the state of our finances makes necessary, and which is to be repaired as soon as we have the means.

It appears in the Minute of Lord William Bentinck to be inferred that there would be no diminution of strength in the reduction of a number of regiments, provided that the number of privates remained the same. I cannot think so. The loss of European officers would be an immense loss of strength. What would our native army be without our European officers. The Goorkhas, the best soldiers ever opposed to us in India, told us to take away our European officers, and then see what they would do with our native troops. They were confident of their own superiority over the latter, without the former. They were right; but whether right or wrong, the sentiment evinced the value of our European officers in the eyes of our enemies, and the strength which we derive from them. That loss alone, therefore, would be a great reduction of force.

Apart from that, a reduction of regiments would, in another point of view, be a decrease of strength, greater or less, according to the number reduced. A regiment is a regiment, and for most purposes in peace has the same moral effect, whether it consist of 640 privates or of 800.

If a regiment be stationed to maintain the tranquillity of a district, it produces the effect desired, although consisting of the smaller number.

If a force of several regiments be formed, its moral strength will be greater in the estimation of those it may be sent to overawe if it consist of a greater number of regiments of the lower complement, than if of a smaller number of the higher.

The regiments will be counted and reported by the enemy's spies, not the exact number of the men. And as our regiments on their present strength are more than equal in number to those in the native armies generally, the effect of the number of regiments is not diminished by the low scale of their numerical strength. In a great majority of instances during peace regiments of the present strength would have the same moral effect as if they were on a higher scale in the number of privates, and a reduction of regiments would be, in the important respect of European officers, as well as the Native officers, a real and, in all other respects, an apparent and, therefore, a real reduction of strength.

The disheartening effect of the proposed measure on the whole army, from the oldest European officer down to the youngest sepoy, must be regarded as a very strong objection. Infinite mischief is done by any measure that excites dissatisfaction throughout the army. Nothing can tend more to shake the stability of our empire. Any expense within bounds which would promote cheerfulness in the army would be true economy; and whatever saving would produce discontent and dissatisfaction would be worse than waste.

The whole argument of the Right Honourable the late Governor General in favour of the plan which his Lordship has proposed merely goes to show that the number of men in each regiment is too small. It does not in the slightest degree prove that the number of regiments is too large, which is the thing to be demonstrated before a reduction of regiments can be a just conclusion. The only appropriate remedy for the evil actually shown is an increase in the number of privates in each regiment, a measure of which the advantage is indisputable, and which I should earnestly recommend if I thought that we could afford the expense, which, however, I fear we cannot. In this view of the case the evil which exists, and for which, in my opinion, temporary remedies might be supplied on occasions of emergency, is, I conceive, infinitely less than that which would be produced by the reduction proposed. The real question is, can we with safety and advantage effect a permanent reduction in the strength of our army by a reduction of regiments. In other words, have we too many regiments? I should decidedly say

no.

no: And if not, then it will be wiser to bear the comparatively trifling inconvenience of our present organisation, which can be rectified whenever we can afford the expense or whenever necessity require it, than to seek to remove the existing inconvenience by a revolution fraught with incalculable mischief. I have said a revolution, and a reduction of regiments would be a revolution in the constitution of our army. It is a thing unknown, or, if it ever took place, it is beyond the memory of the generality, if not all, of the present generation of public servants in India. I remember, I think, that orders were received from home in 1801 or 1802 for a reduction of regiments. It was determined to reduce men instead. The war of 1803 made us repent of this reduction, and the effect would have been worse had there been a reduction of regiments. Such a measure would have, as before remarked, a most disheartening effect on the whole army, and that alone ought to prevent its adoption without an irresistible necessity for it, and without a certainty that the object contemplated would be of sure and permanent attainment. Neither this absolute necessity nor this certainty exists; but, on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the measure can hardly, with due regard to the actual wants of the State, be carried into effect so as to produce the minor saving promised; and it is almost certain, as certain as anything prospective can be, that long before the reduction contemplated can be completely effected, a necessity for increase will be recognised and acted on.

Our career in India has been one of continued advance, attended by a progressive increase of our army.

To attempt its reduction would be a resolution indicating retreat, which even if it were practicable, on just grounds, would have the worst moral effect. I am not one of those who imagine that a Russian invasion of India is the only danger that we have to apprehend.

Neither do I regard it as the greatest or the most difficult to encounter. But while it is deemed necessary to guard against the approach of Russian power and influence on our north-west frontier, and for that purpose to take a more active interest and extend our relations in that quarter, I am much surprised that a proposition for a great reduction of our army should come from one whose eye is avowedly directed towards that quarter, as the only one from which any danger can arise.

Many regard a Russian invasion, or perhaps the more probable event of an invasion, headed and instigated by Russia, as an imminent, not a remote crisis. If they are right, how can a reduction of our army be recommended in any point of view? My own opinion is that, when such an event is to be contemplated as approaching, a vast increase of our army will become necessary, and that the internal state of India alone is a sufficient reason why no reduction can at present be attempted. The general objections which apply to the reduction of one arm apply equally to the reduction of any. The infantry has hitherto been in view in these observations as the main body of our force, and the arm on which we chiefly rely. With respect to the cavalry, the inexpediency of reduction is increased by the greater delay which would attend the re-organization of cavalry, when the force reduced has to be restored, which is a strong argument in favour of keeping the regiments embodied as they now are, and waiting for the time, which will assuredly come, when it may be necessary to raise their complement. Whether our regular cavalry should be composed of Europeans or Natives, whether regular or irregular cavalry is most useful, are questions into which it is not on this occasion necessary to enter. The proposition to which I am objecting is simply for a reduction in the number of our cavalry regiments, to which I object for all the reasons already urged against reductions generally, and in addition, because our cavalry bears, I believe, a less than usual proportion to our infantry, and because it will require a longer time to restore cavalry regiments after disbanding them.

The objections to the reduction of any part of our force apply with equal strength to any reduction of our artillery, and especially of our horse artillery. Moreover, it would, I conceive, be extremely inexpedient to reduce the most scientific branch of our military force, one which is formed with so much pains, and which we ought to maintain in the greatest state of perfection, as giving an immense advantage to small bodies of regular troops over numbers on the part of their enemies, a state of things in which we continually have to contend in India, whether against internal insurrection or foreign warfare.

It is argued in favour of a reduction of the artillery, that the present number

of guns is greater than the usual proportion of four guns to 1,000 men adopted in European armies, by 10 guns in the aggregate, taking all India into the account, but it ought to be remembered that the calculation is made on a peace establishment of infantry and cavalry, which is at the very lowest point, and must infallibly be increased on the first expectation of the approach of war, when the artillery must be increased also, but with greater difficulty and delay than any other arm of our force. The calculation ought therefore to be made on the proper war establishment of our existing regiments of infantry and cavalry, when it would be found that we have much less than our proper proportion of artillery.

Besides which, if the question were examined, it would be found that we require in India more than the proportion of artillery assigned to European armies, because we have oftener to act in small bodies which most need the aid of artillery.

It is a remarkable fact that in our pitched battles with native armies they have generally been superior to us in the force of artillery, which clearly shows that we have not hitherto had a more than due proportion of that arm in our service.

I deprecate exceedingly any reduction of this important part of our force.

Since the remarks contained in the preceding part of this Minute were written, I have read Colonel Morison's Minutes of the 7th August 1834 and 16th February 1835, to which I beg leave to refer as containing many valuable observations and arguments in which I concur. It will be found that his opinions and mine are very much in unison, and whatever weight may be attached to those of either, opposed to such high authority as that of the late Governor General, it may be useful to state that mine had been offered without the knowledge of what Colonel Morison had previously written. It will be seen that two members of the present Government, of long experience in India, in different branches of the public service, looking at the question with ideas necessarily influenced by the turn of mind produced in each by the peculiar course of his own career, unite in deprecating the immense change proposed by the Right Honourable the late Governor General.

The success of the plan, viewed solely as a financial measure, rests mainly on the reduction of the number of our European officers, which is to effect the great saving prospectively contemplated. That reduction I venture to pronounce to be impracticable. Long before it can be carried into effect the necessity for an increase of our army, and especially of our European officers, in whom its efficiency so much depends, must occur. For all the reasons inadequately urged in this Minute I object to the proposed measures. Our army is not too large, but too small. Increase is forbidden by the state of our finances, and may be avoided in time of peace. We are on the lowest peace establishment, and that so formed as to admit of the most speedy increase on the approach of war. Permanent reduction is impracticable and out of the question. An attempt at a temporary reduction would not be attended by any important financial benefits, but would be fraught with immense mischief in its effects, even if it were in its very first stages possible, which is doubtful. Nothing in my opinion could justify it but absolute necessity; that overruling necessity which might compel us to reduce our army from sheer inability to maintain it at the strength required by our wants, and prepare us to submit to the natural consequence of having a force insufficient for the preservation of our dominion. That necessity does not I trust exist. Whatever reduction of expenditure may be necessary, we must look to other quarters for its realization. It cannot with safety be drawn from a reduction of our military force, or a diminution of its efficiency. We ought to exhaust every other possible source of retrenchment before we attempt, under the greatest necessity, to make serious reductions in our army of the kind proposed, which would be like gnawing our vitals. Unless permanent reduction be practicable, the changes proposed must produce more evil than good. And any expectations of the possibility of permanent reduction can only be founded on a complete delusion.

I shall offer no apology for having expressed these sentiments; that was my duty when I found measures in agitation which appeared to me to threaten extreme injury to the State; but it is with exceeding regret that I find myself opposed on such a vital subject to the late Governor General, for whom I entertain the most sincere and cordial respect, and whose whole heart was incessantly engaged in an anxious desire to promote the welfare of the empire entrusted to his charge.

19 April 1835.

(signed) *C. T. Metcalfe.*

## MINUTE by Mr. Prinsep.

THE discussions upon the late Governor General's projects of military reform having been continued open to the date of his Lordship's departure from India, and nothing final being then recorded, it seems to me that the members of the present Government are called upon to record their opinions on the very important question agitated therein, and that we are by no means exempted from the obligations of taking them into consideration by the circumstance that a reference was made to England from Ootacamund, on the subject of these plans when they were originally brought forward there. The authorities in England will probably decline to come to a decision on such important changes until they shall learn the opinion of them entertained by the full Council; they would not, therefore, hold us excused, if we were merely to forward the subsequent minutes and papers in continuation of the preceding reference; and, though many motives might lead us, and myself in particular, to wish to avoid taking part in discussions partly gone by wherein our sentiments are likely to be at variance with those of the late head of the Government, there is yet no resisting the strong feeling that silence would on the present occasion be an unpardonable neglect of duty, for the measures contemplated in this instance are of first-rate importance, as they affect the interests, the *morale*, and the efficiency of our Indian armies, all which might be jeopardised by a hasty adoption of the scheme. It would be a failure of obvious duty, therefore, for any member of the Executive Council to allow these papers to be recorded and submitted to the Court of Directors without a written declaration of his own opinion on them. The particular Minutes I have now before me are those commencing with one by the late Governor General, dated 23rd July 1834, proposing a re-organization of the armies of India in all their three branches, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and holding out a prospective reduction of expense to the extent of 60,80,112 rupees from the entire execution of the plan, without present and immediate saving of 13,81,370 rupees per annum.

I have perused all the Minutes written on this subject, and have examined the statements laid before the Council at Ootacamund, along with his Lordship's first Minute, and the result is a decided conviction that the plan should not be recommended as proper to be carried into execution in any of its parts.

Under the name of a re-organization of the armies of India, the project is simply one for reducing and breaking up and disbanding 29 regiments of infantry, seven of cavalry, and a yet larger proportion to the whole force of the most important arm of all, the artillery. The rest of the scheme consists of propositions for disposing of the men, officers, horses, and equipments of the regiments and corps to be broken up. It has, of course, been an object with the late Governor General to mitigate to the persons affected the evils and injurious tendency of the reduction. The men are not to be discharged, but transferred to other regiments, which are to be increased in the number of rank and file, so as to receive them. The European officers are to be retained in skeleton corps till induced to retire by the proffer of a gratuity, or until absolved. The native commissioned and non-commissioned officers were at first proposed to be transferred as supernumeraries to other regiments; but, in consequence of the strong representation made by Colonel Morison of the injurious effect of this upon the promotion and prospects of every individual of the native army, his Lordship subsequently modified his scheme so far as to consent that these, too, should remain embodied in skeleton corps till absorbed or provided for, to the no small prejudice of the financial results of the measure.

I refer to this part of the plan once for all, in order that I may thus early state my conviction that, if it were proper and possible to make the proposed or any less considerable reductions in the number of regiments and corps of the three Indian armies, the suggested method of providing for the Native and European officers of the corps reduced is as little injurious and as free from objection as any that could be devised. But the real evil of the thing is not to be remedied or lessened by any ingenuity of this description, by which officers are retained in their position and prospects, without interfering with the promotion of others in due roster. The evil lies in the diminution of the number of corps, and it is to this part of the question that the observations I have to make will be principally addressed.

The late Governor General prefaces the introduction of his plan by pointing out that a native army composed of regiments of infantry 640 strong, and of cavalry 420, cannot in consequence of the demand for regimental and other guards, provide a disposable force of anything like the same strength as the same number of men would do regimented into corps of 800 and 600 respectively. In proposing therefore to recast the men of the present three armies into corps of larger numerical strength, his Lordship argues that he provides a more efficient force than the present, and the re-organisation is thus recommended by the double consideration of economy and of an augmentation rather than a reduction of military means. The fallacy of this view of the question is exposed in the Minute of Sir C. T. Metcalfe, and I fully concur in the observations of the present Governor General on the subject. The military means of the State must be estimated by the number of corps at its disposal, and not by the number of individual soldiers. The rank and file number is constantly fluctuating; so were the number of companies, troops, or other subdivisions of corps; there may be 10 companies to each infantry regiment at one time of 100 men each, and at another only eight of 80 as at present, still the corps is a regiment complete in its organisation, presenting the same appearance to the world, and an object of the same respect and dread. True, the corps when reduced is not so efficient, and why is it not so? only because the Government does not at the moment desire the highest comparative efficiency of which such a corps is susceptible. It leaves regiments weak when they are not likely to be called into service in the full confidence that it can by a stroke of the pen replace anyone of these reduced corps, or any number of them within a very short period on a footing of as high numerical efficiency as may be desired. Under the conviction of this in time of peace their strength is always kept down to the lowest possible scale that the actual demands of the service will admit. Since the Burmese war, the Supreme Government have felt more strongly than at any previous period the necessity of this kind of retrenchment on account as well of the augmentations by new corps made during that war, which it was felt impossible to reduce on its conclusion, as of the general burthen imposed by it on the finances of India, for it was the very first war in which the British have been engaged in India which did not end in leaving territory in our hands sufficient to provide from its revenues for the increased charges of the new position in which it placed us. Like every preceding war, this entailed the necessity of establishing new army positions; from the Valley of Assam to the Tenasserim Coast the frontier required to be armed, whereas heretofore a couple of battalions at Dacca and Chittagong were all the force detained within the wide extent of country east of Calcutta. The question was well considered at the close of the Burmese war with reference to all these circumstances, whether any regiment of the Bengal or Madras Presidencies could be considered as superfluous and be dispensed with. The stations to be occupied were necessarily the great consideration; it was not asked how many men, but how many corps it was indispensable to maintain at each. The efficiency of the corps was quite a separate question; *that* it was well known, might be and must be temporarily sacrificed for the sake of no less indispensable financial retrenchment. Now, however, that this sacrifice has been made to an extent verging on the maximum limit to which it could be carried, the plan of the late Governor General comes upon us, building on this very temporary inefficiency as an argument for further weakening and disarming ourselves by reducing the number of corps. True, the men of the reduced corps will by transfer to the weakened regiments make these efficient, and his Lordship's plan goes to keep these always at the increased strength, but where will be the security that upon the next appearance of a threatened deficit of the Treasury the companies will not again be reduced to 80 men?

The late Governor General says, under the proposed new organisation 10,000 muskets will be so disposed that, if wanted for emergent service, a larger number of them will be promptly available. This may be very true, and the Government may yet find itself much crippled of means by the change. In the first place, the 10,000 rank and file, under the new organisation, will furnish corps for 12½ stations only; whereas, under the present, the same number offers to the world the imposing protection of a regimental cantonment at very nearly sixteen stations. No attempt whatsoever is made to show that the presence of a regiment is not wanted at any of these existing stations. If the question had been argued on that ground, the conclusion that the number of existing regiments will bear reduction

reduction might be rightly come to. But on this branch of the subject the decision has been already passed that the corps are barely sufficiently numerous to maintain existing indispensable stations, and surely it is a curious specimen of encyclic reasoning to leave this position untouched and unimpugned, and because the efficiency of corps has been trenched upon by the reductions made in the number of each for the sake of economy, to bring forward these very reductions as a ground for doubling up and diminishing the numbers of corps, previously determined to be the lowest possible number that the service of the State could be carried on with.

But the late Governor General says more bayonets could be thrown forward upon an emergency. Even admit this in full. Still it does not necessarily result that the force thrown forward will be equally effective, equally imposing, or capable of covering so wide a field. Say the force thrown forward be 4000 bayonets, that is but five regiments under the new organisation, while, under the present, seven could be sent, more weakened, indeed, by the guards they will leave behind, but still regiments in the eyes of the world and of the enemy, and capable of each acting separately as such. If the circumstances of the time are so altered at present, that the Government cannot hazard regiments in the field in their weakened state, then is it time to make local or general augmentations of strength in preparation for such an altered state of things, but surely the same cannot be the time for disarming by breaking up regiments.

Upon the project, therefore, for the reorganisation of the armies, as presented to the Government by the late Governor General, without any reference to stations to be maintained, or to the circumstances, political and military, of the territory to be overawed, and the frontiers to be defended, but resting merely on the bare fact that the present organisation does not leave an equal number of bayonets effective, I have no hesitation in recording an opinion, that it ought on no account to be entertained. In the present financial condition of the country, I am far from saying that it is not, or may not be, a question whether to maintain so many corps as we have. Let it be shown where, how, and when any existing regiments are superfluous and can be dispensed with, and I shall be ready enough to join in recommending the reduction of them for the sake of the saving that will be the result; but upon a mere showing of supposed benefit, without impairing means, I will not be led to join in measures of reorganisation pregnant with all the evils of reductions far beyond what the supposed occasion calls for, and calculated to cripple the means of the Government, in case of future exigency, to an extent more than commensurate with the reductions. The saving indicated, now that it is agreed to throw the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers into skeleton corps, is almost entirely prospective. What we need is something immediate, for long before the hopes held out are realized, we might be embroiled in wars and distant operations calling for fresh augmentations of force.

I have referred entirely in what I have said to the infantry, because I have taken up the question as a general one, and argued against the general bearing and character of the scheme; all that I have said, however, applies equally to the cavalry and artillery reorganization, which proceeds upon the same principle; others have discussed the effect of these measures in detail on the promotion and prospects of the officers and men of the three armies. Although I have yet said nothing on this part of the question, I beg to be understood as concurring in every argument adduced in behalf of the claims of the military services to have their interests respected, and to be saved from the disheartening influence of disbandments and breakings up of corps, except under the unavoidable exigency of an impossibility to pay them longer.

As for the State of India being such as to warrant or suggest a reduction of military means, I entirely agree in all that is said in the minutes of Sir C. T. Metcalfe on this subject, and look upon it even as absurd to think of reducing the army of India or the number of corps in the army, which is the same thing, at the very time that we are pushing ourselves by negotiation along the Indus, and preparing for an extension of our relations in the north-west. At the very moment of the decease of the King of Persia, when all is unsettled in that kingdom, and nobody can say for certain that something may not every day occur to call for an expedition and extensive operations in that quarter—at the very time, too, when the conduct of the Chinese threatens the embroilment of affairs with the British nation in the extreme east, for who can pretend to a sufficient insight into futurity

to say that we may not be called upon within a few years, or even months, to support measures for the vindication of the national honour, or for the assertion of a right of intercourse in that ultima Thule of European diplomacy.

If the army were to be reorganised in the manner recommended by the late Governor General upon the avowed principle of considering the present reduced peace scale as a maximum, and studying to combine its numbers so as to give to them the greatest efficiency possible without any means of prompt extension, where should we find 20,000 men to send into Persia if so required? Where, another force of the same strength to be shipped for China? All which are contingencies not to be lost sight of in the estimate of our means compared with necessary wants, and with the probable or possible drains upon them.

I wish that the many questions now before Government, some of them nearly of equal importance with this, had left me more time to have given to the preparation of this minute, that I might have stated more forcibly and in better shape than I have done the very strong impression I feel of the injudiciousness of the plan of reorganisation proposed in this instance. The present Governor General has, however, discussed the question so very ably, and with so much judgment and propriety of view, that I feel myself saved the necessity of doing more than expressing my entire and unqualified assent and concurrence in all his arguments and conclusions.

Calcutta, 19th May 1835.

(signed) *H. T. Prinsep.*

(No. 72 of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Cons. 24 June,  
1835. Nos. 1 to 3.

WITH reference to the minutes recorded by the late Governor General on the Distribution and Composition of the Armies of India, transmitted with our separate letter, No. 36, of the 16th March 1835, we have now the honour to offer for the consideration of your Honourable Court the sentiments of the Governor General and Mr. Prinsep on those important subjects, as shown in the accompanying minutes, under date the 8th and 16th May, and 9th June 1835.

We have, &c.  
(signed) *C. T. Metcalfe,*  
*A. Ross,*  
*W. Morison,*  
*H. T. Prinsep.*

Fort William, 3 July 1835.

MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

Military Department, 8 May 1835.

A MINUTE recorded by the Right Honourable the late Governor General on the consultation of the 13th March, and dated the 28th February, contains his Lordship's sentiments on the distribution of the army of India.

In those sentiments, as far as they regard the proper principle of distribution, I have the honour entirely to concur.

There is no doubt that the dispersion of the army into small bodies is a bad mode of distribution, and that its union and concentration in large bodies is highly desirable.

When the army is dispersed in small bodies throughout the country, it is difficult to collect a large force for any purpose.

It is positively difficult, because every cantonment requires a force for its protection, by which the force to be assembled for field service must be diminished; and further, because delay must be caused by the troops having to assemble



assemble from distant points, instead of being ready to move in one body, in consequence of having been previously united.

It is morally difficult; because, wherever troops are stationed, a general belief becomes established that troops are necessary there; and, consequently, a feeling of insecurity arises whenever the troops are withdrawn. If troops be really wanted in that position, they will be most wanted when it is requisite to withdraw them; for the collection of an army for any important service is the signal for men's minds to think of change, and troops will at that time be required where they were not required before. It would be better that troops should not be stationed anywhere in time of peace for local protection, whence it would be necessary to remove them in time of trouble. It is better that the people should be accustomed to the absence of troops, than that the troops should be withdrawn when their presence is most requisite for either protection or coercion. If they can be dispensed with when everything tends most to raise up danger, either from external foes or internal disaffection, or professed plunderers, they can certainly be most easily dispensed with when all is tranquillity and men's minds are not dreaming of revolution.

If we suppose a field force to be assembled from different stations instead of one, ten times the force would be kept back in the former case to what would be required in the latter for the charge of the cantonments and protection of the posts before occupied. If, for instance, the forces of Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow were required to form a field army, a regiment probably at the least would be wanted to keep charge of each cantonment during the absence of the main body, that is three-elevenths of the whole body of infantry; but if the three stations were united, one regiment, or an eleventh part of the whole, would be sufficient for the same purpose, and the field force would be increased by a fourth or fifth, or as ten is to eight. At the same time three parts of the country would be excited by the absence of the troops, to which they had been accustomed instead of one.

Concentration of force, however, must in practice have its limits. It would not be expedient, for instance, to concentrate the whole army of any Presidency at one point. It is obvious that the greater part of the country would, in that case, remain entirely unprotected, and exposed to any disaster. Thus the distribution of the army is a wide question. There must be concentration for one purpose, and dispersion for another, and after admitting that concentration is the right principle, it may be found that dispersion is the inevitable practice, for a reason which will force itself on the mind the more the subject be examined, because the army is not sufficient for both purposes, that of forming armies for the field, for which concentration is desirable, and that of local protection, for which dispersion is unavoidable. All that can be done is to keep concentration in view, and avoid dispersion as much as possible.

Were I undertaking to distribute the army anew, without reference to its existing position, I should proceed on these principles. On every frontier where there could be a foe, I would have a concentrated force, a division of the army, complete in all arms, and at the least sufficient for defensive purposes on any occasion which might unexpectedly arise. I would have similar forces in the interior, both as reserves and supports to the frontier forces, and to secure internal tranquillity. Whenever it might be necessary to move any of these interior divisions in support of the frontier armies a sufficient force should be left or substituted for the protection of internal tranquillity, because it is then that internal tranquillity most needs protection. A calculation ought to be made of the force requisite for that purpose in each circle of territory, and that amount of force ought to be retained there in peace and in war, but especially in war when it would be most wanted. All divisions or brigades of the army, intended either for field service against enemies or for the preservation of general tranquillity in the interior, ought to be posted in the most convenient stations for the purposes contemplated, and for the health and supply of the troops, without reference to other merely local objects, in order that they may be available to move in any direction without the sacrifice of any such objects. The army ought to be dispersed as little as possible for merely local purposes, but whenever it may be necessary to post troops with reference to local considerations, the force so posted ought not to exceed the strength requisite for the purpose in view, and ought never to be withdrawn in time of trouble. For instance, let us

suppose the troops at Meerut and Kurnaul to be as they are, disposable forces for field service, and the troops at Delhi to be stationed as a garrison for that important city, and as a force for the preservation of tranquillity in its immediate neighbourhood. Is the force at Delhi sufficient, and not more than sufficient for those purposes at all times? If it be so, let it remain permanently stationed at Dihlee and never diminished at those times when the forces of Kurnaul and Meerut may be removed for field service. If it be more than sufficient for local purposes, let the surplus be removed during peace and added to the force at Kurnaul, or that at Meerut, which are supposed to be maintained for field service. The available force will thus be increased, and there will be no necessity to draw any part of the field force from Delhi at a time when a force, avowedly posted for local protection, ought not to be diminished. Take Benares as another city of importance, for which it may be deemed necessary to have a stationary force. The amount ought to be such as may be sufficient, and as might be retained there during war. If it were more, the surplus ought to be disposed of at the station of an available force, which would not be tied down by local wants, but free to move or detach whenever troops might be required. There are many situations in which local wants may be most conveniently met by local corps; such is the case in Ramguh, Assam, &c. "where that description of force is maintained, and its use might be extended as formerly, if we could afford the expense wherever a single regiment ought to be stationed unless it were for an important military purpose for which the most efficient description of force were deemed necessary, a local corps would answer as well as one of the line, and would enable us to release the line more from local duties, and have a greater available force than at present.

But it is almost idle to speculate in this manner. We have not the pecuniary means for a sufficient increase of our army; and if the distribution of what we have were attempted according to the principles stated, we should find that we have not near enough. We are obliged to post our troops according to local exigencies, and when we have a war we collect them as best we can, leaving local exigencies to shift for themselves. It would be well, however, always to keep in mind the expediency of distributing our army so as to have the greatest possible amount of force available for field service in any direction, and not locked up for local purposes. We may not be able with our present force to do much in this way, but attention to the principle may enable us to do something.

How little can be done is shown by the measures proposed in the late Governor General's Minute which regard the Bengal army. Beyond our own territories the concentration of the forces of Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow, with some addition and some reduction, is the only measure proposed; and within our frontier, including Oude, all that is contemplated is the abolition of some small stations, and a consequent addition to some others. Nowhere within our frontier—after the adoption of these measures—could there be such a force concentrated as would in itself form a sufficient army for any great purpose, and important points of our frontier would be left as before, without the means of collecting an adequate force, on any exigency of foreign war. The principle of the proposed alterations is excellent, but the result is a failure, owing to the inadequacy of our army. Neither are the frontiers provided with sufficient forces for defence against foreign enemies, nor are the concentrated masses in the interior that would answer as armies of reserve for the support of those in front, and for the preservation of internal tranquillity. We cannot carry the operation of concentration far enough without laying bare too large a portion of country, and leaving too many places of importance unprotected.

The proposed concentration of the Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow forces is good in itself, because it would give us an additional force for field service of two regiments, as there would be only one station to protect on the troops taking the field instead of three, and because there would be an army of considerable strength ready to move in any direction without the delay of assembling from distant points. But to render the measure effectual, all the three present stations must be entirely abandoned. It would not do to keep a regiment at Mhow, as proposed by the Quartermaster General, for the purpose of furnishing an escort for the Resident at Indore; such a departure from the principles of the plan would tend very much to defeat it. It must be observed, however with reference to this plan, that it would create the necessity of making Ajmere, which is

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now protected by the neighbourhood of Nusseerabad, a separate station capable of self defence, without reference to the position of any protecting force. It must also be remarked that if the forces of Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow are beneficial in their respective vicinities, the local benefit will be affected by removing them, and great spaces of country left without any force; insecurity might be felt and insurrection encouraged, for it often happens that a small and inadequate force stationed anywhere produces all the effect in tranquillising the country that could be obtained by the presence of a larger army. The abolition therefore of these stations would be an experiment, the result of which is uncertain. The removal of a force from a foreign territory, whether it were wise to place it there or not, will always create a sensation, and may be misconstrued as a retrograde movement. It is also to be considered that by that measure much public property would be sacrificed, and much private loss and distress incurred, and that in forming the new station there would be great expense to the State and to individuals. All this having happened, and the new station being completed and occupied, it might prove to be unhealthy, or the neighbourhood incapable of supplying forage for so large a force; or some alteration of circumstances or of opinions might occur to suggest the abandonment of the new cantonment, and a different distribution of the force. That we are liable to such changes is shown by the fate of Muttra. When we extended our dominions beyond the Jumna, Agra and Muttra presented themselves as stations for our troops. Muttra was preferred, and became the principal station in our new frontier; Agra was made merely a garrison. Muttra continued to be our principal station on that frontier from 1806 to 1809, when a new commander in chief fancied another station as better suited to take the lead: and in consequence of the rising power of Runjeet Singh, and the rumoured menaces of French invasion, Meerut superceded Muttra, and became the head-quarters of the division. Muttra, however, remained a considerable station, and underwent increase and decrease as the wind blew. Agra was subsequently increased, and if I be not mistaken Muttra became subordinate to Agra. Next Agra became subordinate to Muttra; and now Muttra is, or is to be, abolished and added to Agra; and it will not be very surprising if, on account of forage, we be obliged to recur to Muttra. Considering the vicinity of Agra and Muttra, within 30 miles of each other, it cannot be supposed that there were very important reasons for these repeated changes; they must have been the consequences of mere differences of opinion prevailing at different times. But the history of Muttra as a military, not yet perhaps brought as a final conclusion, teaches us that in forming a station we may only be laying the foundation of its abolition, and is a warning against trusting too much to any scheme for a change of stations however enticing. Were it now a question whether we should post the forces distributed at Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow, as they now are, or form them into one efficient body constituting one large station, I should, without hesitation, prefer the latter plan; but I see reason to be distrustful of change, and would prefer the continuance of the present distribution to the inconvenience, distress, and expense which would attend the abolition of the existing stations, until some greater urgency than is yet apparent imposes on us the necessity of the alteration.

What is applicable in this instance is applicable generally where cantonments have been once formed. It may be better to retain them than to incur the bad consequences of abandoning them even in pursuit of an object which, regarded singly, would be an improvement.

I will now take a brief review of the actual distribution of the army belonging to the Presidencies of Bengal and Agra. With reference to the Minutes of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Frederick Adam, and Sir Robert O'Callaghan regarding that of the Madras Army, I concur generally in all that has been said in favour of Bangalore and Hyderabad as suitable stations for large bodies of troops. I do not object to Hyderabad as a station because it is beyond our territories. For that very reason it is preferable, the troops there being available for any movement, without causing any sensation in our own country from apparent diminution of protective force. The only objection to Hyderabad as a station of a great moveable force is, that it has hitherto been considered necessary to maintain a stationary force there for local purposes; as long as this may be deemed necessary it is not, according to the ideas which I have above expressed,

the fittest station for a moveable force, because when the main body of the troops march, although a portion be reserved, there will be an impression of comparative weakness, at a time when local strength ought at least to be undiminished. If therefore a station were now to be selected, I should prefer a place for the cantonment of the field force where no special local purposes had to be attended to; but as Sikunderabad, the station in question, has long been established on a large scale, a change would be objectionable. Bangalore, which was formerly out of our territory, has, I believe, by recent arrangements, been brought within it.

The army of Bengal and Agra is distributed in seven divisions, three field forces, and the fortress of Allababad.

The Presidency division contains a force of 17,308 rank and file, and 36 guns, including local corps, as well as troops of the line. The troops are dispersed in eighteen (18) principal stations, including the Tenasserim coast beyond sea. Besides the 18 stations there are many detached posts. The extent of frontier to be guarded is from the boundary of the Madras territory to Bootan on one side, including the Burman frontier from Negrais to Sudeea, and from the Madras frontier to Singbloom on the other side. The force is distributed for local purposes, which would be more urgent if it were necessary to bring them together. This division ought to be able to furnish a field force of 10,000 men at least for the defence of the frontier towards the Burmans, but could not provide near that number. The only large station is that of the Presidency, where a large force ought to be at all times stationed. Nevertheless, I do not perceive that the force of this division could be much less dispersed than it is. It is a remarkable fact that in practical opposition to the theory of concentration, Bancoora has recently been made a station for a single regiment of the line, which was never, I believe, a station for such a force before. This arrangement was in consequence of the insurrection of the Coles and Chooars. I am not sure it was necessary, as I think that a different one might have been made, but if it was necessary, and certainly some force of some kind was desirable in that position, it clearly shows that, however anxious we may be to concentrate, we are constrained, by the exigencies of our situation, to disperse. The force of this division appears to me to be barely adequate for the duties which it has to perform in peace, and for the requisite protection and respectability of the seat of the Supreme Government of India. It is utterly insufficient for any state of affairs, in which it might be necessary to adopt active or precautionary measures against the Burmans, putting enemies by sea out of the question.

The Dinapoor division consists of 4,439 men and 10 guns. Of this force 1,440 men and 4 guns are local corps locked up and required for local purposes, 1,416 are Europeans available for general service, and 1,416 are Native infantry stationed at Dinapoor, where there certainly ought never to be less. There is not, therefore a single sepoy of the line available in this division for field service. To form any field force out of this division every station must be totally abandoned at the precise period when every station ought to be reinforced. The two European regiments and four guns are all that this division could properly contribute towards the formation of a field army. One would suppose from the paucity of force in this division that there was no frontier to protect. But the bravest enemy that we ever had to contend with in India, and the most military nation perhaps in the whole world is on the frontier which this division has to guard. The Dinapoor and Benares divisions together ought to furnish a field force of the most efficient description of at least 10,000 men for the defence of that frontier. Much more would be required if active operations should be necessary; but it will be seen that the two divisions altogether do not contain even that number. They would contribute well in European troops three regiments, which, composed with their whole strength, would be a large proportion of that description of force. But in Native infantry these divisions could scarcely furnish anything, except by the total abandonment of stations which even in time of peace it is deemed necessary to occupy. This is a striking but not a singular proof of the insufficiency of our army, and especially of that part of it in which a reduction has been recently contemplated. Were a war with the Goorkas to take place, all our available force would necessarily be sent into the Dinapoor and Benares divisions; but without that event, were anything to happen elsewhere, which might render precautionary measures  
necessary

necessary on the Nepal frontier, these divisions must be powerfully reinforced. To what, then, is it owing that there is so small an available force stationed in them, but to the fact that our troops are unavoidably distributed elsewhere according to more immediate local exigencies.

The Benares division contains 4,676 men and 8 guns. This force consists of artillery, 445 Native cavalry, 736 European infantry, and 3,400 Native infantry. The Native infantry are distributed at seven different stations. If I were disposed, which in the present state of our finances I certainly am not, to recommend any increase of expense, I should say on this and all similar occasions, let the infantry of the line be brought together in large available bodies, and let every station which requires a single regiment, or a smaller detachment for local protection, be supplied with local troops. This would greatly tend to render the army of the line more efficient in every respect, and more available for field service. It must be done hereafter, or the number of regiments be greatly increased: but at present the additional expense is out of the question. What I have remarked in speaking of the Dinapoor division, is generally applicable to that of Benares. It would be better, perhaps, if both these divisions were under one general officer's command. The head quarters, say at Ghazee-poor, or some other station intermediate between Benares and Dinapoor, to the northward of the Ganges, where the main body should be assembled available for field operations. The troops at Benares and Dinapoor to be put on the footing of stationary forces, not at any time to be reduced and regulated as to number by local wants; brigadiers to be established at Benares and Dinapoor, and the general officer of one of those divisions to be transferred to Agra, or to the general command of the field forces of Rajpootana, Meywar, and Malwa. I am not proposing these measures for adoption. They would require more consideration, and the expense attending such changes is at once an objection. I am no advocate for changes which are not imperative, or of obviously great advantage. I am merely stating what occurs to me as a better arrangement than the present one, if it could be conveniently and unobjectionably adopted.

The garrison of the fortress of Allahabad consists of a company of Native artillery, 112, and two regiments of Native infantry, 1,360—total, 1,472 rank and file. Allahabad is at present the seat of the Government of the Agra Presidency, and the force above mentioned is the force of the station, as well as the garrison of the fortress. It is not adequate as a garrison, if a garrison were really required for defence. Neither is it sufficiently respectable as a force at the seat of Government. But it is as much as can be spared for these purposes, and has been increased from one regiment and a half to its present force, two regiments, in consequence of the station becoming the capital of a Presidency.

The Cawnpore division contains 11,798 rank and file, and 28 guns. Cawnpore is the principal station where, with the exception of one company of Native artillery, which is at Lucknow, all the artillery, sappers and miners, European dragoons, Native cavalry, and European infantry, are properly assembled together with three regiments of Native infantry, which is a disproportionately small force of that arm. The Cawnpore force put in motion would be in other respects complete, but deficient in that particular. It could only take two regiments of Native infantry into the field. On the principle of concentrating for the purpose of forming moveable armies, at least four regiments of Native infantry ought to be added to the station of Cawnpore. The Native infantry is the main body of our Indian army. Until that arm can be brought together in large bodies, the object of concentration cannot be accomplished. But although other descriptions of troops are brought together at principal stations, the Native infantry is almost universally dispersed, and is scarcely ever cantoned together in sufficient numbers to form a sufficient field force. It must be supposed that this dispersion arises from some necessity, for it would otherwise be obviously a very defective and injudicious distribution. For instance, in the Cawnpore division there are 12 regiments of Native infantry, containing 8,160 rank and file. These are dispersed at 10 stations. Until lately there were 13 regiments at 12 stations. Two stations have recently been abolished, Secrora and Peralgurrh; two more might, I conceive, be abolished, Seetapoor and Sooltanpoor in Oude. But in speaking of the abolition of stations I cannot refrain from

remarking that the measure entails great loss on officers, who thereby lose their houses, purchased at considerable expense, and have to incur a similar expense in the purchase or erection of others, and that although this consequence of the occasional abandonment of a station has been usual, it becomes an extensive calamity when the measure is had recourse to generally for a systematic purpose, and becomes worthy of attention with a view to compensation. It is not merely that loss is sustained such as men can bear; the loss in many cases causes or increases debt, which ends in utter ruin. If the stations of Seetapoor and Sooltanpoor were abolished, as has been proposed, the force, two regiments, or 1,360 rank and file, with four guns, ought to be added to the principal station of Cawnpore. If Futegurh and Mynpooree could be abolished as military stations, which I doubt, two more regiments might be added to Cawnpore. If Etawah could be abolished, the force there, half a regiment, might be added to that at Banda, one and a-half regiment, the force in Bundelkund being very weak for its duties. The Cawnpore division includes the kingdom of Oude and Bundelkund within its limits, and has the frontier of Nipal on one side, and of the Boondela States and Sendheea on the other. The principal stations are Cawnpore and Lucknow. The force at the former may be considered, with the exception of what must be left for the protection of the station, a moveable force for field service. The force at Lucknow must be regarded as stationary for local purposes. It would be right, therefore, to increase the force at Cawnpore to any amount practicable, and wrong to augment that at Lucknow beyond what may be requisite for local purposes and could be kept stationary there at all times.

The Meerut division contains a force of 16,551 rank and file, and 52 guns distributed at 12 stations. The principal stations are Meerut, Agra, Delhi, and Bareilly. The force at Meerut may be considered moveable. It could send into the field horse artillery, foot artillery, European dragoons, Native cavalry, and European infantry, in sufficient proportions to form a respectable field force, but could only supply two regiments of Native infantry, a very inadequate proportionate of that arm; there being only three at the station, and one being requisite for its protection. The troops at Delhi and Bareilly are stationary forces, and will be required there at all times. If Agra should become the capital of the fourth Presidency, the force there will become for the most part stationary from the necessity of maintaining in that quarter a respectable force at the seat of Government. Agra could at present supply horse artillery, foot artillery, Native cavalry, and European infantry, in sufficient proportions for a separate field force, but only two regiments of Native infantry. Everywhere the deficiency is in this branch of the service, showing clearly either that our regiments are too few in number, or that they are badly disposed of. That the former conclusion is the just one is evinced by the fact that the late Governor General and Commander in Chief, with the assistance of the chiefs of the staff, although bent on concentration, could not contrive to bring together at any station in the Bengal and Agra Presidencies, with the exception of the seat of Government at Fort William, more than four regiments of Native infantry, although for the purposes of his plan there ought not to have been less than seven at each great station. Although three or four stations are still left which might possibly be abolished, the general observation on examining the distribution of the army would be that many parts of the country are without troops where they are obviously required. In order to make the Native infantry equal to our wants there must either be a great increase in the number of regiments, or, which would be the cheaper plan, a substitution of local force at those stations where single regiments or small detachments are now employed. Then the regiments of the line might be brought together in large cantonments for the purposes which are contemplated by concentration. The expense of such an augmentation in either way puts it out of the question for the present, and we must be content to submit to dispersion to a great extent as unavoidable. The Meerut division is bounded by the Cawnpore division on one side, by Sendheea country, Rajpootana, and the Jumna on another, and by the Himalaya Mountains from the Jumna to the Kingdom of Oude. It includes Rohilkund within its limits.

The Sirhind division contains 6,838 rank and file, and 18 guns. The principal station, Kurnaul has horse artillery, foot artillery, Native cavalry, and European

European infantry, in respectable proportions available for a field, but only two regiments of native infantry, of which only one would be available. The whole division contains five regiments of that description of force dispersed at three stations: two at Kurnaul, two at Loodiana, and one at Hansi. It is evident that no army of native infantry can be formed of this force, for if the detached regiments could safely be withdrawn in war, they ought not to be where they are in peace. The truth is, they are wanted where they are in peace and still more in war, but must be withdrawn in war at all risks, because we cannot do without them. Two regiments occupy the frontier post of Loodiana on the Sutlej, and there would be more advocates for increasing than for diminishing the force at that post. It is to be remembered that this division, with its five regiments scattered at three stations, occupied the frontier beyond which many politicians fancy our only danger to lie. If anywhere, then, an imposing force would be proper here, if it were possible to furnish it, which it is not.

The Saugor division contains a company of foot artillery, a regiment of horse, improperly termed local, and seven regiments of native infantry. Total rank and file, 5,455, with 12 guns. The artillery, cavalry, and four regiments of native infantry are cantoned at Saugor; the other three regiments are dispersed at six stations. This dispersion is no doubt recommended by local considerations, but otherwise it seems inexpedient and quite opposed to the principle of concentration. The force at Saugor could send into the field a company of artillery, a regiment of horse, and three regiments of native infantry, a force perhaps sufficient for local purposes. This division is distinguished from the others by having neither regular cavalry nor European infantry.

The Rajpootana force has 3,940 rank and file, and six guns. A company of foot artillery, a regiment of native cavalry, and four regiments of native infantry are cantoned at Nusseerabad. From that force a detachment is furnished for the duties of Ajmeer. A regiment of local infantry is stationed at Beawr, which is dispersed in numerous small detachments. The Rajpootana field force is obviously insufficient for any service on a great scale, but, like the Saugor force, might suffice for ordinary local purposes.

The Meywar force contains 3,973 rank and file, with 12 guns. It consists of a troop of native horse artillery, a company of native foot artillery, a regiment of native cavalry, a regiment of irregular horse, and four regiments of native infantry. The whole force is cantoned at Neemuch, furnishing a detachment of one company for the escort of the agent at Kotah. The same remark applies to the Meywar as to the Rajpootana force.

The Malwa force contains 3,426 rank and file, with 12 guns. A troop of European horse artillery, a company of European foot artillery, a regiment of native cavalry, and three regiments of native infantry, occupy the station of Mhow, which furnishes two companies for Indore and one company for Mundlesur. A regiment of horse is stationed at Bhopawar. The same remark is applicable to the Malwa as to the Meywar and Rajpootana forces. They are severally unequal to any great purpose, such as requires the assembling of a large field force.

On the subject of the concentration of these forces I have already offered my opinion. It will be seen that there is neither European infantry nor European cavalry with any of these forces.

It is observable in this cursory review of the distribution of the Bengal army, that nowhere is there any station of sufficient strength in all arms to furnish a field force of adequate amount for any great purpose, and that the deficiency is generally owing to the insufficiency of native infantry. Reckoning a regiment of European infantry, as we have been accustomed to regard it, as a due proportion to five or six regiments of native infantry, many stations and every division, Saugor, and the forces of Rajpootana, Meywar, and Malwa excepted, could furnish its quota of European infantry and of other arms for field service, but no stations, and scarcely one division, perhaps not one, could properly provide its proportion of native infantry. The cause of this is, that the native infantry is distributed and dispersed according to local exigencies, and when wanted for field service must be brought together from different points at the sacrifice of local objects, and at the risk of dangerous consequences. It does not appear that stations occupied for local purposes can to any great extent be

abandoned, in order to render the native infantry more readily available for field service. We must therefore either greatly increase our native infantry by additional regiments, or by the substitution of local corps; or either of those being impossible on account of the expense, we must be content to go on as heretofore, incurring the risks attendant on local abandonment whenever more pressing exigencies elsewhere force us to that measure.

At the same time we ought to bear in mind that the absence of troops is of less consequence in peace than in war, and that to accustom people to their presence in peace, when they must be withdrawn in war, is bad policy, consequently that we ought to disperse as little and concentrate as much as possible consistently with safety.

I do not think it necessary to go through the details of the distribution of the Madras and Bombay armies, but it will be found in both that the object of concentration cannot be pursued to a sufficient extent without sacrificing local protection, which it is deemed expedient to maintain.

Viewing the three armies as a whole, we must make the best that we can of the present distribution; and I am not aware that we shall gain any great advantage by such changes as may be practicable. We can nowhere form stations adequate singly to send forth field forces, such as we must bring together whenever called on to make any good exertion. The army of India is not large enough for that purpose, and the expense of putting it on such a footing would at present be intolerable. When, therefore, we require forces in the field, we must draw them as we have been accustomed to do from several or many stations. Whenever we foresee a war we must add greatly to our strength. In the meantime the present distribution, which is probably well suited for local purposes, will suffice in peace; changes, even though they may be in some degree for the better, would hardly be worth the inconveniences which they would cause, when their effect must, as at present, be incomplete; and the advantages to be derived from them inconsiderable. Keeping concentration in mind as a principle to be acted on, whenever this can be done without local injury or with decided advantage, we may, I think, rest with the army distributed as it is, and avoid great changes, which would have little beneficial effect until those times come, when such changes will naturally accompany others, which would then take place. At present I do not see anything in the plans proposed that would compensate for the inconveniences that would probably attend their immediate execution. The effect would be inadequate to the design. The principle is good, but its operation is necessarily limited by the insufficiency of our force for all the purposes which our army has to fulfil.

(signed) *C. T. Metcalfe.*

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(Military Department.)

MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

THE Right Honourable the late Governor General, in a Minute dated the 13th March, has recorded his sentiments regarding the composition of the army of India, and the method to render it more efficient.

In the commencement of that Minute, his Lordship has entered on the question of the danger of our position in India, and although he has, I think, underrated it in some respects, the sum of his remarks tends to show that we are in such danger as is incalculable.

His Lordship is of opinion, that there is no danger from native powers, because there is no chief with any semblance of military force; but this cannot be said of Runjeet Sing, nor of Sindhia, nor of the Goorkhas, a nation of disciplined soldiers, nor of Holkar, nor of the Burmans, nor of many other powers who, in a greater or less degree as to each other, have all the materials of military force according to their means, of which we might be made aware very speedily, if there were any favourable occasion for its display against us. We must not imagine, because we are now at peace, and apparently invincible, that there is

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no military power that could be arrayed against us in the event of troubles and disasters. The difficulties that we had to contend with, and the exertions that we were compelled to make when we had the Goorkhas and the Burmans singly to combat, ought to satisfy us, that we may again be involved in embarrassments which would add greatly to the moral strength of every power in India disposed to enter the field as an enemy. Except the mental effect, which may or may not have been produced by our ultimate success in our former wars with these powers, they are as strong as they ever were, the Goorkhas, I believe stronger, owing to their incessant attention to the perfection of their military efficiency, and to their admirable system by which every man in the nation is made a disciplined soldier. It may be said that they cannot cope with us in the plains and single-handed; if we could bring all our resources against them, they most probably could not; this would not, however, be from any want of energy, or of discipline on their part, but from our superiority in cavalry, artillery, and every other arm, in some respects in skill and efficiency, in others in number; but neither have we any right to expect that the war would be single-handed, nor can we calculate on its being carried on in the plains. We must be prepared for an offensive war, in which the Goorkhas would have all the advantages of their mountains, and our difficulties be accordingly increased. A merely defensive war would be to us nearly the same as defeat; it would be a change, and an evidence of weakness, which our power could hardly survive. It is not therefore enough to say that no power single-handed is a match for us; we should not be here if any were. The question is, can we conquer them all at once? for the power to do this is necessary to our safety; our danger does not lie in the military force alone of native states, but in the spirit by which they are actuated towards us; and still more in the spirit of our subjects from one end of India to the other. We have no hold on their affections; more than that, disaffection is universal, so that what to a power supported by the affections of its subjects would be a slight disaster, might to us be an irreparable calamity. The little reverse which we met with at Ramoo, in the Burman war, sounded throughout India, like our repulse at the first siege of Bhurtpore, magnified and exaggerated as if it had been our death-knell. The Commander in Chief was said to have been killed, and the Governor General to have put an end to himself in despair by swallowing pounded diamonds. Ramoo became so celebrated, that although the place is an insignificant one, in the district of Chittagong, in our own territory never before generally heard of, the word is now used by the natives as the name of the Burman Empire, or of any place to the eastward beyond sea, and an idea of something formidable and dreadful is attached to it.

Some say that our empire in India rests on opinion, others on main force. It in fact depends on both. We could not keep the country by opinion if we had not a considerable force; and no force that we could pay would be sufficient, if it were not aided by the opinion of our invincibility. Our force does not operate so much by its actual strength as by the impression which it produces, and that impression is the opinion by which we hold India.

Internal insurrection, therefore, is one of the greatest of our dangers, or rather becomes so when the means of quelling it are at a distance. It is easy to deride it, because insurgents may not have the horse, foot, and artillery of a regular army; but it becomes serious if we have not those materials at hand. Nothing can be a stronger proof of our weakness in the absence of a military force—even when it is not far removed—than the history of such insurrections as have occurred.

The civil power, and all semblance of the existence of our Government, are instantly swept away by the torrent.

We need not go far back to show that in the neighbourhood of the metropolis of British India, within a forced march from one of the largest of our military stations, our Government was subverted throughout a considerable extent of territory; our magistrates, with all the power that they could collect, driven like chaff before the wind, and an insurrectionary authority established by a handful of men, proclaiming the overthrow of our dominion, and the establishment of a new dynasty in the person of the leader of a band of fanatics. This state of things continued for several days, until the insurrection was suppressed by the application of military force, without which it is impossible to say to what extent it might have proceeded, so completely were the insurgents masters of the

neighbouring country. As the spirit of insurrection is catching, this affair was soon followed by an insurrection of the Dangur Coles, a race previously orderly and submissive, and remarkable for industrious and laborious habits out of their own country. No sooner had insurrection broken out, than it spread like wild-fire. Not a Cole in the country was free from the infection. All the inhabitants of other description, the rajah and a few chiefs excepted, who had strongholds or military means for their protection, were massacred or expelled. The officers of our administration, and every sign of our Government, quickly disappeared. For a long time all the force that could be found on our part was not only inadequate to suppress the insurrection, but, although in able hands, could hardly resist it, and could not prevent its spreading, or do more than check it at one point. It required several months and a large force to put down this insurrection; but that of the Choars, another wild race, soon followed, which baffled the first force and the second force employed, and kept us engaged for many months also, before it was extinguished. Had all those insurrections happened at once, or any of them, at a time when we could not have brought troops against them, they might have been exceedingly embarrassing, and the extent to which they might have proceeded, or the danger with which they might have been attended, cannot now be calculated.

These things happened in countries which had been long under our dominion, and although able reports have been written as to the causes, they have never, to my mind, been satisfactorily explained according to any motives or expectations by which men would rationally have been guided under the circumstances then existing. In each case, in my opinion, the original cause was habitual disaffection operated upon by the spirit of insurrection, excited by false notions that the time was favourable for success. The alleged causes, elicited by investigation, if they were causes at all, were merely sparks applied to combustibles previously existing.

I have noticed these circumstances at the risk of repeating what I have probably said more than once on former occasions, because the prevalent disaffection of our subjects, the uncertainty under which we hold any part of our Indian possessions without the presence or immediate vicinity of a military force, the utter inability of our civil establishments to stem the torrent of insurrection, their consternation and helplessness when it begins to roar, constitute in reality the greatest of our dangers in India, without which a Russian invasion, or any other invasion, might, I doubt not, be successfully met and repulsed. The authority of the late Governor General, in deriding internal disaffection and insurrection as if they were quite contemptible, must have great weight, the more because it will be gratifying to our rulers to see such opinions supported by such authority. Differing totally from those opinions, I think it necessary to appeal to facts of recent occurrence. What happened in the Baraset, Ramghur, and Jungle Mubal districts, may happen in any other part of our country, without any other cause than the disaffection already existing everywhere.

Persons unacquainted with our position in India might throw in our teeth, that this disaffection is the consequence of bad government, and many amongst us, connecting the two ideas together, are reluctant to credit the existence of general disaffection. But this feeling is quite natural, without any misgovernment. Instead of being excited by our misrule, it is, I believe, in a great degree mollified by our good government. It exists because the domination of strangers, in every respect strangers, in country, in colour, in dress, in manners, in habits, in religion, must be odious. It is less active than it might be, because it is evident to all that we endeavour to govern well, and that whatever harm our Government does proceeds from ignorance or mistake, and not from any wilful injustice or oppression.

Although Lord William Bentinck appears to despise the dangers of either foreign foes or internal insurrection in India, his Lordship admits some things which are quite sufficient to show that danger exists. He admits that we have no hold on the affections of our subjects; that our native army is taken from a disaffected population; that our European soldiery are too few to be of much avail against any extensive plan of insurrection. "This is quite enough, and more than I have hitherto alluded to, for it is impossible to contemplate the possibility of disaffection in our army without seeing at once the full force of our danger. As long as our native army is faithful, and we can pay enough for it,

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we can keep India in order by its instrumentality, but if the instrument should turn against us, where would be the British power? Echo answers, "Where?" It is impossible to support a sufficient army of Europeans to take the place of our native army.

The late Governor General appears also to adopt in some measure the just remark of Sir John Malcolm, that "in an empire like that of India we are always in danger, and it is impossible to conjecture the form in which it may approach." This sentiment expresses the reality of the case in perhaps the truest manner, and I will not longer dwell on this part of the subject.

His Lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes. I see so much danger in the ignorance, fanaticism, and barbarism of our subjects, that I rest on the spread of knowledge some hope of greater strength and security. Men will be better able to appreciate the good and evil of our rule, and if the good predominate, they will know that they may lose by a change. Without reckoning on the affection of any, it seems probable that those of the natives who would most deprecate and least promote our overthrow would be the best informed and most enlightened among them, unless they had themselves individually ambitious dreams of power. If, however, the extension of knowledge is to be a new source of danger—and I will not pretend confidently to predict the contrary—it is one altogether unavoidable. It is our duty to extend knowledge, whatever may be the result; and spread it would, even if we impeded it. The time is past when the operations of the press could be effectually restrained, even if that course would be any source of safety, which must be very doubtful. Nothing so precarious could in prudence be trusted to. If, therefore, increase of danger be really to be apprehended from increase of knowledge, it is what we must cheerfully submit to. We must not try to avert it, and if we did we should fail.

His Lordship considers our greatest danger to be in an invasion from the north-west, led by the Russians. He supposes a force of 20,000 Russian infantry and 100,000 Asiatic cavalry to have arrived on our north-western frontier. Supposing such a case, with the time which we should have for preparation, we ought to be able to give a good account of the Russian infantry easily, I should say, if there was no danger of internal insurrection at such a crisis. The 100,000 cavalry it would be more difficult to manage, from the impossibility of collecting an equal force of that arm. But is there no impossibility of collecting such a force against us? I doubt the practicability of assembling such an immense body. Are all to be on one side? Is there to be no hostility to the Russians in their progress? Is every chance to turn up in their favour? If it were possible to collect such a force, how is it to be fed and supported? At whose cost? Not at that of Russia, or any other power; that being utterly impracticable from want of means. Solely, then, at the cost of the countries through which it had to pass. If this were possible, it would at least destroy these countries, and the Russian infantry would be starved to death by the operations of its allied cavalry. All speculations, however, regarding our military defence against a Russian invasion may be safely postponed until we know more on the subject. It cannot come on us so suddenly as to prevent preparation to the utmost extent that our resources will allow; and preparation for such an event must be on a much larger scale than any that our means could afford, without the immediate approach of the event, or for any length of time. Reserving suitable measures until we have reason to apprehend that we shall have to meet this danger, we have in the mean time, without reference to such a course, ample reasons for putting our army on the most efficient footing, and for increasing it to any extent that our finances will bear. The measures proposed, in the late Governor General's Minute, appear to me to fall far short of what would be requisite at the crisis which he contemplates.

Considering the possible disaffection of our Native army as our only internal danger, and the want of physical strength and moral energy as rendering them unable to contend with an European enemy, his lordship proposes that the European portion of our army should be one quarter, and eventually one third, in proportion to the strength of our Native army. He considers this as requiring a force of 30,000 Europeans in India. In the expediency of having at least this force of Europeans, even in ordinary times, I entirely

concur; that is, if we can pay them. But the limit to this, and every other part of our force, must be regulated by our means. If we attempt to fix it according to our wants, we should soon be without the means of maintaining any army. Thirty thousand European troops would be vastly inadequate for the purpose of meeting the imagined Russian invasion; for we should more require European troops in the interior of India at that time than at any other. To have our army on a footing calculated for that event is impossible. Our army cannot well be greater than it is, owing to want of means. It cannot well be less, owing to our other wants. Such as it is in extent, it is our duty to make it as efficient as we can, with or without the prospect of a Russian invasion; and this is the only way in which we can prepare for that, or any other distant and uncertain crisis. On the approach of such an event, we must have reinforcements of European troops from England to any amount required, and we must increase our Native force according to the exigency of the time. We could not long exist in a state of adequate preparation, as we should be utterly ruined by the expense.

In order to raise our European force to the proposed number of 30,000, of which 20,000 are to be infantry and 5,000 cavalry, an addition would be required of 10,000 or 12,000 to our actual force. The increase of expense would of course be great. It is an increase to which I should not object, for it may be of vital importance if we had the means of meeting it; but we have not, and this is the difficulty which opposes us in every attempt at improvement.

In order to provide, in some degree, for this additional expense, the late Governor General recommends that a captain be struck off from every regiment of the Native army. Having, in another Minute, proposed the reduction of two subalterns in every regiment to meet some other expense, his lordship now recommends the abolition of a captain to meet this. If every additional charge is to be met in this manner, what will become of our Native army? I cannot reconcile my mind to these proposed reductions of the European officers of that force. They are the life and soul of it; and to avow the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the Native army, and, in the same breath, to advocate the expediency of reducing the European officers, appears to me to be an unaccountable inconsistency. This proposition is accompanied by another for increasing the number of rank and file, in every Native regiment, to 1,000. This latter measure is highly desirable, but, like every other good proposition, impracticable from want of means.

Lord William Bentinck maintains the opinion that there are too many European officers with the Native army, or that there is no necessity for so many. From what I have said above, it will be seen that I cannot concur in that opinion. If we were to regard our Native army as mere local corps for the support of our civil administration in internal Government, we might reduce the number of European officers, but we cannot, I conceive, do so while we expect from the Native army the efficiency of real soldiers against all enemies in the field, European or Native. We must not reduce the number of officers who are to lead them to the charge, and on whose energies their discipline and spirit depend. In any future necessary increase of our Native army, either temporary or permanent, it might be well to see whether internal tranquillity and order could not be sufficiently preserved by corps partially officered, as local corps now are, and former levies have been; but with respect to any kind of regular force intended for field service requiring the aid of perfect discipline, the absence of European officers would be a deplorable and perhaps fatal deficiency. To think of the occasion when our native troops may have to be led to the charge of Russian batteries and bayonets, and to propose at the same time to take from them their European officers, are incongruities which one cannot understand.

The late Governor General condemns our Indian army, in a sweeping sentence, as being the most expensive and least efficient in the world. If it were so, how should we be here? Is it no proof of efficiency that it has conquered all India? Is it no proof of its efficiency that India is more universally tranquil, owing to our Indian army, than it ever was under any native Government or Governments that we read of? If our Indian army be so expensive, why do we not employ European troops alone to maintain India? why but because Europeans are so much more expensive that we could not pay a sufficient number? If our Indian army be so inefficient, why do we incur the expense of making soldiers of the natives? why do we not entertain the same number of undisciplined

ciplined people, who would cost much less? Why but because then we should lose the country from the inefficiency of Native force? If, therefore, the Indian army be preferable to an European force on account of its cheapness, and to other Native troops on account of its efficiency—if we cannot substitute any other force cheaper and more efficient, how can it justly be said to be the most expensive and least efficient army in the world? If it enables us to conquer and keep India; if it performs well every duty required of it—hard work in quarters, good service in the field—how can it be subject to imputation of inefficiency? The proof of its cheapness and of its efficiency is, that we cannot substitute any other description of force at once so cheap and so efficient.

One important measure proposed by the late Governor General is the entire abolition of the Bombay army, and its union, half to the Bengal, and half to the Madras army. I am not aware of any advantage to be derived from this measure, except the saving that might be effected by the abolition of the portion of staff which would cease to be necessary when the Bombay army ceased to be a separate army; but I can hardly think that this advantage would be sufficient to make the measure desirable. It would, I imagine, be a source of great discontent to the whole of the Bombay army, and of gratification to none. If there were sufficient reasons for uniting all the armies of the several Presidencies in one, which, I apprehend, there are not, the Bombay army would share the fate of the others, and all would be amalgamated; but while there are separate armies and separate presidencies, I cannot see any sufficient motive for the abolition of the Bombay army, and the infliction of the wound which would thereby be given to the feelings of that body, and of the whole service of that presidency. For so great a change some very important benefit ought to be shown, which is not at present visible. The amount of consequent reduction of expense has not been stated, and would probably be insignificant compared with the magnitude of annoyance.

The junction of the Ceylon force with that of India appears, for unity of power, to be desirable, but while the Government of Ceylon is distinct, there will probably be impediments to a junction of the forces.

The introduction of Malay troops into the Indian army is another question agitated in his Lordship's minute. I am not competent to offer any decided opinion on this subject from a want of sufficient knowledge of the Malay character. The general impression of it is unfavourable, but I have met with gentlemen accustomed to it, who speak highly of it. If Malays would make orderly and faithful soldiers, I should be inclined for the admission on the ground that our Native infantry is composed too much of men of one class, actuated by one common feeling, and that it is expedient to have a variety, in order that one description, in case of necessity, may be used to maintain order in another. But this purpose would not be well accomplished by the introduction of less orderly or less efficient or more expensive troops, and what the Malays might prove in these respects I do not know. There cannot be a more orderly body of soldiers in the world than our Bengal Native infantry, and caution ought to be exercised before we substitute for any portion of them another class of men.

It is proposed that a portion of the Native army should be light infantry. To this I see no objection. It was formerly, and is I suppose still, the case in the Madras army: it was also at one time the case in the Bengal army. Several light infantry regiments were formed during the command of General Hewitt. That was because the French were supposed to be coming. They were afterwards reduced. There is now a light infantry company in each regiment, equal in amount in the Bengal army to nine regiments. Whether it be better to have the light infantry as a portion of each regiment or in separate regiments is a question on which I cannot pretend to offer a decided opinion.

In all that Lord William Bentinck says in favour of that description of our force which is called irregular, or, still more improperly, local cavalry, perhaps from its not being local, I have the honour entirely to concur, which I am always more happy to do than to differ from one whose mind has been so properly and anxiously devoted to the public welfare. I regard the irregular horse as a most useful and valuable description of troops. I wish that all our Native cavalry were of this description, and all our regular cavalry European. I do not mean by this remark to recommend such a change. All such changes, even if they were generally desired, require great consideration. Our regular Native cavalry has grown up as a branch of our establishment, has hitherto done its duty well,

and ought not to be inconsiderately broken up. But if I had to form a cavalry army for India, without the previous existence of the regular Native corps, I would make the regular cavalry European, and the Native cavalry of the same description as that body now termed the irregular or the local horse. I do not know that the late Governor General goes so far in his opinion on this subject, but in all that I have seen of his sentiments in approbation of that description of our cavalry I fully concur.

I also concur in the opinions which he has expressed regarding the use which might be made of steam power to increase our military efficiency, and maintain a speedy communication with Europe. But this and other expensive additions to our establishment can only be adopted when we have adequate means. Great improvements might easily be suggested, but where are the funds to come from? Many are sanguine in expectation of vast increase to our revenue from the future development of the resources of India, but for the present at least we must regulate our expenditure by the income which we have.

This consideration must render nugatory all schemes of improvement which would be attended with any considerable increase of expense; and to seek improvement in one quarter by positive deterioration in another is a most unsatisfactory mode of proceeding, and requires at least that the gain by the change, as compared with the loss, should decidedly preponderate, and be well ascertained.

The concluding sentiments of the late Governor General's minute are, that we are utterly unprepared to meet a Russian invasion, which I fully admit, and that we ought to be so prepared, with the large sum already appropriated to our military expenditure; which opinion is not so convincing, but very questionable, for if the same sum were sufficient to put us in a state to meet the supposed invasion, and that were the only danger against which we had to prepare, it would follow that a great reduction in our military expenditure would be practicable were it not for that expected event, but no one is able to show how this can be effected.

With a view to that great crisis, his Lordship proposes the increase of our European force to one-fourth, and eventually to one-third, in proportion to the whole army; the increase of the regular horse to 20,000; the increase of each regiment of native infantry to 1,000 rank and file; and of each regiment of cavalry to 800; all measures highly desirable and proper, in contemplation of the expected invasion, but still inadequate, and intermediately sure to produce an immense increase of expense which would be utterly intolerable and ruinous.

The only measure pointed out by his Lordship as calculated to meet this increase of expense, are, the abolition of the separate staff of the Bombay army and the juncture of that force with the armies of Madras and Bengal, the result of which, apparently, would give little aid to the purpose designed, and would not even recompense the injury done to the feelings of the Bombay service, in the destruction of a long-established and efficient army; and, secondly, the abolition of a captain in every Native regiment at all the Presidencies, a measure which would deteriorate the efficiency of the main body of our army—the very force which it is our object to make more efficient: and, besides, have an effect on the minds of the European officers, much more injurious than the saving produced would be advantageous. These measures, exclusive of their being objectionable, would be very inadequate in their results for the end in view, and we should find the expense, as before remarked, utterly intolerable. To increase the efficiency of the army by increasing its inefficiency, appears to me to be altogether a wrong course of proceeding. No proper resources for the increase of the army can be found in the decrease of the army. The two objects are incompatible, and the same things that make the former desirable or unnecessary must make the latter impossible or inexpedient, unless it can be shown that we have superabundance of force of some description, which cannot be done. We must not look to reductions in the army for the means of bearing expenditure, which is rendered unavoidable by the necessity of having a larger army. We can only look to our civil establishments when reduction is absolutely necessary; and even there nothing short of the total abolition of the civil service, and its amalgamation with the army, would be effectual, which could only be gradual.

Having objected to the plan of the late Governor General, I may be asked how I would prepare against the supposed invasion from the North-West. I should say, that to prepare for it adequately is impossible; we have not the pecuniary resources to place us in a state of sufficient preparation. What, then, is to be done?

done? We must wait. The event is at present remote and uncertain. We must postpone our preparations until its approach be less doubtful. It cannot come so rapidly in the shape imagined as to deprive us of time for preparation. We may then draw from England any number of European troops required, whether it be a fourth, or a third, or half, of the amount of our Native army. We may raise the complement of our Native regiments to any proper number; we may increase our irregular cavalry to 20,000, or a larger amount, if expedient; we may, by the formation of local corps and levies and depôts, make our regular army wholly available for field service. We must then make the exertions, military and financial, which the exigencies of the crisis will suggest, and our vital interests demand. In the meantime, we must keep our expenditure within our income; else, when the prophesied event arrives, it will find us in a state of the worst kind of inefficiency, an inefficiency of resources; which would be fatal, without a single blow from the enemy.

Let us, therefore, pause. Let us maintain our army on its present peace establishment, without attempting changes and reductions hurtful to its feelings, and, consequently, injurious to our best interests. Let us make it as efficient as we can without a great increase of charge. Let us watch our finances, and if they improve, and afford the means, let us apply additional funds to increase the strength and improve the efficiency of our army in any mode most advisable. Any outlay that we can afford for this purpose will be well laid out; and it is not necessary to think of the Battle of Armageddon, or a Russian invasion, to justify it. But our military efficiency in peace and ordinary times must be limited by our financial means. It is only in war and a period of necessity, that we can venture to put out of calculation the difference between income and expenditure. Our financial difficulties, actual and probable, are those which are most pressing; and military speculations, leading to a great increase of expense, ought to be suspended until they become unavoidable, or until we see our financial prospect brightening, and light shining through its present gloom.

16 May 1835.

(signed) C. T. Metcalfe.

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(Military Department.)

MINUTE by Mr. Prinsep.

THE late Governor General's Minute of the 28th February last on the distribution of the armies of India, and that of the 13th March on their composition, together with the Minutes of the present Governor General on the same subjects, dated respectively the 8th and 16th May, have just reached me in circulation, and the vast importance of the questions thus brought under discussion seems to me to call for a written expression of opinion on both points. The subjects are so intimately connected that it will not be necessary to multiply the record by separately stating what I have to say on each, more especially as I hope to confine my observations within moderate compass, and shall not think it necessary to follow out the plans of the late Governor General through all the details into which his Lordship has entered.

Although the earlier Minute of his Lordship relating to the distribution of the army touches necessarily on many of the sources of danger to our power, and on the objects to be provided against by the arrangements recommended therein, it is in the Minute regarding the composition of the troops that his Lordship has stated his opinion most at length on the means of securing our position, and has discussed with the most care the evils that surround us, internal and from without, and has pointed out the kind of military preparation by which he would recommend them to be met. As it seems to me to be the first point to come to a right understanding of the real nature of the purposes for which an army is required to be maintained in this country, I shall reverse the order in which the late Governor General has brought forward these questions, and first state my opinion on this point, reserving the mode of distributing the troops so as to make the most of them for after consideration.

We require an army to protect the country from foreign enemies; it must not only be sufficient to repel invaders, but must be exhibited in a state of preparation

to deter from attack, and ensure respect, and give political influence beyond the frontier, and to keep up the prestige as well as the reality of power. We require an army to suppress insurrections and sudden commotions, to awe the disaffected and give confidence to the well disposed, to command the respect of our subjects and allies, and preserve them in obedience, by the conviction of the hopelessness of any resistance, so that the turbulent, the refractory, and the ambitious, may cease in despair to entertain designs injurious to the public peace and subversive of the established order of things. Lastly, we require an army to support the civil power, to ensure the collection of the revenue, to excite the police and local authorities to act with vigour in the confidence of unlimited support, and to enable the administration of civil and criminal justice to proceed with sure and effectual steps until the population become habituated to both, and begin to regard with affection and respect the institutions provided to secure them in their rights and possessions.

Now, these three purposes of an army are evidently very different things in different circumstances. The frontier defence is one thing, when there is a peaceable and well disposed, or a weak and broken spirited State only to be watched and overawed, and quite another thing when there is a presumptuous, overweening enemy at our door studying the means of aggression and encroachment, or, when backed by others further behind, he assumes a threatening attitude, and a motive only is wanting for the commencement of hostilities, so that there is perpetual preparation for operations on a large scale. At the present moment we have the former condition of things to look to on every part of the frontier of India, we have thorough confidence that Runjeet Singh desires to maintain peace and conciliate the British power. The principalities of the lower Indies and of Afghanistan can scarcely maintain their own independence. Nepal, though military and martial beyond all the other powers of India, has had experience of a struggle, and is sensible of the insufficiency of its resources for another contest. The Burmese were more thoroughly broken in the late war with them than even Nepal; and this finishes the catalogue of frontier States. Towards all these we have only to maintain the attitude of sufficient preparation to keep up the prestige of our military strength; there is no occasion anywhere to arm for defence; we have neither invasion to fear from the standing armies and regular troops of these powers, nor the unlicensed breaking in of plunderers and loose rabbles to guard against, as used to be the case when our dominion was young, and we had the hordes of Hyder and the Mahrattas to watch, and in latter days when the Pindarees and Patan Condottieri used to threaten our defensive lines at every point. The show of force is all that needs to be maintained towards any of these neighbours in their present temper; if their disposition should change, or circumstances should bring enemies on to the same frontiers, we shall need a different state of preparation; and the only question is, whether we can reckon upon knowing in time when to make the change.

The late Governor General appears to have argued this part of the question as if he thought the Supreme Government bound to make preparation now for the remotely possible contingency of a Russian force being upon the Indus. Sir C. T. Metcalf however justly observes, that this is an altered state of things for which there will be abundant time allowed to make provision; that to commence doing so now would impose the necessity for a state of preparation quite unnatural in a time of peace, and such as it must be impossible that the finances of India or of any country could bear for a permanency. That it would be bad policy, nay, absolutely ruinous, to put ourselves into that state until the danger should be imminent, and the occasion should call for the expenditure. In the interim, it must suffice to maintain such an attitude of preparation as shall confirm Runjeet Singh, and other powers like him, in the conviction that our friendship is the most advisable thing for him and them to secure. In like manner, as our preparations for frontier defence vary according to the temper and attitude of neighbouring States, so also the repressing of the disposition to rebellion and to commotion or disturbance amongst those within. The natural frontier of India is at one time an object of comparatively easy attainment, and to be effected with much less means than at another. In the first few years after the Dooab and Rohilkund were transferred to us from Oudh, nearly half the army stationed within those territories was employed in repressing rebellion, in capturing forts, and driving out bands of plunderers who traversed the country by open day to the terror of the peaceable inhabitants, if in those days there were any such.



The same or a worse state prevailed in Bundlekund, in Kandis, and in the Nerbudda districts, and necessarily must prevail upon the first acquisition of any territory the inhabitants of which have been unused to the blessings of civil Government. The population must first be broken down by the rough hand of military coercion before they will receive civil institutions as a blessing, and change the modes of life to which they have been long inured. In the territory administered by the officers of Government, this change is effected in a very few years, and the same number and description of troops is no longer required to maintain tranquillity; but if instead of assuming the territory, we should leave the anarchist Native Governments to conduct the local administration, the wild state continues, and military force requires to be employed perpetually, as in Oudh and Hyderabad, and in Sindheas dominions and towards Indore, we daily see occurring. This force must either be provided from the British armies maintained for general protection, or we must allow, and indeed encourage, the native princes to maintain forces of their own; in which case double the quantity of men will be required, and unless officered by Europeans, the troops will be a source of evil rather than of good. Indeed, these very troops become objects of alarm to us, and are the cause of frequent disturbance, requiring to be watched and restrained by the continued presence of a British army; assuming, of course, that all within the external frontier of India has to be protected and maintained in tranquillity by the British armies, there is evidently much variety in the circumstances under which this purpose has to be effected; and until all shall be brought under the operation of one system, we could not apply generally any one single principle for regulating either the numerical strength or the stations of our military force, while the circumstances of the several divisions of the country so widely differ, and the duties of the troops, and the requisitions for their services, depend so entirely on those circumstances, it can only mislead to refer either to the measured area, or to the number of inhabitants to be protected and maintained in peace, or to any similar criterion as furnishing a ratio for the troops required, much less for their kind and description. There is little hope that in this respect there will ever be anything like complete uniformity. It is not attained in Europe, for England and Scotland require quite a different proportion of military force from Ireland, and so always must be the different divisions of the Indian Peninsula. There are at present three great varieties of condition, the subsidized, the protected, and the directly administered, besides a wide difference in the character of the inhabitants; and the time is far distant when even the political distinctions will vanish so as to admit of all being brought under one great and consistent scheme. But even if the whole of India were to be reduced to the same political condition, and all to be subjected to the direct administration of British officers, there would still be a wide difference in the demand for military protection. The disposition to submit to civil authority is more or less confirmed, as the habits of social intercourse have been long established, and civilization has spread. Amongst the Coles and Chooars, and in the wilds of Sumbhulpore, the population know nothing of British rule, and are prone to rise in insurrection at the bidding of any chief of influence, or upon any real or fancied grievance, whereas in the Gangetic Provinces, although we have seen a local tenantry goaded by hard landlords to turbulence and rebellion, the occasion is rare that any actual employment of military force takes place; and when the civil power has proved inadequate to repress disturbance, a company of a provincial corps used ordinarily to be sufficient, the prestige of the red coat and musket being all powerful in giving to the wearers the courage and confidence that secured good behaviour, and in inspiring fear and despondency in those opposed to them.

From the above observations it will result that, in the present condition of India, each army station must always require to be regulated by the circumstances of the surrounding country, and to be considered separately with reference to the particular objects for which it has been established; some stations have been intended as cantonments for field armies, whose presence and state of preparation are to strike awe into nations and chiefs beyond the frontier. Some are for forces of a similar description subsidized to support Native Governments. Some have been established to overawe protected principalities, and prevent their encroaching one on the other, or otherwise disturbing the public peace. Some are to restrain turbulent and disaffected populations. Some to control the mobs of large cities. Some have been temporarily established to

bring into order districts recently disturbed. Some to bring under more complete subjection territory of recent acquisition, of which the inhabitants are unruly, and unused to Civil Government. All these, and many more, have been the motives which have led to the formation, and to the strength and composition of existing stations, and the armies have been deemed sufficient, or the contrary, as they have afforded the means of supplying the demand for corps to effect these purposes in all directions. The armies of India have assumed the constitution they possess from the same causes. The European troops, the artillery, and the cavalry occupy stations where they form part of the field forces or of the reserves, and they are held in readiness to take the field whenever an army has to be formed for any operation of war; but the working duties of the country are universally assigned either to corps of Native infantry of the line, or to local or provincial corps specially substituted for them, and of nearly similar organization. The number of the European troops of the artillery and regular cavalry has been regulated by the number and strength of the armies to be maintained effective, or held in a state of preparation; the number and strength of the Native infantry, on the other hand, depends on the demand for the services of this most useful class of soldiers for any of the purposes above referred to, in addition to the share they necessarily take in the formation of armies for service, or to be held in a state of preparation.

The late Governor General makes light of the dangers to be apprehended from internal commotion, whether arising from the disaffection of allies and protected feudatories, or of our own subjects. I, too, regard as utterly futile the efforts that any of these single, or united, might make to shake off the British supremacy, or to subvert the British power; but if we are safe from injury from such attempts, it is only through the omnipresence of the Native army that we enjoy the security, and the promptitude with which a disciplined body from its ranks can be thrown in, superior to any existing body of troops, or any that could be hastily raised to be opposed to it; in other words, we owe our safety to the number, the constitution, and the distribution of the corps of Native infantry, and to the confidence we feel in their fidelity. The late Governor General, looking to the condition of the field armies to be kept up, and wishing to improve their efficiency, has declared the Native infantry of the Indian armies to be an inferior order of soldiers, not worth the expense at which they are maintained; and his Lordship has expressed the desire that an additional 10,000 Europeans should be added to the total force of that description, stating the opinion that this is necessary to secure our dominion in the possible case of disaffection amongst the Native troops, or of a struggle with an European power on the Indus, or with an army of the hardy races of Central Asia.

No one can doubt for an instant that the proportion of European soldiery maintained in India is at present very low, and that we should derive great additional strength and security from any augmentation that might be possible of this part of the force; but as remarked by Sir C. T. Metcalfe, this is purely a question of finance, and the answer in that view is clear that it cannot be afforded so long as we have to provide for the entire military defence and internal protection of India, with the revenue of only half the territory to apply to these purposes, the rest being appropriated to chiefs and families who squander it on their own pleasures, or in maintaining a state that contributes nothing to either great purpose. His Lordship himself does not maintain that the Europeans thus added to the effective strength of the Indian army are to relieve and take the duty of Native troops, and so allow of reductions of this part of the force sufficient to pay for them. The reduction of a captain in every regiment, and of the staff of the Bombay army, proposed to be dispensed with by dividing that army between the Madras and Bengal Presidences, are the only savings indicated, unless it be his Lordship's intention to make applicable to this object the gain, by reducing 29 regiments of infantry and 7 of cavalry, proposed in another Minute, which gain, however, has been shown to be only remotely prospective as men and officers are absorbed, for of neither will there, according to the plan, be any present reduction. The proposition, in short, for increasing the European force is accompanied by no demonstration of commensurate saving in any other branch, but is supported purely on the ground of the urgent expediency of raising the proportion of these troops to the whole force for the sake of increased future security and strength. The Native army is to be maintained in its present numerical strength; nay, the corps kept up are proposed to be fixed at 1,000 men each,

each, and yet this proposition for increasing the peace establishment of the regiments is accompanied by another for reducing the European officers in each, and this, too, under a declaration that the Native regiments are at present inefficient, and unequal to cope with Europeans or with other troops of more hardy nations than those of India. There is surely little consistency in these propositions; the reduction of officers will not improve the efficiency of the Native troops, especially if the corps be increased in number, nor will it tend to prevent the great anticipated evil of extensive disaffection amongst them, or to promote a better feeling amongst both officers and men towards each other, and towards the Government; but these observations are incidental, not touching on the main question.

I regard the idea of danger on the side of the Indus as chimerical, at any rate, as very remote, and sure to timely warning as it approaches to require to be prepared against; I join in deriding the idea of any real danger to our power from insurrection, internal commotion, or the disaffection of allies and feudatories, so long as our Native army remains faithful, and is available for the suppression of such troubles; and I think that the Government may at all times secure the fidelity of this army by acting towards it with justice, liberality, and a due consideration for its interests and feelings. Therefore, although I should feel great additional security from an augmentation of the European force, I do not look upon this measure as one of absolute necessity, without which our dominion in the country will be liable to be brought into jeopardy, and it is not, in my opinion, a measure for the attainment of which any sacrifice ought to be made of other interests, much less should it be pursued at the expense of the Native army, which is already overworked, and insufficient in number and defective in organisation, only because of our establishments having all from financial considerations been so pared down as to trench on their efficiency. Upon the question, therefore, whether the augmentation of 10,000 Europeans should be recommended to the Home Authorities, in order to bring the proportion of Europeans to one-fourth instead of one-sixth or one-seventh as it now stands, I would say that I do not consider the augmentation to be either indispensable as a security against the infidelity of our other troops, or necessary for the increase of the field and reserve armies maintained in a state of preparation; consequently, until there shall be more reason to dread the loss of the affections of the Native troops as a body than I yet see, or until the aspect of things on the Indus frontier should present greater and more imminent dangers than yet threaten, I think the expense of the large proposed addition to our European troops may well be saved, but I would at all times rather see the European force increased than diminished.

Other points in the constitution of the Indian armies are adverted to in the Minutes of the late and present Governor General, which it may be convenient to notice, before proceeding to consider the new principles of distribution recommended. The Native troops of the Madras and Bombay armies are stated to want physical strength and stature, and on that account to be very inferior, so much so as to destroy altogether their efficiency. The late Governor General's remarks on this part of the subject do not apply to the Bengal Native soldier, who is a larger and finer man, and in stature and strength nearly equal to the European. His Lordship has been at the pains to obtain returns of the proportion of Natives of Hindoostan entertained in the ranks of the other Presidencies; and his proposition for remodelling the Bombay army, by abolishing it as a separate service, and annexing one-half the men and officers to the Bengal establishment, is founded on the ascertained fact that about one-half of the number of the Bombay sepohees are from the Western Provinces of Hindoostan. The condemnation passed by his Lordship on the Native troops of India, seems particularly to have reference to the weak and diminutive men of the Dukhun; and I am inclined, from what I have seen and heard of the sepoys of the Dukhun, to agree with his Lordship, that it should be the study of the Government, and in particular of the military authorities there, to endeavour gradually to substitute, if possible, men of a stouter race. The men of Hindoostan will be available to a certain extent, but only so while the ranks of the Bengal army are fully supplied for if extensive recruiting for the latter were to be going on, the armies of the South could only obtain men by the offer of extra countries, and the competition would be prejudicial to both services, and contrary to all sound principle, and must soon be discontinued. But the present is a favourable opportunity for

endeavouring to effect a change; and it is to be presumed that the result of the inquiries instituted by the late Governor General has convinced the military authorities of the Dukhun Presidencies of the inferiority of those armies in this particular, so as to have prepared them to fix a higher standard of strength and stature for the men who may hereafter be enlisted, and so make them eventually equal to the Bengal sepoy; the difficulty will be in getting rid of the present small race of men, which can only be done with justice by the slow process of absorption.

Amongst other suggestions connected with this subject is the enlisting of Malays, who are a much more energetic race than the Natives of the Peninsula of India. It is said that there is a corps of Malays in Ceylon, and we know that pending our occupation of Java there were Buggese corps formed on that island which had obtained considerable discipline, and of whose fidelity and military habits I have always heard favourably. I believe, however, that the rates of pay allowed to Native troops (and the Europeans get little more) are not sufficient to induce people of these races to enlist, and we lately had experience in an attempt made to raise a local corps of Burmese and Tullians, that their expectations in this respect are higher than either our system or our finances will allow. If this objection, however, can by any means be got over, I should rejoice to see corps formed of any of the races indicated, or men of these races mixed with others in the ranks of existing corps, which would perhaps be even favourable to the raising of separate corps if it could be effected.

But though I freely admit that the Native armies of India are all greatly inferior to European troops, and that those of the Peninsula are composed of men wanting in bodily strength and in mental energy, and that these men, if possible, should be gradually changed, I am far from conceding that any one of the three armies is inefficient, much less that it is not well worth the cost at which it is maintained. Considered with reference to the purposes for which Native troops have been entertained, it might, on the contrary, be asserted with safety that these troops are the most efficient, the most hard-working, and the best bargains of all that are kept up. They enable us to keep together, and save from the wear and tear of unhealthy and laborious service, our more valuable Europeans. They were added to our armies to eke out the small number of Europeans who could be brought into the field, as an aid and second rank to them; and we were satisfied to find them superior to all of the same description that were ever attempted in any part of India to be brought against them. Sir Eyre Coote gained many of his battles even over the French Europeans without bringing under fire any of his British troops, their presence in the field being alone sufficient to give confidence to the Sepoy regiments, and ensure their good behaviour against troops they would never have dared to face but for the knowledge of this support; and yet these were the undersized troops of the Dukhun who in the Burmese War, and the late Governor General says, even in the recent operations against Coorg, misbehaved when acting alone under new circumstances. In the field the Native troops require, perhaps, skilful handling; but under a commander who understands them, and in whom they have confidence, they have never hitherto failed, and will ever be found most useful. Too much, however, must not be expected of them at once; and if the enemy is new and the circumstances uncommon and the mode of warfare strange, they must be broken in by degrees to what they are unused to, and not presented rashly to dangers for which their minds are not prepared. But although the Native troops must be spoken of with these reserves when their conduct in the field is under discussion, there needs no reserve in respect to their general utility for every other purpose of a military force. Their behaviour in cantonments, their promptitude in taking the field at all seasons, and the patience with which they undergo labours and privations when employed on services for which Europeans would be quite unfit, are most exemplary; for, as above observed, it is to them that the working duties of the country are universally confided, and their performance of them proves that they are fully equal to the trust, and therefore so long as these duties are essential and necessary, no one can deny that those who perform them are well worth their salt. I confess I do not like to see the merits of these troops under-rated, and I am quite sure that nothing would tend more to lower the high military feeling it is desired to instil into them, than that they should imagine they are despised or thought unworthy, and depreciated before the world.

Another

Another change proposed by the late Governor General in the constitution of the Native army is to keep up Europeans only as regular cavalry, and to convert the Native regiments into what we call irregulars. I have seen this project presented on several occasions before, but have always been opposed to it, for I think that our hold on the fidelity of men who provide themselves and are ready to take service for the day with anyone that will pay them is much less than the attachment that may be reckoned upon in men taken in early life and broken in by habit and discipline to associations connected in all things with their regimental duties. I should regret extremely that the Government were dependent for all its Native cavalry on men of the character and habits of those who form the irregular horse, under their present constitution. They are too much of one caste, and upon any impulse or present dissatisfaction would be liable to fall into courses troublesome at least, if not dangerous. The further proposition of the late Governor General for converting several of the Native infantry regiments into light troops is, to my mind, more worthy of attention. I should think the change likely to be extremely beneficial, for in hill and jungle warfare, which is a service on which these troops are often employed alone, it must frequently be of essential benefit to use as light troops more than the single company of men trained to do duty as such that is more than the one-eighth of the whole body, which is the proportion now allotted to each regiment.

I have not yet noticed the immense facilities in the movement of troops and stores which the extensive introduction of steam navigation will be likely to give in any future operations in which the Indian Government may be engaged. If it were said that this invention, confined as it must be for a long time wholly to ourselves, doubles the efficiency and strength of our military power, I should not deem the estimate too high. But we have by no means yet pushed the invention to the limit of its power of benefiting us, and all that has yet been done is only experimental.

The late Governor General was an enthusiast in his view of the changes to be wrought by the extensive application of the power of steam to the improvement of the means of communication, internal as well as by sea, between the several parts of India and with Europe. I do not think these views at all overcharged, so far as they refer to effects expected to result in future military operations, but it is yet too early to attempt any distinct estimate of their extent, or of the precise method in which they will operate. This, however, is a digression from the subject immediately in hand, which is the composition and distribution of the Indian army; and upon the latter branch of the subject I have yet a few observations to offer, resulting from the principles I have endeavoured to explain in stating my opinion on the points brought forward in Minutes regarding the former.

The late Governor General advocates strongly the collection of the Indian armies into masses, instead of allowing them to be spread in detail by corps and attachments. He advocates this as a general principle, and is supported by all the military authorities, who regard it as essential for the efficiency of the troops that they should be habituated to the training and discipline that can only be given when several corps are brought together.

It must be with great deference that any one not of the military profession should state an opinion differing in any shade from such authority, but I confess that I think the principle of concentration may be carried too far. I have always understood that the great benefit to corps from being exercised together is, that they should move well in brigade, which, howsoever well drilled and trained, they never will be able to do if exercised separately only as single corps. Troops that move well in brigade will act well in masses, for, beyond the brigade movements, it is generalship only that is wanting. For brigade exercise, however, a greater concentration is not required than three or four regiments, which make a force equal nearly in strength to the Roman legion, and so far as the maintenance of the country by cantonments of troops distributed over it is concerned, this strength seems to me quite sufficient for the forces to be held in readiness and exhibited to the disaffected, and quite sufficient also for the preservation of the troops composing it, in the highest possible state of discipline.

If, therefore, the whole of India were in one condition of subjection to British dominion, and its population were alike submissive, or alike in disaffection, the natural distribution for the troops, by which it should be held in subjection and overawed, would be in brigades at such distances as that there should be no district into which, in case of disturbance, a brigade could not be marched in

a given number of days, supported by others in so many additional days, according to the distance. There would be depôts with battering trains at certain selected stations, at which the troops of other arms besides the infantry would be collected, and the appearance thus kept up would be more formidable, but the general character of the distribution would be legionary if the purpose were purely to hold in subjection by means of the military force. In fact, however, the character of the country and its population are so various, and the objects to be provided for so different, that on that account alone this uniform scheme of distribution for the army would be quite inapplicable. There are large tracts that a single battalion is sufficient to overawe, and this even may be converted into a local or provincial corps without impairing the object; on the other hand, the dense population and the seditious habits of a large city may require the presence of more than a single brigade; and there may be other objects combined, such as the defence of a frontier, or the protection of an ally requiring the appearance and reality of an army equipped in all respects, and of greater strength than a brigade. The Benares, Cawnpore, and the Meeruth divisions are kept up in their present strength on these principles, and very properly so; and it is, as observed above, on this account that each military station requires, and will always require, to be judged of separately. Even where armies have to be maintained, there are often special considerations which influence their formation. When our troops were first pushed forward to the Sutlej, the natural inference would be, that as this was the most exposed position, the choicest description of force would have been placed there; but it is not so; we have never had an European regiment at Loodeeana, because we desired to avoid outraging the feelings of the Sikh population by placing amongst them troops that ate beef. A similar motive led to the first subsidiary force attached to Nagpoor, although a fighting force equipped for the front line of operations against the Pindarees, being wholly composed of Natives, and the composition of the forces now employed in Rajpoot, and will have been influenced by the same desire to avoid offending deeply-rooted prejudices on this point. From all this, I merely draw the inference that it would be unwise, upon the mere application of any general principles, to remodel the distribution which has arisen out of circumstances in each individual case, and in respect in particular to the three forces of Rajpootana and Malwa, which, from a sense of the advantages attending concentration, the late Governor General would unite in one central position. I can see no motive for this, unless there should be ground to apprehend that, separately, they are liable to be overwhelmed before any support could be thrown in, which is not the motive assigned. Sir C. T. Metcalf has adverted to the sacrifice of property, public and private, and to the expense that would attend this concentration; and I confess myself to be of the same opinion with him on the proposition, and to conceive that no case has yet been made out for the change. Sir Charles Metcalf has also well pointed out, as respects generally the army stations of Bengal, that the number of corps of Native infantry are insufficient for their maintenance in the strength deemed necessary, and for providing at the same time the due proportion of Native troops to be attached to any field army that might be formed to operate on any part of our frontier. I quite concur in the inference necessarily deduced from this state of things, viz., that this useful branch of the army, instead of being too numerous so as to admit of a reduction of the number of corps, is too weak at present for the purposes for which it is designed and has been raised. I also entirely concur in the suggestions as to the best means of remedying the deficiency when it shall be judged necessary to do so, and when our finances may admit of it, viz., by supplying the place of regiments of the line at all stations, were there may be only a single corps, by a local corps formed for the purpose, or by provincials. I look upon the disbandment of the provincial corps about five years ago, and the supplying of their place by Burkundazes, as a retrograde step of most prejudicial influence, for it destroyed the appearance of prompt military support to the civil power which the red coat always carried with it, and left the local authorities with no better aid than a body of Burkundazes, that every city mob or collection of Mofussil insurgents regarded as no better than themselves.

It is far from my intention to follow Sir C. T. Metcalf in the particular review he has given of the circumstances of each military division of the Bengal Presidency. I have already written too much to think of entering on such details.

In

In like manner, the late Governor General's summary of the distribution of the Madras army, with the Minutes and propositions of Sir R. W. O'Callaghan and of Sir F. Adam submitted therewith, though deserving of minute examination, must be passed over by me with only a summary notice. The points upon which I feel called upon to state an opinion are, first, the concentration of troops at Bangalore, so that the force at that station, now only 4,047 men, may be augmented to upwards of 10,000. The station possesses the advantage of being most salubrious, and it is central for communication with any part of the southern extremity of the peninsula. On these grounds, it is a proper place for the principal force, and for the depôts necessary for overawing and holding in subjection the subsidized States and other territories of that extremity of India. But wherefore should a larger force be kept there than may be necessary for this purpose? It is not the point from which a force would actually be selected for embarkation on foreign service. The Presidency, where only ships can be taken up, is the place to which troops must be marched whenever this is the object, and they might as well be called from anywhere else in the interior, where they may have been cantoned in brigades, as from Bangalore, where they are proposed to be in a larger body. Moreover, if India should ever again be convulsed so as to call for extensive military operations, it is farther north than Bangalore that the call would be for the strength of the Madras army to be displayed, and wherefore not so dispose the troops beforehand, that the army may be ready promptly to meet that call. Secondly, it is proposed to diminish the force at Bellary, and make Hyderabad a division command for a general officer, which it has not been heretofore. I entirely concur in the propriety of transferring the general officer from Vellore to Hyderabad, although I am not quite satisfied of the propriety of removing the troops from Bellary to strengthen the force at Bangalore. I conclude that the effect of the late political arrangements in Mysore and Koorg will be to bring all that wide tract more completely under subjection than heretofore, so as to enable it to be kept henceforward with fewer of our own troops actually in position to overawe it. There is a strong army at Hyderabad, more especially since the Jalna force has been called back, but the country it has to hold is wide, and although the Nizam has an auxiliary army, officered from our own, that can be depended upon for co-operation, that army is in respect to our own only what the Sepahees are to the Europeans, a support of inferior quality requiring to be managed with care if called upon for unusual service. The station of Nagpoor is, from its distance, further removed from support than even Hyderabad; whereas, upon the principles to which I have referred above, this part of India must be assumed to be in a condition requiring the restraint of military cantonments more than any of the territory more immediately subject to British administration. I should have expected, therefore, that the propositions for change in the distribution of the Madras army should have tended to throw troops northward into this widely vacant space, rather than to add to the crowded array in the extreme south. If the Madras army be a second line for the defence of the only frontier by which a formidable enemy could enter India, viz., by the north-west, the north or centre of the Dukhun is surely the field where one would expect to see it collected, but the effect of breaking up the Jalna station has been to withdraw it from this position, and the proposition to concentrate the army at Bangalore as the main reserve, added to that of transferring Nagpoor to the Bombay army in exchange for Belgaum, has a like tendency, viz., to keep the Madras army to the extreme south, and withdraw it from the line of support in the direction where only a serious attack is apprehended. I incline to think, on the contrary, that Nagpoor is an useful advanced position, to be occupied by the armies of Madras, and that strong supports should be posted for prompt concentrations on that point.

Such are the general impressions made on my mind by an attentive perusal of the important papers connected with the two subjects brought by the late Governor General under discussion in the Minutes cited at the commencement of this paper, viz., the composition and distribution of the armies of India. I cannot satisfy my mind that his Lordship's views upon either are just, or that any sufficient case has been made out for the extensive changes proposed or meditated by him in both these branches. My opinions on some points may be deemed presumptuous, on others, peculiar. I offer them because I feel called upon by the state in which these questions were left by the late Governor General to state my sentiments, also for the information of those who will have finally to deter-

mine on the measures to be adopted. I do not, on all points, quite agree in the views upon these subjects stated in the Minutes of the present Governor General, but if the question were put to me, whether to give my support to the latter, or to the propositions of Lord William Bentinck, I should have no hesitation in at once subscribing my assent to all the conclusions at which Sir Charles has arrived. If there be any difference of opinion between us, it is on speculative points not bearing materially on the practical results which it is the wish of us both to enforce by the line of argument and observation we have pursued.

(signed) *H. T. Prinsep.*

9 June 1835.

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Sir *John Malcolm's* REPORT to Lord *William Bentinck*, on the Bombay Army and Army Generally; dated 27 November 1830.

My Lord,

I HAVE been long in answering your Lordship's letter, applying for my opinion on the pay, composition, and distribution of the army in India; as I wished before I did so to collect such information as would aid me in giving my opinion on points so important to the future peace and maintenance of this empire.

2. This subject divides itself into very distinct branches, the European and the Native. Of the constitution of the European branch, I have given my sentiments generally, but very fully in the second volume of "History of India." The actual state of the army of this Presidency demanding attention soon after my arrival, your Lordship will find all the information I possess, as well as my opinion upon some of the most essential points, in a copy of my Minute under date the 25th March 1828, which I annex to this letter.

3. The subject of the pay of European officers in India has been brought forcibly to your attention by the clamorous discontent occasioned by reducing several of your stations from full to half batta; and the feelings and hardships of the European corps on this establishment by the unequal operation of the order reducing half tentage. Both these facts impart a serious lesson to Government in respect to the principles that should regulate increase in the pay of armies. Full batta was originally meant to provide for field equipment and extra expense which officers must incur when marching; but it early lost this character in Bengal, when continued to officers in cantonment. The same case occurred when the mode of supplying officers of European corps on the Bombay Presidency was changed; and instead of an amount to meet a necessary but temporary expense, a monthly allowance was given, which, from strict musters being discontinued, became part of the pay. Providence for the future is a rare feature in the military character, particularly among junior officers, whose expenses will usually exceed their means. In proportion to their allowances, houses were built and furnished, houses bought, and too often debts incurred; under such circumstances, reductions were felt as hardships, and with reason, for what had formerly been deemed luxuries and enjoyed by few, had from habit become necessities, and were deemed essential to all. It is easier to know the causes which have produced the distress that has ensued, than to point out the remedy that is consistent with the public interests. I have already given my opinion upon this subject.\*

\* *Vide* Colonel Frederick's Report, dated 23 November 1830.

4. When I made a Minute on the recent reduction of the batta of sepoy, I was only restrained from proposing a reduction of the full batta of the European officers at Deesa and Bhooj, as well as the troops, by consideration of the principle to which our attention has been of late frequently directed, of assimilating our military allowances with those of Bengal as much as local circumstances would permit; and by the fact of there being only four corps of the 36 of this establishment, the European officers of which draw full batta. If I had made this proposition as I did in the reduction of full batta at Mhow, I should neither have anticipated discontent nor distress on the part of the European officers of this army; and under other circumstances than the present, I should certainly have deemed the measure expedient. I think it desirable that an officer should have an increase when marching, or actually in the field, because his expenses must be increased; and if he is always on field allowances, he will soon acquire habits



habits of living which will on extraordinary expense occurring, be certain to involve him in difficulties and embarrassments.

5. An officer, particularly of a native corps, can live very well when on half batta, if he is frugal. No State can afford to pay officers in the Indian branches of its army in a manner that will exempt them from the necessity of careful and frugal habits, and the most baneful of all consequences that has been and will hereafter be found to result from too great liberality towards them, and which alike affects their future prospects and the public interests, is that this expenditure (if beyond what is strictly necessary), takes from Government the means of rewarding merit and long service.

6. An observation of the true principle, both of economy and discipline in armies, should lead to an endeavour to habituate junior officers to privations, and to make them look forward with hope, instead of dwelling on the enjoyment of ease and comfort in their actual condition. Particular situations in an army to which the view of every officer should be directed, require therefore all the consideration they can receive from Government; and the army in this country will never be in a healthy state till the command of a corps is a more desirable object for an officer of rank and character than any staff employ except the head of a Department; but of this I shall give my sentiments hereafter.

7. There can be no doubt that recent reductions have pressed with peculiar hardship upon the European branch of the army, the great majority of which are his Majesty's corps. The discontent this has caused will cease, but its evil operations will continue. I have fully shown in my Minute of the 25th March, now transmitted to your Lordship, the embarrassing results which are occasioned by the present stagnation of rise to higher rank in the Company's army, and the effect it produces of keeping many efficient officers from accompanying the corps to India, who generally have at their head colonels and lieutenant-colonels who come out in the certainty, from their rank being above the great majority of the field officers of the local army, of attaining general command. I know of no remedy to this evil, except that which I have pointed out in my Minute on the Army of this Presidency. It may be out of ordinary rule, but rules should, under such circumstances as those that relate to India, be made to bend to the primary objects of maintaining the peace and prosperity of our possessions in that quarter. Our success in that ever has been and ever will essentially depend upon the number, condition, and temper of our army. Every point therefore that affects these has much importance.

8. The arrangement I proposed would in its operation only affect the commandants of regiments in his Majesty's service serving in India, who would be of junior standing to what they are now; but there is another point of serious consideration, as it affects the captains and commanders of companies in these corps who are, I believe, under the operation of the late changes and reductions, admitted to have less means of supporting their condition with reference to local circumstances, than in any part of the king's dominions. If this be the fact, the consequence is obvious; no officer that can obtain leave or exchange without great injury to his prospects, will remain in India. The causes which formerly led to a preference being given by many to the regiments in India are gone. The pay is diminished, the chances of promotion which gave life to the service in this country no longer exist; and we observe a corps after being here some time, lose gradually almost every officer who came from England with it, while their places are supplied by others, whose circumstances, connections in this country, or want of means to promote their advancement, or even to subsist themselves, if reduced to half pay, lead them to prefer remaining in India. Such changes in the officers of a corps must be injurious, particularly among the seniors who have served long with the regiment. This might, perhaps, in some degree be rendered less by more frequent reliefs, but that must involve too great an expense. The restoring the allowances of captains and officers in charge of companies to what it was before 1825, would, I think, be a proper and salutary measure. Captains of troops and companies before that date drew a personal allowance of 20*l* per annum, under the head of non-effective allowance. This allowance is not known to the Indian army, and was the only part of their allowance that king's officers serving with their regiments in India could draw in England; and as such was generally appropriated by them for the pay-

ment of dress and equipment. Calculating the disadvantageous rate of exchange at which such articles are at present paid, the value of this allowance may be fairly estimated as at least to 40 *l.* paid in India. This allowance was done away with; but an exact proportional increase of net pay was given in lieu;\* upon this the directors ordered that the king's pay having been increased, the Company's allowances were to be proportionally reduced, so as to keep the pay and allowances of the two services equal. Thus to captains of king's regiments in India, the change of non-effective allowance to pay was a positive reduction. It may be argued that if the Court of Directors had not acted as they have done in this respect, it would have been injustice to the Company's service. But this conclusion is not correct. The captains in the Indian army have advantages in exclusive claims to staff employ, minor commands, and many other situations that might be adduced as far more than balancing the benefits which the captains of his Majesty's regiments derived from this increased item in their allowance; and I think that it is to be regretted the reduction was ever made, which with that of the half tentage before noticed, may be said to have deteriorated the allowances of a captain of a company in one of the king's regiments nearly 100 *l.* per annum.

9 Few subaltern officers in his Majesty's army, serving in this country, can look forward to command the corps to which they belong, but they aspire to command a troop or company; and to lessen its value is taking from them the only object (as far as improved allowances are concerned) to which they had to look, and is from this and other causes singularly calculated to destroy hope and increase discontent. A discontinuance of half the field officers, or even one in a King's regiment serving in India, would go far to meet this expense, and be little if any loss to the efficiency of a corps. There are in India few of those detachments from European corps which require captains, and their places would be well supplied by an arrangement that kept captains and old subalterns with the regiment to which they belonged. In addition to the hardship which the senior captains with the King's corps in India have to complete, it may be stated that a captain regimentally, but a brevet major, has 2 *s.* per day more than another captain at home, and in all foreign stations but India. This hardship, for such it is deemed, is felt by very few, and might be relieved at small cost. I believe there is no instance in the Company's army of a captain attaining, by seniority, the rank of a field officer; and it could not, therefore, be quoted as a case of partiality.

10. I have on many occasions, and especially in the Minute sent to your Lordship, given my opinion most fully on the actual necessity of the increase of allowances to commandants of corps in a degree that will render that station superior to any on the staff, except the heads of Departments. This has been my earnest object for more than 20 years, and the Court of Directors had authorised an increase which would have effected it; but as almost the whole of the Bengal army were on full batta, the arrangement brought no benefit to their commandants, and their not wanting it had probably its influence in the resolution of the Supreme Government to annul the acts of Sir Thomas Munro and Mr. Elphinstone, both of whom had put the most liberal construction on the order of the Court of Directors, and to the Presidencies at which they were the head it was a real and essential boon.

11. The allowance for commanding a corps should, I think, be raised to 500 rupees per mensem, and if with this should be associated the modification of minor commands, and given to officers who exercised them a superior allowance of 200 rupees, without removing him from the charge of his corps, his duties would be in no way increased beyond his power of performing them, and the ends of economy, as far as such commands were concerned, would be combined with the promotion of the efficiency of the service.

12. Two commands of the first class are allotted by the orders of the Court of Directors to this Presidency; six stations will remain at this Presidency, where there will probably always be at least two corps. These might remain with the allowance now assigned to the second class; and there are five stations which, being commands, with one corps and detachments from others, might be denominated the third, with 600 rupees per mensem, but, with the exception of all these commands, unless peculiar cases required the two of the first class, rendered necessary  
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by peculiar circumstance, should include the allowance for commanding a corps. This would in most cases be very beneficial to the service, and make a saving that would enable Government to effect the desirable object of increasing the allowance to the regimental commandants. The results of it at this establishment are shown in the annexed Table.

13. This arrangement, if connected with an obligation that officers should serve a certain number of years before they could be entitled to enjoy the benefit of off-reckonings, the consequences would be most beneficial to the discipline and efficiency of the army. This arrangement, however, to be just, should in a great degree be prospective in its operation; none who had been more than six or seven years in the service being affected by it.

14. As connected with having the most effective officers for regimental duty, I think no situation of brigade or line staff should remain to the same individual beyond a period of three years, except on field service. The young captain or subaltern who now obtains such a situation deems himself removed altogether from regimental duty till his rank compels him to join a corps, and often till that places him at its head. The general result is an establishment and a mode of life that often involves him in debt. This would not be the case if these officers knew they were only to hold their stations till a relief came. It would come as a temporary boon and be taken care of, as such men would return to regimental duty with knowledge of general duties, and the whole class of officers from whom such staff were selected would be animated to efforts to fit themselves for such stations to which having passed in the Hindoostani language should be an indispensable qualification. If this arrangement is made, actual incumbents might hold their situations three years, except their corps was ordered on service.

15. With regard to other staff I need only refer to my Minute in the Military Department, of which I transmit a copy. I am confirmed in my opinion that the Pay Department should be separated in the manner proposed; and, with reference to the police of the territories under this Presidency, I am quite satisfied that a cheap and efficient agency might be introduced in the mode proposed in page 201 to 225 of my "History of India." If there was a difficulty in obtaining officers qualified and efficient for such duties, who could be prevailed upon to resign their standing in the army, their net pay might be continued, and they might have an allowance to place them on a footing with magistrates of the grade which they obtained; but they should neither be considered eligible to the promotion or pensions which were allotted to others in this line. I have been completely convinced of the necessity in this part of India for the improvement of our police; and among our hills and our frontiers we have now specific officers detached, to one of whom only the powers of a magistrate have been granted; but I mean to propose it should be given to another, and I view it as the commencement of a system which must be extended, and which may, if well conducted, tend greatly to the future peace and prosperity of our Provinces.

16. The recent orders respecting the limitation to staff to be absent from one corps were well intended, but are singularly inapplicable to the native army in India. Obedience to them will be found difficult and embarrassing in peace and wholly impracticable in war. They may be followed in his Majesty's corps, who are full of officers, and in peace occupy healthy stations and have few detachments; but the exact contrary is the fact with regard to native corps, and the rules may often limit selection where that is essential to success. Their tendency also is to damp the hopes of aspiring men and check the acquiring of those qualifications, which it is most essential European officers of the native branch should possess. The option remains with the Court of Directors to adopt the suggestion that has been frequently made of forming a staff corps, or to apply some other remedy to this evil. But I deem it essential that, with reservation as to knowledge of language and standing in the army, that the prizes of staff employment should be open to every officer of the army. But in the meantime I think your Lordship might alleviate much of the injurious application of this order by limiting the situations which are to be considered as staff. This question has lately come under discussion at this Presidency, and I have signified my intention to refer it to your Lordship in order that it may be clearly decided. According to my view no European officer of the native army, who is

detached on special duty in the provinces where he commands troops of the branch to which he belongs, can be considered on the staff, nor can I consider as subject to this rule the officers who are nominated to act with bodies of the Guicowar Contingent appointed to preserve the peace of the countries of Kattywar and Myhee Counta, which are entirely under our rule and control, and for the peace of which we are exclusively responsible. These officers are employed in command of detachments of their own branch, co-operating with the Guicowar Horse. They are it is true denominated assistants to aid the political authorities in all duties for which they may be required, but those that are not military are contingent and were added to save considerable expense. The arrangement has fully met every subject that was contemplated. These officers should, I conceive, like others I have stated, be returned and detached on special duty, and I think that officers employed with Bheel and police corps, such as two of this establishment now are, and under whom considerable bodies of their own branch are often placed, should be returned in the same manner. They are not staff and are more usefully employed as officers of the native army than with their regiments. It is not for the parade and drill duties of a corps that officers of standing are much required in the native infantry. A good commanding officer and staff with junior officers will bring a native corps into full as high order as if the whole complement of senior officers were present, but it is in the command of these troops when on service and when detached on special duty that good and efficient officers are required, and all those I have stated are in the daily exercise of this duty. I deem it here necessary to add, that I consider the arrangement recently made, by which three officers in military command, Sattara, Bhooj, and Baroda, fulfil political duties as well as the junior officers employed with the Guicowar Contingent, to be of much importance, beyond meeting as it does the object of economy in training persons in this branch as instruments who will be found not merely useful but indispensable in case of war.

17. Your Lordship will add to the facts stated regarding the staff that even under ordinary circumstances the orders of the Court fall much heavier on a comparatively small army like that of this Presidency, than on a large one like that of Bengal or even Madras, particularly as in all the latter Presidency almost all the provinces are so settled as not to call for the specific nomination of officers, while the condition of many of our districts demands such selection; and I can only add that there are four or five officers now employed on such duties that I neither could nor would remove, if I had legally the power to permit it, from the situations in which they are now employed, stating my decided opinion that I deemed their services were essential where they were placed. This may not be a common case, but it is one that will exist in this part of India for years; and a Governor who has such heavy responsibility on him as the maintenance of the public peace should have a latitude of employing instruments that he judged competent, and be freed from restrictions that limited his choice. There is no fear of patronage being abused in such cases. The duties are of a nature that can only be performed by men that are equal to them.

18. I should think the staff regulations might be construed to relate only to officers removed from regimental duty or from the command of men of their line, and they might not be applied to brigade majors or line adjutants if the system was introduced which I before suggested, of giving these temporary appointments to officers belonging to corps at the station. They are not, as I said, wanted for drill, and they would be ready for all field service or special duty on which they could be required.

19. The personal staff of Governor General and Governors, Commanders in Chief and officers on general staff, paymasters (until a change takes place), commissariat officers under existing rules, judge advocates, town majors, fort adjutants, barrack masters and officers employed with corps in territories not under British control and management, are all I conceive that should be brought under this order. Cavalry, engineer, and artillery officers should not be eligible to hold any station in the Pay Department nor in the Commissariat, unless qualified by peculiar circumstances to be placed at the head of either of those branches of the service.

20. The few points I have to suggest regarding the pay of the staff of this Presidency will be brought to your Lordship's notice by Colonel Hough, as also  
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many similar subjects. With respect to the pay of the European soldier and the recent changes in many points connected with his comfort and accommodation, I can only say such points are before you in great detail. My own opinion is that we have gone to an extreme, and that in many respects an expense has been incurred beyond what was called for by either attention to the habits or health of European troops serving in India.

21. I have changed none of the opinions I have given in my history regarding the expediency of making the three armies of India *one*, with three divisions, and as far as relates to the European officers and troops with their establishment, regulating allowances according to remoteness from supply and price of labours and provisions with as much uniformity of system as practicable. I am still satisfied that regimental rise to the rank of lieutenant colonel, as I proposed in the chapter upon the army, is expedient, and that exchanges with his Majesty's corps, purchase of commissions under the restrictions and regulations stated in that work, would be advisable and salutary. My opinion is given so strong in the Minute now sent regarding the obligations for officers to serve a certain number of years regimentally allotted to colonels of these corps, that I need not here again advert to the subject. The propositions I have made regarding the brigade and line staff, I deem, on many grounds, very essential. It should be, of course, prospective and applied to none who had not been five years in the service, under which period no officer should, I think, be eligible to any staff except regimental.

22. The origin of the native armies of India and their progress to their present condition and character your Lordship will find fully given in the "Quarterly Review," vol. 18, page 385. That article is framed from papers of mine, and indeed was taken in substance from a memorandum prepared by me for Lord Buckinghamshire.\* If, in addition to this document, your Lordship peruses what I have said of the native troops in my History of India, volume 2, page 225 to 245, you will find all I can say upon the more general parts of this subject. I can only add that recent observations have confirmed every sentiment expressed in the volume to which I have alluded.

\* *Sic in orig.*

23. The pay of our native troops at the different Presidencies is, I believe, the same. There is a difference in the batta and a more considerable one in some of the pensions. This has arisen from a variety of causes referring to the class of men, the difficulty of obtaining recruits, price of provisions and labour, and the different judgments founded with reference to local considerations of means best adapted to form, in particular quarters of India, an efficient native army.

24. The Bombay Army is at present composed of :

Hindoostanees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,476
Konkanees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,015
Deccanees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,910

This large number of Hindoostanee men has occurred since the breaking out of the Mahratta war, and particularly during that with Burma in 1824-25. Previous to the former period their number in the army of this Presidency did not exceed 4,000.

25. In 1824 the Hindoostanees in the Bombay army amounted to 7,465, and the following year, on an increase of its establishments, to 1,000 men per battalion, with an addition of two extra battalions, the number of this class of men was greatly augmented, caused a good deal perhaps by the station of the Bombay troops at Mhow, where an officer was specially employed to recruit for the army.

26. This increase of foreigners over the natives of the Bombay territories was by no means desired by the more experienced officers of this army, and was, moreover, contrary to the wishes of the Court of Directors, who, in 1821, directed that the armies of the three Presidencies should be kept as distinct as possible in their respective territories. In 1823 this subject was brought to the attention of the Bombay Government by a letter from the Military Secretary, Colonel Casement, and in 1824 recruiting for this army in the Bengal provinces was positively prohibited by the Supreme Government.

27. The officers of the Bombay army generally considered it beneficial to have a mixture of castes in their regiments, and among others a proportion of Hindoostanee men, not exceeding 200 per battalion, but they consider these as only indispensable when their own provinces cannot recruit their ranks.

28. They consider the Hindoostanee men, though in size, appearance, and, perhaps, in a certain degree of military pride to be superior to their own, to excel them in nothing else. The Konkanees and Deccanees they account more patient under privation and fatigue, more easily subsisted and managed, and in bravery to be fully their equals. They are the descendants of Sawajies "Mountain Rats," whom neither the stature nor military bearings of the Hindoostanee could debar from advancing to the gates of Delhi; and the early history of the Bombay army (no where better related than in "Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas") shows them to be in no way degenerated from the spirit of their ancestors.

29. For the welfare of the Presidency there is another very good reason (not of a military character) why its army should be recruited from its own provinces. Not only do the men receiving pensions retire to spend them in its villages, but the sepoys on actual service remit (as is well known to every one acquainted with the kind filial feelings of the natives of India) a portion of their pay for the subsistence of their parents and families. This not only to a certain degree enriches the village, but affords a great inducement to the young men to enlist, with the view of following so enviable an example; with the Hindoostan sepoys all this is lost, and the inhabitants of that Presidency are discouraged from entering our ranks, not only from the want of examples of their countrymen's enjoyment of comfortable retirement, but from an impression that the superior stature, and the more soldier-like appearance of the Rajpoots, often recommend them to promotion in cases when the equality-efficient Konkanee and Deccanee in all the substantial qualities of a soldier give them as good if not better pretensions.

30. My own opinion is, that if the encouragements now given are continued to the men of the Bombay provinces, there will not in future be occasion to have recourse to other countries for recruits. The natives of this Presidency will early become reconciled to service in the regular army. The Hindoostanee commissioned officers and men will bring their families and colonise.\* But I am adverse to the present proportion of these men in our ranks, and if the evil of the present system is aggravated by those prejudices being admitted to have force, it would be much better that the Hindoostanees of the Bombay army were in distinct corps, than that their numbers, aided by their looks, should tend to lessen the self-esteem, and damp the hopes of men of lower cast and stature.

31. I have perused very attentively the records of the Bombay native army before they had any men from Hindoostan, and through the severest trials they have evinced a courage of fidelity and temper under danger, privation, and fatigue that we cannot expect to see exceeded. Till within twelve years the general sentiment among these men was the pride of corps. I regret to observe that the pride of caste is now much cherished by the men,† and considered by the officers. There are no prejudices and pretensions that will be found so injurious if not resisted as those minor ones of caste, if they receive more attention than is due to them. This is not the place to state my sentiments on this point as relating to our civil rule, farther than as that affects the temper of the native army. Almost all the principal native revenue servants are Brahmins,  
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\* *Vide* Appendix (F.) containing propositions for the Widows' Fund, from which it appears that the report of this fund added to the existing establishment of boys, led all the native officers to apply for means of bringing their families from Hindoostan.

† A remarkable circumstance, which shows the character of this feeling, occurred in 1818. Captain McDonald, an officer on my staff, who had belonged to a Bengal corps, at the siege of one of the forts of Bundelcund, where a low caste man had distinguished himself, and been promoted to the great disgust of the others, several of whom had taken their discharge, came to me one day in Malwa, and said he had met one of these Brahmins, a naique in the 8th Bombay Infantry, and that he asked why he left his corps on a low caste man being promoted, and was now serving with a Jeu Subedar, a Purwaree Jemadar, and other low caste men; the man said, he answered promptly, "Hindoostan Zat ke Ghyrat, Bombay, Pultun ke Ghyrat," that is, "In Hindoostan, it is the pride of caste, in Bombay, that of the corps."

and they are a valuable class of men. Every attention is due to the essential observances of their caste and religion; but when, as frequently happens, they solicit their European superiors to classify sepoy, and to place sentries in a manner that will prevent the inconvenience of their washing, or be offensive, they should be told the soldier is ennobled by his occupation, and that they might leave the public service, if the proximity to any of those employed in it was insufferable. This feeling when indulged increases and creates the worst spirit amongst the men of the corps, as well as hatred in sepoy to be employed under, or have any communication with Native servants in the civil branch. They complain, and justly, that the treatment they meet from them is often different from that they receive from their officers. "These cowardly fellows of Brahmins," said an able and old Konkaneer subadar I was conversing with on this point, "who would not look at me, and would degrade a brave man of my caste (a Purwaree) by refusing to let him stand sentry over the treasure, if in a cutcherry will cringe and help the collector to his shoe if it fell off, and would consider themselves the more honoured the nearer he sat to them; and yet, I believe," said the old man, laughing, "you Faringees are, according to their belief, as unclean and impure as we Purwarees." I have communicated with some of the Brahmins who exercised high civil and military power under the Native Government of the Deccan, and they assure me no objection would have been tolerated on this score against any soldier. Purwa, the celebrated Dewan of Mysore, himself a strict Brahmin, and the ablest man I ever knew, repressed this spirit with great violence in one of the two instances where it appeared in men of his own caste, and repeatedly told me it was calculated to make impressions dangerous to any government, however constituted, in India. The error into which numbers fall in this respect proceeds from the best motive, that of conciliating useful and respectable men; but their pride of caste must not be gratified at the hazard of any part of the temper and respectability of that army to which the safety of that empire has been and must continue to be intrusted.

32. In the Madras army desertions have been long almost unknown. This has prevailed to a great extent in that of Bombay; from 1803 to 1808, a period of five years, the desertions equalled its entire numerical strength, a loss to Government, independent of the services of the men, of seven lacs of rupees. The desertions of the next three years, from 1808 to 1812, averaged 2500 men per annum, costing Government six lacs. From that period (1811) to 1822 the returns show an average of desertion of 1·253 annually, but from 1822 to the present year, such became the improved state (in this respect) of the Bombay army, that they have decreased, and its desertions do not in the last year exceed 300 men.

33. Many causes combined to render desertions frequent, some local and uncontrollable—the disgust taken at the system of our discipline by the recruit; the facility of desertion from the limited territories of this presidency, and the certainty of getting service from Mahratta princes.

34. The Hindostanee men, indeed, were after a certain period of service almost certain to desert. Their view in enlisting was generally to obtain an opportunity of saving a sum of money (which their parsimonious habits enabled them to do), and they had no local bias, for they never brought their wives and families with them from Hindostan. When their object was attained, they took the first opportunity of deserting, and the distance of their homes, which, as well as their right names, are generally unknown, secured them from subsequent detection.

35. In 1809 Government, on the suggestion of Sir John Abercrombie, adopted several measures to obviate this great evil, and these were attended with most beneficial effects.

36. An amnesty to deserters, with liberty to re-enlist, was published. Furloughs were granted, the gratuity system was abolished, and pensions\* for service and wounds were established for the sepoy, and, under certain circumstances, for his wife and children. Men were also allowed to enlist for limited periods of five, eight, or ten years.

\*After 20 years' service three-fourths of his pay, and after 30, full pay for life.

37. There was before my arrival at Bombay a small establishment of sepoy boys with each Native corps, to which the court of directors had at first objected.

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They, however, afterwards assented, on the representation of the Bombay Government of the ultimate economy as well as efficiency of the measure, to sanction it. Sir Thomas Bradford, the late commander-in-chief, pressed the increase of the sepoy boys, which, when the reductions were made in invalids, was carried into execution on the grounds stated in an annexed extract. When the hill forts were reduced in 1828, and a considerable reduction of expense effected, their commandants were remodified, and first and second class killadars established on a footing which, at a very trifling increase of expense, instituted a system of honourable rewards for old and distinguished soldiers. The annexed extracts of minutes will show your Lordship my reasons for adopting this measure, and the effects by which it has been followed. I also annex extract of a minute by which your Lordship will see that our local Sebundy corps are now commanded by active and distinguished Native officers, by which economy and efficiency have been promoted, and great encouragement given to the Native army.

*Vide Appendix, B.*

*Vide Appendix, C.*

*Vide Appendix, D.*

38. A subsequent measure, which allows a trifling distinction in pay, and exemption from corporal punishments in passing through the ranks, to a limited number in each corps to the sons of Native commissioned officers has been carried into execution at this presidency. The grounds on which the measure was adopted, as well as the expense incurred, your Lordship will find stated in the Appendix, to which I have added the minute upon the proposed widows' fund for Native commissioned officers, which would have been attended with no increase of expense to Government, but which, I regret to say, has been objected to by the supreme Government on the same ground that objections have been stated to the other measures regarding killadars and boys, that there were no such usages in Bengal, and that such distinctions were calculated to create discontent among the Native troops of that Establishment.

*Vide Appendix, B.*

*Vide Appendix, F.*

39. Each of the three Presidencies of India has succeeded in attaining, though by different means, the object of having an effective Native army. I have served with, and commanded, Native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and I declare to your Lordship I have hardly a choice. They have different qualities, but with good officers they are all excellent troops. Their respective characters have been elsewhere described, and I confess I should dislike to see any serious change in their composition further than was dictated by a gradual change of circumstances. Independent of other reasons, which render the change far from desirable, there is no empire in which more attention may be eventually required, than in that of India, to the well-known maxim of the Romans in regard to their distant conquests, which was to preserve, or restore if disturbed, the peace of one province by troops drawn from another.

40. I have of late noticed this subject in several Minutes, in reply to suggestions and instructions from your Lordship in Council, founded on general principles of making an arrangement respecting Native troops similar at the three presidencies, and expressing apprehension lest giving encouragement to the Native army at one Presidency might create discontent at another. That this consideration has not before met with attention is to be referred to the distance at which the armies at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay acted, the different races of whom they were formed, and their habits of life. There has been no occasion to give that encouragement to the frugal Rajpoots, who are the cultivators of the provinces of Hindostan, that has been found necessary to attach Mahometans of the Carnatic, and the Hindoos of the Northern Circars, at Madras, and to induce the inhabitants of the Northern Concan and Deccan to enter the ranks at Bombay; but there can be no doubt that the pensions to Native officers of distinction, the fine establishment of boys attached to their corps, the regimental depots formed at the best recruiting stations at Madras, have accomplished their objects in fixing the attachment of the army to their colours, and their forwardness to march and embark on every service, as singularly evinced on the late occasion of the war in Burmah.

*Vide Sir Thomas Munro's Correspondence.*

41. Desertions, as I have already remarked, are almost unknown in that army, and I have shown that the same causes have produced the same effects at Bombay; recent and most minute examination into this and other subjects connected with the public service of this Presidency has quite convinced me that if the principles upon which measures are founded, and the effects produced by them, are not very carefully considered, the objects of true economy may be afterwards



wards sacrificed, and I have seldom known this fact more clearly elucidated than by the papers I have had to examine regarding the past and present condition of the army of this Presidency, the general results of which I have already noticed.

42. The late approximation of our Native armies certainly requires more attention than was formerly given to similarity of measures in regard to them, but there are so many opposite usages and feelings, as well as local circumstances, to be considered, that this object must be the work of time. Great care and caution are also necessary, for most serious injury may be inflicted by an order that apparently rests upon indisputable general grounds, but is inapplicable to the particular case. Before any measure connected with the improvement of our Native army is rejected at one Presidency because it has not been found necessary at another, it should be ascertained, in the first place, whether there are not local causes and considerations that render it wise and expedient, where it has been adopted; and, in the next, whether, judging the principles upon which it is founded and the effects it is calculated to produce, it is not worthy of imitation.

43. On the consequence that attaches to the Native army all are agreed. That a certain proportion of European troops should always be in India is fully admitted, but there is no error more common than that of considering the latter as a check upon the Native armies. They never have, and never will prove such. Long experience has rendered my opinions the same as those of Sir Thomas Munro. The necessity of check implies distrust that degrades. It is by complete confidence alone that the Native army of India can be preserved in efficiency, and attached to the Government it serves. But this most important object will require great increased consideration when a period of successive wars and field service is succeeded by a long peace, which, besides its other effects, calls for reduction in every branch of public expenditure; and, at such a time, with men who cannot be aware of all the bearings of this subject, and must be ignorant of the motives which actuate Government in the line of conduct necessity obliges them to pursue, and consequently are likely to misrepresent its intentions towards them. Government should be solicitous to substitute every other possible motive of fidelity and attachment, and omit no opportunity that may still be available of strengthening the subsisting ties between the Native soldiery and Government. I have elsewhere observed: "The rigid principles of economy, and the precise forms of our civil rule, should both yield to the establishment of this cornerstone of our strength, as without it the vast fabric which has been raised with such pains must totter to its base at every tempest with which it is assailed."

44. On the pay of our Native army I can make no further remark than that I think prospectively a modification might be made that would be beneficial to Government, and not unsatisfactory to the troops, by giving less to the younger sepoy and more to the older. This is the case in the British army, and I believe with every one in Europe. I know of none in which it would be more accordant with circumstances than in the Native army of India. But it is a point that merits great attention, and the scale of it, if it is ever adopted, should be fixed with deliberate care.

45. I cannot quit this part of my subject without stating my opinion to your Lordship that it is not one to be intrusted to mere financiers or calculators, far less should the opinions of men not intimately acquainted with the feelings and character of our Native troops, and who have never served with them, be taken; nor can the opinions of those who have only served in one part of India be adopted as conclusive in regard to arrangements which affect another quarter of our dominions; the considerations which are involved in every question that does or may affect the temper of our Native army are, in my mind, of the highest importance. It cannot be too often repeated, this army is our safety and our danger. Every information should be sought and obtained to aid the judgment of those who have to decide upon points by which the temper, zeal, and fidelity of that class of troops can be affected; but not even what appears to be the least important of these measures should be adopted without the most serious deliberation. Every branch of this subject requires the mind of a statesman. We have, through the efforts of our Native army, triumphed in wars; and rebellious plots and conspiracies may be formed, but they will never succeed while we maintain the good spirit and fidelity of this branch of our force. This our

enemies, avowed and secret, well know; and all their efforts have been and will hereafter be directed to its corruption. This object has never been but very partially effected, but it is one which we must beware of aiding by any measure that impairs the confidence, that undervalues the merits, and slights the pretensions of men who are every day becoming more sensible of their own importance, and naturally seek for participation in the benefit of a power they have so largely contributed to establish, and of which they cannot be ignorant they must continue the principal support.

46. With respect to the distribution of the armies of India, I can only state a few leading principles by which that should be regulated. Though circumstances may occasion deviations that cannot be provided for, if we fix and pursue to the utmost of our ability a settled plan we shall avoid great expense, both to Government and individuals; for when that plan is fully acted upon, the distinction will be completely made between temporary and fixed stations. The plan regarding fixed stations is simple and obvious, from its principal object being the preservation of the internal peace of India and defence against foreign invasion.

47. The recurring expediency of embarking European troops should also be borne in mind; and this, with the nature of their supplies, requires that, where it is practicable, a considerable proportion of that branch should be near the sea, or where there is water carriage. These corps should be distributed in ordinary times according to the proportion of the divisions of the Native army with which they serve.

48. The principles to be observed in fixing upon permanent stations are, lines of defence and of communication. I have, in recommending such stations since I arrived, kept this steadily in view. From Bombay to Masulipatam, which cuts the Peninsula at a part very important for preserving tranquillity, the line of direct road from Bombay is Poonah, the principal station for European troops, and from that to Sholapore, our next permanent station, is 160 miles, from which it is 200 to Hydrabad and to Masulipatam. The superior road recently constructed up the Bhoire Ghaut renders that not only practicable but easy for wheeled carriages, though the ascent is 2,000 feet. It completes an excellent road to Poonah, and we are gradually extending that to Sholapore by the Collectors, which, from the soil of the Deccan being so favourable, has not yet cost more than 300 rupees per mile. If the Nizam's Government can hereafter be persuaded to make the road through its territories between those of Madras and Bombay, the communication from sea to sea, on this line, will be complete, while the station of Belgaum is in another line, by which we communicate with the ceded districts of Madras and Mysore. This road from Poona will extend to the Neera Bridge, from whence the Rajah of Sattarah has promised to make it through his territories, which leaves a distance of miles to Belgaum, whence an excellent road to Dharwar will be completed by the Madras Pioneers within the next month. Little remains to finish this line, and these roads, when completed, will be found of the utmost importance, not only as they facilitate a communication between our force throughout the southern parts of India, and enable us to reduce expense by improved means of combining military resources, but as they promote intercourse and commerce. The permanent station of Belgaum has, besides the recommendation of being on this line, that of salubrity, and being well situated for a European regiment, and the additional one of being within 70 miles of the port of Vingoorla, to which an excellent road has been made that facilitates supplies from Bombay, and is favourable for this corps embarking at the shortest notice.

49. Ahmednuggur, which is on the line from Poonah to Central India, and also to Aurungabad, Jaulna, and Nagpore, must ever be deemed, in the distribution of the troops allotted to this quarter, an important permanent station. It is now the Artillery Depôt, and almost the whole of that corps are fixed at it. The communication between this place and Bombay can be shortened by 30 or 40 miles, and it may be eventually useful to open this line of road. The Engineer Corps being stationed at Seroor, which is on the line, and exactly half way between this place and Poonah, will soon complete, and at no cost, a road already commenced betwixt them; and, that being hereafter carried to Jaulna  
and

and Nagpore, will be of much importance in improving the efficiency derived from the station of troops on that line to the Bengal territories.

50. A most excellent and permanent road has been made from Bombay to Tannah, and from that up the Tull Ghaut to Malligaum, and through the greater part of Candesh, towards Sindwar. It will be of much importance this road should hereafter be extended to Mhow. The distance to be made is not great, and the soil in most parts favourable. The construction of a road, and clearing the jungle, would make this route as good and as safe as other lines of communication in which such tracts are to be passed.

51. To the northward our present permanent stations are singularly well calculated to maintain the public peace, to meet invasion, and to communicate (the most important of all points) with the troops of Bengal for the protection of our north-western frontier, from the Indus to the Himalaya mountains.

52. Ahmedabad, a most central situation, is now the head quarters of the northern division. It is from the Gulf of Cambay 30 miles; 70 from Deesa, the principal permanent station on the frontier of Guzerat; 80 miles from Rajcote, in Katywar, by which it communicates in a direct line with Kutch; and 70 from Baroda. Hursole, a new station, which is 30 miles from Ahmedabad, is on the direct line to Neemuch, from which its distance is only 130 or 140 miles; and, by the report of Lieutenant Holland, lately returned from the survey of a route from Hursole to Dungerpore, added to my knowledge of the Banswarrah and Purtubghur country, I must assume that a road sufficiently good for all military purposes might be constructed, at comparatively small cost, between these stations, and through it our military strength would be increased without any addition to its numerical numbers; but a line from Deesa, from Seroee to Ajmeer and Delhi, is of still more consequence. A glance at the map will satisfy your Lordship of this fact; I cannot tell you the importance I attach to opening these roads, which are to communicate, and in a manner join, the only frontiers of our Empire which can be exposed to invasion; but that may be termed a speculative event, and one probably so remote as not to warrant any disbursement. But there is, or I am mistaken, more proximate dangers from internal disturbances along these lines that would be almost removed by the construction of roads, or, under all circumstances, much lessened. My inquiries and observations in Kattywar and Myekanta, as well as the information I was able to obtain of the adjoining districts of Rajpootana, led me to deem these countries far from free of the seeds of future trouble. The chiefs under our direct rule, as well as those subject to our controlling management throughout our north-western frontier, are neither in a settled or contented state. Independent of their attachment to ambitious habits, and their restless minds, those of this class in our own provinces are far from being yet reconciled to the system of our judicial administration, which it has been stated by my predecessor, and has been recently\* repeated by me, is, in its forms and processes, very unsuited to their condition. Those who are not yet subject to the regulations, but are under protection, live in dread of the approach of our regular courts, and I really know of no other feeling that makes this class of persons view with jealousy, and a spirit of hostility, the extension of our power, which, whenever our system has been modified to the circumstances and condition of such classes, has been recognised and acknowledged as a blessing.

\*Vide Minute in Revenue Department, in Guzerat, dated 15 October 1830.

53. The Rajpoot chiefs to whom I allude are almost all connected with the highest families in Rajpootana,† with whom they correspond, intermarry, and no doubt at times intrigue. There may be no immediate proofs of existing danger, but this is a part of our territories in which a flame once raised would be likely to spread, and not be easily extinguished. The intersection of these countries by roads, and the increased intercourse consequently created, would, while it improved both their countries and ours, give us a facility of moving troops at all seasons that would tend more materially than any measure I know to preserve the general tranquillity.

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† Both the Eden and Ahmednuggur chiefs are very nearly related to the Rajah of Gordpore. The son of the Ahmednuggur Rajah (a fine boy), is, I believe, thought likely to succeed eventually to that great Principality.

54. In the present state of the finance of India no large work of the nature proposed can be undertaken, but the object of the true economy of a state is to reduce every unnecessary expense, that it may possess the means of making those disbursements which it is compelled to do by public exigencies, or which it is wise and expedient to do on grounds that cannot be disputed, of preventive policy, which demands more attention in a Government like that we have established in India than in any I know in the whole world, would gain by the increased power of rapidly combining our military resources, and lead to great saving of future expenditure. I do not wish your Lordship to go farther at present than to direct the plan I have sketched, if you approve of it, to be progressively accomplished. If that is done I should deprecate any extensive surveys, or any nominations of general superintendents, or employment of scientific officers, except to construct bridges or other works in which science was required. The lines being decided upon by reference to past surveys, and information of local revenue and political authorities, the roads might be gradually commenced by the collectors, and princes and chiefs may be induced by remissions or favour to continue it through their territories. If this was done, and some aid granted, much might be effected at small comparative cost. I am by no means an advocate for these lines being made in the first instance on any great scale, though they might be constructed with a view to future improvement, when their beneficial results, and the more prosperous state of our finance warranted. Practical experience upon this subject leads me to assure your Lordship that the expense, if incurred gradually, and the work effected in the manner we are now carrying on some roads in the Deccan, will not be great. Natural obstacles will no doubt occur, which will require the application of art as well as expenditure, but these would not be numerous in any of the lines I have suggested, and, when overcome, would be attended with increase of commerce, and consequently of customs, besides the cheaper conveyance of stores and provisions, even when a duty was not established to reimburse expenditure.

55. The rendering the Bhoze Ghaut, on the road between Bombay and Panwell, practicable for wheeled carriages, has long been a desirable object; but Government was deterred by the expense, it having been estimated at above two lacs of rupees. A contract was made for one lac. The annual saving upon the transport of public stores is between 6000 and 7000 rupees in times of profound peace. Had it been as practicable for carts as it now is, even as late as 1827 (during the Kolapoor expedition) the calculated saving would have been from forty to fifty thousand rupees in one year; and, besides the saving actually made on stores, twelve thousand rupees have been offered for the moderate duties imposed for next year. More will be given, and there can be no doubt the judicious expenditure of one lac of rupees on this work will be a certain source of revenue of thirty or forty thousand rupees in ordinary times, and, on the occurrence of military operations, the actual cost will be more than realized every year. The duties levied will be cheerfully paid, for it is as great pecuniary benefit to individuals as to the public. I instance this work as one in which the outlay is very profitable, besides the many great advantages to be derived from its construction.

56. The stations at Madras have been fixed at different periods, as here, to meet the changing circumstances of the territories it had to protect, and the subsidiary forces it had to furnish. The southern stations have been gradually decreased. Its great line of communication with Calcutta through the Circars is one not requiring protection. The stations in the Carnatic and Mysore, which are those of its disposable troops, connect it with Malabar in one line and with the Southern Mahratta country by another. The latter has also a communication with the stations in the ceded districts. All these lines require attention, and fortunately the excellent roads made through various parts of Mysore, and the ability and disposition of the Rajah to construct such works, will greatly aid the object in this quarter.

57. The communication from Hyderabad, by Nagpore to Saugur, is a military line of importance, and one on which the stations should be permanent, while that of Jaulna is useful as communicating with Malwa.

58. From Calcutta to the station of Loodhiana, on the Sutledge, is one direct line on which, besides the stations, the disposable part of the army of this Presidency is cantoned. This line, branching from Allahabad or Benares military lines,

lines, might lead to Malwa, Bundelchund, and Nagpore, which, with those communicating with the Bombay troops on the North Western Frontier, would make not only the distribution of our force, but the means of one part giving aid to another, very complete.

59. With respect to the extent of country to be occupied, and lines to be guarded by each Presidency, I must state my opinion that no changes can well be made, unless it is determined, as I anxiously trust it will be, that the local Indian force is to be one great army of three divisions. If that took place, the troops of this Presidency might occupy the line from Mhow to Mangalore as the South Eastern Frontier, and from Cutch to Serohee, which they now do within a few miles, as the North Western. It is, however, to be stated, that though many reasons, which I have before placed upon record, would render it more economical as well as convenient for the relief, stores, and supplies of the station of Mhow to appertain to Bombay than Bengal; yet unless the present separate, imperfect, and, I must add, fallacious system of keeping the accounts of India is changed, the expenses of this station would be an objection, so far as tending to swell the deficit of this Presidency; but that would be made up by the transfer of Canara, which is, in fact, similar in language to the whole of the Southern Mahratta country, and might be placed under the same rule, with considerable saving of expense. The military station of Mangalore would, particularly if an European regiment from this establishment was stationed there, be supplied with more facility and more economy from Bombay than Madras; but I beg to be distinctly understood by your Lordship as not recommending this extension of our lines of defence with the slightest view to increase the corps of this establishment to the decrease of either Bengal or Madras; on the contrary, I should deem such a measure unjust to the fair expectation and pretensions of those armies. But I state it as a desirable distribution, if the forces of the three Presidencies were so united as to clear us of the increasing embarrassment and injury to the public service which must continue on their present footing.

60. Your Lordship has expressed a wish, to which I can have no objection, that my opinion on the subject you have referred to my consideration should be placed on record; so I shall likewise place a copy on the records of this Presidency.

Bombay, 27 November 1830.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *J. Malcolm.*

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(A.)

MINUTE on the State of the Bombay Army, dated 25th March 1828, by  
Major General Sir *John Malcolm*, G. C. B. and K. L. S.

In the letter in the military department, to the Honourable the Court of Directors, of the 1st of December 1827, it was stated to be the intention of Government to address the Court at an early period, and in a fuller manner, upon the state of the army.

2. In pursuance of this intention, I desire to place upon record my opinion upon this large question, which, though grounded on general experience, will have more immediate reference to the present condition of the army of this Presidency.

3. The statement in the Appendix, No. 1, will show the exact number of officers now doing duty with corps, and the number of those employed on the staff, on furlough, and on sick certificate.

4. It appears from this statement, that of the three regiments of cavalry, one is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and two by majors; of the two regiments of Europeans, one is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and the other by a major.

5. Of the 26 regiments of Native infantry, three are commanded by lieutenant colonels, nine by majors, and the remaining 14 by captains, some of which latter are of very junior rank.

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6. When to this is added, that the greatest part of the Native troops are scattered over an extensive country, many stations of which are unhealthy, it is difficult to conceive a state more inefficient than that of these corps, with regard to European officers. It is thought by some, from recollection of former times, that a battalion of Native infantry may be brought not only to and maintained in discipline by two or three officers, but be nearly as efficient for service. This opinion has gained strength by the excellent state of several extra corps which have only an European commandant and adjutant, but the conclusion here alluded to is drawn from erroneous premises. The introduction of a greater number of European officers into Native corps has totally altered their constitution, and they form, according to the existing system, a part whose inefficiency in number must include that of the whole corps. It would be needless to enumerate the obvious causes of this effect, as it relates to the regiments of the line. With regard to extra corps, though they have admirably answered the local purposes for which they have been raised, they would not without an addition of European officers be fit for general service.

7. It is much easier to point out the evil effects which this want of regimental officers, particularly of the higher class, must have upon the efficiency and reputation of the army than to suggest the remedies, but the case is one which will neither admit of evasion nor delay; and if it is felt, as it is at this moment, seriously to affect the discipline of the army during a period of profound peace, what would be the consequence in the event of war? for we must always bear in mind that our situation on such an event occurring has no analogy to that of any other state.

The officers who are absent on furlough are almost without exception in Europe, and cannot join till the emergency is over, while the number on sick certificate is certain to be increased without any possibility of supplying their place. This applies even to the most junior ranks, for, judging from the last 20 years, there never have been cadets more than sufficient to complete the establishment.

8. Before entering upon the means necessary to render regiments more efficient in European officers, it is essential to offer some observations upon the actual condition of this army with respect to officers required for more general command.

9. The only two major generals, Morris and Skelton, and two colonels, Lewis and Osborne, belonging to this establishment, are in England; the youngest major general is upwards of 46 years in the service, and the youngest colonel 37 years, and are, as is to be expected from their period of service, enjoying a liberal and comfortable retirement; and as their return to the active duties of their profession could not be anticipated, the Government have been compelled to place two lieutenant colonels commandant upon the general staff. This measure has and must continue to excite unpleasant feelings amongst senior lieutenant colonels of His Majesty's service who are in regimental, garrison, or station commands, while their juniors are doing the duty and receiving the pay of general officers. Though the discontent they may feel be, for reasons that will be stated,† groundless, as far as relates to the established rights and usages of the army, with whom they are associated on service, its existence is an evil, and might, in the event of general operations, be attended with great loss of temper and much embarrassment.

10. This point, therefore, requires serious attention; no remedy (while brevets are so rare in England) suggests itself to my mind, except giving to officers of a certain standing, say 12 years as lieutenant colonels, local brevets or commissions as brigadier generals. If His Majesty deem it proper to issue such brevets to officers of his service employed in India on the staff, as well as to those of the Company, it could have no further injurious effect in His Majesty's service than that of preventing some old officers proceeding with their regiments to India; for if the expedient was adopted, no regimental officer of the standing of those eligible to be brigadier generals could be employed in that country;

\* Commander in Chief's letter, 19 September 1824.

† See Appendix, No. 4, Mr. Elphinstone's minute in reply to Sir C. Colville's letter of 19 September 1824.

country; but, on the other hand, whilst it imposes no obligation to employ junior officers on the general staff, it might afford an opportunity that a long peace would render very desirable of bringing forward comparatively young men in duties for which they are required, and in the execution of which they might gain an experience that would prove most valuable to the country in the event of future hostilities in Europe. I speak with great diffidence when I presume to offer my observations upon the result of such an expedient as I have suggested, as far as it affects his Majesty's service; but I am quite positive in my opinion, that without this measure or some similar one is adopted, the army of this Presidency must deteriorate from that discipline and high reputation by which it has been hitherto distinguished. It cannot long support its character without the officers at its head are in rank as well as command on a par with the army with whom they are associated. If those are liable to constant supercession, and limited in their opportunities of acquiring fame, they will sink in their own estimation. The desire of obtaining the means of returning to England will be their sole object, and when they abandon for such feelings their hopes of military reputation, they will cease to enjoy the respect and consideration of their inferiors. The high tone and spirit of the army will degenerate, and without that is kept up, no army can be efficient; and most of all, one so constituted as that of the Company.

11. The late alteration in the army,\* which only changed the number of battalions into as many regiments, added to the number of colonels, but not to the number of lieutenant colonels or majors, and by the privilege granted to those who became commandants of remaining in England, only five have been induced to stay in India, two† being nominated to the high station of the general staff of the army, one‡ acting in that station, one§ in a junior command, and one|| in command of the artillery.

12. The prospect even of the station commands has not been sufficient to withhold officers of this class from retiring, nor is it to be expected that persons who have served near 30 years in India will remain in expectation of such commands when they have the power of living in complete comfort in their native country.

13. It may be urged that officers of the standing here mentioned have generally suffered in constitution, and their places in India are better filled by younger and more efficient men.

14. This would be true if such juniors attained rank, and every branch of troops employed in India was on the same footing, but it is the difference in the constitution of the King's and Company's army that creates the difficulty.

15. The oldest of the Company's lieutenant colonels present for duty on the Bombay establishment will, at a very early period, if no change takes place, be almost all junior to the majority of those in his Majesty's regiments. This is in a great degree the case at present, as will be seen by the Appendix, No. 8, which gives the number and rank of the 10 senior lieutenant colonels, King's and Company's, on the Bombay establishment. Justice to the senior officers of the Company's army, and consideration of their great local experience, has led to their being appointed to several separate and important commands; and attention to this rule must frequently compel the Government to resort to expedients with regard to the distribution of its troops,¶ which, in time of peace, are often difficult and embarrassing, and in the event of hostilities wholly impracticable. The consequence is, that his Majesty's and the Company's troops can never join in service without the senior officers of the latter (however high the separate commands they may have held) being superseded by the great proportion of the regimental officers of his Majesty's corps, who must, from their seniority,

\* See Appendix, No. 7, stating the alteration and increase that actually took place.

† Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Leighton and Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Hessman.

‡ Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Cleiland.

§ Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Delamotte.

|| Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Whish.

¶ Sir C. Colville's letter, 19 September 1824, and Mr. Elphinstone's Minute in reply, Appendix, No. 4.

seniority, command every division, brigade, or detachment. There is no question meant to be raised as to the comparative merits and pretensions of the officers of the two armies, but the above facts are stated as the ground of my positive opinion that the present system in its effects has a direct tendency to prevent the senior officers of the Company's army, present in India, exercising high command during war, and consequently to deprive them of opportunities of distinguishing themselves in the service of their country; and it is obvious that, under such circumstances, these officers will exclusively limit their views to the preservation of their health and the completion of their period of service, in order that they may enjoy in their native country that comfort and repose which the liberality of Government has provided for them.

16. This is a fair and just object for men in the ordinary walks of life, but it is not one that will ever excite or maintain that spirit of animation among the seniors of an army which is requisite to make them stand as they ought in the estimation of those they command. Subordinate officers will cease to consider with sentiments of deference and respect persons whom they never contemplate as likely to attain any rank in command that will enable them to confer by their notice benefits and distinction; and the Native troops of India, who singularly associate their fame with that of their officers, will gradually cease to regard with that consideration they have hitherto done persons whose names they cannot trace from the loved and honoured command of their regiment to the successful leader of a division or army, whose victories have raised the reputation of the branch of the service to which he belonged.

17. These effects have always been, and must always continue to be, the consequence of the mixed service in India of his Majesty's and the Company's troops; various measures have been adopted to remedy the evils which have constantly occurred from the different constitution of these armies, and whenever this subject has been agitated, the local branch (that of the Company) has had no reason to complain of want of attention to its just claims. It may indeed be stated, that the actual increase of the evil at this moment is in some degree to be traced to a desire in the Honourable the Court of Directors to benefit the condition of the officers in India. By the regulations which divided each regiment into two, the number of retirements for commandants of corps was doubled; and though the income of the succeeding commandants was lessened, it was still however a provision so liberal, that it was not to be anticipated that many officers,\* entitled to the enjoyment of such comfort in their native country, would remain in India in the distant expectation of advancement, while, on the other hand, alarm at slight indisposition even would in times of peace incline them to retire from the active duties of their profession; and on the occurrence of war, hostilities would be, in all probability, terminated before they could return.

\* 28 out of 31 are in England.

18. It has been concluded that the division of the regiments, by doubling the number of commandants, would greatly add to promotion, but the fact may be questioned.

19. The casualties in the higher rank will, from the residence in England of a greater proportion of commandants, decrease in a ratio that will probably balance the difference of numbers calculated upon; and if not, the improved prospect of attaining this provision will prevent many from retiring on the pay of their rank, who, under the former system, would have done so, either from incompetence to active duties, or from despair of obtaining the off-reckonings of a regiment.

20. It might seem to a superficial observer that the evil stated would admit of an easy remedy, by only granting leave to a certain proportion of the commandants of corps to remain in England; but this, in the first place, would appear to be a violation of the principles of the existing regulations, and in the next, it would be ineffective to its object, for officers of such standing in the service, when they desired to retire home, would in most cases be too certain to have the just plea of impaired health; and it may be asserted that, under the circumstances they are placed, Government\* cannot have the benefit of their services, unless

\* Appendix, No. 21—H. E. Sir Thomas Bradford's letter of 12 December 1826.



unless arrangements are made that render these to a limited extent indispensable to establish their claim to the command of a corps, or that prevent them, by adding to their income, or giving them a prospect of distinction, from taking immediate advantage of their right of retirement.

21. The principle of selection to the command and emolument of a regiment can never be introduced into an army so constituted as that of the Company in India; it seems fair to the public service, however, that every individual, before he became eligible to that station, should have served with credit for a certain period in the command of a corps, or in a station so high in the general staff as to be deemed of equal importance as that charge.

22. The established principle of seniority would not be violated by such a regulation; none would be excluded by its operation, except those who, from bad health or other causes, were incompetent to the higher duties of their profession, and to such the pay of their rank would appear a sufficient reward for past services. On others it would impose no hardship beyond obliging them to serve one or two years more in the higher stations of the army than what they might otherwise do, or to abandon their claims to a regiment. This principle has been, in fact, adopted in other branches of the service. An actual period of service is necessary to a medical officer, both as a superintending surgeon and in the medical board, before it can establish his rights to pension. The above suggestion is merely offered for consideration; if adopted, it could have no retrospective operation, and in its introduction it might be so qualified that it should not injure the just pretensions of any meritorious officers.

23. The Court of Directors have not been inattentive to the necessity of inducing officers of rank and character to remain in India after they become entitled to return to England. By their order, under date 25th of November 1823, besides the general officers on the staff, several stations\* and brigades, of different classes, were authorised on allowances calculated to give every fair encouragement to the senior officers of the Company's service; and had the same liberal principle been extended to the officers actually commanding corps, the evils now complained of would, as far as the field officers † were concerned, not have existed, for a less proportion would have solicited furlough, and none would have remained filling subordinate staff situations.

24. There is no principle connected with the efficiency of an army so universally admitted, as that its discipline depends more upon the officers commanding regiments than any other class; and it is further admitted, that to command a corps well not only requires a knowledge of military duties but high rank. ‡

25. It follows, that with the exception of the principal staff§, the command of a corps should be the most desirable, both from allowances and respectability, that an officer can aspire to hold.

26. There is no subordinate staff situation which a subaltern or captain of 12 or 15 years' standing cannot fill as well as a major or lieutenant colonel; but the former, however otherwise qualified, cannot exercise the command of a corps, except under great disadvantages. A full conviction of the truth of these facts, and of their great consequence to the efficiency of the Indian army, led the Court of Directors to take the subject into their consideration, and in consequence they sent out their orders of November 1823, which not only remodelled the armies of the three Presidencies, but settled the number of Government commands for each, with their respective allowances.

27. The Bengal Government, in forwarding the orders of the Court, stated in their instructions that the number fixed of seven Government commands at Bombay was to include all permanent Government commands, but that frontier stations and subsidiary forces were not subject to the same restrictions on the score

\* Appendix, No. 11.—Statement of Allowances to the several Commands.

† Appendix, No. 12.—Statement of Regimental Allowances.

‡ Appendix, No. 13.—Sir C. Colville, Sir Thomas Bradford, and Colonel Leighton's opinions on this head.

§ Appendix, No. 27.

score of allowances, and that the officers placed at the head of such forces were to be selections by the Governor without reference to seniority.

28. The orders of the Court of Directors regarding the changes in the constitution of the army directed the allowance of 400 rupees per mensem as increase to officers in command of corps.

29. The Governments of Madras and Bombay granted this allowance in addition to the full batta of the rank, considering such to be the Court's intention;\* but the Governor General in Council did not concur in this interpretation of the Court's order, and in a letter to this Government, under date the 4th February 1825, it is stated that the corps in garrison † in Bengal drew only half batta, and that officers commanding such corps lost by the late orders from England a sum more than equivalent to the 400 rupees, and therefore the field allowances which had been continued at Bombay could not be sanctioned. Similar orders were sent to the Government of Fort St. George.

30. The existing difference between the allowances of the European officers of the Bengal establishment and those of the coast of Coromandel, is in no instance so great as in that of full batta, which, with the exception of two or three garrisons, ‡ is drawn throughout the territories subject to Bengal, whereas the armies of the subordinate Presidencies have the allowance at none but a few field stations.§

This difference between the establishments in this and other allowances to officers commanding corps affected the operation of the Court's orders on this point, and renders what would be a boon to the officers of Madras and Bombay not so to those of Bengal.||

31. The orders issued by the Supreme Government on this occasion reduced a lieutenant colonel commanding a corps at Bombay, at a half batta station, from the monthly allowances of 1,420 rupees,¶ which he had drawn under the interpretation given by the Governor in Council to the Court's order, to 1,220 rupees,\*\* and from the diminution of this liberal augmentation of his former salary, the principal effect anticipated from the arrangement was in a great measure lost, for the command of a regiment, though increased, was not sufficiently so to induce officers of high rank to remain in India, nor to tempt others to quit staff situations from which it would have been harsh and impolitic to remove them, unless for their advantage; but there appears no ground to doubt but the objects the Honourable Court had in view will be attained (as far as the army of this Presidency is affected), if the Honourable Court determine upon granting the increase of 400 rupees without striking off the additional batta formerly enjoyed by officers in command of regiments. According to the existing rule, lieutenant colonel commandants under this Presidency are not considered at liberty to remain with their corps when their turn comes for Government commands. The operation of this rule may even at present be in some cases detrimental to the public service, and supposing that the increase recommended for the regimental commanding officers of corps is adopted, it might be an injury to a lieutenant colonel, instead of a benefit, to remove him from his regimental charge to one of the lesser Government commands, †† for while he would receive a very trifling increase of allowance, his expenses would become greater.

32. It

\* See Mr. Elphinstone's minute, dated 2nd March 1825.

† Colonel Casement's letter, and Colonel Imlach, the Auditor General's remark.

‡ Fort William, Barrackpore Cantonment, and Allahabad.

§ Cutch, Deesa, and Mhow, all on the frontier.

¶ Colonel Casement's letter, 12th August 1824.

		Rs.
¶ Field Allowances	- - - - -	1,020
Staff Pay	- - - - -	400
		1,420
		1,420
** Garrison Allowances	- - - - -	820
Staff Pay	- - - - -	400
		1,220
		1,220

†† Appendix, No 11.—Statement of Allowances.

32. It may be here stated that though the number of brigades authorised by the Court of Directors is quite indispensable as an encouragement to the senior members of the army, while the officers in command of corps are on their present allowances, the case would be altered if the proposed increase was given to the commanders of corps; it would, on such a measure being adopted, appear practicable to reduce some of the stations that are of minor importance, while the four principal frontier stations, Baroda, Mhow, Deesa, and Cutch, and the large cantonment of Poonah, might be beneficially increased. The result of such an arrangement would be to give more field officers for regimental duty, and the prospect of these higher and more desirable commands might prevent officers of rank from soliciting a furlough to England, or taking advantage of their right to retire at so early a period as they otherwise would.

33. To preserve that spirit and animation which are necessary in an army, and above all to that of India, high prizes must be presented to officers of rank. There is, when a forcible impetus is required, little if any advantage derived from those slight gradations of allowances and command, which leave individuals in doubt whether they shall benefit or lose by a change of their situations.

34. Other arrangements might be made to keep lieutenant colonels of the Bombay army with their corps. Of the present Government commands, I can only deem those I have before mentioned, Baroda, Mhow, Deesa, Cutch, and Poonah, of importance enough to require a specific officer to be nominated to them; with regard to the other stations, such as Candeish, Southern Konkan, Kaira, there appears to me no reason why the senior regimental officer at the station might not exercise the general command, as is now the case in the garrisons of Surat and Bombay.\* Such officer would have a moderate additional allowance for this duty, but he would not be separated from his corps, and though his next senior might have regimental charge, his regiment would continue under his general authority and inspection.

35. The reduction made by discontinuing some of the above stations as Government commands might well be applied to increase the allowance now enjoyed by the officers in charge of the five important cantonments before noticed. This would constitute them into such objects, that officers of rank and character would remain in the country, or return to it in hopes of attaining them. They would of course continue as at present to be filled by selection; and though seniority would constitute a claim, it would be destructive of principles essential to the political administration of the country to admit it as giving any right to such command.

36. This plan would in a great degree be rendered abortive if lieutenant colonel commandants were not allowed to command their regiments, when they had no general charge, but to this there can be no objection. In his Majesty's service there are generally two lieutenant colonels present with a corps; and in the Company's, from regimental use ceasing at the rank of major, lieutenant colonels are always available for any corps in which they are required, and a case can hardly be anticipated in which two could be present with one regiment.

37. It is unnecessary to add, that the proposition I have made to diminish the number of Government commands is meant to be contingent on the increase of allowances to officers commanding corps, and of the grant of an increase to the higher commands in the army; if such a reduction was made without the adoption of these measures, the evil complained of would be aggravated instead of being remedied.

38. The above arrangements relate chiefly to field officers, but there are, and must still be, a great want of efficiency in the army till the vacancies† in corps caused by the number employed in the staff are diminished.

39. The Adjutant General's return§ will show the number of officers in the Bombay army employed on staff duty. The great proportion of captains will be noticed

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\* Bombay is a special appointment, generally a king's officer.

† A lieutenant colonel commandant and a lieutenant colonel.

‡ Appendix, No. 11.—H. E. Sir T. Bradford's letter, December 1826.

§ Appendix, No. 19.

noticed. This arises from several causes. Under the regulations and usages of the service, officers of this rank may be said to be alone eligible to many stations on the staff.

40. We shall effect no good if we merely obtain field officers for regimental duty, without these are aided with more captains than we now have.\* This rank is one of the most important in the army, and there cannot be a condition more unfavourable to military discipline than that of many corps of this Presidency, in which there is not an officer between the commander of the regiment and the subalterns. This injurious effect will in a great degree be done away by arrangements which give to those that perform regimental duty as good, if not better, prospects than upon the staff, and which render a certain portion of actual service with a corps indispensable to rise to the distinction and the emoluments accompanying its command; but further measures must be adopted to give an actual increase of officers, and particularly of captains, for regimental duty.

41. It has often been proposed to strike off the staff of the Indian army, but from the established principle of rise by seniority, and its association on service with his Majesty's troops, every plan hitherto brought forward has been found liable to what were deemed insurmountable objections; but the necessity for doing something is imperative, and we must not be withheld by ordinary difficulties and general rules from applying an unusual remedy in a case so emergent, and one which on some points has analogy to no other.

42. It has been proposed to form corps of officers without men, from which vacancies by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff or be nominated to corps proceeding on service, † but under all circumstances continue to rise in the skeleton corps to which they belonged.

43. There appears to me fewer objections to this plan than to any other I have seen. It would furnish officers for regimental duty without disturbing the regular rise of regiments, or producing those just grievances and irregularities of promotion that must result from associating in the Indian army staff employ with the attainment of permanent rank.

44. The above corps should in the first instance be raised, as an augmentation. They should certainly have no ensigns in them, and perhaps the rank of lieutenant might also be dispensed with. ‡ The promotion to the junior rank of these corps, whether it was a lieutenant or captain, should be from the senior ensign or lieutenant of the line; and this effect would be good, so far as it repaired bad fortune in regimental rise.

45. As the proposed skeleton regiments would have no lieutenant colonels commandant, they would consist of one lieutenant colonel, § one major; five captains, and 10 lieutenants (if that rank was included); and two or three corps would consequently render disposable, for staff or to fill vacancies, 34 officers, all of whom would be of some standing in India.

46. Another question relating to staff employment, remains to be examined, on which I shall venture some suggestions on points that I believe to be very seriously connected with the future efficiency of this army. In treating this subject, I shall divide the staff into military and civil. Under the first head is the general, the division, the brigade, the garrison, and the regimental staff. I consider also that in India the officers of the Commissariat Department must continue on the military staff of the army.

47. Independent of many other reasons which require this department to be filled by officers educated in the army, I know no line that derives so much advantage from the information brought into it by persons well acquainted with other branches of the service, nor one that imparts more useful knowledge to officers who leave it, on promotion, to assume regimental or general command. The

\* Appendix, No. 22.—Statement of the Number of Captains, and how employed.

† Appendix, No. 24.

‡ Appendix, No. 25.—Statement of the Plan.

§ Appendix, No. 26.—Comparative Statement of Expense of Three Skeleton Corps.

The greatest difficulty in operations in India is feeding an army, and familiarity with the details by which that is done is an incalculable advantage to an officer. I should on that and other grounds deem this department an essential branch of military staff; for if it takes men from regimental or general duty, it returns them more efficient, supposing always that advancement in it is not regulated by a succession by seniority, that must in a series of years make numbers forget other branches of their profession, and become fit only for office duties.

48. Officers who enter into the political line are usually selected for their talent and energy, combined with a knowledge of the languages and habits of the natives, acquired in the course of military service; and when they return to professional duties, they carry with them an experience and information that are most useful. Their occupation, indeed, in the political line often includes much military employment, and it would be as injurious to this class as it would be detrimental to the army not to consider them as a branch of military staff.

49. Officers employed in the survey branch may also be strictly accounted military, as their pursuits and studies are calculated to improve them in science, and to fit them for the highest stations in their profession; and above all, the Quartermaster General's Department.

50. I must place under the head of civil staff the Auditor \* General's Department and paymasters, collectors, magistrates, or other officers continued permanently on civil duties.

51. I think there are many and obvious reasons why persons should be selected from the army to fill the various offices in the Pay Department, in which they should rise according to seniority or merit in the branch they had chosen. No officer should be eligible to this line that had not been eight or ten years in India, and who could not find ample security. The pay and prospects in this department would be such as fully to form compensation to satisfy officers well qualified for such appointments, for what they gave up in quitting the military line; and all persons appointed permanently to this branch should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belonged. Their promotion should cease, and they should retain no further claims upon the military line than that of a right, at the stated period, to the pension of the rank they held when they were nominated to the civil staff.

52. This separation of the Auditor General's Department would not apply to any person appointed to act on periods of emergency, but only to those who were nominated to the fixed establishment.

53. When emergencies or urgent calls of the service led to the appointment of military officers to be collectors, magistrates, or any other office that was strictly civil, such officer, if continued after the emergency had ceased, should be considered as upon the civil staff, and be struck off the strength of his corps, in the same manner as those belonging to the Pay Department.

54. To prevent the possibility of this arrangement giving rise to any complaints with regard to the unequal promotion it might make in regiments, it should be a rule that any vacancy caused by the transfer of an officer to the civil staff should be filled up by line, and not regimental promotion.

55. The army would gain in the number of officers with corps and in promotion† by striking off the civil staff; and it would not lose in efficiency by their separation from the line, for though there would be no want of qualified and respectable candidates for this branch, these would not be officers whose minds were

\* *Vide* Appendix, No. 27.

† The period that officers served in the line would be one of probation as to character and fitness for the duties of the pay department, and promotion would be accelerated by their transfer to this branch. This last is an important consideration, for, in an army that rises as that of India must continue to do upon the principle of seniority, it is almost impossible to devise expedients that will save it from that stagnation into which it is so prone to seniority. Amongst others, benefit has been justly anticipated from permitting, under strict regulation, the sale of commissions and exchanges with His Majesty's army; but I have elsewhere\* given my sentiments very fully upon both these points.

\* *Vide* "Political History of India," vol. ii. pp. 211, 212, 213, 222.

were bent upon military duties, or who were ambitious of advancement in their profession.

56. If the suggestions here offered respecting the civil staff are adopted it will be but just to the meritorious officers now in this branch to give them two or three years to make up their option, whether they will remain in it, or return to the military line of the service.

57. To sum up what has been stated : the superior commands proposed to be given to the senior officers, and the increased allowance to those in charge of corps, might be expected to preserve and regain the services of the most experienced and distinguished men in the army, while the other arrangements proposed would add greatly to the number of officers for regimental duty.

58. These arrangements will no doubt be attended with considerable expense, but it has been assumed that this expenditure has already been contemplated by the Honourable the Court of Directors, who have considered that it is justified by the necessity which exists of preserving and improving the efficiency of the Indian army.

59. The facts I have adduced will, I think, prove that as far as that of this Presidency is concerned, there is a considerable danger, if some change is not made in the present system, of a deterioration from that high character it has hitherto maintained.

60. I am quite aware of the numerous and serious objections which may be offered to what I have proposed, but they are the best and most expedient that I can devise.

61. The case is surrounded with too many difficulties and embarrassments to give a hope of remedying every evil ; but I must conscientiously state my conviction that nothing short of some such measures as I have proposed will give health and vigour to a branch of the service which, in its decay, must involve that of an empire.

### Appendix No. 1.

RETURN of the Officers belonging to 3 Regiments of Light Cavalry, and 2 European and 26 Native Infantry, on the Bombay Establishment.

Adjutant General's Office, 14 December 1867.

	Colonels, &c.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	TOTAL.
Native cavalry, 3 regiments - - -	-	1	2	6	20	14	43
European infantry, 2 regiments - - -	-	1	1	4	13	8	27
Native infantry, 26 regiments - - -	-	3	9	54	197	91	354
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	-	5	12	64	230	113	424
<b>On the Staff:</b>							
Native cavalry, 3 regiments - - -	1	2	1	3	4	-	11
European infantry, 2 regiments - - -	-	1	-	4	3	-	8
Native infantry, 26 regiments - - -	3	9	8	56	38	-	114
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	4	12	9	63	45	-	133

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

193

	Colonels, &c.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	TOTAL.
On Furlough, Europe :							
Native Cavalry, 3 regiments - - -	2	-	-	6	6	1	15
European infantry, 2 regiments - - -	2	-	1	2	4	-	9
Native infantry, 26 regiments - - -	23	14	9	20	25	3	94
TOTAL - - -	27	14	10	28	35	4	118
Abstract :							
Effective, doing duty with 31 regiments -	-	5	12	64	230	113	424
On staff employ, and other appointments -	4	12	9	63	45	-	133
On furlough } On sick certificate - - -	6	6	7	19	31	3	66
to Europe } On private affairs - - -	21	8	3	9	4	1	46
TOTAL - - -	31	31	31	155	310	117	669

(True Abstract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*, Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 2.

Paragraph 3rd. "The security of our profession in this country must chiefly depend on our military power."

Paragraph. "The improvement of our military system is our first and most important care."

Lord William Bentinck's Minute, while Governor at Madras.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 3.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the State of the Madras Army, to the late President of the Board of Control.

"We must mingle the two services by permitting exchanges, under certain limitations, and we must make them one at a particular point by rendering officers who have attained the rank of colonel or major eligible to employment in all parts of the world; and we must show that honorary marks of distinction and the office of the Commander in Chief are not exclusively reserved for one service.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 4.

MR. ELPHINSTONE'S Minute in reply to Sir Charles Colville's letter, 19th September 1824, states that the distinctions complained of (Company's officers having the greater number of commands, while many of those officers were junior to those of his Majesty's service) were not so great as apprehended by the Commander in Chief, as the commands were as equally distributed as political circumstances rendered expedient, and had an European regiment (King's) been sent to Mhow, and the 4th Dragoons to Baroda (as was in agitation), the two best commands would be filled by King's officers.

(True copy.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 5.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the State of the Army.

THE senior officers who have not regiments must remain, from necessity, in India, subjected to the mortification of seeing the commands of most importance entrusted to the King's officers of equal rank, not from partiality, but from their being younger men, and fitter for the duty. The officers actually in charge of corps, by the diminution of their allowances, and by being more seldom employed than formerly in distinguished commands, have lost, in the eyes both of the junior European officers and of the Native troops, much of that respect which they once enjoyed. The younger part of the European regimental officers, seeing their commanders obliged to give way to his Majesty's officers in almost every situation where honour is to be acquired, and knowing that after the longest course of service their own case will be no better, have lost the very hope of distinctions, and with it the most powerful incentive to honourable deeds.

We must quicken promotion by augmenting the number of officers in the higher, and diminishing that of those in the lower, ranks.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 6.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the State of the Army.

WE must render the situation of officers commanding Native corps more respectable, by higher allowances and a larger share of authority than they now possess. We must remove, as far as may be practicable, all distinctions between the King's and Company's officers, and we must elevate the Company's service by making their officers virtually, as well as in form, eligible to every office in India to which those of his Majesty's can be appointed, and eligible also, after attaining a certain rank, to employment in Europe or any part of the world.

(True copy.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 7.

THE old establishment, consisting of 13 regiments of two battalions each (now denominated 26 single regiments), each with one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and two majors, are each divided into two single regiments with each one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major; consequently, the increase has only been of one colonel, thus leaving each regiment or battalion with its former number of lieutenant colonels and majors.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 8.

THE senior officers of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service present on the Bombay establishment:—

Colonel Fitzgerald, his Majesty's 20th Foot, 12th August 1819.

Lieutenant Colonels:

Leighton, Company's, 25th December 1812.

Sullivan, his Majesty's 6th Foot, 1st July 1813.

Willshire, his Majesty's 6th Foot, Queen's, 4th December 1815.

Hessman, Artillery, 2nd February 1816.

Thomas, his Majesty's 20th Foot, 21st January 1819.

Clelland, Company's, 15th April 1819.

Wilson, his Majesty's 4th Dragoons, 12th August 1819.

Whish, Artillery, 11th September 1820.

Rainey, his Majesty's unattached, 15th August 1822.



Appendix, No. 9.

*Sir Thomas Munro's Letter.*

THE conclusion which I would wish to draw from all that has been said is, that if we would wish to raise the Company's army from its present depressed state, we must make the situation of officers commanding Native corps more fixed and respectable. We must accelerate promotion by a greater proportion of the higher ranks, and we must draw home the senior officers when past the time of actual service by securing to them a comfortable retirement.

(True copy.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 10.

Commander in Chief's Letter, 12th December 1826.

Paragraph 3. I think it imperatively my duty to call the attention of the honourable President and Board to the state of the regiments in regard to the number of officers for regimental duty.

Para. 4. His Excellency admits there is no other method of filling up the Staff than from the line, but adds that "besides the other vacancies, the casualties occasioned by the climate, and the propriety of listening to old and sick officers for furlough, the proposed increase would not more than meet the demands of the service." His Excellency proposes the vacant commissions (90) to be filled up by an additional major to each regiment.

*Mr. Elphinstone's Minute, 15th December.*

Replies generally to the above, and then proceeds to state,—

Para. 4. We shall find by the adjutant general's list that the number of officers on the Staff and other duties does not exceed that contemplated by the Court of Directors.

Para. 5. I nevertheless agree with his Excellency as to the advantage of a large proportion of European officers, and therefore readily concur to recommend the whole of his suggestions to the honourable Court.

Second Minute by *Mr. Elphinstone.*

Para. 7. If we refer to the state of appointments in 1817, 1818, and 1819, the average was then about five per regiment. The last Madras army list shows the proportion in that long-settled Presidency to be very little less.

In Bengal, also, it is considerably more than four, but the larger the army the less in proportion will be the Staff.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 11.

THE following seven commands were authorised for Bombay :

Baroda, beyond frontier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 1,410
Mhow	-	-	ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,180
Cutch	-	-	ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	710
Sattara	-	-	ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	710
Candeish	-	-	ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Southern Concan, beyond frontier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Northern Division, Guzerat, beyond frontier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600

in addition to regimental pay and allowances.

## PAPERS RELATING TO

The cantonment of Poonah falls to the command of the senior King's officer, and the garrison of Bombay is a special command, and held almost always by a King's officer also.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 12.

Lieutenant Colonel's pay and allowances on the Bombay Presidency	- - - - -	Rs.	820
Allowance for commanding	- - - - -		400
		Rs.	1,220
<hr/>			
Lieutenant Colonel's pay and allowances in all situations in Bengal, agreeably	} to Colonel Imlack, the Auditor General's, statement - - - - -	Rs.	1,020
Allowance for commanding			400
		Rs.	1,420

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

*N.B.* See pay table and Colonel Imlack's red ink remark.

## Appendix, No. 13.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF's letter, 12th December 1826, "and that the efficiency of the Native army can only be preserved by having an adequate number of European officers with each regiment."

Commander in Chief's Minute, 2nd January 1827, paragraph 2nd:—"Every native regiment should have at its head a field officer, as those under that rank who fall into the command labour under disadvantages, and are never looked up to with the same respect by the sepoys, who think it a great hardship to be commanded by officers who know little or nothing about their individual character; and perhaps it is not too much to say, that the junior inexperienced European officers, of whom the proportion, compared with the number who know their duty, is much too great in almost every regiment, at present do not conduct themselves towards a captain in temporary command as they would towards a field officer."

Extract from Colonel Leighton, the late Adjutant General's letter.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 14.

MR. ELPHINSTONE's Minute, 2nd March 1825, stating that it is his opinion that the 400 rupees should be in addition to the field allowances for the command of regiments, that being the case at Bengal and at Madras.

See the whole of this discussion in Council under this date, with Mr. Chief Secretary Newnham's remarks.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 15.

IN Bengal, all stations below Allahabad, that is to say, Barrackpore and the garrison of Fort William, are half-batta stations; and all above Allahabad, that is to say, every other station

station in that Presidency are on field batta. Colonel Imlack, the Auditor General, makes the following red ink remark in his official returns sent to Bombay under date 31st July 1827.

“ The allowances of commissioned officers *do not* change in any situation.”

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 16.

ON the Bombay Presidency there are only three batta stations, Mhow, Cutch, and Deesa; but at the two frontier stations (which are also subsidiary forces), Baroda and Sattara, half batta only is drawn.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 17.

LIEUTENANT Colonel commanding a corps draws together	-	-	-	Rs. 1,220
If the proposed additional batta was given of	-	-	-	200
				<hr/>
				1,420
The Government commands, &c.	-	-	-	1,660
				<hr/>
				Rs. 240
				<hr/>

The difference of 240 rupees, therefore, between the Government command and the command of a regiment would appear a trifle.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 18.

THE Honourable the Court clearly did not, in their orders, contemplate the probability of a regiment being commanded by a lieutenant colonel commandant, for they most expressly direct the command allowance of 400 rupees not to be drawn by an officer in the receipt of off-reckonings.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

Appendix, No. 19.

RETURN of the Number of Staff and other Appointments, not Regimental, held by Officers of Cavalry, European and Native Infantry in the Honourable Company's Army on the Bombay Establishment during the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827. Adjutant General's Office, Bombay, 6 February 1828.

	1st January 1826.							1st January 1827.							1st January 1828.						
	Colonels, &c., Lieutenant Colonel Commandants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Colonels, &c., Lieutenant Colonel Commandants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Colonels, &c., Lieutenant Colonel Commandants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.
General Staff and Departments of the Army -	3	5	4	22	3	-	37	2	2	5	23	4	-	36	1	2	2	21	4	-	30
Divisional and District Staff -	4	1	-	13	9	-	27	2	4	-	13	10	-	29	3	5	-	13	9	-	30
Garrison Staff -	-	1	-	2	5	-	8	-	1	-	2	5	-	8	-	1	-	1	2	-	4
Personal Staff to the Honourable the Governor -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commander in Chief and General Officer of the Staff -	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	1	2	1	4	-	1	-	1	2	-	4
Attached to the Survey Department -	-	1	-	5	9	2	17	-	-	-	6	16	-	22	-	-	-	5	3	-	8
Attached to the Battalion of the Pioneers, extra Battalions Marine -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Battalion Invalid and Sebundy Corps -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guzerat and Provincial Battalion, Poonah Auxiliary Horse and Political Escorts -	-	1	-	11	31	-	43	-	-	-	13	24	-	37	-	-	-	14	17	-	31
Employed in Political or Civil Duties -	-	4	1	16	1	1	23	-	4	5	11	3	1	24	-	3	7	7	5	-	22
Attached to the Troops of H. H. the Nizam and Nagpore Auxiliary Horse -	-	-	1	2	1	-	4	-	-	1	2	1	-	4	-	-	-	2	1	-	3
<b>TOTAL</b> - - -	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>132</b>

(True Copy.)  
(signed) Ed. Frederick, Lieutenant Colonel, M.S.

(signed) J. W. Atchison,  
Adjutant General of the Army.

Appendix, No. 20.

500.

RETURN of the Number of Officers belonging to each Regiment of Light Cavalry, European and Native Infantry, on the Bombay Establishment, Effective with the Regiments during the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827. Adjutant General's Office, Bombay, 6 February 1828.

B B 4

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

19

	1st January 1826.							1st January 1827.							1st January 1828.							
	Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels Commandant.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels Commandant.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels Commandant.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	
Native cavalry - 1st Regiment	1	1	1	5	10	2	20	-	1	1	4	9	3	18	-	-	1	2	7	5	5	15
Native cavalry - 2nd ditto	-	-	1	4	8	3	16	-	-	1	4	6	4	15	-	-	1	4	5	4	4	15
Native cavalry - 3rd ditto	1	1	1	2	8	4	17	1	1	-	-	9	3	14	-	1	1	2	4	4	4	11
European infantry - 1st Regiment	-	1	-	3	4	2	10	-	-	-	2	5	2	10	-	1	-	2	9	4	4	16
European infantry - 2nd ditto	-	-	-	3	9	5	17	-	-	1	1	9	2	13	-	-	-	1	10	3	3	14
European infantry - 1st Regiment	-	-	-	2	6	3	11	-	-	-	3	5	3	11	-	-	-	3	5	4	4	12
European infantry - 2nd ditto	-	-	-	2	6	3	12	-	-	-	3	8	2	15	-	1	-	2	5	4	4	12
European infantry - 3rd ditto	-	1	-	2	6	3	12	-	1	-	3	8	2	14	-	-	-	1	9	3	3	14
European infantry - 4th ditto	-	-	1	2	7	4	14	-	-	-	1	7	1	9	-	-	1	4	7	3	2	11
European infantry - 5th ditto	-	-	1	1	7	3	13	-	-	-	1	7	4	15	-	-	-	4	3	3	3	15
European infantry - 6th ditto	-	1	-	1	9	3	14	-	1	-	3	7	4	15	-	-	-	4	3	3	3	15
European infantry - 7th ditto	-	-	1	1	8	2	12	-	-	-	3	9	4	16	-	-	1	2	3	4	4	15
European infantry - 8th ditto	-	-	-	3	7	4	14	-	-	-	2	7	4	13	-	-	-	2	3	3	4	13
European infantry - 9th ditto	-	1	-	1	7	5	13	-	-	1	1	6	3	11	-	-	1	2	0	3	3	12
European infantry - 10th ditto	-	-	1	2	6	4	13	-	1	-	4	8	3	16	-	1	-	1	3	4	4	13
European infantry - 11th ditto	-	-	-	2	7	2	11	-	1	-	1	8	2	12	-	-	1	2	3	7	4	14
European infantry - 12th ditto	-	-	1	1	4	4	10	-	1	-	2	6	1	10	-	-	-	2	3	4	4	15
Native infantry - 18th ditto	-	-	-	3	8	4	15	-	-	-	3	8	3	14	-	-	-	3	3	3	3	13
Native infantry - 14th ditto	-	1	-	1	7	3	13	-	-	-	1	7	3	11	-	-	1	2	6	3	3	11
Native infantry - 15th ditto	-	-	1	1	6	5	13	-	-	-	2	6	1	9	-	-	-	2	4	4	4	10
Native infantry - 16th ditto	-	-	-	1	5	3	8	-	-	-	1	4	3	8	-	-	-	2	7	3	3	14
Native infantry - 17th ditto	-	1	-	1	5	5	14	-	1	1	1	9	4	15	-	1	-	3	7	3	3	15
Native infantry - 18th ditto	-	-	1	2	7	4	14	-	1	1	2	6	4	14	-	-	-	1	10	4	4	15
Native infantry - 19th ditto	-	-	1	4	8	4	17	-	-	1	4	8	2	15	-	-	1	4	7	3	3	15
Native infantry - 20th ditto	-	-	1	4	8	4	17	-	-	1	4	8	2	15	-	-	1	10	5	5	18	
Native infantry - 21st ditto	-	-	1	4	9	4	18	-	-	1	2	9	3	15	-	-	1	2	7	4	4	13
Native infantry - 22nd ditto	-	-	1	1	7	3	12	-	-	1	1	7	3	12	-	-	1	1	7	3	3	14
Native infantry - 23rd ditto	-	-	-	-	8	4	12	-	-	1	3	8	2	14	-	-	1	3	6	2	2	12
Native infantry - 24th ditto	-	-	1	1	7	5	14	-	-	1	1	7	4	13	-	-	-	2	8	2	2	12
Native infantry - 25th ditto	-	1	-	1	7	3	12	-	-	1	1	8	4	13	-	-	-	1	6	4	4	13
Native infantry - 26th ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	7	2	12	-	-	-	2	7	4	4	13
TOTAL	2	10	15	63	206	104	390	1	10	13	62	222	89	397	-	5	13	63	230	112	423	

(True copy.)

(signed) Ed. Frederick,  
Lieut.-Colonel, M. S.

(signed) J. W. Atchison,  
Adjutant General of the Army.

## Appendix, No. 21.

HIS Excellency the Commander in Chief remarks, in his letter of the 12th December 1826, that it never could have been in the contemplation of the Court of Directors, in the original constitution of the army, that the increasing exigencies of the service during a period of 30 years would have created so extensive a demand for officers for the staff. Mr. Elphinstone, in reply, agrees with the general reasoning of his Excellency, and finally proposes the reduction of some staff appointments, that these officers might join their corps. But the Commander in Chief imagines this would not answer the demand, for regimental officers who lost their appointments would apply for furlough, on the plea of impaired health.

(True Extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 22.

In three regiments of cavalry, two of European infantry, and 26 of Native infantry, there are a total number of captains - - - - - 155

Deduct,		
Captains as deputies in offices	- - - - -	4
Ditto - assistants - ditto	- - - - -	14
Ditto - brigade majors	- - - - -	5
Ditto - paymasters	- - - - -	7
Ditto - surveyors, political agents in civil and other appointments	- - - - -	32
		62
Ditto - sick, absent	- - - - -	24
		86
Captains for regimental duty, about 2½ per regiment	- - - - -	69

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 23.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter.

IF military considerations alone regulated the formation of armies, it would not be difficult to ascertain what kind of army would be best adapted to Indian service. In this view, then, the best army would be such an one as the Indian army formerly was, the whole, both European and Native, one army under the Company, receiving temporary aid in war from the King.

What cannot be done by force may now and at all times be effected by justice, by a wise and liberal Government substituting confidence for distrust, and securing to the officers of the Native army a fair participation in all the honours and advantages of military command.

(True Extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 24.

Sir *John Malcolm's* Central India, Vol. 2nd.

“ AND accelerating promotion in the local army; but there is no measure so requisite for the latter as the formation of a staff corps, which would furnish the means of supplying vacancies in regiments occasioned by the removal of their officers to other duties. Under the present system, the deficiency of European officers is felt, particularly on service, as a great evil. This evil must continue till the regular staff of the army are separated from that list which it is essential to keep complete for regimental duties. If this measure is

is determined upon, the formation of a plan\* for carrying it into effect will not be difficult; but great care must be taken that it combines a due regard for the interests of individuals with those of the public.

“ We must continue dependent on the fidelity and efficiency of our Native Army for the preservation of India. The European officers are the links by which we must preserve its attachment and maintain its reputation. Their peculiar condition requires favour and support, and it is not too much to affirm that any means which have a tendency to depress this body of men, or to introduce any claims but those of Indian service and complete competence, into a competition for those objects of reward, will be fatal to our best hopes of preserving our Eastern Empire.”

Appendix, No. 25.

To fill up vacancies occasioned by staff appointments and absentee field officers.

It is not intended that the staff corps alluded to should be on the same principle as the one in England. This would involve some objections, as affecting the rise by seniority.

It is meant only to offer an experiment, by way of relief, which could be relinquished if found not applicable. That for a certain number of the fixed staff appointments, such as adjutant and quartermaster general, auditor and commissary general, with two or three of the principal commands, a promotion of majors to lieutenant colonels, and captains to majors, should take place, as an augmentation to the aggregate number of field officers in the line, to fill up the vacancies occasioned by these appointments, which, as being permanent, would occasion no fluctuation. This would keep the operation of it strictly in the line, while it placed so many more field officers at the head of corps.

If it were necessary, the operation might be extended to captains holding the deputyships, brigade majors, and paymasters, all being permanent but not temporary appointments; so that when a lieutenant was promoted to be a captain, a captain a major, a major a lieutenant colonel, in the place of those appointed to the permanent staff, they would run no risk of being reduced, when once promoted, by the staff person dying, retiring, or other casualty, as the vacancy must be filled up, because a certain number must be employed on the staff from the line; for an officer who had once attained the “ lance rank ” would never go back to his former one, while it would have the advantage of giving the seniors of every grade the pay and rank of the duties and command they were exercising in the absence of those employed on the staff. It is necessary to contemplate a case similar to the one in existence of a captain holding the appointment of adjutant general. This would not influence the rule, which ought to be allowed to take its course; and though the promotion of a major incidental to it might be considered as not strictly called for, and as surcharging the establishment, yet as no provision is made for the vacancies of field officers absent on sick leave, it would only act as beneficial, filling up the place of a field officer in Europe; otherwise, in considering it an exception to the rule, it might operate prejudicially to meritorious individuals, and consequently injurious to the public service.

It is to be doubted whether doubling the number of officers would effect the object in view. The Native Army wants more European officers, but the sepoys do not require so many in proportion as the King’s regiments. One of the greatest defects is, that the communicating link between major and subaltern is so frequently broken by the absence of many and sometimes of all the captains of a regiment. Sir Thomas Munro thought the Indian Army wanted more field officers, but not more captains and subalterns.

The plan, however, for the skeleton corps mentioned in Appendix, No. 26, is no doubt the simplest and best.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M.S.

Appendix, No. 26.

THE proposed augmentation of one major to each regiment would involve monthly expense of - - - - - Rs. 19,685

The expense monthly for officers at one regiment native infantry would be - 9,277

The proposed plan for three skeleton corps would be, for—

3 Lieutenant Colonels	- - - - -	Rs. 2,460
3 Majors	- - - - -	1,905
15 Captains	- - - - -	5,565
		9,930

While

\* The formation of the corps of officers without men from whom vacancies caused by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff, and who could join corps with whom their services might be required, but should rise in unattached corps. There are fewer objections to this plan than any other, for it could in no degree disturb the regular rise of other corps or produce those inequalities of promotion that must result from filling by nomination to the staff from the regiments to which they belonged. These unattached corps would be found in the first instance as an augmentation.—Note, page 223, vol. ii.

## PAPERS RELATING TO

While this plan furnishes 21 officers in the ranks most important, it incurs no expense for off-reckonings, staff, &c. Sir Thomas Munro was decidedly of opinion that the defect of our army laid in the want of officers in the *senior*, not *junior* ranks.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

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## Appendix, No. 27.

THE adjutant and quartermaster general's offices require to be filled by the first professional officers in the army, and should be equal to the general staff; while the situations of auditor and commissary general should be paid more as civil officers, proportionate to their great responsibility.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

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## Appendix, No. 28.

*Sir Thomas Munro's* Letter on the state of the Madras Army, to the late President of the Board of Control.

PROMOTION might also in some degree be aided by giving to the officers appointed to the situations of quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, commissary-general, or military secretary to Government one step of advanced rank, provided they had served a certain number of years in India.

There is another mode of accelerating promotion, which was recommended by Lord Cornwallis, namely, to permit officers who had served their full time of 22 years actually in India to sell their commissions.

The introduction of this practice into a service where seniority is the fundamental principle of promotion, is a measure of doubtful expediency, as it might not at first be well received by the Company's officers; and if not limited by the strictest regulations, it might so extend as to destroy the rise by seniority, the very basis of the service; as it is, however, a most essential point that promotion should be facilitated whenever it can be done without injury to the present system, officers who have completed their 22 years service might, I think, be allowed to sell their commissions.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*  
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

*Ordered,* That the subject of the preceding be noticed in the next Despatch to the Honourable Court, and that a copy of the paragraphs already prepared relative thereto, and the Minute above recorded, be sent to the Supreme Government.

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## Appendix (B.)

EXTRACT of *Sir John Malcolm's* Minute, dated 4 September 1829.

I AM quite prepared to give the attention it demands to the proposition of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, regarding an increase of the number of boys to each native regiment.

The number proposed would entail a considerable expense, and it would be difficult at the present moment to incur that without authority from the Honourable the Court of Directors, except we had stronger reasons than any that can be urged for the measure as it now comes under consideration; but as I deem it of particular importance, when we are making every reduction we can, and have effected some and contemplate more in the pay of establishments and followers, to assure our native army by acts that these plans of retrenchment will not affect them, and that on the contrary we continue anxious to improve their condition, and as I consider their attachment to be very dependent on the feelings towards Government of the native commissioned officers, I must desire to combine with the proposition of the Commander in Chief an arrangement that would induce native officers to give their sons to the service, which false pride and alarm lest bad conduct in the son should bring disgrace upon the father now prevents their doing. There is another reason for our offering every encouragement for native officers bringing their sons up in the army, as it will obviate much of that distress which often falls upon their families at their death, and creates embarrassing claims on Government.

I would propose that the present number of boys be increased to 30; but that eight more boys be added, and denominated "first-class boys," with some slight distinctive mark



mark on their dress, and receiving 1½ rupees more than other boys. This class to be exclusively composed of the sons of native officers, and there might be eight men in every corps who were also sons of native officers, who received until they were promoted, from their superior merits, to the rank of commissioned officers, the sum of two rupees extra, but to have no other privilege or claim either to promotion or favour above other men of the corps, except exemption from corporal punishment. If guilty of disgraceful or improper conduct, they would, on this being reported, be discharged the service. When a vacancy occurred in this class, a best class boy, if old enough, might succeed.

The small extra pay recommended for these boys and men, and the exemption proposed, would be regarded with no envious feeling by the men of the regiment; on the contrary, it would add to the value of that rank to which they all aspired, and to which officers' sons would have no claim, except on the ground of superior merit.

This arrangement, supposing it to extend to all the native corps in the army, would be a total expense of little more than 2,000 rupees per mensem, or 24,000 rupees per annum, and less than the proposition of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, nearly 4,000 rupees per annum.

I have not entered into minute details of this plan, as these can be settled or modified if the principles on which it is grounded are approved. Of its excellent effects I can have no doubt, and I am indeed persuaded, from my knowledge of the feelings of our native troops, acquired in a course of 40 years' service with them, that no measure could be adopted more calculated to attach them to the service and to give value to the rank they have attained.

This measure is further recommended by the actual condition of the army of Bombay. The number of Hindoostan men in the native corps of this Presidency is within the last nine years 8,000 men more than it was previous to that period, and a decrease of 3,000 men has taken place of the natives of this Presidency. Notwithstanding the superior appearance and acknowledged gallantry of the Rajpoots of Hindoostan, this change in the composition of the native army of Bombay is far from desirable, for unless we can make the sepoy of Hindoostan settle in our provinces, they will be much more liable to desert; and many circumstances may occur to prevent their being so much depended upon as the natives of our provinces, who from many causes, and none more than this influx of foreigners, it is now difficult to recruit.

The measure I have proposed would be a real encouragement to men born in our provinces, and have a beneficial influence, as it tempted natives from Hindoostan to settle with their families in this part of India.

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MINUTE by Sir *John Malcolm*, dated 14th September 1829.

I HAVE given every consideration to the Minute of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, upon the introduction into our ranks of the sons of native officers with a small increase of pay, and with exemption, unless in capital cases, from corporal punishment, and as we differ on the latter point, I must desire with his Excellency's acquiescence to postpone for the present the further consideration of this subject.

I am quite positive that under the very exigent call for reduction in all parts of our military charges and establishments, and the proof exhibited in the recent dispatches of the Court of Directors of these being higher than those of either Madras or Bengal, that not only considerations of economy, but the best interests of this Presidency imperatively demand that all expenses under the head of military charges should be avoided, unless they can be proved to be attended with a benefit of a clear and positive magnitude. Such the proposition I brought forward, would, I am assured have been, but I am also quite persuaded that, unless commissioned officers' sons were in some mode (I care not about forms) exempted, except in capital cases, from disgraceful punishment, that the good effects of the measure would be so materially lessened, as not to make it justifiable under the circumstances, we are placed in regard to all increase of military establishments.

I am quite aware that this opinion is not only contrary to that of his Excellency, but to that of officers for whose experience and judgment I have great respect. I spoke to Brigadier General Leighton upon the subject, and he told me that he thought with the Commander in Chief that the course of justice to all should, in his opinion, be equal, and he did not like the exemption suggested. Notwithstanding these opinions, I cannot resign my judgment upon a point that I may honestly say has had my anxious attention for more than 40 years, during which period I have served and been in intimate and direct communication with all ranks of our native troops, and have had under me those of every Presidency in India. I am positive on the grounds of the knowledge, that unless the exemption from corporal punishment is in some mode secured, the proposed boon to the native commissioned officers will be so deteriorated as not to warrant the expenditure that has been suggested.

I have very recently given a strong opinion on the operation of those general principles, attention to which limits and depresses the natives in every branch of our service, and shall here only repeat my perfect conviction that our unbending systems, and our reluctance to grant to our native subjects public servants and soldiers any exemption or privilege, however slight and unsubstantial, that interferes with our rules or forms, will

tend more, if rigidly persevered in, than any other cause I know to prevent our empire over India being of long duration. It is the constant theme (I speak from an experience on this point that cannot be mistaken) of all our native subjects in India, and creates brooding discontent with their condition. That increases as men are advanced in our service, for disappointment at checked ambition will, from the construction of the human mind, be too often found a stronger feeling than gratitude for past favours. Among our native commissioned officers, of whom I now speak, I know their most corroding feeling is, that though they may found the highest claims upon the service, they can transmit none, and they die in nine cases out of ten with the melancholy thought of leaving starving widows and idle profligate sons whom pride (mistaken perhaps) has led them to withhold from a career in which they have been successful, but in which they have fears the thoughtlessness of youth or vice may lead to their disgrace in corporal punishment being inflicted on their sons.

It has been often proposed to remedy these evils by introducing the promising sons of deserving men as volunteers, and allowing them to rise to commissions without passing through the ranks. For this I have ever objected, and ever shall. It would destroy the whole constitution of our native service, but the necessity of denying to the claims of rank and of merit, such distinction made me more anxious to grant all I could to gratify the prejudices and natural feelings of this valuable class of men, but it is a point I cannot desire to press in opposition to the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the army.

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### Appendix (C.)

EXTRACT from Sir John Malcolm's Minute, dated 2nd November 1828.

REDUCTIONS have been recently made in many branches of the Military Department, and from intended reforms in the Native Pension Invalid Establishment, very considerable savings may be anticipated in this great but essential branch of expenditure. The certainty of provision in his old age, or when disabled by wounds, forms the principal tie by which we hold the attachment of our native army, but it is to be doubted whether, considering the changed condition of India, and the want of that action which beyond all other causes keeps soldiers true to their duty, we shall not now require an accession of motives to animate men upon whom we must continue dependent, and who will be every day more exposed to temptation to swerve from allegiance.

Minute on Captain Spiller's Corps, 28 October 1828.

I have observed, in a recent minute, that "the defect in this branch of our army, which threatens gradually to undermine its attachment, is the impracticability of raising any person in it above the most subordinate military charge. To reconcile the zeal and ambition required to animate the soldier with such depression, is a problem of no easy solution," but the difficulty of effecting this in a manner that fully meets the object, should not deter us from measures which have a tendency to keep alive hope, and through it to maintain the attachment of this most valuable and most important of all the classes of our native subjects.

Subsequent to the last war, this consideration led to the appointment of some distinguished commissioned and non-commissioned native officers to the charge of the hill forts upon a small additional pay, and the recent nomination of native officers to command the Sebundy Corps in the northern and southern concans, with the appointment of a senior subadar and the gradual introduction of deserving men from the line into the provincial corps at Ahmednugger, and other places may be expected to operate gradually in a manner the most beneficial to the public service; but more is wanting to give rank and consideration to our native soldiery in the community to which they belong. However distant the prospect, and however small the number who might reach the objects of ambition we may create, a stigma would be removed from our Government, which is now justly reproached with owing its aggrandisement and existence to a body of men to whom it denies all distinction. By conferring that upon some of the most distinguished, the whole service would be elevated, and the youngest native soldier would be cheered and inspirited with the prospect of future honour and advancement.

Vide Appendix (A.)

According to the annexed return, all the native commissioned and non-commissioned of this army who drew any allowance, extra to their regimental pay, or that received as invalids or pensioners were, four subadar majors, five subadars, and four havildars with the rank of jemadars who were nominated to the command of Hill Forts.

The nine subadars receive each for this duty, which exposes them to expense and hazard of health, 30 rupees salary and 15 rupees half batta, and four havildars 14 rupees each and two and a half batta, making a total of Rs. 473. 8. per mensem, or 5,061 rupees per annum, which before the recent resolution to appoint a native commandant to the Sebundy corps (a measure of economy, as it saved the allowances of an European officer), was literally all of extra reward, to which the natives of the Bombay army, consisting of three regiments of cavalry, a battalion of Golendauze, and 26 regiments of infantry could look.

This is besides the marine and extra battalions.

At Madras (with the native service of which I am better acquainted than any other) rewards to the native officers have been frequent and liberal, consisting of palanqueen allowances, horse allowance, pensions, and often grants of lands. These have been, and particularly lately, bestowed with all those imposing ceremonies that gratify the native, and,

and, above all, those who have military habits. I do not find that any similar rewards have been granted in this army, but though I would by no means exclude them for rare and distinguished service, I prefer the mode which has been commenced (for I can deem it nothing more) at this Presidency of instituting a fixed number of commands which present a number of certain objects to which men may look forward as the reward of long and distinguished service. But I am decidedly of opinion that these rewards should be made of higher value. If there were no other reasons, the great changes which have lately taken place, and the efforts made and making to advance the respectability of the public servants in the civil branch of the Government demand that some steps should be taken to grant comparative consideration to those whose services are of equal, if not greater, importance.\*

The proportions I shall submit to Government to effect this object will be as much directed to elevate the old and faithful native soldier in rank as in emolument. The latter will not be great, and it will be consistent with every principle of true economy, for it will reconcile men to reforms now in progress in our invalid and pension establishments, that will, I trust, produce a great annual saving in this most heavy but most indispensable branch of public expenditure.

I should propose that the present 13 commands of hill forts† be reduced to six, to each of which there should be a killadar and a naik.

These should be divided into grades:—

- Two of the first class.
- Two of the second class.
- Two of the third class.

† These forts might be Ryghur, Poorundur, Singhur, Loghur, Trimbuck, and Doomp.

The killadar should not be under the rank of subadar, nor his naik under that of jemadar.

A killadar of the first class should have an extra allowance to that which he was entitled to retire upon, of 170 rupees per mensem and 30 rupees to keep a horse.

He would be nominated by Government at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, and receive on his nomination a sumida's killadar, a dress of honour, and a horse from the Government.

A killadar of the second class should have an extra allowance of 150 rupees per mensem and a sunnud and dress from the governor. Those of the third class should have 100 rupees per mensem and a dress and a sunnud in the same manner.

The naik killadars should have as follows:—

First class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80 rupees per mensem.
Second class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60 - ditto - ditto.
Third class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40 - ditto - ditto.

The killadars of the first class should be admitted to the third-class of the privileged orders of the Deccan. The killadars might be permitted to reside at the fort to which they were nominated, or not, as was expedient; but where any causes led to their being allowed to be absent, the naik must remain in charge.

The whole expense of this arrangement would amount to 1,000 rupees per mensem, or 787 rupees above that now incurred, and there cannot be a doubt that this small increase of expenditure with the employment of the native commissioned and non-commissioned in the provincial corps combined with, perhaps, some slight changes in the constitution of the veteran battalion, will diffuse life and spirit throughout this class of our troops.

Nothing but a thorough conviction of the expediency and policy of this measure would induce me to recommend any increase of expenditure, however small, at a period like the present; but one of the motives which have recently led me to suggest reductions that might, I thought, be made without injury to the service is to possess Government of means to meet expenditure which, like the present, is essential to promote its best interests.

The commands I have proposed would be fixed and certain rewards to which the oldest and most meritorious native officers of this army might aspire in the ordinary course of service, but rare instances may occur under this Presidency, where the extraordinary fidelity or gallantry of a native officer entitles him to higher notice, and in such cases, policy requires we should be forward to confer that distinction which belongs to the possession of land, and the jaghire or enam given to the deserving father might be conditionally or unconditionally given to his heirs. In cases where very extraordinary services called for such notice in an individual of the native army he should be elevated to the jud class of privileged persons in the Deccan, and honoured in every manner that could flatter the pride of that body of men to whom he belonged.

MINUTE by Sir John Malcolm, dated 3rd January 1829.

REFERRING to the Government General Order of the 14th November, regarding native officers to be appointed to the command of certain hill forts.

I should

- More than comparative consideration cannot be granted, but the highest allowance to two subadars or killadars of 1st staff pay included, is not 300, while many native servants in the civil establishments may rise to as high a salary as 500 and 600 rupees per mensem.

(signed) J. M.

I should propose that such commands should not be bestowed upon any native officers of less than 30 years' service. Extraordinary valour or conduct will merit and receive extraordinary notice, without reference to the period of service, but that will be independent of the fixed reward now instituted, as powerful inducements to high military feelings and distinction in this branch of our army.

It being very desirable that the most effectual means should be taken for ascertaining the individuals who have established the best claims upon Government for the proposed appointments, I should suggest that his Excellency the Commander in Chief be requested to lay before Government as soon as may be convenient a register roll of at least 12 subadar majors or other senior subadars, and of 12 jemadars, exhibiting the dates of promotion of each grade, and a detailed account of their services, specifying also whether wounded or not, the number of actions, sieges, and assaults of fortified places at which they may have been employed. It appears necessary that the names and services of all the native officers now in command of hill forts by the appointment of Government, should be laid before the Board in a separate list to enable it to judge of their pretensions to be continued in such commands under the late regulations in preference to others. The dates of their appointments and by whom originally recommended, and the manner they have conducted themselves up to the present time, should also be stated.

Native officers of 30 years' service who may have been transferred from the effective strength of the army since the 1st of January 1828, if properly qualified by their services, are to be deemed eligible, but beyond that period the regulation should not have a retrospective effect to pensioned or invalid officers.

It would be satisfactory that the correctness of the statement of each officer's services were ascertained by division or other superior commanding officers, by careful inquiry and personal examination of the native officers themselves.

The register rolls to be accompanied by a recommendation of the Commander in Chief in favour of the officers who, in his Excellency's opinion, have best entitled themselves, by their services in the field, to reward and high distinction among their countrymen. The selection, however, from the best submitted to the Board, to rest with the Governor in Council in the same manner as that of European officers to Government commands.

The Governor will give the investiture of khilâts to the native officers so selected, and when he cannot do that in person, he will delegate his authority for this purpose, but on all occasions this honour will be conferred with those forms and observances that are calculated to add to the value of the distinctions conferred on the individual.

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MINUTE by Sir John Malcolm, dated 3rd October 1829.

HAVING fixed upon the 23rd of September, the anniversary of the battle of Assaye as an appropriate day to confer the sunnuds and khilâts upon the native officers who have been recommended by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to be promoted to the rank of killadar and naib killadars, the troops at Poona were ordered under arms, and all the jaghirdars and sirdars residing at that city were requested to attend. After these, with the killadars, had been received by me and his Excellency the Commander in Chief in a tent, we adjourned to the front where the ceremony of conferring the honours upon the parties could be witnessed by all the troops. The native officers of the sepoy corps were directed to fall out and attend to the ceremony, at which all the European officers in the cantonment not on duty were present.

A killât, with a horse, was given to the six subadars, along with a sunnud as killadar to each; while a khilât only was given to the six naib killadars, who received also a sunnud of their appointment.

The subadars of the first class, Bhicajee Jadow and Perseraw Sing, the two most distinguished of these old soldiers, were admitted into the third class of the privileged order of the Deccan.\* Though this gives no immunities of which such men can be supposed desirous of availing themselves, it bestows rank and distinction in the native community, and was from this feeling received by the subadar major as the greatest honour that was conferred upon them, and appeared to give equal satisfaction to the other native officers; one of whom observed it was a distinction, which though given to only two of their class, elevated them all in the estimation of their countrymen.

I shall not attempt to describe the effect produced by the liberality of the Government on the occasion further than by stating, an expenditure, not exceeding 1,000 rupees per mensem, and only 787 more than was before incurred, associated as it has been with the distinctions being conferred with every ceremony that could render it impressive, has produced feelings of pride and gratification among the native troops at this place, which I have no doubt will spread to every military station of the Presidency.

When

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\* The privileges of sirdars of the second class consist in an exemption from the ordinary procedure of the zilla courts and a right to have reports against them tried by the agent or deputy agent, who are directed to treat them with every consideration due to their rank.

In certain cases suits against persons in this class may be compromised and an arrangement entered into for an equitable division of their property among their creditors; but in all cases their persons and also much of their property as is necessary to support them in a manner consistent with their rank in society is held exempt from attachment.

When the ceremony of investiture was completed, a royal salute was fired in honour of the occasion, and the killadars and the naibs were invited to an entertainment, which was given by me in the evening, to which I had asked nearly 200 of the principal natives of Poona.

I have to propose that the following Government order be issued:

It has been determined by Government, in order to extend its means of encouraging and rewarding the oldest and most distinguished native officers of its army, to institute at permanent stations six killadars of the principal hill fortresses under Bombay, and to give to each of the officers raised to the dignity suitable allowances. His Excellency the Commander in Chief recommended the following officers to fill these situations:

Present Rank.	Names.		Designation.	To what Command.	Remarks.
Subadar	Bhicajee Jadow	15th Regiment N. I	Killedar	Ryghur	1st Class.
Local Jemadar	Gomogee Damajee	Invalid	Naib		
Subadar Major	Pursuram Sing	5th Regiment N. I.	Killedar	Poorundur	
Jemadar	Gopaljee Jadow	1st E. B.	Naib		
Subadar major	Khooshall	5th Regiment R. I.	Killedar	Singhur	2nd Class.
Jemadar	Tannae Jannae	Gl. P. B.	Naib		
Subadar major	Morad Khan	1st Gr. Regiment	Killedar	Loghur	
Jemadar	Baboo Ram	10th Regiment N. I.	Naib		
Subadar major	Ramjee Crojee	17th Regiment N. I.	Killedar	Trimbuck	3rd Class.
Jemadar	Kristna	9th Regiment N. I.	Naib		
Subadar	Mirza Mahomedally	12th Regiment N. I.	Killedar	Doomp	
Jemadar	Shaik Mahomed	9th Regiment N. I.	Naib		

The Honourable the Governor and His Excellency the Commander in Chief being at Poona, it was resolved that the ceremony of conferring this distinction should be fixed for the 23rd September, that day being the anniversary of the memorable Battle of Assaye, to the success of which the bravery of sepoys so greatly contributed; khilâts, horses, sunnuds, and other marks of honour were given by the Governor to each of the old and gallant officers that had been nominated Killadars and Naib Killadars. This ceremony was performed in front of the corps at Poona, drawn out for the occasion, and at the close a royal salute was fired to mark the degree to which the Government is disposed to honour those who distinguished themselves in its service.

In transmitting this order to His Excellency the Commander in Chief, he may be requested to direct its being communicated in the form he deems most impressive to the different native corps of the army.

Appendix (D.)

MINUTE by the Governor, subscribed by Mr. Warden and Mr. Goodwin.

I CONCUR with Mr. Warden in deeming it inexpedient to employ European officers in command of Sebundies, but I think an encouragement which is much wanted might be given to active and intelligent native officers by nominating them with superior allowances to such commands. It would be both a reward for the past and a stimulus to future exertion, and such men, well selected, would effect more in police duties than any European officers could. Native officers so employed should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belong, but his Excellency the Commander in Chief, if he adopts this suggestion, could best bring forward a plan by which it might be carried into effect with benefit to deserving individuals and to the service.

(signed) John Malcolm.

To the Adjutant General of the Army.

Sir,

I AM directed to acquaint you, for information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the Honourable the Governor in Council has resolved to appoint subadars, to be selected from the army, to the command of the Sebundies employed in the districts under this Presidency, and to grant them, in addition to the net pay of their rank, a staff salary of rupees (100) one hundred per mensem, with the established allowance of rupees (30) thirty, horse money.

2. The Governor in Council therefore requests that his Excellency will be pleased to place an active and meritorious subadar at the disposal of Government, to be appointed on the pay above referred to, to the command of the Sebundies in the Northern Conkan.

Bombay Castle,  
7 May 1828.

I have, &c.  
(signed) T. G. Gardiner,  
Secretary to Government.

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Appendix (E.)

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MINUTE by Sir John Malcolm, dated 27 January 1830.

I HAVE repeatedly alluded to the difficulty of recruiting the army of this Presidency from our own provinces, which will, I trust, be greatly lessened by the encouragement lately given by the nomination of native officers to be killadars, and the appointment of active and intelligent native commissioned officers to command Sebundy corps instead of European officers, and above all, by allotting eight boys and a similar number of men, the sons of subadars and jemadars, to each corps with a slight difference of pay. This last measure has already had the anticipated effect of removing the prejudices native officers have hitherto entertained of withholding their sons from the army.

The Governor General in Council, in a despatch now under consideration, dwells with justice on the expedience of having our native armies, on all points where it is practicable, similar in their frame and constitution, but local circumstances, and particularly those connected with recruiting, must create and continue to create distinctions. Some of the provinces of Bengal abound in recruits, and vacancies can be at once supplied by eligible men. There is greater difficulty at Madras and Bombay, and at both Presidencies it has, I believe, been found necessary to give much encouragement to obtain a superior class of men, and nothing certainly has more tended to infuse a spirit of attachment in these armies, and to prevent desertions, than the rewards given to distinguished native officers and the establishment of recruit boys.

It may be stated that recruits from Hindoostan will always be obtained in sufficient numbers by the Bombay army and the number of Purdesses now in that body may be adduced as a proof of this fact. But admitting it, the oldest and most experienced officers of this Presidency are not anxious to see the numbers of this caste of men increased.

They admit their eligibility from robustness of frame and military habits, but contend that they are mere mercenaries; have a dislike to those embarkations to which the troops of Bombay are so liable, and from having no ties of family (for they seldom or ever bring their wives and children) are apt to desert. These objections would in a great degree be removed if the Hindoostanees in the Bombay Army could be induced to settle; and, considering the numbers who have attained the rank of commissioned officers, there appears every prospect that this may be effected, if to the measures already adopted can be added a pension to their widows. The want of such a fund is with native officers of all castes the most serious grievance. The liberality of Government is often extended to the relief of the wives of men who die on service, but no more, and as they can save little if anything from their pay, their widows (who have lived in comparative affluence) are left almost objects of charity. Contemplating the advantages of a fund that would remedy this evil, I applied to Lieutenant Johnson, 1st assistant of the Military Auditor's office, and I give annexed the plan of a fund framed for me by that intelligent officer, which would meet the object without subjecting Government to any extra expense beyond a small donation at its first institution.

I have had the fullest communications with some of the most respectable native officers of this army, and they are unanimous in their desire to see this plan adopted. Its necessity and justice they observed, are alike obvious, and while it increases their respectability, it would, they all said, bind and attach them still more to the service.

I stated to several the difficulty that might arise from a plurality of wives, but this, they seemed to think, was more ideal than real. "We soldiers," said \*Purseram Sing, one of the oldest and most distinguished native officers of the army, "have seldom more than

\* Purseram Sing is a killadar of the first class.

than one wife; and if it happens otherwise, a Panchayet can decide how the pension is to be allotted." I asked this native officer whether he did not think that however obligatory the subscription should be upon men hereafter promoted, it would not be right to leave it optional to subscribe or not with the present native officers. "By no means," said the sensible veteran; "put the plan of the fund at once in the orderly book. You know the distress in which our families are left by daily memorials for relief. It is almost the only evil of our condition." This relates to men who are married here, and the officers and others from Hindoostan are not only deterred from bringing their families from Hindoostan by the fear of leaving a wife and young children on their death without support, and at a thousand miles from their home and kindred. If to the distinctions recently given to us old soldiers, and the opening made for our boys, you add the establishment of this fund, you will soon see colonies of Rajpoots in the Bombay territories, and no one can object to moderate deduction from his pay for such an object.

I found the opinions and impressions of Purseram Sing were those of other native officers of the 23rd Regiment at Baroda, who are almost all Hindoostan men. On my speaking to them upon the subject, they not only expressed the same sentiments of this plan, but actually desired (as I was informed by Colonel Kennet), in anticipation of its adoption, to write immediately to their families, which I desired they should not do till it was more matured. Some of them I found had written for their sons, on the publication of the order of the 2nd December 1829 (No. 427), being unwilling, as they said, that men of the Bombay Provinces should have the exclusive enjoyment of such benefits.

The above facts, and the concurring opinion of every experienced officer whom I have consulted as to the expediency and policy of this fund, would have led me to recommend it to the Board for immediate adoption; but after the letter from Colonel Casement, under date the 20th November 1829, I deem it proper that the fund should first receive the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, who will judge its merits with reference to the peculiar manner in which the native army of this Presidency is composed and recruited, which will, with every desire to assimilate, render some distinctions between its institutions and that of Bengal unavoidable, and particularly in cases where an encouragement is required at one settlement, to induce men to enlist and remain in the service, that is not found necessary at another. The subjoined plan of a fund for pensioning widows of native commissioned officers, has been framed upon the following data.

1st. With regard to the number of subscribers, that all Native officers, as they stood on the reduced establishment, be required to contribute, viz.—

	Subadars.	Jemidars.
Cavalry - - - - -	18	36
Artillery, Two Battalions:		
Lascars - - - - -	8	8
Golundauze - - - - -	6	12
Ditto - lascars - - - - -	6	6
Sappers - - - - -	2	2
Infantry, including marine battalion and pioneers - -	226	226
	266	290

2nd. That the contributions of subscribers be made with reference to the amount of their net pay, by deduction of five per cent. from all classes and ranks, which, assuming the medium class of subadars to be the average, would give the following as the annual payments by members, and the monthly rate of stoppage from each.

## ESTIMATE Amount and Rate of Subscriptions.

	Annual Pay of Medium Class.	Number of Subscribers.	Pay of the Whole.	Deduction of Five per Cent.	Rate per Month.
Cavalry :	<i>Rs.</i>		<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>
Subadar - -	1,218	18	21,924	1,096	5 - 29
Jemidar - -	378	36	13,608	680	1 2 30
Artillery, Golundauze :					
Subadars - -	624	6	3,744	187	2 2 40
Jemidars - -	336	12	4,032	201	1 1 58
Lascars :					
Subadars - -	378	14	5,292	264	1 2 28
Jemidars - -	210	14	2,940	147	- 3 50
Sappers :					
Subadars - -	624	2	1,248	62	2 2 40
Jemidars - -	336	2	672	33	1 1 58
Infantry :					
Subadars - -	624	226	141,024	7,051	2 2 40
Jemidars - -	294	226	66,444	3,322	1 - 90
TOTAL Annual Subscriptions - - -			<i>Rs.</i>	13,043	

3rd. That Government grant a donation, at the outset, of 10,000 rupees, and a sum equal to the annual average charge on account of pensions to widows of native officers during the last 10 years, towards defraying the annual expenses of the fund.

In 1819-20 the actual payments to this class of pensioners were -	<i>Rs.</i>	8,473	3	48
1820-21 - - - - -		8,233	2	50
1821-22 - - - - -		9,901	-	20
1822-23 - - - - -		10,152	3	-
1823-24 - - - - -		9,519	-	60
1824-25 - - - - -		8,894	2	20
1825-26 - - - - -		7,830	1	20
1826-27 - - - - -		7,725	3	60
1827-28 - - - - -		7,551	-	60
1828-29 - - - - -		7,880	3	80
	<i>Rs.</i>	86,163	1	18

Showing an average of *Rs.* 8,616. 1. 31. annually. As Government would remain charged with the stipends of the already pensioned widows, it might be thought advisable to regulate the annual payment to the fund in proportion to the probable decrease in that charge, by which arrangement any additional expense to the public would be avoided. The average diminution in the above years is 606 rupees. If, therefore, a grant of 600 rupees, increased yearly by that amount till the full sum of 8,600 rupees be completed, were sanctioned, the object of Government would be fulfilled, and no extra charge, most probably, be incurred.

4th. That



4th. That the number of deaths among the subscribers will be in proportion to the average of the last 15 years, which has proved as undermentioned:

1st May	Subadars.		Jemidars.	
1814-15	there were 188, of whom 11 died in that year; 213, of whom 7 died.			
1815-16	197	5	214	2
1816-17	187	3	210	7
1817-18	195	7	214	12
1818-19	210	6	248	8
1819-20	222	6	253	6
1820-21	243	19	257	13
1821-22	268	6	303	4
1822-23	290	6	313	6
1823-24	298	4	316	-
1824-25	297	5	317	-
1825-26	294	2	310	8
1826-27	319	9	347	6
1827-28	335	10	368	5
1828-29	342	8	371	6
	3,885	107	4,254	90

It appears, then, that the average number of native officers in the last 15 years has been 259 subadars, 303 jemidars; and that the average number of deaths in the same period has been 7.13 subadars and six jemidars, or 2.71 per cent. in the former and two per cent. in the latter rank.

**RECEIPTS.**

On the data laid down, the gross receipts in the first year would be—

Interest on Government donation (8 per cent.)	-	-	-	800
Subscription by Government	-	-	-	600
Deduction from the pay of native officers	-	-	-	13,043
				14,443

increasing, in the ratio of 600 rupees, till the 14-15th year, when they would remain stationary at 21,643 rupees.

**EXPENDITURE.**

The widows to be provided for annually would be determined by the number of subscribers in each rank, multiplied by the rate per cent. of casualties in the last 15 years, expressed by—

$$\frac{266 \times 2.71}{100} = 720 \text{ subadar widows.}$$

$$\frac{290 \times 2}{100} = 580 \text{ jemadar widows.}$$

$$\text{Total} \quad - \quad - \quad \underline{\underline{13}}$$

of which the proportion for the cavalry would be -  $18 \times 2.71 = 48$  subadar widows.

$$\frac{36 \times 2}{100} = 72 \text{ jemidar widows.}$$

infantry    „    -  $248 \times 2.71$   
= 672 subadars.

$$\frac{254 \times 2}{100} = 508 \text{ jemidars.}$$

Total Number of Widows annually - - - 13

In estimating the expenses, the principal points for inquiry are,—

1st. What sum could a fund constituted as above afford to pay on the death of each member.

2nd. What annuity could be safely granted to the widow of such member in consideration of that sum improving at compound interest at eight per cent.

There are no data upon which an opinion might be established as to the duration of life among Natives, or the probable average age at which wives become widows; perfect accuracy is not therefore to be looked for in a calculation involving those questions. If, however, it be made on the general assumption that the widows will, one with another, live 26 years after admission on the fund, there will be little cause to dread an under estimate of expense.

It appears above that the number of pensions annually to be provided would probably be 13, and it is found on calculation that 13 pensioners, of Rs. 125. 2., could be furnished for 26 years out of the annual receipts, as estimated in the preceding page, or, in other words, a gross monthly pension of 136 rupees.

On a subdivision of this sum, made with reference to the different ranks (subadar and jemidar) and branches of the service (cavalry and infantry), the stipends of the widows might be fixed as follows:—

Widows of cavalry subadars, Rs. 15 × '48, the number of pensions	-	7.20
Ditto - ditto jemidars, 10 × '71 - - ditto	- -	7.10
Widows of infantry subadars, 12 × 6.73 - - ditto	- -	80.76
Ditto - ditto jemidars, 8 × 5.08 - - ditto	- -	40.64
		Rs. 135.70

Forming a charge of 1,629 rupees annually for pensions. Of course any other disposition of this sum can be adopted that may seem better suited to the case, provided the aggregate amount does not exceed that laid down.

A statement exhibiting the condition of the fund in each year up to the 26th, when it is assumed the maximum of expenditure would be attained, is annexed. It appears from it that the institution would then be in possession of a capital, the interest of which added to the annual contributions by members, would be sufficient at all times to pay the number of annuitants then supposed to be receiving pensions (viz. 338). It is indispensable that such a capital should be available when the annuitants are at their greatest number, regard being had to the stability of the fund. That the period is more distant than has been assumed is very probable, but in the absence of proper tables showing the rate of mortality in India, it is impracticable to form a prospective estimate of the affairs of an annuity fund without assuming a certain term up to which each annuitant is supposed to have an equal chance of living.

It may be proper to state that, according to the generally received theory of life in Europe, where the expectation is 26 years, the age is 34; this is, however, inapplicable to the duration of life in India.

In the case of a fund for the benefit of widows, consisting of the number of subscribers above stated (556), the supposition that the greatest number of annuitants in life together will amount to 330, affords good reason to expect that the calculations have been made on grounds rather favourable to the institution (considered as the party insuring) than of an opposite character.

PROSPECTIVE ESTIMATE of the Receipts and Expenditure of a Native Military Fund, constituted on the Principles laid down in the preceding Remarks.

Y E A R.	Number of Annuitants.	Annual Payment to Annuitants.	Receipts.	Interest at 8 per Cent.	Capital.	REMARKS.
		<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	
1	13	1,629	13,643	800	22,816	Inclusive of Government donation of 10,000 rupees.
2	26	3,258	14,243	1,825	35,626	
3	39	4,887	14,843	2,850	48,432	
4	52	6,516	15,442	3,874	61,233	
5	65	8,145	16,043	4,898	74,029	
6	78	9,774	16,643	5,922	86,830	
7	91	11,043	17,243	6,946	99,616	
8	104	13,032	17,843	7,969	1,12,396	
9	117	14,661	18,443	8,991	1,25,169	
10	130	16,290	19,043	10,013	1,37,935	
11	143	17,919	19,643	11,034	1,50,693	
12	156	19,548	20,243	12,055	1,63,443	
13	169	21,177	20,843	13,075	1,76,184	
14	182	22,806	21,443	14,094	1,88,915	
15	195	24,435	21,643	15,113	2,01,236	In this year the amount of the Government subscription would be completed, after which it would remain at 8,600 rupees per annum.
16	208	26,064	21,643	16,098	2,12,913	
17	221	27,693	21,643	17,033	2,23,896	
18	234	29,322	21,643	17,911	2,34,128	
19	247	30,951	21,643	18,730	2,43,550	
20	260	32,580	21,643	19,484	2,52,093	
21	273	34,209	21,643	20,167	2,59,794	
22	286	35,838	21,643	20,783	2,66,382	
23	299	37,467	21,643	21,310	2,71,868	
24	312	39,096	21,643	21,749	2,76,164	
25	325	40,725	21,643	22,093	2,79,175	
26	338	42,354	21,643	22,334	2,80,798	



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

\*serving in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st April 1837.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.							INFANTRY.										
Regular.				Irregular.			European.			Native.							
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	85	14	5,193	5,292	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	2	685	699	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	751	764	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	752	765	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	2	746	760	4	-	465	469
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	1	118	122	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	1,122	1,126
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	658	671	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	1	718	733	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	57	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	752	768	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	950	958
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2	954	964
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	746	749
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	725	737	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	4	1,325	1,355	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	419	424
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	94	95	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2	1,114	1,123
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	6	2,140	2,179	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	113	113	-	-	-	-
11	2	495	508	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	187	190	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	527	539	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2	368	377	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	3	1,500	1,522	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	6	2,339	2,381	-	-	-	-
-	4	992	1,022	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	749	765	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	739	755	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	1	434	443	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	3	901	918	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	6	2,215	2,256	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	735	751	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	2	751	765	-	-	-	-

## PAPERS RELATING TO

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 APRIL 1837.  STATIONS.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - -												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS & SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Horse.			European Foot.		Native Foot.			
										Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—continued.</b>																		
<b>Meerut Division :</b>																		
Meerut - - - -	19	643	30	833	1,525	-	-	-	-	14	324	191	3	93	2	-	125	757
Delhi - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	8	30	936	974	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Allyghur - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dehrah Dhoon - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fortress and Garrison of Agra.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	226	-	-	-	336
Muttra - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	103	27	-	-	-	-	-	132
Gwalior - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Rohilcund :</b>																		
Bareilly - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Moradabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Kernaon :</b>																		
Almorah - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Howalbaugh - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sirhind Division :</b>																		
Kernaul - - - -	-	-	24	784	808	-	-	-	-	6	112	27	7	202	-	-	-	35
Loodhianah - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	137	-	-	-	-	-	142
Hansi - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Subathoo - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Saugor Division :</b>																		
Saugor - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	102	-	-	-	10
Hussingabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jubbulpore - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	6
<b>Rajpootana Force :</b>																		
Nusseerabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	111	-	-	-	11
Beawr - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Meywah Force :</b>																		
Neemuch - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	137	-	-	2	-	125	20
<b>Malwah Force :</b>																		
Mhow - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	113	27	5	113	-	-	-	26
Mundlaisir - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bhopawar - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - - -</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>1,293</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>6,353</b>	<b>7,941</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>1,064</b>	<b>1,125</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>1,777</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>2,338</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1,917</b>	<b>6,771</b>

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

217

serving in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st April 1837—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.							INFANTRY.										
Regular.				Irregular.			European.			Native.							
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Regular.				Irregular.			
										European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.
11	2	497	510	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	6	2,245	2,287	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	6	2,222	2,267	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	750	762	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	754	760	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	773	802	48	8	2,837	2,893	-	-	-	-
16	2	496	514	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77	77	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	90	91	-	-	-	-
4	-	644	648	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	4	1,501	1,531	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	2	751	765	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	744	760	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	747	752	-	-	-	-
23	4	1,245	1,272	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	4	1,241	1,271	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	4	1,431	1,462	-	-	-	-
6	-	903	908	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	253	256	3	2	698	703
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	730	736
4	-	643	647	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	8	2,943	3,002	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	729	745	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	4	1,429	1,457	1	-	1,756	1,767
11	2	496	509	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	8	2,971	3,024	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	762	768
12	2	1,146	1,160	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	8	2,909	3,059	-	-	-	-
13	2	495	510	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	6	2,227	2,267	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	412	413
3	-	805	808	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
142	21	8,975	9,138	-	-	-	29	773	802	895	148	55,095	56,138	47	15	10,129	10,190

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 April 1837.  STATIONS.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS.												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS & SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Horse.			European Foot.			Native Foot.		
										Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	
<b>PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS:</b>																		
<b>Centre Division:</b>																		
Fort St. George	-	-	31	686	717	1	3	80	84	-	-	-	12	443	4	2	99	871
St. Thomas' Mount	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	94	215	-	-	-	-	-	-
Palaveram	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poonamallee	-	-	33	411	444	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arcot	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vellore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wallajabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Mysore Division:</b>																		
Bangalore	32	632	34	723	1,421	-	-	-	-	12	119	105	2	108	-	-	-	34
French Rocks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hurrybub	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	207	212	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp in Coorg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Malabar and Canara:</b>																		
Cannanore	-	-	36	666	702	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	92	-	-	-	9
Mangalore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Northern Division:</b>																		
Masulpatam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ellore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Samulcottah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vizagapatam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Watar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vizianagram	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chicacole	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berhampore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp in Goomsoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Southern Division:</b>																		
Trichinopoly	-	-	36	828	864	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	77	-	-	-	8
Palamcottah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	23	-	-	-	2
Paulgautcherry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Quilon in Travancore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp Neilgherries	-	-	-	-	-	5	9	218	232	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Ceded Districts:</b>																		
Bellary	-	-	34	896	930	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	97	-	-	-	91
Cuddapah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:</b>																		
Secunderabad	-	-	36	897	933	-	-	-	-	5	6	106	8	121	-	-	-	246
Jaulnah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	107
<b>Nagpore Subsidiary Force:</b>																		
Kamptee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	103	-	8	224	-	-	-	340
<b>Tenasserim Provinces:</b>																		
Moulmein	-	-	33	663	701	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	113	-	-	-	119
<b>Prince of Wales' Island and its Dependencies:</b>																		
Penang	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	283	-	-	-	289
Malacca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>On Detachment Duty</b>																		
	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	319	329	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>632</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>5,775</b>	<b>6,712</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>824</b>	<b>857</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>1,576</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>2,614</b>



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

serving in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st April 1837—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.				INFANTRY.												VETERANS.					
Regular.		Irregular.		European.			Native						Veterans.								
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.			
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.
2	2	119	123							26	4	1,461	1,481					16	2	1,045	1,068
										37	6	1,038	1,081								
32	6	948	986							2		155	157								
										22	4	968	994					5	2	50	57
18	8	474	495							37	0	1,829	1,872								
										14	2	615	631								
										13	2	736	751								
										13	2	734	749								
										20	4	952	976								
										11	2	456	469								
										17	4	982	1,003								
										14	2	832	848								
										6	2	458	466								
										5	2	290	295								
										8	2	401	411								
										32	6	1,847	1,885								
										11	2	721	734								
										10	2	618	630								
										20	4	1,405	1,429								
12	8	473	488							39	6	1,927	1,972								
										10	2	464	476								
										12	2	470	484								
										13	2	590	605								
13	3	474	490							28	4	1,450	1,482								
										13	2	546	561								
12	3	473	488							76	12	4,396	4,484								
15	3	472	490							13	2	710	725								
18	8	472	493				27	753	780	55	8	2,905	2,968								
										10	2	615	527								
										27	4	1,296	1,327								
										10	2	608	620								
										40		3,549	3,589								
122	26	3,005	4,053				27	753	780	664	104	36,814	37,562					29	265	1,095	1,389

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 APRIL 1837.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS & SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	1. Officers.	2. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	3. Officers.	4. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	5. Total.	6. European Officers.	7. European Non-Commissioned.	8. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	9. Total.	Horse.			European Foot.		Native Foot.		18. Total.	
										10. Officers.	11. European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	12. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	13. Officers.	14. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	15. European Officers.	16. European Non-Commissioned.		17. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.
STATIONS.																		
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY :</b>																		
<b>Presidency Garrison :</b>																		
Bombay	-	-	36	786	822	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	151	-	-	-	150
<b>Southern Division :</b>																		
Belgaum	-	-	34	719	753	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dharwar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kulladghee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sholapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	103	25	-	-	-	-	-	130
Concan :—Dapoolie	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Poonah Division :</b>																		
Poonah	-	-	32	681	713	4	22	375	401	7	157	48	-	-	-	-	-	212
Kirkee	32	739	-	-	771	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seroor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ahmednuggur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	405	5	2	461	87
Candish :—Malligaum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Northern Division :</b>																		
Ahmedabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kairah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hursole	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baroda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rajcote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bhoog	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Deesa	-	-	35	711	746	-	-	-	-	5	109	24	-	-	-	-	-	12
<b>Sattarah Subsidiary :</b>																		
Sattarah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Asseerghur Fortress :</b>																		
Asseerghur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
On Detachment Duty	-	-	-	-	-	4	80	84	-	-	-	-	7	196	8	-	419	61
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>2,897</b>	<b>3,805</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>752</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>890</b>	<b>2,111</b>

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

serving in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st April 1837—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.					INFANTRY.											VETERANS.						
Regular.				Irregular.	European.			Native.								European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.		Total.		
European Officers.		European Non-Commissioned.		Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.		Total.	Regular.		Irregular.						European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.		Total.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	3	2,275	2,315	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	2	1,129	1,163	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	728	743	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	1	659	669	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
18	-	479	497	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	1	1,068	1,094	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	692	714	27	4	1,426	1,457	-	-	-	-	-	-	429	437	
-	-	-	-	-	-	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	730	743	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	1	1,191	1,213	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	1	1,113	1,129	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	400	404	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	636	645	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	1	1,411	1,433	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
11	2	335	348	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	637	646	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	729	739	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	1	631	644	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
12	1	290	303	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	532	543	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	1	639	655	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	680	689	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
10	-	359	369	1	767	768	-	-	-	23	-	2,925	2,948	-	-	127	127	2	-	613	645	
61	3	1,463	1,517	2	845	847	22	692	714	307	22	19,139	19,468	3	1	527	531	10	-	1,072	1,082	



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

223

serving in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st May 1847.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.										VETERANS.					
Regular.				Irregular.		European.			Native.												
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Regular.				Irregular.			European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.		
									European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.					Total.	
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	1,074	1,079	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	7	3,336	3,395	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	1	703	712	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	2	987	1,004	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	639	650	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	2	1,008	1,027	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2	1,111	1,121	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	669	676	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	517	522	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	391	397	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	664	668	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	8	3,992	4,057	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	4	588	502	-	-	-	3	2	474	479	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	1	200	201	-	-	-	1	95	96	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	868	876	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	6	2,508	2,547	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	4	586	590	-	-	-	11	2	1,042	1,055	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	824	837	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1,440	1,444	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	4	2,115	2,145	-	-	-	-	1	43	-	44
14	3	407	514	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	4	2,029	2,060	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	1,012	1,027	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	400	405	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	607	615	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	6	3,044	3,095	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	942	948	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	936	941	-	-	-	-
8	3	493	503	3	567	590	-	-	-	24	3	2,164	2,191	6	5	2,242	2,253	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	6	3,064	3,114	1	2	1,093	1,096	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	2	1,088	1,105	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	2	385	393	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	1,026	1,032	-	-	-	-

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 MAY 1847.  STATIONS.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS & SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Horse.			European Foot.			Native Foot.		
										Officers.	European Non Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—continued.</b>																		
<b>Meerut Division—cont<sup>d</sup>.</b>																		
Agra			37	1,008	1,045							7	89					96
Muttra										3	2	143						148
Bareilly															2		177	179
Moradabad																		
Shahjeanpore															2		104	106
Almorah																		
Scharunpore																		
<b>Sirhind Division:</b>																		
Umballah	37	1,350	33	1,007	2,427					13	260	57	11	172				613
Loodianah										14	128	169	8	220				548
Subathoo																		
Mukhoo																		
Ferozepore			29	1,014	1,043	1	4	257	262	9	118	171	4	148				449
Kussowlie			31	946	977													
Juttoh																		
Hansi																		
<b>Punjaub Division:</b>																		
Lahore			30	953	983	1	5	242	248	4	115	35	12	275				441
Jullundur						1	3	135	139	3	109	29	7	91				239
Urmur Tanda																		177
Phallour							4	105	109									
Hajeepore																		
Nakoda																		
Kurturpore																		
Noorpore						2	2	106	110									
Hoshezapore										4	111	28						147
Kangra																		
Mokerian																		
<b>Saugor Division:</b>																		
Saugor																	111	112
Nowgong																1	173	174
Nagode																		
Jhansi																		
Jubbulpore																		
Dumoh																		
Bandah																		
<b>Rajpootanah Field Force:</b>																		
Nusseerabad													3	79				8
Bewar																		
<b>Meywar Field Force:</b>																		
Neemuch																3		166
Kerwarrah																		16
Mhow													4	88				9
Bhopawar																		
Mundlaisir																		
Camp, Sirdapore																		
<b>China:</b>																		
Hong Kong:—Victoria			31	936	967													
<b>On Detachment Duty</b>																		
TOTAL	61	2,057	346	10,781	13,245	16	58	1,591	1,665	62	1,076	839	84	1,809	39	21	2,528	6,411



## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 MAY 1847.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS.												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS & SAPPERS				ARTILLERY.								
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Horse.			European Foot.			Native Foot.		
										Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	
PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS:																		
Centre Division:																		
Fort St. George			33	953	986													
St. Thomas Mount										5	106		22	501				63
Arctot																		
Vellore																		
Wallajahad																		
Mysore Division:																		
Bangalore	31	654	31	723	1,439					11	145	119						27
French Rocks																		
Hariyur						10	18	864	892									
Mercaara																		
Malabar and Canara:																		
Cannanore			38	1,129	1,167													
Mangalore																		
Northern Division:																		
Masulipatam																		
Samulcottah																		
Russelcondah																		
Vizanagram																		
Vizagapatam																		
Berhampore							5	83	88									
Cotapolliam																		
Cuttack																		
Southern Division:																		
Trichinopoly													1	51				
Pallamcottah													109	22				
Panlghautcherry																		
Quilon																		
Ceded Districts:																		
Bellary													3	75				
Kurnool																		
Cuddapah																		
Kulladghee																		
Nagpore Subsidiary Force:																		
Kamptee			34	1,017	1,051					5	108		9	172				
Setabuldee																		
Saugor and Nerbudda Territories:																		
Nowgong																		
Husinghabad																		
Saugor													3	70				
Jubbulpore																		
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:																		
Secunderabad			34	1,056	1,090					4	6	103	9	106				
Jaulua										5	97							
Moulmien								14	14				5	79				
Singapore																		
China								5	322	330								
Aden						3	5	322	330									
On Detachment Duty			13	460	473		7	40	47				21	115				
TOTAL	31	654	183	5,338	6,206	13	35	823	871	30	462	222	185	1,290				



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

227

serving in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st May 1847—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.				INFANTRY												VETERANS.					
Regular.		Irregular.		European.			Native.						European.			Native.					
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Regular.	Irregular.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.		
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.
2	2	124	128							36	4	1,894	1,934					13	41	850	904
15	3	473	491							33	4	1,642	1,679					7	2	249	258
										38	6	2,137	2,181								
										18	2	812	832								
										15	2	730	747								
										13	2	832	847								
										32	4	1,225	1,261								
										14	2	722	738								
										17	2	698	717								
										10	2	431	443								
										20	2	907	1,019								
										25	4	2,171	2,200								
										4	1	367	371					4	76		80
										12	2	590	604								
										15	2	536	553								
										14	2	816	833								
14	3	453	470				34	872	906	30	4	1,510	1,544								
										10	2	651	663								
										13	2	694	709								
										14	2	656	672								
18	3	488	509				37	886	923	34	4	1,781	1,819								
										16	2	740	758								
										15	2	695	712								
										15	2	771	788								
14	3	484	501							45	6	2,445	2,496								
										21	2	1,169	1,192								
15	3	478	496																		
										13	2	588	603								
										36	4	1,845	1,885								
										12	2	634	648								
14	3	445	462							88	10	4,554	4,652								
16	2	471	490							33	4	1,810	1,847								
										31	4	1,723	1,758								
										10	2	524	536								
										23	2	1,039	1,064								
										37	4	1,944	1,985								
										87		6,433	6,520					5		975	980
108	23	3,416	3,547				71	1,758	1,829	902	104	48,885	49,891					29	119	2,074	2,222

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS, of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 MAY 1847.  STATIONS.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.		5. Total.	ENGINEERS & SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	1. Officers.	2. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	3. Officers.	4. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.		6. European Officers.	7. European Non-Commissioned.	8. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	9. Total.	Horse.			European Foot.			Native Foot.		
										10. Officers.	11. European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	12. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Rank and File.	13. Officers.	14. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	15. European Officers.	16. European Non-Commissioned.	17. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	18. Total.
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY:</b>																		
<b>Presidency Garrison:</b>																		
Bombay - - - -	-	-	12	450	462	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	67	-	-	-	73
<b>Southern Division:</b>																		
Belgaum - - - -	-	-	28	1,111	1,139	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	78	-	-	-	81
Sholapoor - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dharwar - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kulladghee - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sawunt-Warjee - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kolapoor - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	90	-	-	-	91
Rutnagerry - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Poonah Division:</b>																		
Poonah - - - -	-	-	80	2,287	2,367	-	-	-	-	9	220	50	-	-	-	-	-	279
Kirkee - - - -	28	643	-	-	671	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ahmednuggur - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	381	-	-	-	395
Seroor - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Candeish—Malhgaum - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Conean—Dapoolie - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jannah - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dhurrungawn - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Northern Division:</b>																		
Ahmedabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baroda - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surat - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Deesa - - - -	-	-	25	1,022	1,047	-	-	-	-	4	111	25	-	-	-	-	-	140
Rajcote - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kaira - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kattywar - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mylce-Caunta - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sattara Subsidiary:</b>																		
Sattara - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Asseerghur Fortress:</b>																		
Asseerghur Fortress - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Aden Force:</b>																		
Aden Force - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	222	225	-	-	-	7	104	-	-	-	111
<b>Scinde Field Force:</b>																		
Hyderabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kurrachee - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sukkur - - - -	-	-	30	929	959	2	25	305	332	5	148	22	-	-	-	-	-	1
Shikarpoor - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Fitzgerald - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Khanghur - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	100	-	-	-	1
Bhooj - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>On Detachment Duty:</b>																		
On Detachment Duty - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	2	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b> - - - -	28	643	175	5,799	6,645	4	26	527	557	18	479	97	53	822	-	-	-	1,411

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

229

servng in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st May 1847—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.											VETERANS.				
Regular.				Irregular.		European.			Native.								European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Regular.				Irregular.								
									European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.					
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	5	2,392	2,433	4	-	552	550	-	-	-	-
2	2	469	478	-	154	154	-	-	-	26	1	1,518	1,545	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	1,003	1,016	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	1,030	1,044	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	768	783	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	1,689	1,713	3	-	624	624	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	172	175	1	-	496	497	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	-	2,057	2,090	1	2	467	470	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	1,007	1,017	1	-	731	732	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	3	238	241	-	-	-	24	-	1,621	1,645	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	650	656	-	-	682	682	9	-	411	420
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,153	1,153	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	1	1,846	1,877	2	-	598	600	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	4	690	694	-	-	-	28	-	1,746	1,774	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	1	479	491	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	1,007	1,019	-	-	394	394	-	-	-	-
19	1	428	448	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	905	918	-	-	800	800	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	925	936	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	969	973	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	901	902	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	1,000	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	1	990	1,006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	676	689	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	724	752	16	2	956	974	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	1	941	955	4	1	915	920	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	3	61	84	21	773	794	18	1	1,030	1,049	10	3	3,188	3,201	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	1,044	1,049	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	2	1,796	1,812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	3	574	577	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	497	502	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	1	996	1,013	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	3,057	3,066	-	-	2,114	2,114	2	-	626	628
37	4	1,376	1,417	13	1,737	1,750	49	1,497	1,546	436	22	31,796	32,254	37	7	16,749	16,793	11	-	1,037	1,048



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

231

every Description, serving in the Presidency of Bengal, on the 1st January 1857.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.							INFANTRY.										
Regular.				Irregular.			European.			Native.							
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Regular.				Irregular.			
										European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.
4	1	188	193							12		1,074	1,086	3	3	1,127	1,133
										43	8	4,030	4,081				
				3	503	506				13	1	1,161	1,175	4	2	898	902
														4		539	545
										14	2	914	930	4	2	567	573
														3	2	694	699
				4	464	468								2	4	396	402
										6	1	543	550				
										11	2	931	944				
										10	2	637	649				
										52	6	4,157	4,215				
				3	435	438								3	2	314	319
				1	117	118								5	2	742	749
														1		92	93
				4	587	591				10	2	1,001	1,013	3	2	774	779
														4	2	695	701
										9	2	928	939				
13	3	507	523							67	11	3,671	3,749				
										13	2	1,163	1,178				
										8	2	786	796				
										40	5	3,334	3,379				
11	3	505	519	1	260	261				26	4	2,174	2,204				
				2	331	333				8	1	606	615				
										5	1	504	510				
11	3	491	505														
										12	2	1,163	1,177				
				3	212	215				14	2	1,061	1,077				
				2	316	318				24	4	2,272	2,300				
										15	2	1,160	1,177				
12	3	506	521							14	2	1,153	1,169				



EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

233

servicing in the Presidency of BENGAL, on the 1st January 1857—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.							INFANTRY.										
Regular.				Irregular.			European.			Native.							
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.
14	2	504	520	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	4	2,281	2,311	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	4	2,284	2,314	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	810	836	7	1	586	594	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	3,383	3,427	2	1	341	344
-	-	-	-	2	588	590	-	-	-	17	3	1,780	1,800	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	2	1,158	1,175	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	2	1,104	1,117	1	-	559	560
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	669	675
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	816	822
12	3	459	474	4	295	299	-	-	-	27	4	2,248	2,279	4	2	737	743
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	865	891	-	-	-	-	4	2	606	612
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	785	807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	3	278	281	-	-	-	35	6	3,471	3,512	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	954	969	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	4	2,282	2,315	-	-	-	-
11	3	501	515	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	5	3,203	3,241	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	1,103	1,119	-	-	-	-
11	3	488	502	4	578	582	-	-	-	27	3	2,293	2,323	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	5	588	593	-	-	-	24	4	2,164	2,192	-	-	-	-
7	2	320	329	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	4	1,980	2,011	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	1	601	614	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	508	512	-	-	-	-
7	2	458	467	8	1,166	1,174	-	-	-	56	10	5,019	5,085	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	1	288	289	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	569	573
-	-	-	-	4	589	593	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	4	588	592	-	-	-	10	2	1,137	1,149	4	1	513	518
-	-	-	-	3	566	569	-	-	-	9	2	836	847	4	1	660	665
-	-	-	-	4	572	576	-	-	-	12	1	1,153	1,166	4	2	912	918
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	672	678
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	912	917
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	892	896





EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

235

servicing in the Presidency of BENGAL, on the 1st January 1857—continued.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.							INFANTRY.										
Regular.				Irregular.			European.			Native.							
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Regular.				Irregular.			
										European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.
4	1	263	268	5	2,225	2,230	-	-	-	40	1	6,442	6,483	7	2	4,849	4,859
117	29	5,190	5,336	87	13,793	13,880	74	2,460	2,534	956	139	83,348	84,443	112	43	25,587	25,742

orders to return to Bengal.

Description, serving in the Presidency of MADRAS, on the 1st April 1857.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.							INFANTRY.										Veterans.				
Regular.				Irregular.			European.			Native.							European Officers.	European Men.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Regular.				Irregular.							
										European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.				
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.
2	2	117	121	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	6	2,349	2,391	-	-	-	-	6	2	856	864
10	3	343	356	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	412	427	-	-	-	-	2	2	124	128
12	3	370	385	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	4	1,433	1,460	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	616	632	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	2	592	606	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	668	680	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	4	1,256	1,275	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2	650	660	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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## ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of every Description,

1 April 1857— <i>continued.</i>	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS AND SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	Officers.	Non Commissioned and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non Commissioned and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Horse.			European Foot.		Native Foot.			
										Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	
STATIONS.																		
<b>PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS—<i>continued.</i></b>																		
<b>Northern Division:</b>																		
Masulipatam																		
Samulcottah																		
Russellecondah																		
Vizianagram																		
Berhampore																		
Vizagapatam																		
Cuttack																		
Dowlaserum						7	24	317	348									
<b>Southern Division:</b>																		
Trichinopoly										6	155						161	
Palamcottah																		
Paulghaut																		
Quilon																		
Jackatalla			17	414	431													
<b>Ceded Districts:</b>																		
Bellary												1	81				82	
Cuddapah																		
Kurnool																		
Sholapore																		
<b>Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:</b>																		
Secunderabad										4	6	103	7	167			287	
Jaulnah																		
<b>Nagpore Force:</b>																		
Kamptea										2	101		4	98			205	
Hossingabad																		
<b>Pegu Division:</b>																		
Rangoon			29	792	821							14	344				358	
Henzadah																		
Tongho												1	38				39	
Moulmein													43				43	
<b>Penang and Straits of Malacca:</b>																		
Singapore																		
Penang																		
Persian Gulf																		
On Detachment Duty	13	326	32	1,298	1,669	12	65	1,023	1,100				21	461			482	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>605</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>2,980</b>	<b>3,715</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>1,340</b>	<b>1,448</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>470</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>1,362</b>			<b>2,126</b>	



## ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of

1 APRIL 1857.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS.												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS & SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	1. Officers.	2. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	3. Officers.	4. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	5. TOTAL.	6. European Officers.	7. European Non-Commissioned.	8. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	9. TOTAL.	Horse.			European Foot.		Native Foot.			
										10. Officers.	11. European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	12. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	13. Officers.	14. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	15. European Officers.	16. European Non-Commissioned.	17. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	18. TOTAL.
STATION :																		
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY :</b>																		
<b>Presidency Garrison :</b>																		
Bombay	-	-	15	487	502	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	77	4	74	76	233
<b>Southern Division :</b>																		
Belgaum	-	-	4	131	135	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	74	73	147
Sholapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	90	91
Dharwar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kolapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Poona Division :</b>																		
Poona	-	-	1	105	106	1	3	293	237	5	119	24	-	-	-	-	-	148
Kurkee	-	-	15	366	381	-	-	-	-	2	239	73	4	176	3	3	267	767
Ahmednuggur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Candesh :</b>																		
Malligaum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	28
Sattara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	88	89
<b>Concan :</b>																		
Dapoolie	-	-	Nil.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Northern Division :</b>																		
Ahmedabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	171	176
Baroda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	89	90
Rajcote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	28	29
Deesa	-	-	23	830	853	-	-	-	-	4	90	25	-	-	-	-	-	119
Surat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	32
Bhooj	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sinde Division :</b>																		
Kurrachee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hydrabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	113	116
Shikarpoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	119	122
Jacobabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Asseerghur Fortress :</b>																		
Aden Force	-	-	15	450	465	1	-	94	95	-	-	-	4	87	1	-	92	184
<b>Rajpootana Field Force :</b>																		
Nuseerabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	154	156
Neemuch	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	137	-	-	-	-	-	145
<b>Persian Gulf Expeditionary Force :</b>																		
Mohumrah	-	-	43	1,246	1,289	-	-	-	-	6	150	25	8	223	-	-	-	412
Bushire	24	616	11	560	1,211	10	15	358	383	6	160	25	7	339	10	101	220	868
On detachment duty	-	-	2	110	112	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	207	-	-	-	218
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>982</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>3,919</b>	<b>5,054</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>685</b>	<b>715</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>1,109</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>1,640</b>	<b>4,176</b>

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

every Description, serving in the Presidency of *Bombay*, on the 1st April 1857.

- - - - - COMPANYS TROOPS.																		
NATIVE CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.												
Regular.				Irregular.		European.			Native.									
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Regular.				Irregular.				
										European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	1	2,409	2,441	4	-	380	384	
12	2	389	403	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	3	1,613	1,638	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	725	731	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	1	728	741	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	1	684	695	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	861	876	19	-	1,694	1,713	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	30	31	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	692	702	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	2	433	435	-	-	-	8	1	548	557	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	940	946	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	2	1,526	1,549	-	-	-	-	
14	1	377	392	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	2	1,246	1,263	-	-	-	-	
1	-	134	135	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	4,019	4,025	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	841	851	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	508	513	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	508	517	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	1,004	1,025	17	-	1,753	1,770	6	-	896	902	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	859	870	-	-	13	13	
-	-	-	-	9	1,186	1,195	-	-	-	11	1	714	726	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	446	448	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	1	830	841	-	-	-	-	
15	1	454	470	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	947	958	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	1,410	1,421	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66	2	2,548	2,616	-	-	-	-	
16	1	462	479	9	1,348	1,357	28	957	985	33	1	1,649	1,683	5	-	768	773	
1	-	148	149	1	797	798	-	-	-	15	-	2,102	2,117	1	-	138	139	
59	5	1,964	2,028	21	3,764	3,785	64	2,822	2,886	372	22	31,969	32,363	16	-	2,195	2,211	



servicing in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras, and Bombay*, on the 1st September 1867.

CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.						Remarks.
British.			Native.			British.			Native.			
9. Officers.	10. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	11. Total.	12. British Officers.	13. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	14. Total.	15. Officers.	16. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	17. Total.	18. British Officers.	19. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	20. Total.	
				33	33	26	707	733				
				431	439	19	551	570	29	2,058	2,087	
						3	81	84	9	704	713	
						4	87	91	11	707	718	
						24	799	823	2	134	136	
									8	715	723	
						24	480	504	7	557	564	
									2	172	174	
										66	66	
									1	326	327	
									1	233	234	
									1	88	89	
									5	495	500	
										57	57	
									1	73	74	
										30	30	
									2	126	128	
										46	46	
									9	740	749	
									10	585	595	
									11	417	428	
									10	736	746	
5	105	110	1	69	70	26	798	824	9	712	721	
21	215	236	6	271	279	24	571	595	9	647	656	
			6	16	16	10	315	325	8	632	640	
				368	372							
				13	13	30	805	835	9	701	710	
										64	64	
24	458	482	11	459	470	63	1,798	1,861	16	1,351	1,367	
			2	66	68				10	695	705	
			1	115	116	35	375	384				
			3	262	265		798	838	9	707	716	
									18	358	376	
			10	428	438	24	523	547	14	687	701	
			2	118	120	21	614	635	9	672	681	
			1	102	103	5	211	216	11	680	691	
			1						9	356	365	
			7	241	248	6	198	204	1	320	321	
			9	436	445	21	587	608	16	1,360	1,376	
						6	181	187				
				24	24	6	149	155		25	25	
			2	184	186	24	540	564	1	52	53	
									5	602	607	
			6	399	404	39	711	750	13	628	691	
				54	54	8	301	309	7	454	461	
										02	62	
									11	622	633	
										25	25	
						19	302	321	2	254	256	
						5	176	181				

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description, serving in

1 SEPTEMBER 1867.  STATIONS.	ROYAL ARTILLERY.				SAPPERS AND MINERS.			
	Horse.		Foot.		Total.	British Officers.	British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Men.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Men.				
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—continued.</b>								
<b>Meerut Division :</b>								
Meerut - - - - -	12	308	8	321	649	-	-	-
Delhi - - - - -	-	-	2	64	66	-	-	-
Muttra - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Agra - - - - -	-	-	5	188	193	-	-	-
Futtehgurh - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Allygurh - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Roorkee - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	10	75	85
Dehra Doon - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sirhind Division:</b>								
Umballa - - - - -	-	-	10	281	291	-	-	-
Dugshaie - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Simla - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp Dhobee Ghat - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Subathoo - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp, Solon - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp, Dugshaie Road - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Camp, Bhanaloghee - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Loodiana - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philour - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jullundur - - - - -	-	-	4	144	148	-	-	-
<b>Lahore Division :</b>								
Meean Meer - - - - -	3	151	7	196	357	-	-	-
Fort Lahore - - - - -	-	-	2	55	57	-	-	-
Mooltan - - - - -	-	-	5	204	209	-	-	-
Sealkote - - - - -	5	123	-	-	128	-	-	-
Ferozepore - - - - -	-	-	4	135	139	-	-	-
Umrirtzur - - - - -	-	-	2	66	68	-	-	-
Kangra - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dhurmsala - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bukloh - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Peshawur Division:</b>								
Peshawur - - - - -	7	246	7	207	467	1	8	159
Shubkudur - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nuchnee - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Abozaie - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mackeson - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nowshera - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Attock - - - - -	-	-	2	62	64	-	-	-
Campbellpore - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syduu Bowhie - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rawul Pindce - - - - -	4	126	2	131	263	-	-	-
Murree - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hill Roads - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cherat - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Punjab Frontier Force:</b>								
Abbottabad - - - - -	-	-	6	142	148	-	-	-
Hoti Murdan - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kohat - - - - -	-	-	4	182	186	-	-	-
Bunnoo - - - - -	-	-	2	104	106	-	-	-
Dera Ismail Khan - - - - -	-	-	2	104	106	-	-	-
Dera Gazeer Khan - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rajanpoor - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>1,342</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>4,910</b>	<b>6,460</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>1,109</b>



**EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).**

the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras, and Bombay*, on the 1st. September 1867—*continued.*

CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.					
British.			Native.			British.			Native.		
Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.
9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.
23	423	446	13	329	341	38	692	730	13	606	619
-	-	-	1	74	75	9	290	299	8	674	682
24	432	456	-	-	47	33	843	876	12	698	710
-	-	-	-	-	-	7	296	303	1	184	185
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	503	510
-	-	-	-	-	-	21	419	440	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	59	60
23	412	435	10	415	425	28	692	720	11	673	684
-	-	-	-	-	-	34	833	867	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	1	154	155
-	-	-	-	-	-	6	217	226	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	6	97	103	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	1	185	191	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	7	49	50	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	3	232	239	1	127	128
-	-	-	1	52	53	24	71	74	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	683	707	8	575	583
-	-	-	9	428	437	26	798	824	18	1,274	1,292
-	-	-	7	460	467	2	106	108	-	-	-
26	441	467	9	458	467	25	515	540	8	665	673
-	-	-	-	30	30	26	816	842	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	36	685	721	10	704	714
-	-	-	-	-	-	1	69	70	1	142	143
-	-	-	-	-	-	2	67	69	-	39	39
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	666	677
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	551	561
-	-	-	22	1,086	1,108	24	522	546	51	3,043	3,094
-	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	90	90
-	-	-	-	47	47	-	-	-	-	71	71
-	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	71	71
-	-	-	-	26	26	-	-	-	-	30	30
-	-	-	-	15	15	24	768	792	-	-	-
23	337	359	-	-	15	3	108	111	-	173	173
4	111	115	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	11	441	452	46	1,198	1,184	17	1,143	1,160
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	96	97
-	-	-	-	-	-	13	652	665	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	36	36	30	797	827	1	232	233
-	-	-	-	-	-	14	1,408	1,422	-	-	-
-	-	-	2	364	366	10	-	-	10	712	722
-	-	-	7	497	504	18	-	-	18	2,124	2,142
-	-	-	7	497	504	19	-	-	19	1,403	1,416
-	-	-	8	474	482	9	61	64	10	1,393	1,403
-	-	-	7	496	503	-	-	-	12	1,408	1,420
-	-	-	6	494	500	-	-	-	-	-	-
172	2,934	3,106	196	10,957	11,153	982	26,767	27,749	560	42,064	42,624

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description, serving in

1 SEPTEMBER 1867.  STATIONS.	ROYAL ARTILLERY.					SAPPERS AND MINERS.		
	Horse.		Foot.		5. Total.	6. British Officers.	7. British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	8. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.
	1. Officers.	2. Non-Commissioned and Men.	3. Officers.	4. Non-Commissioned and Men.				
<b>PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS.</b>								
Centre Division :								
Fort St. George	-	-	5	69	74	-	-	-
Palaveram	-	-	2	183	185	-	-	-
Areot	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Thomas's Mount	-	-	22	440	462	-	-	-
Vellore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Northern District :								
Vizagapatam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wattair	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vizianagrum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berhampore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sumbulpore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cuttack	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Samulecottah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Southern Division :								
Trichinopoly	-	-	5	137	142	-	-	-
Palamcottah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45
Wellington	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
Quilon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coonoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trichoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trevandrum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mysore Division :								
Bangalore	17	150	12	175	354	-	49	528
French Rocks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mysore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hurryhur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mercara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malabar and Canara :								
Cannanore	-	-	6	134	140	-	-	-
Mallapooram	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Calicut	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mangalore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94
Wynaad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ceded District :								
Bellary	6	123	-	-	129	2	4	116
Kurnool	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cuddepah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force :								
Secunderabad	6	128	28	356	518	1	5	199
Nagpore Force :								
Kamptee	4	121	21	329	475	-	-	-
Seetabuldee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Raepore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hoshungabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chaudah	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	108
Seroncha	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chinduanah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pegu Division :								
Rangoon	-	-	10	149	159	-	-	-
Thyetyoo	-	-	6	133	139	-	-	-
Tonghoo	-	-	4	78	82	-	-	-
Shoaygheen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Moulmein	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Andaman Islands :								
Port Blair	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	121
Straits Settlements :								
Penang	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malacca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	-	-	5	82	87	-	-	-
Labuan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bengal Presidency Division :								
Dorundah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>2,265</b>	<b>2,946</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>1,253</b>

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

245

the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras, and Bombay*, on the 1st September 1867—*continued.*

CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.						Remarks.
British.			Native.			British.			Native.			
9. Officers.	10. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	11. Total.	12. British Officers.	13. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	14. Total.	15. Officers.	16. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	17. Total.	18. British Officers.	19. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	20. Total.	
..	..	..	..	..	..	36	638	674	24	2,147	2,171	
..	..	..	9	376	385	..	..	..	1	175	176	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	555	563	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	165	165	6	720	726	†Veterans.
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	725	733	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	722	730	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	345	347	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	439	444	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	709	716	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	2	89	91	16	1,416	1,432	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	639	647	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	528	535	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	179	180	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	73	73	..
31	518	549	..	..	..	38	925	963	16	1,434	1,450	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	630	637	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	86	87	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	704	712	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	719	727	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	32	497	529	17	1,415	1,432	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	3	89	92	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	2	82	84	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	794	803	..
..	..	..	7	375	382	39	755	794	16	1,393	1,409	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	700	714	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	711	719	..
34	445	479	9	397	406	82	1,595	1,677	25	2,148	2,173	..
..	..	..	7	364	371	34	745	779	13	1,423	1,436	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	1	54	55	8	341	349	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	712	719	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	712	721	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	159	160	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	2	50	52	1	157	158	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	42	646	688	8	695	703	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	30	456	486	10	717	727	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	10	355	365	8	578	586	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	125	127	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	610	617	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	3	110	113	1	85	86	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	530	536	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	173	180	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	544	550	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	165	168	..
65	963	1,028	32	1,512	1,544	356	7,151	7,507	323	717	725	..
										28,461	28,784	..

## ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description, serving in

1 SEPTEMBER 1867.  STATIONS.	ROYAL ARTILLERY.					SAPPERS AND MINERS.		
	Horse.		Foot.		Total.	British Officers.	British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.
	1. Officers.	2. Non-Commissioned and Men.	3. Officers.	4. Non-Commissioned and Men.				
<b>PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY :</b>								
Presidency District :								
Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tanna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poona Division :								
Poona	-	-	-	18	18	-	14	73
Kirkee	19	267	16	250	552	-	-	403
Ahmednuggur	7	134	-	-	141	-	-	-
Asseerghur	-	-	5	141	146	-	-	-
Sholapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sattara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malligam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dhoolia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seroor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
On Patrol Duty in Kandeish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mhow Division :								
Mhow	4	131	35	71	241	-	-	-
Nuseerabad	-	-	6	136	142	-	-	-
Neemach	-	-	5	136	141	-	-	-
Indore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ajmere	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mehidpore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Augur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Northern Division :								
Ahmedabad	-	-	15	289	304	-	-	-
Deesa	-	-	3	127	130	-	-	-
Baroda	-	-	-	10	10	-	-	-
Mount Aboo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rajcote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bhoj	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dwarka	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sadra	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
On Field Service in Katywar Districts	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Scinde Division :								
Kurrachee	-	-	26	136	162	-	-	-
Hydrabad	-	-	6	152	158	-	-	-
Jacobsbad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Patrolling on Scinde Frontier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belgaum District :								
Belgaum	-	-	9	200	209	-	-	-
Kulladghee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dharwar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kolapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aden Force :								
Aden	-	-	7	133	140	-	-	108
Perim	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>1,799</b>	<b>2,494</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>584</b>

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

247

the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on the 1st September 1867—continued.

CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.						Remarks.
British.			Native.			British.			Native.			
9. Officers.	10. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	11. Total.	12. British Officers.	13. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	14. Total.	15. Officers.	16. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	17. Total.	18. British Officers.	19. Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	20. Total.	
-	-	-	-	-	-	28	465	493	17	1,425	1,442	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	341	343	
-	29	29	9	499	508	116	2,316	2,432	24	2,125	2,149	
32	405	437	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	705	715	
-	-	-	-	85	85	6	145	151	2	178	180	
-	-	-	-	-	-	5	219	224	8	708	716	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	449	457	
-	-	-	8	278	286	-	-	-	6	534	540	
-	-	-	1	150	151	-	-	-	-	-	-	
29	456	485	-	-	-	33	737	770	15	1,205	1,220	
-	-	-	1	151	152	38	635	673	10	709	719	
-	-	-	9	344	353	5	156	161	6	710	716	
-	-	-	-	-	-	2	78	80	1	205	206	
-	-	-	-	-	-	1	59	60	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	344	350	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	355	357	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	1,357	1,375	
-	-	-	8	395	403	38	804	842	8	711	719	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	688	696	
-	-	-	1	70	71	1	44	45	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	691	702	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	707	714	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	700	708	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	505	513	
-	-	-	-	30	30	-	-	-	-	54	54	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	312	316	
-	-	-	-	-	-	36	859	895	9	704	713	
-	-	-	-	-	-	12	233	245	8	711	719	
-	-	-	19	1,284	1,303	-	-	-	6	594	600	
-	-	-	-	223	223	-	-	-	-	100	100	
-	-	-	-	-	-	37	840	877	18	1,398	1,416	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	75	76	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	626	634	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	705	714	
-	-	-	-	-	-	26	536	562	8	689	697	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	84	86	
61	800	951	56	3,509	3,565	384	8,126	8,510	258	21,404	21,662	

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

RETURN of the Strength of FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Arms and Grades, serving in the in those Territories which, on the 1st day of May 1837,

STATIONS.	ROYAL TROOPS.					COMPANY'S TROOPS.												
	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.			ENGINEERS and SAPPERS.				ARTILLERY.								
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Horse.			European Foot.		Native Foot.			
										Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	
1857:																		
Kurnool	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sinde	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	232	23
Jullundur	-	-	3	937	940	-	-	-	-	4	108	29	3	8	-	-	-	15
Sattara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	88	8
Punjaub	-	-	174	5,593	5,767	5	10	423	438	29	536	518	20	1,001	70	8	674	2,754
Pegu	-	-	43	1,153	1,196	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	167	-	-	71	24
Nagpoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	101	-	4	98	-	-	-	20
Oude	-	-	27	790	817	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	79	5	2	205	35
TOTAL	-	-	247	8,473	8,720	5	10	423	438	35	745	547	35	1,413	20	12	1,230	4,03

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

RETURN of the Strength of FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Arms and Grades, serving in the in those Territories which, on the 1st day of May 1837, were not under the

STATIONS.	ROYAL ARTILLERY.					SAPPERS AND MINERS.		
	Horse.		Foot.			British Officers.	British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Men.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Men.	Total.			
						1.	2.	3.
1867:								
Kurnool	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sinde	-	-	32	288	320	-	-	-
Jullundur	-	-	4	144	148	-	-	-
Sattara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Punjaub	19	646	45	1,588	2,298	-	-	-
Pegu	-	-	20	360	380	-	-	-
Nagpoor	4	121	21	329	475	-	-	-
Oude	4	139	16	503	602	-	-	-
TOTAL	27	906	138	3,212	4,283	See last Column.		

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS (EAST INDIA).

249

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

Presidency of *Bengal* on the 1st day of January, and of *Madras* and *Bombay* on the 1st of April 1857, were not under the direct authority of the Government of India.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

NATIVE CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.												
Regular.				Irregular.		European.			Native.									
European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	Regular.				Irregular.				
										European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Total.	European Officers.
19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	
-	-	-	-	9	1,186	1,195	21	1,004	1,025	8	2	484	494	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	1	3,326	3,366	-	-	909	915	
-	-	-	-	2	433	435	-	-	-	35	6	3,471	3,512	-	-	-	-	
36	10	1,767	1,813	43	6,040	6,083	-	-	-	6	-	940	946	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	203	31	18,018	18,252	21	1	5,042	5,064	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	2	955	975	-	-	-	-	
11	3	372	386	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	8	2,447	2,499	-	-	-	-	
11	3	491	505	3	212	215	-	-	-	66	9	5,558	5,633	-	-	-	-	
53	16	2,630	2,704	57	7,871	7,928	21	1,004	1,025	419	59	35,199	35,677	27	1	5,951	5,979	

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st day of September 1867 in those Territories, which, on direct authority of the Government of India.

CAVALRY.						INFANTRY.					
British.			Native.			British.			Native.		
Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Total.
9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	706	714
-	-	-	19	1,507	1,526	48	1,092	1,140	23	2,109	2,132
-	-	-	1	52	53	24	683	707	8	575	583
-	-	-	-	-	-	5	219	224	-	-	-
53	880	941	95	6,049	6,144	263	7,111	7,373	205	17,497	17,702
-	-	-	-	-	-	85	1,570	1,655	*36	*2,929	*2,965
-	-	-	7	364	371	37	856	893	†40	†3,665	†3,705
24	458	482	17	902	919	128	9,436	3,564	35	2,753	2,788
76	1,347	1,423	139	8,874	9,013	589	14,967	15,556	†355	†30,234	†30,589

\* Includes 1 officer, 121 men, Sappers and Miners.  
† Includes 1 officer, 108 men, Sappers and Miners.

‡ Includes 2 officers, 229 men, Sappers and Miners.

STATEMENT of the AREA and POPULATION of the several TERRITORIES acquired by the BRITISH GOVERNMENT between the 1st day of May 1837 and the 1st day of May 1857, and since that Date.

	Date when acquired.	Area : Square Miles.	Population.
Jaloun - - - - -	1840	1,873	246,297
Kurnool - - - - -	1841	3,278	273,190
Khythul - - - - -	1841	516	Not known.
Kolaba - - - - -	1843	318	58,721
Sind - - - - -	1843	63,599	1,768,737
Serampore and Tranquebar - - - - -	1845	{ Not known - 15	13,000 23,426
Sattara - - - - -	1848	10,222	1,005,771
Punjab - - - - -	1849	81,625	12,717,821
Jeitpore - - - - -	1849	165	16,000
Sumbulpore - - - - -	1849	4,693	274,000
Sikhim (part of) - - - - -	1850	1,670	61,768
Pegu - - - - -	1852	82,250	570,180
Khyrpoor (part of) - - - - -	1852	5,412	Not known.
• Odeypore, S. W. I. - - - - -	1852	2,306	133,740
Territory of Tularam Senaputtee (North Cachar).	1853	2,160	5,015
Nagpore (Berar) - - - - -	1853	76,432	4,650,000
Boodawul (Candeish) - - - - -	1855	50	910
Oudh - - - - -	1856	25,000	5,000,000
Punj Mehals - - - - -	1860	- -	Not known.
Bhootan (Dooars) - - - - -	1865	19,000	Not known.



**EAST INDIA (ARMY).**

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RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,  
dated 31 January 1887;—for,

“ COPY of, or EXTRACTS from, CORRESPONDENCE on the Subject of the  
INCREASE of the ARMY in INDIA.”

---

India Office, }  
March 1887. }

JOHN E. GORST,  
Under Secretary of State for India.

---

(*Sir George Balfour.*)

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
*16 September 1887.*

---

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	SUBJECT.	Page.
		1885 .				
1	Telegram - -	12 March -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Requesting authority for increasing mountain batteries and Goorkha Regiments.	1
2	Ditto - -	12 „ -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Authorising the above increase -	1
3	Ditto - -	13 „ -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Suggesting that three more Goorkha Regiments should be raised.	1
4	Ditto - -	16 „ -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Authorising three additional Goorkha Regiments; but suggesting that they might form 2nd battalions to existing regiments.	1
5	Despatch - -	17 „ -	Government of India	Secretary of State -	Relative to formation of a reserve for Native Army.	1
				Enclosure - -	Extract from Army Commission Report of 1879, regarding native reserve.	4
6	Telegram - -	20 „ -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Agreeing that new Goorkha Troops should form 2nd battalions.	12
7	Despatch - -	4 May -	Government of India -	- ditto - ditto -	Proposals for increasing the Native Army.	12
8	Ditto - -	4 „ - -	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto(Extract)	Recruits to replace men invalided	18
9	Ditto - -	7 „ - -	Secretary of State -	Government of India -	Formal sanction to increase in Mountain Batteries and Goorkha Regiments.	19
10	Army Circular -	20 June -	- - - -	- - - -	Announcing increase to Mountain Batteries.	19
11	Telegram - -	29 „ -	- ditto - ditto -	Viceroy - - -	Enquiring regarding increase to European Forces.	19
12	Ditto - -	1 July -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Relative to Despatch regarding increase to Army.	20
13	Ditto - -	2 „ - -	- ditto - - -	- ditto - ditto -	Correcting some statements in No. 7.	20
14	Ditto - -	4 „ - -	- ditto - - -	- ditto - ditto -	Correction in Despatch (No. 7) -	20
15	Ditto - -	7 „ - -	- ditto - - -	- ditto - ditto -	Proposals as to Infantry in No. 7 to be modified.	20
16	Ditto - -	7 „ - -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Not approving territorial reserve, but approving long furlough system.	20
17	Ditto - -	22 „ - -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Enquiring whether Despatch on Native reserve will be sent.	20
18	Ditto - -	23 „ - -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Despatch on Native reserve leaves 24th July.	21
19	Despatch - -	23 „ - -	- ditto - ditto -	Government of India -	Relative to Native reserve -	21
20	Extract Despatch	24 „ - -	Government of India -	Secretary of State -	Entertainment of 20 supernumeraries for each Native regiment.	23
				Enclosure - -	Army Circular authorising above	24
21	Telegram - -	4 August -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Sanctioning permanent Native cavalry increase.	25
22	Ditto - -	14 „ -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Main proposals of Despatch as to increasing British and Native forces.	25
23	Ditto - -	15 „ -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Is British increase permanent -	25

No	Document.	Date.	From	To	SUBJECT.	Page.
		1885.				
24	Telegram - -	16 August -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	British increase to be permanent	25
25	Despatch - -	14 " -	Government of India	- ditto - ditto -	Proposals for augmenting the forces in India and for re-organising the Native Armies.	26
				Enclosure - -	Minutes by Sir A. Colvin and Mr. Ilbert dissenting from any permanent increase.	43
				Appendices -	On the various proposals in the Despatch.	47
26	Letter - -	11 September	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Deficiencies in European Infantry Battalions in India.	71
27	Ditto - -	17 " -	India Office - - -	War Office - - -	Forwarding proposals for increasing British Troops in India.	71
28	Ditto - -	23 " -	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Stating when the increased British Troops could be furnished.	72
29	Telegram - -	29 " -	Secretary of State	Viceroy - - -	Forwarding information as to when additional Troops could be sent.	73
30	Ditto - -	2 October -	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - - -	Requesting reply to previous telegram.	73
31	Ditto - -	5 " -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Stating readiness to receive Troops as proposed, except Cavalry.	73
32	Ditto - -	14 " -	Secretary of State	Viceroy - - -	Notifying approval of measures for increasing Army in No. 25.	73
33	Letter - -	15 " -	India Office - - -	War Office - - -	Forwarding No. 25 for remarks of Secretary of State for War.	74
34	Ditto - -	22 " -	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Concurring in the measures proposed by the Government of India.	75
35	Extract Despatch	26 " -	Government of India -	Secretary of State -	Papers regarding revision of Native Cavalry.	76
36	Ditto - ditto -	29 " -	Secretary of State	Government of India -	Relative to proposal in No. 20 Native Supernumeraries.	90
37	Despatch - -	29 " -	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto -	On proposals contained in No. 25 for increasing and re-organising the Indian Forces.	90
38	Telegram - -	30 " -	- ditto - ditto -	Viceroy - - -	British Cavalry for India - -	94
39	Ditto - -	3 November	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	No objection to receive Cavalry drafts.	94
40	Letter - -	31 October -	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Arrangements for supplying additional British Troops.	95
41	Ditto - -	4 November	India Office - - -	Admiralty - - -	Relative to transport for additional British Troops for India.	95
42	Ditto - -	7 " -	Horse Guards - - -	India Office - - -	Additional Battalions selected for India.	95
43	Ditto - -	14 " -	India Office - - -	Horse Guards - - -	Approving list of additional Troops.	96
44	Ditto - -	18 " -	- ditto - - -	War Office - - -	Cavalry drafts must be trained before embarkation.	96
45	Telegram - -	17 December	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Enquiring regarding distribution of extra drafts.	97
46	Letter - -	18 " -	India Office - - -	Horse Guards - - -	Forwarding above telegram (No. 43).	97
47	Ditto - -	21 " -	Horse Guards - - -	India Office - - -	Distribution of extra drafts -	97
		1886:				
48	Despatch - -	5 January -	Government of India -	Secretary of State -	Acknowledging No. 35; regiments must be kept at full strength.	98

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	SUBJECT.	Page.
		1886:				
49	Letter - -	21 January -	War Office - -	India Office - -	Medical Staff for India - -	99
				Enclosure - -	Letter from Surgeon General, Bengal, relative to increased Medical Staff.	99
50	Ditto - -	26 " -	India Office - -	War Office - -	No proposals regarding Medical Staff have been received from India.	100
51	Ditto - -	29 " -	War Office - -	India Office - -	Suggesting telegraphic enquiry regarding Medical Staff.	100
52	Telegram - -	1 February	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	Asking if any increase to Medical Staff is proposed.	101
53	Ditto - -	15 " -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	Medical question not settled; but 20 Officers should be sent.	101
54	Letter - -	17 " -	India Office - -	War Office - -	Forwarding above telegram (No. 51).	101
55	Ditto - -	19 " -	War Office - -	India Office - -	Stating that 20 additional Medical Candidates will be selected.	101
56	Ditto - -	10 March -	India Office - -	War Office - -	Approval of above (No. 53). Enquiry as to grades.	102
57	Ditto - -	18 " -	War Office - -	India Office - -	The 20 additional Medical Officers with all be Surgeons.	102
58	Extract Despatch	25 " -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	Forwarding Papers as to appointment of 20 Medical Officers.	102
59	Extract Telegram	17 April -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	Requesting that the sending of certain additional Troops may be deferred for a year.	103
60	Telegram - -	10 May -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	Despatch of Garrison Batteries only can be postponed.	103
61	Extract Telegram	12 " -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	Accepting proposal as to deferring the Garrison Batteries.	103
62	Letter - -	15 " -	India Office - -	War Office - -	Relative to deferring Despatch of Garrison Batteries.	103
63	Ditto - -	31 July -	War Office - -	India Office - -	Garrison Batteries will be delayed for a year.	104
64	Despatch - -	18 June -	Government of India	Secretary of State -	Papers regarding formation of additional Battalions to Goorkha Regiments.	105
65	Extract Despatch	10 September	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto -	Revision of establishment of Farners, &c., for Cavalry.	110
66	Ditto - ditto -	16 " -	Secretary of State -	Government of India	Approving arrangements as to 2nd Battalions for Goorkha Regiments.	114
67	Ditto - ditto -	23 " -	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto -	Papers regarding revised establishment of British Cavalry.	115
68	Telegram - -	24 " -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	Enquiring as to Troops to be sent out.	115
69	Ditto - -	25 " -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	Stating that all Cavalry drafts go this season.	115
70	Ditto - -	18 August -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	Requesting authority to raise two new Mountain Batteries.	115
71	Ditto - -	30 " -	- ditto - -	- ditto - ditto -	Requesting early reply to above	115
72	Ditto - -	1 September	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	Authorising raising of two Mountain Batteries.	116
73	Ditto - -	3 " -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	Requesting Officers for the new Batteries.	116
74	Ditto - -	13 " -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	Steps for supplying Officers for the new Batteries.	116

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	SUBJECT.	Page
		1886 :				
75	Telegram - -	17 September	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State	Captains nominated for command of the Batteries.	116
76	Despatch - -	27 "	Government of India	- ditto - ditto -	Explaining necessity for raising the two Mountain Batteries.	116
				Enclosure - -	Correspondence in India on the subject.	117
				Enclosure - -	Army Circular regarding formation of the new Batteries.	120
77	Despatch - -	18 November	Secretary of State -	Government of India -	Sanctioning proceedings as to formation of New Batteries.	120
78	Ditto - -	27 September	Government of India -	Secretary of State -	Proposed augmentation of Medical Staff in India.	121
79	Extract Despatch	25 October -	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto -	Formation of a Second Battalion to the 5th Goorkha Regiment.	124
				Enclosures - -	Correspondence and Army Circular on the subject.	124
80	Despatch - -	25 "	- ditto - ditto -	Secretary of State -	Changes in conditions of Native Army Service.	126
				Enclosure - -	Army Circular on the Subject -	127
81	Letter - -	20 "	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Cavalry drafts for India; promotion and appointment of Officers.	130
82	Ditto - -	28 "	India Office - - -	War Office - - -	Promotions sanctioned if the authorised strength is kept up.	131
83	Ditto - -	13 November	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Showing estimated strength of Cavalry drafts.	131
84	Ditto - -	4 December	India Office - - -	War Office - - -	Sanctioning promotions on the same condition.	132
85	Despatch - -	9 "	Secretary of State -	Government of India -	Forwarding the above four letters	133
86	Ditto - -	9 "	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto -	Forwarding papers regarding postponement of Artillery Drafts.	133
87	Extract Despatch	14 "	Government of India -	Secretary of State -	Papers regarding the linking of the Native Batteries of the Punjab Field Force.	133
88	Ditto - ditto -	14 "	- ditto - ditto -	- ditto - ditto -	Papers regarding formation of Reserves and Linked Battalions.	135
89	Ditto - ditto -	30 "	Secretary of State -	Government of India -	Enquiring why Gurhwallis have not been accepted for Goorkha Regiments.	168
90	Army Circular -	30 "	- - -	- - -	Relative to revised Establishment of British Cavalry.	168
		1887 :				
91	Extract Despatch	13 January -	Secretary of State -	Government of India -	Approving augmentation of Medical Staff.	169
92	Letter - -	18 "	War Office - - -	India Office - - -	Arrangements for sending remaining drafts to India.	170
93	Ditto - -	7 February -	India Office - - -	War Office - - -	Stating that India had already been informed of these arrangements.	170
94	Ditto - -	4 "	Horse Guards - - -	India Office - - -	Stating that the Establishment of the 7th Dragoon Guards is complete.	171
95	Ditto - -	8 "	India Office - - -	War Office - - -	Acknowledging above - -	171

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	SUBJECT.	Page
96	Telegram - -	1887 : 1 March -	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Budget Estimate. Strength of Bengal Infantry and Guides Cavalry; and Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Reserves.	171
97	Army Circular -	5 " -	- - - -	- - - -	Raising of regimental reserves, Native Army.	172
98	Ditto - ditto -	14 " -	- - - -	- - - -	Addition to established strength of regiments of Bengal Infantry, and of the Punjab Frontier Force.	172
99	Ditto - ditto -	23 " -	- - - -	- - - -	Formation of five additional battalions of Bengal Infantry and one additional squadron of Cavalry.	173
100	Ditto - ditto -	23 April -	- - - -	- - - -	Revision of the establishment of the Corps of Guides, Punjab Frontier Force.	174
101	Ditto - ditto -	2 June -	- - - -	- - - -	Entertainment of supernumeraries in regiments of Bengal and Punjab Infantry.	174
102	Telegram - -	22 February	Viceroy - - -	Secretary of State -	Proposes formation of a Company of Sappers and Miners in Burma.	175
103	Ditto - -	8 March -	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - - -	Above proposal approved - -	175
105	Army Circular -	9 July -	- - - -	- - - -	Formation of a Company of Sappers and Miners in Burma.	175
105	Ditto - ditto -	19 " -	- - - -	- - - -	Entertainment of supernumeraries in Goorkha and Assam Regiments.	178
106	Ditto - ditto -	30 September	- - - -	- - - -	Changes in conditions of service of the Native Army.	178
107	Return - -	24 March -	- - - -	- - - -	Abstract Return showing the former (1884-85), and the present (1886-87) sanctioned Establishments of the Army in India.	179

COPY of, or EXTRACTS from, CORRESPONDENCE on the Subject of the  
INCREASE of the ARMY in INDIA.

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— No. 1. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 12 March 1885.

WE desire your authority to complete the four Punjab and two Bombay Native Mountain Batteries to six guns, and to add 200 men to each of the eight Goorkha regiments.

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— No. 2. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 12 March 1885.

YOURS, 12th, Mountain Batteries and Goorkha regiments I approve.

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— No. 3. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 13 March 1885.

I AM inclined to ask you to allow us to raise three additional Goorkha regiments.

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— No. 4. —

TELEGRAM to the Viceroy, dated 16 March 1885.

IF you can bear expense, additional Goorkhas seem to me very desirable. If the three regiments are to be additional to the 200 men for the eight regiments, would it not be better to add second battalions of present strength to five regiments.

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— No. 5. —

(No. 44 of 1885.—Military Department.)

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Fort William, 17 March 1885.

WE desire to address your Lordship regarding the formation of a reserve for the Native army.

2. The subject was referred to by Lord Lytton's Government in 1879 as one of the principal reasons which led them to propose the appointment of the Army Commission

Commission in that year. Their Despatch on the subject, No. 168, dated 22nd May 1879, states the case in the following terms:—

“ 12. The improvements in arms and in military administration during the last 20 years have revolutionised every great army in Europe; but perhaps the greatest and most important change effected in this period has been the introduction, or immense extension and improvement, of the system of reserves. The Indian army is now the only large army in the world which has no reserves. In other words, India is the only country which, maintaining a large army, pays in peace time for the whole available force which it can put into the field in war. The expense of such a system is patent. Without, therefore, committing ourselves to any premature opinion as to how far a reserve system can or cannot be worked in India, we think that there is at least such *prima facie* evidence in its favour as to demand the fullest consideration for it; and we would go further and say that, so far as we can at present judge, it is in this direction that there is the best prospect of an important diminution of our military expenditure.”

There is no doubt that the strength of a Native regiment, even as augmented in 1882 to a total of 832 of all ranks, is insufficient for active service. A regiment of that strength, when sick and inefficient men are weeded out, will take the field as a very small battalion, and under the stress of campaigning may soon cease to be an efficient military unit. Yet at present there are no means of augmenting battalions in the field, save by the process of recruiting; and in the present state of the labour market, and at the present rates of the soldier's pay, recruits are to be obtained but slowly. This was very clearly brought out by the experience of the Afghan war, and the Army Commission recommended in strong terms the formation of a reserve. The paragraphs of their report dealing with the subject are annexed to this letter for ready reference.

4. A reserve presents the most simple and effective way of augmenting the army rapidly on an emergency. On the other hand, objection may be taken to any arrangements which would increase the strength of the Native army without a corresponding proportionate increase of the British troops in India. But on this point it may be observed that under stress of an emergency an increase of British troops could be counted on, provided effective means were taken to secure it. It is merely a question of the degree of inducement offered; and recruiting is usually more brisk for the British army during war than in peace, whereas there is no certainty that native recruits will be readily forthcoming in case of the Indian army becoming engaged in extensive and difficult military operations. Even if recruits could be obtained quickly, the process of training them must necessarily be slow, and indeed the only way of obtaining what is desired, namely, the means of rapidly increasing the effective strength of regiments, appears to be through some form or other of a reserve through which the sepoy should be passed after a few years' service in the ranks.

5. Actual trial can alone show whether any terms, such, for instance, as those the Commission propose, would be successful in inducing a sufficient number of men to enter a reserve. But before elaborating a complete scheme for the purpose, we think it would be advisable to make the experiment in the first instance on a small scale, which, if it proved successful, might be extended hereafter.

6. There are two ways in which the experiment might be carried out; first, according to the method proposed by the Army Commission, under which the men passed into the reserve would still belong to their respective regiments, and would rejoin them when called out. The organisation of the Bengal army in class regiments specially lends itself to this system which, however, of course involves that the reserve soldiers would be often living at a long distance from their regiment, as it moves from station to station.

7. In the case of mixed regiments, which recruit from various classes and districts, the reserve men would necessarily be a good deal scattered about; but this might be politically advantageous rather than otherwise.

8. Another



8. Another plan would be to make the reserve territorial in character, that is, the men passed into the reserve would not belong to any particular regiment, but would be called up and form a battalion to be stationed at some place near their homes. And this plan might prove the more attractive, especially if it were understood that the reserve battalion would be required only for duty in India, and would not be required to go on foreign service. It would not, however, fulfil one important object of a reserve, namely, to strengthen the regiments taking the field, but it would admit of more regiments being sent on service than would otherwise be possible. There are certain points which, under any circumstances, must always be held by troops. The duties in such places might be taken by reserve battalions, which would set free the troops stationed there for active service.

9. We are disposed to recommend that each of these methods should have a trial, and we should wish to be authorised to apply the reserve system to, say, 10 regiments of the Bengal army in the first instance, and to form one or two reserve battalions on the second plan.

10. The men sent to their homes on the first plan might be considered to be on long furlough, and the term "Reserve," might be confined to the local or territorial battalions.

11. The long furlough men should be liable to be called up for training once a year or once every two years, as might be found most advisable, receiving pay while under training, and a gratuity not exceeding 20 rupees for each month of such training, after it is over; these men would be liable to be called up to their regiments whenever required.

12. It would be for consideration whether these long-furlough men should receive a gratuity at the end of their service, which might be limited to 15 years in all. We should be disposed to give a gratuity of 120 rupees at the expiration of the 15 years' service, that with the colours included.

13. The number of long furlough men might be limited to 250 men per regiment.

14. The term "Reserve" to be applied, as proposed above, to those who leave their regiments finally for the purpose of joining it, and are formed into local battalions. These men to be called out for thirty days' duty once a year, receiving a gratuity of 24 rupees at the expiration of it. The clothing, accoutrements, &c., for these men to be kept with the battalion at head-quarters. The battalion to have native officers and non-commissioned officers on the same scale as the regular army; these men might be chosen from those also on the reserve list, or from pensioners who are efficient and who would be entitled to a proportionate gratuity at the end of their month's service.

15. The battalion to have a commandant on 200 rupees staff, and an adjutant; also a small native staff sufficient for the custody of the arms, clothing, &c., of the battalion.

16. No man to be admitted into the reserve if of more than 10 years' service; but his service in it to be unlimited so long as he remains efficient. No pensions or gratuities to be given when any man leaves it. We would propose to raise two such battalions in the first instance, namely, one at Allahabad and one at Jullundur.

17. Long furlough men from the regular army could either join these local reserve battalions for their annual training, or some corresponding class regiment of their own, if their own regiment were too far off for them to join it conveniently. This is a matter of detail which can be worked out more fully hereafter.

18. The foregoing is an outline of the conditions which appear suitable for the case. But it is probable that experience may indicate modifications to be desirable, and we would prefer to proceed tentatively in the matter, rather than to commit ourselves to a hard-and-fast scheme, which might not be found to work well in practice. We would therefore ask your Lordship's sanction to our making a beginning, on the lines here indicated, of a measure which appears to us to be

imperatively called for in the interests of military efficiency, and of which, as it must take a long time to produce any appreciable result, a beginning should, we think, be made without further delay.

19. The pension rules would remain unaltered for the soldier who remains permanently with his regiment.

20. As regards the probability of soldiers being readily available for a reserve, we attach some tables which were prepared in 1883, showing the length of service of the sepoys of the Bengal and Bombay armies, which bring out a somewhat remarkable result. In the Bengal Infantry no less than 43·88 per cent., or not far short of one-half, were men of under five years' service, and 68·34 per cent., or more than two-thirds of the whole strength, were under 10 years' service. In the Bengal Cavalry the proportion of short-service men is somewhat smaller, but it is still a very large proportion.

21. It might, perhaps, be supposed that this state of things was due to the losses which occurred from deaths and invaliding through the Afghan War, and the large addition of young soldiers; but a similar table prepared for the year 1877 shows that the proportion of young soldiers was then only a little less than at present; 37·54 per cent. were under five years' and 64·28 per cent. under 10 years' service. Of the Bombay army 39 per cent. were under five years' service, and 61·16 per cent., or nearly two thirds of the whole number, were under ten years' service.

22. The result brought out by these figures appears to be that, whether a reserve be created or not, the army is, in fact, a short-service army, and that there must be a large number of young trained soldiers scattered all over the country who have voluntarily taken their discharge. The effect, therefore, of creating a reserve formed of long-furlough men would not necessarily be to pass more men through the ranks than at present; they pass through the ranks now very quickly. The effect of the measure would be to retain a lien on the service of the men who now close their connection with the army on leaving it.

We have, &c.  
 (signed) *Dufferin.*  
*D. M. Stewart.*  
*J. Gibbs.*  
*T. F. Wilson.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*S. C. Bayley.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*

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Enclosure in No. 5.

EXTRACT from the Report of the Army Commission of 1879, paragraphs 258 to 268.

258. *Question of Reserves.*—The want of some system of reserves for India has often been felt, and the subject has been brought forward from time to time. The success of the German system has shown that the existence of army reserves gives an immense, and at the same time an economical, increase to the military power of a nation. Lord Napier of Magdala recommended\* the formation of reserves for the Indian Army when he was Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency Sir Frederick Haines concurred† in Lord Napier's opinion as to the necessity for forming a reserve. The Bombay Government also accepted the views of His Excellency Sir Charles Staveley, then Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, that the State ought to retain a lien on the services of pensioned soldiers. Nearly all the regimental officers of the Bengal and Punjab armies, especially those who were engaged in the Afghan campaign of 1878, are convinced that some system of reserve is needed, by means of which regiments ordered into the field can obtain at once a supply of

\* See letter No. 2857, dated 16th November 1874, from General Lumsden, the then Adjutant-General.

† Madras Adjutant General's letter of 27th July 1876.

of disciplined soldiers to fill vacancies caused by casualties, and to take the places of invalids or others sent to the depôt. As has been stated above, the officers of the Madras and Bombay Army Corps hold that drafts from linked or other battalions can best supply this need. Officers of the two Northern Army Corps, on the other hand, say that some system of regimental reserves ought to be established, under which disciplined and effective reservists could be recalled to the colours at a week's notice. They report, moreover, that such a system of reserves, if combined with localised recruiting grounds and fixed regimental depôts, would be most popular with the best fighting races, of which the Northern armies are composed.

259. *Political aspect of Reserves Question.*—There can be little doubt that the maintenance of army reserves in India would greatly increase the offensive and defensive power of the Indian Army. At the same time, it must be remembered that our Native Army is a mercenary force serving an alien Government. Even if it were desirable, it would not be possible to impose compulsory service in the army of reserve on any large section of the population. And it would be politically inadvisable to adopt for India the short-service system of Europe, whereby the largest possible number of men are passed through the army, returned into the general population, and are kept by periodical training in a state of military efficiency. There can be no advantage, and there might be much risk, in scattering hundreds of thousands of trained reservists over the several provinces of India. The services of such large numbers would never be needed, and the cost of their maintenance would be very great. Under the present system, however, a considerable number of trained soldiers already pass from our army annually into the general population. According to the returns for five years, 7,778 Native soldiers leave the army annually, of whom 4,612 retire on pension. Thus, in 10 years' time, nearly 80,000 trained Native soldiers return to their homes. Any plan which retained a proportion of these 80,000 men in army reserves, and bound them to the British Government by sufficient money payments, would meet the requirements of our military system, without increasing the number of trained soldiers annually absorbed in the general population.

260. *Creation of two lines of Reserve.*—We attach great importance to the opinions of so many distinguished soldiers, and of so many experienced regimental officers in favour of a reserve system. At the same time we recognise a distinct political danger in any indefinite increase of the number of trained soldiers passed annually into the population of India. We consider, however, that the provision of efficient reserves can well be combined with some revision of the pension rules. We propose that a strictly limited reserve of 200 men to every infantry regiment be eventually maintained. The reserve would consist of privates, inhabitants either of British territory, or of States within the frontier of British India, who, after 12\* years' service with the colours with good character, might choose to pass into the reserve. They would receive a reserve pay of 4 rupees a month, payable half-yearly; they would belong to the first reserve till they reached 21 years' service; during their service in the first reserve they would be liable to embodiment for two months in every two years, and to service with the colours whenever summoned; they would receive, during the period of their embodiment, in addition to reserve pay, the full pay, and good-conduct pay, which they might have been drawing when they joined the reserve. At 21 years' service they would pass to the pension list, or second reserve, where they would continue to receive a pension of 4 rupees a month, and would be liable for service on garrison duty only when summoned. After 32 years' service they should be liable for no further service, but would enjoy their pension of 4 rupees a month for the remainder of their lives. It would rarely be necessary to exercise or embody the second reserve; but they could, in time of necessity, usefully take garrison duty in cantonments or fortresses. The first reserve would be embodied at the regimental depôts; and their two months' exercise would include rifle practice. A British officer, with sufficient strength of Native officers and non-commissioned officers, and a medical subordinate, would be deputed to the depôt from the regiment once in two years, to exercise the reserves. The second reserve, when called out, would be armed from the nearest depôt or arsenal. As the first reserves of different regiments would be called up for embodiment in alternate years at the time of year least inconvenient for agricultural operations, arms, uniform, and accoutrements for 200 men would suffice for the reserves of two regiments; and therefore one-half only of the reserve equipments need be kept at the depôts, in custody of the Native regiment cantoned at the depôt headquarters, the remainder being kept at the nearest arsenal. Reservists on embodiment for exercise would be sheltered in standing camps, wherever the depôt buildings and huts did not furnish sufficient accommodation.

261. *Cavalry Reserves not proposed.*—We do not propose to constitute any first reserves of cavalry, because we consider that the country cannot afford to maintain a large reserve of horses. Native cavalry reservists who had no exercise with their horses would soon become

\* Twelve years is named as the period before which a soldier should not be passed into the reserve. But the Commission feel that this term should be open to re-consideration at special times and for special reasons.

See Appendix XXXVI.

become inefficient. We think, however, that the change in the pension rules, and the liability to garrison service in the second reserve, should for the future apply to cavalry as well as to infantry.

262. *Sappers and Miners.*—We recommend that the reserve system be applied to the sappers and miners, but we are of opinion that sapper reservists should, when called up, be formed into reserve companies, which would be able to take the place, in garrison, of those proceeded on active service. Every effort should be made to employ reserve sappers in suitable positions in arsenals and railway workshops.

263. *Present Pension Rules.*—The present pension rules give to sepoy (privates) of the Native Army—

(a) an invalid pension of four rupees a month, or about half-pay after fifteen years' service;

(b) a full pension of seven rupees a month after 32 years' service.

In the Bengal and Punjab armies very few soldiers, less than 100 a year, serve on for the full pension. About 4,600 soldiers in the four armies retire on invalid pensions every year. It is reported by many officers that soldiers who fail to earn promotion to the non-commissioned ranks, habitually mangle and qualify for invalid pension when they reach 15 years' service; whereas it is generally considered that a native soldier is fit for active duty until he is 40 to 45 years of age, that is, until he has completed 20 to 25 years' service. There are wide differences in the tenacity with which soldiers of the four armies cling to the service. For instance, in the Bengal and Punjab armies at the present time, only 11 per cent. of the men are over 15 years' service; whereas, in the Bombay army 23 per cent., and in the Madras army 37 per cent. are over 15 years' service. So, again, in the Bengal army only 21 men per mille retire on full pension annually, whereas in the Bombay army 41 per mille, and in the Madras army, 67 per mille retire every year on pension. Large numbers of sepoy in the Bengal and Punjab armies take their discharge before they have served five years; some of these men, however, re-enlist.

264. *Pension Rules modified to suit Reserve System.*—The pension rules of the Native army would necessarily remain as they now are for soldiers already in the service. But for soldiers enlisted on the new system there would be no invalid pensions, except for wounds and sickness on field service, or for sickness contracted on foreign service. Every private would be entitled, subject to his serving in the second reserve until he attained 32 years' service, to retire on a pension of 5 rupees a month after 21 years' service, unless he had previously joined the reserve. The full pension of 7 rupees for privates of 32 years' service with the colours would be maintained. The present rates of officers' and non-commissioned officers' invalid pensions would be maintained for men now in the service. But for future recruits no pension, either for officers or men, would be allowed, save for wounds and sickness contracted on field or foreign service, until after 21 years' service with the colours, when the present invalid pension would be claimable without a medical certificate of unfitness, but subject to service in the second reserve. The full pension after 32 years' service would stand as at present. Men who retired without earning pension, and without joining the reserve, would receive gratuities as at present. We do not recommend the abolition of the present invalid pension after 15 years' service without full consideration. We find that His Excellency Lord Napier of Magdala recommended (in 1874) that invalid pensions should cease, that no pension should be given to Native soldiers who had done less than 20 years' service, and that to a man who broke down in the service from ordinary causes, before reaching 20 years' service, gratuities up to a maximum of one year's pay should be given. We are convinced by the testimony of many regimental and staff officers that the invalid pension is an abuse under the present system, and we consider that a pension after 21 years' duty with the colours, combined with a system of reserves and reserve pay, will be more satisfactory to the soldiery and more beneficial to the country.

265. *Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers not to be passed into the First Reserve.*—We do not propose that any officers or non-commissioned officers should be passed into the first reserve, because we consider that officers for the reserve can best be supplied by temporary promotions from the fighting ranks. It is not desirable that the company leaders or non-commissioned officers of the reserves should be men of very mature age, or whose knowledge, drill, and company tactics were obsolete. In a separate section of this report we have shown how a reserve of British officers for field service would be supplied.

266. *Strength and Cost of Reserves.*—In applying this system of reserves to the Native army, some regiments will be found, such, for instance, as the Goorkhas, in which the formation of a "first reserve" will be almost impossible. But, apart from any such special exceptions, we recommend that the reserve system be made applicable to all infantry regiments of the four army corps. We advise that the abolition of invalid pensions after 15 years' service, and the obligation on all pensioners for duty in the second reserve up to 32 years' service, should be carried out at once, so far as future enlistments are concerned. We recommend also that men now with the colours should be

be permitted to elect, if they so desire, for the new pension rules, that is, for the pension of 5 rupees after 21 years' service, with liability to duty in the second reserve instead of invalid pension of 4 rupees after 15 years' service. In order that a part of the reserve strength should be established as soon as possible, we recommend that commanding officers of regiments, to which the reserve system is applied, be allowed to arrange at once for raising half their reserves (*i.e.*, 100 men per infantry regiment) by passing into the reserve men now in the ranks, of 12 to 18 years' service, or by inviting men who have already retired to join the reserve. Hereafter, a fixed proportion of men would be passed, at their option, into the reserve annually. For every hundred reservists required for a regiment, 14 men, who had served on the average 13 years with the colours, would be passed into the reserve. This number would allow for a due proportion of casualties in the reserve. Under the system proposed by us, the country would have, when the first and second reserves were in full operation—

- (1.) 200 men per infantry regiment in the first reserve ;
- (2.) Approximately 320 pensioners per infantry regiment in the second reserve.

If first reserves were formed for 96 infantry\* regiments, and if the second reserve system were carried out throughout the army, then the total eventual strength of the reserves might be—

- (1.) *First Reserve*, 19,200 infantry.
- (2.) *Second Reserve*, 33,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.

267. *The proposed system could cause no political danger.*—It will be seen that our proposed reserves (58,200 in all) will form a part of the total number of soldiers (80,000), that under the present system are absorbed every 10 years into the general population. We consider therefore that this restricted reserve system can cause no political danger to the country. Moreover, the reserve system, or some extension of it, might hereafter in time of profound peace enable the Government to reduce the peace strength of the Native army. We anticipate that the cost of reserves, and of pensions as above proposed, will not increase appreciably the cost of pensions to the Native army under existing rules.

268. *Employment of reservists in civil duties.*—A reduction in the cost of the reserves will be gained, if any large proportion of the first and second class reserves are employed near their homes by the civil governments as policemen, as jail guards, on railways, and in other capacities, where disciplined men of good character would be of great use. The several local governments who have favoured us with replies on this point, say that they would be ready to employ reservists in civil departments of the Governments, thus :—

The Bombay Government would employ	-	-	1,500	} Total 7,200
The Bengal Government	-	-	1,300	
The Punjab Government	-	-	1,500	
The British Burmah Government	-	-	900	
The Central Provinces Government	-	-	1,500	
The Berar Government	-	-	500	

The Madras and North Western Provinces Governments have stated that they cannot employ reservists in civil departments. We recommend that one-half reserve pay and full pension, when earned in addition to full pay during embodiment, be granted to reservists who may obtain active employment and pay in any civil department. The army must keep, and must pay for its hold on the reserve. Reserve men would revert to their full reserve pay directly they lost their civil employment. We believe that if commanding officers would keep the local, civil, and police officers fully informed of the number of reservists available for civil duty in each district, a large number of reserve soldiers would always find employment in the civil department, for the reservists will generally be more regular in their conduct, and more amenable to discipline than men taken from the ordinary civil population. We strongly recommend that the local Governments be urged to employ reservists as much as possible, for such employment will tend greatly to increase the popularity of service in the Native army.†

\* This is the number of the regiments of increased strength which the Commission propose to retain exclusive of the Goorkhas and local corps.

† For papers regarding reserves and pension system, see Appendix XXXVII.

LENGTH of SERVICE of Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Rank and File of the Bengal Infantry, compiled from the Inspection Returns for 1882.

Regiments (all ranks).	Under 5 years' Service.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 32 years.	Over 32 years.	Total of all Ranks.
1st Native Infantry - -	304	177	141	70	8	4	3	3	
2nd " - -	455	115	126	85	13	13	7	4	
3rd " - -	176	293	138	96	26	15	8	-	
4th " - -	312	70	261	112	36	7	-	-	
5th " - -	301	154	152	92	-	2	1	3	
6th " - -	271	152	150	128	9	10	2	1	
7th " - -	301	148	132	99	24	5	1	-	
8th " - -	346	109	112	116	7	3	2	1	
9th " - -	300	159	151	76	-	6	-	2	
10th " - -	388	169	79	50	15	16	2	4	
11th " - -	307	183	89	141	4	-	4	1	
12th " - -	332	218	96	96	2	3	3	3	
13th " - -	377	148	103	52	2	4	1	1	
14th " - -	457	-	125	137	61	6	4	-	
15th " - -	189	180	138	73	9	3	-	2	
16th " - -	336	233	87	65	20	5	1	-	
17th " - -	301	159	152	107	33	5	3	1	
18th " - -	328	194	158	76	10	9	1	-	
19th " - -	332	185	125	39	14	8	4	-	
20th " - -	233	314	93	54	8	2	1	1	
21st " - -	285	166	122	100	20	4	-	1	
22nd " - -	387	135	111	44	13	5	2	1	
23rd " - -	195	185	188	61	91	11	-	1	
24th " - -	348	167	85	48	27	18	3	4	
25th " - -	258	233	125	59	13	10	6	1	
26th " - -	373	210	100	27	28	2	2	1	
27th " - -	316	168	137	52	34	2	1	-	
28th " - -	308	166	118	45	33	12	-	-	
29th " - -	315	194	95	51	37	10	1	-	
30th " - -	319	178	126	54	17	4	4	1	
31st " - -	409	126	91	55	9	3	2	-	
32nd " - -	306	211	93	74	96	7	1	-	
33rd " - -	281	190	104	133	24	4	1	1	
38th " - -	582	56	37	15	7	1	-	-	
39th " - -	305	209	159	37	14	2	3	2	
40th " - -	386	128	132	94	10	14	1	1	
42nd " - -	189	325	257	20	29	5	4	-	
43rd " - -	280	219	105	231	21	11	1	-	
44th " - -	346	194	187	35	27	4	1	1	
45th " - -	240	184	189	70	5	5	1	1	
TOTAL - - -	12,754	7,109	5,169	2,784	862	260	82	43	29,063
Percentage - - -	43.88	24.46	17.78	9.57	2.96	.89	.28	.14	

LENGTH of SERVICE of the Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Rank and File of the Bengal Cavalry, compiled from the Inspection Returns of 1877.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years' Service.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 35 years.	35 to 40 years.	Over 40 years.	Total of all Ranks.
1st Bengal Cavalry - -	108	118	68	35	63	31	20	12	2	
2nd " - -	71	102	105	52	53	32	25	16	2	
3rd " - -	191	104	59	79	10	4	5	4	-	
4th " - -	135	83	99	88	22	15	9	4	-	
5th " - -	192	105	78	53	12	10	4	2	1	
6th " - -	159	119	75	75	11	7	11	1	-	
7th " - -	72	93	115	104	53	19	8	-	-	
8th " - -	211	107	48	38	26	19	1	-	-	
9th " - -	30	117	95	93	44	39	23	3	-	
10th " - -	142	125	85	84	7	2	4	-	-	
11th " - -	103	119	87	72	6	1	-	-	-	
12th " - -	170	101	66	103	7	6	4	-	-	
13th " - -	117	125	66	123	11	8	3	3	-	
14th " - -	136	110	121	82	4	3	4	1	-	
15th " - -	116	115	90	88	15	29	4	-	-	
16th " - -	135	137	83	84	4	10	-	-	1	
17th " - -	186	74	44	111	33	3	2	3	1	
18th " - -	173	135	67	53	15	4	9	1	-	
19th " - -	105	142	103	67	21	11	6	-	-	
TOTAL - - -	2,621	2,131	1,557	1,484	417	235	142	50	7	8,662
Percentage - -	30.25	24.60	17.97	17.13	4.81	2.92	1.63	.57	.08	

LENGTH of SERVICE of Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Rank and File of the Bombay Army, compiled from the Inspection Returns for 1882.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years' Service.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 35 years.	Over 35 years.	Total of all Ranks.
1st Cavalry - - -	120	83	93	109	33	23	13	-	
2nd " - - -	177	104	58	70	53	18	9	-	
3rd " - - -	190	85	90	47	38	18	9	-	
Poona Horse - - -	150	102	66	87	47	27	14	1	
1st Sind Horse - - -	186	123	148	46	32	10	3	-	
2nd " - - -	107	91	145	82	62	30	7	-	
1st Infantry - - -	438	91	89	32	17	8	4	-	
2nd " - - -	190	192	128	33	61	40	3	-	
3rd " - - -	205	193	154	40	63	19	6	-	
4th " - - -	454	134	95	84	51	20	3	-	
5th " - - -	275	253	81	61	77	47	2	-	
6th " - - -	264	157	135	53	29	11	2	-	
7th " - - -	245	137	126	94	60	27	8	-	
8th " - - -	460	167	123	45	42	27	1	-	
9th " - - -	352	171	68	129	54	35	2	-	
10th " - - -	345	208	101	73	16	14	-	-	
11th " - - -	276	133	137	37	94	24	1	-	
12th " - - -	223	107	161	118	31	22	1	-	
13th " - - -	401	138	108	104	68	69	10	-	
14th " - - -	198	150	139	63	70	46	6	-	
15th " - - -	277	210	132	50	36	24	11	1	
16th " - - -	369	130	172	36	38	21	1	-	
17th " - - -	209	143	118	129	76	13	6	-	
18th " - - -	254	167	123	64	51	26	5	-	
19th " - - -	215	131	192	19	60	58	26	-	
20th " - - -	252	146	105	123	48	15	1	-	
21st " - - -	229	195	102	67	67	20	2	-	
22nd " - - -	306	131	136	72	23	7	3	-	
23rd " - - -	283	203	150	26	64	16	7	-	
24th " - - -	375	180	190	68	16	7	4	-	
25th " - - -	112	290	168	57	36	15	16	-	
26th " - - -	255	166	177	19	22	46	10	-	
27th " - - -	300	183	102	95	21	10	3	-	
28th " - - -	256	120	176	86	28	20	15	-	
29th " - - -	265	145	161	38	51	22	2	-	
30th " - - -	444	130	83	17	9	-	-	-	
TOTAL - - -	9,657	5,487	4,523	2,368	1,644	863	216	2	24,700
Percentage - - -	39.002	22.16	18.26	9.56	6.63	3.48	.87	.008	



INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

11

LENGTH of SERVICE of the Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Rank and File of the Bengal Infantry, compiled from the Inspection Returns of 1877.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years' Service.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 35 years.	35 to 40 years.	Over 40 years.	Total of all Ranks.
1st Regiment - -	333	220	83	40	12	16	5	1	3	
2nd " - -	183	189	203	34	48	36	6	6	7	
3rd " - -	253	149	148	46	48	32	25	7	3	
4th " - -	348	133	135	41	21	6	4	3	1	
5th " - -	213	247	222	9	9	2	4	2	2	
6th " - -	180	211	253	16	11	15	4	3	-	
7th " - -	190	138	238	99	18	8	5	1	-	
8th " - -	220	149	281	22	13	10	4	3	1	
9th " - -	239	235	155	6	33	22	14	4	2	
10th " - -	366	118	133	20	32	9	1	5	-	
11th " - -	225	150	269	5	27	4	4	10	1	
12th " - -	257	235	87	48	24	14	5	3	-	
13th " - -	292	201	181	13	11	7	2	1	1	
14th " - -	240	202	198	23	9	7	6	-	-	
15th " - -	272	192	186	46	6	4	5	1	-	
16th " - -	208	170	150	162	12	5	-	2	1	
17th " - -	236	213	221	10	7	7	6	6	1	
18th " - -	293	209	123	23	24	8	7	5	1	
19th " - -	235	205	96	41	26	7	2	-	-	
20th " - -	261	274	133	34	6	2	-	-	1	
21st " - -	315	173	99	94	2	7	-	1	-	
22nd " - -	254	193	177	40	16	7	2	1	-	
23rd " - -	185	269	110	112	1	2	-	1	-	
24th " - -	324	141	93	78	38	9	2	-	-	
25th " - -	286	199	102	71	31	13	1	-	1	
26th " - -	338	144	59	121	24	4	-	-	-	
27th " - -	298	170	140	90	6	5	1	-	-	
28th " - -	261	187	94	114	31	4	4	-	-	
29th " - -	349	129	113	85	21	5	-	-	-	
30th " - -	208	295	91	69	18	11	-	-	-	
31st " - -	254	266	122	53	6	4	1	1	-	
32nd " - -	243	150	70	233	7	4	-	1	-	
33rd " - -	243	145	224	85	7	3	-	1	-	
34th " - -	230	188	190	83	3	1	2	2	-	
35th " - -	266	155	204	47	7	5	1	-	-	
36th " - -	305	178	170	36	3	2	-	-	-	
37th " - -	287	161	168	87	3	2	2	2	-	
38th " - -	330	113	123	83	4	4	5	2	1	
39th " - -	305	234	64	73	6	8	1	-	-	
40th " - -	217	131	226	87	6	2	2	2	-	
41st " - -	264	239	137	56	2	3	-	-	-	
42nd " - -	397	166	214	80	14	8	3	2	1	
43rd " - -	354	173	283	50	29	10	7	1	1	
44th " - -	308	295	86	149	15	1	6	4	-	
45th " - -	313	250	97	25	24	-	1	-	-	
1st Goorkhas - -	220	157	104	68	72	41	21	9	1	
2nd " - -	189	137	85	190	46	18	26	15	4	
3rd " - -	211	274	88	119	28	7	1	5	4	
4th " - -	246	140	191	124	6	7	2	1	-	
TOTAL - -	13,044	9,292	7,419	3,342	873	418	200	114	38	34,740
Percentage - -	37.54	26.74	21.35	9.62	2.51	1.20	.57	.32	.10	

— No. 6. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 20 March 1885.

Yours, 16th. My military advisers entirely concur in your suggestion, that it would be better to add second battalions to present strength of Goorkha regiments.

— No. 7. —

DESPATCH from the Government of *India* (No. 63 of 1885, Military Department) to the Secretary of State for *India*.

My Lord,

Simla, 4 May 1885.

IN the Viceroy's telegram of the 30th March 1885, a proposal was made to increase the strength of the Native Army. We now beg to forward our detailed proposals on the subject

2. First, as regards the cavalry. The cavalry regiments of the Bengal Army and Punjab Frontier Force have a present strength of 550 natives of all ranks. It is proposed to bring these regiments up to a strength of 625 natives of all ranks, and to add a fourth squadron, involving an addition of 75 of all ranks per regiment; 24 of these being native officers and non-commissioned officers, and 51 privates. The present and proposed composition of these regiments is shown in the annexed schedule A.

3. The Bombay cavalry regiments have at present the same total strength as the Bengal regiment, namely, 550 of all ranks, but a somewhat larger proportion of non-commissioned officers and smaller number of privates. It is proposed to raise these regiments also to 625 of all ranks organised in four squadrons, with an increase of 20 non-commissioned officers and 55 privates, as shown in schedule B.

4. We recommend that a fourth squadron commander be appointed to all these regiments. This will increase the establishment of European officers, including the medical officer, from nine to ten.

5. The two regiments of Central India Horse are at present somewhat weaker in strength than the Bengal and Bombay regiments, having a total strength of 493 natives of all ranks. It is proposed to augment them to the same strength as the latter, which involves an increase of 24 non-commissioned officers and 108 privates, or 132 in all, as shown in schedule C. A fourth squadron commander would be added to these regiments also, giving them a total establishment of eight instead of seven British officers.

6. The four regiments of Madras cavalry are on a much smaller footing, comprising only 387 natives of all ranks. We propose to increase these regiments by six non-commissioned officers and 96 troopers, or 102 in all, bringing them up to a total of 489 of all ranks, to be organised as at present in three squadrons. The present and proposed establishment are shown in schedule D.

7. In addition to the increase above detailed, we consider it desirable to raise also three new regiments of cavalry, the Indian army being comparatively weak in that arm. We would propose that two of these regiments should be raised in Bengal and one in the Bombay Presidency.

8. The total augmentation to the cavalry under these proposals will amount to 4,572 natives of all ranks, bringing up the establishment from 17,384 to 21,956, as shown in schedule E.

9. An estimate of the cost of the augmentation, amounting to 23,49,727 rupees per annum, is attached, schedule F. To this must be added the cost of 56 European officers—\* 29 added to the Bengal,

Bengal Cavalry	-	-	-	-	17	Punjab, and Bombay regiments and the Central India Horse, and 27 for the three new regiments. This involves a charge of 436 rupees per mensem for each officer in the first instance. But as under the Staff Corps system the substantive promotion of officers is independent of regimental advancement,
Punjab Frontier Force	-	-	-	4		
Bombay	-	-	-	6		
Central India Horse	-	-	-	2		
Total	-	-	-	29		

But as under the Staff Corps system the substantive promotion of officers is independent of regimental advancement,

advancement, the effect of the augmentation must be to add eventually to the number of senior officers in the army; and, considering also the prospective charges for pensions and furloughs, the virtual cost of such an augmentation is considerably more than this, although it is not practicable to state the precise amount.

11. With respect to the infantry of the Indian Army, it is not proposed to make any change in the existing organisation of eight companies per regiment; but we desire your Lordship's authority to increase the regiments of the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras armies and the Punjab Frontier Force, other than the Goorkha regiments which are referred to below, from 832 to 1,000 natives of all ranks, an addition being made of one havildar and one naik per company, or 16 non-commissioned officers in all and 152 privates. The present and proposed establishment of a regiment of native infantry is given in schedule G.

12. The establishment of the 42nd, 43rd, and 44th Bengal Infantry is already 1,112 natives of all ranks. It is not proposed to alter this.

13. As regards the five Goorkha regiments, their present establishment is also 1,112 natives of all ranks. Your Lordship in a telegram, dated 12th March 1885, authorised an increase of 200 men to each of these, and also to the three Assam regiments which contain a large Goorkha element; and orders were issued accordingly.\* But subsequently, in accordance with your Lordship's suggestion, it was decided that the augmentation of the Goorkhas should take the form of second battalions to the five Goorkha regiments. We attach correspondence with the Adjutant General upon the subject, from which it will be seen that, in view of the difficulty which may be experienced in obtaining a large number of Goorkhas, it has been decided to raise in the first instance a second battalion for the 1st Goorkha Regiment only, and not to make even this addition until the progress of recruiting is sufficient to justify the augmentation.

\* Letter to Adjutant General in India, No. 263-B., dated 13th March 1885.  
Telegram from Secretary of State, dated 16th March 1885.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 169 M-R., dated 31st March 1885.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 2485, dated 8th April 1885.  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 361 M-R., dated 9th April 1885.

From Adjutant General in India, No. 830-B. dated 15th April 1885  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 187-Q-B., dated 20th April 1885.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 2377-Camp, dated 4th April 1885.  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 354-M-R., dated 8th April 1885.

14. We attach a statement, schedule H., which shows the present and proposed establishment of infantry in accordance with these recommendations. It will be seen that the total augmentation for 105 regiments will be 17,608 men, thus raising the infantry of the Indian Army from 96,288 to 113,896 men, including the Goorkha and Assam regiments.

Bengal, excluding Goorkha and Assam regiments	-	-	-	-	-	37
Punjab Frontier Force, excluding Goorkha regiment	-	-	-	-	-	10
Madras	-	-	-	-	-	32
Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	26
Total	-	-	-	-	-	105

The estimate of the cost of the additional infantry proposed, amounting to 31,20,500 rupees per annum (*vide* schedule I.), is attached, which has been framed on the assumption that the Goorkha regiments remain at their present strength, as the extent to which an augmentation of them may be possible is at present a matter of uncertainty.

15. The augmentation of the whole army will be as follows:—

	Present.	Proposed.	Increase.
Cavalry - - - -	17,384	21,956	4,572
Infantry - - - -	96,288	1,13,896	17,608

16. It was observed in the Viceroy's telegram of the 30th March, that this form of augmentation to the infantry would admit of an easy reduction should circumstances justify. It will be understood that this is a war measure called forth by the present aspect of affairs, and that, with the exception of the increase of establishment for the cavalry mentioned in the third, fourth, and seventh paragraphs of the Despatch, it is not intended to be permanent, but will

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

be subject to further consideration when the present emergency has passed away.

17. The total annual increased cost of these proposals, exclusive of the charge for 56 additional officers for the cavalry, is—

	<i>Rs.</i>
Cavalry - - - - -	23,49,727
Infantry - - - - -	31,20,500
Total - - -	54,70,227

We have, &c.  
(signed) *Dufferin.*  
*D. M. Stewart.*  
*T. F. Wilson.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*S. C. Bayley.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*

## Enclosure in No. 7.

## SCHEDULE (A.)

## Establishment of a Regiment of Bengal and Punjab Cavalry.

	Present.	Proposed.
<b>European Officers :</b>		
Commandant - - - - -	1	1
Squadron Commanders - - - - -	3	4
Squadron Officers - - - - -	4	4
Medical Officer - - - - -	1	1
Total - - -	9	10
<b>Natives :</b>		
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Ressaidars - - - - -	3	4
Woodie-Major - - - - -	1	1
Jemadars - - - - -	6	8
Kote Duffadars - - - - -	6	8
Duffadars - - - - -	48	64
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	8
Privates - - - - -	477	528
Total - - -	550	625
Strength of one squadron - - - - -	183	156
<b>Increase :</b>		
Officers and non-commissioned officers - - - - -		24
Privates - - - - -		51
Total - - -		75

SCHEDULE (B.)

Establishment of a Regiment of Bombay Cavalry.

	Present.	Proposed.
European Officers - - - - -	9	10
<b>Natives :</b>		
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Woodie-Major - - - - -	1	1
Ressaidars - - - - -	3	4
Jemadars - - - - -	6	8
Kote Duffadar Major - - - - -	1	1
Farrier Major - - - - -	1	1
Kote Duffadars - - - - -	6	8
Duffadars - - - - -	30	32
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	8
Naiks - - - - -	30	40
Sowars - - - - -	463	518
Total - - -	550	625
Strength of one squadron - - -	182	154
<b>Increase :</b>		
Officers and non-commissioned officers - - - - -		20
Privates - - - - -		55
Total - - -		75

SCHEDULE (C.)

Central India Horse, two Regiments.

	Present.	Proposed.
<b>European Officers :</b>		
Squadron Commanders - - - - -	3	4
Squadron Officers - - - - -	3	3
Medical Officer - - - - -	1	1
Total - - -	7	8
<b>Natives :</b>		
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Ressaidars - - - - -	3	4
Woodie-Major - - - - -	1	1
Jemadars - - - - -	6	8
Kote Duffadars - - - - -	-	8
Duffadars - - - - -	54	64
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	8
Sowars - - - - -	420	528
Total - - -	493	625
Strength of a squadron - - -	164	156
<b>Increase :</b>		
Officers and non-commissioned officers - - - - -		24
Privates - - - - -		108
Total - - -		132

## SCHEDULE (D.)

## Madras Cavalry.

		Present.	Proposed.
<b>European Officers:</b>			
Commandant	- - - - -	1	1
Squadron Commanders	- - - - -	3	3
Squadron Officers	- - - - -	4	4
Medical Officer	- - - - -	1	1
Total		9	9
<b>Natives:</b>			
Subudars	- - - - -	6	6
Jemadars	- - - - -	6	6
Havildar Major	- - - - -	1	1
Havildars	- - - - -	30	30
Naiks	- - - - -	24	30
Trumpet Major	- - - - -	1	1
Trumpeters	- - - - -	6	6
Farrier Major	- - - - -	1	1
Farrier Havildars	- - - - -	6	6
Shoeing-smiths and pupils	- - - - -	6	6
Troopers	- - - - -	300	306
Total		387	489
Strength of a squadron		129	163
<b>Increase:</b>			
Non-commissioned officers	- - - - -	-	6
Troopers	- - - - -	-	96
Total		-	102

## SCHEDULE (E.)

## Cavalry, Indian Army—Present and Proposed Establishment.

	Establishment of One Regiment.		Increase per Regiment.	Number of Regiments.	Total Increase.	TOTAL.	
	Present.	Proposed.				Present Strength.	Proposed Strength.
Bengal Cavalry	550	625	75	17	1,275	9,350	10,625
Punjab Frontier Force	550	625	75	4	300	2,200	2,500
Bombay	550	625	75	6	450	3,300	3,750
Central India Horse	493	625	132	2	264	986	1,250
Madras	387	489	102	4	408	1,548	1,956
Three Cavalry Regiments (new)	-	625	-	3	1,875	-	1,875
TOTAL	-	-	-	36	4,572	17,384	21,956

SCHEDULE (F.)

Probable Annual Cost of the Augmentation of Native Cavalry Regiments, Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Punjab Frontier Force, and Central India Horse.

	<i>Rs.</i>
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Native Cavalry regiment, Bengal and Punjab Frontier Force, by one squadron, or 75 men of all ranks per regiment, would be 36,300 rupees; and for the 17 Bengal and the four Punjab regiments, or in all 21 regiments, the total cost would be - - - - -	7,62,300
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Bombay Cavalry regiment by one squadron, or 75 men of all ranks per regiment, would be 36,900 rupees, and for the six regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	2,21,400
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Central India Horse by one squadron, or 132 men of all ranks per regiment, would be 58,400 rupees, and for the two regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	1,16,800
The annual cost of increasing the strength of a Madras Cavalry regiment by 102, or to a total of 489 of all ranks, would be 50,100 rupees, and for the four regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	2,00,400
The annual cost of three new regiments of the increased strength proposed would be - - - - -	10,48,827
<b>TOTAL Annual Cost of Augmentation of Native Cavalry Regiments in India - - - - -</b>	<b>Rs. 23,49,727</b>

SCHEDULE (G.)

Establishment of a Regiment of Native Infantry.

	Present.	Proposed.
Subadars - - - - -	8	8
Jemadars - - - - -	8	8
Havildars - - - - -	40	48
Naiks - - - - -	40	48
Drummers - - - - -	16	16
Privates - - - - -	720	872
<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>832</b>	<b>1,000</b>

[The regiments of the Madras Army have one havildar more than the above.]

Number of Regiments of Native Infantry.

Bengal (excluding Goorkha and Assam) - - - - -	37
Punjab Frontier Force - - - - -	10
Madras - - - - -	32
Bombay - - - - -	26
<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>Present strength—</b>	
105 regiments, at 832 (plus one extra havildar in Madras regiments) - - - - -	87,392
8 Goorkha and Assam regiments, at 1,112 - - - - -	8,896
<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>96,288</b>
<b>Proposed strength—</b>	
105 regiments, at 1,000 - - - - -	105,000
8 Goorkha and Assam regiments, at 1,112 - - - - -	8,896
<b>TOTAL - - - - -</b>	<b>1,13,896</b>
<b>INCREASE - - - - -</b>	<b>17,608</b>

## SCHEDULE (H.)

## Strength of Infantry Regiments.

PRESIDENCY.	Number of Regiments.	Establishment of one Regiment.		Increase per Regiment.	Total Strength of Corps.	
		Present.	Proposed.		As at Present.	As Proposed.
<b>BENGAL.</b>						
Bengal Infantry - - - - -	37	832	1,000	168	30,784	37,000
Punjab Frontier Force (including Guides Corps Infantry) - - - - -	10	832	1,000	168	8,320	10,000
Goorkha and Assam regiments - - - - -	8	1,112	1,112	- -	8,896	8,896
<b>TOTAL - - -</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>- -</b>	<b>- -</b>	<b>- -</b>	<b>48,000</b>	<b>55,896</b>
<b>MADRAS.</b>						
Native Infantry - - - - -	32	833*	1,000	167	26,656	32,000
<b>BOMBAY.</b>						
Native Infantry - - - - -	26	832	1,000	168	21,632	26,000
<b>GRAND TOTAL, INDIA - - -</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>- -</b>	<b>- -</b>	<b>- -</b>	<b>96,288</b>	<b>1,19,896</b>

Increased Strength - - - 17,608

\* Including one extra havildar.

## SCHEDULE (I.)

## Probable Annual Cost of the Augmentation of Native Infantry Regiments.

	<i>Rupees.</i>
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Native Infantry, Bengal, by 168 men, or to a total of 1,000 of all ranks, would be 27,900 rupees, and for the 37 regiments the total cost would be -	10,32,300
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Native Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, by 168 men, or to a total of 1,000 of all ranks, would be 25,200 rupees, and for the 10 regiments (including Guides Corps, Infantry) the total cost would be - - - - -	2,52,000
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Madras Infantry by 167 men, as above, would be 31,300 rupees, and for the 32 regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	10,01,600
The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Bombay Infantry regiment by 168 men, as above, would be 32,100 rupees, and for the 26 regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	8,34,600
<b>TOTAL Annual Cost of Augmentation of Native Infantry Regiments - - - - - } - Rs.</b>	<b>31,20,500</b>

— No. 8. —

EXTRACT from MILITARY DESPATCH from the Government of India, No. 69, dated 4 May 1885, paragraph 22.

22. THE increase proposed in the Indian Army, European and Native, will form the subject of separate letters. We may mention here that we have allowed Native Regiments in the three Presidencies to recruit at once, to replace the men who have been invalided, but who will not be struck off before the 1st May. \* \* \*



— No. 9. —

(Military, No. 117.)

DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office,  
London, 7 May 1885.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the telegraphic correspondence noted in the margin,\* I now communicate to your Lordship's Government the formal sanction of Her Majesty's Government to the number of guns with the four Punjab and the two Bombay Native Mountain Batteries being raised to six, and to the addition of second battalions to the present strength, as fixed in G.G.O., No. 594 of 1882, of the existing five Goorkha regiments.

\* From Viceroy, 12th March.

"We desire your authority to complete the four Punjab and two Bombay Native Mountain Batteries to six guns, and to add 200 men to each of the eight Goorkha regiments."

To Viceroy, 12th March.

"Yours, 12th. Mountain Batteries and Goorkha regiments. I approve."

From Viceroy, 13th March.

"I am inclined to ask you to allow us to raise three additional Goorkha regiments."

To Viceroy, 16th March.

"If you can bear expense, additional Goorkhas seem to me very desirable. If the three regiments are to be additional to the 200 men for the eight regiments, would it not be better to add second battalions of present strength to five regiments?"

From Viceroy, 20th March.

"Yours, 16th. My military advisers entirely concur in your suggestion that it would be better to add second battalions to present strength of Goorkha regiments."

I have, &c.

(signed) Kimberley.

— No. 10. —

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 20 June 1885 [Clause 76].

NATIVE ARMY.

Augmentation of the Punjab and Bombay Native Mountain Batteries from Four to Six Guns.

(Applicable to the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies.)

[Issued as a Special India Army Circular on the 20th June 1885.]

WITH the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, the number of guns with the four Punjab and the two Bombay mountain batteries is raised from four to six, with effect from the 13th March 1885.

— No. 11. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 29 June 1885.

YOUR Military Letter, 69, 4th May 1885, paragraph 22. When may separate letter regarding European increase to Indian Army be expected? Is the proposal for permanent?

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

— No. 12. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 1 July 1885.

YOUR telegram of 29th June. Our Military Despatch, No. 69. With the exception of the increase to the native cavalry, which was intended to be permanent, all our proposals in the foregoing Despatch were framed to meet the then impending exigencies of war. We will shortly forward a second Despatch dealing with the changes we consider necessary in the number and organisation of the army in India, both Native and European. They will possibly contain a suggestion for a certain permanent increase in the number of both branches.

— No. 13. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 2 July 1885.

MY Military Despatch, No. 63, of the 4th May, Native Army, paragraph 16. For the cavalry mentioned in the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the Despatch read in the 3rd, 4th, and 7th paragraphs of this Despatch.

— No. 14. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 4 July 1885.

MY telegram of 1st July, referring to Military Despatch, No. 69. For "European Cavalry," read "Native Cavalry."

— No. 15. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 7 July 1885.

MY Military Despatch, No. 63, of 4th May last, Native Army. Please await further proposals regarding infantry in modification of arrangements therein proposed, which were provisional only to meet emergency of war; but we should be glad to receive early sanction to proposals for cavalry, in which no change is proposed. Raising and equipping fourth squadron, and procuring horses, must in any case be a work of time.

— No. 16. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 7 July 1885.

YOUR Military Letter, 44, dated 17th March 1885, Native Army Reserve, paragraph 9. I do not approve of proposal to form territorial reserve battalions, but cordially accept the alternative system of long furlough men, and authorise your taking immediate steps for giving effect.

— No. 17. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 22 July 1885.

YOURS, 7th, Native Army Reserve. Will despatch follow; if so, when may we expect it?

— No. 18. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 23 July 1885.

YOURS, 22nd, Native Army Reserve. Despatch leaves 24th July or tomorrow.

— No. 19. —

(Military, No. 192.)

DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

India Office, London, 23 July 1885.

1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter No. 44, dated 17th March 1885, regarding the formation of a reserve for the Native Army.

2. Your Government propose, before elaborating a complete scheme for the purpose, to make the experiment in the first instance on a small scale, in view of its future extension should it prove successful. Your Lordship considers that there are two ways in which the experiment might be carried out.

First, according to the method proposed by the Simla Army Commission, under which the men passed into the reserve would still belong to their respective regiments, and would rejoin them when called out, the men sent to their homes being limited to 250 per regiment and considered as on long furlough, but liable to be called up for training once a year, or once every two years, receiving pay while under training, and a gratuity for each month of such training after it is over, either at the end of each training, or at the end of their reserve service.

The second method proposed is to make the reserve territorial in character. Under this system the men passed into the reserve would not belong to any particular regiment, but would be called up and form a battalion to be stationed at some place near their homes, it being understood that the reserve battalion would be required only for duty in India, and would not be required to go on foreign service. The men of the reserve battalion should, it is proposed, be called out for 30 days' duty once a year, receiving a gratuity of 24 rupees at the expiration of it. Each reserve battalion to have native officers and non-commissioned officers on the same scale as the regular army, who would be chosen from the reserve list, or from efficient pensioners. The command to be vested in a British officer on 200 rupees a month staff, who would be assisted by an adjutant, while a small native staff would be maintained for the custody of the arms, clothing, &c., of the battalion.

3. Your Government are disposed to recommend that each of these methods should have a trial, and wish for authority to apply the first or "long furlough" system to about 10 regiments of the Bengal Army in the first instance, and to form one or two reserve battalions on the second plan.

4. I agree with your Lordship's Government as to the expediency of introducing some system of reserve for our native army, in order to enable the effective strength of its regiments to be rapidly increased on an emergency, and I am quite prepared to authorise the adoption of measures for furthering this object.

5. I am, however, of opinion that, in establishing any system of reserves, it should be considered an essential condition that it shall provide for the immediate strengthening of corps proceeding on service, and I also think that it should, if practicable, be so constituted as to afford the means for keeping their ranks supplied while they continue in the field.

6. The proposed formation of reserve battalions does not, as your Lordship points out, meet either of these conditions, and, in my judgment, the utilisation of the battalions in garrison with the consequent release of a corresponding number of regular regiments for employment on active service, would not compensate for this serious defect. But even allowing for the advantage arising from the larger number of regular troops that might thus be placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, certain other objections present themselves in considering the proposed organisation of reserve battalions, to which I desire to draw your Lordship's attention.

7. The battalions, I observe, are to be formed entirely of men who will have no necessary regimental connection with each other, but all of whom will be bound by a common territorial tie. They will not be liable for employment elsewhere than in their own territory, that is to say, they will be employed solely in maintaining order at home. The only occasions on which the battalions would be called out would be when under peculiar stress of war the regular troops had to be withdrawn from those positions which it is a matter of military and political obligation to hold, and the active services of the men would probably be only called into play for the suppression of disturbances amongst the people of their own villages and towns. In the event of any reverses befalling the regular forces in the field, the reserve battalions would not only be unable to afford any active support to the troops engaged, but would themselves be specially liable to be affected by any disturbing influences at work in their districts, and might thus, at a critical period and at important strategical points, be a source of anxiety rather than of strength.

8. For a battalion so constituted and employed it would be obviously necessary that its commissioned officers, both British and Native, should be selected with great care and with special regard to their knowledge of the men, but this does not seem to me to have been provided for, or indeed to be possible under the organisation proposed.

9. That organisation gives a commandant on a scale of staff salary which would only be suitable to a very junior officer, who would be assisted by an adjutant who must necessarily be a still younger officer, while no arrangement is made for the officering of the battalion when embodied for garrison duty. It would be necessary, therefore, to draw on the regular regiments for the needful supply of officers when they could least conveniently be spared, and, moreover, such a mode of officering the battalion would be most unsatisfactory at a critical time when it would be specially desirable that officers should know and have personal influence over the men, and the men know and trust the officers. The same objection is at least as applicable in the case of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of companies.

10. Neither, in my opinion, would the proposed staff of two officers be sufficient for the annual training, even on the assumption that only the men of the reserve battalion were present. It is, however, proposed that not only these men, but that long furlough men shall also, under certain circumstances, join the local battalion for the annual training, thereby greatly increasing, and perhaps even doubling, the enrolled strength of the battalion, and making it impossible for the allotted staff to exercise that careful supervision over the training which is essential in the case of men called out for only four weeks in the year. In raising this objection, I do not overlook the fact that all the men need not go through their annual training at the same time, but practically I believe it would be found that the attendance could not be spread over many months of the year, for if the reserve system is to be made really attractive, it will be needful that the reservists, the great bulk of whom will be agriculturists, shall only be called up at those seasons which will interfere the least with their pursuits.

11. I am apprehensive, therefore, that in practice it would be found necessary to add largely to the staff proposed for these battalions, with the consequence that, while the expense of maintaining them would be very considerable, they would not be thoroughly efficient in themselves, while they would at the same time

time fail altogether to meet one of the main essentials to be kept in view in establishing any system of army reserves.

12. In referring to this question of expense, I would point out that the charge for the staff and the establishments permanently maintained would be an absolute addition to the regular military estimates, and though this would be comparatively trifling if it were confined to the one or two battalions now proposed, it would amount to a very material increase to the estimates if the system were to be generally introduced. I am, of course, aware that any scheme for providing a reserve must involve additional expense, but, in view of the probably increasing requirements for the military defence of India, it should be regarded as an essential condition that no expenditure shall be incurred on any measure which does not afford reasonable expectation that it will secure the greatest results at the least cost.

13. The alternative, or "long furlough" scheme proposed by your Lordship's Government appears free from either of these objections. It provides for an immediate addition of 250 trained men to each regiment ready to fall at once into their accustomed place in its ranks. The mode thus suggested for speedily placing regiments on a war footing is apparently not only easy of application but probably the most efficient and economical manner in which this essential object can be attained.

14. While, therefore, for the reasons already stated, I am unable to accord my sanction to the creation of "reserve battalions," I have, on the other hand, great pleasure in expressing my entire concurrence in the alternative or "long furlough" system, and in authorising your Lordship's Government to give effect to it to such an extent as you may decide.

15. Doubtless your Lordship has already considered the several points of detail connected with the introduction of this measure, and I shall be glad to be favoured with a full report of the conditions and method under which your Government may decide that the long furlough men shall be paid, the earliest date after enlistment at which they will be permitted to elect for the reserve, the period for which their service on it will be allowed to continue, and the arrangements for the maintenance and custody of the arms, clothing, and equipment during the time when the men are not under their yearly training.

16. There is a further point as to which I am anxious to learn the intentions of your Government, viz., the arrangements for the training of the reserve or long furlough men. This question appears to me to present many practical difficulties which, perhaps, I need hardly point out to your Lordship, but I desire to take this opportunity of stating that should such difficulties arise I shall be glad to give full consideration to any measures for obviating them, whether by forming regiments of multiple battalions, or other system which your Government may desire to recommend.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Randolph S. Churchill.*

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— No. 20. —

EXTRACT from a DESPATCH from the Government of India, No. 121,  
dated 24th July 1885.

Paragraph 15. Correspondence and India Army Circular showing that we have sanctioned the entertainment of 20 supernumeraries in every Native Infantry regiment, Goorkha and Assam excepted, to allow for the waste which takes place by casualties before recruiting can be made.

Military Department letter, No. 474-B., dated 18th July 1885.

The returns show that for years past the Native armies have been on an average 2,000 below strength. The measure now sanctioned will help to maintain the army at its established strength, and ensure the presence at headquarters of regiments of a larger number of trained men, thus making them more efficient for service.

[The reply, or rather acknowledgment, to the above, is paragraph 38 of No 297, of 29th October 1885.]

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Enclosures in No. 20.

(No. 474-B.—Government of India.—Military Department.)

To the Adjutant General in India.

Sir,

Simla, 18 July 1885.

IN forwarding, for the information of the Commander in Chief, the enclosed copy of an India Army Circular, about to be published, sanctioning the entertainment of 20 supernumeraries in Native Infantry regiments (Goorkha and Assam regiments excepted), I am to suggest that it be explained to commanding officers that the fixed establishment of a regiment has not been raised, and that it is not necessary that the 20 supernumeraries should be always kept complete. The supernumeraries might be entertained at the beginning of the year before the assembly of the annual invaliding board, and then be allowed to gradually diminish by casualties during the year. Special recruiting measures (*i.e.*, despatch of recruiting parties) should not be undertaken until a regiment is reduced by ordinary casualties to its fixed establishment.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *Arthur Crookshank*,  
for Secretary to the Government of India.

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[Applicable to the three Presidencies.]

ARMY CIRCULARS, INDIA, 1885.—[Clause 98.]

Government of India, Military Department,  
Simla, 31 July 1885.

THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right honourable the Governor General in Council.

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ORGANISATION.—NATIVE ARMY.

Entertainment of Supernumeraries in Native Infantry Regiments.

IN view to maintaining the native armies as nearly as possible at their full established strength, and to provide a margin for casualties, officers commanding regiments of Native Infantry (Goorkha and Assam regiments excepted) are authorised to entertain supernumeraries to the extent of 20 sepoy per corps in excess of the establishment of 720 sepoy.

*G. Chesney*,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

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## — No. 21. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 4th August 1885.

YOUR Military Letter 63, of 4th May, and telegram 2nd July. I sanction your carrying out proposals for permanent cavalry increase.

## — No. 22. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 14th August 1885.

ARMY Despatch goes to-day; main proposals as follows: British troops, artillery additions, one horse, two field, two mountain, six garrison; total, 11 batteries, 1,373 men.

Cavalry: nine regiments to have each a fourth squadron; total, 1,332 men. Infantry, addition of 100 rank and file to existing 50 battalions, and three more battalions 984 strong; total, 7,952; total increase British Army, 10,657 men.

Native cavalry: no change in proposals of last May, which are already sanctioned by you, and in course of being carried out.

Native infantry: Bengal and Punjab infantry, 47 existing battalions to have 80 men more each, but to be raised to 980 in first instance, pending creation of reserve; five new Goorkha battalions proposed, three new Sikh battalions, one Muzbee pioneer battalion, each 912 strong; total permanent increase, 11,968 men.

Bombay infantry to have temporary increase of 80 men per regiment, pending formation of reserves. Madras infantry not increased.

Reserves to be, Bengal, 218; Bombay, 160; Madras, 160 per battalion; total, 23,232 men. Reserve pay,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  rupees per month.

Native infantry to be linked in regiments of three battalions. This change prospective only. Sepoys who enlist henceforward to be liable for transfer to either of two other linked battalions. Various modifications proposed as regards pensions, good conduct pay, and also as regards Army administration, for which see Despatch. We have already received your authority to introduce system of linked battalions, because the two conditions, reserve and linking, form part of same measure to be dealt with as a whole. We also desire authority to begin the augmentation Bengal and Bombay infantry.

Ilbert and Colvin dissent from some of the proposals.

## — No. 23. —

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 15th August 1885.

YOURS 14th August, Military. I understand proposed British increase to be permanent. Is this so?

## — No. 24. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 16th August 1885.

YOURS 15th August, Military. British increase. Yes.

— No. 25. —

(No. 135 of 1885.—Military Department.)

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 14 August 1885.

IN our Military Letter No. 112, dated 10th July, embodying our recommendations for the construction of certain defensive works and the extension of roads and railways on the north-west frontier, we stated that these would be followed by proposals for placing the Indian Army on a footing adapted to the new conditions which it may be called upon to meet. Till lately the functions of that army were limited to maintaining the internal peace of India, and to supplying small bodies of troops for foreign expeditions against adversaries possessing very limited resources. By the recent advance of Russia, the military problem with which the Government of India has to deal has been profoundly modified. We have now in close proximity to our frontier a great European power with which we may at any time be brought into hostile contact; and consequently our existing military establishments are no longer adequate for the duties they may have to fulfil. Though in any great emergency the Indian Administration might doubtless draw largely on the general support and resources of the Home Government and of the British nation as a whole, the existence of this potential reserve does not liberate us from the imperative obligation of increasing India's means of self-defence. We may be suddenly called upon to take measures for repelling or anticipating an attack, and the rapidity with which modern warfare is conducted renders it necessary that we should have ready at hand the troops, both British and Native, as well as the war material required. Nor would it be enough to keep in India merely a force sufficient for the preliminary stages of a campaign, and trust for the conduct of its subsequent operations to receiving aid from England; for, even assuming that a large number of regiments could be spared from home and colonial defence, and could be rapidly transported, without danger of interruption, to Bombay or Karachi, we could not supply them at such short notice with the necessary complement of Native troops. Neither could we prepare this complement long beforehand in view of such a contingency, because we should be thereby raising the proportion of Native to British troops above the figure which is regarded on all hands as the minimum consistent with safety. Considerations of economy on the one hand, and of security on the other, prevent us from garrisoning and defending India exclusively with British or exclusively with Native soldiers, and the necessity of maintaining a just equilibrium between the two has largely influenced our scheme. We have now the honour to submit the proposals to which, after full and anxious deliberation, we desire to obtain the sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

2. The attached letter from the Adjutant General contains the detailed No. 2009, dated 3rd July 1885. recommendations of the Commander in Chief for the augmentation of the army; we proceed to discuss the subject under its different heads.

Appendix A.

*Establishment of British Troops in India.*

3. First, as regards the establishment of British troops in India. His Excellency proposes that the numerical strength of the British Army in India should be augmented from its present establishment of about 59,000 of all ranks, exclusive of officers, to a total of about 75,000, or by 16,000 men.

The greater part of this increase of 16,000 men would, in Sir Donald Stewart's opinion, be most economically and advantageously provided by adding a fourth squadron to each regiment of cavalry now serving in India, each corps being raised from 454 to 602 of all ranks, excluding officers, and by increasing each battalion of infantry from 780 to 960 privates.

4. This



INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

27

4. This measure, his Excellency observes, would give a total increase as follows:

Increase of one squadron of 148 men each to 9 regiments of cavalry (9 by 148) - - - - -	1,332
Increase of 50 battalions of infantry by 180 men each (50 by 180) - - - - -	9,000
Total - - -	<u>10,332</u>

leaving a balance of 5,668 men to be provided by additional cadres from home which the Commander in Chief recommends should consist of the following units:—

1 regiment of cavalry - - - - -	602
1 battery of horse artillery - - - - -	157
2 field batteries at 157 - - - - -	314
4 garrison batteries at 115 - - - - -	460
	<u>931</u>
4 battalions of infantry on the proposed strength of 1,064 men - - - - -	4,256
Total - - -	<u>5,789</u>

5. If these measures were adopted, the total increase to the establishment of British troops would be:—

Increase to cavalry now in India - - - - -	1,332
Increase to infantry now in India - - - - -	9,000
Increase by fresh cadres from home - - - - -	5,789
Total - - -	<u>16,121</u>

6. Taking the augmentation under the different branches of the service, it would be:—

*Cavalry—*

Increase to 9 regiments now in India - - - - -	1,332
Additional (a 10th) regiment - - - - -	602
	<u>1,934</u>

*Artillery—*

Additional batteries - - - - -	931
--------------------------------	-----

*Infantry—*

Increase to 50 battalions now in India - - - - -	9,000
Four additional battalions - - - - -	4,256
	<u>13,256</u>
Total - - -	<u>16,121</u>

7. The Commander in Chief observes that the establishment he proposes would allow of 30,000 men being retained in India as garrisons for those strategic points which it is considered necessary to hold, and furnish 40,000 for active service, leaving a margin of 5,000 men to cover those deficiencies of actual strength as compared with establishment, which are almost certain occasionally to occur. In other words, while estimating for a nominal establishment of 75,000 men, his Excellency has in view that the actual strength of the British Army in India shall be not less, at any time, than 70,000 men effective.

8. The Commander in Chief offers an alternative proposal for obtaining the same augmentation in the event of the Government deciding that it is not advisable to increase the present establishment of regiments, and preferring that the whole increase should be in the form of fresh cadres to be brought out from home. In that case Sir Donald Stewart considers that the cadres should be as follows :—

4 regiments of cavalry at present strength (454) - - -	1,816
15 battalions of infantry at present strength of 884 each -	13,260
1 battery of horse artillery - - - - -	} 931
2 batteries field artillery - - - - -	
4 batteries garrison artillery, as above - - - - -	
Total - - -	16,007

9. We may at once say that even if Her Majesty's Government were prepared to furnish 15 more battalions of infantry and four regiments of cavalry for permanent service in India, this latter mode of obtaining the augmentation should not in our opinion be the one preferred. It would be extremely expensive, both in the annual charges which it would involve, and from the large expenditure that would be required for additional barracks. Moreover, the present strength of the British regiments in India, both cavalry and infantry, has been shown by experience to be much too small for an army, any portion of which may be called upon to take the field at short notice. The increase, whatever the amount of it may be, to be made to the establishment of British troops in India should, in our opinion, be mainly in the form of an increase to existing cadres, as being by far the most economical way of furnishing it, and also that which would most conduce to the efficiency of the Army.

10. In determining the extent of the augmentation to be made to the British Army in India, we have, as was indicated above, to consider to what extent that Army is entitled to count in time of emergency upon reinforcement from the home reserves. The Indian revenues contribute largely to the maintenance of the Army Reserve; and if this can be counted upon to augment the British troops in India, whenever the latter may have to take the field on a large scale, it appears unnecessary to maintain the regiments in India on quite the full establishment of rank and file proposed by the Commander in Chief. Judging from what took place a few months ago, when a part of the Reserve was actually warned, and was ready to be called out to proceed to India, we conclude that, if no great strain is placed on our military resources nearer home, we may count upon our battalions in this country being strengthened from that source, should extensive military operations have to be undertaken. But it may be necessary to take the field in strength at short notice; moreover, a condition of affairs might arise, short of actual war, yet creating the need for a larger force of British troops than could be furnished by the existing establishment, but for which the reserve would not be available. There is further to be considered the liability to interruption of communication with England, when the Government here might be left for a time to its own resources. We are therefore of opinion that while, in view of these considerations, it would not be justifiable to trust entirely to the home Reserves, some abatement may be made from the Commander in Chief's proposal for increasing the British Army by 16,000 men, and we have decided to recommend to Her Majesty's Government that the permanent establishment of British troops in India should be brought up from the existing establishment of about 59,000, excluding officers, to 70,000 men, being an increase of about 11,000.

11. The difference between our proposal and that of the Commander in Chief may, however, be considered as rather apparent than real. Sir Donald Stewart asks for a nominal establishment of 75,000 British troops, with the expectation that this may furnish an actual strength of not more than 70,000; and, judging from the serious deficiencies which have been suffered to occur in the establishment of late years, this expectation is not unreasonable. But we hope that in future her Majesty's Government will take adequate measures to ensure that the

the Indian establishment of British troops shall always be kept up to its full strength, whatever that may be ; and our estimate of 70,000 men has been framed on this assumption.

12. It may be noticed here that the present establishment of 59,000 men is the smallest that has been maintained in this country at any time since the mutiny. The strength for each year from 1860 is given in the Appendix. It will be seen that as lately as 1864, when the internal peace of India only had to be provided for, there were nearly 70,000 British troops in India. Appendix B.

13. The next point is to determine in what form this increase should be supplied.

14. First, as regards the artillery. This is the only part of the British establishment which has of late years undergone reduction. In 1881, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Army Commission adopted by the Government of India, nine batteries were sent home ; at the same time the garrison batteries retained were increased from 87 to 115 of all ranks, excluding officers ; the net reduction was about 800 men.

15. The Commander in Chief now proposes, as a part of the augmentation which he recommends, an addition to the Indian establishment of :—

One horse battery,  
Two field batteries,  
Four garrison batteries.

16. His Excellency observes that this proposal is irrespective of the garrison artillery which may be required for the projected frontier defences. But we think it would be better in our present estimate to take the requirements of these frontier defences into account. One garrison battery at least should be provided for the proposed defensive position in Pishin, and another for the defensive position proposed in advance of Peshawar. In other respects the Commander in Chief's estimate, which provides additional garrison artillery for the improved and more extensive artillery defences now being provided at Karachi, Bombay, and the Hooghly, appears sufficient. The whole requirements for garrison batteries, present and prospective, may therefore be estimated at six, which it may be said provisionally would be stationed :—

One at the new position at Quetta.  
One at the new position at Peshawar.  
One at Karachi.  
One at Bombay.  
One at Fort William.  
One in reserve at some convenient station to be fixed upon hereafter.

17. Next, as regards field artillery. The augmentation proposed by the Commander in Chief is nearly in the recognised due proportion of three guns per 1,000 men to the increase of British troops asked for, taking a garrison battery to represent six guns. But, as will be seen presently, we propose an increase of about 16,500 men to the Native Army, and a proportion of European artillery is required for that augmentation. The present number of field guns in India is 360, which for the existing Army, British and Native (exclusive of the contingents), about 177,000 strong, gives a proportion of little more than two guns per 1,000 men. The proportion generally recognised to be proper is three guns per 1,000 men. The whole of the Army, however, would not take the field ; and if the garrison artillery be included as representing an equivalent to the portion of the Army remaining in reserve, then the present total number of guns may be taken at 504, or nearly three per 1,000 men. With the increase now proposed for the Army, we think that not less than five batteries, or 30 field guns, should be added, which is only at the rate of one gun per 1,000 men of the total augmentation proposed. These batteries might be one of horse, two of field, and two of mountain artillery.

18. The total addition in artillery would therefore be—

1 battery horse artillery at 157	-	-	-	-	-	157
2 batteries field artillery at 157	-	-	-	-	-	314
2 batteries mountain artillery at 106	-	-	-	-	-	212
6 batteries garrison artillery at 115	-	-	-	-	-	690
<u>11</u>						<u>1,373</u>
					Total - - -	1,373

excluding officers.

19. Next, as regards the infantry. The Commander in Chief's proposals would bring up the strength of the British battalion in India to 1,064 of all ranks, excluding officers; and although such a battalion would certainly not be of a strength at all greater than is suitable for active service, still it would be strong enough to take the field in the first instance without being replenished from the reserves; and those battalions which in case of a campaign on the frontier remained to garrison India would also be at war strength. Having regard, then, to the two considerations which have been already enlarged upon, namely, the claim of India to draw upon the reserves, and, on the other hand, the possibility that circumstances might prevent this form of reinforcement from being immediately forthcoming, and, lastly, our desire, on financial grounds, to limit the augmentation to 11,000 men, we are of opinion that the establishment of the battalion in India should be fixed at something between its present figure of 868 of all ranks, excluding officers, and the establishment of 1,064 of all ranks proposed by the Commander in Chief. The Government of India in 1881, when reviewing the recommendations of the Army Commission Military Letter, No. 141, dated 24th April 1881, with regard to the establishment of British troops, proposed that the strength of the rank and file of the battalion in India should be raised from 820 to 920 privates, which, they observed, was 30 less than the strength at that time fixed for the battalion first for service at home. An establishment of this strength, 984 of all ranks, excluding officers, would be very suitable for the general purposes of military duty in this country. It would also furnish reasonably strong battalions for active service in case of sudden emergency, while at the same time such an establishment would not assume that India would be left without the aid of the home reserves. For active service the battalion should be augmented by at least 150 men from that source, or brought up to a total strength of 1,134, which, when sick and absentees are deducted, would give perhaps 1,000 men effective with the colours wherewith to open the campaign.

20. This proposed augmentation of 100 rank and file per battalion gives a total increase of 5,000 men to the existing establishment of 50 battalions.

21. The Commander in Chief proposes the addition of a fourth squadron to the nine cavalry regiments now in the country. We concur in this recommendation, which gives an increase of 1,332 men.

22. We further concur with the Commander in Chief in considering that some additional battalions of British Infantry should be stationed in India, but we would limit the number to three instead of four. Of these, two will be required to occupy the new entrenched position in Pishin, and one for the position at Peshawar, in addition to the present garrison of that place.

23. We may observe that the arrangement above proposed for obtaining the desired increase of British troops will also be the most economical that could be made in respect of barrack accommodation. The fortified positions at Peshawar and Pishin must necessarily be provided with quarters for the garrison to hold them, and be occupied by troops, setting free barracks in other parts.\* As regards existing barracks, the buildings for general purposes, canteens, guard room, staff quarters, &c, will be as suitable for battalions of 1,000 strong as for battalions of 900. The only additions necessary will be in the way of barrack rooms; but these are in many places in excess of existing wants, and by the needful redistribution of buildings and stations where necessary, the required accommodation can be obtained with a moderate outlay.

\* One battalion has already been moved up from Bangalore, leaving the barracks at that place empty.

24. If

INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

31

24. If the measures proposed above were adopted, the total increase to the British Army in India would be as follows :—

*Cavalry—*

Addition of a fourth squadron to nine regiments - - - 1,332

*Artillery—*

1 battery of horse artillery at 157	-	-	-	-	157
2 batteries of field artillery at 157	-	-	-	-	314
2 batteries of mountain artillery at 106	-	-	-	-	212
6 batteries of garrison artillery at 115	-	-	-	-	690
					1,373
<u>11 Total Batteries.</u>					

*Infantry—*

Increase of 100 men to 50 regiments	-	-	-	5,000
Three additional battalions at 984	-	-	-	2,952
				7,952
<b>Total Increase</b>	-	-	-	10,657

or nearly 11,000 men.

25. The total establishment would therefore be :—

Present Establishment	-	-	-	-	59,371
Addition as above	-	-	-	-	10,657
<b>Total</b>	-	-	-	-	70,028

exclusive of officers.

*Native Army— Cavalry.*

26. First, as regards the cavalry. Our recommendations with respect to this branch have already been submitted, and have just been sanctioned by your Lordship,\* but it may be useful to recapitulate them here.

\* Telegram from Secretary of State of 4th August 1885.

27. The 17 regiments of Bengal Cavalry and four regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force Cavalry to be organised in four squadrons, and brought up to a total strength of 625 natives of all ranks, being an increase of 75 to the existing strength.

28. The two regiments of Central India Horse to be brought up to the same strength as the Bengal Cavalry Regiment, which will involve an increase of 132 of all ranks to their present establishment.

29. The six regiments of Bombay Cavalry to be brought up to the same strength as the Bengal Cavalry Regiment, namely, 625 of all ranks, involving an increase of 75 of all ranks to the present establishment.

30. The foregoing 29 regiments to have each an additional squadron officer, which will raise the establishment of British officers per regiment from eight to nine.

31. The four regiments of Madras Cavalry to be increased from their present strength of 387 natives of all ranks to a total of 489 natives of all ranks, organised, as at present, in three squadrons.

32. It is further proposed to raise three new regiments of cavalry, two in Bengal and one in Bombay, each on the new strength of 625 of all ranks. The

Appendix A.

Commander in Chief in India observes that it appears preferable to raise all three regiments in the Bengal Presidency, as the Commander in Chief, Bombay, has frequently reported that it is difficult to get men to enlist under the silladar system in that presidency, whereas in Bengal no such difficulties are experienced. The Bombay Army, however, is comparatively the weaker in cavalry, and we think that the difficulty referred to by his Excellency might be overcome, and a valuable purpose served, by raising one of the three new regiments to take the place of the 3rd Sind Horse, which was reduced in 1882, from the tribes on the Biluchistan frontier. The climate of that country, in which henceforward a considerable portion of the Indian Army must be permanently stationed, is unquestionably trying to the natives of India; and, both on political and military grounds, it appears desirable to follow up the policy which has hitherto been pursued of enlisting in the army the people of the country with whom, under the gradual advance of the British power, we have successively come in contact. We would therefore adhere to the proposal to give this third regiment to the Bombay Presidency.

33. The total augmentation to the cavalry under these proposals will amount to 5,072 natives of all ranks, which will bring up the establishment from the present strength of 17,384 to 22,456:—

17 regiments Bengal Cavalry.	
4 regiments Punjab Frontier Force Cavalry.	
21 regiments, each increased by 75 men	- - - - 1,575
2 regiments Central India Horse, each increased by 132 men	264
6 regiments Bombay Cavalry, each increased by 75 men	- 450
4 regiments Madras Cavalry, each increased by 102 men	- 408
Increase to existing regiments	- - - 2,697
3 new regiments, 2 in Bengal, 1 in Bombay, of 625 each	- 1,875
Total	- - - 4,572
The present establishment of cavalry is	- - - 17,384
Proposed augmentation	- - - 4,572
Total proposed strength	- - - 21,956

*Native Infantry. Linked Battalions.*

34. We now turn to the Native Infantry. The proposal submitted in the letter of May last, above quoted, regarding this branch of the service was simply for raising each regiment of the Indian Army from 832 to 1,000 natives of all ranks, by the addition of 168 non-commissioned officers and privates. It was stated that this increase was proposed as a special war measure, which was not intended to be permanent, but was to be subject to further consideration when the emergency which led to the proposal had passed away. That measure has not been carried out, and we now desire to substitute for it a proposal for the permanent re-organisation of the Native Infantry to replace the present organisation, which is confessedly adapted for Indian service only and the maintenance of internal tranquillity. Since that proposal was made, we have received your \* Telegram to Viceroy of 7th July 1885. Lordship's authority\* to introduce a system of reserves; but we have had under consideration at the same time, as part of a general scheme for strengthening the active army, the question of substituting for the present system of single battalion regiments one of regiments composed of two or more battalions. While the system of reserves admits of a regiment being retained in peace time on a small establishment, and brought up to a war establishment when necessary, this mode of augmentation operates only at the outset

outset of a war ; it does not afford the machinery for keeping the regiment up to its full strength. And undoubtedly under the present system of single battalion regiments having no connection with each other, a great source of strength is wasted. Under no circumstances is it conceivable that the whole Indian Army could be employed against a foreign enemy, but the regiments which remain in quarters afford no aid to strengthening the ranks of those in the field, except such as can be given by the uncertain and insufficient process of volunteering. We have no doubt, therefore, that a reorganisation of the infantry of the Native Army is necessary under the present circumstances, and we desire to obtain your Lordship's authority to set about introducing such a measure. The only doubtful point appeared to be whether the present infantry regiments should be reorganised in linked double battalions, or in regiments of

Adjutant General's letter as above, three battalions. It will be seen that the Com- Appendix A.  
 paragraph 27. mander in Chief has submitted alternative

proposals on this head, and on full consideration we have no hesitation in pronouncing in favour of the three-battalion system as the more flexible and generally convenient of the two. It may be mentioned that the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army brought forward a proposal to this effect in 1882, when he pointed out that, under ordinary circumstances, it was not likely that the Bombay Army would be called upon to furnish more than one-third of its regiments for service beyond the frontier, in which case each battalion, under the proposed organisation, would have two battalions remaining in India to act as feeders to it. The Bombay Government have lately renewed the proposal. The same consideration applies to the Madras Army. While, as regards the Bengal Army, the three-battalion system would admit on emergency of two battalions being sent into the field, and having still a third battalion in reserve to act as a depôt and feeder ; whereas, under the linked-battalion system, if it is to be worked properly, not more than one-half of those regiments could be employed on active service at a time. The same advantages would be gained in respect of the European officers. With a regiment of three battalions and 24 officers, it should be possible to keep the battalion on active service supplied with its full establishment of officers, and a valid objection to the present system of officering the Indian Army, namely, that either the number of officers maintained in peace time must be in excess of the wants of the service, or that a regiment on service may be denuded of officers to a dangerous extent, will be satisfied. We desire therefore to obtain your Lordship's authority to carry out at once the reorganisation of the native infantry upon the three-battalion system.

35. The full benefit of this measure can, of course, be prospective only. The men now in the service, who have enlisted for a particular battalion, cannot be transferred to another, except with their own consent ; but hereafter a sepoy would enlist for a particular battalion with the liability to be transferred to either of the linked battalions.

36. As regards the officers, they should be placed, in our opinion, on the footing proposed by the Government of India in their Military Letter No. 230, of the 24th June 1881, paragraphs 28-29, the conditions stated in which should be generally adhered to.

37. We think that it is not necessary or desirable to alter the existing numbers of regiments. This may follow, perhaps, hereafter, but the change does not appear to be called for at present.

38. Next, as to the way of carrying out the change : First, with respect to the Madras Army. This consists of 32 battalions, two of which are pioneers ; it would, therefore, form ten regiments of three battalions each, and a pioneer regiment of two battalions. The Government of Madras will be asked to propose the distribution.

39. The Bombay Army consists of 23 regiments of the Line and three local Biluch regiments. The Commander in Chief of that army has already proposed the order of linking those regiments, the three Biluch regiments, as one, and the rest of the army in seven regiments of three battalions each,

Adjutant General, Bombay Army, No. 5-C.-T., dated 25th March 1882 (Pro. June 1882, No. 1157).

Government of Bombay, No. 3752, dated 6th July 1885.

Appendix A.

with two spare; and as his Excellency is still of the same opinion, that order may be adopted. One of these spare battalions is the Marine Battalion. With the concurrence of the Bombay Government, we would propose that the other battalion be made into a pioneer regiment, or, which would be a better arrangement, that these two battalions should be formed into a regiment of pioneers. The Army Commission recommended that each of the Indian armies should contain a pioneer element; and we entirely concur in that opinion. The Punjab Pioneers have proved most valuable, and the Madras Pioneers, lately formed, promise well.

40. The Bengal Army may be conveniently considered under the three heads of Punjabis, Hindustanis, and Goorkhas.

41. The schedule attached to the Adjutant-General's letter shows the proposed way of grouping the regiments in threes. Of the 40 Line regiments

*Note.*—There were 45 regiments up to 1882, but in that year five were broken up—the 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, and 41st.

of the Bengal Army, 23 belong to the Hindustani portion of it. In this number we include the 42nd, 43rd, and 44th, because, although they are mainly composed of Goorkhas, and have only a small Hindustani element, they are always stationed in Assam, and may be regarded as belonging to the Hindustani portion. These 23 regiments would be organised as seven regiments of three battalions each, and one regiment of two battalions, which two battalions might be converted into pioneers, if it should be found that such a change would be acceptable to the men.

42. The remaining 17 Line battalions of the Bengal Army are Sikhs and Punjabis, two of these, the 23rd and 32nd, being Pioneer Muzbee Sikh battalions; the other 15 would be conveniently distributed in five regiments of three battalions each.

43. The Commander in Chief proposes to raise a new regiment of Muzbee Pioneers on the model of the 23rd and 32nd. We support this recommendation. This battalion would be linked to the above two, would be numbered the 34th, and would take the place of the regiment of that number which was reduced in 1882.

44. His Excellency also proposes to raise three more battalions of Sikhs. This recommendation we also desire to support. The number of Sikhs now serving is only about 11,400, and we think this important fighting element of the army may safely and properly be increased. The three battalions, if raised, would be organised in one regiment, and would be numbered the 35th, 36th, and 37th, in the room of those reduced in 1882.

45. There are five regiments of Goorkhas. Her Majesty's Government have authorised the raising of five additional regiments as second battalions of the existing ones. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, only half of the Goorkha portion of the army would take the field; but if it were desired to employ this valuable force to a greater extent, this might be arranged, as soon as the second battalions have been raised, by organising a *dépôt* battalion for the time, and sending both battalions of a regiment on a somewhat reduced scale into the field.

46. The Punjab Frontier Force comprises nine regiments of infantry, excluding the Guides, which might similarly be organised in three regiments of three battalions; the Guides to remain a separate corps as at present.

#### *Strength of Native Infantry Regiments.*

47. It will be seen that the Commander in Chief proposes to raise the establishment of the Bengal, Bombay, and Punjab Frontier Force regiments from their present strength of 832 to 980 of all ranks; the eight Goorkha and Assam regiments being also raised from their present establishment of 912 to 980 of all



all ranks. Sir Donald Stewart does not propose any augmentation to the Madras Infantry. His reasons for not doing so are given in the 20th paragraph of the Adjutant-General's letter.

48. We consider that if the army were to remain on its present footing of isolated battalions, with no reserves, the proposals of the Commander in Chief would be the very lowest which could safely be accepted. A battalion of even nearly 1,000 men would not furnish more than a proper strength at the outset of a campaign, and would soon, under the stress of war, run down to a much lower figure, and there would be no means of rapidly replacing casualties. But the two measures which it is proposed to introduce, the linking of battalions and the formation of a reserve, materially alter the aspect of the case. If the reserve system can be introduced successfully, these measures of reorganisation will admit for the first time of all the troops available, those in quarters as well as those in the field, being turned to the best account. And the question arises how far, in view of the aid which may be furnished by these two agencies towards keeping the battalions on active service in an efficient state, it would be prudent and reasonable to maintain an establishment on a scale somewhat smaller than that proposed by the Commander in Chief.

49. We think it may be accepted that the proper strength of a battalion in the field is about a thousand men, and that our organisation ought to be such as will admit of maintaining a battalion at that strength for at least one or two campaigns. Now in the case of a regiment of three battalions which sends only one into the field, there will remain two in quarters as a reserve, or a total, on the present strength, of about 1,400 men with which to strengthen the battalion in the field, after first bringing it up to 1,000 men. For such cases the existing establishment of battalions, 832 of all ranks, ought to suffice.

50. But in the case of what must be recognised as the most valuable fighting element of the Native Army, it might be found necessary to send two out of three battalions of several regiments into the field. In that case there would remain only about 400 men with the depôt battalion, after the two battalions on active service had been brought up to the war strength of 1,000 each. Such a reserve would be quite insufficient.

51. This calculation, however, leaves out of consideration the assistance to be derived from the reserve. The Army Commission recommended that this should be fixed at 200 men per battalion, so that a regiment of three battalions would have a reserve of 600 men, all of whom would be available for replenishing casualties in the one or two battalions on active service. Thus, if only one battalion were on service, there would be 600 reservists available before the other two battalions were drawn upon. If two out of three battalions went on service, they would each have a reserve of 300 men, besides the third battalion to fall back upon. So that with battalions 980 strong and a system of reserves, the number of men available at the beginning of a war might thus appear to be somewhat in excess of the needs of the case. We say at the beginning, because it is quite possible that in case of a prolonged campaign recruiting might fail, as happened in the last Afghan war, and then the reserves available at the outset would not prove to be more than necessary in the long run.

52. But there are two considerations which at the present time modify this view of the case. At the outset the men of the linked battalions would be available for transfer to another battalion of their regiment only with their own consent, so that we cannot count with any certainty on being able to fill up casualties from that source. And further, the possibility of establishing a satisfactory reserve system has yet to be ascertained by trial. Moreover, in order that a reserve should be established, it is necessary to strengthen the regiments in the first instance in order to form the reserve. It would not be expedient at the present time to transfer 200 men to the reserve, and leave the battalion for several months with only 600 effective soldiers, while recruits were being trained to supply their places.

53. In view, then, of all these considerations, we desire to submit the following proposals:—

First, as regards the Bengal Army. Every battalion to be recruited to a strength in the first instance of 980 of all ranks, and to be maintained at that strength until it has furnished 150 men to the reserve; the reserve to be then further increased by reducing the battalion to 912 of all ranks, which is the existing strength of the Assam and Goorkha regiments. Each battalion will then consist of 912 soldiers present for duty, and 218 men in the reserve. This process may be expected to take a couple of years to effect, by which time circumstances will probably indicate more clearly than at present whether or not this number of 912 is an adequate establishment for a battalion. This proposal differs from that of the Commander-in-Chief only so far that we contemplate a slight reduction on the reserve becoming complete.

54 Next, as regards the Bombay Army. We would propose a similar augmentation, but on a somewhat smaller scale.

Each battalion to be raised in the first instance from its present strength of 832 of all ranks to 912 of all ranks. As soon as the augmentation is completed, men to be passed into the reserve until that reaches a strength of 160 men, when the process would stop. The establishment of a battalion will then consist of 832 of all ranks, as at present, with 160 in the reserve. This proposal is for a smaller strength than that proposed by Sir Donald Stewart, both present and prospective.

55. For the Madras Army a similar arrangement is proposed, except that no augmentation would be made, but a reserve of 160 men to be formed as rapidly as can be effected, the places of the reservists being at once filled by recruits. This is the Commander-in-Chief's proposal, with the addition of a reserve.

56. The result of these proposals would be an increase to the Bengal Infantry of—

47 battalions at 80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,760
5 new Goorkha battalions at 912	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,560
3 new Sikh battalions at 912	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,736
1 new Pioneer battalion at 912	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	912
								11,968
								Increase - - -
Present establishment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46,400
								58,368
								Proposed - - -

57. There would also be a temporary increase to the Bombay Infantry of—

20 by 80 =	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,080
								2,080

58. In addition, there would be the reserve—

Bengal, 64 battalions at 218	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,952
Bombay, 26 battalions at 160	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,160
Madras, 32 battalions at 160	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,120
								23,232
								23,232

59. But no precise value can be attached to these figures for the reserve in the present state of uncertainty as to what may be the result of the experiment.

60. The increase proposed by the Commander in Chief of 68 men more per battalion for the Bengal Infantry amounts to 16,320, and this larger figure would also be reached under our proposals in the first instance until the reserve is completed. The increased proposed by him for the Bombay Infantry is 3,848.

61. The

61. The total increase to the Indian Army would be—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	
Bengal, including Central India Horse and Punjab Frontier Force - - - - -	3,089	11,968*	15,057	* 16,320 in the first instance.
Madras - - - - -	408	—	408	
Bombay - - - - -	1,075	2,080†	1,075	† Temporary.
<b>TOTAL permanent - - -</b>	<b>4,572</b>	<b>11,068</b>	<b>16,540</b>	

62. In making this reduction on the proposals of the Commander in Chief, which involve an increase of 24,740 men, we are far from considering his proposals excessive. We are very sensible indeed that, considered with reference to the altered circumstances which the Government of India have now to meet, his Excellency's views are very moderate, and that, even before the additions now proposed can be carried out, the pressure of circumstances may involve an entire alteration of plans, and an increase to the Indian Army, both British and Native, on a much larger scale. But we have also in view the strong obligation upon us not to place a heavier burden on the finances of the country than they can bear without serious strain. That some augmentation must be made to the army will, we think, be accepted as necessary by all authorities who have to deal with the subject. The proposals now submitted comprise, we think, the very smallest measure compatible with reasonable precaution, and we have framed them on this scale because we think it is better to confine ourselves, in the first instance at any rate, to a measure which may have to be enlarged, rather than to put forward one which might afterwards admit of being reduced.

63. It will be seen from the estimates attached to this letter that the effect of our proposals will be an increase to the military estimates of 1,196,800 l. a year. The proposals of the Commander in Chief would cost 1,616,200 l. a year, or, taking into account home charges, reliefs, &c., about 500,000 l. a year more than ours. It will be observed that the estimates do not include non-effective charges. Appendix G.

*Conditions of Service in the Reserve.*

64. We have already stated that we propose in the first instance to limit the reserve to about 23,000 men. If it is found on trial that such a force can be satisfactorily established, it can be augmented hereafter, should circumstances render an augmentation desirable. The proposals of the Army Commission on the subject, which are reproduced in the appendix to this letter, were for a reserve pay of four rupees a month, payable half-yearly; this rate to be continued after 21 years' service with a reduced liability to serve only on garrison duty, and after 32 years' service on a pension without any further liability. Appendix C.

65. In our letter No. 44 of 1885 we proposed a gratuity at the rate of 20 rupees a year; also a gratuity of 120 rupees at the end of 15 years, when the man's service would be completed.

66. On a further consideration we are disposed to give the preference to the general plan of the Army Commission, because it is probable that the sepoy will attach great value to the certainty of the fixed allowance from the time he passes to the reserve for the rest of his life. Moreover, a difficulty would arise in the

Appendix D.

case of men called up for active service, and who afterwards returned to the reserve, if they gained thereby no claim to pension. We propose, therefore, to adopt the plan of the Commission in its main features. Their limitation, however, of 12 years' service before a man becomes eligible for admission to the reserve, would not furnish a sufficiency of men for the purpose, because in many regiments the greater proportion of the men are quite young soldiers. The Commander in Chief has proposed a scheme fulfilling the needful conditions, which is attached to this letter; it will be seen that they comprise the following main points:—

Adjutant's General's No. 2352 B,  
dated 28th July 1885.

Men to be eligible for the reserve after three and up to 12 years' service.

The reservist to be liable to garrison duty only after 21 years' total service, and to be eligible for pension after 32 years' service.

The pay for privates to be Rs. 3. 8. a month.

A scale of gratuities is provided for men disqualified for service before completing service for pension.

67. It will be a feature of the reserve system that each regiment under the new organisation will have one of its battalions always stationed at or in the neighbourhood of a particular district, so that wherever the other battalions may be, there will always be a depôt battalion in a fixed place to which the reservist will be attached when he comes up for his training every year or every alternate year. There will be no difficulty under the present organisation of regiments in arranging this.

68. When the reserves are completed to the maximum strength proposed in paragraph 60, the total cost would be 9,75,744 rupees per annum.

69. The Commander in Chief makes a proposal for forming a small cavalry reserve, which we desire to adopt.

There would also be a second reserve of men of 21 years' service and upwards. The strength of this force cannot be estimated with any precision, but it would certainly be small.

#### *Improvement of Position of the Native Soldier.*

70. In making arrangements for the augmentation of the Native Army, it is necessary at the same time to combine with them such measures as may serve to ensure that the increased numbers of soldiers wanted shall be forthcoming. For we must not leave out of sight the fact that of late years it has become comparatively difficult to obtain recruits. Whereas in former years service in the army was so popular that practically any number of sepoys could be obtained immediately on the call being made, latterly the recruiting has barely sufficed to make good the ordinary rate of casualties on the peace establishment. The main cause for this falling off we believe to be simply that, while the sepoy's pay has remained at its present rate of seven rupees *per mensem* during the present century, the rate of wages for all other employments has risen. In fact, we have now reached a situation in India analogous to that which obtains in England. The Indian Army, like the British Army, is raised by voluntary enlistment, and the rate of wage offered to the soldier is lower than what can be obtained in most other employments, even of a menial kind, and by classes inferior to him. For the non-combatant classes of the army, transport attendants, doolie-bearers, &c., the rates of pay have had to be largely raised from time to time, till they now approximate closely, and in some cases exceed those given to the soldier. The time has come then, in our opinion, when it has absolutely become necessary to take steps to restore to military service the popularity it formerly possessed, and thus to regain the source of military strength which the Indian Government should always be able to command, an unlimited supply of fighting material. And it is in the highest degree desirable to make the needful change at once, so that the rate of recruiting may be satisfactorily maintained in the present time of peace. During the last Afghan war recruiting came practically to an end, notwithstanding the high bounties resorted to. It would be disastrous to find that,

that, if war broke out, a call for more soldiers failed to obtain response, while there would be grave objections to raising terms under stress of emergency. Whatever needs to be done in this way should, we think, be done at once.

71. One boon which would be greatly appreciated by the sepoy would be the grant to him of a free railway pass when going on and coming back from furlough. Fifteen per cent. of the men of a regiment are usually allowed to take furlough each year. In the case of a Punjab regiment serving in Bengal, or a Hindustani regiment serving on the frontier, the cost of the railway journey both ways may be as much as the sepoy's pay for three months. We propose in future to give the regular number of sepoys granted furlough and travelling by rail a free railway pass. It is impossible to estimate accurately the cost of this measure, because the stations of the regiments, and therefore the distances of the men from their homes, vary from year to year; and many men make the journey on foot from inability to pay the railway fare. But we may observe that on the State lines the cost to Government will be very small as compared with the saving to the sepoys. What really will happen is that Government will forego the profit it now makes out of the sepoys who travel. On the lines which do not belong to the State, we shall arrange for the sepoy going on furlough to travel at troop train rates, which will be paid by the Government. This change is recommended by the Commander in Chief.\*

\* Adjutant General's  
Letter, No. 2204 B.  
dated 16th July  
1885.  
Appendix E.

72. In 1877 the terms for the grant of good conduct pay were improved, and at present the sepoy receives a first grant of one rupee a month after three years' service, a second rate of two rupees after nine years' service, and a third rate of three rupees after 15 years' service, when his pay becomes 10 rupees. We would recommend that the second increment be given after six years instead of nine years' service, and the third increment after 10 years instead of 15 years' service. We recommend this change in view of the fact, which is clearly shown in the annexed tables, that the great drain on the army now takes places from the proportionately large number of privates who claim their discharge in the early years of their service; a drain which grants of good conduct pay at earlier periods than the present may tend to check.

Appendix F.

73. The rules for the payment of recruits in Bengal and Madras are not very satisfactory, inasmuch as the recruit does not get his full rate of pay until he joins his regiment. We propose to modify the rules in this respect.

74. The sepoy has to provide his own great-coat at a cost of from 10 rupees to 13 rupees. This is a heavy charge, and we think the annual allowance for kit, "half-mounting," as it is termed, should be increased from four rupees to five rupees in order to meet it.

75. One cause of the unpopularity of the service of late years is undoubtedly the long distances at which the men are called upon to serve from their homes during peace time. Service in Bengal is distasteful to the Punjabi, and equally so is service in the Punjab to the Hindustani; while politically it is not desirable to mix up the two classes promiscuously to any great extent in peace time. We have in previous letters enlarged on the importance of maintaining this segregation. There are at the present time only four Hindustani regiments serving in the Punjab, and five Punjabi regiments serving in Hindustan. The liability to this distant service exists, however, for every sepoy, and we have reason to believe that it is a cause of making the service unpopular. The measure proposed for constituting the Bengal Army in two separate commands in peace time would practically put a stop to this altogether.

76. Another matter in the position of the sepoy which calls for improvement, but in which the change can be made only gradually, is in respect of his hutting accommodation. The hutting allowance as at present given is insufficient to enable the men to hut themselves properly; and moreover the state of things under which this allowance was first sanctioned, when the men really lived in huts which they built themselves, has passed away. The sepoys throughout India are now quartered in what are really very inferior barracks, which however are not kept up by the State, but are maintained by the men on their hutting allowance. The result is that in a large number of stations the quarters of the native troops are quite unfit for habitation. Some definite action in the way of improvement would possibly have been taken before this

but for the great outlay which was being incurred for the accommodation of British troops. The British troops, however, are now well provided for as regards barracks in almost all parts of India, and the necessity for improving the quarters of the native troops, who undoubtedly suffer much in health from their present insufficient accommodation, has lately been engaging the attention of the Government. Some improved lines for native troops have lately been built in the Madras Presidency under the supervision of the Commander in Chief, and also in Bombay, and we hope soon to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to what should be the scale of the accommodation necessary, and the cost at which it may be supplied. As soon as these points are satisfactorily settled, we shall be prepared to furnish grants to be expended under regimental arrangements for constructing wholesome accommodation for native troops throughout India on a systematic plan, so that the measure may be carried out to completion within a definite term of years. We may mention that the Punjab Frontier Force has already been provided with excellent barracks built by the State. So have been the Local Service regiments.

77. Last, but not least, we propose to improve the position of the sepoy in respect of the pension rules. At present no man can claim a pension until he has completed 32 years' service, a period before which the sepoy has ceased to be a really effective soldier for active service. We recommend that the time at which pension can be claimed, irrespective of health, should be fixed at 21 years' service for all ranks of the regular army. This measure ought to conduce much to the popularity of the army. At present the distant prospect of pension has no sensible effect in keeping the private soldier in the ranks. The amount of extra charge this will involve cannot be precisely stated; but it will not be large, for it will be seen from the attached tables that the proportion of old soldiers in the army is very small.

78. If this change be made, the present invalid pension after 15 years' service should be abolished prospectively, and the scale of gratuities extended for men discharged for ill-health with less than 21 years' service.

#### *Reductions and Reorganisations.*

79. We now turn to consider what saving may be effected as a partial set-off against this additional outlay. The regimental establishments being increased, economies can be effected only in the staff and departments of the army; and, in pursuance of Lord Kimberley's instructions,\* we have now to state how far these are susceptible of reduction. And we may at once say that, in our opinion, this can be effected only by a reform and simplification of military administration on the lines proposed by the Army Commission, and recommended for adoption by the Government of India in 1881, and again pressed in 1883.

\* Despatch No. 39, dated 12th February 1885.

80. We may first note that the following measures, proposed by the latter in dealing with the report of the Commission, which involve in most cases a reduction of expenditure, and in others a great improvement in procedure, have already been carried out:—

Reduction of the number of Native regiments of the Indian Army, with a corresponding increase to the strength of the remainder.

Reorganisation of the Ordnance Department.

Partial reorganisation of the Commissariat Department.

Formation of an Army Transport Department.

Introduction of the station hospital system for British troops. The larger measure proposed of the reorganisation of the Medical Department has not been carried out.

Partial reorganisation of the Army Veterinary Department.

81. There still remains to be carried out the reduction of commands and army staff, and the establishments connected with the different military departments, which was proposed as a part of the general scheme for the reform of army administration. And upon this point we desire again to submit, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, that the abolition of the presidential

tial system in its present form, recommended by the Army Commission, and earnestly pressed upon the Secretary of State for India by Lord Ripon's Government, should now be carried out without further loss of time. We urge this in the strongest way, not so much because, as will be seen from the figures to be given below, it is the only means of effecting that reduction of expenditure which we consider it to be incumbent on the Government to effect, as because we are very deeply sensible of the grave inconvenience which must result if this Government is called upon to undertake extensive military operations under the present system of divided military administration. Unless this measure be agreed to, the Indian Government would embark on war weighted with this division of military authority and responsibility. It will be unnecessary here to repeat the arguments which have already been advanced by Lord Ripon's Government in favour of this pressing reform. We would merely invite your Lordship's particular attention to the letters of the Government of India in 1881 and 1883, in which the case for change is stated at great length, only adding the expression of our conviction that the events of the past few months have entirely confirmed the apprehensions expressed by the Government of India of the ill consequences that might follow if this reform should be deferred until the season of quiet had passed away. We regret that the advantage was not taken of a less critical time than the present to effect the change, and we feel that any further delay in dealing with this matter is to be deprecated. Even in such a comparatively small matter as the provision of supplies for the troops warned for service in Biluchistan, and the arrangements lately made for placing those troops in the field, the evils of divided control, notwithstanding the hearty and loyal co-operation manifested by the different authorities concerned, were very apparent. And we should regard with considerable misgivings the prospect of undertaking actual war under such disabilities. We would therefore press that the needful action may be taken for carrying this change into effect without further loss of time.

82. As regards the troops stationed beyond the limits of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, in Burma, Rajputana, &c., it would be practicable to introduce at once the more simple and convenient procedure recommended by the Government of India in their letter, No. 208 of 1884, which accordingly, with your Lordship's sanction, we propose to adopt for the troops in these provinces, as we have already found it necessary to do for the troops in Biluchistan.

Paragraphs 7, 8, 90.

83. We may here notice that the present is a suitable time for making the larger reform advocated, because the three commands in India will shortly become vacant, and the successors to these appointments in Madras and Bombay might be nominated under the new conditions.

84. There is a further change which we recommend should be at once carried out, the transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force to the orders of the Commander in Chief in India. It is unnecessary to repeat here the reasons which have already been advanced at length for this measure, but recent events have shown it, in our judgment, even more plainly than before to be necessary. Moreover, a considerable part of the Punjab frontier is now overlapped and covered by the territory occupied by us in Biluchistan, and so has ceased to be a frontier in the original sense; that the force which garrisons the former country should be subject to a different jurisdiction from that of the regular army stationed beyond it is a source of constant trouble and embarrassment, and is opposed to rational principles of administration. We do not, however, propose to make any change in the organisation of the Punjab Frontier Force, which should continue to be a purely local force stationed beyond the Indus and in Hazara, and also, perhaps, if necessity arises, at Multan, but simply that it should come under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief. We have reason to believe that the transfer would be very acceptable to the officers of the force, who probably feel with us that the state of things, which at one time rendered a local administration of the force appropriate, has now passed away.

85. If these recommendations for simplifying Indian army administration be carried out, then the reduction in the commands and staff of the army proposed

Report,  
paragraphs 84-90.

by the Commission may also be carried out. These are, briefly, the reduction of the present 35 divisions, districts, and brigades commanded by general officers into 25 districts, and a reduction of the staff.

Appendix H.

86. The distribution of troops throughout the country has been somewhat altered since the Commission reported, and some further changes will be necessary owing to the occupation of Pishin. But we should be prepared to carry out the change on the lines proposed by the Commission; that is, to reduce the number of commands to 25, and the staff to the scale proposed by them. We attach an estimate framed in accordance with these conditions, which shows a saving upon present charges for staff and commands of about 2½ lakhs a year. This estimate provides for a reduction of the staff of the two lieutenant-generals commanding in Madras and Bombay, and also for the appointment of two lieutenant-generals for the eastern and western portions of the Bengal army.

87. The other items of saving will be in the abolition of the Military Departments of Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab. In our military letter of 1881 on this subject,\* the financial result of these measures was stated at 1½ lakhs per annum. Lord Kimberley, in his Despatch † in reply, questioned the sufficiency of this estimate on the ground that the additional work thrown upon the Government of India would absorb a large part of the saving to accrue from the change. But since that estimate was made, the experience gained of the saving to the Government of India Secretariat in correspondence, owing to the centralisation of the administration of the Ordnance Department and the appointment of a director general, and also the partial centralisation of the Commissariat Department by the appointment of a Commissary General in Chief attached to the Government of India, satisfies us that, so far from the proposal to assume the direct administration of the Indian armies leading to increased work, the result will be rather the reverse. Centralisation and simplification of military administration reduce, and do not increase, the labours of this Government. The concentration of the military offices, including Army headquarters, in one group of buildings at Simla has also materially tended to reduce business and correspondence. And we are satisfied that any additional work which might come on the Government of India by undertaking the direct administration of all the Indian armies in those small details which still remain to be taken over would be sufficiently met by the additional establishment proposed, and that the business of the Military Department, or, as it would properly be called, the War Department of the Government of India, would be amply provided for under the estimate made in 1881. The total saving, therefore, which could be claimed for the proposal would be in—

\* No. 336, dated 9th September 1881.

Departments to be abolished—	<i>Rs.</i>
Military Department, Madras -	63,700
Military Department, Bombay -	86,000
Military Department, Punjab -	42,000
	<hr/>
	1,91,700
<i>Deduct</i> —Additional expenditure for	
Military Secretariat, Government	
of India - - - - -	35,880
	<hr/>
Net Saving - - -	1,55,820

† No. 243, dated the 26th July 1883, paragraph 3.

Staff and Commands - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i>
	2,24,648
Army Departments - - - - -	1,55,820
	<hr/>
Total - - - <i>Rs.</i>	3,80,468

88. This is only a small saving to place against the large increase of military expenditure proposed. But, as far as it goes, a saving of this sort may be regarded as satisfactory, if it can be effected not only without interfering with the efficiency with the Army, but as part of a most important and present reform.

89. The Commander in Chief desires to record his opinion that he adheres to his own proposals for the larger increase of both European and Native troops than that proposed in this Despatch, believing the addition of 16,000 British troops to be the smallest required by present circumstances; while his Excellency considers that the Native Army cannot be increased to the extent



extent desired by him unless the established proportion of British troops also is supplied.

90. Our honourable colleagues, Mr. Ilbert and Sir Auckland Colvin dissent from some of the recommendations contained in this Despatch; their reasons for doing so are embodied in the accompanying minute.

We have, &c.  
 (signed) *Dufferin.*  
*D. M. Stewart.*  
*T. F. Wilson.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*S. C. Bayley.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*

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Enclosure in No. 25.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir *A. Colvin* and the Honourable Mr. *C. P. Ilbert* on the proposed permanent increase to the Strength of the Indian Army.

1. WHILST fully agreeing in the proposals of our colleagues for a better organisation of the Indian Army, we regret that we are unable, for the reasons given in this Minute, to concur in the recommendations of the Despatch which it accompanies, regarding a permanent increase in the numerical strength of that army. We have no desire to dispute the claim of our military colleagues to speak on the point with greater authority than any to which we can pretend; but we perceive that there is great divergence of opinion on the subject among military men; and we think that, in the consideration which has been now given to the subject, the obligation of the English Government to contribute towards the safety of its Indian Empire has been unduly minimised.

2. The Indian Army Commission, who were appointed by and reported to Lord Lytton's Government, who wrote with perfect knowledge of the rapidity and the direction of the Russian advance in Central Asia, and on whose recommendations are based some of the most important proposals of the Despatch, summarised as follows, in their Report of November 1879, the purposes for which the Army of India must be maintained:—

“(a) Preventing and repelling attacks, or threatened aggression, from foreign enemies beyond the border.

“(b) Making successful armed disturbance or rebellion within British India or its feudatory states impossible.

“(c) Watching and overawing the armies of Native feudatory states.” (Report, Paragraph 17.)

3. It appears indisputable from the Report that, in their enumeration of these purposes, the Commission contemplated the contingency of operations beyond the frontier, not merely against Russia with Afghanistan as our ally, but against Russia assisted by Afghanistan.

They say: “The external foes which the Indian Army may have to meet on its land frontier are Russia and Afghanistan on the north-west. . . . For operations against Russia, or Afghanistan assisted by Russia, a force of two army corps, or 50,000 to 60,000 fighting men, might possibly be necessary. No one has ever suggested that the Army of India should be maintained at a strength necessary to put into the field a larger force than this.” (Report, Paragraph 17.)

4. They were of opinion that the Army of India, if properly organised, was sufficient to provide for the purposes thus enumerated, without any addition to its numerical strength.

5. They expressly made the reserve that, in making this estimate, they did not take into consideration the contingency of a permanent or lengthened military occupation of Afghanistan.

“We have not considered,” they say, “the question of the future military occupation of Afghanistan proper, or any part of it not embraced in the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. We are well aware that, if there is to be a permanent, or even a lengthened, military occupation of Afghanistan, it can no more be provided from the Army, or the distribution of the Army that we propose, than it could be from the Army as it now is. There can be no doubt that the duty of garrisoning Afghanistan will not be popular with the regular Native troops, and that if the occupation of the country is of any duration, constant relief of regiments will be called for, which will involve the

“maintenance in India of a number of regiments extra to the present establishment. We presume, therefore, that if Aghanistan is to be occupied for any great length of time—a matter on which, as far as we know at present, no decision has been arrived at—regiments will be specially raised in India, and perhaps to some extent in Afghanistan itself, for local service in that country, thus obviating the necessity for a system of constant relief from the regular Native Army.”

6. The data on which the Army Commission based their estimates have not, so far as we have been able to learn, been proved insufficient. Nor is it suggested that, in consequence of any changes which have been made since the Commission's Report was presented, the fighting power of the Indian Army is less than it then was. On the contrary, our honourable military colleague, in a Minute dated 10th September 1884, which was forwarded to the Secretary of State under cover of a Despatch dated the 10th of March last, expresses himself as follows in respect of these points: “Until she (Russia) is much further consolidated on the Herat frontier, she will, I believe, make no further attempt to advance towards India; and then her task is gigantic” (paragraph 45). He considered a small increase in the strength of the Army necessary, which should not exceed 10,000 in all, of whom 4,000 would be Europeans; neither was he disposed to say that this increase should take place immediately. He wrote further:—

“Thus the general result of what was effected in 1882 has been that the strength of the Native and British troops remains what it was before the changes were made; but the Army is organised on a more economical, efficient, and useful basis, better adapted to war and the general requirements of the country, and, from the increased strength of the battalions, more in accordance with the recommendations of some of our most experienced officers. Thus, in considering the present strength of the Army, it must be prominently kept in view that the result of the changes carried into effect in 1882 did not bring about a reduction in the total strength of our fighting power in India” (paragraph 34).

The contingency which the Army Commission, when it submitted its Report, thought possible has now become more possible; but this furnishes no ground for believing that the precautions then recommended as sufficient, in the event of such a danger overtaking us, are insufficient now. It is necessary, on the contrary, to remember that since the Commission wrote, a large scheme of strategical frontier railways has been sanctioned, and is being vigorously pushed on; while an elaborate plan of frontier defensive works is also about to be put into execution. Apart altogether from the immediate purpose which they are expected to serve, these works will add indirectly, but not inconsiderably, to the mobility and the fighting strength of our forces.

7. The frontier fortifications to which we refer cannot require, for their occupation, an increase to the Indian Army of 27,000 men. We fail to see why any force needed for this purpose should not be obtained in the mode contemplated by Lord Lytton's Government, that is to say, by withdrawing the necessary troops from other parts of India. [See Paragraph 13 of the Despatch of 22nd May 1879: Blue Book on East India (Army System), p. 3.]

8. If the above reasoning is correct, there seems to us every reason to apprehend that the increase of our forces beyond the needs enumerated by the Army Commission may prove a weapon less of defence than of aggression. The presence in India of so strong a force as is desired may even suggest the permanent occupation of some part of Afghanistan. Against the policy of extending to a point beyond Kandahar, the frontier, formal or practical, of British India, and the area which must be permanently held by British troops, weighty arguments, moral, political, and financial, have been, and may still be urged. But, whatever may be the merits of such a proposal, it forms no part of the grounds on which an increase to our Army is now advocated; and is foreign, we have every reason to believe, to the desires or intentions of our colleagues.

9. We are thus of opinion that as no circumstances have arisen which, from a military point of view, have not been already foreseen and guarded against, the proposal to increase the strength of the Army by 27,000 men should be negatived. We are further of opinion that the proposal is open to the objection that it may lead to the advocacy, and possibly to the adoption, of projects for the extension of our present frontier. The question then narrows itself to this: Is it the duty of the Government of India to maintain and charge to Indian revenues a permanent addition to its forces, not required for India, but available for the purpose of extending and securing its dominion beyond India?

10. We are wholly unable to admit that the Indian Government is under any obligation to maintain a standing army beyond the numbers indicated by the Army Commission, or for purposes other than those enumerated by them. They can draw on England, as in practice they always draw, should necessity arise for a temporary increase to the forces in India; obtaining what is required, paying for it so long as it is needed, and dismissing it when the need is over.

11. Where is the line to be drawn if India admits its liability to maintain a force strong enough, not only to fulfil the purposes which have been enumerated in this Minute, but to acquire and maintain against all comers positions in Afghanistan, or elsewhere? It is desired,

desired, apparently, to have a force for home use, and a force for exterior use. The necessary strength of the former can be measured; but where is a measure to be found for the latter? It has to deal with that unknown quantity, the assumed military possibilities of the Russians in Central Asia and Afghanistan. If the principle is admitted that an army is to be maintained from Indian revenues for exterior use, it is difficult to see how its numbers are to be controlled, or why we shall not presently be told that 100,000 men are as necessary as 10,000. It has been already pointed out that the existence of such a force would be no mean agent in bringing about the very risk which it is meant to obviate. A standing army which is larger than is necessary for home requirements will be a tempting, and almost an irresistible, weapon of offence beyond the border.

12. It is asked how provision is to be made for an increase of native troops should a merely temporary addition to the English force in India in the event of war be advocated. We reply that, unless our frontier is to be extended, we are unable to see the necessity for any such increase. If, on the other hand, the frontier is to be extended, the new territory acquired must, we believe, be held by the aid of local levies. Experience, it is agreed on all sides, has shown that Indians will not enlist for service beyond the frontier. It must be further remembered that a system of reserves, such as it is proposed to initiate, will gradually furnish us with the power of increasing our native forces to a considerable extent.

13. It can hardly be contended that the mere establishment of a reserve necessitates, of itself, an increase in the English force, and that the latter must be proportioned, not only to the native force actually under arms, but to that force *plus* the reserve.

The Appendices to the Despatch prove how large a number of young men trained to arms annually leave the army, and are scattered about the country. These men, though unavailable for the purpose of increasing our military strength, are as much an element of danger as the proposed reserve will be. No count has been hitherto taken of their existence, we believe, in fixing the strength of British troops in India. Nor, whatever may be urged as to English troops, can the existence of a Native reserve possibly furnish arguments for an addition to the number of our Native Army.

14. Finally, it is stated that, even were all we have urged to be admitted, we cannot depend on England for reinforcements, and that we must not risk the Indian Empire on the ability of the English Government to furnish us with troops at the moment we may happen to want them. The alternative appears to us unquestionable; if India is to maintain troops additional to those needed for her own requirements, solely because England cannot be trusted to supply them, our military and financial arrangements with the English Treasury should be so altered as to set free a sum equivalent to that required for the addition to our forces in India.

15. So far we have dealt with general considerations. The financial effect of the proposals makes the case against them, in our opinion, more cogent. It is not contended even by those who desire to add no more than 10,000 to our English and 17,000 to our Native troops, that the total ultimate cost will be less than about 1,500,000 *l.* a year. There can be no doubt that, to meet this cost, we shall be compelled to resort to taxation of a considerable amount, and seriously to burden our finances. So far, on the other hand, as we effect our object without taxation, it can only be by charging to loans the very costly unproductive military works in which we are at present engaged, the execution of which, at least in part, we believe to form an obligatory charge upon our revenue.

16. On the subject of taxation, we desire to draw attention to paragraphs 9 to 14 of the late Viceroy's Minute of 22nd September 1884. We agree entirely with the opinion of those who hold that, as an alien people, our best claim to the regard of the natives of the country, and therefore one of our main sources of security lies in the fact that taxation is light. We believe that this is a principle which has been admitted by all Governments foreign to their subjects, and that it has been uniformly recognised and adopted by our predecessors in the administration of British India. It seems an axiom which at the present time it is singularly incumbent on the Government of India to bear in mind. If it was important when India had no European neighbour, it becomes much more so when she has at her frontier a power whose agents will make the most of all our mistakes, and will bid against us, by every means at their disposal, for popularity. We are aware that it is easy to push this consideration too far, and that the Indian Government must be prepared to risk a certain unpopularity if it is convinced that the measures which it has in view, and for which the imposition of burdens is required, are of so urgent a character as to necessitate their adoption, all drawbacks notwithstanding. But we have given in this Minute our reasons for holding that in the present instance no sufficient case is made out for departing from the policy above indicated.

17. There is considerable probability of our being called upon after a term of years

during which our precautions have proved uncalled for, and our taxation has appeared vexatious, to relax our precautionary measures, and of our then being tempted to pass from the extreme of precaution to the extreme of negligence.

18. We do not deny that there may be force in the contention to which we have alluded, that, if we look to England for reinforcements in the event of war, we may find the English Government incapable, when called upon, of meeting our requirements. But there is at least an equal risk that if we accept from such an apprehension burdens which do not belong to us, we shall find ourselves keeping up, at the cost of the India revenues, a reserve which, in the event of circumstances arising that necessitate the action of troops for extra-Indian purposes, as in the case of Egypt, Abyssinia, and the Soudan, will be drawn upon by the English Government.

19. To sum up: Regarding, for the reasons we have given, the proposed increase of the Indian Army as unnecessary, we adhere to what are described by the late Army Commission as "the principles so strongly enunciated by Lord Mayo, and reiterated by his successors, that the people of India ought not to be called upon to support or pay for "one single unnecessary soldier" (paragraph 575). We cannot admit that it is the business of the Government of India, under the apprehension that reliance cannot be placed on the Government in England, to assume more than its hitherto recognised share of the common obligation. We would not accept as a charge upon Indian revenues any single item of expenditure which should be undertaken by the Government at home.

*A. Colvin.*

*C. P. Ilbert.*

Simla, 14 August 1885.

## APPENDICES to MILITARY LETTER, No. 135, dated 14th August 1885.

Appendix A.	- -	Proposed increase of the Indian Army, and introduction of the linked battalion system.
„ B.	- -	Statement showing the established strength of British troops in India from 1860 to 1885.
„ C.	- -	Proposals of Indian Army Commission regarding creation of a reserve for the Native Army.
„ D.	- -	Proposals of the Commander in Chief for the formation of a reserve for the Native Army.
„ E.	- -	Proposed grant of free passage by railway to non-commissioned officers and men of the Native Army proceeding to or returning from their homes on furlough.
„ F.	- -	Statements showing the length of service of non-commissioned officers and rank and file of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Native Cavalry and Infantry.
„ G.	- -	Statements showing the approximate annual cost of the increase to the British and Native Army in India as proposed by the Commander in Chief and the Government of India.
„ H.	- -	Statement showing the estimated saving by the changes proposed in the staff and commands of the Indian Army.
„ J.	- -	Present and proposed strength of Indian Army.

## ENCLOSURES to MILITARY LETTER, No. 135, dated 14th August 1885.

## APPENDIX (A).—[Paragraph 2 of Letter.]

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.—(No. 2009-B.—“Native Army” Organisation; dated Simla, 3rd July 1885)—(Confidential).

In the judgment of the Commander in Chief, the time has now arrived when it has again become the duty of his Excellency to urge upon the consideration of the Government of India, the measures for that increase of the army which the present condition of public affairs has rendered necessary.

2. In a Minute written by the Commander in Chief on the 8th September 1884, and which is before the Government, his Excellency pointed out that the question for consideration at that time was “whether the army, which was considered suitable for the defence of India when Russia was at a distance from which she could not molest us, is adequate to the increased strain that is placed upon it by the advance of that power to the confines of Afghanistan.”

3. The course of events since that Minute was written has more than justified the recommendations for an increase to our military strength which were therein made; and the situation now demands as urgently indispensable measures which might then have been regarded merely as desirable precautions. The menacing attitude of Russia, and the renewed obligations which we have undertaken in regard to the integrity of the Afghan kingdom, render it imperative that our military forces should be on a scale commensurate with our national obligations and the effective defence of our Indian Empire.

4. The letters quoted in the margin contain the recommendations on this subject which his Excellency has already submitted for the consideration of Government, and it is proposed in the present communication to summarise and repeat those recommendations, and to supplement them by certain proposals regarding the organisation of the Native army, the adoption of which, the Commander in Chief considers, would materially conduce to its efficiency.

5. In regard to the British army in India, the Commander in Chief is of opinion that the normal establishment should be increased from its present strength of 59,206 men\* to a strength of about 75,000 men.\*

This number would allow of 30,000 men being retained in India as garrisons for those strategical points which it is considered necessary to hold, and of a field army of 40,000 men, leaving a margin of 5,000 men to cover those deficiencies of actual strength as compared with establishment which are almost certain occasionally to occur.

His Excellency is moreover of opinion that no increase can be made in the Native army without a proportionate augmentation in the British forces.

The greater part of this increase of about 16,000 men\* would be most economically, and, in the Commander in Chief's opinion, advantageously provided by adding a fourth squadron to each regiment of cavalry, thus raising each corps from 454 to 602 men,\* and by increasing each battalion from 780 to 960 privates.

These measures would give a total increase as follows, viz. :—

- (1). Increase of one squadron of 148 men each to nine regiments of cavalry  
(148 × 9) = 1,332 men.\*
- (2). Increase of 50 battalions of infantry by 180 privates each (50 × 180) = 9,000 men.

This leaves a balance of 5,668 men to be provided by bringing out fresh cadres from home; and his Excellency recommends that, in order to provide the increased strength in garrison artillery, which the armament of the existing fortifications and of those now under construction (irrespective of the projected frontier defences), will necessitate, these cadres should consist of the following units:—

	Men.*
1 Regiment of cavalry - - - - -	602
1 Battery horse artillery - - - - -	157
2 Field batteries - - - - -	314
4 Garrison batteries - - - - -	460
4 Battalions infantry on the proposed strength - - - - -	4,256
	5,789

If these measures were adopted, the total increase to the British army would be represented by the following figures:—

	Men.
Increase to cavalry now in India - - - - -	1,332
Increase to infantry now in India - - - - -	9,000
Increase by fresh cadres from home - - - - -	5,789
	16,121

6. The Commander in Chief desires to lay especial stress on the recommendation to add a fourth squadron to regiments of cavalry, both British and Native; and his Excellency feels bound to place on record his conviction that, unless this measure is adopted, the organisation of this arm will remain radically defective.

On parade, and for all movements of manœuvre, whether in peace or war, a regiment of cavalry should be formed into four squadrons; but if the regiment has an organisation of only three squadrons, the fourth squadron, if formed, must be made up of men drawn from different troops, and must therefore lack that cohesion which is essential to the efficiency of any military unit. It is therefore obvious that to organise a cavalry regiment in three squadrons is but a makeshift expedient, and that the natural organisation of the arm is into regiments of four squadrons each.

7. The above paragraphs show the manner in which the Commander in Chief considers the necessary increase to the British army in India may be most economically and conveniently provided; but if the Government should decide that it is not advisable to increase the present establishments of regiments, and that the increase should be in the form of fresh cadres to be brought out from England, then his Excellency begs to submit his recommendations that the cadres should be as follows, viz. :—

	Men.
4 Regiments of cavalry - - - - -	1,816
1 Battery horse artillery - - - - -	157
2 Batteries field artillery - - - - -	314
4 Batteries garrison artillery - - - - -	460
15 Battalions of infantry, at 884 each - - - - -	13,260
	16,007

8. In

\* Exclusive of officers, but including warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.

8. In regard to the Native Army, the Commander in Chief desires to repeat his recommendation that a general increase of about 25,000 men should be made to its strength.

9. This increase should, in the cavalry, for the reasons stated in paragraph 6, take the form of a fourth squadron; and his Excellency proposes that the 17 regiments of Bengal Cavalry and the four regiments of Punjab Frontier Force Cavalry should in future have the following establishment, viz. :—

Ressaldars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar Woordie Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Sowars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	528
Total										625

which is an increase on the present establishment of—

Ressaldar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Ressaidar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Sowars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51
Total										75

The two regiments of Central India Horse should each be of the same strength, viz., 625, as a Bengal Cavalry regiment, which would give an increase as follows on their present establishment:—

Ressaldar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Ressaidar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Sowars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108
Total										132

10. The Commander in Chief further recommends that three new regiments of cavalry should be raised in Bengal, each to be of the new strength of 625 natives of all ranks. It seems preferable to raise the three regiments in this Presidency, as the Commander in Chief, Bombay, has frequently reported that it is difficult to get men to enlist on the silladar system, whereas in Bengal no such difficulties are experienced.

11. As regards British officers, the Commander in Chief thinks it will be sufficient to increase the present number by one squadron commander, which would make the establishment of each regiment—

Commandant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Squadron commanders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Squadron officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Total Combatant Officers										9

12. Regarding the Bombay Cavalry, the Commander in Chief recommends that the six regiments should each consist of the following establishment:—

Ressaldars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar Woordie Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Kote Duffadar Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Farrier Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Naiks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Sowars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	518
Total										625

which

which is an increase on the present establishment of—

Ressaldar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Ressaidar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Naiks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Sowars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55
Total										75

13. The Commander in Chief will not at present deviate from the recommendations which have already gone home regarding the augmentation of the Madras Cavalry; but his Excellency is of opinion that it would be a preferable arrangement to add a fourth squadron to these corps also. The increase which has been recommended for each regiment is as follows :—

Naiks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Troopers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96
Total										102

14. The general result of the augmentations would be to give the following increase of cavalry strength:—

Bengal:		Total Increase.			
17 regiments Bengal Cavalry	-	-	}	each to be increased by 75 men	1,575
4 regiments Punjab Frontier Force Cavalry	-	-			
2 regiments Central India Horse, increased by 132 men each	-	-			264
Bombay:					
6 regiments, each increased by 75 men	-	-	-	-	450
Madras:					
4 regiments, each increased by 102 men	-	-	-	-	408
3 new regiments in Bengal, of 625 men each	-	-	-	-	1,875
Total					4,572

15. Regarding the Native Infantry, and dealing with that of the Bengal Presidency first, we have at present two scales of establishment, viz. :—

*Class A.—Ordinary Bengal Infantry.*

Native officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Havildars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Drummers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Rank and file	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	760
Total										832

*Class B.—Goorkha and Assam Regiments.*

Native officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Havildars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Drummers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Rank and file	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	840
Total										912

Of Class A., we have—

Bengal Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
Punjab Frontier Force, including the Guides Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Total										47

Of



INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

51

Of Class B., we have—

Goorkha regiments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Assam regiments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Total										<u>8</u>

Our present strength in infantry, therefore, is—

47 regiments, at 832 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39,104
8 regiments, at 912 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<u>7,296</u>
Total										<u>46,400</u>

16. The Commander in Chief recommends as follows :—

(1.) To increase the whole of the Bengal, Goorkha, and Punjab Frontier Force Infantry to the following regimental establishment, viz. :—

Native officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Havildars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
Naiks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
Drummers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Sepoys	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<u>852</u>
Total										<u>980</u> Natives of all ranks.

(2.) To raise five new Goorkha battalions of 980 each.

(3.) To raise a new corps of Muzbee Pioneers, on the model of the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers, of 980 strong. His Excellency also recommends that, in order to have a greater number of this very useful class of regiments available for field service, two of the Hindustani Infantry regiments in Bengal, and two regiments of Bombay Infantry should be converted into pioneers. In the Madras Presidency two pioneer regiments already exist.

(4.) To raise three new battalions of Sikhs, each of 980 strong. The Commander in Chief selects Sikhs for the new regiments, not only on account of their superior fighting qualities, but also in consideration of the small number\* of this class now serving in the Army, as compared with their numbers in the general population of the Punjab.

* Bengal Infantry	-	-	-	8,800
Punjab Frontier Force Infantry	-	-	-	<u>2,600</u>
				11,400

17. The adoption of these measures would give us the following strength of Native Infantry in the Bengal Presidency, viz. :—

55 existing regiments at a strength of 980 each	-	-	-	53,900
1 new pioneer battalion	-	} 9 regiments, at 980 men each	-	8,820
3 new Sikh regiments	-			
5 new Goorkha regiments	-			
Total				<u>62,720</u>

That is, we should get an increase on the present establishment of 16,320 men.

18. In the Bengal Presidency, therefore, leaving out of consideration the local corps marginally named, which should be left at their present strength, we should get the following increase :—

Deoli Irregular Force.				
Erinpura Force.				
Meywar Bheel Corps.				
Malwa Bheel Corps.	In the Cavalry	-	-	3,714
Bhopal Battalion.				
Mhairwarra Battalion.	In the Infantry	-	-	16,320
Nepal Residency.				
Total				<u>20,034</u>

19. In the Bombay Infantry the Commander in Chief recommends that the 26 regiments should all be raised from their present strength of 832 to the new establishment of 980 natives of all ranks, which would give a total increase of 3,848 men.

20. In the Madras Infantry the Commander in Chief does not propose to make any addition. That army is already of sufficient numerical strength for the duties it is called upon to perform, and there is no present urgent necessity which would warrant his Excellency in recommending the Government to incur the additional expense which an increase to it would cause.

21. It will now be convenient to summarise the proposals of the Commander in Chief as regards the Native Army. They are as follows:—

- (1.) To increase the Native Cavalry in India by 4,572 men (paragraph 14).
- (2.) To increase the Native Infantry in India by 20,168 men, thus giving a total increase to both arms of 24,740 men.
- (3.) To give an additional squadron commander in 29\* regiments of Native Cavalry. | 6 Bombay. Cavalry.
- (4.) To raise in Bengal the following new troops:—
  - 3 regiments cavalry.
  - 1 regiment pioneer.
  - 5 regiments Goorkha (already sanctioned).
  - 3 regiments Sikhs.

22. The Commander in Chief, after the most careful consideration of the subject, is of opinion that the increase to our military forces proposed in this letter is absolutely essential to render our position in India secure; and his Excellency earnestly trusts that these recommendations may meet with the approval of Government.

23. I will now proceed to submit, for the consideration of Government, a proposed alteration in the organisation of the Native Armies, the adoption of which would, in his Excellency's judgment, render them better able than at present to sustain the pressure caused by a serious and continued war.

24. The weak point in the present organisation is that the infantry regiment has nothing to fall back upon. It is a unit that stands by itself, and when a regiment takes the field there is no adequate means either to bring up its strength to a war establishment or to keep its ranks filled during the progress of the war. A system, in short, is required by which regiments may be put into the field at a proper strength, and maintained at that strength while on service.

25. This defect in the organisation of the Native Army has long been patent, and various schemes have been put forward to meet it by the establishment of some system of reserves. The Commander in Chief cannot say whether any of these schemes may be practicable, as without the test of actual experience no one can predict whether the sepoy who has left the colours would be willing to accept service as a reservist, or could be depended upon to come forward to rejoin his battalion in time of need.

28. But the Commander in Chief is fully prepared, if Her Majesty's Government should approve the proposals on the subject which have already gone home, to submit for consideration of Government a detailed scheme for the formation of a reserve, as an additional means towards maintaining regiments on a war footing while on service in the field. His Excellency is, however, very strongly of opinion that in a matter of such vital importance as the efficiency for war of the entire Native Army it would not be prudent in times such as the present to limit ourselves to experiments, and that it will be wise to devise a system by which that portion of the Army which takes the field may depend for immediate reinforcement and support upon the battalions which remain in quarters.

27. This end can best be met, in the Commander in Chief's opinion, by linking two or three battalions together as sister regiments, the corps which is put into the field drawing men from that which remains behind.

28. The plan thus proposed can be most easily explained by showing in some detail how it would work if its principles were applied to the Bengal Infantry.

29. (1.) All regiments to be linked (as sister battalions) either in the manner shown in Annexure A., by twos, or, as in Annexure B., by threes.

(2.) In detailing an army for field service, one of the sister battalions should always be left in cantonments.

(3.) When warned for service, a regiment should at once be made up to 1,000 *effective* rank and file by transfers from its sister battalions.

(4.) The establishment of the sister battalion or battalions should also be simultaneously raised to 1,000 rank and file.

(5.) The sister battalions would supply transfers of trained soldiers to fill the gaps in the ranks of the battalion on service during the continuance of the war.

(6.) The depôt of the battalion on service would, whenever practicable, be attached to one of the sister battalions in cantonments.

(7.) All enlistments in any battalion to be made in future for both or all three battalions; *i.e.*, a recruit enlisted in the 1st Bengal Infantry would at the time of enlistment be made to understand that he enlists also for the 2nd and 3rd Bengal Infantry, and was liable to transfer, in the event of war, to either of those regiments.

(8.) Beyond

(8.) Beyond this liability to transfer to a sister battalion during a war, the conditions of the sepoy's service to remain precisely as at present.

(9.) No alteration to be made in the numbers or designations of regiments; the only present change would be that all recruits would be enlisted with liability of transfer to their sister battalions, and a note would be added in the Army List to each regiment stating its sister battalions.

(10.) As the liability to transfer would only come into existence on one or two of the battalions being ordered on service, there would be no change whatever either in the organisation of regiments or in the conditions of the sepoy's service during peace-time.

30. By this system we should ensure a supply of trained soldiers, both to bring a battalion up to war strength and to replace its casualties in the field. The obvious objection to the system is, that by using a part of the Army as a means of supply for the other part, we have only a proportion of our strength really available for field service. But the Commander in Chief regards this objection as more theoretical than real. We must always keep at least a third of our army in garrison; and if the battalions in reserve are not depleted, but kept up to their proper strength of 1,000 rank and file, his Excellency does not anticipate that we should experience any practical inconvenience from depending for our first reserve on the ranks of the Army itself. At all events, the system has the advantage of supplying an assured reserve of trained and thoroughly effective soldiers for the immediate requirements of regiments placed on a war footing. If, in addition to this, it is decided to establish an army reserve of men who have served with the colours, we shall probably find no difficulty in maintaining battalions at full war strength.

31. The Commander in Chief recommends that the system of linked battalions should be applied to the Native Infantry of the three presidencies, and to that of the Punjab Frontier Force. His Excellency does not recommend that it should be also applied to the cavalry, as the organisation of sillardar cavalry does not lend itself to such an arrangement.

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ANNEXURE A. to Adjutant General's Letter.

Schedule of Regiments linked by Twos.

*Bengal Infantry.*

1st and 2nd.	23rd	} Pioneers.
3rd „ 4th.	32nd	
5th „ 6th.	34th (new pioneer regiment)	
7th „ 8th.	24th and 25th.	
9th „ 10th.	26th „ 27th.	
11th „ 12th.	28th „ 29th.	
13th „ 16th.	30th „ 31st.	
14th „ 35th (new Sikh regiment).	33rd „ 38th.	
15th „ 36th ( ditto ).	39th „ 40th.	
17th „ 18th.	42nd	
19th „ 22nd.	43rd	
20th „ 21st (these two regiments enlist Afridis).	44th	
	45th and 37th (new Sikh regiment).	

*Punjab Frontier Force.*

1st and 2nd Sikhs.	4th	} Punjab Infantry.
3rd „ 4th „	5th	
1st „ 2nd Punjab Infantry.	6th	
	The Guides.	

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## ANNEXURE B.

## Schedule of Regiments linked by Threes.

*Bengal Infantry.*

1st, 2nd and 3rd.	25th, 27th and 28th.
4th, 5th „ 6th.	29th, 30th „ 31st.
7th, 8th „ 9th.	14th, 15th „ 45th (Sikhs).
10th, 11th „ 12th.	39th „ 40th.
13th, 16th „ 17th.	23rd, 32nd „ 34th* (new*) Pioneers.
18th, 33rd „ 38th.	42nd, 43rd „ 44th (Assam).
19th, 22nd „ 24th.	35th, 36th „ 37th (all new) Sikh regi- ments.
20th, 21st „ 26th.	

*Punjab Frontier Force.*

1st, 2nd and 3rd Sikhs.	5th and 6th Punjab Infantry.
1st, 2nd „ 4th Punjab Infantry.	The Guides.
4th Sikhs.	

## APPENDIX (A.)—[Paragraph 39 of Letter].

From Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3752, dated Bombay Castle, 6th July 1885).

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your letter, No. 59-S-B. (Organisation), dated 28th April 1882, I am directed to forward herewith, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Adjutant General, No. 35-2-C.—6419, dated 22nd June 1885, re-submitting the proposals regarding the reorganisation of the infantry of the Bombay Army in regiments of three battalions each, which, consequent upon the disbandment of certain regiments of the Bombay Army, his Excellency the Commander in Chief then recommended for the consideration of Government.

2. A copy of the Adjutant General's letter, No. 5-C-T., dated 25th March 1882, referred to in paragraph 2 of that officer's letter quoted above, accompanies.

From Brigadier General *A. L. Annesley*, Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 35-2-C.—6419, dated Poona, 22nd June 1885).

ADVERTING to Government Resolutions, Nos. 1874, of 5th April 1882, and 2432, of 9th May 1882, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to re-submit the proposals which, consequent upon the disbandment of certain regiments of this army, he then recommended to the attention of Government, as it appears to his Excellency not improbable that the Government of India may be disposed to give them from altered circumstances a further consideration.

2. His Excellency desires particularly to draw attention to paragraph 12 of my letter, No. 5-C-T., of 25th March 1882 (extract attached), which refrains from advising that a strictly regimental promotion as regards British officers should ensue from this amalgamation, as the experience derived from the custom of the three regiments of Sind Horse, where this principle for a time obtained, produced anything but satisfactory results. The 24 officers, who would thus become the quota of an enlarged regimental organisation, would not, his Excellency is satisfied, afford a sufficient field for selection to provide three commandants, three seconds in command, and three adjutants of exceptional ability; and any rapid run of promotion, such as must be caused by active service, would promote officers to regimental positions so much at variance with their army rank as to become embarrassing in regard to army discipline, if the rule of regimental promotion was made more than a desirable enhancement of regimental continuity.

3. I am to point out that the only expense chargeable to the public revenues in connection with this scheme would be the equipment of two battalions as rifles, and the small outlay consequent on a change of facings and puggries in certain other linked battalions.

EXTRACT Paragraph 12 of the Adjutant General's Letter, No. 5-C-T., dated 25th March 1882, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department.

Para. 12. It would, in his Excellency's opinion, be quite beyond the range of the present proposal to alter any of the existing rules of promotion, or to extend it regimentally, so as to contract that field of selection by which the efficiency of battalions is strengthened. The suggestion is limited to a fresh arrangement in the telling off of regiments; and if palpable advantages can be secured from this opportunity, whilst regimental susceptibilities are also considered, without any increase of expenditure, and with a reasonable promise of augmented efficiency, it is certainly, in his Excellency's opinion, an opportunity which should not be overlooked.

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From Brigadier General *A. L. Annesley*, Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5-C-T., dated Poona, 25th March 1885) (Confidential).

WITH reference to Government Resolution, No. 1362, dated Bombay Castle, 14th March 1882, I have the honour, in obedience to the instructions therein contained, to submit the views of his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the proposal contained in letter, No. 179-B., Government of India, Military Department, dated Fort William, 11th March 1882.

2. His Excellency the Commander in Chief submits that the regiments of the Bombay Army to be reduced should be as follows:—

Cavalry :

3rd Sind Horse.

Infantry :

The 6th Native Infantry.

The 11th Native Infantry.

The 15th Native Infantry.

The 18th Native Infantry.

3. His Excellency's reasons for this selection are as follows: that the 3rd Sind Horse is the junior regiment of the Bombay Cavalry as well as of a brigade, whose conditions of enlistment, involving permanent quarters at Jacobabad, have become ill-suited to general service.

The above procedure (selecting the junior regiment) cannot, however, be extended to the infantry without disbanding the 27th, 29th, and 30th regiments; these are Biluch regiments, and of them the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Biluch Regiments. the two first have a valuable character; the third (late Jacob's Rifles), though it has not equal claim to consideration on the score of efficiency, enjoys advantages for recruiting, and a promise of equal efficiency in the future with the 1st and 2nd Biluchis. His Excellency would not, therefore, desire to terminate its recent reconstruction.

The 28th, 26th, 25th, and 24th are regiments of good service and of good repute, and the 24th is serving in the Quetta Brigade. It seems, therefore, undesirable to apply to them a principle which has been surrendered in regard to the Biluch regiments, so that selection, based upon records of service and present efficiency, influenced also by financial convenience when the claims of regiments are perplexingly balanced, remains the only alternative of an invidious decision.

The regiments with least field service are the 6th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 22nd. The 22nd has just gone to Aden, which would complicate its disbandment.

The 14th and 16th are regiments of superior physique; the 17th is very favourably reported on, and his Excellency therefore considers that those already noted can be best spared consistently with public interests, which have exercised full weight in this conclusion.

4. The selection of regiments for reduction will entail a very general re-numbering of regiments, and this will be a greater grievance to those thus affected if accident exempts others from a similar change. His Excellency the Commander in Chief therefore suggests for consideration that no organisation could be better suited to the peculiarities of

Indian service than Native Infantry regiments composed of three battalions. It would rarely be prudent to withdraw more than one-third of the native troops, and more than half of the English force from garrison duties; and this proportion coincides with the contingent of 10,000 to 12,000 men which Bombay is calculated to contribute to an Indian army in the field.

5. Twenty-four Native Infantry battalions incorporated into eight regiments would thus put eight battalions, the fittest for service, at once with the first line. Each such battalion would in war be backed up by a reserve of two battalions, and would leave its sick, its recruits, its families, with the nearest reserve battalion without any of the expense and mismanagement which is the inevitable result of Native Infantry depôts.

6. Such a system as that herein proposed would be an assurance to the Army at large that at the first call for service each regiment would be fairly represented in the force by its best battalion at the time, thus stimulating not only greater emulation in the field between regiments, but within them supplying an incentive to the greatest efficiency. His Excellency considers the advantages of the system incontestable from a military point of view, provided it can be adapted to the Staff Corps system.

7. His Excellency would further point out that within this Presidency there are eight English regiments of infantry. Number of the native battalions, exclusive of one battalion at Aden, and the Marine battalion in Bombay, will be henceforward 24 battalions thus classified :—

2 Grenadier battalions.	3 Biluch battalions.
5 Light Infantry battalions.	13 Line battalions.
1 Rifle battalion.	

8. His Excellency would propose to add a good line battalion (the 19th) to the two Grenadier battalions, and form these three into the first regiment; also to assimilate the 3rd and 5th Light Infantry to the 4th Rifles; these would form the second regiment; the remaining three regiments of Light Infantry would form the third regiment.

The three Biluch battalions to form the fourth regiment.

The remaining twelve battalions to be divided into groups of three, and to compose four regiments, viz., the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, preserving their present precedence as follows :—

5th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	7th	8th	9th
6th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	12th	13th	14th
7th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	16th	17th	20th
8th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	22nd	24th	26th

9. With regard to the regiments which remain over, his Excellency would propose to add the 28th Regiment Native Infantry as a fourth battalion to the proposed eighth regiment, by which arrangement a ninth battalion could, if necessary, be placed in the field, leaving two battalions in reserve. The Marine battalion, whose duties are specific, would remain single, and not numbered.

10. His Excellency desires me to point out that as at Quetta, Poona, Mhow, Bombay, and Belgaum two or more Native Infantry battalions serve together, the usual rotation of relief would not unfrequently bring together at the same station battalions of the same regiment, which would go far to cement regimental sympathies amongst the men, which must facilitate, simplify, and cheapen volunteering on emergency. It would also in a degree mitigate the hardship of unexpectedly shifting officers to regiments with which they have no connection, and would periodically afford them the option of a combined regimental mess.

11. Thus eight Native Infantry battalions at 832 (total 6,656), four European regiments at 886 (total 3,544), together with the proper proportion of cavalry 10,200 infantry and artillery, would make a compact division with great vitality of resource and elasticity of development.

12. It would, in his Excellency's opinion, be quite beyond the range of the present proposal to alter any of the existing rules of promotion, or to extend it regimentally so as to contract that field of selection by which the efficiency of battalions is strengthened. The suggestion is limited to a fresh arrangement in the telling off of regiments; and if palpable advantages can be secured from this opportunity, whilst regimental susceptibilities are also considered, without any increase of expenditure, and with a reasonable promise of augmented efficiency, it is certainly, in his Excellency's opinion, an opportunity which should not be overlooked.

13. With regard to the stations which should, in consequence of the proposed reductions, be reduced or abandoned, his Excellency is of opinion that, both from a military and political point of view, the following arrangement is desirable, with one exception, however,

however, namely, the retention of Bbuj, which, from a military point of view, his Excellency does not consider necessary or even advisable :—

Bombay, detachment Tanna	- 2 battalions	Angur ½ - - - - }	1 battalion
Poona	- - - - 3 battalions	Mehidpur ½ - - - - }	1 battalion
Mhow 1½	- - - - }	Nasirabad - - - - -	1 battalion
Indore ½	- - - - }	Bhuj - - - - -	1 battalion
Deesa	- - - - 1 battalion	Rajkot, detachment Dwarka	- 1 battalion
Belgaum	- - - - 2 battalions	Ahmedabad - - - - -	1 battalion
Satara ½	- - - - }	Baroda, detachment Surat-	- 1 battalion*
Dharwar ½	- - - - }	Karachi - - - - -	1 battalion
Ahmednagar	- - - - 1 battalion	Hyderabad - - - - -	1 battalion
Aden	- - - - 1 battalion	Jacobabad - - - - -	1 battalion
		Quetta District - - - -	4 battalions
Total - - - -			26 battalions.

14. The stations his Excellency proposes to abandon for Native Infantry are Malegaon, Sholapur, Kaladghi, Sadra, Neemuch; and those where a diminution of garrison is recommended are Baroda, six companies in place of eight; Bombay, 15 companies in place of 20; Dharwar, four companies in place of eight; Surat, three companies in place of eight companies; and Ahmedabad, eight companies in place of 15 companies.

<sup>2</sup> The increased strength of regiments will admit of the detachment being furnished without a diminution of Baroda garrison.

APPENDIX (B.)—[Paragraph 12 of Letter.]

Established Strength of British Troops in India.

1860	- - - - -	83,161	1873	- - - - -	60,452
1861	- - - - -	74,425	1874	- - - - -	60,435
1862	- - - - -	69,324	1875	- - - - -	60,432
1863	- - - - -	69,363	1876	- - - - -	60,409
1864	- - - - -	69,646	1877	- - - - -	60,398
1865	- - - - -	67,131	1878	- - - - -	60,341
1866	- - - - -	62,454	1879	- - - - -	60,329
1867	- - - - -	62,210	1880	- - - - -	60,300
1868	- - - - -	62,350	1881	- - - - -	60,297
1869	- - - - -	61,995	1882	- - - - -	59,458
1870	- - - - -	60,425	1883	- - - - -	59,531
1871	- - - - -	60,453	1884	- - - - -	59,372
1872	- - - - -	60,417	1885	- - - - -	59,371

APPENDIX (C.)—[Paragraph 64 of Letter.]

Proposal of Army Commission regarding Creation of an Army Reserve.

258. The want of some system of reserves for India has often been felt, and the subject has been brought forward from time to time. The success of the German system has shown that the existence of army reserves gives an immense, and at the same time an economical, increase to the military power of a nation. Lord Napier of Magdala recommended the formation of reserves for the Indian Army when he was Commander in Chief. His Excellency Sir Frederick Haines concurred in Lord Napier's opinion as to the

the necessity for forming a reserve. The Bombay Government also accepted the views of Excellency Sir Charles Staveley, then Commander in Chief of Bombay, that the State ought to retain a lien on the services of pensioned soldiers. Nearly all the regimental officers of the Bengal and Punjab armies, especially those who were engaged in the Afghan campaign of 1878, are convinced that some system of reserve is needed, by means of which regiments ordered into the field can obtain at once a supply of disciplined soldiers to fill vacancies caused by casualties, and to take the places of invalids or others sent to the depôt. As has been stated above, the officers of the Madras and Bombay Army Corps hold that drafts from linked or other battalions can best supply this need. Officers of the two Northern Army Corps, on the other hand, say that some system of regimental reserves ought to be established, under which disciplined and effective reservists could be recalled to the colours at a week's notice. They report, moreover, that such a system of reserves, if combined with localised recruiting grounds and fixed regimental depôts, would be most popular with the best fighting races of which the northern armies are composed.

259. There can be little doubt that the maintenance of army reserves in India would greatly increase the offensive and defensive power of the Indian Army. At the same time, it must be remembered that our Native Army is a mercenary force, serving an alien Government. Even if it were desirable, it would not be possible to impose compulsory service in the army of reserve on any large section of the population. And it would be politically inadvisable to adopt for India the short-service system of Europe, whereby the largest possible number of men are passed through the army, returned into the general population, and are kept, by periodical training, in a state of military efficiency. There can be no advantage, and there might be much risk, in scattering hundreds of thousands of trained reservists over the several provinces of India. The services of such large numbers would never be needed, and the cost of their maintenance would be very great. Under the present system, however, a considerable number of trained soldiers already pass from our army annually into the general population. According to the returns for five years, 7,778 native soldiers leave the army annually, of whom 4,612 retire on pension. Thus, in 10 years time nearly 80,000 trained native soldiers returned to their homes. Any plan which retained a proportion of these 80,000 men in army reserves, and bound them to the British Government by sufficient money payments, would meet the requirements of our military system without increasing the number of trained soldiers annually absorbed in the general population.

260. We attach great importance to the opinions of so many distinguished soldiers, and of so many experienced regimental officers, in favour of a reserve system. At the same time we recognise a distinct political danger in any indefinite increase of the number of trained soldiers passed annually into the population of India. We consider however that the provision of efficient reserves can well be combined with some revision of the pension rules. We propose that a strictly limited reserve of 200 men to every infantry regiment be eventually maintained. The reserve

\* Twelve years is named as the period before which a soldier should not be passed into the reserve. But the Commission feel that this term should be open to reconsideration at special times, and for special reasons.

would consist of privates, inhabitants either of British territory or of States within the frontier of British India, who, after 12\* years' service with the colours with good character, might choose to pass into the reserve. They would receive a reserve pay of four rupees a month, payable half-yearly; they would belong to the first reserve till they reached 21 years' service. During their service in the first reserve, they would be liable to embodiment for two months in every two years, and to service with the colours whenever summoned. They would receive, during the period of their embodiment, in addition to reserve pay, the full pay and good-conduct pay which they might have been drawing when they joined the reserve. At 21 years' service they would pass to the pension list or second reserve, where they would continue to receive a pension of four rupees a month, and would be liable for service on garrison duty only when summoned. After 32 years' service they should be liable for no further service, but would enjoy their pension of four rupees a month for the remainder of their lives. It would rarely be necessary to exercise or embody the second reserve; but they could, in time of necessity, usefully take garrison duty in cantonments or fortresses. The first reserve would be embodied at the regimental depôts, and their two months' exercise would include rifle practice. A British officer, with sufficient strength of Native officers and non-commissioned officers, and a medical subordinate, would be deputed to the depôt from the regiment once in two years to exercise the reserves. The second reserve, when called out, would be armed from the nearest depôt or arsenal. As the first reserves of different regiments would be called up for embodiment in alternate years at the time of year least inconvenient for agricultural operations, arms, uniform, and accoutrements for 200 men would suffice for the reserves of two regiments; and therefore one-half only of the reserve equipments need be kept at the depôts in custody of the native regiment cantoned at the depôt head-quarters, the remainder being kept at the nearest arsenal. Reservists on embodiment for exercise would be sheltered in standing camps whenever the depôt buildings and huts did not furnish sufficient accommodation.

261. We do not propose to constitute any first reserves of cavalry, because we consider that the country cannot afford to maintain a large reserve of horses. Native cavalry



cavalry reservists, who had no exercise with their horses, would soon become inefficient. We think, however, that the change in the pension rules, and the liability to garrison service in the second reserve, should for the future apply to cavalry as well as to infantry.

APPENDIX (D).—[Paragraph 66 of Letter.]

From Major-General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2352-B., "Native Army, Organisation," dated Simla, 28 July 1885).—(Confidential).

In continuation of paragraph 26 of this office letter No. 2009-B. of 3rd July, and with advertence to the instructions contained in your No. 479-B. of 20th July, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to submit, for the orders of the Government of India, the following scheme for the formation of a reserve for the Native Army:—

- (1.) Each regiment of infantry to have a first reserve limited to 200 men.
- (2.) This 1st Reserve to be composed of men of under 12 years' service, and who, after a service of not less than three years with the colours, volunteer for transfer to the Reserve.
- (3.) Only men physically fit, and who may be approved by their commanding officers, to be allowed to join the Reserve.
- (4.) The Reserve to be formed gradually; and in order to avoid impairing the efficiency of regiments, no men should be passed into the Reserve if the corps is more than 10 per cent. below its established strength, including recruits.
- (5.) Commanding officers should be empowered to enlist in the 1st Reserve any suitable men who may have already taken their discharge from the service.
- (6.) Men of the 1st Reserve to be liable for field service.
- (7.) If the scheme for linking battalions proposed in paragraphs 27 30 of this office letter No. 2009-B. of 3rd July is approved by Government, the men of the 1st Reserve should be liable for field service with any one of the sister battalions.
- (8.) Each regiment to have also a 2nd Reserve, to be composed of men physically fit for garrison duty, who take their discharge from the service between 40 and 50 years of age, and of transfers from the 1st Reserve on completing a total service of 21 years.
- (9.) The 2nd Reserve to be unlimited in number, but no man to be retained in it who has completed 32 years' service since date of first enlistment, or who is not in all respects fit for the performance of garrison duty.
- (10.) Men of the 2nd Reserve not to be liable for field service, but only for garrison duty.
- (11.) Men of both reserves to receive pay, while at their homes, at the following rates:—

	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>„</i>	<i>p.</i>
Sepoys	3	8	— a month.
Havildars and naiks	4	—	„
- (12.) When embodied for training, or called to join their battalions during a war, reserve men to receive the full pay, with good conduct pay, which they were drawing when passed into the Reserve.
- (13.) Payments to reserve men to be made once a year in arrears when they are called out for training; thus, on the men being mustered, each sepoy would receive 10 rupees for his current expenses, and the balance (32 rupees) on the conclusion of the training.
- (14.) If the proposals for linking battalions are adopted, the Commander in Chief would further recommend that a head-quarter station should be allotted to each group of linked battalions, at which one of the three battalions should always be quartered, and at which it would probably be found convenient to place the depôts of the battalion or battalions in the field.

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

The stations could be allotted somewhat as follows :—

1st, 2nd, 3rd	- - - - -	Meerut.
4th, 5th, 6th	- - - - -	Cawnpore.
7th, 8th, 9th	- - - - -	Lucknow.
10th, 11th, 12th	- - - - -	Fyzabad.
13th, 16th, 17th	- - - - -	Allahabad.
18th, 33rd, 38th	- - - - -	Benares.
39th, 40th	- - - - -	Dinapore.
19th, 22nd, 24th	- - - - -	Jhelum.
25th, 27th, 28th	- - - - -	Umballa.
29th, 30th, 31st	- - - - -	Sialkot.
20th, 21st, 26th	- - - - -	Rawalpindi.
14th, 15th, 45th	- - - - -	Ferozepore.
35th, 36th, 37th (all new regiments)	- - - - -	Jullundur.
23rd, 32nd, 34th* (new*) regiments	- - - - -	Lahore.

- (15.) The men of both reserves to be embodied for training for one month in each year at such season as agriculturists can best be spared from their fields. The training, when practicable, to be carried out at the head-quarter station of the linked battalions, or by the battalions to which the men belong, the principle being observed that the reserve men should be trained as near as possible to their own homes.
- (16.) If necessary, officers from regiments quartered at stations where but few reserve men assemble for training could be detached to stations where the numbers are larger for the period of the annual training.
- (17.) Free railway passes and marching allowance to be given to men going to and returning from the annual training.
- (18.) The arms and accoutrements of reserve men to be kept at the stations at which they assemble for their annual training. Special arrangements will have to be made for their proper charge and security.
- (19.) The records and documents of reserve men to be kept at the headquarters of the battalion to which they belong.
- (20.) Reserve men to get an allowance of two rupees a year to aid them in keeping up a suit of uniform in serviceable order: the uniform to consist of a regimental turban, a khaki blouse, a khaki pair of pyjamas, putties, and a pair of native shoes. Great-coats, havresacks, and water-bottles should be supplied to men by Government when called up for field service.
- (21.) All reserve men to be medically examined before they are dismissed from the annual training; when any short service men found unfit should be discharged with gratuity proportional to their length of service as follows, viz :—
- |  |     |                |
|--|-----|----------------|
| Five years' and under 10 years' service    | - - | 3 months' pay. |
| Ten years' and under 15 years' service     | - - | 6 " "          |
| Fifteen years' and under 20 years' service | - - | 9 " "          |
| Twenty years' and under 25 years' service  | - - | 12 " "         |
- (22.) Men of 25 years', but under 32 years' service, should be granted a modified pension.
- (23.) Reserved non-commissioned officers to be allowed at the following rates for every 100 reservists :—
- |                |           |                      |
|----------------|-----------|----------------------|
| Four havildars | - - - - - | at 4 rupees a month. |
| Four naiks     | - - - - - | at 4 " "             |
- These men would be liable for field service, if belonging to the 1st Reserve; but it would probably be found advantageous to retain them at the depôts for training or enlisting recruits.
- (24.) As it is very desirable to render reserve service popular, the Commander in Chief recommends that it would be allowed to qualify for pension, reserve men being entitled to pension after 32 years' service.
- (25.) The Commander in Chief is of opinion that the present invalid pension after 15 years' service should be abolished, but would recommend that the native soldier

soldier should be entitled to the ordinary pension of his rank after 21 years' service with the colours.

- (26.) The reserve system, as above detailed, to be applied to the Sappers and Miners, Native mountain batteries, and Native cavalry: the two former having a reserve of 25 per cent. on their established strength, and the cavalry having a reserve of from 50 to 100 men for each regiment.

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Appendix (E.)—[Paragraph 71 of Letter.]

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From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department—(No. 2204-B.—“Native Army,”—dated Simla, 16th July 1885.)

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to submit, for the favourable consideration of the Government of India, whether, in order to increase the popularity of military service among the people of this country, it would not be advisable to grant free passage by railway to native and non-commissioned officers and men of the Native Army proceeding to or returning from their homes on furlough for such part of the journey as railway transit is available.

2. As the Native Army is at present constituted, it is impossible to avoid quartering men at considerable distances from their homes: and thus it happens that natives of Oudh are found serving at Peshawar, and natives of the Punjab at Allahabad or Calcutta. On such men the travelling expenses to which they are put when visiting their homes on furlough fall very heavily. The railway fare from Lucknow to Peshawar is Rs. 11. 6. 0.; and thus a sepoy at Peshawar on seven rupees a month going to his home in Oudh on 3½ months' furlough actually has to pay more for his railway fare than he can receive as pay during the entire period of his absence.

3. It has frequently been recommended to the Commander in Chief that the Government should be asked to assist native soldiers towards defraying the expenses of their furlough journeys, and Colonel Norman's committee in 1882 suggested that free passes should be granted to all men serving at a distance of 700 miles or more from their homes; but his Excellency has hitherto refrained from making any proposals on the matter, because it seemed impossible to draw any line between the men who should get free passes and those who should not.

4. In view however of the necessity that now exists, and will continue to exist, for rendering military service popular among the classes from which our native soldiery are drawn, the Commander in Chief is of opinion that the time has now come for the Government to take this matter in hand, and his Excellency recommends that free passes should be granted to all native soldiers on *furlough*, men going on temporary leave continuing to pay their own expenses.

5. The distinction between furlough and temporary leave is well known in the army, and the Commander in Chief feels assured that, if the Government see fit to grant this boon, it will remove what is now felt to be a distinct grievance, and will go far to render service in the ranks of the British Army popular. Free ration and free travelling are tangible advantages that the natives of India will not be slow to appreciate; and though the former would be too costly a measure to be considered at present, his Excellency believes that the latter might be granted with but small actual expense to the State.

## APPENDIX F.—[Paragraph 72 of Letter.]

## BENGAL CAVALRY.

LENGTH of SERVICE of the Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File, compiled from the Inspection Returns for 1884-85.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 32 years.	Above 32 years.	TOTAL.
1st Bengal Cavalry - -	133	174	103	86	24	11	6	-	
2nd " - -	179	130	100	74	17	22	6	-	
3rd " - -	175	172	118	56	6	10	-	-	
4th " - -	158	143	100	72	45	14	2	3	
*5th " - -	154	157	119	62	24	18	1	2	
6th " - -	233	124	82	48	15	29	-	3	
7th " - -	176	186	59	63	11	19	1	-	
8th " - -	112	204	153	47	10	8	2	-	
9th " - -	230	144	71	4	33	12	-	-	
10th " - -	183	167	100	4	17	13	1	-	
11th " - -	174	185	73	67	23	15	-	-	
12th " - -	234	147	104	28	6	16	2	1	
13th " - -	221	150	92	34	20	20	-	-	
14th " - -	229	140	65	63	27	12	-	-	
15th " - -	212	126	78	61	34	24	1	-	
18th " - -	171	180	131	40	8	4	1	2	
19th " - -	261	104	91	53	19	9	-	-	
TOTAL - - -	3,235	2,633	1,639	965	339	256	23	11	9,101
Percentage - - -	35.54	28.93	18.00	10.60	3.72	2.81	.25	.12	-

\* Taken from the returns for 1883-84.

BENGAL INFANTRY.

LENGTH of SERVICE of the Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File, compiled from the Inspection Returns for 1884-85.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 32 years.	Over 32 years.	TOTAL.
1st Infantry	357	225	117	80	8	2	-	2	
2nd "	279	151	113	197	33	11	-	5	
3rd "	86	363	173	108	77	3	2	4	
4th "	180	344	206	51	13	-	-	1	
5th "	441	140	110	75	43	-	-	-	
6th "	318	197	175	88	15	11	-	3	
7th "	175	345	165	91	13	13	-	-	
8th "	249	233	172	93	48	5	-	-	
9th "	200	314	141	81	19	1	-	-	
10th "	209	383	122	66	19	2	2	-	
11th "	230	272	166	113	32	1	1	-	
12th "	279	328	131	51	4	-	-	-	
13th "	362	246	120	68	9	1	-	1	
14th "	302	279	176	54	5	1	-	-	
15th "	386	190	167	51	13	1	-	-	
16th "	292	330	77	71	29	8	-	-	
17th "	378	215	129	73	15	3	1	1	
18th "	200	317	141	125	14	4	2	-	
19th "	337	218	164	75	20	1	1	-	
20th "	427	194	115	46	18	1	-	-	
21st "	335	249	141	47	24	1	-	-	
22nd "	413	200	126	48	4	2	-	-	
23rd "	290	232	145	80	26	11	-	1	
24th "	428	172	132	43	18	14	-	1	
25th "	335	229	192	48	4	2	-	-	
26th "	392	210	117	43	12	6	-	-	
27th "	363	208	167	64	7	5	-	-	
28th "	376	230	130	49	17	7	1	-	
29th "	390	243	119	42	3	5	-	-	
30th "	314	208	143	110	15	3	1	-	
31st "	451	164	86	99	11	3	-	-	
32nd "	193	241	139	110	60	22	4	1	
33rd "	369	156	181	52	27	5	-	-	
38th "	396	361	25	16	1	-	-	-	
39th "	253	306	141	111	2	3	-	-	
40th "	232	189	254	111	22	-	-	-	
42nd "	399	266	139	73	17	1	-	-	
43rd "	367	197	119	93	3	-	-	-	
44th "	532	181	106	65	3	2	-	-	
45th "	353	189	186	67	7	-	-	-	
1st Goorkhas	440	246	146	59	17	6	3	1	
2nd "	423	209	128	66	47	48	-	-	
3rd "	420	188	143	133	13	1	-	-	
4th "	464	211	122	74	41	6	-	-	
Sappers and Miners	533	238	168	160	20	6	-	-	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15,213</b>	<b>10,812</b>	<b>6,354</b>	<b>3,520</b>	<b>868</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>37,044</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>29.21</b>	<b>17.15</b>	<b>9.50</b>	<b>2.34</b>	<b>.61</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.05</b>	

## BOMBAY ARMY.

LENGTH of SERVICE of Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File, compiled from the Inspection Returns for 1884-85.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years' service.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 32 years.	Over 32 years.	TOTAL.
Body Guard - - -	1	5	11	1	17	21	1	1	
1st Cavalry - - -	225	100	72	73	39	13	6	-	
2nd " - - -	153	174	40	52	64	38	-	-	
3rd " - - -	245	113	76	50	25	20	4	2	
Poona Horse - - -	190	116	80	63	38	44	15	-	
1st Sind Horse - - -	130	189	115	16	32	23	10	-	
2nd " - - -	153	198	107	36	15	2	-	-	
Aden Troop - - -	20	20	22	22	5	7	-	-	
1st Infantry - - -	517	154	79	46	6	2	3	-	
2nd " - - -	323	226	119	65	19	16	1	1	
3rd " - - -	181	218	194	68	37	25	4	3	
4th " - - -	352	211	85	105	19	14	1	-	
5th " - - -	263	231	174	71	15	31	1	-	
7th " - - -	233	277	138	110	25	6	4	1	
8th " - - -	333	201	153	65	19	5	1	-	
9th " - - -	201	308	157	107	35	38	2	1	
10th " - - -	188	248	266	56	35	6	-	-	
12th " - - -	349	178	125	60	25	4	2	-	
13th " - - -	281	203	105	125	30	27	21	-	
14th " - - -	265	265	126	88	25	21	2	1	
16th " - - -	317	216	98	121	12	18	2	-	
17th " - - -	331	180	138	86	43	23	2	1	
19th " - - -	170	251	161	31	99	19	31	3	
21st " - - -	225	237	170	98	53	25	1	-	
22nd " - - -	256	278	99	91	33	29	3	-	
23rd " - - -	361	193	134	89	18	-	-	-	
24th " - - -	314	209	167	96	11	2	2	-	
25th " - - -	202	188	235	137	19	23	5	-	
26th " - - -	386	157	155	43	18	10	1	-	
27th " - - -	341	221	117	62	30	6	1	-	
28th " - - -	233	212	145	151	23	14	3	2	
29th " - - -	391	137	133	48	55	8	3	1	
30th " - - -	452	209	91	24	-	-	-	-	
Sappers and Miners - -	206	115	60	56	16	8	2	-	
TOTAL - - -	8,809	6,438	4,150	2,412	949	558	134	17	23,467
Percentage - - -	37.49	27.43	17.68	10.27	4.04	2.37	.57	.07	

MADRAS ARMY.

LENGTH of SERVICE of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File, compiled from the Inspection Returns for 1884-85.

REGIMENTS.	Under 5 years.	5 to 10 years.	10 to 15 years.	15 to 20 years.	20 to 25 years.	25 to 30 years.	30 to 32 years.	32 to 35 years.	Over 35 years.	TOTAL.
1st Cavalry - -	127	132	20	11	23	16	8	2	1	
2nd " - -	-	-	-	Returns not available.			-	-	-	
3rd " - -	94	146	11	25	44	17	2	2	1	
4th " - -	86	172	9	12	18	8	9	2	-	
1st Infantry - -	193	255	104	73	36	79	31	2	-	
2nd " - -	-	-	-	Returns not available.			-	-	-	
3rd " - -	122	229	167	107	34	86	9	2	-	
4th " - -	-	-	-	Returns not available.			-	-	-	
5th " - -	367	189	109	54	54	54	6	-	-	
6th " - -	233	289	148	69	25	35	14	2	2	
7th " - -	289	152	152	61	30	110	6	2	-	
8th " - -	310	160	189	81	32	32	1	1	-	
9th " - -	207	251	183	90	11	45	9	1	-	
10th " - -	378	148	85	76	36	52	14	3	-	
11th " - -	263	250	169	67	42	55	2	-	4	
12th " - -	216	227	213	62	32	49	10	-	-	
13th " - -	255	173	101	142	49	74	6	3	1	
14th " - -	271	166	140	95	86	49	6	-	1	
15th " - -	204	185	151	123	51	71	9	4	-	
16th " - -	267	161	153	95	47	66	15	3	-	
17th " - -	296	194	113	113	34	38	12	6	-	
19th " - -	247	188	144	75	30	84	3	1	-	
20th " - -	155	234	159	136	70	57	11	2	-	
21st " - -	362	159	105	97	25	51	5	6	-	
22nd " - -	274	223	149	84	38	40	8	1	-	
23rd " - -	279	162	166	79	74	46	3	6	-	
24th " - -	335	247	113	64	23	22	4	4	-	
25th " - -	255	210	142	105	18	71	5	1	2	
26th " - -	311	164	116	83	31	90	11	1	-	
27th " - -	-	-	-	Returns not available.			-	-	-	
28th " - -	223	303	221	113	19	53	8	13	-	
29th " - -	224	242	97	71	41	108	25	4	-	
30th " - -	330	143	147	67	46	66	10	1	-	
31st " - -	362	147	144	80	31	36	7	2	-	
32nd " - -	279	192	107	101	46	68	7	3	-	
33rd " - -	236	143	139	119	91	49	6	8	-	
TOTAL - - -	8,049	6,216	4,166	2,609	1,267	1,777	262	88	12	24,446
Percentage - -	32.92	25.42	17.04	10.67	5.18	7.26	1.07	.75	.04	

## Appendix (G.)—[Paragraph 63 of Letter.]

STATEMENT showing the Approximate Annual Cost of the Increase to the British Army in India, as proposed by the Commander in Chief in India.

	<i>Rs.</i>
1. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a British cavalry regiment by one squadron (148 men) to a total strength of 602 of all ranks, exclusive of officers, would be 1,49,500 rupees per regiment, and for the nine regiments of cavalry serving in India the total additional expenditure would be (inclusive of one major, one captain, and four lieutenants for fourth squadron) - - - - -	13,45,500
2. The annual cost of one regiment of British cavalry with four squadrons would be - - - - -	7,07,000
3. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a battalion of British infantry by 180 privates, or from 884 to 1,064 of all ranks (exclusive of officers), would be 79,000 rupees per battalion, and for the 50 battalions serving in India the total expenditure would be - - - - -	39,50,000
4. The annual cost of four battalions of British infantry at the proposed increased strength would be at 6,63,000 rupees per battalion - - - - -	26,52,000
5. The annual cost of seven batteries of Royal Artillery would be :—	
	<i>Rs.</i>
For one battery of horse artillery - - - - -	2,02,000
For two batteries of field artillery, at 1,74,000 rupees each - - - - -	3,48,000
For four batteries of garrison artillery, at 95,000 rupees each - - - - -	3,80,000
	9,30,000
Total Annual Cost of proposal - - - - -	95,84,500
In round Numbers - - - <i>Rs.</i>	95,85,000

Probable ANNUAL COST of the Augmentation of Native Cavalry in India, as proposed by the Commander in Chief in India.

	<i>Rs.</i>
1. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Native cavalry regiment, Bengal and Punjab Frontier Force, to four squadrons, or by 75 men of all ranks, would be 41,600 rupees, and for the 17 Bengal and the four Punjab regiments, or in all 21 regiments, the total cost would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) - - - - -	8,73,600
2. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Bombay cavalry regiment to four squadrons, or by 75 men of all ranks, would be 42,200 rupees, and for the six regiments the total cost would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) - - - - -	2,53,200
3. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Central India Horse to four squadrons, or by 132 men of all ranks per regiment, would be 63,700 rupees, and for the two regiments the total cost would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) - - - - -	1,27,400
4. The annual cost of increasing the strength of a Madras cavalry regiment by 102 men, or to a total of 489 of all ranks, would be 50,100 rupees, and for the four regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	2,00,400
5. The annual cost of three new cavalry regiments in Bengal of the increased strength proposed would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment), at 3,47,800 rupees each - - - - -	10,43,400
Total Annual Cost of Augmentation of Native Cavalry in India - - - - - <i>Rs.</i>	24,98,000



Probable Annual Cost of the Augmentation of Native Infantry in Bengal and Bombay, as proposed by the Commander in Chief in India.

1. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Native Infantry, Bengal, by 148 men, or a total of 980 of all ranks, would be 25,000 rupees, and for the 37 regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 9,25,000
2. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Native Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, by 148 men, as above, would be 22,500 rupees, and for the 10 regiments (including Guides Corps Infantry) the total cost would be -	2,25,000
3. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Goorkha and Assam Infantry Regiment by 68 men, or to a total of 980 of all ranks, would be 12,000 rupees, and for the eight regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	96,000
4. The annual cost of increasing the strength of a regiment of Native Infantry, Bombay, by 148 men, as above, would be 28,500 rupees, and for the 26 regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	7,41,000
5. The annual cost of nine new regiments of Native Infantry at the proposed increased strength would be :—	
	<i>Rs.</i>
For five Goorkha Battalions at 2,27,700 rupees each - - - - -	11,38,500
For three Sikh Battalions, at 2,41,000 rupees each - - - - -	7,23,000
For one Muzbee Pioneers - - - - -	2,30,000
	20,91,500
Total Annual Cost of Augmentation of Native Infantry -	40,78,500
In round Numbers - - - <i>Rs.</i>	40,79,000

STATEMENT showing the Approximate Annual Cost of Increase to the British Army in India, as proposed by the Government of India.

1. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a British cavalry regiment by one squadron (148 men) to a total strength of 602 of all ranks, exclusive of officers, would be 1,49,500 rupees per regiment, and for the nine regiments of cavalry serving in India, the total additional expenditure would be (inclusive of one major, one captain, and four lieutenants for fourth squadron) - - - - -	<i>Rs.</i> 13,45,500
2. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a battalion of British Infantry by 100 privates, or from 884 to 984 of all ranks (exclusive of officers), would be 44,000 rupees per battalion, and for the 50 battalions serving in India the total expenditure would be - - - - -	22,00,000
3. The annual cost of three new battalions of British Infantry at the proposed increased strength (984) would be, at 6,33,000 rupees per battalion - - - - -	18,99,000
4. The annual cost of 11 batteries of Royal Artillery would be :—	
	<i>Rs.</i>
For one battery of horse artillery - - - - -	2,02,000
For two batteries of field artillery, at 1,74,000 rupees each - - - - -	3,48,000
For two batteries of mountain artillery, at 1,53,000 rupees each - - - - -	3,06,000
For six batteries of garrison artillery, at 95,000 rupees each - - - - -	5,70,000
	14,26,000
Total Annual Cost of Proposal - - -	68,70,500
In round Numbers - - - <i>Rs.</i>	68,71,000

Probable ANNUAL COST of the Augmentation of Native Cavalry in India, as proposed by the Government of India.

	<i>Rs.</i>
1. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Native cavalry regiment, Bengal and Punjab Frontier Force, to four squadrons, or by 75 men of all ranks, would be 41,600 rupees, and for the 17 Bengal and the four Punjab regiments, or in all 21 regiments, the total cost would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) - - - - -	8,73,600
2. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Bombay cavalry regiment to four squadrons, or by 75 men of all ranks, would be 42,200 rupees, and for the six regiments the total cost would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) - - - - -	2,53,200
3. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a regiment of Central India Horse to four squadrons, or by 132 men of all ranks per regiment, would be 63,700 rupees, and for the two regiments the total cost would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) - - - - -	1,27,400
4. The annual cost of increasing the strength of a Madras cavalry regiment by 102 men, or to a total of 489 of all ranks, would be 50,100 rupees, and for the four regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	2,00,400
5. The annual cost of two new cavalry regiments in Bengal, of the increased strength proposed, would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander per regiment) at 3,47,800 rupees each -	6,95,600
6. The annual cost of one new cavalry regiment in Bombay, of the increased strength proposed, would be (inclusive of one extra squadron commander) - - - - -	3,72,700
<b>Total Annual Cost of Augmentation of Native Cavalry in India -</b>	<b>25,22,900</b>
In round Numbers - - - <i>Rs.</i>	<b>25,23,000</b>

Probable ANNUAL COST of the Augmentation of Native Infantry in Bengal, as proposed by the Government of India.

	<i>Rs.</i>
1. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Native Infantry regiment, Bengal, by 80 men, or a total of 912 of all ranks, would be 12,720 rupees, and for the 37 regiments the total cost would be - - - - -	4,70,640
2. The annual cost of augmenting the strength of a Native Infantry regiment, Punjab Frontier Force, by 80 men, or to total of 912 of all ranks, would be 11,440 rupees, and for the 10 regiments (including Guides Corps Infantry) the total cost would be - - - - -	1,14,400
3. The annual cost of nine new regiments of Native Infantry at the proposed increase strength would be :—	
<i>Rs.</i>	
For five new Goorkha battalions at 2,15,700 rupees - - - - -	10,78,500
For three new Sikh battalions, at 2,31,000 rupees - - - - -	6,93,000
For one new Pioneer battalion - - - - -	2,17,500
	19,89,000
<b>Total Annual Cost of Augmentation of Native Infantry in Bengal - - - - - <i>Rs.</i></b>	<b>25,74,040</b>
In round Numbers - - - <i>Rs.</i>	<b>25,74,000</b>

NOTE.—The five Goorkha and three Assam regiments have already a strength of 912 men of all ranks.

APPENDIX (H.)— [para. 86 of Letter.]

Estimated Saving by the Changes proposed in the Staff and Commands of the Indian Army.

	<i>Rs.</i>
Estimated annual saving proposed in the Despatch from the Government of India, No. 283, dated 6th November 1881 - - -	3,00,000
<i>Add—</i>	
The cost of four Garrison Instructors in Bengal, with reference to paragraph 23 of Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 243, dated 26th July 1883 - - - - -	35,376
	3,35,376
<i>Deduct—</i>	
With reference to paragraph 26 of above Despatch from the Secretary of State—	
	<i>Rs.</i>
(1) Increased cost of office establishments at the head-quarters of the four army corps -	1,00,000
(2) Pay of the Interpreter to the Commander-in-Chief in India as Lieutenant-Colonel instead of Major - - - - -	2,244
(3) Allowance for Interpreters to Lieutenant-Generals Commanding Army Corps, 4 × 130 rupees × 12 months - - -	6,240
(4) Pay of Assistant Judge Advocate General as Lieutenant-Colonel instead of Major -	2,244
	1,10,728
Net Saving per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>	2,24,648

## APPENDIX (J.)

## British Army, India: Present and Proposed Establishment.

DETAILS.	Present Number of Batteries and Regiments.	Strength of one Battery or Regiment.		Increase per Battery or Regiment.	Proposed Number of Batteries and Regiments.	Total Strength of Batteries and Regiments.		Total Increase of Strength.
		Present.	Proposed.			As at Present.	As Proposed.	
<b>Royal Artillery :</b>								
Horse artillery batteries - - -	10	157	157	-	11	1,570	1,727	—
Field artillery batteries - - -	40	157	157	-	42	6,280	6,594	—
Mountain artillery batteries - -	6	106	106	-	8	636	848	—
Heavy field artillery batteries - -	4	95	95	-	4	380	380	—
Garrison artillery batteries - - -	17	115	115	-	23	1,955	2,645	—
<b>Total - - -</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>10,821</b>	<b>12,194</b>	<b>1,373</b>
<b>Cavalry - - -</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>602</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4,086</b>	<b>5,418</b>	<b>1,332</b>
<b>Infantry - - -</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>884</b>	<b>984</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>44,200</b>	<b>52,152</b>	<b>7,952</b>
<b>GRAND Total - - -</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>59,107</b>	<b>69,764</b>	<b>10,657</b>

## Native Army, India: Present and Proposed Establishment.

PRESIDENCY.	Present Number of Regiments.	Strength of one Regiment.		Increase per Regiment.	Proposed Number of Regiments.	Total Strength of Corps.		Total Increase of Strength.
		Present.	Proposed.			As at Present.	As Proposed.	
<b>BENGAL.</b>								
<b>Cavalry :</b>								
Bengal Cavalry - - - - -	17	550	625	5	19	9,350	11,875	—
Punjab Frontier Force Cavalry - -	4	550	625	75	4	2,200	2,500	—
Central India Horse - - - - -	2	493	625	132	2	986	1,250	—
<b>Total - - -</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>12,536</b>	<b>15,625</b>	<b>3,089</b>
<b>Infantry :</b>								
Bengal Infantry - - - - -	37	832	912	80	46	30,784	41,952	—
Punjab Frontier Force (including Guide Corps Infantry).	10	832	912	80	10	8,320	9,120	—
Goorkha and Assam Regiments - -	8	912	912	-	8	7,296	7,296	—
<b>Total - - -</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>46,400</b>	<b>58,368</b>	<b>11,968</b>
<b>Total Bengal - - -</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>58,936</b>	<b>73,993</b>	<b>15,057</b>
<b>MADRAS.</b>								
Cavalry - - - - -	4	387	489	102	4	1,548	1,956	408
Infantry - - - - -	32	833	833	-	32	26,656	26,656	—
<b>Total Madras - - -</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>28,204</b>	<b>28,612</b>	<b>408</b>
<b>BOMBAY.</b>								
Cavalry - - - - -	6	550	625	75	7	3,300	4,375	1,075
Infantry - - - - -	26	832	832	-	26	21,632	21,632	—
<b>Total Bombay - - -</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>24,932</b>	<b>26,007</b>	<b>1,075</b>
<b>GRAND Total - - -</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>112,072</b>	<b>128,612</b>	<b>16,540</b>

Note.—Exclusive of officers.

— No. 26. —

LETTER from the Under Secretary of State, War Office, to the Under Secretary of State for India.

(120—India—4356.)

Sir,

War Office, 11 September, 1885.

IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, M. 12,502 forwarding the copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 9th instant, in which is specified the deficiency which will exist in each infantry battalion in India when transfers to the Reserve are resumed, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of Lord Randolph Churchill, that the deficiencies reported do not in most cases differ largely from those estimated in this Department last July, and make, after excluding Aden, from which station the 1st Battalion South Lancashire Regiment is about to return to the United Kingdom, an aggregate of 6,601 men.

To this number, however, must be added five per cent. calculated on the establishment of each battalion to meet unforeseen casualties during the six months over which the trooping season extends, or 1,960 men, making thus a total of 8,561 men.

So far as can at present be foreseen, all the battalions, with the exception of the seven specified in the letter from this Department (120—India—4037), dated the 30th June last, will be completed to their existing establishment during the course of the present trooping season.

It is computed that the number of men not forthcoming to complete these battalions will be as follows:—

2nd Battalion Royal Lancaster Regiment	-	-	-	70
2nd Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers	-	-	-	110
2nd Battalion Liverpool Regiment	-	-	-	20
2nd Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment	-	-	-	200
2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers	-	-	-	170
1st Battalion East Lancashire Fusiliers	-	-	-	110
1st Battalion Connaught Rangers	-	-	-	90
				770
TOTAL	-	-	-	770

I am directed to add, however, that special efforts are being made to obtain qualified men to meet these deficiencies, and there is some reason to hope that even if a sufficient number of such men are not forthcoming to complete them, the deficiencies may in any case be materially reduced.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India,  
India Office, S.W.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

— No. 27. —

(No. M. 12,468—85.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 17 September 1885.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Smith and His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, that the Government of India have made proposals for a considerable increase to the British troops on the Indian establishment.

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These recommendations may be stated very briefly as an increase of 10,657 men, composed as follows :—

148 men to each regiment of cavalry =	1,332,	
100 men to each battalion of infantry =	5,000,	
3 additional battalions of infantry of the increased strength =	2,952,	
1 additional battery Royal Horse Artillery	- 157	} 1,373,
2 additional field batteries	- - - 314	
2 additional mountain batteries	- - - 212	
6 additional garrison batteries	- - - 690	

bringing the total Indian establishment up to 70,028.

The subject has not yet come under the actual consideration of the Secretary of State in Council, and it is in view to assisting its consideration that I am to request Lord Randolph Churchill may be informed by what date, assuming the measure to be sanctioned and approved by Her Majesty's Government during the present year, the whole or a portion, and what portion, of the above suggested increase could be furnished and despatched to India.

I am to request that, as the matter has not been brought formally before the Indian Council, this inquiry may be treated as confidential, and that the reply may be given as early as practicable.

The Under Secretary of State,  
War Office.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Allen Johnson*,  
Major-General, Military Secretary.

— No. 28. —

(No. 20—India—27.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 23 September 1885.

IN reply to your Letter M. 12,468, of the 17th instant, acquainting me, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that the Government of India have made certain proposals for the increase of the British troops on the Indian establishment, and asking to be informed by what date the 10,657 men required to make up the contemplated increase could be furnished and despatched, on the supposition that the proposals made shall receive the sanction of Her Majesty's Government during the present year, I have the honour to inform you as follows, for the information of the Secretary of State for India :—

The period required for the preparations to despatch the reinforcements required will differ according to the several arms. In the case of the cavalry, it is hoped that, by using every exertion, the majority, if not all the men required may be recruited and sufficiently trained to allow of their despatch to India by the 1st of April next; but they can in this case be only superficially trained before embarkation.

In regard to the Royal Artillery, one battery Royal Horse Artillery, two batteries Field Artillery, and personnel for two batteries Mountain Artillery can be furnished by the 1st January next. The formation of the six garrison batteries will be a matter of time, the duration of which must be entirely dependent on the state of the recruiting market, which has hitherto been unable to supply the ordinary establishments. It will probably not be excessive to estimate the period at 12 months.

Of the 5,000 infantry men required as an increase to the 50 battalions in India, 2,500 could be supplied by the 1st January next, and the remainder in from nine to twelve months.

The three extra battalions could be made up to the increased establishment and despatched one per month, so as to arrive in India between the 31st January and 31st March 1886.

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *Ralph Thompson*.

## — No. 29. —

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 29th September 1885.

YOUR Military Letter, 135, of 1885, under consideration. If proposed increase of 10,657 men is sanctioned, War Office could send one horse battery, two field batteries, and men of two mountain batteries by 1st January next. The six garrison batteries probably not available under 12 months. The three additional infantry battalions could be sent one monthly, to arrive January, February, March next; 2,500 additional men for Indian battalions could be supplied by 1st January; balance in 12 months. The 1,332 cavalry might be ready for dispatch, but only superficially trained, by 1st April next. Assuming approval here, what would you wish done regarding their dispatch?

## — No. 30. —

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 2nd October 1885.

IN continuation, mine 29th September 1885, army increase; most desirable reply should be sent as early as possible.

## — No. 31. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 5th October 1885.

WE are prepared to receive troops as proposed, except cavalry, which should be trained in England and sent by first troopship in 1886-87.

## — No. 32. —

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 14th October 1885.

YOUR Military Letter, 135, of 1885, increase to establishment British troops. All recommendations approved. One battery horse, two batteries field, two batteries mountain artillery, three battalions infantry of revised strength, and 2,500 infantry drafts for augmentation leave this trooping season; remainder during season 1886-87.

Programme dates of sailing follows.

Proposed increase to Native Army, temporary and permanent sanctioned, but I urge corresponding increase to Guides Cavalry.

Regulations for employ and payment of men of first and second reserve all approved, but men called out for training should not receive both reserve and full pay while out. Measures for forming regiments of three linked battalions, including arrangements in paragraph 36 for British officers, approved.

Measures for improving position of native soldiers approved, except improved hutting allowances, which I wish to see first in detail.

Despatch follows regarding mode and conditions of transfer of Punjab Frontier Force, and dealing with the other points in paragraphs headed reductions and reorganisation.

I suggest orders for linking battalions, reserves, and improvements in native soldiers' position should be issued simultaneously.

-- No. 33. --

(M. 12,468—85.)

## LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 15 October 1885.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to forward, for the information and early consideration of the Secretary of State for War, the accompanying copy of a letter\* from the Government of India, conveying their proposals for placing Her Majesty's forces in India, both British and Native, on a footing adapted to the new conditions which they may be called upon to meet. These conditions are so well known to Her Majesty's Government that it appears to Lord Randolph Churchill superfluous to enter on any explanations regarding them.

I am to observe that the increase the Government of India propose for the Native Army must be, to a great extent, contingent on that proposed for the British force, as it is essential that the existing proportion of British to Native troops shall not be lowered.

His Lordship in Council, I am to state, is prepared to sanction all the measures recommended by the Government of India for the augmentation of the British establishment, and he trusts that they will be concurred in by Her Majesty's Government, and that Mr. Secretary Smith will be able to take the needful steps for placing the British establishment in India on the footing now recommended, and maintaining it at that strength for the future.

These measures contemplate the addition to the permanent Indian establishment of 11 batteries of artillery, with a total of 55 officers and 1,373 men of all ranks; of the addition of a fourth squadron to each of the nine regiments of British cavalry now in India, or a total of 54 officers and 1,332 men of all ranks; the augmentation of each battalion of British infantry by 100 rank and file, or an addition of 5,000 men for the 50 battalions on the establishment; and an addition to that establishment of three battalions of the revised strength, viz., 984 of all ranks, excluding officers. The total augmentation of the British establishment in all three arms thus being 196 officers and 10,657 of all other ranks.

The Secretary of State of War will observe that the permanent increase proposed by the Government of India falls short of that recommended by the Commander in Chief, but the difference between them, as pointed out by the Government in paragraph 11 of their letter, is rather apparent than real, and is only due to the apprehension entertained by Sir D. Stewart that the deficiencies in drafts to complete the establishment which have been experienced during the past few years will continue in the future. Lord Randolph Churchill, in view of the past, cannot too strongly urge on the Secretary of State for War the paramount necessity of taking adequate and unremitting measures to ensure that the Indian establishment of British troops shall always be kept up to its full strength, whatever that may be. On any other view it would, in his opinion, be of no more use to fix the establishment at the higher than the lower rate, and it is in the conviction that no Government which may be in power at home will henceforth allow the British force in India to fall below the establishment deemed essential for its security that his Lordship adopts that now proposed by the Government of India, in lieu of the higher one advocated by Sir Donald Stewart.

It was in anticipation of the consideration of these measures by his Lordship in Council that the inquiry was made in my letter, No. 12,468, dated 17th September 1885, as to whether, in the demand being assumed, the additional troops and drafts could be supplied at all, and, if so, by what date they would be ready for dispatch to India. Sir R. Thompson's reply, which I am directed to acknowledge, was communicated by telegraph to the Government of India for their opinion as to when, if sanctioned, the troops should be dispatched. They state that they are prepared to receive all the troops, as proposed, except the cavalry drafts, which should be trained in England and sent by the first troopship



ship in 1886-87. On learning, therefore, that the arrangement proposed in your letter of the 23rd September 1885 can still be given effect to, Lord Randolph Churchill will cause the necessary steps to be taken, in communication with the Admiralty, for the provision of transport for three field batteries, two mountain batteries, three infantry battalions, and 2,500 infantry drafts, to embark on the dates indicated in that letter.

Assuming that the proposals now put forward meet with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, I am to request information as to whether they will necessitate any increase to the strength of the depôts now maintained, and, if so, to what extent.

Contingent on the proposed increase to the British forces being carried into effect, Lord Randolph Churchill proposes to accord his sanction to the measures for the augmentation to the Native Army, and for the formation of a reserve as recommended by the Government of India. His Lordship in Council is prepared also to sanction the several measures proposed for the improvement of the position of the native soldier, which will, his Lordship trusts, greatly facilitate the future recruiting of the Army.

With respect to the proposals again put forward by the Government of India for the abolition of the presidential system, and the reorganisation of the three armies in four corps under the direct and sole control of the Government, no steps can, under existing circumstances, be taken, but Lord Randolph Churchill approves of the transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force to the orders of the Commander in Chief in India, on the condition that it remains a purely local force, though liable, of course, for service in any quarter. His Lordship, I am to add, is not at present in a position to decide on the recommendations of the Government for the reduction in the number of general officers' commands.

I am to request that the Secretary of State in Council may be favoured with as early a reply as the Secretary of State for War may be able to afford.

I have, &c.

(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,  
Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State  
for War.

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— No. 34. —

(M. 6820.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

22 October 1885.

IN reply to your letter of the 15th instant, forwarding, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for War, the copy of a letter from the Government of India regarding their proposals for placing Her Majesty's forces in India upon an improved footing, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Smith to inform you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that he concurs in the measures recommended by the Government of India for the augmentation of the British establishment, and that the necessary steps are being taken to give effect to them.

In my letter, 20-India-27, of the 23rd ultimo, it was stated what portions of the troops required to complete the proposed new establishments could be dispatched during the present season, and the dates by which they could be prepared for embarkation.

I have now to inform you that the one horse artillery battery, two field batteries, two mountain batteries, three battalions, and about 2,500 infantry drafts will be forthcoming by the dates named, and, as soon as the arrangements for transport are notified by you, the details will be furnished in the ordinary manner.

With regard to the suggestion by the Government of India, that the dispatch of cavalry drafts for the formation of a fourth squadron to each of the cavalry regiments in India should be deferred till next trooping season, I am directed to acquaint you that the means do not exist at the cavalry depôt, either for accom-

modating or training, at one time, so large a number of cavalry recruits, and it is consequently most desirable that about 500 of them should be dispatched to India towards the end of the present trooping season.

When the new establishments have been reached every effort will be made to maintain them complete, but I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to point out that, in order to meet the demands now put forward, a great strain will necessarily be thrown upon the Home Army, from the ranks of which the men preparing for next year's ordinary drafts will have to be taken, and no small difficulty is to be anticipated in replacing them and furnishing the drafts in 1886-87.

This can only be done by now recruiting largely in excess of the existing home establishments, while the extent of the permanent increase which will be required in these to admit of the larger drafts that will be wanted in future must be a matter for subsequent consideration. The additional expense entailed by both these causes will, in any case, necessitate considerably increased charges, which must fall upon Indian funds.

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *H. G. Deedes.*

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— No. 35. —

EXTRACT from a Despatch to the Secretary of State for India, No. 179,  
dated 26th October 1885.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 597-B., dated 13th August 1885.  
To Government of Madras, No. 598-B., dated 13th August 1885, and enclosure.  
To Government of Bombay, No. 599-B., dated 13th August 1885, and enclosure.  
To Government of Punjab, No. 600-B., dated 13th August 1885, and enclosure.  
To Foreign Department, No. 601-B., dated 13th August 1885, and enclosure.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 2722-B., dated 21st August 1885.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 2838-B., dated 28th August 1885.  
Special India Army Circular, dated 4th September 1885.  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 728-B., dated 5th September 1885.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 2902-B., dated 4th September 1885, and enclosure.  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 756-B., dated 10th September 1885.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 3038-B., dated 11th September 1885.  
Special India Army Circular, dated 15th September 1885.  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 781-B., dated 16th September 1885.  
To Foreign Department, No. 782-B., dated 16th September 1885.  
To Government of Bombay, No. 783-B., dated 16th September 1885.  
To Government of Punjab, No. 784-B., dated 16th September 1885.  
From Foreign Department, No. 3170-I., dated 15th September 1885.  
From Government of Punjab, No. 526-S-C., dated 18th September 1885, and enclosure.  
To Government of Punjab, No. 832-B., dated 25th September 1885.  
To Foreign Department and others, No. 895-B., dated 9th October 1885.  
From Government of Bombay, No. 5336, dated 10th October 1885.

Para. 13. Correspondence regarding the revision of establishments of native cavalry regiments in India and formation of three additional regiments. [Your Lordship's telegram, dated 4th August 1885.]

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Enclosures in No. 35.

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India—(No. 597-B.—“Organisation, Native Army”; dated Simla, 13th August 1885).

I AM directed to forward herewith a copy of a Despatch, No. 63, of the 4th of May, to the Secretary of State proposing an augmentation of the Native Army.

2. The

2. The proposals therein contained as regards the infantry have been superseded by other and later proposals, but the proposals as regards the cavalry have now been sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

3. Enclosed is a draft of the Army Circular giving effect to this augmentation. I am to ask that, under the Commander in Chief's orders, such additions may be made to it as may appear necessary, and that it may be returned with any recommendations his Excellency may desire to make as regards the manner in which the new squadrons may be formed, the classes from which they are to be recruited, and the castes of which they are to be composed.

4. I am also to ask that the Commander in Chief will please to consider whether this opportunity may not be conveniently taken to confer commissions of Rissaldar and Ressaidar on a few native gentlemen of rank who may be desirous of accepting such positions, and whose services would be useful in procuring recruits.

5. With regard to the new regiments to be formed, the Government of India desire to receive the opinion of his Excellency as to the manner in which, and the classes from which, they should be raised, and especially whether, in view of the probability of the Indian Army being in future employed to a considerable extent beyond the frontier, and the disinclination of Indians to prolonged service away from India, it would not be expedient that at least one of the regiments should be raised from tribes beyond the frontier, and employed, for the most part, locally.

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, (No. 598-B.—“Organisation, Native Army”; dated Simla, 13th August 1885).

THE Government of India have lately submitted proposals to the Secretary of State for India for strengthening the establishment of native cavalry regiments, which proposals have now been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government.

2. The proposed increase to the Madras Cavalry consists in the addition to each of the four regiments of six naiks and 96 privates, when the present and new establishments will be as shown in the table below.

3. I am to ask that the Madras Government will be pleased to issue the necessary orders for carrying out this augmentation.

ESTABLISHMENT of a Regiment of Madras Cavalry.

	Present.	Now Sanctioned.
<b>British Officers :</b>		
Commandant - - - - -	1	1
Squadron Commanders - - - - -	3	3
Squadron Officers - - - - -	4	4
Medical Officer - - - - -	1	1
Total - - - - -	9	9
<b>Natives :</b>		
Subadars - - - - -	6	6
Jemadars - - - - -	6	6
Havildar Major - - - - -	1	1
Havildars - - - - -	30	30
Naiks - - - - -	24	30
Trumpet Major - - - - -	1	1
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	6
Farrier Major - - - - -	1	1
Farrier Havildars - - - - -	6	6
Shoeing Smiths and pupils - - - - -	6	6
Troopers - - - - -	300	396
TOTAL - - - - -	387	489

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 599-B.—“Organisation, Native Army”; dated Simla, 13th August 1885).

THE Government of India have lately submitted proposals to the Secretary of State for India for augmenting the strength of the Native cavalry. The sanction of Her Majesty's Government to these proposals has now been received.

2. The augmentation comprises the addition of a fourth squadron to each of the existing six regiments of Bombay cavalry, thus bringing up the regiment to a strength of 625 of all ranks, the present and new establishments being as shown in the annexed table.

3. I am to ask that the Government of Bombay will be pleased to issue the necessary orders for carrying out this augmentation.

4. Her Majesty's Government have also sanctioned the proposal made by the Governor General in Council for adding an additional regiment to the Bombay establishment to take the place of the 3rd Sind Horse, to be raised locally, and to consist as far as possible of men from tribes on the Biluchistan frontier. I am to ask that an early opinion may be furnished to the Government of India whether a regiment can be so raised, with any suggestions that may occur to the Bombay Government for carrying such a measure out.

5. It would be obviously desirable that officers of special qualifications should be selected for the duty. The regiment should be raised, as far as possible through tribal agency, commissions being given to chiefs who could bring recruits, and who are in other respects eligible and likely to prove useful as native officers in cavalry regiments.

6. I am to suggest that this opportunity may be usefully taken to find places in some one or other of the cavalry regiments for any cavalry officers who, from no fault of their own, are not at present borne on the cadres of any regiments. As the Government of Bombay are aware, under the system now in force officers on appointment to the staff are seconded in their regiments, so that every officer, whether employed on the staff or otherwise, will have a place in some regiment. But it is believed that some officers who were formerly, or are now on the staff, and so under the old system vacated their regimental appointments, have no longer places on the cadres of regiments, and therefore are, or will find themselves unprovided for on the termination of the tour of their staff employment. It would be very desirable, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, to take advantage of this augmentation to assign such officers, if there are any in the Bombay Army, definite places in some regiments.

ESTABLISHMENT of a Regiment of Bombay Cavalry.

	Present.	Now Sanctioned.
<b>British Officers:</b>		
Commandant - - - - -	1	1
Squadron Commanders - - - - -	3	4
Squadron Officers - - - - -	4	4
Medical Officers - - - - -	1	1
Total - - - - -	9	10
<b>Natives:</b>		
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Res-aidars - - - - -	3	4
Ressaidar Wocrdie Major	1	1
Jemadars - - - - -	6	8
Kote Duffadar Major	1	1
Farrier Major	1	1
Kote Duffadars - - - - -	6	8
Duffadars - - - - -	30	32
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	8
Naiks - - - - -	30	40
Sowars - - - - -	463	518
Total - - - - -	550	625

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (No. 600-B.—“Organisation, Native Army ;” dated Simla, 13th August 1885).

HER Majesty's Government having sanctioned the addition of a fourth squadron to each of the four cavalry regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, I am desired to forward, for the information of the Lieutenant Governor, a tabular statement showing the existing establishment of a cavalry regiment of the force, and the revised establishment now sanctioned.

2. I am to ask that, under the Lieutenant Governor's orders, the Government of India may be informed how it is proposed the increase now sanctioned is to be carried out, and the classes of which the new squadron should be composed.

ESTABLISHMENT of a Regiment of Bengal and Punjab Cavalry.

	Present.	Now Sanctioned.
<b>British Officers :</b>		
Commandant - - - - -	1	1
Squadron Commanders - - - - -	3	4
Squadron Officers - - - - -	4	4
Medical Officers . - - - -	1	1
Total - - - - -	9	10
<b>Natives :</b>		
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Ressaidars - - - - -	3	4
Ressaidar Woordie Major	1	1
Jemadars - - - - -	6	8
Kote Duffadars - - - - -	6	8
Duffadars - - - - -	48	56
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	8
Privates - - - - -	477	536
Total - - - - -	550	625

Office Memorandum from Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 601-B.—“Organisation, Native Army ”; dated Simla, 13th August 1885).

THE undersigned is directed to forward a schedule showing the present establishment of the Central India Horse, and the establishment which has lately been sanctioned by the Secretary of State as part of the augmentation of the Native cavalry proposed by the Government of India.

2. This augmentation for the Central India Horse may now be carried out. But this Department requests to be informed of the classes of men it is proposed that the augmentation should consist of.

## ESTABLISHMENT of each of the Two Regiments of Central India Horse.

	Present.	Now Sanctioned.
<b>British Officers :</b>		
Squadron Commanders - - - - -	3	4
Squadron Officers - - - - -	3	3
Medical Officer - - - - -	1	1
Total - - - - -	7	8
<b>Natives :</b>		
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Ressaldars - - - - -	3	4
Woodie Major - - - - -	1	1
Jemadars - - - - -	6	8
Kote Duffadars - - - - -	-	8
Duffadars - - - - -	54	56
Trumpeters - - - - -	6	8
Sowars - - - - -	420	536
Total - - - - -	493	725

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.—(No. 2722-B. "Native Army, Organization"; dated Simla, 21st August 1885)

In returning the enclosed draft India Army circulars, giving effect to the augmentation of the Native cavalry regiments in India received with your No. 597-B. (Organisation, Native Army), dated 13th August 1885, I am directed to state that the Commander-in-Chief suggests that the following be added thereto :

"The above revised establishment of each regiment will be organised in four squadrons consisting of eight troops."

2. The remaining portion of your letter will be replied to hereto.

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.—(No. 2838-B., "Native Army, Organization"; dated Simla, 28th August 1885).

IN continuation of this Office No. 2722-B., dated 21st August 1885, I am now directed to convey the Commander in Chief's recommendation on certain points regarding the two new regiments of Bengal cavalry about to be raised.

2. His Excellency recommends that the composition of the two regiments (which will be styled the 16th and 17th Bengal Cavalry) should be as follows :

## 16th Bengal Cavalry.

4 troops - - - - - Sikhs.  
2 " - - - - - Dogras.  
2 " - - - - - Jats of Hindustan.

## 17th Bengal Cavalry.

4 troops - - - - - Punjabi Mahomedans.  
2 " - - - - - Mahomedans, trans-Indus British subjects.  
2 " - - - - - Mahomedans, independent tribes, such as  
Biluch, Afghans, Farsiwans.

3. After

3. After careful consideration of the point raised in the fifth paragraph of your letter, No. 597-B., of 13th August 1885, his Excellency cannot recommend that one of the regiments should consist entirely of tribes beyond the frontier. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to get the requisite number of men of this class with money to pay their chunda; and such a regiment could only be formed on an entirely different footing from the other regiments of Bengal Cavalry. The Commander-in-Chief is also unable to recommend that either of the new regiments should be local. In his Excellency's judgment past experience has amply proved that local regiments would soon become inferior in discipline and military efficiency to general service corps.

4. The following is the dress, armament, &c., proposed for the regiments:

Arms	-	-	-	-	-	-	Sword and carbine.
Dress	-	-	-	-	-	-	Dark blue, lace gold, as in the 12th Bengal Cavalry. The selection of facings might be left to the commanding officers.
Equipment and saddlery	-	-	-	-	-	-	Mackenzie pattern.

5. In order to form the nucleus of the new regiments, it will be necessary to call for a certain number of volunteers from the existing regiments of Bengal Cavalry. This will be arranged for under his Excellency's orders.

6. With reference to paragraph 4 of your letter, No. 597-B., of 13th August 1885, I am desired to state that a list of candidates for direct commissions is kept in this office; but as not much is really known about these men, his Excellency thinks that it will be a better plan to offer a certain number of commissions, say one-third in each regiment, to native gentlemen bringing recruits on somewhat the following scale:

To native gentlemen bringing 20 men of the classes required, with horses fit for service, and 50 rupees towards defraying cost of equipment (or 20 men with 250 rupees each).	}	A commission as jemadar without probation.			
To those bringing 40 men and horses			-	-	-
To those bringing 50 men and horses	-	-	-	-	A ressaidar's commission.

It is suggested that a Governor General's Order should issue notifying this decision; or, if the Government desire it, it can be notified in General Order by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

7. The Commander-in-Chief believes that the commanding officers of the 16th and 17th Bengal Cavalry will require considerable pecuniary and other assistance from Government in the form of loans for purchase of remounts, and making up saddlery and equipment at the Government factory, or to be allowed to purchase certain material, such as numdah and cloth, from Government stores, if they can conveniently be spared. On these points further communications will be made to you if necessary.

8. A separate letter will shortly be forwarded to you regarding the caste constitution of the new troops of the existing regiments of Bengal Cavalry.

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INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS, 1885.—[Clause 130.]

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Organisation.—Native Army.

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Simla, 4th September 1885.

Formation of Three Additional Regiments of Cavalry.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in Council directs the immediate formation of three additional regiments of Native Cavalry, of which two will be raised in the Bengal Presidency and one in Bombay.

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

2. The two regiments to be raised in Bengal will be designated the 16th and 17th Regiments of Bengal Cavalry, with the following establishment :—

## British—

Commandant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Squadron commanders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Squadron officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Medical officer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total										-	10

## Native—

Ressaldars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar-Woordie Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars (including farrier-major and salutri)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Sowars (including one assistant salutri, eight farriers, and eight camel sowars)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	536
Total										-	625

3. To form the nucleus of these two regiments, volunteers will be called for, under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, from existing regiments of Bengal Cavalry.

One-third of the commissions in each regiment will be conferred on native gentlemen who may come forward with recruits, according to the following scale :—

To a native gentleman bringing 20 men of the classes required, with horses fit for service, and 50 rupees towards defraying cost of equipment, or 20 men with 250 rupees each } A commission as jemadar without probation.

To a native gentleman bringing 40 men and horses - - - A rissaidar's commission.  
To a native gentleman bringing 50 men and horses - - - A rissaidar's commission.

4. The armament of these regiments will be sword and carbine, with revolvers for those ranks which are now so armed in the Bengal Cavalry.

5. The regiment to be raised in the Bombay Presidency will be formed under the orders of the Government of Bombay.

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From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 728-B.—“ Organisation— Native Army ;” dated Simla, 5th September 1885).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2838-B., dated the 28th ultimo, conveying the recommendation of the Commander in Chief on certain points connected with the formation of additional regiments of Native Cavalry.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India sanction the adoption of his Excellency's proposals. I am to forward a copy of a special army circular, dated the 4th instant, authorising the formation of the additional regiments, and laying down the establishment sanctioned for them, &c., and to request that his Excellency may be moved to issue all necessary subsidiary orders.

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From Major-General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2902-B.—“ Native Army— Organisation ;” dated Simla, 4th September 1885).

In continuation of this office letter, No. 2838-B., dated the 28th August 1885, I am directed to state that, after consulting commanding officers as to their wishes, the Commander in Chief recommends that the caste constitution of the two extra troops sanctioned for regiments of Bengal Cavalry should be as given in the enclosed statement.

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STATEMENT showing the Caste Composition of the Two Extra Troops sanctioned for Bengal Cavalry Regiments.

1st Bengal Cavalry	-	2 troops Hindustani Mahomedans.
2nd " "	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Rajputs.
3rd " "	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Jats.
4th " "	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Hindustani Mahomedans.
5th " "	-	2 troops Jats.
6th " "	-	1 troop Jats, 1 troop Sikhs.
7th " "	-	1 troop Jats, 1 troop Dogras.
		The enlistment of Dogras has been discontinued in this regiment since the issue of General Order, No. 9, of 1883; but the officer commanding reports that he still has 56 men of this class, and would experience no difficulty in completing the troop.
8th " "	-	1 troop Hindustani Mahomedans, 1 troop Jats.
9th " "	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans.
10th Bengal Lancers	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans.
11th " "	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Dogras.
12th Bengal Cavalry	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans.
13th Bengal Lancers	-	1 troop Sikhs, 1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans.
14th " "	-	2 troops Jats.
15th Bengal Cavalry	-	1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans, 1 troop trans-Indus and border tribes.
16th " "	-	1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans, 1 troop Sikhs.
19th Bengal Lancers	-	1 troop Punjabi Mahomedans, 1 troop Sikhs.

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 756-B.—“Organisation—Native Army;” dated Simla, 10th September 1885).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2902-B., dated the 4th instant, and in reply to say, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the caste constitution of the two additional troops sanctioned for regiments of Bengal Cavalry, as detailed in the statement enclosed therein, is approved by the Government of India.

2. An India Army Circular notifying the revised establishment of Native cavalry regiments in India will be issued very shortly.

From Colonel *H. Collett*, Deputy Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3038-B.—“Native Army—Organisation;” dated Simla, 11th September 1885).

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to recommend that the offer of a commission without probation to native gentlemen bringing a certain number of recruits for the two new regiments of Bengal Cavalry may be extended to those who may bring men to complete the revised establishments of the old regiments to the extent of two commissions in each regiment.

## INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS,—1885.—[Clause 131.]

## Organisation.—Native Army.

Simla, 15th September 1885.

## Revised Establishments of Native Cavalry Regiments in India.

UNDER authority from Her Majesty's Government, the establishments of Native cavalry regiments in India are revised as follows:—

## Establishment of a Regiment of Bengal and Punjab Cavalry.

(Organised in four squadrons.)

British—										
Commandant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Squadron Commanders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Squadron Officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Medical Officer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL										10
Native—										
Ressaldars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar Woodie-Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars (including farrier-major and salutri)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Sowars (including one assistant salutri, eight farriers, and eight camel sowars)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	536
TOTAL										625

## Establishment of each of the two Regiments of Central India Horse.

(Organised in four squadrons.)

British—										
Squadron Commanders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Squadron Officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Medical Officer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL										8
Native—										
Ressaldars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar Woodie-Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Kote Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Sowars (including 16 camel sowars)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	536
TOTAL										625

Establishment of a Regiment of Madras Cavalry.

(Organised in three squadrons.)

British—										
Commandant -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Squadron Commanders -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Squadron Officers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Medical Officer -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL - - - -										9
Native—										
Subadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Jemadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Havildar-Major -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Havildars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
Naiks -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Trumpet-Major -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Trumpeters -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Farrier-Major -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Farrier-Havildar -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Shoeing-smiths -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Veterinary pupils -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Pr.vates -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	396
TOTAL - - - -										489

Establishment of a Regiment of Bombay Cavalry.

(Organised in four squadrons.)

British—										
Commandant -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Squadron Commanders -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Squadron Officers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Medical Officer -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL - - - -										10
Native—										
Ressaldar -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ressaidar Woordie-Major -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Jemadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Kote Duffadar-Major -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Farrier-Major -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Kote Duffadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Duffadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32
Trumpeters -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Naiks -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Sowars (including eight camel-sowars) -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	518
TOTAL - - - -										625

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 781-B.—“Organisation—Native Army;” dated Simla, 16th September 1885).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3038-B., dated the 11th instant, and in reply to say, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India sanction the offer, of commissions without probation to the extent of two per regiment on the terms set forth in paragraph 3 of the Special India Army Circular, dated the 4th instant, to native gentlemen who may bring men to complete the revised establishments of regiments of Bengal Cavalry.

Office Memorandum from Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 782-B.—“Organisation—Native Army;” dated Simla, 16th September 1885).

THE undersigned is directed to forward the correspondence noted in the margin and to request that, should the course sanctioned in regard to the grant of direct commissions to native gentlemen bringing men to complete the revised establishments of Bengal Cavalry regiments be considered feasible or desirable in the Central India Horse, the needful instructions may be issued in continuation of the India Army Circular.

From Adjutant General in India, No. 3038-B., dated 11th September 1885.

Military Department letter to the Adjutant General in India, No. 781-B., dated 16th September 1885.

Special India Army Circular, dated 15th September 1885.

Army Circular.

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 783 B.—“Organisation, Native Army;” dated Simla, 16th September 1885).

I AM directed to forward, for information of the Governor in Council, the correspondence noted in the margin, and to request that, should the course sanctioned in regard to the grant of direct commissions to native gentlemen bringing men to complete the revised establishments of Bengal Cavalry regiments be considered feasible or desirable in the Bombay Cavalry, the needful instructions may, under the orders of his Excellency in Council, be issued in continuation of the India Army Circular.

From the Adjutant General in India, No. 3038-B., dated 11th September 1885.

Military Department letter to the Adjutant General in India, No. 781-B., dated 16th September 1885.

Special India Army Circular, dated 15th September 1885.

the orders of his Excellency in Council, be issued in continuation of the India Army Circular.

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (No. 784-B.—“Organisation—Native Army;” dated Simla, 16th September 1885).

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor, the correspondence noted in the margin, and to request that, should the course sanctioned in regard to the grant of direct commissions to native gentlemen bringing men to complete the revised establishments of Bengal Cavalry regiments be considered feasible or desirable in the cavalry of the Punjab Frontier Force, the needful instructions may, under Sir Charles Aitchison's orders, be issued in continuation of the India Army Circular.

From the Adjutant General in India, No. 3038-B., dated 11th September 1885.

Military Department letter to the Adjutant General in India, No. 781-B., dated 16th September 1885.

Special India Army Circular, dated 15th September 1885.

instructions may, under Sir Charles Aitchison's orders, be issued in continuation of the India Army Circular.

From Sir *Lepel Griffin*, K.C.S.I., Agent to the Governor General for Central India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 46-M—371; dated Indore Residency, 5th September 1885).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2828-I., dated 20th August 1885, on the subject of the increased establishment for the Central India Horse, and in reply to forward copy of a letter from the Commandant giving the classes of men from which he proposes to draw the additional strength required, and also suggestions regarding the enlistment of sowars.

No. 300, dated 1st September 1885.

From Colonel *C. Martin*, C.B., Commandant, Central India Horse, to the 2nd Assistant Agent to the Governor General for Central India (No. 300; dated Agar, 1st September 1885).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorandum, No. 2994, dated 27th August 1885, giving cover to copy of letter, No. 2828-I., dated 20th August 1885, from the Under-Secretary, Foreign Department, to the Agent to Governor General for Central India, authorising an augmentation to each regiment, Central India Horse, according to a schedule attached.

2. I propose

2. I propose that the augmentation should consist of a troop of Sikhs and a troop of Mahomedans (Ranghurs and Gukhas from the Jhelum District) in each regiment.

Each regiment will then consist of—

Sikhs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 troops.
Jats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 troop.
Rajputs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 troop.
Ranghurs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 troops.
Gukhas and Pathans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 troop.
Total										- - - 8 troops.

A few Pathans are very useful, but I do not propose to increase the number largely.

3. I do not wish to solicit the Government of India to advance money at a time when it is urgently required for other purposes, nor is it necessary to do so. But money will be required, for it is quite a mistake to suppose that good recruits will come forward with money of their own. If they do so, as a rule it is with money borrowed from relatives and others at 24 and 36 per cent. A much better class of men will be procured if I am able to advance them the money for horses and equipments. The regimental funds are not available for the purpose, and the sum required is 40,000 rupees for each regiment. It would not exceed this sum, and I beg to be allowed to borrow the money, which I can do without difficulty, at 7½ per cent. per annum. The interest would be added to the cost of supplying the recruit with horse and equipments, and the whole would be recovered by monthly instalments. Endeavours will, of course, be made to get recruits who can bring their own horses. There will be no difficulty in carrying out the above arrangement if sanction is accorded.

I beg permission to order the required number of swords from England, as we have heretofore done.

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No. 3170-I.

COPY of the above forwarded to the Military Department for consideration, with reference to that Department's communication, No. 601-B., dated the 13th August 1885.

(signed) *G. S. Forbes,*  
 Junior Under-Secretary to the  
 Government of India, Foreign Department.

Simla, the 15th September 1885.

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From Major *J. Davidson*, Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 526—S—C.; dated Simla, 18th September 1885).

I AM desired to forward, for consideration, copy of a letter from the Brigadier General Commanding Punjab Frontier Force on the subject of the constitution of the two new troops in each regiment of Punjab Cavalry.

2. I am to state that the Lieutenant Governor concurs in the constitution recommended, and strongly supports the application for an advance of 15,000 rupees to each regiment made in paragraph 4.

3. The subject of promotions consequent on the augmentation of these regiments will be followed up very shortly.

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From Brigadier-General *T. G. Kennedy*, C.B., Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, to the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (No. 435-B.; dated Abbottabad, 11th September 1885).

IN reply to your endorsement,\* No. 1333, dated 19th ultimo, calling for proposals regarding the carrying out of the augmentation sanctioned for the four cavalry regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, I have the honour to report that a fourth squadron will, on due sanction thereto, be added to each of the four regiments of Punjab Cavalry by the enlistment of 75 recruits, and by the necessary transfers from the existing squadrons to be reduced in strength to the new one to be raised.

2. The classes required by the various commandants are—

*1st Punjab Cavalry*—One troop each of Sikhs and of Dogras.

*2nd Punjab Cavalry*—One troop of Sikhs, and one troop, half of Pathans and half of Punjabi Mahomedans.

*3rd Punjab Cavalry* }  
*5th Punjab Cavalry* } —One troop each of Punjabi Mahomedans and of Sikhs.

3. The transfer will temporarily disturb the “class troop” organisation recently sanctioned, and now nearly completed in all our regiments; but eventually they will be of the following constitution, if the present wishes of commandants are sanctioned; and I recommend that they be so:—

REGIMENTS.	TROOPS.								
	Punjabi Mahomedans.	Trans-Indus within border Pathans.	Hindustanis.		Sikhs.	Dogras and Punjabi Hindus.	Religious Element.		Total Troops.
			Mahomedans.	Hindus.			Mahomedans.	Hindus.	
1st Punjab Cavalry - -	-	2	2	-	2	2	4	4	8
2nd „ „ - -	1½	1	1	1	3	-	4	4	8
3rd „ „ - -	1	1	2	-	3	1	4	4	8
5th „ „ - -	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	5	8
TOTAL - - -	3½	5½	6	2	11	4	15	17	32

4. I strongly recommend a grant-in-aid (to equip and mount without delay the 75 new enlistments), of 15,000 rupees as an advance to each regiment, to be repaid by monthly instalments of 375 rupees (or 5 rupees a man per mensem), and to be fully adjusted in 3½ years, and I earnestly ask that sanction for this advance may accompany the order for the new squadron, and that such may be as promptly given as possible; otherwise the Punjab Cavalry will be at a great disadvantage in the horse market compared with the Bengal Cavalry.

From Major *E. Hay*, for Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (No. 832-B.—“Organization—Native Army;” dated Simla, 25th September 1885).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 526-S-C., dated the 18th instant, and in reply to say, for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor, that the proposed composition of the two new troops to be added to cavalry regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force is approved by the Government of India.

2. The question of the advances asked for will be made the subject of a separate communication.

Office Memorandum from Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 895-B.—“Organisation;” dated Simla, 9th October 1885).

THE undersigned is directed to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Department Endorsement No. 3170-I., dated the 15th ultimo, forwarding, for the consideration of the Military Department, correspondence on various points connected with the organisation of the extra squadron added to each regiment of the Central India Horse.

2. In

2. In reply, the undersigned is to say that there is no objection in the Military Department to the proposal that the augmentation shall consist of a troop of Sikhs and a troop of Mahomedans (Ranghars and Ghukas from the Jhelum district) in each regiment, which will then consist of—

Sikhs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 troops.
Jats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 troop.
Rajputs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 "
Ranghars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 troops.
Ghukas and Pathans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 troop.

3. The proposal that each regiment should be permitted to borrow 40,000 rupees to aid in the equipment of the additional squadrons is not approved in the Military Department. The undersigned is to forward a copy of a letter addressed to the Adjutant General in India, showing what has been ordered in regard to advances to Bengal Cavalry regiments on this account, and to say that, similarly, each regiment of the Central India Horse may be allowed an advance up to a maximum of 15,000 rupees, the amount granted to each being regulated by its circumstances, the number of recruits brought by native gentlemen, &c.; the loan to be repaid in two years.

4. The proposal to procure swords from England is approved of in the Military Department.

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EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5336.—Army, "Native Cavalry"; dated Bombay Castle, 13th October 1885).

Read the following :—

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 783-B., Organisation, Native Army; dated Simla, 16th September 1885).

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Governor in Council, the correspondence noted in the margin, and to request that, should the course sanctioned in regard to the grant of direct commissions to native gentlemen bringing men to complete the revised establishments of Bengal Cavalry regiments be considered feasible or desirable in the Bombay Cavalry, the needful instructions may, under the orders of his Excellency in Council, be issued in continuation of the India Army Circular.

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REPORT by Brigadier General *A. L. Annesley*, Adjutant General, Bombay Army (No. 35-4-C.-9993; dated Poona, 29th September 1885).

His Excellency the Commander in Chief considers that if suitable candidates can be found of good family, physique, and character, the proposals of the Government of India with regard to the Bengal Army may with advantage be carried out in the Bombay Army.

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*Resolution.*—The course sanctioned for Bengal by the Government of India should be adopted in this presidency as far as may be practicable.

2. The Government of India to be informed.

Submitted to the Government of India for information.

— No. 36. —

EXTRACT MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of India, dated 29th October 1885, No. 279, paragraph 38.

38 THE question of the entertainment of 20 supernumeraries in every native infantry regiment, Goorkha and Assam excepted, to allow for the waste which takes place by casualties before recruiting can take place, will be considered separately.

[In reply to the Despatch of the Government of India, dated 24th July 1885, No. 121, paragraph 15.]

— No. 37. —

(Military, No. 275.)

The Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

India Office, London, 29 October 1885.

Increase and re-  
organisation of the  
Army in India.

1. I HAVE given full consideration to the proposals contained in your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 135, dated 14th August 1885, for placing Her Majesty's forces in India, British and Native, on a footing adapted to the new conditions which they may be called on to meet.

2. The proposals affecting the British force are, briefly, to add to the permanent establishment of British troops in India,—

I.— 1 battery of Horse Artillery,  
2 batteries of Field Artillery,  
2 batteries of Mountain Artillery and  
6 batteries of Garrison Artillery;  
or 11 batteries, with 30 guns and 1,373 men of all ranks, excluding the 55 additional officers.

II.—The addition of a fourth squadron of 148 men to each of the nine cavalry regiments in India, bringing each corps up to 602, or a total cavalry increase of 1,332 of all ranks, excluding the 54 additional officers.

III.—An augmentation of 100 rank and file to each of the 50 infantry battalions now in India, bringing their strength up to 984 of all ranks, excluding officers, and an addition of three battalions of the revised strength to the existing establishment, or an increase of 7,952 men of all ranks, excluding 87 officers of the new battalions. The total British increase thus amounting to 196 officers and 10,567 men of all other ranks.

3. The cost of this augmentation, exclusive of home, depôt, and all non-effective charges, as well as of sea transport and the provision of additional barrack accommodation and departmental charges in India, is estimated at 14,26,000 rupees for the Artillery, 13,45,500 rupees for the Cavalry, and 40,99,000 rupees for the Infantry, or 68,70,500 rupees in all.

4. Your Lordship will perceive from the accompanying correspondence with the War Office\* that Her Majesty's Government agree to this permanent increase of the British establishment in India of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry from 59,107 to 69,764, and to maintain that establishment complete.

\* To War Office, 17th September 1885, M. 12,468 (see p. 71).  
From ditto, 23rd September 1885, (see p. 72).  
To ditto, 15th October 1885, M. 12,468 (see p. 74).  
From ditto, 22nd October 1885, M. 6820 (see p. 75).

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

5. The



5. The arrangements for the dispatch, this trooping season, of five batteries, 2,500 drafts, and three battalions of infantry, have been already communicated to you by telegram; the remainder, viz., six garrison batteries, 1,332 cavalry, and 2,500 infantry drafts will be dispatched during the trooping season of 1886-87.

Telegram to India,  
29th September 1885.  
Telegram from India,  
5th October 1885.

6. I will hereafter address your Lordship on the subject of the increase to the home depôts for cavalry and infantry which the foregoing augmentations may call for.

7. As regards the recommendations for the augmentation of the Native Armies, your Lordship's proposals have my full approval.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

8. Your Government have already received my sanction to their recommendation that the 17 regiments of Bengal and four regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force Cavalry, the two regiments of Central India Horse, and the six regiments of the Bombay Cavalry shall be organised in four squadrons, and brought up to a total strength of 625 natives of all ranks, the establishment of combatant British officers in each of these 29 regiments being raised from eight to nine by the appointment of an additional squadron officer. The four regiments of Madras Cavalry continuing as at present with three squadrons, but with a strength of 489 natives of all ranks in lieu of the present establishment of 387. I observe, however, that in stating the present establishment at that strength it is placed higher than is shown in the Budget Estimate for 1885-86, where the total strength of natives is estimated at 384 only, shoeing-smith pupils being apparently included in the higher estimate.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

9. I at the same time sanctioned your Lordship's proposal to raise three new regiments of Native Cavalry, two to be added to the Bengal, and one to the Bombay Army, each on the new strength of 625 natives of all ranks in four squadrons. The total augmentation to the cavalry thus sanctioned amounts to 4,572 natives of all ranks, and 56 British officers, with further a certain proportion of reserve which will have to be provided for the latter, to meet the requirements of casualties and leave. Excluding this reserve of officers and all non-effective charges, the estimated annual cost of the cavalry augmentation is in round numbers 25,23,000 rupees.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

10. I desire, however, to draw your Lordship's attention to the omission of the Guides Cavalry from the regiments to be augmented. I am of opinion that the extension to this distinguished corps of the increase which has been granted to the rest of the cavalry of the Punjab Frontier Force, and to the Central India Horse, will be a wise and politic measure, and I shall be glad to learn that your Government are able to give effect to it.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

11. I accord my sanction to your Lordship's recommendations for the augmentation of the Native Infantry, both temporary and permanent, as well as to the addition of three new Sikh battalions and one Muzbee Sikh battalion to the Bengal Army. The temporary increase of the existing Bengal and Punjab regiments will raise their establishment from 832 to 980 natives of all ranks, which will be maintained until 150 men have passed to the reserve, when the permanent establishment for the existing and the newly-raised regiments will be fixed at 912, the reserve consisting of 218 men per battalion. In the Bombay Army the increase will be temporary only, the strength of the battalion being raised to 912 natives of all ranks, which will be maintained until 160 men have passed into the reserve, when the battalion will revert to its present strength of 832 natives of all ranks, the reserve being kept up to 160 for each battalion. The Madras Infantry will receive no augmentation beyond the creation of a reserve of 160 men for each battalion.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

12. I have already sanctioned the formation of five additional Goorkha corps to serve as second battalions to those already on the establishment, and I am hopeful that this important addition to the strength of the Indian Army may be made at an early date.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

13. The aggregate result of the infantry increase is the permanent addition of 11,968 natives of all ranks and 63 British officers to the Bengal Army, with a further temporary increase of 4,352 to that army, and of 2,080 men to the Bombay Army, during the creation of the reserve. The total annual cost of

the permanent augmentation, exclusive of all non-effective charges and of proportionate reserve of officers, is estimated at 25,74,000 rupees.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

14. I had already, in my Despatch of 23rd July 1885, No. 192, authorised your Government to give effect to such extent as you might decide to the measure proposed in your Lordship's Military Letter of the 17th March 1885, No. 44, for the formation of an infantry reserve on the "long furlough" system, and I now agree to its extension to the whole infantry of the Army, as well as to the Cavalry, Artillery, and Sappers and Miners to the limited extent recommended by the Commander in Chief in India for these latter.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

I approve also of the formation of a second reserve, composed of men of 21 years' service and upwards, to be employed on garrison duties only.

15. The strength of the first reserve is to be 218 men for each Bengal battalion, and 160 men for each battalion of the Madras and Bombay Armies. The strength of the second reserve to be unlimited, except by superannuation and the exclusion of men physically unfit; but your Lordship believes its numbers will be small.

16. The monthly pay, it is proposed, shall be the same for both classes of the reserves, viz., Rs. 3. 8. for privates, and 4 rupees for havildars and naiks while at their homes, but when embodied for training or called to join their battalions during a war they are to receive the full pay, with good conduct pay, which they were drawing when passed on to the reserve. The proportion of reserve non-commissioned officers is to be four havildars and four naiks to every hundred men.

17. I agree to these terms, but I observe an apparent miscalculation in the Commander in Chief's estimate of the payment to be made to the sepoy reservists, viz., 42 rupees in the year, at which rate he would receive during his month of training both his reserve and his full pay. I assume that this is not intended by your Government.

18. These rates of pay and the other regulations, contained in Appendix D. of your letter, for the employment, &c. of the reservists have my entire approval; but I would express my hope that it will rarely happen that men of such very short service as three years will be permitted to leave the colours for the reserve. The estimated annual cost of the reserve is 9,75,744 rupees, but this apparently excludes the additional reserves proposed by the Commander in Chief, as well as the second reserve and the additional non-effective charges which the measure will create.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

19. The opinion expressed by your Lordship's Government and the military authorities in India is so strongly in favour of a system of linked battalions for the Native Army that I accord my sanction to the measure, and authorise your Lordship to carry out at once the reorganisation of the native infantry of all three armies upon the three-battalion system, and in the manner proposed by your Government, both as respects the British officers and the natives of the force.

20. I trust that by the introduction of the system of making the regimental promotion of British officers throughout the three battalions, but not outside the regiment, of 21 officers, one of the chief defects found in the existing organisation of single corps of seven officers will be removed.

21. I agree with your Government that the full benefit of this measure must be prospective, as the men now in the service could not be transferred to one of the linked battalions without their consent. I suggest, however, for your consideration, whether preference might not be given, in passing men to the reserve, to those who agree to serve as reservists with any one of the three battalions of which their own corps forms one. I agree also in your Lordship's conclusion that it is not necessary or desirable to alter the existing numbers of regiments. The arrangement proposed by the Commander in Chief for noting the linked battalions of each existing regiment will meet all requirements.

Telegram to India,  
14th October 1885.

22. I desire to express my concurrence in the several recommendations of your Government for the improvement of the position of the native soldier. The measures proposed are, 1st, the grant of a free railway pass to each man going  
on

on and coming back from furlough; 2nd, the grant of the second increment of good conduct pay after six years instead of, as now, after nine years' service, and the third increment after 10 instead of 15 years' service; 3rd, the grant of full pay to all recruits on enlistment; 4th, an addition of one rupee to the yearly "half mounting" allowance of four rupees; 5th, an improvement of the present system of hutting allowances; and, 6th, a reduction of the period of service with the colours now qualifying for pension, viz., 32 years to 21 years, with the prospective abolition of the existing invalid pension after 15 years' service.

23. I authorise your Government giving effect to all of these measures at once, with the exception of that which proposes to deal with the hutting allowances of the troops. With respect to this question, I observe that your Government hope to arrive soon at a definitive conclusion as to what should be the scale of hutting accommodation necessary, and the cost at which it may be supplied, and that as soon as these points are satisfactorily settled, you will be prepared to furnish the necessary grants. The question is, I am aware, one which stands in need of settlement, but I request that the result of your inquiry may be furnished to me before any action is taken.

24. I concur in the conclusion at which your Lordship has arrived, that the Punjab Frontier Force should now be transferred to the orders of the Commander in Chief, and I accordingly sanction that measure. I should regret any measure which might tend to disturb the traditions of this most distinguished force, and I therefore observe with satisfaction that your Lordship does not propose, in transferring its control to the Commander in Chief, to alter in any degree its distinctive local character. At the same time I desire to impress on your Government the importance of preserving, as far as possible, the special connection which I understand has hitherto existed between the civil officers of the border, the force, and the militia. On this point your Lordship will doubtless communicate with the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, and I shall be glad to be informed in some detail of the actual conclusions at which you may arrive.

25. In announcing this measure care should be taken to make the force understand that, except for the fact of their being henceforward placed on a more even footing with the Imperial Army, their actual status is in no respect altered, and I should wish your Lordship to take the opportunity of expressing the high sense entertained by Her Majesty the Queen-Empress of the loyal and gallant services which, under the Government of the province, the Punjab Frontier Force has invariably rendered to the State from the earliest period of its creation.

26. It appears to be worthy of consideration whether a similar course should not be pursued towards the Hyderabad Contingent by placing it under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, preserving of course its strictly local character, and such special conditions of service as attach to it. On this point I shall be glad to be favoured with an early expression of your Lordship's views, after communication with the Government of Madras and the Resident at Hyderabad.

27. In sanctioning the increase to the actual effective strength of the Indian Army, British and native, I have, as you will perceive, adopted the recommendations of your Government in preference to the larger proposals made by the Commander in Chief, to which you state his Excellency desires to adhere. In doing so I have not left out of consideration the great weight which must necessarily attach to the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart on such a point, but, as respects the British augmentation, I have acted on the full belief that Her Majesty's Government will feel bound and able in future to maintain, at its full strength, the establishment of British troops authoritatively laid down as essential for the security of India. With regard to the native army, I concur with the opinion of your Government that, through the new organisation of regiments of linked battalions and the formation of regimental reserves, the battalions required for active service will be able to be placed in the field, and maintained there at the adequate strength of 1,000 rank and file.

28. I observe that, in the opinion of your Government, any reduction of present military expenditure is only possible through the abolition of the Presidential system. This is to be regretted, because that measure could not be

carried out without an Act of Parliament being passed to give effect to it. Under existing circumstances, such a course would be, for the present at any rate, altogether impracticable, and need not, therefore, be now taken into consideration. I am not, however, satisfied that all reduction in staff and departmental charges is necessarily contingent on the abolition of the Presidential system. On the contrary, I believe that an appreciable diminution of expenditure in that direction is quite practicable under the existing organisation, and I accordingly propose shortly to address your Lordship separately on this point.

29. In connection with this question of the Presidential system, I think that until it has been decided to remove the armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of their respective Governments, it is undesirable to diminish their authority over the troops composing those armies, and I am unable, therefore, to sanction the measures in regard to the Madras and Bombay troops in Burma and Rajputana respectively proposed in paragraph 82 of your Lordship's letter.

30. Having conveyed my approval of all the recommendations of your Government for placing the army in India on such a footing as will enable it securely to meet its new responsibilities, it is not necessary to discuss the objections raised to them by the two members of your Lordship's Government who have recorded their dissent. It is a matter of deep regret to my Council and to myself that circumstances should render so large an addition to our permanent military expenditure an imperative necessity, but I am of opinion that, in the altered state of affairs, it has become inevitable, and it would, therefore, have been a satisfaction to find your Government unanimous on so important a matter. I cannot doubt, however, that, with a careful administration of the finances, the resources of the country will suffice to meet the additional burden thus placed on the revenue without undue pressure on the people; and I am, moreover, satisfied that the conviction which will be now felt in India and elsewhere as to our absolute security will not only go far towards saving India from very serious war charges in the future, but, by inducing a feeling of confidence in the stability of our rule, with its consequent freedom from anxiety, will encourage commercial enterprise, and prove of the highest value to the civil government of the country.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Randolph S. Churchill.*

[*For Enclosures to above Despatch, see pages 71-75.*]

— No. 38. —

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 30th October 1885.

MILITARY. Your telegram, 5th October. War Office states, owing to want of barrack accommodation here, 500 cavalry recruits must go to India this season.

The 2nd Dragoon Guards will go out four squadrons strong, "Serapis," 22nd November, and will comprise a proportion of the 500.

Do you object?

— No. 39. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 3rd November 1885.

YOURS, 30th October. No objection to despatch of cavalry drafts, if thoroughly trained.

— No. 40. —

(20—India—30.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 31 October 1885.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 11th ultimo\*, I have <sup>\*See p. 71.</sup> the honour, by desire of the Secretary of State for War, to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that arrangements have been made to provide sufficient men to enable the 2nd Dragoon Guards to embark at the increased establishment of four squadrons.

I am further to inform you that the additional 100 men per Infantry Regiment will be sent when possible with their own ordinary drafts in the troopships leaving this country in November and December.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *H. G. Deedes.*

— No. 41. —

LETTER from the India Office to the Admiralty.

Sir,

India Office, 4 November 1885.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acquaint you that it has been decided to send out to India between this date and March 1886, about 6,600 troops of all arms, in addition to those proceeding as at present arranged in Indian troopships in the ordinary course of relief, and I am to request that you will place yourself in communication with the War Office with a view to the provision of freight for the number approximately given above, and cause me to be furnished with a programme of the arrangements you propose for their despatch.

2. The troops referred to consist of about 500 cavalry drafts, 5 batteries of artillery, numbering about 680 men, 2,500 infantry drafts, and 3 battalions of infantry, about 2,950 men.

The Director of Transports,  
Admiralty.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *John H. Mayo,*  
Assistant Military Secretary.

— No. 42. —

(120—India—4649.)

LETTER from the Horse Guards to the India Office.

Horse Guards, War Office, Pall Mall, S.W.,  
7 November 1885.

Sir,

I AM directed by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to acquaint you that His Royal Highness and the Secretary of State for War have approved of the selection of the undermentioned batteries and battalions as the reinforcements which it has been decided to send to India.

I am to request you to be pleased to inform me whether the Secretary of State for India concurs :—

F. Battery, B. Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, Canterbury to Egypt, to relieve G. Battery, B. Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, Egypt to India.

Horses and equipment to be taken over in Egypt.

England to India.

G. Battery, 3 Brigade, Royal Artillery,	} Field.
L. " 4 " " " " " " " " " " " "	
No. 2 Battalion, 1 " Brigade, " Cinque Ports Division,	} Garrison.
No. 1 " 1 " " Northern Division,	

The personnel for two mountain batteries.

The above to embark about January 1886.

The six garrison batteries required, to embark next season.

2nd Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Ireland to Malta, starting about the end of December 1885, to relieve 1st Battalion Hampshire Regiment, Malta to India.

1st Battalion Norfolk Regiment, England to Gibraltar, to relieve 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment, Gibraltar to Egypt.

2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Egypt to India, commencing early in February.

2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Egypt to India, to be relieved by a battalion to be selected hereafter; commencing about the end of February.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Arthur Herbert*, Q.M.G.

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.

— No. 43. —

LETTER from the India Office to the Horse Guards.

Sir,

India Office, 14 November 1885.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th November 1885 (120—India—4649), and to acquaint you in reply that he concurs in the selection of the batteries of artillery and battalions of infantry approved by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief and the Secretary of State for War, as the reinforcements to be sent to India this season.

2. With regard to the conveyance of the batteries and battalions named in your letter under reply, and the 2,500 infantry drafts to proceed this season to India, I am to request that you will communicate direct with the Director of Transports, with a view to the preparation of a sketch programme for submission to the Secretary of State for India at an early date.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *John H. Mayo*,  
Assistant Military Secretary.

The Quartermaster General,  
Horse Guards.

— No. 44. —

(M. 7041.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 18 November 1885.

WITH reference to your letters of 23rd September 30—India—27; 22nd October, 20—India—30; 31st October, 20—India—30; I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acquaint you that the necessary communication has been made to the Admiralty in respect to the provision of transport for the troops which are to proceed to India during the present season in addition to the ordinary reliefs.

2. With regard to your statement, that in consequence of the want of accommodation and means of training in this country it will be desirable that 500 cavalry recruits should go out towards the end of the present season, and to your further statement that the 2nd Dragoon Guards will embark with the increased strength of a fourth squadron (such squadron forming presumably a portion of the above 500), I am to state that the Government of India have been communicated with by telegraph on the subject, and have replied in the following words, "No objection to despatch of cavalry drafts, if thoroughly trained," and I am to state that Lord Randolph Churchill cannot consent to the embarkation of any cavalry recruits who have not undergone an appreciable amount of training, and who do not in respect of age fulfil the conditions required for Indian service.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *John H. Mayo*,  
Assistant Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State  
for War.

— No. 45. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 17 December 1885.

YOURS, 30th October. To what regiments are 500 extra cavalry drafts distributed? How are 2,500 extra infantry drafts distributed? Information required with regard to extra accommodation required at various stations.

— No. 46. —

(M. 13,391—1885.)

LETTER from the India Office to the Horse Guards.

Sir,

India Office, 18 December 1885.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to forward, for the information of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, a copy of a telegram which has been received from India, and to request to be informed whether the particulars therein requested with regard to the distribution of the 500 cavalry and 2,500 infantry drafts proceeding to India this season can be furnished for the information of the Government of India.

17 December 1885

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) *John H. Mayo*,  
Assistant Military Secretary.

The Quartermaster General, Horse Guards,  
War Office.

— No. 47. —

(120—India—4952.)

LETTER from the Horse Guards to the India Office.

Horse Guards, War Office,  
21 December 1885.

Sir,

WITH reference to India Office letter, dated 18th instant, No. M. 13,391, regarding the distribution of the extra cavalry and infantry drafts proceeding to India this trooping season, I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that the 500 cavalry drafts (extra) are composed of 150 men of the 2nd Dragoon Guards who proceeded with the regiment, and 50 men for each of the cavalry regiments in India, except the 14th Hussars, and the Commander-in-Chief in India has been informed of this by telegram.

I am further to acquaint you that the 2,500 infantry will, it is expected, consist of 100 men for each of the following regiments:—

West Surrey Regiment.  
Royal Fusiliers.  
Norfolk Regiment.  
Devonshire Regiment.  
Suffolk Regiment.  
Somersetshire Light Infantry.  
East Yorkshire Regiment.  
Leicestershire Regiment.  
Cheshire Regiment.  
South Wales Borderers.  
King's Own Borderers.

West Riding Regiment.  
Border Regiment.  
South Yorkshire Regiment.  
Middlesex Regiment.  
King's Royal Rifle Corps.  
Wiltshire Regiment.  
Seaforth Highlanders.  
Highland Light Infantry.  
Royal Irish Fusiliers.  
Munster Fusiliers.  
4th Rifle Brigade.

And about 50 men for each of the following:—

Royal Welsh Fusiliers.  
Worcestershire Regiment.  
Leinster Regiment.

Scots Fusiliers.  
Royal Sussex Regiment.

After the arrival of these extra drafts, the infantry battalions receiving the full 100 men should then be of a strength of 920 rank and file each.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Redvers Buller*, D.A.G.

The Under Secretary of State for India.

— No. 48. —

(No. 4 of 1886.—Military Department.)

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Fort William, 5 January 1886.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 275, of the 29th October 1885, conveying the decision of Her Majesty's Government on our proposals for placing the forces in India, British and Native, on a footing adapted to the new conditions which they may be called on to meet.

2. It has afforded us much satisfaction to find that the measures to this end, which we put forward, have met with such complete and hearty support from your Lordship. They were, in our opinion, no greater than were warranted by the altered circumstances of our position in India, and they were devised with a careful regard, not only to this consideration, but also to the means at our disposal wherewith to meet the increased expenditure which they involved.

3. As regards the increase to the Native Army, India Army Circulars, Nos. 130 and 131 of 1885, will show your Lordship that steps have been taken to raise three new regiments of cavalry, and to bring existing regiments up to the new complement of four squadrons, except in the Madras cavalry, which regiments have an addition of 102 men, but remain organised in three squadrons. Orders have been issued for the gradual formation of four Goorkha regiments, but recruits come in very slowly, and we are now in communication with the Nepalese Government with a view to facilitate the supply of Goorkha recruits.

The formation of four new Sikh regiments, and of reserves, the increase to the Guides cavalry, the transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force to the orders of the Commander in Chief, and the grant of further concessions to the Native soldier, are under our consideration, and we shall address your Lordship hereafter on these subjects.

4. There is, however, one point to which we desire specially to invite your Lordship's attention.

In framing our proposals for an increase to the British Army in India, we made a very sensible reduction on Sir Donald Stewart's proposals, which were that it should be increased by 16,000 men, and we decided to recommend to Her Majesty's Government that the increase should be limited to about 11,000 men. We pointed out that Sir Donald Stewart asked for a nominal establishment of 75,000 men, in the belief that not more than 70,000 would be actually forthcoming, and we expressed a hope that in future Her Majesty's Government would take adequate measures to ensure that the establishment should always be kept up to its full strength. If this could be certainly assured, it is obvious that the smaller establishment would carry with it a sensible reduction in the charges for officers, establishments, barracks, and other items in India, and in the depôt and other charges in England, and it was on this ground, and in the above hope, that we recommended for the sanction of Her Majesty's Government the more moderate proposals contained in our Despatch. If, then, the reduced complement which has now been sanctioned be not kept fully complete at all times, our actual strength will be reduced to a point below what we think necessary for the defence of India, and we shall be burdened with an addition to the home expenditure for which we shall get no equivalent return.

5. To



5. To show that our anxiety on this account is not without foundation, we need only refer your Lordship to the numerous letters and telegrams of the past few years, in which we have repeatedly and earnestly begged that the regiments in this country should be brought up to their full strength. We would specially invite attention to our Despatch No. 79, of 22nd May 1885, in which we brought to notice the very serious state of things which resulted from the continuous deficiency in the supply of drafts to India.

6. We are glad to find from Major General Johnson's letter of the 15th October 1885 to the War Office, that your Lordship is fully in accord with us on this important question, and that you have impressed on the Secretary of State for War "the paramount necessity of taking adequate and unremitting measures to ensure that the Indian establishment of British troops shall always be kept up to its full strength, whatever that may be." We are confident that your Lordship will continue to lend your earnest support to our views on this subject, but we should be glad to receive from the War Office some definite assurance that the complement now fixed will be maintained constantly and fully at the strength which we deem essential for the safety of this country.

We have, &c.  
 (signed) *Dufferin.*  
*T. F. Wilson.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*S. C. Bayley.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*

— No. 49. —

(No. 4831—1—412.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 21 January 1886.

WITH reference to the enclosed copy of a communication which has been received by the Director General of the Army Medical Department from the Senior Surgeon General of the British forces in India, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to request that you will be so good as to move Secretary Lord Randolph Churchill to cause me to be informed what augmentation of the Medical Staff in India is proposed in consequence of the augmentation of the Army there, and whether it is intended that any portion of such increase should be proceeded with this year.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.

I am, &c.  
 (signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

Enclosure in No. 49.

(No. 4213—Establishments.)

Copy of a Letter, No. 4212, "Establishments," dated 7 November 1885, from the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in Bengal, to the Adjutant General in India, Simla.

Surgeon General's Office, Her Majesty's Forces,  
 Military Department, Government of India,  
 7 November 1885.

Referring to Military Department Letters, Nos. 961 and 1040 and 1074 (b) (Organization, British Army) of the 20th, 28th, and 31st October 1885, respectively, relative to the augmentation of the British Forces in India and the location of the additional troops sanctioned, I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and of the Government of India, the necessity of correspondingly increasing the Indian Establishment of executive officers of the Medical Staff.

2. Estimating the strength of the additional troops at 10,657, I beg to state that a total increase of fifty-three (53) medical officers will be necessary to the present establishment, calculated at five per 1,000 of the troops in question. This calculation is based on that sanctioned when a reduction of Medical Staff Officers was carried out in 1882-83

consequent on the formation of station hospitals, *see* correspondence (Surgeon General's Nos. 57—A, camp, dated 11th January 1882, and 343—A, camp, dated 7th March 1882, Military Department No. 460 C. (Medical Department), dated 20th March 1883).

3. As, however, only 6,635 additional troops will be sent out to India during the present trooping season, it is submitted that arrangements be made with a view to increasing the establishment of executive medical officers in India by 33 for 1885-86, leaving the balance of 20 officers to be sent during the trooping season of 1886-87.

(signed) *C. D. Madden*,  
Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in Bengal,  
and Principal Medical Officer Her Majesty's  
British Forces in India.

The Director General,  
Medical Staff, War Office.

— No. 50. —

(M. 759.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 26 January 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st January, No. 4831—1—412, and to acquaint you in reply, that it is not proposed to take any steps towards the augmentation of the Medical Staff in India until the Government of India have reported to this Office on the question, which appears to have been brought to their notice by the senior Surgeon General of the British Forces in that country.

I am, however, to inquire whether any information has yet reached the War Office as to the answer addressed by the Government of India to Surgeon General Madden's letter of 7th November 1885.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Allen Johnson*,  
Major General, Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State  
for War.

— No. 51. —

(No. 4831—1—416.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 29 January 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 26th instant (No. M. 759), relative to the question of augmenting the Medical Staff for service with the British Forces in India, and, with reference to the second paragraph thereof, to acquaint you that no communication on the subject has been received in this department from the military authorities in India, excepting that of which a copy was forwarded to you in the letter from this Office of 21st instant.

Surgeon General Madden is, however, now in this country on short privilege leave, and in an interview with the Director General of the Army Medical Department on the 28th instant, he stated that the augmentation of the Medical Staff, which he had recommended, was absolutely necessary, and that on his return to India it would be his duty to press the necessity on the attention of the Government.

It is to be observed that the trooping season is drawing to a close, and also that the competitive examination for medical officers is close at hand. The advisability of an early decision of this question is therefore obvious.

I have been accordingly desired by the Secretary of State to suggest that you have the goodness to move the Secretary of State for India to cause the Government of India to be communicated with by telegraph on this subject, with a view to an early settlement of the question.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *Ralph Thompson*.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.

— No. 52.

TELEGRAM to the Viceroy, dated 1 February 1886.

Do you propose any, and what increase to Army Medical Department consequent on increase to British establishment? When should it take effect?

— No. 53. —

TELEGRAM from the Viceroy, dated 15 February 1886.

YOURS, 1st. Increase of British Army Medical Department not settled; but for the present it will be sufficient if you send 20 officers before the commencement of the hot weather.

— No. 54. —

(M. 1617.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 17 February 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th January, No. 4881—1—416, and to acquaint you in reply that the following telegram has been received from the Viceroy, "Increase of British Army Medical Department not settled, but for the present it will be sufficient if you send 20 officers before the commencement of the hot weather."

I am to add that this application will be submitted for the approval of the Secretary of State in Council, whose decision will be duly communicated to you at the earliest date possible.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major-General,  
Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State  
for War.

— No. 55. —

(No. 4831—1—420.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 19 February 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge your letter of 17th instant (M. 1617), and in reply to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that, as the result of the recent examination of candidates for the Army Medical Staff has to be declared to-day, it is essential that a decision should be given at once regarding the proposal to increase the number of British Medical Officers in India.

Under these circumstances, 20 additional candidates at the late examination will be appointed in order to meet the increase in question, to which Mr. Campbell-Bannerman trusts Lord Kimberley will offer no objection.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Ralph Thompson*.

— No. 56. —

(M. 1817.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir, India Office, 10 March 1885.  
 I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th February, No. 4831—1—420, and to acquaint you, in reply, that the Earl of Kimberley approves of the proposed augmentation of the British Medical Staff in India by 20 officers, who, it is understood, will be sent out before the hot weather. Lord Kimberley, I am to add, will be glad to be informed of the proportions of the several grades of the additional 20 officers.

I have, &c.,  
 (signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major-General,  
 Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State  
 for War.

— No. 57. —

(No. 4831—1—3.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir, War Office, 13 March 1886.  
 I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge your letter of the 10th instant, inquiring as to the proportions of the several grades of the additional 20 Medical Officers sanctioned for India.

In reply I am to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that the augmentation in question will consist wholly of surgeons.

I am, &c.  
 (signed) *H. G. Deedes*.

The Under Secretary of State  
 for India.

— No. 58. —

(Military, No. 70.)

EXTRACT DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

India Office, London,  
25 March 1886.

1. WITH reference to the telegrams quoted in the margin,\* I have to inform your Excellency that the War Office have arranged for the despatch to India of 20 officers of the Medical Staff, who are all of the rank of surgeon, in augmentation of the Establishment in that country.
- Augmentation of Medical Staff in India.*  
 \* To Viceroy, 1st February 1886.  
 "Do you propose any, and what, increase to Army Medical Department consequent on increase to British Establishment? When should it take effect?"  
 From Viceroy, 15th February 1886.  
 "Yours, 1st. Increase of British Army Medical Department not settled, but for the present it will be sufficient if you send 20 officers before the commencement of the hot weather."

3. Copy of correspondence† on the subject is enclosed for your information.

I have, &c.  
 (signed) *Kimberley*.

† Letter from War Office, 21st January 1886, with enclosures.

Ditto to ditto, 26th January 1886, M. 759.  
 Ditto from ditto, 29th January 1886.  
 Ditto to ditto, 17th February 1886, M. 1617.  
 Ditto from ditto, 19th February 1886.  
 Ditto to ditto, 10th March 1886, M. 1817.  
 Ditto from ditto, 13th March 1886.

[For Enclosures to above Despatch, see pages 99 to 102.]

## — No. 59. —

EXTRACT TELEGRAM from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated  
17 April 1886.

If it can be managed without disturbing arrangements already made by War Office, or charging us with extra expense, Government of India would prefer that balance of the additional Infantry sanctioned for India, amounting to 2,500 men, should be sent out during the cold weather season of 1887-88 instead of 1886-87, and that despatch of garrison artillery should be similarly postponed for a year.

## — No. 60. —

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated 10 May 1886.

YOURS, 17th April. Additional British troops. War Office cannot without serious inconvenience disturb arrangements on which their recruiting and this year's estimates are based. They would, however, be willing to forego, say, 50,000 *l.*, and postpone despatch of garrison batteries till 1887-88, but sending out additional Infantry drafts next season, as arranged. Would this help you?

## — No. 61. —

EXTRACT TELEGRAM from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated  
12 May 1886.

YOURS, 11th May. In view of the difficulty attending compliance with our request for postponement of the arrival of the sanctioned Infantry till next year, we accept the proposal contained in your Lordship's telegram under acknowledgment.

## — No. 62. —

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

(No. M. 4584.)

Sir,

India Office, 15 May 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the accompanying copy of a telegram, dated 17th April 1886, suggesting that, in view of the financial exigencies of the present year, the despatch of the six garrison batteries, and of the additional Infantry drafts arranged to be sent out during the ensuing trooping season of 1886-87, should be postponed until the following season of 1887-88.

On this I was authorised to place myself informally in communication with you, in order to ascertain how far, if at all, the wishes of the Government of India could be met, and learnt that the arrangements of the War Office, both in respect to finance and recruiting, would be seriously interfered with if the enlistment of the additional men required for India were stopped, and if the advance of the 200,000 *l.* agreed to be paid to the War Office were withheld.

Lord Kimberley, however, understood that Mr. Secretary Campbell-Bannerman, though unable to accept the whole of the suggestions made by the Government

of India, would be disposed, in order to meet their wishes as far as practicable, to agree to the postponement of the despatch of the six additional garrison batteries from the trooping season of 1886-87 to that of 1887-88, a reduction being made for that period of 50,000 *l.* in the advance of 200,000 *l.* above referred to. The rest of the arrangements, both for the advance and for the despatch of the other drafts of additional troops, still required to complete the revised establishment, standing as originally decided.

I am now to inform you that Lord Kimberley has ascertained by telegraph that this proposal as to the garrison batteries, and the reduction of the 200,000 *l.* by 50,000 *l.* would be acceptable to the Government of India, and I am to request that, if the Secretary of State for War concurs, effect may be given to this arrangement.

In anticipation of this concurrence, I am to express his Lordship's appreciation of the willingness shown by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman to meet the wishes of the Indian Government.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major-General,  
Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State for War.

— No. 63. —

(No. 20—India—34.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Financial Secretary's Department,  
War Office, 31 July 1886.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of Major General Johnson's letter of 15th May last, No. M. 4584, having reference to a proposal that, in view of the financial exigencies of the Indian Government, the dispatch of the balance of the additional force of 10,000 men to the Indian Establishment shall be held over until 1887-88, and that the contribution of 200,000 *l.*, which was to be paid by India during the current financial year, shall be reduced to 150,000 *l.*

In reply, I am to request you will acquaint the Secretary of State for India in Council that, on the strong representations which have been made on the subject, Mr. Secretary Campbell-Bannerman will arrange for the six garrison batteries of Royal Artillery which were shortly to have been sent to India not to be dispatched, as well as the further reinforcements for the Infantry during the present financial year, and he also proposes to submit, for the approval of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that the payment on account of the additional force during the present financial year shall be reduced to 150,000 *l.* as proposed.

I am, however, to remark that the latter sum is only accepted as a payment on account, and it is estimated that the raising and equipment of the additional troops which have already been sent to India has entailed a charge of about 180,000 *l.* on the home exchequer.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *R. H. Knox*.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.

— No. 64. —

(No. 92 of 1886.—Military Department.)

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 18 June 1886.

WE have the honour to forward the correspondence noted in the margin, showing the steps taken towards the addition of second battalions to the five existing Goorkha regiments sanctioned in your Lordship's Military Despatch, No. 117, dated 7th May 1885.

2. Your Lordship will observe that we have sanctioned the formation of four of these additional battalions, but owing to the close of the recruiting season, we have as yet actually formed second battalions only for the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Goorkha regiments. The two first require only a few men to bring them up to full strength, and the last is complete.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 263-B, dated 13th March 1885.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 169-M-R, dated 31st March 1885.  
 From Adjutant General in India, No. 2377-Camp, dated 4th April 1885.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 354-M-R, dated 8th April 1885.  
 From Adjutant General in India, No. 2485-Camp, dated 8th April 1885.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 361-M-R, dated 9th April 1885.  
 From Adjutant General in India, No. 830-B, dated 15th April 1885.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 187-Q-R, dated 30th April 1885.  
 From Adjutant General in India, No. 3710-B, dated 26th October 1885.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 1071-B, dated 30th October 1885.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 250-B, dated 12th February 1886.  
 Special India Army Circular, dated 26th February 1886.  
 From Adjutant General in India, No. 2308, dated 3rd March 1886.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 476-B, dated 19th March 1886.  
 Telephonic Message to Adjutant General in India, No. 454-B, dated 17th March 1886.  
 From Adjutant General in India, No. 1054-B, dated 3rd April 1886.  
 Special India Army Circular, dated 10th April 1886.  
 To Adjutant General in India, No. 70-B, dated 16th April 1886.

We have, &amp;c.

(signed)

*Dufferin.*  
*F. S. Roberts.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*S. C. Bayley.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*  
*O. R. Neumarch.*

Enclosures in No. 64.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 263-B—"Organisation;" dated Fort William, 13th March 1885).

I AM directed to say, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Governor General in Council has decided, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, to complete the four Punjab and the two Bombay Native mountain batteries to six guns each, and to add 200 men to each of the five Goorkha regiments, and to the 42nd, 43rd, and 44th Bengal Infantry.

2. I am to ask that, under his Excellency's orders, steps may be taken for the immediate enlistment of the necessary number of recruits for the five Goorkha and the three Assam regiments which are under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

From Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to Adjutant-General in India (No. 169-M-R, dated Camp Rawalpindi, 31st March 1885).

HER Majesty's Government have signified their sanction to the augmentation of the Goorkha battalions, but consider that the augmentation should be effected by adding second battalions to the five existing Goorkha regiments. I am therefore to request that his Excellency may submit proposals for carrying this arrangement into effect.

2. It will be understood that the second battalions would be of the same strength as the existing battalions, namely, 912 of all ranks, and this arrangement will cancel the previous sanction for augmenting the battalions by 200 each.

3. In view of the uncertainty which exists as to the rapidity with which the additional Goorkha recruits will be obtained, and also of the fact that the formation of a second battalion will necessarily weaken the original battalion for the time to the extent of the officers and non-commissioned officers furnished to the former, it appears to the Governor General in Council that it would be preferable to attach the recruits obtained to the different regiments in succession, rather than to endeavour to raise all the five new battalions simultaneously.

It is obvious that the process of completing the five battalions will be effected quite as rapidly by the one process as the other, and the effect would be avoided of the different regiments competing with each other for what may possibly prove to be a limited number of recruits.

4. If the Commander-in-Chief concurs in this view, I am to ask that he will name the order in which he proposes to raise the five battalions.

5. On receipt of your reply, the necessary final sanction to the proposed augmentation will be notified.

From Adjutant-General in India, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department (No. 2,377-Camp,—“Native Army, Organization;” dated Camp Rawalpindi, 4th April 1885).

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to reply as follows to your letter, No. 169-M-R, of 31st ultimo, regarding the raising of the new Goorkha regiments.

2. His Excellency agrees with the Government that the new regiments should be styled, at all events for the present, second battalions of the old.

3. His Excellency also concurs in thinking that at present it is not advisable to take in hand the raising of more than one regiment. The season for procuring recruits from Nepal is now practically past, and it will not be possible to bring any large number of recruits through the unhealthy Terai until the rainy season is over, say, until about the end of next September.

4. In the meantime what recruits may be obtainable may be formed into the second battalion of the 1st Goorkhas; and, if the Government approve, his Excellency is prepared to appoint at once a commandant, a wing commander, and an adjutant for the new corps. The other officers can be added hereafter, if recruits come in, as may be necessary.

5. An order cancelling the previous instructions for the five Goorkha regiments to recruit up to a strength of 1,112 natives of all ranks will be issued.

6. It appears to the Commander-in-Chief that as the five Goorkha regiments are all under orders to take the field, the best way of raising the new regiments will be as follows:—

(1.) To put in hand the raising of the 2nd battalion, 1st Goorkhas, at once as proposed above, thus utilising any recruits that may be obtainable during the next few months.

(2.) To ask the Nepal Government to allow a recruiting depôt to be established at once at Katmandu, at which as large a body of recruits as possible should be collected during the summer months, ready to be moved down to India in the autumn as soon as the Terai is fit for travelling.

(3.) To send to Katmandu an experienced officer at once to undertake the duty of collecting the recruits, and to give him a British officer as adjutant, and as many native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men as he may think it necessary to take. These men may be drawn from the men detailed for transfer from the old to the new regiments.

(4.) The Nepal Government to be asked to allow this officer to send recruiting parties, composed of his own men, into the districts from which the Goorkha recruits are usually procured.

(5.) The Commander-in-Chief has already called on the old regiments to furnish nominal rolls of selected men for transfer to the new regiments up to the following extent, or to such less extent as may be consistent with preserving their own complete efficiency for service:—

30 sepoys for promotion to naik,

20 naiks for promotion to havildar,

and such number of havildars for promotion to jemadar, and of jemadars for promotion to subadar, as the commanding officer may think it advisable to recommend; also any subadars whose transfer may be considered to the benefit of the new regiments.

(6.) The



(6.) The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men thus detailed for transfer to be left at the depôts when their regiments march on service, and promotions to be made in their room.

The formal sanction of Government for this is necessary.

7. It may be expected that under these arrangements if the Nepal Government are really in earnest in helping us, a large body of good recruits would be collected at Katmandu during the summer,—sufficient probably for the requirements of the five regiments, the raising and equipping of which could then be proceeded with.

8. I am to point out the advisability of definite orders on the subject of this letter being issued before the Rawalpindi Camp breaks up. The five Goorkha regiments are all named for service, and it is necessary that orders regarding their transfers to the new corps should be given before the regiments march from their stations.

From Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to Adjutant-General in India (No. 354-M-R., dated 8th April 1885).

IN reply to your letter, No. 2377-Camp of the 4th instant, I am directed to say that it appears extremely doubtful whether any additional facilities for obtaining Goorkha recruits will be immediately available.

2. Under these circumstances, the Governor-General in Council thinks it would be a pity to weaken any of the existing regiments by forming additional battalions immediately, and that it would be preferable to see first what progress can be made in recruiting. As soon as 300 or 400 additional recruits are distinctly forthcoming for the 1st regiment, the Governor-General in Council would be prepared to sanction the formation of a second battalion to it.

3. Every endeavour will be made to carry out his Excellency's wishes for obtaining the consent of the Nepal Durbar to establish recruiting depôts in Nepal itself. A further communication will be made on this head.

From Deputy Adjutant-General, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Rawalpindi (No. 2,485-Camp,—“Native Army, Organisation;” dated Camp Rawalpindi, 8th April 1885).

WITH reference to your letter marginally quoted, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inquire whether it is intended by Government that the order contained in Military Department letter, No. 263-B (Organisation), dated 13th March 1885, for an increase of 200 men to each of three Assam regiments\* is also to be cancelled.

No. 169-M. R, dated Camp Rawalpindi, 31st March 1885, paragraph 2.

\*42nd Assam Light Infantry.  
43rd Assam " "  
44th Sylhet " "

From Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to Adjutant-General in India, Rawalpindi (No. 361-M-R., dated Rawalpindi, 9th April 1885).

IN reply to your letter, No. 2485-Camp, of this date, I am directed to say that the order in Military Department letter, No. 169-M-R., of the 31st March 1885, was intended to apply to the three Assam regiments.

From Deputy Adjutant General, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Simla (No. 830-B—“Field Operations, Organisation”; dated Simla, Head Quarters, 15th April 1885).

WITH reference to your letter, No. 361-M-R, dated 9th April 1885, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to state for the information of Government that the officers commanding the Goorkha and Assam regiments have been informed that the order for the augmentation of these regiments by 200 men is cancelled, and their recruiting parties, except those of the 1st Goorkhas, have accordingly been recalled.

2. The commanding officer of the 1st Goorkhas has been directed to keep his recruiting parties out, and to attach any men they may bring to the regiment for ultimate transfer to the new second battalion when raised.

3. I am to request the sanction of Government to this arrangement, to prevent any objection being raised by the Pay Department to pass pay to the men enlisted in excess of the establishment.

4. The strength of the four Goorkha regiments on 1st April 1885 is given in the margin.

1st Goorkhas	-	-	-	5 men short.
2nd "	-	-	-	10 men in excess.
3rd "	-	-	-	5 " short."
4th "	-	-	-	5 " short."

From Officiating Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to Adjutant General in India (No. 187-Q-B,—“ Organisation, Native Army ”; dated Simla, 20th April 1885).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 830-B (Field Operations— Organisation), dated the 15th April 1885, and in reply, to say, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that the Government of India approve of the instructions issued to the commanding officer of the 1st Goorkhas to keep his recruiting parties out, and to attach any men they may bring to the regiment for ultimate transfer to the new second battalion when raised.

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From Colonel *H. Collett*, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General in India, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3710-B—“ Native Army ”; dated Simla, 26th October 1885).

WITH reference to the correspondence marginally noted, I am directed to forward the enclosed copy of a telegram, and to state that the Commander in Chief recommends that the 2nd Goorkhas, which is at present up to full strength, be allowed now to enlist men towards the raising of their second battalion, as was sanctioned in the case of the 1st Goorkhas.

2. There seems no reason why the raising of two out of the five Goorkha battalions should not be actively proceeded with this cold season; and, if the Government approves, his Excellency proposes to instruct the officers commanding the 3rd and 4th Goorkhas to enlist men for the second battalion of the 1st and 2nd respectively, after their own corps have been completed to full strength.

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TELEGRAM from Officer Commanding 2nd Goorkhas, to the Adjutant General in India, (dated Debra-Dun, 21st October 1885).

MAY I recruit for second battalion when strength of first battalion is complete?

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From Colonel *A. C. W. Crookshank*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 1071-B—“ Organisation, Native Army ”; dated Simla, 30th October 1885).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3710-B, dated the 26th instant, and in reply to say, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that the Government of India sanction the 2nd Goorkha regiment being permitted now to enlist men towards the formation of its second battalion, and the officers commanding the 3rd and 4th Goorkha regiments being instructed to enlist men for the second battalions of the 1st and 2nd regiments after their own regiments have been completed to full strength.

2. I am to add, however, that an India Army Circular will shortly be issued sanctioning the formation of five Goorkha regiments to be second battalions of the existing corps, and that all enlistments will be for the two battalions thus linked together.

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From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 250-B—“ Organisation, Native Army ”: dated Fort William, 12th February 1886).

IN reply to your letter, No. 1330-Camp (Native Army), dated the 29th January 1886, I am directed to say, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that the formation of the second battalions of the 1st and 2nd Goorkha regiments may at once be proceeded with, and officers be formally posted to them.

2. A special Army Circular authorising the formation of these battalions, is forwarded herewith for the concurrence of his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

3. With reference to your No. 1372-Camp, dated the 1st February 1886, I am to say that for financial reasons it has been decided by the Government of India that only two battalions shall be raised at present, and to request that a report may be made as soon as these battalions are complete, and the remaining regiments are up to their full strength.

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## INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS.—[CLAUSE 28.]

Government of India—Military Department—Calcutta, the 26th February 1886.

## Organisation—Native Army.

## Formation of the Second Battalions of the 1st and 2nd Goorkha Regiments.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in Council directs the immediate formation of second battalions to the 1st and 2nd Goorkha Regiments.

2. All enlistments will be for the first and second battalions of the regiment, and each recruit at the time of enlistment should be made to understand that he is liable to transfer in the event of war, to either of the two battalions for which he enlists.

3. To form the nucleus of these second battalions, volunteers will be called for, under the orders of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, from the 1st and 2nd Goorkha regiments. These volunteers will be subject to the same conditions as newly-enlisted recruits in respect of their liability to transfer to the linked battalion.

From Colonel *H. Collett*, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General in India, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2308-Camp—"Native Army, Organisation"; dated Fort William, 3rd March 1886).

IN forwarding the enclosed copy of a telegram from the general officer commanding Lahore Division, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to recommend that the officers commanding the 2nd battalion 1st Goorkha Light Infantry, and 2nd battalion 2nd Goorkhas may be authorised to draw advances up to 10,000 rupees each, to be recovered in the usual way from their monthly pay bills.

2. It is evident that the commandants of regiments in course of being raised, must be provided with cash to meet charges for the provision of uniform, payments on account of recruits, &c. &c.

An early reply is solicited.

TELEGRAM from General Officer commanding Lahore Division, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 166-A, dated Meean Meer, 2nd March 1886).

MAJOR ROGERS reports large batches of recruits are arriving, and funds are absolutely necessary. I recommend an advance of 10,000 rupees only.

From Colonel *A. C. W. Crookshank*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 476-B—"Advances;" dated Fort William, 19th March 1886).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2308-Camp (Native Army—Organisation), dated the 3rd March 1886, and in reply to say, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India sanction the grant to the officers commanding the 2nd battalion 1st Goorkha Light Infantry and 2nd battalion 2nd Goorkhas of advances up to 10,000 rupees each to meet charges for the provision of uniform, payments on account of recruits, &c., &c.

Telephonic Message from Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India, (No. 454-B, dated Fort William, 17th March 1886).

YOUR letters, 2351 and 2491, of 4th and 9th instant. Government sanction continuance of recruiting for two more Goorkha regiments, making four in all. When these are complete, further recruiting should cease.

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 1054-B—"Native Army," Organisation,—dated Simla, 3rd April 1886).

WITH reference to your telephonic message, No. 454-B, dated the 17th March 1886, sanctioning the continuance of recruiting for two more Goorkha regiments, I am directed to state that the Commander-in-Chief has decided that the 2nd battalion of the 4th Goorkhas shall be raised next.

2. I am to request that an India Army Circular may be issued on an early date authorising the formation of this battalion in order that the names of the officers to be appointed thereto may be notified in G. O. C. C.

3. The Commander-in-Chief recommends that the officer commanding 2nd battalion 4th Goorkhas be granted an advance of 10,000 rupees to aid in the organisation of the battalion, as sanctioned in Military Department, No. 476-B (Advances), dated 19th March 1886, for the other newly-raised battalions.

4. The 2nd battalion 4th Goorkhas will be recruited to a strength of 912, all native ranks, and will be equipped in all respects like the 1st battalion.

5. I am to request that the different departments concerned may be authorised to supply the necessary arms, ammunition, clothing, &c.

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INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS.—[CLAUSE 60.]

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Government of India.—Military Department.—Simla, 10th April 1886.

Organisation—Native Army.

Formation of a Second Battalion to the 4th Goorkha Regiment.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in Council directs the immediate formation of a second battalion to the 4th Goorkha regiment.

2. All enlistments will be for the first and second battalions of the regiment, and each recruit at the time of enlistment should be made to understand that he is liable to transfer in the event of war to either of the two battalions for which he enlists.

3. To form the nucleus of this second battalion, volunteers will be called for under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, from the 4th Goorkha Regiment. These volunteers will be subject to the same conditions as newly-enlisted recruits in respect of their liability to transfer to the linked battalion.

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From Major *T. Deane*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India,—(No. 70-B—"Organisation;" dated Simla, 16th April 1886.)

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, No. 1054-B (Native Army—Organisation), dated the 3rd April 1886, I am directed to say that the Government of India sanction the grant to the officer commanding the 2nd battalion 4th Goorkhas of an advance of 10,000 rupees to meet charges for the provision of uniform, payments on account of recruits, &c., &c.

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— No. 65. —

EXTRACT from a DESPATCH to the Secretary of State for India, No. 130,  
dated 10 September 1886.

PARA. 7. Correspondence relative to the revision of the establishment of

From Adjutant General in India, No. 2635-Camp, dated 12th March 1886, and enclosures.

From Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, No. 422, dated 9th April 1886.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 684-C, dated 8th June 1886.

From Adjutant General in India, No. 2557-C, dated 18th June 1886.

To Governments of Madras and Bombay, No. 858-C, dated 25th June 1886.

Telegram from Government of Madras, No. 4125, dated 9th July 1886.

From Government of Bombay, No. 2990, dated 15th July 1886.

Clause 108, India Army Circulars 1886.

farriers, syces, and grass-cutters for British Cavalry regiments serving in India in consequence of the addition of a fourth squadron to each of those regiments. [*Telegram, dated India Office, the 14th October 1885.*]

Enclosures in No. 65.

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2635 - Camp—" Establishments, British, Native ;" dated Fort William, 12th March 1886).

I AM directed by the Commander-in Chief to forward, for the orders of the Government of India, the accompanying Memorandum No. 17,893, dated 23rd February 1886, from the Controller of Military Accounts, and annexures, regarding the revised establishments for British cavalry regiments serving in India.

2. For the fourth squadron an augmentation of Native Establishments as follows seems necessary, viz. :—

2 native farriers.	1 hospital syce.	132 grasscutters.
1 jemadar syce.	70 syces.	

From Lieutenant Colonel *C. J. Durand*, 1st Pay Examiner, Bengal, to the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal (No. 1600-B-T, dated Calcutta, 17th February 1886).

THE authorised complement of non-commissioned officers of a British cavalry regiment of six troops in India, exclusive of Staff Sergeants, is as stated in the margin (a).

2. The 2nd Dragoon Guards has lately arrived in India with eight troops, and a proportionate increase of non commissioned officers [*vide* margin (b)], except in the case of acting ranks, viz., Lance Sergeants and Lance Corporals, whose total numbers are the same as those of the authorized Indian complement for a regiment of six troops.

3. The pay of the establishment of non-commissioned officers given above has been admitted by this office ; but in view of the sanctioned increase of all British cavalry regiments serving in India to four squadrons each, it seems desirable that a revised establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers be laid down, as also of syces, grasscutters, and other native establishments, except Quartermasters and Conservancy, regarding which action has already been taken (*vide* Controller's No. 17,214, dated 8th February 1886).

(a) Troop Sergeant Majors	-	6	
Sergeant Farriers	-	6	
Sergeants	-	18	(including 1
Lance Sergeants	-	4	Sergeant
Corporals	-	20	Rough
Lance Corporals	-	12	Rider.)
Trumpeters	-	6	
(b) Troop Sergeant Majors	-	8	
Sergeant Farriers	-	8	
Sergeants	-	24	(including 1
Lance Sergeants	-	4	Troop
Corporals	-	28	Sergeant
Lance Corporals	-	12	Major
Trumpeters	-	8	Rough
			Rider)

MEMORANDUM by Colonel *M. C. Perreau*, Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal (No. 17,893, dated Calcutta, 23rd February 1886).

FORWARDED to the Adjutant General in India, Simla, for such action as may be considered necessary.

2. The question of increasing the Quartermaster's and Conservancy establishments of British cavalry regiments is now before his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief (*vide* accompanying copy of letter No. 268-B, dated the 27th January 1886, from the Quartermaster General in India, Simla, and this Office reply, No. 17,213, dated the 8th instant).

From Major General *E. F. Chapman*, C.B., Quartermaster General in India, to the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal (No. 268-B, dated Simla, 27th January 1886).

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward the marginally noted communication, relative to the Quartermaster's and dry-earth conservancy establishments which should be allowed for the 2nd Dragoon Guards, which has come out from England, eight troops strong.

2. As there appears to be a necessity for at once sanctioning an establishment capable of maintaining the lines of the corps in a sanitary condition, his Excellency would propose that the following additional establishments be allowed :—

Quartermaster's Establishment.

Pakhalis.	Sweepers.
4	4

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE,

## Dry Earth Conservancy.

Bhistie.	Sweepers.	Bildar.	Filth Cart.
1	2	1	1

3. The establishments might at first be allowed as a tentative measure, a report as to their sufficiency or otherwise being called for on expiry of six months, so as to enable the revision of the establishments of all British cavalry regiments in Bengal being carried out previous to the arrival from England of the fourth squadron lately added thereto.

4. The favour of an early reply, and of Government sanction being obtained, if deemed necessary, is requested.

From Colonel *M. C. Perreau*, Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, to the Quartermaster General in India,—(No. 17,213, dated Calcutta, 8th February 1886).

WITH reference to your No. 268-B, dated the 27th ultimo, the enclosure of which is herewith returned, I have the honour to state that under the circumstances sanction might be accorded tentatively by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the entertainment of the additional Quartermaster's (a) and Dry-earth Conservancy (b) establishments proposed for the 2nd Dragon Guards, which has recently arrived in this country, eight troops strong, the revision of these establishments consequent on the augmentation of British cavalry regiments serving in India being considered, as suggested, after the expiry of six months.

(a) Pakhalis - - - - - 4  
Sweepers - - - - - 4  
(b) Bhistie - - - - - 1  
Sweepers - - - - - 2  
Bildar - - - - - 1  
Filth cart - - - - - 1

be accorded tentatively by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the entertainment of the additional Quartermaster's (a) and Dry-earth Conservancy (b) establishments proposed for the 2nd Dragon Guards, which has recently arrived in this country, eight troops strong, the revision of these establishments consequent on the augmentation of British cavalry regiments serving in India being considered, as suggested, after the expiry of six months.

REPORT by Colonel *M. C. Perreau*, Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal (No. 422, dated Calcutta, 9th April 1886).

THE additional native establishments recommended by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for the 4th squadron of British cavalry regiments might, with the exception of grasscutters, who should not exceed 129 (a), be sanctioned by Government.

(a) Number of grasscutters allowed to British cavalry regiments before augmentation at the rate of 1 per each horse, 396 horses (*vide* clause 193, India Army Circulars, 1882) - - - - - 396  
Number of grasscutters required for an augmented British cavalry regiment consisting of 525 horses (India Army Circulars, Special, dated 13th March 1886) - 525  
Additional number required - - - - - 129

2. The complement of syces (b) proposed is in the authorized (c) proportion of one to each horse in the case of a non-commissioned officer, and 1 to 2½ horses in the case of troopers.

(b) 70.  
(c) *Fide* Military Department, No. 1379-S.D, "Horses British Cavalry," dated 14th October 1882.

From Lieutenant Colonel *E. H. H. Collen*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 684-C—"Establishments, Regimental;" dated Simla, 8th June 1886).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2635-Camp, "Establishments, British—Native," dated the 12th March 1886, regarding the revision of the native establishments of British cavalry regiments in India consequent on their augmentation by a fourth squadron.

2. The Commander-in-Chief proposes that for the fourth squadron the following increase to the native establishment should be allowed, viz. :—

2 native farriers.	1 hospital syce.	132 grasscutters.
1 jemadar syce.	70 syces.	

I am, however, to say that, with the exception of the native farriers, the establishment proposed does not appear to have been correctly calculated.

3. As regards the jemadar and hospital syces, according to the scale in G. G. O. No. 379 of 1862 (*viz.*, one hospital syce for every two troops, two of these syces in each regiment

regiment having the designation of jemadar syces) only two jemadars and two hospital syces were allowed to each regiment when it was previously composed of seven or eight\* troops, and it is thought that no addition to these grades should be made so long as the strength of each regiment does not exceed eight troops.

*In 1860-62 - - - -	8 troops
In 1863-70 - - - -	7 "
From 1870 to 1885-86 - - - -	6 "

4. The number of additional syces required, calculated in accordance with the scale laid down in Military Department Nos. 1379-S-D and 1579-S-D, dated 14th October and 7th November 1882, would appear to be 67, not 70 as per details in the margin.

For 20 non-commissioned officers and trumpeters at 1 horse each = 20 horses;	
at 1 syce for each horse = syces - - -	20
For 128 privates or trumpeters minus 15 per cent. = 109 at 2½rd horses to a syce - - - - -	47
<hr/>	
Total for 129 horses =	67

5. The scale of grasscutters being one per horse, the additional number required for 148 men, or 129 horses, is 129 grasscutters, not 132 as proposed.

6. The total correct establishment for the present increased strength of a British cavalry regiment in the Bengal Presidency will therefore be as follows:—

8 farriers.		2 jemadar syces.		525 grasscutters.
2 hospital syces.		276 syces.		

7. A draft India Army Circular, which it is proposed to issue, publishing the revised establishment of farriers, syces, and grasscutters for British cavalry regiments in the three Presidencies is herewith forwarded for his Excellency's concurrence. The increase in the case of regiments in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies has been calculated on the basis of the authorized proportion of syces, &c., at present obtaining in those Presidencies, with reference to the establishments hitherto allowed for six troops.

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From Major-General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2557-C—"Establishments;" dated Simla, 18th June 1886).

In reply to your No. 684-C, dated 8th June 1886, "Establishments—Regimental," the enclosure of which is herewith returned, I am directed to state that the Commander-in-Chief concurs in the draft India Army Circular fixing the establishment of farriers, syces, and grasscutters in the British cavalry regiments.

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From Captain *W. J. B. Bid*, for Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras—Bombay, Military Department (No. 858-C—"Establishments—Regimental;" dated Simla, 25th June 1886).

I AM directed to forward, for any remarks the Governor in Council may desire to offer, the annexed draft of an India Army Circular, which it is proposed to issue, fixing the future establishment of farriers, syces, and grasscutters of British cavalry regiments in India, and to explain that the increase in the case of regiments in the Madras—Bombay Presidency has been calculated on the basis of the authorised proportion of syces, &c., at present obtaining in that Presidency, with reference to the establishment hitherto allowed for six troops.

2. A very early reply is requested.

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TELEGRAM from Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 4125, dated Ootacamund, 9th July 1886).

Your 858-C, 25th ultimo. Establishment for Madras cavalry is correctly given in Draft Circular.

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EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 2920—"Establishments—Regimental;" dated Bombay Castle, 15th July 1886).

Read the following:—

Report by Brigadier-General *C. B. Knowles*, C.B., Adjutant-General, Bombay Army (No. 901-6815, dated Poona, 9th July 1886).

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the proposed new establishment of native followers will suit all the requirements of British cavalry regiments serving in the Bombay Presidency.

RESOLUTION.—The foregoing report to be forwarded to the Government of India, with an expression of the concurrence of his Excellency the Governor in Council, with the view held by the Commander-in-Chief, in reply to the letter from that Government entered in the preamble.

Submitted to the Government of India in accordance with the above Resolution.

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INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS.—[CLAUSE 108.]

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GENERAL REGULATIONS.—British Cavalry.

Establishment of Native Farriers, Syces, and Grasscutters.

Sinla, 31st July 1886.

With advertence to Clause 50, India Army Circulars, 1886, it is hereby notified, in supersession of all existing orders on the subject, that the establishment of farriers, syces, and grasscutters in British cavalry regiments serving in India will be as follows:—

Bengal - -	{	8 Native farriers.
	{	2 Hospital syces.
	{	2 Jemadar syces.
	{	276 Syces (including 90 for non-commissioned officers' horses).
	{	525 Grasscutters.
Madras - -	{	8 Native shoeing-smiths.
	{	8 Jemadar syces.
	{	199 Syces (including 90 for non-commissioned officers' horses).
	{	525 Grasscutters.
Bombay - -	{	8 Native shoeing smiths.
	{	2 Jemadar syces.
	{	2 Hospital syces.
	{	8 Muccadums of syces.
	{	8 Ditto of grasscutters.
	{	235 Syces (including 90 for non-commissioned officers' horses).
	{	175 Grasscutters.

2. The additional establishments will be gradually employed in proportion to the actual increase in the number of horses and men.

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— No. 66. —

(Military, No. 244.)

EXTRACT of DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 16 September 1886.

3. THE arrangements reported by you in connection with the addition of second battalions to the five existing Goorkha regiments have my approval.

I note that you have sanctioned the formation of four of these additional battalions, but that up to the date of your Despatch second battalions for the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Regiments only had been actually formed.

[In reply to your Military Despatch, No. 92, dated 18th June 1886.]

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## — No. 67. —

EXTRACT from MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of India, dated  
23rd September 1886, No. 256, paragraph 2.

2. I FORWARD herewith copy of correspondence \* with the War Office, relative to the revised establishment of British regiments of Cavalry serving in India. The War Office letter states that the strength fixed in the Army Establishment Circular for the present year (June 1886, No. 106) for a Cavalry regiment in India, consisting of four squadrons, agrees with the table forwarded by you, except in the numbers of Majors and Lieutenants, which should be 4 and 15 respectively instead of 3 and 11, the latter being the numbers allowed for three squadrons only.

\*To War Office  
6th July 1886,  
6007. From ditto  
12th July 1886.

In the Establishment circular one regiment only, the 2nd Dragoon Guards has been given an establishment of four squadrons. A modified establishment has, for the present, been given to the other Cavalry regiments on the Indian establishment.

[In reply to paragraph 14 of your Military Despatch, No. 66, dated 17th May 1886, and Military Secretary's Letter, dated 28th May, No. 353B.]

## — No. 68. —

TELEGRAM from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated  
24th September 1886.

MILITARY. Our telegram of 12th May. Additional British troops. Is any change proposed in the numbers of additional Cavalry and Infantry drafts being sent out this trooping season?

## — No. 69. —

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated  
25th September 1886.

YOURS, 24th September. All Cavalry drafts go, but War Office hope now to retain some of the Infantry. Number yet uncertain.

## — No. 70. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 18th August 1886.

MILITARY. We consider it absolutely necessary to relieve two Native Mountain Batteries now in Burma at end of cold season, and desire sanction to raise two new batteries for this purpose as only practicable means of doing so. This increase permanent, as the batteries will be needed for Burma Garrison.

## — No. 71. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 30th August 1886.

REPLY urgently required, my Military Telegram, 18th August. Additional Native Mountain Batteries.

— No. 72. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 1st September 1886.

YOURS, 18th and 30th August. I sanction your raising two Mountain Batteries as proposed.

— No. 73. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 3rd September 1886.

MILITARY. Your telegram 1st. Mountain Batteries. Please send as soon as possible two captains and six subalterns, Royal Artillery, to replace officers appointed to new batteries.

— No. 74. —

TELEGRAM to Viceroy, dated 13th September 1886.

YOUR telegram in the Military Department, dated 3rd September 1886, Mountain Batteries. I have taken steps to send out six subalterns as early as possible. State names of seconded captains.

— No. 75. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 17th September 1886.

MILITARY. Your telegram 13th. Captain C. P. Triscott, E. A. Smith, nominated for command, Mountain Batteries. Former already seconded for employment, Ordnance Department.

— No. 76. —

(No. 149 of 1886.—Military Department.)

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 27 September 1886.

WITH reference to the telegrams noted in the margin, we have now the

From Viceroy, dated 18th and 30th August 1886.

To Viceroy dated 31st August and 1st September 1886.

From Viceroy, dated 3rd September 1886.

From Quartermaster General in India, No. 2888-A, dated 30th June 1886, and No. 3300-A, dated 17th July 1886.

From Adjutant General in India, No. 3333-1, dated 28th July 1886, and No. 3644-1, dated 14th August 1886.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 1593-C, dated 3rd September 1886.

From Adjutant General in India, No. 4105-1, dated 8th September 1886.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 1689-C, dated 14th September 1886.

Special India Army Circular, dated 15th September 1886.

Government pointed out the desirability of arranging for its relief, service in

honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of correspondence explaining the necessity for forming two new native mountain batteries to provide for the requirements of Burma.

2. There are at present six native mountain batteries in India; four belong to the Punjab Frontier Force, and two to the Bombay Army. One of the latter (No. 2) has been employed in the Quetta District for nearly two years; and, in connection with the reliefs to be carried out in 1886-87, the Bombay Government pointed out the desirability of arranging for its relief, service in Beluchistan

Beluchistan being very unpopular with native troops. The relief of this battery is not, however, possible at present, and must be deferred for a time. No. 1 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, as well as No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force, have been serving in Burma since October 1885. They have suffered much in health during their stay there, and are reported to be already becoming inefficient. It is therefore very necessary that they should be relieved during the next cold weather.

3. It was clear that for some time to come two native mountain batteries would be required in Burma, and it became necessary not only to arrange for the relief of the two batteries already there, but to meet the future requirements of that country. In doing so, we had to bear in mind the necessity for not overtaxing the existing native mountain batteries, and for maintaining unimpaired the conditions of service of the Punjab Frontier Force, the local character of which was so recently re-affirmed on its transfer to the Commander in Chief. His Excellency proposed that two new native mountain batteries should be raised to provide the necessary relief, and, believing this to be the best solution of the difficulty, we recommended the measure for your Lordship's favourable consideration.

G. G. O. No. 485  
of 1886.

The force of artillery which will be maintained as part of the permanent garrison of Burma will be considered hereafter, when the pacification and settlement of the country have been completed.

4. On receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 1st September sanctioning the formation of these two batteries, his Excellency was requested to proceed immediately with the necessary arrangements, so as to ensure the batteries being fit for service as soon as possible. It is hoped that they will be ready by 1st March 1887.

5. It was at first thought that the batteries might be raised locally, but there is much force in the objections to the adoption of this plan mentioned in the Adjutant General's letter, No. 3333-1, dated 28th July 1886, and they will consequently be raised at Rawalpindi and Mian Mir. They will be equipped with the 7-pounder gun of 200 lbs, which is considered by the Commander in Chief to be suitable to the conditions of service in Burma. The establishments will be on the scale laid down in the Equipment Tables for Native Mountain Batteries of six guns of 200 lbs. The pay, clothing, &c., of the men will be the same as allowed to batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force. The new batteries will, however, be in no way connected with that force, but will be raised "for general service" under the designation Nos. 1 and 2, Bengal Native Mountain Batteries.

We have, &c.  
(signed) *Dufferin.*  
*F. S. Roberts.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*  
*G. Chesney.*

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Enclosures in No. 76.

From Major-General *E. F. Chapman*, C.B., Quartermaster-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2888-A—"Field Operations—M"; dated Simla, 30th June 1886).

WITH reference to Military Department No. 822-C "Distribution of Army," Reliefs, dated 22nd June 1886, I am desired to invite attention to paragraph 1 of the redistribution statement forwarded to Government under cover of Quartermaster-General's No. 2802-A., dated 28th June 1886, and to say that the Commander-in-Chief thinks the proposal of the Punjab Government makes it more than ever desirable that the Government of India should at once sanction the formation of a mountain battery for special service in Burma, and the Adjutant-General has accordingly been instructed to put forward proposals for the organisation, equipment, pay, &c., of the battery in question.

2. Unless this step is taken, and a new native mountain battery is raised, the Commander-in-Chief can see no immediate prospect of the Hazara Mountain Battery being withdrawn from Upper Burma.

From Colonel *W. F. Gatacre*, Officiating Quartermaster-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3300-A—"Distribution,—Movements—Relief"; dated Simla, 17th July 1886).

WITH reference to Military Department No. 996-C "Distribution of Army," Reliefs, dated 10th July 1886, to the Secretary to Government of Bombay, copy of which was forwarded to the Quartermaster-General for information, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to say that, looking to the necessity of relieving the two Bombay Mountain Batteries at Duki and in Burma respectively, as well as the Hazara Mountain Battery, also on service in that country, his Excellency would wish, in modification of his views expressed in Quartermaster-General's No. 2888-A, dated 30th June 1886, to recommend, for the consideration of the Government of India, the advisability of raising two additional mountain batteries instead of one, as suggested in the letter above referred to.

2. I am to add that Sir F. Roberts, on reconsideration of the conditions of service under which these additional batteries may best be raised, has instructed the Adjutant-General to put forward, at an early date, fresh propositions regarding their organisation, pay, and equipment.

From Major-General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3333-1—"Royal Artillery in India,"—Organisation, 7-86; dated Simla, 28th July 1886).

WITH reference to Quartermaster-General's letter No. 3300-A of the 17th instant to your address, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief in India to state that his Excellency, having further considered the question of raising local artillery for service in Burma, has arrived at the conclusion that such a course is not practicable, for the following reason, viz. :—

- I. The expense would be very great, the General Officer Commanding Burma Field Force having expressed his opinion that an increase of 50 per cent. on present pay of all ranks is necessary.
  - II. Owing to the unpopularity of service in Burma, there may be difficulty in obtaining officers of Royal Artillery to serve there without prospect of relief.
  - III. Great difficulty is anticipated in securing Punjabis, of which race it is most desirable the batteries should consist, for permanent service so far away from their homes.
2. Sir Frederick Roberts therefore recommends that two native mountain batteries be raised on the model of the artillery of the Punjab Frontier Force, both of which should be armed with four 2.5" rifled muzzle-loading guns of 400 lbs., and two 7-pr. muzzle-loading rifled guns of 200 lbs.; the establishments, pay, &c., to be the same as for the batteries now in existence. They should be designated Nos. 5 and 6 Batteries, the present designation of the garrison battery being altered from Nos. 5 to 7.
3. Two native batteries would then be available for service in Burma to be detailed in turn from the Punjab Frontier Force and the Native Artillery of Bombay. The period might be limited to two years, and the officers and men only relieved, the cattle and the equipment being handed over to the relieving battery.
4. The Commander-in-Chief considers that these batteries could best be raised at stations where batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force are located; and should Government approve of these proposals, the general officer commanding the force will be directed to take steps to raise them, a nucleus being formed of volunteers from the present batteries.

From Major-General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3644-1—"Royal Artillery in India,"—Organisation, 7-86; dated Simla, 14th August 1886).

IN continuation of this Department letter No. 3333-1, dated 28th ultimo, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief in India to solicit that the sanction of the Secretary of State for India to raising the two new native mountain batteries for general service may be urged by telegram.

2. Sir Frederick Roberts now proposes to raise them at Rawalpindi and Mian Mir, so as to be entirely dissociated from the Punjab Frontier Force; but that the batteries be in every other respect on the same lines as the native mountain batteries of that force, excepting the guns which, I am directed to say, the Commander-in-Chief would wish to be the 7-pr. guns of 200 lbs., this being the gun most suitable for Burma and such like countries,

countries, where the enemy is frequently engaged, owing to jungle, at a distance of 200 yards. It is not only a more useful gun at that distance than the 2·5", but it is more quickly limbered up and retired, should necessity arise for so doing; a very material point in guns engaged so near an enemy.

3. I am also desired to request that early sanction may be given to his Excellency to nominate officers for these two batteries, as eight more, viz., two captains and six subalterns, will be required from England to take their places; and these will have to be telegraphed for. It is, moreover, very necessary that the newly appointed officers should be enlisting natives and purchasing mules in order that there may be no delay in having these batteries ready for Burma by March 1887.

4. I am, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, addressing another very urgent letter to you this day having reference to the purchasing of mules.

Early replies to both these communications are solicited.

From Major-General *O. R. Neumarch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant-General in India (No. 1593-C—"Artillery"; dated Simla, 3rd September 1886).

IN continuation of Military Department letter No. 1418-C, dated the 18th August 1886, I am directed to say, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that Her Majesty's Government have now sanctioned the raising of two native mountain batteries of six guns for service in Burma. I am accordingly to ask that, under his Excellency's orders, immediate steps may be taken so as to ensure their being ready for Burma as soon as possible, not later, it may be hoped, than 1st March 1887.

2. These batteries will be raised at Rawalpindi and Mian Mir. Their pay, clothing, and general constitution will be identical with that of batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force, with which, however, they will be in no way connected, and they will be armed, as proposed, with the 7-pr. gun of 200 lbs. The establishment will be on the scale laid down in the Equipment Tables for Native mountain batteries of six guns of 200 lbs. While actually serving in Burma, free rations and foreign service batta will be granted, and the men and followers will come under the rules which govern the housing of troops and followers in that country.

3. I am to convey the sanction of the Government of India to officers being at once nominated to these batteries; they should commence recruiting operations as soon as possible. The Secretary of State will be asked by telegram to send out two captains and six subaltern officers of Royal Artillery to take the places of those appointed to the new batteries.

4. Mules should be purchased under the arrangements detailed in Military Department letter No. 1343-S-D, dated the 17th August 1886.

5. The necessary instructions will be issued to heads of all departments concerned for the supply of guns, clothing, equipment, mules, &c., and an Indian Army Circular will shortly be issued formally announcing the formation of these two batteries.

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 4105-1—"Royal Artillery in India," Organisation, 7-86; dated Simla, 8th September 1886).

IN reply to your letter, No. 1600-C, of the 3rd instant, forwarding, for the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief in India, draft of a Special Army Circular directing the formation of two native mountain batteries, I am directed to state that his Excellency concurs therein, but would suggest, for the consideration of Government, that the words "for general service" should be substituted for the words "for service in Burma" in paragraph 1.

2. I am also to say that it would prevent confusion if the batteries were designated in the Indian Army Circular about to be published, and that Sir Frederick Roberts recommends that the battery to be raised at Rawalpindi be called No. 5, and that at Mian Mir No. 6 Native Mountain Battery.

From Major General *O. R. Newmarch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 1689-C—"Artillery;" dated Simla, 14th September 1886).

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter, No. 4105-1—"Royal Artillery in India," Organisation, 7-86, dated the 8th September 1886, I am directed to say, for the Commander-in-Chief's information, that the Government of India approve of his Excellency's proposal to substitute the words "for general service" for the words "for service in Burma," in paragraph 1 of the draft Army Circular regarding the formation of two native mountain batteries. This alteration has been made in the draft Circular; but it should be explained to all ranks on enlistment that for the present their services will be required in Burma.

2. As regards the designation of the batteries as Nos. 5 and 6 Native Mountain Batteries, I am to remark that the adoption of this numbering might possibly be held to imply that they had some connection with the Punjab Frontier Force; and as this is not considered desirable, the Government of India would prefer that they should be designated Nos. 1 and 2 Bengal Mountain Batteries.

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INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS, 1886.—[CLAUSE 135.]

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Government of India,—Military Department. --Simla, 15th September 1886.

The following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council:—

ARTILLERY.

Formation of two Native Mountain Batteries for general Service.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government the Governor General in Council directs the immediate formation of two native mountain batteries, of six guns each, for general service. The batteries will be designated Nos. 1 and 2 Bengal Mountain Batteries.

2. Their pay, clothing, and general constitution will be on the scale sanctioned for batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force, and they will be armed with the 7-pounder gun of 200 lbs.

3. The establishment will be as laid down in the equipment tables for native mountain batteries of six guns.

*O. R. Newmarch*, Major General,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

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— No. 77. —

(Military, No. 323.)

DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 18 November 1886.

1. I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Military Despatch, dated 25th September 1886, No. 149, with accompanying correspondence explaining the necessity for forming two new native mountain batteries to provide for the requirements of the service in Burmah.

2. My sanction to your proposal to raise these batteries was communicated to you in my telegram of 1st September 1886, and I have now to express my approval of the orders\* you have issued in respect to their formation.

3. I note that you have decided that the batteries shall be raised for "general service," under the designation Nos. 1 and 2 Bengal Native Mountain Batteries, their armament to consist of six 7-pounder guns of 200 lbs.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Cross*.

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\*India Army Circular, 15th September 1886

— No. 78. —

(No. 150 of 1886.—Military Department).

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Lord Kimberley's Military Despatch No. 70,\* dated 25th March 1886, we have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted on the proposed augmentation of the establishment of Medical Staff officers, consequent on the recent increase to the number of British troops in India.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 454-C., dated 15th May 1886.  
 To Governments of Madras and Bombay, No. 882-C., dated 29th June 1886.  
 To Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, No. 863-C., dated 29th June 1886.  
 From Adjutant-General in India, No. 3595-B., dated 21st August 1886, and enclosures.  
 To Adjutant-General in India, No. 1786-C., dated 22nd September 1886.

Simla, 27 September 1886.  
 25th March 1886, we have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted on the proposed augmentation of the establishment of Medical Staff officers, consequent on the recent increase to the number of British troops in India.

\* See page 102.

2. It will be seen from the correspondence

To Secretary of State—  
 Telegram, dated 7th November 1882.  
 Despatch No. 289, dated 13th November 1882.  
 From the Secretary of State—  
 Telegram, dated 30th November 1882.  
 Despatch No. 42, dated 25th January 1883.

1 battery Royal Horse Artillery	- - - -	157
2 batteries Field Artillery	- - - -	314
2 Mountain batteries	- - - -	212
6 Garrison batteries	- - - -	690
3 battalions British infantry	- - - -	2,952
Increase to British cavalry	- - - -	1,332
Increase to British infantry	- - - -	5,000
TOTAL	- - -	10,657

noted in the margin that the establishment of the Medical Staff for India was fixed in 1882 at 300 officers, calculated at five officers per 1,000 British troops on a strength (approximate) of 60,000 men. The augmentation to the strength of the British troops in India sanctioned last year by Her Majesty's Government amounts to a total increase of 10,657 men, of whom 6,332 are merely an addition to the former

strength of the existing regiments of cavalry and infantry.

3. The addition of 100 men (representing seven sick) to a battalion of British infantry, or of 148 men (representing 10½ sick) to a regiment of cavalry, does not, in our opinion, call for any increase of the Medical Staff. We have accordingly decided that the establishment of Medical Staff officers shall be increased in proportion only to the requirements of the separate units mentioned in the margin that have been added to the army. The strength of these amounts to 4,467 of all ranks, including officers, and the number of medical officers required for this force, calculated on the existing scale of five medical officers per 1,000 troops, is 22 officers, of whom 20 have already arrived in the country.

1 battery Royal Horse Artillery	- - -	162
2 batteries Field Artillery	- - -	324
2 Mountain batteries	- - -	222
6 Garrison batteries	- - -	720
3 battalions British infantry	- - -	3,039
TOTAL	- - -	4,467

mentioned in the margin that have been added to the army. The strength of these amounts to 4,467 of all ranks, including officers, and the number of medical officers required for this force, calculated on the existing scale of five medical officers per 1,000 troops, is 22 officers, of whom 20 have already arrived in the country.

4. Should your Lordship concur in the decision at which we have arrived, we beg that the two officers required to complete this establishment may be sent out in the trooping season of 1887-88, when the garrison batteries are expected to arrive.

We have, &c.  
 (signed) *Dufferin.*  
*F. S. Roberts.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*  
*G. Chesney.*





From Lieutenant Colonel *E. H. H. Collen*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, Bengal (No. 883-C., "Medical Department, Officers," dated Simla, 29th June 1886).

IN continuation of Military Department letter, No. 519-C., dated 2nd March 1886, and with reference to your letter, No. 1436, dated 20th May 1886, I am directed to forward a copy of a letter\* addressed to the Governments of Madras and Bombay, making a temporary re-distribution of the present establishment of 320 medical staff officers between the three presidencies, and to ask that you will arrange for the transfer to the Madras and Bombay presidencies of the 12 officers who, as therein shown, are in excess of the allotment to the Bengal presidency, seven being made over to Madras and five to Bombay.

Copy of the above, and of its enclosure, forwarded, in continuation of Military Department letter, No. 519-C., dated the 2nd March 1886, to :

The Adjutant General in India.  
The Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal.  
The Accountant General, Military Department.

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., A.D.C., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3595-B., "Medical Department," dated Simla, 21st August 1886).

WITH reference to Military Department letter, No. 454-C., dated 15th May 1886, and subsequent reminders, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward, for the consideration and orders of Government, the accompanying letter,\*  
\* Return requested. No. 2775, dated the 13th August 1886, from the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, on the subject of the inadequacy of the present establishment of medical staff officers in India.

2. I am to say that this question has received the most careful and earnest consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, and that in view of our possible requirements at any time for service in the field, his Excellency is of opinion that it would be very unwise to reduce the establishment below five officers per 1,000 troops, or, in other words, four officers per 1,000 troops, plus 25 per cent. reserve.

3. The Commander-in-Chief, I am to add, was most anxious, for financial reasons, to be able to recommend a reduction to four officers per 1,000 troops with a reserve of 20 per cent.; but the difficulties recently experienced in supplying the medical wants of Burmah, which have necessitated all leave out of India to medical officers being stopped, clearly prove to his Excellency that the present establishment is insufficient to ensure the maintenance of the medical service in a thoroughly efficient state, more especially as at any time complications might arise which would necessitate our sending more troops into the field on some other portion of our Indian frontier.

From *C. D. Madden*, Esq., Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, Bengal, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 2775, "Establishments," dated Simla, 13th August 1886).

REFERRING to our conversation of the 10th instant, I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a *résumé* of the correspondence which has taken place on the question of the establishment of medical staff officers for service in India.

2. When the station hospital system was established, it was decided to fix the establishment at five medical officers per 1,000 troops, including the reserve. This scale was approved by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India, and, moreover, was accepted by the late Sir William Muir, the then Director General of the Army Medical Department.

3. When it was decided to augment the strength of the British Army in India, application was made for proportionately increasing the number of medical officers and, pend-

ing a settlement of the general question, the Government of India sanctioned an augmentation of 20 medical officers for the additional British troops which arrived during 1885-86.

4. Taking the authorised strength of the British Army at 73,500, an establishment of 368 medical officers is required, calculated at five per 1,000 troops; but, owing to the urgent need for reducing public expenditure, it was suggested that the establishment be reduced to four medical officers per 1,000 troops, with a reserve of 20 per cent., which gives 353 officers.

5. The statement showing the proposed distribution of medical staff officers to the several stations in the three presidencies, and forwarded with this office, No. 2433, dated 3rd July 1886, does not include the requirements of the additional troops yet to arrive in India.

6. Assuming that two army corps were employed on field service against an Asiatic foe, it is estimated that 190 medical officers would be required for active service, while, on the other hand, if operations were conducted against a nation equally well equipped in arms as ourselves, the number of medical staff officers would have to be increased to 260. To meet these demands, it would be necessary (assuming that the Indian Establishment was fixed at 353) to obtain from England an augmentation of 40 or 110 medical staff officers, according to the nature of the service. It should, however, be borne in mind that if India is engaged in a large war across the frontier, there is the likelihood that England will, at the same time, be similarly employed in Europe, in which case it is for consideration whether England would be in a position to assist India with medical officers.

7. If the Government of India recognise the strength of the medical staff to be 314\* before the augmentation, the requirements for the additional regiments will be 19 medical officers, including a reserve, and for augmentation to regiments 20 medical officers, including a reserve. If, on the other hand, the old establishments is fixed at 300 only, then a corresponding increase in the latter number (20) must be made.

8. In conclusion, I beg to state that the efficiency of the medical staff is already impaired; with only a small force in the field, it has been necessary to stop all leave out of India, and latterly some of the officers on leave in India have been recalled. Moreover, the unhealthy season is approaching, and intimation has been received that a number of medical staff officers in Upper Burmah have broken down in health, and must be relieved. Unless additional officers are therefore sanctioned, the present difficulties will increase; and should unusual sickness break out, it will be impossible to meet the demands of the service. Further, as all leave is being stopped, there will be increased sickness amongst the medical officers.

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— No. 79. —

EXTRACT from a DESPATCH to the Secretary of State for India, No. 168, dated 25th October 1886.

Paragraph 27. Correspondence regarding the formation of a second battalion of the 5th Goorkha Regiment. [In continuation of Military Despatch, No. 92,\* dated the 18th June 1886.]

From Adjutant General in India, No. 4047-B., dated 15th September 1886.

Military Department, No. 1368-B., dated 28th September 1886.

Special India Army Circular, dated 1st October 1886.

\* See page 105

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Enclosure in No. 79.

From Major-General Sir T. D. Baker, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 4047-B., "Native Army, Recruiting," dated Simla, 15th September 1886).

I AM directed to report for the information of Government that 2nd battalions have been raised for the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Goorkhas, but that there appears to be no prospect of obtaining a sufficient number of suitable recruits through the agency of the Nepal Durbar during the coming cold season to complete the formation of two additional Goorkha battalions (2nd battalions to the 3rd and 5th Goorkhas).

2. Under

2. Under these circumstances, the Commander in Chief desires strongly to advocate that immediate steps be taken to raise a 2nd battalion to the 3rd Goorkhas by enlisting Gurhwallis, whose many good qualities as a fighting class have been amply borne testimony to by such experienced officers as his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir H. T. Macpherson, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., V.C., Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir H. Ramsay, C.B., K.C.S.I., Major-General J. I. Murray, C.B., Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon, C.B., C.S.I., Colonel J. F. L. Fisher, Commissioner of Kumaon, Colonel H. H. Lyster, C.B., V.C.

3. Very careful inquiries have been made from officers experienced with Goorkhas, and the general opinion is in favour of a Gurhwalli regiment. Some of the best men in our Goorkha regiments come from Gurhwal, and all that is necessary is for care to be taken No. 630, "Camp," dated 28th December 1885. in enlisting so that the proper class of recruits may No. 1329, "Camp," dated 29th January 1886. be obtained. On this subject I am to invite a reference to this office letters marginally quoted.

4. The Commander in Chief also solicits sanction to commence the formation of a 2nd battalion of the 5th Goorkhas by calling for volunteers from the present regiment and from the Assam regiments (the numbers volunteering from each regiment being limited, say to 150), the battalion being completed during the cold season by the enlistment of recruits from Nepal.

5. His Excellency earnestly hopes that Government will sanction the formation of these two new battalions during the present cold season. At least two years must elapse before a newly formed regiment can take the field.

6. I am to request the favour of a very early reply, as it is most desirable that orders should be issued at once, in order that arrangements for officers and recruiting may be made.

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The Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant General in India.

(No. 1368-B.—Government of India.—Military Department.)

Sir,

Simla, 28 September 1886.

IN reply to your letter, No. 4047-B., "Native Army, Recruiting," dated the 15th September 1886, I am directed to say, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that the Government of India sanction the formation of a 2nd battalion to the 5th Goorkha Regiment, but, with reference to the correspondence ending with your No. 1054-B., dated 3rd April 1886, regret to be unable at present to sanction his Excellency's proposal to raise a 2nd battalion to the 3rd Goorkhas by enlisting Gurhwallis.

2. The proposal that volunteers should be called for from the 5th Goorkhas and from the Assam regiments is approved, but the Government of India consider that the number of volunteers from each corps should be limited to 100, the new battalion being completed by the enlistment of recruits from Nepal.

3. An India Army Circular notifying the formation of the battalion will shortly be issued.

4. Advances may be made to the officers selected to raise the battalion and to enlist recruits, as in the case of the regiments already raised. The rules as to pay of officers transferred to this battalion will also be the same as on the previous occasions.

I am, &c,  
(signed) O. R. Newmarch, Major-General,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

Copy forwarded to—

The Director General of Ordnance in India.  
The Superintendent and Agent for Army Clothing, Bengal.  
The Surgeon General with the Government of India.  
The Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces.  
The Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal.  
The Accountant General, Military Department.

By Order,  
(signed) T. Deane,  
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

[Special.—Applicable to Bengal only.]

INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS.—1886 [Clause 171].

Government of India, Military Department,  
Simla, 1 October 1886.

THE following regulations and instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

ORGANISATION.—NATIVE ARMY.

Formation of a Second Battalion to the 5th Goorkha Regiment.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in Council directs the immediate formation of a second battalion to the 5th Goorkha regiment.

2. All enlistments will be for the first and second battalions of the regiment, and each recruit, at the time of enlistment, should be made to understand that he is liable for transfer, in the event of war, to either of the two battalions for which he enlists.

3. To form the nucleus of the second battalion, volunteers will be called for, under the orders of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, from the 5th Goorkha Regiment, and from the three Assam regiments. These volunteers will be subject to the same conditions as newly-enlisted recruits in respect of their liability to transfer to the linked battalion.

(signed) *O. R. Newmarch*, Major General,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 80. —

(No. 172 of 1886.—Military Department.)

DESPATCH from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 25 October 1886.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 4, of the 5th January 1886, we have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of Special India Army Circular, dated the 13th October 1886, making certain changes in the conditions of service of the native armies in India.

2. In this circular we have notified all the measures for improving the position of the native troops sanctioned in Lord Randolph Churchill's Despatch,\* No. 275, of the 29th October 1885, merely reserving for further consideration the question of hutting accommodation.

3. For financial reasons, we have decided to restrict the formation of reserves in the first instance to 100 men in the infantry of the Bengal Army and Punjab Frontier Force.

We have, &c.  
(signed) *Dufferin.*  
*C. P. Ilbert.*  
*T. C. Hope.*  
*A. Colvin.*  
*G. Chesney.*  
*J. B. Peile.*

\* See page 90.

[Special.—Applicable to the three Presidencies.] INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS, 1886.  
[Clause 170.]

Government of India, Military Department; Simla, the 13th October 1886.

The following Regulations are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council :—

ORGANISATION—NATIVE ARMY.

CHANGES in the Conditions of Service of the Native Armies in India.

WITH the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, the Governor General in Council notifies the following regulations affecting the conditions of service of the Native soldier in India :—

*Linked Battalions.*

1. The Native infantry regiments of the three Presidencies, including those of the Punjab Frontier Force, will be linked together in regiments of three battalions each, with the exception of certain corps which will be linked together in regiments of two battalions each.

Local regiments will remain on their present footing,

2. All enlistments in any battalion, after the 30th November 1886, will be made for both or for all three battalions; that is to say, a recruit enlisted for one battalion of a regiment will be liable to serve in the other battalions of the regiment, and will be transferred thereto if required in case of war. Beyond this liability to transfer to a linked battalion during war, the conditions of the Sepoy's enlistment will remain as at present.

3. No alteration will at present be made in the numbers or designations of regiments. The liability to transfer will only come into force on one or two of the battalions being ordered on service. During peace time there will be no change either in the organisation of the regiments or in the conditions of the Sepoy's service. In detailing troops for field service, one or more of the battalions of a regiment will be left in cantonments; when warned for service, the battalion so warned will at once make up its strength to 1,000 effective rank and file by transfers of men, enlisted under the new conditions specified in this order, from the other battalions of the regiment. The other battalion or battalions will simultaneously be recruited to the extent required to replace the men so transferred. The linked battalions will thus supply trained soldiers to fill the ranks of the battalions in the field during the continuance of war. The depôt of the battalion on service will, when practicable, be attached to one of the battalions of the linked regiment.

4. In the Bengal Presidency the regiments will be linked as follows :—

*Bengal Infantry.*

1st, 2nd, and 3rd.	25th, 27th, and 28th.
4th, 5th, and 6th.	29th, 30th, and 31st.
7th, 8th, and 9th.	39th and 40th.
10th, 11th, and 12th.	42nd, 43rd, and 44th (Assam).
13th, 16th, and 17th.	1st Goorkhas, 1st and 2nd battalions.
14th, 15th, and 45th (Sikhs).	2nd " " "
18th, 33rd, and 38th.	3rd " " "
19th, 22nd, and 24th.	(2nd batt. will be raised hereafter.)
20th, 21st, and 26th.	4th Goorkhas, 1st and 2nd battalions.
23rd and 32nd Pioneers.	

*Punjab Frontier Force.*

1st, 3rd, and 4th Sikhs.  
1st, 4th, and 5th Punjab Infantry.  
2nd Sikhs, 2nd, and 6th Punjab Infantry.  
The Guide Corps.  
5th Goorkhas, 1st and 2nd battalions.

The linking of the Madras and Bombay regiments will be notified hereafter.

*Reserves.*

5. The formation of a system of reserves for the Native army, details of which are notified in the Appendix to this Circular, has also received the sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

The measure will be introduced at first only into the infantry of the Bengal Army and Punjab Frontier Force.

*Railway Passes to Furlough Men.*

6. The Governor General in Council is pleased to grant free conveyance by railway to and from the stations nearest to their homes to all Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men of the Native army proceeding on furlough. They will travel on warrants which will be issued under the instructions of the Commander in Chief in India, Madras, and Bombay. When on temporary leave they will pay own their expenses as heretofore.

7. Free transport by rail is not admissible for the horses of the Native cavalry.

8. This concession has already been notified with effect from 1st January 1886.

*Recruit Pay.*

9. All recruits for the Artillery, Madras cavalry, Sappers and Miners, and Infantry, enlisted elsewhere than at regimental head-quarters, will receive full pay from date of enlistment, as well as marching batta or free carriage for the conveyance of their baggage (according to the regiment for which they are enlisted), to date of joining the regiment.

*Good-conduct Pay.*

10. The second rate of good-conduct pay, 2 rupees per mensem, now allowed after 9 years' service, will be given after 6 years' service, and the rate, 3 rupees per mensem, now allowed after 15 years' service, will be given after 10 years' service. This change applies only to the following troops:—Artillery, Viceroy's body guard; cavalry (except the Bombay cavalry), Infantry, Sappers and Miners, Central India Horse, Deolee and Erinpoora force, Merwarrah battalion, Meywar and Malwah Bheel Corps, Bhopal battalion and Nepal escort. It does not apply to the Hyderabad Contingent.

*Half-Mounting.*

11. The annual allowance in aid of half-mounting is raised from four rupees to five rupees, with effect from the 1st of January 1887.

*Pensions.*

12. The present invalid pension after 15 years is abolished prospectively for all soldiers enlisted after the 30th November 1886, and in lieu thereof the ordinary pension will be granted to all soldiers on completion of 21 years' service in the regular army. The ordinary pension is also admissible after 21 years' service to all men now in the army. The superior rate of pension will continue to be granted after 32 years' service under the present rules. This change does not apply to strictly local corps.

13. The scale of gratuities for short-service commissioned and non-commissioned officers and soldiers enlisted after 30th November 1886, who may be discharged as unfit for further service, is extended as follows:—

Above 15 and under 21 years' service, a gratuity of 12 months' pay of rank, including good-conduct pay.

O. R. Newmarch, Major-General,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

## APPENDIX.

## ORGANISATION OF RESERVES.—BENGAL ARMY.

1. Two reserve forces will be formed in the Bengal Army, viz., an active reserve and a garrison reserve, both limited at present to the infantry.

2. The active reserve will be formed of men who may be transferred to the reserve after not less than five, or more than 12 years' service with the colours; its numbers will be limited at present to 100 men per battalion.

3. No men are to be passed into the reserve unless certified by a medical officer as physically fit, and approved by the commanding officer of their regiment. Selections for transfer to the reserve will be made with reference to length of service, the senior applicants having the preference

4. No

4. No men are to be passed into the active reserve if the regiment is on active service, or is more than five per cent. below its established strength, including recruits.

5. Non-commissioned officers and men in the active reserve will be liable for field service with any one of the battalions linked with their own battalion.

6. The garrison reserve will be formed of soldiers who have been pensioned after 21 years' service under the new rules, or of men belonging to the active reserve who have completed a total colour and reserve service of not less than 21 years.

7. No man will be accepted for the garrison reserve unless certified by a medical officer as physically fit for the performance of garrison duties, and approved by the commanding officer of the regiment to which he belongs.

8. Short-service soldiers who have been already discharged with gratuities may also be accepted for the garrison reserve on re-attestation, if certified as fit by a medical officer, and approved by the commanding officer of the battalion. Such men must refund the gratuities which they have received before they can be enrolled in the garrison reserve, after which they will be entitled to the rates of pay laid down in paragraph 14.

9. The garrison reserve is unlimited in number.

10. Men belonging to the garrison reserve are not liable for service beyond the frontier of British India; they will be employed only on garrison duty within the frontier.

11. All records and documents relating to reserve men will be kept in the battalion to which they belong; an office allowance of 30 rupees per mensem will be granted for this purpose. Rolls of reserve men are to be kept in the form on the first page of the sheet roll (Bengal Form A—R. 12), and copies of these rolls must be furnished to the civil officers of the districts in which the men live.

12. The arms and accoutrements of the active reserve men will be kept with the battalion head-quarters, and their training will be carried out with that one of their linked battalions of the regiment which may happen to be quartered nearest their homes. In cases where this is impracticable, special orders will be issued for the training being carried out elsewhere. Arms and accoutrements will not be issued for the garrison reserve men, for whose training the spare arms in regimental charge will be utilised.

13. One havildar and one naick will be allowed in each class of reserve for every section of 25 men or fraction thereof, exceeding one-half.

This staff will be maintained either by transfer of non-commissioned officers from the battalion to the reserve, or by promotion of privates in the reserve, at the discretion of commanding officers in each case.

14. Men (not being pensioners) of both reserves while at their homes will receive the following rates of pay :—

	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Havildars - - - - -	4 - - a month.
Naicks - - - - -	3 8 - - „
Sepoys - - - - -	3 - - „

Pensioners who join the garrison reserve will draw their pensions with an addition thereto of one rupee per mensem for sepoy, and 1 rupee 12 annas for havildars and naicks.

15. Reserve men going to, and returning from, their training will be granted free passes by rail and marching batta at the rate of two annas per 15 miles for such part of the journey as cannot be done by rail.

16. While embodied for training, or when called up for service during a war, men of both reserves will receive the full pay and good-conduct pay which they were drawing when first transferred to the reserve; while thus drawing full pay, the reserve pay (paragraph 14), and pension pay in case of pensioners, will, of course, lapse.

17. Reserve men will be paid their reserve pay in arrears by commanding officers when embodied for training, one-half of the arrears due being paid to each man on first muster, and the balance, with the full pay and good-conduct pay specified in paragraph 16, at the end of the training.

18. The active reserve will be embodied for training for one month in every year at such date as may be directed by the general officer commanding the division or district in which the battalion is quartered. The garrison reserve will be embodied for training for one month in every alternate year under similar regulations.

19. During the training all the reserve men will be examined by a medical officer, and men found unfit will be transferred to the pension list (paragraph 21), or discharged with gratuity (paragraph 20), or transferred from the active to the garrison reserve (paragraph 6), as the case may be.

20. Gratuities on the following scale will be allowed to reserve men who are discharged as unfit, and who are not entitled to pension:—

							Number of Months' Full Pay of Rank and Good Conduct Pay.
Men of—							Rs.
5 years' but less than 10 years' colour and reserve service	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
10 " " " 15 " " " " " " "	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
15 " " " 20 " " " " " " "	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
20 " " " 25 " " " " " " "	-	-	-	-	-	-	12

21. Men of the garrison reserve become entitled to an invalid pension on completing a total colour and reserve service of 25 years, at the following rates:—

		Rs.	a.	p.
Havildars	- - - - -	} 5	8	- a month.
Naicks	- - - - -			
Sepoys	- - - - -			

Pensioners (paragraph 14) who may be invalided as unfit for garrison duty will revert to their original pensions.

22. Men on passing into the reserve will be provided, as a free issue, with the following articles, which will be of regimental pattern, and will be kept in store at regimental head-quarters:—

1 Puggri.	1 Pair putties.
1 Khaki blouse.	1 Pair native shoes.
1 Pair pyjamas.	

These articles will be renewed as required under regimental arrangements, the cost being recovered on a contingent bill.

The clothing in wear of men passing into the reserve will be left in regimental store for use during training, or when called out for service.

28. Reserve men called out for service will be supplied by Government with great coats, water-tins, havresacks, and such other articles of equipment as the nature of service may necessitate.

No. 81. —

(No. 20—India—41.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 20 October 1886.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour, by direction of the Secretary of State for War, to annex hereto a list of the Cavalry regiments in India to which a fourth squadron has still to be added, showing their strength, including the drafts which have already embarked, and deducting invalids and time-expired men expected to return home this season.

I am at the same time to inform you that there is every prospect of sufficient further drafts being sent out during December, to complete the increased establishment, with the exception of that of the 7th Dragoon Guards, which, however, it is also hoped to complete before the end of this trooping season.

Under these circumstances Mr. Secretary Smith proposes, should the Secretary of State for India concur, to proceed at once with the promotion and appointment of the necessary officers and non-commissioned officers in and to each of these regiments, to complete the fourth squadron.

I have, &c.  
(signed) H. G. Deedes.

The Under Secretary of State for India.



INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

131

	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.		
	Establishment at present.	Strength.	New Establishment.
1st Dragoon Guards - - - - -	502	533	600
3rd " " - - - - -	502	517	600
7th " " - - - - -	502	429	600
8th Hussars - - - - -	502	558	600
17th Lancers - - - - -	502	590	600
6th Dragoon Guards - - - - -	502	560	600

— No. 82. —

(M. 10,686.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 28 October 1886.

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th October 1886, No. 20—India—41, and to acquaint you in reply that Viscount Cross sanctions the appointment of the additional lieutenants for the regiments named in your letter,\* but is unable to sanction the promotions in the several corps unless, before or by the close of the present trooping season, they are completed to the revised strength or do not fall short of it by more than 20 privates.

\*1st Dragoon Guards.  
3rd " "  
6th " "  
7th " "  
8th Hussars.  
17th Lancers.

His Lordship will, however, sanction the promotions in the case of a regiment which before the 31st December of this year has a strength joined or actually embarked coming within 40 of the new establishment, but only on the understanding that it will receive the additional needful complement of not less than 20 privates during the remainder of the trooping season. The proviso will, in either case, of course, exclude invalids and time-expired men.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,  
Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State for War.

— No. 83. —

(No. 20—India—43.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 13 November 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, M. 10,686, and to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, the enclosed statement showing the estimated strength of the Cavalry regiments in India named in the margin.\* As it will be seen that the whole of the regiments named, except the 7th Dragoon Guards, will be completed within 20 of the new establishment by the 31st December, steps are now being taken to promote and appoint the additional officers rendered necessary by the increase.

\*1st Dragoon Guards.  
3rd " "  
6th " "  
7th " "  
8th Hussars.  
17th Lancers.

332.

R 2

I am

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

I am also to inform you that the Commander in Chief in India will be authorised to complete the new establishment of non-commissioned officers, with the exception of the 7th Dragoon Guards. A draft will be sent out to this regiment in February, but the numbers are not yet known.

It is probable that a few more men may be sent out to the other regiments at the same time.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

REGIMENT.	Actual Strength on 1st October 1886.	Draft already Embarked.	Volunteers from 14th Hussars.	Draft to Embark before 31st December 1886.	Total.	Coming Home.		Estimated Strength of Regiment at close of Trooping Season.
						Invalids.	To Reserve, Time-expired &c.	
1st Dragoon Guards -	487	68	3	62	620	6	31	581
3rd " " -	485	66	30	87	668	16	42	610
6th " " -	514	77	-	62	653	12	10	622
7th " " -	467	52	13	-	532	24	75	-
8th Hussars -	508	65	13	52	638	20	28	590
17th Lancers -	521	85	5	51	662	6	24	632

The new Establishment is 600 all ranks.

War Office, 13 November 1886.

— No. 84. —

(M. 11,503.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 4 December 1886.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th November, 20—India—43, and to acquaint you, in reply, that Viscount Cross consents to the promotions and to the appointment of additional officers to the regiments named by you, with the exception of the 7th Dragoon Guards, on the understanding that the additional numbers of privates required to complete some of the regiments are dispatched during the remainder of the trooping season.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *J. H. Mayo,*  
Assistant Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State for War.

— No. 85. —

(Military, No. 357.)

DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

India Office, 9 December 1886.

IN continuation of paragraph 2 of Military Despatch, No. 256, of the

(M. 11,503.)

\* From War Office, 20th October, and Enclosure.  
To, 28th October, M. 10,686  
From, 13th November, and Enclosure.  
To, 4th December, M. 11,503.

23rd September last, I forward herewith a copy of correspondence\* with the War Office on the subject of the completion of the new establishment of regiments of

British Cavalry serving in India.

I have, &c.  
(signed) Cross.

(For the correspondence referred to in above Despatch, see pages 130-2.)

— No. 86. —

(Military, No. 359.)

DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

India Office, 9 December 1886.

WITH reference to your Despatch dated 5th January 1886, No. 4, and the

\* From Viceroy, 17th April 1886.  
To ditto, 11th May 1886.  
From ditto, 12th May 1886.  
From ditto, 24th September 1886.  
To ditto, 25th September 1886.

telegrams noted in the margin,\* I transmit, for your information, copy of correspondence† with the War Office relative to the postponement, until the trooping season of 1887-88, of the dispatch of the six batteries of garrison artillery and the drafts to complete the Infantry reinforcements which were to have proceeded to India during the present trooping season.

† To War Office, 15th May 1886, M. 4584.  
From ditto, 31st July 1886, M. 7409.

I have, &c.  
(signed) Cross.

(For the correspondence referred to in above Despatch, see pages 103-4.)

— No. 87. —

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the Government of India, No. 194, dated 14th December 1886.

Para. 12. CORRESPONDENCE showing that on the recommendation of the

Commander in Chief, it has been decided that the four native mountain batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force shall be linked together under conditions similar to those laid down in Clause 170, India Army Circulars, dated 31st October 1886, for battalions of Native Infantry.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 56-1-C dated 15th November 1886, and Enclosure.  
To Adjutant General in India, No. 927-C., dated 25th November 1886.  
From Adjutant General in India, No. 167-1-C, dated 29th November 1886.  
Special India Army Circular, dated 1st December 1886.

Enclosures in No. 87.

Artillery.—Organisation.

No. 56—1-C., "Royal Artillery in India, Organisation," dated Headquarters, Calcutta, 15th November 1886.

From Colonel *M. Elliot*, R.A., Deputy Adjutant General, for Adjutant General in India, to Colonel *E. H. H. Collen*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief in India to forward, for the consideration of Government, the enclosed letter from the General Officer Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, recommending that the four native mountain batteries of that force should be linked together under conditions similar to those laid down in Special Indian Army Circular, dated 13th October 1886, for battalions of native infantry.

2. As very great difficulty has been experienced in keeping the Hazara Mountain Battery up to its strength on service in Burma, his Excellency is most desirous, in order to prevent any similar occurrence in future, that early sanction should be accorded to this proposal, and that, after the 30th instant, all enlistments should be for the artillery of the Punjab Frontier Force generally, instead of for a particular battery as at present.

No. 745, "Organisation," dated Abbottabad, 4th November 1886.

From Brigadier-General *J. W. M'Queen*, C.B., A.D.C., Commandant, Punjab Frontier Force, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Artillery in India.

WITH reference to Special India Army Circular, dated 13th October 1886, introducing a system of linking native infantry regiments together, in order that in time of war battalions in the field may have their ranks filled with trained soldiers, I have the honour to address you on the great advantage there would be in introducing a similar system in respect to the four mountain batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force.

2. It will be within your recollection that very great difficulty has been experienced in keeping in an efficient state No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery, now on field service in Burma. This has been owing to there being no system in operation under which the casualties in men and animals, inseparable from field service, could be efficiently replaced, and it is in view of avoiding any similar difficulty in future that I now address you.

3. I would recommend that the four mountain batteries of this force should be linked together, and as it is improbable that all four would be detailed for field service at the same time, the battery or batteries left in cantonments would supply trained men and mules to fill all casualties that occurred in the batteries in the field, replacing by enlistment and purchase the men and mules so transferred.

4. Should my suggestion meet with his Excellency's approval, I would recommend that all gunners and drivers enlisted in any of the four\*  
 \*No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery  
 No. 2 Derajat " "  
 No. 3 Peshawar " "  
 No. 4 Hazara " " mountain batteries of this force after the 30th November 1886 be liable to transfer to the other batteries in case of war, it being explained to the men on enlistment that this liability to transfer would come into force only in time of war, and that in peace time a man would remain with the battery in which he originally enlisted.

No. 927-C., "Artillery, Organisation," dated Fort William, 25th November 1886.

From Colonel *E. H. H. Collen*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant-General in India.

I AM to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 56—1-C., Royal Artillery in India, Organisation, dated the 15th November 1886, requesting sanction to a proposal by the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force that the four native mountain batteries of that force should be linked together under conditions similar to those laid down in Special India Army Circular, dated 13th October 1886, for battalions of native infantry, so as to provide that after the 30th November 1886 all enlistments shall be for the artillery of the force generally, and not for a particular battery as at present.

2. In reply I am to say, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that the Government of India approve of the proposed arrangement, which it is considered should have effect from 15th December 1886, it being clearly understood that the change is prospective only, and is not to apply to men enlisted before that date. A draft of an Indian Army Circular, which it is proposed to issue notifying the change, is sent herewith for his Excellency's concurrence.

No. 167—1-C., "Royal Artillery in India, Organisation," dated <sup>at</sup> ~~at~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>quarters</sup> ~~quarters~~, Calcutta, 29th November 1886.

From Colonel *M. Elliot* R.A., for Adjutant-General in India, to Lieutenant-Colonel *E. H. H. Collen*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I AM directed to state that the Commander in Chief in India approves of the publication of the draft India Army Circular on the subject of future recruiting for the artillery of the Punjab Frontier Force, submitted for his *Excellency's* concurrence with Military Department Letter, No. 927-C. "Artillery, Organisation," of the 25th instant.

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SPECIAL ARMY CIRCULAR.

Government of India.—Military Department.—Fort William, 1st December 1886.

ARTILLERY.—ORGANISATION.

CHANGE in the Conditions of Service of Men of the Four Native Mountain Batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force.

THE Governor-General in Council notifies that the four native mountain batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force will be linked together, and all enlistments in any of these batteries, after the 15th December 1886, will be made for the whole four; that is to say, a recruit enlisted for one battery will be liable to serve in any of the other three, and will be transferred thereto if required in case of war. Beyond this liability to transfer during war to any of the four batteries, the conditions of enlistment will remain as at present.

2. Men enlisted prior to 15th December 1886 do not come within the provisions of this circular.

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— No. 88. —

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the Government of India, No. 194, dated 14th December 1886.

Military Department Letters Nos. 653-B. to 656-B., dated 25th August 1885.

To Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, No. 687 B., dated 29th August 1885.

From Government of Punjab, No. 521-S.-C., dated 17th September 1885.

From Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, No. 10,018, dated 19th September 1885.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 959-B., dated 20th October 1885.

From Government of Bombay, No. 5484, dated 20th October 1885.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 3756-B., dated 29th October 1885.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 3757-B., dated 29th October 1885.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 1085-B., dated 2nd November 1885.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 3903-B., dated 9th November 1885.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 4064-B., dated 20th November 1885.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 478-B., dated 10th December 1885.

From Government of Madras, No. 7103, dated 14th December 1885,

and enclosures

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 552-C, dated 26th December 1885, and enclosures.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 316-B, dated 25th February 1886.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 317-B., dated 25th February 1886.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 2387-C., dated 5th March 1886.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 1413-B, dated 2nd October 1886.

From Adjutant-General in India, No. 4465-B., dated 11th October 1886.

Special India Army Circular, dated 13th October 1886.

To Adjutant-General in India, No. 1480-B., dated 14th October 1886.

To Governments of Madras and Bombay, No. 1496-B., dated 16th October 1886.

From Government of Bombay, No. 188-P., dated 1st November 1886.

Special India Army Circular, dated 23rd November 1886.

Para. 13. CORRESPONDENCE regarding the formation of reserves and the linking of the battalions of the Native armies in India. [This has reference to p. 19 of the Secretary of State's Despatch, 29th August 1885, No. 275.]

## Enclosure in No. 89.

## ORGANISATION.—NATIVE ARMY.

No. 653-B., Organisation, Native Army, dated Simla, 25th August 1885.

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

THE Commander in Chief is aware that the Government of India have recommended to the Secretary of State the formation of a reserve on the lines proposed in your letter, No. 2009-B., dated the 3rd July, and also the reorganisation of the Native Infantry of the Indian Army in linked regiments of three battalions each. Her Majesty's Government have already sanctioned the formation of a reserve, and, pending a reply to the proposals regarding the linking of battalions, I am now to forward, for the opinion of his Excellency, the draft of a General Order which it is proposed to issue as soon as sanction is received to the proposal for linked battalions, with which measure the scheme for a reserve is intimately connected.

2. It would be a necessary part of the new system that the selection of battalions for foreign service should be equally distributed over the different regiments; that is to say, in a general way each three-battalion regiment should furnish one battalion for foreign service before any other regiment is called upon to furnish two battalions. The system assumes also that no regiment shall ever furnish more than two battalions for foreign service, one battalion at least remaining in India as a depôt. It further appears to the Government of India very desirable that a roster for foreign service should be established similar to that which obtains in the British Army. The observance of a fixed order of duty of this sort appears to the Governor General in Council a necessary condition for maintaining a proper degree of military spirit and *esprit de corps* in both officers and men; the Army should feel that all parts of it have an equal chance of achieving distinction, and in this view the selection of regiments for foreign service should be determined by the roster. I am now to suggest that in this view a roster may be laid down for the Bengal Army, which might be either one for all regiments, or separate for the Punjabi and Hindustani regiments, as Sir Donald Stewart thinks best. The Punjab Frontier Force might properly be included, if his Excellency sees no objection.

3. The pioneer battalions will be on an exceptional footing, as also will be the Goorkha regiments. In the present instance the Goorkha regiments will remain as five existing single-battalion regiments, double-battalion being added to each in turn as recruits are available, according to the plan laid down in Military Department letter, No. 169 M.-R., of the 31st March last.

4. I am to forward, for the information of his Excellency, copies of letters which have just been addressed to the Governments of Madras, Bombay, and Punjab on this subject.

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 DRAFT GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.—Simla, the August 1885.

No. , ORGANISATION.—NATIVE ARMY.

THE Governor General in Council directs the promulgation of the following regulations, which have been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, for the organisation of the Native Armies of India into linked battalions, and the formation of reserves, and has much satisfaction in notifying at the same time the grant to them of the advantages in pay, pension, and travelling allowances herein accorded:—

*Formation of Linked Battalions.\**

2. The existing regiments of Native Infantry of India will be grouped into larger regiments of three linked battalions from the present regiments, and to each regiment will be allotted a territorial headquarter station as follows :—

*Bengal Army.*

Regiment.	Stations.	Regiment.	Stations.
1st, 2nd, 3rd - - -	Meerut.	39th, 40th - - -	Dinapore.
4th, 5th, 6th - - -	Cawnpore.	19th, 22nd, 24th - - -	Jhelum.
7th, 8th, 9th - - -	Lucknow.	25th, 27th, 28th - - -	Unballa.
10th, 11th, 12th - - -	Fyzabad.	29th, 30th, 31st - - -	Sialkot.
13th, 16th, 17th - - -	Allahabad	20th, 21st, 26th - - -	Rawal Pindi.
14th, 15th, 45th - - -	—	35th, 36th, 37th - - -	Jullundur.
18th, 33rd, 38th - - -	Benares.	23rd, 32nd, 34th - - -	Lahore.

A second battalion will be added hereafter to each Goorkha regiment.

*Punjab Frontier Force.*

\* \* \* \* \*

*Madras Army.*

\* \* \* \* \*

*Bombay Army.*

\* \* \* \* \*

3. The regulation for the formation of regiments of linked battalions will be prospective as regards the soldier.

4. In future a recruit will be enlisted for service in any one of the linked battalions forming the regiment, and he will be liable for transfer to any of the battalions of which his regiment is composed. Beyond this liability to transfer to a linked battalion, the conditions of the sepoy's service will remain just as at present.

5. One of the linked battalions will ordinarily be quartered at the regimental headquarter station, and will form the depôt there when one or two of the other battalions of the regiment take the field.

6. When a battalion is detailed for field service, it will be made up at once to 1,000 effective rank and file by calling in the active reserve, or by drafts from the linked battalion at the headquarter station, or from both.

7. Casualties on service will be filled by transfers of trained men from the battalions left behind.

FORMATION OF RESERVES.

*Bengal.*

8. Each regiment of infantry will have an active reserve of 218 men, composed of men under 12 years' service, who, after three years' service with the colours, volunteer for transfer to the reserve.

9. Only

\* Will not be entered if not sanctioned.

9. Only men physically fit and approved by their commanding officer will be permitted to join the reserve, and the nomination will be made by length of service, the seniors having the prior claim.

10. No men are to be passed into the reserve if the regiment is more than 10 per cent. below its established strength, including recruits.

11. Suitable men already discharged may be taken into the active reserve, if considered fitted for it by their commanding officer. If pensioners, their pensions will lapse; if discharged, with gratuity, the amount so received must be refunded to enable them to count their past service for pension.

12. All men of the active reserve will be liable for field service with any of the linked battalions of their regiment.

13. A garrison reserve will be formed—(1) of men physically fit for garrison duty of between 20 and 30 years' service, who take their discharge; and (2) all men of the active reserve who, on completing a total colour and reserve service of 21 years, will be passed into the garrison reserve, if physically fit for garrison duty.

14. This garrison reserve will be unlimited in number; but no man who has completed 32 years' total service since enlistment, and no man who is not in all respects fit for garrison duty, will be retained in it.

15. The men of this garrison reserve will not be liable to be called out on service beyond the frontier out of India, but only for garrison duty in the country.

16. Men of the reserve, while at their homes, will receive the following rates of pay, viz. :—

	Per Mensem.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Sepoys - - - - -	3 8 -
Havildars and naicks - - - - -	4 - -

17. While embodied for training, or when called out to join their regiments during a war, reserve men will receive the full pay and good-conduct pay they were drawing when they joined the reserve. They will be paid once a year in arrears when called out for training, 10 rupees being paid to each sepoy on first muster, and the balance at the end of the training.

18. The active and garrison reserves will be embodied for training for not less than two months in two years, the period being fixed at such seasons of the year as will best enable the men to be spared from their field work.

19. This training will be carried out at the head-quarter station of the regiment when possible. When this is not practicable, the reserve men will join the nearest battalion of their own, or any other regiment, for training.

20. Free passes by rail, and marching batta, at the rate of two annas per 15 miles, will be given to reserve men going to and returning from the annual training.

21. Two rupees per annum will be paid to each reservist to enable him to keep up at all times, and in an efficient condition, the following articles of uniform, viz. :—

1 puggri,	} Regimental pattern.
1 khaki blouse,	
1 pair pyjamas,	
1 „ putties,	
1 „ native shoes,	

22. When called out for service, each man will be supplied by Government with—

- 1 great coat.
- 1 havresack.
- 1 water bottle.

23. During



23. During the annual training reservists will be medically examined, and all men found unfit for garrison duty will be discharged, and will receive gratuities or pensions as follows:—

24. The following gratuities will be allowed to reservists:—

Men of five years' colour and reserve service, but less than 10 years' colour and reserve service - - - - -	}	3 months' pay of rank and good-conduct pay.
Men of 10 years' colour and reserve service, but less than 15 years' colour and reserve service - - - - -	}	6 ditto.
Men of 15 years' colour and reserve service, but less than 20 years' colour and reserve service - - - - -	}	9 ditto.
Men of 20 years' colour and reserve service, but less than 25 years' colour and reserve service - - - - -	}	12 ditto.

25. A reserve soldier will not be entitled to pension until he has completed 25 years' colour and reserve service.

26. After 25 years' service, partly with the colours and partly in either reserve, he will, if invalided as unfit for garrison service, be granted a modified pension, according to rank (paragraph 40).

27. For every 100 men of the reserve the following non-commissioned officers will be allowed, viz.:—

- Four havildars.
- Four naicks.

28. If they belong to the active reserve they will be liable to be called out for field service.

29. The records and documents of reservists will be kept at the head-quarters of the battalion to which they belong.

30. The arms and accoutrements of reservists will be kept at the head-quarter station of the regiment, whence they will be forwarded to the place appointed for the annual training of other than the regimental head quarters.

31. The above regulations apply also to the corps of Sappers and Miners, mountain batteries, and to the native cavalry.

32. The reserve for the corps of Sappers and Miners, and the batteries, will consist of 25 per cent. on their established strength.

33. In the cavalry the reserve will consist of 75 dismounted men per regiment.

#### GRADUAL FORMATION OF RESERVE.

##### *Bengal Army.*

34. Each infantry battalion will be recruited to a strength of 980 of all ranks before it commences to pass men into the reserve. When it has reached that strength, the active reserve will be commenced as fast as recruits can be obtained to take the place of men so transferred until the reserve consists of 150 men. When that number has been completed, 68 men will be further transferred to the reserve, and the battalion be reduced to a strength of 912 of all ranks. No more transfers will then take place to the active reserve until a vacancy occurs in the active reserve, either by death, discharge, or transfer to the garrison reserve.

##### *Madras Army.*

35. The general regulations for the reserve as given above are applicable to the Native Army of Madras, except as follows:—

The active reserve will consist of 160 men per infantry battalion. This reserve will be formed at once, as fast as recruits can be obtained to take the places of men transferred to the reserve.

*Bombay Army.*

36. The general regulations for the reserve as given above are applicable to the Native Army of Bombay, except as follows:—

Each infantry battalion will be raised from 832 to 912 of all ranks, and when it has reached the latter strength the formation of the active reserve will be commenced, and 80 men be passed into it, the strength of the battalion being again reduced to 832 of all ranks, which will be its permanent establishment. The reserve will then be further increased to 160 men per battalion, so fast as recruits are available to take the place of men passed into it.

## GENERAL REGULATIONS.\*

## PENSIONS AND GRATUITIES.

37. The invalid pension now granted to men invalided after 15 years' service is abolished prospectively as regards men enlisting after this date, and the following pensions will be granted in lieu:—

After 21 years' service with the colours an ordinary pension of—

Sepoys - - - - -	<i>Rs</i>
Drummers, buglers, fifers, trumpeters - - - - -	4
Trumpet, fife, or bugle-major - - - - -	7
Havildar, duffadar, and naick after three years' service as such - - - - -	7
Jemadars after three years' service as such - - - - -	15
Subadars, ressalgars, and ressaidars after three years' service as such - - - - -	30

38. All men now serving retain their right to invalid pensions and gratuities as allowed by existing regulations. They are also eligible for the pension now sanctioned after 21 years' service.

39. The present superior rates of pension granted under existing regulations to men of unblemished character after 32 years' total service remain unaltered.

40. The existing pension and gratuity rules for non-combatants are unaltered.

## GOOD-CONDUCT PAY.

41. The present rates of good-conduct pay are altered as follows, viz. :—

<i>Re.</i> 1 a month after three years' service.
<i>Rs.</i> 2     "     "     six     "     "
<i>Rs.</i> 3     "     "     ten     "     "

The conditions attached to the grant of this pay remain unaltered.

42. Havildars and naicks will continue to receive good-conduct pay as at present.

## HALF-MOUNTING ALLOWANCE.

43. Five rupees per annum, instead of four rupees, will be granted in future as half-mounting allowance to every man of the rank and file over 18 months' service.

## FURLOUGH.

44. The rules for the grant of furlough to the Native Army will remain as at present; but all men going on and returning from furlough will receive free passes by rail for that part of the road to and from their homes on which they can use the railway.

\* Will not be entered if not sanctioned.

No. 654—B, Organisation,—Native Army, dated Simla, 25th August 1885.

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department.

THE Government of India have lately received the sanction of Her Majesty's Government for the formation of a reserve to the infantry of the Native Army.

2. It has also been proposed to introduce a system of regiments of linked battalions, each of these larger regiments to consist of three of the existing battalions.

3. A leading object of this arrangement is to furnish reinforcements to a battalion serving in the field. The system would be prospective only as regards the men, that is to say, sepoy now in the army will continue to be liable for service only in their present regiments; but all men enlisted hereafter, although ordinarily serving with a particular battalion, would be liable to transfer, either temporarily or permanently, to either of the other two battalions of the regiment. Further, men going to the reserve will be liable to be attached, when called up, to any of the three battalions of a regiment.

4. The Madras Infantry comprises 32 battalions, two of which are pioneers; these latter might be formed into one regiment of two battalions, the remaining 30 battalions being formed into ten regiments of three battalions each. I am to ask that the Government of Madras will please to propose a distribution of these regiments accordingly for embodiment in a General Order, which it is proposed to publish as soon as the approval of Her Majesty's Government is signified to certain points in the measure which have been referred for further orders.

5. This new system, combined with that of the reserve, renders it desirable that each of the ten regiments of the Madras Army should be given, as far as possible, a territorial character, that is to say, that each regiment should be associated with some particular part of the country, a military station in which should be designated its head-quarters, at which one of the three battalions of the regiment would ordinarily be stationed. The new system further assumes that the battalions to be employed on active service should be furnished equally from the different regiments, that is, that each of the ten regiments should furnish one battalion for foreign or active service before any regiment is called upon to furnish two battalions; and further, that no regiment will ever furnish more than two battalions for foreign service, the third battalion always remaining at territorial head-quarters as a *depôt* and feeder.

6. The pioneer regiments would be on a special footing as regards the roster and reliefs; and, in the event of both battalions going on foreign service, a joint *depôt* for the two would be formed under existing rules, but double the usual strength.

7. In connection with the new system, it is also very desirable to establish in a recognised and methodical way a system of rosters for foreign service. I am to ask accordingly that the Government of Madras may be pleased to furnish a list of the order in which the ten regiments it is now to be composed of are to be told off for foreign service.

8. Upon this point I am to observe that the 8th and 20th Regiments, which are now being got ready for service at Suakin, would naturally be regarded as first on the roster. The 23rd and 24th Regiments have been warned for the 1st Army Corps, and the 27th for the Reserve Division; so that if the Government of Madras desire that this order be maintained, these regiments must be considered as next for foreign service.

9. It may be observed that these five battalions must necessarily be attached to five separate regiments on the new organisation, or if it is desired that any of them should belong to the same regiment, then some other battalions would have to be substituted for them in the present order of relief.

10. The rules for the formation and constitution of a reserve accompany. The strength of reserves fixed for each battalion of the Madras Army is 160, and I am to say that the Government of Madras will be authorised, as soon as the General Order is published, to at once pass men into the reserve to that extent, as fast as recruits are obtained to take their place.

11. It will be noticed that men are eligible to enter the reserve after only three years' service; but preference should be given to older soldiers in the first instance, and only men of such short service passed into the reserve, if this is found necessary to complete the number.

12. It will be for the consideration of the Madras Government whether the reservists, when called out for training, should be attached to the battalion at their regimental head-quarters or to some other battalion nearer to their homes. Possibly, in the first instance, the latter arrangement may be found the more convenient; but eventually, if recruiting assumes a more territorial character, it should be practicable always to attach the reserve men to a battalion of their own regiment.

13. It is not proposed, at any rate at present, to alter the numbers of existing battalions, but it may perhaps be found convenient to designate each group of linked battalions by a territorial designation.

14. I am to ask that the Government of Madras, in reply to this letter, will be so good as to favour the Government of India with any suggestions which may appear to them calculated to conduce to the success of this important measure.

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No. 655—B., Organisation—Native Army, dated Simla, 25th August 1885.

From Major General *C. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government, India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department.

THE Government of India have lately received the sanction of Her Majesty's Government for the formation of a reserve to the infantry of the Native Army.

2. It has also been proposed to introduce a system of regiments of linked battalions, each of these larger regiments to consist of three of the existing battalions.

3. The Government of Bombay have already in 1882 proposed the introduction of this system for their army, and the proposal was lately renewed in your letter, No. 3752, dated 6th July 1885. I am now to say that if the Government of Bombay adhere to that distribution, it may be at once carried out on the general arrangement, receiving the sanction of the Secretary of State, which has been applied for. The system would be prospective only as regards the men, that is, sepoys now in the army will continue to be liable for service only in their present regiments; but all men enlisted hereafter, although ordinarily serving with a particular battalion, would be liable to transfer, either temporarily or permanently, to either of the other two battalions of the regiment. Further, men going to the reserve will be liable to be attached, when called up, to any of the three battalions of a regiment.

4. The Bombay Infantry, comprising 26 battalions, would thus be formed into eight regiments of three battalions each, with two regiments of one battalion, one of these, the 21st, being the Marine battalion. I am to say that if the Bombay Government approves of the proposal, these two single-battalion regiments, or any others to be selected for the purpose, might be made pioneer battalions. The Madras Army has two pioneer battalions, so also has the Punjab portion of the Bengal Army, and it is in contemplation to convert two battalions of Hindustanis into pioneers; it seems desirable that the Bombay Army also should contain a proportion of this useful arm.

5. This new system, combined with that of the reserve, renders it desirable that each of the eight regiments of the Bombay Army should be given, as far as possible, a territorial character, that is, that each regiment should be associated with some particular part of the country, a military station in which should be designated its head quarters, at which one of the three battalions of the regiment would ordinarily be stationed. The new system further assumes that the battalions to be employed on active service should be furnished equally from the different regiments, that is, that each of the eight regiments should furnish one battalion for foreign or active service before any regiment is called upon to furnish two battalions; and further, that no regiment will ever furnish more than two battalions for foreign service, the third battalion always remaining at territorial head quarters as a *dépôt* and feeder.

6. The pioneer regiments, should the Bombay Government decide to propose their formation, and the proposal be approved by Her Majesty's Government, would be on a special footing as regards the roster and reliefs; and in the event of both battalions going on foreign service, a joint *dépôt* for the two would be formed under existing rules, but double the usual strength.

7. In connection with the new system, it is also very desirable to establish in a recognised and methodical way a system of roster for foreign service. I am to ask accordingly that the Government of Bombay may be pleased to furnish a list of the order in which the eight regiments it is now to be composed of are to be told off for foreign service.

8. Upon this point I am to observe that the 28th Regiment, which is now about to return from Suakim, will naturally be placed last on the roster, and the 16th Regiment, which is now under orders to go there, will stand first on the list. Next to them will come the 9th and 23rd Regiments, which have been warned for duty with the 1st Army Corps, the 29th Regiment for the 2nd Army Corps, and the 27th and 30th for the Reserve Division, if the Government of Bombay desire this order to be maintained.

9. It may be observed that these six battalions must necessarily be attached to six separate regiments on the new organisation, or, if it is desired that any of the battalions should belong to the same regiment, then some other battalions would have to be substituted for them in the present order of being warned for duty.

10. The

10. The rules for the formation and constitution of a reserve accompany. The strength of reserves fixed for each battalion of the Bombay army is 160, the existing strength of the regiments being first raised from 832 to 912; and I am to say that the Government of Bombay will be authorised, as soon as the General Order is published, which is now under preparation, to pass 80 men into the reserve upon the battalions respectively being recruited up to 912, thus bringing the active establishment down again to the normal strength of 832, and thereafter to complete the reserve of the battalion to 160 so fast as recruits are obtained to take the place of the reserve men.

It will be noticed that men are eligible to enter the reserve after only three years' service; but preference should be given to older soldiers in the first instance, and only men of such short service passed into the reserve, if this is found necessary to complete the number.

12. It will be for the consideration of the Bombay Government whether the reservists, when called out for training, should be attached to the battalion at their regimental headquarters, or to some other battalion nearer to their homes. Possibly, in the first instance, the latter arrangement may be found the more convenient; but, eventually, if recruiting assumes a more territorial character, it should be practicable always to attach the reserve men to a battalion of their own regiment.

13. It is not proposed, at any rate at present, to alter the numbers of existing battalions, but it may, perhaps, be found convenient to designate each group of linked battalions by a territorial designation.

14. I am to ask that the Government of Bombay, in replying to this letter, will be so good as to favour the Government of India with any suggestions which may appear to them calculated to conduce to the success of this important measure.

No. 656-B., Organisation—Native Army, dated Simla, 25th August 1885.

From Major General *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Military Department.

I AM directed to inform you, for the information of the Lieutenant Governor, that the Government of India have proposed to the Secretary of State that the existing regiments of infantry of the Indian army should be grouped into larger regiments of three battalions each. The object of this measure is to admit of reinforcing the battalions on service from those left in quarters, it being understood that not more than two of the linked battalions of a regiment would ever go on service at the same time, one at least remaining as a *depôt*.

2. Omitting the 5th Goorkha Regiment and the Guides Infantry, whose organisation would not be disturbed, there are nine regiments of infantry in the Punjab Frontier Force. I am desired to ask that, under the orders of the Lieutenant Governor, a proposal for grouping these into regiments of three battalions each may now be furnished.

3. It would be understood that this change, if sanctioned, would be prospective only, that is to say, every sepoy enlisted hereafter will be liable for transfer, either permanently or temporarily, to any of the three battalions composing the regiment.

4. I am to ask that the Government of India may be favoured with any suggestions which may be called for in view to carrying out this change as regards the class composition of the different regiments, or any other point.

No. 687-B., Organisation, dated Simla, 29th August 1885.

From Colonel *A. Crookshank*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for review by you and any officers of your Department you may select, a rough draft of rules which have been proposed for the formation of reserves for the Native army, and to request that you will communicate as early as possible any additions or emendations which may appear to you to be desirable in view to the rules being made full and complete in every respect.

2. Your opinion, and suggestions are invited, particularly with regard to the registration of addresses, the payment of reserve pay, should it be thought desirable to pay the men half-yearly instead of yearly on embodiment, the grant and rate of gratuities, and the rate of modified pensions after 25 years' service.

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

No. 521-S-C., dated Simla, 17th September 1885.

From the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Military Department, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I AM desired to forward, in reply to your letter No. 656-B., dated the 25th August 1885, copy of a letter from the General Officer Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, submitting a proposal for grouping the nine infantry regiments of the force into regiments of three battalions.

2. I am to state that the Lieutenant Governor has no suggestions to make at present on the subject of paragraph 4 of your letter.

No. 427-B., dated 8th September 1885.

From the Brigadier General Commanding Punjab Frontier Force to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Military Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 1372, dated 21st August 1885, forwarding copy of Government of India, Military Department, letter No. 656-B., Organisation—Native Army, dated the 20th idem, intimating that it is contemplated to group the existing regiments of infantry of the Indian Army into larger regiments of three battalions each, and calling for proposals regarding the grouping of the nine regiments of infantry, omitting the 5th Goorkha Regiment and the Guide Infantry, of the Punjab Frontier Force.

2. In reply, I have the honour to suggest the following grouping of the nine regiments referred to :—

GROUPED AS REGIMENTS.	COMPANIES.									
	Punjab Mahomedans.	Trans-Indus Mahomedans.		Hindustani.		Sikhs.	Dogras.	Religious Element.		TOTAL.
		Within the Border.	Afridis.	Mahomedans.	Hindus.			Mahomedans.	Hindus.	
1st Sikh	1st Sikhs - - - -	1	2	-	-	4	1	3	5	8
	3rd " - - - -	1	2	-	-	4	1	3	5	8
	4th " - - - -	2	1	-	-	4	1	3	5	8
1st Punjab Infantry.	1st Punjab Infantry - -	2	1	1	-	2	2	4	4	8
	4th " " - - -	2	1	1	-	2	2	4	4	8
	5th " " - - -	1	2	1	-	3	1	4	4	8
2nd Punjab Infantry.	2nd Sikhs - - - -	2	1	-	-	2	3	3	5	8
	2nd Punjab Infantry -	3	1	-	-	3	1	4	4	8
	6th " " - - -	1	3	-	-	1	2	4	4	8
TOTAL Companies - - -	15	14	3	-	1	26	13	32	40	72

3. The constitution of the regiments as above detailed is according to the standing orders of the force, and where in fact it differs in detail it is gradually conforming to orders.

No. 10,018, dated Calcutta, 19th September 1885.

From Colonel *M. C. Perreau*, Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, to Colonel *O. B. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Simla.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 687-B., of the 29th August 1885, forwarding a draft of rules proposed for the formation of reserves for the Native Army, and requesting suggestions as to any additions or emendations which may appear desirable. The question is of much importance, and one which would require considerable time and inquiry before any practical suggestions could be made with confidence.

2. I placed the rules before the officers of this department named in the margin, and  
 Major Thomas. have now the honour to offer the following brief remarks on the points  
 „ Woodstock. specially noticed.  
 Captain Burgess.

- 1st.—Registration of address.
- 2nd.—Payment of reserve pay.
- 3rd.—Grant and rate of gratuities.

*Registration of Address.*—Some such form as that on the first page of Bengal Form A-R, No. 12, would appear to be well suited for the purpose of affording all the information required, and a register in such form should be kept at the head-quarter station of each regiment, containing the names of the recruits alphabetically arranged, each district in which the men may reside being separately grouped.

Copies of the registers should be lodged with the civil authorities of the several districts, in view to aiding them in calling out the reserves as occasion demands.

*Mode of Payment.*—Payment should be made at regimental head-quarters yearly in arrears.

Neither the agency of the civil authorities nor of the deputy paymasters of pension circles is advocated. It is well understood that native pensioners much prefer being dealt with by military officers, and payment by deputy paymasters is deprecated, as these officers have quite enough to do, if their legitimate duties are properly attended to. The roll of pensioners is already very large, and the reservists should be kept quite distinct. Half-yearly payments are therefore not approved of. By being paid yearly in arrears, the men will have all the greater inducement to attend at regimental head-quarters.

*Gratuities.*—The rates proposed appear fair, and commend themselves when compared with those in Article 35, Indian Army Regulations, Vol. I., Part II. It is thought that para. 4 of the printed rules will require reconsideration. A sepoy in receipt of 4 rupees per mensem, ordinary rate of pension, may require better terms than those offered to induce him to waive the right to pension to which he has attained. As the scheme develops, so will details requiring consideration and adjustment be brought to light, and it will probably be found necessary to have the whole reserve force placed under a body of officers responsible for the maintenance of the force in a state of thorough efficiency.

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No. 959-B., Organisation—Native Army, dated Simla, 20th October 1885.

From Colonel *A. Crookshank*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

IN continuation of Military Department, No. 621-B., dated the 18th August last, forwarding a copy of a Despatch from the Governor General in Council to the Secretary of State, No. 135, dated the 14th idem, I am directed to transmit herewith, for the information of the Commander in Chief, an extract of a telegram from the Secretary of State, dated the 14th instant, sanctioning the formation of reserves for the Native Army, and to request that, under his Excellency's orders, the Government of India may be furnished at an early date with a report on the rules for the formation of these reserves.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 5484, Army—Native Organisation—Formation of Reserve and Introduction of system of Linked Battalions; dated Bombay Castle, 20th October 1885.

Letter from the Adjutant General, No. C-35-5—10,270; dated 6th October 1885.

“ With reference to Government Resolution, No. 4968, dated the 17th September, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to state that his Excellency is most anxious to give effect to the proposals of the Government of India embodied in Secretary Colonel Chesney's letter, No. 655-B., dated 25th August 1885, in every detail in which these agree with the internal conditions of this Army.

“ 2. The grouping of three battalions into one homogeneous regiment as already worked out is perfectly simple, leaving regiments very nearly as they stood before in the Army List without incorporating the 21st and 28th Regiments of Bombay Infantry.

“ 3. These last thus present themselves for the two pioneer battalions intended to reinforce the efficiency of a Bombay Contingent in the field.

“ 4. But the 21st Bombay Infantry is a special regiment, finding detachments for the Persian Gulf, and from time to time performing Marine duties, for which it maintains a seaboard recruitment.

“ 5. The Government of India would probably not wish to disturb its present useful *status*, the more so as its headquarters at Bombay would certainly not assist pioneer enlistment.

“ 6. The Commander in Chief would propose to sever the Marine Battalion altogether from the Bombay Army and place it as a separate corps under the orders of the Government of India. Its special duties render it absolutely impossible to move it from Bombay, and its utility as a fighting battalion is therefore *nil*. At the present moment 286 men of this battalion are on detachment in Persia and Arabia, and a certain quota are employed on duty in the ironclads which guard Bombay Harbour. Moreover, as it has been decided to increase the defences of Bombay and Karachi, it is probable that more men will be required for harbour duties, and for this and the Persian detachments the Marine Battalion would, from its constitution, be admirably suited and always available. To replace the Marine Battalion, his Excellency would recommend that one of the disbanded infantry regiments of the Bombay Army should be restored, and this battalion with the 28th Bombay Infantry would supply the two pioneer regiments required. An attempt might be made to raise this new battalion amongst the Mangs and Ramosees, a class containing excellent material, but whom it has hitherto been found difficult to attract to military service, making Ahmednagar, which is near the district they inhabit, the territorial centre for the regiment.

“ 7. Should this plan, however, not meet with the approval of the Government of India, the Commander in Chief would propose to utilise the Mhairwara Battalion local to Ajmere. His Excellency lately inspected this corps, and, from its activity, its high training in musketry, and its good physique, formed a very high opinion of its suitability for the work of a pioneer battalion on service. The men composing it are very enduring, but of a class that decline service in the regular Army in time of peace, but most willing and anxious to serve in time of war. As pioneer companies are always split up, the 10 companies of the Mhairwara Battalion would be sufficient, six companies being always available for field service. It is but only fair to remark that the Governor General's Agent in Rajputana does not approve of the suggestion, considering that the transfer would be unpopular with the men, and that any alteration in the terms of service had been strongly deprecated by Colonel Keatinge (at one time Governor General's Agent in Rajputana). As this was 15 years' ago, and a change may have come over the minds of the men, it might be considered advisable to ascertain their feelings on the subject, if Government consider the proposal otherwise worthy of consideration.

“ 8. As a third alternative towards the provision of pioneers, pioneer companies might be raised at the territorial centres of each regiment, thus giving eight companies of pioneers capable of amalgamation when required.

“ 9. In grouping the existing battalions into regiments, it would, the Commander in Chief thinks, be impolitic to upset the natural order, which in the first four of the new regiments preserves a traditional and much-valued character; thus:—

1st Regiment	-	-	-	-	of Grenadiers.
2nd	„	-	-	-	of Rifles.
3rd	„	-	-	-	Light Infantry.
4th	„	-	-	-	Biluch.

So that if the creation of two pioneer regiments be insisted upon in dealing with the remaining thirteen regiments of the line, the three-battalion principle must be sacrificed to this object by placing the eighth regiment on a double-battalion footing.

“ 10 The



" 10. The objection to this prevails even over General Hardinge's strong wish that two pioneer battalions should be a part of the infantry of this command, because his Excellency attaches greater importance to the placing of all regiments upon such equality as will ensure that none shall forfeit (in its most capable representative for the time being) its proper turn of active service on any other grounds than those of self-created disabilities; and this, with regiments uniform in constituents, can be assured, without detriment to public interests, by a strict system of confidential reports and practical inspections.

" 11. Moreover, pioneer battalions for effective use in the field should habitually, at drill, carry their burdensome equipment (as is the custom with the 32nd Musbi Sikhs), or at least must have such constant pick and shovel exercise as employment on public works in the Madras Presidency profitably facilitates. The seldom cold climate of Western India renders the former hardly desirable, and without working pay a mere title will little influence the special training which it implies.

" 12. Again, a pioneer battalion attached to divisional headquarters on service must so often be broken up into detachments for separate columns that it suffers least from dismemberment for technical duties; and although each quota of a distinct force should be as complete as it can be made, this principle in India can very rarely be carried to its highest standard.

" 13. If the Government of India will assent to the Bombay troops remaining, as hitherto, dependent upon Bengal and Madras for their pioneer adjuncts, General Hardinge sees in this the simpler settlement of the question.

" 14. The all-important consideration in carrying out the new organisation is to determine where the centres for the eight regiments shall be established, as many of the stations now occupied by Bombay troops are barren of recruits, and even where this is not the case may be found insufficient in their resources for increased demands. The following places seem from present experience to offer the best chance:—

Poona	-	-	-	-	-	Centre for 1 regiment,
Nasirabad	-	-	-	-	-	" 2 regiments,
Mhow	-	-	-	-	-	" 2 "
Satara	-	-	-	-	-	" 1 regiment,
Ahmednagar	-	-	-	-	-	" 1 "
Sind	-	-	-	-	-	" 1 "

for the working of which the redistribution scheme proposed by his Excellency in the Quartermaster General's Department will be necessary.

" 15. The Commander in Chief has no remarks to offer regarding the proposals for the Reserve as suggested in the letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, which seem to him to meet the case completely; but his Excellency would venture to submit the following supplementary proposals for extending the usefulness of this reserve in reducing the large number of Native civilian followers which at present hamper an Indian army in the field by substituting for them armed and efficient men.

" 16. This, General Hardinge thinks, could be accomplished by having battalions in the Reserve trained specially, according to army corps or presidential requirements, as transport drivers, ambulance corps; hospital bearers, &c., &c., and armed, with certain modifications, as soldiers.

" 17. The advantages of such a system are obvious. The men would be disciplined and capable of defending themselves and the camp, if necessary, instead of, as at present, being a helpless crowd of undisciplined individuals at the mercy of any one who chooses to attack them. Baggage guards would be reduced to a minimum, and stores, &c., be safe and regular in transit instead of, as at present, irregular and often relieved of half their bulk by the time they reach their destination. Convoys would thus be trained machines, and would move and march with the same precision and regularity as the army itself. The hurry and scurry in procuring followers now attendant on the dispatch of an army to the field would be avoided, and we should instead have at hand a trained body of men with the confidence begotten of comradeship and the self-reliance following on discipline. Officers should have soldier-servants limited according to rank and requirements; for staff and departmental officers they could be taken from the reservists, and for regimental officers from regiments.

" 18. General Hardinge would not confine himself to manning these battalions from the reservists, but would draft volunteers from the regular army into them as soon as they had been well trained in the use of arms, say after one or two years' service. From the very fact of their being to a great extent localised, service in these battalions would be most popular.

" 19. Such a system as that roughly sketched above would, General Hardinge thinks, be quite practicable, and once well established would be easily expansible, if necessary, from the civil population. One campaign in ten years would make it self-supporting in the saving effected in transport animals and commissariat stores in transit.

"20. The present arrangement, which can hardly be dignified by the name of system, is a relic of times which have long since gone by; and although it might be said that it has answered well up to now, albeit at an enormous cost and sacrifice in men, money, and animals, it can scarcely be maintained that it is suitable to the military efficiency of the present age, the essentials to which are swiftness, precision, and cohesion, combined with flexibility.

"21. However strongly the frontier may be fortified in the most approved and scientific manner, the works would prove of doubtful utility, unless combined with mobile armies having an organised system of workers in the immediate zone of operations, such as is provided for every army in Europe; and the Commander in Chief considers the present a very favourable opportunity for establishing such a system to the greater efficiency of the army and eventual benefit to the finances of the State."

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RESOLUTION.—The proposals made by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in the foregoing letter from the Adjutant General should be submitted to the Government of India for consideration, with reference to their letter No. 655-B., Organisation—Native Army, dated 25th August last.

The Adjutant General.  
The Quartermaster General.

(signed) *M. W. Willoughby*, Colonel,  
Secretary to Government.

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No. 5484.

SUBMITTED to the Government of India for consideration, in accordance with the preceding resolution.

The Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, Simla

(signed) *M. W. Willoughby*, Colonel,  
Secretary to Government.

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No. 3756-B., Native Army—Organisation, dated Headquarters, Simla,  
29th October 1885.

From Colonel *H. Collett*, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I AM instructed to reply as follows to your letters marginally noted :—

(1.) No. 688-B, dated 29th August 1885, forwarding 12 copies of draft rules for the formation of Native Army Reserves.

(2.) No. 842-B., dated 28th September 1885, forwarding a review by the Controller of Military Accounts of the draft rules for the formation of the Native Army Reserves.

(3.) Military Department No. 959 B., dated 20th October 1885, forwarding Secretary of State's telegram authorising formation of Reserves.

Colonel Beddy, Commanding 29th Punjab Infantry.

2. The draft rules for the formation of the Native Army Reserves have been, under the Commander in Chief's orders, sent for review to Colonel Pennington, Commanding 13th Bengal Lancers; Colonel Chapman, Commanding 8th Bengal Cavalry; Colonel Venour, Commanding 5th Bengal Infantry; and

3. His Excellency, after a careful consideration of these officers' opinions, has directed the following remarks on the draft rules to be submitted for the consideration of Government :—

(1.) Paragraph 1. All the officers consulted agree in thinking that three years is too short a service to require of men before transfer to the Reserve. His Excellency is disposed to agree with the reasons urged in support of this opinion, and recommends that "five years' service" be substituted in this paragraph for "three years' service."

(2.) Paragraph 3. Ten per cent. is considered too large a proportion to allow a regiment to fall below its complement, especially in the case of cavalry. The Commander in Chief recommends that for cavalry regiments the limit may be fixed at 5 per cent.

(3.) Paragraph 4.

(3.) Paragraph 4. This paragraph appears to require revision. The Controller of Military Accounts, and the officers consulted, point out that a pensioner is not likely to give up his pension to join the reserve; and, moreover, it seems inexpedient to admit into the active reserve men who have been declared physically unfit for further service by a medical committee.

The Commander in Chief recommends that men who have already been discharged on pension should be eligible only for the garrison reserve, if considered fit, and that such men joining the garrison reserve should be granted a suitable increase to their pension, say one-third or one-fourth of its amount.

Short-service men who have been discharged with gratuity should only be admitted to the garrison reserve on refunding the amount of the gratuity they had received; they would then become entitled to their ordinary reserve pay. Very few men would probably be found able to refund their gratuities, and this is not to be regretted, as men of this class would not be very desirable recruits.

Paragraph 6. It should be stated in this paragraph that the men admitted to the garrison reserve should be volunteers and approved by the commanding officer.

Paragraph 7. It seems doubtful whether it is advisable to lay down 32 years as the limit beyond which men will not be retained in the garrison reserve, or indeed whether any age limit is necessary if adequate measures are taken to secure the exclusion of men who are physically unfit. There are many men, especially Native officers and havildars, who are quite fit for garrison duty, and who would be valuable men in a garrison reserve, whose service exceeds 32 years. The Commander in Chief thinks that it will be advisable to omit the age limit, and to make service in the garrison reserve entirely dependent upon bodily fitness for duty.

Paragraph 9. It seems advisable to make a difference between havildars and naicks, and the sepoy's reserve pay is perhaps unnecessarily high. The following modification is suggested:—

	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>
Duffadars and havildars - - - - -	4	-	-
Lance duffadars and naicks - - - - -	3	8	-
Sowars and sepoy's - - - - -	3	-	-

It should also be stated that these rates of pay apply to all men of both garrison and active reserve, except pensioners, who are specially provided for.

Paragraph 10. It should be stated in this paragraph that reserve pay lapses while full pay is being drawn. Some rules are also required in this place regarding the punishment of reserve men who absent themselves from, or are negligent in attending, the annual training. The Commander in Chief thinks that the best way will be to make such offences cognisable by a civil magistrate, and punishable by either fine or imprisonment in a civil gaol.

Paragraph 12. It seems necessary to revise the last clause of this paragraph as follows:—

“When this is not practicable, the reserve men will join the nearest battalion of their own or any other regiment in which there may be a company of their own class or nationality.”

It is not advisable that Hindus should be required to undergo their annual training in a purely Mahomedan regiment, or *vice versa*.

Paragraph 14. It has been represented to the Commander in Chief that the sum of two rupees a year is not sufficient to maintain the kit laid down, especially in the case of cavalry soldiers, for whom additional articles would be necessary.

The following kit would be the least that a Sowar would require:—

1 turban.	1 pair putties.
1 kurta.	1 „ ankle boots.
1 kumarbund.	1 sword belt.
1 pair pyjamas.	

Perhaps the best and cheapest way would be to lay down the two kits as above, and for the Government to give a free issue once in three years, the articles being made up regimentally, and the cost recovered in contingent bills.

The following equipment would also be necessary for the annual training of the cavalry reserve:—

- 1 saddle, bridle, &c., complete.
- 1 sword.
- 1 lance (where used).

These articles should be Government property, and be kept in regimental charge.

The supplying of horses for the annual training is rather a difficult matter to deal with; the horses in a Silladar regiment are the men's property, and they could hardly be required to lend them for the reserve men's training without some compensation for their use. It seems necessary that the Government should be prepared to pay the Chunda Fund a suitable compensation on this account.

Paragraph 20. Should read—

4 duffadars or havildars.

4 lance duffadars or naiks.

4. The Commander in Chief also desires to draw the attention of Government to the following points, for which provision seems required:—

I. The addition made by the organisation of the reserves to the numbers borne on the rolls of an infantry regiment will be 218 men of the active reserve and an unlimited number of men in the garrison reserve.

For these men clothing will have to be prepared and issued, arms and ammunition indented for and taken care of, pay drawn and disbursed, arrangements made for accommodation while training, nominal and descriptive rolls prepared, records corrected, civil officers communicated with, and a variety of other business carried out, and details cared for.

Unless the management and organisation of the reserve branches of a regiment are adequately provided for, and placed on a proper footing at starting, the scheme, which ought to prove a valuable adjunct to our military strength, will run a good chance of being a failure.

The Commander in Chief does not consider that the reserve branch of a regiment will be properly worked unless a qualified officer is placed in special charge of it, and unless he is adequately remunerated for his labour, and provided with a sufficient office establishment.

It appears to his Excellency that such an officer should be of the rank of captain; that he should have the same office allowance as an adjutant; and that a havildar, with the staff allowance of a pay havildar, should be appointed to assist him. It seems impossible to work an organisation with less, which will entail a great deal of correspondence with the civil district officers and with the departments of the Army.

II. It seems necessary that civil officers in charge of districts should be supplied with nominal and descriptive rolls of all reserve men; that they should be responsible for the delivery to them of all orders received from the regiment, and for reporting to the regimental authorities the occurrence and date of casualties among reserve men. Reserve men should, on the other hand, be bound, under legal penalties, to keep their district officers informed of their movements and change of address.

*P S.*—The question of native officers for the garrison reserve has not been provided for. If it is intended to employ those men as garrisons for posts, &c., without attaching them to regiments, native officers will be necessary.

No. 3757-B., Native Army-Organisation, dated Head Quarters, Simla,  
29th October 1885.

From Colonel *H. Collett*, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to reply as follows to your letter, No. 653-B., of 25th August, forwarding for remark a draft General Order notifying the establishment of reserves for the native army:—

Paragraph 2. It is recommended that Ferozepore may be named as the head quarter station for the 14th, 15th, and 45th Sikhs.

Paragraph 3. Last line should read "as regards soldiers now in the service?"

Paragraph 6. Last line should read, "or from both the sister battalions?"

Paragraph 7. Last line should read, "from the sister battalion or battalions not in the field?"

Paragraph 26. The reference in the last line should be to paragraph 37, not to paragraph 40?

2. The remainder of the General Order has been already reported on in this office, No. 3756-B., dated 29th October 1885.

No. 1085-B., dated Fort William, 2nd November 1885.

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

WITH reference to, and in continuation of, Military Department letters quoted in the margin, I am directed to forward, for the early opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, a draft India Army Circular which it is proposed to issue at an early date, notifying the changes in the conditions of service in the Native armies in India, which have been proposed by the Government of India and sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 653-B, dated 25th August 1885.  
No. 688-B, dated 29th August 1885.  
No. 842-B, dated 29th September 1885.  
No. 959-B, dated 20th October 1885.

2. The papers detailed above will place his Excellency in possession of the detailed reasons which have led to the proposed changes of organisation, and I am to ask that, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, the Appendix to the Circular notifying the rules for the formation of reserves may be prepared and submitted for the consideration of the Government of India. In connection with this particular question, I am to invite attention to paragraph 67 of the Despatch No. 135 of 1885. The proposals might be those already sent for his Excellency's opinion with the amendments proposed in your letters Nos. 3756 and 3757, dated 29th October 1885, which would then be considered by Government in a complete form.

3. The Government of India will be glad to receive any additions or amendments to the circular which the Commander in Chief may consider necessary or desirable. The favour of an early reply is requested,

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No. 3903-B., Native Army—Organisation, dated Simla, 9th November 1885.

From Colonel *H. Collett*, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

In para. 19 of the draft rules for the formation of Native Army reserves, received with Military Department No. 688-B., dated 29th August 1885, it is stated that a man after 35 years' service, partly with the colours and partly in either reserve, will, if invalided, be granted a "modified pension," according to rank.

I am to inquire what this "modified pension" is, as it does not appear to be anywhere laid down.

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No. 4064-B., Native Army—Organisation, dated Simla, 20th November 1885.

From Colonel *H. Collett*, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

WITH reference to paragraph 4, clause 1, of this office letter, No. 3756-B, dated the 29th October 1885, and in modification thereof, I am directed to state that the Commander in Chief considers that commanding officers of regiments should be responsible for all records of reserve men which should be kept in the orderly-room, and that such extra clerical assistance as may be required should be given to the adjutant.

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No. 478-B., Organisation—Native Army, dated Fort William, 10th December, 1885.

From Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

WITH reference to your letters quoted in the margin, I am desired to forward, for the final concurrence of the Commander in Chief, draft rules for the organisation of reserves for the Native Army, and to offer the following remarks thereon for his Excellency's consideration :—

Para. 4. The Government of India are inclined to doubt the advisability of taking into the active reserve men who have been discharged with or without gratuity.

Para. 6. As the new pension rules give a soldier his pension after 21 years' service, it seems necessary to modify this paragraph.

The opinion of the Commander in Chief is requested on the change proposed, as also on the proposed addition to pensions made by paragraph 9.

Paras. 11 and 12. His Excellency's attention is invited to these paragraphs.

Para. 14. In the opinion of the Government of India it will be better to adhere to the original proposal and to allow the reserve men to keep up their own kit under such regulations as may be laid down regimentally. The preparation and issue of, and payment for, clothing by the regimental authorities would add very considerably to their work.

Para. 18. The opinion of the Commander in Chief is requested on the proposed rates of pension.

Para. 19. This seems to provide sufficiently for the proposal made on para. 10 in your letter, No. 3756-B., dated 29th October 1885.

Para. 22. An office allowance of 30 rupces per mensem is proposed with reference to your letter, No. 4064-B., dated 20th November 1885.

Para. 23. It is thought that if each regiment kept the arms of its active reserve, these would suffice for the training of such number of its active and garrison reserve as would join regimental head-quarters, and also of those men of the reserves of other corps who might be attached for the biennial training under para 12. It seems hardly practicable that each regiment should send down the reserve arms from its head-quarters to the various stations, when the reservists might undergo their training under the above paragraph. But this paragraph can easily be modified hereafter, when the stations at which the bulk of the reservists will undergo their training are known.

Para. 27. I am to ask what allowance the Commander in Chief would propose for the use of the regimental horses.

Postscript to your letter, No. 3756-B., dated 29th October 1885.—It is not considered necessary to have any reserve Native officers for the garrison reserves, as these would be attached for duty to regiments.

2. I am to add that if there is likely to be much delay in replying to this letter, or if there are any important points which his Excellency the Commander in Chief would wish to reserve for further consideration, it would be as well to publish at once the India Army Circular regarding the new conditions of service in the Native Army, forwarded with my No. 1085-B., dated 2nd November 1885, with a remark in paragraph 6, that the rules for the organisation will be notified hereafter. In any case, they will no doubt require considerable modification hereafter after actual experience has brought to light the defects in their working. But it is very desirable that the new conditions of service should be made known to the army at the earliest date.

3. The favour of a very early reply is requested.

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No. 7103, dated Fort St. George, 14th December 1885.

From Lieutenant-Colonel *A. Kenney-Herbert*, Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

WITH reference to your letter No. 654-B., Organisation—Native Army, dated 25th August 1885, I have the honour to forward letter No. 2848, Dated 25th November 1885. Native Army—Organisation, from the Adjutant General of the Madras Army, together with a Memorandum by Colonel Faunce, Deputy Adjutant-General, in which the proposals of the Government of India are exhaustively considered from every point of view.

2. With reference to this subject, I am directed to state that the Government of Madras have nothing to urge against the introduction of the linked battalion system. The measure can apparently be carried out without affecting the foreign service roster. The regiments may likewise receive a territorial designation; but, with the exception of these adoptions, the scheme does not seem to be at present practicable in this Presidency.

3. The reasons for this conclusion are fully explained in the Adjutant-General's letter above mentioned, wherein, you will observe, it is shown that the recruiting of the Madras Army is now, practically speaking, confined to two districts only. These are the poorest in the Presidency, to the inhabitants of which army service still offers some attraction.

4. In other parts of Madras want of confidence in the security of military service brought about by changes of late effected, and improvement in the status of the people, have gradually alienated from the army the classes from which recruits were formerly obtained.

5. Unless,

5. Unless, therefore, some inducement be conceded in the form of increased pay and other advantages with a view to opening again the recruiting fields that have been closed, the prospect of carrying out the project of territorialising the Madras Army, in the correct sense of the term, would seem to be gloomy in the extreme.

6. Colonel Faunce's Memorandum with letter No. 7-C., Native Army—Recruiting, dated 26th May 1885, from the Adjutant-General on the subject of the unsatisfactory state of recruiting in the Madras Army, is enclosed. This document has been, unfortunately, for a long time overlooked in the office of the Controller of Military Accounts, to whom the proposals were submitted for financial review.

7. With reference to the formation of reserves, I am to remark that further information appears to be necessary if the question is to be thoroughly worked out. It is, however, quite clear that if we are unable to fill the ranks of our army as it stands, the raising of a reserve will be out of the question. The impracticability already alluded to of territorialising the regiments is another fact which strikes at the root of this part of the scheme, while the effect of the measure with reference to the present condition of service and our existing pension system does not seem to have been considered.

8. With these remarks I am to say that the Government of Madras await a further expression of the wishes of the Government of India in regard to this subject.

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No. 2848-N-A., Organisation, dated Ootacamund, 25th November 1885.

From Brigadier-General *W. K. Elles*, C.B., A.D.C., Adjutant General, Madras Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel *A. Kenney-Herbert*, Officiating Secretary to Government of Madras, Military Department.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your reference memorandum relative to the proposed formation of a reserve to the infantry of the Native Army and the introduction of a system of regiments of linked battalions, herewith returned, 'No. 4844,\* of 3rd September 1885, I have the honour, by direction of the Provincial Commander in Chief, to submit, for the consideration of Government, a memorandum drawn up by the Deputy Adjutant General, reporting in detail on the subject under reference, in which Major General Rowlands fully concurs, and to offer the following general observations.

2. The scheme proposed by the Government of India for the re-organisation of the native armies includes two distinct operations:—

- (1.) The localisation and grouping of battalions.
- (2.) The formation of a reserve.

3. The general conditions prescribed by the Government of India have been observed as far as possible, but in one essential particular the directions cannot be followed. The connection between a localised regiment and the district in which it is localised will, in most cases, be either slight or wholly fictitious. This arises from the fact that two-thirds of the Madras infantry soldiers are recruited from two districts, in which four-and-a-half battalions only are quartered, and these districts include the city of Madras, with two battalions; so, while five regiments are localised in their recruiting ground, the five others will have their head-quarter stations in places foreign to two-thirds of their men.

4. It may be said that the localisation will in time create a connection and increase the proportion of local recruits, but there is little prospect of any such result under present conditions of the recruiting question.

The communications\* which have from time to time been addressed to Government show how precarious is the supply of the native army and how urgently reforms are needed to make recruiting more secure. It has been shown that it is hopeless to extend recruiting more equally over the Presidency by increasing the proportion of recruits from the southern districts, unless the service can be made acceptable to the classes which have been alienated from it by a variety of circumstances, partly by changes in the army and consequent insecurity of the military career, and partly by the improved conditions of civil life.

5. It is the opinion of officers who have most closely studied this question that unless the conditions of service in the native army are improved so as to be brought at least within the field of comparison with the many eligible careers afforded by civil life, the native army must depend more and more on the poorest parts of the Presidency, viz., the Northern Circars and Central Carnatic, that is, upon the districts from which it is

now sought to dissociate one-half of the Madras Infantry and to which two-thirds of its men belong.

6. The utmost efforts do not avail to keep the army up to strength, and there is a steady increase in the numbers wanting to complete. The result of closing, in however slight a degree, the chief recruiting grounds to half the army may thus be predicated with certainty. If the supply of recruits were greater than the demand, the disturbance of the recruiting field might be effected with impunity, but with an ebbing tide the result cannot but accelerate the fall in numbers. The proper course would seem to be to rectify, in the first place, the causes of unpopularity of the service, and then, by localisation, to open up districts which are now practically closed to the recruiter.

7. The recruiting of the army is in an unsatisfactory state, but it is by no means without remedy. The whole question has only recently been discussed by Colonel Faunce in a Memorandum\* dated 26th May 1885, which has been laid before Government, and it is consolatory to observe that reforms have been suggested which would cost little while promising good result.

8. The report on the scheme for the formation of a reserve is as full as possible, but it is necessarily imperfect, because the scheme itself is not only imperfect but has been partially withheld. The Memorandum of the Government of India, as communicated, contains but 29 paragraphs; but in one place paragraph 40 is quoted. As the scheme stands, it is entirely inconsistent with the present conditions of service, and its adoption would necessitate a revision of the pension system, of which, however, there is no suggestion.

9. The scheme has been reported on paragraph by paragraph, and it may suffice here to note that the preponderating dependence of the army on two districts of the Presidency will disturb the proposal that reservists should be trained by their own regiment, and unless special arrangements are authorised in the Northern Circars, will impose too heavy a duty on the two regiments therein localised. The same considerations will make it desirable not to keep the arms and accoutrements of the reservists entirely at the headquarters of regiments.

10. With reference to paragraph 7 of letter from the Government of India, No. 654-B., dated Simla, 25th August 1885, I am desired to say that the distribution, as proposed, in territorial regiments of the present regiments of the Madras Army will not, with one exception, affect the foreign service roster of the Madras infantry, as will be seen from a comparison between the roster as it now stands (marked A) and the proposed roster (marked B) forwarded herewith.



(A.)

ROSTER showing the Dates on which Regiments of Native Infantry Embarked at the Presidency on Foreign Service, and the Dates of their Return.

Regiments.	Date of Embarkation.	Date of Return.	REMARKS.
21st Regiment M.I. -	5 March 1860 -	28 May 1861 -	(From China.)
16th " " -	2 February 1860 -	28 January 1869.	
25th " " -	9 May 1860 -	14 February 1869.	
30th " " -	27 February 1866 -	5 March 1869.	
29th " " -	19 April 1868 -	22 January 1871 -	(At Bombay, from China.)
7th " " -	9 March 1868 -	22 March 1871.	
12th " " -	23 December 1868 -	28 January 1872.	
19th " " -	27 February 1871 -	9 and 10 May 1872.	
13th " " -	23 November 1870 -	20 and 21 May 1872.	
14th " " -	24 January 1871 -	25 January 1874.	
10th " " -	18 December 1871 -	29 January 1875.	
27th " " -	20 February 1872 -	15 February 1875.	
17th " " -	3 February 1875 -	9 February 1878.	
15th " " -	28 January 1875 -	7 March 1878.	
6th " " -	9 January 1875 -	30 April 1878.	
24th " " -	2 and 3 March 1877 -	3 April 1880	
32nd " " -	12 March 1878 -	21 January 1881.	
33rd " " -	9 April 1878 -	15 March 1881.	
23rd " " -	14 February 1878 -	22 March 1881.	
22nd " " -	22 March 1879 -	4 March 1882.	
31st " " -	11 March 1879 -	9 March 1882.	
2nd " " -	16 February 1881 -	15 January 1884.	
11th " " -	5 and 24 February 1881 -	27 March 1884.	
28th " " -	14 and 24 February 1882 -	27 January 1885.	
3rd " " -	11 and 24 February 1883 -	—	
9th " " -	5 January 1884 -	—	
5th " " -	13 March 1884 -	—	
26th " " -	11 January 1885 -	—	
20th " " -	5 October 1885 -	-	(Suakin.)
8th " " -	2 November 1885 -	-	(Suakin.)

(B.)

Number on Roster.	Battalion.	Territorial Regiment.	Number of Battalion on Foreign or Field Service.		Year in which in ordinary course Battalions will go on Foreign Service, and Number in Regiment then on Foreign Service.
			1*	2†	
1	21st Regiment M.I. -	4	-	1	1886 vice 3rd (1.)
2	16th " " -	3	-	-	1887 " 9th (1.)
3	25th " " -	8	-	1	1887 " 5th (1.)
4	30th " " -	10	-	-	1888 " 26th (1.)
5	29th " " -	1	-	-	1889 " 21st (1.)
6	7th " " -	5	-	-	1890 " 16th (1.)
7	12th " " -	6	-	2	1890 " 25th (1.)
8	10th " " -	5	-	-	1891 " 30th (2.)
9	13th " " -	9	-	-	1892 " 29th (1.)
10	14th " " -	4	-	-	1893 " 7th (1.)
11	10th " " -	8	-	-	1893 " 12th (1.)
12	27th " " -	3	-	-	1894 " 19th (1.)
13	17th " " -	6	-	-	1895 " 13th (1.)
14	6th " " -	4	-	-	The results of the above ten years' foreign service reliefs would be that in 1891 a second battalion of the 5th ought to go on foreign service; but it could be easily detained until 1893, when it could be sent without causing any derangement of roster again until 1900, when two battalions of the 2nd Regiment would fall to foreign services together. A regimental roster might well stand thus:
15	15th " " -	10	-	-	
16	24th " " -	5	-	-	
17	32nd " " -	8	-	-	
18	33rd " " -	1	-	-	
19	22nd " " -	9	-	-	
20	31st " M.L.I. -	2	-	-	
21	23rd " " -	2	-	2	
22	2nd " M.I. -	1	-	-	
23	11th " " -	7	-	-	
24	28th " " -	7	-	-	
25	3rd " M.L.I. -	2	1	-	4th
26	9th " M.I. -	7	1	-	3rd
27	5th " " -	3	1	-	6th
28	26th " " -	10	1	-	8th
29	20th " " -	9	1	-	10th
30	8th " " -	6	1	-	1st
					2nd
					7th

\* Excluding battalions in Burma Expeditionary Force.  
 † Including battalions in Burma Expeditionary Force.

## MEMORANDUM on the proposals for—

- (1) The formation of a reserve to the infantry of the Native Army.
- (2.) The introduction of a system of regiments of linked battalions.
- (3.) The localisation of such regiments.

1. In the last paragraph of the letter No. 654-B., dated 25th August 1885, the Government of India asks for any suggestions that may conduce to the success of the measures proposed.

2. Any such scheme as that contemplated to be in any sufficient degree successful on this side of India must be part of one comprehensive scheme for bettering the condition of the native soldier and making service in the army more popular for the reasons already given in the memorandum on recruiting, which was submitted to Government with this office letter No. 7-C., Native Army—Recruiting, dated 26th May 1885.

3. The localisation of regiments is apparently proposed to this end, but of itself this can have little appreciable effect; for putting aside the want of sufficient inducements for men to enlist, it is necessary that recruits should be obtainable in the district in which a regiment is localised to a sufficient extent to fill and keep up a territorial regiment; it is not practicable to make the permanent headquarters of one or more territorial regiments in particular districts merely because such districts furnish us with sufficient recruits for one or more such regiments; regiments must be distributed as the interests of the State require, and it happens with us that garrisons are mostly required in districts which give the fewest recruits.

4. In the Central Provinces we have four-and-a-half battalions; at Cuttack (Orissa), one battalion; on the Western Coast, three battalions; in all eight-and-a-half battalions in localities whence we obtain no recruits.

5. To admit of a territorial character being given to the Native Army, so that, as proposed, regiments should be associated with some particular part of the country in which one of its battalions would ordinarily be quartered, it is necessary that recruits should be obtainable, if not from all the various districts of the Presidency, then, at least, from the districts in which the requirements of the State necessitate the regiments being quartered; but this is not so; the terms of service are such that none but the poorest classes will accept them, and these are found in the largest number in the Northern Circars, whence we draw 41 per cent. of our recruits, and where yet only two battalions are quartered; and again the Northern Circars, with the Central Carnatic, give 69 per cent. of our recruits, while only five battalions are quartered in those districts. Still, if the terms of service are made more liberal to accord with what men can earn throughout the Presidency, it is probable that other districts would give more recruits, though whether in sufficient numbers to fill a territorial regiment, can only be determined by experiment, and will depend entirely on the terms of service offered.

6. It is the more desirable to induce the classes of the more southern portions of the Presidency that used to enlist to again do so; for though not such tall, big men as those of the Northern Circars, they are undoubtedly more intelligent and better soldiers.

7. Restricting regiments to certain defined areas for recruiting would tend to make our regiments into class regiments, a change much to be deprecated, for which there is no necessity, and which all officers of the Madras Army, who were questioned by the Simla Army Commission, 1879, objected to. There is no necessity for it, because if only the terms of the service are made to accord in some degree with those offered to the police, and with what can be earned in other walks of life, there will be no lack of recruits, though it must be added that only a few weeks ago Native officers spoken to on the subject said that, even with greater inducements to enlist, it would not be easy to overcome the widespread feeling caused by the many reductions of late years, that men so induced to enlist might find themselves sent adrift as soon as the necessities of the moment ceased to operate.

8. However, if it be determined to localise regiments, it might be done as shown in the accompanying distribution list, and should it hereafter be found that regiments cannot keep themselves to full strength in their own districts, they might after they have used every effort for, say, six months, be allowed to send recruiting parties to the Northern Circars and Central Carnatic, whence we now get 69 per cent. of our recruits; but it should be made a rule that the proportion of Mussulmans to Hindus in regiments should be as 6 to 10.

9. The grouping of the present regiments, as shown in the distribution list, will not interfere with the foreign service roster as it now stands; for even including the regiments sent to Burma since it was drawn up, only two of the new regiments (excluding Pioneers) would have two of their battalions on field or foreign service, viz., the 2nd and the 6th; and of these, one battalion of the (proposed) 2nd Regiment returns to India from

from Burma in the present relief season, and the stay in Burma, with the expeditionary force of the (proposed) 6th Regiment, may not be prolonged.

10. If, however, there is any probability of the garrison of Burma being increased and taken from the Madras Army, it will not be possible, with the present number of battalions, to ensure only one at a time being on foreign or field service.

11. With regard to the rules for the formation of reserves, it may be remarked that any such scheme to be successful must be accompanied by a revision of the present terms of service; men who can obtain a pension of 4 rupees a month (with 1 rupee rice-money) if invalidated at any time between 15 and 32 years' service, and men that make up their minds to be invalidated generally manage to be so, will not give up 60 rupees a year, payable monthly at their homes, for Rs. 48. 8. (which is what, as reservists with one good-conduct badge, they would receive), payable in two instalments of 10 rupees at the end of 11 months, and Rs. 38. 8. at the end of 11 months; and this only if called out for training at the end of 11 months; if the training were deferred for two years (paragraph 11 of the scheme), no payment would be made (paragraph 10 of the scheme) for 22 months.

12. In the scheme paragraph 40 is alluded to, but only 29 paragraphs have been sent for remark.

13. The Madras Army Reserve of 160 per battalion of infantry (5,120 men) is to be formed "at once as fast as men can be obtained to take the place of men transferred to the reserve," but as we are, and have long been, under strength, and cannot with the present terms of service bring the army to full strength, it is evident that till these terms of service are altered no reserve will be formed.

14. To take the paragraphs of the scheme *seriatim*—

Paragraph 1. It is said that the Active Reserve is to be "composed of men under 12 years' service." From the fact that men can (paragraphs 17 and 18) obtain gratuities and pensions after various periods of colour and reserve service, it is evident that there is a mistake in this paragraph in saying that the active reserve is to be "composed of men under 12 years' service." What is apparently meant is that men will have the option of passing into the active reserve, provided they have not less than three, and not more than 12 years' colour service; for from paragraph 6 alone it seems clear that it is not, as stated in paragraph 1, intended that the active reserve should be "composed of men under 12 years' service," as by paragraph 6 men who have a combined colour and reserve service of 21 years are to be passed into the garrison reserve if physically fit for garrison duty; so that the active reserve will be "composed" of men of between three and 21 years' service and not of men under 12 years' service." It would seem better that paragraph 1 should read thus:—

"Each battalion" of infantry will have an active reserve of 218 men in Bengal, and of 160 men in Madras and Bombay. This reserve will be formed by the transfer thereto of volunteers who have completed not less than three, and not more than 12 years' colour service; they will remain in the active reserve till the completion of 21 years combined colour and reserve service, when they will (paragraph 6), be transferred to the garrison reserve if physically fit for garrison duty."

Paragraph 2. On what grounds may the approval of the commanding officer be withheld? It seems necessary to prescribe that the physical fitness or otherwise for active service of men wishing to pass into the active reserve should be certified by a medical officer.

Paragraph 3. A necessary rule, but with the present difficulty in getting recruits it means that the reserve will never be anything like 160 men per battalion; at best it will be something less than 10 per cent. of the present strength of regiments, which will be so much the more below strength.

Paragraph 4. Men who have taken their discharge without pension or gratuity might enter the active reserve, but the number of such men is very small.

Men discharged with gratuity are not likely to be found fit for the active reserve, as, with the exception of men discharged on disbandment, they are men who have been so discharged on being found by medical boards to be unfit for the service. Moreover, we know by the recent experience of 1882 that men, however anxious to re-enlist, have not, and cannot procure, the means of repaying the gratuity in a lump sum, and that when allowed to do so by instalments out of their receipts, few were found willing to re-enlist on such conditions, and that although in return they at once received a stipend paid monthly.

Pensioners are not likely to enter the reserve. Why should they? The lowest pension of

\* NOTE.—From a comparison of paragraph 1 with paragraphs 28 and 29, it would appear that the word "Regiment" in the original is a mistake for "Battalion." Irrespective of the difficulty of passing men into the reserve from the want of recruits to replace them, already spoken of, it does not seem to be probable, seeing the terms offered, that in this army any but a very small number of men willing to be transferred to the reserve will be forthcoming.

of a private is 4 rupees a month, with about 1 rupee in addition as rice-compensation, or 5 rupees a month. Why should a man give up 60 rupees a year paid monthly at his home, with no liability to be called out for training, for Rs. 48. 8. a year (supposing him to have as reservist one good-conduct badge) paid in two instalments at the end of the eleventh and twelfth months? Pensioners live from hand to mouth, are usually in debt, and could not give up the advantage of regular monthly payments at their homes for a deferred payment even if of a larger amount; much less can they do so when the deferred payment is less than their aggregate receipts for a similar period.

Paragraph 5. No remarks.

Paragraph 6. How is this paragraph to be worked with the present rules as to pensions?

(1.) Men do not "take their discharge" at "between 20 and 30 years' service;" such men only leave the service on being found by medical boards to be unfit for further service, when they are, under present regulations, entitled to a pension, and, for reasons already given, such men will not enter the reserve. It can be scarcely contemplated to deprive such men of the right to pension which they possess, and to force them into a garrison reserve? The more that then they would be worse off than men in the ranks of less than 20 years' service, who, if found unfit for active service, are under this paragraph ineligible for the garrison reserve, not having 20 years' service; but who, if of more than 15 years' service, would, under the regulations now existing, receive a pension for the rest of their lives. Supposing, however, a man of 20 years' colour service to pass into the garrison reserve, and to serve in it for four years, and then to be discharged as unfit for garrison duty (paragraph 16), he would then, under paragraph 17, appear to be entitled only to a gratuity of 12 months' pay (reserve pay?) of rank and good-conduct pay; whereas, had he been invalided after his 20 years' colour service (a matter easy of accomplishment), he would have received for life a pension of 4 rupees a month and rice-money.

Paragraph 7. This paragraph should be read with paragraphs 18 and 19, and it will be seen how necessary it is that any reserve scheme should form part of one comprehensive measure for the revision of the terms of service: for instance, paragraph 6 says, men may pass into the reserve if fit "physically fit for garrison duty," and therefore presumably if no longer fit for active service with 21 years' colour service; and paragraph 17, that men with 20 but less than 25 years' combined colour and reserve service, will be allowed a gratuity of nine months' pay and good-conduct pay; but a man of 20 (or even of 15) years' colour service is already, if physically unfit for active service, entitled by present regulations to a life pension.

Paragraph 8. No remarks.

Paragraphs 9, 10, and 11. The first of these three paragraphs says that reservists will receive certain rates of pay per mensem while at their homes; whereas, the second says they will be paid once a year in arrears when called out for training; and the last says that they will be embodied for training for not less than two months in two years.

Does this mean that reservists may, at the option of the Government, be called out either (1) for one month in each year, or (2) for two months in every two years? If only called out after an interval of two years, will reservists be paid up at the end of the intervening year; and if so, by whom and where? And will the medical examination be dispensed with?

Paragraphs 13 and 16. Certainly seem to contemplate an annual training, but the three paragraphs under review appear to throw some doubts on this point.

Then again—

(1.) Is any, and if so what, penalty to be exacted for absence without sufficient cause from training?

(2.) Who is to decide as to the sufficiency of the cause?

(3.) If a man is prevented by—

(a) illness.

(b) or other cause,

from attending the training, would he receive his reserve pay for the period since the last training, and how would it reach him?

(4.) If a reservist dies between two trainings, would his heir receive the reserve pay due up to the date of his death?

Stringent rules are required on these points, especially as regards (3), as it will be difficult to procure reliable certificates of sickness from out-of-the-way villages, and weakly men afraid of being discharged as unfit might scheme to avoid attendance at the training with the consequent medical examination. The best way to meet the difficulties would

would seem to be to make discharge with forfeiture of arrears of reserve pay the penalty, without appeal, for absence from training or when called out.

Paragraph 12. This question has been left by Government for future decision.

Paragraph 13. It will be necessary to arrange for the payment of the batta to the men at their homes, and of the issue of the free rail-passes at the station of departure. In most cases reservists would not have the means to pay the expenses of joining.

Paragraph 14. It is said that 2 rupees will be paid to the reservist annually to enable him "to keep up" certain articles of clothing; presumably these articles will, in the first instance, be issued free, for their cost would be some 10 rupees; as "native shoes" are not worn by men of the native army, it does not seem of much use making men of the active reserve keep up such things.

Paragraphs 15 and 16. No remarks.

Paragraphs 17, 18, and 19. It is difficult to understand how these rules can work with the present pension rules regarding a modification of which nothing is said.

A man now nominally enlists for life, that is, he cannot claim a pension till he has served 32 years, when he can obtain 7 rupees (and 1 rupee rice-money) a month, but practically he can obtain a pension of 4 rupees (and 1 rupee rice money) a month at any time after 15 years' service; that this is so is shown by the fact mentioned in the Memorandum on recruiting, already submitted to Government, that of 2,690 men pensioned in the years ending 31st December 1881, 1883, and 1884, 2,157 had less than 32 years' service, and of these 2,157, 1,416 had less than 25 years; these men receive full pay till pensioned, and then 5 rupees, all told, paid monthly at their homes for life. What are the inducements for them to volunteer for the reserve? Rs. 3. 8. paid at long intervals (paragraph 10), a gratuity of 12 months' reserve pay if discharged as unfit for garrison duty after less than 25 years, but more than 20 years' service, and "a modified pension," amount not stated, if so discharged after 25 years' service. It is extremely unlikely men will exchange the advantages they are now entitled to for such terms as these.

Paragraph 20. Does this mean that the 160 reservists per battalion are to be exclusive of non-commissioned officers, and that for the 160 there will be allowed six havildars and six naiks?

Paragraph 21. No remarks.

Paragraph 22. Documents of reservists should not, I think, be kept at the head-quarters of the battalion from which they passed into the reserve.

All men enlisted in future, although enlisted by one battalion, are to be liable to serve in any of the other battalions of the regiment, and all men passed into the reserve by the three battalions of a group will be liable to serve with any of those three battalions. If regiments are localised the documents should be kept at the head-quarter station of the territorial regiment, or, if reserve centres are formed, at those centres.

Paragraph 23. The arms and accoutrements would be dealt with in the same way as the documents.

Paragraphs 24, 25, and 26. The Sappers would continue to enlist as before, but principally in the Central Carnatic and Mysore. The reserve headquarters would be with the headquarters of the corps at Bangalore. The number of reservists for the Sappers would be 328.

The four cavalry stations might be the reserve headquarter stations for the 300 reservists of the cavalry, who would probably be distributed as follows:—

Bangalore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150
Bellary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75
Secunderabad and Kamptee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75
									300
								Total	300

The kit laid down in paragraph 14 is not quite suitable to a cavalry reservist. I would suggest the following modifications:—

*For* "1 pair pyjamas" *substitute* "1 pair khaki drawers."

*For* "1 pair Native shoes" *substitute* "1 pair ankle boots."

*Add* "1 kummerbund."

The cavalry reservist could ride in such a dress, but he would probably require more than 2 rupees per annum to keep it up, say 3 rupees.

A pair of jack spurs should be kept at reserveheadquarters, in the same way as the arms, for the use of each cavalry reservist.

Paragraph 28. By this paragraph the Madras Army is treated differently from the Bengal and Bombay armies (paragraphs 27 and 29), and the active reserve is to be informed at once as fast as recruits can be obtained to take the places of men transferred to the reserve.

From this it would appear that regiments are not first to be made up to full strength, but that transfers to the active reserve may be made at once, subject to the following provisions :—

(1.) That regiments are not more than 10 per cent. under strength (paragraph 3).

(2.) That recruits can be found to replace men passed to the reserve. None of our infantry regiments are more than 10 per cent. (72) under strength, but they are all more or less below their establishments, the average being 14·43 per regiment on the 1st August 1885. With regard to the cavalry, the four regiments are now so considerably under strength that it will be some time before they can pass any men into the active reserve.

The average number of recruits enlisted by each infantry regiment per mensem during the first seven months of this year has been 3·05; passing men into the active reserve at this rate, therefore, will take more than four years to form the reserve, and regiments would still be under strength. If paragraphs 3 and 28 are to be read together, *i.e.*, that regiments may pass men into the reserve till they are 72 below strength, we shall never have our regiments, which are already on the average 14·43 short, up to established strength, that is, if men are willing to join the reserve, which they are not likely to do under a scheme such as this. If, on the other hand, paragraph 28 is to be read alone, and we are only to pass men into the reserve when up to full strength (we being on the average 14·43 below), a reserve will never be formed. The fact is that the first step to take is to improve the terms of army service sufficiently to make service therein popular; petty concessions of free passes for men on the few occasions they go on furlough, a reduction by a few years of the periods at which good-conduct badges can be earned without increasing the number that can be earned, calling regiments by territorial titles, inviting men to pass into a reserve for less pay, and that less often paid than the pensions present rules allow, will not attract men. It is no use tinkering at the terms of service; if men are likely to be required, they must be induced to enlist now, while there is time to train by a liberal revision of their terms of service, which undoubtedly in a day of pressure must be conceded, though then the result may not be successful.

(signed) *E. Faunce*, Colonel,  
Deputy Adjutant-General, Madras Army.

Ootacamund, the 25th November 1885.

DISTRIBUTION LIST of REGIMENTS of MADRAS INFANTRY divided into Groups of Two Battalions for Pioneers, and Three Battalions for all other Regiments.

Regiment.	Battalions of which each Regiment will be composed, showing present Stations.	Former Designation of Battalions.	Present Facings.	Territorial Designation and Recruiting Area.	Headquarter Station of Territorial Regiments.
Pioneer	1st Pioneers, Burma Expeditionary Force (from Bangalore). 4th Pioneers, Pishin	1st Battalion 1st 1st " 4th	White - Yellow -	Madras Pioneers - General -	Bangalore.
1st	2nd Madras Infantry, Saugor - 29th " " Berhampore - 33rd " " Belgaum -	1st " 2nd 1st " 15th 1st " 17th	Green - White - Yellow -	Ganjam - - - - Ganjam -	Berhampore.
2nd	3rd Light Infantry,* Tonghoo (under orders to Trichinopoly). 23rd Light Infantry,† Burma Expeditionary Force (from Sitabuldi). 31st Light Infantry, Mangalore -	1st " 3rd 1st " 12th 1st " 16th	Green - " - " -	Madras Light Infantry - Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Madras, and Tinnevely. - - -	Trichinopoly.
3rd	5th Madras Infantry, Rangoon* - 16th " " Vizianagram - 27th " " Jubbulpore† -	1st " 5th 2nd " 5th 1st " 14th	Yellow - " - " -	Vizagapatam - Vizagapatam, Godavari, and Jeypore. - - -	Vizianagram.
4th	6th " " Belgaum - 14th " " Bangalore - 21st " " Burma Expeditionary Force* (under orders to Tonghoo).	1st " 6th 2nd " 6th 1st " 11th	White - " - " -	Salem - - - - Salem, Coimbatore, and North Arcot.	Bangalore.
5th	7th Madras Infantry, Kamptee - 19th " " Cannanore - 24th " " Kamptee† -	1st " 7th 2nd " 7th 2nd " 12th	Yellow - " - Green -	Deccan - - - - Nizam's Dominions, Kistna and Kurnool.	Secunderabad.
6th	8th " " Suakin* - 12th " " Burma Expeditionary Force (from Bangalore). 17th Madras Infantry, Secunderabad -	1st " 8th 2nd " 8th 2nd " 1st	White - " - " -	Mysore - Mysore Country and North Arcot. - - -	Bangalore.
7th	9th " " Port Blair* - 11th " " Secunderabad - 28th " " Madras -	1st " 9th 2nd " 9th 2nd " 14th	Green - " - Yellow -	Madras - Madras, South Arcot, Chingleput, and Nellore. - - -	Madras.
8th	10th " " Vellore - 25th " " Burma Expeditionary Force (from Bellary). 32nd Madras Infantry, Secunderabad -	1st " 10th 1st " 13th 2nd " 16th	" - Green - Yellow -	North Arcot - North Arcot - - - -	Vellore.
9th	13th " " Bellary - 20th " " Suakin* - 22nd " " Quilon -	2nd " 3rd 2nd " 2nd 2nd " 11th	White - Green - White -	Bellary - Bellary, Anantapur, Cuddapah, and Southern Mahratta Country. - - -	Bellary.
10th	15th " " Madras - 26th " " Thayetmo* - 30th " " Trichinopoly -	2nd " 4th 2nd " 13th 2nd " 15th	Yellow - Green - White -	Chingleput - Chingleput, Madras, Nellore, and South Arcot. - - -	Madras.

\* On foreign service, or serving beyond limits of Madras Presidency, Pioneers not included.

† Under warning orders for First Army Corps and Reserve Division.

14 September 1885.

(signed) H. R. H.

No. 7-C., "Native Army—Recruiting," dated 26th May 1885.

From the Adjutant-General, Madras Army, to the Secretary to Government,  
Military Department.

IN continuation of my letter No. 156-T.-K., "Native Army—Recruiting," dated 8th February 1885, and with reference to previous correspondence on the question of recruiting for the Native Army of this Presidency, I am now desired to submit, for the information and consideration of Government, a memorandum which has been drawn up by Colonel Faunce, Deputy Adjutant-General, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

2. This memorandum deals with the subject under two heads, showing first the difficulty which now exists in getting good recruits for the ranks of the Madras Army, and also giving the reasons which are believed to be the cause of this difficulty.

Secondly, in the memorandum a scheme is roughly given, in which certain alterations in the terms of enlistment, pension rules, &c., are suggested, which it is thought would not only tend to make service in the ranks more popular than it apparently is at present, but would also ensure regiments being more efficient and fit for service than they are under existing pension regulations, which require men to serve on for a service of 32 years for pension, and which result in a regiment, when put under orders for active service, having to leave a considerable number of men behind in consequence of the various disqualifications for rough work caused by age and length of service.

3. Colonel Faunce is an officer of varied and considerable experience in the Madras Army, both staff and regimental, and his Excellency considers that the memorandum herewith submitted is deserving of the serious consideration of Government.

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No. 552-Camp, "Native Army—Organisation," dated Camp Delhi,  
26th December 1885.

From Major-General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of Military Department No. 1085-B., of 2nd November, and of No. 478-B., of 10th December, forwarding, for the opinion of his Excellency, a draft Army Circular and draft rules regarding the organisation of reserves for the Native Army.

2. Draft rules for this purpose had already been prepared in this office under the instructions contained in your letter No. 1085-B., of 2nd November, and were ready for transmission to you.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has now carefully reconsidered both sets of rules, and I am to submit a revised copy of the rules prepared in this office, which his Excellency now recommends for adoption.

4. The only points of difference between the two sets of rules which seem to require explanation are the following:—

(The numbers quoted are those of the revised (Adjutant-General's) rules).

Paragraph 6. Has been revised in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Military Department draft rules.

Paragraph 8. The Commander-in-Chief agrees that men who have been discharged with gratuity should only be taken into the garrison reserve.

Paragraph 12. The training of the reserve men presents many practical difficulties, and it will be prudent to make the rules on this head elastic and for the present tentative. The best plan appears to be that now proposed, and his Excellency is of opinion that this plan should be tried for, say, the next three years, after which, if found desirable, the regulations may be modified. It does not appear necessary to provide arms or accoutrements for the training of the garrison reserve.

An allowance for the care and repair of the 128 stand-of-arms will have to be made to commanding officers.

Paragraph 14. The rates of increase to pension have been added in this paragraph. They appear to be sufficient.

Paragraph



Paragraph 18. The Commander in Chief thinks that an annual training for one month is necessary to maintain the efficiency of the active reserve. For the garrison reserve one month's training in two years will be sufficient.

Paragraph 21. The pension to men having a total colour and reserve service of 25 years will, it is presumed, be an invalid pension, and will be granted only to men pronounced unfit for garrison duty. It seems necessary to lay down this condition distinctly, in order that this pension may not be confounded with the pension which, under the new rules, will be claimable as a matter of right after 21 years' colour service. The Commander in Chief considers that the modified rate of pension for sepoy proposed in the Military Department draft rules is suitable, but that a havildar should get Rs. 5. 8. so that both ranks should lose more nearly the same proportion of the full rates of pension.

Paragraph 22. The Commander in Chief does not recommend a fixed allowance should be made for the clothing of the reserve men. It must in any case be made up regimentally to insure the necessary uniformity; and as it would only be used for one month in the year, its renewal would not cost Rs. 2. 8. a man annually, while, on the other hand, its first cost would be considerably in excess of this sum. The plan proposed in the revised paragraph appears to the Commander in Chief to be the best.

5. No rule has been inserted regarding penalties to be enforced in cases of absence from training or when called out for field service, as the Judge Advocate General is of opinion that, though reserve men will draw military pay and will be borne on the rolls of their regiment, a special enactment will be necessary to render them subject to the Articles of War. This point will be taken up separately in view to the insertion of the necessary clauses in the new Indian Army Act.

6. Regarding the training of the cavalry reserves, the Commander in Chief does not at present consider that any compensation to the Chunda is necessary for the use of the horses, and would prefer to leave this point for future adjustment.

7. Regarding the proposed gradual formation of the reserves, the Commander in Chief thinks that it will be sufficient to direct that the reserves may be commenced as soon as a regiment has been raised to its new strength, and the rules on this subject have been altered accordingly.

8. In regard to the draft India Army Circular forwarded with Military Department No. 1085-B., dated 2nd November 1885, the Commander in Chief desires strongly to urge upon the Government the omission, for the present at all events, of paragraph 4, regarding the placing on one list for promotion of the British officers of the linked battalions. His Excellency has not yet been able to devote full attention to the point, and in a matter of such vital importance, both to the interests of the officers and efficiency of the service, it is obvious that the most careful deliberation is necessary before giving an opinion. The Commander in Chief further observes that this proposed alteration in the present regimental system does not appear to have been contemplated by Sir Donald Stewart. In the remainder of the draft circular his Excellency entirely concurs.

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No. 316-B., Organisation, dated Fort William, 25th February 1886.

From Col. *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

IN continuation of my letter No. 1085-B., of the 2nd November 1885, and with reference to paragraph 8 of your No. 552, dated the 26th December 1885, I am directed to forward herewith, for the final concurrence of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, a draft India Army Circular, notifying certain changes in the conditions of service of the Native Army. The rules for the formation of the reserves are attached as an Appendix to the Circular, but for the sake of convenience those rules have been dealt with separately in my letter No. 317-B., of this date.

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No. 317-B., Organisation, dated Fort William, 25th February 1886.

From Col. *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

WITH reference to your letter No. 552, dated the 26th December 1885, I am desired to forward, for the final concurrence of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the draft rules for the formation of reserves, which will appear in an Appendix to the India Army Circular, notifying the changes in the conditions of service of the Native Army, forwarded with my letter No. 316-B., of this date.

## CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE

2. The rules are, with slight alterations, those forwarded with your letter under reply ; but there is one point on which the opinion of the Commander in Chief is still required, and that is whether there should be any cavalry reserve in the Madras Army. If so, then it will be necessary to modify somewhat paragraph 27.

3. The reserve for the Sappers and Miners has been fixed with reference to the new organisation of those corps.

4. I am to add that it may very probably be necessary for financial reasons to omit paragraph 3 of the rules, and to start the formation of the reserves on the existing establishment of Bengal regiments.

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No. 2387-Camp, dated Fort William, 5th March 1886.

From the Adjutant General in India to Col. *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

IN reply to Military Department Letter No. 316-B., Organisation, dated the 25th February 1886, I am directed to state that the Commander in Chief concurs in the draft India Army Circular therewith forwarded, notifying certain changes in the conditions of service of the Native Army.

2. It is observed that the new regiments, which it was proposed to raise, but which are at present in abeyance, have been included in the list of "linked" battalions.

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No. 1413-B., Native Army—Organisation, dated Simla, 2nd October 1886.

From Major General *O. R. Newmarch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your letter No. 2318-Camp, dated 5th March 1886, I am directed to forward herewith, for the concurrence of the Commander in Chief, and for any remarks his Excellency may desire to offer, the annexed copy of an India Army Circular which it is proposed to issue immediately, notifying certain changes in the conditions of services in the Native Army in India. I am to explain, for his Excellency's information, that for financial and other reasons it has been decided that for the present the formation of reserves shall be limited to the Bengal Army, and to 100 men per regiment.

2. The favour of a very early reply is requested.

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No. 4465-B., Native Army—Organisation, dated Head Quarters, Simla, 11th October 1886.

From Major General Sir *T. D. Baker*, K.C.B., Adjutant General in India, to Major General *O. R. Newmarch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

WITH reference to Military Department letter, No. 1413-B., dated 2nd October 1886, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to make the following remarks on the draft India Army Circular therewith submitted, notifying certain changes in the conditions of service in the Native Army in India, and publishing rules for the formation of reserves.

(1.) Paragraph 3. The effect of this paragraph as it now stands will be that, for some time to come, *i.e.*, until recruits enlisted after 31st October 1886 have become trained soldiers, there will be no material forthcoming for transfer to the battalion warned for service.

In case it should be thought well to provide for a sudden emergency, before the new conditions of service have had time to produce a supply of men liable to such transfer, it is suggested for the consideration of Government that there is nothing in the attestation of the sepoy now serving which would prevent his transfer to a linked battalion if necessary. The omission of the words "enlisted under the new condition specified in this order" would leave the door open for providing for any such emergency ; but perhaps it would be safest in practice, to obviate any chance of dissatisfaction, to trust to volunteering from the other battalions to meet any such case.

(2.) Paragraph 4.

(2.) Paragraph 4. The 14th, 15th, and 45th Sikhs should come after the 13th, 16th, and 17th Bengal Infantry in the list of battalions to be linked together.

The Commander in Chief thinks it would be advisable to include the new Pioneer Corps (34th) and the 35th, 36th, and 37th Sikhs, which have been sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India as an addition to the Bengal Army, in the list of linked battalions, the remark "to be raised together" being noted opposite these corps, as in the case of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Goorkhas. This seems to his Excellency to be most desirable.

(3.) Paragraph 5. The words "the infantry of" should be added after the words "into" in the first line of clause 2, paragraph 5.

(4.) Paragraph 10. Under Article 100, India Army Regulations, Vol. I., Part II., the artillery and infantry of the Hyderabad Contingent are entitled to good-conduct pay as follows:—

	<i>Rs.</i>
1st rate, after 5 years' service - - - -	1 monthly.
2nd „ 10 „ - - - -	2. „

Under the India Army Circular the artillery of the Hyderabad Contingent are excluded from the grant of good-conduct pay, while the infantry of that force are brought on the same footing as the infantry of the Bengal Army. The reason for this is not apparent. The omission of the Merwarra Battalion from the list of local corps is also observed.

(5.) Paragraphs 12 and 13. The Commander in Chief recommends that the men now in the army should be given the option of electing the new pension rules. As the draft India Army Circular stands, it is apparently only men who enlist after 31st October 1886 who will benefit by the new rules, and they will therefore not come into operation until 1907. Indeed, without the new pension rules, his Excellency does not see how the garrison reserve (paragraph 6 of Appendix) can come into existence, after the word "army;" therefore, in the 4th line of paragraph 12, his Excellency suggests the insertion of the following clause: "This rule will also apply to all men now in the service who may elect to come under it," as it appears to his Excellency very necessary to make it clear that the new pension rules apply to men now in the service if they elect them.

(6.) Paragraph 6 of Appendix. The word "infantry" in the first line, and the words "of infantry" in the third line, might be omitted as the reserves apply to that branch only.

(7.) Paragraph 21 of Appendix. As the rules now stand, there is nothing to prevent a man remaining in the active reserve if he is bodily fit up to 25 or more years' service, but paragraph 21 makes no provision for an invalid pension for him.

This should be so worded as to show that he must go into the garrison reserve before being pensioned.

2. With the exceptions above noted, the draft India Army Circular is concurred in by the Commander in Chief.

[The India Army Circular above referred to was eventually issued on 31st October 1886, as Clause 170 of 1886. See p. 127.]

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No. 1480-B., Organisation, dated Simla, 14th October 1886.

From Major General O. R. Newmarch, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 4465-B., Native Army—Organisation, dated the 11th October 1886, and to reply as follows to the remarks of the Commander in Chief therein contained on the draft India Army Circular regarding changes in the conditions of service in the Native Army in India and the formation of reserves.

Clause I.—The Government of India concur in the conclusion arrived at by the Commander in Chief that it would be better to trust to volunteering than to make any provision in the Circular for the transfer to a linked battalion of men enlisted under the present conditions of service.

Clause II.—The Government of India would prefer that the linking of the new pioneer corps and the three Sikh regiments should be notified hereafter on issue of the Circular directing their formation.

Clause III.—The addition proposed in paragraph 5 of the Circular has been adopted.

Clause IV.—It was not intended to give the new rates of good-conduct pay laid down in paragraph 10 of the Circular to the Hyderabad Contingent, which has rules of its own, and the Circular has been amended accordingly; the Merwarra Battalion was omitted as being a police battalion, but has now been included.

Clause V.—The following addition has been made in paragraph 12 of the Circular after the word “Army” in line 4: “The ordinary pension is also admissible after 21 years’ service to all men now in the Army.” This alteration seems sufficiently to meet his Excellency’s wishes; no alteration in paragraph 13 is considered necessary, as it is certain that no man who can claim a pension after 15 years’ service will take a gratuity.

Clause VI.—The word “infantry” has, as suggested, been struck out of paragraph 6 of the Appendix to the clause.

Clause VII.—With reference to the remark that paragraph 21 of the Appendix to the clause should be so worded as to show that a man must go into the garrison reserve before being pensioned, I am to invite his Excellency’s attention to paragraph 6 of the Appendix, which shows that a man must pass into the garrison reserve after 21 years’ colour and reserve service.

2. The date of enlistment has been altered to the 30th November 1886, as the order will not reach many corps till some time after the 31st October.

3. The India Army Circular amended, as above explained, will now be published.

No. 1496-B., Organisation, dated Simla, 16th October 1886.

From Major General *O. R. Newmarch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, and to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department.

IN forwarding herewith, for the information of the Madras—Bombay Government, a copy of a Special India Army Circular notifying certain changes in the conditions of service of the Native armies in India, I am directed to request that, under the orders of his Excellency the Governor in Council, the Government of India may be furnished, for publication in India Army Circular, with a list showing how the regiments of Madras—Bombay Infantry will be linked together in the manner shown in paragraph 4 of the Circular.

2. All further details should be reserved for future and separate consideration; all that is required at present is a list similar to that of the Bengal Army. As the enlistments under the new conditions of service will begin from the 1st December, I am to request that it may be sent (by telegram if necessary) as soon as possible.

3. I am to add, for the information of the Madras—Bombay Government, that for financial reasons it has been decided for the present to limit the formation of the reserves to 100 men in the infantry of the Bengal Army.

No. 188-P., dated Poona, 1st November 1886.

From Brigadier General *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to Major General *O. R. Newmarch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1496-B., Organisation, of the 16th ultimo, forwarding copy of a Special India Army Circular, notifying certain changes in the conditions of service of the Native armies in India, and requesting to be furnished, for publication, with a list showing how the regiments of Bombay infantry will be linked together in the manner shown in para. 4 of that Circular.

2. In reply, I am directed to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the regiments in this Presidency will be linked as follows:—

*Bombay Infantry.*

1st Regiment	-	-	-	-	1st, 8th, and 9th.
2nd	”	-	-	-	2nd, 12th, and 13th.
3rd	”	-	-	-	3rd, 5th, and 10th.
4th	”	-	-	-	4th, 23rd, and 25th.
5th	”	-	-	-	14th, 16th, and 17th.
6th	”	-	-	-	19th, 20th, and 22nd.
7th	”	-	-	-	7th, 24th, and 26th.
8th	”	-	-	-	27th, 29th, and 30th.

3. I am to add that the 28th Regiment, Bombay Infantry, will remain unattached, with a view to forming it eventually, if sanctioned, into a pioneer corps, and the 21st Bombay Infantry (Marine Battalion), employed on special duties, will also remain unattached.

[N.B.—The India Army Circular referred to in the foregoing Correspondence was eventually issued on 23rd November 1886 as Clause 188 of 1886. See p. 167.]

[Special.—Applicable to the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.]

INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS,—1886. [Clause 188].

Government of India, Military Department, Fort William, the 23rd November 1886.

THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council :—

ORGANISATION.—NATIVE ARMY.

CHANGES in the Conditions of Service in the Native Armies in India.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of Special India Army Circular, dated the 13th October 1886, the linking of the Regiments of the Madras and Bombay Armies will be as follows :—

*Madras Infantry.*

	1st (Pioneers).	4th (Pioneers).	
2nd		29th	33rd
3rd		23rd	31st
5th		16th	27th
6th		14th	21st
7th		19th	24th
8th		12th	17th
9th		11th	28th
10th		25th	32nd
13th		20th	22nd
15th		26th	30th

*Bombay Infantry.*

1st	8th	9th
2nd	12th	13th
3rd	5th	10th
4th	23rd	25th
11th	16th	17th
19th	20th	22nd
7th	24th	26th
27th	29th	30th

The 21st (Marine Battalion) and 28th Regiments, Bombay Infantry, will not be linked with any other corps.

E. H. H. Collen, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 89. —

EXTRACT MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of India, dated 30th December 1886, No. 379, Paragraph 17.

17. IN acknowledging receipt of correspondence regarding the formation of a second battalion of the 5th Goorkha Regiment, I would observe that I should be glad to be informed of the reasons for which your Government have declined to sanction the enlistment of Gurhwallis, some of whom are believed to have proved themselves excellent soldiers.

[In reply to paragraph 27 of your Military Despatch No. 168, dated 25th October 1886.]

— No. 90. —

[Special.—Applicable to the Three Presidencies.]

INDIA, ARMY CIRCULARS, 1886. [Clause 195.]

Government of India, Military Department, Fort William, the 30th December 1886.

THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council:—

ESTABLISHMENTS.—BRITISH ARMY.

Revised Regimental Establishments, British Cavalry.

THE following revised establishment of British regiments of cavalry serving in India is sanctioned, in supersession of that notified in Clause 227, India Army Circulars, 1881:—

R A N K.	REGIMENT OF CAVALRY.
	India.
Lieutenant Colonels - - - - -	2
Majors - - - - -	4
Captains - - - - -	4
Lieutenants - - - - -	15
Adjutant (*) - - - - -	1
Riding Master - - - - -	1
Quartermaster - - - - -	1
TOTAL Officers - - - - -	29

\* May be a Captain or a Lieutenant.

RANK.	REGIMENT OF CAVALRY.
	India.
Regimental Sergeant Major (Warrant Officer) - - - - -	1
Bandmaster (Warrant Officer) - - - - -	1
Quartermaster Sergeant - - - - -	1
Sergeant Trumpeter - - - - -	1
Sergeant Instructor in Fencing - - - - -	1
Paymaster Sergeant - - - - -	1
Armourer Sergeant - - - - -	1
Saddler Sergeant - - - - -	1
Farrier Quartermaster Sergeant - - - - -	1
Orderly Room Sergeant - - - - -	1
Troop Sergeant Majors - - - - -	8
Troop Sergeant Major Roughrider - - - - -	1
Sergeants - - - - -	23
Sergeant Farriers - - - - -	8
<b>TOTAL Warrant Officers and Sergeants - - -</b>	<b>50</b>
Trumpeters - - - - -	8
Corporals - - - - -	32
Privates - - - - -	512
<b>TOTAL Rank and File - - -</b>	<b>552</b>
<b>TOTAL Officers and Men - - -</b>	<b>630</b>

*E. H. H. Collen, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.*

— No. 91. —

EXTRACT MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of India, dated  
13th January 1887, No. 10 (paragraph 2).

2. I APPROVE of the augmentation of the establishment of the medical staff in India by two officers, as proposed in your Military Despatch, No. 150,\* dated 27th September 1886. Two officers will accordingly be sent out during the next trooping season, in addition to the ordinary relief. \*See pp 121-4.

— No. 92. —

(20—India—49.)

LETTER from the War Office to the India Office.

Sir,

War Office, 18 January 1887.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Stanhope to request that you will have the goodness to lay before the Secretary of State for India the correspondence relative to the reinforcements to the European garrison of that country, embodied in your letter of 17th September 1885 (No. M. 12,468) and subsequent communications, and to inform Viscount Cross that, under the decision come to, as modified by the postponement of this reinforcement from 1886-87 to 1887-88, arranged at the request of the Government of India, as conveyed in your letter of 15th May 1886 (No. M. 4584), the necessary steps are being taken to provide the six batteries of garrison artillery, and the 50 men per battalion of infantry now in India, with a view to their being dispatched to that country in the course of the next trooping season (1887-88).

I am, &amp;c.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.

(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

— No. 93. —

(M. 613.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 7 February 1887.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 18th January 1887, 20—India—49, stating that, under the decision come to in the correspondence\* with the War Office in 1885-86, on the subject of the reinforcements to the European garrison of India, as modified by the postponement of the dispatch of six garrison batteries of artillery, and 50 men per battalion of infantry in India, until the trooping season 1887-88, the necessary steps are being taken to provide the six garrison batteries, and the 50 men per battalion, in view to their being dispatched to India in the course of the next trooping season.

2. The Government of India have already been informed of these arrangements.

I have, &amp;c.

The Under Secretary  
of State for War.

(signed) *Allen Johnson, Major General,  
Military Secretary.*

\* Ending with W.O.  
letter of 31 July  
1886.

20—India—34.



— No. 94. —

(20—India—51.)

LETTER from the Horse Guards to the India Office.

Horse Guards, War Office,  
4 February 1887.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 13th November, and the India Office letter in reply thereto, dated 4th December last (M. 11,503), I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that sufficient men are now forthcoming to complete the 7th Dragoon Guards to the new establishment, and the necessary steps will be taken in regard to the promotion and appointment of the additional officers rendered necessary by the increase, and the Commander in Chief in India has been authorised to complete the new establishment of non-commissioned officers.

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.I have, &c.  
(signed) *E. Bulwer*,  
Deputy Adjutant General.

— No. 95. —

(M. 1327.)

LETTER from the India Office to the War Office.

Sir,

India Office, 8 February 1887.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of the Deputy Adjutant General's letter of 4th February 1887 (No. 20—India—51), stating that sufficient men are now forthcoming to complete the 7th Dragoon Guards to the new establishment, and that the necessary steps will be taken in regard to the promotion and appointment of the additional officers rendered necessary by the increase, and that the Commander in Chief in India has been authorised to complete the new establishment of non-commissioned officers.

The Under Secretary  
of State for War.I have, &c.  
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,  
Military Secretary.

— No. 96. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, dated 1st March 1887.

YOURS 14th October 1885. We have taken for the Budget Estimate all battalions of Bengal infantry as being raised to 932 of all ranks; also for formation of one Goorkha, three Sikh, and one Pioneer battalion, and one squadron of Guides Cavalry, also for reserves at 218 per Bengal infantry battalion, and 160 per Madras and Bombay infantry battalion.

— No. 97 —

(Applicable to the three Presidencies.)

INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS, 1887.

(Clause 43.)

Government of India, Military Department,  
Fort William, 5 March 1887.THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of  
the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council:—*Organisation.—Native Army.*Raising of the Regimental Reserves of the Bengal Army, and extension  
of the Reserve System to the Madras and Bombay Armies.WITH reference to para. 5, clause 170, India Army Circulars of 1886, the  
Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that the system of reserves  
therein sanctioned shall now be extended to the Madras and Bombay Armies,  
the numbers being limited to 160 men per battalion of Madras and Bombay  
Infantry.2. The Governor General in Council also directs that, in modification of para. 2  
of the Appendix to the above-quoted circular, "Organisation of Reserves," the  
strength of the reserves of the Bengal Army shall be raised to 218 men per  
battalion.

3. These orders will have effect from 1st April 1887.

(signed) *E. H. H. Collen*, Lieut. Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 98. —

(Applicable to the Bengal Presidency.)

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 1887.

(Clause 44.)

Government of India, Military Department,  
Fort William, 14 March 1887.THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of  
the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council:—*Organisation.—Native Army.*Addition to the existing establishment of regiments of Bengal Infantry  
and of the Punjab Frontier Force.WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in  
Council directs that the established strength of a battalion of Bengal Infantry  
and of the Punjab Frontier Force shall in future be—

Subadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Jemadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Havildars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Naiks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Drummers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Sepoys	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	800
									<hr/>
								Total	912
									<hr/>

2. This order will have effect from the 1st April 1887.

(signed) *E. H. H. Collen*, Lieut. Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 99. —

(Applicable to the Bengal Presidency.)

INDIA ARMY CIRCULARS, 1887.

(Clause 46.)

Government of India, Military Department,  
Fort William, 23 March 1887.

THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council :—

*Organisation.—Native Army.*

Formation of Five additional Battalions of Bengal Infantry (including 1 Goorkha Battalion), and the addition of One Squadron to the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in Council directs the addition of the following troops to the Bengal Army :—

- 3 Battalions of Sikh Infantry.
- 1 Battalion of Pioneers.
- 1 Battalion of Goorkhas.
- 1 Squadron of Cavalry.

2. The three battalions of Sikh Infantry will be designated the 35th, 36th, and 37th, and will be linked together. The Pioneer battalion will be designated the 34th (Pioneers), and will be linked with the 23rd and 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).

3 The establishment of these regiments will be as follows :—

*British:*

Commandant -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Wing commanders -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Wing officers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Medical officer -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

*Native :*

Subadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Jemadars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Havildars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Naiks -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Drummers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Sepoys -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	800

4. To form the nuclei of the Sikh and Pioneer regiments, volunteers will be called for, under the orders of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, from existing regiments of Bengal Infantry in which the proper classes are serving.

5. The 34th Regiment (Pioneers) will be armed, equipped, and clothed in the same manner as the 23rd and 32nd Regiments (Pioneers). Further orders will be issued for the assimilation of these regiments in the above respects.

6. As regards the uniform and equipment of the 35th, 36th, and 37th Regiments, orders will be issued hereafter.

The Goorkha Battalion will form the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Goorkha Regiment.

7. Orders will be issued hereafter regarding the recruitment of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Goorkha Regiment. All enlistments will be for the first and second battalions of the regiment, and each recruit, at the time of enlistment, should be made to understand that he is liable to transfer, in the event of war, to either of the two battalions for which he enlists.

8. The squadron of cavalry will form the third squadron of the cavalry of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

(signed) *E. H. H. Collen*, Lieut. Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 100. —

(Applicable to the Bengal Presidency only.)

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 1887.

(Clause 62.)

Government of India, Military Department,  
Simla, 28 April 1887.THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of  
the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council :—*Organisation. — Native Army.*Revision of the Establishment of the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides, Punjab  
Frontier Force.WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the establishment of the  
cavalry of the Corps of Guides, Punjab Frontier Force, is revised and organised  
in three squadrons as follows, with effect from 1st April 1887 :—*British :*

Squadron commanders, including commandant of cavalry -	3
Squadron officers - - - - -	3
	6
Total - - -	6

*Native :*

Ressaldars - - - - -	3
Ressaidars - - - - -	3
Woordie-major (Ressaidar) - - - - -	1
Jemadars - - - - -	6
Kote-duffadars - - - - -	6
Duffadars - - - - -	42
Trumpeters - - - - -	6
Sowars (including 8 camel sowars) - - - - -	402
	469
Total - - -	469

(signed) *E. H. H. Collen,*  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 101. —

(Applicable to the Bengal Presidency only.)

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 1887.

(Clause 99.)

Government of India, Military Department,  
Simla, 2 June 1887.THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of  
the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council :*Organisation. — Native Army.*

Entertainment of Supernumeraries in regiments of Bengal and Punjab Infantry.

It is notified that the authority given in clause 98, India Army Circulars of  
1885, to officers commanding regiments of Native Infantry (Goorkha and  
Assam regiments excepted) to entertain supernumeraries to the extent of 20  
sepoys per corps in excess of the prescribed establishment, still holds good, and  
is not affected by the increased establishment laid down for regiments of Bengal  
and Punjab Infantry, in clause 44, India Army Circulars of 1887.(signed) *E. H. H. Collen,*  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 102. —

TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22 February 1887.

MILITARY. Owing to insufficiency of sappers to relieve all companies which must be brought away from Burma, we wish to raise a local company of Burmese, as experiment. This recommended by Commander in Chief as cheapest way of providing skilled labour. Please sanction.

— No. 103. —

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated 8 March 1887.

YOUR military telegram, local sapper company, Burma. Experiment approved. For the present British officers should be lent from existing corps without replacement.

— No. 104. —

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 1887.

Government of India, Military Department,  
Simla, 9 July 1887.

THE following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council:—

*Organisation.—Native Army.*

Formation of a Company of Sappers and Miners in Burma.

1. WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Governor General in Council directs the raising of one company of sappers and miners in Burma.

2. The company will be designated "The Burma Sappers and Miners," and will be affiliated to the Queen's Own Corps of Madras Sappers and Miners. Its establishment will be as laid down in Appendix A.; and it will be organised, paid, clothed, and equipped in all respects as a service company of the Madras Corps, except as hereinafter provided.

3. The officers of Royal Engineers will be lent from the three corps of sappers and miners in rotation, and will not be replaced in their respective corps. They will be relieved, should they desire it, on completing two years' service in Burma. The staff pay of the company commander will be 340 rupees per mensem, and that of the company officer (or officers), 212 rupees per mensem. The company commander will also receive an office allowance of 30 rupees per mensem, in addition to the contract allowance of 35 rupees, referred to in paragraph 16 of clause 174, Army Circulars of 1885.

4. The establishment of British non-commissioned officers will form part of, and be an augmentation to, the establishment of that class in the Madras Sappers and Miners; and, except as herein specially provided, these men will be on exactly the same footing as the other British non-commissioned officers of that corps.

5. Their engineer pay will be regulated as follows:

The senior non-commissioned officer will receive engineer pay under India Army Circulars, clause 148 of 1886, Article 1595 (a) 2nd, with an addition of one shilling for each day he is present and effective in Burma.

The other two non-commissioned officers will receive engineer pay as laid down for non-commissioned officers mentioned in Article 1595 (c) of the above-named circular, but with the addition, in the case of each man, of 8 *d.* for each day he is present and effective in Burma, provided that either or both of these men, if on the "A" corps rating, shall be dealt with under Article 1595 (d) of the above-named circular with an addition, in the case of each individual, of 10 *d.* for each day he is present and effective in Burma.

6. The issue of the rates of engineer pay above detailed will be irrespective of all Burmese language tests.

7. Subject to the exigencies of the service, no British non-commissioned officer will be required to serve more than two years with the Burma Sappers and Miners.

8. The British non-commissioned officers first appointed to the new company will be selected from the Bengal Sappers and Miners (in which corps there is a surplus of that class) under the orders of His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, and will be transferred in due course from the Bengal to the Madras establishment.

9. The native officers will be drawn from the Madras Sappers and Miners, and may be selected from the ranks next below those in which they are to serve in the Burma company. They will receive rates of working pay 50 per cent. in excess of those they may be entitled to in India, such enhanced rates being paid them for every day they are present and effective in Burma.

10. Such of the native non-commissioned officers as are transferred from the Madras Corps may similarly be selected from the ranks next below those in which they are appointed to the new company, and will receive working pay for every day they are present and effective in Burma, at rates 50 per cent. in excess of those to which they may be entitled in India. Native officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to the Burma Sappers and Miners will be seconded in their corps; in the event of their electing to return thereto, they will remain supernumerary to its establishment until absorbed.

11. Native commissioned and non commissioned officers will be eligible for promotion in their own corps while thus seconded or supernumerary, and in case of such promotion, each individual will be borne as seconded in the higher grade, in which also he will join his corps on reversion, remaining a supernumerary until his absorption on the occurrence of a vacancy. The vacancies in the Burma Sappers and Miners caused by the reversion of native officers and non-commissioned officers will, as a rule, be filled by promotions within the Burma Company, but the Government of Madras can authorise the Commander in Chief in Madras to sanction further transfers in their place, under the same conditions, from the Madras Corps.

12. The sappers of the company will consist of one-half Burmans, one-quarter Shans, and one-quarter Kachins and Karens, and all the soldiers enlisted should be fairly skilled artificers.

13. They will receive the same rates of working pay as those allowed to the Sapper artificers of the Bengal Corps.

14. The Sappers will be enlisted for five years, on the expiration of which they will be entitled to claim their discharge. After seven years' approved service their regimental pay will be increased by 1 rupee per mensem, and after 12 years' approved service by .2 rupees per mensem; these increments being in addition to all other emoluments, and being granted under the orders of His Excellency the Commander in Chief in Madras. No pension will be granted to sappers on discharge, but the native officers and non-commissioned officers, whether transferred from India or enlisted in Burma, will receive pensions calculated according to the system in force in the Madras Corps.

15. The native officers, non-commissioned officers and men, will draw free rations when they are granted to the other troops with which they may be serving.

(signed) *E. H. H. Collen,*  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

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APPENDIX A.

DETAILED STATEMENT of the Establishment of the proposed Company of Burma Sappers and Miners.

DETAIL.	Numbers.	REMARKS.
Company Commander - - - - -	1	
Company Officer - - - - -	1	
Total - - -	2	
Company Sergeant Major - - - - -	1	
Sergeant - - - - -	1	
Corporal - - - - -	1	
Total - - -	3	
Subadar - - - - -	1	
Jemadars - - - - -	2	
Havildars - - - - -	6	
Naiks - - - - -	10	
Sappers - - - - -	150	
Buglers - - - - -	2	
Total Native Fighting Ranks - - -	171	
GRAND TOTAL - - -	176	
<i>Followers.</i>		
Lascar - - - - -	1	
Bhisties - - - - -	2	
Sweepers - - - - -	2	
Cooks - - - - -	4	} To be employed only if necessary.
Extra Bhisties - - - - -	2	
Total Followers - - -	11	

— No. 105 —

(Applicable to the Bengal Presidency only.)

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 1887.

Government of India, Military Department,  
Simla, 19 July 1887.The following Regulations and Instructions are promulgated by direction of  
the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council :—*Organisation.—Native Army.*

ENTERTAINMENT of Supernumeraries in Goorkha and Assam Regiments.

IN modification of Special India Army Circular, dated the 2nd June 1887, it is hereby notified that the authority given in clause 98, India Army Circulars of 1885, to officers commanding regiments of Native Infantry to entertain supernumeraries to the extent of 20 sepoy per corps in excess of the authorised establishment, is extended to the Goorkha and Assam Regiments.

(signed) *E. H. H. Collen,*  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

— No. 106. —

INDIA ARMY CIRCULAR, 30 September 1887.

(Clause 152.)

*Organisation.—Native Army.*

CHANGES in the Conditions of Service of the Native Armies in India.

\* See page 127. THE Governor General in Council directs that the following corrections be made in clause 170,\* India Army Circulars, 1886 :—

Para. 2.—Is reconstructed as follows :—

“ All enlistments in any battalion, after the 30th November 1886, will be made for both or for all three battalions, that is to say, a recruit enlisted for one battalion of a regiment, or group of linked battalions, will be liable to serve in the other battalions, and will be transferred thereto if required, whenever the Government of India may consider it necessary to make preparations for active service. Beyond this liability to transfer to a linked battalion during preparations for war, the conditions of the sepoy's enlistment will remain as at present.”

Para. 3, line 3.—For the words “ ordered on service ” substitute “ selected for active service.”



— No. 107. —

ABSTRACT RETURN showing the former and the present Sanctioned Establishments of the Army in India, for the Years 1884-85 and 1886-87.

BRITISH TROOPS (ALL INDIA).

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
10 Batteries of Horse Artillery :		11 Batteries of Horse Artillery :	
Bengal - - -	7	Bengal - - -	7
Madras - - -	2	Madras - - -	2
Bombay - - -	1	Bombay - - -	2
Officers - - -	5	Officers - - -	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	27	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	27
Gunners - - -	76	Gunners - - -	76
Drivers - - -	54	Drivers - - -	54
	<u>162</u>		<u>162</u>
Total - - -	1,620	Total - - -	1,782
40 Field Batteries :		42 Field Batteries :	
Bengal - - -	21	Bengal - - -	21
Madras - - -	8	Madras - - -	10
Bombay - - -	11	Bombay - - -	11
Officers - - -	5	Officers - - -	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	27	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	27
Gunners - - -	76	Gunners - - -	76
Drivers - - -	54	Drivers - - -	54
	<u>162</u>		<u>162</u>
Total - - -	6,480	Total - - -	6,804
4 Heavy Field Batteries :		4 Heavy Field Batteries :	
Bengal - - -	2	Bengal - - -	2
Madras - - -	1	Madras - - -	1
Bombay - - -	1	Bombay - - -	1
Officers - - -	5	Officers - - -	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	25	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	25
Gunners - - -	70	Gunners - - -	70
	<u>100</u>		<u>100</u>
Total - - -	400	Total - - -	400
6 Mountain Batteries .		8 Mountain Batteries :	
Bengal - - -	4	Bengal - - -	6
Madras - - -	1	Madras - - -	1
Bombay - - -	1	Bombay - - -	1
Officers - - -	5	Officers - - -	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	24	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	24
Gunners - - -	82	Gunners - - -	82
	<u>111</u>		<u>111</u>
Total - - -	666	Total - - -	888
17 Garrison Batteries :		23 Garrison Batteries :	
Bengal - - -	8	Bengal - - -	11
Madras - - -	4	Madras - - -	4
Bombay - - -	5	Bombay - - -	8
Officers - - -	5	Officers - - -	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	18	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	18
Gunners - - -	97	Gunners - - -	97
	<u>120</u>		<u>120</u>
Total - - -	2,040	Total - - -	2,760

[Note.—Each mountain battery has a native establishment of 149; all ranks.]

[Note.—Each mountain battery has a native establishment of 149; all ranks.]

## BRITISH CAVALRY (ALL INDIA).

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
9 Regiments of 6 Troops each :		9 Regiments of 8 Troops each :	
Bengal	6	Bengal	6
Madras	2	Madras	2
Bombay	1	Bombay	1
Officers	24	Officers	29
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	70	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	90
Privates	384	Privates	512
	478		631
Total	4,302	Total	5,679

## BRITISH INFANTRY (ALL INDIA).

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
50 Battalions of 8 Companies:		53 Battalions of 8 Companies :	
Bengal	32	Bengal	33
Madras	9	Madras	11
Bombay	9	Bombay	9
Officers	29	Officers	29
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	104	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	104
Privates	780	Privates	880
	913		1,013
Total	45,650	Total	53,689

## NATIVE ARMY, BENGAL.

## ARTILLERY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
4 Mountain Batteries (4 Guns each) :		6 Mountain Batteries (6 Guns each) :	
British officers	3	British officers	4
Native officers	2	Native officers	3
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	12	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	16
Gunners	60	Gunners	80
	77		102
Drivers establishment	92	Drivers establishment	123
	169		226
Total	676	Total	1,356
1 Garrison Battery :		1 Garrison Battery :	
British officer	1	British officer	1
Native officers	2	Native officers	2
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	13	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	13
Gunners	60	Gunners	60
	76		76
Total	76	Total	76

## SAPPERS AND MINERS.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
10 Companies :		8 Companies :	
British officers	10	British officers	21
British non-commissioned officers	63	British non-commissioned officers	43
Native officers	20	Native officers	24
Native non-commissioned officers, &c.	140	Native non-commissioned officers, &c.	128
Privates	1,000	Privates	1,200
	1,233		1,416
Total	1,233	Total	1,416

INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

18:

NATIVE ARMY, BENGAL—continued.

CAVALRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
<b>Governor General's Body Guard :</b>		<b>Governor General's Body Guard :</b>	
British officers	2	British officers	2
Native officers	3	Native officers	3
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	19	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	19
Troopers	98	Troopers	98
	<u>122</u>		<u>122</u>
Total	122	Total	122
<b>21 Regiments of 6 Troops :</b>		<b>23 Regiments of 8 Troops :</b>	
British officers	9	British officers	10
Native officers	13	Native officers	17
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	67	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	81
Sowars	454	Sowars	519
Camel Sowars	6	Camel Sowars	8
	<u>559</u>		<u>635</u>
Total	11,739	Total	14,605
<b>Guide Corps, 4 Troops :</b>		<b>Guide Corps, 6 Troops :</b>	
British officers	3	British officers	4
Native officers	9	Native officers	13
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	40	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	60
Sowars	280	Sowars	420
Camel Sowars	8	Camel Sowars	12
	<u>340</u>		<u>509</u>
Total	340	Total	509
<b>Central India Horse, 2 Regiments of 6 Troops :</b>		<b>Central India Horse, 2 Regiments of 8 Troops :</b>	
British officers	7	British officers	8
Native officers	13	Native officers	17
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	60	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	72
Sowars	408	Sowars	520
Camel Sowars	12	Camel Sowars	16
	<u>500</u>		<u>633</u>
Total	1,000	Total	1,266
<b>Deolee Cavalry, 2 Troops :</b>		<b>Deolee Cavalry, 2 Troops :</b>	
British officer	1	British officer	1
Native officers	5	Native officers	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	20	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	20
Sowars	137	Sowars	137
Camel Sowars	3	Camel Sowars	3
	<u>166</u>		<u>166</u>
Total	166	Total	166
<b>Erinpoora Cavalry, 2 Troops :</b>		<b>Erinpoora Cavalry, 2 Troops :</b>	
British officer	1	British officer	1
Native officers	5	Native officers	5
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	20	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	20
Sowars	137	Sowars	137
Camel Sowars	3	Camel Sowars	3
	<u>166</u>		<u>166</u>
Total	166	Total	166

NATIVE ARMY, BENGAL—*continued.*

## INFANTRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
54 Battalions of 8 Companies :		*63 Battalions of 8 Companies (5 additional Goorkha Battalions and 4 additional Sikh Battalions) :	
British officers	9	British officers	9
Native officers	16	Native officers	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96
Sepoys	720	Sepoys	800
	841		921
Total	45,414	Total	58,023
Guide Corps (8 Companies) :		Guide Corps (8 Companies) :	
British officers	10	British officers	10
Native officers	16	Native officers	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96
Sepoys	720	Sepoys	800
	842		922
Total	842	Total	922
Deolee Infantry (8 Companies) :		Deolee Infantry (8 Companies) :	
British officers	3	British officers	3
Native officers	16	Native officers	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96
Sepoys	600	Sepoys	600
	715		715
Total	715	Total	715
Erinpoora Infantry (8 Companies) :		Erinpoora Infantry (8 Companies) :	
British officers	3	British officers	3
Native officers	16	Native officers	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96
Sepoys	600	Sepoys	600
	715		715
Total	715	Total	715
Malwa Bheel Corps (8 Companies) :		Malwa Bheel Corps (8 Companies) :	
British officers	3	British officers	3
Native officers	16	Native officers	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96
Sepoys	500	Sepoys	500
	615		615
Total	615	Total	615
Meywar Bheel Corps (8 Companies) :		Meywar Bheel Corps (8 Companies) :	
British officers	5	British officers	5
Native officers	16	Native officers	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	96
Sepoys	600	Sepoys	600
	717		717
Total	717	Total	717

*Note.*—Regimental reserves for the regular Bengal infantry, including the Guide Corps, are in progress of formation, to consist of 218 men per battalion.

INCREASE OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

183

NATIVE ARMY, BENGAL—continued.

INFANTRY—continued.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
<b>Bhopal Battalion (10 Companies) :</b>		<b>Bhopal Battalion (10 Companies) :</b>	
British officers - - - - -	5	British officers - - - - -	5
Native officers - - - - -	20	Native officers - - - - -	20
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	120	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	120
Sepoys - - - - -	800	Sepoys - - - - -	800
	945		945
Total - - -	945	Total - - -	945
<b>Nepaul Escort (1 Company) :</b>		<b>Nepaul Escort (1 Company) :</b>	
British officer - - - - -	1	British officer - - - - -	1
Native officers - - - - -	2	Native officers - - - - -	2
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	13	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	13
Sepoys - - - - -	80	Sepoys - - - - -	80
	96		96
Total - - -	96	Total - - -	96

NATIVE ARMY, MADRAS.

SAPPERS AND MINERS.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
<b>(10 Companies) :</b>		<b>(8 Companies) :</b>	
British officers - - - - -	14	British officers - - - - -	21
British non-commissioned officers - - -	32	British non-commissioned officers - - -	43
Native officers - - - - -	20	Native officers - - - - -	24
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	141	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	128
Privates - - - - -	1,050	Privates - - - - -	1,200
	1,257		1,416
Total - - -	1,257	Total - - -	1,416
<i>Note.</i> —In addition to the above there were attached to the corps 86 recruit boys, and a native recruit establishment of six non-commissioned officers and 94 privates.		<i>Note.</i> —Fifty-six recruit boys are also borne on the strength of the corps.	

CAVALRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
<b>Governor's Body Guard :</b>		<b>Governor's Body Guard :</b>	
British officers - - - - -	3	British officers - - - - -	3
British non-commissioned officer - - -	1	British non-commissioned officer - - -	1
Native non-commissioned officers - - -	3	Native non-commissioned officers - - -	3
	7		7
Total - - -	7	Total - - -	7
<i>Note.</i> —The native officers and men of the Body Guard, 187 in number, are temporarily withdrawn from the regiments of Madras cavalry. As they continue to be borne on the strength of their regiments, and are not extra to that strength, they are not shown on the establishment of the Body Guard.			
<b>4 Regiments of 6 Troops :</b>		<b>4 Regiments of 6 Troops :</b>	
British officers - - - - -	9	British officers - - - - -	9
Native officers - - - - -	12	Native officers - - - - -	12
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	72	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	78
Privates - - - - -	300	Privates - - - - -	396
	393		495
Total - - -	1,572	Total - - -	1,980
<i>Note.</i> —Forty recruit boys are also borne on the strength of each regiment of Madras cavalry.		<i>Note.</i> —Forty recruit boys are also borne on the strength of each regiment of Madras cavalry.	

NATIVE ARMY, MADRAS—*continued.*

## INFANTRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
32 Battalions of 8 Companies :		32 Battalions of 8 Companies :	
British officers - - - - -	9	British officers - - - - -	9
Native officers - - - - -	16	Native officers - - - - -	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	97	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	97
Sepoys - - - - -	720	Sepoys - - - - -	720
	842		842
Total - - -	26,944	Total - - -	26,944
<i>Note.</i> —Fifty-six recruit boys are also borne on the strength of each regiment of Madras infantry.		<i>Note.</i> —Fifty-six recruit boys are also borne on the strength of each regiment of Madras infantry. Regimental reserves are in progress of formation, to consist of 100 men per battalion.	

## NATIVE ARMY, BOMBAY.

## ARTILLERY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
2 Mountain Batteries (4 Guns) :		2 Mountain Batteries (6 Guns) :	
British officers - - - - -	3	British officers - - - - -	4
Native officers - - - - -	2	Native officers - - - - -	3
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	12	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	16
Gunners - - - - -	60	Gunners - - - - -	80
	77		103
Drivers establishment - - - - -	92	Drivers establishment - - - - -	123
	169		226
Total - - -	338	Total - - -	459

## SAPPERS AND MINERS.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
(5 Companies :)		(5 Companies :)	
British officers - - - - -	11	British officers - - - - -	14
British non-commissioned officers - - -	16	British non-commissioned officers - - -	38
Native officers - - - - -	10	Native officers - - - - -	15
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	70	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	80
Privates - - - - -	400	Privates - - - - -	750
	507		897
Total - - -	507	Total - - -	897
<i>Note.</i> —Twelve boys are also borne on the strength of the corps.		<i>Note.</i> —Twelve boys are also borne on the strength of the corps.	

NATIVE ARMY, BOMBAY—*continued.*

CAVALRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
<b>Governor's Body Guard :</b>		<b>Governor's Body Guard :</b>	
British officer - - - - -	1	British officer - - - - -	1
Native officers - - - - -	3	Native officers - - - - -	3
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	8	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	8
Sowars - - - - -	60	Sowars - - - - -	60
	<u>72</u>		<u>72</u>
Total - - -	72	Total - - -	72
<b>6 Regiments of 6 Troops :</b>		<b>7 Regiments of 8 Troops :</b>	
British officers - - - - -	9	British officers - - - - -	10
Native officers - - - - -	13	Native officers - - - - -	17
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	74	Non-commissioned officers - - -	90
Sowars - - - - -	457	Sowars - - - - -	510
Camel sowars - - - - -	6	Camel sowars - - - - -	8
	<u>559</u>		<u>635</u>
Total - - -	3,354	Total - - -	4,445
<b>Aden Troop :</b>		<b>Aden Troop :</b>	
British officer - - - - -	1	British officer - - - - -	1
Native officers - - - - -	3	Native officers - - - - -	3
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	14	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	14
Sowars - - - - -	83	Sowars - - - - -	83
	<u>101</u>		<u>101</u>
Total - - -	101	Total - - -	101

INFANTRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
<b>26 Battalions of 8 Companies :</b>		<b>26 Battalions of 8 Companies :</b>	
British officers - - - - -	9	British officers - - - - -	9
Native officers - - - - -	16	Native officers - - - - -	16
Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	96	Non-commissioned officers, &c. - - -	96
Sepoys - - - - -	720	Sepoys - - - - -	720
	<u>841</u>		<u>841</u>
Total - - -	21,866	Total - - -	21,866
<i>Note</i> —Twenty-four boys are also borne on the strength of each battalion of Bombay infantry.		<i>Note</i> —Twenty-four boys are also borne on the strength of each battalion of Bombay infantry. Regimental reserves are in progress of formation, to consist of 160 men per battalion.	

## HYDERABAD CONTINGENT.

## ARTILLERY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
4 Field Batteries (4 Guns):		4 Field Batteries (4 Guns):	
British officers	2	British officers	2
Native officers	2	Native officers	2
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	14	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	14
Gunners	56	Gunners	56
Drivers	58	Drivers	58
	<u>132</u>		<u>132</u>
Total	528	Total	528

## CAVALRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
4 Regiments:		4 Regiments:	
British officers	5	British officers	5
Native officers	14	Native officers	14
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	59	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	59
Sowars	478	Sowars	478
	<u>556</u>		<u>556</u>
Total	2,224	Total	2,224

## INFANTRY.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.		PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.	
6 Regiments:		6 Regiments:	
British officers	5	British officers	5
Native officers	17	Native officers	17
Non-commissioned officers, &c.	102	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	102
Sepoys	732	Sepoys	732
	<u>856</u>		<u>856</u>
Total	5,136	Total	5,136



S U M M A R Y.  
BRITISH TROOPS (ALL INDIA).

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.			PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.		
Royal Artillery :	All Ranks		Royal Artillery :	All Ranks.	
Horse - - - - -	1,620		Horse - - - - -	1,782	
Field - - - - -	6,480		Field - - - - -	6,804	
Heavy Field - - - - -	400		Heavy Field - - - - -	400	
Mountain - - - - -	666		Mountain - - - - -	888	
Garrison - - - - -	2,040		Garrison - - - - -	2,760	
Cavalry - - - - -	4,302		Cavalry - - - - -	5,679	
Infantry - - - - -	45,650		Infantry - - - - -	53,689	
TOTAL - - -		61,158	TOTAL - - -		72,002

NATIVE TROOPS, BENGAL.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.			PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.		
Artillery :	All Ranks.		Artillery :	All Ranks.	
Mountain - - - - -	676		Mountain - - - - -	1,356	
Garrison - - - - -	76		Garrison - - - - -	76	
Sappers and Miners - - - - -	1,233		Sappers and Miners - - - - -	1,416	
Cavalry - - - - -	13,533		Cavalry - - - - -	16,834	
Infantry - - - - -	50,059		Infantry - - - - -	62,748	
TOTAL - - -		65,577	TOTAL - - -		82,430

NATIVE TROOPS, MADRAS.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.			PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.		
Sappers and Miners - - - - -	All Ranks.		Sappers and Miners - - - - -	All Ranks	
	1,257			1,416	
Cavalry - - - - -	1,579		Cavalry - - - - -	1,987	
Infantry - - - - -	26,944		Infantry - - - - -	26,944	
TOTAL - - -		29,780	TOTAL - - -		30,347

NATIVE TROOPS, BOMBAY.


FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.			PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.		
Artillery :	All Ranks.		Artillery :	All Ranks.	
Mountain - - - - -	338		Mountain - - - - -	452	
Sappers and Miners - - - - -	507		Sappers and Miners - - - - -	897	
Cavalry - - - - -	3,527		Cavalry - - - - -	4,618	
Infantry - - - - -	21,866		Infantry - - - - -	21,866	
TOTAL - - -		26,238	TOTAL - - -		27,833

HYDERABAD CONTINGENT.

FORMER ESTABLISHMENT, 1884-85.			PRESENT SANCTIONED ESTABLISHMENT, 1886-87.		
Artillery - - - - -	All Ranks.		Artillery - - - - -	All Ranks	
	528			528	
Cavalry - - - - -	2,224		Cavalry - - - - -	2,224	
Infantry - - - - -	5,136		Infantry - - - - -	5,136	
TOTAL - - -		7,888	TOTAL - - -		7,888
GRAND TOTAL - - -		190,641	GRAND TOTAL - - -		220,500

India Office, 24 March 1887.

Allen Johnson, Lieutenant General,  
Military Secretary.



~~S15~~  
14351

R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES);

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
*26 July 1867.*

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MV41.2.M67t

A867

14356.

*Tuesday, 26th February 1867.*

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*Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the duties performed by the British Army in India and the Colonies; and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies, or to organise a force of Asiatic Troops for general service in suitable climates.*

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*Wednesday, 6th March 1867.*

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Select Committee nominated of—

Viscount Cranborne. Mr. Childers. Sir James Fergusson. The Marquis of Hartington. Captain Hayter. Mr. Oliphant. Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Sir William Russell. Captain Vivian. Viscount Hamilton. Mr. Laing. Lord William Hay. Colonel North. Major Anson.
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*Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.*

*Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.*

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*Wednesday 13th-March 1867.*

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*Ordered, THAT Colonel Percy Herbert be added to the Committee.*

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*Friday, 26th July 1867.*

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*Ordered, THAT the Committee have Power to Report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.*

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REPORT	- - - - -	p. iii
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE	- - - - -	p. iv
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE	- - - - -	p. 1
APPENDIX	- - - - -	p. 209

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R E P O R T.

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THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Duties performed by the British Army in *India* and the Colonies; and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies, or to organise a Force of Asiatic Troops for General Service in suitable Climates;— HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:—

YOUR Committee have examined numerous witnesses upon the matters referred to them; and they have also directed that questions should be sent to a number of persons in high official positions in India and the Colonies. It is not possible that all the answers to these questions should arrive in England within the period to which the Session of Parliament ordinarily extends. They have therefore agreed to report the evidence they have taken to the House, and to recommend that the Committee be re-appointed at the commencement of next Session, for the purpose of considering their Report.

26 July 1867.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

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*Friday, 8th March 1867.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Colonel North.
Captain Hayter.	Major Anson.
Lord William Hay.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Childers.	Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Cranborne.	Mr. Oliphant.
Mr. Laing.	Captain Vivian.

Viscount CRANBORNE was called to the Chair.

Colonel *H. W. Norman* examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.]

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*Saturday, 9th March 1867.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT :

Major Anson.	Captain Vivian.
Sir James Fergusson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Colonel North.	Captain Hayter.
Lord William Hay.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.	

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Order of the House of 8th March giving leave to the Committee to sit this day, notwithstanding the adjournment of the House, read.

Colonel *H. W. Norman*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

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*Tuesday, 12th March 1867.*

---

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Captain Hayter.
Major Anson.	Lord William Hay.
Captain Vivian.	Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.	Sir James Fergusson.

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir *Walter Elliot* and Colonel *Keys*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

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ON ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

*Friday, 15th March 1867.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir James Fergusson.		Lord William Hay.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.		Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.		Mr. Childers.
Captain Hayter.		

Colonel *H. H. Clifford*, v.c., examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

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*Tuesday, 19th March 1867.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.		Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.		Sir James Fergusson.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.		Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.		Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.		Captain Vivian.

Major General *Pears*, Colonel *Probyn*, v.c., Captain *Mends*, R.N., and Lieutenant Colonel *F. M. Baker*, were severally examined.

Lieutenant Colonel *Keyes*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

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*Tuesday, 26th March 1867.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.		Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.		Marquis of Hartington.
Viscount Hamilton.		Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Oliphant.		Captain Hayter.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.		Mr. Childers.
Colonel Percy Herbert.		

Lieutenant General Sir *Hope Grant*, and Sir *Robert Montgomery*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE

*Friday, 29th March 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Mr. Laing.
Sir James Fergusson.	Captain Hayter.
Viscount Hamilton.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Oliphant.	

Colonel *Johnson* and Mr. *Thomas Caird*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

*Tuesday, 2nd April 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Viscount Hamilton.	Major Anson.
Lord William Hay.	Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.	Marquis of Hartington.
Sir James Fergusson.	

Sir *George Russell Clerk* and Colonel *Kenneth Mackenzie*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

*Friday, 5th April 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Colonel North.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.	Viscount Hamilton.
Major Anson.	

Colonel *Macdonald* and Mr. *Alexander C. Macpherson*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

*Tuesday, 9th April 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Lord William Hay.
Major Anson.	Viscount Hamilton.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Oliphant.	Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.	Sir James Fergusson.
Captain Vivian.	

Mr. *Henry Taylor* examined.

The Committee deliberated.

Motion made, and Question put, "That printed questions be sent out to witnesses to be selected, upon subjects referred to this Committee"—(Mr. *Chairman*).—The Committee divided.

<p>Ayes, 8.            Sir James Fergusson.            Marquis of Hartington.            Captain Hayter.            Mr. Oliphant.            Sir Henry Rawlinson.            Viscount Hamilton.            Colonel North.            Major Anson.</p>	<p>Noe, 1.            Colonel Percy Herbert.</p>
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[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.]

*Thursday, 11th April 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBOENE in the Chair.

<p>Major Anson.            Lord William Hay.            Colonel Percy Herbert.            Captain Vivian.            Mr. Childers.            Colonel North.            Viscount Hamilton.</p>	<p>Sir James Fergusson.            Mr. Laing.            Captain Hayter.            Sir Henry Rawlinson.            Mr. Oliphant.            Marquis of Hartington.            Sir William Russell.</p>
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The Committee deliberated.

Several questions to be sent to witnesses, *agreed to*.

- Motion made, and Question put, That the following question be sent:—"In case of pressure at home, would it be more advantageous to withdraw European regiments that might be wanted in England from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India, or to withdraw them from India"—(Major *Anson*).—The Committee divided :

<p>Ayes, 10.            Sir James Fergusson.            Captain Hayter.            Mr. Oliphant.            Sir H. Rawlinson.            Sir William Russell.            Captain Vivian.            Viscount Hamilton.            Lord William Hay.            Colonel North.            Major Anson.</p>	<p>Noes, 2.            Marquis of Hartington.            Colonel Percy Herbert.</p>
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Several other questions agreed to.

[Adjourned till Friday, 3rd May, at One o'clock.]

*Tuesday, 7th May 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Major ANSON in the Chair.

<p>Colonel North.            Lord William Hay.            Captain Vivian.</p>	<p>Sir James Fergusson.            Colonel Percy Herbert.            Mr. Oliphant.</p>
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Captain *Mends*, R.N., further examined.

Lieutenant Colonel *Shadwell* examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]



*Tuesday, 14th May 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.		Sir James Fergusson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.		Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Vivian.		Colonel North.
Captain Hayter.		Mr. Laing.
Lord William Hay.		Marquis of Hartington.

Sir *Robert Montgomery* further examined.

Mr. *E. B. de Fonblanque* and Colonel *Charles Gordon*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

*Friday, 17th May 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.		Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Colonel North.		Viscount Hamilton.
Mr. Laing.		Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.		Marquis of Hartington.
Sir James Fergusson.		Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.		

His Royal Highness the Duke of *Cambridge* (attending by permission of the House of Lords) examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

*Tuesday, 21st May 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Mr. Laing.		Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Childers.		Sir James Fergusson.
Major Anson.		Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.		Mr. Oliphant.
Sir H. Rawlinson.		

Mr. *Ross D. Mangles*, Sir *Henry Storks*, and Major General *Kavanagh*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 12th July, at One o'clock.

*Friday, 12th July 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.		Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.		Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.		Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.		

The Lord *Strathnairn*, attending by permission of the House of Lords, examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.

ON ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

*Tuesday, 16th July 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount Cranborne.		Colonel North.
Major Anson.		Sir Henry Rawlinson.

[No quorum being present, the Committee was adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Tuesday, 23rd July 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.		Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.		Sir James Fergusson.
Captain Vivian.		Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Captain Hayter.		Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.		Viscount Hamilton.

Major-General *Balfour*, examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

*Friday, 26th July 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Lord William Hay.		Colonel Percy Herbert.
Captain Hayter.		Viscount Hamilton.
Major Anson.		Sir James Fergusson.

Major-General *Balfour*, further examined.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman, read the first and second time, and agreed to.

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence and Appendix,

EXPENSES OF WITNESS.

Name of Witness.	Profession or Condition.	From whence Summonsed.	Number of Days Absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during Absence from Home.	Total Expenses allowed to Witness.
James M. Macdonald -	Colonel (Ceylon Rifles).	Edinburgh -	3	£. s. d. 7 10 -	£. s. d. 3 3 -	£. s. d. 10 13 -

LIST OF WITNESSES.

<i>Friday, 8th March 1867.</i>		<i>Tuesday, 9th April 1867.</i>	
	PAGE		PAGE
Colonel Henry Wylie Norman, C.B.	- 1	Henry Taylor, Esq.	- 109
<i>Saturday, 9th March 1867.</i>		<i>Tuesday, 7th May 1867.</i>	
Colonel Henry Wylie Norman, C.B.	- 15	Captain William Robert Mends, R.N., C.B.	- 121
<i>Tuesday, 12th March 1867.</i>		Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Shad- well	- 121
Sir Walter Elliot, K.S.I.	- 26	<i>Tuesday, 14th May 1867.</i>	
Colonel C. P. Keyes	- 34	Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.B.	- 123
<i>Friday, 15th March 1867.</i>		Edward B. De Fonblanque, Deputy Commissary General	- 128
Colonel the Hon. H. H. Clifford, V.C., Assistant Quartermaster General	- 38	Colonel Charles Gordon	- 135
<i>Tuesday, 19th March 1867.</i>		<i>Friday, 17th May 1867.</i>	
Major General Thomas Townsend Pears, C.B.	- 40	Field Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge	- 138
Colonel Dighton Probyn, C.B., V.C.	- 44	<i>Tuesday, 21st May 1867.</i>	
Captain W. R. Mends, R.N., C.B.	- 48	Ross D. Mangles, Esq.	- 140
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Moffat Baker	- 50	Lieutenant General the Right Honour- able Sir Henry Storks, G. C. B.	- 154
Lieutenant Colonel Charles P. Keyes	54	Major General Orfeur Cavenagh	- 160
<i>Tuesday, 26th March 1867.</i>		<i>Friday, 12th July 1867.</i>	
Lieutenant General Sir Hope Grant, G.C.B.	- 57	The Right Honourable Lord Strath- nairn	- 164
Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.B.	- 69	<i>Tuesday, 23rd July 1867.</i>	
<i>Friday, 29th March 1867.</i>		Major General George Balfour	- 171
Colonel Edwin B. Johnson, C.B.	- 71	<i>Friday, 26th July 1867.</i>	
Thomas Caird, Esq.	- 80	*Major General George Balfour	- 191
<i>Tuesday, 2nd April 1867.</i>			
Sir George Russell Clerk, K.C.B., K.S.I.	84		
Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie, C.B.	- 94		
<i>Friday, 5th April 1867.</i>			
Colonel James Mitchell Macdonald	- 99		
Alexander Campbell Macpherson, Esq.	105		