

THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE)

AND

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR C. J. NAPIER, G.C.B.

---

ALSO

PROCEEDINGS

REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF BARRACKS

FOR THE EUROPEAN TROOPS.

---

L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE COURT OF PROPRIETORS OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

BY J. & H. COX, 74 & 75, GREAT QUEEN STREET.

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1854.

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# AT A GENERAL COURT

OF THE

## EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

Held on Wednesday, the 21st December, 1853.

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1 ORDERED.—That the Correspondence, Memoranda, and Minutes relating to the resignation, by General Sir Charles James Napier, G.C.B., of the office of Commander-in-Chief in India, including the Memorandum of the late Duke of Wellington thereon :

2 Also, the Report of General Sir Charles James Napier on the Military Occupation of India, with the Minutes and Proceedings of the Government of India, and the Despatches of the Court of Directors in reply to the same :

3 Also, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Governments in India, and of the Court of Directors, relating to the Construction and Sites of Barracks for the European Troops,—be laid before this Court, and that the same be printed for the use of the Proprietors.

# LIST OF PAPERS.

## PART I.

Correspondence, Memoranda, and Minutes, relating to the Resignation by General Sir Charles James Napier, G.C.B., of the office of Commander-in-Chief in India.

	PAGE
Extract Military Letter from Bengal, dated 28th May, 1850 ... ..	1
Letter from Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 20th June, 1850 ... ..	1
Letter from Brigadier J. B. Hearsey, C.B., commanding at Wuzeerabad, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 11th January, 1850 ... ..	2
Old Pay and Audit Regulations ... ..	2
New Pay and Audit Regulations ... ..	3
Letter from Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant General of the Army, dated 14th February, 1850 ... ..	4
Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 13th April, 1850 ... ..	5
Letter from Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 13th April, 1850 ... ..	6
Letter from the Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 26th May, 1850 ... ..	7
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated 22nd May, 1850 ... ..	7
Memorandum by the Adjutant-General, dated 2nd March, 1850 ... ..	9
Extract of a Military Letter from Bengal, dated 24th August, 1850 ... ..	9
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 14th June, 1850, recorded on the Military Proceedings of 13th July, 1850 ... ..	10
Extract Military Letter from Bengal, dated 19th April, 1851 ... ..	18
Letter from Capt. F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, Military Department, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, dated 3rd February, 1851 ... ..	19
Letter from Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, C. B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 10th December, 1850 ... ..	19
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, in reply to the Governor-General's Minute of the 14th June, 1850, dated 4th December, 1850 ... ..	19
Letter from Capt. E. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 3rd February, 1851 ... ..	31
Minute by the Governor-General, 28th February, 1851 ... ..	31
Letter from Capt. F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Major W. Mayne, commanding Governor-General's Body Guard, dated 4th February, 1851 ... ..	50

## LIST OF PAPERS.

	PAGE
Letter from Major W. Mayne, commanding Governor-General's Body Guard, to Capt. F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 4th February, 1851...	51
Office Memorandum, Military Department, dated 3rd February, 1851 ... ..	51
Memoirandum of the Duke of Wellington upon the subject of Sir Charles Napier's Letter of the 22nd of May, 1850, requesting the Commander-in-Chief to obtain her Majesty's permission for him to resign the office of Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies, dated July 30th, 1850 ... ..	52
Military Despatch from the Court of Directors to the Government of India, dated 7th August, 1850 ...	54

## PART II.

Report of General Sir Charles James Napier, G.C.B., on the Military Occupation of India, with the Minutes and Proceedings of the Government of India thereupon, and the Despatches of the Court of Directors in reply to the same.

Letter from the President of the Council of India in Council to the Court of Directors, dated 22nd April, 1850 ... ..	61
Report by the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 27th November, 1849 ... ..	61
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 27th December, 1849 ... ..	79
Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, to the President of the Board of Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab, dated 1st January, 1850 ... ..	79
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 26th February, 1850 ... ..	79
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 11th April, 1850, on the Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief, 26th February, 1850 ... ..	95
Letter from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India to Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 13th April, 1850 ... ..	99
Letter from Sir H. M. Lawrence, K.C.B., President of the Board of Administration, Lahore, to Sir Henry Elliot, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, dated 1st March, 1850 ... ..	103
Memorandum on the Civil and Military Administration of the Punjab, dated 1st March, 1850 ...	103
Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 13th April, 1850 ... ..	123
Letter from Sir Henry Elliot, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 26th June, 1850 ... ..	123
Draft of General Orders ... ..	124
Letter from Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, Adjutant-General of the Army, to Sir Henry M. Elliot, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, dated 6th August, 1850 ... ..	127
Memorandum ... ..	127
Memorandum by Colonel Hodgson, for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief ... ..	129
Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 22nd August, 1850 ... ..	130
Letter from the Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General ... ..	130
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated 30th August, 1850 ... ..	130
Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 26th October, 1850 ... ..	131
Ditto " " 7th May, 1853 ... ..	133

## PART III.

Extracts from the Proceedings of the Governments in India, and of the Court of Directors, relating to the Construction and Sites of Barracks for the European Troops.

## STANDARD PLAN FOR BARRACKS.

	PAGE
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 2nd September, 1835 ... ..	141
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 29th December, 1834 ... ..	141
Extract "Memorandum on the plan of an Infantry Barrack," by Colonel P. Lindsay, H. M.'s 39th regiment, dated 14th October, 1834 ... ..	141
Extract Letter from Lieut.-Col. R. Brunton, H. M.'s 13th Light Dragoons, to the Brigade-Major, Bangalore, dated 13th October, 1834 ... ..	142
Extract Memorandum by the Quartermaster-General, dated 21st February, 1835 ... ..	142
Ditto ditto, dated 21st February, 1836 ... ..	142
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 10th August, 1836 ... ..	143
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 26th October, 1842 ... ..	143
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 21st August, 1850 ... ..	143

## BARRACKS at COLABA and in the FORT of BOMBAY.

Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 22nd November, 1841 ... ..	144
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 29th June, 1842 ... ..	145
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 17th June, 1844 ... ..	146
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 2nd October, 1844 ... ..	146
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 19th July, 1844 ... ..	146
Letter from the Military Board to Sir George Arthur, Bart., K.C.H., Governor of Bombay, dated 24th June, 1844 ... ..	147
Letter to the Secretary to the Military Board, 19th June, 1844 ... ..	147
Letter to the Secretary to the Medical Board, Bombay, dated 18th June, 1844 ... ..	147
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 30th September, 1844 ... ..	148
Letter from Captain Ward, Barrack-Master, dated 21st September, 1844 ... ..	148
Letter from Lieut.-Col. Carruthers to the Barrack-Master, Bombay, dated 4th September, 1844 ... ..	148
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 22nd January, 1845 ... ..	148
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 30th October, 1845 ... ..	149
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 3rd June, 1846 ... ..	149
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 4th July, 1851 ... ..	150
Minute by the Governor of Bombay, dated 31st May, 1851 ... ..	151
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 2nd June, 1852 ... ..	155
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 19th January, 1853 ... ..	155
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 20th May, 1853 ... ..	156
Letter from the Secretary to the Medical Board to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, dated 21st December, 1852 ... ..	156

## LIST OF PAPERS.

	PAGE
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 17th August, 1853 ... ..	157
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 21st December, 1853... ..	158

## DESTRUCTION, by a HURRICANE, of BARRACKS at LOODIANAH.

Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 14th August, 1846 ... ..	160
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 1st October, 1846 ... ..	160
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 24th February, 1847 ... ..	160

## BARRACKS AT HYDRABAD AND KARACHEE.

Minute by Governor of Bombay, dated 24th April, 1848 ... ..	161
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 21st July, 1852 ... ..	164
Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 16th January, 1852 ... ..	164
Letter from the Quartermaster-General of the Army to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay, dated 16th December, 1851 ... ..	164
Proceedings of Medical Committee, 26th August, 1850 ... ..	165
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 13th April, 1852 ... ..	166
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 30th March, 1853 ... ..	166

## BARRACKS at POONA and KIRKIE.

Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 31st October, 1845 ... ..	166
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bombay, dated 3rd June, 1846 ... ..	166
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 2nd August, 1848 ... ..	167
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 21st July, 1852 ... ..	168
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 17th August, 1853 ... ..	169
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 21st December, 1853 ... ..	169

## HILL STATIONS.—SUBATHOO, KUSSOWLIE, and DUGSHAIE.

Letter from Major-General Sir John McCaskill, K.C.B., commanding Kussowlie, to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated July, 1844 ... ..	170
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 14th January, 1846 ... ..	172
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 8th April, 1846 ... ..	172
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 10th February, 1847 ... ..	172
Letter from the Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 10th November, 1846 ... ..	173
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 15th September, 1847 ... ..	173
Letter from the Governor-General of India to the Court of Directors, dated 6th February, 1847 ... ..	174
Memorandum by the Governor-General of India, dated 28th January, 1847 ... ..	174
Report by Lieut.-Col. J. T. Boileau ... ..	176
Letter from Lieut.-Col. J. Orchard, C.B., to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 9th November, 1846 ... ..	177
Report from Lieut.-Col. G. Congreve to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 25th Nov. 1846 ... ..	178
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of India, dated 5th May, 1847 ... ..	184

LIST OF PAPERS.

ix

	PAGE
Letter from the Bengal Government to the Court of Directors, dated 24th September, 1847 ... ..	184
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 16th February, 1848 ... ..	184
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 20th September, 1848 ... ..	185
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 13th May, 1848 ... ..	185
Letter from Major W. M. N. Sturt, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. W. Garden, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 26th Nov. 1847	185
Letter from Lieut.-Col. W. Garden, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 9th February, 1848 ...	186
Report by the Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division, dated 28th January, 1846 ... ..	186
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 8th November, 1848 ... ..	191
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of India, dated 20th October, 1847 ... ..	192
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 1st November, 1848 ... ..	192
Report by Special Committee, dated 26th August, 1847 ... ..	192
Memorandum by the Governor-General of India, dated 7th December, 1847 ... ..	202
Letter from the Medical Board to the Governor-General of India, dated 25th December, 1847 ...	206
Letter from Lieut.-Col. W. Garden, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 5th January, 1848 ...	207
Letter from Colonel J. Frushard to Lieut.-Col. W. Garden, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 29th September, 1847 ... ..	208
Letter from Lieut.-Col. Congreve, commanding at Kussowlie, to Lieut.-Col. W. Garden, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 17th November, 1847 ... ..	209
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 30th May, 1849 ... ..	213
Letter from Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, Adjutant-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 23rd August, 1850 ... ..	214
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated 22nd August, 1850 ... ..	214
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 3rd September, 1850 ... ..	214
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 26th April, 1850 ... ..	215
Letter from Lieut.-Col. E. Lugard, Acting Quartermaster-General, H. M.'s Forces in India, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 16th February, 1850 ... ..	215
Letter from Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. E. Lugard, Acting Quartermaster-General, H. M.'s Forces in India, dated 15th March, 1850 ... ..	215
Letter from Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 19th February, 1850 ... ..	216
Letter from Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 11th March, 1850 ... ..	216
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 23rd October, 1850 ... ..	216
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of India, dated 23rd February, 1853 ... ..	217
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 26th September, 1853 ...	217
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 4th May, 1853 ... ..	218
Ditto .. .. 26th May, 1853 ... ..	220
Letter from Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 21st June, 1853 ... ..	220

c}



## LIST OF PAPERS.

	PAGE
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated 13th June, 1853 ... ..	221
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 5th July, 1853 ... ..	222
Letter from Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 21st June, 1853 ... ..	223
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 19th July, 1853 .. ..	224
Letter from Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 17th August, 1853 ... ..	225
Minute by the Governor-General, dated 14th September, 1853 ... ..	226

## SICKNESS AMONGST TROOPS AT LAHORE.

Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 24th September, 1849 ...	226
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 24th July, 1849 ... ..	227
Letter from Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 12th July, 1849 ... ..	227
Letter from Surgeon J. McCosh, M.D. to Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 1st July, 1849 ... ..	227
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 24th July, 1849 ... ..	229
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 24th September, 1849 ...	230
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 27th November, 1849 ...	230
Letter from Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 13th September, 1849 ... ..	230
Letter from Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 29th August, 1849 ... ..	230
Proceedings of Special Medical Committee, dated 16th August, 1849 ... ..	231
Letter from Surgeon J. M'Cosh, M.D., 2nd European Regiment, to Surgeon S. Holmes, President of Special Medical Committee, dated 22nd July, 1849 ... ..	234
Letter from Captain F. W. Burroughs, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Division, to Colonel N. Penny, C.B., commanding at Lahore, dated 1st August, 1849 ... ..	240
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 6th October, 1849 ... ..	240
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 22nd May, 1850 ... ..	240
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 26th March, 1850 ... ..	241
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 21st August, 1850 ... ..	241
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 27th March, 1851 ... ..	241
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta, dated 11th January, 1851 ... ..	241
Letter from Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, G.C.B., commanding the Punjab Division, to Capt. F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 8th January, 1851 ... ..	242
Proceedings of a Special Medical Committee ... ..	242

LIST OF PAPERS.

xi

	PAGE
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, G.C.B., or officer commanding the Punjab Division, dated 11th January, 1851 ... ..	244
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 11th January, 1851 ... ..	245
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 3rd September, 1851 ...	245
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 29th November, 1851 ...	246
Letter from F. Corbyn, Esq., Superintending Surgeon, Punjab Division, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 3rd September, 1851 ... ..	246
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 13th April, 1852 ... ..	247
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 23rd March, 1853 ... ..	248
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 2nd August, 1853 ... ..	248

BARRACKS, &c., AT MEEAN MEER.

Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 26th March, 1850 ... ..	248
Letter from the Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 26th Dec. 1849 ...	248
Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 4th January, 1850 ... ..	249
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 21st August, 1850 ... ..	250
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 27th March, 1851 ... ..	250
Minute by Governor-General of India, dated 11th November, 1850 ... ..	251
Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, dated 7th September, 1850 ... ..	251
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. Wylhe, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta, dated 19th December, 1850 ... ..	252
Letter from ditto to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 19th December, 1850 ... ..	255
Letter from ditto to Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 19th December, 1850 ... ..	255
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 3rd September, 1851 ...	258
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 24th November, 1851 ...	259
Letter from Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 26th June, 1851 ... ..	259
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 2nd July, 1851 ... ..	259
Letter from Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 9th August, 1851 ... ..	260
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Tremenheere, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 16th August, 1851 ... ..	260
Letter from Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Tremenheere, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Col. J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 26th August, 1851 ... ..	261
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Tremenheere, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 4th September, 1851 ... ..	262

	PAGE
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 4th September, 1851. ....	262
Letter from Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Tremeneheere, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Col. J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 6th September, 1851. ....	263
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 13th April, 1852. ....	263
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 24th May, 1852. ....	263
Letter from Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremeneheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Lieut.-Col. A. Becher, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 23rd February, 1852. ....	263
Memorandum by Lieut.-Col. Tremeneheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 23rd February, 1852. ....	264
Letter from Lieut.-Col. A. Becher, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Brigadier J. Tennant, C.B., commanding at Lahore, dated 29th February, 1852. ....	265
Letter from Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. A. M. Becher, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 7th April, 1852. ....	267
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 20th October, 1852. ....	267
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 26th July, 1852. ....	267
Letter from Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremeneheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Lieut. J. P. Beadle, Officiating Secretary, Military Board, dated 11th May, 1852. ....	268
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 1st December, 1852. ....	268
Letter from ditto to ditto, dated 22nd February, 1853. ....	268
BARRACKS, &c. AT PESHAWUR.	
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 31st October, 1849. ....	269
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 28th May, 1850. ....	269
Letter from Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremeneheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 18th February, 1850. ....	269
Instructions for Lieut.-Col. Tremeneheere, regarding Peshawur, dated 18th February, 1850. ....	269
Letter from Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 13th April, 1850. ....	270
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 19th June, 1850. ....	271
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 11th May, 1850. ....	271
Letter from Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Col. J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Simla, dated 30th April, 1850. ....	271
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 11th May, 1850. ....	272
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 27th November, 1850. ....	272
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 24th September, 1850. ....	272
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, dated 17th July, 1850. ....	273
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 2nd April, 1851. ....	273
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 19th November, 1850. ....	273


LIST OF PAPERS.

xiii

	PAGE
Letter from Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, dated 27th September, 1850 ... ..	274
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 19th May, 1851 ... ..	274
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 21st March, 1851 ... ..	274
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. Drummond, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 21st March, 1851 ... ..	276
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 24th March, 1851 ... ..	277
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, dated 25th March, 1851 ... ..	278
Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 10th March, 1851 ... ..	278
Letter from Brigadier Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B., commanding Peshawur District, to Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 13th March, 1851 ... ..	279
Proceedings of a Committee of all the Medical Officers at Peshawur, 12th March, 1851 ... ..	279
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Brigadier Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B., dated 22nd March, 1851 ... ..	280
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major Wyllie, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 26th March, 1851 ... ..	281
Minute by the Governor-General of India, 10th March, 1851 ... ..	282
Letter from Brigadier Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B., to Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 14th March, 1851 ... ..	283
Letter from Captain F. D. Atkinson, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Brigadier Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B., dated 26th March, 1851 ... ..	284
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 5th November, 1851 ... ..	285
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 26th September, 1851 ... ..	285
Letter from Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Col. J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 13th June, 1851 ... ..	285
Letter from the Executive Engineer, Peshawur, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle ... ..	286
Minute by the Governor-General of India, 1st August, 1851 ... ..	286
Letter from Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Colonel J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 26th July, 1851 ... ..	287
Letter from Col. J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. Tremenheere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 11th August, 1851 ... ..	287
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 25th February, 1852 ... ..	287
Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 21st April, 1852 ... ..	288
Letter from Lieut.-Col. A. Becher, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Col. J. Stuart, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, dated 30th January, 1852 ... ..	288
Letter from Brigadier Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B., commanding Peshawur Field Force, to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 17th January, 1852 ... ..	288
Letter from Major J. S. Banks, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. A. M. Becher, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated 5th March, 1852 ... ..	289

## LIST OF PAPERS.

	PAGE
Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, dated 31st August, 1852 ... ..	289
Letter from the Government of Bengal to Court of Directors, dated 14th June, 1852 ... ..	290
Letter from Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Board, Department of Public Works, dated 10th May, 1852	290
Letter from the Court of Directors to Government of Bengal, dated 3rd November, 1852 ... ..	290
Letter from Government of Bengal to Court of Directors, dated 14th June, 1852 - ... ..	290
Letter from the Court of Directors to Government of Bengal, dated 3rd November, 1852 ... ..	291



PART I.

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CORRESPONDENCE, MEMORANDA, AND MINUTES,

RELATING TO

THE RESIGNATION

BY

GÉN. SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, G.C.B.

OF THE OFFICE OF

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA.

# CORRESPONDENCE,

*&c. &c.*

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## EXTRACT MILITARY LETTER FROM BENGAL,

*Dated 28th May, 1850. (No. 88.)*

22. Para. 20 of separate letter No. 183, dated 5th September, 1845, acquainted your Honourable Court that the government of Lord Hardinge had, after mature deliberation, resolved that money compensation to native troops, for high price of provisions, should be allowed on the aggregate of the price of all the articles composing the ration of the Sepoy, and not upon each separate article, as was directed by the order of March, 1844.

Extract Military  
Letter from Bengal,  
28th May, 1850.

23. The documents forming the present collection will apprise you that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, without any previous reference to Government, and apparently without any inquiry whatever, acting on an erroneous statement submitted by Brigadier J. B. Hearsey, C.B., commanding at Wuzeerabad, issued orders that compensation should be granted to the native troops in the Punjab, in accordance with the older regulation, his Excellency having considered the revised one to be "impolitic and unjust," and that it only required "to be brought to the notice of the Government to insure its immediate rectification."

24. Our sentiments regarding this assumption by the Commander-in-Chief of the functions of the Supreme Government, and a statement of the difficulty and embarrassment produced by the act of his Excellency are recorded in a minute of the Most Noble the Governor-General on Consultation, 19th April, 1850, No. 302.

25. Further proceedings on this subject will be duly reported.

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(No. 13.)—*From* Lieutenant-Col. P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

SIR,—

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward to you, for the purpose of being submitted to the Honourable the President of the Council of India in Council, copy of a letter addressed to me by Brigadier J. B. Hearsey, C.B., commanding at Wuzeerabad, No. 21, of the 11th inst., with annexments, drawing attention to the difference between the rates of compensation for the dearness of rations to the native troops contained in the pay and audit regulations for 1845, and those specified in the code, published in 1849.

From Lieut.-Col.  
P. Grant to  
Major R. Wylie,  
20th Jan. 1850.

By the old regulation, the soldier received compensation in money, on each article of his ration, calculated *separately* when these provisions exceeded the regulated prices.

By the new regulation, the aggregate of the bazaar cost of the whole ration is calculated, and from this the Government rate, also *aggregated*, is deducted, so that at Wuzeerabad, as shown by the statement of the Commissariat Officer, dated the 11th instant, each native soldier is said to lose one anna and six pies per mensem, by the operation of the new regulation.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

From Lieut.-Col.  
P. Grant to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
20th Jan. 1850.

This change in the regulation was not observed by Sir C. Napier's predecessor, when the code of 1849 was sent to army head-quarters for any comment the Commander-in-Chief might see fit to make; and Sir C. Napier is persuaded that the alteration has been introduced without the circumstances of the case being fully and clearly explained to the Supreme Government.

The Commander-in-Chief considers the change that has thus been made, to the injury of the soldier, to be both impolitic and unjust; and he feels assured that it only requires to be brought to the notice of the Government to insure its immediate rectification.

In the meantime, confident of the support of Government, the Commander-in-Chief has directed that compensation shall be issued to the native troops serving in the Punjab, in accordance with the rules laid down in the old regulation, as in the present state of transition from Scinde pay and allowances to the regular pay of the troops, a transition which has produced a most unprovoked state of insubordination in some regiments, the Commander-in-Chief thinks that no cause of dissatisfaction should be given to the troops.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

P. GRANT, Lieutenant-Col.  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Head-Quarters, Camp Rawul Pindee,  
20th Jan. 1850.

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(No. 21).—From Brigadier J. B. HEARSEY, C.B., commanding at Wuzeerabad, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL of the Army.

*Dated Wuzeerabad, 11th January, 1850.*

SIR,—

From Brigadier  
J. B. Hearsey, to  
the Adjutant-Gen-  
eral of the Army,  
11th Jan. 1850.

Having noticed that the new pay and audit regulations differ from the old ones on a subject I deem of some importance, and as this difference has not been directed to be explained to the native troops, and relates to compensation for food when it sells at a high rate, I do myself the honour to state it for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The orders regarding compensation, as copied from the old pay and audit regulations, are transcribed and appended, vide letter A, so that when otta and flour by the old pay and audit regulations sold for twelve or fourteen seers per rupee, it was made up to the sepoy by a money compensation to fifteen seers. When dholl sold for seven or eight seers per rupee, it was made up to ten seers. When ghee sold for one and a half seer per rupee, it was made up to two seers. When salt sold for six or seven seers per rupee, it was made up to eight seers. All these articles of food were calculated *separately* and compensation granted accordingly.

In the new pay and audit regulations, as copied and appended, vide letter B, this is altered, and it is ordered that the aggregate of all the prices of the above articles of food is to be struck by the Commissariat Officer, and the compensation in money to the sepoy is to be calculated from that *aggregate*; so, if a man does not eat dholl and it sells cheap, its cheapness of price is to be considered in the dearness of flour, and deducted therefrom.

This appears to me to be altogether a new regulation, and it ought to be carefully explained to the sepoys on parade, if it is to be the rule for the future, and to be enforced, and not thus introduced for the first time in a new edition of pay and audit regulations.

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#### APPENDIX, LETTER A.

##### OLD PAY AND AUDIT REGULATIONS.

Copy from Addenda, section 25, page 1018, article 281.—“It is known to the troops that when the price of otta is above fifteen seers the rupee, compensation in money for the excess of price is now given to them, at the rate of a seer a day for each man.”

282. “With a view of providing, as is done in Her Majesty's service, that the soldier's ration shall never cost him more than a fixed moderate sum, the Governor-



“ General in Council thinks it expedient to extend the principle of giving compensation in money, in case of high prices, to the other minor articles composing the sepoy's ration, and it is accordingly notified, that whenever the price of dholl is above ten seers the rupee, that of ghee above two seers the rupee, and that of salt above eight seers the rupee, compensation money for the excess of price will be given to the troops, at the rate of two chittocks of dholl, one chittock of ghee, and one-third of a chittock of salt a day each man.”

283. “ With a view of providing, as is done in Her Majesty's service, that the soldier's rations shall never cost him more than a fixed moderate sum, the Governor-General in Council thinks it expedient to extend the principle of giving compensation in money, in the case of high prices, to the other minor articles composing the sepoy's ration; and it is accordingly notified, that whenever the price of dholl is above ten seers the rupee, that of ghee above two seers the rupee, and that of salt above eight seers the rupee, compensation money for the excess of price will be given to the troops, at the rate of two chittocks of dholl, one chittock of ghee, and one-third of a chittock of salt a day for each man.”

284. “ This rule is made generally applicable to the troops of all the presidencies.”

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

From Brigadier J. B. Hearsey, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, 11th Jan. 1850.

#### APPENDIX, LETTER B.

##### NEW PAY AND AUDIT REGULATIONS of 1849.

(Copy.)

Under head of Native Infantry, their pay and allowances, Section 25, page 249.

Article 22. “ On such and all other occasions when money rations are sanctioned to native troops, companies, or establishments, under the head “ extra charges,” at the rates published in orders by officers commanding divisions or detachments at the close of each month, on a certificate from the commissariat executive officer of the current prices of each article in the bazars, or of the rates at which they have been issued from the public stores, as the case may be, with a calculation, in the following form, of the value of each man's rations for the month.

“ Rice, 30 seers, at seers per rupee	...	...	...	...	0	0	0
“ Dholl, 60 chittocks, at do. ..	...	...	...	...	0	0	0
“ Ghee, 30 do. at do. ...	...	...	...	...	0	0	0
“ Salt, 10 do. at do. ...	...	...	...	...	0	0	0
“ Monthly value of each ration.—Total for a month of 30 days...					0	0	0
“ Do. do. 31 days ...					0	0	0”

23. “ A copy of the order publishing the rates to be furnished as a voucher to the Audit Department, by officers commanding.”

24. “ When, from scarcity of provisions in the bazars, rations are issued from the public stores, the same will be charged to corps by the commissariat, at the following rates.—Regimental officers will continue to draw the ‘ money rations ’ in their regular abstracts, as laid down, to prevent confusion : ”

#### “ FOR FIGHTING MEN.”

“ Wheat, flour, or rice, each 1 seer per diem, at 15 seers per rupee.				
“ Dholl	...	2 chittocks	at 10	ditto.
“ Ghee	...	1 ditto	at 2	ditto.
“ Salt	...	$\frac{1}{8}$ ditto	at 8	ditto.”

Page 252.—Article 31. “ Native troops, wherever stationed, are at all times entitled to compensation in money, whenever the price of provisions forming their diet shall exceed Rs. 3. 8 a. per mensem, and public establishments when the price shall exceed Rs. 2. 8 a. 8 p. per mensem; those sums being respectively the aggregates of the rates of the several articles composing the rations, laid down in Article 24, and bills for compensation for the excess in price are to be submitted by commanding officers to the commissariat officers attached to the division, &c., in which their corps may be stationed, by whom the charges will be checked and adjusted.”

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c. RELATIVE TO THE

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.		AGGREGATE.						
		BAZAR RATE.						
	31 Seers of Otta, at 13 seers 9 chittocks per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	Rs. 2 4 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	3 Seers 14 chittocks Dhol, at 11 seers 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ chittocks per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	0 5 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	1 Seer 15 chittocks Ghee, at 2 seers $\frac{1}{2}$ chitcock per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	0 15 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ Chittocks Salt, at 16 seers 8 chittocks per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	0 0 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
							<u>Rs. 3 10 0<math>\frac{1}{2}</math></u>	
		DEDUCT GOVERNMENT RATE.						
	31 Seers of Otta, at 15 seers per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	Rs. 2 1 0 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	3 Seers 14 chittocks Dhol, at 10 seers per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	0 6 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	
	1 Seer 15 chittocks Ghee, at 2 seers per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	0 15 6	
	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ chittocks Salt, at 8 seers per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	0 1 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
							<u>Rs. 3 8 0<math>\frac{1}{2}</math></u>	
	Difference	...	...	...	...	...	0 2 0	
		OTTA ONLY.						
	31 Seers of Otta, at 13 seers 9 chittocks per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	Rs. 2 4 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	31 Seers of Otta, at 15 seers per rupee	...	...	...	...	...	2 1 0 $\frac{3}{4}$	
							<u>0 3 6</u>	

The latter showing that each fighting man would receive 1 anna 6 pies more if the old system of compensation were adhered to, which would amount in a regiment of (say) 1,000 men to Rs. 93. 12 a.

Wuzeerabad,  
Executive Commissariat Office,  
11 Jan. 1850.

(Signed) E. R. MAINWARING,  
Dep. Asst. Commissary Gen.  
J. B. HEARSEY, Brigadier,  
Commanding at Wuzeerabad.

(No. 331.)—From Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the army.

Dated, Fort William, 14 February, 1850.

Military Department.

SIR,—

From Major  
R. Wyllie, to  
Lieut.-Col.  
P. Grant,  
14th Feb 1850.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 13, of the 20th ultimo, submitting copy of a despatch from Brigadier Hearsey, commanding at Wuzeerabad, reporting the circumstances of his having noticed a difference between the regulation recorded in the pay code of 1845, and that laid down in the code of 1849, relative to the compensation to the native soldiery for the dearness of their rations, and intimating that the Commander-in-Chief, being persuaded that the alteration in question has been made without the circumstances of the case being fully and clearly explained to Government, and considering it to be both impolitic and unjust, has ordered that compensation shall be issued to the native troops serving in the Punjab, in accordance with the rule published in the code of 1845.

2. In reply, I am desired by the Honourable the President of the Council of India in Council to observe, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that Brigadier Hearsey has wholly misled his Excellency in stating that the rule in the code of 1849 is "altogether a new regulation," as the following brief history of the regulations on the subject will show his Excellency.

3. Compensation appears to have been first granted to the native troops serving at some of the western stations, in the year 1821, in consequence of the dearness of provisions in that part of the country; the grant was confined to those stations, and limited to otta, whenever that article of food should be selling under 15 seers for the rupee.

4. Compensation seems to have been subsequently passed, on special applications, to the native troops at other stations of the army where a scarcity of otta prevailed; but the rule was not extended to the native soldier throughout this presidency until the year 1844, when Lord Ellenborough's government, in the General Order No. 79, dated 12th March of that year, in defining the allowances admissible to the troops serving in the province of Scindh, ruled that compensation should be granted, not for dearness of otta only, as formerly, but also for the several minor articles (dhol, ghee, and salt), composing the native soldier's rations. This is the order entered in the code of 1845. P. 1018.

5. In the following year Lord Hardinge's government resolved to sanction a more liberal scale of allowances, and other advantages, to the troops in Scindh; and at the same time to relieve the native soldiery, generally, from the expenses to which, up to that period, they had been subjected in providing their own huts, and for the wages of certain of the servants necessarily employed with native corps; and as the rule of March, 1844, had been found, in practice, very troublesome and inconvenient, as well as injurious, inasmuch as, though at the same stations, one of the minor articles of ration may occasionally be more expensive, the other articles may as frequently be procurable at rates favourable to the soldier, advantage was taken of the opportunity thus afforded to introduce the existing rule, and accordingly in paragraph 3 of the G.O.G.G. in Council, of the 15th August, 1845, it was declared, that compensation would be granted "whenever the price of provisions, forming the native soldier's diet, shall exceed three rupees eight annas (3. 8. 0), the aggregate of the rates for the several articles, as laid down in the "G.O. of the 26th February, 1824," for troops on service.

6. It is true that this rule was published in a G.O. fixing the allowances admissible to the troops in Scindh; but seven days subsequently, on the 22nd August, 1845, in reviewing a letter of instructions on the subject, proposed by the Military Board to be addressed to the Deputy Commissary-General, the Governor-General in Council caused it to be explained to that body, that "as regards money rations, that item of grant will cease in Scindh from the 1st September next, compensation only being allowable there, as elsewhere, whenever the price of provisions forming the soldier's ration shall exceed 3 rupees 8 annas, the aggregate of the rates for the several articles, &c."

7. And still further to remove all doubt on the subject, on the 17th December, 1847, a G.O. (No. 389 of 1847) was issued by the Governor-General in Council, republishing to the army paragraph 3 of the order of 15th August, 1845, already referred to, and declaring that that paragraph was intended to be, and is to be considered "applicable to the native troops generally, wherever they may be stationed."

8. The G. O. in question, of 15th August, 1845, was, previous to its publication, submitted to the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, and its provisions were cordially approved by his Excellency, as appears from his minute on the subject, dated 10th June, 1845, on record in this department.

9. The Commander-in-Chief, I am instructed to state, will thus perceive that the change in the regulation of 12th March, 1844, made on the 15th August, 1845, and explained in the G.O. of 17th December, 1847, was not ordered hastily or unadvisedly, by the Supreme Government; but, on the contrary, after much consideration on different occasions, and full deliberation; that it had been in operation throughout the presidency long previous to the publication of the Pay Code of 1849, without, as far as Government are aware, a single objection being offered to it; and that it was adopted, as being perfectly just, equitable, and politic, by the late Governor-General (Lord Hardinge) in Council, and by the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough; and I am to add, is still so considered by the President in Council.

10. Under such circumstances, the President in Council cannot but regret that his Excellency should, without previous communication with Government, have ordered a general regulation, passed by the Governor-General of India in Council, to be set aside at any of the stations of the army; but his Honour in Council does not consider it expedient to do more than thus explain the real state of the case, until the arrival of the Most Noble the Governor-General, who is shortly expected at the presidency.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) R. WYLLIE, Major,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department.

Council Chamber, Fort William,  
14th February, 1850.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

From Major  
R. Wyllie to  
Lieut.-Col.  
P. Grant,  
14th Feb. 1850.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated 13th April, 1850.

The letter addressed to the Military Secretary to the Government of India, dated 20th January, 1850, by the Adjutant-General of the army, relative to the mode of calculating compensation for sepoy's rations, has been submitted to me, that the orders of the Government may be given upon it.

I entirely concur in the opinion expressed by the President in Council, in paragraph 9 of letter to the Adjutant-General, 14th February, 1850; and I view with regret

Minute by the  
Governor-General  
of India,  
13th April, 1850.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General  
of India,  
13th April, 1850.

and dissatisfaction the orders which the Commander-in-Chief intimates he has issued to the officers in the Punjab.

There was no room for doubt as to what were the intentions of the Governor-General in Council on the point, if the G.O. of 1847 had been referred to. If there had been doubt, the obvious and proper course for his Excellency was to have referred the matter for the consideration of the President in Council, and to have awaited his reply before he gave an order which he had no power to issue, and which did not in any respect call for haste.

The Commander-in-Chief has issued this order with reference to troops in the Punjab. His Excellency well knows the difficulty of reversing an order issued regarding pay, and he must be aware that that difficulty becomes an impossibility after what has recently occurred in the Punjab. The effect, therefore, of his Excellency's act has been to re-establish in the Punjab (for the Governor-General in Council will not sanction the extension of the change to districts to which his Excellency's order has not applied) a different rate of allowances from that which will prevail in other provinces; and thus, in great measure to thwart the endeavour which the Governor-General in Council has been making to assimilate the soldiers' allowances in every province of the presidency.

His Excellency's orders have been given; they are hereby confirmed so far as regards the Punjab, and officers will be instructed to carry them into effect.

But the Governor-General in Council, from a consideration of the papers before him, feels it necessary to intimate, for the future guidance of his Excellency, that the Governor-General in Council will not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall change the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme Government alone.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

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(No. 451.)—From Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL of the ARMY.

SIR,

From Major  
R. Wyllie to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
13th April, 1850.

Your despatch, No. 13, of the 20th January, and my reply thereto, No. 331, dated the 14th February last, relative to the mode of calculating compensation for sepoys' rations, having been submitted to the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, I am now directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that his Lordship in Council entirely concurs in the opinion expressed in paragraph 9 of my letter to your address of the 14th February, above referred to, and views with regret and dissatisfaction the orders which the Commander-in-Chief intimates he has issued to the officers in the Punjab.

2. There was, I am to observe, no room for doubt as to what were the intentions of the Governor-General in Council on this point, if the G. O. of 1847 had been referred to. If there had been doubt, the obvious and proper course for his Excellency was, to have referred the matter for the consideration of the President in Council, and to have awaited his reply, before he gave an order which he had no power to issue, and which did not in any respect call for haste.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has issued this order with reference to troops in the Punjab. His Excellency well knows the difficulty of reversing an order issued regarding pay, and he must be aware that that difficulty becomes an impossibility, after what has recently occurred in the Punjab. The effect, therefore, of his Excellency's act has been to re-establish in the Punjab (for the Governor-General in Council will not sanction the extension of the change to districts to which his Excellency's order has not applied) a different rate of allowance from that which will prevail in other provinces, and thus, in great measure, to thwart the endeavour which the Governor-General in Council has been making to assimilate the soldiers' allowances in every province of the presidency.

4. His Excellency's orders having been given, they are hereby confirmed as far as regards the Punjab, and officers will be instructed to carry them into effect.

5. But the Governor-General in Council, from a consideration of the papers before him, feels it necessary to intimate, for the future guidance of his Excellency, that the Governor-General in Council will not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall change the pay and allowances of the troops

RESIGNATION OF SIR C. J. NAPIER.

7

serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme Government alone.

I am, &c.

Council Chamber, Fort William,  
13th April, 1850.

(Signed) R. WYLLIE, Major,  
Officiating Secretary to Government of India,  
Military Department.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

From Major  
R. Wyllie to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
13th April, 1850.

*From the ADJUTANT-GENERAL of the ARMY to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.*

SIR,

With reference to a despatch, No. 451, of the 13th April last, from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, relative to certain orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief for suspending in the Punjab the enforcement of the rules laid down in the Pay Code of 1849, on the subject of compensation for sepoy's rations, I have now the honour to forward in reply, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General, a memorandum in original by his Excellency, dated the 22nd instant, together with its annexment of the 2nd March last, by the late Adjutant-General of the Army, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant, C.B.

From the Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to the Government of India,  
26th May, 1850.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Simla, May 26, 1850.

*For the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA in COUNCIL.*

MEMORANDUM.

On the 24th April, the Adjutant-General laid before me a letter from Major Wyllie, written by order of the Governor-General in Council, expressing his dissatisfaction at certain orders issued by me in the Punjab, relative to the mode of calculating the compensation for sepoy's rations, and reprimanding me for issuing those orders.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief,  
22nd May, 1850.

He says that there was "no room to doubt as to what were the instructions of the Governor-General in Council," with regard to this matter; and that "if there had been doubt, the obvious and proper course for his Excellency was to have referred the matter for the consideration of the President in Council, and to have awaited his reply before he gave an order which he had no power to issue, and which did not in any respect call for haste." But it did call for haste!

The letter states that the Governor-General in Council finds it necessary "to intimate, for the guidance of his Excellency, that the Governor-General in Council will not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall change the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme Government alone."

Such are the contents of this reprimand, and here is my answer, to exculpate myself from the charges made against me in the Governor-General in Council's letter; and to support the just exercise of my own authority against the unjust accusation of having presumed to interfere with that of the Governor-General, which I did not do!

I shall begin by giving the following abstract of the case.

Lord Ellenborough gave an allowance to the sepoy as a compensation, when, at any particular station, his ration exceeded a certain price; and this compensation was justly calculated upon the price of each article separately, so that the soldier was sure of having whichever article he required at a certain price, however high the cost of that article might be in the market. He might get the article cheaper, and generally did so; but he knew that he could not be called upon to pay a higher price for it than that which was fixed upon it by the Government. This order appeared in the code of 1845.

In 1847, Lord Hardinge altered the form of this allowance; and instead of compensation being calculated on each article separately of the soldiers' ration, he ordered that it should be calculated on the whole of those articles in the aggregate. Of course,

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief,  
22nd May, 1850.

if each article was above the maximum price established, the Government neither gained nor lost by the new rule; but if any of the articles were below the maximum, the Government saved, and the sepoy lost, to that extent, as per statement from the commissariat officer at Wuzeerabad, dated Jan. 11, 1850.

This new rule was taken in 1847, and in 1849 appeared in the code of that year.

It is therefore evident, that the compensation for rations is not an ordinary daily occurrence, nor does it occur at every station. On the contrary, it is, I believe, of rare occurrence, and in many stations it is never called into operation from year's end to year's end.

The foregoing statement explains what the compensation is, and Lord Hardinge's modification of it, though known to the Government, was (as Brigadier Hearsey's letter, confirmed by Sir Walter Gilbert, explains) not known to the sepoys of the army generally. It had not, to my knowledge, come into operation in any station of the Punjab till last Christmas, when the rise of provisions at Wuzeerabad suddenly called for the application of the new rule, which, but for Brigadier Hearsey, would have unexpectedly introduced to the sepoys a new regulation, at the very moment when mutiny had appeared at this station in a very formidable shape! The aforementioned commissariat statement shows that this new rule deprived each sepoy of one anna and six pies per month, which he would have received by the old rate.

Brigadier Hearsey very properly stated, (and Sir Walter Gilbert agreed with him), that such a reduction ought not to be suddenly put into operation, without having been previously and carefully explained to the sepoy; for "*it appears to him to be a new regulation,*" injurious to the soldier.

I thought at the time, and I think so *now*, that these two general officers performed their duty with wisdom and prudence, placed, as they were, in very critical and dangerous circumstances; and here began my part in this transaction.

Seeing the great peril to which the Indian Government was exposed by the mutinous spirit which had appeared among the troops, it seemed to me that the greatest caution and the promptest decision on my part were necessary; and I resolved at once to suspend the operation of the new rule for an additional reduction from the pay of the sepoy at a moment so alarming,—on the same day reporting what I had done.

I therefore wrote to Sir Walter Gilbert to adjust the compensation in accordance with the regulations of 1845, which were perfectly known to and understood by the sepoys. These orders to Sir Walter Gilbert were expressly stated to be "*pending the result of a reference to the Supreme Government,*" which reference was made to that Government on the same day, viz. the 20th January. My orders to Sir Walter Gilbert were issued deliberately, but promptly; for I thought *then*, and I am sure *now*, that there was no time for doubt or hesitation: and three of the most experienced and distinguished officers in the Company's service concurred in my opinion.

I now come to the letter written by the Adjutant-General to Major Wyllie, by my orders, on the same day that I wrote to Sir W. Gilbert, and stating what my orders to that general officer were. This letter explains the whole case to the Supreme Government, and I awaited its orders. My belief is, that everything therein stated is perfectly correct, especially my conviction that "the change thus made, to the injury of the soldier, was both impolitic and unjust." I will add my belief that, had I not suspended the operation of the new rule, the then existing danger at Wuzeerabad would have been much increased, and very possibly would have produced bloodshed; for the sepoys had become daring, and, about ten days after, very nearly seized the fortress of Govindghur.

I repeat that I considered it impolitic to enforce the new rule of compensation, because it suddenly and without explanation tampered, at a most critical moment, with the sepoy's money,—at all times a most dangerous experiment. I considered it *unjust*, because, the former compensation having been once given, to take it away appears to me to be a breach of public faith to the soldier.

With regard to Lord Gough's opinion, referred to in Major Wyllie's letter, dated 14th February, 1850, the assertion is easily disposed of. See a memorandum given by Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, the Adjutant-General. I have thus endeavoured to set the whole of my conduct in its proper point of view, and in all its details, before the Governor-General in Council, because I consider that I acted as it became the Commander-in-Chief to act, and I would again act in similar circumstances. But I do not consider that the real question is, whether I acted with judgment or without judgment. I consider the real question to be this—whether the Commander-in-Chief in India,

removed to a great distance from all higher authority (the highest being even at sea), in a moment of great danger, surrounded by a hostile population, and with an army of upwards of forty thousand men infected with a mutinous spirit, was justified, or not justified, in using his discretion, and promptly dealing with danger in the manner which he thought most effectual for the safety of India.

This is the real question!

The Governor-General in Council has decided that I ought not to have used my own discretion; that I ought to have lost five weeks in applying to the Supreme Council for instructions; and the Governor-General in Council has not only reprimanded me publicly for my conduct, but has given me positive orders not again so to act "under any circumstances."

Such are the shackles put upon my conduct as Commander-in-Chief: such is the support which I have received on this occasion: and such the support which I may expect in future difficulties!

So circumstanced, I no longer feel safe, and shall resign a command that I could not retain, under such restrictions, with advantage to the public service.

Head-Quarters, Simla,  
22nd May, 1850.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief,  
22nd May, 1850.

#### MEMORANDUM.

Head-Quarters, Camp,  
2nd March, 1850.

I beg to submit, for your Excellency's consideration, with reference to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5,\* that the real question is not how, or under what circumstances, the rule to which you have objected was framed, but whether, at the present time, when the allowances in the Punjab have been reduced to the ordinary province rates, it is prudent or politic to enforce a rule which deprives the native soldier of even the trifling addition to the ration-compensation† to which he was entitled under the older regulation, framed by Lord Ellenborough, and published in the Pay Code of 1845.

Adverting to what is stated in paragraph 8, with respect to Lord Gough's cordial approval of the existing rule, I would observe that his Lordship could only have considered the ration-compensation question as then placed before him, in reference to its bearing on Scinde, where the soldier was in the receipt of the high rates of allowances then and still enjoyed by the troops serving in that province.

I am persuaded that Lord Gough had no knowledge of the correspondence between the Military Board, the Commissariat Department, and the Governor-General, to which allusion is made in paragraph 6; and if his Lordship was ever consulted, which I greatly doubt, regarding the general application of the general order of the 17th December, 1847 (paragraph 9), at all events he could not have considered it in connection with our occupation of the Punjab, and the altered circumstances in which the native troops serving in the new territory are now placed; neither, I may be permitted to add, could these points have been contemplated by the late Governor-General in Council when, for the sake of convenience and to save trouble, as stated in paragraph 5, it was decided to enact the rule to which your Excellency has seen reason to object.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Memorandum  
by the  
Adjutant-General,  
2nd March, 1850.

#### EXTRACT of a MILITARY LETTER from BENGAL.

(No. 139.)—Dated the 24th of August, 1850.

5. In continuation of paragraphs 22 to 25 of our general letter, No. 88, dated the 28th May, 1850, we have the honour to transmit further proceedings in the Military Department, regarding the suspension in the Punjab by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, of the orders issued by the Government of Lord Hardinge, in 1845, regulating the grant of compensation to native troops for dearness of provision.

Extract of a  
Military Letter  
from Bengal,  
24th Aug. 1850.

\* Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Letter No. 331, dated 14th Feb. 1850.

† At Wuzerabad it is stated to amount to one anna six pies per mensem.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Extract of a  
Military Letter  
from Bengal,  
24th Aug. 1850.

6. The memorandum of his Excellency on this subject and the minute in reply of the Most Noble the Governor-General, recorded on the proceedings as No. 41, of the 13th July, 1850, have already been transmitted to your Honourable Court from the Secret Department. Copies are now forwarded to complete our military "collections."
7. The Military Board, it will be observed, have been called on to furnish statements showing to what extent compensation has been issued under the order of 1844, and also under that of 1845.

## MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

*Dated Simla, 14th June, 1850.*

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
14th June, 1850,  
recorded on the  
Military Proceed-  
ings of  
13th July, 1850,  
No. 41.

I had the honour of receiving, on the 26th of May, a memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, in reply to the letter No. 451, April 13, 1850, addressed to the Adjutant-General, for his Excellency's information, by direction of the Governor-General in Council, on the subject of the orders relative to compensation for sepoy's rations in the Punjab.

2. I have given to his Excellency's memorandum that full consideration which is due, as well to the importance of the correspondence, as to the consequences which his Excellency has thought fit to connect with it. And having thus a second time examined the whole subject, together with the explanations and remarks which his Excellency has furnished, I beg leave to state that I adhere to the opinion I expressed before, that his Excellency's act, in cancelling an order of the Governor-General in Council, regarding sepoy's compensation for rations, and introducing another regulation into the Punjab, was precipitate and uncalled for; and that his Excellency therein exercised an authority which did not belong to him, and which was not justified by the circumstances of the case.

3. The Commander-in-Chief defends his act on the ground that he was placed in critical and dangerous circumstances; that the moment was alarming; that the Indian Government was in great peril by reason of the mutinous spirit which infected more than 40,000 men in the Punjab; and that therefore he was justified in setting aside, at such a time, the introduction of a new regulation, which enforced an additional reduction from the pay of the sepoy.

4. I regret to be unable to assent to the accuracy of these the main propositions on which Sir Charles Napier has rested the justification of his act.

5. Without further preface, and refraining from many remarks which the paper before me would suggest, I address myself to the consideration of these propositions. I shall endeavour to discuss them with as much conciseness as a full examination of them will permit, and I shall refute and shall disprove them both.

6. The Commander-in-Chief affirms that the rule of compensation, which he has lately superseded, was a new rule,—“a new rule, which, but for Brigadier Harsey, would have unexpectedly introduced to the sepoy's a new regulation at the very moment when mutiny had appeared at this station in a very formidable shape.” He terms it a “reduction,” which “ought not to be suddenly put into operation,” and he states that he suspended the “operation of the new rule for an additional reduction of the pay of the sepoy.”

7. In several other passages, his Excellency has in like manner termed it a new rule—he stigmatizes it as unjust and impolitic—asserts it to be a “breach of public faith to the soldiers;” and, finally, his Excellency has not thought it unbecoming his position to state, that “it suddenly, and without explanation, tampered at a most critical moment with the sepoy's money.”

8. In the first letter of the Adjutant-General, dated 20th January, 1850, to the Secretary to Government, his Excellency declared the rule he had superseded to be a new regulation. It is a matter of surprise to me that, notwithstanding the clear and distinct narrative, since that time transmitted to his Excellency, by order of the President in Council, in which facts and dates are fully cited, the Commander-in-Chief should now reiterate the same assertion, and that he should still treat the order of the Governor-General in Council, which he sets aside, as a new regulation, which suddenly introduced a fresh reduction at a critical moment. But as the letter in question, of the 14th February, seems to have escaped the recollection of the Commander-in-Chief, when he wrote the memo-



randum of the 22nd May, and as the narrative which his Excellency has given therein of the changes in the terms of the rule, is incomplete and incorrect, I am compelled to quote afresh the several orders which have been issued.

9. It is not necessary to specify the several rules which were introduced between the years 1821 and 1843.

10. On the 30th April, 1844, the Governor-General in Council, Lord Ellenborough, issued a general order, granting compensation for ration to sepoy, in the following terms :

“ It is known to the troops that when the price of ottah is above fifteen seers the rupee, compensation in money for the excess of price is now given to them, at the rate of a seer a day for each man.”

“ With a view of providing as is done in her Majesty’s service, that the soldier’s rations shall never cost him more than a fixed moderate sum, the Governor-General in Council thinks it expedient to extend the principle of giving compensation in money, in case of high prices, to the other minor articles composing the sepoy’s rations, and it is accordingly notified, that whenever the price of dholl is above ten seers the rupee, that of ghee above two seers the rupee, and that of salt above eight seers the rupee, compensation-money for the excess of price will be given to the troops, at the rate of two chittocks of dholl, one chittock of ghee, and one chittock of salt a day, each man.”

11. That rule was of short duration. It was rescinded (not in 1847, as his Excellency has supposed), but on the 15th August, 1845, when the Governor-General in Council, Lord Hardinge, directed that compensation should be paid whenever the price of provisions forming the soldier’s diet shall exceed Rs. 3. 8 a. on the aggregate of the rates for the several articles laid down in G. O. of 26th Feb., 1824.

12. On the face of the order, this rule was applicable only to the province of Scinde. It was explained, however, in a letter from the Government to the Commissariat Department, that the rule was to be acted upon “ elsewhere,” as well as in Scinde. On the 12th February, 1846, the rule for compensation of 15th August, 1845, No. 261 A., was made applicable to the British army which had crossed into the Punjab; and on the 17th December, 1847, in order to remove a doubt which had inadvertently arisen, the Governor-General in Council, Lord Hardinge, declared in General Orders, that the rule of 15th August, 1845, was “ intended to be, and is to be considered, applicable to the native troops generally, wherever they may be stationed.”

13. This is the last order which has been issued on the subject; and thus, in a few sentences, it is shown that the rule for compensation, far from being a new rule, was established as long ago as the 15th August, 1845, and that it has been uninterruptedly in force from that date to the present time.

14. But Sir Charles Napier has further asserted, that the rule was not known to the sepoy of the army. “ Lord Hardinge’s notification of it (he says), though known to the Government, was (as Brigadier Harsey’s letter, confirmed by Sir W. Gilbert, explains) not known to the sepoy of the army generally. It had not, to my knowledge, come into operation in any station of the Punjab till last Christmas;” and his Excellency intimates, that if enforced in January, 1850, “ it would have unexpectedly introduced to the sepoy a new regulation:” for this and other reasons, his Excellency states that he directed General Gilbert to adjust the “ compensation in accordance with the regulations of 1845 ” (his Excellency means the order of the 30th April, 1844), “ which were perfectly known to and understood by the sepoy.”

15. In the absence of any explanation by his Excellency of the preceding passage, it is difficult to understand how it should come to pass that the sepoy should perfectly know and understand the regulation of 1844, which lasted only for seventeen months, and yet that they should not know the regulation of 1845, which has endured for three times that period; or how it should come to pass that the sepoy should be familiar with a former rule, which has been done away with for four years and a half, and yet should know nothing of the existing rule, which has been in active operation during all that time.

16. Possibly, the observation which his Excellency has made, that the compensation is not “ an ordinary daily occurrence,” and that “ in many stations it is never called into operation from year’s end to year’s end,” may be intended as an explanation of the assertion that the sepoy did not know the rule of 1845.

17. I do not at all question the accuracy of the remark as a general one, but I beg to say that it does not apply to the particular case before us, and does not assist his Excellency’s argument.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 14th June, 1850, recorded on the Military Proceedings of 13th July, 1850, No. 41.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
14th June, 1850,  
recorded on the  
Military Proceedings of  
13th July, 1850,  
No. 41.

18. Whatever may have been the impression of the officers by whom his Excellency has unfortunately been misled, and however true it may be that compensation is often not paid from year's end to year's end, it assuredly is not the case that the sepoys were ignorant of the rule of 1845, or that that rule has been a dead letter; for it has not only been frequently promulgated, but the compensation allowed by it has frequently been disbursed among them.

19. Whatever publicity was given to the Compensation Order of 1844, which his Excellency says the sepoys perfectly knew and understood, precisely the same publicity was given to the rule of 1845. It was frequently published and re-published by the Commander-in-Chief in general orders to the army. In addition to the original publication, it was made applicable to the army of the Sutlej on the 15th February, 1846; it was continued to the troops in the Punjab in the Commander-in-Chief's orders of the 8th March, 1846; again on the 9th January, 1847; and republished on the 31st December of the same year.

20. Time has not admitted, before the departure of the mail, to ascertain every occasion on which the compensation was actually paid under this rule during the four and a half years of its existence. But documents are before me which show that it was paid to the large force in the Punjab in 1847; that it was paid to the whole army of the Punjab in 1848; and that it was again disbursed to the same army in 1849. The payments were not made at an isolated station, or to a few companies or corps; they were made to large bodies of troops, comprising a considerable portion of the Bengal army. These payments in themselves are amply sufficient to establish the fact that the rule of compensation of 1845 was known to the sepoys, not only by the ordinary course of orders issued to the army, but by the intelligible explanation of it which has been conveyed to them and to others by their having received and enjoyed the compensation allowed under the rule, on many different occasions, and in several continuous years.

21. I have thus examined, as briefly as possible in the preceding paragraphs, the assertion of Sir Charles Napier, that he was suddenly required to enforce a new rule, by which fresh reductions of pay were imposed upon the sepoy. The statements I have adduced in refutation of this position are not assertions, but official facts placed on public record, and which admit of no dispute. They prove that the order of the Governor-General in Council, which his Excellency took upon himself to abrogate, was a long-promulgated rule, established several years ago in principle, and constantly and continuously acted upon in practice ever since. They therefore utterly destroy the first of those pleas which his Excellency has advanced in defence of his act, viz., that in the month of January last his Excellency was suddenly called upon to enforce a new rule, which was not known to the sepoys, and by which further reductions were made from their pay, in addition to those which had already been directed.

22. Before I leave this part of the subject under consideration, I think it necessary to advert to the opinion expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, that the rule of compensation established in 1845 is unjust and impolitic. It will not be difficult to show that the conclusion which his Excellency has formed, on the very superficial examination which he appears to have given to the question, is altogether an erroneous one, and that the rule of 1845 is perfectly just in principle and liberal in extent. It is perfectly just in itself, because it fully accomplishes the purpose which was originally declared to be the object of a compensation rule, when Lord Ellenborough first issued his orders of 1844, and gives to the soldier everything which that order was intended to secure to him. It is politic, because, prevailing in every other part of the British dominions, there is no reason whatever why it should not be introduced, with the ordinary rates of pay, into the new province of the Punjab.

23. The principle on which the compensation rule of 1844 was founded is defined in the general order dated April 30th, 1844. It is this, "that the soldier's ration shall never cost him more than a fixed moderate sum."

24. The amended rule of 1845 strictly adheres to that principle, and gives full effect to it in its operation under all circumstances of price. The several articles composing the soldier's ration can never cost him more than the specified moderate sum of Rs. 3. 8a. 0p.; for however much the market price of those articles may exceed at any particular time that fixed sum of Rs. 3. 8a. 0p., the difference between the market price and the fixed sum above mentioned is immediately paid to the soldier in cash, and in addition to his pay.

25. The rule of 1844 secured the same result, but it did more than it was intended to do. The declared object of a compensation rule was to ensure that the soldier should

never pay for his ration more than a fixed moderate sum; but the rule of 1844, by giving compensation for the price of each article separately, not only secured to him his ration at this fixed moderate sum, but even if his ration should actually have cost him less than that fixed sum, it would frequently give him an additional payment in cash into the bargain.

And whereas the intention was that the soldier's ration should never exceed a fixed moderate price, and not that when the ration was cheaper than that price, it might, by a money payment, be made cheaper to him still; and whereas the existing rule of 1845 does fully provide that on all occasions and under all circumstances "the soldier's ration shall never cost him more than a fixed moderate sum;" it follows that this latter rule has strictly and literally secured to the soldier, in all respects, the whole advantage which it was the declared intention of the Government in 1844 to confer upon him; consequently, that the rule itself is strictly just, and that faith with the soldier has in no respect been violated.

26. Since, then, the rule has been shown to be just, I am unable to discover any reason why it should be impolitic to introduce it at once into the Punjab. The principle that the pay and allowances of the soldier should be, as far as possible, the same in every part of the British territories is a simple and a reasonable one. It has always, heretofore, been acted upon with justice and with success, and my declared intention of extending it to the Punjab has received the approbation of the authorities in England.

Precisely the same course was pursued by the Government of India in recent conquests as that which has now been followed by the Governor-General in Council. When, as the result of the war of 1846, the Jullundur Doab and other territories were dis severed from the kingdom of the Punjab, and added to this empire, the same measures as the present were enforced. The war allowances were continued as an indulgence for a time; on the relief of the occupying troops, those war allowances were withdrawn, and ultimately the relieving troops were placed on the ordinary rate of provincial pay, and the ordinary scale of allowances, including the compensation rate of 1845, was established also.

27. What possible reason can there be why the just measures which we pursued in respect of our first conquest in the Punjab should not be followed, when further conquests in the same country have been added to it? What possible reason can be alleged to show that it is impolitic to introduce into the Baree and neighbouring doabs the same rule of compensation which was at once established, and has been acted upon, in the Jullundur Doab? Why, in short, should the rule of compensation for soldiers' rations be different in the province of the Punjab from that which prevails in every other province of the Indian empire?

No reason whatever has been shown—none has been suggested—excepting the reason specially alleged by the Commander-in-Chief as applicable to the present case, namely, that he considered it impolitic to enforce the new rule of compensation, "because it suddenly and without explanation, tampered at a most critical moment with the sepoy's money."

28. I have already demonstrated that the rule was not a new rule, that it was not enforced suddenly, but was of long standing, and by frequent experience was well known to the sepoy.

I proceed now to consider the accuracy of his Excellency's description of the circumstances of the time, and of the position in which he declares that the Government was then placed.

29. In various passages of his memorandum, his Excellency states that when he issued the order on the 20th January, relative to sepoys' compensation, "mutiny had appeared in a very formidable shape;" that the officers in command were in "very critical and dangerous circumstances;" that it was "a moment of great danger;" that he was "surrounded by a hostile population, and with an army of upwards of 40,000 men infected with a mutinous spirit;" and finally, that the Indian Government, by reason of this mutinous spirit, was exposed to "great peril."

I cannot sufficiently express the astonishment with which I read, on the 26th May, the intimation then made to the Government by the Commander-in-Chief, that in the month of January last a mutinous spirit pervaded the army in the Punjab, and that insubordination had risen so high and spread so wide, as to impress his Excellency with the belief that the Government of the country was placed at that time in a position of "great peril."

30. I have carefully weighed the statements which his Excellency has advanced.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 14th June, 1850, recorded on the Military Proceedings of 13th July, 1850, No. 41.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
14th June, 1850,  
recorded on the  
Military Proceedings of  
13th July, 1850,  
No. 41.

I have examined anew the records that bear on the state of public affairs at that period, and I have well reflected upon all that has passed. While I do not seek to question in any way the sincerity of the convictions by which Sir Charles Napier has been led to declare that the army was in mutiny and the empire in danger, I, on my part, am bound to say, that my examination and reflection have not lessened in any degree the incredulity with which I first read the statements to which I have referred.

Passing over many minor evidences to the contrary, I feel myself unable to admit the reality of such a state of things, especially on this consideration, that it is quite irreconcilable with the official proceedings of the Commander-in-Chief at the time.

31. Is it conceivable, that if in January last, the insubordination of the troops in the Punjab, by reason of reduced allowances, was such as to place the Government in danger, the Commander-in-Chief would have left the quarter where reduced allowances and discontent prevailed, and would have quietly pursued his march towards a district where the high allowances were still retained, and where no dissatisfaction could possibly arise? Is it conceivable that his Excellency, who justly lays such stress on the necessity for the exertion of prompt decision under circumstances such as he describes, would neither have remained in, nor returned to, the plains, if such a spirit had generally prevailed there, but would have continued to remove himself to a distance from whence the exercise of that promptitude and decision was plainly impossible? Is it, in short, conceivable, that if 40,000 men had been so far disaffected as really to place the Government in peril, his Excellency would at such a time have quitted the scene of danger, and would have left to his subordinates the adoption of decisive measures, and the immediate responsibility of them? Unquestionably not. The reputation and character of Sir Charles Napier are a sufficient guarantee, that if the spirit of the troops had seemed to him thus extensively insubordinate to their service and dangerous to the Government, he would have remained upon the spot where discontent was loudest, and where danger was thickest. The bare fact itself, therefore, that his Excellency did not think it necessary to remain in the doabs, or to check his march towards Peshawur, entitles me with certainty to infer that no such extensive mutiny or such public peril existed, as has since been supposed.

31 A. But I do not need to rest this conclusion upon inference. There is direct evidence in its support, the evidence of the Commander-in-Chief himself. At the very period of which I am treating, his Excellency issued a General Order to the army, the terms of which directly disproved the existence of extensive mutiny or danger to the state. In that order of 16th January, 1850, Sir C. Napier recorded these remarkable words: "I have seen," he said, "I have seen most of the armies in the world, and I have never seen one that is better paid or better cared for, than the army of the East-India Company; *neither have I ever seen a more obedient, more honourable army.*" His Excellency did not conceal that insubordination existed, nor evade the mention of it; but he characterized its nature, and described its extent, when he added, "*I will not allow a few malignant, discontented scoundrels to disgrace their colours and their regiments by an insolent attempt to dictate to their Government what pay that Government shall give to soldiers towards whom it has always been both just and generous.*"

32. It is not pretended that anything occurred in the three days which immediately preceded the 20th January last; yet his Excellency has now informed the Government, that on that 20th January, the army was in mutiny, and the state in danger, when at that very time he was proclaiming to the army, and to the world, that a more honourable and obedient army he had never seen, and that the mutineers of its number were but a few malignant, discontented scoundrels. It is not my business to attempt to reconcile these irreconcilable contradictions, or to form any conjecture as to the impression under which his Excellency has recently written. But I cannot for a moment suppose that the Commander-in-Chief did not mean, or did not believe, that which he then declared to the army in the Punjab; and every circumstance within my knowledge goes to corroborate the truth and justice of the words he used. Therefore I am well convinced that his Excellency bore true testimony to the subordination of the troops in general when he so addressed them, and correctly estimated the comparative numbers of those whom a mutinous spirit had possessed.

33. The course of subsequent events has not impeached the substantial correctness of his Excellency's estimate of the comparative extent of the mutiny. One regiment, indeed, left in ignorance of the intentions of the Government through the scandalous disobedience of his orders by the officer who commanded it, unhappily fell from its duty, and was betrayed into acts of violence and insubordination. If the state of feeling in

surrounding corps had been such as is now alleged, the mutiny of the 66th would have been a spark sufficient to light the whole into a flame. But no symptoms of such feeling appeared. The native regiments who were at hand showed themselves ready to act against the mutineers cheerfully and with vigour. So hopeless were the men of the 66th themselves of sympathy or support, that they actually piled their arms at the word of command, and were marched out of Govindghur to await the arrival of the announcement of their fate. Disarmed and disgraced, they were marched across the Sutlej; and during all that time, and from that time to this, not a voice has been raised, either to imitate their example or to pity their fate.

34. Let it be remembered, that every native regiment in the Punjab was relieved and their places supplied by other corps. All on this side of the Indus were placed on ordinary cantonment allowances, corps after corps has crossed the Sutlej, pay-day after pay-day has passed, but with the exceptions which have been detailed, there has been no manifestation whatever, either of insubordination or discontent.

35. That the withdrawal of war allowances, which were continued as an indulgence after the war had ceased, was unpalatable to the sepoys, no one for one moment doubts. That dissatisfaction would be felt at the fact, however just and necessary the order might be, and that such dissatisfaction might be partially shown, were matters which the Government was fully prepared to expect. But relying on the perfect justice of the withdrawal of war allowances when war had ceased; conscious of the absolute necessity of the measure; mindful of the liberal and generous treatment which the sepoy receives from his Government, and which his Excellency in his general order of 31st January very forcibly describes, I was confident that the native troops, as a body, would act upon this occasion, as our experience told us they have acted on other occasions in similar circumstances, and that the transition to ordinary rates of pay and allowances would be made, if not with unbroken order, at all events with safety and with general submission.

36. Time and events have justified the confidence I entertained; for while I admit and lament that partial disaffection has prevailed, and that some misguided men have been betrayed into open mutiny, yet neither the frequency of the offence nor the number of the offenders, has been sufficient to justify the sweeping inculcation which has been pronounced by his Excellency on the troops that occupied the Punjab. I feel it to be my duty, therefore, to vindicate the Bengal army from the unjust and injurious imputations which its Commander-in-Chief has cast on 40,000 of its number, and to declare my firm conviction, that while some in its ranks have disgraced their names, the great body of the troops in the Punjab have been true to their colours and faithful to their salt.

37. There is no justification for the cry that India was in danger. Free from all threat of hostilities from without, and secure through the submission of its new subjects from insurrection within, the safety of India has never for one moment been imperilled by the partial insubordination in the ranks of its army.

I have confronted the assertions of the Commander-in-Chief on this head with undisputed facts, and with the authority of recorded documents. Fortified by these facts and documents, and my convictions strengthened by the information which the Government commands, I desire to record my entire dissent from the statement that the army has been in mutiny and the empire in danger.

38. It is possible that his Excellency, in the warmth of his argument and in his anxiety to vindicate his own act, may have unconsciously employed expressions which closer inquiry and more mature deliberation might tend to modify. But I cannot permit these grave allegations, impugning the fidelity of the army and questioning the safety of India, to be advanced by so high an officer as the Commander-in-Chief, without at once counteracting their possible influence by recording a declaration that, on the grounds already given, I altogether deny the accuracy of these allegations; and that however convinced his Excellency himself may be of the correctness of these representations, I contradict and condemn them as extravagant and mischievous exaggerations.

39. I have thus examined in detail the circumstances which his Excellency urged as a full justification of the step he took. I have proved that the Commander-in-Chief was not called upon to enforce a new rule or a fresh reduction, and that no such national emergency as that which he describes existed to justify his assuming the power which he exercised.

40. On this head, his Excellency denies that he assumed any authority at all, for he says that the order to substitute the rule of 1844, for that which existed, was stated to be "pending the result of a reference to the Supreme Government."

41. In the letter addressed by the Adjutant-General to the Secretary to Govern-

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 14th June, 1850, recorded on the Military Proceedings of 13th July, 1850, No. 41.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
14th June, 1850,  
recorded in the  
Military Proceedings of  
13th July, 1850,  
No. 41.

ment, of January 20th, it was distinctly stated, "the Commander-in-Chief *has directed* " that compensation shall be issued to the native troops serving in the Punjab, in " accordance with the old regulations," and compensation was issued accordingly.

42. His Excellency must be well aware that in such a case as this, if the order were once issued by him, the clause of reservation to which he points became at once an empty form. His Excellency cannot be ignorant that when the Commander-in-Chief had issued an order to the troops bestowing upon them certain additional advantages, the act was final. It was practically impossible for the Government to withdraw those allowances for some time to come, especially if the state of the army were such as his Excellency has described it. The authority then to cancel an order of the Governor-General in Council, and to alter the allowances of the troops, was assumed by the Commander-in-Chief; for the directions which he then issued were to all intents and purposes irreversible for the present.

43. The Commander-in-Chief, however, not only maintains that in this particular case he acted within the just exercise of his own authority, but in the concluding paragraphs of his memorandum he assumes a still higher and broader ground.

44. Quoting the letter addressed by order of the Governor-General in Council, on 13th April, to the Adjutant-General, his Excellency refers to the passage in which it was stated, "for the future guidance of his Excellency, that the Governor-General in Council will not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to " issue orders, which shall alter the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India." His Excellency proceeds to declare, "that, so circumstanced, he no longer feels safe;" and he announces that he "shall resign a command which he can no longer retain under " such restrictions with advantage to the public service."

45. Sir C. Napier, therefore, openly and broadly claims for himself, as Commander-in-Chief of this army, the power of altering the pay and allowances of the troops under his command, whenever in his discretion he may judge it necessary to do so.

46. Herein, his Excellency claims a power which has never heretofore belonged to any Commander-in-Chief in India, which is not enjoyed by the Commander-in-Chief of the British army itself, and which no constituted Government could ever allow. To concede this claim would confer on the Commander-in-Chief of this army, for the future, an authority disproportioned to the position in which his commission has placed him, and would render his power co-ordinate with that of the Government itself. The Government of India is responsible for the finances of the empire, and for the great interests which are closely dependent on their adjustment and right administration; but if the pay of the army is to be placed under the control of its Commander, the revenue of the country will in all time to come be at the mercy of any General in command, whose caprice may suggest the expediency, or whose fears may dictate the necessity, of an increase. In one word, to concede such a power to any Commander-in-Chief of this army would give to the empire of India two masters, and would render the sure administration of the Government plainly impossible.

47. Least of all should a power be conceded to the head of this army, to alter the regular pay and allowances of the troops during the manifestation of a mutinous spirit.

The regular pay of our native troops in India is ample in itself, and the allowances given in addition to the pay are generous in the extreme. Batta to pay his expenses when he marches—money to provide his quarters—increase of pay for length of service—pension when worn out—pension for wounds—pension to those he may leave behind him; these, with many lesser advantages, render the condition of our native soldiers far superior to that of the soldiers in the service of any native prince, and, as his Excellency has lately testified, equal to the condition of any soldier in the world.

48. Thus munificently and indulgently treated, no increase of what he now enjoys can reasonably or justly be demanded by him. To concede at any time hereafter, merely because discontent is threatened; to concede because a demand is made, however numerous those who demand, however menacing the aspect of affairs; would in my judgment, be, under any circumstances, a grievous error. It would serve no purpose but to add to the arrogance of the disaffected and uselessly to postpone the struggle which, under such circumstances, must come at last. To direct such a measure would be the worst weakness of which a ruler could be guilty, and so long as I have the honour of administering the government of India, it shall never be placed in the power of a General in Command to commit the Government to so feeble and so fatal a policy.

49. One point only remains on which I think it necessary to make any remark, before I bring this minute to an end. His Excellency Sir C. Napier, at the close of his

memorandum, having referred to the intimation conveyed to him by the Governor-General in Council that his Excellency could not be permitted to alter the pay or allowances of the troops at his own discretion, proceeds thus:—"Such are the shackles put upon my conduct as Commander-in-Chief—such is the support which I have received on this occasion; and such the support which I may expect in future difficulties."

50. In these sentences Sir C. Napier represents himself as aggrieved by restrictions placed upon him by the Government of India, and by such a denial of support in the past, that he can no longer expect to be supported in any future difficulties. I beg leave to bring these complaints to the test of facts; whereby it will be seen, that, whether regard be had to the period of his Excellency's service generally as Commander-in-Chief, or to recent events, his Excellency's complaints are equally groundless.

51. During almost the entire period of Sir C. Napier's service in India as Commander-in-Chief, the Government has been administered, in my absence from the Council, by myself alone; I am therefore competent to speak with accuracy as well of the acts as of the intentions of the Government. I will take upon myself to say that no Commander-in-Chief of this or of any other army ever received a more honest or more active support from the Government under which he served, than Sir C. Napier has received from me. From the day on which his Excellency landed in India and assumed the command, I have treated him with unreserved confidence, and as well from a desire to promote the public interest as from sentiments of personal good will. I have afforded to him ready co-operation, and have endeavoured on every occasion to meet his views and to strengthen his hands in the exercise of his own legitimate authority.

52. It would be very easy for me to cite instances in proof of what I have now advanced, but it is unnecessary. Sir Charles Napier has himself placed on record an ample acknowledgment of the support I have afforded to him. On the 26th February last, in a memorandum forwarded to the Governor-General in Council, his Excellency expressed himself in these words:—"The Commander-in-Chief in India has not the authority to fulfil the duties of his position in this and many other matters, as I have personally stated to his Lordship more than once; but I do not mean by this, that *I am denied any support from his Lordship*, quite the contrary. I complain of the system, which I think objectionable, and had not his Lordship given me the support which he has, I would not have remained a month in India. But I have to thank his Lordship, not the system, for that support."

53. Such is the unqualified testimony borne by his Excellency to the support he had received from me, from his arrival in India till February last. If it were possible, the support he has had since that date has been stronger still.

54. When the mutiny of the 66th regiment determined his Excellency to resort to vigorous measures, he issued a general order, in which he directed that that regiment, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, should forthwith be disbanded; he ordered that the officers and men of the Nusseeree battalion should be transferred to the 66th regiment; and lastly, that the Nusseeree battalion should again be raised by its commanding officer.

Each and all of these acts were beyond the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. It was the opinion of my colleagues and myself that they were all not necessary, and one of them was exceedingly embarrassing to the Government in its effects, by compelling the Governor-General in Council prematurely to increase the pay of the Sirmoor and Kumaon battalions, while the question was yet under the consideration of the Court, by reference from him. But was my support withheld from his Excellency? On the contrary, the Governor-General in Council, feeling that under such circumstances the acts of the Commander-in-Chief should receive a support without any qualification, confirmed each one of these three unauthorized acts with a full, cordial, and unqualified approbation.

55. I have purposely laid an emphasis on the word "unauthorized," for his Excellency in his general order stated, under some misapprehension which I am unable to explain, that he directed these several measures, "having resolved to use the powers entrusted to him by the Governor-General."

After careful examination of public documents and demi-official or private correspondence, I have been unable to find a single phrase which can be construed into the bestowal of such powers. Most certainly no such delegation of authority or power was ever contemplated by me.

I have to state, therefore, that his Excellency was not vested by me with authority to do those or any other acts which his own powers as Commander-in-Chief did not allow

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 14th June, 1850, recorded on the Military Proceedings of 13th July, 1850 No. 41.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
14th June, 1850,  
recorded on the  
Military Proceedings of  
13th July, 1850.  
No. 41.

him to do, for I knew too well the limits of my own authority to suppose that it was competent to me to delegate to the Commander-in-Chief, powers which belonged to me as Governor-General only.

56. My official conduct, in consequence of the statement contained in the general order I have quoted, has been publicly questioned as illegal; nevertheless, I should have continued to maintain silence on the subject even to his Excellency, but for the tenor of this memorandum.

The tone which his Excellency has therein assumed compels me to stand upon my defence, and at last to make known the full extent to which his Excellency's acts have owed their validity to my support.

57. Lastly, his Excellency has complained that support has been withheld from him by the Government, on the occasion of the issue of the order out of which this correspondence has arisen. Did, then, the Governor-General in Council withhold his sanction from the order which his Excellency issued on the 20th January? Did he reverse the instructions which the Commander-in-Chief had given, or thwart the object which he had in view?

I have done the very reverse of all this. Though that order of the Commander-in-Chief undid all that for six months I had been doing, though it counteracted my intentions, approved by the Court of Directors, to assimilate the pay and allowances of the troops throughout the British territories generally, and thus threw down at once the principle I had been building up anxiously and with difficulty; yet I recognized and confirmed that order. Thus to the last I have supported the acts of Sir Charles Napier, have confirmed his orders, and upheld his authority before the army and the public.

58. Yet in the face of such facts as these Sir Charles Napier has thought himself warranted in stating on record that his action has been fettered, that he cannot hope for support from me in future difficulties, and that he resigns.

59. I am much concerned that the retirement of Sir Charles Napier from the head of the Indian army, should appear to be in any way connected with any public act of mine. I regret still more that his Excellency should have permitted himself thus hastily to resign his high command on grounds so insufficient and untenable, and that he should abandon the charge so honourably intrusted to him, merely because the Government under which he acts, will not concede to him the power of altering the pay or allowances of the troops under his command, whenever in his discretion he may judge it necessary so to do.

59 A. The grounds on which I refuse such powers are set forth in this minute, and will be submitted, with the representations of the Commander-in-Chief, for the judgment of the Honourable Court of Directors and of her Majesty's Government. I have perfect confidence that the documents in their hands will suffice to convince them that I have uniformly afforded to Sir Charles Napier a full, cordial, and constant support. I have equal confidence that their judgment will be, that I have only done my duty towards the Government I administer, and towards those who intrusted it to me, in refusing to allow to the Commander-in-Chief of their army a power which no Commander-in-Chief has ever enjoyed, which no predecessor of his has ever dreamed of claiming, and which no Government in Christendom could ever concede.

Simla,  
14th June, 1850.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

#### EXTRACT MILITARY LETTER FROM BENGAL.

No. 66.—*Dated 19th April, 1851.*

4. In continuation of paragraphs 5 to 7 of our general letter, No. 139, dated 24th August, 1850, we have the honour to forward, for the purpose of completing our military collections, the accompanying papers, already transmitted to the Secret Committee by the Most Noble the Governor-General, comprising a memorandum by Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B., late Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Headquarters, Camp, 4th December, 1850, on the subject of his resignation of that office, and the occurrences which preceded it; together with a minute recorded by his Lordship in reply, on the 28th January, 1851.

Extract  
Military Letter  
from Bengal,  
19th April, 1851.  
Consultation,  
7th March, 1851.  
Collection No. 3.



EXTRACT FORT WILLIAM, MILITARY CONSULTATIONS of the  
7th of March, 1851.

## No. 2 c. Military Department.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated, 3rd February, 1851.*

SIR,

In continuation of letter No. 122 A, of the 14th June, 1850, I am directed to inclose, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, copy of the undermentioned correspondence.

From Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
3rd Feb. 1851.

Despatch from the Adjutant-General of the army, No. 1362, dated 10th December, 1850, inclosing a memorandum by Sir C. Napier, dated July, and 4th of December, 1850.

Reply to above, No. 2 A, of this date.

Minute of the Most Noble the Governor-General, dated 28th January, 1851.

Letters to, and from, the officer commanding the Governor-General's body guard.

Communication to the Foreign Department, No. 2 B, of this date.

I am, &c.

Camp Kote,  
the 3rd February, 1851.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Asst. Sec. to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

## No. 1,362.

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. TUCKER, C.B., Adjutant-General of the army, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

*Dated 10th December, 1850.*

SIR,

I am ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to transmit to you, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General, a memorandum\* in original by his Excellency, bearing date, Simla, July, 1850; and Camp, 4th December, 1850.

From Lieut.-Col.  
H. T. Tucker to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
10th Dec. 1850.

Simla,  
10th December, 1850.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieut.-Col.,  
Adj.-Gen. of the Army.

MEMORANDUM in reply to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S MINUTE  
of the 14th June, 1850.

Paragraphs of the  
Governor-General's  
Minute.  
Para. 2.

I must beg leave to deny the first assertion made by his Lordship in this paragraph. I *suspended* the execution of the order; and to *suspend was not to cancel*.

His Lordship's second assertion is, that my so doing "*was precipitate and uncalled for*." This, also, I deny, because there was a mutiny.

His Lordship, thirdly, says that I exercised an authority which did not belong to me. Being beyond the reach of higher authority, I exercised my discretion, and instantly reported my having done so to higher authority.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief, dated Simla,  
July, 1850, and  
Head Quarters,  
4th Dec. 1850.

\* Forwards a Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief in reply to the Governor-General's Minute of the 14th June, 1850.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minute.

Para. 2.

Fourthly. His Lordship says, I was "not justified by the circumstances of the case." I assert that they did justify me; and in this opinion I was supported by the opinions of officers of the Indian army with me on the spot—officers of the highest rank and of the greatest experience in that army.

Paragraph 2.

Paras. 3 and 4.

Yes! I *suspended* the execution of the order upon the grounds stated by his Lordship; but his Lordship has omitted to add that I only did so till I should receive orders from the Supreme Government, to which I instantly reported what I had done "*pro tempore*." But his Lordship "cannot assent to the accuracy of these, the main propositions, &c." His Lordship here assumes that the Governor-General, thousands of miles distant at sea, was better able to decide on an extremely difficult military question than the Commander-in-Chief on the spot, assisted by several of the most experienced officers of the army.

Paras. 5 and 6.

Contain nothing to the purpose,—mere recapitulation of my memorandum.

Para. 7.

Contains nothing more than an offensive sneer. The only reply I shall at present make is the reiteration of every word that I formerly used. I formed my opinion of the details from what I heard from the Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, from Sir W. Gilbert, and from Brigadier Hearsey, and from my own judgment as regarded the existing danger, in which we all concurred; and here it may be right to say who Brigadier Hearsey is, for with him, who was on the spot, the whole affair originated. Brigadier Hearsey was born and brought up in India; he has served all his life as a regimental officer with native troops, and is considered by the whole Bengal army not only to be one of its most distinguished officers, but to be more intimately acquainted with the language, feelings, and character of the sepoys, than perhaps any other officer, civil or military, in the service of Government; and it was because of his being so thoroughly aware of the angry feelings of discontent which pervaded the minds of the whole of the native regular troops in the Punjab, that I gave the very greatest weight to his opinions. Had I not done so, and that the discontented troops at Wuzeerabad had broken out into open mutiny, one general cry of reprobation would have instantly arisen against me throughout all the British empire! Had Brigadier Hearsey not acted as he did, then on *him* would have fallen the blame; for the Commander-in-Chief of such an immense army as this, can only act on the reports of his commanders of divisions, brigades, and regiments. Whether Brigadier Hearsey, Sir W. Gilbert, Lieut.-Col. Grant (the Adjutant-General), and myself formed views that were correct, or the contrary, is not the question. They were the best we were able to take, and I acted upon them, with entire success, when failure would have been ruinous, and, to use the words of the Governor-General a month before, "*would be worse than a defeat by an enemy in the field*." Had I done otherwise I ought to have been dismissed the service. That the crisis was most dangerous, every one knew perfectly well; and no one was more alive to the danger than the Governor-General himself, whilst he remained within the reach of a knowledge of what was going on. It is therefore the more unaccountable to find his Lordship, after having been at sea, far beyond the reach of knowing the events that were in progress, attempting, by erroneous assertions, and arguments discordant with facts, to dispute the opinions of men on the spot, and deny the tendency and symptoms of overt acts infinitely more serious than any of those which had previously excited his alarm when he was on the scene himself.

There was the mutiny! Forty thousand sepoys were more or less infected with this bad spirit: we were in the midst of a hostile

Paragraphs of the  
Governor-General's  
Minute.  
Para. 7.

population; the Governor-General was far away on the high seas; the Supreme Council one thousand five hundred miles distant: the whole responsibility of quelling this mutiny rested upon me. I was obliged to decide to the best of my judgment. I had no reason to doubt the statements of Brigadier Hearsey and his commissariat officer, sustained by Sir Walter Gilbert and the Adjutant-General of the army, in reference to the orders and the practice under which they had been serving all their lives; and I had no time, in the circumstances, to scrutinize their statements by reference to Calcutta. I had necessarily to decide at once, and I did so without a moment's delay. Armed soldiers in mutiny cannot be dealt with by the inexcusable procrastination which I am found fault with by my Lord Dalhousie for not adopting. Whether my decision was the best that could have been come to, does not enter into the question. I did what I thought *right*, and I *succeeded*, without cost, too, either of money or of life! Now it is impossible for his Lordship to show that a different course might not have failed, after both had been expended. This is the whole question; but his Lordship ingeniously eschews it.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief, dated Simla,  
July, 1850, and  
Head Quarters,  
4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraph 3.

Paras. 8 to 21.

In these paragraphs the Governor-General reverts to my memorandum, dated 22nd May, and, wholly neglecting the grounds on which I based the defence of my order relative to the rations, his Lordship fixes upon a number of comparatively unimportant details, and therefore I shall not lengthen this memorandum by answering these observations of the Governor-General, but allow, without entering further into the discussion, that I may have been misled by Brigadier Hearsey and Lieut.-Col. Grant, neither of whom seems to have recalled the circumstances of the case which his Lordship, after the danger had been averted by me, and with full time to apply to the public offices, has discussed in thirteen paragraphs. But his Lordship has, as I before said, studiously avoided answering the following, and all important, paragraphs of my memorandum:—"But I do not consider that the real question is, whether I acted with judgment, or without judgment. I consider the real question to be this,—whether the Commander-in-Chief in India, removed to a great distance from all higher authority (the highest being at sea), in a moment of great danger, surrounded by a hostile population, and with an army of upwards of forty thousand men infected with a mutinous spirit, was justified, or not justified, in using his discretion, and promptly dealing with danger in the manner which he thought most effectual for the safety of India. This is the real question." And this is precisely the question which his Lordship has so unjustly decided in his reprimand of the 13th April, but so carefully avoided the discussion of in the minute under reply.

Finally, I completely succeeded in putting a stop to a widely-spread and spreading mutiny in the Bengal army, probably the most dangerous that had ever appeared in that army, because founded upon the claims of the soldier to dictate to Government what rate of pay he should receive—a principle which, in all ages and among all nations, has been perilous to the state and popular among the troops, and which principle had just destroyed the Punjab Government! Not only *that*, but numbers of the relatives of our sepoys, then claiming more pay, were among the actors in the very army which had so recently destroyed their own Government, on the very spot where the sepoys were now following the identical plan pursued by the Sikh army, of employing agitators to go from company to company, and from regiment to regiment. Had the measures taken by me not prevented it, we should in a short time have had "*Punchayets*" assembling in every regiment!

Paragraph 4.

Paras. 22 to 28.

These seven paragraphs of his Lordship's minute are devoted to

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850,

Paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minute.

Paras. 22 to 28  
*continued.*

disprove my opinion, "That the rule of compensation established in 1845 is unjust and impolitic." My opinion remains the same after reading his Lordship's seven paragraphs against it, and hereafter I shall probably explain my reasons for that opinion. Still, it was merely an opinion expressed to superior authority, and *right or wrong*, I was bound to express it.

The Governor-General thinks he has overturned my arguments on this irrelevant point. I shall not discuss it with his Lordship. I shall only make one remark, that if the rule of 1845 was, in the opinion of the Governor-General, both just and politic, I cannot imagine why he did not *at once* remove the temporary suspension which I had laid upon it. Even I, thinking it both unjust and impolitic, only *suspended* its operation at a critical moment! That moment had long passed, and there could be no danger whatever in restoring a regulation which his Lordship considers so "just and politic." His Lordship's acts seem to contradict his expressed opinions in this instance.

## Paragraph 5.

Paras. 29 to 59.

The remainder of his Lordship's minute is contained in these thirty paragraphs, the drift of which is merely to prove that there was no mutiny in the army, and that I never believed that one existed; that my own orders prove this, and that I have libelled the Bengal army. Now, I assert the very reverse of all this to be the case. I assert that every man in India, including the Governor-General himself (whose own letters prove it), knew that there was a very extensive spirit of mutiny among the troops. That this mutiny, being grounded on the desire to get higher pay, was in the very greatest degree dangerous. That great alarm existed in consequence. That I was not only aware, but told the Governor-General of it. That my own orders prove its existence, and not only my knowledge of it, but also the pains I took to conceal from the army the extent of the danger. *Common sense called upon me to conceal this danger*, lest it should spread still wider, and the whole army, learning that a great number of regiments were combined in the Punjab, might join. No one could exactly tell how far the bad spirit had spread; and to have made a parade of it in public orders would have been madness!

As to my libelling the Bengal army, it is an unjust and unfounded assertion made by his Lordship, which I think it sufficient indignantly to deny.

I will take these paragraphs *seriatim*, and reply as shortly as I can to each, and begin with the—

Para. 29.

His Lordship need not have expressed any "*astonishment*" at what was known to every one, and himself among the rest.—See my letters to him on the subject, as well as several of his own to me, showing that he had been informed of the danger before he went to sea. When at sea he knew nothing about the progress of what was going on; but on his return he found that a strong fortress had been nearly seized by a regiment in open mutiny; that the mutiny was for an increase of pay; this made it of the most dangerous kind, uniting Mahomedans and Hindoos in one common interest. That five regiments had manifested *openly* their mutinous disposition. That the men of one, the 32nd, had openly declared their intention of consulting with other regiments. That some had said, "What can we do *now*, with two European regiments in cantonment with us: wait till we can consult with the other regiments." That the fortress nearly seized had a large treasure in specie in it. That it had cannon and ammunition in it. His Lordship knew all these things. He also knew that an extraordinary correspondence had been going on between all the native regiments. Will he deny that we had about 40,000 native troops in the Punjab, having the same will, interests, and feelings as those regiments that had already shown a

Paragraphs of the  
Governor-General's  
Minute.

Para. 29  
*continued.*

Para. 30.

Para. 31.

bad spirit? Will he deny that the Punjab population was hostile, and well armed? His Lordship will scarcely venture to deny these facts, which are patent to all India; and does he pretend "*astonishment*" beyond expression, at my saying that there was peril in such a state of things? If so, I can only express equal astonishment, and pass on to

In this paragraph his Lordship expresses his incredulity that "*the army was in mutiny, and the empire in danger*;" a sweeping and exaggerated mode of expression: a statement which I never made as his Lordship asserts that I did. The whole army was *not* "in mutiny;" but a mutinous spirit pervaded a large portion of that part of the army which occupied the Punjab. This misrepresentation of my words is not argument; so I pass on to

His Lordship says (and in saying so evinces but little acquaintance with the subject he treats of), that my going to Peshawur entitles him, "*with certainty, to infer that no extensive mutiny or public peril existed, as has since been supposed.*" This is one of those assertions which his Lordship has been pleased to substitute for argument, as I will in this instance endeavour now to show.

The mutinous spirit first broke out at Rawul Pindee, in July, 1849. I was then at Simla. It next displayed itself at Delhi, in November, 1849. I was on the spot. It then showed itself at Wuzeraabad in December, and finally it burst forth at Umritsir in January. Here were evidences of long-continued design and correspondence,—a correspondence so alarming, that one general officer asked me to order the letters to be opened privately, which I refused to authorize, because I was prepared for the worst, and there was something revolting in the act. (Moreover, all my information concurred in saying that there was such a correspondence going on, and that the plan of the mutineers was to oppose the Government by passive resistance; namely, to refuse the pay of Rs. 7, and demand Scinde pay of 12. Before proceeding, let us see what passive resistance leads to. The sepoy refuses to accept his pay; he is respectful in his demeanour, and does his duty correctly in all other ways. This can only go on a few days. Then comes want of food, and one side must give in, or recourse be made to violence. The Government cannot give in. Suppose thirty or forty regiments take the course of this passive resistance (and when his Lordship left India, *five regiments had*), what could prevent a collision with the Government? Who could say that more regiments would not join? In this state of things, who will pretend that there was not great peril? No one but the Governor-General in his after reflection upon past dangers, which I had overcome, but which had not surrounded him as they did me. He was far away seeking health on the ocean, and the Supreme Government was at Calcutta, 1,500 or 2,000 miles distant. I was alone, and the whole responsibility was thus thrown upon the Commander-in-Chief.

So circumstanced, I decided to proceed to Peshawur, for the following reasons, and I have never changed my opinion:—1st. There are two points where our position in the Punjab is more exposed to danger than in any others, *Peshawur* and the *Manjha*. My reasons for considering these points to be the weakest do not enter here. I had that experienced officer Sir Hugh Wheeler posted in the Jullunder, and he had with him an excellent European regiment, besides a large force of irregulars, whose pay was regulated by a different principle from that of the sepoys, and they were, therefore, supposed to be faithful. Besides being an excellent soldier, Sir Hugh Wheeler has spent his whole life among the sepoys, and is master of their language. Who, let me ask, was more fit to control the large portion of sepoys in the Jullunder than this officer? No one!

The next and still safer station of Lahore was under the distinguished Sir W. Gilbert, who had under his hand two European regi-

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief, dated Simla,  
July, 1850, and  
Head Quarters,  
4th Dec. 1850.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minutes, Para. 31.

ments, a strong force of European artillery, and a large body of irregulars. Sir Walter also speaks the native language. My *fixed* presence was as little wanted here as in the Jullunder! The next station was Wuzcerabad. There Brigadier Hearsey commanded. If any man could deal with the sepoy, he could, and he had three regiments of Europeans with him. Under him, therefore, Wuzcerabad was as safe as I could make it.

The next station is Jhelum. This small station was the most exposed, because there were no Europeans; but it was no place for the Commander-in-Chief and his camp. If the troops mutinied, I had not an European under my hand. But there I staid three days, and reviewed the troops. An excellent officer, Colonel Huish, was in command, and no more could be done at this station. Pass on to Rawul Pindee. There her Majesty's 53rd regiment enabled Brigadier Broton to hold his ground; as he had a force of Europeans equal to that of the native regiment.

Now, where would the Governor-General have had me fix my head-quarters? In each of these places my presence could have done no good, and would, in some measure, have shackled the above able officers in their own command. Well, we now come to Attock and Peshawur, to which last place I had sent the able Sir Colin Campbell. This position, in case of an open mutiny of the sepoy in the Punjab, became most important, because the moment a mutiny broke out in open violence, Peshawur would, as well as Attock, have been exposed to an attack from the Afghans, and from Gholab Sing, through the Baramulla pass. Lord Dalhousie asserts that, because the troops at Peshawur had the high pay, "no dissatisfaction could possibly arise." I must take leave to tell his Lordship, that he knows but little of soldiers, if he thinks they would not unite in a common cause! Still I will admit, that where the high pay existed, there would be a fair probability of the sepoy being contented. But does his Lordship imagine that if the mutiny broke forth, as there was great probability of its doing, that he could hold Peshawur? It appears that his Lordship has no just idea of the danger of such a crisis, nor how such a crisis was to be encountered—looking forward to safety with indiscreet confidence. Had all happened that might have happened, the Queen's troops, comparatively few in number, would have been isolated at each station. The Sikhs and Afghans would inevitably have been in arms. What the Maharaja would have done no man can tell, but he would have had power to do us all possible mischief. I might have been obliged to withdraw the European force at Peshawur, recrossed the Indus, and marched upon Lahore, gathering the Europeans as I swept along, engaged with the enemy during the whole march. It would have been impossible to divine what would happen, and what would not, and if my presence was useful at one place more than another, it was probably at Peshawur. But my duty was to move rapidly from station to station, and to conceal the great danger which existed; it was to show no fear of mutiny; to confide in my sepoy escort, and to brave the worst; trusting to my own resources if that worst happened, and in the meantime to lose no opportunity of winning the confidence of the troops; which last was one reason, among several, for my going with them to Kohat; because, under fire, a commander gains the confidence of his troops; for this reason I was delighted to have an opportunity of expressing my feelings towards them, when I wrote the despatch of the 16th February, which the Governor-General thought proper to suppress. It has since been published, and the Bengal army know that I am not the man either to conceal their deeds or to libel them!

Such were, among others, the reasons for my going to Peshawur, exclusive of the necessity which existed that I should visit that important station. I hold them to have been sound, and that my conduct became the Commander-in-Chief of this army.

Paragraphs of the  
Governor-General's  
Minute.  
Para. 31.

On the other hand, his Lordship would have had me proclaim, in my remarks upon the sentence of doomed mutineers, my belief that a considerable portion of the Punjab army was tainted with a mutinous spirit! proclaim to them their numbers and their strength! break off the prosecution of an important tour, and do so, from the fear of a danger which might, or might not, become greater, and shut myself up in a cantonment or in the fortification of Lahore, cowering under the insolence of mutinous troops! I beg the Governor-General's pardon; but this would have been an impolitic and unbecoming line of conduct, much more likely to encourage the mutineers than to quell the mutiny! It would have alarmed the whole of India, and would have given hopes of no unfounded a nature to the armed and discontented Sikhs, and to the astute Maharaja of Cashmere. I must have also sacrificed the many and important other objects of my journey, namely, first, getting acquainted with the officers in the various commands,—second, knowing and being known to the troops,—third, seeing how they were lodged and fed,—fourth, choosing sites for new cantonments,—fifth, seeing the state of drill and discipline of regiments,—sixth, seeing the topography of the country, its views, passes, jungles, &c., so that if war was to be made, I might have a just idea of the country. All these, and other important points, added to the propriety, not to say necessity, of the tour which I had undertaken; and I have also a right to congratulate myself, that my timely arrival at Peshawur prevented a disaster to our arms.

As I consider that I have now fully answered this paragraph, I shall pass over all his Lordship's subsequent reasoning, if that can be called reasoning which is built upon so unsound a base.

Paragraph 6.

Paras. 31 A and 32.

This has been answered in my last paragraph, and the "*irreconcilable contradictions*" reconciled without the least difficulty, as they only existed in his Lordship's imagination; but I must again beg to remind his Lordship that a grave misrepresentation of my words is repeated in paragraph 32, where I am stated to have informed the Government, in my letter of 22nd May, that on the 20th of January "*the army was in mutiny.*"

His Lordship asserts, as an admitted fact, that "one regiment, "left in ignorance of the intentions of the Government," was "*betrayed into acts of violence.*" This was not the case. No regiment was ignorant of the intentions of Government. Major Troup, of the 66th, in common with others, did not obey his orders; but those orders were, nevertheless, read to the whole regiment, at Lucknow, as Lord Dalhousie knew; for I forwarded the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry to the Government, in which proceedings the fact was distinctly stated by one of the European officers, and was known to every one. Why his Lordship chooses to make this erroneous assertion is, therefore, best known to himself. The 66th were *not* "betrayed" into mutiny; they had planned it long before.

The Governor-General in this paragraph chooses to assume that there was no mutiny, and chooses to forget that I had quelled the mutiny; for that reason, there was no mutiny when he wrote his minute. This assumption on the part of the Governor-General, and the sneering tone which his Lordship has thought proper to use in this minute, would alone have obliged me to resign the command had I not already done so, and had nothing else proved the total want of confidence which had arisen between the Governor-General and myself.

Paragraph 7.

Pars. 33, 34, and 35.

In these paragraphs the Governor-General endeavours, by the most extraordinary and the most disingenuous course of reasoning, to describe the perfect obedience of the Indian army after I had put down the mutiny, as if that submissive state was not the result of

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minute.  
Paras. 33, 34, & 35.

the measures I had taken to quell mutiny! The last circumstance his Lordship has endeavoured to cast out of sight altogether. This appears to me so extremely absurd and unfair, that I shall not at present vouchsafe any answer.

## Paragraph 8.

Para. 36.

The only notice I shall at present condescend to take of this paragraph is, a distinct denial. I have cast no "unjust and injurious imputations on the Bengal army." His Lordship's endeavours to turn the Bengal army against one who has led their battalions in action, and who they know to have done his duty towards them, both in action and out of action, is as weak as it is unjustifiable, and there I leave it, with this observation—that to forget good service is common among men; but to enjoy the safety resulting from good service, and then endeavour to make the man who produced that safety appear criminal, is unusual; and I willingly leave to the Governor-General any satisfaction which he may be able to derive from such a line of conduct.

## Paragraph 9.

Para. 37.

This paragraph consists in a concatenation of mere assertions, which I dispute, and have shown to be fallacious. I also here record my entire dissent from his Lordship's convictions; and having far more experience than his Lordship, and having also been on the spot, whereas he was at sea, I consider that I am the best able to judge; I cannot, however, avoid referring his Lordship to a third repetition of his misrepresentation of my words, which I find in the last line but one of his paragraph 37.

## Paragraph 10.

Para. 38.

His Lordship seems unfortunately to have lost temper, and permitted himself to become personally offensive in his language. I shall not follow his example, but merely record here my dissent from, and denial of, the correctness of the whole paragraph, which, at some more convenient opportunity, shall be answered.

## Paragraph 11.

Para. 39.

Already fully answered. This is merely repetition of a former paragraph.

## Paragraph 12.

Paras. 40 and 41.

In these his Lordship gives a quotation from the Adjutant-General's letter to Government, leaving out that which contradicts the crime of defying the Government, which is implied in these paragraphs. I said, "*confident of the support of Government*," the Commander-in-Chief has directed, &c. As this letter was dated the same day as my Order, the "*confident in the support of Government*" shows that I considered my own act as merely a secondary one, waiting for the sanction (or the reverse) of the Government, and not issued insolently to usurp the power of Government. But this is not all. I sent to his Lordship an extract from my Order, which does not permit of being mis-stated, or of doubt; and his Lordship quotes it in part. My orders to Sir W. Gilbert contained directions that they were only to be obeyed pending a reference to Government. I quoted the exact words to Lord Dalhousie, and I here do so again:—"I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to request that you will cause instructions to be immediately issued to the several officers of the Commissariat department concerned, to adjust the compensation in accordance with the old regulations as laid down in the code of 1845, pending the result of a reference which will be made to the Supreme Government on the subject," and



Paragraphs of the  
Governor-General's  
Minute.  
Paras. 40 and 41,

which was made on that same day, namely, the 20th January. There never was a more unjust, unfair, and unfounded accusation against a man in my position than that of charging me with an attempt to usurp those powers which belong to the Supreme Government alone! After which groundless accusation, no man having proper respect for his position as Commander-in-Chief could hold that commission.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief, dated Simla,  
July, 1850, and  
Head Quarters,  
4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraph 13.

Para. 42.

There was not the objection which the Governor-General supposes to reversing my orders. They were issued with reference to the most dangerous and critical state of the troops at *that* moment. By my having issued them "*pending*" sanction, and not "*abrogating*" any existing order, I clearly showed that while I held it "unjust and *impolitic*," I was quite prepared to enforce it, if so ordered by Government. My own conviction is, that the Government were satisfied that it was both unjust and impolitic, but was afraid to enforce it. The fact is, that the compensation for rations is a rare occurrence, and I know officers of long service who never yet saw it enforced! The application of it is so partial, that the code of 1849 may now be, at any moment, put in force whenever his Lordship pleases; especially as it is a rule which he deems so admirable. The amount which Government lost by my suspending the rule (which applied for the first time to the troops at Wuzeerabad) was only about (63) sixty-three rupees a month on a regiment of 1,000 men.

Paragraph 14.

Paras. 43, 44, 45,  
46, 47, and 48:

His Lordship has devoted these six paragraphs to the display of a vast number of truisms, which I am not aware that any one is inclined to dispute, and this has been done ostentatiously enough, in opposition to a claim which his Lordship has been pleased to put into my mouth; for I positively deny that I ever made any claim so perfectly ridiculous! My answer may therefore be short.

First, that his Lordship has worked himself up to a long description of this claim, made not by, but for me, to a dictatorship, and which he so nobly avows his determination to resist while he is Governor-General of India, but which never entered my head till I was amused by reading the Governor-General's description of it.

Secondly, that my *real* claim was simply this, that, when placed in a position of danger and responsibility, in consequence of both the Governor-General and the Supreme Government being far beyond my reach; when I was obliged to act on my responsibility and at my own discretion; when in so doing I did my best, and moreover with perfect success, I might not be submitted to a public, severe, and unjustifiable reprimand. That is my real claim, and not the dictatorship of India. I had a right to support which I did not receive, and I therefore resigned. I did not dispute the right of the Governor-General to reprimand the Commander-in-Chief: but I denied, and I still deny, the justice of his exercise of that right. Therefore I resolved not to submit to an undeserved and uncalled-for reproof. Had Lord Dalhousie written to me a private letter to say, "you were in a difficult position, and you did your best, but "I think you were wrong;" or had he written a civil public letter, differing with me, as the Government at Calcutta did before the Governor-General landed, the case would have been different. I would have taken no offence, and such a course would have been becoming in him. But to this intemperate reprimand no man could submit without baseness, especially when I maintain that my whole conduct was correct, politic, and perfectly successful.

Paragraph 15.

Paras. 49, 50, 51,  
52, 53, and 54.

His Lordship in these paragraphs has assumed, and without the slightest foundation for the assumption, that I wanted to alter the

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minute.

Paras. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54.

pay and allowances of the troops at my own discretion. Having assumed this most erroneous position, he proceeds to say that I complained of want of *support in the post*; and then he overturns the complaint of his own creation, which he so gratuitously endeavours to fix upon me. All this is making out a case which has no existence in fact. My complaint was as distinct as the sun in the heavens. I stated in my memorandum, that the absence of any higher power to refer to for a decision, had driven me to act to the best of my judgment and with success, for which I deserved *thanks*, and received *reprimand*. After describing this *single fact* (for the whole case referred to regards but one "*fact*"), I concluded thus, "Such are the shackles put upon my conduct as Commander-in-Chief; such is the *support which I have received ON THIS OCCASION*, and such the *support which I may expect in future difficulties*. So circums-tanced, I no longer feel safe, and shall resign a command which I could not retain under such restrictions with advantage to the *public service*." Do the words, "on this occasion," authorize his Lordship's sweeping assertion that I complained of denial of support in the post? Assuredly not, and the proofs which he adduces to show that he had given me support on other occasions are unnecessary, for I never questioned it. On the contrary, I always and openly acknowledged it. It was his duty to give it to me; and had I not received it, I should have resigned sooner. But all that his Lordship has stated in these five paragraphs is fighting with a shadow. The one complaint I made (for I did not make "*complaints*"), was not groundless; it was just, and no officer of my rank, and in the position I stood, could submit to such an offensive reproof as I had received. It was impossible for me to remain Commander-in-Chief after that reprimand. Lord Dalhousie seems to think that his having given me support on previous occasions gave him the right to inflict on me this unjustifiable reprimand, for no reprimand is justifiable unless the man reprimanded has been culpable; and no man can be culpable who has fully succeeded under very difficult circumstances. His Lordship is in error. His former support gave him no right to withdraw support on this occasion, of which he must have been aware at the time.

## Paragraph 16.

Para. 55.

In this paragraph his Lordship says, that he did not authorize the acts which he enumerated in paragraph 54, and of which he afterwards approved, and that he is unable to explain on what "*misapprehension*" I said, "*having resolved to use the powers entrusted to me by the Governor-General*," and the Governor-General denies having entrusted me with such powers. I will, therefore, by quotations from his Lordship's letters to me, endeavour to show that my "*misapprehension*," if I did misapprehend, which I deny, was a very natural one, and that most men in the same situation would, in like manner, have misapprehended. As his Lordship says it was a misapprehension, be it so; all I can say is, that it was a very happy misapprehension, and one for which I deserve thanks. It was fortunate for the East-India Company that I was driven by circumstances to act by my own judgment, and that the Governor-General was not present to prevent my taking advantage of such an opportunity of placing the obedience and discipline of the Bengal army on a sounder base than it was before, which, in consequence of a private letter that I received from his Lordship at the time, I have reason to believe would have been the case. However, the good is done, and I hope no measure will be taken by his Lordship that may undo it! To proceed with the extracts from the Governor-General's letter, which made me consider myself authorised to say I used "*the powers entrusted to me by the Governor-General*."

In the first place, I can show by his letters that, from the first,

Paraphrased of the  
Governor-General's  
Minute.  
Para. 55.

he approved of all I did relative to the mutiny when it first appeared at Rawul Pindie, and also in the various personal interviews which I had with his Lordship on the subject. But let all this pass, and come to later transactions, when matters became more serious. (The underlining is chiefly mine). On my reporting the affair of the 41st to the Governor-General, he writes on the 11th November, from Loodianah, "I am very sure of your doing everything that is right in the circumstances that *may arise, whatever they may be.*"

On the 30th December he writes from Mooltan, "The conduct of the 32nd distresses me in every way. It is unreasonable, and on every ground unpardonable. The original creations of an allowance extra was a short-sighted and impolitic as well as an unnecessary act; but the Government cannot allow the act and its evils to extend into futurity. I am very sure that the course you contemplate is the truly merciful one. No punishment can be too severe for the men who deliberately instigate to mutiny; and although I am as little bloody-minded as most men, I should be quite prepared to advise, if called upon, that these men should be put to death. It is true that it is said transportation across the seas has more terror than death. I very much doubt it; and I conceive that the promptitude of the punishment in retribution of the act, and in presence of those who partially shared in it, would have a greater effect in repressing similar offence, than the more distant punishment of banishment. *I am very glad you are where you are, and I feel quite at ease when the conduct of measures consequent on such offences is in your hands.*"

On the 18th of January his Lordship writes to me from Scinde:—

"I quite agree with you in being prepared for *discontent among the native troops on coming into the Punjab under diminished allowances.* I looked with great anxiety to the result of a measure that was indispensable from the first, and I am well satisfied to have got so far through it without violence as we have. The sepoy has been overpetted and overpaid of late, and has been led on by the Government itself into the entertainment of expectations, and the manifestation of a feeling which he never held in former times. The Government and yourself have no doubt of the perfect justice and perfect necessity of their present orders, and they must be enforced. I would fain hope that flying rumours are exaggerated, and that your prompt and decided action at Delhi and Wuzeerabad will check all future designs. I saw the 41st at Mooltan; it has behaved perfectly well since it left Delhi; and the men, Major Halford tells me, have seemed ashamed of themselves ever since," (that is to say, ever since I dealt with them). "If my hope be disappointed, the course of action you indicate is the only right one, indeed it is the only possible one. A yielding or a compromise in this case would be worse than a defeat by the enemy in the field, and would make our own army more formidable to us than the Khalsa has been. In this point, then, our sentiments are in perfect unison; and when ever anything may occur which requires, or would be benefited by the support of the Government, that support will be unreservedly given. All testimony has led me to form the opinion you hold of the efficiency and fidelity of the Goorkha corps. If immediate increase of the pay were necessary to enable you to command the services of these corps, in the event of disaffection among the infantry, I would at once issue an order for the increase; but the terms of their own contract of enlistment entitle you to call upon them to move anywhere on emergency, and as you can thus avail yourself of them fully, and at once, if they should be needed, I think it better to wait for the reply from the Court, which in another month will reach me. *I will make use, in the meantime, of recent events, for the purpose of strengthening arguments, which I feel satisfied the Court have already felt to be sufficient.*"

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Simla, July, 1850, and Head Quarters, 4th Dec. 1850.

Paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minute.  
Para. 55.

Now let me ask whether, taking all these letters, and the sentiments therein expressed, together, I, holding the high office of Commander-in-Chief, and having long military experience, and sent to India under no ordinary circumstances of danger, was not fully warranted to take upon me to act as I did, and to consider that I had been entrusted with the discretionary power which, on the spur of the occasion, I exercised? and was that power without precedent? No; for Lord Gough had it, and I myself, when only a major-general in Scinde, had been invested by Lord Hardinge with this very discretionary power to disband one or more regiments, if I thought it necessary. I did not think it necessary, neither did I think it necessary to disband the 13th and 22nd native infantry in the preceding year, when the measure was recommended by Colonel Benson, because I thought it premature to disband for passive resistance like that shown by these two regiments; but when I found that five had exhibited a mutinous disposition, and that one had attempted to seize the strong fortress of Govindghur, *then* I did think the most prompt and severe measures necessary to quell the mutiny, and authorized by the letters above quoted; yet these measures the Governor-General now holds forth as criminal! Yes, it was high time for me to resign a command, where every exercise of sound judgment in my own profession, attended with perfect success, has been considered an encroachment on his Lordship's power, and a misdemeanour, if not a crime. While I found support I acknowledged it. When it ceased I resigned.

In the last sentence of the 55th paragraph, Lord Dalhousie says, "I knew too well the limits of my own authority to suppose that it was competent to me to delegate to the Commander-in-Chief power which belonged to me as Governor-General only." It then appears that neither Lord Ellenborough nor Lord Hardinge knew the limits of their authority as Governor-General, for Lord Ellenborough delegated the power to break regiments to Lord Gough, I believe, and Lord Hardinge did so to me, when only a major-general, as I have already stated.

## Paragraph 17.

I complained only (and no sophistry can alter the fact) of the unjust reprimand which I received from the Governor-General, dated 13th April, and on that alone I resigned. I did not complain that the orders which I issued on the 20th of January had not been supported. I did not complain that I had not been supported on any other occasion. Those orders might have been reversed after the crisis had passed, and may be reversed now. I had only suspended them till I received the orders of the Supreme Government, and I, who had asked for those orders, could not and did not complain of them on that score. I complained of unjust reprimand, and I complain still, as an act of injustice, which prevents my remaining as Commander-in-Chief.

## Paragraph 18.

Para. 58.

Yes, I do exactly so maintain. In this paragraph Lord Dalhousie winds up his very extraordinary paper, by assuming, as things done and said by me, things which I neither did nor said; and assuming as proved, things which I distinctly deny, and intentions and motives of which I never dreamed, and which I disclaim. He recapitulates his groundless assertions and assumptions, and finally feels satisfied with himself that he has done all that is right, and that I have done all that is wrong! consequently, that his conduct will be perfectly approved by the Home authorities. But these authorities have not yet seen my reply to his Lordship's minute. When this reply becomes known, it will be seen what judgment will be formed by those authorities.

## RESIGNATION OF SIR C. J. NAPIER.

31

Paragraphs of the  
Governor-General's  
Minutes.  
Para. 58.

For my part, being conscious that I have done my duty, and being convinced that the mode in which I have done it, although disapproved by the Governor-General, has been highly beneficial to the interests of the Government, the country, and the army whilst the course which he maintains that I should have pursued was calculated to ensure great public disaster; I cannot feel otherwise than confident of receiving, when the real facts are understood, the full approval of my Sovereign, the Government, and my countrymen, as well as of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief, dated Simla,  
July, 1850, and  
Head Quarters,  
4th Dec. 1850.

Simla,  
July, 1850.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

Head-Quarters Camp,  
4th December, 1850.

I have purposely delayed sending in this record of my defence against Lord Dalhousie's minute until the close of my command, because, if any accident prevented the arrival of my successor, this controversy between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief must have been still more prejudicial to the public service than it has been.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

No. 2 A.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to Government, Military Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. TUCKER, Adjutant-General of the Army.

*Dated the 3rd February, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 1,362, dated 10th December last, and in reply to enclose for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, copy of a minute recorded by the Most Noble the Governor-General on the 28th ultimo, in reply to the memorandum by Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., dated July and 4th December, 1850.

From Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Lieut.-Colonel  
H. T. Tucker,  
3rd Feb. 1851.

Camp Kote,  
3rd February, 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant-Secretary to Government,  
Military Department.

MINUTE by the MOST NOBLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

*Dated 28th February, 1851.*

1. The Adjutant-General of the Army has lately transmitted to me a memorandum, written by his Excellency Sir Charles Napier, in reply to a minute which I recorded on the 14th June, 1850, regarding the intimation conveyed to me in a memorandum dated 22nd May, of his Excellency's intention to resign the command of the army in India, together with the reasons which he alleged for that act. The present memorandum bears date, Simla, July, 1850, and 4th December, 1850, but it did not reach me until after Sir Charles Napier had ceased to command the army.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

2. In this document his Excellency reiterates the statements he had before advanced, and contradicts in nearly every point the reply that has been given. Thrown into the form of a running commentary on the several paragraphs of my minute, the memorandum repeats so frequently the same statements under various heads, re-words the same arguments, and traverses so often ground already traversed before, that it would probably prove confusing and perplexing to one who was not acquainted with the

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

cause of previous discussion on the subject of which it treats. Nevertheless, I should be well content to leave my defence to the statement I have already submitted, and to rely on the minute recorded on 14th June as furnishing a full reply, as well to the memorandum which now professes to answer it, as to the previous paper of the 22nd May. I am unwilling, however, to appear to treat with indifference any document, even though posthumous, which has proceeded from a Commander-in-Chief of this army. I shall, therefore, have the honour of submitting in the following paragraphs such further observations as may appear to me to be necessary. In so doing, I shall adhere, for distinctness' sake, to the same order in which the several branches of this question were discussed in the minute of 14th June, collecting under each head everything which is to be found in his Excellency's memorandum that may be connected with the topic and may call for any notice.

3. In that minute I considered, in separate and successive paragraphs, the several pleas advanced by Sir Charles Napier in justification of the course he had adopted. It was shown,

I. That the rule respecting the compensation for sepoy's rations, which his Excellency set aside as a new rule, was not a new rule,\* but one previously established and acted upon in practice

II. That it was not an unjust or impolitic rule,† but in all respects the reverse of this.

III. That no such emergency, no such perilous crisis, did exist, as to justify the terms‡ in which his Excellency described it.

It was further shown,

IV. That the power which Sir Charles Napier claimed for the Commander-in-Chief in the concluding paragraphs of his memorandum§ was unprecedented and inadmissible.

V. That full support had been given to his Excellency by me during the period of his command, and that he had no sufficient ground for intimating an opinion that support would not be given to him in future difficulties.||

I shall now again review these several heads successively.

4. I. It has been shown that the rule respecting the compensation for sepoy's rations, which his Excellency set aside as a new rule, was not a new rule, but one previously established, and acted upon in practice.¶ In his present memorandum, adverting to my reference\*\* to the act of the Commander-in-Chief "in cancelling an order of the Governor-General in Council regarding sepoy's compensation for rations," his Excellency Sir C. Napier objects,†† "I must beg leave to deny the first assertion made by his Lordship in this paragraph. I *suspended* the execution of the order, and *to suspend is not to cancel.*" In reply I have to observe, that in describing the act of the Commander-in-Chief as a cancelling of the order of the Government, I used the term advisedly, and advisedly I repeat it. I dealt in my minute with the acts of the Commander-in-Chief as they were in reality—not as they professed to be. I brought forward prominently in my minute‡‡ the explanation (advanced by his Excellency in his memorandum of 22nd May,§§ and again in the paper before me) which was founded on his having declared that he suspended the order "*pending the result of a reference to the Supreme Government.*"||| I stated that his Excellency must be well aware that if the order were once issued by him, the clause of reservation to which he pointed became an empty form. The reversal of an order by the Commander-in-Chief conveying advantages to the troops, would, under any circumstances, be inexpedient, from the dissatisfaction it must necessarily create among those affected by it, and the lowering of his authority which it would produce; but to reverse it under the circumstances which had then existed was practically impossible, and doubly so if the state of the army were really such as his Excellency believed it to have been. Wherefore the order of the Commander-in-Chief respecting the compensation for sepoy's rations was at that time final; consequently, the phrase I employed was strictly correct, for, under such circumstances, to suspend *was* to cancel.

5. Having thus replied to the objection which his Excellency has raised to the mode in which I described the measure he had adopted relative to the rule for rations' compensation, I proceed to notice his Excellency's remarks on the paragraphs which treated his view of the rule itself.

\* Minute, 14th June, Paras. 6—21.

† Do. Paras. 22—27.

‡ Do. Paras. 29, 30.

§ Do. Paras. 43—48.

|| Do. Paras. 49—60.

¶ Do. Paras. 6—21, 40—42.

\*\* Do. Para. 2.

†† Memo. 4th Dec., Para. 1.

‡‡ Minute, 14th June, Paras. 40—42.

§§ Do. 22nd May, Paras. 10—11

||| Do. 4th Dec., Paras. 1, 2, 12.

Upon them his Excellency observes,\* “ In these paragraphs (Minute, 14th June, “ 8—21) the Governor-General reverts to my memorandum of 22nd May, and, wholly “ neglecting the grounds on which I based the defence of my order relative to the “ rations, his Lordship fixes upon a number of comparatively unimportant details, and “ therefore I shall not lengthen this memorandum by answering these observations of “ the Governor-General, but allow, without entering further into the discussion, that I “ may have been misled,” &c. Sir Charles Napier has done wisely in attempting no answer to a refutation of his views, which, being founded on facts and official documents, was in itself unanswerable.

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851.

6. With this remark I should have passed to the next division of the subject, but that his Excellency, in the sentence above quoted, has alleged that, in the paragraphs on which he was commenting, I wholly neglected the grounds on which he based the defence of his order relative to the rations. Further on in the same paragraph his Excellency remarks, “ But his Lordship studiously avoided answering the following “ and all important paragraphs of my memorandum:† ‘ But I do not consider that “ ‘ the real question is, whether I acted with judgment or without judgment. I consider “ ‘ the real question to be this—whether the Commander-in-Chief of India, removed to “ ‘ a great distance from all higher authority (the highest being at sea), in a moment of “ ‘ great danger, surrounded by a hostile population, and with an army of upwards of “ ‘ forty thousand men infected with a mutinous spirit, was justified, or not justified, in “ ‘ using his discretion; and promptly dealing with danger in the manner which he “ ‘ thought most effectual for the safety of India? This is the real question.’ And this is “ ‘ precisely the question which his Lordship has so unjustly decided in his reprimand of the “ ‘ 13th April, but so carefully avoided the discussion of in the minute under reply.” To this I rejoin that if, by the words contained in the foregoing passages, Sir Charles Napier meant to object that I had not noticed the large question contained in his quotation in the 13th paragraph, on which he was immediately commenting, his objection is unreasonable; for, as my minute declaredly treated the several divisions of the subject separately, it was not possible that the paragraphs which were exclusively allotted for the consideration of one portion of the subject should enter on the discussion of another and very different portion of it. But if Sir Charles Napier means to allege that the question contained in the passage he quotes was nowhere discussed in my minute, I have to state that his Excellency is in error. The passage quoted by his Excellency was not transcribed in full, but the question raised in it as to the right of the Commander-in-Chief to use his discretion in the manner which he thought most effectual for the safety of India, was entered into and fully discussed in paragraphs 43—48 of my minute of 14th June,‡ paragraphs which are commented upon by his Excellency in his present memorandum,§ and which will again be adverted to in this minute.

7. II. It was shown that the rule of rations’ compensation|| was not an unjust or impolitic rule, but in all respects the reverse of this. This portion of the question was discussed in paragraphs 22 to 27 of the minute, 14th June. Adverting to them, Sir C. Napier observes:¶ “ My opinion remains the same, after reading his Lordship’s seven paragraphs “ against it.” Subsequently, his Excellency adds, “ The Governor-General thinks he “ has overturned my argument on this irrelevant point. I shall not discuss it with his “ Lordship.”

It is unnecessary for me to dwell on a point which is abandoned. I will, therefore, only observe, that “ my acts” on this head in no respect “ contradict my expressed “ opinions.”\*\*\* Just and politic as was the rule which his Excellency thought proper to supersede, its restoration could only have been effected by a reversal of his Excellency’s order. The reasons which were valid against such reversal were fully stated in paragraphs 40, 41, 42, of the former minute, and have already been repeated in the present paper.†† It is unnecessary to repeat them a second time.

8. Having thus finally disposed of the first of those pleas on which Sir C. Napier, on 22nd May, justified his order respecting sepoy’s compensation for rations; having shown that the order set aside was well established, in use just and fair, and that his Excellency had not directly or indirectly been called upon to enforce a new rule by which fresh reductions of pay were imposed upon the sepoy; I proceed to review again his Excel-

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 3.

† Memo, 22nd May.

‡ Minute, 14th June, Paras. 43—48.

§ Do. 4th Dec. Para. 14.

|| Do. 14th June, Paras. 22—27.

¶ Do. 4th Dec. Para. 4.

\*\* Do. do. Para. 4.

†† Para. 4.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.  
Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

lency's second plea, founded on the alleged extraordinary and perilous circumstances in which he was acting. This portion of the question was examined in paragraphs 29 to 39 of the minute of 14th June, wherein it was shown—

III. That no such great emergency, no such perilous crisis, did exist, as to justify the terms in which his Excellency described it in the memorandum of the 22nd May. Sir Charles Napier has commented on these paragraphs at considerable length, reiterating in them, as in other portions of the memorandum, his former assertions regarding the perilous nature and extent of the mutiny which he affirms to have existed; endeavouring to combat the arguments by which he was met, as well as to explain acts and words to which reference was made, and advancing such further statements as render it necessary that I should again enter into some details.

9. Before engaging, however, in detailed examination of the question at issue, I desire to notice a charge of misrepresentation which his Excellency has brought against me. Commenting on paragraph 30 of my former minute, Sir C. Napier states, "In this paragraph his Lordship expresses his incredulity that 'the army was in mutiny and the empire in danger; a sweeping and exaggerated mode of expression; a statement which I never made, as his Lordship asserts that I did.\* The whole army was not 'in mutiny,' but a mutinous spirit pervaded a large portion of that part of the army which occupied the Punjab. This misrepresentation of my words is not argument, so I pass on to paragraph 31." Subsequently, in reference to paragraph 32, 14th June, Sir C. Napier observes, "I must again beg to remind his Lordship that a grave misrepresentation is repeated in paragraph 32, where I am stated to have informed the Government, in my letter 22nd May, that on the 20th January the army was in mutiny."† Again Sir C. Napier states, "I cannot however avoid referring his Lordship to a third repetition of his misrepresentation of my words, which I find in the last line but one of his paragraph 37."‡ The charge of misrepresentation is frivolous. I have nowhere imputed to Sir C. Napier, that he stated "*the whole army*" was in mutiny.§ I have nowhere imputed to him that his statement respecting the mutiny applied to any other than the army of the Punjab. When, in the minute of 14th June, I first introduced the topic, I did so in the words his Excellency actually used, and those words I literally quoted. I quote my own paragraph again, and the mere citation of its terms will prove the accuracy and fulness with which I repeated the statements his Excellency set forth. In paragraph 29 of minute 14th June were these words,—“In various passages of his memorandum his Excellency states that when he issued the order on the 20th January, relative to 'sepoys' compensation, 'mutiny had appeared in a most formidable shape,' that the officers in command were in 'very critical and dangerous circumstances,' that it was 'a moment of great danger,' that he was 'surrounded by a hostile population and with an army of upwards of 40,000 men infected with a mutinous spirit,'|| and finally that the Indian Government by reason of this mutinous spirit, was exposed to 'great peril.'" These are his Excellency's words; a reference to them and to the 10th paragraph¶ of his memorandum of 22nd May, in which his Excellency speaks of "the *great peril to which the Indian Government* was exposed by the mutinous spirit which had appeared among the troops," and a similar reference to the 15th paragraph,\*\* in which his Excellency described himself as surrounded by "*an army of upwards of 40,000 men* infected with a mutinous spirit," will conclusively establish the fact, that Sir C. Napier *did* assert that the army of 40,000 men by which he was surrounded was in mutiny, and in mutiny to such an extent as to place the state in great peril. A further reference to other portions of my minute will show, that in the frequent allusions made to his Excellency's statement therein †† I sedulously restricted its application to a portion of the Bengal army; to that army with which the Commander-in-Chief was placed,—to the army of the Punjab,—the only army which could indeed be referred to, since it alone was affected by the causes of discontent. No man, after such literal quotation in the first instance, and after such careful repetition, on my part, of the phrase which was actually employed by Sir C. Napier, could by possibility misapprehend the casual expressions, less precisely worded, which Sir C. Napier has picked out. No man has construed, or could construe, my minute as representing that his Excellency had affirmed the existence of formidable mutiny in the whole Indian army, or in the whole army of Bengal, or in any other army than the army in the Punjab, to which it was actually attributed by his Excellency in the words I have repeated again

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 5.

† Do. do. Para. 6.

‡ Do. do. Para. 9.

§ Do. do. Para. 5.

|| Do. 14th June, Para. 29.

¶ Do. 22nd May, Para. 10.

\*\* Do. do. Para. 15.

†† Do. 14th June, Paras. 3—29 (1), 29 (2), 31, 32—36.



and again. Nor could Sir C. Napier himself have affected to see any misapprehension, or risk of misapprehension, attaching to those words of mine, excepting under the influence of that querulous spirit which has unhappily marked so much of his recent correspondence with the Government of India; and which has inclined him to discover an injustice in each letter, a reprimand in each request, and a grievance in every thing.

10. I have stated that, in my former minute,\* it was maintained that no such general or perilous mutiny existed in the army in the Punjab as that described by the Commander-in-Chief. Omitting many minor evidences to the contrary, the existence of such a mutiny was declared to be irreconcilable with the official acts and words of the Commander-in-Chief at the time.

11. It was irreconcilable with his acts, since if any such mutiny had existed in the plains, it was inconceivable that at such a time his Excellency should have left them and proceeded to the frontier. His Excellency combats the inference herein drawn from his official acts, and enumerates the reasons which induced him to proceed to Peshawur. These reasons are of various kinds.

First, it was necessary that he should become acquainted † with the troops, become acquainted with the country, ‡ and select cantonments, &c. &c. Second, he had able and trustworthy officers,—Brigadier Wheeler, at Jullundur; General Gilbert, at Lahore; Brigadier Harsey, at Wuzeerabad. Third, if his “presence was useful at one place § more than another, it was probably at Peshawur.” To these reasons, I reply: first, that however important the duties here described by his Excellency may ordinarily be, they sink into insignificance when compared with the vital importance of suppressing such a mutiny as his Excellency alleges to have existed. Nor would any of them, or all collectively, have been permitted by the Commander-in-Chief to divert his attention for a day from the management of the perilous difficulties with which such a state of things would have surrounded him; secondly, whatever may be the abilities of the several officers, whom his Excellency has named, I must repeat my conviction already expressed, that if the extensive and dangerous mutiny which his Excellency describes had then existed, he would not have left to any subordinate officer whatever the task of dealing with such events, or thrown upon them the responsibility thereof. Thirdly, after very frequently perusing the remarkable exposition of his Excellency’s views of the advantage and necessity of his proceeding at that time to Peshawur, I am compelled to say that it has not convinced my mind, nor will it convince the minds of others either, that the best means by which the head of the army could prevent a serious outbreak of insubordination was by quitting the scene of it, or that the choicest measure which the Commander-in-Chief could have adopted, in January last, for promptly repressing a mutiny in the plains, was to march to Peshawur across the Indus. If 40,000 men had then been infected with a mutinous spirit so as to put the state in great peril, the Commander-in-Chief would at once have placed himself where he would be able to act with most authority and effect to repress the spirit and to avert an outbreak. His Excellency is compelled to admit that the cause of discontent being the reduction of allowances, there was no probability that the troops at Peshawur would have shown insubordination, since no reduction was ordered there. Wherefore, with few exceptions, the whole of the 40,000 men, among whom the mutinous spirit prevailed, were in the plains of the Punjab; the first duty and object of his Excellency was to repress that spirit, to prevent its breaking out into open and violent mutiny, and for that purpose he would unquestionably have remained in the midst of it. It was the post of danger, and he would not have quitted it; it was the point of action, and he would have abided by it. He would have remained || (not “shutting himself up in a cantonment, or in the fortification of Lahore, cowering under “the insolence of mutinous troops,” as his Excellency, utterly without warrant, asserts I would have him do, but he would have remained), moving rapidly “from station to “station,” if he thought proper, showing “no fear of mutiny,” *but near at hand to the scene of discontent*; I say he would have remained there, because there he would be best prepared to exercise the full authority of his office, and would give confidence by his presence to the action of those who served in their several stations under him. He would have remained there, because there information could best be had of all that was occurring, from time to time; there the course of action to be adopted could be most clearly seen; and there the orders he might resolve to issue could best be executed with the prompt-

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851.

\* Minute, 14th June, Para. 8.

† Do. do. Para. 5.

‡ Do. do. do.

§ Do. do. do.

|| Do. do. do.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

titude which gives half their value to vigorous resolutions. In one word, if formidable mutiny had been in the plains of the Punjab, the Commander-in-Chief would have remained where he most readily could learn all that was doing; where he could best resolve what ought to be done, and where he could most speedily execute whatever he might resolve. This is the course of action, consonant with reason and common sense, which the Commander-in-Chief would have followed, if 40,000 men had been in mutiny in the plains. The course pursued by Sir Charles Napier was directly the reverse, and I repeat the conclusion, that it was irreconcilable with the existence of such a mutiny as he asserts.

12. Further, it was shown in the minute of 14th June that the existence of such a mutiny as his Excellency affirmed was inconsistent with his own official words,\* since, at the period in question, he issued a general order to the army, the terms of which directly disproved the existence of extensive mutiny or danger to the state. Justifying the general order to which I have adverted, Sir C. Napier observes:—"My own orders prove its existence (the mutiny), and the pains I took to conceal from the army the extent of the danger.† *Common sense called upon me to conceal this danger, lest it should spread wider still, and the whole army, learning that a great number of regiments were combined in the Punjab, might join. No one could exactly tell how far the bad spirit had spread, and to have made a parade‡ of it in public orders would have been madness.*" Subsequently his Excellency observes:—"On the other hand, his Lordship would have had me proclaim, in my remarks on the sentence of doomed mutineers, my belief that a considerable portion of the Punjab army was tainted with a mutinous spirit! Proclaim to them their numbers and their strength!" His Excellency is quite in error. I would by no means have had his Excellency adopt any such course. I must be permitted to point out, that to withhold from the army the knowledge that formidable mutiny existed in its ranks, is one thing; but if formidable mutiny did exist, to tell them there was none at all, would be another, and a very different thing. In like manner, if 40,000 men were in dangerous mutiny in the Punjab, to make no mention to the army of the fact would have been to preserve a judicious silence; but if 40,000 men really were in mutiny, then to tell the army that they were an honourable and obedient army, and that the mutineers were only a few discontented scoundrels, would have been to proclaim a deliberate untruth. Sir C. Napier is utterly incapable, under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, of lending himself to an untruth. When, therefore, his Excellency, in his general orders, announced the existence of a mutiny, and described its extent as inconsiderable, and when the description of its extent so given is corroborated by all information, and confirmed by the course of contemporary events, I give entire credence to the testimony his Excellency bore to the then existing condition of the army in the Punjab. And when his Excellency, under whatever impressions, announces subsequently that 40,000 men had been in mutiny and the state in danger, I am bound, in the exercise of free judgment, to reject that opinion as irreconcilable with his Excellency's recorded declarations at the time, and as unsupported either by testimony or facts.

13. Again, in the minute of 14th June, it was maintained that the existence of any mutiny in the army in the Punjab, such as that which his Excellency affirmed, was inconsistent with the course of known events. It was stated that partial disaffection had prevailed—that partial mutiny had appeared; but it was altogether denied that either the frequency of the offence or the number of the offenders was sufficient to justify the sweeping inculcation subsequently advanced by the Commander-in-Chief. Upon this Sir Charles Napier observes:—"The Governor-General, in this paragraph, § chooses to assume that there was no mutiny, and chooses to forget that I had quelled the mutiny; for that reason, there was no mutiny when he wrote his minute. Again, in these paragraphs || (M. 14th June, 33, 34, 35) the Governor-General endeavours, by the most extraordinary and the most disingenuous course of reasoning, to describe the perfect obedience of the Indian army after I had put down the mutiny, as if that submissive state was not the result of the measures I had taken to quell mutiny. The last circumstance his Lordship has endeavoured to cast out of sight altogether." To this I beg leave to reply, that I have in no respect forgotten the extent to which his Excellency repressed mutiny; that I have never withheld from him the fullest credit that was due for suppressing all the mutiny that ever existed in the Punjab; further, that I never have for a moment disputed that some mutiny did exist. But I maintained in the

\* Minute, 14th June, Para. 31 A.

§ Do. do. Para. 6.

† Do. 4th Dec., Para. 5.

|| Do. do. Para. 7.

‡ Do. do. do

minute of 14th June, as I again maintain now, that the mutiny so repressed was partial, inconsiderable in degree, comprising comparatively few in numbers, and that it did not justify the Commander-in-Chief in representing that he was surrounded by an army of 40,000 men infected with mutiny, so as to place the Indian state in danger.

14. The question at issue is, the real extent of this mutiny. The character and extent of a mutiny can only be determined by the overt acts in which it shows itself, and by the character and extent of the measures which are sufficient to repress it. In this view I shall first examine the several cases which his Excellency recites.\* I use his own words. "The mutinous spirit first broke out at Rawul Pindee, in July, 1849. I was then at Simla. It next displayed itself at Delhi, in November, 1849. I was on the spot. It then showed itself at Wuzeerabad in December, and finally it burst forth at Umritsir in January." These were the cases that occurred. The following were the circumstances:—At Rawul Pindee the men of the 13th and 22nd regiments Native Infantry declined to receive their pay, on which the first reduction had then been made. Without recourse being had to any coercion, they subsequently thought better of it, and took their pay. Courts-martial were afterwards held. In the 13th regiment, a native officer and four men were dismissed the service, seven other sepoy were imprisoned for four months. In the 22nd regiment, one officer and six men were dismissed, one officer suspended, and ten sepoy imprisoned for four months. The next case occurred at Delhi, in the 41st regiment. After the order respecting reduction had been read on parade and explained, the men returned to the lines, piled arms, but for a time would not take off their accoutrements, and it was considered that a bad spirit was shown. A message was sent by the Commander-in-Chief, who was then on the spot, to the native officers, saying that he would recommend their dismissal if any insubordination took place. Nothing ever took place, and they marched a few days afterwards to Mooltan. The next case occurred at Wuzeerabad, where the sepoy of the 32nd regiment N.I. were about to refuse their pay. The first four who refused were taken out of the ranks, tried then and there, sentenced to imprisonment, their irons were put on their legs, and they were marched off in presence of the brigade paraded. The pay was then proceeded with, and not another man refused it. Five other men were subsequently tried,—a havildar for concealing, and four men for inciting, the above mutiny. The havildar was dismissed the service; the four men were condemned to death. The Commander-in-Chief commuted the sentence to transportation for life. Lastly, the 66th regiment mutinied at Govindghur, and were wholly disbanded. The circumstances are well known, and need not be repeated. These were all the overt acts of insubordination or of mutiny that occurred, beginning with the 13th and 22nd regiments six months before, and ending with the 66th. After the fullest weight has been given to the open mutiny of the 66th,—to the passive resistance commenced, but abandoned on the first exercise of authority, by those who refused to receive their pay, and to the conduct of the 41st regiment, who, in truth, never did anything at all,—I unhesitatingly uphold the declaration I have maintained, that there was partial disaffection, but no such extensive or formidable mutiny as his Excellency has affirmed.

15. In order that the real character and extent of the alleged mutiny may be further tested, I proceed now to examine the character and extent of the measures by which the mutiny was quelled. These were of two kinds: the one was the relaxation of the rule for regulating compensation for sepoy's rations; the other was the infliction of punishment on those who had offended. It does not very clearly appear, from his Excellency's memorandum, to which class of measures he most attributes the suppression of the mutiny.

16. Adverting to the alteration of the rule respecting compensation for rations, he observes,† "The Governor-General was far away on the high seas! The Supreme Council 1,500 miles distant. The whole responsibility of quelling this mutiny rested on me. I was obliged to decide to the best of my judgment. I had no reason to doubt the statements of Brigadier Harsey and his commissariat officer. Whether my decision was the best that could have been come to does not enter into the question. I did what I thought right, and I succeeded, without cost, too, of either money or of life." Again, he says immediately afterwards,‡ "Finally, I completely succeeded in putting a stop to a widely-spread and spreading mutiny in the Bengal army, probably the most dangerous that had ever appeared in that army." From these passages it would be inferred that his Excellency attributes the suppression of the then existing mutiny in the Punjab to

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 5.

† Do. do. Para. 3.

‡ Do. do. do.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE. &c.Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

the measure he adopted respecting ration compensation. Now, what was the extent and nature of that measure? Sir Charles Napier has himself described it in the present memorandum, and I shall merely quote the words in which he characterizes it:—"The fact is, that the compensation for rations is a rare occurrence, and I know officers of long service who never yet saw it enforced. The amount which Government lost by my suspending the rule (which applied for the *first time* to the troops at Wuzeerabad) was only about (63) sixty-three rupees a month on a regiment of a thousand men."\* Thus, it appears that the measure which successfully quelled the mutiny in the Punjab was the re-establishment of a rule, the operation of which would be of infrequent occurrence, and which, on the rare occasions on which it came into play, would give about three halfpence a month to each man for the month during which it operated. This is the measure which Sir Charles Napier represents as of such importance and moment that it could not bear the delay of a reference to the Supreme Government. "Armed soldiers in mutiny," he observes,† "cannot be dealt with by the inexcusable procrastination which I am found fault with by my Lord Dalhousie for not adopting." This is the measure which, as his Excellency states, successfully quelled the mutiny, without cost of money or of life! It may have quelled the mutiny. If it did,—if a boon of three halfpence to each man for a month, receivable so rarely that many officers in a long service never saw it received at all,—if such an insignificant boon as this did really suffice to quell the mutiny in the Punjab, then it is impossible for any man living to contend that the mutiny so quelled was a really formidable mutiny; extending over 40,000 men, and of such a nature as to make the moment dangerous and critical, or to put the state in peril.

17. On the other hand, it is to be inferred from many other passages in the present memorandum, that his Excellency attributes the suppression of the then existing mutiny in the Punjab to the measures he adopted for meeting and punishing the offence. These measures were the dismissal and imprisonment of men who refused their pay in the 13th, 22nd, and 32nd regiments. A message to the native officers sufficed to repress any symptoms of mutinous spirit which had been shown in the 41st. The measures were promptly taken, judicious, just, and effectual for their end; but is it possible for any man seriously to contend that measures of no greater extent and severity than this would have sufficed to repress all the main force of a mutiny which had so possessed an army of 40,000 men as to have made the moment dangerous and critical, and put the state in great peril? Yet these measures were sufficient to subdue the main force of the mutiny; for if a formidable mutinous spirit still remained when the 66th regiment broke into disaffection, and if soldiers always "unite in a common cause," (and his Excellency tells me that I "know little of soldiers" if I think they would not do so), how is it to be accounted for, that when the 66th mutinied for pay, the native regiments who came up, not only showed no sympathy with them, but exhibited the utmost alacrity in preparing to act against them? If 40,000 men were still infected with a spirit of formidable mutiny, how is it to be accounted for, that when the 66th mutinied for pay, and did it in the violent and startling manner described by his Excellency, no corps in all the 40,000 showed the least community of feeling, or inclination to join? It is only to be accounted for by admitting the conclusion which I have from first to last maintained, namely, that a formidable mutinous spirit did not exist; that the army of 40,000 men was not tainted with mutiny to such an extent as to justify the assertion that the feeling was general, and the state thereby in danger. It is only to be accounted for by admitting that the mutiny was partial. Openly and generally displayed in the 66th regiment, and exhibited in the four other regiments named, but existing in a degree so inconsiderable as to have been promptly and finally put down by the first manifestations on the part of his Excellency, and the officers under his command, of their determination to permit no act of insubordination in the ranks of this army, and no resistance to the just and reasonable orders of the Government which it served. Whether, therefore, Sir C. Napier attributes the suppression of the mutiny that did exist to the one class of measures which he adopted, or to the other, or to both conjointly, it is clear to demonstration, that that mutiny was not of the character and extent he has subsequently affirmed.

18. Sir C. Napier, in his present memorandum, has advanced further statements in corroboration of his declarations regarding the mutiny in the Punjab, to which it is necessary that I should advert. His Excellency observes,‡ "That the crisis was most

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 14.

† Do. do. Para. 2.

‡ Do. do. do.

“ dangerous, every one knew perfectly well, and no one was more alive to the danger than the Governor-General himself, while he remained within the reach of a knowledge of what was going on. It is therefore the more unaccountable to find his Lordship, after having been at sea, far beyond the reach of knowing the events that were in progress, attempting by erroneous assertions, and arguments discordant with facts, to dispute the opinions of men on the spot, and deny the tendency and symptoms of overt acts infinitely more serious than any of those which had previously excited his alarm when he was on the scene himself. There was the mutiny! 40,000 sepoys were more or less infected with this bad spirit.”\* “Again I assert that every man in India, including the Governor-General himself (whose own letters prove it), knew that there was a very extensive spirit of mutiny among the troops. That this mutiny, being grounded on the desire to get higher pay, was in the very greatest degree dangerous. That great alarm existed in consequence. That I was not only aware, but told the Governor-General of it.” “Further, his Lordship need not † have expressed any astonishment at what was known to every one, and himself among the rest. See my letters to him on the subject, as well as several of his own to me, showing that he had been informed of the danger before he went to sea.” In these passages, Sir C. Napier, re-affirming the existence of dangerous mutiny, asserts further that no one was more alive to the danger than I was; that great alarm existed; that Sir C. Napier had told me of it in his letters; that my alarm had been excited, and that my own letters prove it. In a subsequent paragraph, his Excellency quotes largely from my private letters addressed to him at the time, relative to the symptoms of mutiny which had appeared.

19. It has hitherto, I apprehend, been usual among public men to preserve inviolate the confidence of private correspondence, and to abstain from dragging into the paragraphs of public despatches each other's private letters, written in all the careless frankness of familiar intercourse, and containing probably remarks which would not have been so conveyed, unless under the seal of that security which has been supposed to be imparted by the confidential nature of communications passing in personal intimacy. His Excellency Sir C. Napier has no such scruples.

20. Whatever may be my opinion of the character of this act, I have no reason whatever to regret its results. I beg to draw full attention to the quotations of my letters given by Sir C. Napier. I beg to refer to them in proof of the entire accordance of the sentiments of my private correspondence with the statements of my official papers, and in corroboration of my declaration that I never for one moment regarded the state of affairs to which his Excellency refers as having reached a dangerous crisis; that I never either experienced or exhibited alarm. There is not one sentence in the quotations given by the Commander-in-Chief, or in any other of the letters, which countenances the assertion that I recognized the existence of any such great public emergency as that which he now vainly labours to establish. In truth, if my private letters had been written under the guidance of a spirit of prophecy, they could not have foreshadowed ‡ more accurately than they do the explanation of my public views, given in paragraph 35 of the minute of 14th June; for the passages cited from my private letters show that I was prepared for the exhibition of discontent among the troops upon whom the reduction fell, that (regard being had to the very large number simultaneously affected by the change) some anxiety was necessarily felt by me during the progress of the change; but that having confidence in the judgment and resolution of Sir C. Napier, and relying on the perfect justice of the act itself, and guided by experience of similar measures successfully carried into effect before, I held that no concession could for a moment be dreamt of, and was confident that the change would be effected, if not without some violence, at all events with general submission. These views are established by the quotations already given. Since Sir C. Napier has thought proper to produce them; I will add generally, that further quotations would have proportionably strengthened the proofs already given; moreover, further quotation from my letters would serve to relieve me from an imputation which the memorandum of his Excellency must necessarily have cast upon me. No one who has read that document can have failed to observe the repeated allusions it makes to the fact of my having been at sea during a portion of the period of which we have been treating. His Excellency, by the frequency of these references, most unquestionably, though no doubt unintentionally, must have created the impression that I improperly quitted my post at a time of great danger, and proceeding to sea, left to him the responsibility of dealing alone with the danger which

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 5.

† Do. do. do.

‡ Do. do. Para. 16.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

I knew to be impending. It is very true that serious failure of my health compelled me, under medical advice, and with the permission of the Court, to proceed to sea for one month; but before I left the Punjab I intimated \* that I did not anticipate the occurrence of anything extraordinary for the present; that if I had so anticipated, I should not have proposed to go; and that if any unfavourable intelligence should reach me on my way, I should at once return to this frontier, wherever I might be, or whatever might have been planned. These few words conclusively show that I saw no such public danger, as Sir C. Napier asserts; they show that if I had seen such danger, I would not have quitted the frontier; and that as I did ultimately proceed to sea, I did not recognize (as Sir C. Napier erroneously declares my letters prove) any such great emergency as he has subsequently sought to affirm. The sentiments of my private letters have now been made known; the sentiments contained in the public minute are upon record. Both are in close conformity to the declaration I have throughout maintained, that there was partial discontent in the army in the Punjab, but no general mutiny putting the state in great peril.

21. Again, Sir Charles Napier has affirmed, that the existence of a mutinous spirit and of insubordination, which had risen so high and spread so wide as to place the Government in great peril, was made known to me before I went to sea, by letters from his Excellency. In reply, I have to state, that the letters addressed to me by Sir Charles Napier, during the period to which reference is made and until I went to sea, communicated to me the existence of partial manifestations of mutiny in the corps which have been already named. The letters dwelt with great truth and justice on the danger of permitting any such spirit to gain head or to extend; they expressed a firm determination to deal vigorously and severely with every case that might occur; and assumed, with perfect confidence, that such measures would be attended with success. But the letters of Sir C. Napier, up to the time at which I proceeded to sea, did not convey, and were not calculated to convey, the impression that his Excellency regarded the mutiny as having extended generally over the army in the Punjab, or as placing the state in great peril. Not only so, but even at a subsequent period, when his Excellency addressed me relative to the mutiny in the 66th, while he pointed out the necessity for striking at once and with vigour, and while he referred to the spirit and to the time as appearing to him to be very dangerous, he did so on the general ground of the possibility of further extension of the same spirit; but he made no statement which conveyed, or was calculated to convey, to my mind, an impression that he entertained those opinions relative to the actual extent of mutiny then prevailing in the Punjab, which he has subsequently maintained. I will not quote the contents of private letters addressed to me in proof of what I now advance; but lest my refraining from so doing should in some way be misinterpreted, I have caused copies or extracts to be made of everything contained in these letters, connected, however remotely, with that state of affairs in the army of the Punjab which arose out of the reduction of allowances directed in the G. O. of October 25th, 1849. They have been copied in the Secret Department, and will be transmitted to the Honourable the Secret Committee; in whose hands they will be safe. At the same time, I shall forward copies or extracts of all my own letters which in any way refer to the same question.

22. Again, Sir C. Napier states, that I knew "the men of one (regiment), the 32nd, had openly declared their intention of consulting with other regiments; † that some had said—'What can we do now with two European regiments in cantonments with us? "Wait till we can consult with other regiments.""

Admitting the fact, it proves only that which has never been denied, namely, that partial discontent did exist. How partial the discontent was, and how little it was encouraged by the result of any consultations that may have been held, is shown by the prompt and entire suppression of insubordination in that very regiment, which was shortly afterwards effected by the firm and judicious measures pursued towards the malcontents.

23. Again, Sir Charles Napier states, ‡ that I "knew that an extraordinary correspondence had been going on between all the native regiments;" "a correspondence," he subsequently states, "so alarming, that one general officer asked me to order the letters to be opened privately, which I refused, because I was prepared for the worst, and there was something revolting in the act." Admitting the fact to be so, it proves nothing: an increase in the quantity of the correspondence proves nothing as to its nature. § An addi-

\* Minute, 14th Dec., 1849.

† Do. 4th Dec., Para. 5.

‡ Do. do. do.

§ Do. do. do.

tion to the ordinary number of letters does not prove that the contents of those letters are treasonable. If his Excellency felt at the time, that the circumstances of the case were not sufficiently strong to justify his ordering the letters to be examined as treasonable then, they are not sufficiently strong to justify a conclusion that the letters actually were treasonable now. There is not even a presumption against them. In truth, whatever presumption there is, tends the other way; for I have been informed by the officer who was president of the Court of Inquiry, that when the 66th regiment mutinied, the whole body of their correspondence was seized and examined, and that not a trace of treason, or conspiracy, or mutiny was found in it all. This statement shall be placed on record.

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851.

24. I have now examined, in tedious but unavoidable detail, everything which has been advanced by his Excellency Sir Charles Napier in maintenance of the opinion he recorded on the 22nd May, relative to a mutiny alleged to have extended in a dangerous degree over a large portion of the Bengal army. I submit to the judgment of the Honourable Court of Directors, that the issue of this examination firmly establishes the conclusion recorded by me on the 14th June, and proves that, while discontent did prevail on the reduction of allowances, and while open mutiny appeared, the discontent and mutiny were partial; that the spirit of the army affected by the reduction was generally submissive and subordinate, and that there did not exist throughout 40,000 men in the Punjab a spirit of mutiny, such as to place the Government of India in great peril.

25. It may be convenient to sum up in one view the reasons on which I have based the conclusion that has thus been maintained. I deny that the general mutiny alleged did exist in the army in the Punjab, because,

I. No report whatever of such a state of things was made by his Excellency Sir C. Napier to the Government. If 40,000 men had been so deeply infected with a mutinous spirit as to place the Government of the country in great peril, the Commander-in-Chief could not have neglected to report the existence of such formidable disaffection at the time, and could not have dared to conceal it.

II. Because at that time Sir C. Napier did report the existence of discontent among the troops in the Punjab regarding the reduction of allowances, but he defined its actual extent, and described it as "a most unprovoked state of insubordination in some "regiments."\*

If 40,000 men had then been in such mutiny as has been alleged, his Excellency could not, and would not, have reported the feeling as merely insubordination in some regiments.

III. Because at the time at which Sir C. Napier was thus reporting to the Government the existence of discontent to an inconsiderable extent, he made similar, but still stronger statements to the whole army in his G. O. of 16th January. If 40,000 men were then in such mutiny as has been alleged, his Excellency could not, and would not, have proclaimed to the whole army that the mutineers were a few discontented scoundrels.

IV. Because the existence of such a mutiny as has been alleged is inconsistent with his Excellency's own acts,† as shown already at such length, as to render a recapitulation unnecessary.

V. Because the overt acts committed in five several regiments, from July, 1849, to February, 1850, do not warrant the statement made, as to the general character of the mutiny; while the full submission which followed the first judicious measures employed for the repression of the discontent, where it appeared, equally negatives the assumption that the spirit of mutiny was general and perilous in the Punjab.

VI. Because the existence of such a mutiny as has been alleged is not supported by any recorded testimony, and is at variance with all that information which is open alike to the Government and to individuals on such a subject.

26. I have every confidence that the views, which it has been necessary for me to repeat and to enforce in the present minute against whatever has lately been advanced by Sir Charles Napier, will appear to the Honourable Court of Directors to be as convincing as those which were submitted to them on the 14th June. But if there should be any lingering doubt left on the mind of the Court, after their perusal of the several documents now submitted to them; or if the discussion shall have been renewed in

\* Letter from Adjutant-General to President in Council, No. 13, 20th January, 1850.

† Minute, 14th June, Para. 31, and 28th January, Para. 11.

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General;  
28th Feb. 1851.

England, and any uncertainty shall have been felt by her Majesty's Government, or by Parliament, or by the public, regarding the facts at issue, then I beg respectfully to suggest that I should be instructed to have recourse to a measure, which will bring at once to test the facts, that one way or other must be capable of easy proof. Let instructions be sent to me for the appointment of a commission for the purpose of instituting a searching inquiry into this question, whether 40,000 men were, or were not, at the period named, or at any period during his Excellency's command, in such a state of mutiny in the Punjab, as to render the circumstances of the time dangerous and critical, and to place the Government of India in great peril? Let the commission have before them the general of division, the brigadier, the staff who have been quoted by his Excellency; let them summon every officer and man from whom anything calculated to exhibit the full and clear truth can be drawn. And when they have so done, I am very certain that the Court of Directors will have before them an overwhelming body of evidence, amply justifying my words, when I said, regarding the mutiny alleged by Sir C. Napier,\* "That however convinced his Excellency himself may be of the correctness of these representations, I contradict and condemn them as extravagant and mischievous exaggerations."

27. Before I pass on to the next division of the subject, I wish to notice a few points which occur incidentally in this part of Sir C. Napier's memorandum, but which I have hitherto passed over, in order that the consideration of the main question might not be interrupted. In paragraph 6, Sir C. Napier observes on paragraphs 31 A and 32 of minute of 14th June—"His Lordship asserts as an admitted fact, that one regiment, left in ignorance of the intentions of the Government, was betrayed into acts of violence. This was not the case. No regiment, was ignorant of the intentions of Government. Major Troup, of the 66th regiment, in common with many others, did not obey his orders; but those orders were nevertheless read to the whole regiment, as Lord Dalhousie knew, for I forwarded the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry to the Government, in which proceedings the fact was distinctly stated by one of the European officers, and was known to every one. Why his Lordship chooses to make this erroneous assertion is therefore best known to himself; the 66th were not 'betrayed into mutiny,' they had planned it long before." My words were these†:—"One regiment, indeed, left in ignorance of the intentions of the Government, through the scandalous disobedience of his orders by the officer who commanded it, fell from its duty, and was betrayed into acts of violence and insubordination." The assertion here made is substantially and literally correct.

Sir Charles Napier, in contradicting it, is himself mistaken. I made my statement after perusal of the proceedings of the aforesaid Court of Inquiry; I have carefully re-examined those proceedings, and have found, as I anticipated, that my original statement, which his Excellency has contradicted, is entirely correct. The orders of the Government were not read to the 66th regiment; no European officer says so before the Court; and the whole body of evidence, without any exception, distinctly proves that they were not read to the regiment. The order was read to the *orderly havildars*,‡ and was explained to them by the serjeant-major,§ in such a manner as an European serjeant-major may be supposed likely to explain such an order in a language foreign to him. But the order *never was explained* to the regiment at all. *It never was read to the regiment at all* till the eve of the mutiny at Govindghur. In proof of this, I refer as well to the evidence before the Court of Inquiry, as to the general order|| issued by the Commander-in-Chief at the time. In that document his Excellency observed, "Major Troup had not *previously read and explained to the sepoys of his regiment* the G.G.O. dated 25th October, 1849, when he received those orders at Lucknow, in November. Those orders were issued by the Governor-General, through the Commander-in-Chief, for the express purpose of preparing the minds of the sepoys for the just and necessary cessation of a temporary allowance, graciously granted to the troops during the war. To cause those sepoys to discuss, to consider, and thoroughly to understand that reduction, was the object of issuing those orders; and they must, from the sound principle on which they were based, have brought a conviction of their justness to the minds of the sepoys. The Government of India has appointed an interpreter to every regiment, for the purpose of translating orders to the native corps; yet Major Troup left to a serjeant-major to explain, *not to the men, but to the orderly havildars, to explain to the*

\* Minute, 14th June, 1850, Para. 38.

† Do. do. Para. 33.

‡ Court of Inquiry, Para. 30.

§ Serjeant-Major Myers.

|| General Order by Commander-in-Chief, 27th Feb., 1850.



"*sepoys* one of the most important and critical orders that ever was issued by a Governor-General, and which the Commander-in-Chief had specially directed to be carefully explained by commanding officers to the regiments." These paragraphs prove that the regiment was left in utter ignorance of the intentions of the Government, so far as their commanding officer was concerned. I have further to state, that as the intentions of the Government were never explained to the regiment by the commanding officer, so they never were explained to the regiment by any other person. The adjutant deposes: "It was never ordered through me that\* the order in question should be explained to the orderly havildars by the serjeant-major, although I suggested two or three times to the commanding officer that the order should be explained to the regiment." In reply to the query, "By whom was the order in question explained to the orderly havildars; and were they specially directed to promulgate the same to the regiment?" the commanding officer deposes,† "that he caused the order to be explained by the serjeant-major to the orderly havildars of companies, in the same way as all other orders are, which are not specially directed to be promulgated on a general parade;" adding, "and I adopted this course with regard to this particular order for this purpose, that it should not be more canvassed and conversed upon than all other orders which Government is pleased to issue." The commanding officer thus confirms the evidence of his adjutant; he shows that not only he did not explain the order to the regiment himself, but that he purposely abstained from causing any other person to explain the order to the regiment, or to anybody except to the orderly havildars.

The rest of the evidence shows that the object of the commanding officer was fully attained, and that the order never was read, far less explained, to the regiment by anybody, until the 1st February, when a mutinous spirit had already appeared. No European officer states that the order was previously read to the regiment; no officer of any kind, no witness examined, states that the order was read to the regiment. A cloud of witnesses, on the contrary, depose that the order was not read to the regiment, and that the regiment knew nothing about it, except from rumour or surmise. Thus, the subadar of the grenadier company is asked,‡ "Do you mean to say that the government order for the discontinuance of Scinde allowances was not explained to the regiment previous to the 1st February, 1850?"

He replies, "No; the order never was explained, and it was only known to the regiment by a rumour picked up upon the road from Lucknow." Again, the subadar of the light company is asked,§ "Before the reading of the government order, discontinuing the Scinde allowances, on the parade in the afternoon of 1st February, do you think it was generally understood in the regiments, that they would receive the same pay as at Lucknow?"

He replies, "Until the order in question was promulgated, on the 1st February, we knew nothing about it, excepting by reports, to which we paid slight attention." The jemadar of the light company, in reply to the same question, says,|| "The regiment knew nothing of the order in question until it was read out on the parade, excepting through reports, which were not paid much attention to." The question was not put to the officers of 1st and 2nd companies.¶ It was put in the same words to the officers of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th companies, and answered by them all in the same sense as by the officers of grenadier and light companies. It was put to one of the non-commissioned officers, who replied,\*\* "We knew nothing about it till the 1st February, excepting from reports, to which we paid no attention." Lastly, Lieutenant Carter states†† that on 2nd February he further reported thus:—"One of the men asked me why the order that was read out to the regiment the previous evening had not been read to it previous to leaving Lucknow?" The evidence thus quoted from all ranks in the 66th regiment proves that the order of the Government never was explained to the 66th regiment, nor even read to them, till the eve of their mutiny. The existence of the order for reduction, of course, was known to the sepoys of the 66th regiment; but the general order of the Commander-in-Chief, and the evidence of the Court of Inquiry, both demonstrate that my statement was in all respects correct, when I said that, by the disobedience of their commanding officer, the 66th regiment was left in ignorance of the intentions of the Government. They were left in total ignorance both of the terms of the order and of the intentions of the Government in issuing it,—in total ignorance of those facts and reasons connected with the order, which, had they been

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851.

\* Court of Inquiry, Page 30. † Do. Page 29. ‡ Do. Page 17. § Do. Page 28.  
 || Do. Page 29. ¶ Do. do. \*\* Do. Page 25. †† Do. Page 9.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

explained, might have preserved the 66th regiment; like other regiments similarly situated, in faithful adherence to its duty until this day. I will only add that, after careful re-perusal of the evidence, I find no warrant there for his Excellency's concluding statement, that the 66th had "planned" the mutiny "long before." There is not in the whole proceedings a tittle of evidence to that effect: there is a great deal of evidence against it; and the commanding officer deposes directly to the contrary. Being asked,\* "Do you mean to say that, previous to the 31st January, no reason had been given to you, directly or indirectly, to suppose that your regiment was inclined to be disaffected in consequence of the discontinuance of the extra pay?"—Major Troup replies, "No reason whatever had been given to me, nor had I any reason to suppose anything of the kind."

28. In connection with the mutiny of the 66th regiment, Sir C. Napier has the following passage.† Adverting to remarks on the disbandment and subsequent measures, contained in the 55th paragraph of minute, June 14, he says, "It was fortunate for the East-India Company that I was driven to act by my own judgment, and that the Governor-General was not present to prevent my taking advantage of such an opportunity of placing the obedience and discipline of the Bengal army on a sounder basis than it was before, which, in consequence of a private letter that I received from his Lordship at the time, I have reason to believe would have been the case. However, the good is done, and I hope no measure may be taken by his Lordship that may undo it." I am unable to understand the passage quoted above. I presume, however, that it is meant to cover an insinuation that, if I had been present at the time, I should somehow have thwarted Sir C. Napier's endeavours to place the discipline and obedience of the Bengal army on a proper basis. If I am right in my construction of the purport of this passage, I have only to give to it a full contradiction. My public despatches and my private letters are both before the Honourable Committee. If they will do me the honour of referring to them, I make bold to say, that throughout this affair they will find at least as firm and uncompromising a resolution expressed by me to adhere to the measures, and to follow the line of policy best calculated to enforce obedience and uphold discipline in the Bengal army, as was declared in the words of the late Commander-in-Chief, or shown in his acts.

29. I think it necessary very briefly to notice a remark by his Excellency on another subject, made incidentally in the course of his present memorandum. In paragraph 5‡ he alludes to "the despatch of the 16th February" (relative to the expedition to Kohat) "which the Governor-General thought proper to suppress." Since the despatch in question was disposed of in exactly the same way as any other despatch, I infer, that when Sir Charles Napier states that I suppressed his despatch, he means that I did not publish it in the newspapers. It is perfectly true that I did not so publish it. The want of publication did not cause the deeds of those engaged to be concealed, or his Excellency's approbation to be unknown. He had already proclaimed both very fully in a general order which he issued. Nor did it leave the sentiments of the Government uncertain, for they also were published in general orders to the army. Publication of a despatch in the journals is expedient only where the magnitude of the event described renders it advantageous to the state that it should be widely known; or where its details make it of general interest to the community at large. In the case of the Kohat expedition, neither the importance of the event, nor its results, seemed to render publication at all necessary, or even expedient. There had been no publication before of the reports of affairs on a similar scale, of which there have been many since I assumed this government. Only a few weeks previously, another expedition marched from Peshawur against the hill tribe of Eusofzyes. It was admirably conducted, completely executed, and brilliantly successful. The despatch was sent to me by the Commander-in-Chief; it was not published in the newspapers; but his Excellency made no complaint that that despatch had been "suppressed." I know no reason why a different view should be taken of the report of the expedition which followed, merely because the Commander-in-Chief accompanied, without commanding it; nor why his Excellency should take the liberty of stating that I had suppressed a despatch of his, merely because I did not print it in the Indian newspapers.

30. I have now come to the fourth topic of the minute of 14th June, in which it was shown—

IV. That the power which Sir C. Napier claimed for the Commander-in-Chief, in

Court of Inquiry, Page 29.

† Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 16.

‡ Do. do. Para. 5.

the concluding paragraphs of his memorandum, was unprecedented and inadmissible. The claim thus preferred by his Excellency was put forth in the concluding paragraphs of his memorandum of 22nd May. It was discussed in paragraphs 43—49 of the minute of 14th June. It was there shown to involve an extent of authority which had never before belonged to any Commander-in-Chief in India, which, if conceded, would make the power of the head of the army co-ordinate with that of the Government itself, and which could not be permitted to exist in any constituted Government. Adverting to these paragraphs, Sir Charles Napier now observes,\* “His Lordship has devoted these paragraphs to the display of a vast number of truisms, which I am not aware that any one is inclined to dispute; and this has been done ostentatiously enough, in opposition to a claim which his Lordship has been pleased to put into my mouth; for I positively deny that I ever made any claim so perfectly ridiculous. My answer may therefore be short.

“First, that his Lordship has worked himself up to a long description of this claim made, not *by* but *for* me, to a dictatorship, and which he so nobly avows his determination to resist, while he is Governor-General of India, but which never entered my head till I was amused by reading the Governor-General’s description of it.” Having here denied that he ever made this claim, Sir C. Napier proceeds to declare what his claim was:—“Secondly. My real claim was simply this: that, when placed in a position of danger and responsibility, in consequence of both the Governor-General and the Supreme Government being far beyond my reach, when I was obliged to act on my own responsibility, and at my own discretion; when, in so doing, I did my best, and more over with perfect success, I might not be submitted to a public, severe, and unjustifiable reprimand. That was my real claim, and not the dictatorship of India.” In these sentences his Excellency Sir C. Napier feebly attempts to explain away the remarkable words of his former memorandum. That the Commander-in-Chief, acting on his discretion in difficult circumstances with success, should be protected from severe reprimand, was *not* the claim put forward by Sir C. Napier. He made no reference or allusion to reprimand. His Excellency took up far higher and broader grounds. The words which were employed by his Excellency are too wide and comprehensive to be restricted to the limited sense in which he now would have them construed, while such limited sense is totally irreconcilable with the terms of the context. Sir C. Napier’s words were these:† “I consider the real question to be this—whether the Commander-in-Chief in India, removed to a great distance from all higher authority (the highest being at sea), in a moment of great danger, surrounded by a hostile population, and with an army of upwards of 40,000 men infected with a mutinous spirit, was or was not justified in using his discretion and promptly dealing with danger in the manner which he thought most effectual for the safety of India? This is the real question.” And having observed that this discretion had been refused to him, he declared his conclusion that he could not retain a command, “under such restrictions,” with advantage to the public service.

In thus stating the question at issue between himself and the Government, regarding the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, and in further declaring his own determination to resign, since that question had been decided in the negative, Sir Charles Napier claimed for the Commander-in-Chief of the army in India that, when removed to a distance from the Supreme Government, and placed in circumstances of difficulty, he should be entitled to “use his discretion and promptly to deal with danger in the manner which he thought most effectual for the safety of India;” that is to say, in plain English, that at a distance from the Government, and placed in circumstances which he considered dangerous, the Commander-in-Chief might do what he pleased, as he pleased, without restriction. Such was the general authority which his Excellency claimed. The particular powers which he was prepared to exercise under such general authority had already been shown by the issue of his order altering the rate of sepoy’s ration compensation; and the full extent to which he insisted on that specific power being practically conceded to the Commander-in-Chief was proved in the concluding paragraphs of his memorandum of 22nd May, where, having adverted to and partially quoted the letter from the Government, in which it was intimated that the Governor-General in Council would “not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall alter the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India,” he thereupon at once proceeded to declare that, so circumstanced, he no longer felt safe, and would resign a command which he could not hold with advantage under such restrictions.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 14.

† Do. 22nd May, Pages 7, 8.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

This brief review of his Excellency's words and acts will suffice to show that I correctly represented the claim put forward by Sir C. Napier, when in the 45th paragraph of minute 14th June I stated, "Sir C. Napier therefore openly and broadly claims for himself, as Commander-in-Chief of this army, the power of altering the pay and allowances of the troops under his command whenever, in his discretion, he may judge it necessary to do so." This brief review will further show that the claim advanced by Sir C. Napier was no gentle claim for exemption from reprimand, but a claim for *power*, and that the refusal of such power was the ground of his resignation. I am not at all surprised that Sir C. Napier should desire exceedingly to explain away the unparalleled claim which he advanced. It is natural that he should be solicitous to retrace the false step he has taken, and should be anxious to disclaim such pretensions when exposed to him in their deformity. But Sir C. Napier has placed those claims on record in characters too distinct to be obliterated by mere disclaimers, or by affecting now to regard them as ridiculous. They were formally advanced. The consequences which would have followed the concession of them were fully shown in my former minute; and they were justly refused as unprecedented and inadmissible.

31. The prominence which Sir C. Napier has recently given to the reprimand contained in the letter from the secretary to Government, of 13th April, and frequently mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, calls for some remark. In the present memorandum his Excellency ascribes to the reprimand an importance and influence far beyond all that was given to it in his former paper. He even intimates that on that alone he resigned.\* He designates it an "intemperate reprimand, to which no man could submit without baseness, an undeserved and uncalled-for reproof," and "offensive."† To this I have to reply, that the letter in question is already before the Court. A reference to that letter, to its substance and manner, will supply the best refutation of these assertions, and will, in itself, suffice to show that Sir C. Napier's words are without warrant, when he describes the letter as either intemperate or offensive. Still less will those who are acquainted with the circumstances under which this despatch was written be disposed to concur in the opinion that it was undeserved or uncalled-for. The order issued by the Commander-in-Chief regarding the compensation for sepoy's rations, even if it had been an isolated act, would have required explicit notice by the Government. But it was not a single incident. It is well known that for some time previously the tone assumed by Sir C. Napier towards this Government, in the official papers submitted by him on subjects of general importance, had been of such a nature as to convince the Government that it would shortly become absolutely necessary to take measures for maintaining the just limits of its own powers, and for protecting its authority against disrespect. In order to show that this conviction was not founded on over-sensitiveness, or on any such unsubstantial ground, it may be mentioned that, when the documents to which I have alluded reached the Home authorities, they thought it necessary immediately and voluntarily to convey to the Governor-General in Council, an assurance "that the Home Government will not permit his authority to be disputed by any functionary subjected to his control.‡ It is essential for the public interests that those intrusted with supreme power should be implicitly obeyed; and it is also necessary that any advice given to them should be tendered in respectful language, and with a due regard to the usual forms of official correspondence." While such was the attitude which the Commander-in-Chief had assumed towards the Government under which he served, a despatch was received, announcing that his Excellency considered that the rule respecting sepoy's rations compensation was unjust and impolitic, and that he had accordingly suspended it, which, I have repeatedly shown, was, under such circumstances, practically to cancel it. The rule was a well-established rule. It was perfectly just and politic; no sufficient reason was given for its reversal; the act was entirely beyond his Excellency's authority; and although the financial question involved in the change was insignificant in amount, yet the effect of the change was to thwart the course of measures in the Punjab, by again needlessly establishing a difference in principle and regulation where the Government had been labouring to restore uniformity. Having regard as well to the act itself, as to the circumstances which had preceded it, the Governor-General in Council now felt it to have become quite necessary that he should point out to Sir C. Napier the proper limits of his Excellency's authority, and should intimate that they must not again be exceeded. Accordingly, the letter of the 13th April was addressed to his Excellency. He was informed that the Governor-General in Council

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 17. † Do. do. Paras. 14, 15. ‡ From Secret Committee, 24th June, 1850.

concurred in the views previously expressed by the President in Council; further, that he viewed with regret and dissatisfaction his Excellency's act, which, it was stated, called for no haste, while it interfered materially with the measures which the Government had been pursuing. The order of the Commander-in-Chief was confirmed; whatever it gave was continued, and his Excellency's authority was upheld before the army: but Sir C. Napier was informed, for his future guidance, that the Governor-General in Council would not permit the Commander-in-Chief again to alter the pay and allowances of the army, and thus to exercise an authority which belonged only to the Government of India. Such was the substance of the letter. Very few will be found, acquainted with the circumstances I have now narrated, who will attempt to maintain that it was either undeserved or uncalled for. The measured language of the letter, and its expressions, free from all discourtesy, will speak for themselves to any one who may choose to read it, and will effectually disprove the statement, that it was intemperate or offensive. If the resolution of the Supreme Government, not to permit the Commander-in-Chief of the army to exceed his own authority, was told plainly, it was high time that it should be so told: if the tone of the prohibition was peremptory, it was not one whit more so than was required by the circumstances of the case, and by the character of the officer to whom it was addressed.

32. I come now to the last head of this discussion, in which it was shown,

V. That full support\* had been given to Sir Charles Napier during the period of his command, and that he had no sufficient ground for intimating an opinion that support would be withheld from him in future difficulties. This topic was treated in paragraphs 49—58 of the minute of 14th June. Upon these, Sir Charles Napier thus comments.† The Governor-General “proceeds to say, that I complained of want of support in the past, and then he overturns the complaint of his own creation, which he so gratuitously endeavours to fix upon me. All this is making out a case which has no existence in fact. My complaint was as plain as the sun in the heavens. I stated in my memorandum that the absence of any higher power to refer to for a decision had driven me to act to the best of my judgment, and with success, for which I deserved thanks and received a reprimand. After describing this single fact (for the whole case referred to regards but one fact), I concluded thus ‘Such are the shackles put upon my conduct as Commander-in-Chief, such is the support which I have received on this occasion; and such is the support which I may expect in future difficulties. So circumstanced, I no longer feel safe, and shall resign a command which I could not retain under such restrictions with advantage to the public service.’” And then his Excellency asks, “Do the words ‘on this occasion’ authorise his Lordship’s sweeping assertion, that I complained of denial of support in the past?” Premising that the assertion to which he refers was not a sweeping one, I reply that most unquestionably his Excellency’s words, which he has quoted, do authorize the statement I made, that he complained of want of support in the past. My words were these: after quoting the commencement of the paragraph, which his Excellency has also quoted, I proceeded: ‡ “In these sentences Sir Charles Napier represents himself as aggrieved by restrictions placed upon him by the Government of India, and by *such a denial of support in the past that he can no longer expect to be supported in any future difficulties.*” These words most accurately represent Sir Charles Napier’s statements, as quoted by himself. He did represent himself as “aggrieved by restrictions placed upon him by the Government of India,” for he said, § “such are the shackles put upon my conduct as Commander-in-Chief.” He did represent himself as aggrieved by “such a denial || of support in the past that he could no longer expect to be supported in any future difficulties,” for he said, ¶ “such is the support I have received on this occasion, and such the support I may expect in future difficulties,” expressions followed immediately by the announcement of his resignation as the consequence. Though Sir Charles Napier limited his complaint to the transactions of one occasion, it was not the less a complaint of want of support in the past, upon which he founded his declaration of his hopelessness of all support in the future. The words of my minute do not extend his Excellency’s meaning beyond the limit set to it by his own words; and I cannot comprehend on what ground Sir Charles Napier now describes as a complaint of my creation his own plainly expressed

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851.

\* Minute, 14th June, Paras. 49—60.

† Do. 4th Dec. Para. 15.

‡ Do. 14th June, Para. 50.

§ Do. do. Para. 50, and 22nd May, Para. 8.

|| Do. 14th June, Para. 50.

¶ Do. 22nd May, Para. 8.

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

complaint, set down by himself, in his first memorandum, and quoted by himself in his second, of want of support on the occasion which led to his retirement. Sir Charles Napier having complained of a want of support in the past in a specified instance, it was necessary for me to show, if I could, that no proper support had been refused to him on that occasion. But it was necessary for me to do a great deal more, and to show that no support had ever been withheld from him by me, either on that or any other previous occasion in the past. Sir Charles Napier says,\* “the proofs he adduces that he had given me support on other occasions were not necessary, for I never questioned it. On the contrary, I always and openly acknowledged it.” I take the liberty, however, of saying that these proofs were quite necessary, and for the reasons that follow. Sir Charles Napier forgets that my minute was not written for his information only, but for the information also of my superiors and his. When a Commander-in-Chief resigns, avowedly in consequence of some act of the Governor-General, it must always be necessary for the latter functionary, for his own credit, to show that he had not unnecessarily done any act which could lead to such an event. But when Sir Charles Napier was seen resigning the high command which he had so lately assumed, abandoning the honourable trust so honourably committed to him, and on the declared ground that he could no longer expect support from the Governor-General in future difficulties, it became indispensably necessary, for my own reputation, that I should show to the satisfaction of the Court of Directors, not only that I had not withheld any support that was due on the occasion chiefly indicated, but that I had not withheld support at any time from the Commander-in-Chief during the whole period of his service in India; that, on the contrary, my support had been so cordial, so undeviating, so effectual from first to last, that his Excellency had no just ground for declaring “that he had no hope of support in the future,” and that his resignation was not justly to be attributed for blame to me. These were the reasons which made it my duty to put forward in my own defence the full proofs contained in the minute of 14th June, of the continuous support which his Excellency Sir Charles Napier had received from me. They conclusively show that the recording of such proofs was not “unnecessary” or “fighting with a shadow.” †

33. In the 54th paragraph of the minute 14th June, I pointed out that his Excellency was under some misapprehension when he spoke of “the powers‡ entrusted to him by the Governor-General.” In the present memorandum§ Sir Charles Napier proceeds to show that he had good ground for assuming that powers had been entrusted to him by me. He does so by large quotations from my private letters showing that I approved of what his Excellency had done regarding the mutiny in the 13th and 22nd regiments, &c.; that I expressed full confidence that his Excellency would do whatever might be necessary in the circumstances that might arise, and had assured him that whenever the support of the Government could be given beneficially, it would be given unreservedly. Having cited these quotations, Sir Charles Napier asks whether he was not warranted in considering that he was entrusted with the discretionary power which, on the spur of the occasion, he exercised? I reply that Sir Charles Napier was most fully warranted by the contents of these letters in believing that the utmost support of the Government would be afforded to him, and that he would be cordially sustained in any exercise of a wise and necessary discretion; but Sir Charles Napier was not warranted thereby in publicly proclaiming that powers had been entrusted to him by the Governor-General. In every public despatch, in every private letter, ample support was given, or implied. But neither in public despatches nor in private letters was it ever intimated that the ordinary powers of the Commander-in-Chief would be increased by powers to be vested in him by the Governor-General, and for this plain reason—it was competent to me to give and to promise full support; it was not competent to me to delegate the powers which belonged to my office. Sir Charles Napier observes that it follows from what I said, that my predecessors have not known the limits of their authority. I have no doubt that whatever my predecessors actually did was done both legally and wisely. I speak only for myself. So speaking, I have to state that the power of dismissing the commissioned officers of a regiment, without the sentence of a court-martial, is vested in the Governor-General in Council alone, and he has no authority to delegate that power to another. Sir Charles Napier was, no doubt, entirely justified in promptly declaring the dismissal of the officers of the 66th regiment, and he was promptly and cordially supported in doing so, but he was in error when he stated in his general order|| that in doing this he was

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 15.  
§ Do. 4th Dec., Para. 16.

† Do. do. do. ‡ Do. 14th June, Para. 55.  
|| General Order of Commander-in-Chief, 27th Feb. 1850.

about "to use the powers entrusted to him by the Governor-General." The considerations which induced me to advert to this minor point were set forth in the 55th and 56th paragraphs of the minute of 14th June, and need not be repeated.

34. In connection with my remarks on matters connected with the disbanding of the 66th regiment, Sir C. Napier thus writes:\* "When I found that five regiments had exhibited a mutinous disposition, and that one had attempted to seize the strong fortress of Govindghur, then *I did* think the most severe measures were necessary in order to quell the mutiny, and authorized by the letters above quoted; yet these measures the Governor-General now holds forth as criminal! Yes; it was high time for me to resign a command, where every exercise of sound judgment in my own profession, attended with perfect success, has been considered an encroachment on his Lordship's power, and a misdemeanor, if not a crime!" Elsewhere, too, Sir C. Napier expresses himself in a similar strain.† "His Lordship's endeavours to turn the Bengal army against one who has led their battalions in action, and who they know to have done his duty towards them both in action and out of action, is as weak as it is unjustifiable; and there I leave it with this observation, that to forget good service is common among men, but to enjoy the safety resulting from good service, and then endeavour to make the man who produced that safety appear criminal, is unusual, and I willingly leave to the Governor-General any satisfaction which he may be able to derive from such a line of conduct." In reply to this really wild declamation, I beg leave simply to refer the Honourable Court of Directors to the minute in which these measures are said to have been held forth as criminal, as encroachments on the Governor-General's‡ power, as a misdemeanor, if not a crime. There is not one sentence in it which could be made to carry such a construction. Illustrating the extent to which the support of the Government had actually been given to Sir C. Napier, I stated that the disbanding of the 66th, and the consequent measures were beyond the competency of the Commander-in-Chief, yet they were all readily confirmed. I thus stated the fact; but far from objecting to these measures of the Commander-in-Chief as criminal, as an encroachment on the power of the Governor-General, as a misdemeanor, or as a crime, I said that the Government, "feeling that under such circumstances the Commander-in-Chief should receive a support without any qualification," gave publicly to them all a *full, cordial, and unqualified*§ approbation. In like manner, when Sir C. Napier, in the second paragraph which I have transcribed, asserts that I have endeavoured to turn the Bengal army against him, and that enjoying the safety which his good service has created, I now seek to make the man who produced it appear criminal; it is enough for me to refer again to my recorded words, and to reply that there is not a sentence in my minute which will justify these attacks. I have never refused to Sir C. Napier the credit of the service he has done; I have never depreciated the merits of those acts of his by which public safety was in any way promoted. Admitting the existence of partial discontent, I have not underrated the difficulties of his Excellency's position, I have never questioned the danger which would have been consequent on such a spirit of discontent, *if it had not been promptly and firmly dealt with*. I cordially approved of his Excellency's declared determination to visit it with instant punishment on its earliest manifestation; I reposed and expressed entire confidence in his Excellency's capacity to deal with these difficulties; and I give to him the fullest credit he can claim for the success which attended his measures, in putting down the partial mutiny that did prevail. But I could not, and I do not, give to Sir C. Napier the credit of quelling a formidable mutiny among 40,000 men in the Punjab, because no such mutiny ever existed. And believing, as I did, that the statement that 40,000 troops in the Punjab were so infected with a mutinous spirit as to have placed the Government of India in great peril had cast an unjust and injurious imputation on those troops, I emphatically contradict it. Sir C. Napier imputes to me that in so doing I have endeavoured to turn the Bengal army against him. But I must be permitted to remind his Excellency that, as the head of this Government, I have as deep and as close an interest in the honour of the Bengal army as any other man can claim. When, therefore, I saw unjust aspersions cast on the credit of a large portion of its members, I chose to shield it from those aspersions, though the band of its own chief had flung them. I am confident that my act in so doing will be ascribed to its real motive by those who shall judge my conduct; that it will be attributed not to a petty and unmean-

CORRESPONDENCE, &c

Minute by the Governor-General, 28th Feb. 1851

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 16.  
§ Do. 14th June, Para. 54.

† Do. do. Para. 8.

‡ Do. 14th June, Para. 54.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
28th Feb. 1851.

ing wish to lower Sir C. Napier, but to the true cause from which it sprang, namely, my desire to uphold, as I ought to do, the reputation of a body of men, whom I believe to have served faithfully under my authority.

35. I have now adverted to every topic and to every passage in Sir C. Napier's memorandum, dated 4th December, which appears to me to call for any remark; I desire only to offer a single observation on the language and style of the document before me. The official papers addressed by Sir C. Napier to the Government of India have for some time past been habitually rude and discourteous in expression. On this occasion, however, the language and tone which the late Commander-in-Chief has assumed, are such as I would not have permitted any officer under my command to address to me with impunity. But his Excellency Sir C. Napier was careful that this memorandum, declaredly written five months before, should not be placed in my hands until he had ceased to serve under my authority. This being so, I shall now rest satisfied with having fully replied to all the substance of his Excellency's memorandum, and I shall brush aside its language and style without any further notice.

36. In the concluding paragraph of his memorandum,\* Sir Charles Napier thus writes:—"In this paragraph † Lord Dalhousie winds up his extraordinary papers, by "assuming, as things done and said by me, things which I neither did nor said; and "assuming as proved, things which I distinctly deny, and intentions and motives of which "I never dreamed and which I disclaim. He recapitulates his groundless assertion and "assumptions, and, finally, feels satisfied with himself that he has done all that is right, "and that I have done all that is wrong, consequently, that his conduct will be perfectly "approved by the Home authorities. But these authorities have not yet seen my reply "to his Lordship's minute. When this reply becomes known, it will be seen what "judgment will be formed by those authorities." I very earnestly trust, that if this question shall be revived in England in some other form, as I infer, from passages in the memorandum, is likely to be the case, every possible information will be afforded regarding it. I trust that, in such event, the Honourable Court of Directors will solicit her Majesty's Government to lay all the papers connected with the subject on the table of Parliament, whence they will at once become accessible to the whole public. The more open the court before which the question shall come, the more numerous the jury, the more I shall be content, for the weightier will in such case be the verdict which I am confident will be pronounced in my favour; thereby confirming the assurances of unqualified approbation of my conduct on this occasion, which I have already had the honour of receiving from the Court of Directors and from her Majesty's Government.

Camp, Rawul Pindiee,  
28th January, 1851.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

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*From* Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General; *to* Major W. MAYNE; Commanding Governor-General's Body Guard.

*Dated 4th February, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,

*From* Captain  
F. D. Atkinson *to*  
Major W. Mayne,  
4th Feb. 1851.

I am directed by the Governor-General to state, that his Lordship has been verbally informed, on various occasions, that when the 66th regiment N. I. mutinied at Govindghur, in February last, the correspondence of the regiment was seized; and that, on examination of it, no evidence of any preconcerted mutiny was found therein.

2. Circumstances having occurred which render it desirable that any authentic and available information on this subject should be placed on record, I am directed by the Governor-General to address to you, who were President of the Court of Inquiry at Govindghur, the following questions:—

\*1st. When the 66th regiment mutinied at Govindghur, was the correspondence of the regiment taken possession of?

2ndly. Did the correspondence seized include merely the day's dāk, or the letters retained previously in the men's possession?

\* Minute, 4th Dec., Para. 18.

† Do. 14th June, Para. 58.



3rdly. Was the correspondence examined?

4thly. If so, was there found, on examination, any trace of treason, or conspiracy, or of preconcerted mutiny?

3. The Governor-General will be glad if you would be so good as to reply to these questions to the best of your knowledge and recollection, and at your earliest convenience.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

Camp, Thuthee,  
4th February, 1851.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

From Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Major W. Mayne,  
4th Feb. 1851.

From Major W. MAYNE, commanding Governor-General's Body Guard, to Captain ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to Government of India, Military Department.

Dated 4th February, 1851.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, calling upon me, as having been president of the Court of Inquiry assembled to investigate the conduct of the 66th regiment N. I. at Govindghur, in February, 1850, to answer, for the information of the Most Noble the Governor-General, certain questions, which I here transcribe, together with my replies thereto.

*Question 1.* When the 66th regiment mutinied at Govindghur, was the correspondence of the regiment taken possession of?

2. Did the correspondence seized include merely the day's dāk, or the letters retained previously in the men's possession?

3. Was the correspondence examined?

4. If so, was there found, on examination, any trace of treason, or of conspiracy, or of preconcerted mutiny?

*Answer 1.* All the papers' and correspondence of the 66th regiment were seized by my orders, immediately after that regiment quitted the fort.

2. The papers seized included not only the day's dāk, but the correspondence of months before.

3. The whole of the papers and correspondence were examined by Captain Siddons, formerly interpreter 1st light cavalry, who was a member of the Court of Inquiry.

4. Not one word, as I was informed, of a treasonable nature, or indicative of any preconcerted plan of mutiny, was found among the documents seized.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. MAYNE, Major,  
commanding Governor-General's Body Guard.

4th February, 1851.

From  
Major W. Mayne to  
Capt. Atkinson,  
4th Feb. 1851.

No. 2 B.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

Military Department.

Camp, Kote, 3rd February, 1851.

Read a despatch from the Adjutant-General of the Army, No. 1,362, dated 10th December, 1850, enclosing a memorandum by Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B. dated July and 4th December, 1850.

Letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army, No. 2 A, of this date, enclosing a minute by the Most Noble the Governor-General, dated 28th January, 1851.

Letters to and from the officer commanding the Governor-General's body guard.

Ordered, That a copy of the foregoing correspondence be transmitted to the Foreign Department, in continuation of No. 122, dated 14th June, 1850.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant Secretary to Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

Office Memorandum,  
3rd Feb. 1851.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

MEMORANDUM of the Duke of Wellington, upon the Subject of Sir Charles Napier's Letter of the 22nd of May, 1850, requesting the Commander-in-Chief to obtain her Majesty's permission for him to resign the Office of Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies. London, July 30th, 1850.

Memorandum of the Duke of Wellington, upon the subject of Sir C. Napier's Letter of the 22nd May, 1850, requesting permission to resign, 30th July, 1850.

There can be no doubt that the suppression of mutiny among troops, particularly if at all general or extended to numbers, and the restoration of order and subordination to authority, and discipline, among troops who have mutinied, is the most arduous and delicate duty upon which an officer can be employed, and which requires in the person who undertakes it, all the highest qualifications of an officer, and moral qualities; and he who should undertake to perform the duty should enjoy in a high degree the respect and confidence of the troops, as well as of the Government by which he should be employed.

Under ordinary circumstances, an officer employed on such service, even if the Commander-in-Chief of the army, is highly instructed by the Government by which such a service is required; and he is particularly instructed in respect to the terms which he is to hold out to the mutineers, whether pecuniary or other.

But even when a Commander-in-Chief is himself in supreme command in the field, and it is his duty to direct the measures for the suppression of a mutiny of the troops and to restore order, whether himself personally or by others, it has not been unusual to instruct him in respect to the terms, whether pecuniary or other, which he is to offer and to grant to the mutineers.

The arrangement cannot be otherwise regularly settled, as it rarely happens that military mutineers do not require something, or that it is not necessary to perform some act, before order is thoroughly established, which is not consistent with the provisions of the existing law, and which the Commander-in-Chief cannot have authority to carry into execution.

According to strict rule, the Commander-in-Chief, or any other officer employed in quelling a mutiny and in restoring order and subordination, ought to have the instructions and authority of Government to engage for, and carry into execution, such measures.

If circumstances should have occasioned the omission fully to instruct the Commander-in-Chief, or an officer employed to quell a mutiny and to restore subordination and legitimate order, and such officer should have assumed authority with which he should not have been regularly invested, it is usual and it is but fair towards one who should have undertaken the performance of duty so necessary, but so arduous and dangerous, to examine minutely all the circumstances attending the case, to see that the mutiny really existed—that it was formidable on account of the numbers engaged in it—on account of the territorial extent in which it existed—on account of the political circumstances of the country at the moment,—that it was *urgently necessary* to interfere and settle and stop the mutineers immediately;—that there was no time for reference to distant authority, and reference for superior orders on the measures considered necessary to be adopted.

Accordingly, I have inquired for and called in vain for the inquiries of the Governor-General in Council, or the President in Council, into the fact of a general mutiny of the native troops in the service of the East-India Company, stationed throughout the Punjab in the month of January, 1850, and most particularly the mutiny of the native corps at Wuzeerabad at that period.

What corps—whether European or native—were in the neighbourhood, and within reach of one, two, or three marches at that moment.

I see no inquiry whatever upon this subject.

I required information from the President of the Board of Control in respect to dates connected with these transactions. I have been able to obtain none.

Yet I am certain that if the Governor-General in Council had examined this subject minutely, as his Lordship in Council ought, before he recorded the minute which appears against his colleague in Council, the Commander of H.M.'s Forces in the field, in command of the troops in the Punjab, there would have been no want of information in the offices of the India House which would elucidate the whole transaction.

Since writing the above, I have received from the Board of Control, papers which contain a review of the course of proceeding of the Government of India in relation to the orders given by General Sir Charles Napier in respect to the payment of certain troops at Wuzeerabad, of which the President in Council at Fort William, and after-

wards the Governor-General, had disapproved, and which led to the resignation of his office of Commander-in-Chief of H.M.'s Forces in India, by General Sir Charles Napier.

A close examination of the papers sent to me by Sir Charles Napier himself, with his report of the transaction, convinced me that there was no mutiny of the troops at Wuzeerabad in December, 1849, or January, 1850. There were murmurings and complaints, but no mutiny. The commanding officers of the troops had already warned the troops of the dangerous consequences of refusing the pay offered to them when the pay-day should come.

*The pay-day had not been fixed; the fixation thereof might be postponed.*

But if the sepoys required money, a measure, not uncommon, might have been adopted; that is to say, that of making to each of them an advance on account.

In short, the Commander-in-Chief should have availed himself of every resource to prevent or delay the explosion of disorder, and to avoid the extreme measure of altering the regulation of Government, which, on the contrary, it was his duty to enforce.

I put out of the question altogether his opinion that the regulation was impolitic and unjust. His Excellency had no right to consider of such an opinion, and to act upon it at Wuzeerabad.

He ought to have given such an opinion to the President in Council, and to have gone to Fort William, taken his seat in the Council, and there, with that body, have discussed his opinion upon the regulation.

He had no right to act upon that opinion at Wuzeerabad, in December, 1849, or January, 1850, and, above all, to omit any measure which would avoid or even delay the explosion of the mutiny of the troops, in order that he might alter a regulation which he considered impolitic and unjust.

He states that the regulation had not been considered by the military authorities. It had been adopted by Lord Hardinge when he was Governor-General and Lord Gough the Commander-in-Chief; Lord Hardinge, one of the first military authorities in England, particularly in matters of financial regulation.

It was re-enacted in a new form by Lord Dalhousie, that is, in a pay code, and was again considered and adopted by General Lord Gough, and from the period of its first adoption, during the Government of Lord Hardinge, had been promulgated to the army, and had been the governing rule.

It is true that the object of the regulation being to give troops compensation for the high price of provisions when they should be serving in the field, and the price of provisions having been in those years, in the country-quarters and cantonments of the troops, at a lower rate than that predicated in the regulation, it had seldom, if ever, been necessary to carry into execution the regulation, and its details were not accurately and familiarly known to the officers or troops.

Since writing this, I have seen a statement that the regulation had been carried into execution in parts of the army in the field in the Punjab, in 1848.

But it appears, according to Sir Charles Napier's statement, that there existed in the country a general mutiny, which pervaded the whole army of 40,000 men in the Punjab, in the month of January, 1850.

Where is the report? where is the evidence of that mutiny, except in Sir Charles Napier's report sent to the Horse Guards, and in the 66th regiment, the corps at Govindghur, which had been suppressed in a most signal manner without difficulty and without effort?

It appears that the 66th regiment at Govindghur, having mutinied, piled its arms in the fort under the orders of its officers, was marched out, disbanded, and sent into the Company's provinces, in this very month of January, 1850, with the knowledge of the whole army of the Punjab, and that there had not been the sign of movement of a man in favour or support of the mutinous regiment, thus punished and disarmed, the Commander-in-Chief having quitted Wuzeerabad and proceeded on his march to Peshawur.

On the 16th of January, he issued to the army a general order as follows:—

"I have seen most of the armies in the world, and I have never seen one that is better cared for than the army of the East-India Company. Neither have I ever seen a more obedient, more honourable army. I will not allow a few malignant, discontented scoundrels to disgrace their colours and their regiments, by an insolent attempt to dictate to their Government what pay that Government should give to soldiers towards whom it has always been both just and generous."

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum of the Duke of Wellington upon the subject of Sir C. Napier's Letter of the 22nd May, 1850, requesting permission to resign, 30th July, 1850.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Memorandum of the Duke of Wellington upon the subject of Sir C. Napier's Letter of the 22nd May, 1850, requesting permission to resign, 30th July, 1850.

Thus it appears that his Excellency did not conceal that insubordination existed, nor evade the mention of it, and that he characterized its nature and described its extent.

This was the order issued by General Sir Charles Napier to the army on the 16th of January, 1850, of which army he, on the 20th of January, reported that 40,000 men in the Punjab were in a state of mutiny.

There is no recorded report of the existence of such mutiny in any part of the country, excepting the one in the 66th regiment at Govindghur above adverted to, and which it is concluded is the exception to the universal applause of the conduct and feelings of the army conveyed in the Government order of the 16th, the substance of which I have mentioned.

I have not got an official copy of this order, I have copied it from a report of it in a minute by the Governor-General in Council.

I have now performed the painful task of reviewing this whole transaction brought under my consideration, first, by the report of Sir Charles Napier, dated the 22nd of May, 1850, and subsequently by letters from the President of the Board of Control, in which he transmitted for my perusal the documents sent to the Court of Directors of the East-India Company by the Governor-General in Council.

I have no hesitation in stating my opinion, that there existed no sufficient reason for the suspension of the rule, or order, of the 15th of August, 1845, at Wuzeerabad.

That the Governor-General in Council was right, and did no more than his duty, in the expression of his disapprobation of the act of the Commander-in-Chief, in suspending an order of Government in relation to the pay of the troops, and in ordering the adoption of a former repealed order providing for the same object.

I regret that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier, should have thought proper to resign the highest and most desired situation in the British army, to fill which he had been selected in a manner so honourable to his professional character. But as he has resigned, and I declare my decided opinion that the Governor-General in Council could not with propriety have acted otherwise than have expressed his disapprobation of the conduct of General Sir Charles Napier, in suspending the order of Government of the 15th August, 1845, at Wuzeerabad, I must recommend to her Majesty to accept his resignation of his office.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

MILITARY DESPATCH from the COURT of DIRECTORS to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA.

Dated 7th August, 1850, No. 18.

Military Despatch from the Court of Directors. 7th Aug. 1850.

Reply to paragraphs 22 to 25 of military letter from the Government of Bengal, dated 28th May, No. 88, and to a letter from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, dated the 14th June, 1850, No. 11.

1. This correspondence has engaged our immediate and earnest attention.

2. For many years prior to the year 1844, it was the practice of your Government to grant compensation to the native troops whenever their chief article of food, ottah, was dear. Compensation was limited to that article, and was granted when its selling price was under fifteen seers the rupee, and at the rate of a seer a day for each man.

Dholl, if above ten seers per rupee, at the rate of two chittacks per man per day.

Ghee, if above two seers per rupee, at the rate of one chittack per man per day.

Salt, if above eight seers per rupee, at the rate of  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a chittack per man per day.

G. O. 12th March, 1844.

3. In the year 1844 your Government extended the compensation to the several minor articles composing the native soldier's ration, viz. dholl, ghee, and salt, in the proportions and at the prices named in the margin, with the avowed object "of providing, as is done in her Majesty's

"service, that the soldier's ration shall never cost him more than a fixed moderate sum."

CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Military Despatch  
from the Court of  
Directors,  
7th Aug. 1850.

4. This regulation, which involved the necessity for settling with the soldier for each separate article of diet, was found in practice to cause great complication in the accounts, and also frequently to give more than was intended; for it not only, as observed by the Governor-General, secured to the sepoy his ration at the fixed moderate sum of three rupees and a half per month, but, even if his ration should actually have cost him less than that fixed sum, it would frequently give him an additional payment in cash, in consequence of some one or more of the minor articles being dear.

5. In the next year (1845) your Government, when promulgating several rules which were beneficial to the troops, took the opportunity of correcting these defects. It was then announced that the troops would be entitled to compensation whenever the price of provisions forming the native soldiers' diet should exceed the aggregate of the rates for the several articles, viz. three rupees and a half per mensem.

6. This rule was in strict accordance with the intention expressed in that of 1844, and was in accordance with the rule in force in her Majesty's army and in the European corps of our army.

7. The above order, and the other orders published at the same time, granting advantages to the native soldiers, as specified in the margin,\* were translated into Hindostanee in the Persian and Nagaree characters; were published in general orders by the Government and Commander-in-Chief; and were circulated in the same language to every regiment in the army.

8. We may observe that, before these several orders were adopted, they were sent for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief in India (Lord Gough), who recorded the following general remarks† upon them:—

“ In returning the inclosed papers, I beg to express my firm conviction, in which I am joined by one of the most experienced officers in the service, with whom I have confidentially communicated, that for the last half century nothing has been produced so replete with a judicious and paternal solicitude for the interest and welfare of our native army, as the present contemplated enactments; and I feel confident that these invaluable boons will be hailed by all grades of that army with emotions of the most lively gratitude towards the considerate and liberal Government whose servants they are.”

9. The regulation then established to compensate the troops for high prices of provisions was originally limited to Scinde, but became applicable to the troops which entered the Punjab after the battle of Sobraon, under the G.O. of 12th February, 1846, which declared that they should receive the same rates of pay and allowances as those serving in Scinde; and by a G.O. dated on the 17th December, 1847, the regulation was made applicable to the native troops generally, wherever they might be stationed.

10. The rule, thus deliberately established and carefully promulgated, was duly observed for upwards of four years, viz., from August, 1845, to January, 1850, when the occurrences took place which are detailed in the papers now before us.

11. It may here be observed that, by a general order dated the 2nd June, 1849, a revised code of pay and audit regulations was published by your Government. This code contained the order of 1845-47, as above specified, in substitution for that of 1844.

12. Brigadier Hearsey, C.B., commanding at Wuzeerabad, addressed a letter to the Adjutant-General of the army, on the 11th of January, 1850, stating that, having noticed that the revised code of pay and audit regulations which was promulgated in June, 1849, differed from the old code as to compensation for food when it sells at a high rate, and “ as this difference has not been directed to be explained to the native troops,” he thought it necessary to bring the matter under the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, at the same time forwarding statements to show that the rule of 1845 was less beneficial to the troops at that particular time and station than the rule of 1844, to the extent of one anna six pies (2½d.) per mensem.

13. We have to express our surprise that an officer of the experience and standing of Brigadier Hearsey should have been so ignorant of the regulations of the service as to have made this representation, and that the Commander-in-Chief did not refer to the Government orders, or to the authorities competent to afford him correct information on the subject. This course, unfortunately, was not taken by the Commander-in-Chief, who stated that the “ change in the regulations was not observed by his (Sir C. Napier's)

\* Revision of Scinde allowances, hutting money, payment of certain regimental establishments, privileges to native officers and sepoys in respect to judicial and revenue proceedings.

† 10th June, 1845.

## CORRESPONDENCE, &amp;c.

Military Despatch  
from the Court of  
Directors.  
7th Aug. 1850.

Letter from Adjutant-General of the  
Army to the Secretary to Government  
of India, 20th Jan. 1850.

“without the circumstances of  
the case being fully and clearly explained to the  
Supreme Government.”

“predecessor, when the code of 1849 was sent to army  
head-quarters for any comment the Commander-in-  
Chief might see fit to make; and Sir C. Napier is  
persuaded that the alteration has been introduced

14. The Commander-in-Chief observed as follows:—

“The Commander-in-Chief considers the change that has thus been made to the  
injury of the soldier to be both impolitic and unjust, and he feels assured that it only  
requires to be brought to the notice of the Government to ensure its immediate recti-  
fication.”

“In the meantime, confident of the support of Government, the Commander-in-  
Chief has directed that compensation shall be issued to the native troops serving in the  
Punjab, in accordance with the rules laid down in the old regulations, as in the  
present state of transition from Scinde pay and allowances to the regular pay of the  
troops, a transition which has produced a most unprovoked state of insubordination in  
some regiments, the Commander-in-Chief thinks that no cause of dissatisfaction should  
be given the troops.”

15. Immediately on receiving the above intimation, the President of the Council  
of India in Council (the Governor-General being then absent at sea), caused explanations  
to be given to the Commander-in-Chief, showing how completely he was in error as to  
the regulations of the service, observing that his Excellency would now see that the rule  
of 1845-7 “was not ordered hastily or unadvisedly by the Supreme Government, but, on  
the contrary, after much consideration on different occasions and full deliberation; that  
it had been in operation throughout the presidency long previous to the publica-  
tion of the Pay Code of 1849, without, as far as Government are aware, a single  
objection being offered to it; and that it was adopted as being perfectly just, equitable,  
and politic by the late Governor-General (Lord Hardinge) in Council, and by the late  
Commander-in-Chief (Lord Gough).”

16. Under such circumstances, the President in Council observed, that he could  
not but “regret that his Excellency should, without previous communication with  
Government, have ordered a general regulation, passed by the Governor-General of  
India in Council, to be set aside at any of the stations of the army; but his Honour  
in Council does not consider it expedient to do more than thus explain the real state  
of the case until the arrival of the Most Noble the Governor-General, who is shortly  
expected at the presidency.”

17. We may here observe, that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief immediately  
gave rise to claims from several regiments at Lahore to receive, retrospectively, the  
difference between the compensation received by them under the orders of Government,  
and that which they would have received had the orders of 1844 continued in force.

18. On the return of the Governor-General to Calcutta, his Lordship recorded a  
Minute, 13th April, 1850. minute, in which he expressed his regret and dissatisfaction at  
these proceedings, observing that there was no room for doubt  
as to what were the intentions of the Governor-General in Council, and that, if there had  
been, the obvious and proper course was to refer the matter for the consideration of the  
President in Council, and to await his reply, before giving an order “which he had no power  
to issue, and which did not, in any respect, call for haste.” The Governor-General  
further observed, that his Excellency well knew the difficulty of reversing an order re-  
garding pay, and that the effect of his order had been to re-establish in the Punjab a  
different rate of allowance from that which will prevail in other provinces, and thus, “in  
great measure, thwart the endeavours which the Governor-General in Council has been  
making to assimilate the soldiers’ allowances in every province of the presidency. But  
the Governor-General felt it necessary to intimate, for the future guidance of his Ex-  
cellency, that the Governor-General in Council will not again permit the Commander-  
in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall change the pay and allow-  
ances of the troops serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which  
has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme Government alone.”

Memorandum, 22nd May, 1850.

19. To our extreme surprise, the Commander-in-Chief,  
after attempting to justify his proceedings on this occasion,  
has deliberately declared that, under similar circumstances, he would again act in the same  
manner.

Minute, 14th June, 1850.

20. We deem it quite unnecessary to enter into a lengthened detail of the exposition by the Governor-General of his Lordship's sentiments and views on this subject as opposed to those of the Commander-in-Chief. It will suffice to say that his Lordship shows to be entirely void of foundation the reiterated assertion of the Commander-in-Chief, that the rule in question, as contained in the code of 1849, is a new rule, and unknown to the troops. On the contrary, his Lordship points out that compensation, under that rule, was paid to the large force in the Punjab in 1847, the whole army of the Punjab in 1848, and to the same army in 1849; so that "the rule of compensation of 1845 was known to the sepoy, not only by the ordinary course of orders issued to the army, but by the intelligible explanation of it which has been conveyed to them and to others of their having received and enjoyed the compensation allowed under the rule, on many different occasions and in several continuous years." His Lordship proves that the rule of 1845, instead of being impolitic and unjust, as asserted by his Excellency, secured to the soldier the whole advantages which it was the declared intention of the Government in 1844 to confer upon him; and shows that the justification attempted to be set up by the Commander-in-Chief, as founded on an alleged mutinous spirit in the whole army in the Punjab, and on belief that the empire was in danger, had, so far as the Government were informed, no foundation, and was totally irreconcilable with the acts and declarations of the Commander-in-Chief at the time. "However convinced his Excellency may himself be, of the accuracy of the allegations, his Lordship contradicts and condemns them as extravagant and mischievous exaggerations."

21. We now arrive at a most important part of this discussion, which cannot be better explained than in the words of the Governor-General.

"44. Quoting the letter addressed, by order of the Governor-General in Council on 13th April, to the adjutant-general, his Excellency refers to the passage in which it was stated, for the future guidance of his Excellency, that the Governor-General in Council will not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall alter the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India; his Excellency proceeds to declare, that so circumstanced he no longer feels safe, and he announces that he shall resign a command which he can no longer retain, *under such restrictions*, with advantage to the public service.

"45. Sir C. Napier, therefore, openly and broadly claims for himself as Commander-in-Chief of this army, the power of altering the pay and allowances of the troops under his command, whenever in his discretion he may judge it necessary to do so.

"46. Herein his Excellency claims a power which has never heretofore belonged to any Commander-in-Chief in India; which is not enjoyed by the Commander-in-Chief of the British army itself; and which no constituted Government could ever allow. To concede this claim would confer on the Commander-in-Chief of this army for the future an authority disproportioned to the position in which his commission has placed him, and would render his power co-ordinate with that of the Government itself. The Government of India is responsible for the finances of the empire, and for the great interests which are closely dependent on their adjustment and right administration; but, if the pay of the army is to be placed under the control of its commander, the revenue of the country will, in all time to come, be at the mercy of any general in command, whose caprice may suggest the expediency, or whose fears may dictate the necessity, of an increase. In one word, to concede such a power to any Commander-in-Chief of this army, would give to the empire of India two masters, and would render the sure administration of the government plainly impossible."

22. The soundness of these views is unquestionable. As observed by us on a somewhat similar occasion, the "supreme civil and military power, which in all governments must reside somewhere, is, at your presidency, vested by Act of Parliament in the Governor-General in Council, subject to the control of the authorities in Europe. All

"Military letter to Bengal, 3rd July, 1853." "other authorities and powers, must be held and exercised in subordination to that supreme authority."

23. Sir Charles Napier has now in effect declared that he will not be bound by the constitution of the Government of India as by law established, and has announced that he shall resign his command. This announcement obviates the necessity for any further remarks on his Excellency's proceedings, and we have only to state that immediate measures will be taken by us, with a view to the appointment of his successor.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

Military Despatch from the Court of Directors, 7th Aug. 1850.

CORRESPON-  
DENCE, &c.

Military Despatch  
from the Court of  
Directors,  
7th Aug. 1850.

24. In conclusion, we desire to express our entire satisfaction with the course pursued by the Governor-General, and our conviction that his Lordship has given to the Commander-in-Chief during the whole term of his Excellency's command the most cordial support which the paramount obligations of public duty would permit.

We are your affectionate friends,

W. L. MELVILLE,	(Signed)	J. SHEPHERD,
R. JENKINS,		J. W. HOGG,
J. MASTERMAN,		W. WIGRAM,
R. CAMPBELL,		J. L. LUSHINGTON,
J. A. MOORE,		W. B. BAYLEY,
H. WILLOCK,		H. T. PRINSEP,
R. D. MANGLES,		E. MACNAGHTEN,
H. ALEXANDER,		W. J. EASTWICK,
J. C. WHITEMAN.		J. OLIPHANT,

London, 7th August, 1850.



PART II.

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R E P O R T

OF

GEN. SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, G.C.B.

ON THE

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF INDIA,

WITH THE

MINUTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA THEREUPON,

AND THE

DESPATCHES OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS

IN REPLY TO THE SAME.

# R E P O R T,

*&c. &c.*

No. 12 of 1850.

Fort William, Foreign Department,  
the 22nd April, 1850.

To the Honourable the SECRET COMMITTEE of the Honourable the COURT of DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

In accordance with the wish expressed by the Governor-General, in his Lordship's minute, dated the 13th instant, a copy of which accompanies this despatch, we have the honour to forward to your Honourable Committee the papers noted in the margin.\*

Letter from the  
President of the  
Council of India  
in Council,  
22nd April, 1850.

Fort William,  
22nd April, 1850.

We have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,  
Honourable Sirs,

Your most faithful humble servants,

J. H. LITTLER;  
F. CURRIE,  
J. LOWIS.

## REPORT by the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF in INDIA.

*Dated 27th November, 1849.*

The question of occupying the Punjab involves in some measure that of whether the Indian army shall be increased or not. This must be determined by the political state of India with regard to the surrounding countries, and by the internal duties which the troops are and may be called upon to perform.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

Such appears to me to be the broad statement of the case, and it embraces not merely the Punjab, but all India.

It is a wide question and demands an immediate and vigorous decision, or great inconvenience may befall the Indian Government.

I shall begin by a general outline of the political state of India, and in the view which I have taken of this matter I must be very general; to enter into the details would require volumes.

The outline of the political state of India as regards foreign powers State of India. is this:—

South. In the south there is the large kingdom of the Nizam, whose capital is Hyderabad in the Deccan. This sovereign has, I believe, twelve millions of subjects, and his government is in confusion. As I write for one whose position gives him a full

\* Memorandum by Commander-in-Chief, dated 27th November, 1849; Minute by Governor-General, dated 26th December, 1849; Minute by do., dated 27th December, 1849; To President of Board of Administration, Punjab, No 1, dated 1st January, 1850; Memorandum by Commander-in-Chief, dated 26th February, 1850; Minute by Governor-General, dated 11th April, 1850; To Adjutant-General of the Army, No. 63, dated 15th April, 1850; From Board of Administration, Punjab, dated 1st March, 1850; Minute by Governor-General, dated 13th April, 1850; Abstract, Nos. 3 to 11.

REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

knowledge of this matter, I need merely call attention to the dangerous aspect of this state, capable of sustaining a very mischievous war against us.

South-west of the  
Nizam's territories.

power links on, as it were, to the Southern Mahratta states, which, in 1845, singly, made war upon us for many months, though we had 10,000 men in the field, and among them five or six European regiments! And they will again do so when an opportunity offers: other tribes there hate us.

North-east of the  
Nizam's territories.

To the north-eastward of the Nizam's territory lies a wild tract of lawless barbarians, called by various names — Goomsoor, Coles, &c.

Some of these are, I may say *now*, in a state of hostility with the Madras presidency. All to the south of the Nerbudda river is therefore unsettled, unsafe, and ready to rise against the British rule; and, in addition to this, those two great presidencies do not cover their own expenses; though, if properly ruled, they would yield a large revenue to the Company. I can conceive no state of things more unsettled or more dangerous than this; and these two mismanaged presidencies amount to somewhere about one-half of our eastern possession, including Scinde, which is, in my opinion, unwisely attached to the Bombay Government. However, as these two presidencies have each an army of its own, over which I have no other control than the command when in the field, I need say no more about them, and I merely touched upon the subject to show that, in case of distress, Bengal cannot justly trust to much support from this quarter. I therefore

Country south-west of the  
Nerbudda river, unsafe.

consider that the whole country lying to the south of the Nerbudda river is *unsafe*, and that to the north very little better, if at all.

Eastern frontier.

I will now take a view of the *eastern* frontier of our possession.

Burma.

Here we have the Burrampootra river, which descends from the Himalaya mountains and joins the Ganges near the mouth of that river. The Burrampootra, curving towards the west, and our territories which lie on its left bank are shaped thereby like a crescent moon; one of the horns of which is formed by Assam, and the other by Arracan; I have no local knowledge of these points, but this strip of territory lies along the powerful and unfriendly kingdom of Ava. In case of a war with this strong power, our whole eastern frontier is exposed to attack, and the distant parts in Assam would be in peril. The close frontier of Ava, or Burma, enables that kingdom to press suddenly and dangerously upon the capital of our Indian empire. Such events are no

Eastern frontier not safe.

“castles in the air,” but threatening and real perils; and the East therefore is not safe.

Northern frontier, Nepal.

We now come to the *north*. Here we find the kingdom of *Nepal*, hostile and ready to strike. This country runs along and forms our northern frontier for about five hundred miles, and is placed in a most dangerous position upon our line of communication between Calcutta and the North-West Provinces. It can bring about 300 pieces of cannon and 100,000 fighting men into the field. Should danger arise in these provinces, and they are all hostile to us, or should we have war with Ava or with any Indian power, Nepal is upon our rear. Does any man, knowing India, doubt that, if a reverse had befallen our armies on the Sutlej, Nepal was ready to fall upon our rear? Does any man doubt that all the good people in and around Patna would not have joined them? The war would run south like wildfire, and all those tribes would be in arms. These are serious matters and claim timely consideration; for, were danger to gather upon us, it would find our troops widely scattered over the land from the Indus to the Burrampootra, a distance which it would take a body of troops about six months\* to march over, and for five months in each year the European portion of our army cannot march at all. These things render war ruinous, and victory doubtful.

North-west.

Let us now consider the north-west, that is to say, the country between the Jumna and Sutlej, the Punjab and Scinde, or the line of the lower Indus. These countries call for much consideration. But while we are discussing these North-Western Provinces, we must not forget that the south, the east, and the north are teeming with danger. Each has fought us singly, and handled us rudely; what could

\* As there is now a tendency to construct railways in India, it is satisfactory to observe that the structure of the country, as regards this subject, is calculated to combine the various important requirements of traffic, political objects, and military defence, if the right course be pursued.

they not do if combined? and that they have not yet so combined is almost miraculous, but it gives no security for the future.

Punjab not yet conquered. The Punjab has been twice occupied by our troops; but it is not conquered. We now occupy it with 54,000 fighting men; and it is at present very dangerous ground. Scinde has hitherto been safe under the system established by Lord Ellenborough. This has been changed; and should risings take place in Scinde simultaneously with the Punjab, the Bolan pass will be immediately opened to invasion from Affghanistan, in concert with an inroad through the Khyber. Multitudes would pour through the Bolan, and be joined by all the tribes to the east of that pass, rising in thousands among the surrounding hills, and rushing down upon Scinde, which could not march a man to the aid of the Punjab, as it did in 1846 and 1849.

Should the Affghans enter Scinde by the Bolan, simultaneously with an invasion through the "Khyber," Scinde cannot aid our troops in the Punjab under the present system.

Scinde ought not to belong to the Bombay Presidency.

Under the Bombay Government, Scinde is not likely to be safe, as it has been for the last six years. The Government being changed, the result will in all probability also be changed. A civil form of government I believe to be uncongenial to barbarous eastern nations. I see no probability of the Punjab becoming safe. Both Scinde and the Punjab are now governed by a system unsuited to the people. It is the same system which has for an hundred years governed India, without making it tranquil or prosperous.

Rise of Indian empire not due to its Civil Government.

India has only prospered by conquest, and these conquests are assuredly not due to the *system* of its Government, but to the courage of the troops. I avow frankly that, in my opinion, the present system in the Punjab will produce among the people neither peace nor attachment to our rule: no barbarous people will endure a civil government. The plain statement of facts is this:—

Under the government of Lord Ellenborough, Scinde was conquered; and the Governor-General established a cheap military government, which lasted five years, and has continued so, under *nearly* the same system, up to the present moment in perfect tranquillity.

Under the government of Lord Hardinge, the Punjab fell into our hands. His Lordship took a course diametrically opposed to that of Lord Ellenborough, and adopted a plan of civil government, which produced a hatred to our rule. The result has been seen.

Again, the Punjab has been won by our courageous armies; and there was a choice between the two systems—that of Lord Ellenborough, which succeeded, or that of Lord Hardinge, which failed. The choice made was that of Lord Hardinge's mode of civil government, with one difference, that Lord Hardinge *subsidized*, and Lord Dalhousie *annexed*. The two first-named Governors-General acted from their own opinions, the third was controlled. I hold the most decided opinion that Lord Ellenborough's system was right; and fact bears my opinion out: But the discussion of this is not my object, which is only to show that the above facts make me believe the present system of govern-

ment will break down. Possibly there may not be another war in the Punjab; but still the country will, in my opinion, be unsettled, dangerous, and a vast weight on the finances of India, which India cannot bear; for we must sustain a large army in the Punjab, and (compared with Lord Ellenborough's) an exorbitantly paid civil establishment, where a small military force and an economical civil establishment ought to suffice. After four years' governing Scinde,

A large army ought not to be required in the Punjab.

Scinde offered to be held with 3,000 men and the police.

I could have held that country (and offered to do so) with 3,000 men and the police. All beyond that number were maintained in expectation of a war in the Punjab; and were the Punjab governed in a similar manner, 30,000 would *now* be sufficient for the occupation of that province, and in two years more, about *half that number*. It is impossible to form opinions on the force required to control any country, without a *full consideration* of the mode in which it is governed; for this is the foundation of everything. Taking all these matters into consideration, and giving each its just weight, as far as my limited

Mode of government regulates the military force.

abilities permit me to do so, and having some experience of the people and country about which I am writing, I am of opinion that, after victories which ought to have decided everything, the *north-west* is not more safe than the *south*, the *east*, and the *north*.

I have now gone round our frontier; and we must acknowledge that there is a belt

REPORT, &c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov., 1849.

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

of powerful *external* enemies around India, and plenty of internal foes besides! that is to say, every native prince or chief within or without our frontier; and there is not a single exception—our colour, our religion, our deeds, our thoughts, our manners—are all odious to them; and a venomous hatred to us pervades them all! There is nothing unreasonable, nothing unnatural in this; but we should look at it as dangerous. To meet these enemies, we must first consider the strength of each separately; and as the Punjab, so recently annexed, may at this moment be considered the most dangerous, I shall begin by the examination of the state of this province, and delay a review of the rest, till I acquire more knowledge of their force, and more time to give them consideration.

The defence of our Indian empire is confided to four distinct armies (Queen's, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay), consisting, collectively, of about 300,000 fighting men and 400 pieces of field artillery ready for war, without including those of position, mounted on forts and lying in our arsenals.

This is a vast army; and it is in a good state of discipline, complete in its equipments, full of high courage, and a high military spirit reigns through all ranks! It is also necessary to say, that this force could be doubled without any injurious pressure on the population, and that every part of India can furnish recruits in abundance. Our service is extremely popular, and the troops faithful, to a proverb. There are some things which admit of correction, and these may be put right when the Commander-in-Chief is placed on a proper footing, but not till then. I shall consider these matters in another letter. Let it here suffice to say, it is my decided opinion that this magnificent army is sufficient to guard India at present, and that the annexation of the Punjab does not, at least need not, demand an additional regiment. I shall now proceed to the consideration of the immediate occupation of the

## PUNJAB.

General description of the Punjab. This country is in the form of an equilateral triangle, of which each side is about 400 miles. The north side, or base, is bounded by the southern ranges of the Himalaya mountain; the western side, by the Indus; and the southern side, by the Sutlej and Beas rivers.

These great rivers join at Mithenkote, which forms the apex of the triangle. The northern part is mountainous, and its centre and southern portion flat, traversed by many rivers, large and small, all uniting their waters at Mithenkote. This description is sufficient for the purpose of this letter, and gives about 80,000 square miles of territory to defend, which territory is filled with rivers, deserts, mountains, marshes, jungles, and all the paraphernalia (if I may use the term) for a stiff Vendeean warfare, should the Sikhs take that fancy into their heads. They have done so before, and may again. That their courage has been no way abated by the last struggle, is confidently asserted.

I now come to the numbers of the Sikhs lately in arms, and who are now in the Punjab. This is estimated at 100,000 fighting men, and they are not men who are likely to "turn their swords into ploughshares," very far from it; but they laid down their arms! Yes, a portion did; but this signifies nothing, brave men soon find arms. There are arms enough to be had, but their cannons were all taken; so it was confidently said. But they neither were *then*, nor are they *now*.

The credulity which believes that they were, will believe anything. However, I make my calculations on their not only having artillery, but making it daily in the jungles. A Sikh foundery is not like our founderies. A dozen men make some holes in the earth, serve to melt the metal, cast the gun in sand, and none of our people know a word about it. How can they? Can they watch over 80,000 square miles? it is not done, and it cannot be done. Probably the Sikhs want money. As to this, I am not able to form an opinion; but I have seen the Irish, in 1798, make a fierce war without money. The Vendeeans had no money—the Greeks had no money; and I dare say, the Sikhs can, if they bestir themselves, do without money. But Golab Singh may join them, and he has great wealth.

Such is the force of the Sikhs, and they may some day, unexpectedly, use it. We must, at all events, take possibilities into our consideration, and leave nothing to chance that we can provide against by foresight.

This is not all that we have to look to in the Punjab. Golab Singh will probably be faithful to us. He knows our power; but then he has also seen our weakness in two

wars. I am not going to detail, much less to criticise, our two last wars of the Punjab and Sutlej, but no man in his senses will deny that India was in great danger in both, or that both times the country was scarcely saved by the victories of Sobraon and Goojerat. A third war may be still ably and more violently contested. For a third we must therefore be prepared.

Golab Sing a dangerous neighbour. Two cases may arise—Golab Singh may be made angry, or he may die: in either case we shall have war with the Punjab; for it is supposed to be certain, that his son and his nephew will draw the sword against us. What abilities they possess I know not; but I know that Golab Singh is possessed of great abilities, of about 400 pieces of artillery, of an army, and all the Sikhs (if he holds up his finger) will rally round him, giving him the power of raising an army with extraordinary rapidity. And, with regard to his treasures, he has been accumulating money all his life. He is said to have a most avaricious disposition, and his means of accumulating money are said to have been equally ample and unscrupulous. There is, therefore, no sound reason to doubt his means of subsisting a numerous army for two years. His country is perhaps the strongest in the world for defence: he can ensconce himself in snow for half the year. He has forts of various strength: he has quantities of small arms. In the depths of his jungles and his snows he has the power of concealing his preparations.

Now, to meet such an enemy will be no easy matter, especially if this intriguing genius of his can persuade the Nepalese to war upon us at the same time. This combination I consider to be the greatest danger that we have to apprehend; and if it happens, then will the position of the Indian army demand all the courage of our troops and all the skill of their leaders.

It is this view of the subject that I think it right to take, when disposing of the troops; that they may be so placed as to meet such an emergency with fair prospects of success, in a war with the two most dangerous powers that we have to guard against.

For this, and, indeed, for every purpose, I think that Delhi is the proper place for our great magazine. It lies in a central position to supply troops and reinforcements. It is at hand either for Nepal or for the Punjab. For this reason, also, I think that the head-quarters of the artillery should be marched to Delhi or Meerut, as may be hereafter arranged.

Mussoorie, Landour, Almorah, Barreilly, and Almorah should be made strong. I have much to learn as regards these places, in regard to which I mean to acquire more information. At present, I need not say more than that they appear to be important points in case of an attack being made from Nepal; for if such an attack be threatened from the western frontier of that long kingdom, the troops at these stations would be instantly supported from Delhi, Meerut, Umballa, and Simla; and if the Nepalese moved out from their capital against Dinapore, from these stations we could at once penetrate in their rear, and oblige them to retrace their steps and defend their own country. I also hold that Dinapore should be at all times strongly occupied by a strong garrison, and have a fortified magazine, so as to be ready to meet any inroad from Katmandoo, or to attack that capital, from which it is about twenty marches distant; being nine to Segowlie (which should always have a strong body of cavalry), and eleven to Katmandoo. I say Segowlie should be strongly occupied with cavalry, because it is generally supposed that the Nepalese have a great dread of this arm, and the country around furnishes plenty of forage. But this station ought to be strongly occupied by troops, whether of cavalry or infantry, and even protected by works so as to be able to maintain itself till succour arrived from Dinapore, which I consider to be one of the most important places in India for a grand magazine. To the north, it holds Nepal in check, and supports a force acting on Katmandoo. To the west, it is well placed to forward stores by water to Allahabad and Delhi. In case of any reverses, it supplies the Bengal army defending the line of the Sone river, in combination with the armies of Madras and Bombay, co-operating along the Nerbudda river, each covering its own presidency—each communicating with the other, and the whole, in case of need, being able to form one mass.

I think this hasty outline is enough at present, as to those important districts in which I think the number of stations may be diminished, so as to concentrate the troops on strong points in case of coming wars.

The great principle to follow in India, as regards armed forces, I think is this: to have a large, well-organized police to do all those duties for the civil branches of the Govern-

REPORT, &c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

ment that require armed men, such as occasional guards for civil servants, escorts of treasure, putting down robbers, arresting men by order of the civil power,—in short, a constabulary force, that leaves the military to their own duties. This was the intention of Lord Ellenborough, and he partly executed it. Thus the troops would be concentrated in large bodies, ready to move in heavy columns upon any enemy, whether foreign or domestic. But I will return to this subject, and at present proceed with the affairs of the Punjab, which in some degree required the foregoing general outline bearing so strongly upon them.

In the first place, then, I hold it to be my business to consider the feelings and habits of the various tribes which we may have to deal with, and I find that in the Jullunder, the people of the plains, or south, are quiet and agricultural, while those to the north, among the hills, are warlike, dissatisfied Sikh soldiers; food and money very scarce and swords in plenty; all ready for any outbreak as their best and natural calling.

I have many statements to this effect, and that these turbulent tribes cluster on the frontier of the Maharajah Golab Sing.

With regard to this able upstart, whose progress from catamite to cabinet minister, and finally to a throne, all is and must be conjecture. He has his choice of peace or war, and which he will decide upon no man can tell; but in this doubtful state he has made his peace with the Sikhs, and though he will not enrol those discontented soldiers, he has the power to do so when he pleases. This great and doubtful power has therefore a strong moral influence over the Jullunder, and from this territory his dominion trends in a north-western direction towards *Attok*, on the Indus, where he links on to the Huzara country, and to the Peshawur district, which is ever troubled by the Affghans. These, and the tribes of the Khyber pass, are too well known to be dwelt upon here; suffice it that, in any disturbance in the Punjab, the district of Peshawur would probably at once become the seat of warfare. South of Peshawur is the Kohat country, with all the wild tribes of Bunnoo and of the Salt Range, the men of Bunnoo being unruly and warlike.

We may therefore consider that the Jullunder Doab and the Peshawur districts are the two most dangerous points within our newly-acquired frontier.

I shall first speak of the Jullunder Doab, as by far the most important of the two. The loss of Peshawur would be trifling. It is a mere outpost guarding the Khyber pass, and advance guard, waiting for the day, and come it will, when, with all our "*moderation*," we shall conquer Afghanistan and occupy Candahar. But to lose the Jullunder would cut our line of communication and place an enemy between the Punjab and our Indian provinces.

The district, which I consider to be of such high importance, is contained between the Upper Ravee and the Upper Ganges, and embracing a portion of the Jullunder. Of this district I consider Simla to be the proper head-quarters and centre. Ensnconced in these mountainous districts, a strong body of troops effectually cuts off the communication between Nepal and the territories of the Maharajah, so that should a war arise with Golab Sing, the troops in this district, would form the right flank of an army marching against Jummoo; or in a war with Nepal, it would reinforce the left flank of a force marching from Delhi upon the upper Goggra river.

There is also another thing which we must not forget, it is that Golab Sing is reported to have said (at the time I was at Lahore with Lord Hardinge) that had he conducted the war, it would have been carried on very differently. "That he would not have been shut up in Sobraon like a rat in a trap, and would have turned 80,000 cavalry upon the country between Ferozepore and Delhi." Had this happened, our army, scattered as it then was, would have stood a fair chance of being cut to pieces. There was then nothing to meet an enemy in the rear.

Now if an enemy again get these hills, as they once had, we might not have a second Ochterlony to put them out; the disasters of Kalunga might be repeated. This important mountainous district, the key equally to the Punjab and to Nepal, should not be left exposed as it has hitherto been.

These hills have an advantage in their healthy air for European troops, which adds to the value of their good military position, and for that reason I propose to gather the greatest portion of the European troops between the Jumna and the Beas. I hope that the Government will cause permanent barracks to be built in a

Europeans to be quartered in the  
Jullunder and the Hill Stations.

Bad barracks the great cause of sickness in India. becoming manner, for *to bad barracks* may be attributed the enormous loss of men which the 29th regiment has sustained, and every other regiment that has suffered in the Bengal presidency. There is scarcely any illness which the troops suffer from, that may not be traced to want of room in barracks.

The other day the 1st Europeans suffered from cholera in the barracks at Cawnpore; they were moved into tents, and the cholera ceased. The 2nd Europeans are suffering from scurvy, and it is justly attributed, by medical men on the spot, to the crowded state of their barracks. But of this, more shall be said hereafter.

Troops on the banks of the Sutlej. It therefore is now to be decided what number of troops should be cantoned on each bank of the Sutlej. I shall consider them under the head of regiments of cavalry, battalions of infantry, and pieces of cannon, without entering into greater detail; merely, when I speak of so many battalions or regiments, I will draw a line under the number and place a figure in a fractional form to designate how many battalions or regiments are Europeans, thus  $\frac{10 \text{ battalions}}{2}$  the reader then will understand that there are eight battalions of native infantry and two battalions of Europeans.

On the left bank of the Sutlej, above its junction with the Beas, there are six stations, viz. :—

1st. Loodianah	...	...	I would not quarter Europeans here.
2nd. Soobathoo	...	...	The present barracks <i>infamous</i> .
3rd. Kussowlee	...	...	Ditto, a <i>slaughter-house</i> .
4th. Dugshai	...	...	Excellent.
5th. Intog	...	...	None.
6th. Simla	...	...	None.

Five regiments of Europeans in the hills. I would build barracks for a European regiment at five of these stations, from which, in a fortnight, they can reach either the banks of the Ravee or of the Ganges, and the men would be preserved in full and robust health, if the positions are well chosen and the barracks good,—*the last being imperative*.

Ghoorkhas to be kept in the hills as well as Europeans. hills. There are now *five battalions* on the left bank of the Sutlej, above its junction with the Beas, and as there is but the station (that of Ferozepore) below the junction of the above rivers, I will include the *five battalions* there cantoned, which would make in all *ten battalions* along the left banks of the Sutlej, two regiments of cavalry, and twelve pieces of cannon.

On the left bank of Sutlej, including Ferozepore, 10 battalions, 2 regiments, 12 pieces of cannon.

## JULLUNDER.

Jullunder, right bank of river Sutlej, 13 battalions, 5 regiments of cavalry, 18 pieces of cannon.

On the right hand of the Sutlej, and between it and the left bank of the Ravee, there are *thirteen battalions*, five regiments of cavalry, and eighteen pieces of cannon.

Total, 23 battalions; 7 regiments cavalry, 30 pieces of cannon.

26,000 fighting men in the mountainous district.

The above gives  $\frac{23 \text{ battalions}}{2}$  of infantry, seven regiments of cavalry, and thirty pieces of cannon, for what I will denominate the "mountainous district." Therefore, averaging each regiment of cavalry at 420, and each battalion at 1,000, we have about 26,000 fighting men. I do not think we can reduce a man of this number when the character of the people between the Upper Beas and the Upper Ravee is taken into consideration in connection with the frontier of the Maharajah, embracing all the east and north from Shifnee to Jummo! For this district *more* European troops ought to be cantoned, and *fewer* native regiments. Barracks will therefore be required, but *where* cannot be decided till we know the places which are most salubrious.

More barracks required in the Jullunder.

REPORT, &c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.



## REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
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27th Nov. 1849.

Garrison of  
 $\frac{7}{2}$  battalions of infantry,  
 $\frac{3}{1}$  regiments of cavalry,  
24 pieces of artillery,  
2 companies of reserve artillery,  
1 company of pioneers.

## LAHORE.

I now come to the consideration of the garrison of Lahore. This is for me a question of great difficulty, and I trust to others.

The present garrison consists of  $\frac{7}{2}$  battalions, of infantry,  $\frac{3}{1}$  regiments of cavalry, 24 pieces of cannon.

Sir W. R. Gilbert,  
Sir Colin Campbell,  
The Adjutant-General,  
The Quarter-Master General,  
Colonel M'Sherry.

I have consulted with the officers named in the margin, and they all held the same opinion with myself—that the garrison of Lahore cannot be safely reduced below its present force; but I shall move one regiment of Europeans till the barracks are more ample, for it is now destructive to have them there. I shall make a distinct report upon each station when I see them.

I shall now proceed to

## WUZEERABAD.

Wuzeerabad:  
 $\frac{3}{1}$  regiments of cavalry,  
 $\frac{6}{2}$  battalions of infantry,  
 $\frac{4}{1}$  batteries, 24 guns.

The garrison of this station consists of two troops horse artillery, two field batteries, manned by two companies foot artillery (twenty-four guns); two companies of pioneers,  $\frac{3}{1}$  regiments of cavalry,  $\frac{6}{2}$  regiments of infantry.

Wuzeerabad (or Sealkote, which I understand to be a far preferable position for a station) dominates over two doabs, holds Jummoo in check, commands the passage of the Chenab, and supports the garrisons of Lahore and Jhelum. I recommend the construction of martello towers at the ford, if the river does not

change its bed at this ford. We do not use fortifications enough; they double our forces, and in occupying a large country like India, they are of great advantage, *if properly placed*. Perhaps martello towers are the best description of works for guarding this ford. However, fortification or not, the ford of the Chenab must be secured, and I cannot recommend, in existing circumstances, that any reduction should be made of the force at Wuzeerabad beyond what I have done,—viz., withdrawing a battery, and possibly a regiment of infantry to reinforce other points.

I now come to

## JHELMUM.

Jhelum.  
1 regiment of cavalry,  
2 battalions of infantry,  
1 battery, 6 guns,  
1 company of pioneers.

This station guards the fords of the Jhelum. They are generally practicable from November to March, inclusive. I cannot think that this station, close to a large town, can consist of less than a brigade. It is exactly the same force as the Supreme Government deem it requisite to have at Saugor, in the centre of the three presidencies! How then could I venture to recommend the reduction of troops which guard the passage of a great river, and watch the passes, through which a powerful and not well-disposed neighbouring sovereign can pour down his troops into the plains below? "It is impossible."

I now come to the station of

## RAWUL PINDEE.

Rawul Pindée.  
1 troop horse artillery,  
1 regiment of cavalry,  
 $\frac{3}{1}$  battalions of infantry,  
1 company of pioneers.

At this station there are  $\frac{3}{1}$  battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, with one troop of horse-artillery and company of pioneers.

The greatest advantage that I can perceive in this station is its reported salubrity. It is high land, and rivers flow from it to the west into the Indus, and to the east into the Jhelum rivers. That it commands the road from Wuzeerabad to Attok is true; but this is equally done by uniting this station to Attok, and so we *mass* our troops more. If the Governor of Cashmere formed an intention of attacking Attok, he could do so before the officer commanding at Rawul Pindée was aware of it; whereas, if both stations were united at Attok, they would be safe, or, at least, able to hold their position till reinforced, and a hostile force could not march on Jhelum; leaving the force at Attok in its rear.

REPORT, &amp;c.

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Commander-in-  
Chief in India.  
27th Nov. 1849.

## ATTOK.

Attok. This commands the passage of the Indus at that place. The force now there is sufficient *at present*, but not so for a permanent cantonment, which should be prepared to hold a much greater force, and that force strongly entrenched.

At present there are three companies of infantry, one company of artillery, one company sappers and miners. To this place I would remove the Rawul Pindee cantonment at once, unless consideration of health prevents it, which I shall learn on reaching the spot. The bridge at Attok should be defended with fortifications on both sides of the river, so as in all cases to secure the retreat of, or to support, the troops at Peshawur. What works are required I cannot tell till I see the place. Attok is two long marches from Peshawur. That a bridge of iron should be thrown over the Indus at Attok no one can doubt. In short, Attok commands all that Rawul Pindee does, and supports Peshawur into the bargain. It should be a large station, and, I think, might enable us to withdraw the regular troops now at Peshawur.

3 companies native infantry,  
1 company artillery,  
1 company sappers.

## PESHAWUR.

Peshawur.  
2 troops horse artillery } 24  
2 field batteries } guns,  
2 companies foot artillery,  
1 company of pioneers,  
3 regiments of cavalry,  
2 battalions of infantry.

The force here is four batteries, one company of pioneers, three regiments of cavalry,  $\frac{2}{3}$  battalions of infantry, or somewhere about nine thousand men, and assuredly not less can be kept in this isolated position, within three marches of Jellallabad. But I believe that Sir H. Lawrence thinks all this territory can be defended by irregulars. I should like to give it up, and remove this station to Attok.

I have now taken into review the whole of this force, which amounts to about 54,772 men of all arms; and I do not at present see that I can make any reduction in this large force.

I have always entertained the opinion that the policy of Lord Ellenborough in placing a military government in Scinde was right. It succeeded. This was followed by a different policy, which has once failed, and as I fear that some results of a similar nature may follow in the course of a couple or three years, if not sooner, therefore I cannot at present recommend any reduction of the force now occupying the Punjab.

## IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

now raising under the civil authority.

There are, I think, ten regiments now raising under the direction of the Board of Administration in the Punjab. Of these, five are cavalry, I think, and five infantry. I recommend that they be employed as a military police in parts remote from the great military stations, and across the Indus. As Sir Henry Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur districts, I am very glad to give that up to them. On one point, however, it is necessary to say explicitly, that, from my knowledge of all irregular corps, except those extremely well commanded (and even those are not always very safe), they will plunder the people, more or less. The few European officers with them are unable to control their men when detached. If the irregulars take the trans-Indus districts, the whole Peshawur force may be withdrawn to Attok, where it will form a reserve to protect the irregulars in case of need. On these matters I beg to reserve my opinion till I reach Peshawur.

Force which might oppose  
us in the Punjab.

That the force now in the Punjab is enormous, 54,772 men, I admit; but, in the first place, it may be opposed by 150,000 or 200,000 men. The calculation made by those best capable of judging; both from their position and their abilities, in this army, estimate that 100,000 were opposed to Lord Gough, and to estimate Golab Singh's army at 50,000 men is taking a very low scale.

Golab Singh can raise  
any army he pleases.

The Maharajah has plenty of money, and whoever has money in India has *armies*. They are synonymous.

## POLICE.

Scinde police. I always have assumed it as a maxim that the revenue of a country could never be collected without force; that in a civilized country this force was the "*law of the land*," and in a barbarous country the "*law of arms*;" that any force which obliged people to pay taxes must be *odious*; that in a friendly

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India.  
27th Nov. 1849.

conquered country the soldiers ought to be *feared*, not *hated*; that, therefore, it would be pure folly to bring them in daily contact with the people as mere tax-gatherers, by which daily contact all fear of them would gradually wear away, hatred be engendered, discipline destroyed. When I became Governor of Scinde, I saw that, if the maxim and its deductions were correct, I must establish some other *force* than the military to support the officers charged with the collection of revenue, to repress vagabonds, and to spread like so many *eyes* over the land, and so leave the troops unemployed in works *not military*, and injurious to their discipline and spirit. I, however, feared that this strong, active, and vigorous police might oppress the poor people. To prevent this, I did not place them under the magistrates, but gave them their own officers. I knew well, from the examples which I had *seen* in Bombay, and *heard of* in Bengal, that all troops or paid people put under a magistrate are spoiled, lose discipline, and become very dangerous to the people, unless a counteracting power prevented this abuse. So I placed the magistrates and their people in one body, while the officers of police and their men were in another; both having an "*esprit de corps*," and both without power over the other. In all quarrels I *alone* was arbitrator. But the police had their rules; they were created for the sole purpose of supporting the magistrates and the laws; they were at the *call*, but not under the *command*, of the magistrates; and their pride was to maintain peace, catch thieves, fight bands of robbers, and support the magistrates, *but under the orders of their own officers!* Thus, if either a European or a native magistrate, or a European or a native officer of the police, oppressed the poor, the others took part against him; if they joined, I was sure to have a petition from the people, and I held a court of appeal, the punishments of which were severe. Twice I held such Grand Courts, which kept all straight. In both instances the people were victorious against the decision of English officers, for I made it a point not to bolster up any authority that was assailed, but leave him to stand on his being *right*, and on that *alone!* Thus the poor knew where to find redress: the police and magistrates of all ranks knew this; they were all diligent and active in their respective duties; and each department having British officers of great zeal and activity at its head (but each holding the duties of his own corps, unincumbered on by the others), the whole worked well for the poor, so that oppression was soon resisted in all directions, and the soldiers, having no concern in any disputes, were held in awe and dread, but in perfect amity with the people. *Crime, trial, acquittal, or punishment*, all followed each other in rapid succession; and this course pleases a barbarous people more, perhaps, than any other. This vigour never does, and never can, exist under a civil government.

The Scinde police was thus constructed.

I had divided Scinde into three collectorates, namely, *Hyderabad, Kurrachee, and Shikerpore*. I was, as governor, the chief of the three collectors. I formed 2,400 police, and organized them into three divisions, the *Hyderabad* police, the *Kurrachee* police, the *Shikerpore* police; and at the head of each division I placed a British officer. Over these three "lieutenants of police" I placed a "captain of police," who was always at my head-quarters, and to whom his three lieutenants made their daily reports. His own diary, and those of every lieutenant of police, collector, and deputy collector, being periodically transmitted to, and *read* by me, so that I knew all that passed in Scinde, exclusive of my private information; and on no secret information did I ever act except to make preparation for evil, or to order open inquiry. In no instance was punishment awarded without *trial*, and no trial but under open *accusation*. No man was ever treated in Scinde during my military administration as the Munshee Alli Akbar has been treated by the civil Bombay Government. Well, these three divisions of police were each formed into three separate classes,—1st, the *cavalry*; these men were armed and mounted like the irregular horse. I forget what their pay is, but I think Rs. 25 a month. 2nd. The *rural police*. These men were on foot, armed and drilled like men of the line: they acted as regular troops with me in the Hill campaign. 3rd. The *city police*. These were also drilled and armed. They were exclusively employed in the large towns, Hyderabad, Kurrachee, Shikerpore, Sukkur, Linkana. No man of the police could be dismissed without trial unless by my authority as Governor, and that I restricted by rules.

To the captain of police I gave a native adjutant, on Rs. 200 a month. Under these officers were havildars and naicks, as in other irregular corps. Nothing occurred in Scinde that was not reported to me daily by the captain of police, if it were of an extraordinary nature; otherwise, his diary gave me all the ordinary intelligence at the end of

REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India.  
27th Nov. 1849.

the week. These various "diaries," coming in from all parts of Scinde, either confirmed or refuted each other, and thus was my police kept to its duty with a tight rein, though with much labour to me. At first the rural police and cavalry had some stiff fights with bands of robbers. I once had six policemen slain in a single encounter; but in nearly all they were victorious. At last they ended in clearing Scinde of robbers completely. No man travelled *with a guard in Scinde*, whereas before the conquest no man did so *without a guard*. This was all done by the police. Nor do I recollect that any soldier was ever called out to arrest a man, to execute a man, to furnish a treasure escort, or to quell a riot,—at least not while I was in Scinde. What has occurred since I know not.

Now if such a police had been established in the Punjab, I think a smaller body of troops might suffice. Were I at the head of the Government of the Punjab from the first, I should not demand more than 30,000 soldiers, and I should greatly reduce that number after three or four years. But to do this would demand a very different system from that which prevails, and which I honestly own I think very dangerous and defective in principle. I do not mean to cast (on the contrary I repudiate the idea of casting) any reflection on the abilities or zeal of the officers employed in the Punjab; but I well know that if danger arises, the civil and military authorities will not agree; all the operations will be weak, and great danger will arise. Neither have I made the observation from any desire to govern the Punjab myself as I did Scinde, for I would not now undertake such a government unless some *very* extraordinary circumstance indeed should arise, and then it would be a matter of sore regret and displeasure to me, and only undertaken from a sense of duty and obedience to orders. My saying that I think the system of Government in the Punjab a very dangerous one, is merely the simple expression of my *opinion*, formed on what I saw in Scinde, compared with what has taken place in the Punjab, and on that opinion I make my calculation that the force in the Punjab cannot at present be reduced. The Government of the Punjab appears to me to be feeble and expensive, when it ought to be strong and economical. If I am wrong, a large revenue and a quiet people will prove me to be a false prophet! I am by no means singular in the opinion which I have formed. Nearly all that I have heard give any opinion on the subject, look forward to another rising of the Sikhs against us; and at Golab Sing's death, I believe very few doubt that his son, having now the desire, will then have the *means* of making war upon us. However, be my judgment sound or unsound, I can only estimate our position by that judgment, such as it is; and my bounden duty is to state it honestly, and so I have done, I hope inoffensively.

I have now to consider what force we have left for the defence of the remaining provinces of India, that is to say, of the Bengal presidency, for the Madras and Bombay presidencies have each their own armies for their defence.

I have therefore only to deal with

#### THE BENGAL ARMY.

Bengal army. The Bengal army consists of (in round numbers) 158,659 fighting-men. From this number, deduct 54,772 occupying the Punjab, and we have 103,887 men left for the defence of Bengal, exclusive of the Punjab. Taking a mere approximation, we may call the remainder of the presidency of Bengal about four times the area of the Punjab, which gives about 25,000 men in the other parts of Bengal for the same area which is occupied by 54,772 in the Punjab. Now, common sense tells us that we ought not to require half as many men to occupy a country that has been many years under our rule, as we required to occupy a warlike country which has only been subdued five months. After four years governing Scinde, I estimated the proper garrison for that province at *three thousand men*, and Scinde is not much less than the Punjab in its extent, and extent forms one of the chief difficulties in the military occupation of a country, and more particularly one like India. Moreover, Scinde is an isolated country, entirely surrounded by foreign states. I bring Scinde forward too often, it may be said, but I have no better guide for judging the number of troops required for other provinces than by referring to what was done by myself in Scinde. All India is a conquered land. The Punjab and Scinde are merely two provinces added to the rest, under the same general features, only that these two are inhabited by a more warlike race than the people of Bengal. If, then, the measures and number of men which sufficed for Scinde are applied to the more gentle race of Bengal, *that* number should be ample, and would give 3,000 men to each space equal to the Punjab, or 12,000 for the whole of Bengal, or but little more! I therefore maintain, that eight times that number, or 100,000 men, are sufficient to occupy Bengal, and that no increase to the

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India.  
27th Nov. 1849.

military force of India is required; but I do say, distinctly, that to render that force efficient, a good military police is necessary. There is at this moment, as I have learned from very high authority, a number of *chuprassees* and *burkendauzes*, &c., *equal in number to the Indian army*—but I will quote the whole passage of memorandum given to me by that authority:—“The *burkendauzes*, *chuprassees*, and other civil servants of the Government, are almost as numerous as the army. They are utterly inefficient for the suppression of any more than a street-row; they are not to be trusted in the escort of treasure. They cannot take the ordinary duty of guarding public and private property in a cantonment when a regiment moves out. Their inefficiency is a main cause of the dispersion of the army, and its occupation in duties not properly of a military character. I was introducing military police in lieu of them, and had already a battalion at each of the great stations above Allahabad; the whole civil duty of Bundelcund and Saugor was performed by other similar battalions. The presence of these police battalions in the upper provinces enabled Lord Hardinge, in 1845-46, to move to the Sutlej four more regiments than he would otherwise have had disposable.”

I need not extract more from this able memoir. What I have given is a proof of Lord Ellenborough's opinion, which I think all must admit to be the very highest authority on Indian affairs.

Suppose, then, that the number of *chuprassees*, *burkendauzes*, and others, equals the number of the Bengal army, we have then this number of idlers (equal to 158,659 fighting-men), which will be made to do their duty to the public! Allow 58,000 of this number to continue in their present capacities, we should then have 100,000 men at the disposal of Government as military police, to do those duties which are now thrown upon the army, to its great detriment and disorganization.

We have seen that the occupation of the Punjab has reduced the Bengal army south of the Sutlej to 103,000 fighting-men. These men are not concentrated in masses, ready to meet invasion or quell rebellion; they are scattered over an enormous space in small bodies, for the sole purpose of protecting those civil servants of the state, who ought to be protected by a just and good Government, gaining the affection of its people, and by those 158,000 servants called *chuprassees* and what not, who *now* afford no protection at all to the civil magistrates for whose protection they were originally entertained. This is proved by the fact that the troops are made to do the duty of these people. But we have now got 100,000 of these men. Let these 100,000 men be turned into eight divisions, each division of 12,500 men, and the whole army is at once set free from civil duties and given up to its own, viz., the defence of our vast and dangerous frontiers.

There are, as I have shown, 103,887 soldiers at our disposal for our provinces, exclusive of the army which occupies the Punjab. Of these I would station,

- 1st. 5,000 men at Dacca, to protect the eastern frontier.
- 2nd. 5,000 at Barrackpore, to protect the capital.
- 3rd. 3,000 at Bhaugulpore, sending 1,000 cavalry to Tilalya.

This force of 3,000 has three duties:—

- 1st. Watch the Nepal frontier.
- 2nd. To support the Dinapore force.
- 3rd. To support the capital; and is also a connecting post between Dinapore and Calcutta.
- 4th. 14,000 at Dinapore, sending 2,000 cavalry to Segowlee, to protect our frontier from Nepal, and to send troops eastward, in case of a war with Ava.
- 5th. 4,000 at Allahabad, as a reserve, to support either Dinapore or Cawnpore, as occasion might require.
- 6th. 2,000 at Cawnpore and Lucknow.
- 7th. 4,000 at Agra, to support either Delhi or Cawnpore.
- 8th. 12,000 at Delhi, as this magazine must be powerfully defended, and this great Mahomedan city as powerfully controlled.

The force here stationed should also be able to send convoys whenever they were necessary, and to resist any sudden danger, should such arise from the Ajmere side, or in any other direction. Delhi should be the grand magazine for supplies to all the troops stationed between the Upper Ganges and the Upper Sutlej, and which troops should be placed on the circumference of a semicircle, passing through Agra, Almorah, Simla, and Ferozepore. To all these Delhi is central, and from it also must supplies be sent to the magazines in the Punjab and the Jullunder, till the more convenient route (by the rivers) from Kurrachee is arranged to Ferozepore, Lahore, and Wuzeerabad.

- 9th. 10,000 men at Meerut, to support Delhi, and to form a reserve in case of a

- war either with Nepal or with the Maharajah Golab Singh. Meerut should also be the head-quarters of the artillery.
- 10th. 10,000 men at Umballa, to support either Deera or Simla, in case of war with Nepal or the Maharajah.
- 11th. 5,000 men at Almorah, to guard the north-western frontier of Nepal.
- 12th. 4,000 at Bareilly, to support Almorah.

REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

To recapitulate:—		
Dacca	...	5,000
Barrackpore	...	5,000
Bhaugulpore	...	3,000
Dinapore	...	14,000
Allahabad	...	4,000
Cawnpore	...	2,000
Agra	...	4,000
Delhi	...	12,000
Meerut	...	10,000
Umballa	...	10,000
Almorah	...	5,000
Bareilly	...	4,000
		78,000

All these could be reinforced  
in case of need by large  
bodies of police.

I would, in the above manner, dispose of 78,000 men, and enable the Government to reduce 25,000 of the 103,887 men now scattered, as if with a pepper-box, over the length and breadth of Bengal, for what purpose I am unable to say, except it be to do those duties which no good government ought to require, and those duties which, under a good government, the civil service ought to perform with the 158,000 men now at its command! I have given pretty nearly the reasons for forming each station, and I have calculated the numbers so as to make each able to hold its ground, assisted by the police, till aid arrives. For example: should a war (concerted between Nepal and the Maharajah) suddenly break out, within ten days 20,000 men could assemble at Deyra (from Meerut and Umballa) to support Almorah or Simla, while the troops at each would be able to make a good defence for that short period. Delhi, with its strong garrison, would forward convoys of supplies to Hurdwar in eleven days. If circumstances placed Almorah in most danger, Meerut and Bareilly would march 15,000 men to its aid, and so on.

I will not enter into details of a conjectural campaign, but merely state, that by the above disposition of the troops, I have endeavoured so to place them, that, in case of danger from Nepal or the Punjab, or both together, a large force can rapidly be assembled at Dinapore, either to support the capital in a war with Ava, or to cover it from Katmandoo; and at the same time another large force could be thrown from Umballa and Meerut into the mountainous district, so as to cut all communication between the Punjab and Nepal, forming a powerful reserve; as either power may oblige our troops to demand reinforcements, whether to invade Nepal by Almorah, or the Maharajah by Noor-pore. These masses would always have the aid of the police battalions, to the number of 12,000 in each district. They would either keep the country tranquil, or would form reserves. I hold, that in war these battalions would be of no less use than in peace. They would form a nucleus for the villagers to rally round, in cases where clouds of irregular cavalry might try to spread over and devastate a district. Such troops would be defeated by police. In Scinde the police defeated them; and I also took them into the hills when I made war on the Boogties, and they did good service both in guarding convoys and as out-picquets. These police battalions could also guard the towns when the troops march to battle. As 2,000 did these duties in Scinde, 100,000 could do the same in Bengal! Aye, and a third of that number could so, working as they would, according to my arrangement, under the strong protection of great military masses.

I now come to another very important point, and, next to the location of our troops, the most important one of the whole; I mean the immense increase of military discipline, and the perfection at which large masses of troops arrive, by being collected in numbers. The men and officers; and more especially the commanders, acquire the habit of acting in great bodies, of manœuvring, of drawing their supplies, of knowing and emulating each other, occupying ground, judging distances, and times of march to reach ground when large bodies are moving. The necessity of moving well closed up when

REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

heavy columns are in march, of good lines being preserved, &c., all matters well known in theory, but their execution only acquired by practice. All the moral feelings of an army, and its physical powers, are increased by being assembled in large masses. I have heard that Lord Hardinge objected to the assembling of the Indian troops, for fear they should conspire. I confess I cannot see the weight of such an opinion. I have never met an Indian officer who held it, and I certainly do not hold it myself; and few men have had more opportunities of judging of the armies of all three presidencies than I have. Lord Hardinge saw but the Bengal army, and that only as Governor-General, and for a short time. I have studied them for nearly eight years, constantly at the head of Bengal and Bombay sepoys, and I can see nothing to fear from them except when ill-used; and even then they are less dangerous than British troops would be in similar circumstances. I see no danger in their being massed, and very great danger in their being spread over a country as they are now. On the contrary, I believe that by concentrating the Indian army as I propose, its spirit, its devotion, and its powers will all be increased. By dispersion, our safety hangs on the want of combination between any two or more of our surrounding enemies; and such a combination is so far from being improbable, that its not yet having taken place is almost miraculous.

I have one more remark to make ere I close the subject of our defence against external and internal foes. It relates to railways. I have no idea of railways being of any use in war, except in one single instance, and that is precisely the present case, namely, when an immense distance separates detached bodies of troops. In the present case, from Peshawur to Calcutta is such a vast distance that no enemy could easily interrupt the rail communication. Let us take from Loodiana to Calcutta, say 1,200 miles. In a war with Nepal, a small portion of rail might be taken up by an active enemy, and no doubt would be so; but still (guarded by an active police in its whole length), the interruption, however mischievous, would have the advantage of rapidly assembling large bodies in many portions. If in 1,000 miles, for example, *one* mile be interrupted, and to take up one mile (even by ten feet being destroyed here and ten there) would be dangerous and difficult when vigilantly guarded during a crisis which would treble the guard in number and watchfulness; but even this one mile, or say 100, would leave 900 miles of rapid travelling! A distance of this sort would in India require about two months, if not three, to march a regiment over, while by railroad it would be traversed in thirty-six hours! In short, every four hours of railroad give you 100 miles, and in marching, this distance requires ten days, or 240 hours, instead of four! There is, therefore, an immense gain, even if a portion of the rail be taken up; and there is, also, time gained sufficient to *repair* and yet gain *days*, weeks, aye, months, in such a long space. In short, it is different from railways, which merely traverse the seat of war in a hostile country, when they cannot be guarded, and can only bear accidentally on military movements with any advantage. The cases are wholly different. Here we have one fixed line of communication, and one line of railway running exactly along that line of communication, neither varying nor changing in the least, with the advantage of being in its whole length within our own territory, and everywhere guarded by moving armies and thousands of police. Further, the cost of moving troops would be vastly diminished by a railway.

My plan may, therefore, be recapitulated in a few words.

1st. The army so placed as to be able to concentrate rapidly on points of military importance in case of war.

2nd. Its moral and physical powers greatly increased.

3rd. Its numbers reduced: and thus while less numerous, and consequently less expensive, its power would be increased; for after a few (say three) years, the Punjab ought not to require 20,000 men, and thus 34,000 might be reduced, in addition to the 25,000 which I have already said can *now* be reduced south of the Sutlej, a reduction of 59,000 in all.

4th. A great diminution of expense in many other ways too obvious to require explanation here; I mean exclusively of the reduction of expense in the disbanding of 59,000 men.

5th. The embodying of an active police formed out of those now numerous and mischievous petty tyrants, the chuprassees and burkundauzes, which all men seem to concur in considering as not merely useless, but as a curse to the whole country, and to the character of our civil government; in short, as far as the poor people are concerned, all our civil servants that I have conversed with (or read the report of) say these chuprassees and burkundauzes are a heavy infliction. These men, instead of being under magistrates, of which many are young and too inexperienced to keep them in order, and

who have, besides, other avocations to attend to, would be under officers whose sole occupation would be then confined to police duty, and both men and officers having fixed and defined works confided to them, and for which each in his grade would be responsible, would take a pride in doing well.

Whether the above will meet the opinion of higher authorities than mine I know not, but it is merely on a larger scale that which answered well in Scinde while I was there.

This I think may be considered a fair proof of its efficacy if properly conducted, for these rules and regulations are idle things if not well and vigorously enforced!

#### FORTIFICATIONS OF LAHORE AND MOOLTAN.

Fortifications of Lahore and Mooltan. I have left this subject to the last, because I can only enter into it generally. It may be divided into two questions.

1st. Whether there is any occasion to fortify these two cities at all?

2nd. Whether the new works proposed for them are good or not?

The first of these questions is easily answered, as it belongs to this report, being a part of the general plan of defence which I have herein sketched out. I begin by asking those who want expensively fortified places, the following questions:—

As fortifications are thrown up against some enemy, *who* is the enemy that can besiege either Lahore or Mooltan? I imagine that the answer is difficult.

There is no enemy, nor can there be an enemy (for at least a hundred years), capable of besieging either of these cities. We may be beaten in the field by a coalition against us, but then neither Lahore nor Mooltan would be held. Our rallying point would be Delhi, not Lahore. If we are not beaten, who is to besiege Lahore or Mooltan? No one.

We do not want fortified towns in the Punjab: we do want *barracks*. I mean, good barracks: not the vile and murderous places called barracks, into which soldiers have been thrust and punished.

As it is most unwise to throw up fortifications at enormous expense, while the hospitals and graveyards are filled by bad barracks, I am utterly hostile to the plan for fortifying either Lahore or Mooltan. Some *small repairs* may be necessary, on which I will report, and there, in my opinion, all idea of fortifying Lahore and Mooltan should stop, as being unnecessary and expensive.

Every shilling which the Government can possibly afford, and even more, being required for barracks; not those most expensive and most mischievous barracks, such as the Military Board built at Loodiana, by which the 50th regiment was destroyed, but really good barracks, built on arches, and the rooms thirty feet high and twenty feet wide.

The second of these questions I cannot answer till I see both places, and go more into detail if necessary.

#### FORTS.

Forts in the Punjab. I learn that there are some hundreds of these forts in the Punjab, large and small, and the question seems to be, whether they are to be *repaired* or *destroyed*? My answer is, neither, unless some of them are useful for police stations, and such I would of course repair.

When Scinde was conquered the same question arose. The Court of Directors sent a letter to Lord Hardinge, asking what I advised, and my advice was then, as now, to let these forts alone.

There can be but two kinds of war in the Punjab. A war made by regular armies invading this territory or an insurrectionary war within it. In the first case, these forts can do us no harm. I would not wish *better* than that the enemy would disperse his army into these petty forts. The spirit of regular war is to concentrate, not to disperse.

In the event of an *insurrectionary* war, the spirit of *that* is for the people suddenly to congregate and fall on some weak point. Having destroyed this, the rebels disperse, and the troops, sent hurriedly to the post in danger, find the mischief done, and no man there to show how or by whom! Such is the spirit of partisan warfare. Now what leader, in such a war, would shut himself up in one of these forts? His game is freedom—enterprise. The man who would occupy one of these forts would be a fool! They are of no importance, and may be safely left to themselves.

If ever they are available in war, it must be, on our side, as a *temporary* refuge for a detachment of police, until relief arrives; in this way they may be of use.

REPORT, &c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.



REPORT, &amp;c.

Report by the  
Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
27th Nov. 1849.

Finally, to destroy them would cost a large sum of money, which would be more usefully expended in saving the lives of Europeans by giving them better food and good dwellings!

## BARRACKS.

I have, while writing the above, visited the barracks at various stations, and find most of them disgraceful, and the cause of disease and death to thousands of European soldiers.

Those of Kussowlie are perfect slaughter-houses, and there are others not much better. However, there are evident endeavours lately made to improve these buildings.

It is necessary that proper barracks should be built, and I shall make an especial report to the Governor-General as soon as I can collect the requisite documents to prove the evils which arise from building bad barracks. Those at Dugshai are the only good ones that I have seen, and those are really excellent. I trust that the Governor-General will give orders for their being immediately completed, as we are greatly in want of them.

I now close this report, which has been drawn up with an imperfect knowledge on many points, as I have been so short a time in this part of India, and had such various matters to deal with on assuming the command of this great army; but I shall perhaps find leisure to correct it hereafter, and make it more worthy of notice than it may be now.

Head-Quarters, Umritsir,  
27th November, 1849.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

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Confidential.

## MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
26th Dec. 1849.

On the occupation of the Punjab. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief transmitted to me, while at Lahore, a report on the army of the presidency of Bengal, and on the amount of force which he considers to be necessary, and the distribution of that force which he recommends for the occupation and defence of all the territories in which it is employed.

I have read and considered the report with the attention which is due to a subject of such magnitude and importance.

In the present minute I shall refer only to that portion of the report which calls for an immediate decision, and which treats of the force required for the defence of the Punjab, reserving the very large questions that have been raised in connection with the general occupation of the presidency of Bengal, for future and early consideration.

The Commander-in-Chief, in the several portions of his report, reviews the natural features of the Punjab with its adjacent districts, and dwells on the character and condition of the Sikh population. His Excellency sets forth the view he has taken of the power and disposition of the neighbouring states, and adverts to the form of administration, and to the mode in which the province is governed. His Excellency gives it as his opinion that the system of government in the Punjab is "very dangerous, and defective in principle, feeble, and expensive;" and as the consequence of that opinion, and having regard to the character of the population, to the position and power of the Maharajah of Jummoo, and to the amount of force by which he thinks we are liable to be opposed, his Excellency has formed the conclusion, that he cannot at present recommend any reduction of the force now occupying the Punjab, and amounting to not less than 54,000 men.

While I think it right to state that I by no means concur in the opinions his Excellency has expressed respecting civil government in India generally, or admit the justice of the terms in which he has conveyed his judgment on the system of government established in the Punjab, I yet do not feel myself called upon in this place, to vindicate the measures which have been taken, and which have received the approbation of the Government I serve.

Neither do I concur with his Excellency in the estimate he has formed of the actual power for attack possessed by Maharajah Golab Singh, or coincide with him in the anticipation of events which he regards as probable.

Nevertheless, I entirely agree with his Excellency as to the expediency which he

urges, of maintaining the army on a footing of full preparation against all possible risks, in a country whose warlike population has been but recently subdued, and where internal insurrection, as well as frontier disturbance, must be regarded as probable contingencies.

The force of 54,000 men, which his Excellency has named as essential for the occupation of the Punjab, including the Jullunder Doab and the banks of the Sutlej, is indeed enormous.

But when the Commander-in-Chief of the army, after a very mature deliberation, submits it to me as his professional opinion that a smaller amount of force cannot at present be employed—founding his opinion on the circumstances of our position in the Punjab, and more especially on the formidable character of the people who have passed under our rule, and on the means possessed by neighbouring princes for our injury, I consider it to be my duty at once to confirm the arrangements which under this head his Excellency has suggested.

In pages 29 to 37 of the Report, his Excellency explains in detail the distribution which he desires to make of the troops that are to be stationed within the new territory for its occupation and defence.

I. His Excellency recommends that the army in the Punjab shall be stationed at the following places:—viz. Lahore, Wuzeerabad or Sealkote, Jhelum, Attok, and Peshawur. Mooltan is not mentioned; but I presume that it is intended to retain there permanently the amount of force which has lately been sent there in relief.

II. His Excellency recommends that the five regiments of irregular cavalry, and five of irregular infantry which have been raised in the Punjab, shall be “employed as a military police in parts remote from the great military stations and across the Indus.” (P. 36). He adds, “As Sir H. Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur districts I am very glad to give that up to them.”

The two preceding paragraphs sum up briefly the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief under this head.

The distribution of the regular troops in the new province is a question so purely military, that I should desire to rely upon his Excellency’s judgment and to accept his recommendations, as conclusive in this matter.

But I consider it necessary to direct his Excellency’s especial attention to that portion of the Punjab, which is designated the Manjha, and which lies between the Ravee and the Beas, or Sutlej. The whole of that district is occupied almost exclusively by Sikhs; and within its bounds the Sikh population, as a body, is for the most part collected. If formidable insurrection is to be apprehended, it is most probably within the Manjha to the north of the city of Umritsur that it will take place. The character of that portion generally is far too warlike, especially after the addition which it has lately received of large bodies of discharged or fugitive soldiers, to be securely left to the control even of the military police which I have intimated my intention of forming. It is hardly necessary for me to add, that it is of the utmost importance that any attempt at actual insurrection should be dealt with speedily as well as vigorously, and that the means should be at hand of bringing promptly to bear upon the insurgents a force so constituted as to ensure immediate and entire success.

I apprehend that this will not be the case if the regular troops within the Barea Doab are stationed exclusively at Lahore, especially since it is now intended to hold the fortress of Govindghur by a wing, instead of an entire regiment, as hitherto.

I am not aware whether his Excellency has in view any particular station for the camel corps, which, at his request, I transferred to the Bengal establishment. My consent to the transfer was grounded on those considerations of its peculiar constitution and capacities, which would appear likely to render it of the greatest value in this quarter, where disturbances are more likely to occur than anywhere else in the plains, and where force and rapidity of action would be of the greatest moment.

I would beg his Excellency’s consideration of this subject, and shall be happy to be favoured with his views thereupon.

It certainly would have been satisfactory to me, if his Excellency’s scheme for the distribution of so large a force, had provided for the occupation by the regular troops of the frontier districts along the right bank of the river Indus. These districts his Excellency proposes to leave to the irregular regiments which have been recently raised.

With reference to the relinquishment of the Peshawur valley also to an irregular force, I conceive that I am right in stating that Sir H. Lawrence never contemplated undertaking such a duty, with the comparatively small amount of force which has been sanctioned as *permanent* by the Government.

REPORT, &amp;c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
26th Dec. 1849.

But however this may have been, I have now to state, on the part of the Government, that I cannot consent to confide the defence of a post, whose security is of the highest political importance, to any irregular force. Whatever it may be practicable to do when an iron bridge shall have been completed across the Indus, I hold strongly now the opinion which the Commander-in-Chief has expressed in page 35; and I would request that the regular force stationed across the Indus, beyond Attok, may at present be one capable of maintaining itself in that "isolated position," as his Excellency appears to have originally intended. While, as I have before observed, I should have been glad if his Excellency had contemplated the occupation of the Lower Trans-Indus districts by the regular troops, I am prepared to assent to their defence being undertaken, if necessary, by the irregular and local corps.

But this frontier is of very great extent. His Excellency correctly describes the population of Bunnoo and the neighbouring districts as "warlike and unruly;" and in the time of the Sikhs, a little army was requisite to keep them in submission. The passes in the hills must be secured; and the forts, which it has been found necessary even of late years to build, in order to overawe these turbulent tribes, must be garrisoned. For all this the irregular corps, weakened as they must be by providing for the control of Huzara and other points, will afford a very inconsiderable force.

It is true that a military police, amounting to 3,000 horsemen and 6,000 foot, has been sanctioned. The number appears in the aggregate considerable; but when applied to the vast area included within the new territory, the extent of aid which it can give in dealing with rebellion, or invasion beyond the Indus, would not be great.

I repeat that it is of the highest political importance that we should secure ourselves against any circumstances which could cause even a temporary relinquishment of the ground we have occupied. However temporary the withdrawal might be, its mere occurrence would spread over the country, as we have before seen, and would be deeply injurious to our position and to the public tranquillity. If, then, the Trans-Indus districts are to be held by the irregular corps, it is, in my judgment, indispensable that they should be aided by the presence of artillery across the river, and provided with sufficient support upon this side.

As the distribution stands at present, no support, however urgently required, could be given without a very considerable delay. It has not been proposed to place any troops in the Scinde Saugor Doab, from its extremity to the Salt Range,—none in the Chueh Doab,—none in the Lower Rechnab Doab; and I presume that not much could safely be spared from the force at Mooltan.

Guided by past experience and by a knowledge of the nature of these districts, I do not consider that they can be safely held, as suggested, by the irregular corps, unless these are accompanied by a field battery in Bunnoo and the northern portions, and by another field battery at Dera Ghazee Khan and the southern portions, the whole being supported by a station resembling that at Jhelum, at some point upon the eastern side of the river Indus.

The position of cantonments, the maintenance and repair of forts, to be occupied by troops, and the fortifications of Lahore, &c. are details on which his Excellency proposes to report officially after he shall have visited them severally. They need not, therefore, be adverted to at present.

I am very desirous of coming to a definite conclusion on this subject before I go to sea.

The necessity for my going has already been the source of much vexation to me, and the feeling is greatly aggravated by my finding myself unable to remain at Lahore, in order to settle these details in more close communication than is now practicable. I trust, however, that the several points which as yet remain undecided may be speedily adjusted. They are as follows:—

1. Having acquiesced in the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief respecting the amount of force to be stationed in the Punjab, and the general distribution thereof, I beg to be favoured with his Excellency's consideration of the views I have expressed as to the sufficiency of the force, as now placed, for acting speedily on any formidable rising among the Sikhs in the upper Manjha, an event which I do not regard as probable, but which is very possible.

2. If his Excellency should still prefer that the Trans-Indus districts of the Derajat and Bunnoo should be held by the irregular corps, under the conditions which I have stated as those on which I could consent to the measure, I should wish to know where the supporting force would be placed.

3. In that event, the question must be determined, under whose orders the irregular corps are to be.

In the minute authorizing their organization, I stated that, on their completion, they should be considered as under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

Expressions in his Excellency's report induced me to suppose that, in the event of their being employed as he has suggested, he contemplates their becoming what are called civil corps, and being placed under the orders of the Board of Administration.

It is necessary that this point should be clearly ascertained, and I therefore request to be favoured with his Excellency's opinion, whether the corps in question should be placed, as contemplated in the original minute, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, or under those of the Board of Administration.

26th December, 1849.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

REPORT, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
26th Dec. 1849.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

*Dated the 27th December, 1849.*

For Secret Department.

On my arrival at Lahore, I received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief a report on the army of the Bengal presidency, and on its distribution, as well in the presidency generally as in the new provinces beyond the Sutlej.

The report is now placed upon record in the Foreign Department.

I think it expedient that the portions relating to the Punjab should be made known to the Board of Administration.

I request, therefore, that a copy of the report may be sent to the president, marked "Secret," and that the Board may be requested to communicate such remarks as they may wish to make to the Governor-General in the Secret Department.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
27th Dec. 1849.

No. 1.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, with the Governor-General, to the PRESIDENT of the BOARD of ADMINISTRATION for the Affairs of the PUNJAB.

*Dated Camp, Mooltan, 1st January, 1850.*

For Secret Department.

SIR,—

On the arrival of the Governor-General at Lahore, his Lordship received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a report on the army of the Bengal presidency.

2. His Lordship thinks it expedient that the portions relating to the Punjab should be made known to the Board of Administration. With this view, I am directed to forward to you a copy of the report marked "Secret," with the request of the Governor-General that the Board will be pleased to communicate such remarks as they may wish to make to his Lordship, in the Secret Department.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
with the Governor-General.

Camp, Mooltan,  
the 1st January, 1850.

Letter to the  
President of the  
Board of Adminis-  
tration, Punjab.  
1st Jan. 1850.

MEMORANDUM by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF in INDIA.

*Dated 26th February, 1850.*

*Paragraph of the Governor-General's Minute, dated 26th December, 1849.*

The Commander-in-Chief, in the several portions of his report, reviews the natural feature of the Punjab, with its adjacent

Yes; I do in my report "advert to the form of administration, and to the mode in which the province is governed." For on the mode in which a newly-conquered country is governed everything depends;

Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

REPORT, &c.  
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 Memorandum by  
 the Commander-in-  
 Chief in India,  
 26th Feb. 1850.

districts, and dwells on the character and condition of the Sikh population. His Excellency sets forth the view he has taken of the power and disposition of the neighbouring states, and adverts to the form of administration, and to the mode in which the province is governed.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief gives it as his opinion, that the system of government in the Punjab is "very dangerous and defective in principle, feeble, and expensive;" and as the consequence of that opinion, and having regard to the character of the population, to the position and power of the Maharaja of Jummoo, and to the amount of force by which, he thinks, we are liable to be opposed, his Excellency has formed the conclusion that he cannot, at present, recommend any reduction of the force now occupying the Punjab, and amounting to not less than 54,000 men.

their proceedings, thus doing all that foresight can do to *prevent* insurrection. If, in despite of such necessary precautions, an insurrection breaks out, and the police give information of the coming evil, the troops can deal with it; but the troops cannot *prevent* insurrection if a country is resolved upon it, in consequence of being discontented with its Government. The absence of an efficient police makes me consider that the 54,000 men which I found in the Punjab are still requisite. It would be madness in me hastily to reduce the number of troops which my predecessor thought necessary, after six years' experience in this command, and in which opinion all officers of high rank, with whom I have conversed on the subject, concur.

While I think it right to state that I by no means concur in the opinions his Excellency has expressed respecting civil government in India generally, or admit the justice of the terms in which he has conveyed his judgment on the system of government established in the Punjab, I yet do not feel myself called upon, in this place, to vindicate the measures which have been taken, and which have received the approbation of the Government I serve.

Neither do I concur with his Excellency

it is the Alpha and Omega; it embraces everything; as it is good or bad, so does it create or prevent rebellion. Therefore did I advert to the government in the Punjab, as the foundation on which all military disposition of the troops must mainly depend. Where a good Government rules, the people are content, and few or no troops are required. Where a bad one rules, the reverse is the case. It is impossible for me to shut my eyes to these truisms, and, neglecting them, pretend to make military arrangements of any soundness or sense.

All this I am bound to admit to be my opinion, and my residence of three weeks at Lahore, and tour through the Punjab, have confirmed my opinion. I consider that a powerful police ought long since to have been formed; none has yet been formed.

The civil Government at the capital could not even relieve the gate guards of the town. They had no arms!—were not formed!—there is no head of police to form them! A strong and vigorous government in the Punjab would, long since, have had a powerful police all over the country, controlling troubled spirits, protecting the well-disposed, and collecting information as to the state of the people in each district; also collecting information relative to the unquiet spirits and

I did not expect to alter the opinion of the Governor-General, nor was my opinion given with that object. I merely stated my own opinions, which, as Commander-in-Chief and as one of the Supreme Council, I am bound to do honestly. The Governor-General has a right to honest opinions from me in both capacities. An honest opinion may be a wrong opinion, even dangerously so; but whatever it be, the person who gives it is answerable for its honesty, which alone is in his own power. The Governor-General is, assuredly, not called upon to vindicate to me the measures which have been taken; and I can assure him that my report was not intended as an attack upon those measures, but merely the expression of my own opinion, which was called for by him.

I am very glad that the Governor-

in the estimate he has formed of the actual power for attack possessed by Maharaja Golab Sing, or coincide with him in the anticipation of events which he regards as probable.

Nevertheless, I entirely agrée with his Excellency as to the expediency which he urges, of maintaining the army on a footing of full preparation against all possible risks, in a country whose warlike population has been but recently subdued, and where internal insurrection, as well as frontier disturbance, must be regarded as probable contingencies.

The force of 54,000 men, which his Excellency has named as essential for the occupation of the Punjab, including the Jullunder Doab and the banks of the Sutlej, is indeed enormous.

But when the Commander-in-Chief of the army, after a very mature deliberation, submits it to me as his professional opinion, that a smaller amount of force cannot at present be employed, founding his opinion on the circumstances of our position in the Punjab, and more especially on the formidable character of the people who have passed under our rule, and on the means possessed by neighbouring princes for our injury, I consider it to be my duty at once to confirm the arrangements which, under this head, his Excellency has suggested.

In pages 29 to 37 of the report, his Excellency explains, in detail, the distribution which he desires to make of the troops that are to be stationed within the new territory, for its occupation and defence:—

I. His Excellency, recommends that the army in the Punjab shall be stationed at the following places, viz.: Lahore, Wuzeerabad or Sealkote, Jeelum, Attock, and Peshawur. Mooltan is not mentioned; but I presume that it is intended to retain there, permanently, the amount of force which has lately been sent there in relief.

II. His Excellency recommends that

General does not think my estimate of the power of the Maharaja correct. He has more information than I have on the subject, and is probably right.

The Governor-General and myself agree perfectly in this grand principle of preparation, whatever difference there may be in other points,—and this is the essential one, to cope with fortune.

The Governor-General seems to think the force in the Punjab enormous. I think so too. But his Lordship will no doubt recollect, that many think the army should be increased, and that I not only said that it was enough, but, in my report, have pointed out the means of great reduction, grounded upon the very high authority of Lord Ellenborough.

I believe that there is scarcely a man in India that thinks the army in the Punjab is too large, except myself; and I think it could be reduced; but I cannot recommend its reduction under the present form of government, and other existing circumstances.

I explain, in my Report, the *actual distribution* of the force. This I have *no power to change*. I think the distribution a good one; but, were it the worst possible, I have no power to change it now, for we have no cover anywhere else to put the troops under. When I see the various stations; when I hear the reports of experienced men, as to the health of these stations, then I shall be able to say whether or not I desire any change. Circumstances must decide these matters. What is right to-day may be wrong to-morrow.

As to Mooltan. Being a fortified place, I intended, if possible, to visit it, and make a special report from actual observation; for I considered the position to be one demanding a more decided opinion than I possess the means of giving; but I think that Mithunkote is a preferable position for a cantonment. I would not re-build the walls of Mooltan, if they are down.

I only recommended that the Board

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REPORT, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

the five regiments of irregular cavalry, and five of irregular infantry, which have been raised in the Punjab, shall be employed as a military police in parts remote from the great military stations, and across the Indus (page 36). He adds: "As Sir H. Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur districts, I am very glad to give that up to them."

The two preceding paragraphs sum up, briefly, the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief under this head:—The distribution of the regular troops in the new province is a question so purely military, that I should desire to rely upon his Excellency's judgment, and to accept his recommendations as conclusive in this matter.

But I consider it necessary to direct his Excellency's especial attention to that portion of the Punjab which is designated Manjha, and which lies between the Ravee and the Beas or Sutlej. The whole of that district is occupied almost exclusively by Sikhs; and, within its bounds, the Sikh population, as a body, is for the most part collected. If formidable insurrection is to be apprehended, it is most probably within the Manjha, to the north of the city of Umritsir, that it will take place. The character of that population, generally, is far too warlike, especially after the addition which it has lately received of large bodies of discharged or fugitive soldiers, to be securely left to the control even of the military police, which I have intimated my intention of forming. It is hardly necessary for me to add, that it is of the utmost importance, that any attempt at actual insurrection should be dealt with speedily, as well as vigorously, and that the means should be at hand of bringing promptly to bear upon the insurgents, a force so constituted as to ensure immediate and entire success.

I apprehend that this will not be the case if the regular troops within the Baree Doab are stationed exclusively at Lahore; especially since it is now intended to hold the fortress of Govindgurb by a wing, instead of an entire regiment, as hitherto.

placing of troops. None in the world! time, gave me information of danger; and suggestions how to meet it.

should have the defence of the Trans-Indus territory; 1st, because it was volunteered; 2nd, because, in those territories, I considered there was *very little* danger of invasion, except at Peshawur, which was provided for by placing a large body of regular troops *there*; 3rd, because I thought that so large an irregular force ought to do something, and I have hitherto seen this force do little or nothing, though nearly a year has passed since the conquest; and it yet seems to be without order or arrangement. To speak the truth, I see very little prospect of its being organized. The organization of such a body is no easy operation. It requires a skilful military head. I see no such head at work.

The distribution of these irregulars is as purely a military question as that of the regulars, and I will hereafter touch upon it.

His Lordship directs my especial attention to that portion of the Punjab designated the Manjha, lying between the rivers Beas and Ravee. This I shall attend to; but I must be allowed to call his Lordship's attention to a few facts, as being very important, because his Lordship's letter throws upon me a very great proportion of responsibility, which his sense of justice will tell him I can only accept, if the confidence placed in me, and the power entrusted to me, are commensurate to this responsibility. His Lordship's observation, calling my attention to the state of the Manjha, does three things:—1st, it implies that I know, and have all along known, the dangerous state of the Manjha; 2nd, that I could make arrangements to prevent a rising there, and that I have not done so; 3rd, that if one should hereafter occur, I am responsible.

Now, in justice to myself, I must protest against the assumption of any such responsibility (if I am correct in assuming that it is implied by his Lordship's expression); I will therefore state why I protest against this responsibility, by answering these three points *seriatim*.

1st. I have had no information given to me relative to the state of the Manjha, till I received a letter from the Board of Administration, dated 20th December, 1849, which improperly writes to me to propose an arrangement of the troops, because the Manjha is unsafe. Now the Board's suggestions are of no use to me as to the

But the Board, in this letter, for the first information of danger is what I want,—not

The next information which I get, and it is more full and more detailed than that which I received from the Board, is this minute of his Lordship's.

Had his Lordship, while at Lahore, either by letter or by word of mouth, given me the information I have now received, I would have explained all that I had done, without having the information I ought to have had from the Board, and taken his Lordship's orders on what he wished, if he thought my arrangements deficient, which I do not think they are, as far as circumstances permit. Had I been summoned to his Lordship's presence with Sir H. Lawrence, I could have replied to all I now do; for his Lordship's observations I had before heard from Sir H. Lawrence, though *not* the detailed information of the danger now said to exist.

I have already said that I had no information confided to me as to the dangerous state of the Manjha, till the date of the Board's letter and his Lordship's minute, and that unless full information is given to me (as far as Government possess it) of the real state of the country, it is impossible for me to make other than general preparations for war, viz., the location of the troops, so as to support each other: the improvement of the tone of honourable feeling in the army: the maintenance of rigid discipline and the drill.

To the 2nd observation implied (as I read his Lordship's minute), namely, that I could make arrangements to prevent a rising in the Manjha, I reply thus: It is quite possible that, if I filled the Manjha with troops, it might prevent a rising; it is not *probable*, because, if men are resolved to rise, they can always find a place of rendezvous where no force can prevent them assembling,—“Where there is a will there is a way.” However, it is (I am ready to admit) *possible*. But will the Board, which has made the suggestion, be pleased to say, *where the soldiers are to be lodged?* The placing troops at Adeenanuggur is to murder them. By removing the troops from that place last autumn I have saved many lives, which would have been lost had his Lordship taken the opinion of the Board, instead of a much more competent opinion, that of Brigadier Wheeler. Well, failing in the inconsiderate attempt to lodge soldiers in the noxious district of Adeenanuggur, the Board called for them at Battala, and said there was ample accommodation for two companies. These companies were sent. They found no accommodation at all! and, after much suffering, and, for ought I know to the contrary, loss of life, by being exposed to the weather in tents during the rainy season, these two companies were obliged to return to Umritsir. It is easy for the Board to say, “put 2,000 men in the Manjha;” but the Board's words are not soldiers' barracks, and therefore it is not so easy to “put 2,000 men in the Manjha,” without a much greater loss of life than putting down a rising by force of arms would cost. Believing, as I do most sincerely, that his Lordship and the Board are as anxious to protect the soldiers from pestilence as I am, I am sure that both will admit that I cannot pour troops into the Manjha without barracks are amply provided; and none are provided. But why should troops be poured into the Manjha?—merely because the Board say there is danger of a rising! I have assertions; I have no *proofs*: no detailed *information from spies* to enable me to form any sure judgment how to act on an emergency, when, if it occurs, all must depend upon that very knowledge, which is withheld from me even at this moment. I ought to have daily information from the Board of all that passes in the Manjha, and in every part of the Punjab; or I should have means given to me to acquire information for myself, which I could do, I believe, more effectually than the Board can. However, I cannot put troops into the Manjha without cover; but I have done all that I could do. I have placed troops all round the Manjha. Troops at Noorpoor, at Kangra, at Hajee-pore, Makerian, Bodeepind, Hoshearpore, Kurtarpore, Jullundur, Loodiana, Ferozepoor, Lahore, Govindgurb, Nakoda, and soon at Sealkote. Thus the Manjha is the centre of a girdle of troops, which in a few hours, and the most distant in two marches, can be poured in rapidly from the Jullunder and Lahore, under two of our ablest general officers, Sir W. Gilbert and Brigadier Wheeler. I therefore affirm, that I have made all the preparations in my power, for *speedily* and *vigorously* suppressing an insurrection; and I place full confidence in the experience and abilities of the two generals above named. On all these grounds, I maintain that I am not responsible for insurrections; but am responsible for putting such risings down, for which I have made the proper preparations. I also maintain that the proper means of preventing such insurrections, viz., a well-ordered police force, has not been established, which is one of my reasons for thinking the Board of Administration is a feeble government.

I maintain that a well-organized police, and a well-conducted system of espionage, are the two most powerful means of *preventing* an insurrection; and, should the police

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.



REPORT, &amp;c.

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 Memorandum by  
 the Commander-  
 in-Chief in India,  
 26th Feb. 1850.

prove too feeble, then the work of the troops is to quell such a rising, the Government keeping the commander of such troops constantly and fully *informed*, leaving it to him to take his own measures. A Government that keeps me informed, assists me in my duties. A Government that "suggests," only impedes me, and is more dangerous than an enemy. It destroys all system, and produces a patchwork, without plan or definite object.

The Manjha is, by my plan, surrounded by troops, and the heavy force in the Jullunder has a bridge and many fords, through which that force can pass into the Manjha. The Government can also provide boats when the river swells.

I was asked what force was required in Govindgurh. I said, and say still, the wing of a regiment; but I was not told, till now, that large bodies of soldiers had entered the Baree Doab. This reinforcement, however, does not alter my opinion,—that a wing is sufficient for Govindgurh; but I shall be glad if quarters are constructed for a whole regiment,—not at all as regards the defence of the Baree Doab, but because there is a want of barrack room *everywhere*; and the more barracks that are constructed, the greater will be the saving to Government. I say that, for the defence of the Doab, no more men are wanted at Govindgurh than are required for the defence of the fortress. Gentlemen who wear red coats, but are not soldiers, are always for a small force to march here and another there, so as always to bring British troops into battle with inferior numbers, when proper management may give an equal or superior number. The courage of our troops may sometimes prevent disaster; but a commander has no right to make such arrangements as require such dangerous proofs of their bravery. If a regiment is quartered at Govindgurh, it could send a wing, promptly, no doubt, against neighbouring insurgents, and that wing *might* beat them, and suffer great loss in doing so; but it might also get cut to pieces! or the whole regiment might be blocked up in the fort. All these small detached bodies, scattered here and there as with a pepper-box, are common devices, but are dangerous, and proofs of extreme ignorance in military matters. My object, as I endeavoured to explain in my report (but I fear unsuccessfully), is to have the power of attacking any enemy that presents himself, with an overwhelming force, and also a healthy force of strong men. I cannot undertake to prevent insurrection as matters are in the Punjab, and I would, on no account, be held responsible for what I cannot do. If that is to be done, it must be done by a well-organized police, well supported by a regular force; should it arise, I am ready to put rebellion down. I have not the least doubt of doing so; but it must be by concentrating the forces,—not by dispersing them,—at least, I cannot do so in any other way. If it is thought I am wrong, I am ready to obey any orders that I received; but I will not act on opinions which I think erroneous, unless I am relieved from responsibility: then, indeed, I am ready to send troops anywhere that the Board of Administration may advise.

The troops defending the Baree Doab are not merely those forming the large force at Lahore. Troops can march from Noorpore, Hadjeepore, Makerian, Kangra, Bodeepind, Hoshearpore, Kurtarpore, Jullunder, Loodiana, Ferozepoor, Sealkote; the most distant post being within a circle of about sixty miles' radius—that is to say, two forced marches.

I have marched the distance in twenty-four hours, and we have within these limits forty-seven regiments, with a due proportion of artillery.

I am not aware whether his Excellency has in view any particular station for the camel corps, which, at his request, I transferred to the Bengal Establishment. My consent to the transfer was grounded on those considerations of its peculiar constitution and capacities, which would appear likely to render it of the greatest value in this quarter, where disturbances are more likely to occur than anywhere else in the plains, and where force and rapidity of action would be of the greatest moment.

I would beg his Excellency's consideration of this subject, and shall be happy to be favoured with his views thereupon.

The camel corps is to be applicable wherever there may be sudden danger. It is, and has been ever since it came into the Punjab, within a march (for the camel corps) of the Manjha. If the Civil Service do their duty, as I dare say they do, there can be no armed insurrection (beyond their own strength to put down) without their being able to give timely information to the Government; and the camel corps, like other troops, would march towards the point of danger. I have no other views about it, than to quarter it where there is good forage for the camels, and where its great powers may be useful. It is ready for service when called upon, as reported to Government. I have now

ordered it to the Derajat, where it will find good forage, and I think will be more useful than anywhere else.

It certainly would have been satisfactory to me if his Excellency's scheme, for the distribution of so large a force, had provided for the occupation, by the regular troops, of the frontier districts, along the right bank of the river Indus. These districts his Excellency proposes to leave to the irregular regiments, which have been recently raised.

With reference to the relinquishment of the Peshawur valley, also, to an irregular force, I conceive that I am right in stating, that Sir H. Lawrence never contemplated undertaking such a duty, with the comparatively small amount of force which has been sanctioned, as permanent, by the Government.

thing down the river, and Mooltan could support, by a meeting force, everything up the river. I also told Sir H. Lawrence at Lahore, that I proposed to place the camel corps somewhere about Munkera, and he was to give me all the information he could collect; but, some years ago, I knew pretty nearly all he can find out. With Peshawur on the north, Mooltan in the south, and the camel corps in the centre, at Dera Ismael Khan, we have also a grand support of 54,000 men, dominating over the whole country, and, by their influence, supporting everything everywhere!

Let me now ask, what enemy would the troops in the Derajat have to encounter? We are not in danger of invasion, unless from Afghanistan, and the Affghans would come through the Bolan and Khyber passes. Met at the Bolan by the force in the north of Scinde and their reserves; also met by those at Mooltan, or, if matters are properly managed, by a force at Mithenkote, which I believe to be a superior position to Mooltan. At the Khyber, the Affghans would be met by the force at Peshawur. The troops have been all exceedingly well posted by my predecessor, to support these regular troops at Mooltan, and in the Peshawur district.

But it may be said we have wild tribes in Derajat to oppose. I cannot believe that these tribes will rebel if the civil officers govern well; I have dealt with the wildest of them and I found no difficulty. But say there may be partial disturbances about Bunnoo, and inroads from the hills! Well, we have an army of irregulars, and these would put down insurrection, and repel invasion by wild tribes, even though they were without support from any other troops. But they are not without support! They will be well supported as I have shown; and when I learn more, I can reinforce the camel corps at Dera Ismael Khan, if necessary.

This corps is in beautiful order, equal to any regular corps in the Indian army, and all tried soldiers! I must have a report on Dera Ismael Khan, as to its feelings, its means of defence, its health, &c., all which I shall take means to procure.

But however this may have been, I have now to state on the part of Government, that I cannot consent to confide the defence of a post whose security is of the highest political importance to any irregular force. Whatever it may be practicable to do when an iron bridge shall have been completed across the Indus, I hold strongly now the opinion, which the Commander-in-Chief has expressed in page 35; and I would request, that the regular force stationed across the Indus,

The principle of concentrating large bodies of troops in masses, is that of strength. It is the application of the fable of the bundle of sticks, applied to military operations. Were I "to provide for the occupation, by the regular troops, of the frontier districts, along the right-bank of the Indus," more than I have done, I fear that I should weaken the regular force, injure discipline, which grows lax in detachments, and thus do harm instead of good. Both his Lordship and Sir H. Lawrence think, that to relinquish, to the irregular troops, the districts beyond the Indus, would be unadvisable. So do I! I did not propose to do so! I proposed to keep a large force at Attock (on the *right* bank, but I have no other name to mark the spot so well as Attock) as a support to the irregulars. This force would support every-

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

With reference to this paragraph, I do not clearly understand what is meant by—"I cannot consent to confiding the defence of a post &c. to any irregular force."


I never proposed in my report to leave the district solely to the defence of the irregular force! On the contrary, there are ten regiments, and twelve pieces of cannon stationed in the Peshawur district to support the irregular force; and I have expressly said, that I would not withdraw

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

beyond Attok, nay, at present, be one capable of maintaining itself in that "isolated position," as his Excellency appears to have originally intended.

a man, but station them on the river, and establish a *tête de pont*, thus—



reserving to myself to fix the station when I saw the ground.

Now the ten regiments at A or C, and 4,000 at B, form an army ready to march to the support of any part (held by the irregulars) that might be attacked. But who is to attack them? people like the Eusofzyes, 10,000 of whom were defeated by 2,000 of our men; the latter losing but five men killed! I cannot help thinking, that my using the word "Attok" to mark the point for the bridge and large cantonment, has made his Lordship imagine, that I propose drawing the Peshawur station altogether, to the left bank of the Indus, which never came into my head, not even if an iron bridge existed.

While, as I have before observed, I should have been glad if his Excellency had contemplated the occupation of the lower Trans-Indus districts by the regular troops, I am prepared to assent to their defence being undertaken, if necessary, by the irregular and local corps.

If his Lordship will place the whole of the irregular force under my command, I will do my best immediately to form them and support them effectually, by their own high state of discipline. The Sindh horse and camel corps are irregulars, and I know of no regiments of cavalry or infantry superior to them. There is no reason why all the new corps should not be equally efficient. I think I could quickly make them so, if his Lordship

places them under my orders, and gives me the means; but in their present state, they appear to me an inefficient, dangerous, and consequently a costly force.

I am prepared (should his Lordship wish me to take this force in hand) to organize it, so that the new regiments shall give full and efficient support to the magistracy of the Punjab, and be equal to deal with any local disturbance. I should model them upon the same system that I did the Sindh police, with such modification as their having been already formed into regiments requires. It would be better otherwise, but it is not good to make changes when it can be avoided. I should keep them distinct from the military, and call them "police regiments." I should require to have an officer to command them, with the rank and pay of a brigadier, who ought to have a brigade-major and a clerk. This, I think, would be quite enough. The officer I should recommend for this, would be Lieutenant Colonel Hodgson, as he is said to be a strict and able officer, somewhat severe, which is so much the better for such a command. His regiment is said to be in excellent order. His Lordship knows more of him than I do, but I judge from his general character among military men, and I have neither met nor can I hear of any one with sufficient rank, more fitting.

But this frontier is of very great extent. His Excellency correctly describes the population of Bunnoo and the neighbouring districts, as "warlike and unruly," and in the time of the Sikhs a little army was required to keep them in submission. The passes in the hills must be secured, and the forts which it has been found necessary, even of late years, to build, in

The frontier referred to by his Lordship in this paragraph is about 400 miles in length. In the time of the Sikhs, the tribes were warlike and unruly, and having been (as I have known them to have been for many years) horribly tyrannized over by the Sikhs, even past the endurance of human nature, a "little army" was necessary to hold them in

order to overawe these turbulent tribes, must be garrisoned. For all this, the irregular corps, weakened, as they must be, by providing for the control of Huzara and other points, will afford a very inconsiderable force.

check, as his Lordship justly observes. Writhing, as they were, under such cruelty six years ago, they sent to ask me to relieve them from their sufferings; and I would go alone among them to-morrow, and rule them without a British soldier. With this conviction and experience, I cannot think that there is any great difficulty in our holding the Derajat. The passes need not be secured,

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

but they must be made passable, by good roads. Why forts should have been built by us, I do not know; I did not know that they had been. I know the moral feelings of the people, and the general topography of the Derajat; but I do not know the topography of this country *in detail*. The first knowledge tells me that good government will do more than forts to keep those tribes in order, however turbulent they may now be. However, it is very possible that one or two forts may be required; one, for instance, for a magazine, in some central point, as Dera Ishmael Khan. I hear that the Governor-General has made a tour there. If this be true, it is worth a hundred forts towards quieting the people. As I know nothing of the disposition of the irregular force alluded to by his Lordship, I cannot say where it is weak, or where strong; but I know that, if well organized and well placed, this force is numerous enough to keep the whole Punjab in obedience, the Derajat included. If it cannot do this, the force is either badly placed or badly commanded, or there must be a general resolution to rebel against our rule, which cannot be prevented, and must end in another war.—Which of the three is the case, I am not able to say.

I have seen Major Abbott, who is in civil charge of the Huzara, and he is decidedly against any additional troops, whether regulars or irregulars, being sent into his district.

It is true that a military police, amounting to 3,000 horsemen and 6,000 foot, has been sanctioned. The number appears in the aggregate considerable; but when applied to the vast area included within the new territory, the extent of aid which it can give in dealing with rebellion, or invasion beyond the Indus, would not be great.

A military police of 9,000 cavalry and infantry, his Lordship says, has been sanctioned. I do not know if this be *in addition* to what I hear is the amount (18,000) of irregulars, or that these 9,000 men *make up* a portion of the 18,000; it is not material. His Lordship thinks the number “in the aggregate considerable, but when applied to the vast area included within the new territory, the extent of aid which it can give in dealing with rebellion, or invasion beyond the Indus, would not be great.”

In answer to this I have to observe,—

1st. That the extent of our new territory is thinly populated, and the Mahomedans form half of that, and are probably friendly to the British rule in the Punjab.

2nd. That there are vast tracts nearly desert in this new territory, which require no troops at all; for example, all the interior of the tracts between the rivers generally, whose banks only are populous.

3rd. That the police, or irregulars, would have to deal neither with rebellion nor invasion, both of which would be met by an army of above 54,000 men. The whole duties of these 18,562 military police would be simply to support the local civil authorities against any turbulent individuals, or small bands of robbers that might infest a district. The Irish constabulary force does this; the Scinde police did this in my time. The villagers generally obeyed the call, if assistance was required by the police. The same ought to take place in the Derajat. The whole right bank of the Indus is inhabited by people whose habits, and manners, and language are similar, from Kurrachee up to Attok; I know their general character perfectly; I held about 400 miles of this district in perfect subjection for years.

I repeat that it is of the highest political importance that we should secure ourselves against any circumstances which could cause even a temporary relinquishment of the ground we have occupied.

I perfectly agree with his Lordship that it is dangerous to abandon territory, even for a time. I think when, at Meanee, I attacked an army of 35,000 men with 2,000, I gave a pretty decided

REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

However temporary the withdrawal might be, its mere occurrence would spread over the country, as we have before seen, and would be deeply injurious to our position and to the public tranquillity.

proof of my conviction of the danger of retiring before these very people. To prevent such an occurrence as the abandonment of territory is the great object of my report, and of all that I have said on the subject. There is but one system, in my opinion, by which this can be prevented,—good and conciliatory government; a well-organized police; troops kept in masses, well disciplined

and well placed for meeting invasion or supporting the police. His Lordship states the danger of temporary withdrawal. I quite agree with him, and for that very reason have opposed the withdrawal of a single man from the Punjab generally, or from any part of it; and so afraid I am of such a misfortune taking place, that I am now opposing the very mistaken plan which the Board of Administration seems desirous of seeing adopted, viz. spreading detachments all about the country, which is far more calculated to ensure the abandonment of territory, or some worse disaster, than to keep a country quiet,—a system, as I have before said, betraying but small knowledge of military matters. I opposed this system when I commanded the northern district in England in perilous times, and saved Manchester and Nottingham from being attacked, and enabled the garrison of Sheffield to resist an attack, at the same time that the 45th detachment fought the rebel Frost in Wales. In 1842 I found this system in force by the politicals in Scinde, and, by overturning it, I held the country safe. I must always oppose this system of scattering troops, as destructive to the discipline and safety of the army, and admirably calculated, on the occurrence of any outbreak, to cause the abandonment with disgrace of large tracts of territory. The reason is very simple. The enemy breaks out prepared in masses, and finds us spread out, and prepared to be defeated in detail! But, in any case, we must *abandon territory* to concentrate. This alone, without referring to the destruction of discipline caused by such dissemination of the troops, is of itself an immense evil and full of danger.

If then the Trans-Indus districts are to be held by the irregular corps, it is, in my judgment, indispensable that they should be aided by the presence of artillery across the river, and provided with sufficient support upon this side.

As the distribution stands at present, no support, however urgently required, could be given without a very considerable delay. It has not been proposed to place any troops in the Scinde Sagur Doab from its extremity to the salt range: none in the Chuch Doab: none in the Lower Rechna Doab; and I presume that not much could safely be spared from the force at Mooltan.

Of course; no one can doubt of it for a moment.

I have already shown that *full* support can be given to the troops in the Derajat, if those troops are well disciplined and properly placed. This is one of those places, for which I wanted the camel corps, and only kept it at Goojrat till I could see it, to ascertain the state of discipline it is in; which I have now done and find it excellent. It has now marched for Dera Ismael Khan. Its remaining there cannot be finally settled, till I know more as to the health of the place, and what forage there is. It must be recollected that I have no information given

me. I know *nothing*; absolutely nothing of these irregular corps, and I cannot arrange for the support of troops, of whose state and locality I am utterly ignorant: the thing is impossible! I can either take the whole under my orders, or I can defend the Derajat with regular troops, by establishing new stations—a work of time, and care, and cost; or I can give up all interference with the right bank, and merely place reserves where the Board wish. But in so doing, I cannot be responsible for what may happen, whether good or evil; but I will do whatever the Governor-General orders, to the best of my ability. I cannot, and am sure he does not expect me, to take responsibility, except for my own measures. If his Lordship the Governor-General, gives over the whole defence of the Derajat to me, I will immediately recall all ill-formed regiments, and relieve them by good troops. As to the Doabs mentioned by his Lordship as defenceless, I have to observe—

1st. That "the Scinde Sagur Doab, from its extremity to the Salt Range," is, generally speaking, a desert! It requires no regular force, nor would it be possible there to station one, without an enormous expense, which outlay would in no shape be remunerated by any advantage, of which I am aware.

2nd. "None in the Chuch Doab." No, none! and for pretty nearly the same reasons; no invader can enter *there*. It has much desert, and is dominated by Lahore, Wuzeerabad, and Jhelum. What large body of insurgents could collect there? None! The Board, and his Lordship's minute, both say that all the dangerous Sikhs are in the Manjha, far from and unconnected with the Doab, between the Jhelum and Chenab! I repeat that no danger can arise there, and no regular troops can be *there* placed without any great expense.

3rd. "None in the Lower Rechna Doab." No, none! It also is nearly a desert, and no regular troops could there be placed without great expense; and there is no object to be gained. Mooltan and Lahore completely command the waste, for such it has been from the time of Alexander to this day.

The inhabitants of all these Doabs live along the banks of the rivers which bound them, and along the banks alone, are people and cultivation found. Now these long strips of population must be kept in order by a police, and this is easily done; but, surely, stations of regular troops would be utterly misplaced in such positions! The character of these Doabs is to be high between the rivers, deficient in water, and therefore without much cultivation.

Guided by past experience, and by the knowledge of the nature of these districts, I do not consider that they can be safely held, as suggested, by the irregular corps, unless these are accompanied by a field battery in Bunnoo and the northern portions; and by another field battery at Dera Gaze Khan and the southern portions: the whole being supported by a station resembling that at Jhelum, at some point upon the eastern side of the river Indus.

The position of cantonments, the maintenance and repair of forts to be occupied by troops, and the fortifications of Lahore, &c., are details on which his Excellency proposes to report officially, after he shall have visited them severally. They need not, therefore, be adverted to at present.

I am very desirous of coming to a definite conclusion on this subject, before I go to sea. The necessity for my going has already been the source of much vexation to me, and the feeling is greatly aggravated by my finding myself unable to remain at Lahore, in order to settle these details in more close communication than is now practicable. I trust, however, that the several points, which as yet remain undecided, may be speedily adjusted. They are as follow:—

1st. Having acquiesced in the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief, respecting the amount of force to be stationed in the Punjab, and the general distribution thereof, I beg to be favoured with his Excellency's consideration of the views I have expressed as to the sufficiency of the force, as now placed, for acting speedily on any formidable rising among the Sikhs in the Upper Manjha, an event

It is not for me to dictate to the Governor-General, if he thinks that the 18,562 irregular troops and some twenty or thirty pieces of cannon are not sufficient to hold these miserable tribes in subjection; I can only say that those whom he has entrusted with the direction of this army must mismanage their troops, for I should stake my life upon doing it with half this force, with proper civil government.

While writing this, a return has been sent to me, from which I now see the numbers and stations of those troops; but I have, as yet, had no time to study them, or form any idea of the propriety of the latter, neither do I know the state of their discipline, drill, arms, appointments, clothing, and composition.

His Lordship desires me to say what consideration I have given to the defence of the Upper Manjha. My answer is as follows, viz.:

1st. There is a large body of troops at Lahore.

2nd. There are other large bodies of troops in the Jullundur.

3rd. There is the wing of a regiment at Noorpore, and another at Kangra.

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

which I do not regard as probable, but which is very possible.

These, and all beyond north of the Beas, are placed under Sir Walter Gilbert, who has a perfect knowledge of the country and the people, whose head-quarters are at Lahore, and he can, in two marches, reach any point of the Upper Manjha.

4th. Being at Lahore, he is at the seat of Government, and *if* kept properly informed of *everything* that passes, of *all* the Board of Administration hear, and of *all* they report to the Governor-General, as he, Sir Walter Gilbert, ought to be, or he cannot make his arrangements, then he can, before an outbreak occurs, move in force with his troops to the point in danger, of which he must be the best judge. If he is to consult with the Board of Administration, I have no doubt that all kinds of accidents will happen, as is generally the case when a council directs the movements of troops.

5th. I have given both Generals Gilbert and Wheeler distinct instructions to seek for and attend to all information which the civil authorities can give to them, and to be prompt in putting down insurrection, keeping a sharp look-out as to what passes in the Manjha.

6th. There is one bridge and eight or ten fords over the Beas, and Brigadier Wheeler can pass his force at one or many points over the Beas into the Manjha during the winter.

7th. I have ordered the American pontoons, also, to be sent to him, which will arrive before the swelling waters destroy the bridge and fords. There are also boats in abundance.

8th. To station forces in the Upper Manjha *after* the waters rise would be to destroy the troops by disease; *before* that time there is no need. However, this must be as the Governor-General pleases; and, if he decides on the plan of the Board of Administration, new stations must be built in an unhealthy district. I will, on my return from Peshawur, when I mean to go through all that country, make my report to his Lordship. I have always said that, if healthy, I consider Noorpore a proper position to station a strong force, as being a frontier post, on the borders of the Maharaja's territories. It is with regard to his Highness's power that I propose this, not to insurrection, which I can never cease to repeat can only be prevented by good government.

2nd. If his Excellency should still prefer that the Trans-Indus districts of the Derajat and Bunnoo should be held by the irregular corps, under the conditions which I have stated, as those on which I could consent to the measure, I should wish to know where the supporting force would be placed.

I can at present see no better position than Dera Ismael Khan for a central force in the Derajat. To this place I have, as before stated, ordered the camel corps, and ordered Major Michell to make his report to me upon it. There should be a report made by some experienced medical officers upon this place, but I have no power to send them; the Commander-in-Chief in India has not the authority necessary to fulfil the duties of his position in this and many other

matters, as I have personally stated to his Lordship more than once; but I do not mean by this that I am denied any support from his Lordship; quite the contrary! I complain of the *system*, which I think objectionable, and had not his Lordship given me the support which he has, I would not have remained a month in India. But I have to thank his Lordship, not the system, for that support.

If his Lordship requires that new stations should be formed in the doabs, and in the Derajat, he has only to order them; but it is clear that it was impossible for me to form these since my arrival, as there are no means within my reach, even had I thought they were necessary, which, as I have said, I do not.

The military occupation of a country, *if it be done at once*, requires the full and uncontrolled power of the commander, with full means at his disposal; and it requires also very great experience and ability to do it. *If to be done* by consultation, as in the present case, *after a year has passed*, the troops holding the ground on which the accidents of the war had placed them, then the affair is one of time and examination, and the Governor-General has two sources of information—the Board of Administration and the Commander-in-Chief of the army. I have personally much respect for the members of the Board; and in their civil capacity, for aught I know to the contrary, their abili-

ties may be great and their exertions successful; but I consider their military views to be erroneous and dangerous; for, though I have no doubt but that the bravery of the troops will carry them victoriously through all encounters, it is my business to place them so that their known valour may not be put to such unfair and, at times, to disastrous trials. I have seen 20,000 men (at the lowest calculation) destroyed at Cabul, a small force cut off, to a man, in the Boogtie hills. Another force utterly defeated in the same hills, and other disasters equally shameful, and all arising from civilians, or ignorant officers in civil employment, pretending to direct military operations, which wearing a red coat and holding a commission does not make every man capable of doing; on the contrary, very few men are capable of this. I do not know one man among the military employed in political situations under Government who has an idea of conducting military operations. There are many clever men, and I believe they are all brave soldiers, but they are not, in my opinion, either generals or statesmen! Witnessing the disgraceful and melancholy facts above alluded to, and which have happened in the last ten years, it is impossible for me to conceal from his Lordship a single opinion which I hold, or I should render myself responsible for any misfortune that should hereafter happen to our arms.

The Board of Administration have, apparently, called out to his Lordship for troops here and troops there; but I ask, where are the barracks for them? I have already said, that the Board once stated to his Lordship that there were barracks for two companies at Buttala; on the faith of that statement, two companies were sent to Buttala, and there was not accommodation for a man! The companies, after much suffering, returned to Umritsir. I reported this to the Governor-General, but I never heard more upon the subject. Of course, I cannot now attach any faith to any statement made as to cover for troops by the Board, as I cannot risk the health and the lives of soldiers upon reports so ill-judged and groundless as that relative to Buttala.

The supporting force for the Derajat is the chain of stations, viz. Peshawur, Attok, Rawul Pindie, Jhelum, Wuzeerabad, Lahore, and Mooltan; and the proper discipline and location of the large body of irregular troops quartered in the Derajat, which is sufficient, if properly handled, to keep a country double the size of the Derajat in subjection.

3rd. In that event, the question must be determined, under whose orders the irregular corps are to be.

In the minute authorizing their organization, I stated that on their completion they should be considered as under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

Expressions in his Excellency's report induce me to suppose that, in the event of their being employed as he suggested, he contemplates their becoming what are called civil corps, and being placed under the orders of the Board of Administration.

It is necessary that this point be clearly ascertained, and I therefore request to be favoured with his Excellency's opinion, whether the corps in question should be placed, as contemplated in the original minute, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, or under those of the Board of Administration.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

This rests with his Lordship. His "*Minute authorizing their organization*" places them, on completion, under the Commander-in-Chief, and I am perfectly ready to take them.

The expressions in my report refer to circumstances which can only be determined by his Lordship the Governor-General. They are these, viz.

1st. If there is to be a *police* under the civil power, and I hold that such a force is necessary, for, without it, the Punjab will sooner or later be in disorder, *then*, I think, the whole irregular force ought to be under the exclusive orders of the Commander-in-Chief, because I *know*—I do not think, or imagine, or conjecture, but I know—that, if the civil power in India may interfere with the military, the public service will suffer by their jarring. This ought not to be, neither ought any evil to exist. But so it is, and no human power can prevent it.

2nd. If there be *not* a police, let the irregular force be applied to the duties which police battalions ought to perform, and let a brigadier be appointed to command the whole, as head of the police, and let him be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, or of the Board of Administration, as his Lordship thinks best.

My own opinion is, that the Commander-in-Chief is best, because he will maintain a system of regularity and discipline that the Board will not be able to do, and I always considered that the value of the police in Scinde depended more on the tone and spirit instilled into the corps than on any thing else; and this no body of magistrates can effect:

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum by  
the Commander-  
in-Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.



REPORT, &c.  
 Memorandum by  
 the Commander  
 in-Chief in India,  
 26th Feb. 1850.

it is impossible! I speak with perfect disinterestedness, for the formation of this body of irregulars will give me much trouble, but which trouble I am ready to take as an imperious public duty, for, as matters now stand, I do not think that this large body of irregular troops is of much use; on the contrary, I think they are dangerous. If made over to me (as in the first minute of the Governor-General was contemplated), I should at once organize and place them in proper positions for securing the tranquillity of the country, if not so.

I hear there has been a battle in Bunnoo; but I have, as yet, had no report of it. All these matters I will endeavour to regulate.

Knowing the character of the whole of that tract of country called the Derajat, I can assure his Lordship, that he may always expect inroads from the mountains. Having full power, I prevented this in Scinde; but I do not think, with less power than I possessed in Scinde, it can be prevented by any one in the mountains which bear upon the Derajat. *Nothing can prevent it* short of systematic attacks on the hill tribes, such as I made on the Boogtee hills, and a system of government suited to the Punjab.

If the Governor-General orders me, according to his first intention, to take the new corps under my orders, I will—

1st. Appoint a proper officer, selected for the service, as brigadier to the whole force, and give him an active brigade major and a clerk. This will ensure the exact execution of my orders.

2nd. I will complete and organize those regiments, reporting to his Lordship any officers who are either incompetent or without zeal, and whose regiments are, therefore, not in the state of discipline which they ought to be.

3rd. I will apply to the Board of Administration, to say where it apprehends danger. I conclude the Manjha and Bunnoo to be the two where there is apprehension. However, where they apprehend danger, there shall they find support, as far as a government so unsuited to the people can be supported.

4th. I will study the question, as to the security of the Derajat, a question with which I am tolerably familiar, because, as I have before stated, it is a continuation of that strip of territory which runs along the whole western course of the Indus, from Attok to Kurrachee. I refer to the right bank; there neither is, nor can be, danger on the left; if the people are well treated they will not rise. They have no support from mountains, and no mountains wherein to seek refuge, however discontented they may be.

Having now seen a good deal of this province, I feel satisfied that it is much more easy to govern than Scinde; because on the left bank of the Indus there are no mountains for refuge, except the Huzara districts. The influence of the troops dominates over the whole. Golab Singh is detested, and can influence none but the disbanded Sikh troops. From him, and him alone, may danger be expected. On the eastern side of the Indus, at the present moment, no one else has *means*; I think him powerful and dangerous in the extreme. He will oblige us to keep a large force in the Punjab, and this large force will drain the Indian treasury. It would be wise, on the first occasion, to undo the injustice which we committed on the unhappy people of Cashmere, by placing them under this man's rule. We ought to pay him back the purchase-money, and take Cashmere from him. The bargain would be a great gain to the Company, and a blessing to the people of that unhappy valley.

#### CONCLUSION.

Conclusion. When I accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief in India, I knew well that, if war continued in the Punjab, I should require a good pontoon train; and I applied, through the Duke of Wellington, to the India Board, for the services of Lieutenant Wood, of the Indian navy, to command the pontoon train, which I intended to form. His Grace, I believe, entirely concurred in my opinion, and took great pains to obtain for me the services of that skilful officer, who has passed much time on all the Punjab rivers and the Oxus; speaking the dialects of most of the tribes inhabiting their banks, knowing the character of the Punjab rivers well. His services were refused by the Court of Directors; but I was allowed to send out some newly-invented inflated composition rafts, which the Duke himself saw, and, I believe, approved of an experiment being made of them. They are now come, and answer so far, that I have been on them with a gun, and they seem capable of bearing a great weight; whether they will eventually be found to answer or not, I am not prepared to say.

In the meantime, and after having seen most part of the Punjab, and crossed all its

rivers, my conviction is more strong than ever, that, both for peace and war, for military movements and for the demands of the civil government of the Punjab, a large and effective pontoon train should be formed, under the command of an expert naval officer, with not less than seven divisions of seamen under his command; each division consisting of as many men and boats, &c. as may hereafter be decided.

1st Division, stationed at Attok.

2nd. At Jeelum.

3rd. At Wuzeerabad, or Sealkote.

4th. At Lahore.

5th. At Hurreekée.

6th. At Kalla Baug.

7th. On the River Beas.

The stations should always be as high up the current as found convenient, as boats could be the more easily floated down. The boats, the armament, and all belonging to such an establishment, should be arranged in the most perfect manner; and till such a pontoon train be formed, the full resources of the Punjab will not, in my opinion, be drawn forth, nor will an army be able to act with the freedom which such an establishment would give to its operations.

To bridge the rivers in the Punjab may be practicable, by means of arched viaducts, for ten or twenty miles, *running down from high-water marks to the low-water marks*, and then connecting these viaducts with a bridge; but it is not in these days that such great works can be performed; and, until they be performed, an establishment for pontoons, that can place and remove floating bridges rapidly when the water is low, and attend to the ferries when the floods come down, is, in my opinion, essential to the good government of the Punjab.

#### ATTOK, PESHAWUR, AND KOHAT.

I have examined, carefully, all this country, and have made up my mind that Peshawur is the only proper place for the military station in this district.

1st. Because the town is a very large one. The civil power must therefore reside there.

2nd. The magistrates and the town must be protected from the molestations of the Khyberee and Afreedie tribes; all living by plunder.

3rd. If the station was anywhere but in Peshawur, a *second* station must be formed to protect that place. Thus would the troops be divided, and the expense doubled.

4th. It not only guards the entrance to (or rather exit from) the Khyber Pass, but also that to Kohat. If placed elsewhere, it would be inconvenient.

5th. The recent quarrel with the Afreedie tribes has rendered all communication with Kohat dangerous, and it is likely to continue so unless proper measures are taken.

6th. I therefore decided upon Peshawur as the proper position for the station across the Indus in that district.

7th. I also decided that the west side of the town is the proper place for the cantonment. It appears that all the troops there quartered were very healthy all the past year, whereas those quartered in the fort and the Weezereé Baug were very unhealthy. Every thing concurs to make the west side of the town the proper place for the troops, as far as our medical men's experience goes.

8th. The citadel of Peshawur ought *immediately* to be repaired. To do this will not be expensive; and I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenhère to make a report and estimate of the work.

#### KOHAT.

I visited Kohat. It stands on a plain, has an old citadel, which completely protects the town, and ought to be *immediately* repaired, without much expense. A few guns should be mounted, the well cleaned out, and a small magazine built. The idea of building a work, farther advanced in the plains, is too puerile to need remark.


I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenhère to make a report on, and an estimate of, the expense of repairing the citadel of Kohat.

The Pass. The Pass must *now* be fortified. I see no reason why we should have had any quarrel with the Afreedie tribe; but the mischief is done; blood has been foolishly shed, and no choice is left. We must command the Pass, and the defile (of many miles) leading thereto, or the communication with Kohat is lost.

I have, therefore, after much consideration, ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenhère to prepare the plan of a *serai*, with two towers, thus:—

REPORT, &c.  
 Memorandum by  
 the Commander-in-  
 Chief in India,  
 26th Feb. 1850.

Each tower is to hold twelve men, &c., and be prepared for its own separate defence; so that the serai may be abandoned, and the towers prevent any one entering, as they would be shot from the towers. Each tower would have a piece of cannon, so that twenty-four men could defend the Pass, while, if danger pressed, the wing of a regiment of infantry could be quartered in the serai. I much fear that twelve more towers, at least, will be required to secure the communication along the defile. However, they will not be expensive; but they will demand a police to occupy them. If my opinion is of any weight, I should say, pay the Afrædie chiefs *double* what they ask to defend the Pass. They ask Rs. 6,000 a year. I would give them Rs. 12,000. It is only by generosity that such tribes can be kept in order *in such circumstances*.



These people will give trouble unless this course be taken, and the salt-tax placed on its ancient footing. These are civil matters; but unless well regulated, Kohat is cut off. Nothing can pass that defile without being fired upon by the mountaineers.

#### ATTOK.

*Attok.* This tower is defended by a mere wall and towers, and is commanded on all sides. But it is important as being placed on the most suitable position for passing the River Indus; and for the construction of a bridge, for which this is generally allowed to be the most eligible place.

I propose that six martello towers should be placed on the heights which command this fort and town, and ought to be occupied for that reason. These I have marked in the plan A, B, C, D, E, F.

A commands the fortress at 1,450 yards' distance, and all the other adjacent heights on the left bank of the Indus.

B commands the fortress at 620 yards' distance, and a small tower there would be necessary.

C commands the fortress at 540 yards, and a low hill under it, from which the enemy breached the western side of the fortress when defended by Lieutenant Herbert. This is an important place, I think, for a large tower, to hold four or six guns. It commands the road from Rawul Pindie and the gorge G, between the heights H, K.

D. On this height I would also place a small tower, with one gun; because, unless occupied, a besieging force would, in the night, pass a force under cover of the height D, H, and place a battery to play upon the bridge M.

On the right bank of the river I would place a strong tower at E, which commands, in reverse, the whole fortress of Attok, at 1,580 yards. This height also commands all the others, in reach of the fort, on the right bank of the Indus.

F. This height commands the town and fortress, and also the fort of Kairabad, on which the besiegers established a battery against Lieutenant Herbert. This tower I would make strong.

I would repair the fort of Kairabad, and fortify the serai on the left bank.

I also consider that a large *tête de pont* ought to be thrown up on the right bank. This need not be expensive. A mere high wall of stones, with loop-holes, will be sufficient. The stone abounds on the spot, and of that strong slate which requires no cutting or blasting.

The whole expense of these works I have requested Lieutenant-Colonel Tremehere to estimate, and I will forward it, when received, to the Governor-General. I should apprehend that a lac of rupees would cover it all.

I think that barracks should be built here for three regiments of native infantry, one in the fortress, and two on the right bank of the river. They should be divided between the fortress, the serai, the *tête de pont*, and the towers.

By the foregoing means, the passage of the Indus at Attok will be made safe, whether war should come from Golab Sing on the east, or the Affghans on the west, or both together. The vast importance of this passage requires no comment, it is obvious; and its importance becomes tenfold, if the Government means to keep the district of Peshawur.

I should have made a sojourn of some days at Attok, but the expedition to Kohat has delayed me, and the hot weather approaches fast, so as to leave me but little time for examining the Manjha and Jullunder Dab.

In concluding these remarks, I have to observe that there may be some discrepancies in them, and some differing in some degree from those given in my original report. If so, these arise from my having *seen* the localities of which I speak, whereas in my report, and in the commencement of these remarks, I had not, and was obliged to speak from what I heard from others.

I will not detain this paper to examine and compare it with the report, as it would add to the delay which has *necessarily* taken place, for a subject so serious cannot be written off without due consideration and examination.

Camp,  
26th February, 1850.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

REPORT, &c.  
Memorandum by  
the Commander-in-  
Chief in India,  
26th Feb. 1850.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, dated 11th April, 1850, on the  
MEMORANDUM of the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, 26th February, 1850.

On the 26th December, 1849, I forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief a minute upon the Military Report on the Punjab, which his Excellency had submitted to me some weeks before. In that minute, which is before the Council, I suggested certain points for his Excellency's consideration, and requested that a reply might be sent before I proceeded to sea, as an early decision was of great consequence.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
11th April, 1850.

Circumstances appear to have prevented his Excellency from complying with my request. Some days after my arrival at the presidency, in the beginning of March, I received from the Commander-in-Chief, in a private letter, the paper which I now place upon record.

It is extremely voluminous, and contains a great deal of matter which appears to me to be unnecessary for the determination of the questions on which I had solicited his Excellency's opinion. Harsh and unmerited reflections are cast on the officers by whom the government of the Punjab is administered, and on others who are serving there in various capacities, while the tone and style of the paper itself are not only of a nature unusual in official communications, but such as might fairly provoke retort and justify severe remark.

I make these observations lest I should seem, in abstaining from refutation, tacitly to admit the justice of the reflections to which I have alluded, or should appear to pass by, in unaccountable silence, expressions which would naturally be expected to call for some notice. But having said thus much, I shall resist the temptation which urges me to take up the reflections and remarks of his Excellency, and to deal with them one by one. I shall refrain from introducing into the recorded transactions of the Government anything which could lead to the use of that sharp and controversial tone, which could hardly fail to interfere injuriously with the harmonious conduct of the public service, and which cannot, under any circumstances, promote it.

Throughout the rest of this minute, therefore, I shall confine myself to the substance of his Excellency's replies to the questions I put, and to such further points as call for explanation, or are essentially necessary for determining the measures which the Governor-General in Council may now think it right to direct.

I. The first point to which I took the liberty of directing his Excellency's attention, and requesting his consideration of it, was the condition of the Upper Manjha.

The Commander-in-Chief, having quoted the passage in my minute on that head, proceeds to say:—

*Extract from the Minute of the Governor-General.*

"The distribution of the regular troops in the new province is a question so purely military, that I should desire to rely upon his Excellency's judgment, and to accept his recommendations as conclusive in this matter.

"But I consider it necessary to direct his Excellency's especial attention to that portion of the Punjab which is designated the Manjha, and which lies between the Ravee and the Beas, or Sulej. The whole of that district is occupied almost exclusively by Sikhs, and within its bounds the Sikh popula-

"His Lordship directs my especial attention to that portion of the Punjab designated the Manjha, lying between the rivers Beas and Ravee. This I shall attend to; but I must be allowed to call his Lordship's attention to a few facts, as being very important, because his Lordship's letter throws upon me a very great proportion of responsibility, which his sense of justice will tell him I can only accept, if the confidence placed in me and the power intrusted to me are commensurate to this responsibility. His Lordship's observation, calling my attention to the state of the Manjha, does three things—

REPORT, &c.  
Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
11th April, 1850.

"tion, as a body, is for the most part col-  
"lected. If formidable insurrection is to  
"be apprehended, it is most probably  
"within the Manjha, to the north of the  
"city of Umritsir, that it will take place.

"The character of that population gene-  
"rally is far too warlike, especially after  
"the addition which it has lately received,  
"of large bodies of discharged or fugitive  
"soldiers, to be securely left to the control  
"even of the military police, which I have  
"intimated my intention of forming. It  
"is hardly necessary for me to add, that it  
"is of the utmost importance that any  
"attempt at actual insurrection should be  
"dealt with speedily as well as vigorously,  
"and that the means should be at hand of  
"bringing promptly to bear upon the in-  
"surgents, a force so constituted as to  
"insure immediate and entire success.

"I apprehend that this will not be the  
"case if the regular troops within the  
"Baree Doab are stationed exclusively at  
"Lahore, especially since it is now in-  
"tended to hold the fortress of Govind-  
"gurb by a wing, instead of an entire  
"regiment, as hitherto.

"I am not aware whether his Excel-  
"lency has in view any particular station  
"for the camel corps, which, at his re-  
"quest, I transferred to the Bengal esta-  
"blishment. My consent to the transfer  
"was grounded on those considerations of  
"its peculiar constitution and capacities,  
"which would appear likely to render it  
"of the greatest value in this quarter,  
"where disturbances are more likely to  
"occur than anywhere else in the plains,  
"and where force and rapidity of action  
"would be of the greatest moment.

"I would beg his Excellency's con-  
"sideration of this subject, and shall be  
"happy to be favoured with his views  
"thereupon."

I have read these observations with the utmost surprise, and I am altogether at a loss to understand by what his Excellency has been led to place such an interpretation on the words of my minute.

I am very certain that a re-perusal of these paragraphs will in itself suffice to remove the impression his Excellency has derived from them. But in order to obviate all misapprehension, I beg leave to say that there is not one sentence in my minute which, whether read in its grammatical construction, or taken with the context, can be construed to imply, either that the Commander-in-Chief knew, and had all along known, the dangerous state of the Manjha, or that he could have made arrangements to prevent a rising and had not done so, or that, if an insurrection should hereafter occur, his Excellency would be responsible.

The Commander-in-Chief having proposed to station a certain force in the Punjab, I directed, in my minute, his especial attention to that portion of it termed the Manjha. I described the character of those districts, and dwelt on the importance of having within them the means of effectually suppressing those attempts at insurrection which might there, if anywhere, be looked for.

I expressed my doubt whether, under the arrangements then proposed, that prompt support, which was desirable, could be given to the police in the Manjha in the event of a sudden and formidable outbreak occurring there; and I requested his Excellency to favour me with his views on the subject.

There is nothing whatever in this which implies that his Excellency was aware of

" Ist. It implies that I know, and have  
" all along known, the dangerous state of  
" the Manjha.

" 2nd. That I could make arrangements  
" to prevent a rising there, and that I have  
" not done so.

" 3rd. That if one should hereafter  
" occur, I am responsible."

the condition of the Manjha, or that he had omitted to provide for risings within it, or that responsibility was cast upon him.

Having thus explicitly shown that my minute conveys no such meaning as that which his Excellency has seen in it, it becomes unnecessary to enter into the statements and the arguments which his Excellency has founded upon his misapprehension of it. His Excellency having subsequently explained fully his views on the point I submitted to him regarding the Manjha, adds, "I have always said that if healthy, I consider Noorpoor a proper position to station a strong force, as being a frontier post on the borders of the Maharajah's territories. It is with regard to his Highness's power that I propose this, not to insurrection, which, I can never cease to repeat, can only be prevented by good government."

I fully assent to the statement that good government is the best preventive of insurrection: but good government consists in the providing of sufficient means to enforce the authority of the state not less than in a mild and judicious exercise of that authority.

I consider that such a provision is very necessary in the Upper Manjha, and I shall be glad if his Excellency's approaching inspection shall satisfy him of the eligibility of that position for a military station, since the objects which are considered desirable by his Excellency and myself respectively will thereby be simultaneously accomplished.

Before leaving this portion of his Excellency's paper, I think it my duty to remark on the following passages.

"I have already said that I had no information confided to me as to the dangerous state of the Manjha till the date of the Board's letter and his Lordship's minute, and that unless full information is given to me (as far as Government possess it) of the real state of the country, it is impossible for me to make other than general preparations for war."

"Should the police prove too feeble, then the work of the troops is to quell such a rising, the Government keeping the commander of such troops fully informed, leaving it to him to take his own measures. A Government that keeps me informed, assists me in my duties. A Government that 'suggests' only impedes me, and is more dangerous than an enemy. It destroys all system, and produces a patchwork, without plan and definite object."

I have read these passages with pain, understanding them (with other incidental passages in the context) to convey an intimation of his Excellency's conviction, that in the discharge of his important duties as Commander-in-Chief of this army he has not received from the Government that full information on public affairs which his position entitles him to expect and to receive.

I should be sincerely glad to learn that I have misunderstood the passages above quoted; but as these documents will be submitted to other and higher authorities, I think it due to myself and to the Government of India to record at once that the Commander-in-Chief is in error if he entertains an impression that he has not received full and confidential communication of all information which was at the command of the Government. No intelligence whatever has at any time been withheld from Sir Charles Napier; whatever was known to the Government that could in any way be connected with that branch of the service over which his Excellency is placed, has been promptly made known to him.

Every inquiry that he might have thought proper to make would have been answered unreservedly, and I am unconscious of any one fact which could even give a colour to the complaint which his Excellency appears to prefer.

No Commander-in-Chief in India has ever received a more cordial support from the Government than his Excellency Sir C. Napier, or has been treated with more unreserved confidence. I regret that his Excellency should not have derived that impression from his communications with the Government of India.

II. The second point on which I requested a further statement of his Excellency's views was the military occupation of the districts across the Indus.

Commenting on observations of mine regarding the necessity of holding the Peshawur district by regular troops, his Excellency intimates that he never proposed to relinquish the valley to irregular troops; and observes that he supposes his use of the name Attok has led me to the belief that he had entertained such an intention.

In his first report the Commander-in-Chief said, "I believe that Sir Henry Lawrence thinks all this territory (Peshawur) can be defended by irregulars. I should like to give it up and remove this station to Attok;" and again, "as Sir Henry Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur districts, I am very glad to give that up to them."

From these passages I certainly understood that his Excellency proposed to withdraw the whole Peshawur force to Attok.

REPORT, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
11th April, 1850.

REPORT, &c.  
Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
11th April, 1850.

The explanation now given shows me that this was not intended; and I regret that, from an accidental want of precision in the expressions he employed, I have misapprehended his Excellency's meaning.

With respect to the Derajat and remainder of the Trans-Indus provinces, I declared my readiness to hold those districts by means of the irregular corps, but I ventured to express my conviction of the necessity of supporting these corps by regular troops at some nearer point than any they at that time occupied.

His Excellency, in reply to my statement, that no troops were in the Sind Saugor Doab, the Chuch or the lower Rechnah Doab, intimates that he is satisfied no troops are required in any of those districts.

Without entering on that question at present, I beg to point out to his Excellency that my remark did not go to intimate any opinion that those districts required the presence of troops for themselves, but to illustrate the statement I had made that no support for the irregular troops in the Derajat would be found within a great distance, including all those Doabs.

His Excellency says, "It is not for me to dictate to the Governor-General if he thinks that the 18,562 irregular troops, with some twenty or thirty pieces of cannon, are not sufficient to hold these miserable tribes in subjection."

The levies here named are not all in those districts.

I have repeatedly explained, and I do so again officially, that these irregular troops are merely in temporary employment—that they were in the service of the Government during the war—that after the war closed they were retained of necessity, because there was not then a single British soldier in the districts in which they were placed; and because I could not and cannot get rid of them, either by dismissal or by transference to police bodies or otherwise, until permanent military arrangements shall have been made for the occupation of the territories which they still hold by troops in the permanent service of the British Government.

I received no sketch even of such permanent arrangements until the Commander-in-Chief's first memorandum, dated 27th November, 1849; and his Excellency must be aware that neither my minute of 26th December, nor his Excellency's second memorandum of 26th February, 1850, have as yet concluded such arrangements.

Whenever this shall be the case, these irregular levies will be dispensed with.

The actual number of men which will then be employed in the Punjab will be stated in a subsequent paragraph.

As the result of his consideration of this point, his Excellency is clearly of opinion that ample support can be given to the troops in the Derajat from Mooltan; and he intimates that he has already sent the camel corps for that purpose to Dera Ismael Khan, and that he will reinforce it if necessary.

I beg to observe that in the former report no mention was made of the force intended ultimately for Mooltan, where a cantonment has now been ordered, and that no destination was given to the camel corps.

The detachment to the Derajat of that corps, which from its construction is understood to be equal in efficacy to two or three battalions of infantry; and his Excellency's conviction of the sufficiency of the force which he has fixed at Mooltan for purposes of support, practically meets the views I took the liberty of stating, regarding support for the irregular troops Trans-Indus, especially as his Excellency proposes that the troops across the Indus should be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

III. The third and last point on which I requested his Excellency's judgment was, whether the ten irregular corps in the Punjab should be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, or under those of the Board of Administration.

His Excellency replies, "If there is to be a police under the Civil Power, and I hold that such a force is necessary, for without it the Punjab will sooner or later be in disorder, then I think the whole irregular force ought to be under the exclusive orders of the Commander-in-Chief."

I stated in the minute of 26th December that it was my intention that (besides the ordinary rural police which has long since been formed and in operation) there shall be a body of 6,000 foot and 3,000 horse police distributed over the Punjab. Therefore effect shall certainly be given to the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, and the ten irregular corps shall be placed exclusively under his Excellency's orders.

The Commander-in-Chief has recorded, that as matters now stand, he does not think that this large body of irregular troops is of much use; on the contrary, he thinks them dangerous.

His Excellency has not specified the grounds on which he considers that these corps are dangerous as matters now stand; I have only, therefore, to record my entire dissent from that opinion.

The officers by whom these corps have been raised, and are commanded, have been selected with the utmost care, and with reference exclusively to the peculiar qualifications for the task committed to them which they were believed to possess.

Nine months had hardly elapsed, after the order for raising them was issued, when one of them had the good fortune, on active service in Kohat, to earn from his Excellency in general orders the distinction of being declared to have "called forth the applause of the whole column;" while the brigadier commanding reported that their conduct had elicited "the admiration of the whole force."

I am very confident that, if an opportunity should present itself, the other irregular corps would behave equally well, and would prove themselves to be in no respect open to the reproach of being either useless or dangerous.

The various points noticed in the concluding portion of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum regarding Peshawur, Attok, Kohat, &c., will each come before the Government in a separate form, and need not be entered upon here.

In order that the intentions of the Government may be distinctly understood, I think it will be convenient here to state what is the force which will now be maintained for the occupation of the Punjab and the neighbouring districts. It will be,

I. The regular troops, as proposed in the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum of November 30, 1849, and assented to in the minute of the Governor-General, 26th December, 1849.

II. The five regiments of Punjab infantry and five regiments of Punjab cavalry.

III. Mounted police, to the number of about 2,500 or 3,000; dismounted police, to the number of 6,000.

The ten irregular regiments will be placed under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as soon as possible.

I shall be at Simla within a few weeks; and the several points of detail respecting the additional equipment of these regiments, the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief for an officer to command the whole, &c., &c., &c., may be then rapidly settled through the adjutant-general, when a G.O. will be issued, transferring these corps to the Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency will thereafter make such arrangement as may seem to him best for the posting of these troops in the Trans-Indus districts, and the occupation of the forts which his Excellency has intimated should be held.

The mounted and dismounted police will be exclusively under the orders of the Board of Administration, and will be posted by them throughout the Punjab with reference to the preservation of the internal peace of the country. The posts selected will be made known to the Commander-in-Chief.

The powers and authority which have been exercised heretofore by his Excellency, the Board of Administration, and by the civil and military officers respectively within the Punjab, remain as they were, and are in no respect affected or altered by these arrangements.

11th April, 1850.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

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No. 63 of 1850.

From the OFFICIATING SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT of INDIA to  
Lieutenant Colonel P. GRANT, C. B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

*Dated Fort William, the 13th April, 1850.*

SIR,

I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of a memorandum, by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 26th February last, commenting upon the Governor-General's minute of the 26th December, on the subject of the report of the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the military occupation of the Punjab, dated 27th November last, and to communicate to you, to be laid before the Commander-in-Chief, the following remarks upon the subject, together with the decision of the Governor-General in Council, on the several points which have been under consideration:—

2. The Governor-General in Council observes, that the first point to which the Governor-General, in his minute above quoted, directed his Excellency's attention, and requested his consideration of it, was the condition of the upper Manjha.

3. The Commander-in-Chief having quoted the passage on that head in the minute of the Governor-General, proceeds to remark as follows:—

REPORT, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
11th April, 1850.

Letter to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
13th April, 1850.



## REPORT, &amp;c.

Letter to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
13th April, 1850.

*Extract from the Minute of the Governor-General.*

"The distribution of the regular troops in the new province is a question so purely military, that I should desire to rely upon his Excellency's judgment, and to accept his recommendations as conclusive in this matter.

"But I consider it necessary to direct his Excellency's especial attention to that portion of the Punjab which is designated the Manjha, and which lies between the Ravee and the Beas or Sutlej. The whole of that district is occupied almost exclusively by Sikhs, and within its bounds the Sikh population, as a body, is for the most part collected. If formidable insurrection is to be apprehended, it is most probably within the Manjha, to the north of the city of Umritsir, that it will take place.

"The character of that population generally is far too warlike, especially after the addition which it has lately received of large bodies of discharged or fugitive soldiers, to be securely left to the control even of the military police, which I have intimated my intention of forming. It is hardly necessary for me to add, that it is of the utmost importance that any attempt at actual insurrection should be dealt with speedily, as well as vigorously, and that the means should be at hand of bringing promptly to bear upon the insurgents a force so constituted as to insure immediate and entire success.

"I apprehend that this will not be the case, if the regular troops within the Baree Doab are stationed exclusively at Lahore, especially since it is now intended to hold the fortress of Govindghur by a wing, instead of an entire regiment, as hitherto.

"I am not aware whether his Excellency has in view any particular station for the camel corps, which, at his request, I transferred to the Bengal establishment. My consent to the transfer was grounded on those considerations of its peculiar constitution and capacities, which would appear likely to render it of the greatest value in this quarter, where disturbances are more likely to occur than anywhere else in the plains, and where force and rapidity of action would be of the greatest moment.

"I would beg his Excellency's consideration of this subject, and shall be happy to be favoured with his views thereupon."

"His Lordship directs my especial attention to that portion of the Punjab designated the Manjha, lying between the rivers Beas and Ravee. This I shall attend to; but I must be allowed to call his Lordship's attention to a few facts as being very important, because his Lordship's letter throws upon me a very great proportion of responsibility, which his sense of justice will tell him I can only accept, if the confidence placed in me and the power entrusted to me are commensurate to this responsibility. His Lordship's observation, calling my attention to the state of the Manjha, does three things:—

"1st. It implies that I know, and have all along known, the dangerous state of the Manjha.

"2nd. That I could make arrangements to prevent a rising there, and that I have not done so.

"3rd. That if one should hereafter occur, I am responsible."

4th. The Governor-General in Council has read these remarks with great surprise, and is at a loss to understand how his Excellency has been led to place such an interpretation on the words of the Governor-General's minute. It appears to the

Governor-General in Council, that a re-perusal of that part of his Lordship's minute will in itself suffice to remove the impression his Excellency has derived from it.

5. The Governor-General in Council cannot perceive any one sentence in the minute in question which, whether read in its grammatical construction, or taken with the context, can be construed to imply either that the Commander-in-Chief knew, and had all along known, the dangerous state of the Manjha, or that he could have made arrangements to prevent a rising, and had not done so; or that if an insurrection should hereafter occur, his Excellency would be responsible.

6. The Commander-in-Chief having proposed to station a certain force in the Punjab, the Governor-General, in his minute, directed his Excellency's special attention to that portion of it termed the Manjha. His Lordship described the character of those districts, and dwelt on the importance of having within them the means of effectually suppressing those attempts at insurrection which might there, if anywhere, be looked for.

7. The Governor-General expressed his doubt whether, under the arrangements then proposed, that prompt support which was desirable could be given to the police in the Manjha, in the event of a sudden and formidable outbreak occurring there, and his Excellency was requested to favour the Governor-General with his views on the subject.

8. The Governor-General in Council can perceive nothing whatever in this, which implies that his Excellency was aware of the condition of the Manjha, or that he had omitted to provide for risings within it, or that responsibility was cast upon him.

9. As, therefore, it is clear to the Governor-General in Council, that the minute in question conveys no such meaning as that which his Excellency has seen in it, it becomes unnecessary to enter into the statements and the arguments which his Excellency has founded upon his misapprehension of it. His Excellency, having subsequently explained fully his views on the point submitted to him by the Governor-General, regarding the Manjha, adds: "I have always said that, if healthy, I consider Noorpoor a proper position to station a strong force, as being a frontier post on the borders of the Maharajah's territories. It is with regard to his Highness's power that I propose this, not to insurrection, which, I can never cease to repeat, can only be prevented by good government."

10. The Governor-General in Council fully assents to the statement, that good government is the best preventive of insurrection. But good government, his Lordship in Council observes, consists in the providing of sufficient means to enforce the authority of the state, not less than in a mild and judicious exercise of that authority.

11. The Governor-General in Council considers that such a provision is very necessary in the upper Manjha, and will be glad if his Excellency's approaching inspection shall satisfy him of the eligibility of that position for a military station, since the objects which are considered desirable by his Excellency and the Governor-General respectively will thereby be simultaneously accomplished.

12. The Governor-General in Council thinks it his duty to remark on the following passages in his Excellency's memorandum:—

"I have already said that I had no information confided to me, as to the dangerous state of the Manjha, till the date of the Board's letter and his Lordship's minute, and that, unless full information is given to me (as far as Government possess it) of the real state of the country, it is impossible for me to make other than general preparations for war."

"Should the police prove too feeble, then the work of the troops is to quell such a rising, the Government keeping the commander of such troops constantly and fully informed, leaving it to him to take his own measures. A Government that keeps me informed, assists me in my duty. A Government that 'suggests,' only impedes me, and is more dangerous than an enemy. It destroys all system, and produces a patch-work, without plan or definite object."

13. The Governor-General in Council has read these passages with pain, conveying, as they now stand, a distinct intimation of his Excellency's conviction, that, in the discharge of his important duties as Commander-in-Chief of this army, he has not received from the Government that full information on public affairs which his position entitles him to expect and to receive.

14. The Governor-General in Council would be sincerely glad to learn that he had misunderstood the passages above quoted. But, as these documents will be submitted to other and higher authorities, it appears to his Lordship in Council due to the Government of India to record at once, that the Commander-in-Chief is in error, if he entertains an impression that he has not received full and confidential communication of all information which was at the command of the Government. No intelligence whatever has, at any time, been withheld from Sir Charles Napier. Whatever was known to the Govern-

REPORT, &c.

Letter to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
18th April, 1850.

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Letter to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
13th April, 1850.

ment, that could in any way be connected with that branch of the service over which his Excellency is placed, has been promptly made known to him. Every inquiry that he might have thought proper to make would have been answered unreservedly; and the Governor-General in Council is unconscious of any one fact which could even give a colour to the complaint which his Excellency appears to prefer.

15. No Commander-in-Chief in India has ever received a more cordial support from the Government than his Excellency Sir C. Napier, or has been treated with more unreserved confidence; and the Governor-General in Council regrets that his Excellency should not have derived that impression from his communications with the Government of India.

16. The second point on which the Governor-General requested a further statement of his Excellency's views, was the military occupation of the districts across the Indus.

17. Commenting on the Governor-General's observations, regarding the necessity of holding the Peshawur district by regular troops, his Excellency intimates that he never proposed to relinquish the valley to irregular troops; and observes that he supposes his use of the name Attok has led to the belief that he had entertained such an intention.

18. In his first report, the Commander-in-Chief said, "I believe that Sir Henry Lawrence thinks all this territory (Peshawur) can be defended by irregulars. I should like to give it up, and remove this station to Attok;" and again: "As Sir Henry Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur districts, I am very glad to give that up to them."

19. From these passages it certainly might have been understood that his Excellency proposed to withdraw the whole Peshawur force to Attok.

\* 20. The explanation now given shows that this was not intended; the Governor-General in Council regrets that, from an accidental want of precision in the expressions he employed, his Excellency's meaning has been misapprehended.

21. With respect to the Derajat, and remainder of the Trans-Indus provinces, the Governor-General declared his readiness to hold those districts by means of the irregular corps, but his Lordship expressed his conviction of the necessity of supporting these corps by regular troops at some nearer point than any they at that time occupied.

22. His Excellency, in reply to the statement that no troops were in the Sind Saugor Doab, the Chuch, or the lower Rechnah Doab, intimates that he is satisfied no troops are required in any of those districts. Without entering on that question at present, the Governor-General would desire to point out to his Excellency that the remark of the Governor-General did not go to intimate any opinion that those districts required the presence of troops for themselves, but to illustrate the statement that no support for the irregular troops in the Derajat would be found within a great distance, including all those doabs.

23. As the result of his consideration of this point, his Excellency is clearly of opinion, that ample support can be given to the troops in Derajat from Mooltan, and he intimates that he has already sent the camel corps for that purpose to Dera Ismael Khan, and that he will reinforce it if necessary. The Governor-General in Council observes that in the former report no mention was made of the force intended ultimately for Mooltan, where a cantonment has now been ordered, and that no destination was given to the camel corps.

24. The detachment to the Derajat of that corps, which from its construction is understood to be equal in efficacy to two or three battalions of infantry, and his Excellency's conviction of the sufficiency of the force which he has fixed at Mooltan for purposes of support, practically meets the views of the Governor-General regarding support for the irregular troops, Trans Indus, especially as his Excellency proposes that the troops across the Indus should be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

25. The third and last point on which the Governor-General requested his Excellency's judgment, was whether the ten irregular corps in the Punjab should be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, or under those of the Board of Administration.

26. His Excellency replies,—“If there is to be a police under the civil power, and I hold that such a force is necessary, for without it the Punjab will sooner or later be in disorder; then I think the whole irregular force ought to be under the exclusive orders of the Commander-in-Chief.”

27. The Governor-General stated in his minute of 26th December, that it was his intention that, besides the ordinary rural police (which has long since been formed and in operation), there shall be a body of 6,000 foot and 3,000 horse police distributed over the Punjab; effect will therefore be given to the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, and the ten irregular corps will be placed exclusively under his Excellency's orders.

28. The various points noticed in the concluding portion of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum regarding Peshawur, Attok, Kohat, &c., will each come before the Government in a separate form, and need not be entered upon here.

29. In order that the intentions of the Government may be distinctly understood, it appears to the Governor-General in Council, that it will be convenient here to state what is the force which will now be maintained for the occupation of the Punjab and the neighbouring districts. It will be—

I. The regular troops, as proposed in the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum of November 30th, 1849, and assented to in the minute of the Governor-General, 26th December, 1849.

II. The five regiments of Punjab infantry and five regiments of Punjab cavalry.

III. Mounted police to the number of about 2,500 or 3,000, and dismounted police to the number of 6,000.

30. The ten irregular regiments will be placed under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible.

31. The Governor-General will be at Simla within a few weeks, and the several points of detail respecting the additional equipment of these regiments,—the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief for an officer to command the whole, &c. &c. &c., may be then rapidly settled through the adjutant-general, and a general order issued transferring these corps to the Commander-in-Chief.

32. His Excellency will thereafter make such arrangements as may seem to him best for the posting of these troops in the Trans-Indus districts, and the occupation of the forts which his Excellency has intimated should be held.

33. The mounted and dismounted police will be exclusively under the orders of the Board of Administration, and will be posted by them throughout the Punjab, with reference to the preservation of the internal peace of the country. The posts selected will be made known to the Commander-in-Chief.

34. The powers and authority which have been exercised heretofore by his Excellency, the Board of Administration, and by the civil and military officers respectively within the Punjab, remain as they were, and are in no respect affected or altered by these arrangements.

I have, &c.

Fort William,  
the 13th April, 1850.

(Signed) F. J. HALLIDAY,  
Officiating Sec. to Govt. of India.

From Sir H. M. LAWRENCE, K.C.B., President of the Board of Administration, Lahore, to Sir HENRY ELLIOT, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General.

*Dated Lahore, 1st March, 1850.*

SIR:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1, of 1st January, forwarding copy of that portion of a report on the army of the Bengal presidency which relates to the Punjab, and conveying the instructions of the Most Noble the Governor-General that the Board of Administration should communicate such remarks as they may wish to make to his Lordship in the Secret Department.

2. In reply, I herewith beg to forward, for submission to the Governor-General, a statement of the views of the Board on the questions discussed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Lahore,  
the 1st March, 1850.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) H. M. LAWRENCE, President.

From  
Sir H. M. Lawrence  
to Sir H. Elliot,  
1st March, 1850.

#### MEMORANDUM on the CIVIL and MILITARY ADMINISTRATION of the PUNJAB.

*Dated Lahore, the 1st March, 1850.*

Secret.

States what points the Board propose to discuss.

1. The memorandum of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the 29th November, 1849, touches on such a variety of subjects, that to answer it fully would occupy much time and

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

REPORT, &c.

Letter to the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army,  
13th April, 1850.

REPORT, &c.  
 —  
 Memorandum of the  
 Board of Adminis-  
 tration, Lahore,  
 1st March, 1850.

research, and would be foreign to the immediate duties of the Board of Administration; they therefore propose to consider in detail only those portions which pertain especially to the Punjab,—to the question of a civil form of government for it and for India generally, as compared with a military one,—and to the advantages or otherwise of police corps.

History would lead to different conclusions.

Circumstances which render the Government of Hyderabad powerless for harm.

The Nizam's troops dangerous, or not, as they may be dealt with.

Sawuntwaree and Kolapoor campaigns, the cause of tardy success therein.

Goomsur and Chota Nagpoor wanting in military strength, and were easily subdued by our irregular force possessing local knowledge.

Burmah, its weakness and vulnerability.

Government is hated in Assam and Arracan.

Our steamers could be at the capital before the Burmese could reach Chittagong.

Its strength in the war of 1824 consisted in our ignorance of the country and in the unhealthiness of the climate; now it is better known, and has long ago been explored.

Its army, even when undismayed by defeat, never dared to meet our troops in the field, but cooped themselves up in stockades.

It is true that in the year 1824 Calcutta was in a panic on the Burmese crossing the river Naaf; but although they destroyed or dispersed the detachment of 1,200 men that opposed them, killing every officer but three, they halted close to the field of battle for seven months, nearly six hundred miles from Calcutta, though Chittagong, seventy miles distant, was at their mercy, and evacuated the British territory, without the slightest opposition, on the advance of General Morrison's force.

With scarcely 3,000 men fit for duty, Sir Archibald Campbell withstood the attacks of the main Burmah army at Rangoon throughout the monsoon, and advanced through the whole length of the country to within a few miles of the capital.

These facts prove that the Burmah army is not formidable, and that its advance on Calcutta is not practicable.

2. The Board, however, think it right to record that, in their judgment, a careful retrospect of the political history of India, and an analysis of its present state, would lead to deductions widely different, in many essential points, from those of his Excellency.

3. The Commander-in-Chief states that the Government of the Nizam of Hyderabad is in confusion, and yet that the aspect of this state is dangerous, and that it is capable of sustaining a mischievous war with the British power. These assertions are not easily reconcilable. The Nizam is weak, and inexperienced in military affairs; his army, though numerous, is disorganized, ill paid, and ill equipped, though in part composed of warlike materials; his exchequer is exhausted, nay, in debt; his people impoverished and discontented. The very contingent, which is disciplined and led by British officers, would alone suffice to control the army and keep the peace of the country, as it, indeed, has done since that contingent was formed.

4. It may truly be asserted that, since the troops raised and organized by French officers were disbanded in 1798, the power of the Nizam of Hyderabad, as a Government, has ceased to be dangerous to British rule. That there is, however, the germ of tumult, and even of disaster, at Hyderabad, if mismanaged, no one can deny. Twenty-five thousand ill-paid and disorderly troops, many of them warlike foreigners, within a walled town, where no European can enter without permission and without the risk of insult (where every chief and official has his band of armed men), are, of course, formidable; the mode in which they are dealt with, politically and military, make them either innocuous or dangerous. Such may be equally affirmed of our own native army.

5. The next territory to which his Excellency would appear to allude is that of Sawuntwaree and Kolapoor.\* Five European regiments were certainly not employed in the campaign against it: the Board doubt if there were two complete ones. The incapacity of the commander was always allowed to have been the real cause of the tardy success obtained. The whole country could not have assembled, at any time, a tumultuary force of 10,000 men.

6. The districts of Goomsur and Chota Nagpoor have also no military strength. The country is hilly, and covered with jungle, affording refuge to banditti, who, beyond the localities they infested, were never troublesome. So long as we employed regular troops against them, the result was ineffectual; when an irregular force, acquainted with the country and able to meet them in their own way, was organized, they were speedily put down.

7. Burmah has no aggressive strength whatever, and its Government is hated in Assam and Arracan. Our steamers could be at the capital before the Burmese could reach Chittagong. Its strength in the war of 1824 consisted in our ignorance of the country and in the unhealthiness of the climate; now it is better known, and has long ago been explored. Its army, even when undismayed by defeat, never dared to meet our troops in the field, but cooped themselves up in stockades. It is true that in the year 1824 Calcutta was in a panic on the Burmese crossing the river Naaf; but although they destroyed or dispersed the detachment of 1,200 men that opposed them, killing every officer but three, they halted close to the field of battle for seven months, nearly six hundred miles from Calcutta, though Chittagong, seventy miles distant, was at their mercy, and evacuated the British territory, without the slightest opposition, on the advance of General Morrison's force. With scarcely 3,000 men fit for duty, Sir Archibald Campbell withstood the attacks of the main Burmah army at Rangoon throughout the monsoon, and advanced through the whole length of the country to within a few miles of the capital. These facts prove that the Burmah army is not formidable, and that its advance on Calcutta is not practicable.

\* The united area of these two States does not exceed 4,000 square miles, and the revenue 7 lacs of rupees. The country is extremely strong.

REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum of the  
Board of Adminis-  
tration, Lahore,  
1st March, 1850.

Nepaul defensively strong, but has no cavalry, its army is not enterprising, and the greater part of its revenue is drawn from the Turai, which we could take at pleasure.

8. Nepal is unquestionably strong in its hills. It has 18,000 soldiers, which number might be trebled, for defence. The Goorkhas are a hardy race, but the present generation have no experience in war. Nepal probably has two hundred field-pieces, none above six, and most only three-pounders, carried on men's shoulders, and only suited to mountain warfare. It has no means of equipping these guns for a campaign in the plains; it has no cavalry, and consequently never has dared to advance any distance beyond the hills. The revenues are barely half a million sterling, more than a third of which is collected from the Turai, which we could overrun and occupy at our pleasure. The people of Patna would hardly join them; for the plunder of such a city, if they ventured so far, would be the chief object of the Nepalese. As in Sawuntwarree, the delays that caused a second campaign in Nepal were entirely owing to the mismanagement of the British commander. The Goorkhas, after their greatest success, never passed beyond the bounds of the Turai, though the rich towns of Goruckpoor, Mozufferpore, and Mootibaree were temptingly before them.

Improbability of any combination of native power against us,—precaution considered necessary to provide for the safety of our frontier towards Nepal.

9. During the last thirty-five years, several futile attempts have been made by native powers to combine against us: with ordinary precautions they can never do so with effect. If Scindiah, Holkar, and the Peishwa, when backed by battalions officered by Frenchmen—when flushed by success, and elated by almost uninterrupted victory, could not unite against us—surely it is extremely improbable that, in the present day, when such armies no longer exist, their successors, untrained to arms, inexperienced in the arts of Government, could contend with our matured power. Nepal is doubtless to be guarded against. It appears to us, that the opinion of the Governor-General, regarding Almorah and Kumaon, was correct when his Lordship proposed to withdraw the frontier posts of Petoragurh and Loohooghat, to strengthen the fort of Almorah, and watch the frontier with only irregulars. A force is required as much to overawe as to protect Benares and Patna. Goruckpoor and Segowlee (Motibaree) ought both to have intrenchments for 500 men, and a few guns, as should Almorah. With these precautions, and a moveable column of from 2,000 to 3,000 good irregulars, half being cavalry, that frontier would be sufficiently provided for on the plain side. Such were the arrangements suggested by Sir Henry Lawrence, when consulted on the subject by the late Governor-General in 1846, and, as far as regards the plains, seem scarcely to differ from those now proposed by his Excellency. With reference to the advisability of placing 5,000 men at Almorah, a glance at the map will show that the Goorkhas are unlikely to act offensively on the Kumaon frontier, and that the British *could not do so*, even if it were politic to move, on a line of 400 miles of mountain, on the Nepal capital, when Segowlee is within ninety miles, only half of which are in the hills.

European troops have fought as well as marched in the hot weather.

10. Surely it is hardly politic to declare that, "for five months in the year, our European troops cannot march at all." The fact, however, is, that many, if not most, of our campaigns have been fought in the hot weather. Lord Lake's army for nearly three years were under canvass.

Form of government prior to annexation.

11. It is an error to suppose that Lord Hardinge "adopted a plan of civil government" for the Punjab, or that any such arrangement produced a hatred to our rule, which resulted in insurrection. His Lordship's acts, and those of the administration of 1846 and 1847, are on record, and will stand the test of any scrutiny, when fairly considered with reference to the circumstances of March, 1846. No Sikh has ever asserted, or will assert, that the occurrences of 1848 arose from such a system. No government, which can strictly be called either civil or military, was introduced: the old native form of government was, in the main, maintained. All the changes introduced were those which necessity imperatively demanded; all were beneficial to the people, and all were carried out through the machinery of its own servants. His Excellency would find it difficult to enumerate the acts of the administration which led to the convulsions of 1848.

Cause of the late war.

12. The fact is notorious that the late war originated in a military insurrection—not of Sikhs only, but also of Mahomedan and Hindoo soldiers. At Mooltan, where the outbreak commenced, the Sikh troops were in a large minority, and among the population there were literally no Sikhs at all. The rebel Sikh army was recruited, not only from the Manjha or country of the Sikhs, but also from the hills,

REPORT, &c.  
 Memorandum of the  
 Board of Adminis-  
 tration, Lahore,  
 1st March, 1850.

from the Sind Saugor, from the Cis-Sutlej States, and from Hindoostan. In short, from the same quarters that would supply any other insurrectionary force. The military classes, fanatics and faqueers, joined the enemy—the former, at least, would rather have joined us.

Peaceable state of the Punjab during two years of occupation, and favourable feeling of the people towards the British.

European officers, and with the utmost difficulty could be induced to go to the native tribunals. Solitary British officers, slightly escorted, were employed in demarcating boundaries and redressing wrongs, in places where no Sikh official unattended by a full regiment would have dared to remain. During all this time, and indeed during the war, single officers, on duty and off duty, traversed the country, often altogether unattended, and never with more than two or three horsemen, and yet in no instance was one attacked.\* The people never rose *except* in our favour. It was the people who enabled Major Abbott to hold out, Major Edwardes to conquer, and Major Taylor and Lieutenant Young to besiege and capture forts. The people also enabled Lieutenant-Colonel George Lawrence to remain at Peshawur, even after he was assured of the disaffection of his army. The same people escorted him safely to Kohat.†

Benefits derived by the Sikh army from British interposition.

whole force, owed its extra batta and its regular leave of absence; and to us did the whole army owe its pensions and its promotions for merit instead of favour. In short, whatever were the causes that brought on the last Sikh war, it was not the hatred of the people to British authority, as set forth by the Commander-in-Chief.

Commander-in-Chief's opinion of a civil form of government.

The Board's opinion of the same.

is as much due to it, and that we have gained by it as much in the feelings and regards of the people as it is possible for a conquering race, so dissimilar in religion, customs, and habits, to do. The justice and good faith of our administration has signally aided us in our conquests.‡

Absence of wars and disturbances where a civil form of government has been established.

tually established. Since the cession and conquests of the North-Western Provinces, the only exceptions in their tranquillity have been a petty disturbance at Bareilly, which lasted two days; an *émeute* at Benares, raised not by the inhabitants, but by the exiled chief of Oude; and a tumultuary assembly of Mahomedan enthusiasts near Calcutta, which was put down by a few companies of native infantry and a detachment of horse artillerymen, acting as cavalry.

Wars with native chiefs have, in all instances, occurred beyond the frontier, where civil administration did not extend.

been allowed to retain. Such have been the wars with the Mahrattas, Pindarries, the

13. During two full years of British occupation, not a single outrage (except in a low tumult the second month) on a European occurred. The people flocked from all corners to Lahore for justice from the few

administration been odious to the people. It would be as difficult to show that the army had real grievances, as that the people had. To us the army beyond the Indus, amounting to fully one-half of the

14. None, much less all of this, could have occurred had the

15. His Excellency affirms that the Punjab is now ruled by a civil form of government, uncongenial to the people, and that India owes nothing to this kind of government, which has hitherto prevailed in it.

16. We believe that the reverse is the fact; that a civil form of government, as distinguished from a military one, is that best suited to the feelings of the people; that the prosperity of India

17. It is a remarkable fact (a fact which the Commander-in-Chief cannot controvert), that from the battle of Plassey to that of Goojerat, no general insurrection, no formidable war, has ever arisen where the civil form of government has been once effectually established. Since the cession and conquests of the North-Western Provinces, the only exceptions in their tranquillity have been a petty disturbance at Bareilly, which lasted two days; an *émeute* at Benares, raised not by the inhabitants, but by the exiled chief of Oude; and a tumultuary assembly of Mahomedan enthusiasts near Calcutta, which was put down by a few companies of native infantry and a detachment of horse artillerymen, acting as cavalry.

18. Where we have had wars, they have arisen either beyond the frontier, where the civil government did not extend, or where chiefs resided independent of that administration and backed by strong forts which they had

been allowed to retain. Such have been the wars with the Mahrattas, Pindarries, the

\* Two attempts, by fanatic Mahomedans, on the life of Major Edwardes in Bunnoo, are no exceptions to what is here stated. In one case the Sikh soldiery killed the assassin, and in the other they rushed into Major Edwardes' tent to do so. He had anticipated them.

† In proof of the remarkable good feeling and forbearance of the people, it is worthy of record, that in the end of the year 1847, an invalid serjeant of her Majesty's 10th regiment, in a state of intoxication, killed a Faqueer about three miles from Lahore, and then lay down and went to sleep by the side of the corpse. In this state he was found by the villagers, who sat down and waited till he awoke, despatching one of their party to Lahore for the police, on whose arrival the culprit was brought in uninjured to the authorities.

‡ The French in Algeria offer the most striking example of a military government among a conquered people. Is it congenial to popular feeling? and does it work well?

Nepalese, and Burmese; with the chiefs of Hattrass and Bhurtpore; the disturbances in Bundelcund, in the Deccan, in Sawuntwarree, and Chota Nagpore, down to the last war.

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

The people of the Punjab not unused to the forms of civil government.

19. His Excellency should point out where the civil form of government, as compared with a military one, is defective and unpopular. It is a mistake to call the people of India generally, or the majority of the inhabitants of the Punjab, barbarous and uncivilized. They are neither the one nor the other; though they are not as highly advanced in civilization as the people of Europe, they understand and appreciate the forms of civil government, and were accustomed under their own rulers to see the leaders and officers of the army distinct from those of justice and finance.

The Commander-in-Chief's short visit to the Punjab not calculated to enable him to form a correct judgment.

20. When his Excellency wrote the paper now under review, beyond a flying visit of a few days, he had not seen the Punjab, and had not enjoyed the means and opportunities of forming a correct judgment of the system which had been introduced, and of the feelings of the people regarding it.

Convulsions of last year would not have occurred had the Punjab been occupied by our troops in 1848; or the government been a civil one.

21. Had the Punjab been really occupied by British troops in 1848, had the Government been really a civil one introduced by us and administered by British officers, it may be fairly questioned if the convulsions which ensued would have ever occurred; assuredly, they would never have reached the height they did. It must never be forgotten that our troops occupied only Lahore, while all other posts were held by those of the Sikh nation, the majority of whom did not swerve from their duty until after months of inaction on our part. A vigorous Government, be it military or civil, will hold a country and secure tranquillity: that in the Punjab had necessarily elements of weakness. The Government of Scinde was vigorously administered and was backed by a large military force, and therefore, irrespective of its merits, was successful. The rule of Maharaja Golab Sing is notoriously a hard one, yet it keeps the people in subjection by that chief's ability and force of character.

Answer to the Commander-in-Chief's imputation, that the present administration "is weak and expensive."

22. His Excellency further states the present administration in the Punjab to be "weak and expensive." An enumeration of what has already been accomplished would dispose of the first charge, but the Board will cheerfully leave this point to the judgment of the Governor-General, before whom a weekly epitome of its acts passes in review. But it may be recollected that the country has been annexed scarcely twelve months; that it has within it nearly 100,000\* disbanded soldiers, the half of whom were lately in arms against our power; that officials of all ranks and grades, all accustomed to bear arms, have lost service, power, and emoluments by the changes inseparable from a change of masters; that the army of occupation is all massed on one line, leaving the frontier and the larger portion of the country solely to the charge of the civil administration; and yet that not even a petty *émeute* has occurred within its confines. His Excellency is an officer of fame and reputation, he is a successful soldier, and his assertion, no doubt, will have much weight on men's minds; but do not the above facts speak volumes in refutation of his opinions? The very arrangements which the Commander-in-Chief proposes for the troops, the arguments he adduces in support of those arrangements, show that he looks rather to danger from without than to intestine commotion.

The Board willing that the charges of Scinde be compared with those of the Punjab.

23. We are told that the administration of the Punjab is enormously expensive, and that of Scinde is cited in contrast, as extremely cheap. We are willing to join issue on this ground: we are willing that the expenses of the two governments shall be compared. In the margin † are noted the charges of the province

\* 100,000 includes friends and foes.

† It was currently reported in Calcutta that Scinde now about pays its extra charges, i.e. the charge incurred, exclusive of the ordinary pay of the troops. The parliamentary returns give the following entries:

Charges of the province of Scinde.—For note see next page.

1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.	1846-47, &c.
76,62,979	56,01,188	64,93,221	84,08,178



## REPORT &amp;c. ON THE

REPORT, &c.  
Memorandum of the  
Board of Adminis-  
tration, Lahore,  
1st March, 1850.

of Scinde for four years, taken from the published Parliamentary papers, which appear to include military and civil expenses. In his Excellency's G. O. of the 28th February, 1847, when taking leave of the army in Scinde, it is stated that the revenue of the province for the past year was Rs. 41,42,112, and the civil expenditure Rs. 15,01,754, equal to 37 per cent. This includes a military police, but excludes Jacob's horse, the Belooche and camel corps, which were all stationed along the frontier, and were, therefore, to a certain extent, available as military police.

The greater part of the troops under the Board employed on military duties.

withdrawn from our control.

The expenses of civil administration, including a military police, will not exceed thirty per cent. when the protection of the frontier shall have been arranged for by his Excellency.

of the revenues of the country. The purely civil charges, *i.e.* independent of the military police, are not twenty, including the pay of all the covenanted officers.

Number of troops in the Punjab cannot be reduced within two years to 15,000 men.

they cannot foresee the time when less than that number will suffice for the line of the Indus alone. If the population of the Punjab is more warlike and physically superior to that of any other part of India, so is its north-western border equally warlike, and still more hostile. The Punjab *must* always be held in strength; it can never be abandoned with safety.

Error in description of the country and estimate of the number of Sikhs. Predatory acts more to be feared than open war.

success, is open, level, and generally well cultivated. The rest of the country abounds in Mahomedans, who are bitterly hostile to the Sikhs, and would always unite against them, when encouraged to do so by the presence of our troops. It is a mistake to estimate the Sikhs lately in arms, and who are now in the Punjab, as amounting to 100,000 men. The number of soldiers actually opposed to us could not have much exceeded 60,000 men, and of them a considerable portion were Hindoostanees and Mahomedans. Many of the Sikhs also came from the Cis-Sutlej states. The real strength of their forces in the late war consisted in their regular troops and artillery. Shere Singh and other leaders have invariably admitted, indeed have complained, that in the pitched battles with our troops, the insurrectionary levies disbanded, and that on the organized infantry and artillery fell their chief loss. It is against predatory acts rather than from open war we have to guard; the arms, organization, and *prestige* of their regular battalions could not easily be renewed, even if the men could come together.

## Receipts from Scinde.

1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.	1846-47.
9,37,937	27,40,722	28,00,817	27,06,200

<sup>a</sup> In a note to the returns it is stated :—

“ Includes the amount stated as extraordinary military charges and war charges, which amounted in

1843-44	..... to	.....Rs. 66,30,096
1844-45	..... to	..... 36,49,910
1845-46	..... to	..... 33,68,337
1846-47	..... to	..... 34,32,000

It also includes the charge for the Scinde local corps, but is exclusive of other ordinary military charges, which are not distinguished in the Indian statement, and of the extraordinary military charges inserted in the Bombay accounts, as shown in statement No. 7, which gives this entry :—

Charges on account of the province of Scinde.

Military Charges Extraordinary.

1844-45.	1845-46.	1846-47.
2,53,018	3,37,763	3,50,000

Record of number of guns captured from the Sikhs correct. Doubts as to guns being so easily cast as is supposed by his Excellency.

28. As regards their guns, we know that in the year 1844, the number with the Sikhs was recorded in the office of the North-Western Agency, and that if we add those found at Lahore, Govindgurb, and elsewhere in 1846, to the number captured during the Sutlej campaign, that record will be found wonderfully correct. In like manner, the return of those captured and surrendered during the late war accords almost exactly with what were known to be at Peshawur, Bunnoo, Huzara, and Mooltan. The appearance of their guns alone will show that nearly all must have been cast many years. Raja Shere Singh, moreover, stated that he had cast three guns during the war; Dewan Moolraj, that he had made two. If it is as easy to make guns as the Commander-in-Chief supposes, it is remarkable that so few were actually made when most required.

Punjab gun-founders chiefly Mahomedans. Opinion that guns cannot be made without the fact becoming known.

29. The Punjab gun-founders were not generally Sikhs; the majority are Mahomedans, some of whom had been decoyed from our magazines by high pay, which failing, they have no motives to remain in the country on the chance of an employment which they could only pursue at great risk. We have a list of the gun-manufacturers now in the Punjab. It is surely not credulity to believe, that, if guns are made in holes in the jungles, the fact will transpire.

Improbability of the Cashmeer ruler making war with us.

30. We admit fully that we have little to expect from the love of native princes; Maharaja Golab Sing, however, knows well his own interests, and above all, his own weakness. His son and nephew are much more likely to draw their swords against each other than against us. In the event of war with either father or son, the nephew would readily join us, as he did the Sikhs in 1844. The Hukka Humba chiefs, and the ex-chiefs of Ranjouri and Bhimber, indeed the whole Mahomedan population, would rise against him or his family at any hint.

His power has been over-estimated.

31. The power of Maharaja Golab Sing has been prodigiously exaggerated. He is notoriously a hard, grasping ruler, with little or no moral influence. In 1844, he was unable to make head against the Sikhs, though led by so unpopular and inexperienced a chief as Raja Lal Singh, and though he was defending his mountain fastnesses. In 1846 his troops were shamefully defeated by Sheikh Imamoodeen, who, but for our interference, would have held Cashmere against him to this day.

His resources for offensive war very scanty. His troops undisciplined and badly paid.

32. The British officers, who accompanied the Sikh troops towards Cashmere in that year, were all of opinion that, in discipline, organization, and material, they vastly surpassed those of the Maharaja, who could with difficulty collect even 12,000 men and 10 guns, and that after we had posted regiments near Jummoo and Jusranta, to hold the country in his absence. During the few days that the march lasted, his men were half-starving, supported only by what they could forage for themselves. The Board have reason to believe that Golab Sing cannot have 300 guns, the majority of which are one, two, three, and four pounders. He may have 23,000 men, not more, a large proportion of whom are little better than militia, who, in addition to their rations, do not receive more than a couple of rupees a month.

Sikhs would espouse the most liberal side.

33. The best-paid man in his army, if we except Colonel Steinback, receives 150 rupees a month, and a common employment of that army is to pick saffron, and to cut and carry wood for the Maharaja. If our army is ruined by civil work, what must then be the condition of the Maharaja's? It is true that Sikhs would probably rally round him, if satisfied that he would pay them; but they would prefer rallying round us, as we should treat them liberally. In the event of a war, he would have no time to discipline and organize such hastily-raised levies.

Golab Sing's disadvantages in respect to mountain passes.

34. The passes leading to Cashmere are doubtless strong, but there are several of them, and an invading army would have the choice. It would be impracticable for the Maharaja to arrange for the adequate protection of all. He could not so post his troops as to bring them to bear on any one which was suddenly attacked by a skilful officer.

Our own advantages over him in possessing Huzara.

35. His frontier cannot be less than 400 miles long, and the tribes who are peculiarly hostile to him occupy the

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

REPORT, &c.  
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 Memorandum of the  
 Board of Adminis-  
 tration, Lahore,  
 1st March, 1850.

country through which the most important passes lie. The possession of Huzara alone lays Cashmere open to our mercy. That country has never been well defended. If the Maharaja accumulated his troops to defend it, Jummoo would be lost; if he concentrated them to protect Jummoo, Cashmere would fall. The loss of either would ruin him, for it would destroy his *prestige*.

Golab Sing has no superfluous military resources.

though they have waited on our authorities.

Improbability of Cashmere and Nepal uniting against us.

power of the other. If Holkar and Scindiah, men who had risen in the same confederation, who owed allegiance to the same chief, could never act together, Jummoo and Nepal are not very likely to combine; the force of Jummoo would be annihilated before the troops of Nepal could be brought to bear against us, and Katmandhoo might be captured before Golab Sing was satisfied that we had taken the field.

Error in regard to the Jullunder and its inhabitants corrected.

are not Sikhs, but Rajpoots, who are unfriendly to the Sikhs. Few of the latter are to be found in the Highlands. The two chief occupations of the Rajpoots are agriculture and military service. In the Sikh army there could not have been less than six or seven thousand of them, who are now residing at their homes. Agriculture they cannot readily take to, for the quantity of land fit for tillage is very limited, and has nearly all been broken up. The hill Rajpoot is brave, docile, and intelligent; they make good soldiers, though physically inferior to the Sikhs, but have none of the turbulence of the latter. They would gladly enlist in our irregular corps of infantry, and the want of employment is their only complaint.

Military charge of the frontier not desired by the Board.

that it was made over to the military authorities, to whom, indeed, it more directly pertains. When Sir H. Lawrence proposed a plan originally for the defence of the frontier, annexation had not taken place. That officer was anxious that it should be held by irregulars, keeping the regular troops in reserve near at hand, chiefly because he was desirous to see a portion of the warlike population employed, as well as that he considered such troops better adapted to the warfare likely to prevail, and indeed as cheaper than regulars. These men, many of whom fought under Major Edwardes at Mooltan, are less inclined to the *plough* than either the Sikhs or Rajpoots; to live, they must have employment, either with us or with our enemies.

Military police; its ability admitted, but its numerical strength must depend on the disposition which may be made of troops.

depend on the disposition of the military force in the Punjab; if the troops are all massed together, the military police, as his Excellency admits, must be very strong. Supposing that the military authorities arrange for the security of the frontier, including Huzara, then the Board consider that from six thousand to seven thousand infantry police, and from two thousand to two thousand five hundred cavalry, would suffice. But this force must be independent of, and in addition to, the ordinary revenue and police *peons*, whose duties are separate and distinct, as will be hereafter shown.

Employment of troops on civil duties never advocated by the Board.

they may perform no civil duties whatever, their presence enables the civil power to work with a less force of its own. The Board have never advocated the employment of the troops in collecting the revenue, or in discharging any police duties. In no part of the Bengal presidency are the military so employed, and even the majority of the corps raised by Lord Ellenborough had nothing to do with the former duty, and little with the latter. There neither are nor were any troops under the magistrate, there are "paid people;" but why police under him should be spoiled, is not clearly shown in the Commander-in-Chief's minute.

36. The Maharaja's resources at present barely suffice to hold his own territory, and to restrain the wild tribes around him. Some of their chiefs have never yet come in to him,

37. A glance at the map will show how difficult it would be for the rulers of Cashmere and Nepal to unite. At present, neither has a clear idea of the true position and

38. His Excellency's description of the Jullunder, or rather, of the Kohistan (Alpine region north of Jullunder), is not quite correct. The military classes

39. The Board are in no way ambitious of being allowed military charge of the frontier. If intrusted to them, they will undertake the duty; but they would prefer

40. The Board fully admit the value of military police, and will be happy to see such a force allowed for the security of the country. What the strength of that police should be, must greatly

41. The presence of a military force must have a decided effect on the tranquillity of a country, even though that force is seldom, if ever, called out; though

Objections to a police force under the command of a military officer, independent of the magistrate.

42. Disciplined police, under military men who are not magistrates, and employed in purely police duties, are expensive, are not efficient, are liable to be more oppressive than ordinary policemen, and are likely to *clash* with them and the civil authorities under whom they act. It is extremely difficult to define the separate powers of the magistrate and the commanding-officer; as the former tries the cases in which the police have been employed, he is the best judge of how they have exerted themselves. The magistrate and commanding-officer will have very different ideas of the merit of the same individual,—the one will prefer the best policeman, the other the best soldier. A native subordinate to one superior, and working for another, is seldom zealous.

The same continued. 43. The bias of a commanding-officer of such men is to shelter them when accused of misconduct in civil matters. He is ready enough to punish for a breach of military discipline, especially when it has been committed within his own knowledge, but he is inclined to be sceptical when one of his men is accused by an officer of another department; a false feeling of *esprit de corps* inclines him to screen his men in such cases. If the division of the military and civil power has a tendency to weakness and inefficiency, the duties of the two being perfectly distinct, what must be the result when the police work under the magistrate, and yet are independent of his authority?

Disciplined police more likely to oppress the people. 44. The tendency of all natives, perhaps it may be said of all mankind, is to abuse authority. The tendency, not only of native soldiers, and consequently of disciplined police, but of all connected with them, is more especially to do so. "Kumpani-ka-nokur" (Company's servant) is an exclamation which often frightens the poor villager, and deters him from defending his property. Native soldiers and camp-followers are greatly dreaded by the people. Go along a high-road, and ask the villagers, especially in a new country, on a great thoroughfare, what they have to complain of, and the answer usually will be—of the native soldier. His conduct is very different, before, and in the absence of, his superiors. Armed with all the power and influence of the British Government, his dress, his arms, his bearing, all tend to alarm; he is here to-day, gone to-morrow. We do not say that the ordinary policeman is not oppressive—there is too much to be reformed in all native officials—but what we do assert is, that the soldier is more so. The disciplined policeman is no whit behind the regular soldier in tyranny; we have seen more than once an unfortunate villager running alongside of one of the disciplined police, carrying the man's musket. The ordinary peon is better suited for all the duties of the policeman, except fighting, than the soldier: clad in his light native dress, with his blanket thrown over his sword, he can run his ten, fifteen, and twenty miles, and be ready for work, when the heavily-equipped soldier, in his awkward English dress, will not have got over half the distance. The men in police corps are generally, also, strangers to the country, and being selected as soldiers, are more remarkable for their physical than intellectual qualities. Few of the native officers can read and write, and it is notorious in the army what little influence they have over their men. The officers of the police, on the other hand, are usually intelligent, well-informed men, chosen from the class who serve in our irregular cavalry, men who have all the materials for good soldiers, though, from habit and prejudice, ill suited to the strict discipline of regular troops. In short, the disciplined policeman will neither work so continuously nor rough it so readily as the ordinary one: he is deficient in all the qualities of a detective police; his strong point is that, in an actual disturbance, his weapons and discipline render him formidable.

Police corps in Bundelcund and Saugor not considered to be effective, but were most so where the magistrate was the commanding-officer.

45. In Bundelcund and Saugor we believe that the police corps performed all police duties, but have always understood that they were not effective; that they were most so where the magistrate was the commanding-officer; and that the best men in the new corps were those who had previously belonged to the ordinary police. The fact is easily, however, ascertained. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra and Colonel Steel would be able to furnish full information on the point. In other districts the military police were employed as guards for all treasuries,—as escorts for ordinary remittances,—on jails,—as the personal guards of civil officers,—and were available in the event of any public commotion. In all such duties they were efficient and useful. If they committed a breach of discipline, they were tried and punished by military courts; if they broke the law of the land, they were amenable to the magistrates.

REPORT, &c.  
 Memorandum of the  
 Board of Adminis-  
 tration, Lahore,  
 1st March, 1850.

Inferiority of men in the police corps to those in regiments of the line, reasons for this being the case.

Men seemed usually to prefer four rupees in the common police to five in a corps where they had to wear clothes of the European fashion, were subject to military law and restraint, and had to undergo regular drill. The men were much inferior to those of the four frontier regiments, who receive seven rupees a month, whether in the field or not. These corps, indeed, especially that of Hoshiarpour, will bear comparison with any regiment of the line. The police corps were expensive, for they did not do as much work as the men they displaced. At Delhi and other places, Government had formerly local corps, which performed civil duties subsequently entrusted to the police corps. These were all broken up by Lord William Bentinck in 1832, when men who had formerly served in the local corps composed the civil guards, but in the pay of the common burkundaz.

The reductions made in consequence of the police corps being raised could not have exceeded one-fourth the cost of those corps.

actually effected; they can be ascertained at Agra, but they were probably not one-fourth of the cost of the police corps. Doubtless the measure rendered more regiments of the line available for general service, but it is a mistake to suppose that because the military were located in particular districts they were employed in civil duties. Beyond the guard for a great central treasury and furnishing escorts for remittances from one military station to the other, they performed no duty which can be termed civil, and surely the guarding of treasure is a very legitimate work for native troops. We would suggest that Government call for a return of all the civil duties performed in 1849 by the troops of the line.

Assistance which the civil establishments give to the military.

the military do for the civil. The mere presence of the military power in the country usually effects all that the magistrate can desire; it is very seldom indeed in our old provinces that their actual interference is necessary. But the duties which the civil government perform for the military are considerable, and enhance the expenses of the establishment.

The same. 49. Troops hardly ever march, perhaps never, without the aid of the civil authority. The latter furnishes all the supplies and carriage, and during the reliefs of troops, its whole time is absorbed in assisting the military. It is not an unfrequent occurrence on such occasions, on visiting a revenue or police post, to find a single man in charge, all the others being required to meet the different demands made on them. The police patrol round camps, guard the roads, arrange for collection of boats when passing rivers, and take care of the ferries. Even in the time of war their aid usually proves most useful. In the Sutlej campaign upwards of 4,000 carts were collected by the magistrate of Delhi alone and sent to the army, and other magistrates were equally zealous; as far as Cawnpore the requisitions extended, and all this was in addition to the carriage afforded to the troops marching to join the army. Grain, ammunition, and all the materials of war, were thus forwarded. There is not, we believe, an officer in the army, who is acquainted with the subject, who will not bear testimony to what we assert.

Civil officers and establishments equally useful in the late war.

50. In the late war, the civil officers and their establishments were equally useful.

The same. 51. In the Trans-Sutlej territory, in 1848, the police proved most useful, and their exertions and those of their superiors were fully admitted by the military themselves, and by Government at the close of the war. At the attack on Ram Singh's position, near Noorpoor (a formidable one), a burkundaz, on four rupees a month, showed the way to the detachment on whom the brunt of the fight fell, and such was the gallantry of the man, that the officer commanding the party, himself gave him a reward equal to that he received from the magistrate. At the fight at Umb in the hills, during the same season, a native police officer performed a similar service, and was shot through the body.

52. In the old provinces, soldiers have very rarely been called out to quell riots. They are not employed to arrest or to execute. Since annexation no troops have been

Troops rarely called out to quell riots in the old provinces; they have never, with one exception, been out in aid of the civil officers in the Punjab since the annexation.

have hitherto been employed, in a great measure, on the frontier, on duties purely military. The other corps raising under their control have not yet been placed permanently at their disposal, and the infantry portion have only just received their arms from the government magazines.

Cordiality with which civil and military officers have hitherto worked.

53. His Excellency feels certain that "if danger arise, the civil and military authorities will not agree," and that "all the operations will be weak, and great danger arise." With Sir John Littler, Sir Walter Gilbert, Sir Henry Dundas, and Sir Colin Campbell, the President and the Board have always worked most cordially; and where the duties and responsibilities of each are defined, where a spirit of conciliation and good feeling exists, the civil and military authorities will assuredly get on well together.

Questions that an officer capable of commanding the whole force of the Punjab, and governing the people with due regard to their interests and those of Government, is available.

54. But how is the division of duties to be obviated? Where is the officer available, of such varied knowledge, of such untiring energy, of such masterly capacity, that he shall command the whole military force of the Punjab, and administer its government, consonantly to the habits, the feelings, and customs of the people, and with due regard to the interests of Government?

Excellent military officers unsuited to civil administration.

55. Perhaps his Excellency would divide the country into circles, placing each under the brigadier commanding the doab. But there are many excellent officers who have never made the administration of a country their study, and would, therefore, find themselves unsuited to such duties.

Peons and burkundazes—their number estimated. Board do not consider it reasonable to lump them all up as "idlers," as the Commander-in-Chief would have it. The necessity of their services and their usefulness described. Their reduction, in case of police corps being raised, considered.

The Commander-in-Chief would convert 100,000 of them into military police, to perform duties now thrown on the army, to its detriment and disorganization. We have no means of ascertaining the number of these men, but we know that they are numerous. Before summarily disposing of them, however, it would be well to ascertain what are the real and nominal duties which they perform. Probably a scrutiny would enable Government to get rid of a portion, especially if police corps were raised in their place, but certainly not two-thirds. Surely it is not reasonable to lump them all up as "idlers," and then dispose of them summarily. In the number stated by Lord Ellenborough are probably included those of every department, civil, *military*, and political. From the Governor-General down to the meanest official, from the Commander-in-Chief to the commissariat officer; every staff situation has some of these men attached to it. It is hardly possible that all could carry on their functions with one-third of the number now allowed. In a military or civil office, these men are the messengers who convey orders. On the north-west line of customs, for instance, which yields a revenue of 600,000*l.* sterling, at a cost of about 12 per cent., the different posts are guarded by a large body of burkundaz or peons. If two-thirds of them were discharged, a large deficit in the revenue would assuredly ensue. A body of military police, even of the same strength, would not be so efficient.

\* Since writing the above, we have ascertained that the total peons of all descriptions, including revenue, police, civil, and customs establishments, with personal guards and messengers, in short, all whose duties could, under any circumstances, be taken by men armed and disciplined as the police battalions were, are—

In Bengal and Behar.....	26,000
And in the North-West Provinces .....	33,000

Making a total of ..... 59,000 under the Agra and Bengal presidencies, instead of 158,000, as estimated by the Commander-in-Chief.

REPORT, &c.  
—  
Memorandum of the Board of Administration at Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

REPORT, &c.  
Memorandum of the  
Board of Adminis-  
tration, Lahore,  
1st March, 1850.

The expense of the police corps proposed to be raised estimated at more than double that of the old establishment.

a small portion of the army is engaged in civil duty; we are certain that Government could not raise 100,000 efficient military police under a very much larger cost, even if that number of burkundazes could be dispensed with. A burkundaz throughout the Bengal presidency receives Rs. 4 a month. The men in the police corps, in 1842, received but Rs. 5; and the men, as a body, were very inferior. Good men will not enlist in a corps subject to military discipline, under Rs. 7; this, with the superior pay and number of native officers, the allowance of the European ones, the expense of arms, clothing, barracks, and the like, would more than double the expenses.

Evils of a frequent change of system.

could dispense with so large a portion of the old establishments. It will not do to throw their expense on the people, or to leave their duties undone, if really important. All such organic changes should be well considered before adopted; for the constant change from one system to another causes a great deal of individual suffering, and unsettles men's minds.

Number of revenue and police officials in the Punjab, exclusive of customs, stated, and their services described.

59. In the Punjab, exclusive of the customs, the arrangements for which are not completed, there are 8,503 revenue and police officials of all grades. In the whole territory under the Board—that is, the Punjab and the Cis and Trans-Sutlej territory—the whole are 10,999. This force will collect a revenue of one million and three-quarters sterling, in round numbers, and carry on the whole police duties of the territory, yielding a revenue of at least two and a half millions. They are located in the great towns, on the high roads and thoroughfares, and it is impossible that anything of moment can go on in the country without their knowledge. They send daily diaries to their European superiors, and especial ones when necessary. So far from not reporting what they hear and see, they are inclined, in time of excitement, to report too much. The territory extends from the Khyber to Kurnaul, from the borders of Maharaja Golab Sing's dominions and the snowy range to the Scinde frontier: 3,132 men are employed in collecting the revenue—7,867 in police duties. We are yet unable to state what is the exact area and population of this vast tract; but the commissioner of the Jhelum division gives the following estimate for his charge, from which a fair approximation for the whole country may be made.

Statistics of the Jhelum division as furnished by the Commissioner.

60. The Jhelum division is reckoned to comprise an area of about 14,000 square miles, to have a population of one million one hundred and sixteen thousand and thirty-five souls—divided into sixteen revenue and fifty-three police circles.\* Thus each revenue circle averages 875 square miles. The expenses of these establishments are ten per cent. on the revenue, and the number of towns and villages is 4,369.

Area of the Punjab, and the number of revenue and police peons employed in it. Proportion of the latter calculated at 1 to 10.

61. His Excellency estimates the area of the Punjab at 80,000 square miles, which is probably a close approximation to fact. With the Cis and Trans-Sutlej states, the area of these territories is probably 130,000 square miles, of which perhaps 20,000 are under independent chiefs. Deducting these tracts, which however rather add to than diminish the difficulty of the police administration, we have 11,000 peons to carry on the police, civil, and fiscal duties of 110,000 square miles. This gives one peon to ten square miles.

62. Considering that the Punjab contains many large and important towns, we do not think that a less number could efficiently carry on the duties. Scinde possesses a large area, estimated at 60,000 square miles;

but a great proportion of it is very thinly populated, if not a mere desert. Shikarpore, the largest town, was estimated to contain but 30,000 inhabitants some years ago, and the whole population of the country to be only 1,000,000. The Scinde police, we are informed, consisted of the following force:—

Rural horse	...	...	...	...	...	1,000
„ foot	...	...	...	...	...	2,500
Town police	...	...	...	...	...	300
			Total	...	...	3,800

\* A revenue circle, on an average, has a native collector, a deputy, two native clerks, a jemadar, and twenty peons. A police one has a police officer, a writer, a jemadar, and sixteen peons.

which is equal to one policeman to 263 inhabitants. Assuming that the population of the territories now under the Board is as dense as that of the Jhelum division—and it is probably more so—we should have a population of 8,000,000 souls. Our force, allowing that we have eventually 9,000 horse and foot in the shape of military police, and 11,000 peons, will give 20,000 in all, or about one man to 400 inhabitants. But it must not be forgotten, that his Excellency had always in Scinde a very large military force, and could, and did, locate it as he pleased. The distribution of the military power must have a considerable effect on the amount of police necessary for the security of the country.

Defects of the police ascribable to bad pay.

63. We do not pretend to affirm that the system of police in the Bengal presidency is efficient, or that it is not in a degree oppressive to the people; but so long as Government pay the policeman no better than the commonest menial, it can hardly be otherwise. The pay of a burkundaz throughout the provinces is Rs. 4 (four) per mensem, here we give him five (5), and all the native officers are proportionably remunerated. Let the policeman be as well paid and *as well treated* in the way of pensions and rewards as the native soldier (he is much harder worked, except in time of war, and his temptations are much greater), and then, under efficient control, there cannot be a doubt that he will be as well-behaved as the sepoy. The drilling, arming, and placing him under a military superior will not remedy his defects as a policeman.

The sepoy equally deficient in moral character as the policeman. — A military police not considered to remedy the existing evils.

64. The sepoy of the native army, with many good qualities, has the same moral defects as the policeman. Beyond the eye of his officer he has few scruples. The great problem is, how to employ the police so that they may be useful and not oppressive. If they have no power, if they are allowed no discretion, they are useless. If they have power, they are too apt to abuse it. A military police would in no respect remedy the real evils which exist.

The comparison in the military administration of Scinde and the civil one of the Punjab is not a fair one. Enumerates the difficulties encountered in the former administration of the Punjab.

65. His Excellency strongly advocates a military government. The Punjab is instanced as a decided case of failure of the civil system,—the administration of Scinde, of the success of the military. We do not consider the comparison a fair one. Lord Hardinge's arrangements were framed to meet an emergency, and his Lordship had peculiar difficulties to contend with. There was a veteran army, accustomed to power, to be reduced; there were a host of officials, grown grey in intrigue and corruption, to be restrained; the expenses of the state were nearly double its income; and above all, the object was to reform, not destroy. It would have been more easy to have swept away everything connected with the past, than to regenerate.

The comparative facilities experienced by his Excellency in the government of Scinde.

66. In Scinde, his Excellency had a comparatively easy task; the facility alone of drawing troops from Bombay, by steam, in four days, is a most important assistance to a governor in economising his military force in Scinde. There was an open field for administration, and he was backed by a British force, which completely occupied the country. In contrasting the merits and efficiency of a civil and military administration, it is but just that we should compare the two systems under circumstances as nearly as possible similar.

Comparison in the civil administration of the Trans-Sutlej territory and the military one of Scinde proposed.

67. Supposing, for instance, we compare the civil administration of the Trans-Sutlej territory with the military one of Scinde.

Opinion as to the qualifications of the officers employed in the administration of Scinde.

68. His Excellency's remarks touch only upon the police system; the judicial, fiscal, and customs' management is not alluded to; to administer all these departments efficiently, a thorough knowledge of the language, interests, and customs of the people is necessary. None of the Commander-in-Chief's officers had any previous experience, or any knowledge of the Scinde language, when they took charge of their districts. One was selected from the commissariat, the others from military duty. We cannot understand how the holding of two high courts in three or four years could have insured the people from oppression. There is no reason why trial, acquittal, or punishment cannot quickly follow crime under civil as well as military rule. Indeed it is obvious that officials, understanding their duty, must more readily and satisfactorily dispose of cases brought before them than military officers, however able as soldiers, who are suddenly called on to deal with novel and difficult questions.

REPORT, &c.  
Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.



## REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

The Board's idea of a military government; they do not consider it at all suited to the interests of the people.

the land. He cannot refer merely to the employment of military men, for such are many of the Punjab officials. It would be worth while to compare some of the returns of the administration of Scinde with those of the North-Western Provinces; we do not think that these returns would prove that martial rule is the most efficient and the best suited to the interests of the people. The fact is, that expedition, a quality so undeniably valuable in the administration of justice, much more depends on the personal qualities of the executive officer, than on the nature of the law. Zeal and general intelligence, though essential, unless combined with a previous knowledge of the duty, will make but an inefficient administrator. In the course of time, no doubt, such a man will surmount the difficulties of his position, and teach himself; but he will learn at the expense of Government, and, above all, of the people; his errors will be the only masters who can train him; for in civil administration, especially in that of a new country, there is little or no time to learn; the emergency is instant and pressing, the demands on the European officer incessant and imperious, and he must act without consulting others, and with little time for deliberation. He will do so at hap-hazard, or he will throw himself into the hands of his native officers. What would an experienced soldier say to the civilian who proposed to manœuvre a regiment or brigade? and assuredly, the duties of administering a large district are not less mechanical. Military law is considered rather technical than otherwise; its process is not expeditious, except perhaps in a drum-head court-martial, and to the subject it would be oppressive; for on military considerations it often converts a very venial crime into a serious one.

Remarks on the system of administration which prevailed in Scinde.

70. The Board understand that in Scinde, in civil cases, there was no appeal whatever, under his Excellency's rule; that in criminal matters, the youngest officer could inflict fifty lashes, fine to the extent of one hundred rupees, and imprison for three months, without taking down any evidence, but simply by entering the charge and sentence in a book kept for the purpose. That in all other cases, the proceedings, in English, had to go to his Excellency himself; and that in heinous cases, men were tried by military commission. Before these commissions, native collectors accused of fraud and embezzlement have been tried and sentenced to five, seven, and ten years' imprisonment.

The same. In a system where such was the process, justice, in many cases, was, no doubt, very expeditiously dispensed; but a good deal of injustice must have also been done. Too great a facility for appeal is doubtless an evil; but a complete sense of irresponsibility is a greater one. The fact, that his proceedings can be revised, analyzed, and commented on, is a great check even on the best officer.

The same. 71. A military commission, also, trying a revenue officer for fraud and embezzlement of the public revenue, must have often found itself curiously situated. To do justice in such matters, a thorough scrutiny into a mass of accounts in the vernacular, and a considerable knowledge of the revenue system which prevailed, would have been necessary.

System of collecting land revenue in Scinde.

72. In Scinde, for the two first years after the conquest, the revenue was nearly all collected in kind; subsequently, some changes were made to check fraud and corruption; but no fixed assessment of the land was introduced, while the Commander-in-Chief was there.

Remarks. 73. Next to the security of life and property, there is nothing in Hindoostan on which the comfort and happiness of the people so much depends, as on the system by which the land revenue is collected; the mass of the people are agriculturists.

The revenue of Scinde collected in three ways.

74. In Scinde, we have been informed by officers who served there under his Excellency's administration, the revenue was collected in three ways:—by "butâi," or, in other words, by Government taking a proportion of the crop of each field; by it taking a fixed quantity of grain from a certain number of fields; and by a money rate. Villages paid their revenue in one, in two, or in all three modes, according to former custom. The great mass of the revenue, however, was paid in the first way.

75. Every one who has the slightest practical knowledge of revenue matters, must instantly see what a host of "idlers" such a system lets loose in the country. From

Remarks on the number of "jdlers" that the Scinde system must let loose upon a country.

the first appearance of the crop, until it was cut, thrashed, gathered, divided,—until the Government share had been stored, and even sold, a large body of watchmen were necessary. These men received two rupees a month, and assuredly did not starve on that pittance while guarding grain. But to those men must be added, the agents who divided the crops, those who measured the land, those who kept the accounts, those who weighed and stored the grain, and those retained to sell it. All had to be paid their regular wages, and to be well fed; whether these people were paid by the agriculturists or the Government, they were a heavy tax. A native official entertained, on a salary of Rs. 20 a month, for a single harvest, on such duties, has been known to pay Rs. 200 as a bribe for his berth. It is bad to levy a money-rate by measurement at each harvest, but payments in kind, founded on a division of the crops, or the measurement of the fields, it is impossible to control. Government was thus the great corn-factor of the country.

Computes the number of watchmen required for the Scinde system of collection.

76. It is difficult to estimate the number of people which such a system requires to be kept up. But supposing the land revenue of Scinde was equal to but 30 lacs of rupees, and that the revenue of each village averaged Rs. 500, we have 6,000 villages; allowing but two watchmen for each, we have a force of 12,000 men, armed with enormous authority, paid at the rate of Rs. 2 a month! We will not attempt to count the weighman, accountant, &c.

Evils of that system.

77. Such a system of revenue has long since been exploded under civil rule. With it there can be no Government rent-roll; the income varies from harvest to harvest; there can be no control, no check, but by informers. It is a common saying, "Butâi lootâi," *i. e.* the division of the crop is plunder—plunder of the Government—plunder of the people.

Yield of the Trans-Sutlej territory during four years.

78. We have no means of judging what were the annual income and expenditure of the military administration of Scinde. The Trans-Sutlej territory, by the end of April, will have been four years under British rule, and in that time will have yielded a net revenue of one million pounds sterling, *i. e.* after the payment of the civil expenses of its rule.

Suggests a way in which the respective merits of military and civil governments be inquired into.

79. Let Government not be guided by the statements and opinions of officers who may be supposed to be interested in this or that system; let it appoint a commission, composed of men, the *élite* of both services, to take evidence, to call for returns, visit the country, and judge for themselves; the result of their inquiries will enable the Most Noble the Governor-General to judge for himself. Let that system which is found to be the best, or that portion of both systems which may be found to render the country flourishing and the people happy, be introduced into the Punjab.

Location of troops; Dacca and Almora unsuited to a large number of troops.

80. Without presuming to enter into detail on the general question of the location of troops throughout the Bengal presidency, a few words on the subject may not be uncalled for. Experience has proved the climate of Dacca to be so prejudicial to the health of Hindoostanee sepoy, that it would be difficult to keep 5,000 men there in a state of efficiency; and even stronger objections might be shown against Almora, as a location for a similar number. Indeed, it was not long since officially reported by the local authorities, that the province could not feed and supply one regiment.

Impolicy of massing native troops, as intended, at Dinapore, Delhi, and other places, without more than one European corps at each place.

81. The Board, though fully convinced of the purely military advantages of massing troops,\* consider that the measure would be impolitic anywhere in India. They would deprecate the location of 12,000 (14,000 less by 2,000) at Dinapore; of 10,000 at Meerut, an equal number at Umballa, and 12,000 at Delhi, especially with the gathering of "the greatest portion of the European troops "between the Jumna and the Beas;" five regiments being, as it is elsewhere said in his Excellency's memorandum, stationed in the Simla Hills; thus making it impossible to

\* In Sir Charles Napier's general orders of 28th January, 1847, already referred to, he remarks on the danger to which the army was exposed, divided as it was before the conquest, between Kurachee and Sukkur. But when Scinde was conquered, his Excellency no longer massed his troops, but divided them between Kurachee, Hyderabad, Shikarpore, and Sukkur, with his irregulars at Khungurh and Luskane, with outposts to watch the frontier. Thus, he disseminated his troops to hold the country, and massed them to conquer it.

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum of the  
Board of Adminis-  
tration, Lahore,  
1st March, 1850.

place with each of the above large masses of native troops, above a single European corps. Indeed, when the calls of Lahore, Wuzeerabad, and Peshawur, as well as of the presidency, are attended to, one regiment for each will, with difficulty, be found.

Depôts of all European regiments considered better than locating a number of regiments in the hills.

ill during the past year, annually sent to the hills under *selected* officers, would probably keep the European branch of the service more efficient, and would certainly render it more useful than at present. Experience has shown that European troops could not be on the Ravee or Ganges from Simla in the time mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief. The arrangements for carriage must be *very much changed* to enable them to reach either river in a month, instead of a fortnight.

A large native army not required at Lahore.

intrigue and treachery.

A strong force required at Peshawur; Europeans and irregulars the best adapted for such a country.

that Europeans and irregulars are the troops best adapted for such a country, even if a regiment of regular native infantry did not cost beyond the Indus nearly as much as one of Europeans.

Usefulness of irregular troops, who are not worse, as regards plunder, than regulars are when not looked after.

and Ferris's jazulchees were generally acknowledged to be during the second Affghan campaign. Indeed, as long as hostilities are anywhere carried on, no one hesitates to acknowledge the value of such regiments as the Scinde horse, the Goorkha battalions, and other such levies, though in time of peace their services are too often forgotten. The Commander-in-Chief observes that such troops plunder; the Board would add, that all troops do so if they are not looked after, and of course those would do so most who are worst paid and worst cared for. A regular cavalry soldier has no motive to plunder for his horse, as it belongs to the state, and is fed and cared for by the commissariat; whereas the irregular cavalry-man has not only the hard and dirty work of camp to perform, but is often put to his wit's end to provide for his horse; and indeed, not unfrequently for himself, his pay of Rs. 20 a month being quite insufficient when grain is dear and fodder scarce.

The Board would prefer that two regiments of European infantry were left at Lahore, instead of only one, and one of horse.

corps are at Lahore, we trust that both may be infantry.

Not open war, but secret intrigue, to be feared; how to be provided for.

Europeans: for the other, irregular horse, and such infantry as, unincumbered with baggage, can be under arms and in movement at an hour's notice.

Expeditions movement of a small body of troops more efficacious in securing peace than late assemblage of an army.

miles a day, will do more to secure the peace of the Punjab than the tardy assemblage of armies. Indeed we do not hesitate to state, that our anxiety is rather on account of the number of troops, and the system on which we understand they are to be located, than of any deficiency of force.

Further reasons against massing troops.

82. Depôts of *all the* European regiments, brigades, and battalions, in the hills, would perhaps best meet the exigencies of the service. Twenty to thirty men per company and troop, including all who had been seriously

83. Above all, the Board deprecate the location of a large native army at Lahore, where we have no open enemies to meet, and where the engines that will be used against us are

84. Peshawur requires a strong force; as there, at a week's warning, an army might issue from the passes, and until there is a permanent bridge over the Attock, it can with difficulty be reinforced; but it is incontrovertible

85. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has lately found Captain Cook's corps to be what Col. Hodgson's regiment and Lieut. Lumsden's guides proved themselves during the late war, and what Broadfoot's sappers

86. The Board regret to observe by his Excellency's memorandum, that it is contemplated to leave seven regiments of native infantry, and for the present, only one of European infantry, at Lahore: while only two European

87. As before stated, it is not open war that is to be guarded against at Lahore, but secret intrigue and outbursts of small bands of desperate men: against the first, the best remedy is a mixture of the different arms, with a large sprinkling of

88. One thousand (1,000) men (half cavalry, half infantry), and two guns, put in motion within two hours of the news of a disturbance reaching any of our stations, and able to traverse the country at the rate of twenty or thirty

89. As this view, though not rare among our thoughtful military men, has seldom been officially put forward, it may be necessary to observe, that independent of the obvious objections

to massing troops, are the difficulty and expense of continually feeding them; and if they require to move, of providing carriage for all from one point; there is also the palpable objection of thus affording opportunity to schemers, especially near a city, and in a country where, for nearly ten years, rank, riches, honours, and the very Government itself, have been openly bought and sold by military and religious intriguers.

Massing together troops tends to mutiny.

90. It is obvious that the incentives to and chances of mutiny in any army, European or native, are proportioned to the number and unity of feeling of those congregated together. Masses everywhere give confidence, how much more so when nearly all come from the same tract of country; while half are of the same caste, and that an influential and lately a dominant one! We are far from intending to cast any imputation on the native army; we are perfectly aware how often and how severely their fidelity has been tried—we simply argue on the plain grounds of common sense and historic experience of all mercenary armies.

Opinion that troops should, to a certain degree, be disseminated.

91. The Board have no wish to see the regular army in the Punjab frittered into small detachments, or indeed, unless as an exception, to see less than a brigade, with cavalry and artillery, at each station. They are most anxious to have a cantonment of regular troops at Leia, and another in the Manjha country, and have on a former occasion fully recorded their reasons for considering both to be necessary. We conceive that troops are massed to fight battles and besiege fortresses: but that to hold and awe a conquered country, they need to be, to a certain degree, disseminated. When the manufacturing districts in England were disturbed, did not Government pour troops into them? It did not simply collect a force in their vicinity, or consider that the household troops in London were sufficient to awe them. The sight of troops has a sedative effect. In Ireland you do not mass your troops; you have them in strong detachments about the country.

If the Punjab is not now conquered, no part of India is so; shows the security which people feel and experience in travelling through the Punjab.

92. The Board and the Commander-in-Chief unfortunately start on different premises; hence their discordant conclusions. His Excellency declares that the Punjab, though twice occupied by our troops, is not yet conquered. We have already shown that Lord Hardinge occupied only Lahore, and did not place elsewhere a single British soldier; and as to the Punjab not being now conquered, if it be not, no part of India, and indeed no British possession is so. During the last twelve months the main line from Umritsir to Peshawur, being occupied by the troops, all else, the frontier included, has been held by the police and irregulars under the Board; and throughout these 80,000 square miles it is questionable if there has been more crime or more violence than in the oldest provinces of the empire; treasuries are almost everywhere guarded only by a score of natives of the country; the civil officers traverse their districts with the slightest guards, and ride from end to end with single horsemen. Travellers and ladies go day and night by dâk from Ferozepore to Peshawur, and from Umritsir to Mooltan. The roads are literally covered with carts, camels, and conveyances of every kind, transporting, without escort, baggage and stores to every cantonment and station in the country. The rivers are also becoming thoroughfares and are equally safe. The President of the Board has lately gone a circuit of not less than 1,000 miles, the greater part with an escort of sixteen men, half of them Sikhs; often for days with a single soldier, and only for one march, in the Kohat pass, with half a company and half a troop. While we write, we hear that the arms of the 1st Punjab infantry at Kohat have been sent from Ferozepore direct to Dera Ismael Khan, under an escort of only twelve sepoy.\*

93. Sir Walter Gilbert has himself ridden many times during the last month with a single horseman to Umritsir, and no part of the country has been untraversed by officials of one grade or other; and yet no violence has occurred that might not have happened at Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay. To this may be added that the revenue has been, in some districts, collected without the employment of a single "dustuck" (bailiff with process), and everywhere without threat or violence, that the arrears at this moment are most trifling. If, under these circumstances, no man in arms within our limits, the revenue readily paid, and so much safety everywhere to high and low,—if this is not conquest, if this is not peace, the Board are at a

\* This was wrong, and we have written for troops to meet them. We mention the fact, to show what is considered to be the state of the Punjab by the military authorities on the border.

REPORT, &c.  
 Memorandum of the  
 Board of Adminis-  
 tration, Lahore,  
 1st March, 1850.

loss to know what is.\* It may be argued that if such be the real picture, why lay so much stress on the presence of troops at particular points? The reply is obvious, that on the frontier we are liable to predatory attacks from tribes over whom we have no control, and that in the interior of the country, the great distance of troops from certain points may encourage any desperado to create a disturbance. The elements of danger exist everywhere; we must not simply trust to moral considerations for tranquillity.

Shows that little is to be apprehended from Gholab Singh or the Affghans.

that the power of the latter has been greatly over-estimated, and assuredly the Affghans are not likely to prove more formidable in the plain than the ruler of Cashmere. Five thousand (5,000) men held Cabool; three thousand (3,000) held Jellalabad; General Pollock, with 10,000, marched through the passes to Cabool: and General Nott, with an inferior force, joined him from Candahar. The Affghans could make no head against Major Abbott's irregulares in Huzara, and only won the fort of Attok by treachery. They fled the field of Goojerat before the day was warm; and nowhere, during the year's occupation of Affghanistan, did they stand, in fair fight, against a quarter of their number of irregulares in British pay. However individually brave they may be, they alone can never be a formidable enemy.

Doubts as to any considerable army being arrayed against the British power.

such numbers are to come, whence they are to be armed, fed, and paid. Knowing that scarcely 100,000 men crossed the Sutlej during the height of the Sikh power; and that when they had still the nucleus of a regular army, with magazines and stores at their back, and with the Affghans in the field as their allies, that they could not bring any thing like that number to bear, we doubt the possibility of their or any other enemy doing so, unless, by some great convulsion, the hordes of Central Asia, influenced and paid by a European power, are under another genius like Nadir Shah, rolled against us, and our own magazines provide them with stores.

Advocates that no more than a brigade be kept at one station.

general rule, we advocate keeping brigades together, and during the exercising season, uniting two or more for drill and instruction, as the artillery annually are.

Citadels of Lahore and Mooltan, and forts in the Punjab.

of Lahore or Mooltan, or to destroy the numerous forts that are in every part of the country. His Excellency asks, who would attack Lahore or Mooltan? The Board reply, the same enemy that would successfully cope with the 54,000 regular troops, and numerous irregulares now in the country.†

98. Peshawur is certainly an outwork, but it is one that cannot be abandoned without great danger, and even if Delhi be a more important point than Lahore, it would cease to be a safe one, were Lahore abandoned.

Forts and entrenchments indispensable on a wild frontier.

99. The Board are glad to observe that his Excellency considers we do not make sufficient use of entrenched positions in India. They are far from desiring our troops to be

\* The onslaught of six fanatic Sikhs on the barrack of the European infantry regiment is no exception. Such fanatics, Hindoo and Mahomedan, are to be found everywhere in India. Their selection of a barrack instead of the dwelling or office of an official, for their attack, might be adduced as a proof of the little, instead of the great enmity that our acts have caused. We do not pretend that the Sikhs love us; our argument is, that the country is now in a peaceable state, and that two years ago our acts did not cause us to be detested by the people.

† By having a safe fortress at Lahore, Peshawur, Mooltan, &c., we secure our women and children, our treasure and magazines, and enable the mass of our force to move out and fight. During the last war, upwards of 5,000 men were idle at Lahore, holding the cantonment; and the common cry then was, that neither the fort nor citadel were tenable. If the Derajat were in danger to-morrow, it is a question whether it would be reinforced from Mooltan; the commanding officer could not spare a large force, and would not like to send a small one. We have repeatedly heard it stated, as a valid reason for not moving against an enemy, that a cantonment would be left unprotected.

cooped up in garrisons; but they are satisfied that, on a wild frontier, such as it has been their duty to guard during the last twelve months, small forts and entrenchments are indispensable.

The people and frontier of the Punjab different from those of Scinde.

100. The frontier of the Punjab is as different from that of Scinde, as are the warlike inhabitants of the greater portion of the former from the peaceable dwellers in the latter. The Beloches, the soldiers of Scinde, are mostly dwellers in the mountains, and the majority of them disappeared after the battle of Hyderabad; the cultivators of Scinde are proverbially a mild, docile race, unused to arms. On the other hand, the people of the Punjab, Mahomedans and Hindoos, as well as Sikhs, have, with few exceptions, been accustomed to the sword. The Hindoo grain dealers, elsewhere noted for their cowardice, are here found good soldiers—Moolraj was one, Dewan Jowalee-Suhae, the Minister of Cashmeer, is one, as were many of Runjeet Singh's best officers. The only vulnerable quarter of Scinde has a desert of thirty or forty miles between the British border and the hills, whence marauders come; whereas, from Mozufferabad, on the west confine of Cashmeer, down to the neighbourhood of Mitthunkot, the Punjab border is immediately touched by mountains, varying from 1,000 to 5,000 feet in height, traversed by numerous passes, impenetrable to any force less than an army; but open at all points for the egress of the rude tribes to pour down and plunder our subjects. Huzara is on two sides encircled by such mountains, and is cut through by scarcely less difficult ones. Peshawur has such mountains on three sides, and partly on the fourth—for 180 miles its frontier is of this description. Kohat is thus quite encircled, and is separated from Bunnoo by continuous difficult passes for sixty miles. That valley is also surrounded by mountains. Those on the west, inhabited by the predatory Wuzerees, who infest even the southern ridge, separating Bunnoo from Dehra Ismael Khan. On the north and east the Khu-Huks are scarcely more civilized, and will long require watching. South of Bunnoo, only the western border is mountainous; but the inhabitants were always troublesome under the Seikh rule, and continually annoyed even the able and energetic Sawun Mull.

The same. 101. Along the whole frontier, of not less than 700 miles, a cannon-shot fired from the hills would almost anywhere fall within the limits of our villages, and often in our cultivation. Whereas, in Scinde, with an open, though desert plain, of miles before them, a bold cavalry would, without difficulty, follow up, if not intercept marauders.

Questions Scinde having had anything to fear from Punjab invasion.

102. The Commander-in-Chief not unfrequently assigns the troubled state of the Punjab, as the cause of his having kept so strong a military force in Scinde. We may remark that Buhawulpore and Dehra-Ghazee-Khan, both of which were not only loyal to the last, but afforded Major Edwardes most of his soldiers, are the territories that adjoin Scinde, and intervene between it and Mooltan. The only danger then was of invasion. If Buhawulpore and our own adjoining possessions actually on the Sutlej required no special protection, we cannot understand what Scinde had to fear from Punjab invasion.

Reasons for entrenched positions in certain portions of the frontier.

103. On such a border as we have to guard, it is apparent that forts, or strongly entrenched posts, are required at all the usual outlets from the hills, to stop small bands of marauders, or at least to intercept them, and to give rallying points and places of protection to the peaceably-disposed. In like manner the road through the Kohat pass, and from Kohat to Bunnoo, as also from Peshawur to Attok, should have entrenched positions, at short intervals, to protect travellers and convoys.

Forts of Peshawur, Attok, &c., to be held in strength, for similar reasons.

104. On similar grounds, the Board advocate the policy of holding in strength the forts of Sumeergurh (Peshawur), Attok, Dehra-Ismael-Khan, Duleepgurh, (Bunnoo), Mooltan, Govindgurh, and Lahore, as magazines, depôts, and treasuries. Indeed, they consider that not only in the Punjab, but throughout India, every magazine and every treasury ought to be within an entrenched post; the contrary, however, is not only the case, but in many places, as Dehli, Kurnaul, and Umballa, both are, and others have been for years, exposed to any sudden danger that might have arisen. Even the fortress of Agra (a principal magazine) is understood to be very unsafely garrisoned. It was the guns and munitions of the Austrians, taken from their own magazines, that enabled the Hungarians so long to contend against the united force of Austria and Prussia.

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

## REPORT, &amp;c.

Memorandum of the Board of Administration, Lahore, 1st March, 1850.

Deprecates forts being left in the hands of any one save our own troops.

rison, save that of the state. His Excellency would wish that an enemy should throw himself into a fort. An able leader would, however, not do this, unless, indeed, it were of the first class: he would place his irregular infantry behind walls, and would keep the field with his horse and more disciplined infantry. This has been the practice of Asiatic marauders and Asiatic leaders of all grades in all ages. In India, especially, it has been so.

Reasons for the above opinion.

of India, that the enemy has not had a fort to fall back upon. Not only have we the examples of Seringapatam, Bhurtpore, and Hattrass before us, but the more recent ones in the southern Mahratta country, and in the Punjab. During the late wars, small forts in several directions, were held to the very last, and commanded, awed, and plundered the country around them. The *prestige* of such forts is inconceivable; the occupation of the walled town of Goojrat, for less than a week, enabled Sher Singh to levy more than a lac of rupees of its revenue. The robber Ram Singh, at the head of scarcely 1,000 men, seized and occupied the fort of Shahpoor, on the Ravee. The news went over the country like wildfire. Two days afterwards he was surprised and driven out of the fort, and instantly the excitement ceased. During the last campaign also, Brigadier Wheeler, with nineteen guns and mortars, could not prevent the garrison of Rungumungul from escaping. Before proceeding against Mooraria he had to send for two heavy guns from Govindgurh. Both were small forts, and there must be hundreds, at least as strong within the Punjab.

The same. 107. The command of a petty fort makes a marauder, in the popular opinion, if not in reality, master of the country, and as such he collects the revenue; with the money he raises followers, and with those followers he coerces the peaceable inhabitants, and under pain of fire and torture obliges them to join his standard. This is the history of all plundering armies, from the days of the Mahrattas down to the recent raids of Ram Singh, Nurain Singh, and other lieutenants of Moolraj and Sher Singh.

108. Such proceedings may be opposed to the rules of European warfare, but are consonant to native customs and habits. In this way, without money and with little influence, formidable organizations may be effected, if our troops are not at hand to crush them. Every step the enemy advances unopposed may be said to give him strength, and the robber of to-day becomes the prince and leader of to-morrow.

Advantages of having entrenched posts ourselves. 109. On the other hand, we have had numerous and even recent instances, both of the advantages of holding entrenched posts ourselves, and of the disadvantages of not having places of refuge. Candahar, Killat-i-Ghilzie, Julalabad, and Cabul afford examples.

Conclusion. 110. We have now gone through the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum. It is with diffidence we have so often ventured to differ from the views of a general of his Excellency's fame and experience. On mere abstract questions of military policy we should not have presumed so to do, but we request it may be born in mind that we have to deal with facts; and that it is the historic lesson of the last 100 years in India which we venture to oppose to Sir Charles Napier's dicta.\* From comments on Scinde policy we should have wholly abstained had not his Excellency's remarks broadly challenged a comparison between the Government of that province and that of the Punjab.

(Signed) Henry M. LAWRENCE,  
C. G. MANSEL,  
John LAWRENCE,

President and members of the Board of Administration for the affairs of the Punjab.

Lahore, March 1st, 1850.

\* For an able and clear exposition of our military position in India, contrasted with the means which may be arrayed against us, we would refer to the minute of Lord Hardinge, the late Governor-General, dated the 9th December, 1848.

## MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

*Dated the 13th April, 1850.*

Military report of his Excellency the  
Commander-in-Chief.

Court of Directors.

I wish to take this opportunity of explaining to the Honourable Court, why the report of His Excellency was not sent to them at the moment it reached me. I received it on the 30th November last; I found it so extensive in its range, that it became necessary to limit my consideration of it, at that moment, to the portion which pressed most urgently for decision. I therefore submitted to his Excellency a minute on the 26th December, to which I requested a reply, before I should leave Bombay to go to sea, which I hoped would admit of final orders.

2. I did, not however, receive his Excellency's opinions until some days after I returned to Calcutta, in March. Orders have now been issued on his Excellency's second paper, sufficiently conclusive, to admit of our stating to the Court that the main outlines of the arrangements to be made for the permanent occupation of the Punjab, are determined upon.

3. I transmit these papers now, because I feel it to be desirable, that the views which his Excellency Sir Charles Napier has submitted to the Government, should at once be made known to the Court. But, I beg it to be understood, that while on the purely military portions of these papers, I should speak with great hesitation; yet I have no hesitation in dissenting entirely from very many of the statements and opinions which his Excellency has adopted and declared in the documents before me.

4. Hereafter I shall do myself the honour of communicating my observations on them to the Honourable Court. In the mean time, the Court will be placed in possession of the views of the Governor-General in Council on those points which called for immediate decision.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

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No. 38.

From Sir HENRY ELLIOT, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the  
Governor-General, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL of ARMY.

*Dated Simla, the 26th June, 1850.*

Foreign Department, secret.

SIR,—

I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General to request that you will bring it to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, in consequence of various representations which were made to his Lordship, it seemed expedient to make further inquiries relative to the equipment, &c., of the regiments of the Punjab irregular force.

2nd. The result of these inquiries has induced his Lordship to modify, in many material respects, the scale of equipment and allowances originally proposed for the corps, and to place them on a better footing than regiments of local troops generally.

3rd. I am accordingly directed to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a General Order, which his Lordship proposes to issue, by which the establishment of these corps shall be fixed, and the whole placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief; but, before issuing the General Order in question, his Lordship would be glad to be favoured with any remarks which his Excellency may wish to make on the several matters therein adverted to.

4th. It is, however, to be understood, that when the corps have thus been transferred, all forts upon the frontier or elsewhere, which have already been reported, or may hereafter be reported, to be required as military posts, will be ultimately garrisoned by the regular or irregular troops under his Excellency's command.

5th. His Lordship therefore requests, that the regiment of Punjab infantry, at present stationed at Lahore, may be permitted to remain there till the end of the present

REPORT, &c.

Minute by the  
Adjutant-General,  
13th April, 1850.

From Sir H. Elliot  
to the  
Adjutant-General,  
26th June, 1850.



REPORT, &c.  
From Sir H. Elliot  
to the  
Adjutant-General,  
26th June, 1850.

rainy season. It is necessary, his Lordship observes, that one regiment of infantry should be stationed in Huzara, where as yet none have been placed. His Lordship requests that this may be effected after the rains, when the present levies, temporarily employed during and subsequent to the war, will be paid off.

6th. His Lordship will be happy to attend to the recommendation of his Excellency, that an officer should be appointed to the command of these irregular corps in the Punjab.

7th. This officer should, in his Lordship's opinion, be designated "Inspecting Officer," and should be allowed a staff officer to aid him. The allowances, looking to the extent of his duties, may fairly be made those of a brigadier of 2nd class; and a brigade-major, as in the scale contained in the General Order above alluded to

8th. In a memorandum relative to the Punjab, dated 26th February last, his Excellency appeared to indicate a wish that Lieut.-Col. Hodgson, now commanding one of the Sikh local corps, should be named for the appointment. In this respect also his Lordship will be happy to comply with his Excellency's wishes, if that officer's services are available. But, his Lordship remarks, that Lieut.-Col. Hodgson lately applied for and received a further leave of absence for six months, on medical certificate, which shows of course that that officer cannot safely undertake any present duties in the plains.

9th. If, however, his Excellency should consider that the active services of the inspecting officer are required immediately, his Lordship would propose to offer the appointment to Lieut.-Col. Bradford or Lieut.-Col. Christie. These officers bear, each of them, a high character, and his Lordship believes are well qualified for such duties as those which would belong to the inspecting officer.

10th. The corps of guides and the four Sikh local corps, raised in 1846, will continue to be civil corps, as at present.

11th. A further General Order, relative to the artillery at present employed across the Indus, will be transmitted hereafter for the information of his Excellency.

Simla,  
the 26th June, 1853.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
with the Governor-General.

#### DRAFT OF GENERAL ORDERS.

Draft of General  
Orders.

1. The Most Noble the Governor-General of India is pleased to resolve that the force raised in the Punjab by general order of the Governor-General of the 18th May, 1849, and denominated the "Punjab Irregular Force," shall from the 1st proximo be transferred from the orders of the Board of Administration, and be placed as military corps under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. The "Punjab Irregular Force" will consist of five regiments of cavalry and five regiments of infantry, and is for general service in the Punjab and the Trans-Indus provinces under British rule, as well as beyond those limits, should the emergencies of the service require it.

3. The nomination of European officers and staff to the force will continue as at present in the hands of the Governor-General.

4. The establishment of the force and the rates of pay and allowances will be as follows, from the 1st proximo.

5.	1 Inspecting Officer, staff pay	...	...	...	Rs. 800	0	0
	and Pay and Allowances of Rank						
	1 Staff Officer, Staff Pay	...	...	...	Rs. 124	0	0
	2 Horses	...	...	...	60	0	0
	Office Tent	...	...	...	30	0	0
	Office Allowance	...	...	...	140	0	0
						354	0
	and Pay and Allowances of Rank.						

6. Establishment and allowances of a regiment of Punjab irregular cavalry of six rissallahs.

1 Commandant, Consolidated	...	...	...	Rs. 1,000	0	0
1 Second in Command, do.	...	...	...	500	0	0

6	}	3 Ressaldars ... ..	Rs. 150	0	0	REPORT, &c. Draft of General Orders.
		3 Ressaldars ... ..	80	0	0	
		6 Naib Ressaldars ... ..	50	0	0	
		6 Jemedars ... ..	45	0	0	
		6 Kote Duffadars ... ..	35	0	0	
		48 Duffadars ... ..	28	0	0	
		6 Nishanburdars ... ..	28	0	0	
		6 Trumpeters or Nuggarchees ... ..	25	0	0	
500 Sowars ... ..	20	0	0			
6 Bheesties ... ..	4	8	0			

STAFF.

1 Adjutant and Quartermaster, Staff Pay	Rs. 60	14	0
Horse Allowance ... ..	30	0	0
Office Allowance ... ..	80	0	0
	<hr/>	170	14 0

and Pay and Allowances of Rank.

1 Assistant Surgeon, Medical Staff Salary ...	Rs. 165	0	0
with the Cavalry Scale of Pay and Allowances			
1 Woordee Major ... ..	105	0	0
1 Nakeele ... ..	20	0	0
1 Persian Writer ... ..	30	0	0
2 Native Doctors, Pay and Batta according to Class			
Allowance for a Horse each ... ..	6	8	0
2 Lascars in Cantonment ... ..	5	0	0
1 per Ressallah when Marching			
1 Chowdree ... ..	11	0	0
1 Mutsuddee ... ..	5	0	0
3 Flag or Weighmen ... ..	3	0	0
1 Trumpet Major } Non-Effective {	5	0	0
6 Pay Duffadars }	6	0	0
Allowance for Stationery ... ..	30	0	0
Mess Allowance ... ..	60	0	0

Allowance for Watch, one and a half anna per man. Hospital Establishment with Bearers for Doolies, as allowed for a Regiment of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, to be paid by the Commissariat Department.

7. The Punjab Irregular Cavalry Regiments are to be on the same footing in all respects as the Regiment of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, subject, however, to the modification contained in paragraph 9.

8. Establishment and Allowances of a Regiment of Punjab Irregular Infantry, consisting of eight companies.

1 Commandant, Pay and Allowances of Rank and			
Command Allowance ... ..	Rs. 200	0	0
Horse Allowance ... ..	30	0	0
	<hr/>	230	0 0
1 Second in Command, consolidated ... ..	500	0	0
1 Adjutant and Quarter-Master Pay and Allowances of			
Rank and Staff Pay ... ..	60	14	0
Horse Allowance ... ..	30	0	0
Office Allowance ... ..	80	0	0
	<hr/>	170	14 0
1 Assistant-Surgeon Pay and Allowances of Rank and			
Staff Pay ... ..	165	0	0
or 1 Apothecary consolidated ... ..	300	0	0
1 Serjeant-Major, Pay and Batta ... ..	51	5	0
1 Quarter-Master Serjeant, Pay and Batta ... ..	45	5	2

REPORT, &c.  
Draft of General  
Orders.

	Pay.	Batta.	Total.	Add. Batta when on Field Service or marching.
8 Subadars ... ..	Rs. 52 0	15 0	67 0	15 0
8 Jemadars ... ..	17 0	7 8	24 8	7 8
48 Havildars ... ..	9 0	5 0	14 0	5 0
48 Naicks ... ..	7 0	5 0	12 0	5 0
16 Drummers { under 20 years	5 8	1 8	7 0	1 8
{ after 20 years	6 8	1 8	8 0	1 8
800 Sepoys { after 27 years	7 8	1 8	9 0	1 8
8 Lascars ... ..	4 12	1 0	5 12	1 0
8 Bheesties ... ..	5 0	0 0	5 0	1 0
8 Sweepers ... ..	-4 0	0 0	4 0	0 0

## STAFF.

2 Native Doctors, Pay and Batta according to Class

1 Drum-Major	Non-Effective.	...	...	...	Rs. 5 0 0
1 Fife-Major		...	...	...	5 0 0
8 Pay Havildars		...	...	...	5 0 0
8 Colour Havildars		...	...	...	2 0 0
1 Drill Havildar		...	...	...	5 0 0
1 Drill Naick		...	...	...	2 8 0
1 Moonshee ... ..		...	...	...	30 0 0
1 Tindal, Pay Rs. 7. 8p. Batta Rs. 2. 0p.		...	...	...	9 8 0
Additional Batta on Field-Service or Marching		...	...	...	2 0 0
1 Chowdree ... ..		...	...	...	11 0 0
1 Mutsuddee ... ..		...	...	...	5 0 0
3 Flag or Weighmen ... ..		...	...	...	3 0 0
2 Bildars ... ..		...	...	...	3 8 0
Additional Batta on Field-Service or Marching		...	...	...	1 0 0

Hospital establishment as allowed for local corps to be paid by the Commissariat Department, and Doolies and Bearers as allowed for regiments of native infantry.

## ALLOWANCES.

Repairs of Arms Rs. 25 per Company ... ..	Rs. 200 0
Mess Allowance ... ..	60 0
Repair of Tents to Quarter-Master at ten annas per Paul and one rupee per Serjeants' tents.	
Ditto Butts and Targets ... ..	4 0
School-Shed ... ..	5 0

9. No additional or extra pay, beyond the rates above stated, will be granted to either cavalry or infantry while employed in any part of the British territories.

10. Hutting-money is authorized for the infantry portion of the force.

11. The native officers and men of both cavalry and infantry are admissible to invalid, wound, and family pensions, according to the regulations applicable to local and irregular troops.

12. Men who have been transferred from the line or irregular cavalry, will retain all pensionary claims to which they were entitled at the time of their transfer.

13. The infantry will be armed with muskets or rifles and black accoutrements, and clothed in the same manner as local corps on the Bengal establishment.

14. The full proportion of camp equipage will be allowed for the infantry regiments.

15. The "Punjab Irregular Force" will from the 1st proximo be subject to military law and regulations.

No. 845.

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. TUCKER, Adjutant-General of the Army, to Sir HENRY M. ELLIOT, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

*Dated Head-Quarters, Simla, 6th August, 1850.*

SIR,

Reply, submits a memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief on the draft of the general order regarding the transfer, &c. of the Punjab irregular force

the honour to transmit to you, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General, a memorandum in original, of date the 30th ultimo (with its annexment of the 5th *idem*, from Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Hodgson), detailing the sentiments and opinions of Sir Charles Napier on the subject under advertence.

Head-Quarters,  
Simla, 6th August, 1850.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

From the  
Adjutant-General,  
to Sir H. M. Elliot,  
6th August, 1850.

## MEMORANDUM.

1. With regard to the first paragraph of the Governor-General's "*draft order*," I have to observe, that it is the prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief to command all the troops in India, or that title has no meaning.

2. That troops to the amount of ten regiments should have been enrolled, by an order dated the 18th May, 1849, and that they should not yet have been placed by the Governor-General under my command, but under that of a Civil Board, appeared to evince such a want of confidence in me as Commander-in-Chief, that had it not been my duty to smother my private feelings during the continuance of an incipient mutiny, which was smouldering among the troops, I should have resigned sooner than I did. But I considered that it was my duty to remain while the danger lasted,—a danger which, as every one knows, was both great and imminent.

3. As regards paragraph 2, I have no remarks to make.

4. The third paragraph of the "*draft order*" I consider to be strange; but I should take no notice of it, had not my position as Commander-in-Chief demanded that I should protest against what appears to me to be an innovation. The injury which this does to the service, every military man must be aware of; I shall therefore confine my observations to the indignity which will be offered to the Commander-in-Chief, if this proposed breach of precedent be carried into effect.

5. When, in 1846, Lord Hardinge made over the irregular troops to the Commander-in-Chief, he made over with them the nomination of the European officers. When irregular troops were raised in Scinde by both the Lords Ellenborough and Hardinge, the nomination of the European officers was given to me, then a major-general; but now it seems that my present far higher rank has, in the opinion of the present Governor-General, rendered me less worthy of public confidence! Yet, if I am fit to be Commander-in-Chief, there can hardly be any good reason to withhold from me any portion of that power to reward and encourage officers, which has hitherto been intrusted to the chief military authority in this country.

I therefore remonstrate against the Governor-General's depriving the Commander-in-Chief of the power to nominate European officers to this portion of the army, if it is to be placed under my orders.

6. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, all relate to details of little or no importance, except one, viz., the pay of the sowars; this is placed at Rs. 20, which I think too low a rate. These sowars ought not to have less than Rs. 25 a month. On so small a sum as Rs. 20, the sowars will plunder whenever an opportunity offers; and there are few stations where the man can properly feed his horse on that sum. I believe this opinion to be general, and it is strongly corroborated by the very details now under consideration, for I find that wherever horse allowance is granted to an officer, the amount is Rs. 30! Now, if it requires Rs. 30 to feed an officer's horse, how is the sowar to feed

Memorandum  
by the Commander-  
in-Chief,  
30th July, 1850.

REPORT, &c.  
 Memorandum  
 by the Commander-  
 in-Chief,  
 30th July, 1850.

both himself and his horse, and pay for his arms, dress, and other expenses besides, out of Rs. 20? The allowance appears to me to be insufficient. Let the superiority of the "*Scinde Horse*" be brought to mind, and the power which *their* horses exhibited in the field. I recommended Rs. 30 when I formed that regiment, because I knew that they could not be efficient on a less sum.

I have no more to say on this "draft order."

I am ready to obey this or any other order that I receive from the Governor-General, but I cannot submit, without remonstrating, to have the privileges and the position of the Commander-in-Chief in India lowered while in my hands.

7. Having made the foregoing remarks on the "draft order," I now come to the letter of Sir Henry Elliot, inclosing that order.

There can be no doubt (as therein said) inquiries are necessary as to the equipment of the Punjab irregular force. I inspected two of the infantry regiments during my tour to Peshawur, and though the zealous and clever officers in command of them had done all that could be done (indeed, one of them, the 1st Punjab regiment, under Major Cook, was as well drilled as any Queen's regiment in India), and that sufficient time had elapsed from the date of their formation to make them perfectly efficient, yet, from want of equipments, they were unfit for service. The cavalry regiments supply themselves, and, not being dependent upon Government, were fit for service.

Had the 1st regiment of Punjab infantry been sent through the Kohat Pass, as was ordered when I arrived at Peshawur, it would probably have been cut to pieces! It may appear to his Lordship, not being a military man, that it is an easy thing for anybody to form soldiers; but I fear he will find that this is a very mistaken idea. It is my opinion that the Civil Board of Administration cannot do it, and had certainly not done it when I was in the Punjab.

8. There seems to be something unsatisfactory in the 3rd paragraph of Sir Henry Elliot's letter. Above one year after these ten regiments have been embodied, a proposed establishment for their pay and numbers is sent by the Governor-General (his Lordship not being a military man) for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. One would imagine, that before these corps were raised, the Commander-in-Chief would have been ordered, "*ex officio*" as head of the army, to draw up a proposed establishment, and submit it to the higher authority of the Governor-General for confirmation or alteration, as his Lordship judged proper. But not so. My work, and that of the departments under my orders, is done by I know not who, and then sent to me for my opinions on the details. Then I have to observe that the *present* pay and establishment—those on which these troops have worked for above a year—have not been sent. How, then, am I to form a judgment in what way the feelings, or interests, or the promise made originally to these troops, will be affected? These are points, on all which I must be informed, ere I can give a just opinion on these new arrangements proposed by the Governor-General.

9. I am perfectly aware of the system now pursued in India,—which is to render the Commander-in-Chief powerless, and, at the same time, to increase his responsibility. Against this, I beg leave, with due respect, to remonstrate; and as a proof (there are many others) that what I say is just, I refer to the next paragraph of Sir Henry Elliot's letter. In this paragraph (while asked, with an appearance of respect, for my opinion upon a few insignificant details) I am informed, "It is, however, to be understood that, when the corps have thus been transferred, all forts, upon the frontier or elsewhere, which have already been reported, or may hereafter be reported, to be required as military posts, will be ultimately garrisoned by the regular or irregular troops under his Excellency's command." The plain English of this paragraph is, that the local authorities, civil and military (along the "*frontier and elsewhere*"), and the Board of Administration, are to decide which forts are required for the defence of the country, and which are not; and the so-called Commander-in-Chief of the army is to send garrisons wherever Mr. This, Captain That, or Lieutenant T'other may think that a garrison is required! Thus, in case of war or insurrection, the army would be divided into innumerable detachments, at the discretion of these incompetent gentlemen, clothed with the power of the Governor-General, while the Commander-in-Chief, without any voice in the matter, is to be responsible for the discipline of that army, for the defence of that frontier, and for the protection of those forts! I cannot here enter into an essay on war, but I must be allowed to say that, if the Commander-in-Chief has not the entire disposition of all the troops under his command, an enormous responsibility is forced upon him, while he is deprived of the power to meet it. That power is placed

in other men's hands, whose rank, experience, and capacity to use it may be doubted, and, as far as my opinion goes, very much doubted!

His Lordship, in dictating this paragraph to Sir Henry Elliot, does not appear to be aware that the occupation of the strong forts in this country is a matter which requires much military knowledge, and must be dependent both upon the quarter from which danger is apprehended, and upon a general system of defence submitted by the Commander-in-Chief for the information of the Governor-General, and so arranged as to meet any danger expected; such arrangements being previously approved by his Lordship.

But, except some system of this kind be acted upon, I do not see how this army can be either safe or efficient in time of war. It would be disseminated in detachments at the pleasure of ignorant and inexperienced subordinates.

10. The 5th paragraph orders the Punjab regiment now at Lahore to remain there till the end of the season, which, if these troops are placed under my orders, shall of course be done.

His Lordship also desires that a regiment should be sent to the Hazara country, which shall also be obeyed.

11. Adverting to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9, of Sir Henry Elliot's letter, I enclose Lieut.-Col. Hodgson's own letter on the subject of his being employed. I continue to think him well suited to this command, the duties of which will be, to see that the equipments of the Punjab irregular corps are complete, their discipline good, and, in case of war, to assume the command of any body of these troops which the Commander-in-Chief may assemble for a particular duty, under a select officer.

Simla,  
30th July, 1850.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

#### MEMORANDUM.

For the consideration of his Excellency General SIR CHARLES NAPIER, G.C.B.,  
Commander-in-Chief.

*Simla, July 5th, 1850.*

I have maturely considered the subject on which your Excellency communicated with me yesterday; and deeply sensible of the honour you have conferred on me, by selecting me for the appointment of inspecting officer of the Punjab irregular force, I feel disposed, both in gratitude to your Excellency, and on other grounds, to accept the honourable employment offered me; but I confess, and your Excellency will, I am sure, not misunderstand me when I say, that I have some misgivings as to the adequacy of the allowance attached to this appointment, considering that I must unavoidably keep up a full and permanent marching establishment, and be constantly on the move during a great part of every year, through a very extended country, not to mention the necessity of maintaining a suitable appearance.

The principal difficulty, however, as it presents itself to my mind, is the somewhat anomalous designation of inspecting officer, and my ignorance of the exact nature of the duties and responsibilities involved in it, and whether in any, and what respects my position as inspecting officer will differ from that of a brigadier.

Your Excellency will understand, and enter into the feelings which I entertain, although I have but imperfectly expressed them.

I am very anxious to know whether in the situation proposed for my acceptance I shall be invested with superior *military* command and control over the troops of the Punjab irregular force, such as a brigadier exercises; I hope that your Excellency will not consider me unreasonable in respectfully requesting that the duties of the office proposed for my acceptance may be distinctly defined previous to my undertaking them. I beg, however, the indulgence of being permitted to leave the matter in your Excellency's hands. I need hardly say that I am prepared to render the most willing service; and if your Excellency considers that the situation offered, is in fact that which you did me the honour to select me for, I shall feel no further hesitation in accepting it, and will endeavour to show the sincerity of my gratitude to your Excellency as it may best be proved, by the most zealous performance of the duties of the situation, which I shall owe to your favourable opinion.

(Signed) J. S. HODGSON, Bt. Lieut.-Col.,  
12th Regiment Native Infantry.

2 L

REPORT, &c.

Memorandum  
by the Commander-  
in-Chief,  
30th July, 1850.

Memorandum by  
Lieut.-Col.  
Hodgson,  
5th July, 1850.

REPORT, &amp;c.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA,  
dated the 22nd August, 1850.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
22nd August, 1850.

On a memorandum by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, relative to the Punjab irregular force.

1. The Adjutant-General of the army has transmitted to me, in a letter, dated the 6th instant, a memorandum by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, relative to a general order, by which it was proposed to place the ten irregular regiments which have been raised for service in the Punjab, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

2. It is not my intention to address to his Excellency any detailed reply to the contents of that document.

I shall fully justify the measures of my administration, which are therein impugned; and I shall expose the misrepresentations which it contains of my words, and acts, and intentions. But for that purpose I shall address myself exclusively and directly to those authorities, from whom I received the commission that I hold.

3. The spirit which his Excellency Sir Charles Napier has exhibited towards the Government under which he acts, is so gravely reprehensible, and the tone and tenor of his communication are so highly objectionable, that I deem it necessary for the public service, and due to the station in which I am placed, that I should formally bring his Excellency's proceedings to the notice of the Honourable Court of Directors, and of Her Majesty's Government.

4. In order that Sir Charles Napier may be aware of the sentiments entertained by the Honourable Court, and by Her Majesty's Government, regarding the communications which have already taken place on measures connected with the subject of his recent memorandum, I beg that a copy of the despatch from the Honourable the Secret Committee, dated 24th June, 1850, may be communicated to his Excellency, together with this minute.

5. In the mean time, and until the reply of the home authorities shall be received, I must necessarily suspend the orders which it was my intention to have issued.

August 22nd, 1850.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

No. 962.

From the ADJUTANT-GENERAL of the ARMY to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

SIR,—

From the  
Adjutant-General  
of the Army to the  
Secretary to the  
Government of  
India,  
6th Sept. 1850.

Forwards a memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief in reply to the minute by the Governor-General.

the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, copy of a memorandum by his Excellency, received yesterday in this department, but bearing date the 30th idem, in reply to the minute by his Lordship, enclosed with your communication under acknowledgment.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, and with advertence to your dispatch, No. 59, of the 29th ult., to transmit to you, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, copy of a memorandum by his Excellency, received yesterday in this department, but bearing date the 30th idem, in reply to the minute by his Lordship, enclosed with your communication under acknowledgment.

Head Quarters, Simla,  
the 6th September, 1850.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

MEMORANDUM by the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, dated 30th August, 1850.

Memorandum  
by the Commander-  
in-Chief,  
30th August, 1850.

1. In their present relative positions, the Commander-in-Chief can only acknowledge the receipt of the Most Noble the Governor-General's minute, dated 22nd instant, simply denying that he has made any intentional misrepresentation, either on this or any other occasion in his life.

2. The Commander-in-Chief entirely concurs in the general principle laid down in the extract, which he has invariably sought to observe to the best of his abilities.

August 30th, 1850.

## MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India.

*Dated 26th October, 1850.*

On Punjab irregular force.

1. The considerations which induced me in April, 1849, to sanction the raising of ten irregular regiments in the Punjab

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
26th Oct. 1850.

were threefold :—

I. The great extension of our territory by the annexation of the Punjab, rendered it indispensable to make some increase to the army of the Bengal Presidency, even though certain stations had been made over to the armies of Madras and Bombay.

II. The regular army having been stationed at various points over the surface of the Punjab, irregular corps were represented to me as best adapted for service on the frontier where it was proposed to place them.

III. Promises had been given during the course of the disturbances in 1848 and the subsequent war, by our own officers to the Sikh Durbar troops, who remained faithful, and to the temporary levies, that their fidelity would be rewarded by permanent service. These promises the Government was in good faith bound to fulfil, and the promised service could be best provided by raising these local corps.

2. When conveying the sanction of the Government to the measure, I intimated my intention of transferring these corps to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief when they should be completed.

3. The delays which have from time to time occurred in fulfilling this intention, and the causes of them, have been already recorded. In the month of June last, I transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief a draft of a general order detailing fully the establishment of the Punjab irregular force, which I proposed to publish on transferring the force to his Excellency's orders. The reply which I received from his Excellency was of such a nature as to raise a reasonable doubt in my mind whether, if I should transfer the force to his Excellency's orders, I should be able to rely with confidence on meeting with prompt and full attention to my wishes regarding such distribution and movements of the irregular force on the frontier, as political considerations might render expedient.

4. After careful consideration, I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that I must for the present forego my intention of transferring these corps to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and must retain them under my own immediate authority, until those arrangements shall be completed on the frontier, which political considerations, as well as military necessities, may suggest.

5. Besides the infantry and cavalry to whom service was promised, two batteries of artillery, and some Golundauze obtained the same guarantee of military service in consideration of their steady fidelity during the war.

These batteries have been stationed across the Indus for the last year-and-a-half. Some artillery is absolutely necessary along that frontier. We have no excess of that arm, and these men may as well be employed in the mode in which they have hitherto been employed, as be placed in other battalions or batteries where they must be supernumeraries.

His Excellency, Sir C. Napier, saw one of these batteries during the last winter, and approved strongly of it. I myself saw the other at Dehra-Ghazee-Khan, and found them orderly, smart, and soldier-like.

They adhered to us firmly under temptations to which others of their countrymen yielded, and are fully worthy, according to the testimony of all who are cognizant of their conduct, of trust and reliance.

The consent of the Honorable Court of Directors will, I have no doubt, be readily given to their being retained for frontier service under the command of an European officer.

6. Those of the Golundauze who are not incorporated into the two batteries, should be employed as at present in garrisoning the several forts which are placed along the frontier.

The armament necessary for such forts as must in prudence be retained, has been, or shortly will be, fixed. I propose to place in each fort the number of artillerymen necessary to work the guns allotted to it as its armament. And as the exigencies of the service will not admit of an European commissioned officer being placed in each fort, and as it is manifestly desirable that the corps on that frontier should be able to take all their officers into the field in the event of their being ordered out on service, I have con-



REPORT, &c.  
Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
26th Oct. 1850.

templated the appointment of a steady non-commissioned officer of artillery to each of the more distant forts, so as not to leave the garrison for any period without an European of some rank in it. Perhaps some of the unattached ensigns, may, on inquiry, be found well qualified for this duty.

7. Thus the Punjab irregular force will consist of five regiments of cavalry, five regiments of infantry, two field batteries, and such artillerymen as may be stationed in the forts along the frontier.

8. In his second memorandum, the Commander-in-Chief recommended that an officer should be appointed to command this force as a brigadier. The advantages of placing these corps under one well qualified to maintain uniformity of system and strict discipline, as well as of proved capacity, to direct the operations which the force must at all times be liable to be called upon to undertake, on an extended and turbulent border, are too evident to require discussion. I have therefore resolved to solicit the sanction of the Honourable Court to the creation of this office, and to the addition of the staff appointment which must accompany it.

9. Sir C. Napier further pointed out Lieutenant Colonel Hodgson, now commanding the 1st Sikh local regiment, as the officer whom he would wish to see nominated to the command of the force.

Lieutenant Colonel Hodgson's established reputation as a soldier, and especially his experience of the management of Sikh troops, who under him, rendered excellent service during the late war, entirely justified in my judgment the preference given to him, by Sir Charles Napier, and I propose to appoint him accordingly.

10. The Punjab irregular force then will be placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hodgson, with the designation of brigadier, and with a consolidated salary of two thousand (2,000) rupees per mensem.

11. The brigadier will be assisted by a major of brigade, with the salary of a brigade-major of the line.

12. The scale of pay and allowances which have been given since the embodiment of the corps, has recently been modified. The establishments of the regiments and batteries have been placed on that footing, which the experience of the past eighteen months has shown to be necessary, in order to render these troops thoroughly efficient for frontier service. The scale will shortly be published in a general order.

13. The powers and functions of the brigadier will be precisely analogous to those of a brigadier of the line, over the troops composing the irregular force.

Regard being had to the peculiar character and position of this force, it is expedient that the brigadier should have entire control over the discipline and interior economy of the corps; report being made by him of all his measures to the Board of Administration, for the approval and confirmation of the Government.

14. The force will be placed under the articles of war. A warrant will be obtained for the brigadier, giving the necessary powers for courts martial, while full weight will be given to the recommendations of the brigadier on such points: it is not expedient that any officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, should be removed from the service without the sanction of the Government.

15. The force will, for the present, be retained under the immediate authority of the Governor-General, administered ordinarily by the Board of Administration in the Punjab.

16. All orders which may be issued by the Board of Administration, respecting any portion of the irregular force, shall be addressed to the brigadier, excepting in cases of sudden emergency.

17. The distribution of the force, and the periodical relief of the several corps, shall be reported upon by the brigadier, and shall be ordered by the Board after they shall have received the confirmation of the Government.

18. My object, in retaining for the present, the irregular force under my own immediate authority, is to secure for the local Government, the full and prompt control of military means, sufficient to effect any object which political considerations may in their judgment render it expedient to secure, without any delay on the distant frontier across the Indus.

19. In fulfilment of this object, the brigadier and the officers of the force are required to comply promptly and fully with any requisition for troops which may be made by the Board of Administration, or by the civil officers of the district in which any portion of the force may be stationed. It is at the same time to be understood, that the direction of the military operations of any such force when in the field, and the responsibility for them, will rest exclusively with the military officer in command at the time.

20. The troops composing the irregular force shall be moved into the field only by

the orders of the brigadier, or on the requisition of the Board of Administration, or of the civil officer on the spot. But in the event of troops of the irregular force having been moved and employed on any service, together with troops of the line, the command will be taken, as usual, by the senior officer, whoever he may be.

21. The Punjab irregular force will be employed chiefly on the frontier across the Indus. An organized police force, under its own officers, will also be employed there; and the troops of the regular army will be in close proximity, and in contact at various points.

It is very necessary, therefore, to define, as has been done in the preceding paragraphs, the limits of the authority which is intended to belong to the several parties by whom the service in its various branches will be carried on.

But while thus defining the authority of each, I expect that all the officers of every branch, whether civil or military, will be prepared to act together in harmony, and with cordiality for the public interests, without any such over-sensitiveness or jealousy as to the precise limits of their respective powers, as must invariably tend to the prejudice of the general interests of the state wherever such feelings are indulged.

22. During my administration I have marked, with extreme satisfaction, the entire absence of such feelings on the part of officers on the frontier; and I take advantage of this opportunity, to record my unqualified approbation of the cordial co-operation which the civil and military officers in the Punjab, have given to each other, and of the public spirit and harmony which have characterized all their proceedings.

23. Thus encouraged by my experience of the past, I rely with confidence on a steady continuance of the same good-will and mutual co-operation between the services for the future.

24. Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgson has been directed to proceed to Lahore and to report himself to the Board of Administration.

The Board will direct him to repair as soon as possible to the frontier, in order to report on the question which presses most urgently for decision, namely, the distribution of the troops, and of the several detachments which may be necessary for the defence and tranquillity of the frontier districts from Kohat to the borders of Scinde.

25. The brigadier should at the same time submit his views regarding the several forts to be kept up, their garrison, armament, &c., and regarding all such military measures as he may judge it expedient to notice.

26. One of the officers intended to hold command in the organized police force should accompany Colonel Hodgson to the frontier. In concert and communication with Major Taylor and the other civil officers, the brigadier, and the officer of police, will be able, speedily and effectually, to determine the several arrangements which they may suggest as best calculated to meet attack from enemies beyond the frontier, and to maintain order and security for life and property within our own territories.

27. In furnishing instructions to the brigadier, the Board of Administration will be so good as to communicate to him the contents of paragraphs 12 to 23, and to make them known to the several officers along the frontier.

26th October, 1850.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

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MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated the 7th May, 1853.

Punjab irregular force.

Letter to Adjutant-General,  
29th August, 1850.

In letter from Adjutant-  
General, 6th August, 1850.

1. Circumstances have accidentally brought to my knowledge that I have omitted to record the reply which I intimated my intention of making to a memorandum by Sir Charles Napier, when Commander-in-Chief of this army, dated 30th July, 1850, relative to the irregular regiments raised in the Punjab.

2. The memorandum was of such a nature that I declined to address any reply to his Excellency; informing him at the same time that I considered it "necessary for the public service and due to the station in which I am placed, that I should formally bring his Excellency's proceedings to the notice of the Honourable Court of Directors and her Majesty's Government."

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
7th May, 1853.

REPORT, &c.  
Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
7th May, 1853.

Very shortly afterwards it became officially known that Sir Charles Napier was to quit this command, and I was glad to set the paper and its contents aside.

It seems fitting, however, now that it has again come before me, to notice the leading allegations of the memorandum, merely for the purpose of placing on record the proof of their incorrectness.

3. Those allegations are, 1st. That I had shown want of confidence in the Commander-in-Chief by delaying to place the irregular regiments raised in the Punjab under his orders; and to such an extent that he should in consequence have resigned sooner

Paragraph 2. than he did, but for an incipient mutiny among the troops. 2nd. That in retaining the appointment of the officers of these irregular regiments in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, I had made an "innovation," and should offer

Paragraph 4. an "indignity" to the Commander-in-Chief by the proposed "breach of precedent."

4. A very brief statement of facts will suffice to show that one and all of these allegations are equally without foundation.

5. First, as to delay in transferring the irregular regiments in the Punjab to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

The orders to raise them were issued on 18th May, 1849. In the minute proposing their being raised it was provided that on their completion they should be considered under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

In a confidential memorandum, which I submitted to Sir Charles Napier only five weeks subsequently, and within ten days of his arrival at head-quarters, he was informed that, "with the exception of raising certain local corps, *the origin of which I have already explained*, nothing has been decided upon regarding the permanent military arrangements for the occupation of the Punjab, until the whole subject shall have been submitted to and considered by the Commander-in-Chief."

His Excellency's opinion was solicited, and it was added, "There are several points connected with *the corps already authorized to be raised*, on which I am very anxious to have his Excellency's opinion; but I will not trouble him with these at present."

6. The opinion of his Excellency thus solicited was not given till the 30th November, five months subsequently. In the paper then submitted, Sir Charles Napier, far from complaining that the irregular regiments had not already been made over to him, expressed himself regarding them in these words:—

Page 36. Irregular cavalry now raising under the civil authority. "There are, I think, ten regiments now raising under the direction of the Board of Administration in the Punjab; of these, five are cavalry, I think, and five infantry. I recommend that they be employed *as a military police* in parts remote from the great military stations and *across the Indus*. As Sir Henry Lawrence thinks they can defend the *Peshawur district*, I am very glad to give that up to them."

I, on my part, far from being reluctant to make over the irregular regiments to the Commander-in-Chief, demurred to this proposal of his Excellency giving the Peshawur district up to the civil authority.

Accordingly, on the 26th December, I observed that *in the minute authorizing their organization*, I stated that *on their completion* they should be considered as under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief; and I added, "It is necessary that this point should be clearly ascertained," and requested to be "favoured with his Excellency's opinion, whether the corps in question should be placed, *as contemplated in the original minute* under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, or under those of the Board of Administration."

Sir Charles Napier had been requested to reply to this question, so that the several matters pending might be "speedily adjusted." He did not reply, however, till the 26th February, 1850, when he expressed, in a memorandum, his readiness to take the irregular regiments.

This memorandum reached me at Calcutta, after my return from the Straits settlements, in March. On the 10th April it was recorded in a minute, "The ten irregular regiments will be placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible."

It was added, "I shall be at Simla in a few weeks, and the several points of detail respecting the additional equipment of these regiments, the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief for an officer to command the whole, &c. may be then settled

“ rapidly through the Adjutant-General, when a general order will be issued transferring these corps to the Commander-in-Chief.”

I reached Simla on 1st May. Some modifications were made, but the general order for transferring these corps was sent to the Adjutant-General on 26th June.

7. This simple statement of facts and dates, is sufficient to show, that, instead of having exhibited a want of confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, by withholding from him the ten irregular regiments, I voluntarily proposed, in the original minute, that the regiments, as soon as they were completed, should be made over to the Commander-in-Chief; that on receiving his proposal that they should be given to the civil government, I opposed it; and that on receiving his Excellency's assent to take the regiments, I directed at once their transfer, and carried it into effect as speedily as was practicable.

I have further to remark, that Sir Charles Napier's own memorandum of 27th November, conclusively proves that at the very time at which he has represented himself (in his memorandum of July 30th) as anxious to resign his command, in consequence of the irregular corps not having been transferred to him, he had himself actually recommended officially to the Governor-General, that they should not be transferred at all, but should be employed as military police under the civil government, and in the district of Peshawur.

8. I have now to advert to the second allegation, that in retaining the appointment of the officers of the Punjab irregular force in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, when the force was to be transferred to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, I made an “ innovation,” committed a “ breach of precedent,” and, in so doing, offered an “ indignity ” to Sir Charles Napier.

His Excellency's statement is incorrect in regard to facts, and wholly erroneous otherwise.

9. The course I pursued was in strict accordance with the course followed by my predecessors on similar occasions; and when Sir Charles Napier stated that Lord Hardinge, in 1846, made over to the Commander-in-Chief the appointment of officers in the irregular cavalry corps he had lately raised, his Excellency should have added that his Lordship's doing so had been an exception to general practice, and not the rule.

For the records of the Government show, that all the provincial and local corps that at various times have been raised, had at first their officers appointed by the Governor-General in Council, though the corps themselves were placed under the orders of the military authorities, and made returns to the Adjutant-General.

When some of those local, became purely military, corps, the appointment of officers still remained with the Governor-General in Council, and the Commander-in-Chief made his recommendations only. Many local battalions so circumstanced, however, have remained, in regard to appointment of officers, just as they were originally, and are still officered by the Governor-General in Council.

10. This practice has prevailed from the first institution of local corps, and has been acted upon by successive Governors-General, up to my immediate predecessor inclusive.

Minutes Council, 24th April, 1792. 11. The corps of Hill Rangers at Bhaugulpore was “ transferred from the Revenue to the Military Department ” in 1792, and the Commander-in-Chief was requested “ to issue the necessary orders in consequence.”

G. O. C. C. 14th July, 1795.

G. O. P. C. 20th August, 1806.

In 1795, the Ramghur battalion was raised in the same manner.

These local corps greatly increased in number, so that in 1823 the Governor-General in Council issued the following order regarding them :—

#### LOCAL CORPS.

56 (1).

That the fourteen battalions named in the margin\* be declared “ local battalions,”

- |                                     |                  |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Calcutta native militia (civil). | } since reduced. |
| 2. Ramghur local battalion.         |                  |
| 3. Bhaugulpore hill rangers         |                  |
| 4. Dinagepore local battalion       |                  |
| 5. Chumparun light infantry.        |                  |

6. First.

REPORT, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
7th May, 1853.

REPORT, &c.  
 Minute by the  
 Governor-General,  
 7th May, 1853.

raised for the service and defence of the provinces or districts in which they were formed, or elsewhere *on emergency*, and liable to active service in the field; that they have rank and precedence next after the troops of the line, and be considered as entitled to the benefits of the Invalid Pension Establishment, under regulations to be issued separately.—Govt. G.O. No. 8, 2nd May, 1823.

These corps are clothed, armed, equipped, and supplied with ammunition at the expense of the state, and under the same rules as prevail with troops of the line, excepting their belts and accoutrements, which are black instead of buff. They are supplied also under the like orders with camp equipage and stores when necessary; the dress and discipline are the same, except that the men supply themselves with half-mountings, on which account commandants are strictly prohibited from making any deductions, except in cases of confirmed slovenliness, or inattention of the men to cleanliness and the standing orders, which being, special cases, will be noted in orders, and the adjutant directed to supply the parties deficient of half-mounting, deducting the actual cost thereof from the men's pay.—Govt. G.O. No. 8, 2nd May, 1823.

The appointment of officers to command provincial corps was at all times made by the Governor-General in Council.

This appears by a letter from the Adjutant-General, dated 30th March, 1828, in which he submitted, on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, a memorandum which his Excellency had received from his predecessor, Sir Edward Paget, who, in his turn, had received it from the Marquess of Hastings.

This memorandum detailed the appointment made by the Governor-General in Council and by the Commander-in-Chief respectively. Therein the appointments of "Commandants and Adjutants of all police, Sebundy Nujeeb, or provincial battalions, " which form no part of the regular army, although returns are received from all by the Adjutant-General," are specified to be in the direct gift of the Governor-General.

12. Such has ever since continued to be the case in regard to many of these local corps.

The two regiments of light infantry, on the Assam frontier; the Ramghur battalion, on the south-west frontier; the sappers, on the Sikkim frontier; the Calcutta local corps; the corps in Mhairwarrah, in Marwar, and Meywar, all have their officers named by the Governor-General in Council.

Lastly, when Lord Hardinge, whose practice Sir Charles Napier seeks to contrast with mine, raised a frontier brigade, consisting of four regiments of Sikh local infantry, on the Sutlej frontier, he retained the appointments of their officers in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, where it still remains.

13. Thus I have shown, that for sixty years past, the practice, when provincial corps and local battalions were raised, even when they were placed upon a frontier, was to retain the appointment of their officers in the hands of the Governor-General in Council.

When, therefore, I directed an irregular force of local corps to be raised in the Punjab, for service on the frontier, I followed the example of my predecessors, and retained the appointment of the officers for their Governor-General in Council.

14. There was an additional and a special reason for doing so upon that occasion. The Bombay army had shared in the conquest of the Punjab: it was fair that they should share in the appointments created in consequence of it. The Court of Directors have since directed that both Bombay and Madras officers should be selected for these corps. The position of the Governor-General enabled him to exercise such selection with greater facility than the Commander-in-Chief.

6. First Nusseree (Goorkha) battalion.
7. Second Nusseree (Goorkha) battalion, since reduced.
8. Sirmoor Goorkha battalion.
9. Kumaon battalion (civil).
10. Rungpore light infantry, now the Assam light infantry.
11. Goruckpore light infantry } since
12. Rampoorah local battalion } reduced.
13. Bencoolen local corps.
14. Mhairwarra local battalion (civil).

15. The statement contained in the preceding paragraphs incontrovertibly shows, that in retaining the appointment of the officers of the Punjab irregular or local force in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, while the force was placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, I made no "innovation," for I acted in pursuance of long-established practice; that I committed no "breach of precedent," for I strictly conformed to precedents; and, consequently, that I did not offer to Sir Charles Napier that "indignity" which the innovation and breach of precedent, incorrectly imputed to me, were supposed to involve.

16. These observations are recorded with no view to elicit a remark from any quarter; but simply that the complaints of Sir Charles Napier against me may not stand upon the correspondence of the Government of India, unaccompanied by the refutation which, I stated at the time, I should supply for the information of those I have the honour to serve.

7th May, 1853.

(Signed)

DALHOUSIE.

REPORT, &c.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
7th May, 1853.

PART III.



EXTRACTS

FROM

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENTS IN INDIA,

AND OF

THE COURT OF DIRECTORS,

RELATING TO

THE CONSTRUCTION AND SITES OF BARRACKS FOR  
THE EUROPEAN TROOPS.

# EXTRACTS,

*&c. &c.*

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## STANDARD PLAN FOR BARRACKS.

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### GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 2nd September, 1835 (No 106).*

9. We have the honour to submit herewith a minute by the Right Honourable the late Governor-General, dated the 29th December last, together with two papers containing remarks by Colonels Lindsay and Brunton, of his Majesty's service, on a plan of a new barrack for a regiment of Europeans.

Government of  
Bengal to Court  
of Directors,  
2nd Sept. 1835.

10. Agreeably to his Lordship's recommendation, the necessary communication has been made to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, as also to the Military Board at this presidency, that in the future construction of barracks for European troops, the instructions conveyed in the accompanying memoranda from the quarter-master-general of the army may be attended to, in so far as local circumstances, particularly with regard to the description of roof, may render it expedient to adopt them.

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### MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

*Dated Calcutta, 29th December, 1834.*

Before I embarked for Madras I submitted the plan of a new barrack for a regiment of Europeans, arranged in consultation with the most experienced and intelligent officers in command of King's corps in Bengal, which was (unofficially) sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council.

Minute by the  
Governor-General,  
29th Dec. 1834.

When at Bangalore I took the opportunity of submitting the same plan for the consideration of Major-General Hawker, and Colonels Lindsay and Brunton, in command of H. M.'s 39th foot and 13th light dragoons, at that station.

I annex the remarks of those officers.

The suggestions which they contain are evident improvements, and if approved by the Council, I would propose that the plan, as last amended, shall be sent to each presidency, with a direction that, in the construction of new barracks, no departure from it may take place without the previous sanction of the Governor-General of India in Council.

(Signed) W. C. BENTINCK.

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### EXTRACT "MEMORANDUM on the PLAN of an INFANTRY BARRACK;" by Col. P. LINDSAY, H. M.'s 39th Regiment.

*Dated Bangalore, 14th October, 1834.*

I consider the general plan of this barrack to be very good, and the conception of the two lines to be excellent; but still, that the former may advantageously admit of some alteration, and that it will depend on the ground which may be marked out, to develop the merits of the latter.

Memorandum by  
Col. P. Lindsay,  
14th Oct. 1834.

\* \* \* \* \*

The dimensions of the rooms and verandahs seem to me to admit of no improvement.



## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

EXTRACT LETTER *from* Lieut.-Col. R. BRUNTON, H. M.'s 13th Light Dragoons  
to the Brigade Major, Bangalore.

*Dated 13th October, 1834.*

Letter from Lieut.-  
Col. R. Brunton to  
the Brigade Major,  
Bangalore,  
13th Oct. 1834.

I have the honour to return the plan for an infantry barrack, which was submitted to the field officers of the regiment for their opinion.

I consider the general plan to be excellent, but in its execution beg to point out the defects of our own barracks, in order that they may be guarded against in any new erections.

Our verandahs are quite open; our doors without venetians; and our windows without either venetians or glass. The consequence is, that the men are either exposed to the chilling night draft, or are so shut in that the heat is scarcely bearable. By enclosing the verandahs, and furnishing them with venetians, this defect would be obviated, and the ventilation might be at all times regulated according to the degree of cold. Ventilators near the top of the walls would also be very desirable. We have so much cold and windy weather at Bangalore, especially at night, that I question whether the placing the barracks in two lines, as shown in the plan, and which is evidently intended to secure a thorough draft from all quarters, is necessary here. Perhaps our present plan of the rooms in open column would be all that is required for that object, and the men would then all have an equal distance to go to the cook-rooms, &c.; but this is merely a matter of opinion.

## EXTRACT MEMORANDUM

Quarter-Master General's Office, Head-Quarters,  
Calcutta, 21st February, 1835.

Memorandum  
by Quarter-Master  
General,  
21st Feb. 1835.

In this separate plan for an hospital calculated for a regiment of European infantry, two distinct buildings are recommended, the one exclusively for the ordinary patients that do not require separate accommodation, sufficient for eighty men. The other building is divided into three wards: one for the women and children; one for cases of ophthalmia, small-pox, &c. &c.; and the third for such a classification as the medical officer may be desirous of making. The four inner rooms are provided for such patients as are labouring under delirium, or otherwise require to be secured.

Flat roofing to be adopted in all cases; and that the height of the centre wards should be at least twenty-five feet, and that of the inner verandahs eighteen feet; where thatch is used, a less elevation will be sufficient.

## EXTRACT MEMORANDUM.

Quarter-Master General's Office, Head-quarters,  
Calcutta, 21st February, 1836.

Memorandum  
by Quarter-Master  
General,  
21st Feb. 1836.

In this plan of a barrack, calculated to accommodate 120 privates besides the non-commissioned officers, space for two cots has been provided opposite each pillar. The centre ward admitting of a double row of thirty-two cots, and the verandahs a single row of twenty-eight cots, making a total of 120 men, independent of the lower rooms.

In all situations flat roofing is indispensable, and although outer verandahs are not laid down in the plans, they will be found requisite in some parts of India. The centre ward to be twenty-four feet and the verandahs twelve feet wide each, with an elevation of twenty feet to the former and sixteen to the latter.

The plan of having a married barrack in each wing obviates the necessity of partitioning off the verandahs and keeps the barracks clear and free from these separate berths, which every commanding officer finds it difficult, if not impossible, to prevent, when the married men are not otherwise provided for.

The establishments of regiments in the service of his Majesty and the Honourable Company are frequently upon a lower scale than is here provided for; but the dimensions given are frequently required to afford that accommodation so necessary to the comfort and health of the European soldier.

The nature of the ground, in most instances, will allow the two lines of barracks being 150 feet separate from each other; but where it admits of a greater space being given, it will be advisable to do so. The prevailing winds vary so much during the hot season in different parts of India, it is impossible to prescribe one uniform direction of constructing them; this must necessarily be regulated with reference to local circumstances. But the plan of having two lines of barracks has this obvious advantage, of concentrating the whole and bringing all within a reasonable distance to the points where they in common have most frequent occasion to resort.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Memorandum  
by Quarter-Master  
General,  
21st Feb. 1836.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to the GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 10th August, 1836 (No. 44).*

Reply to Letter dated 2nd September, 1835, Pars. 9 and 10.

6. We notice with pleasure the attention you have paid to the important subject of providing healthy quarters for European troops.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
10th Aug. 1836.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to the GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 26th October, 1842 (No. 53).*

10. We unite with you in expressing concurrence in the opinion of the Military Board, that "the accommodation of the soldiers should as far as possible be the same at Bombay as under the Bengal presidency." The Bengal standard plans for barracks, &c. were long since furnished to you with a view to their being adopted when new barracks should be constructed.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
26th Oct. 1842.

11. Whatever additional accommodation may be required in the hospitals of European barracks you will cause to be provided, and, as far as possible, upon the approved plan.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to the GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 21st August, 1850 (No. 96).*

Reply to Letter dated 26th March, 1850 (No. 49).

23. The barracks and depôt buildings at Darjeeling extended for the accommodation of 150 Europeans, and constructed so as to afford a space of 1,100 cubic feet for each man.

15. We observe that the Medical Board recommend that, in all buildings for bodies of men lodged together, "1,100 cubic feet should be allowed to every inmate so-lodged, where the means of

Court of Directors  
to the Government  
of Bengal,  
21st Aug. 1850.

"ventilation are not of the most perfect description, so that compensation may be ensured for the air displaced by beds and other necessary furniture."

16. It is most important to the health of troops that adequate ventilation should be constantly maintained in the barracks, and this by means of ventilators properly constructed. Additions to space unaccompanied by such means will be no compensation for the want of them.

17. By H.M.'s ordnance regulations, the space allowed per man, in the West Indies, is from 480 to 600 cubic feet for barracks. The standard plans in Bengal allow of 1,200 cubic feet per man in barracks.

18. With the interior spaces allowed in the standard plans, as specified in the margin,\* there ought to be no difficulty in furnishing to the inmates a constant supply of fresh air. Additions to the height and width of the standard plans, for purposes of ventilation, are therefore unnecessary, whilst the expense of such additions would be of serious consequence.

19. We would call your particular attention to these remarks.

\* Height—centre compartment, 20 feet; side compartments, 16 feet. Width—centre compartment, 24 feet; side compartments, 12 feet.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## BARRACKS AT COLABA AND IN THE FORT OF BOMBAY.

GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to the COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 22nd November, 1841.*

Government of  
Bombay to the  
Court of Directors,  
22nd Nov. 1841.

We do ourselves the honour to submit for the consideration of your Honourable Court the series of our proceedings, relating to the extreme unhealthiness of the European troops composing the garrison of Bombay, more particularly of that portion of them which has been quartered in the barracks on the contiguous island of Colaba; and to the measures which we have in consequence found it necessary to adopt.

2. Your Honourable Court will observe, that, on the 13th September, 1839, the major-general at that time commanding the forces at this presidency presented to the Government a report, drawn up by the Deputy-Inspector-General of her Majesty's Hospitals, upon the state of the barracks at Colaba, Kirkee, and Poonah. Those at Colaba, Dr. Loinsworth condemned in the strongest language, pronouncing them to be of the worst description, as regards both locality and construction; and he recommended, as the only effectual mode of correcting the evils attending upon their existing state, that they should be pulled down, and rebuilt upon arches raised seven or eight feet from the ground, the space under the arches being flagged, to admit of the men parading there in wet weather, and the floors of the barrack-rooms constructed of wood. In the event of this extreme measure being rejected as impracticable, the inspector proposed some other confessedly doubtful and imperfect remedies, such as raising the floors and the height of the walls, the use of a better description of stone for pavement, and the removal of offensive nuisances, which are calculated to injure the health of the men.

3. This report attracted the serious attention of Government, and, on the 2nd January, 1840, the Military Board submitted their opinion upon it. The expense of pulling down and re-constructing the Colaba barracks, as proposed by the inspector, was estimated at Rs. 1,21,381.5a.7p. The expense attending the modified remedies, proposed by the alteration of the present buildings, was estimated at a nearly equal amount; and the Board then proceeded, with reference to Dr. Loinsworth's remark, that "the expense would be soon repaid by the decrease of sick, and consequent corresponding decrease in the mortality of the troops," to state it as "a received opinion, based on experience, that Colaba is so damp and bleak in the monsoon, that it would continue to be unhealthy at that season under any circumstances, and that any outlay, however large, of public money, would not effect the object of Dr. Loinsworth's anxiety." The report of the Military Board concluded with this observation—that, "although the suggestions of Dr. Loinsworth might be calculated to add to the comfort of the troops quartered in the barracks, they did not concur in the necessity of the alterations recommended."

4. The Medical Board, in a report dated the 20th January, 1840, "agreed with the Military Board that it would be inexpedient to lay out so large a sum of money as would be required for the proposed alterations in the general construction of the barracks and hospital at Colaba; as experience had proved the situation inimical to the health of the European troops, not only during the monsoon, but at other seasons. Although some mitigation of the effects of the climate might be the result of the alterations suggested, yet they were of opinion that it would be better, if a convenient and more favourable site could be found, to abandon the present barracks altogether and construct new ones, than to be at so great an expense without some certainty of an adequately favourable result."

5. Upon this the Military Board was called upon to examine and report whether any other available and desirable locality existed, whereon to erect new barracks, with a view to the removal of the European regiment from Colaba. To this call a reply was made, to the effect that the Military Board were unable to point out any such locality; but suggested a reference to the Medical Board, which was accordingly made, and elicited a very able paper upon the subject, bearing date the 12th March, 1840, to which we beg to solicit the particular attention of your Honourable Court, as it forms the basis of our subsequent proceedings.

6. In this document the Medical Board, grounding their opinion on returns which exhibit the appalling mortality of upwards of ten per cent. during the year then past, clearly and convincingly shewed that the climate of Bombay and Colaba is inimical to the health of European troops, and that the evil effect of its agency is much increased by

the facility with which the men can obtain the most deleterious liquor. At Poona, on the contrary, between which and the presidency there is an excellent road, and the communication at all seasons open, the climate has been long known to be most favourable to the health of the European troops, not only in exhibiting a comparatively small ratio of mortality, but in sustaining a strength and hardiness of constitution which renders them at all times efficient and fit for duty. And the salubrity of the climate is assisted by the restrictive regulations, which can only be efficiently carried into effect in a strictly military cantonment for the prevention of the sale of spirits, and by the almost perfect liberty allowed the soldiers, with the best effects on their minds, their tempers, and their health.

7. Upon these grounds the Medical Board proceeded to suggest, that instead of building new barracks or altering the existing barracks as proposed, the European portion of the troops in Bombay should be reduced as far as possible, and that every soldier not absolutely required for garrison duty should be stationed in the Deccan.

8. In these views the Government entirely concurred, considering them to be both humane and economical; but before they were acted upon, the Medical Board was requested, for the satisfaction of distant authorities, to submit a table showing the relative healthiness of European troops during ten successive years at Colaba, Bombay, and Poona. This table, your Honourable Court will find annexed to the Medical Board's letter of the 27th April; and showing, as it does, the average mortality at Bombay and Colaba to be  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum, while at Poona it is only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., we think the correctness of the grounds on which the above suggestions are founded is established beyond the power of doubt.

9. Without further hesitation, we now proceeded, in communication with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to issue instructions that only five hundred European troops, or one wing, should be retained for permanent duty in Bombay, and that the remainder of the strength heretofore quartered in the garrison should be removed to Poona. We further resolved that the barracks at Colaba should be abandoned, that the wing retained for garrison duty should occupy the town barracks, and that additional barracks should be built at Poona for the accommodation of the wing which was ordered to be stationed there.

10. To fit them for the reception of a complete wing, we found, by the estimate submitted by the Military Board on the 11th August, 1840, that alterations and additions were necessary to the town barracks, by which an expense would be incurred of Rs. (5,164) five thousand one hundred and sixty-four; but these have not yet been effected, nor has the estimate ever been finally sanctioned.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 29th June, 1842 (No. 29).*

Reply to Letter, dated 22nd November, 1841 (No. 29).

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16. It is clear to us, after an attentive consideration of the documents which accompany the letter under reply—especially the able and judicious reports of the Medical Board—that the unhealthiness of Colaba is not so much attributable to defects in the construction of the barracks, as to climate and the facility with which the soldiery obtain access to deleterious spirits, and to other means of dissipation. The barracks in the fort appear to be quite unobjectionable in their structure; they are lofty, dry, and well ventilated; and yet the soldiery quartered in them appear to have suffered as much, if not more, from sickness and mortality, than those quartered in Colaba. Your decision not to incur the large expenditure involved in speculative improvements in the Colaba barracks, has, therefore, our approval; as well as that limiting the number of European infantry stationed at Bombay to 500, the lowest number absolutely requisite for the military occupation of the fortress, and for which accommodation can at all times be found in the town barracks.

17. The proposed alterations in these barracks, at an expense of Rs. 5,164, will not be objected to, provided on further examination you shall be satisfied that the changes will be beneficial, and that the object of shutting out the troops from access to deleterious

EXTRACTS, &c.

Government of  
Bombay to the  
Court of Directors,  
22nd Nov. 1841.

Court of Directors  
to the Government  
of Bombay,  
29th June, 1842.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bombay,  
29th June, 1842.

spirits cannot be accomplished otherwise than by the construction of the proposed way in the rear of the barracks, which, as diminishing ventilation, may be considered inadvisable.

18. The barracks and hospital at Colaba will, we conclude, be kept in adequate repair for occasional use in the dry season, and in times of emergency. You will consider whether the ground on which the villages stand, whence has proceeded so much of the contamination producing disease and death amongst the European soldiery, ought not properly to be resumed, as we are satisfied that the injury arising from the introduction of deleterious spirits, &c. by boats would comparatively be very insignificant.

19. In conclusion, we must express our entire approval of the proposed half-yearly relief from Poona of the wing of the European regiment to be stationed in the fort. We are also of opinion that the advantage of frequent reliefs should be extended, as far as possible, to the detachment of artillery stationed in the fort; and that your arrangements should, if possible, allow of all recruits being immediately sent to Poona on their arrival from England, as suggested by the Commander-in-Chief.

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GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS,

*Dated 17th June, 1844 (No. 62).*

Government of  
Bombay to the  
Court of Directors,  
17th June, 1844.

1. We have the honour to transmit, for the information of your Honourable Court, the accompanying copies of our proceedings relative to an improvement in the ventilation of the barracks at Colaba.

2. Your Honourable Court will perceive from these papers, that we have sanctioned alterations for improving the ventilation of one of the barrack-rooms at the cost of Rs. 3,010; and we request the permission of your Honourable Court to pursue the same plan in the other barracks at Colaba, the estimated cost of which is Rs. 19,890, provided the reports of the result of the experiment, which will be required as soon as the monsoon is over, shall be favourable.

3. We beg to solicit the favour of an immediate reply to this despatch, in order that we may be enabled to give authority for the work to proceed as soon as possible after the commencement of the next season.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY,

*Dated 2nd October, 1844 (No. 53).*

Reply to Letter, dated 17th June, 1844 (No. 62).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bombay,  
2nd Oct. 1844.

19. The proposed plan of ventilating the barracks at Colaba is very costly; but if it has been attended with entire success in the single barrack in which it has been tried, we shall not object to its extension to the other barracks at that station.

20. From the description given of the floors of the barracks, it would appear to be probable that until flooring is laid down, whether of wood or stone, raised in however small a degree from the ground, and sub-floor ventilation established to carry off the damp exhalations, the object in view of keeping the floors dry will not be attained.

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GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS,

*Dated 19th July, 1844.*

Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
19th July, 1844.

3. We have the honour, with reference to our despatch, No. 62, of the 17th ultimo, to transmit the annexed copy of a letter from the Military Board, dated the 24th idem, submitting one from the Secretary to the Medical Board, with its accompaniment, reporting on the improved ventilation of one of the barrack-rooms, at Colaba; and in remarking that these reports are very satisfactory, we beg to express our opinion, that the alterations in question appear to afford every prospect of rendering the barracks and hospital at Colaba much more healthy for European troops.

4. We beg respectfully to observe, that we are very desirous of being honoured with your Honourable Court's authority for this work; but we do not intend that it shall be undertaken until we have had the full experience of the effect of the monsoon weather upon the barrack that has already been ventilated.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From the MILITARY BOARD to Colonel the Honourable Sir GEORGE ARTHUR, Bart., K.C.H., Governor and President in Council.

Dated 24th June, 1844.

HONOURABLE, SIR,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Secretary Lieutenant Colonel Melvill's letter, No. 2,295, of the 12th instant, and to submit a letter from the Secretary to the Medical Board, No. 671, of the 19th instant, together with its accompaniment, reporting on the recently improved ventilation of one of the barrack-rooms at Colaba, from which it will be seen that the alteration is considered very beneficial, and calculated to add greatly towards the preservation of the health of the occupants.

2nd. We shall submit a further report on this improvement, so soon as the experience of the monsoon has furnished a sufficient test of the experiment.

Bombay Military Board Office,  
28th June, 1844.

We have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) D. BARR, Major-General,  
Military Auditor-General,  
G. JERVIS, Lieut.-Col., Commandant,  
Chief Engineer.  
F. P. LESTER, Lieut.-Col.,  
Member Military Board.

From the  
Military Board to  
Sir George Arthur,  
24th June, 1844.

To the SECRETARY to the MILITARY BOARD, BOMBAY.

SIR,

With reference to your letter, No. 1,665, dated the 20th April last, desiring the opinion of the Medical Board relative to a recent alteration in the ventilation in one of the barracks at Colaba, I am now desired by the Board to transmit to you the enclosed original letter of yesterday's date, No. 395, from the superintending surgeon, Poona division of the army, reporting most favourably thereon, after personal inspection of the improved barrack; and to state that the Medical Board entirely concur in the opinions and suggestions offered by Mr. Wight on the present subject.

2nd. The Board regret that so much delay should have arisen in answering your letter now under reply, which was however referred for the report of the superintending surgeon, on the 23rd April last.

Medical Board Office,  
Bombay, 19th June, 1844.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) J. BURNES,  
Secretary, Medical Board.

To the Secretary  
to the  
Military Board,  
19th June, 1844.

To the SECRETARY MEDICAL BOARD, BOMBAY.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive your "emergent memorandum," No. 664 of 1844, with its accompanying letter, No. 2,294, from the Secretary to Government to the Medical Board, on the 16th instant.

2. I now beg to report, for the information of the Board, that I yesterday minutely inspected the barracks at Colaba occupied by H.M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royals, accompanied by Ass<sup>t</sup>-Surg<sup>n</sup> Jopp, M.D., of that regiment, and nothing can be more complete or satisfactory than the improved system adopted for ventilation in the barrack alluded to in the letter of the Secretary to the Military Board, No. 1,665 of 1844, to your address.

3. This system is not theoretically good only, for it has had a trial, and I conversed with several men of the company (light), all of whom were unanimous in acknowledging the comforts bestowed by the improved ventilation. The other pendals are *singularly badly* ventilated. There cannot, therefore, be a doubt that, should a similar system of ventilation be adopted in them, it would add greatly to the preservation of the health of the troops who occupy them.

Superint<sup>d</sup>-Surgeon's Office,  
Bombay, 18th June, 1844.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) R. WIGHT,  
Superintending-Surgeon.

To the Secretary  
Medical Board,  
Bombay,  
18th June, 1844.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
30th Sept. 1844.

## GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 30th September, 1844 (No. 99.)*

With reference to our despatch, No. 73, dated 19th July last, we have the honour to forward the accompanying report of the great improvement which has taken place in the health of the men who reside in the barrack at Colaba, which has been ventilated, and to intimate that we have called upon the Military Board to supply what further information appears to be required. In the mean time it is highly gratifying to us to find that the alteration has succeeded, and that the health and comfort of the men appear to be greatly improved.

To the TOWN MAJOR.

SIR,

From  
Captain Ward,  
Barrack-Master,  
21st Sep. 1844.

I herewith have the honour to transmit a copy of a report from the officer commanding H.M.'s Queen's Royals, on the late alteration in one of the barrack-rooms at Colaba, which I request you will have the goodness to bring to the notice of the Honourable the Commander-in-Chief of the garrison.

In addition to the great improvement represented in this report, it is proper to state, that the men who have occupied the altered room have enjoyed better health than those quartered in the others, and therefore it may be fairly estimated, that if all the rooms were in a similar manner improved, the health of the troops generally would be much better than has hitherto been the case at Colaba.

Barrack-master's Office,  
Bombay, 21st Sept., 1844.

I have the honour to be, &c.,  
(Signed) W. WARD, Captain,  
Barrack-master, Presidency.

To the BARRACK-MASTER, BOMBAY.

SIR,

From  
Lieut.-Col.  
Carruthers,  
4th Sep. 1844.

In reply to your letter of the 2nd instant, calling for a report on the new barrack-room at Colaba, I have the honour to inform you that it is in every respect superior to the old rooms, and has many advantages from free ventilation and a better supply of light and air.

The floor is kept constantly dry from the air-holes at the bottom of the walls during the monsoon, and they likewise cause a thorough draft round the cots of the men in the hot season.

I have only to suggest, that if the roof over the ventilator projected beyond the skylights when open, it would prevent the loss of many panes of glass, which are constantly broken by bones dropped by the kites, and would also probably obviate the necessity of matted covers to exclude the wet during the rainy weather.

Colaba Barracks,  
4th September, 1844.

I have the honour to be, &c.,  
(Signed) R. CARRUTHERS, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Commanding Left Wing Her Majesty's  
Queen's Royals.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 22nd January, 1845 (No. 4).*

Reply to Letter dated 30th September, 1844 (No. 99).  
With reference to the Letter 19th July, 1844 (No. 73).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bombay,  
22nd Jan. 1845.

Report the great improvement which has taken place in the health of the men who reside in the barrack at Colaba, which has been altered and better ventilated.

10. This report of the improved health of the men occupying that portion of the Colaba barrack in which the altered system of ventilation has been adopted is very satisfactory. Our authority for the extension of the change under such circumstances to the other portions of the barrack was given in our military letter of the 2nd October, 1844, No. 53, paragraph 20.

## GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 30th October, 1845 (No. 96).*

1. We have the honour to forward, for the information of your Honourable Court, the accompanying copies of our letter to the Quarter-Master-General, dated 6th September last, and of the reply thereto of the 2nd October, with its enclosures, from which your Honourable Court will perceive that when sanctioning the proposed reliefs and changes among the European regiments of this presidency, we observed to the Quarter-Master-General, that "If the recent improvements in the Colaba barracks have been found to remove the producing causes of unhealthiness, and if this result has been sufficiently proved by the test of experience; perhaps, when the 1st fusileers are withdrawn, it might be expedient that the entire 22nd regiment should occupy Colaba, and under any circumstances that the wing should remain unrelieved the whole year," as the relief of the wing in Bombay from Poona every six months is inconvenient and expensive.

Government of  
Bombay to Court  
of Directors,  
30th Oct. 1845.

2. It appears from the reports submitted with the Quarter-Master-General's letter that the medical authorities are of opinion that "the experience in regard to the effects of the improvement of the barracks is yet of too limited and too uncertain a nature to sanction any departure from the orders of your Honourable Court." The superintending surgeon, however, remarks that, had not his attention been especially directed to these orders, he should have felt disposed to state on general grounds that the extension to an annual relief in December or January would prove of no detriment to the health of the army.

3. With these reports before us, we do not intend to propose any deviation, not rendered necessary by circumstances, from your Honourable Court's orders, and we have informed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief accordingly.

4. We have, however, to observe to your Honourable Court that we shall carefully watch the effect of the improved ventilation upon the health of the men, and we entertain sanguine hopes it will prove very beneficial. But if this should not be the case, still we feel it our duty to point out that a march from Bombay to Poona, in the month of May, must undoubtedly be very trying for the men. As the sickly season includes only one period of the year, viz. from June to October, we cannot understand the advantage to be gained by a relief every six months, and we are strongly inclined to the opinion that an annual relief in the month of November would be found preferable, and more conducive both to the health of the soldiers and to public economy.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 3rd June, 1846 (No. 27).*

Reply to letter dated 30th October, 1845 (No. 96).

18. We observe with satisfaction the continued attention you are giving to this subject. Whenever you shall be satisfied that it will be advantageous for the public service to relieve the European part of the garrison of Bombay from Poona annually, instead of half-yearly, as at present, you have our full authority for making this arrangement.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
3rd June, 1846.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 3rd June, 1846 (No. 27).*

Letter dated 28th November, 1845 (No. 105),

Request sanction to the estimated outlay, Rs. 8,621, and an establishment for carrying the filth of the Colaba barracks out to sea, and preventing its being deposited on the rocks to windward of the barracks; and, in the event of Court's concurrence, that the necessary quantity of iron pipe may be furnished.

34. The object in view is so important to the health of the troops who may be quartered in the Colaba barracks, that we readily assent to the trial of the experiment here mentioned. The required supply of iron

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
3rd June, 1846.

pipes will be ordered forthwith.



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 4th July, 1851 (No. 55).*

Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
4th July, 1851.

1. We have the honour herewith to submit, for the consideration of your Honourable Court, a series of proceedings connected with the subject of the fort and island of Bombay, as a quarter for European troops.

2. In September, 1848, the collector of sea customs submitted to us a proposition to convert the town barracks, situate in the centre of the fort of Bombay, into bonding warehouses, whence a yearly revenue of considerable amount might be derived by the Government. The proposition bore a plausible appearance; but it appeared to us plain, that the accommodation afforded by the town barracks could not be altogether dispensed with; and therefore the question arose, whether equivalent accommodation could or could not be provided elsewhere. To determine this point in a decided manner, a committee was convened, composed of experienced and competent officers, military and medical, to examine and report whether any proper site could be found, within a convenient distance of the fort, for the erection of barracks. The report of this committee indicated a site on the high ground near Parell as salubrious, and in every respect eligible, excepting as regards its distance from parades, guards, and church; but recommended, in preference, the erection of new barracks on the island of Colaba, on an improved plan. For such barracks, capable of containing a wing of a regiment, it was estimated that the cost would be nearly  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees—a sum larger than we could recommend to be expended for the purpose of allowing the conversion of the town barracks into bonding warehouses; and we were about to abandon the proposition, when it was suggested by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief, that sufficient accommodation to supply the place of that afforded by the town barracks might be gained by an extension of the buildings of the Queen's depôt, on Colaba, which might be effected at a cost of not more than half a lac of rupees. Lastly, H.E. the Commander-in-Chief has submitted to us a table, framed by Mr. Thom, Acting-Deputy Inspector-General of H.M.'s Hospitals, showing the rate of mortality among the European troops at the several stations of the Bombay presidency during twenty years, from which it appears, that while (excluding Scinde) the average annual mortality of the rest of the military stations has been under 33, that of Colaba has been at the rate of 81; and of the fort, no less than 152 in every thousand men.

3. We now, therefore, beg to bring the whole subject under the notice of your Honourable Court, and for a full exposition of our views and opinions on this important matter, we respectfully refer to the minute of our Right Honourable President recorded on the 31st May.

4. Assuming that European troops, to the number of 500 at least, must be quartered in the garrison of Bombay; assuming, also, that all the existing barracks on the island of Colaba and in the fort are insalubrious, and more or less objectionable, as quarters for European soldiery; assuming, further, that no reasonable expectation can be entertained of essentially correcting the proved and admitted insalubrity by any alterations in the present buildings, then we have to solicit your Honourable Court to consider and decide whether an expenditure can be permitted of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees in the construction of a new range of barracks on the high ground near the Parell flag-staff. We are desirous of recommending this measure to your favourable attention, because it meets every difficulty, and the inconvenience attending the distance from the fort may be obviated by taking the Europeans off all the ordinary duties of the garrison. But should your Honourable Court determine that a new range of barracks is an undertaking too costly in the present state of the finances, it remains for decision whether the construction of additional buildings may be sanctioned to the Queen's depôt at the estimated cost of half a lac of rupees.

5. Should either of the above propositions be authorized, the town barracks may at once be made over to the civil department, to be used for any purpose that may be required.

6. At the suggestion of the Honourable Mr. Blane, we have made a reference to ascertain to whom the land on the hill near Parell belongs, and on what terms it might be obtained, should the Government desire its purchase. Mr. Blane also deems a further medical report on the locality would be satisfactory; but the superintending-surgeon was a member of the committee which recommended the spot, and we consider its salubrity, comparative speaking, as certain as it is possible to determine a point of the kind by mere opinion, without the test of experience for our guidance.

## MINUTE by the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR of BOMBAY.

*Dated 31st May, 1851.*

The extreme unhealthiness of Bombay as a quarter for European troops has been frequently the subject of anxious consideration by the Government, both in India and in England. A long despatch was addressed by the Government of Bombay to the Honourable the Court of Directors in 1841, in which the question was very fully treated; the fact of the place being most insalubrious and inimical to the European constitution was incontestibly shown; but with regard to any efficient remedy, opinions were found to differ widely. On the one hand, the evil was attributed to the barracks themselves more than to the locality; and the construction of new buildings was urged as a certain remedy. The expense of such a measure, it was said, would be soon repaid by the decrease of sickness and mortality among the troops. But, on the other hand, it was argued that Colaba is so damp and bleak in the monsoon, that it would continue to be unhealthy at that season under any circumstances, and that the largest outlay of public money upon the buildings of any form upon that island, or upon any spot that could be named within the limits of the garrison of Bombay, would not effect the desired object.

Minute by the  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
31st May, 1851.

2. The Medical Board then came forward, and after the exhibition of returns showing the appalling mortality of ten per cent. during the year just passed, delivered their decided opinion that the climate of Bombay and Colaba is adverse to the health of European troops, and that the evil effect of its agency is much increased by the facility with which the men can obtain the most deleterious liquor. Upon this opinion was grounded the advice, that, instead of building new barracks, or altering existing barracks, at Bombay or Colaba, the European portion of the garrison should be reduced as far as possible, and every soldier not absolutely required for duty in the garrison should be stationed in the healthy air of the Deccan.

3. This advice was generally approved, and instructions were issued that the European strength of the garrison should never exceed, under ordinary circumstances, 500 men, and that these should be relieved from the Deccan at intervals not exceeding one year.

4. Every endeavour has since been used to fulfil these intentions; but notwithstanding that additional barracks have been erected at Poona for this especial purpose, it has been found impracticable, under the many chances and contingencies of the service, rigidly to adhere to the rule laid down.

5. Attempts have subsequently been made to improve the Colaba barracks by a better system of ventilation; and that the result has not been altogether unsuccessful may, I think, be demonstrated from the tables of Dr. Thom, which are now before us. In the three years, 1840-41 and 1842, the mortality is shown to have been 350 per thousand; but in the three years 1847-48 and 1849, only 50 per thousand. The sweeping conclusion, therefore, which met with common consent in 1841, that the unhealthiness of Colaba is not so much attributable to defects in the construction of the barracks, as to climate and the facility with which the soldiery obtain access to deleterious spirits, and to other means of dissipation, has not proved to be perfectly accurate, and might now be questioned with some show of reason.

6. Within the garrison of Bombay there are three distinct quarters for European troops,—Colaba, the fort, and Fort George. Of the barracks in the fort, it was observed by the Honourable Court, in their despatch of the 29th June, 1842, that they appeared “to be quite unobjectionable in their structure, being lofty, dry, and well-ventilated, and yet the soldiery quartered there have suffered as much, if not more, from “sickness and mortality than those in Colaba.” Some alterations were designed in these barracks to make them more complete and commodious; but these were abandoned from the conviction that they could not be used with safety as permanent quarters for European soldiers. Recently, H. E. the Commander-in-Chief has drawn our attention, in strong terms, to the fatal effects to health and discipline produced by quartering troops in the town barracks, and has earnestly remonstrated against their use, even as temporary accommodation, for passing detachments of recruits and invalids.

7. The barracks in Fort George are less objectionable in every point of view than those in the fort, and probably are more healthy than those in Colaba, but they are limited in space, and there is no room for extension; and they are found liable to sudden accesses of sickness at uncertain periods of time. This has been supposed to arise from a ditch upon the sea face not being kept clean and free from impurities, and it has lately

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Minute by the  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
31st May, 1851.

been filled up; but whether the remedy will prove effectual cannot yet be determined. Fort George is used as quarters for the artillery, and as a depôt for the Company's troops, and for these purposes it answers very well.

8. The following memorandum shows in one view the extent of barrack accommodation for European soldiers within the garrison of Bombay:—

Colaba	...	...	...	...	...	...	864 men.
Town Barracks	...	...	...	...	...	...	600 "
Fort George	...	...	...	...	...	...	600 "
Depôt Queen's Troops, Colaba	...	...	...	...	...	...	88 "

Total for ... 2,152 ..

and all these quarters are pronounced to be insalubrious, and liable to objections, more or less grave.

9. Three causes may conduce to this result, climate, the construction of the buildings, and facility of access to liquor and dissipation: that the first and the third of these are constantly in active operation there can be no doubt; that the agency of the second has been felt, has, I conceive, been proved in the case at least of Colaba, where, as I have shown above, improved ventilation has been followed by a diminished rate of mortality; but it still remains an open question, whether the evils of climate and vicinity to the means of debauchery can be materially overcome by any description of barracks, on any available site within the range of the garrison limits.

10. A committee of very competent and experienced officers was convened in 1848, "to examine and report whether any proper site can be found within a convenient distance of the fort for the erection of a range of barracks, for either a wing or a regiment of European infantry." And the report rendered was, "that there are only two spots on the island eligible for European barracks: the first being the summit and the western slope of the range of rocky hills, extending from near Belair House to the vicinity of the Parell flag-staff; the second being the rocky ridge at Colaba, opposite to the barracks at present occupied by the subalterns' quarters and mess-house of the European infantry regiment." The first of these two sites the committee considered very salubrious, with ample space for an entire regiment; but the distance from the fort, and the exposure and fatigue the men would suffer in the hot weather and monsoon while marching to and from their guards, general parades, and churches, they regarded as a fatal obstacle to its selection. The Colaba ground the committee considered to be in most respects well adapted for barracks for a complete wing. Relative to the reported unhealthiness of Colaba, they expressed their conviction, from observation, inquiry and experience, that it does not appertain to the island generally, but to the *barracks*, and the ground on which they stand; and therefore, in recommending a site on Colaba, the committee proceeded upon the understanding that the buildings should be capacious, lofty, and airy, and raised on arches or otherwise to the height of not less than fourteen feet above the surface.

11. This opinion is opposed, it may be observed, to that which was received as sound in 1841; it is supported on plausible grounds, but its accuracy can be determined only by the test of actual experience.

12. In preference to a costly and doubtful experiment upon Colaba, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief now recommends that attention should revert to the first of the two sites named by the Committee—that near Parell,—and suggests that the only serious objection to it, viz. its distance from the fort, may be met either by means of the railroad now in progress, which will pass near, or by withdrawing the European troops altogether from ordinary garrison duty.

13. I could not yet venture to propose a measure involving a large expenditure of public money on the contingency of the railway, but I am inclined to believe, that the alternative of relieving the Europeans from duty in the garrison would not be attended with difficulty, or even any sensible inconvenience.

14. It might, indeed, be made a question, whether the European troops may not be withdrawn from the garrison entirely, leaving it to be composed of native troops only. But I am of opinion that this would not be safe. In so large a place, riots may occur in a population so varied and so mixed; sedition and insurrection are possible; and the constant presence of *some* European soldiery, ready at hand, and to be promptly called out in case of need, is, I consider, indispensable to safety and the security of good order. A body of five hundred men is sufficient, but not more than sufficient, for the purpose.

Beyond this limit, I do not consider reduction in this part of the garrison to be practicable; but there is no reason why the Europeans should be employed necessarily in the ordinary guards and duties of the garrison.

15. I concur, then, thus far in the views of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, if new barracks are to be erected at all within the limits of the garrison and island of Bombay, the site named near Parell presents the greatest advantages and fewest objections of any that have hitherto been proposed. We have no estimate before us of the cost of barracks in this situation; but for a range of barracks on Colaba, sufficient for one wing only, it has been estimated that the cost would be four and a half lacs of rupees; and certainly we cannot suppose that buildings on Parell Hill would be less expensive.

16. To meet in part this outlay, it has been proposed to give up the town barracks, to be converted into a bonding warehouse, and appropriated to other purposes in the civil branch of the administration.

17. This proposition was first originated by the collector of customs in the revenue department. The proceedings connected with it form a separate series, but it is desirable that they should be combined with those at present under consideration, in order that the whole subject may be embraced in one view.

18. In the first instance, the form in which the question was presented was this: Can the town barracks be altogether and permanently dispensed with as military buildings, and be made available for appropriation to civil and commercial purposes? In discussing this question, it was considered that the town barracks are the only buildings available for military contingencies, and that if these were withdrawn from the military, and made over to the civil department, there would be left no resource in the event of a regiment becoming sickly at Colaba, of a strong detachment arriving in the harbour, or any of the casualties, that, in a port like that of Bombay, may continually be expected to occur. For these reasons, it was determined that the town barracks could not be altogether dispensed with, unless equivalent accommodation were provided elsewhere. To effect this, two plans have been proposed: the one to erect an entirely new range of barracks, at the cost of four and a half lacs of rupees, at least; the other to construct some additional pendalls in extension of the Queen's depôt at Colaba, involving an outlay of probably half a lac of rupees.

19. The following extracts from the Quarter-Master-General's letter of the 28th February, 1850, exhibit in a strong light the grounds on which the latter of these plans is advocated by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

"There can be little doubt but that the invalids of H.M.'s regiments serving in the Punjab will annually be sent to Bombay to be embarked for England. These last year amounted to 227 men, besides 188 belonging to the corps under this presidency, exclusive of others sent here for change of air, and for whose reception here accommodation must be found."

"In place of the town barracks, the Commander-in-Chief instructs me to suggest that four temporary pendalls, capable of containing 100 men each, should be built at Colaba, on the vacant spot of ground, believed to be Government property, adjacent to the present cells attached to the depôt. These H.E. has ascertained can be erected for about Rs. 7,000 each, and be similar in construction to the four smaller pendalls of the barracks now occupied by the Highlanders; and for the officers, new bungalows in place of the present old and dilapidated ones, built in the sick officers' compound, which is one of the best sites on the island. These buildings will not only afford ample accommodation for the invalids, but be available for any troops temporarily located here or passing through, and recruits of H.M.'s service from England.

"From the situation of the town barracks, during the five days the invalids were located therein, the greatest irregularities and drunkenness prevailed, owing to the continued temptation offered by the numerous grog-shops surrounding them, and the impossibility of keeping the men in barracks, and from their being able to get as much spirits as they desired over surrounding walls: and his Excellency has not only the opinion of old officers of her Majesty's service to confirm what is stated on the unfitness of these buildings, but the fact that many of the men forfeited their good conduct stripes, received for years of excellent behaviour, most of whom were likewise decorated with medals for services in the field, thereby losing the advantages of the higher rates of pension; arising from the unusual degree of temptation they were exposed to, in an evil hour when located in these buildings; and the scenes that occurred were, the Commander-in-Chief is credibly informed, most disgraceful."

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Minute by the  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
31st May, 1851.

20. The consideration of the question in the revenue department led to the conclusion that if an immediate outlay of four lacs and a half of rupees is to be incurred in the building of new barracks in lieu of the town barracks, then the project must be abandoned; but if sufficient accommodation for troops can be provided elsewhere for half a lac of rupees, then the proposal that the town barracks should be made over to the collector of customs, to be used as a bonding warehouse, might be entertained as expedient.

21. For two reasons, as I have observed in my minute of the 19th December last, I am unwilling to propose the erection of permanent barracks at Colaba, or merely as a substitute for the town barracks: 1st, because in the present financial state of the country, the very heavy expense involved ought not to be incurred except under a necessity more urgent than can be shown here; and 2nd, because opinions still differ as to the salubrity of Colaba, and the medical reports we have received go this length and no further, that the selected site is as good as any to be found on the island.

22. The same objections do not apply to the plan of merely extending the accommodation of the Queen's depôt sufficiently to provide accommodation for recruits, invalids, and time-expired men, now largely increased in number by our communication through the line of the Indus with the Punjab.

23. For this object, the exchange of barracks in the fort for barracks on Colaba is beyond doubt an expedient measure; but there is one consideration yet remaining which is too important to be overlooked, viz. the necessity of retaining available quarters into which a regiment lying at Colaba, and visited with severe sickness, may be moved during the monsoon months.

24. I have already stated, in my minute of the 3rd April, that I regard this objection to the proposed transfer, as obviated in a great degree by our recent resolution to reduce to a very trifling strength, the European artillery company usually occupying Fort George, so that arrangements might easily be made to allow of these quarters being used for the Colaba regiment in any time of peculiar emergency.

25. Finally, we have been apprised by the letter from the Quarter-Master-General of the 17th April last, that if the proposition to erect barracks for 500 infantry on the hilly ground near Parell be entertained, it will not, in the opinion of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, be requisite to extend the depôt, as Fort George or the Colaba barracks will answer that end perfectly.

26. The whole question then which we have now to submit for the judgment and decision of the Honourable Court, may be succinctly summed up, and stated in the following terms.

Assuming that European troops, to the number of 500 at least, must be quartered in the garrison of Bombay:

Assuming also, that all the barracks on the island of Colaba and in the fort are insalubrious, and more or less objectionable as quarters for the European soldiery:

Assuming further, that no reasonable expectation can be entertained of essentially correcting the present insalubrity by any alterations in the existing buildings:

Then, will the Honourable Court consent to the expenditure of four lacs and a half of rupees in the construction of a new range of barracks on the Parell Hill?

27. I recommend this proposition to favourable attention, because it meets every difficulty in the case, and the inconvenience attending, may, I consider, be obviated by taking the Europeans off all the ordinary duties of the garrison.

28. But should it be rejected, then, assuming that a new range of barracks is *not* to be erected, will the Honourable Court consent to the expenditure of half a lac of rupees in the construction of additional buildings to the Queen's depôt at Colaba?

29. Should either of the above propositions be sanctioned, the town barracks may at once be made over to the civil department, to be used for any purpose that may be required.

31st May, 1851.

(Signed) FALKLAND.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Dated 2nd June, 1852 (No. 32).

Reply to Letter dated 12th December, 1851 (No. 105).

Annual report of the Deputy Inspector-General, her Majesty's Hospitals, on the health of her Majesty's troops serving in this presidency, for the year ending 31st March, 1851, and remarks of Government on certain passages of that report.

10. The general results of this report, as stated in the margin,\* are favourable, except at Colaba and Kirkee. We observe that the great loss of life at Colaba is attributed by

Court of Directors to Government of Bombay, 2nd June, 1852.

Deputy Inspector-General Thom mainly to deleterious effects of moisture in the air during the south-west monsoon. He is of opinion that, on this account, Colaba can never be made a healthy station.

11. By previous reports we had been led to hope that, with improved ventilation and drainage, and by securing dry flooring to the barracks at Colaba, the health of the troops there would have been greatly improved.

12. The contents of this report will, we conclude, be carefully considered by the Medical Board, in connection with the health of Europeans generally residing in the island, and with that of the officers belonging to the regiment quartered in the barracks.

13. The proposed construction of new barracks on a more elevated site in the island of Bombay, as referred to us in your letter of the 4th July, 1851, No. 55, will be considered on the receipt of the information for which you had called, as mentioned in paragraph 6 of that despatch.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

Dated 19th January, 1853 (No. 3).

Reply to Letter dated 30th August, 1852 (No. 49).

With reference to paragraph 13 of Court's letter, No. 32 of 1852, forwards copy of a letter from the Military Board, reporting the party to whom the ground at Belair, recommended as a site for European barracks, belongs, and the terms on which it may be purchased, and solicit attention to the remarks of Dr. Hall, the Deputy Inspector-General of H.M.'s Hospitals, on the subject, in his annual report, which accompanied No. 45.

6. The following remarks were made by the Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals in the report here referred to, viz. :—

Court of Directors to Government of Bombay, 19th Jan. 1853.

“ It is difficult to discover anything in the position of Colaba to render it so unhealthy as it has occasionally been; and if the barracks had been placed on the highest part of the ridge, and pro-

perly constructed and ventilated, I am of opinion much of this would have been obviated; at all events, it would be a matter of economy to try the experiment of altering one or two of the buildings at Colaba, before incurring the vast expense of removing the whole establishment to the immediate neighbourhood of a post—Ma-toongha—that was so notoriously unhealthy in former years as to render it absolutely necessary to remove the European garrison from it and abandon it altogether.”

7. These remarks have much weight. We shall accordingly approve of the suggestion here made for altering experimentally portions of the barracks at Colaba in the manner proposed, viz., by rebuilding them on arches six or eight feet high, and giving them ample means of ventilation.

* General Result for the last Four Years.					Health of H.M.'s troops under the Bombay Presidency, for the year ending 31st March, 1851.				
Proportion of	1847-48	1848-49	1849-50.	1850-51.	Stations.	Total strength	No. treated.	No. died.	Proportion per cent. of deaths to strength.
	PerCent.	PerCent.	PerCent.	PerCent.					
Admission to strength.....	174.7	175.04	190.0	155.61	Colaba .....	514	1.049	38	7.39
Deaths to ditto.....	2.24	2.62	4.36	2.71	Kirkee .....	649	1.519	25	3.85
Ditto to ditto, excluding deaths from cholera .....	2.17	2.62	3.53	2.03	Poonah.....	883	1.619	24	2.71
Deaths to total sick treated ..	1.24	1.51	2.22	1.68	Deesa .....	1.269	1.788	25	1.97
Ditto to ditto, excluding cholera.....	1.23	1.51	2.24	1.07	Hyderabad and Karachee } .....	2.092	2.985	33	1.57
Average daily number of sick to numerical strength....	7.9	7.71	9.87	5.61	Aden .....	493	562	15	3.04

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 20th May, 1853 (No. 46).*

Government of  
Bombay to Court  
of Directors,  
20th May, 1853.

Referring to your Honourable Court's despatch, No. 32 of the 2nd June, 1852, on the subject of the health of the troops quartered at Colaba, we have the honour to transmit a communication from the Medical Board, bearing date the 21st December last, giving their opinion generally as to the salubrity of that locality for Europeans.

2. We at the same time beg to forward several minutes regarding the erection of new barracks on a hill at Chintzpooglee, on the island of Bombay. Your Honourable Court's recent orders, instructing us to turn our attention to the improvement of the barracks on Colaba, are now engaging our careful consideration.

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From the SECRETARY MEDICAL BOARD to the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Military Department.

*Dated 21st December, 1852.*

SIR,—

From the Secretary  
Medical Board  
to the Secretary to  
Government,  
21st Dec. 1852.

I have the honour, by direction of the Medical Board, to acknowledge the receipt of extract paragraphs 10 to 13 from despatch from the Honourable Court of Directors, No. 32, of date 2nd June, 1852, transmitted for their information with your letter, No. 2,072 of 1852; and to state, that delay in replying to that communication has been caused by references having been made to medical officers now at distant stations, who, from former residence on Colaba, were thought qualified to give information regarding the health of the inhabitants of that island.

2nd. The Medical Board have no numerical data on which to form an estimate of the salubrity of that island generally for Europeans; but the medical officers who, during the past fifteen years, have successively resided there as port surgeon or surgeon of the lunatic asylum, give their testimony to its healthiness in more or less decided terms.

3rd. The deaths in the returns from the military hospitals on Colaba, if taken in the aggregate, show a very high rate of mortality; but if these are analyzed, it is found that it is not all attributable to local causes.

4th. There are two hospitals from which these returns are received—viz. that of the wing of European infantry cantoned there, and that of the depôt of H. M.'s troops, the strength of which is made up in part of invalids of H. M.'s regiments sent from out-stations to the coast, on account of sickness. It is by conjoining the deaths from imported diseases occurring in the depôt, with those in the regimental hospital, that the table of the Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals exhibits so high a rate of mortality in Colaba.

5th. On examining the returns from these two hospitals separately, it is found that, in the year ending 31st March, 1851, the deaths, exclusive of those from cholera, were, in the regimental hospitals, 3.08 per cent. to the strength; and in the depôt hospital, H. M.'s troops, 19.23 per cent.; and if the period of four years, 1847-8 to 1850-1, be taken, the mean yearly deaths to strength, in the regimental hospital, were 4.73 per cent.; and in the depôt hospital, 12.88 per cent. The cholera deaths are excluded in this calculation, because the visitations of that disease are irregular. During the above-mentioned four years, there were seventeen deaths from cholera, of which fifteen happened in the year ending 31st March, 1851.

6th. Even after setting aside the deaths reported from H. M.'s depôt hospital, the returns of the regiment allow no room to doubt that the sickness and mortality among the soldiery, from disease of local origin, is high; but from the circumstance that the salubrity of the island generally is favourably reported on by so many, it is reasonable to attribute the evil to the barracks, rather than to atmospheric causes, which must influence all the inhabitants alike. All the medical officers formerly or now resident on the island, who, on this occasion, have given their opinion, condemn the present site of the barracks.

7th. The Medical Board are of opinion, that if upper-storied barracks had occupied the higher ground on which the officers' bungalows are now built, and if efficient means had been employed for their sewage into the tideway of the harbour, the excess of sickness and mortality among the soldiers would have been less.

8th. The proposal to erect barracks on Chintzpooglee Hill had not been communicated to the Medical Board before the receipt of this extract from the Honourable Court's despatch, and the grounds on which the recommendation rests are unknown to them. In the quoted portion of the report of Deputy-Inspector General Thom, Chintzpooglee Hill, which is about ninety-five feet above high-water mark, is erroneously estimated at three hundred feet. It appears very doubtful that the facilities for obtaining spirits would be less in that locality than on Colaba, for on all sides of the hill, even now, distillation is carried on.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
From the Secretary  
Medical Board  
to the Secretary to  
Government,  
21st Dec. 1852.

I have the honour to be, &c.  
(Signed) A. H. LEITH,  
Officiating Secretary Medical Board.

Bombay, Medical Board Office,  
21st December, 1852.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 17th August, 1853 (No. 58).*

Reply to letter dated 20th May, 1853 (No. 46.)

18. There being good reason to suppose that the climate of Colaba is not less healthy than that of any other site for barracks in the island of Bombay, we have authorised you to take measures for rebuilding experimentally, portions of the barracks at Colaba, with a view to ascertain if the insalubrity there is occasioned by the defective construction of the present barracks. These orders, you now report, are engaging your particular consideration.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
17th Aug. 1853.

19. We observe that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that, even if the barracks at Colaba were unobjectionable in site and construction, there would still be the serious objection to them arising from the facility with which the soldiers obtain spirituous liquors from the native houses by which the barracks are surrounded.

20. Upon this opinion your Governor has made the following remarks:—

“The Colaba barracks are, I conceive, as much isolated and as far removed from surrounding population, as it would be possible to keep such buildings in any part of the island of Bombay; and if on Colaba it is found impracticable to prevent the illicit sale of spirits to the men, I should fear that the same evil will be experienced in the projected barracks at Chintzpooglee. The spot looks open and uninhabited at present, but, as the Medical Board observe, there are distilleries even now on all sides of the hill; and when once the barracks are completed and occupied, haunts of debauchery of every kind will rapidly spring up and extend about the place, till the bazar, which must be at first established for the use of the troops and their followers, grows into a village and a suburb, which will defy for its regulation all the precautions of police and sentries, in the same manner precisely as the population of Colaba does at present. For this there is, I apprehend, no remedy. We cannot form a cantonment, with its restrictive rules and laws, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and I can perceive no means within our reach of protecting our troops stationed in Bombay from the pollution attending upon their close proximity to the city and all its vices, other than the exercise of constant vigilance on the part of their officers, and the establishment of a correct system of interior economy in the several corps.”

21. On these remarks the Commander-in-Chief has recorded Minute, 21st Jan. 1853. a minute, from which the following is an extract:—

“I cannot subscribe to the idea that the Colaba barracks are as far removed from the bulk of the population, and consequent temptation to the soldiers, as such buildings might be placed in any other part of the island of Bombay. There is no wall round the Colaba barracks, nor can one be built there, for fear of rendering them more unhealthy, by impeding the free current of air over the low ground they stand upon at present; whereas at Chintzpooglee, the barracks might be surrounded by a wall; added to which, the regimental police and sentries would there have the advantage of a more or less open space to watch, and be enabled to prevent the introduction of cheap and deleterious spirits into the barracks—a practice next to impossible to check at Colaba. With respect to the present barracks at Colaba, all parties agree as to their unfitness for troops, and that new ones must be erected even at Colaba. The question, therefore, narrows itself into the difference of expense between one site and another; and, at the same time, with an undoubted superiority in every respect of the site of Chintz-



EXTRACTS, &c.  
Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
17th Aug. 1853.

“ pooglee over Colaba, more especially in that of advantage of position; and cheerfulness of aspect, which operate most essentially on the minds of soldiers, tending to wean them from the daily pursuit of degrading vices, which they are induced to seek, in many instances, to relieve themselves from the local gloom and monotony of their quarters. “ At Chintzpooglee, the space about the heights is open, and the prospect to the front agreeable and enlivening; whilst to their rear, the soldiers would have the Flats and Mahin woods, within easy reach, to resort to, and roam about, instead of those sinks of debauchery and drunkenness, from which it is impossible to disconnect the locality of Colaba.”

22. If you shall be satisfied, after making the inquiries on which you are now engaged, that the barracks at Colaba must be reconstructed, or barracks of equal extent be built on some eligible site in the island of Bombay, we shall approve of your constituting a special committee, composed of several of the best-qualified military and medical officers available at the presidency, to inquire into all the particulars which must enter into the consideration of Government when deciding upon the proper location of European troops. Having ascertained their opinion, we shall approve of your transmitting it, with the sentiments of your Government, to the Government of India, on whose decision we authorize you to act without delay.

### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 21st December, 1853.*

Reply to Letter dated 9th September, 1853 (No. 88).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bombay,  
21st Dec. 1853.

Report by the Deputy-Inspector-General of H.M.'s Hospitals on the health of the Queen's troops at Bombay, for the year ending 31st March, 1853.

2. The returns of mortality in this year are not unfavourable when compared with those of the preceding three years, as will appear from the following statement:

Per-Centage of Deaths.			
1849-50	...	...	4.36
1850-51	...	...	2.71
1851-52	...	...	3.27
1852-53	...	...	3.21

3. The rates of mortality at the different stations are given in the margin.\*

4. These rates have, as usual, been affected by peculiar and temporary causes. An instance of this kind occurred at Hydrabad. One wing of H. M.'s 64th was stationed there, and the other wing at Karachee, from April to December, 1852. In the first, the deaths averaged 8.25 per cent.; whilst in the wing at Karachee, they averaged only 1.61 per cent. in these nine months.

5. The Deputy Inspector-General observes,—“ So far as barrack and hospital accommodation goes, the men quartered at Hydrabad had all that can be desired, and the duty there is at all times light, so that the disease (fever) may fairly be considered endemic, and not attributable in any way to either of the above-named causes. When fever first broke out with severity, and spread rapidly and extensively amongst the garrison of Hydrabad, the men, Mr. Carey says, were seized with a species of panic, and flew to the canteen for comfort and forgetfulness.” \* \* “ Mr. Carey says, the greater portion of the men who died were well known to be most intemperate in their habits.”

6. With respect to the barracks at Colaba, which have engaged so much of the attention of the local and the Home Government for many years past, we find the following remarks in Dr. Hall's report:

“ The ratio of mortality in the European garrison of Colaba for the last six years, terminating on the 31st March, I find has been 5.3 per cent., which, perhaps, is not

		Average strength.	Deaths per cent.			Average strength.	Deaths per cent.	
*	Kirkee	...	...	Hydrabad.				
	Poona	...	...	64th regiment	..	207	} 11.786	
	Deesa	...	...	83rd	..	73		
	Karachee.	...	...	Aden	..	359	1.949	
	64th regiment	...	756	2.248	Colaba	...	333	5.405
	83rd regiment	...	926	7.019				

“much above that of any other locality in the island of Bombay. For some years previous to 1847, the mortality returns of both Colaba, Bombay Castle, and Fort George, were swelled out by casual and accidental circumstances;—such as the occasional arrival of large numbers of sick and wounded from the army serving in Scinde;—the arrival of regiments from England and other places at unhealthy seasons of the year, and their departure to other stations after a short residence at the presidency, which materially affected the statistics of the garrison, without the mortality, in many cases, being fairly attributable to the locality itself.

“In illustration of what I mean, I will just quote two examples, out of many, that might be adduced to show how fallacious general averages are, and how apt they are, without due explanation, to lead to inaccurate conclusions. For instance, the 86th regiment, 836 strong, arrived from England in July, August, and September, 1842, were landed at Bombay, and quartered, 510 at Colaba, and 326 in Fort George. Cholera, in an aggravated form, broke out amongst the men almost immediately on their landing; and during the few weeks the regiment remained in Bombay, before it could be removed to Belgaum, 90 men perished, viz., 79 at Colaba and 11 in Fort George. During the other three quarters of the year Colaba was only garrisoned by invalids and small detachments from some of the regiments serving in Scinde; but, in striking the average at the end of the year, the mean strength of the four quarters has been taken, so that, according to Mr. Thom’s table, 804 admissions and 98 deaths appear to have taken place out of an average strength of 144 men.

“Again, in 1845, the 78th Highlanders were brought down from Hyderabad, in Scinde, where and at Sukkur they had suffered fearfully from fever and dysentery. They arrived in the presidency on 4th March, and as they happened to be in garrison there on the 31st of the same month, when the quarterly return of sick was made out, 797 admissions, and 276 deaths out of a strength of 468 men, were returned as having actually occurred there, whereas only 24 deaths took place after the 4th March—the date given of the regiment’s arrival in Bombay—and every one of these, so far as our information goes, was evidently the result of disease contracted in Scinde, and not in Bombay. On the 7th of April, the 78th left Bombay for Poona, so that, according to the bare enumeration of figures in the return, without any explanation, this enormous mortality of 276 men appears to have taken place in Bombay.

“It is needless to follow out these details further, as Colaba is considered objectionable, by the military authorities, as a quarter for Europeans, in other respects than on the mere score of health: the facilities for drunkenness, and other means of demoralization, are so great there as to be nearly beyond the reach of military control; and, to add to these deteriorating effects, the duty there is at all times severe; more so indeed than could be borne by troops in any climate without injury to their health. When the 78th Highlanders occupied Colaba, Assistant-Surgeon Dr. Leitch, the medical officer in charge, reported that the men had seldom more than three nights in bed, and very often only two, according to the number of men non-effective, from sickness and other causes. This subject was brought officially under the notice of the military authorities twice in the course of last year; but, from the limited number of European soldiers quartered in Bombay, and the amount of daily duty there, I presume it did not admit of remedy. It has now, however, been brought under the immediate consideration of the present Commander-in-Chief, Lieut.-Gen. Lord Frederick FitzClarence, and will, I have no doubt, meet with due attention, for he seems to make the efficiency and well-being of the soldier his peculiar study; and ere long the result of the beneficial changes in discipline, dress, and barrack accommodation which he is making, will be felt and acknowledged by all. If, therefore, by moving the European soldier from Colaba to Belair Hill, or any other place in the island that may be considered more cheerful, and may actually be found to be more salubrious than Colaba is, these sources of demoralization can be got rid of, it will be a great point gained in the right direction. What all are striving for is, the improvement of the soldier’s condition, both morally and physically, in this depressing climate; and it is cheering to see with what energy the good cause has been taken up by the Commander-in-Chief, and how cordially he is seconded in his endeavours by the two zealous and intelligent officers at the head of the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General’s departments of the army.”

7. We had been made previously aware of the serious errors committed in preparing the returns of the deaths amongst the troops occupying the Colaba barracks, as again pointed out in the above remarks by Her Majesty’s Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals. Such errors will, we trust, be carefully guarded against in future returns.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
—  
Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bombay,  
21st Dec. 1853.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

8. We await with interest the receipt of your further proceedings with respect to the barracks for the garrison of Bombay.

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DESTRUCTION, BY A HURRICANE, OF BARRACKS AT LOODIANAH.

GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 14th August, 1846 (No. 81).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
14th Aug. 1846.

1. We have the honour to submit copies of the documents relating to a melancholy accident, attended with loss of lives, which occurred at Loodianah, on the 20th May last.

2. On the evening of that day an unusually violent storm visited the station of Loodianah, and destroyed the temporary barracks occupied by her Majesty's 50th regiment, burying in the ruins many of the men, women, and children of that corps. The abstract given in the margin\* shows the fearful loss of lives occasioned by this disaster.

3. All documents connected with the subject, including the proceedings of the Courts of Inquest and Inquiry held on the spot, and reports of the measures that had been adopted for the accommodation of the survivors, accompany this dispatch.

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GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 1st October, 1846 (No. 97).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
1st Oct. 1846.

1. In continuation of our separate letter, No. 81, dated the 14th August, 1846, we have the honour to transmit, for the information of your Honourable Court, copies of a letter from the Secretary in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, and its enclosures—comprising reports by Lieut.-Col. Benson, member of the Military Board; by the Assistant Executive Engineer at Loodianah, and by the Superintending Engineer, North-Western Provinces, connected with the destruction, on the 20th May last, by a hurricane, of the barracks occupied by her Majesty's 50th regiment, at Loodianah; also the proceedings of a Special Committee of Military Officers convened to survey and report upon the ruins.

2. These papers contain all the information which has come into our possession since the date of our last report to you on the lamentable occurrence; and we deem it only necessary in this place to attract your Honourable Court's attention to the details given in Lieut.-Cols. Benson and Abbott's communications of the circumstances under which the barracks in question were hastily constructed in 1844, and of those which prevented their subsequent improvement in 1845; of the good condition in which the Superintending Engineer found the buildings on inspecting them personally in the early part of 1845, and again in April, 1846, when they presented no appearance whatever of instability; and to the last paragraph of Lieut.-Col. Benson's letter, from which it will be seen, that the Governor-General has required the Military Board to enter upon the consideration of the question, as to the proper measures to be adopted for strengthening the existing temporary barracks, and for giving greater stability to such as may hereafter be erected at frontier stations, with the view of guarding against the recurrence of similar accidents.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL,

*Dated 24th February, 1847 (No. 16).*

Reply to Letters dated 14th August and 1st October, 1846.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
24th Feb. 1847.

7. The tidings of the melancholy event which is recorded in these proceedings, were received by us with the deepest regret.

\* Killed—57 men (4 natives included), 15 women, 20 children. Wounded—127 men (1 native included), 4 women, 5 children.

8. We have now perused the details of the investigation into the causes of the disaster, with an anxious hope of being satisfied that it was from no want of due caution on the part of any of our officers, that this great loss of life has been sustained. In this hope we have not been disappointed.

9. It appears that the construction of these barracks was ordered in March, 1844, when political circumstances rendered it absolutely necessary that cover should be provided at Loodianah for 1,000 Europeans, before the setting in of the hot weather. No limitation, as to expense, was imposed on the engineer officers employed on the work; and, by great exertions on their part, barracks of the usual temporary description were constructed in a very short space of time, of the best materials available in that part of the country (which, however, is particularly destitute of such resources), and on a plan which had been previously in general use, and had proved successful on the hills and elsewhere. One year afterwards (June, 1845), the superintending engineer examined the barracks, and found them "firm and in good order." He observes: "They withstood all the gales of the hot and rainy season without showing any weakness, excepting that during a storm of wind and rain from the south, the end or gable walls were a little injured." Again, in March, 1846, the superintending engineer reports that he "examined the barracks attentively, and found all the essentials to be as sound and strong as on the day of their construction;" that he "entertained no sort of apprehension regarding their safety;" and that he has been many years employed in the upper provinces, and had never witnessed a gale of wind that would, in his opinion, have overthrown such buildings.

10. The barracks were on an exposed plain, standing at right angles to the course of the hurricane. "The fatal blast," Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott observes, "seems to have been momentary and simultaneous on every point of this line, as it appears from all I can learn, that all the barracks, nine in number, went down at the same moment."

11. The hurricane, by which this fearful accident was occasioned, appears, by all accounts, to have been the most formidable which had visited that locality within the memory of man. Still, after this instance of the insufficiency of ordinary means to withstand such a tempest, the superintending engineer very properly observes, that if the barracks were to be built again, he would now recommend a different style of building. He has, accordingly, made several suggestions, with a view to giving increased strength to temporary barracks. These suggestions will doubtless have received immediate and most careful attention.

12. We conclude that active and very effectual measures have been taken for strengthening the temporary barracks at Ferozepore, and at other frontier stations.

13. In remarking on the force exerted by the storm on this occasion, Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott observes, that "in India we are very deficient of observations regarding natural phenomena; nor do I believe that the working of any anemometer (measuring forces) has been kept in any quarter of the empire." We are surprised at this remark,

Letter in the Marine Department,  
dated 1st April, 1840.

as we sent to each presidency, six years ago, several anemometers complete, and had hoped that due use would have been made of them. They were sent out chiefly with reference to tidal observations; but some of them might have been long since made available for observations on storms inland, as well as on the coast. We would call your attention to the subject. Copies of reports of such observations we are desirous should be sent to us.

## BARRACKS AT HYDRABAD AND KARACHEE.

MINUTE by SIR GEORGE CLERK, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay.

*Dated 24th April, 1848.*

140. A range of magnificent barracks is now in course of construction at Hydrabad. It is calculated for a regiment of European infantry, of the full strength of a thousand men; but the buildings are all on so large and roomy a scale, that, if completed, they would certainly be equal to the accommodation of a regiment and a half, or even 1,600 men with all appurtenances. The site chosen for these barracks is probably the best.

Minutes by  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
24th April, 1848.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Minute by  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
24th April, 1848.

that could have been selected within a moderate distance of the fort and town of Hydrabad. It is comparatively elevated, perfectly open and airy, and free from vegetation or the appearance of any noxious matter. The buildings are large and very lofty, and the greatest possible care seems to have been taken to provide the men with every comfort that can be given to them, and to protect them from everything that can injure them. There is a difficulty with regard to the provision of water, as there is none on the plateau where the barracks stand; but this may, I doubt not, be overcome by leading a canal from the Indus, or it might be managed by conveying the requisite supply daily by means of camels or bullocks from the river. If there is a fault to be found with the plan of these barracks, it is that the several parts are too much detached from each other, which, under a burning sun in the hot season, may be found injurious to the health of the men, although, at the same time, it renders the whole more airy.

141. These barracks are estimated to cost more than seven lacs of rupees, and already nearly four lacs have been expended. Yet the question still remains to be answered, whether it is necessary or expedient to locate any European troops at Hydrabad. If it be so, then better barracks for them could scarcely have been designed, and though they are costly buildings, the expense would be wisely incurred. But that such a necessity or expediency really exists I am not prepared to admit. For the immediate security of Hydrabad a native force is, I imagine, ample; it could put down any sudden insurrection, and nothing more serious ought to occur, if our officers are properly vigilant, without a warning sufficiently long to allow troops to be brought up from Karachee. It is true, indeed, that there is no good reason for concluding that the climate of Hydrabad would prove inimical under all circumstances to the European constitution. With such shelter as the barracks now building will afford, the extreme heat would be materially mitigated, and I do not know that heat alone ever constitutes an unhealthy climate. Experience only can determine the real sanitary conditions of this, or of any locality; such experience as yet is wanting, for, in the rare instances in which Europeans have been quartered at Hydrabad, sickness has been generated among them, I believe, from causes independent of the local climate. But no one believes for a moment that Hydrabad is likely to prove so salubrious a station for European troops as Karachee, and, with the complete navigation now established through the tidal creeks to the Indus, the communication appears to me to be sufficiently certain and speedy, to render the constant presence of European troops at any other point a matter of less moment.

142. Were it then a question now, whether barracks should be built at Hydrabad, I should unhesitatingly give my opinion against the measure. But though still far from completion, the buildings are in an advanced state and of the most superior description, and it is necessary immediately to determine whether the design shall be carried out to the full, or the work going on be brought to a conclusion short of the original intention. I found the engineers at fault for want of instructions, and compelled to leave their people unemployed in consequence. I, therefore, caused the superintending engineer to be called upon for a statement showing the amount already expended, the amount required to complete the barracks to the full intended extent for the accommodation of an entire regiment, and the amount required so far to complete them as to suffice for a wing, or half a regiment. At the same time I directed him to confine his operations for the present to the completion of barracks for a wing only, and such measures as might be necessary to preserve the other parts already partially built.

143. The engineer has given me the following estimate.

To complete all for one wing	...	...	Rs. 5,79,724
To complete all for one wing and roof the whole	...	...	Rs. 6,00,000
To complete the whole	...	...	Rs. 7,34,050

144. I recommend the medium plan of completing everything required for one wing, and roofing over the other buildings, of which the walls are already raised; and under all the circumstances I have above endeavoured to describe, I consider it will be advisable to place at Hydrabad a wing of one of the European infantry regiments now at Karachee from the commencement of the next cold season. This wing should be occasionally relieved; the effect upon the people of such movement will be useful; the men themselves thus become more fit for active service. The position of Hydrabad is one to be always held in some strength, and the absence of a wing will relieve Karachee from the embarrassment of a number of European soldiers greater than there is accommodation for, if even entire new barracks should be built for one regiment while two regiments remain within the province. It will certainly be an experiment upon the sanitary

condition of Hydrabad as a station for European troops ; but in such quarters as these, there is not, I would venture to hope, much room for apprehension of an evil result.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Minute by  
Governor of  
Bombay,  
24th April, 1848.

152. The late Governor of Scinde has observed—"The great secret of health to the European troops in Scinde, and indeed everywhere is, building good barracks, with very high rooms. These are sadly wanted in Karachee, where we also want good water, without which there can be no good health." Upon this the Governor-General thus remarks—"In describing the best mode of securing the health of the European troops in Scinde, Sir Charles Napier states, that the barracks at Karachee, recently built, are too low:" and his Lordship then regrets that the Engineer Department, in building these barracks, committed this error.

153. In this there must, I think, be some misapprehension. At Karachee there are new barracks building for a troop of horse artillery: the buildings are upper-storied, of a very superior description, and the plan seems in every way to be unobjectionable. The other barracks at Karachee, occupied by the European infantry, have been hastily run up at different times, as occasion pressed, and are all at present condemned as unfit for the residence of European soldiers. The best of them are of the most inferior description, and many are in a state scarcely removed from dilapidation. The instructions, then, of Lord Hardinge, that the defects of these barracks should be corrected, and should be begun without delay, or, at the latest, next autumn, the original cost and expense of alteration being reported to the Government of India, must be applied to new barracks, since the expenditure of money in alterations on such worthless buildings would be only an useless and unprofitable waste.

154. Sir C. Napier intended, I believe, after completing the barracks at Hydrabad, and there placing one of the two European infantry regiments assigned to the province, to have commenced a similar range of barracks at Karachee for the other. Before he quitted the country, the late Governor forwarded to the Governor-General "plans and estimates of expense of new barracks for a European regiment of infantry at Karachee; the necessity for the erection of which H. E. most strongly urged, as the present accommodations for European infantry at the station have been altogether condemned as insufficient and bad." The Governor-General referred the question to this Government, adding that I should be able to form an opinion on the necessity for erecting new barracks, and of the advantages of the proposed site, during my tour in the province of Scinde.

155. I have not failed carefully to examine and consider this subject, and I am certainly of opinion that new barracks, for at least one regiment of European infantry at Karachee, are absolutely necessary. The estimated cost of those designed under the sanction of Sir Charles Napier, exceeds six lacs of rupees. The space, however, may be somewhat curtailed; but proper buildings cannot possibly be erected for a less sum than four lacs. I am most unwilling to propose this large expenditure, but I am satisfied that it is necessary, and must be incurred, to secure the health as well as comfort of our European soldiers in Scinde. The present season, however, is so far past that nothing can be done in this matter until after the monsoon; but preparations may be made and materials collected, so as to ensure the completion of the buildings in the course of the ensuing year, and for this, orders should, I consider, be given as soon as the sanction of the Government of India has been obtained.

156. With regard to the site for the new barracks, I am unwilling to speak decidedly. On such a point, the experience of those long resident at the place, must always be preferable to a hasty observation of a stranger, and I therefore should wish to leave this for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The opinion given by the Committee (composed of Colonel Dundas, Superintending Surgeon Patch, and Superintending Surgeon Peat) is very strong against the site of the present barracks, and cannot lightly be set aside.

157. With respect to water, I imagine there is no urgent want at present of a larger or a better supply than is afforded by the wells. To bring in water by aqueducts would be a costly experiment, and one that, after all, might fail, while always it must be exposed to the danger indicated by the late Governor-General, viz. that the supply of water would be dependent on a mode of conveyance so easy to be interrupted, and liable to be cut off, without the possibility of prevention.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 21st July, 1852 (No. 49).*

Reply to Letter dated 3rd April, 1852 (No. 23).

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
21st July, 1852.

The heavy rain at Karachee during last mousoon having rendered the barracks occupied by the wing of H.M.'s 64th regiment at that station unsafe, Government, with the approval of the Government of India, authorized the completion, at a cost of Rs. 1,02,495, of those commenced at Hyderabad, so as to make them capable of accommodating an entire regiment, in preference to repairing the former (not considered worth repair by the general officer commanding the division), at an estimated cost of Rs. 20,674.

2. The experience of the last few years of the salubrity of Hyderabad as a station for European troops having been very

favourable, we fully approve and confirm the decision of the Government of India in favour of completing the barracks at that station to an extent sufficient for an entire regiment, in preference to repairing the inferior and damaged barracks at Karachee.

## GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 16th January, 1852 (No. 5).*Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
16th Jan. 1852.

In continuation of our despatch No. 105, under date the 12th December last, we beg to communicate, for your Honourable Court's information, the accompanying copies of a letter from the Quartermaster-General, dated the 16th idem, and its inclosures, explanatory of the objections raised by the Acting Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals to the site on which the new infantry barracks are now under construction at Karachee.

From the QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL of the ARMY to the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Military Department, Bombay.

*Dated 16th December, 1851.*

SIR:

Quarter-master-  
General to  
Secretary to  
Government,  
16th Dec. 1851.

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of your letter,\* enclosing an extract from a report by Mr. Thom, Acting Deputy Inspector-General of her Majesty's Hospitals, objecting to the site on which the new infantry barracks are now under construction at Karachee, as being to leeward of the bazar, and desiring me to obtain and submit an explanation on the subject.

2. In reply, I am directed by his Excellency to state that, on examining the records of my office, it appears that, subsequent to my predecessor's letter to your address, No. 456, of the 25th February, 1850, adverted to in yours under reply, concurring in the opinion of the Committee of 31st December, 1849, which pointed out the most eligible site, a letter was received from the Military Board, dated 8th June, 1850, submitting, for the Commander-in-Chief's consideration, a plan by the Executive Engineer in Scinde for upper-roomed barracks, as cheaper and preferable, in his opinion, to lower-roomed buildings, adding that the selected ground contained space *for upper-roomed buildings alone*. The Board stated they did not concur with Captain Hill in his opinion of upper-roomed buildings, and on the 14th idem Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell replied that his Excellency coincided with their opinion, and on the same day he wrote to Brigadier-General Manson, commanding in Scinde, to point out the best available site for lower-roomed buildings, in reply to which that officer forwarded (on the 3rd July, 1850) tracings, showing *the best sites* for ten lower-roomed and five upper-roomed barracks. The Brigadier-General's letter and plans were sent, on the 13th July, 1850, by Lieut.-Col. Campbell, to the Military Board, with a letter stating that the Commander-in-Chief agreed with the Brigadier-General, and that the site pointed out by him for the lower-roomed barracks should be selected.

3. In reply to this communication, the Military Board stated, on the 20th July, 1850, that the Quartermaster-General's letter had been sent for the information and guidance of the superintending engineer in Scinde, adding, that as there is nothing now to prevent the immediate progress of the work, they hope to hear it has commenced.

\* Of the 2nd instant, No. 3,183.

4. It would thus appear that, although the best site for upper-roomed barracks has not been chosen, the best ground for lower-roomed buildings has been selected.

5. The proceedings of the Medical Committee, referred to by Mr. Thom, are herewith annexed, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council; they were received with a reference from the Military Board on some points connected with the laying out of the buildings, for which purpose, and not for determining the site, as stated by Mr. Thom, it appears to have been convened; but as the Committee's opinion that the site fixed on was not the *most eligible*, merely referred to the better site previously recommended for upper-roomed barracks, Sir Willoughby Cotton considered it unnecessary to notice it.

6. With reference to the opinion of Mr. Thom, the Commander-in-Chief considers it erroneous. From an inspection of the plan, a sketch of which is annexed, it would appear that from the bazar to the nearest point of the barracks is 350 yards, while two rows of compounds, occupied by officers and others, intervene, and the barracks stretch away half a mile to the S.S.E., far beyond any possible evil influence; a north-west wind, not a south-west one, as stated by Dr. Thom to be so pernicious, being the only one which could affect even the nearest part of the barracks, the south-west blowing clear away from them, nor, with the most ordinary attention to cleanliness and order, is there, in his Excellency's opinion, any reason to expect foul or unwholesome effluvia to be necessarily generated in the vicinity of the sudder bazar of Kurrachee.

Head-Quarters, Bombay,  
16th December, 1851.

I have the honour to be, &c.,  
(Signed) J. HOLLAND, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Quartermaster-General of the Army.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Quarter-Master-  
General to  
Secretary to  
Government,  
16th Dec. 1851.

PROCEEDINGS of a COMMITTEE assembled by order of BRIGADIER WILSON, commanding the station, to report on the direction in which it is proposed to lay out, and the manner of arranging, the new European infantry barracks and buildings attached.

President, Surgeon DON, M.D., Acting Staff Surgeon.  
Surgeon ARCHER, M.D., H.M.'s 64th regt., } Members.  
Surgeon TICE, M.D., H.M.'s 8th regt., }

The Committee having met, and Captain Hill, executive engineer, having submitted the plans and proposed site, proceed to examine the ground and immediate neighbourhood.

Proceedings of  
Medical Committee,  
26th Aug. 1850.

2. The Committee are of opinion that, although the site of the barracks is not the most eligible, yet the distribution of the buildings is the best that the ground will admit of, care having been taken to avoid the low ground to the south-eastward, which, after rain, must be overflowed with water; and hence the committee would beg to remark the necessity of having this space well drained before the barracks are occupied.

3. Captain Hill points out two sites for the hospital—one on the end of the staff lines, in the compound occupied by Brig.-Gen. Manson; the other on an elevated spot to the south-east of the barracks, about an equal distance. The latter appears to the committee to be the preferable, the site being well raised and perfectly open to the southerly and westerly breeze, and sheltered from the east wind by a low ridge of rocky hills, while its privacy will be greater than in the former site, which has the principal road to Gizree Bunder passing in front, and another branch of the same road in the rear.

4. In conclusion, the committee, understanding that the building of the barracks is about to be commenced, would beg strongly to recommend that the burial-ground, which is close on the right wing of the proposed building, be changed *immediately* to some other locality, so that no bodies may be interred in the ground for some time previous to the occupation of the barracks.

(Signed) J. DON, M.D., Acting Staff Surgeon,  
and President.  
G. ARCHER, M.D., Surgeon, H.M.'s 64th  
regt., and Member.  
J. C. G. TICE, M.D., Surgeon, H.M.'s  
8th regt., and Member.  
J. G. Wilson, Brigadier,  
Commanding at Kurrachee.  
A. MANSON, Brigadier-General  
Commanding Scinde division.,

Karachee,  
26th August, 1850.



## PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 13th April, 1852 (No. 23).*

Reply to Letter dated 16th January, 1852 (No. 5).

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
13th April, 1852.

7. It appears from this statement that, in selecting the site for the new European barracks at Karachee, the best available site for barracks of the description proposed by the Commander-in-Chief and Military Board, viz. lower-roomed barracks, was chosen; and that the objections taken to it by the Acting Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals were found, on inquiry, to be untenable. The buildings being under construction, we can only now express our hope, that they will be found to be unaffected by any local causes of malaria which might have been avoided.

8. We conclude that the recommendation of the Committee, to the effect that the burial-ground in the immediate vicinity of the proposed buildings be changed to some other locality, has been attended to.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 30th March, 1853 (No. 18).*

Reply to Letter dated 17th December, 1852 (No. 70), Para. 3.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
30th March, 1853.

11. We observe with satisfaction the great attention paid by all the departments at your presidency to ensure the completeness and efficiency of the new barracks at Karachee. The proceedings now reported have our approval.

## BARRACKS at POONA and KIRKIE.

## GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 31st October, 1845 (No. 98).*Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
30th Oct. 1845.

1. We have the honour to submit, for the consideration of your Honourable Court, the accompanying copies of our proceedings, regarding the extent of barrack accommodation available for the European troops of this presidency.

2. In your letter dated 29th June, 1842, No. 29, your Honourable Court expressed your "anxious wish that no expense which could possibly be avoided should be incurred on the erection of new barracks for European troops whilst the state of affairs on the north-west frontier should be unsettled, as, under existing circumstances, no decided opinion could be given on the proper distribution of that important portion of our military strength."

3. Your Honourable Court further stated in the same despatch, that "the number of regiments of European infantry on your establishment is six, and you have barrack accommodation for that number exclusive of the barracks at Colaba."

4. At present there are eight regiments of European infantry on this establishment, and only one of these regiments is employed beyond the territories of this presidency. It is clear, therefore, we would respectfully submit, that the time has arrived when either a fresh distribution of this part of the military force must be ordered, or new barracks must be erected for the accommodation of the additional numbers maintained.

5. From the improved ventilation of the barracks at Colaba, we are hopeful that hereafter these quarters may be used without danger to the health of the men; but a positive opinion on this point cannot yet be formed. Under any circumstances, more than one European regiment ought not, we would submit, to be assigned to the presidency, as the constant coming and going of detachments, recruits from England, and invalids from India, render it very desirable to have much spare accommodation always available there.

6. It is certainly of the greatest importance that no more European regiments should be kept in Scinde than are absolutely required. At the same time, however, we

must be prepared to reinforce that province with European troops when the exigencies of the service call for it; and, in such cases of sickness as visited the 78th Highlanders, we should be ready with comfortable accommodation to receive any sick European corps or men returning from Scinde.

7. We would observe, too, that barracks for a single wing are always inconvenient, and the necessity thereby caused of dividing a regiment is often very injurious to the service.

8. We respectfully request that your Honourable Court will be pleased to take these circumstances into your early and serious consideration, and we beg strongly to recommend the expediency of completing the barracks at Poona, which have been built for one wing, to the extent required for an entire regiment, the estimate for which amounts to Rs. 1,03,592.

9. The subject of alterations and additions for the improvement of the existing barracks at Poona cannot be fully considered, until we are favoured with a decision on the question now referred to your Honourable Court. On this head we await further reports from the Military Board, which will in the meanwhile be prepared.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 3rd June 1846 (No. 27).*

Reply to Letter, dated 31st Oct. 1845 (No. 98).

Forwarding proceedings relative to the want of barrack accommodation for the European troops of the Bombay presidency: request an early consideration of the subject, and strongly advocate the expediency of completing the barracks at Poona (built for one wing) to the extent required for an entire regiment, the estimate for which amounts to Rs. 1,03,592.

Also, letter No. 106, paragraph 7, forward, with reference to No. 98 of 1845, copy of letter from the Quartermaster-General, regarding the proposed extension of the barracks occupied by H.M.'s 78th Highlanders at Poona.

but as the arrangement for the distribution of our European force must be mainly influenced by political considerations affecting the empire at large, we are desirous that, before deciding on the present question, you should refer for the views and orders of the Government of India.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 2nd August, 1848 (No. 38).*

Reply to Letter, dated 15th April, 1848 (No. 44, A).

With reference to former proceedings, Government report the extension of the wing barracks at Poona, for the accommodation of an entire regiment, at an estimated outlay of Rs. 1,49,400, and other proceedings connected with the barrack accommodation of European troops.

penditure upon them for repairs, from time to time, and being, in their present state, unsafe for habitation, and not susceptible of repair, so as to be rendered fit for the permanent residence of European troops, it has become necessary to condemn them.

34. The completion of the only remaining infantry barrack at Poona, viz. that for five companies (as erected of permanent materials in the year 1842), to an extent sufficient to receive an entire European regiment, became, in consequence, indispensably necessary, and was accordingly sanctioned by the Government of India.

35. We observe that the estimate for the additional barracks, as prepared in the year 1845, amounted to Rs. 1,03,592, but that the estimate now prepared amounts to Rs. 2,05,217. This great increase arises from improvements in the construction, as to height, width, and ventilation, all of which appear to have been determined upon after careful inquiry. The contracts have been taken at sums varying from  $26\frac{1}{2}$  to  $28\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. below the estimate, and amount in the aggregate to Rs. 1,49,400.

36. We concur with you in observing that the difference between the estimates and tenders is remarkable. If the work can be properly executed at the amount of the tenders,

EXTRACTS, &c.

Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
30th Oct. 1845.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
3rd June, 1846.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
2nd Aug. 1848.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
2nd Aug. 1848.

the rates on which the engineer's estimate has been framed are obviously excessive. You have very properly given a caution as to the exercise of due supervision over the contractors to compel them to use the best materials, and to fulfil all the stipulations of the agreement, observing that "it must be borne in mind by all parties that the adoption of such a contract, on the recommendation of the Military Board, does not relieve the executive officer or the Board from the obligation attaching to them, respectively, to ensure the performance of the work in the manner in which it is intended to be executed."

37. We are desirous of being furnished with a plan and sections of this barrack.

38. When this barrack shall have been completed, it appears that you will only within the Bombay territories possess accommodation, of an improved and permanent description, for three and a half\* regiments, although, in the opinion of the Government of India, you should be provided with barrack accommodation for five regiments. Doubts are also suggested by the Government of India, whether the barracks of Deesa should not be abandoned, and the regiment now there removed to a position whence its services could be rendered more available.

39. The further consideration of these important matters has been deferred, and meanwhile, as a temporary expedient, accommodation has been formed for one regiment out of the condemned ranges at Poona.

40. You will not fail to communicate to us, for our previous approval, any plans for additional barrack accommodation. Meanwhile, we will remark that we are most desirous to correct any defective, and to supply any deficient, accommodation for European troops,—being satisfied that a due consideration for their comforts and a sound and judicious economy are equally consulted by placing them in healthy and commodious quarters.

41. It does not appear to have engaged your attention whether a suitable site for a hill station exists within your presidency. This object should be attended to, if it become necessary to build new barracks.

42. We are desirous of being informed of the means of ablution which are provided in the several barracks at your presidency, and especially in the new barracks now under construction at Poona.

### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 21st July, 1852 (No. 47).*

Reply to Letter dated 11th March, 1852 (No. 20).

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
21st July, 1852.

Government forward for consideration plans and estimates for a range of barracks at Poona for a regiment of European infantry 1,000 strong. The estimates for upper-roomed barracks is Rs. 3,26,017; if lower-roomed, Rs. 3,83,401. The proposition to form a hill station for a regiment, instead of erecting new barracks at Poona, has been abandoned as inexpedient.

ment is still quartered in a portion of the condemned barracks.

4. You have now at length forwarded to us estimates for new barracks, for the second regiment.

5. If, on reference to the Government of India, it shall appear to be necessary to maintain, permanently, barracks for two regiments of European infantry at Poona, we authorise you to proceed with the construction of the required buildings, either on the upper or lower-roomed plan, as your present chief engineer may consider to be best adapted to the purpose, and to the site available for the barracks.

6. When referring to the Government of India on this subject, we are desirous that you should, at the same time, procure information of the plans of the barracks now under construction in the Punjab, and full particulars of the manner in which married soldiers are accommodated, in order that, as far as local circumstances will permit, the European troops at each presidency may receive accommodation of the same extent and description.

7. Upon the intimation given to us, that you have abandoned, as inexpedient, the

\* Poona, 1; Belgaum, 1; Deesa, 1; Bombay, 1.

proposition for placing a regiment on a hill station, we would remark that, so far as may be judged by the results of the inquiries yet made, there appears to be no ground to expect that a station, combining so many advantages as Poona, will be found on the hills within your presidency.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
21st July, 1852.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 17th August, 1853 (No. 58).*

Reply to Letter dated 9th May, 1853 (No. 44).

Proposed plan for the water supply and drainage of the Ghorepury barracks, which is recommended to be adopted, and extended to other European barracks. Solicit attention to the letter addressed to the Government of India, expressing the sentiments of Government on the subject.

5. This subject was brought to our notice by the Government of India. It engaged our immediate attention; and we replied, under date the 8th ultimo, authorizing the carrying out of the plans for the water-supply and drainage of the

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
17th Aug. 1853.

Ghorepury barracks, to such extent and in such manner as the Government of India should consider expedient, "care being taken that in all underground drainage, the pipes, both "secondary and principal, shall be of adequate dimensions."

6. This last caution was given by us, because we observed that pipes were proposed of 4-inch, 6-inch, and 9-inch—dimensions which appear to be quite inadequate for the sewerage of a barrack.

7. Upon this subject, we enclose, for the information of your chief engineer, two copies of a report, lately laid before Parliament, relative "to the prevalence of disease at "Croydon, and to the plan of sewerage."

8. In our letter of the 8th ultimo, we referred to our already-expressed desire, that "ample means for personal ablution shall be furnished in all barracks." We trust that no time will be lost in carrying out the requisite measures for this object.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BOMBAY.

*Dated 21st December, 1853 (No. 85).*

Reply to Letter dated 24th September, 1853, No. 98.

Request Court's consideration to a project for supplying the Kirkee camp with water from a rivulet that drains the Pashair Valley, at an estimated cost of Rs. 75,585.

7. This is the first intimation we have received of the necessity of taking measures to supply water to the barracks at Kirkie. We conclude that it arises out of a suggestion to build new barracks

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bombay,  
21st Dec. 1853.

there, and to introduce underground sewerage, as proposed at Ghorepury. These projects we are of opinion should not be brought forward separately, but be considered together. We authorize you to take measures for this purpose, and to bring any well-considered proposition for improving the quarters of the dragoon regiment at Kirkie, under the notice of the Supreme Government, by whose decision thereon we authorize you to abide.

8. Upon this subject, we would call your attention to the concluding part of the following extract from the report of her Majesty's Deputy-Inspector-General of Hospitals, on the health of her Majesty's troops, dated 30th June, 1853.

"On the strength of this decided opinion of the Medical Committee, the Commander-in-Chief, I understand, has represented to Government the circumstances of the case, and has strongly recommended that substantial up-stairs barracks should be substituted for the remainder of the old pavilions at Kirkie, which will be of incalculable advantage to the troops quartered there when carried out, but whether they will realize the sanguine anticipations of the Medical Committee, remains to be proved. My own opinion is, they will not to their full extent, for sickness in the cantonment of Kirkie has never been uniformly equal in all the pavilions; and on reference to the returns, it will be found that the admissions from the right wing have exceeded those of the left wing by 61½ per cent., and in the left wing some of the old pavilions have been as healthy, or even healthier, than the new ones, which argues that there is some external exciting cause of disease; and I quite agree with Dr. Fraser

EXTRACTS, &c. " that it may have its origin in a portion of wet ground directly to windward of the  
 Court of Directors " barracks, which, from the tenacious nature of the soil, retains moisture for a length of  
 to Government " time after the rains have ceased. If practicable, I think it would be highly desirable  
 of Bombay, " to have this piece of ground thoroughly drained."  
 21st Dec. 1853. 9. The mortality at Kirkie in the year 1852-53, we observe, was five out of a  
 strength of 680, being less than one per cent. per annum, a result which must be  
 considered as satisfactory.

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HILL STATIONS. SUBATHOO, KUSSOWLIE, AND DUGSHAIE.

BENGAL MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 11th October, 1844.

LETTER from Major-General Sir John McCASKILL, K.C.B., Commanding Kus-  
 sowlie, to the QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL of the Army, Head-Quarters.

*Dated July, 1844.*

Major-General  
 Sir John McCaskill  
 to the Quarter-  
 master-General,  
 July, 1844.

Agreeably to the request contained in your letter of the 25th June; I have the honour to communicate, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, such observations as I have to offer upon the eligibility, or otherwise of the two hill stations, Subathoo and Kussowlie. *Subathoo* was occupied in the month of April, 1843, by H. M.'s 9th foot, and 1st European light infantry, under circumstances probably unfavourable to a fair testing of its advantages. Both regiments had previously suffered severely in health. Many of their men were at this time sick; many were still labouring under the effects of former disease, and many more had got into their constitutions a tendency or predisposition to disease. The 9th fell into this state through their severe exertions, exposure, and privations during the service in Affghanistan, and the European light infantry from their experiencing immediately previous, two successive seasons of great sickness at Kurnaul.

The only barracks then prepared and preparing for the reception of the men of either corps were temporary buildings, and not enough of them. But when time admitted of the complement being got ready, and the weather became variable, these were found to be, in several respects, defective. From the nature of their construction, the walls being chiefly of matting, covered over with a thin coating of plaster, they were not capable of keeping out the cold night air, nor, subsequently, the strong, damp winds during the rains. They were thatched with a coarse, stubborn, hill grass, and leaked so much, that many, indeed the greater part, in each barrack, were, in consequence, exposed to continual droppings on their cots, and were unable to keep their bedding dry. The doorways were at first too many, and, having only common grass jhamps to them for doors, the cold and damp making their way through them, proved both inconvenient and injurious. To remedy this in part, every other doorway was closed up, in the same manner as the rest of the walls, which was found of much benefit. Great sickness prevailed in both corps throughout the hot and rainy weather, and, in the 9th, great mortality also. The diseases were fever, liver, and bowel complaints. The seeds of all these the 9th brought with it from Affghanistan. The bowel disorders, which were of the most obstinate and virulent character, a great number of the men contracted there, and it was very rarely that any so affected ever recovered. This disease was known among the men by the name of the white purging.

I have noticed these circumstances, in order to show that the sickness and deaths at Subathoo are sufficiently accounted for, quite independently of anything connected with the station itself. An error there was, in my opinion, in putting two European regiments, with their numerous followers, in so confined a spot as Subathoo.

The position of the barracks there of the 9th, was comparatively low, and along the edge of a deep khud or ravine, whence, it was latterly suspected, malaria found its way to them. The situation of the permanent barracks being far more elevated, must be deemed entirely free from any such objection; and there can be no doubt that, with such accommodation as they afford, the pure good air surrounding them, and the happy medium of the temperature beneath their shelter, any regiment of Europeans that, under any circumstances, came thither from the plains, would experience and acknowledge very great benefit from the change. For about two months before the rain sets in at Su-

bathoo, the temperature is a little high, but this again is counterbalanced by the comparative mildness of its winter months, for a hill station.

*Health of the troops.*—The health of the men of the 9th regiment has been gradually improving from the period of the setting in of the cold of last season. In November last, three companies were moved from Subathoo to Kussowlie, and others followed at intervals, as the permanent barracks were reported ready for their reception. On the 9th of March of the present year, the last of the companies and the head-quarters came over. I am of opinion that the health of the men would have progressed satisfactorily as it has done, at either station; and this favourable change requires now only a little time to have it confirmed, when all trace of the wide-spread evil will have been eradicated, and the 9th will again have arrived at its former state of efficiency.

*Hospitals and barracks.*—I have already remarked upon the barracks at Subathoo. The hospitals for the two corps were situated on a spur of a hill, a good deal more elevated than were the barracks of the 9th; that of the 9th consisted of two long rooms or wards, one 84 feet by 18, the other 46 feet by 18, both only  $11\frac{1}{2}$  feet high; on each side was a verandah, 10 feet wide and eight feet high, and at each corner a small room for hospital serjeant and guard. This was the old hospital, originally built for a native corps. Another, parallel to it, and better calculated for Europeans, was built, and occupied by the 1st European light infantry. The old was but ill ventilated, and its want of height made this the more felt.

*Kussowlie barracks.*—The permanent barracks, nine in number, have now been completed, and the last of them made over and occupied by the 9th about twelve days ago. They are all of them well situated, eight of them forming two sides of a square, over the parade ground. The area was formerly a deep ravine, about 300 feet long, and varying in breadth from eighty to twenty feet. On the west side of the ravine the ground rises abruptly for about 150 feet, and on the summit and slope stand three barracks. Part of the slope is being cut away, and the soil and rock (in some parts so hard as to require blasting) thrown into the chasm, by which will be formed a flat parade-ground 400 feet long, varying in breadth from 400 to 170. This work is about half completed.

These barracks vary a little in length—some being 142 and others  $153 \times 155$ . They contain two long rooms, separated by a passage; each room holding a double row of cots, the passage being occupied by mess-tables and forms. The roof is ten feet from the floor, and, in all but two, doors in each side, and numerous small windows for ventilation, eight feet above the floor, moving on central hinges,—no roof ventilation. The centre passage would be improved by sky-lights—three or four would be sufficient; for, in the winter weather, when the doors are shut, the want of light must otherwise be felt, and occasionally the additional ventilation would be desirable. They are all flat roofed. The floors, as yet, are only mud. I believe it is intended to lay boarded floors, and, when this has been done, the whole will be very comfortable and well adapted to the climate. There are four serjeants' rooms to each, one at each corner. There are a sufficiency of fire-places to all the long rooms, and one small one to each of the serjeants' rooms. The buildings appear very substantial; and I have every hope they will, with a little more labour and care, be made water-tight. To most there are privies and cook-rooms, finished. The staff serjeants have comfortable houses of two rooms each, with cook-room and privy attached. A canteen is building; but there is no school-room, library, serjeants' mess-room, or orderly room, yet begun. Two of the temporary barracks, partitioned off, are made to serve for all these; and the part appropriated for the school serves also for the performance of divine service in.

*Hospital, men's.*—This building is 182 by 43, completed with flooring of planks, and is a comfortable hospital, with ventilation along central passage excellent; but in stormy weather rain beats in through these sky-lights, for want of their being sufficiently sheltered. For this a remedy is proposed. Cook-room and privy are completed; a dead-room is attached, flat roof, and sky-light ventilation.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Major-General  
Sir John McCaskill  
to the Quarter-  
master-General,  
July, 1844.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 14th January, 1846 (No. 5).*

Reply to Letter, dated 30th August, 1845 (No. 133).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
14th Jan. 1846.

12. We regret to observe from these reports that the difficulty of procuring water at Kussowlie still exists, and that in consequence of the nature of the rock and its figure, which is that of a sharp ridge, the Superintending Engineer has no hope of success in procuring a supply there from wells. Water must, therefore, be procured at a considerable permanent expense, from springs distant one mile and a quarter, and which, it now appears, are at a level of 848 feet below the parade-ground, instead of 700 as formerly stated.

13. The supply of water at Subathoo appears to be sufficient in ordinary seasons, and only to fail in seasons of drought; and it is hoped that permanent sources of supply may be found in wells. In any case, an ample supply can be procured from springs three-quarters of a mile distant, and at 400 feet below the level of the barracks; a depth which, we now learn, should have been specified in the report formerly sent to us, instead of 1,400 feet, which was inserted by a clerical mistake.

14. The reports on the salubrity of Subathoo and Kussowlie as cantonments for European troops are not yet conclusive, because the regiments stationed there were suffering from unusual sickness when sent to the hills. There appears, however, to be good ground for hoping that the results will be favourable, especially at Kussowlie, which is superior in elevation\* and position to Subathoo. This latter station, we observe, is considered by the Superintending Engineer to be adapted only to one European regiment, although buildings were constructed for two regiments.

15. We shall look with much interest for further reports in continuation of those now before us.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 8th April, 1846 (No. 25).*

Reply to Letter, dated 27th August, 1845 (No. 130).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
8th April, 1846.

The under-mentioned estimate sanctioned:—  
23. Rs. 14,417. 11a. for verandahs to certain public buildings at Subathoo.

65. We notice with regret that the walls of the European barracks at Subathoo are made of such destructible materials that they require the protection of verandahs to save them from ruin. In the words of the Superintending Engineer, "if water gets to it," (the Kutcha brick, of which the walls are built) "it melts away in a dangerous manner." There are, it appears, ample materials on the spot for stone walls; but these have not been hitherto available, owing to the limited number of masons procurable on the spot. This want can probably be supplied when buildings require renewal, as in these exposed regions it is important that the cover for the troops should be constructed of solid and durable materials.

66. We take this opportunity of mentioning that her Majesty's Government have sent some barracks constructed of iron to the Mauritius. It may be desirable that you should seek from the government of that island information of the experiment.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 10th February, 1847 (No. 12).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
10th Feb. 1847.

132. The documents recorded in the margin† contain remarks by the Superintending Surgeon of the Sirhind division on the superiority of a hill climate, founded on the annual medical report of the Sirhind division for the year 1845.

\* Elevations—Kussowlie, 6,000 feet; Subathoo, 4,500 feet.

† Military Consultations, 18th December, 1846.

## BENGAL MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 18th December, 1846.

From the SUPERINTENDING-SURGEON, Sirhind Division, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL of the ARMY.

*Dated Kussowlie, 10th November, 1846.*

SIR,

I have the honour to forward a table, made out from the annual medical report of the Sirhind division for the year 1845, which I solicit the favour of your submitting to his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief.

Superintending-Surgeon, Sirhind Division, to Adjutant-General, 10th Nov. 1846.

2. The object of this document is to demonstrate by facts and figures the superiority of a hill climate over the plains to the health of our British soldiers.

3. It will be seen that at the station of Kussowlie particularly, great immunity from fever prevails, the admissions from that fatal disease being less than one-third, and the deaths in the same proportion.

4. Subathoo is also more favourable to health than the plains,—but the elevation is not high enough; and in the deaths from all diseases, dysentery is often fatal.

5. I have heard that it is in contemplation by our humane Governor-General to have more hill stations for our European troops, and having myself had the honour of personally beholding H. E. the Commander-in-Chief inquiring into the case of every individual soldier in crowded hospitals, I have been induced most respectfully to lay this brief table and remarks before Lord Gough, whose interest in the health of our British troops must, if possible, have been increased by late events.

Should the wisdom of Government deem it right to have more stations in the sub-Himalayan range, I would respectfully beg to recommend that the height of the places chosen should not be less than Kussowlie, and that the regiments should at once, on their arrival in the country, if circumstances admit, be marched to a hill residence.

## EXTRACT from Annual Report of European Troops for 1845.

Stations.	Average strength per annum.	Fevers per annum.	Total sick per annum.	Total deaths from fevers per annum.	Total deaths per annum.	Remarks.
Umbala .	3,205	2,381	5,489	31	324	Here remark the superior healthiness of Kussowlie to Umbala, and no doubt the plains generally. The admissions from fever at Umbala are 74 per cent. to the
Kussowlie..	978	217	1,682	3	63	
Subathoo .	789	339	1,650	5	102	

strength; at Kussowlee only 22 per cent. Deaths from fever at Umbala, 9.16 per cent.; at Kussowlie, 3 per cent., which is not one-third of the mortality.

From all causes, we have at Umbala 10 per cent. of deaths, at Kussowlie 6 per cent.

At Subathoo the contrast is not so great, but still the admissions from fever are not much more than one-half, and deaths from the same cause two-thirds of the deaths from fever at Umbala.

(Signed) W. JACKSON,  
Superintending-Surgeon, Sirhind Division.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 15th September, 1847 (No. 103).*

Reply to Letter dated 10th February, 1847 (No. 12), para. 132.

59. This return shows advantages (especially in regard to fevers) at the hill stations as compared with Umbala, but the positive results at all these stations are very unsatisfactory. At Kussowlie the deaths in 1845 were 6 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., at Subathoo 13 per cent., and at Umbala 10 per cent. These large rates of decrement, unless accounted for by an unusual visitation of sickness, indicate some serious defects in locality, or in the internal economy of regiments, which call for your particular inquiry, and we desire a special report upon the subject.

Court of Directors to Government of Bengal, 15th Sept. 1847.



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to COURT of DIRECTORS

*Dated 6th February, 1847.*Governor-General  
to  
Court of Directors,  
6th Feb. 1847.

I have the honour to transmit, for your Honourable Court's information, a copy of my memorandum, of the 28th ultimo, as communicated to H. E. the Commander-in-Chief, relative to barracks for the European troops on this establishment, accompanied by the papers therein adverted to, and to request your Honourable Court's favourable consideration of my proposal to construct two sets of barracks for the accommodation of two regiments of infantry, the one set at Jullundur, and the other on the hills near Kusowlie, alluded to respectively at paragraphs 3 to 11 of the memorandum; and, as their estimated cost exceeds the amount authorized to be expended on buildings without your previous sanction, I hope to be favoured with your Honourable Court's sanction, at your earliest convenience.

## MEMORANDUM by the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

*Dated Camp, Busséean, 28th January, 1847.*Memorandum by  
Governor-General,  
28th Jan. 1847.

11. If, therefore, two regiments of cavalry are stationed at Umbāla, a new set of cavalry barracks must be built, or the infantry barracks transferred to the cavalry, and a new set of infantry barracks built in the hills, probably in the neighbourhood of Kusowlie, at 6,000 feet above the level of the sea, at a place called Dugshaie, to which site Lieutenant-Colonel Boileau gives the preference.

No. 2 of enclosure. 12. Send a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Boileau's report to the Commander-in-Chief, and request his Excellency to select a staff-officer, and a field-officer who has had experience in the hill-stations, and a surgeon from one of the regiments in the hills, to inspect the ground, and report to his Excellency the most eligible site for a set of European barracks, especially adverting to the water, fuel, and the distance and facility of moving, on any emergency, from the hills to their marching establishments in the plains.

13. I propose that the barracks should be built on the same plan as those of Kusowlie, assuming the materials on the spot to be the same; and the engineer officer intrusted with the building will receive his instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, the superintending engineer.

14. Any improvements which experience in the hills may suggest, may be adopted; but I do not agree with Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve, commanding H.M.'s 29th regiment, that bathing-rooms are required, where the difficulty and expense of procuring water is great, and the climate cool. If the lieutenant-colonel means washing-sheds, one to each company may be erected. In the plains, the necessity for baths on the score of health, is quite a different question; but in the hills, the necessity is by no means one of urgency, and might with equal reason be required in every barrack in Great Britain. The lieutenant-colonel's report is very satisfactory, and does him great credit.

\* \* \* \* \*

No. 3 and 4 of enclosures,  
No. 5 of enclosure. 21. The present seems to me to be a convenient opportunity of adverting to the Honourable Court's letters of 14th January, 1846, No. 5, paragraphs 12 to 15; and 8th April, No. 25, paragraph 65, relating to the construction of the barracks in the hills, and their comparative salubrity with stations in the plains, on which subject, as affecting the health and efficiency of the European troops, the Court take the deepest interest, and are most anxious that every means should be resorted to by which this end may be obtained.

22. With regard to the class of barracks to be built on the frontier, I am of opinion that, in the hills and the plains, they should be constructed on the same system as those at Kusowlie, Subathoo, and Ferozepore.

23. The first cost will probably average one thousand five hundred pounds for each set of barracks for 1,000 rank and file. Those at Subathoo and Kusowlie cost about one thousand pounds, since which authorized additions have been made for the serjeants' mess-room, reading-room; and I propose that a large school-room, divided by a shifting partition, should be built, for the regimental boys and girls, which, on the Sundays, shall be used for divine service.

24. The Court observe, in their letter of the 8th April, paragraph 65, in noticing a letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott's, that the barrack at Subathoo should have been built of better materials, as was the case at Kussowlie. The explanation given by the superintending engineer will satisfy the doubts expressed by the Court; and as the temporary barracks at Subathoo were hastily run up, to cover H.M.'s 9th regiment, and have lasted three years, and, with the repairs made this autumn, will probably last two or three years more, I consider this fact as quite conclusive, that the system of temporary barracks is the most economical, and the most politic, in permitting the Government to abandon them without reluctance, provided that they are, from their construction, as healthy as the more costly permanent barracks.

25. I may ask, in what part of the world can 1,000 men of H.M.'s troops be housed at an expense of five hundred pounds a year, as far as the construction of the barrack is in question?

26. In a paper, relating to the construction of new barracks at Poona for one European regiment, it appeared that these barracks had originally cost seventeen thousand eight hundred pounds, and that, during the last twenty years, the repairs alone had averaged six hundred and ninety-one pounds a year, exclusive of interest on the original outlay.

27. I am aware that all the military establishments at Bombay are on a more expensive scale than those of Bengal; but the difference is very striking.

28. The permanent barracks at Kurnaul, Hazareebaugh, and Ghazeepeer, have done but little service. The two latter have not been much occupied; and owing to the uncertainty of climate and an advancing frontier, the expensive barrack of Kurnaul has been inevitably abandoned.

29. The temporary barracks on this frontier were partly built to shelter the troops returning from Afghanistan, in the shortest space of time, and were consequently imperfect. Others were built as experimental sanitarium, and at the least expense of construction.

30. The barracks at Ferozepoor and Loodianah were constructed to meet political and military emergencies. The destruction of the latter by a hurricane last year was a disaster which occurs more frequently in H.M.'s colonies in the West Indies than in the East; and the barracks at Ferozepoor, distant eighty-five miles, built on the same plan, suffered no accident.

31. It remains to be considered, whether these temporary barracks on the frontier are, as regards their construction, well adapted to secure the health of the troops, in protecting the men against the peculiarities of the climate, whether built in the hills or the plains.

32. There are more complaints of the heat of the brick walls and the want of ventilation at the permanent barracks in Fort William and at Dinapore than in any of these frontier temporary barracks. The brick walls and tiled roofs retain the heat longer than the mud or unburnt brick walls and thatched roofs of the temporary barracks; and on this frontier, where, for five months in the year, the climate is as fine as any in the world, there is no reason to believe that a cheap temporary barrack is less favourable to the health of the soldier than a more permanent style of building of brick or stone. The addition of glazed windows, to admit light and exclude wind, ought to be made.

33. If their comparative salubrity be established, there can be very little reluctance on the part of the Government to abandon any of these barrack stations, as convenience may dictate, knowing that there is no real pecuniary sacrifice, as in two or three years the barrack has more than paid for its original cost.

34. Even if doubts existed as to the comparative salubrity of the two classes of barracks, political and military necessity generally compels the Government to build rapidly, and therefore cheaply, to meet sudden emergencies.

35. There are certain points, such as Fort William, Dinapore, Cawnpore, and Agra, where for several years European troops will require to be permanently stationed, and no expense should be spared to render these as healthy as possible; but in the frontier provinces it may be affirmed that all our military stations must to a certain extent be in a state of transition. The progress of events on any frontier renders it good policy not to be embarrassed with expensive substantial buildings, when temporary barracks will answer the same purpose.

36. In 1845 the barrack at Loodianah was completed; in 1847 a set of barracks is advanced to Jullundur, and another European regiment stationed at Lahore. In this state of things, the Court will, I have no doubt, concur with me, that it would be improvident to build expensive permanent barracks on this frontier.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
Governor-General,  
28th, Jan. 1847

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Memorandum by  
Governor-General,  
28th Jan. 1847.

37. If circumstances should force the Government to advance two or more European regiments beyond the Ravee, the abandonment of the hill barracks would be no sacrifice, except as regards the health of the troops. These barracks have already more than paid the expense of their construction.

38. Until this necessity should arise, I recommend that the hill stations should be maintained as sanatoria, the experiment, as far as it has gone, having been proved to be very successful.

39. The Court will read with great interest the reports from the officers commanding at Subathoo and Kussowlie, annexed to this memorandum.

40. They will observe that for one soldier who dies in the hills, three die on an average in the plains, and in all probability, as regards the invaliding of the worn-out men, a very large consumption of men will be saved under this head.

41. It appears that the elevation for a barrack ought not to be below 6,000 feet above the level of the sea, which corresponds with the altitude of health in the West Indies.

42. The reports now sent are very satisfactory as far as they go, but I should prefer to have a committee appointed of an experienced staff-officer, and a field-officer who has passed a season with his regiment in the hills, and an able surgeon, say the superintending surgeon of the Sirhind division, to draw up a report of the comparative eligibility between the hill stations of Subathoo and Kussowlie, and the stations in the plains of Umbala and Ferozepore, being authorized to call on the several departments, through the military secretary to the Government, for such information as the committee may require. The barracks at Umbala, being permanent barracks, will enable the committee to form an opinion between the salubrity of these barracks and the temporary barracks at Ferozepore, although I am aware that no opinion can be very decisive, as the result depends more upon the air of the place than the style of the building, and also on the system of discipline in the regiment.

43. Having collected the necessary evidence, which they will annex to their report, the three principal heads will consist: 1st, of the expense incurred on each of the four sets of barracks for 1,000 men each; the annual repairs, the probable duration of the buildings, the variations in the construction, the deficiencies of accommodation at some of the barracks, which have been remedied at others, and, in general, whether, as frontier barracks, they are calculated to insure the health of the troops.

2ndly. The extraneous expenses at any of these stations, such as the supply of water, fuel, the transport of food and grain, and whether the existing system is susceptible of any improvement.

3rdly. The most important point of all, the comparative salubrity of the four stations, deducing from the records and returns in the hospitals the actual amount of the alleged superiority of the hill stations over the plains, in the number of deaths as well as the probable effects upon the invaliding of sickly men; although it must be evident that any very correct result of the difference will be unattainable.

44. Let all the papers referred to be sent to the Honourable Court, stating that as the outlay of money will exceed the sums authorized to be spent without the Court's authority, I shall be glad to receive their orders at their earliest convenience.

45. In all probability the Court's answer will be received in the latter end of April, and during the next eight months, from May till December, there will be time to erect the buildings.

46. I will in a separate paper call upon the Medical Board to draw up a report on the same plan as that of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch's, laid before the House of Commons, and prepared by order of the Secretary at War, of the comparative salubrity of the several stations, extending it to Sinde and the presidencies of Madras and Bombay.

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REPORT by Lieut.-Col. J. T. BOILEAU, Engineers, on Places in the Hills apparently adapted for locating European Troops.

Report by  
Lieut.-Col. J. T.  
Boileau.

42. Having thus described the various "places in the Hills apparently adapted for locating European troops," I would, in conclusion, beg to state my opinion, that the preference lies in favour either of Bunasur or of Dugshaie. The former from its proximity to the plains, and especially to Kalka, where the Government store depôts

are established, and from the ample resources (especially in wood) which would be at the command of the Executive Building Department, has advantages which are wanting at the Dugshaie Hill; but the highest portion of Bunasur, *i.e.* the Tower Hill, is limited in extent, and though sufficient for the accommodation of a full regiment of Europeans, under proper management, it wants the compactness of the Dugshaie, as well as its parade-ground, its clear bracing climate, and, what is by no means an unimportant advantage in favour of the latter, its elevation. The comparative disadvantage, too, under which the Dugshaie location would labour, of lying more distant from its building resources than Bunasur, is by no means sufficient to give the preference to the latter position. Stone is in both cases abundant on the spot; lime is rather more distant at Dugshaie than at Bunasur, and the principal disadvantage consists in the distance whence timber would have to be brought to Dugshaie. Considering, however, that it has, at the stations of Kussowlie and Subathoo, to be brought from distances one and a half times greater than at this location, and at Simla from fully twice the distance, and that at the above places wood work of all kinds can be executed at moderate prices; taking into account also the facility of intercommunication which at present exists between Dugshaie and the other hill stations, its altitude, low temperature, favourable situation for receiving the full benefit of the Doon breeze, and ample supply of water close at hand, I am decidedly of opinion that the Dugshaie Hill is the preferable of the two for the location of a European regiment.

EXTRACTS &amp;c.

Report by  
Lieut.-Col. J. T.  
Boileau.

LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel J. ORCHARD, C.B., commanding 1st European Bengal Fusileers, to Lieutenant-Colonel GARDEN, C.B., Quarter-master-General of the Army. Head-Quarters, Simla.

*Dated 9th November, 1846.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 563, of the 14th October, 1846, and in compliance with the instructions therein contained, have now to report—

Lieut.-Col.  
J. Orchard to  
Lieut. Col. Garden,  
9th Nov. 1846.

1st. An experience of four summers' and one winter's residence, with the 1st European Bengal fusileers, at Subathoo, enables me to report with the greatest confidence, that the station is admirably adapted in every respect for European troops.

2nd. It may be remembered in what a terribly sickly state the 1st European Bengal fusileers were at Ferozepoor, when with the army of reserve; two years' residence at Kurnaul, during particularly unhealthy seasons, having rendered the regiment next to inefficient.

3rd. From Ferozepore the regiment was ordered to Subathoo; the first and second years did not entirely eradicate the Kurnaul fever from the soldiers' constitutions, and many deaths still occurred from fever; but the third and fourth years have indeed made a change, and though the regiment is unfortunately weak in numbers, in health it is in splendid order. I attribute this solely to the fine climate of Subathoo. I cannot speak in too high terms of it, as a station for European troops; the very appearance of the soldiers now, after the most trying time of the year in India, must confirm my opinion respecting the climate.

\* \* \* \* \*

7th. The temporary barracks erected in 1843, for the accommodation of her Majesty's 9th foot, are in a very bad state of repair, in fact, scarcely habitable; and I would strongly recommend their being altogether rebuilt; certainly, in their present condition, the least that would be necessary to render these barracks suitable accommodation for European troops, would be, the substitution of mud for the present tatty walls, the addition of outer verandahs and ceiling cloths, the exchange of sound for a number of the decayed posts, and a new coating of good clay over the present floors.

8th. Two of the permanent barracks stand in need of repair, Nos. 2 and 9. In the former, the woodwork down the centre of the building is much sunk, and in some places broken—it has been supported during the rainy season; in the latter, the inner western long wall has fallen from the perpendicular, and the woodwork in the roof down the centre passage has sunk considerably—it has been propped up during the rainy season, but must be renewed. The completion of the verandahs to the whole of these barracks has been a great improvement, and has proved a source of great comfort to the men during the rains; and as the floors of those not already terraced will be done during the absence of the 2nd European regiment, these barracks will be complete. An additional barrack

EXTRACTS, &c. for the band and drummers, and sufficiently large to allow of a good room for the excellent subscription library in the regiment, would be a great convenience.

Lieut.-Col.  
J. Orchard to  
Quarter-Master-  
General,  
9th Nov. 1846.

The following remarks by Dr. McGregor will give his Lordship the Commander-in-Chief, an idea of the health of Subathoo during the present year.

In making choice of Subathoo as a cantonment for European troops, too much was expected from climate. As a means of preserving health among a body of European soldiers, the climate of Subathoo is admirably adapted; but when chronic disease exists, as it did to a great extent among the men of her Majesty's 9th foot and the 1st European Bengal fusiliers, the effect of any climate must necessarily fail in recovering them; and the mortality in both corps from such causes was great in 1843, particularly from dysentery. The same was the case as regards the fusiliers in 1844; while the epidemic cholera committed great havoc in 1845. In 1846, when the regiment was in a comparatively healthy state, after its absence from the campaign, the place was found highly conducive to health, since only four deaths occurred in the 1st European Bengal fusiliers from the 1st of June to the 1st of September, a period which is generally the most unhealthy, but which, during this season, has proved the reverse. Four cases of ophthalmia have occurred in the regiment, in consequence of the 2nd European regiment being stationed at Subathoo, but all of them have perfectly recovered, and it may, therefore, be inferred that Subathoo is a place well adapted for the preservation of health among European troops in ordinary years. The removal of the old bazar will still further contribute to its healthy character; and the removal of other huts about the hospitals and roadsides would be advisable, as preventing the accumulation of dirt, by which the purity of the air is deteriorated. The walls of the hospital, in which the men of the 2nd European regiment are located, require to be raised a few feet, in order to secure a freer ventilation of air, as nothing tends more to accelerate the recovery of ophthalmia than a fully ventilated, airy hospital barrack.

I trust that the above reports on the subjects mentioned in your letter will prove satisfactory to the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief.

REPORT from Lieut.-Col. GEORGE CONGREVE, H.M.'s 29th Regiment, commanding at Kussowlie, to Lieut.-Col. W. GARDEN, C.B., Quarter-master-General of the Army. Head-Quarters, Simla.

*Dated 25th November, 1846.*

Report from Lieut.-  
Col G Congreve  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
25th Nov. 1846.

In accordance with the instructions contained in the two letters above referred to, I have now the honour to furnish, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief and the Government, a report upon the eligibility or otherwise of Kussowlie as a station for European troops; this report being, as required, in continuation merely of one to the same effect dated July, 1844, forwarded by the late Major-General Sir J. McCaskill to your address, and of which you have been kind enough to send me a copy for my guidance. I shall take the liberty to introduce the remarks which I have to offer upon the subject of the report, according to the arrangements suggested in your letter, No. 264, of the 25th June, 1844, for the report of the late Sir John McCaskill.

1. Of the climate, &c. It must be premised of the statements in this and the succeeding section, that they are grounded upon the interrupted experience of one year only; the regiment first arriving at Kussowlie on the 21st November, last year, and then being absent from this station with the army of the Sutlej from the 11th of the month following to the 11th of April this year. A monthly abstract of the meteorological journal kept at the regimental hospital is appended. It will be seen that the highest range of the mercury in a thermometer placed in the shade, and in a verandah facing north, is 80°, and the lowest range 30°. These and the mean temperature monthly appear to show that the climate, as regards temperature, is well adapted to the European constitution. Further, there are no hot winds, and the frequent frosty days in the cold season are very invigorating. Thus, the advantage of the hill climate over that of the plains to the Europeans is very obvious. The principal differences from a European climate are,—the greater direct power of the sun's rays, particularly in May, June, and July, when it is nearly equal to what is felt in the plains, the lesser degree and shorter duration of cold, and the occurrence of periodical rains.

The rains here were exceedingly heavy, and fell very constantly from the end of May to the end of September. The atmosphere at that season was unwholesomely damp, not merely from the quantity of rain, but from the upper part of the mountain being frequently enveloped in clouds, sometimes, indeed, being above them. Occasionally the atmosphere changed very often during the day from clear and hot, to cold, foggy, and damp,—these changes arising from detached and drifting clouds crossing the mountain. These last remarks apply only to the rainy season; during the rest of the year, with the exception of a few days in the cold season, the air is beautifully clear and pure. Fires are more or less agreeable, or necessary, from September to April. Snow fell twice last winter, and, in shady places, remained on the ground some days.

In consequence of the continued heavy rains, the grass and underwood near the cantonment on the northern face of the mountain became of injurious density, and, at the recommendation of the surgeon of the 29th regiment, I directed this jungle to be cleared, and a judicious thinning of the trees to be effected. From the want of labourers, the executive engineer could only in part carry out this order. The trees on the northern aspect of the mountain may still be considered rather dense; they are almost exclusively a common kind of pine, of no value as timber. With ordinary cultivation, the climate admits of the production of European fruits and vegetables nearly all the year round.

2. Health of the troops. There can be no hesitation in pronouncing the climate of this station to be, on the score of health, to say nothing of bodily comfort, infinitely preferable to the climate of the plains. The extent of this superior sanitarium must be considered as very imperfectly displayed by the sickness and mortality in her Majesty's 29th regiment, during the twelve months just ended. The men arrived at this station with their health and stamina much reduced from the European standard, by three and a-half years of previous service in the plains; two epidemics each year, but more particularly the epidemic remittent fever of 1844, had permanently injured the constitution of many, and fairly undermined the health of the whole corps. Under these circumstances, several deaths were to be expected in any climate, and it is probably a fact highly in favour of the relative healthiness of the station, that the number died in the regiment, during its sojourn here, does not exceed thirty-four, including two by wounds, and deaths of men in a hopeless state upon their arrival. Hence for subsequent years there is even a better prospect. But to ascertain the full extent of congeniality of the climate for the European soldier, it would be necessary to bring him direct from England, without any intermediate service in the plains. Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix II., extracted from the Quarterly Report of the surgeon of the 29th regiment, furnish a comparative statement of the sickness and mortality in the regiment here and in the plains, during the two most sickly periods of the year, from 1843 to 1846 inclusive; and further to illustrate this most material point of eligibility, I shall subjoin a return of admissions and deaths in this regiment monthly, during the twelve months it has been in this climate, begging, at the same time, that in the perusal of it, the previous observation of the unhealthy condition of the men upon their arrival at the station may be borne in mind.

Months.	Admitted	Died.	Remarks.
1845. November, from 21st to 30th . . . . .	123	1	During this period the regiment was with the army of the Sutlej; and the depôt, only consisting of 70 sick in hospital, and weakly men, occupied the station.  1 of delirium tremens.  2 died of wounds.  The twelve months' donation batta paid on the 14th of this month, and 3 deaths from this date have been by delirium tremens, with contusion from falls.
December, to the 11th . . . . .	15	1	
Ditto 11th to April 11th . . . . .	—	3	
April 12th to 30th . . . . .	103	7	
May . . . . .	58	4	
June . . . . .	71	—	
July . . . . .	89	1	
August . . . . .	67	5	
September . . . . .	80	6	
October . . . . .	69	2	
November, to the 21st . . . . .	61	4	
Total . . . . .	736	34	

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Report from Lieut -  
Col. G. Congreve,  
to Quarter-Master  
General,  
25th Nov. 1846.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
 Report from Lieut.-  
 Col. G. Congreve  
 to Quarter-Master-  
 General,  
 25th Nov. 1846.

Upon comparing this total of admissions and deaths with the similar annual totals for previous years in the plains, the superiority of healthiness of this climate for European troops is placed in a very marked light.

Period.	Stations.	Mean Daily Strength.	Total Admissions	Total Died.
8 months to 31st March, 1843 . . . .	Chinsurah and Ghazeepore . . . .	1,019	1,637	101
12 months ending March, 1844 . . . .	Ghazeepore . . . . .	921	1,657	83
Ditto ditto 1845 . . . . .	Ghazeepore and Meerut . . . . .	930	2,475	144
7 $\frac{1}{2}$ months, ending 21st November, 1845	Meerut . . . . .	923	1,344	69
12 months ending 21st November, 1846 .	Kussowlie . . . . .	712	736	34

Here it is to be remarked, that the admissions and deaths are exclusive of wounds received in action, with the exception of two deaths in the statement for Kussowlie. Thus, allowing for the difference of strength in each period, the sickness and mortality in the regiment, during the twelve months at this station, has been on the average fully two-thirds under what it has hitherto been at any station in the plains, or an actual saving of about sixty lives. Now, taking the commonly-stated calculation of cost of strength at Rs. 1,000 per soldier, here is a saving of Rs. 60,000 a year, from which, deducting Rs. 20,000 for the increased expense in wood, water, &c. at this station, there remains a clear balance of eligibility of Rs. 40,000 a year.

Before leaving the subject of this section, it is necessary for me to refer to the prevalence of scorbutic disease amongst the men, reported to me by the surgeon of the regiment. These cases have only been observed since the latter part of the rainy season, and are attributed by that medical officer to the excessive dampness of the atmosphere, together with the exceedingly inefficient supply of fresh succulent vegetables procurable at this station. Surgeon Taylor further informs me, that in his medical reports, he has particularly remarked upon the occurrence of such unusual cases, and suggested the formation of a cantonment garden, as a means of obviating the recurrence of this disease in future years. I beg to submit this suggestion, in which I fully concur, to the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief and the Government.

I consider the measure a feasible one, and one which might be carried out at little expense, by either purchasing or renting from any of the zemindars in the neighbourhood a plot of ground of sufficient size to supply the troops constantly with green vegetables. The cultivation of this ground might be intrusted to some steady men of the regiment, aided by a few coolies, the wages of whom, would willingly, I conceive, be defrayed by the troops.

Of the barracks and hospital so accurately described by Major-General Sir J. McCaskill, I have only to say that the latter building has proved very unsubstantial, and is now undergoing very extensive repairs. The barrack buildings are in progress of being much improved by the boarding of the floors, which were formerly merely the bare earth. Seven buildings are already finished, two remain to be boarded. This improvement being finished, the barracks will be unobjectionable, except as regards the deficiency of places for effecting personal cleanliness. At present, a soldier's ablutions are completed by a little sprinkling of water on his hands and face at the puckall in front of his barrack-room; and as the main road from Kalka to Simla intersects the barracks, it is impossible for him to wash the other parts of his body without publicly exposing his person, and offending the delicacy of travellers passing by; the importance, and indeed absolute necessity, of erecting proper bathing-rooms is therefore obvious.

APPENDIX, to No. I. to Report from Lieut.-Col. Congreve, dated 25th Nov. 1846.

TABLE showing the Ranges of the Thermometer and State of the Weather at Kussowlie, during the undermentioned Months.

Months.	Thermometer.			Prevailing Winds.	Weather and Miscellaneous Remarks.
	Max.	Med.	Mini.		
December, 1845, to the 10th instant	63°	42°	30°	S. E.	Rain with sleet, and hail on 5th; snow-storm that night, the only snow during the season. Frosty in the shade.
January, 1846 . . . . .	—	—	—	—	} The regiment with the army of the Sutlej.
February . . . . .	—	—	—	—	
March . . . . .	—	—	—	—	
April . . . . .	80°	67°	52°	Variable.	Cool and agreeable. No rain.
May . . . . .	79°	72°	62°	N. E.	Though very sultry during the early part of the month, has been much cooler lately, from the frequent occurrence of heavy thunder-showers during the last sixteen days.
June . . . . .	78°	72°	64°	S. W.	Rains set in very early this year, and may be dated from the 15th of the month; but heavy showers have been very constant since the 6th; only seven days on which more or less rain has not fallen. Constant fog; atmosphere very damp. Temperature agreeable.
July . . . . .	76°	72°	67°	S. and S. W.	Very damp and rainy the whole month. More or less rain in heavy showers on twenty-five days.
August . . . . .	76°	72°	66°	S. E.	Frequent falls of rain till the latter end of the month, when the sky cleared, and weather became much warmer.
September . . . . .	75°	69°	61°	N. E.	Very rainy and damp; showers latterly very heavy, with thunder and lightning. More or less rain on twenty-eight days. Fires agreeable of an evening towards end of month.
October, the 27th instant . . . . .	70°	63°	59°	N. E.	Cloudy, with thunder and heavy showers, with hail, to the 4th; since which no rain has fallen. Cloud of locusts crossing station from twelve to three p.m. on 6th, in direction from E. to W.; smaller flights on two subsequent days. Fires necessary, except in middle of day.

Extracted from "Meteorological Journal" kept at the Hospital of H. M.'s 29th Regiment at Kussowlie.

(Signed) J. R. TAYLOR, Surgeon,  
H. M.'s 29th Regt.



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

APPENDIX No. II. to Report from Lieut. Col. Congreve, dated 25th Nov. 1846.

TABLE I.

Appendix No. II.  
to Report from  
Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve.SHOWING the Sickness and Mortality in Her Majesty's 29th Regiment, during  
each June Quarter, from 1843 to 1846 inclusive.

	Ghazepore.		Meerut.		Kussowlie.			
	1843.	1844.	1845.	1846.	1845.	1846.		
	Of mean daily strength	74.24	54.6	49.9	29.6	1.4	9.2	
Per centage of admission	6.47	3.6	1.38	1.4	9.2	9.2		
of death	10.1	8.8	9.89	9.2	9.2	9.2		
constantly sick	12.38	14.8	18.	28.3	18.	28.3		
Average duration of each attack of disease—days	9.	8.	9.	8.4	9.	8.4		
Average sick time to each soldier—days								
	Admitted.	Died.	Admitted.	Died.	Admitted.	Died.	Admitted.	Died.
By Fevers	153	7	95	3	225	7	38	1
Eruptive Fevers	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
Diseases of the lungs	22	2	28	1	12	1	7	—
" liver	24	1	23	3	9	—	13	—
" stomach and bowels	183	8	131	1	52	3	51	5
Asiatic cholera	34	24	69	27	2	1	—	—
Diseases of the brain	125	20	10	—	3	1	8	1
Dropsies	1	—	3	—	1	—	1	1
Rheumatic affections	15	—	6	—	12	—	4	—
Venereal	64	—	70	—	62	—	33	—
Abscesses and ulcers	29	—	35	—	20	—	13	—
Wounds and injuries	16	—	11	—	18	—	23	—
Punished	1	—	3	—	2	—	4	—
Diseases of the eyes	18	—	18	—	42	—	15	—
" skin	3	—	2	—	3	—	3	—
All other diseases	24	—	15	—	16	—	17	—
Total	712	62	519	35	479	13	232	10

(Signed)

J. R. TAYLOR, Surgeon.

H.M.'s 29th Regt.

TABLE II.

SHOWING the Sickness and Mortality in her Majesty's 29th Regiment during the Quarters ending 30th September, from 1843 to 1846 inclusive.

Appendix No. II.  
to Report from  
Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve.

	Ghazepore.		Meerut.	Kusowlie.
	1843.	1844.	1845.	1846.
	By mean daily strength.	45·8	100·1	60·9
Per centage of admissions . . . . .	45·8	100·1	60·9	29·87
" of deaths . . . . .	1·42	5·	5·24	1·5
" of constantly sick . . . . .	7·26	15·9	10·3	8·25
Average duration of each attack of disease—days . . . . .	14·5	14·6	15·5	25·4
Average sick time to each soldier—days . . . . .	6·7	14·7	9·5	7·6

	Ghazepore.		Meerut.		Kusowlie.			
	Admitted.	Died.	Admitted.	Died.	Admitted.	Died.		
By Fevers . . . . .	68	7	710	40	196	5	24	3
Eruptive Fevers . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Diseases of the lungs . . . . .	23	1	12	4	9	2	4	1
" liver . . . . .	13	—	13	—	9	1	9	1
" stomach and bowels . . . . .	115	2	50	1	120	—	113	2
Asiatic cholera . . . . .	2	2	—	—	67	40	—	—
Diseases of the brain . . . . .	6	1	3	1	4	1	7	2
Dropsies . . . . .	5	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
Rheumatic affections . . . . .	22	—	11	—	8	—	4	—
Venereal . . . . .	89	—	57	—	44	—	18	—
Abscesses and ulcers . . . . .	25	—	24	—	28	—	14	—
Wounds and injuries . . . . .	4	—	9	—	13	—	20	2
Punished . . . . .	2	—	2	—	1	—	5	—
Diseases of the eyes . . . . .	17	—	14	—	51	—	6	—
" skin . . . . .	3	—	1	—	1	—	—	—
All other diseases . . . . .	25	—	15	—	16	—	11	—
Total . . . . .	419	13	921	46	568	49	236	12

(Signed)

J. R. TAYLOR,  
Surgeon, H.M.'s 29th Regiment.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of INDIA.

*Dated 5th May, 1847 (No. 8).*

Reply to Letter dated 6th February, 1847.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of India,  
5th May, 1847.

1. We cannot hesitate to accord our sanction to the proposal of the Governor-General, to construct two sets of barracks for two regiments of European infantry,—the one set at Jullunder, for the regiment to be stationed there, and the other at some hill station near Kussowlie, in substitution for the set of barracks at Umbala, which is to be transferred to a regiment of dragoons. These barracks are to be of the temporary class; but will, doubtless, be constructed with due attention to the suggestions of the superintending engineer, as noticed in our letter of the 24th February, 1847, No. 16, for the purpose of ensuring their complete stability.

2. We notice with satisfaction the great attention given by the Governor-General to ascertain the eligibility of sites for these barracks, with reference to salubrity, the supply of water, the proximity of building materials, &c.

3. The reports now given of the salubrity of Subathoo and Kussowlie, as stations for European troops, are very satisfactory; but there has not yet been sufficient experience of the effects of an uninterrupted residence on the hills, to allow of accurate results being obtained of their comparative salubrity. The Governor-General's statement, that "for one soldier who dies on the hills, three die on an average in the plains," is deduced from the report of H.M.'s 29th regiment at Kussowlie, during a residence of twelve months, as compared with the mortality in that regiment at stations in the plains. It will be very gratifying if subsequent experience establishes the superiority now mentioned.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 24th September, 1847 (No. 148).*

Reply to Letter dated 5th May, 1847 (No. 8).

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
24th Sept. 1847.

17. We have the honour to state that the hill of Dugshaie (described in the accompanying documents) has been selected as the most eligible site for one of the two sets of barracks noticed in your Honourable Court's despatch under reply. Both sets of buildings have been ordered to be proceeded with as rapidly as is consistent with good workmanship and economy.

18. A road will be constructed from Pinjore to the hill of Dugshaie. A detachment of sappers and miners has been placed at the disposal of the superintending engineer, North-Western Provinces, to assist in the formation of the new cantonment.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 16th February, 1848 (No. 16).*

Reply to Letter dated 24th September, 1847 (No. 148), pars. 17 and 18.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
16th Feb. 1848.

25. The particulars here given of the hill of Dugshaie (5,760 feet above the level of the sea), afford satisfactory evidence of its fitness as a hill station for European troops. Its selection for the purpose, and the orders given by you for the immediate construction there of barracks for a European regiment, to be built in a solid and stable manner, have our sanction.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 20th September, 1848 (No. 7)*

Reply to Letter dated 17th March, 1848 (No. 36).

105 and 106. Advert to former correspondence which accompanied paragraphs 17 and 18, No. 148 of 1847, relative to a proposal from Dr. Taylor, of H.M.'s 29th foot, for heating and ventilating the new barracks at Dugshale by means of stoves and iron pipes, which has been sanctioned experimentally.

15. We regret to observe a statement made in these proceedings, that there is a total want of any arrangement for ventilation in the Kussowlie barracks when shut up at night. This statement should engage the attention of the Military Board.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
20th Sept. 1848.

16. Dr. Taylor speaks of the soldiers in the Kussowlie barracks as being "washed." We have lately called for a report on the means of ablution in every barrack on your establishment for European soldiers.

17. The proceedings adopted by you on the proposal for warming and ventilating the barracks at Dugshale have our sanction; but great care should be taken to prevent accidents by fire.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to the COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 13th May, 1848 (No. 79).*

Reply to Letter dated 15th September, 1847 (No. 103).

59. Notice reports of the salubrity of the hill stations, and call for a special report on the causes of their insalubrity during 1845.

hill stations in the year 1845.

90. In compliance with the request contained in this paragraph, we have the honour to forward a special report on the probable causes of the insalubrity of the

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
13th May, 1848.

*From* Major W. M. N. STURT, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department, *to* Lieutenant-Colonel W. GARDEN, C.B., Quarter-master-General of the Army.

*Dated 26th November, 1847.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

With reference to dispatch from the Adjutant-General of the Army to the address of the Secretary to Government, Military Department, with the Governor-General, No. 1,113, dated 18th November, 1846, I am directed by the Honourable the President in Council to transmit to you, to be laid before the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, the annexed extract (paragraph 59) of a military letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors to the Governor of the Presidency of Fort William, in Bengal, No. 103, dated 15th September, 1847, observing that the medical return of the hill stations exhibits large rates of decrement, which are indicative of some defect in locality or in the internal economy of regiments, and desiring a special report on the subject.

I have the honour to be, &amp;c.

(Signed) W. M. N. STURT, Major,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department.

Fort William,  
26th November, 1847.

*From* Major  
W. M. N. Sturt to  
Quarter-Master-  
General,  
26th Nov. 1847.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

*From* Lieutenant-Colonel W. GARDEN, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated 9th February, 1848.*

SIR,—

From  
Quarter-Master-  
General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
9th Feb. 1848.

With reference to letter No. 428, from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated the 26th November last, and its inclosure, I am instructed by the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief to transmit to you, for the information of Government and the Honourable the Court of Directors, a special report from the superintending surgeon, Sirhind division of the army, explaining the cause of the large rates of decrement in deaths between the hill stations of Kussowlie and Subathoo, and that of Umbala, in the year 1845.

2. His Excellency, from personal inspection and knowledge of the state of the internal economy of the regiments referred to, is satisfied that no defect in it tended to produce the large rates of decrement alluded to.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. GARDEN, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Quartermaster-General of the Army.

Quartermaster-General's Office,  
Head-Quarters, Simla,  
9th February, 1848.

SPECIAL REPORT on the CAUSES which influence the rate of decrement in deaths, between the hill stations of KUSSOWLIE and SUBATHOO, and that of UMBALA in the year 1845.

Report by  
Superintending  
Surgeon,  
Sirhind Division,  
28th Jan. 1848.

1. The Honourable the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 10th February, No. 12, paragraph 59, are pleased to remark on the annual report of the superintending surgeon of the Sirhind division, where the superiority of a hill climate is advocated as follows :—

2. " This return shows advantages (especially in regard to fevers) at the hill stations " as compared with Umbala, but the positive results at all these stations are very unsatisfactory. At Kussowlie, the deaths in 1845 were  $6\frac{3}{8}$  per cent., at Subathoo, 13 per cent., " and at Umbala, 10 per cent."

Extract of letter from the Honourable Court. " These large rates of decrement, unless accounted for by an " unusual visitation of sickness, indicate some serious defects in " locality or in the internal economy of regiments, which call for " your particular inquiry, and we desire a special report upon the subject."

Question proposed. 3. I have studied this paragraph with great attention, and if I understand aright, the Honourable Court are desirous of learning why the rate of mortality is so high at Subathoo and Umbala, when compared with the lower proportion of deaths at Kussowlie, and probably they wish to ascertain the causes of the hill station of Subathoo having more deaths than Umbala, situated in the plains.

Deaths at Kussowlie. The mortality at Kussowlie,  $6\frac{3}{8}$ , may not be unsatisfactory when it is considered that the year 1845 was marked by the invasion of cholera. I must observe, however, that a fractional error of three-eighths appears to

Fractional error. have been accidentally added to the deaths at Kussowlie, for my original annual report is now before me, and having invariably given my ratios of deaths to strength in integers and decimals, the fraction does not enter into my annual report for 1845. In rejecting the fractions I reduce the total mortality at Kussowlie to 6, namely 5 per cent. of strength in her Majesty's 9th regiment of foot, and 1 per cent. of strength in her Majesty's 29th. The tables, if carefully examined, explain themselves, otherwise it might be asked, why her Majesty's 9th is 5 per cent. and the 29th only one. The latter regiment may be said to have only marched up the hill of Kussowlie and back again, for they were there in October and engaged in the desperate battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah in December; but my report must embrace every corps, or portion of corps, that enters the Sirhind division, should it only be for a few days. To estimate, therefore, fairly the effect of hill climate at Kussowlie,

H.M.'s 9th foot should only be selected. her Majesty's 9th regiment, which was at the station nearly the whole year, or until, with the 29th, they entered the battle-field

in December, should alone be selected. Now the average strength of the 9th foot was 978, and the total deaths 56, which in my book are entered 5 per cent., and this is correct to a decimal of one. The other seven deaths in the table, making 63, are of her Majesty's 29th regiment.

4. If the Honourable Court will do me the favour to look at the table for Kussowlie, and read the text regarding her Majesty's 9th foot, they will remark that out of this number, 56, not fewer than 38 perished of cholera, reducing the actual deaths from the ordinary cases of mortality to 18, which is less than 2 per cent. of deaths, a rate so favourable that it could not be surpassed in any climate.

The greater number of deaths in H.M.'s 9th regiment were from cholera.

The larger rate of 5 per cent. is accounted for by an unusual visitation of sickness in the appalling shape of cholera.

5. Having disposed of the mortality at Kussowlie, and showed that in the year 1845 it may be finally rated at 5 per cent., leaving out her Majesty's 29th regiment for the reasons stated, I proceed to state that the formidable disease of cholera, which pervaded the hills as well as the plains, and was not obstructed in its desolating progress by rivers or mountains, added at least 3 per cent. to the mortality, and though its place would have been occupied in all probability by some other disease, it would have been less dreadful in its results.

Mortality increased 3 per cent. from cholera.

6. Subathoo presents a large rate of mortality to strength, and is correctly set down at 13 per cent. per annum of strength; for in my table B for 1845,

Deaths from cholera where I took great pains to be accurate, I find it 12.9, deducting, should be deducted, as should be done when an overwhelming epidemic prevails, to obtain truthful results as to effects of climate only on general health, the deaths from cholera, we shall obtain a great modification of the expression, "that the positive results are very unsatisfactory." The total deaths in the year 1845 are, in the 1st European Bengal fusiliers, 102, of which number 42 men fell victims to cholera. The average

Mortality from cholera 5 per cent.

total strength of the regiment for the year is 789 men, and the ratio of deaths from cholera is 5 per cent., which, subtracted from the rest, leaves 8 per cent. of deaths from all other diseases. This is still a large proportion; but it must be taken into consideration, that the 1st European regiment Bengal fusiliers suffered greatly from epidemic sickness at Kurnaul, which must have left a great impression on the moral and physical state of the corps; and a body of soldiers at Subathoo will always suffer in comparison with a similar number at Kussowlie. The reason of that is, the difference of altitude, Kussowlie being estimated at 6,500 feet above the level of the sea, and Subathoo at only 4,000 feet. The lesser elevation, in tropical climates, is the region where dysenteries and diarrhœas prevail, as

Dysentery endemic at Subathoo.

may be seen in the works of medical writers. Dysentery has been found a most formidable disease at Subathoo, and seems to be endemic at certain seasons; when the rain falls, the temperature is lowered and the air moist. I am unable to pronounce an opinion as to how far the internal economy of the regiment may have influenced disease; but there can be no

Difficulty of enforcing military police at hill stations.

doubt that there is greater difficulty in keeping the men within doors in the hills than in the plains; and disease and death must be frequently caused from exposure to a hot sun in the vallies, besides greater facility of obtaining liquor afforded.

7. During the period of cholera at Umbala, H.M.'s 3rd light dragoons was long exempted from the disease, which I could only attribute to the superior moral character of the men, and the stringent military police which prevented the men from wandering to the bazars, obtaining drink and exposing themselves to the causes, whatever they might be, of this fearful disease, which seemed especially concentrated in the bazar.

8. Whether we are to look for the greater rate of the mortality in the 1st European Bengal fusiliers from any want of internal discipline, seems very questionable. In the inferior height of Subathoo, as already stated, we may always look for more sickness and

Hill stations should not be less than 6,000 feet.

for more mortality than at Kussowlie; and I have constantly stated to our Hill Committee, of which Colonel Drummond was president, that no site for European troops should be selected under an elevation of 6,000 feet, or as closely approximating to that height as possible.

9. What I have stated regarding the deduction of cholera cases reducing the mortality to 8 per cent. appears fully borne out by a reference to the year 1844, where the

EXTRACTS, &c.

Report by  
Superintending  
Surgeon,  
Sirhind Division,  
28th Jan. 1848.

## PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Report by  
Superintending  
Surgeon,  
Sirhind Division,  
28th Jan. 1848.

Mean of three years' mortality at Subathoo, 8·32.

ratio of deaths at Subathoo is 8·1 per cent. from all diseases. The year 1846 only shows a rate of deaths at 4·5 per cent., and the mean of the three years is 8·32, as shown by the abstract table annexed for the years 1844, 1845, and 1846.

10. Umballa suffered greatly from the ravages of cholera, as will be observed in the deaths, out of 324 from all cases, amounting to 207, or 6·4 per cent. to the strength, leaving only 3·6 per cent. from other diseases which ended fatally.

11. But I most respectfully entreat the Honourable Court of Directors not to record their opinion from the result of one year; for so many contending and multiform agents enter into collision, that truth is only to be slowly elaborated by extending our researches over many years, to furnish data for proving the superiority, in the long run, of the hill climate over the plains. I have the honour to annex copies of a series of tables, A, B, and C, for 1844, 1845, and 1846, with, lastly, an abstract table of the whole, in the last two columns of which is shown a comparative view for a still longer period, embracing four years' experience of the plain stations, and six of the hill stations. After making allowance for occasional discrepancies in numbers, and, it may be, erroneous reasoning, the fact appears to be established, that where one death occurs in the hills two occur in the plains; and when the sick in the cool regions of Kussowlie, or places equally elevated, amount to 50, we shall find, out of a body of men of equal strength in the plains, 100 in hospital prostrated from disease.

Umbala,  
28th January, 1848.

(Signed) W. JACKSON,  
Superintending Surgeon,  
Sirhind Division.

TABLE A.

EXTRACT from the General Numerical Abstract of the Annual Report of European Troops, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fevers and Dysentery at the Stations mentioned for the Year 1844.

Stations.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysentery.				By all Diseases.				Remarks.
		Admitted.	Died.	Per Centage of Mean Monthly Strength		Admitted.	Died.	Per Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		
				Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.	
Ferozepore	—	Only occupied 5 months.				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	It will be observed in this Table, that the admissions by fevers at Umbala are 100 per cent., at Kussowlie 36·5, and at Subathoo 51 per cent. From dysentery the admissions preponderated in the hills, and so did the deaths; but the general result of deaths from all diseases is favourable to Kussowlie over the plains. The 1st European regiment appears to have suffered more in proportion than the troops either at Umbala or Kussowlie.
Umbala	1450	1445	20	100	1·3	238	23	16·4	1·5	3213	81	221·5	5·5	
Kussowlie	813	297	2	36·5	·2	151	16	18·5	1·9	1098	34	135·	4·2	
Subathoo	834	426	8	51	1	199	39	24	4·7	1880	68	225·4	8·1	

(Signed) W. JACKSON,  
Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.

TABLE B.

EXTRACTS, &c.

EXTRACT from the General Numerical Abstract of the Annual Report of European Troops, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fevers and Dysentery at the Stations mentioned for the year 1845.

Stations.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysentery.				By all Diseases.				Remarks.
		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		
				Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.	
Ferozepore	885	944	43	106.6	4.9	226	25	25.5	2.8	2,315	143	261.6	16.1	Here remark the astonishing difference in admissions from fevers between the plains and hills. The per-centage of admissions from fevers to strength at Ferozepore, 106.6; Umbala, 115.6; while at Kussowlie the proportion is only 15.2, and at Subathoo, 43.4. The deaths from fever at Kussowlie nothing, and at Subathoo, a fraction, while the two plain stations average more than 3 per cent. The saving of life at Kussowlie from all causes which produce death is very remarkable, and shows a saving to the Government, when compared with Ferozepore, of eighty-seven lives, which may be fairly valued at £8,700, estimating each man to cost £100 sterling. If the Umbala troops had been at Kussowlie, the deaths would have been proportionably 130 instead of 324, a saving to the state of £19,400 sterling, and a most triumphant argument in favour of the general salubrity of hill over plain. The deaths at Umbala are swollen by the dreadful invasion of cholera, but then had the men been at Kussowlie, they might not have died in such numbers.
Umbala	2,088	2,415	31	115.6	1.5	383	36	18.3	1.7	5,489	324	262.8	15.5	
Kussowlie	898	137	0	15.2	0	124	6	14	.7	1,271	56	141.8	6.2	
Subathoo	789	343	5	43.4	.6	124	26	15.7	3.3	1,650	102	209	12.9	

(Signed) W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.

TABLE C.

EXTRACT from the General Numerical Abstract of the Annual Report of European Troops, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fevers and Dysentery at the Stations mentioned for the year 1846.

Stations.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysentery.				By all Diseases.				Remarks.
		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		
				Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.	
Ferozepore	Occupied only two months	by H.M.'s 53rd Regt. H.M.'s 62nd foot gone home												This table keeps up the character of the hill provinces for health over the plains. The percentage of admissions from fever at Umbala 146 per cent.; Kussowlie being only 12.4 per cent. and Subathoo 54.6. Death is again observed to be busy at Umbala, claiming nearly its 4 per cent. while Kussowlie is less than 1 per cent. and Subathoo only 1.3. If the Umbala troops had changed places with the Kussowlie men they would have lost 108 men from all diseases, instead of 207. A clear gain to the state of £9,900 sterling. With such extraordinary results, humanity need not be pressed into the cause as an advocate.
Umbala	1,921	2,807	74	140.1	3.8	450	54	23.4	2.8	5,961	207	310.3	16.7	
Kussowlie	638	80	5	12.4	.8	76	8	12.0	1.2	924	36	144.8	5.6	
Subathoo	913	499	12	54.6	1.3	122	9	13.3	1.0	2,023	41	221.5	4.5	

(Signed) W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.  
3 C



ABSTRACT Monthly Returns, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fever and Dysentery, and the Total Ratio of Sickness and Mortality at the Stations mentioned, for the Years 1844, 1845, and 1846.

Stations.	Years.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysentery.				By all Diseases.				Total Rate per Cent. for the Three Years.		Ratio of Sickness and Mortality at Hills and Plain Stations.		Remarks.	
			Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Aggregate Strength Admitted.	Per-Centage of Aggregate Strength Died.		
					Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.						
Ferozepore	1844	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	} one year only. } 261·6 16·1	} Plain Stations. four years. } 267·6 11·9	Returns for 1844 and 1846 not available.			
	1845	885	994	43	106·6	4·9	226	25	25·5	2·8	2,315	143	261·6	16·1						
	1846	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	
Umbala	1844	1,450	1,445	20	100	1·3	238	23	16·4	1·5	3,213	81	221·5	5·5	} 268·6 11·9	} Hill Stations. six years. } 181· 6·89				
	1845	2,088	2,415	31	115·6	1·5	383	36	18·3	1·7	5,489	324	262·8	15·5						
	1846	1,921	2,807	74	146·1	3·8	450	54	23·4	2·8	5,961	207	310·3	10·7						
Kussowlie	1844	813	297	2	36·5	·2	151	16	18·5	1·9	1,098	34	135	4·2	} 140· 5·36	} Hill Stations. six years. } 181· 6·89				
	1845	898	137	—	15·2	·0	124	6	14·	1·7	1,271	56	141·5	6·2						
	1846	638	80	5	12·4	·8	76	8	12	1·2	924	36	144·8	5·6						
Subathoo	1844	834	426	8	51	1	199	39	24	4·7	1,880	68	225·4	8·1	} 218·9 8·32	} Hill Stations. six years. } 181· 6·89				
	1845	789	343	5	43·4	·6	724	26	15·7	3·3	1,650	102	209·	12·9						
	1846	913	499	12	54·6	1·3	122	9	13·3	1·	2,023	41	221·5	4·5						

(Signed) W. JACKSON,  
Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 8th November, 1848 (No. 82).*

Letter dated 13th May, 1848 (No. 79).

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
8th Nov. 1848.

90. Forward a special report on the insalubrity of the hill stations in the year 1845.

year 1845.

26. Superintending Surgeon Jackson now reports that of the deaths at Kussowlie, 56 in number, 38 were caused by cholera; and that deducting deaths from this cause, the average was less than 2 per cent., "a rate," he observes, "so favourable that it could not be surpassed in any climate." He also reports that of the deaths at Subathoo, 102 in number, 42 were the victims of cholera. The deaths from other diseases, however, amounted to the large average of 8 per cent.

27. We regret to observe that, in the superintending surgeon's opinion, Subathoo is not well calculated for a hill station. He says that a body of soldiers there will always suffer in comparison with a similar number at Kussowlie. "The reason of that is," he observes, "the difference of altitude,—Kussowlie being estimated at 6,500 feet above the level of the sea, and Subathoo at only 4,000 feet. The lesser elevation, in tropical climates, is the region where dysenteries and diarrhoeas prevail, as may be seen in the works of medical writers. Dysentery has been found a most formidable disease at Subathoo, and seems to be endemic at certain seasons."

28. The return for the year 1846 of mortality at this station gives, we find, a more satisfactory result, the rate having been 4.5 per cent.; but the accuracy or otherwise of the superintending surgeon's opinions, as tested by subsequent experience, will require to be closely observed.

29. According to the statements furnished by Mr. Jackson, the mortality in the hill stations in the years 1844, 1845, 1846, averaged 6.89 per cent. per annum, and in the plain stations of Ferozepore and Umbala in the same years 11.9 per cent. Deaths from cholera had great effect upon these rates; but still they were from ordinary diseases very large.

30. We noticed in our letter of the 15th September, 1847, the rates of mortality at the hill stations, as indicating some serious defects in locality, or in some internal economy of regiments.

31. We are now informed that the Commander-in-Chief, from personal inspection and knowledge of the state of the internal economy of the regiments referred to, is satisfied that no defect in it tended to produce the large rates of decrement of life to which we had called your attention. With reference to this part of the question, the superintending surgeon reports as follows, on H. M.'s 3rd light dragoons:—"During the period of cholera at Umbala, H. M.'s 3rd light dragoons was long exempted from the disease, which I could only attribute to the superior moral character of the men, and the stringent military police which prevented men from wandering to the bazars, obtaining drink, and exposing themselves to the causes, whatever they might be, of this fearful disease, which seemed specially concentrated in the bazar."

32. In a late letter we have expressed our anxiety to be furnished with "full information of the internal economy of corps of Europeans, and troops and companies of European artillery, particularly as regards the measures adopted for the suppression of intemperance; the prevalence or rarity of crime and punishment amongst the troops; and the means employed to furnish them with healthy exercise, amusements, &c."

33. We take this opportunity of recalling your attention to the advantage of placing in the regimental canteens, supplies of sound, wholesome London porter or ale, for sale to the troops at cost price, or at such reduced price as the canteen funds will permit. We have expressed to you on more than one occasion our readiness to enter into contracts for supplies to be made to your presidency, on the same plan and subject to the same arrangements as they have for some years past been advantageously made to the presidencies of Madras and Bombay; but hitherto no indent for your presidency has been sent to us, although supplies have been, from time to time, purchased in the Calcutta market. There can, we believe, be no doubt, but that if the European soldiers would be induced to spend their balances upon porter rather than upon spirits, the rate of mortality at all stations would be greatly diminished.

25. In our letter of the 15th September, 1847, we noticed, as very unsatisfactory, the rate of mortality amongst the European troops at Kussowlie (6 $\frac{3}{8}$  per cent.), and Subathoo (13 per cent.), in the

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of INDIA.

*Dated 20th October, 1847 (No. 20).*Court of Directors  
to Government  
of India,  
20th Oct. 1847.

Para. 4. We shall look with much interest for the promised report of the Governor-General on the comparative salubrity and economy of the stations for European troops, on the hills and in the plains, as derived from the experience of the last three years.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 1st November, 1848.*Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
1st Nov. 1848.

Para. 213. In obedience to the desire expressed in paragraph 4 of your Honourable Court's letter to the Government of India, No. 20, dated the 20th October, 1847, we have the honour to submit reports on the comparative salubrity and economy of the stations for European troops, on the hills and in the plains, together with a memorandum on the subject by the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Hardinge, in which are fully recorded the results of the additional experience and investigation of another year on this important question.

214. The mere perusal of these reports and of the minute of the late Governor-General has been sufficient to satisfy all doubts as to the relative advantage of stations in the hills over those of the plains. We fully concur with his Lordship in considering the main point, their salubrity, to be clearly established, and that the "lives spared by locating soldiers on the hills is at least one-half of the whole number that die on the plains;" an object apparently effected at Kussowlie and Subathoo, with only the enhanced charges of victualling occasioned by the cost of transport, while, on the other hand, the expense of erecting barracks is little more than two-thirds, and their annual repairs one-fourth, as compared with works of a similar description at stations in the plains.

215. With reference, however, to the proposed location of a fourth European regiment in the hills, we consider that under present circumstances it is manifestly inexpedient, in every point of view, to sanction the heavy building expenses consequent on the establishment of a new station, when already two sets of barracks are unoccupied at Meerut, and one set at Cawnpore.

216. As regards matters of minor detail, the presence of the Right Honourable the Governor-General being required in that part of the country, it is the intention of his Lordship to make such points objects of his personal inquiry, the result of which will be duly communicated to your Honourable Court.

REPORT by SPECIAL COMMITTEE, composed of Lieut.-Col. DRUMMOND, Deputy Quartermaster-General; Lieut.-Col. HEMPHILL, H. M.'s 29th regiment; and Superintending Surgeon JACKSON.

*Dated 26th August, 1847.*Report by Special  
Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

The Committee now approach the third head of inquiry, viz.—

Third head of inquiry. "The most important point of all, the comparative salubrity of the four stations, deducing from the records and returns in the hospitals, the actual amount of the alleged superiority of the hill stations over the plains, in the number of deaths, as well as the probable effects upon the invaliding of sickly men, although it must be evident that any very correct result of the difference will be unattainable."

40. In the Appendix III. will be found the documentary evidence which they have collected on this important subject. They are indebted to their medical member for the valuable tables marked A, B, and C, for three successive years, 1844, 1845, and 1846. These tables show the mean monthly strength of the whole of the European troops at Subathoo, Kussowlie, and Umbala, for that period; the admissions and deaths by fevers and dysenteries; and the admissions and deaths by all diseases. For that at Ferozepore, these particulars are given for one year only, viz. 1845.

41. Table B shows the saving to the state, supposing the troops at Umbala and Ferozepore to have changed places with those at Kussowlie, £28,100 sterling. Table C shows a similar result, supposing the troops at Umballa to have changed places with those at Kussowlie, of £9,900 sterling. Table D gives a general view of the three preceding tables, to which is added, in the two last columns, the per-centage of admissions and deaths, stated in the plain stations as for four, and in the hill stations as for six years.

42. In all these tables, the greater immunity from fevers, which constitute the most fatal class of diseases in the plains, is placed in a striking light; on the other hand, the average of deaths by dysentery is not so favourable to the hill stations.

43. But the grand test between hills and plains is the actual amount of mortality, from whatever cause; and this will be seen from the following abstract, which exhibits an accurate comparison of the mortality for three years at Kussowlie, Subathoo, and Umbala, and for one year at Ferozepore.

Stations and Years.	Mean Monthly Strength.	Total Died from all Diseases.	Per-centage of Deaths to Strength.
1844.			
Ferozepore . . . . .	...	...	...
Umbala . . . . .	1,450	81	5·5
Kussowlie . . . . .	813	34	4·2
Subathoo . . . . .	834	68	8·1
1845.			
Ferozepore . . . . .	885	143	16·1
Umbala . . . . .	2,088	324	15·5
Kussowlie . . . . .	898	56	6·2
Subathoo . . . . .	789	102	12·9
1846.			
Ferozepore . . . . .	...	...	...
Umbala . . . . .	1,921	207	10·7
Kussowlie . . . . .	638	36	5·6
Subathoo . . . . .	913	41	4·5

44. From the foregoing abstract it will be observed that, in 1844, the advantage of Kussowlie over Umbala was little more than one per cent., while at Subathoo the mortality was actually greater than at Umbala by nearly three per cent.

45. In 1845, the advantages of the hill climate begin to be more apparent, Kussowlie being upwards of nine per cent., and Subathoo three per cent., better than Umbala and Ferozepore.

46. In 1846, the hill stations continue to maintain the advantage,—Kussowlie being five per cent., and Subathoo six per cent., better than Umbala.

47. In the tables above referred to, Ferozepore appears under a very unfavourable aspect, the ratio of disease and mortality being greater than at any other station. It is to be regretted that the returns for Ferozepore are incomplete, as the introduction of one year only (for 1845) has an unfavourable influence on the general calculations for plain stations, just as the presence of a single sickly regiment along with two or three other healthy ones gives a character of unhealthiness to a station, which otherwise it would not deserve.

48. On inquiry as to the causes of sickness and mortality in her Majesty's 62nd regiment at Ferozepore in 1845, the Committee are informed that, in May of that year, eleven barracks were completed, with the exception of brick-flooring and whitewashing. One barrack was given up to the officers, and another was used as a theatre and tailors' shop, leaving only nine barracks for the accommodation of the men (there are now twenty), and this when neither canteen nor school-room had been built. The men were consequently much crowded, and obliged to occupy the verandahs, as well as the bodies of the barracks. It does not appear that, even under these disadvantages, any unusual amount of sickness prevailed, until cholera made its appearance. Under these circumstances, the heavy sick list and mortality at Ferozepore in the year 1845 seem pretty well accounted for.

49. The Committee have obtained from Mr. Superintending Surgeon Corbyn returns marked E and F (Appendix III.), of admissions and deaths in the Honourable Company's

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Report by Special  
Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

European artillery, and H. M.'s 62nd and 53rd regiments at Ferozepore, for nine months of the year 1846,—viz., from 1st April to 31st December,—and as this period comprises the last six months of the service of H. M.'s 62nd regiment at that station, previous to its departure for England, the following abstract for those six months, in which Ferozepore is compared with Kussowlie and Subathoo, is of considerable value:—

Stations.	Corps.	Mean Monthly Strength.	Total Died.	Per-Centage of Deaths to Strength.	Per-Centage of Deaths to Aggregate Strength	For what Period.
Ferozepore .	H. C.'s Artillery . .	302	11	3·6	} Plains.	April, May,
Ditto . .	H. M.'s 62nd Foot . .	749	41	5·4		4·9
Kussowlie .	H. M.'s 29th Foot. . .	782	23	2·9	} Hills.	August, and
Subathoo .	1st Bengal Fusiliers .	624	20	3·2		3·0

50. In considering this abstract, the Committee beg that it may be borne in mind, that, the six months from April to September inclusive, are the worst in the year for troops in the plains, and the best for those in the hills. The general averages give barely the proportion of three to five in favour of the hills.

51. As a further contribution to the information regarding Ferozepore, the Committee beg to quote the following passage of a letter from Mr. Superintending Surgeon Corbyn, dated 1st May last:—"When I officiated as superintending surgeon of the "Sirhind division, in 1843-44, I found H. M.'s 31st foot to be, while at Ferozepore, one "of the healthiest regiments in my circle, which included the European regiments in the "hills. In 1846, after the fatigues of an arduous campaign, sickness was to be anticipated in H. M.'s 62nd foot, in no ordinary degree. It is generally believed by most "officers and men, that the climate of Ferozepore agrees remarkably well with the European constitution." Doctor Logan, surgeon of H. M.'s 53rd regiment, in a letter dated 22nd May last, speaks favourably of Ferozepore:—"I am happy to say that my regiment "remains healthy—during the past month of hot weather, we have little exceeded 100 "men in hospital,—the strength present being over 950. We have also had only one "death for the last seven weeks."

52. In regard to the salubrity of Kussowlie, the Committee submit a most excellent paper, marked G (Appendix III.), by Surgeon Taylor, of H. M.'s 29th regiment, detailing the sickness and mortality in that regiment, during each year of its service in India; and showing that, after deducting a certain number of deaths, not considered as chargeable to the climate of Kussowlie, the reduction of mortality, as compared with stations in the plains, is fully one to three.

53. This is highly satisfactory as regards H. M.'s 29th regiment. But the attention of the Committee has been especially directed to the comparative salubrity of the four stations of Subathoo, Kussowlie, Umbala, and Ferozepore; and they find, from the documents already quoted, and taking the most favourable view of the question, that the reduction of mortality in favour of the hill stations, may be taken as one to two—that is, for one soldier who dies in the hills, two die in the plains.

54. And not only will the mortality be thus diminished one-half, by locating European troops in the hills; but the efficiency of regiments will likewise be increased, by the rapid recoveries from fevers. For, in sickly years in the plains, the men who have suffered from fever during the rainy season, and on the breaking up of the rains, are still convalescents in October and November—whereas, in the hills, the fever patients are at their duty, and quite well, in October.

55. With regard to the effects of the climate of the hills and plains on the invaliding of sickly men, the Committee find that nothing of a very satisfactory nature, as to the comparative general results, can be obtained.

56. The number of invalids, from the undermentioned corps, for the present season, is as follows:—

H. M.'s 29th regiment, at Kussowlie	...	...	...	60
" 61st " Umbala	...	...	...	12
1st Bengal Fusiliers, " Subathoo	...	...	...	12

but the medical member of the Committee is of opinion that no argument can be drawn from these numbers "At the last Committee, held lately at Kussowlie, there are sixty "invalided; the reason of which is explained to be, that, in consequence of the wounded "in the late campaign, and since discharged, the number is greater than from any other "station, since the regiment arrived in India." The surgeon of H. M.'s 29th regiment also states that, "not one of the sixty, invalided in 1846-47, incurred his disability at "Kussowlie."

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Report by Special  
Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

57. In the extract marked H. (Appendix III.) will be found some valuable remarks, by Superintending Surgeon Jackson, on the subject of *ophthalmia*, a disease on which "the climate of the plains has a pernicious effect," and which "is the cause of many a "stout soldier being lost to the state, from invaliding." And Dr. Taylor observes, that "one measure of the saving in invaliding by hill stations, is the less frequency and "severity of ophthalmia cases."

58. But the general question of comparative extent of invaliding, from plain and hill stations, cannot yet be answered for want of *data*, which the experience of years alone can supply.

APPENDIX III.—TABLE A.

APPENDIX III.—TABLE A.

Extracts, &amp;c.

## APPENDIX III.—To Report by Special Committee, dated 26th August, 1847.

TABLE A.

EXTRACT from the General Numerical Abstract of the Annual Report of European Troops, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fevers and Dysentery, at the Stations mentioned, for the year 1844.

Stations.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysenteries.				By all Diseases.				Remarks.	
		Admitted.	Died.	Per centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per centage of Mean Monthly Strength.			
				Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.		
Ferozepore	...	...	...	...	Only occupied 5 months.										It will be observed in this table that the admissions by fevers at Umbala are 100 per cent., at Kussowlie 36.5, and at Subathoo, 51 per cent. From dysentery, the admissions preponderated in the hills, and so did the deaths, but the general result of deaths from all diseases is favourable to Kussowlie over the plains. The 1st European regiment appears to have suffered more in proportion than the troops either at Umbala or Kussowlie.
Umbala	1,450	1,445	20	100	1.3	238	23	16.4	1.5	3,213	81	221.5	5.5		
Kussowlie	813	297	2	36.5	.2	151	16	18.5	1.9	1,098	34	135	4.2		
Subathoo	834	426	8	51	1	199	39	24	4.7	1,880	68	225.4	8.1		

(Signed) W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon.

TABLE B.

EXTRACT from the General Numerical Abstract of the Annual Report of European Troops, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fevers and Dysentery, at the Stations mentioned, for the year 1845.

Stations.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysenteries.				By all Diseases.				Remarks.
		Admitted.	Died.	Per centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		
				Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.	
Ferozepore	885	944	43	106.6	4.9	226	25	25.5	2.8	2,315	143	261.6	16.1	Here remark the astonishing difference in admissions from fevers between the plains and hills. The per-centage of admissions from fevers to strength at Ferozepore 106.6, Umbala 115.6, while at Kussowlie the proportion is only 15.2, and at Subathoo 43.4. The deaths from fevers at Kussowlie, nothing, and at Subathoo, a fraction, while the two plain stations average more than 3 per cent. The saving of life at Kussowlie, from all causes which produce death, is very remarkable, and shows a saving to the Government when compared with Ferozepore, of 87 lives, which may be fairly valued at £8,700, estimating each man to cost £100 sterling. If the Umbala troops had been at Kussowlie the deaths would have been proportionally 130 instead of 324, a saving to the state of £19,400 sterling, and a most triumphant argument in favour of the general salubrity of hill over plain. The deaths at Umbala are swollen by the dreadful invasion of cholera, but then, had the men been at Kussowlie, they might not have died in such numbers.
Umbala	2,080	2,415	31	115.6	1.5	333	36	18.3	1.7	5,489	324	262.8	15.5	
Kussowlie	898	137	—	15.2	—	124	6	14	.7	1,271	56	141.5	6.2	
Subathoo	789	343	5	43.4	.6	124	26	15.7	3.3	1,650	102	209	12.9	

(Signed) W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon.

TABLE C.

EXTRACT from the General Numerical Abstract of the Annual Report of European Troops, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fevers and Dysentery at the Stations mentioned for the year 1846.

Stations.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysenteries.				By all Diseases.				Remarks.
		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		
				Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.	
Ferozepore	only occupied two months by H.M.'s 53rd Regt.; H.M.'s 62nd Foot gone home.													This Table keeps up the character of the hill provinces for health over the plains. The per-centage of admissions from fevers at Umbala, 146 per cent, Kussowlie being only 12·4 per cent. and Subathoo 54·6. Death is again observed to be busy at Umbala, claiming nearly its 4 per cent., while Kussowlie is less than 1 per cent. and Subathoo only 1·3. If the Umbala troops had changed place with the Kussowlie men, they would have lost, from all diseases, 108 men, instead of 207, a clear gain to the state of £9,900. With such extraordinary results, humanity need not be pressed into the cause as an advocate.
Umbala	1,921	2,807	74	146·1	3·8	450	54	23·4	2·8	5,961	207	310·3	10·7	
Kussowlie	638	80	5	12·4	·8	76	8	12·0	1·2	924	36	144·8	5·6	
Subathoo, 1st & 2nd European Regts.	913	499	12	54·6	1·3	122	9	13·3	1·	2,023	41	221·5	4·5	

(Signed) W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.

TABLE D.

ABSTRACT of Monthly Returns, showing the Sickness and Mortality by Fever and Dysentery, and the total Ratio of Sickness and Mortality at the Stations mentioned for the years 1844, 1845, 1846.

Stations.	Years.	Mean Monthly Strength.	By Fevers.				By Dysenteries.				By all Diseases.				Total ratio per Cent. for the Three Years.	Ratio of Sickness and Mortality at Hills and Plains Stations.	Remarks.
			Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.		Admitted.	Died.	Per-Centage of Mean Monthly Strength.				
					Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			Admitted.	Died.			
Ferozepore.	1844	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	(One year only.)	Plains stations (Four years.)	Returns for 1844 and 1846 not available.	
	1845	885	994	43	106·6	4·9	226	25	25·5	2·8	2,315	143	261·6				16·1
	1846	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				—
Umbala.	1844	1,450	1,445	20	100·	1·3	238	23	16·4	1·5	3,213	81	221·5	5·5	267·6	11·9	
	1845	2,088	2,415	31	115·6	1·5	383	36	18·3	1·7	5,489	324	262·8	15·5			
	1846	1,921	2,807	74	146·1	3·8	450	54	23·4	2·8	5,961	207	310·3	10·7			
Kussowlie.	1844	813	297	2	36·5	·2	151	16	18·5	1·9	1,098	34	135·	4·2	140·	5·36	
	1845	898	137	—	15·2	—	124	6	14·	·7	1,271	56	141·5	6·2			
	1846	638	80	5	12·4	·8	76	8	12·	1·2	924	36	144·8	5·6			
Subathoo.	1844	834	426	8	51·	1·	199	39	24·	4·7	1,880	68	225·4	8·1	218·9	8·32	
	1845	789	343	5	43·4	·6	124	26	15·7	3·3	1,650	102	209·	12·9			
	1846	913	499	12	54·6	1·3	122	9	13·3	1·	2,023	41	221·5	4·5			

(Signed) W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.



## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Appendix III.  
to Report by  
Special Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

TABLE E.

(No. 288.)

RETURN of Admissions and Deaths in Her Majesty's 62nd Foot and Her Majesty's 53rd Foot, Monthly, during the Year 1846.

	Mean Daily Strength.	Total Admissions.	Total Died.	Where Stationed, Remarks, &c.
January . . . . .	—	—	—	Army of Sutlej
February . . . . .	—	—	—	Ditto.
March, from 16th . . . . .	not reported	25	—	Ditto Ferozepore, from the 16th March.
April . . . . .	736	151	9	Ditto.
May . . . . .	792	163	4	Ditto.
June . . . . .	751	133	5	Ditto.
July . . . . .	747	149	6	Ditto.
August . . . . .	738	287	9	Ditto.
September . . . . .	731	193	8	Ditto.
October . . . . .	665	199	11	Ditto, Her Majesty's 53rd occupied Ferozepore in October, Her Majesty's 62nd having moved on to occupy Lahore.
November . . . . .	804	216	11	Ditto.
December . . . . .	851	184	4	Ditto.
Total, not reckoning March.	6,815	1,675	67	

(Signed) FREDERICK CORBYN,  
Superintending Surgeon.

Average strength for nine months, 757.

Per-centage of deaths to strength for ditto, 8·8.

Ditto, ditto, ditto, for twelve months, 11·7, allowing for January, February, and March at the same rate.

But as these three months are healthy, 10·7 is a nearer approach to the per-centage of deaths for the year.

TABLE F.

RETURN of Admissions and Deaths in the Hon. Company's European Artillery, Monthly, during the Year 1846, at Ferozepore.

	Mean Daily Strength.	Total Admissions.	Total Died.	Where Stationed, Remarks, &c.
January . . . . .	—	—	—	Army of Sutlej.
February . . . . .	—	—	—	Ditto.
March . . . . .	104	10	—	Ditto Ferozepore.
April . . . . .	347	90	2	Ditto.
May . . . . .	293	86	2	Ditto.
June . . . . .	255	71	2	Ditto.
July . . . . .	308	61	2	Ditto.
August . . . . .	311	53	1	Ditto.
September . . . . .	294	57	2	Ditto.
October . . . . .	307	51	—	Ditto.
November . . . . .	308	49	—	Ditto.
December . . . . .	343	65	2	Ditto.
Total, not reckoning March.	2,766	583	13	

(Signed) FREDERICK CORBYN,  
Superintending Surgeon.

Average strength for nine months, 307.

Per-centage of deaths to strength for ditto, 4·2.

Ditto, ditto, ditto, for twelve months, 5·6.

TABLE G.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

On the COMPARATIVE SALUBRITY of KUSSOWLIE for European troops, by John Robert Taylor, Esq., Surgeon, H. M.'s 29th regiment.

Appendix III.  
to Report by  
Special Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

H. M.'s 29th regiment having just completed an uninterrupted sojourn of twelve months at this station, the sanitary value of the locality, as compared with the records of previous years of service in the plains, can now be more accurately displayed than was possible at the date of the report by the officer lately in command at Kussowlie, and which report is before the Committee.

By the statements of sickness and mortality hereafter inserted, it will be perceived that the experience of the twelve months just ended is highly confirmatory of the eligibility of the climate for European troops, the saving of lives being over 6 per cent. of the strength, as compared with former years in the plains. It will be seen, also, that after making certain fair exceptions from the deaths during the year, for reasons which will be stated, there is even promise of a still further reduction of the proportion of mortality.

And here it may be remarked, that to make an equitable comparison between the climate of the hills and the plains, it would be necessary to bring a regiment into each, direct from England. Any lengthened service in the plains, before proceeding to the hills, must produce morbid effects which will materially influence the ratio of mortality during the first year of residence in the hill climate, and, in a decreasing ratio, the mortality of subsequent years. The comparative statement of sickness and mortality which follows is drawn, it must be recollected, from the records of the first year of residence at Kussowlie, at which station the regiment arrived sickly; whilst on the other hand the regiment commenced service in the plains, healthy, after a voyage from England.

TABLE I. Showing the Sickness and Mortality in H. M.'s 29th regiment during each Year of its Service in India.

Climates.	Stations.	Period.	Mean daily Strength.	Mean daily Sick.	Died in Hospital.	Per-centage died of mean daily strength.
Plains	Chinsurah, Ghazee pore	From 1st Aug. 1842, to 31st March, 1843	1,019	72·5	101	10·5 say for the year
	Ghazee pore . . .	1843-44	806	65·9	82	10·18
	Ghazee pore: the march	1844-45	805	102·9	98	12·1
	Meerut: the march— Ferozeshah, Subraon, Lahore . . .	1845-46	886	97·9	124	13·9
	Kussowlie . . .	1846-47	782	59·7	44	5·62

Thus the average ratio of mortality in the regiment annually in the plains is of mean daily strength 11·67 per cent., whilst the ratio of mortality at Kussowlie during the year just ended is only 5·62, leaving a reduction of mortality in favour of Kussowlie of 6·05 per cent. of mean daily strength at the station.

But to exhibit the above comparison more fairly as regards the effects of climate, there must be deducted from the 124 deaths in 1845-46, 53 deaths by wounds received in action; the average annual ratio of mortality in the regiment whilst in the plains will then be 10·17 per cent. of mean daily strength. At the same time, from the deaths of 1846-47, the undermentioned exceptions must be allowed, viz. :—

By small-pox, the sufferers having the disease when they arrived on the hill	2
By gun-shot wounds . . . . .	2
Of four cases of delirium tremens, there must be excepted as the consequence of the donation batta . . . . .	3
Of sick sent from Meerut in a helpless state . . . . .	3
By chronic visceral disease, incurred in the plains, and by injury of the constitution from wounds and other contingent morbid agencies of arduous active service in the field . . . . .	9
Total	19

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Appendix III.  
to Report by  
Special Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

As some doubt might arise as to the propriety of the last twelve exceptions in the above list, the names of the men are here recorded, to facilitate any reference required. The first three are Privates Dovey, Mallard, and Wakefield. The other nine are Serjeant Scott, Privates Holt, Candy, Pitman, Bryant, Kelly, Short, Duncan, and Tully.

Admitting the nineteen deaths here excepted, not to be chargeable in any way to the climate of Kussowlie, the ratio of mortality in the regiment for this, the first year of its sojourn there, may be stated to have been 3·19 per cent. of mean daily strength. The reduction of mortality at Kussowlie as compared with the plains stations in Table I. is then fully 1 to 3, as is remarked in paragraph 40 of extract from the memorandum, &c., before the Committee, the difference being in favour of Kussowlie as 3·19 to 10·17.

To illustrate further the sanitary superiority of the hill to the plains climate, and to exhibit the effect of the seasons of each climate in the production of sickness and mortality, the following table of the sickness and mortality in the regiment each month, from 1st April, 1843, to 31st March, 1847, has been constructed from the hospital records:—

TABLE II.

SICKNESS and MORTALITY in H.M's 29th Regiment.

Years.	1843—44.				1844—45.				1845—46.			
Climate.	In the Plains.				In the Plains.				In the Plains.			
Months.	Mean Daily Strength.	Mean Daily Sick.	No. Died.	Remarks.	Mean Daily Strength.	Mean Daily Sick.	No. Died.	Remarks.	Mean Daily Strength.	Mean Daily Sick.	No. Died.	Remarks.
April . . . . .	981·9	102·1	12	} Epidemic cholera. Erethismas tropicus epidemic.	950·2	71·	2	} By cholera.	962·2	94·1	1	} Epidemic cholera.                The regiment with the Army of the Sutlej.
May . . . . .	967·6	97·9	28		955·5	91·7	24					
June . . . . .	930·2	104·6	22		940·5	90·5	9					
July . . . . .	920·9	63·4	7	934·6	77·2	4	} Epidemic remittent fever.	945·8	100·	5		
August . . . . .	912·6	63·3	5	922·5	134·9	17		942·7	98·	9		
September . . . . .	910·5	72·8	1	901·6	230·9	25	Ditto.	910·4	90·4	34		
October . . . . .	825·8	67·3	1	656·	199·1	11	Ditto.	861·6	54·3	5		
November . . . . .	582·9	49·9	5	} Detachment of 300 at Allahabad.	470·	51·8	—	} 359 sick sent up the Ganges in boats, the regiment proceeding to Meerut. In this detachment there were 46 deaths	842.	59·4	2	
December . . . . .	578·2	23·1	1		471·	45·4	2		725·4	75·2	9	
January . . . . .	583	41·	—		528·5	38·5	—		582·	117·	16	
February . . . . .	583·2	48·9	—	957·9	105·1	—	} 20 sick sent to Landour.	532·6	94·	18		
March . . . . .	891·7	60·2	—	970·3	106·1	4		530.	127·7	6		

S F

BARRACKS FOR THE EUROPEAN TROOPS.

EXTRACTS, &c  
Appendix III.  
to Report by  
Special Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## TABLE H.

LETTER from WILLIAM JACKSON, Esquire, Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind division, to Lieut.-Col. DRUMMOND, President of Committee.

*Dated Umballa, 21st August, 1847.*

Appendix III.  
to Report by  
Special Committee,  
26th Aug. 1847.

There is one disease not noticed, where, in my opinion, the climate of the plains has a pernicious effect, and is the cause of many a stout soldier being lost to the state from invaliding. I allude to ophthalmia. To notice one instance out of many that might, no doubt, be collected from medical records in India,—in the year 1827-28, at Ghazeepoor, eight men of her Majesty's 44th, disabled by blindness, from disorganization of the eyes; at Meerut, in the year 1845, her Majesty's 29th regiment had no fewer than 194 admissions from diseases of the eye, while in the same regiment, placed on the lofty hill of Kussowlie, Surgeon Taylor formerly stated that no serious cases of ophthalmia had appeared since their arrival.

Now if this disease be a fertile source of discharging men from the service, then we have another great reason to prefer the hills to the plains. This week, out of twelve men only in her Majesty's 61st foot, we have invalided five for ophthalmia, four of whom, I think, were discharged from the service, and the fifth recommended to Europe for change of climate. This interesting subject might be continued, but I have already recorded my opinion at some length in my annual report to Lord Gough, under the head of Ophthalmic Institution in the Hills.

MEMORANDUM by the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

*Soonamooke, December 7th, 1847.*

Memorandum  
by the Governor-  
General,  
7th Dec. 1847.

In a memorandum I wrote on the 28th January, 1847, I recommended that a Committee should be appointed to collect facts and data, on which to found their report on various points relating to barrack accommodation, such as the best construction of the buildings, the comparative salubrity and expense between stations in the hills and the plains, and other matters.

2. The Committee, consisting of Lieut.-Col. Drummond, Deputy Quartermaster-General; Lieut.-Col. Hemphill, H.M.'s 29th infantry; Dr. Jackson, Superintending Surgeon, sent in their report, with some supplementary details, the end of September, which I received, when about to leave Simla, the latter end of October. I beg my acknowledgments may be expressed to those officers for the diligence and clearness with which their report is drawn up, and the information it affords.

3. At an earlier period I wrote a memorandum at Simla on the report of a Committee on barrack accommodation and discipline, which the Adjutant-General was so good as to condense into a small compass, on which I made my remarks, which were concurred in by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I confirm the decision I then gave, viz.—that the barrack-rooms should be small, and not, as is generally the case in India, constructed to contain one hundred men each room.

In the Committee's report of last September, paragraph 13, they unanimously concur that small rooms are preferable to large, as being more conducive to health, and, I may add, to the comfort, and thereby to the discipline, of the men. The Military Board will consider this point as definitively settled.

4. The Military Board's attention is also requested to paragraph 16 of Lieut.-Col. Drummond's report, in which I observe that, at

Ferozepore,	66 square feet	are allotted per man,
Meerut,	30	ditto,
Agra,	55	ditto.

This great disproportion must have arisen from some want of system, as it is not stated to be caused by the barracks being temporarily-crowded at Meerut at the time the report was made.

The minimum height of the barrack-rooms should also be settled for the hills and

the plains. I recommend that some competent officer, under the Military Board's orders, should collect the decisions come to of late years by order of the Government, and insert them as a building regulation, for the information of the engineer officers. Lieut.-Col. Drummond's report contains a good deal of valuable information on the general subject. The decision of the Government against allowing a separate barrack-room for every married woman should be recorded by the Board, and made known to the engineer department. Every time a barrack is about to be built, the Government is obliged to repeat its orders. The glazing of windows, the tiling of floors, the dimensions of verandahs, the position and size of the reading and school-rooms, the non-commissioned officers' rooms, and their position relatively to those of the men, and all decisions permanently sanctioned, should be inserted in the Board's instructions, to serve as a guide for the future, and to simplify the public business.

5. Exceptions, according to localities, are inevitable, and can be brought forward as such. Baths are desirable in the plains, but not necessary in the hills. I perceive Colonel Drummond, in his report, recommends bathing-rooms in the hills. The scarcity of water would render baths inconvenient and expensive, and in a temperate climate, six thousand feet above the sea, the European soldier no more requires them than he does in England or North America. A few washing-sheds are all that can be necessary in the hills.

6. Ovens at each of the hill stations appear to be very desirable. An experimental bake-house may be sanctioned, and when approved should be built at each of the hill stations by Government. The quality of flour and its kneading into loaves may be unobjectionable, and yet the bread may be very bad and heavy for want of means of baking it properly. It is immaterial whether the contractor hires the bake-houses or not. If he hires, he will charge the rent to the price of the bread; the Government must build the ovens. No more time ought to be lost in discussing the incessant complaints of the bad quality of food supplied by contract to the European troops of the Bengal army. The bad quality of the meat is almost universal at every station, and complaints are of constant recurrence. The penalties against the contractors must be made more stringent. On my arrival in Calcutta I will take up this point with the Military Board, when I have the papers before me. I cannot say that the contracts are too low to enable the contractors to supply good meat; but the facility of evading the penalties and wearying out the patience of the troops by constant attempts to pass bad meat, must be put a stop to.

Calcutta, 29th Dec., 1847.—The Governor-General has recorded his decision in the Military Department, that whenever rations are rejected by a committee of officers, they should be destroyed.

(Signed) R. W., Mil. Sec.

In the supplementary report, 22nd September, paragraph 16, Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond comes to the conclusion that the extra expense of victualing 1,000 men in the plains as compared to the hills amounts to about £4,500 a year; but the excess is chiefly caused by the extra charge for water and fuel. Every commanding officer made serious complaint to me of the utter impossibility to do justice to his men under the existing system of contracts, and I believe these statements to be well founded.

7. The stoves for heating the barrack rooms in the hill barracks have been sanctioned. The objections to the iron flues made by the Military Board, and the remedy proposed, must be reported upon after the first month's trial.

8. The questions of wood and water ought to be taken up by the commissariat officer stationed in the hills. His local knowledge ought to enable him to report faithfully on all these points and offer useful suggestions. I must remark, the Government never receive any from this department. Call upon him to do so, especially as regards the supply of wood, and, looking forward to its eventual exhaustion, he should communicate with Mr. Edwards, in charge of the civil station in the hills; and if, on mature deliberation, any system of planting firewood is recommended, let it be brought before the Government, and the best mode of ensuring a permanent supply can be arranged. Whilst there is time, write to Mr. Edwards.

The water, if collected during the rainy season in reservoirs, would ensure a perpetual supply, and the engineer officer who is charged with the building of barracks, should propose the means by which this object can be accomplished. At Gibraltar the large European garrison is supplied by rain-water collected in tanks. Here, again, the orders must be given by the Military Board. The Governor-General in Council cannot periodically be expected to enter into all these details; but let a reservoir be built experimentally, and the subject kept in view till a final decision has been made.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Memorandum  
by the Governor-  
General,  
7th Dec. 1847.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Memorandum  
by the Governor-  
General,  
7th Dec. 1847.

9. Gardens for vegetables have been sanctioned at the hill stations; the expenses and the profit should be reported upon. The cricket-grounds, when levelled for the amusement of the officers and men, should be adverted to in the annual reports made to the Government on barracks, whether they are used, and to what extent. The Government and the Court of Directors are ready to assist the recreation of the men; but it not unfrequently happens, that when expense has been incurred in providing these sources of amusement for the men, they are not used, and are disregarded: but if not supplied, the want is complained of as a grievance.

10. The most important portion of these reports is that which relates to the comparative salubrity of the hills and the plains. In paragraph 39 of Lieutenant-Colonel D.'s report, he adverts to Table B, which is stated to exhibit a saving of £28,000 a year in favour of the hills; and in paragraphs 52 and 53, after alluding to Dr. Taylor's reports of H.M.'s 29th regiment, which show a saving of life in favour of the hills as one to three over the plains, the Committee come to the conclusion, that at least two soldiers die on the plains for one in the hills.

11. If this estimate be taken as an approximation to the truth, I have no doubt that it is nearly correct, and certainly within the mark, because I find by the returns of the recruits in the hills and the plains, which I called for in passing through Kussowlie, at the end of October, that the mortality amongst the recruits reaching the north-west frontier at the same period of the year has been, during the last three years, nearly three deaths in the plains for one in the hills. I called for this return, because the recruits, having marched up the country in the cold season, and having joined their regiments in the plains and the hills, are all on an equality as to the effects of climate, not having previously caught complaints from exposure in the plains, which is not the case with an entire regiment, which, like H.M.'s 29th, marched in a very sickly state from Ghazepore to Kussowlie. It required at least a residence of twelve months in the hills before the regiment would recover from the effects of the disease contracted in the plains. Again, when this regiment, after remaining three years in the hills, returns to the plains, it will be able, from the healthy state of the men, to resist the climate of the plains better than a regiment enervated by a continuous service in the plains. Both these causes render it nearly impracticable to make a fair comparison by data taken from regiments going up to the hills in a sickly state, and returning to the plains in a healthy state in three years. The same result was experienced in the case of H.M.'s 9th regiment. It was impossible to ascertain the effect on a regiment whose stamina had suffered by fifteen years' service in the plains, before it was stationed in the hills. It is, therefore, very difficult to arrive at the exact truth, unless a regiment were kept for seven or eight years in the hills as the standard of comparison with regiments of equal continuous service in the plains. There can be no doubt that the lives spared by locating soldiers in the hills is at least one-half of the whole number that die in the plains, exclusive of the efficiency of a hill regiment when it descends for service into the plains. I shall send these returns

Calcutta, 29th Dec. 1847.—A correspondence with the Medical Board on this subject is annexed.

(Signed) R. W., Mil. Sec.

30th December.—It is to my mind quite evident that there is proof sufficient that the saving of European life is very great, by posting these troops in the hills, to justify and recommend the building of a fourth barrack in these localities.

to the Medical Board, whose business it is to attend to these details, on my arrival at Calcutta. Dr. Walker's\* calculation from these returns shows a mortality of recruits—

Plains	...	...	11·3 per cent.
Hills	...	...	4·3

Difference ... 7·

12. I request that the Medical Board, which has ample time and professional data for making these calculations, may be called upon to exercise the utmost vigilance in these important questions of life statistics. Send to that Board a very interesting and able paper by Colonel Sykes, in which this extraordinary result is brought to light—that the mortality of the European troops in the Madras army is only 3·84 per cent., whilst that of the Bengal army is 7·38. So that a European regiment in Bengal would require to be renewed once in ten years, and in Madras in seventeen years: and the colonel then adds, in contrast to this, we find the mortality of the native army at Madras to be 2·095 per cent.; that of Bengal 1·79, and that of Bombay only 1·29.

13. Colonel Tulloch's reports, drawn out by order of the War Office, offer such perfect samples of the mode by which these comparisons can be obtained, that I do not

\* Surgeon to Lord Hardinge.

think it necessary to do more than to invite the Medical Board of Calcutta to make these very necessary researches, and to endeavour to trace the causes of the alleged disparity between Bengal and Madras, and to assist the Government in applying a remedy; for I have no doubt it can be furnished by proper exertion. Call immediately for life-statistic reports from the Madras and Bombay Governments, and let this subject be well sifted with the least delay.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
 Memorandum  
 by the Governor-  
 General,  
 7th Dec. 1847.

14. It is, however, very evident from the practical experience of the last five years, when my predecessor, Lord Ellenborough, first fixed upon the two stations of Kussowlie and Subathoo as military stations, that the system of placing European troops in the hills should know of no other limitation than the absolute necessity of retaining European regiments in the plains at certain stations. The necessity exists at Fort William and at Dinapore, in some degree at Cawnpore, at Agra, Lahore, and the Jullunder; but there is no necessity to have an infantry European regiment at Umbala, with three regiments in the hills able to move with facility in two days into the plains. I, therefore, have proposed that the infantry European regiment at Umbala should be withdrawn and posted in the hills. If this were effected, we should have six regiments in the hills and four in the plains, namely,—

Agra	...	...	...	1
Jullunder	...	...	...	1
Lahore	...	...	...	2

and there would constantly be an alternation of three years in the hills and three in the plains for the eighteen regiments of European infantry posted from Agra to Lahore. The regiment at Fort William is in future always to be the first for Europe, and the regiment at Dinapore being the next to return home. I have concurred in the proposal of the President in Council to have a sanitarium at Darjeeling for the Dinapore regiment, which I have no doubt will greatly relieve that regiment.

15. In the present state of affairs on the north-west frontier, six regiments of European infantry would be stationed from Dugshaie to Lahore. Every infantry regiment has, however, been withdrawn from Meerut, and as the distance from Dugshaie to Agra is great, I should prefer stationing the 4th infantry regiment for the hills near Landour, rather than to concentrate the 4th regiment on the great ridge of hills from Dugshaie to Nahur. There would also be great difficulty in finding a suitable site in that direction. The elevation to insure the sanitary objects intended ought not to be less than 6,000 feet above the level of the sea. There is much objection, on account of the scarcity of wood and water, to a further accommodation of regiments on the hills near Dugshaie. These difficulties would be less felt in the neighbourhood; and I understand that, so far back as 1828, the ridge of mountain about twelve miles from the convalescent depôt at Landour was strongly recommended by Lord Combermere, the height of the position selected being 7,000 feet.

About the same distance from Landour, another position was selected, of suitable elevation; but with the defect of having a scanty supply of wood.

16. Sir Samford Whittingham reported very favourably of a station at Thana Toongra, between the Jumna and the Touse rivers. Of course, it will be very important to consider the access to and from the cantonment, at all times of the year, with the plains, and the expense of making a good military road of communication.

The first step to be taken is to request the Commander-in-Chief to report his view, first, as to the removal of the infantry regiment from Umbala; and next, the selection of a site on the heights near Mussoorie.

17. If the Government should approve of the spot selected, the buildings could be commenced early in the autumn of 1848, before which time the Dugshaie cantonment should have been nearly completed, transferring the pioneers and engineer establishment to the fourth station, which could be occupied in April, 1849; there will also be ample time to refer the whole subject to the Home Authorities for their sanction.

18. Landour, as a sanitarium, may still be of use for the European regiment of cavalry and the European artillery at Meerut; but as it is 300 miles from Lahore, and was only then intended to provide for the wants of the European troops at and below Meerut, a sanitarium is now required for the two European regiments of infantry at Lahore, the regiment at Jullunder, the two European cavalry regiments at Ferozepore and Umbala, and all the European artillery above Meerut. In a memorandum of mine relating to the location of a second European infantry regiment at Lahore, I noticed this point. Request his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to favour the Governor-General in Council with his opinion as to the best mode of providing the accommodation, the numbers required, the locality, and other details. It must not be forgotten that her



EXTRACTS, &c. Majesty's three regiments of European cavalry, and the whole of the Company's European horse artillery, are excluded from their share of the relief afforded to the infantry by the hill stations.

Memorandum  
by the Governor-General,  
7th Dec. 1847.

19. Let the papers for transmission to the Home Authorities be prepared as soon as the Commander-in-Chief's answer shall have been received.

(Signed) HARDINGE.

From the MEDICAL BOARD to the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT  
HARDINGE, G.C.B., Governor-General of India in Council.

*Dated 25th December, 1847.*

MY LORD,

The Medical  
Board to the  
Governor-General,  
25th Dec. 1847.

We have the honour to state that we have carefully examined the returns which have been forwarded to us, showing the comparative ratio of mortality in the plains, and in the hills, which has occurred among the various detachments of recruits which, during the last two years, have joined from England the several European corps serving in the North-Western Provinces to which they belonged.

2. The experience of many years had already earned for the stations established in the hills a reputation for superior salubrity to the European constitution generally, and the effect of the calculations contained in these returns, so far as the results for so limited a period can demonstrate, is to establish, by means of a test the least obnoxious to error, the reality of its claims to that superiority.

3. It is not shown by these returns whether or not any of the casualties which occurred among the parties that joined regiments stationed in the hills resulted from incurable disease, previously contracted in the plains. Should this point have been overlooked in the calculations, the issue would be still more favourable to the climate of the hills. But the results, even as they are exhibited in the abstract which accompanied the returns, prepared, we believe, by Dr. Walker, a copy of which is annexed for convenience of reference, are still of a nature, it must be admitted, very forcibly to recommend the extension of the cantonment accommodation for European troops in a climate in which the mortality, as compared with that of the plains, is shown to be in the proportion of only 4·3 to 11·3.

We have the honour to be, &c.


(Signed)

H. F. HOUGH, Physician-General.

G. LAMB, Inspector-General of Hospitals.

Fort William, Medical Board Office,  
25th December, 1847.

COMPARATIVE RATIO OF MORTALITY.



COMPARATIVE RATIO OF MORTALITY.

COMPARATIVE RATIO of MORTALITY in the Plains and the Hills, of European EXTRACTS, &c.  
Recruits, who arrived in India between the 1st of January, 1845, and the  
1st of November, 1847.

The Medical  
Board to the  
Governor-General,  
25th Dec. 1847.

	Plains.		Hills.	
	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.
H.M.'s 3rd Dragoons . . . . .	190	19	—	—
" 14th ditto . . . . .	103	10	—	—
" 10th Regt. of Foot . . . . .	210	36	—	—
" 29th ditto . . . . .	109	21	238	8
" 53rd ditto . . . . .	47	4	—	—
" 61st ditto . . . . .	101	5	—	—
H.Co.'s 1st European Regiment . . . . .	—	—	227	12
" 2nd ditto . . . . .	19	2	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Umbala Division of Artillery . . . . .	145	14	—	—
HORSE ARTILLERY.				
1st Brigade . . . . .	129	6	—	—
3rd ditto 2nd Troop . . . . .	45	8	—	—
Ditto 3rd ditto . . . . .	43	4	—	—
FOOT ARTILLERY.				
2nd Battalion 2nd Company . . . . .	1	—	—	—
3rd ditto 3rd ditto . . . . .	21	3	—	—
Ditto 4th ditto . . . . .	27	5	—	—
4th ditto 4th ditto . . . . .	10	—	—	—
6th ditto . . . . .	64	7	—	—
Total . . . . .	1,264	144	465	20

Plains—144 deaths in 1,264 strength, equals . . . 11·3

Hills—20 deaths in 465, strength, equals . . . 4·3

Difference in favour of the hills . . . 7·0

From Lieut.-Colonel W. GARDEN, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to  
Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military  
Department, Calcutta.

*Dated 5th January, 1848.*

SIR,

In accordance to instructions conveyed in your letter, No. 161, of the 19th June last, and its inclosures, I have the honour, by desire of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit to you, for the information of Government, further reports upon the salubrity of the hill stations of Subathoo and Kussowlie, as locations for European troops.

From Quartermaster-General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
5th Jan. 1848.

Quartermaster-General's Office,  
Head-Quarters, Simla,  
5th January, 1848.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. GARDEN, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Quartermaster-General of the Army.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From Colonel J. FRUSHARD, commanding Subathoo, to Lieut.-Colonel W. GARDEN, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, Head-Quarters.

*Dated 29th September, 1847.*

SIR,

From Col. J.  
Frushard to  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
29th Sept. 1847.

Report on the station of Subathoo.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 405, under date 22nd instant, calling on me for a report on the station of Subathoo, as regards its eligibility, or otherwise, as a cantonment for European troops.

My opportunities of becoming personally acquainted with the climate and other subjects connected with this station have been confined to the hot and rainy season of 1846 and 1847, the 2nd European regiment having been, from the 24th October, 1846, to the 12th April, 1847, encamped in the plains at Jullunder.

An experience, however, of two summers' residence with the 2nd European regiment at Subathoo, enables me to report with the greatest confidence, that the station as regards climate is, in every respect, adapted to preserve the health of healthy European soldiers, or to recruit the strength of those whose constitutions have been impaired by a residence in the plains.

From May to September the climate of Subathoo I consider better than that of the higher elevations, the falls of rain being less frequent, and the climate consequently more temperate and dry.

The appearance of the soldiers now, after the most trying period of the year in the plains of India, must confirm my opinion respecting the advantages derived from a residence in a climate like Subathoo.

The removal of a portion of the overgrown bazar at this station, in the autumn of last year, and the filth which was consequently collected by the native huts bordering on the parade-ground and near the hospital, has been of decided advantage, dissipating the noxious vapours that used to rise from the bazar at night, causing a free circulation of air near the hospital, and improving the appearance of the station.

The walls of the hospital of the 2nd European regiment have been heightened, and the ventilation improved, but the building is inadequate in accommodation, and, from being so narrow, is close and crowded. It might with advantage be carried out to the east some fifty feet, which would be ample accommodation, and might be done without much expense.

The new temporary barracks in the lower lines, where three companies of the 2nd European regiment and the married men of both regiments have been quartered this season, have proved fully equal during the rains, and were the suggestions I made to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, when inspecting them in March last, and which I understood his Lordship had sanctioned, carried into effect, viz. having the floors terraced, and doors and windows added, I consider they would be comfortable and healthy at all seasons of the year.

A great and most useful improvement to the station would be the deepening of the tank, situated immediately below the slope of the parade, facing it with pukka or brick-work, and making it a reservoir of water throughout the year; at present, during the months of May and June, it becomes dry, and considerable difficulty is experienced in obtaining water for building and for cattle, which this is fit for.

I beg to forward the following remarks from Surgeon McGregor, 1st European Bengal fusiliers.

The health of the station of Subathoo has been greatly improved since the beginning of 1846. During the month of August and a portion of September, 1845, the blue epidemic cholera attacked the fusiliers, but the disease was not confined to Subathoo, but raged equally at Kussowlie, among the men of her Majesty's 9th foot, and the mortality was pretty nearly alike at both these hill stations. From January to August of that year, Subathoo was comparatively healthy as compared with the two previous years.

The month of September, which, in the plains of India, is remarkable for remittent and intermittent fever, is at Subathoo one of the healthiest, at least, as far as casualties are concerned; this circumstance alone proves a decided advantage to Subathoo over the healthiest station in the plains of India.

Dysentery and bowel complaints all commence at Subathoo in the rains, but the disease has been much more tractable during 1846-47, than during the previous years.

This may have arisen from the nature of the season ; but chiefly, I should say, from the diseased state of the soldiers when they first reached Subathoo, and there is no reason to fear that healthy troops will suffer much from dysentery in ordinary years, while the cool nights give a facility in treating fevers, which is not enjoyed by the stations in the plains, even on the North-western frontier. Scurvy has seldom or ever appeared at Subathoo, while the disease has been prevalent at Kussowlie. This it is difficult to account for. The want of vegetables at Kussowlie has been assigned as a principal cause ; but it more likely arises from the free circulation of air not being impeded by forest trees at Subathoo, and somewhat higher temperature in the rains ; while at Kussowlie, the men live in a cold, damp forest, where the circulation of the air must be, more or less, impeded. A public garden has been sanctioned at Kussowlie for the cultivation of vegetables, and the same might be established at Subathoo with advantage.

I consider Subathoo, in every way, well adapted for the preservation of the health of European troops, and admirably suited for the treatment of disorders, which, in the plains of India, prove fatal, or render men unfit for further active service. In July last, there were only twelve men invalided from the fusiliers.

A higher altitude might probably be wished for a Sanatorium ; but for preserving men in health, it may fairly be stated that Subathoo possesses the necessary advantages, viz., a fair, moderate, equable temperature in the cold season, and a moderate fall of rain during the *rainy months*.

Hoping that this report on the subject mentioned in your letter, will meet with the approval of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief,

I have, &c.,

Subathoo,  
the 29th September, 1847.

(Signed) J. FRUSHARD, Colonel,  
Commanding at Subathoo.

EXTRACTS, &c

Col. J. Frushard  
to Quartermaster  
General,  
29th Sept. 1847.

From Lieutenant-Colonel CONGREVE, H. M.'s 29th regiment, commanding at Kussowlie, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. GARDEN, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army. Head Quarters, Simla.

Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve to  
Quartermaster  
General,  
17th Nov. 1847.

*Dated Kussowlie, 17th November, 1847.*

SIR,

My previous report upon the salubrity, or otherwise of the station for European troops, having been dated the 25th November, 1846, and having reviewed an annual period terminating on the 21st of that month, it became necessary for me, in order to acquire the data of a subsequent twelve months, to postpone the report called for in your letter (No. 404) of the 22nd September last, till the expiration of the month just ended. The report required, I have now the honour to subjoin.

Opinion of salubrity of this station, formerly expressed, confirmed by experience of the last twelve months.

The experience of the twelve months elapsed, since the date of my last report, tends to confirm the opinion there expressed of the superior salubrity of the hill to the plains climate for European troops. Not only is the ratio of sickness and mortality considerably decreased in the hills, but there is an equally marked advantage in the increased vigour and healthy aspect of the ranks, not to take into account the greater bodily comfort of which all must be sensible.

I am still of opinion, then, that the hill climate is very preferable to the plains climate for European troops ; but I must admit that certain, perhaps unfounded, anticipations of a nearer approach to the European scale of sickness and mortality in which I indulged at the time of writing my former report, have been disappointed. The ratio of sickness and mortality during the twelve months just ended, has not, as I fully expected, been very much less than during the preceding twelve months, when the regiment had just arrived at this station from the plains, and from an arduous campaign. Yet at the same time that this disappointment is acknowledged, it must on the other hand be observed, that the regiment, as a body, has gained considerably in vigour, stamina, and healthy aspect. These, together with the reduction of sickness

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve to  
Quartermaster  
General,  
17th Nov. 1847.

and mortality before noticed, are probably the real sum of advantages to be expected from the reduced heat, absence of hot winds, and more European winter of the hills climate, as compared with that of the plains; whilst by the occurrence of a periodical rainy season, any much nearer approach to the European standard of health will probably be prevented. The following return exhibits, per month, the sanitary condition of the regiment during the period under report:—

RETURN exhibiting per Month the Sanitary Condition of the Regiment during the Twelve Months ending the 30th of November, 1847.

Months.	Mean Daily Strength.	Mean Daily Sick.	No. Died in Hospital	Fatal Diseases. No. of Deaths by each.	Remarks on the actual and comparative Ratio of Sickness and Mortality in the Regiment during each Month. Extracted from Monthly Return.										
1846. December .	763·7	51·2	1	Diarrhœa . . . 1	The proportion of sickness and mortality has been considerably under that recorded of three preceding Decembers in the plains.										
1847. January .	797·12	57·8	2	{ Febris, C.C. . . 1 Diarrhœa . . . 1	Has not been relatively so good as throughout the preceding nine months the regiment has been at this station, the unfavourable difference being occasioned by the prevalence of diarrhœa of a scorbutic character; due, probably, to circumstances of preceding service, and the want of fresh succulent vegetables and fruits at the station.										
February .	794·	42·3	8	{ Hepat. O.C. . . 2 " Chr. . . 1 Dysentery, A.C. 2 Paralysis . . . 1 Diarrhœa . . . 2	In consequence of the late severely cold and very wet weather, the deaths have been numerous in the class of patients, sometime affected with scorbutic diarrhœa and dysentery; but the great body of the regiment generally has been healthy.										
March . .	816·45	32·87	4	{ Carditis . . . 1 Hepat. Chr. . . 1 Dysentery, A.C. 2	On comparison with March in 1843, 1844, and 1845, the sickness per cent. of strength this month has been under half the average of sickness of those three months in the plains; but the ratio of mortality has been as nearly as possible the same.										
April . .	889·9	41·8	6	{ Dysentery, A.C. 5 Cholera, Spa. . 1	Sickness has been less than half that of last April at this station, and the mortality also less by 3 10 per cent. of strength compared with the average of four preceding Aprils to 1846; including sickness, this month is less than half that average, whilst the mortality is as nearly as possible the same.										
May . . .	937·	65·2	2	{ Dysentery, A.C. 1 Apoplexia . . . 1	Of mean daily strength since the regiment came to India, In May, 1843, 1844, and 1845, <table style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle;"><tr><td>Constantly Sick,</td><td>Died,</td></tr><tr><td>per Cent.</td><td>per Cent.</td></tr><tr><td>on average plains . . . 9 8</td><td>1·9</td></tr><tr><td>" 1846, at present station . . . 9·2</td><td>5·</td></tr><tr><td>" under return . . . 6 96</td><td>2·1</td></tr></table>	Constantly Sick,	Died,	per Cent.	per Cent.	on average plains . . . 9 8	1·9	" 1846, at present station . . . 9·2	5·	" under return . . . 6 96	2·1
Constantly Sick,	Died,														
per Cent.	per Cent.														
on average plains . . . 9 8	1·9														
" 1846, at present station . . . 9·2	5·														
" under return . . . 6 96	2·1														
June . . .	932·	64·53	5	{ Dysentery, A.C. 2 " Chr. 3	The sickness and mortality has been half that experienced by the regiment during three Junes in the plains. In June last year, at this station, the regiment was more healthy, and there was no death that month, apparently from causes before noticed in these returns; there is a prevalent scorbutic taint of the constitution of the men, determining to a dysentery of peculiar and intractable character, whence the five deaths this month.										
July . . .	927·3	75·7	3	{ Delirium Tremens 1 Dysentery, Chr. 2	The proportion of sickness and mortality to strength has been less than the average of the four previous Julys which the regiment has served in India, and as nearly as possible the same as last year at this station.										
August . .	921·3	77·8	3	{ Febris, C.C. . . 1 Dysentery, Chr. 1 Apoplexia . . . 1	The sickness and mortality has been greatly less than the average of three Augusts passed in the plains. The mortality has also been considerably less than during the same month last year at this station.										
September .	915·9	73·9	4	{ Dysentery, A.C. 3 " Chr. 1	Though the number constantly sick has been rather large, the mortality, compared with former years, has been little. Plains' average of three years per cent. of mean strength died <table style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle;"><tr><td>Kussowhe, 1846 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .</td><td>2·9</td></tr><tr><td>Kussowhe, 1847 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .</td><td>7·6</td></tr><tr><td>Kussowhe, 1847 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .</td><td>4 3</td></tr></table>	Kussowhe, 1846 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .	2·9	Kussowhe, 1847 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .	7·6	Kussowhe, 1847 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .	4 3				
Kussowhe, 1846 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .	2·9														
Kussowhe, 1847 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .	7·6														
Kussowhe, 1847 . . . ditto . . . ditto . . .	4 3														
October . .	892·	63·58	5	{ Febris, C.C. . . 1 Dysentery, A.C. 2 " Chr. 1 Diarrhœa . . . 1	The general state of health of the regiment is very confirmatory of the superiority of the hill climate. The ratio of sickness and mortality, though somewhat higher than during this month last year, is very considerably under the average of three previous years in the plains.										
November .	873·7	53·46	2	{ Peritonitis . . . 1 Dysentery, A.C. 1	The health of the regiment has been much better than during any preceding November since its arrival in India, and the ratio of sickness and mortality to strength is far less than the mean of those five preceding Novembers.										
Total . .	871·69	58·34	45												

Ratio of sickness and mortality during the period under report.

From the total line in the preceding return it may be ascertained that the number constantly sick per cent. of mean daily strength is for the 12 months 6·69, and of the same strength 5·16. The regiment has never since its arrival in India, except during last year, at this station, enjoyed any approach to so comparatively low a rate of sickness and mortality. This fact may be better appreciated by reference to table, Appendix 1, showing the extent and nature of the sickness and mortality in the regiment for each year, and for each station it has occupied since its arrival in India. That table will be found to be very comprehensive, and to answer most statistical inquiries concerning sickness, mortality, and disease in the regiment during its service in this country. For the sake of more forcible exposition of the superior salubrity of this station, to others in the plains, which have been occupied by the regiment, I shall here place in one view for comparison, the facts best representative of the sanitary value of each station.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve to  
Quartermaster  
General,  
17th Nov. 1847.

	Stations and Period.	Of Mean Daily Strength.		Remarks.
		Per Cent constantly Sick.	Per Cent. Died.	
Annual ratio of Sickness and Mortality in the Regiment since its arrival in India.	Chinsurah, Ghazeepore 8 Months to 31st March, 1843	7·1	9·9	
	Ghazeepore . . . Year ending 31st March, 1844	7·6	9·	
	Ghazeepore, Meerut . Year ending 31st March, 1845	14·7	15·48	
	Meerut, Army of Sutlej Year ending 31st March, 1846	11·	13·992	{ Includes 53 deaths by wounds received in action.
	Kussowlie . . . . Year ending 31st March, 1847	7·6	5·62	
	Ditto . . . . . Year ending 30th Nov. 1847	6·69	5·16	{ Repeats five months of year, ending 31st March, 1847, on preceding line.

Continued preponderance of bowel complaints said to be of scorbutic character, and noticed in former report.

I noticed in my former report, the occurrence at this station of cases of bowel complaint of a peculiar character, declared by the medical officers to be scorbutic. These cases first appeared toward the end of the rainy season of 1846. They have since continued numerous, but their preponderance amongst the admissions has of late been less marked. I am in hopes, therefore, there will be a still further decrease in the proportion of these cases, and a consequent reduction in the ratio of sickness and mortality during the coming year; for as the preceding monthly statement of sick and died, shows the deaths have been in a large proportion by the bowel affections here noticed, but on the other hand there is so small a list of deaths, exclusive of the deaths referred to, that perhaps it would be safer to conclude the deaths by bowel complaint to have superseded others rather than to have been superadded to others. That in fact the nature rather than the extent of mortality has been influenced by the presence of the scorbutic bowel complaint here noticed.

Nature of influence of these ailments on the sickness and mortality at the station.

2. The following return exhibits by classes of diseases, the diseases by which the sickness and mortality in the regiment during the twelve months under report have been occasioned; and it will serve by comparison with the lower division of the table, Appendix 1, to illustrate the difference in the prevalence of the different classes of diseases, here and in the plains.

Nature of the sickness and mortality amongst troops at Kussowlie.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve to  
Quartermaster  
General,  
17th Nov. 1847.

Classes of Diseases.	Admitted.	Died.
By Fevers . . . . .	138	3
Eruptive fevers . . . . .	2	—
Diseases of the lungs . . . . .	45	—
" liver . . . . .	33	4
" stomach and bowels . . . . .	350	32
Cholera (Asiatic) . . . . .	2	1
Diseases of the brain . . . . .	9	4
Dropsies . . . . .	—	—
Rheumatic affections . . . . .	22	—
Venereal . . . . .	37	—
Abscesses and ulcers . . . . .	56	—
Wounds and injuries . . . . .	51	—
Punished . . . . .	5	—
Diseases of the eyes . . . . .	83	—
" skin . . . . .	4	—
All other diseases . . . . .	38	1
Total . . . . .	875	45

Chief features of difference and similarity in the prevalence of the several classes of diseases in the hills and in the plains.

As compared with similar statements for plains' stations in table, Appendix I, the chief features of difference and similarity in the prevalence of the different classes of diseases here

displayed are:—

1. A very remarkable reduction in the sickness and deaths by the class "fevers."
2. The smaller class of admissions and deaths by diseases of the lungs, a result not anticipated.
3. The class "diseases of the liver" must be regarded as more numerous and fatal than in the plains. I may add, that this and the class "diseases of the stomach and "bowels" include together five instances of abscess of the liver, whilst only eleven instances were observed in the regiment during three years in the plains.
4. The increase in the class "diseases of the stomach and bowels," exclusive of cholera, is very considerable. This increase has been all by cases of the scorbutic character before noticed. Whether this is an accidental or regular feature of the sickness and mortality of this station, cannot yet be determined. Last year, the scarcity of vegetables, was considered by the medical officers to have been a main auxiliary in the production of this class of cases. That opinion was probably correct. The number of cases of this description has decreased as the supply of vegetables, partly by aid of the cantonment garden, has been increased. Having been of opinion myself, in concurrence with the surgeon, that the overgrowth of the trees at this station, consequent upon the restrictive rules of Sir Robert Sale and Sir John McCaskell, contributed to the production of this bowel complaint, I have permitted and carried out a certain thinning of the trees, but more is required on the north face of the hill. Amongst the many unsatisfactory conjectures in explanation of the appearance of this scorbutic affection amongst the men, I may mention that the surgeon supposes that in a rarified atmosphere, as at this elevation, making eleven degrees difference in the boiling point of water, the blood more readily undergoes a scorbutic deterioration from a less effective process of oxygenation, and that this tendency is met by the natural compensating powers in the system under the use of a generous yet guarded dietary, and a more strict compliance with the other organic laws, than is absolutely required by Europeans in their native latitudes and elevations. Surgeon Taylor does not regard the absence of the scorbutic disease alluded to, in the natives of these hills, as an objection to his hypothesis.
5. The Hills, it is well known, are not exempt from cholera.
6. There appears to be a slight increase in the class "diseases of brain."
7. The classes "dropsies," "rheumatic affections," "abscesses and ulcers," and "diseases of the skin," present no particular increase or decrease.
8. Venereal diseases are less numerous, from the restrictive facilities offered by the nature of the station; and the decrease of this class is a more essential cause of eligibility of the station than would at first sight appear. Not merely is the number of admissions by this class of diseases diminished, but it is to be observed that the unhealthiness of many young soldiers in the plains is to be dated from an attack of venereal. The secondary

forms of these diseases often give cause for invaliding, and even for discharge from the service. Further, a bubo, though perhaps an insignificant disease, effectually disqualifies a man for the field; and, on taking the field in December, 1845, several men were lost to the strength from this cause.

9. From the precipitous nature of the ground around the barracks, accidents at this station are more numerous and severe than in the plains.

10. Ophthalmia cases have been much more numerous and severe than was anticipated. The decrease in this class has indeed been very inconsiderable.

11. A peculiar feature in the class of all other diseases is, its containing cases of scorbutic affection of the gums.

Thermometer and state of the weather during the twelve months.

To the preceding remarks upon the salubrity or otherwise of this station, during the twelve months passed since the date of my last report on the same subject, I have now only to add a short notice of the difference of the seasons from those of last year. An abstract of the "Meteorological Journal," kept at the regimental hospital, is appended. It will be seen, on comparing its contents with (see Appendix, No. 2) the abstract which accompanied last report, that the winter of 1846-47 was very much more severe than the winter of 1845-46. Probably such a severe winter is rarely known in this part of the hills. The hot season which followed was very much hotter than the hot season of 1846, the difference in the maximum degree of temperature being as much as 20°. The rainy season of this year commenced later than in 1846, and the fall of rain was less copious. The weather, since the rains to the termination of the period here reported upon, has varied little from the same season last year.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEO. CONGREVE, Lieut.-Col.,  
H.M.'s 29th Regiment,  
Commanding at Kussowlie.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Lieut.-Col.  
Congreve to  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
17th Nov. 1847.

#### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 30th May, 1849 (No. 43).*

Reply to paragraphs 213—16 of Letter dated 1st November, 1848 (No. 167).

78. These proceedings furnish satisfactory evidence of the superior salubrity of the hill stations of Kussowlie and Subathoo as compared with stations on the plains. The Special Committee appointed by you came to the conclusion, that at least two soldiers die in the plains for one on the hills; and the late Governor-General stated, in a memorandum dated 7th December, 1847, that, by returns for the preceding three years, the deaths amongst recruits reaching the N.W. frontier had been nearly three in the plains for one in the hills.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
30th May, 1849.

79. The extra expense for victualling regiments on the hills is stated at about £4,500 per annum, chiefly occasioned by the high cost of fuel, and by the necessity of employing carriage for water. This extra expense is more than met by the saving in constructing and repairing barracks on the hills, and by the saving of life among the soldiery.

80. Numerous suggestions have been made by the Special Committee, on details relating to European barracks generally, and to those on the hill stations in particular, and also relating to the system of providing bread, vegetables, and other articles of diet, and to the supply of water for the troops on the hills. The Governor-General states that such details will be looked into by him, with Lieut.-Col. Benson, during his present visit to the N.W. frontier. The working of the contracts generally for victualling the European soldier, (of which we regret to observe great complaints are made) will also, we are persuaded, engage his Lordship's particular attention.



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## BENGAL MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 20th September, 1850.

From Lieut.-Col. H. T. TUCKER, Adjutant-General of the army, to Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

*Head Quarters, Simla, 23rd August, 1850.*

SIR,—

The Adjutant-  
General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
23rd Aug. 1850.

I have the honour herewith to transmit, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, a memorandum in original, of date the 22nd instant, by H. E. the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject of the unhealthiness of the troops at Kussowlie, attributed to the influence of the trees in the immediate vicinity of the barracks at that station.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieut.-Col.  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

## MEMORANDUM by H. E. the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

*Head Quarters, Simla, 22nd August, 1850.*

Memorandum  
by Commander-  
in-Chief,  
22nd Aug. 1850.

1. The troops at Kussowlie are growing more sickly; those at Dugshaie, having the same climate, are in excellent health. The water at Kussowlie is good in one spring, and it is abundant.

2. The cause of this increasing ill health is attributed to the quantity of trees close to the barracks, so that the water drips from them on the roofs of the barracks, keeping the latter constantly damp. They also prevent a free circulation of air. This produces ill health also.

3. Two Medical Boards have pronounced this state of things to be dangerous, and have declared that the trees close to the barracks ought to be cut down, and the others carefully thinned.

4. The dangerous season has begun, viz. August, September, October, and November; and unless steps are immediately taken, I am afraid that a great deal of ill-health is likely to be produced, unless the trees are thinned with judgment, and those touching the barracks cut down at once.

5. I hope I shall have an order to cut down these trees immediately. There is no time to lose.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER,  
Commander-in-Chief.

From Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. H. T. TUCKER, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

SIR,—

Col. J. Stuart to the  
Adjutant-General,  
3rd Sept. 1850.

In reply to your letter, No. 906, of the 23rd ult., inclosing a memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the trees near the barracks at Kussowlie, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency, that the superintending engineer, North-West Provinces, who is now at Kussowlie, has been directed to cause all the trees overhanging the barracks and hospital to be cut down, and others in the vicinity to be thinned, so as to insure a free circulation of air.

I have, &c.

Simla, 3rd September, 1850.

(Signed) J. STUART, Col.,  
Secretary to Government of India, Military  
Department, with the Governor-General.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 26th April, 1850 (No. 69).*

16. The great and continued sickness with which the men of H. M.'s 60th rifles have been afflicted, during the period they have been quartered at Peshawur, as shown in the accompanying report of the surgeon of that regiment, induced H. E. the Commander-in-Chief to direct, and ourselves to approve, of its immediate removal to Subathoo and Kussowlie, a wing being located at each post.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
26th April, 1850.

## BENGAL MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 15th March, 1850.

From Lieutenant-Colonel E. LUGARD, Acting Quartermaster-General, H.M.'s Forces in India, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

*Dated the 16th February, 1850.*

SIR,—

I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief in India to report to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, that in consequence of a representation (herewith annexed) made by the surgeon of the 60th regt. royal rifles, and senior medical officer here, of the great and continued sickness with which the men of this regiment have been afflicted, during the period they have been quartered at Peshawur, and the probable fatal result of a longer residence in this locality, H.E. has deemed it expedient, for the good of the public service, to remove the regiment from Peshawur to some more healthy climate, where the lives of the convalescents whose constitutions have been so shaken by repeated attacks of fever and ague (amounting to two-thirds of the regiment) may be saved for further service to the state.

Lieut.-Col.  
E. Lugard to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
16th Feb. 1850.

The barracks at Kussowlie and Subathoo being unoccupied, Sir Charles Napier has decided upon sending the regiment there, and as the march is a long one, and the season too far advanced for any reference to Calcutta, H. E. has issued his orders for the immediate departure of the regiment, so soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, which he trusts will meet with the approval of the Government.

I have the honour to be, &amp;c.

Quartermaster-General's Office,  
H. M.'s Forces in India,  
Head-Quarters, Camp, Peshawur,  
16th February, 1850.

(Signed) E. LUGARD, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Acting Quartermaster-General,  
H. M.'s Forces in India.

No. 409.

From Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. E. LUGARD, Acting Quartermaster-General of H.M.'s Forces in India.

*Dated the 15th of March, 1850.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

In reply to your despatch, No. 28, of the 16th ultimo, I am instructed to acquaint you that, under the circumstances represented, the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council is pleased to approve of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having directed the immediate march of her Majesty's 60th regiment royal rifles from Peshawur, with a view to quartering the corps at Subathoo and Kussowlie.

Major R. Wyllie  
to Lieut.-Col.  
E. Lugard,  
15th March, 1850.

Council Chamber,  
Fort William,  
the 15th of March, 1850.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) R. WYLLIE, Major, Officiating Secretary  
to the Government of India in the  
Military Department.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department. Fort William.

*Dated 19th February, 1850.*

SIR,—

Officiating Quartermaster-General to Major R. Wyllie, 19th Feb. 1850.

With reference to a letter to your address, No. 28, dated 16th instant, from the Officiating Quartermaster-General, H.M.'s forces, and its enclosure from the surgeon of H.M.'s 60th royal rifles, on the subject of the sufferings of that regiment at Peshawur, and his Excellency's intention to order a change of quarters, and to station it at Kussowlie and Subathoo, I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to acquaint you that, as his Excellency considers the barrack accommodation at these two places sufficient for a wing only of a regiment at each, the superintending engineer North-Western Provinces has been requested to put the whole of the barracks at Kussowlie and Subathoo in thorough repair, and to have them ready, by the 1st April next, for the reception of European troops, which the Commander-in-Chief trusts may be approved of by Government.

Quartermaster-General's Office,  
Head-Quarters, Camp,  
Pubbee, 19th February, 1850.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. G. DRUMMOND, Lieut.-Col., Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

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No. 375.

From Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated the 11th of March, 1850.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Major R. Wyllie to Officiating Quartermaster-General, 11th March, 1850.

In reply to your letter, No. 150, of the 19th ultimo, I am instructed to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council is pleased to approve of the superintending engineer, North-Western Provinces, having been requested to put the whole of the barracks at Kussowlie and Soobathoo in thorough repair, and to have them ready for the reception of European troops by the 1st of April next.

Council Chamber,  
Fort William,  
the 11th March, 1850.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) R. WYLLIE, Major, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 23rd October, 1850 (No. 113).*

Reply to Para. 16 of letter dated 26th April, 1850 (No. 69).

Proceedings approved.

Court of Directors to Government of Bengal, 23rd Oct. 1850.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 23rd February, 1853 (No. 3).*

Reply to Letter 7th August, 1852 (No. 46), paragraphs 129 to 136; and 6th November, 1852 (No. 65), paragraph 115.

Transmitting correspondence on the proposed establishment of a hill sanatorium in the Punjab, for convalescent soldiers and other invalids, and as to assistance to be given in rendering the Shaikh Budeen Hill, near Dera Ismael Khan, available for the resort of sick officers.

20. We approve of the measures taken by you to ascertain, by a year's experience on the part of a medical officer (Dr. Cleminger), actually resident on the spot, whether the site of the proposed sanatorium on the Chumba Hills,—

Court of Directors to Government of India, 23rd Feb. 1853.

namely, Kutalog,—is such as will combine all the benefits desired in such an establishment.

21. The elevation of Kutalog, upwards of 6,000 feet above the level of the sea, and the proximity to Lahore, 139 miles, with water-communication up to twelve miles of the site, appear to recommend it as an eligible place of resort for invalids and convalescents, whose cases are likely to benefit by a change from the plains to the hills. The Board of Administration observe “that five European regiments and nearly one thousand European artillerymen will,” if this sanatorium is established, “be within twelve easy marches of a good climate. Thus the necessity of dragging sick and worn-out men all the way to Landour would no longer exist.”\*

22. We shall look with interest to the final result of your inquiries on this subject. Meanwhile we will only observe that, if, upon further inquiry and consideration, you shall be of opinion that a sanatorium for the European troops in the Punjab, in addition to that at Murree, is required, and that the site above mentioned is in all respects suitable, and can be made accessible and available at a reasonable cost, you have our authority for establishing a sanatorium there.

23. The encouragement you have given to the plan of rendering the Shaikh Budeen Hill (situated between Bunnoo and Dera Ismael Khan) available for the temporary resort of officers attached to the Punjab irregular force in the Derajat, whose health may require change of air, has also our approval.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 26th September, 1853 (No. 249).*

20. The hardships and suffering endured by convalescents in progress from distant stations to Landour having been brought under our observation in connection with a proposal for the establishment of a new sanatorium at Chumba for the troops stationed between the rivers Jhelum and Sutlej, the whole subject of hill sanatoria received our most careful consideration, the result of which is given in the papers which form the present collection, which comprises several minutes recorded on this subject.

Government of Bengal to Court of Directors, 26th Sept. 1853.

21. We have determined on the establishment of new convalescent depôts at Chumba, Dhurumsala, Noushera, and Amherst, and the entire number will now be eight, viz.—

1. Noushera, for troops in the province of Peshawur.
2. Murree, for troops between the rivers Attok and Jhelum.
3. Chumba, for troops between the rivers Jhelum and Sutlej.
4. Dhurumsala, for troops in the Jullunder Dooab.
5. Subathoo and Dugshaie, for troops between the rivers Sutlej and Jumna.
6. Landour, for the troops at Meerut and Agra.
7. Darjeeling, for the troops at Cawnpore, Allahabad, Dinapore, and Benares.
8. Amherst, for the troops at Calcutta, Dum Dum, Chinsurah, and in the province of Pegu.

\* Letter from Secretary to Board, dated 23rd May, 1851.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 20th of May, 1853.

## MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
4th May, 1853.Convalescent depôt  
for troops.

1. The report of Dr. Cleminger on the proposed site for a sanatorium at Chumba has been for some time in my hands.

Much urgency was used to induce me to consent to this place being adopted as a station as soon as it was first discovered. I declined to do so until it should have been tested experimentally in respect of climate, and until full inquiry should have been made respecting its eligibility in other respects.

Dr. Cleminger was appointed for the purpose. He resided at Chumba during part of the summer of 1851 and all the summer of 1852. His report is now submitted by the Board of Administration, with a strong recommendation that Chumba should be finally adopted as a sanatorium, since they consider Dr. Cleminger's report to be "entirely favourable."

2. I concur with the Board in this view, and do not consider that Dhurumsala would be a preferable site. Were the two places equal in all other respects, the difficulty and expense of forming a road by Noorpore to Dhurumsala, and the all but impossibility of getting there without one, would, I think, turn the balance in favour of Chumba. Mr. M'Leod's arguments, that the expense would be well laid out, by reason of its giving a military road to Kangra as well as a road to Dhurumsala, has been greatly weakened by his own recent proposal for the formation of an excellent, and to all appearance an easy, military road to Kangra by way of Hoshearpore; thus, in a great measure, superseding the necessity of one by Noorpore.

3. The Honourable Court has stated,\* "that if, upon further inquiry and consideration, you shall be of opinion that a sanatorium for the European troops in the Punjab, in addition to that at Murree, is required, and that the site above mentioned is in all respects suitable, and can be made accessible and available at a reasonable cost, you have our authority for establishing a sanatorium there."

4. In connection with the selection of this sanatorium, I have given at various times much consideration to the subject of hill stations with reference to the health of European troops. At present the only convalescent depôt which has been regularly established in Upper India is Landour, and thither men are sent from all the different stations of the army; many of these are at distances so great that the journey must at least impose grievous suffering on the weakly and suffering men who may be selected for the depôt; suffering, which a less prolonged and less fatiguing march might at least be expected to mitigate in a very considerable degree.

In the end of February, 1850, I thus met a large party of convalescents moving from Peshawur to Landour; they were most of them miserably ill. The march was a long and severe one; the hot weather was fully set in upon the plains before they reached their destination. Loss of life must have been incurred, and much suffering must have been added, which might have been saved, if only the depôt had been at a less weary distance than it was.

5. It seems to me that this evil may be obviated, and that the Government has it in its power greatly to improve the lot of these poor fellows whose health gives way, at some cost, perhaps, to its treasury, but with much substantial benefit to its servants, and I feel confident, greatly to its own ultimate satisfaction.

6. I would propose that sanatory stations should be established at various points along the Himalayan range, which should be accessible, without any lengthened journey, to the convalescents from the different divisions of the army, who should be sent thither instead of being all collected at the one depôt at Landour.

A commencement of such a system has been made in the establishment of the depôt at Murree, near Rawul Pindée. This depôt should now be permanently enlarged so as to accommodate the convalescents of the Peshawur division, to the west of the river Jhelum.

A second should be established at Chumba, the site immediately under consideration for the convalescents of the European troops stationed between the Jhelum and the Sutlej.

\* Court of Directors to Government of India, dated 23rd November, 1853 (No. 3).

The soldiers at Ferozepore would be nearer to the hill-station of Kussoowlie than to Chumba; those at Umbala are close at hand.

7. If it should be resolved still to keep two complete European corps in these hills, additional barracks must be built there for the convalescents. In such cases, I am led to believe, by statements I have seen, that Subathoo, though lower and hotter, would probably be better fitted for convalescents than the stations on loftier ridges.

8. If the military road which has been lately proposed, by way of Hoshearpore to Kangra, should be constructed, a small depôt for convalescents from Jullunder might be conveniently and advantageously formed at Dhurumsala, which Mr. M'Leod so strongly recommends for the purpose.

9. The large artillery force which will probably be collected at Meerut, and the other European corps there, will be within easy reach of the present depôt at Landour. To that station, also, convalescents from Agra must go, unless a small depôt should be formed for them on the hills near Nyneetal.

10. The convalescents from Cawnpore would most conveniently drop down the river in boats, and with those from Dinapore would go to Darjeeling.

11. Lastly, it has long been my belief, and a report recently sent to me confirms my impression, that an excellent sanatorium may be formed at Amherst, for convalescents from Fort William and Dum Dum, whither also would now be sent invalids from the European regiments in Pegu.

12. By this distribution, the convalescents of 4,000 men in the Peshawur division would be about 150 miles' march from their sanatorium; the convalescents of 4,000 men, between the Jhelum and Sutlej, would be from 80 to 100 miles' march from theirs; the convalescents of about 3,500 men in the Cis-Sutlej province, within about 150 miles' march of their depôt; and, lastly, the convalescents destined for Landour would have a march of 120 miles, excepting only the regiments at Agra, which would be distant 250 miles, unless there were a station at Nyneetal.

The convalescents from Cawnpore and Dinapore would be carried over nearly the whole distance in boats, and those from Calcutta might be conveyed twice a month, if necessary, to Amherst.

13. If these stations were established within easy reach of the several corps, it would be well worthy of consideration whether a greater resort to them might not be sanctioned in favour of weakly men, who have recovered far enough to be no longer ranked as convalescents, or who have never yet been sickly, but are likely from the climate to become so. Timely refuge thus afforded in a hill climate, might be the means of saving many a life, or of preserving many a man useful in the service who otherwise must have been sent to Europe as unserviceable.

14. A still wider field for consideration is opened by the doubts which have not unfrequently been expressed, whether the hill stations should not be kept wholly for such convalescent and weakly men as I have adverted to above, and whether the system at present in vogue, of quartering entire regiments in the hills, does not bring with it as much of evil as of good. It is stated that the men for the most part dislike it; there is less scope for movement and for amusement than in the plains, and hardly any means of ordinary drill. They presume upon the coolness of the climate, and exposing themselves to the sun in the valleys, and to the damp everywhere, they contract, I have heard said, complaints, as grievous and as frequent, as they are liable to in the plains.

Such opinions deserve examination, and should not be omitted from a general consideration of the subject I have now brought forward.

15. Before taking any steps towards the establishment of Chumba, I should be glad to be favoured with the sentiments of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the proposal I have made for increasing the number of convalescent depôts, as well as upon the point which has been noticed in the preceding paragraph.

16. The Chief Commissioner of the Punjab may be informed, that the Government is in communication with the Commander-in-Chief regarding Chumba.

This minute should be transferred by the Foreign Office to the Military Department.

4th May, 1853.

7th May, 1853.

(Signed)

DALHOUSIE.

J. LOWIS.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
4th May, 1853.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
26th May, 1853.

Convalescent *depôt*,  
Amherst.

1. In connection with a minute which I lately circulated regarding sanatoria for the European troops, I now submit a report by the Medical Board upon the station of Amherst, which I suggested as a place to which recourse might be had for the European troops at the presidency.

2. The Board observes justly, that there has hardly yet been gathered experience enough to entitle it to pronounce positively regarding Amherst. So far as it is prepared as yet to pronounce, it judges favourably, but not very favourably, of Amherst as a sanatorium.

3. There can be no doubt that Amherst can never afford a substitute for the change of climate, which patients are advised to seek out of India. It may be admitted, too, that its climate will not have the tonic effect which is derived from a residence at Darjeeling, or any other of the hill stations. But I conceive that Amherst will afford an easy and beneficial change to soldiers at the presidency, until the formation of the railway shall render Darjeeling more accessible; and that it is very desirable, under all circumstances, to render it available as a sanatory resort for the European soldiery, who must hereafter be stationed in Pegu.

The selection of a site for hospitals and barracks is a point of the first moment. The report of the Medical Board seems to intimate that the present position is not good; and the report of Mr. White, which I have had an opportunity of perusing, seems to indicate that there are obstacles to selecting the best site in the place for hospitals and soldiers' quarters, in the arrangements that have been made by the civil authorities for allotting sites for private residences. This cannot be allowed. I regard the selection of the very best available sites for soldiers' quarters, as a paramount consideration for the government. I propose, therefore, to appoint a committee to examine the question, to report upon it, and upon the place; and particularly to consider the point of the best site for hospitals and barracks, and to make any suggestions they think proper.

Major-General Godwin may be requested to select a medical officer, and a military officer, for two of the members, and he may be requested to be particular in the selection. Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle may be requested to name some one on the part of the civil government as the third member of the Committee. I expect to receive the report of the Committee during the summer.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE, 26th May, 1853.  
S. LOWIS, 28th do.  
S. DORIN, 30th do.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 8th July, 1853.

No. 575.

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. TUCKER, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. BIRCH, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department.

*Dated the 21st of June, 1853.*

SIR,

With reference to your despatch and its annexure (No. 468), of the 17th ultimo, I

The Adjutant-  
General to  
Lieut.-Col.  
R. J. H. Birch,  
21st June, 1853.

Reply, forwards a memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, containing his sentiments on the proposed establishment of a sanatorium at Chumba, and of convalescent depôts at other points on the Himalaya range.

have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, the accompanying original memorandum by his Excellency, containing the expression of his sentiments upon the proposed establishment of a sanatorium at Chumba, and of convalescent depôts at other specified points along the Himalaya range, and also in regard to the question of discontinuing the present system of quartering entire regiments at Kussowlie, Dugshaie, and Subathoo, and devoting these stations exclusively to convalescents from the European troops located in their neighbourhood.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Head Quarters, Simla,  
the 21st of June, 1853.

(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

## MEMORANDUM by COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

1. I have received with a very lively satisfaction the communication made to me by the Officiating Secretary to Government Military Department, of 17th May, notifying to me, that it is the purpose of the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, to establish a military sanatorium at the station of Chumba, for the resort principally of invalids of European corps located between the rivers Jhelum and Sutlej.

2. The report upon which the resolution of Government is mainly forwarded—a copy of which accompanies the letter of the officiating military secretary under review—appears to me to embrace every recommendation that can be desired for the proposed establishment, and it is highly gratifying to learn from it, that the site is found capable of affording accommodation for a number not falling short of from five to six hundred soldiers.

3. I have already had occasion to express my satisfaction at the authorisation given by Government for an increase of the establishment at Murree, and it is with equal satisfaction, that I have received the announcement of its being the further purpose of the Governor-General in Council to extend the convalescent accommodation to Dhurum-sala, being fully impressed with the soundness of the opinions entertained by Government regarding the beneficial effects that must result to the troops, and eventually to the state, from the judicious multiplying of the sanatoria along the whole mountain border of our military occupation; and also of the prejudicial consequences of the necessity hitherto unavoidable, of despatching detachments of invalids upon a long and fatiguing march towards their far-distant depôt.

4. The purpose of Government expressed in paragraph 6 and seven following paragraphs of the Officiating Secretary's letter, carried out, will effectually obviate these hardships throughout our military quarters.

5. I am called upon to offer an opinion as to the advisability of relinquishing the present system of locating two entire European regiments in the hill stations of Dugshaie, Kussowlie, and Subathoo, thereby enabling the authorities to sanction a greater resort to the Hills of weakly men of the description adverted to in para. 14 than will be practicable, even under the full working of the measure contemplated by Government, to which my attention has been above directed.

6. I am not prepared to support the suggestions that have been made to this effect to the Governor-General in Council, nor can I share the doubts which have been expressed, whether the system at present in vogue of quartering entire regiments in the Hills does not bring with it as much of evil as of good.

7. My experience hitherto leads me to a positive conclusion directly the reverse of this.

8. Her Majesty's 22nd and 60th regiments left the Hills, after a two years' sojourn in them, in a state of robust health, *en masse*; and the beneficial effects of that sojourn have abided by them since. The 61st and 98th are completing their two years' sojourn; both these corps came up to the Hills from Peshawur, as the 60th had done two seasons before, in a most exhausted state; and both have essentially benefited in general health, although the latter corps counts not a few among its ranks whose constitutions are too much broken to derive permanent benefit from any advantages of climate.

9. Thus encouraged, I am preparing to recommend to Government, on the occasion of the approaching relief of regiments, to bring up her Majesty's 32nd and 53rd regiments from Peshawur, in which station they have been much harassed, and have suffered proportionably, and shall look with confidence to the result.

10. I apprehend it would be difficult to find all the claims to such a removal specified in para. 14 of Colonel Birch's letter more fully exemplified than they will be found to be throughout both these entire corps.

11. It is my opinion that the two British regiments quartered at Peshawur should be moved up in regular rotation to the Hills after a sojourn of two years in that peculiarly trying station to health; and I believe the soundest medical opinions will concur with mine here expressed.

12. It is true, as observed upon in para. 15 of the Officiating Secretary's letter, that there are soldiers in every corps who prefer the society and entertainment of the

EXTRACTS, &c.  
—  
Memorandum by  
Commander-in-  
Chief,  
13th June, 1853.



EXTRACTS, &c.  
 ———  
 Memorandum by  
 Commander-in-  
 Chief.  
 13th June, 1853.

crowded bazars of the plains, to the comparative solitude and monotony of the Hills, but it may be reasonably conjectured that these are the subjects whose health is most likely to be benefited by the temporary withdrawal.

13. Unwarrantable exposure to sun and damp, it is always within the competency of the regimental authorities to put a wholesome check upon, and although military exercise is limited, particularly at Dugshaie, there is ample space at hand for light infantry evolutions at the stations, both of Kussowlie and Subathoo, and for steady drill in all of them, and more uniform opportunity afforded by the climate than in the plains.

14. Under all the circumstances, as they appear to my apprehension, I would gladly see a third station for an entire regiment take root in these Hills; and I think a highly advantageous site exists on a height opposed to Dugshaie, but I am too imperfectly acquainted with the locality to offer more than a passing conjecture, while delivering my sentiments upon the general subject.

15. On the other hand, I should fear that the surrender of the three stations above specified, for the exclusive reception of detachments from various quarters, of subjects most likely to be benefited by the mountain air, would give rise to a too extensive parcelling out of corps prejudicial to discipline generally.

16. The dispositions announced by Government for increasing the number of convalescent depôts I consider admirable, while respectfully submitting my objections to any change in the destination of the three regimental stations above adverted to. In reference to paragraph 8 of the Government letter, I would observe that I believe the remark of his Lordship in Council to be correct in respect to some diseases, but there are cases, as I had occasion to ascertain this year, when the subject of sending convalescents to Dugshaie, and Subathoo was brought forward, where the medical men consider the climate of the former station best. The convalescents at Dugshaie for the last two seasons have been distributed amid the companies of the regiment occupying the station, which, as a permanent arrangement, would be objectionable: but with one additional barrack there, and some improvement to the existing barracks at Subathoo, there would be ample room for the annual convalescents from Umbala and Ferozepore, who might be classed by a Medical Committee, and though occupying separate barracks attached for all purposes of subsistence and discipline to the regiment and wing of a regiment, respectively, occupying Dugshaie and Subathoo.

17. A small depôt at Nyneethal for Agra, as suggested in paragraph 10, would render the new disposition very complete; and I take this occasion to mention that I am only waiting for further information to submit to Government a suggestion of Brigadier-General Roberts, who thinks that a small barrack for thirty or forty men on the banks of the Cabul river, at Noushera, would be a great benefit to the station of Peshawur, in affording, during the hot and unhealthy seasons, an easy and timely change of air to sick men, who now sink into their graves for want of some such change.

Head-Quarters, Simla,  
 the 13th June, 1853.

(Signed) W. M. GOMM, General.

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#### MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Minute by the  
 Governor-General,  
 5th July, 1853.

1. The Commander-in-Chief having favoured the Government with his opinion upon the scheme for the establishment of convalescent depôts in the hills, and having generally concurred in the views entertained by the Governor-General in Council, orders may at once be issued for giving effect to them.

2. Upon the points that were specially submitted for his opinion, the Commander-in-Chief has replied, strongly advocating the continuance of the present system by which two entire European corps are kept in the hills near Simla, and specifying objections which he feels, to the detachments annually from regiments, of any other than actual convalescents.

Upon these points the Government will of course desire to be guided by the opinion of his Excellency. It is, therefore, to be held as settled that the general features of the

existing system shall be continued; that two full European corps shall habitually be stationed in the barracks at Kussowlie, Subathoo, and Dugshaie, and that depôts for convalescents shall be established at points along the hills.

It is also to be held as settled that the following depôts shall be established for the convalescents of the corps specified below.

- 1st. Murree, for the convalescents of the troops westward of the river Jhelum.
- 2nd. Chumba, for the troops stationed between the rivers Jhelum and Sutlej.
- 3rd. Dhurumsala, for the troops in the Jullunder Doab.
- 4th. Subathoo and Dugshaie, for the troops between the rivers Sutlej and Jumna.
- 5th. Landour, for the troops at Meerut and Agra.
- 6th. Darjeeling, for the troops at Cawnpore, Alahabad, Dinapore, and Benares.
- 7th. Amherst, for the troops at Calcutta.

3. I have to observe that I have included the troops at Agra among those whose convalescents are to proceed to Landour for the present. This must at any rate be done until quarters can be prepared at Nynetal; and, upon further consideration, I am disposed to think that, upon the whole, Landour will be the better situation of the two; for although convalescents from Agra will have a march of 250 miles, which will be farther than several others under the new system, still they will have the advantage of the bullock train, by which the convalescents could be carried for the greater part of the way to Landour, but of which they could have little, if any benefit, if their destination were Nynetal.

In a very few years too, I hope to see railway communication completed between Agra and Meerut. It can hardly be expected to be extended so soon into Rohilcund; and until it is, the existence of a line up to Meerut will obviously be greatly in favour of fixing the depôt at Landour.

4. I have assumed that Amherst will be found eligible; at all events, a committee has been appointed since the Commander-in-Chief was addressed, and the Government will form a decision upon their report.

5. The Governor-General in Council will very readily assent to the formation of a depôt at Noushera, if it be thought likely to prove beneficial to the troops at Peshawur. There is good ground to hope that, before very long, everything will be sufficiently settled to admit of a sanatorium being safely formed in the hills, towards the course of the Swat river, on a site which I have already had for some time in my eye; for the present, however, any attempt to establish it would be premature.

6. I have now only to request, that the Commander-in-Chief will be so good as to state what number of men should be provided for at Murree, Chumba, Dhurumsala, Subathoo, Dugshaie, and Landour respectively, on the principles laid down in the previous paragraphs.

New barracks have already been ordered at Darjeeling; and the Governor-General in Council will look to Amherst without delay, on receiving the report of the Committee.

5th July, 1853.

6th July, 1853.

6th July, 1853.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.  
J. LOWIS.  
J. DORIN.

#### FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 22nd July, 1853.

No. 576.

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. TUCKER, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. BIRCH, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department.

*Dated the 21st of June, 1853.*

SIR,—

Having submitted to the Commander-in-Chief your despatch, No. 949, of the 31st

Reply, approves of the expediency of establishing a sanatorium at Amherst for the European soldiery in the province of Pegu.

ultimo, with annexed copy of one to Major-General H. Godwin, C.B., commanding the forces in Burmah, regarding Amherst as a sanatory station, I am directed to request you will be

The Adjutant-General to Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, 21st June, 1853.

good enough to communicate to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council his Excellency's full concurrence in the expediency of establishing a sanatorium at that place, as a resort for the convalescents of the European soldiery hereafter to be stationed in the province of Pegu, as also temporarily for those serving at the Presidency.

Head Quarters, Simla,  
21st June, 1853.

I have the honour to be, &c.,  
(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieut.-Col.,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

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MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
19th July, 1853.

Convalescent dépôt at  
Noushera.

latter station.

1. The Commander-in-Chief submits in detail his proposal for the establishment of a sanatory depot at Noushera on the Cabul river, two marches from Peshawur, for the convalescents from the

The correspondence establishes fully the efficacy of the change of air to Noushera, in many individual cases that have been tried, and the medical officers as well as the commissioned officers, all very strongly recommend the measure.

An eligible site has been selected, and an estimate has been submitted for two barracks, each containing twenty-five men and a number of married persons, together with quarters for four officers. The aggregate cost is calculated at thirty thousand rupees, of which ten thousand are for the officers' quarters.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, adverting to the amount of money required, proposes that only half should be expended at first.

I am very sensible of his Excellency's considerate desire not to bear with unnecessary weight upon the treasury. But this is one of those cases wherein the health and the comfort of the soldier being concerned, I should be disposed to expend what appears to be desirable, without stint.

It can hardly be doubted, after the extension already gained, that Noushera will be physically advantageous to convalescents. The moral effect of such a refuge from sickness hanging heavily over a corps, I have no doubt would be excellent. If the barracks should be successful, twenty-five men is a very small proportion to benefit by them. If on the other hand they should fail contrary to all expectation, the sacrifice of 10,000 or 15,000 Rs. in a kindly and hopeful experiment is a small matter in my estimation, and I am persuaded would be so regarded by the Honourable Court. At any rate I will take the responsibility, and I request that the scheme may be carried into execution in its full extent.

At the same time, adverting to the remark of the Brigadier-General, I expect that the estimate of the officers' quarters shall be duly reduced.

3. I have no objection to the assistance of Mr. Gully being given in superintending this work.

On this point, however, it will be necessary to consult Lieut.-Col. Napier, and the Adjutant-General may be requested to do so through the Chief Commissioner.

These buildings ought to be ready for occupation by April, 1854.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE,  
19th July, 1853.

I concur.

J. LOWIS,

I quite agree.

J. DORIN.

21st July.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 16th September, 1853.

From Lieut.-Col. H. T. TUCKER, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. BIRCH, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department.

*Dated the 17th August, 1853.*

SIR,—

Reply relative to the amount of accommodation that will be required for convalescents at the sanatoria named.

Having submitted to the Commander-in-Chief your despatch No. 225, of the 8th ultimo, specifying the several places at which the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council has determined the depôts for European convalescents shall be established in the Hills, I have been directed to forward, for submission to his Lordship in Council, in accordance with the requisition contained in your letter under reply, the following statement, showing the amount of accommodation which his Excellency recommends may be provided at the respective sanatoria enumerated.

The Adjutant-General to Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. Birch, 17th Aug. 1853.

Lahore, Mooltan, Govindgurh, Sealkote, Wuzeerabad.

At Chumba for convalescents from the European troops serving at the stations detailed in the margin, for 100 men.

At Dhurumsala for the convalescents from Jullunder (and Hoshearpore, if any European artillery should be stationed there), for thirty men.

At Dugshaie for fifty convalescents; as also an additional hospital for them, it having been shown to the Commander-in-Chief's satisfaction that the present hospital cannot conveniently afford room for other than the patients from the regiment stationed there.

At Subathoo, where the rest of the cases selected from the stations, as per margin, can be sent, there is already more than sufficient available accommodation, there being enough spare barrack room for upwards of 200 men.

At Landour there is at present accommodation for 250 men, and as it is contemplated for the future to send the convalescents to that depôt from Meerut and Agra only, this amount will, it is considered, more than suffice.

Barracks for 200 men having been sanctioned for Murree, no further accommodation at that depôt will, his Excellency thinks, be necessary.

2. In conclusion, I am to observe that in your communication under reference, it is stated that Chumba is to be a depôt "for the troops stationed between the rivers Jhelum and Sutlej;" under the strict letter of this wording, Jullunder would be included; but it has been concluded that it was intended to except that station from the mention of Dhurumsala in the same letter, and also in paragraph 9 of the previous one, No. 468, of the 17th of May last.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Head-Quarters,  
Simla, 17th Aug. 1853.

(Signed) H. T. TUCKER, Lieut.-Col.,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

## Convalescent Depôts for Troops.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
14th Sept. 1853.

The Commander-in-Chief has specified the accommodation which will be required at the several stations, that have recently been set apart as convalescent depôts for troops.

At most of these stations the accommodation already existing will suffice for the troops destined for them. At Chumba, however, there will be required quarters for 100 men; at Dhurumsala for 30 men; at Dugshaie for 50 men, together with an hospital for them.

The Commander-in-Chief should be informed that measures will be taken for obtaining a site in the Chumba Hills, which at present are foreign territory.

The Foreign Department should be communicated with accordingly.

Instructions should be given to the proper authorities to provide the quarters required at Dugshaie and Dhurumsala. Both of these ought to be ready for occupation before the next rains.

Similar instructions should be given for preparing quarters at Chumba, when the site shall have been procured. The construction of them there, however, will necessarily be more slow.

14th September, 1853.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.  
J. LOWIS.  
J. DORIN.

## SICKNESS AMONGST TROOPS AT LAHORE.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 24th September, 1849 (No. 182).*Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
24th Sept. 1849.Consultations,  
11th August, 1849.

Paragraph 85. The marginal papers comprise a report on the state of health of the 2nd European regiment, which we regret to observe is far from favourable.

86. The prevailing sickness is stated to arise partly from the hardships and privations suffered by the corps during the recent campaign, and partly from a tendency to scorbutic disease, which has for years past been undermining the health of the regiment, in Scinde, at Subathoo, and in the Punjab, and an increased vegetable diet is represented as likely to prove beneficial.

87. The Most Noble the Governor-General has therefore, at the recommendation of H. E. the Commander-in-Chief, authorized the officer commanding in the Punjab to obtain, by contract, vegetables, if procurable, and issue a sufficient quantity to the men of the corps, in lieu, as suggested, of their allowance of rice.

88. On the breaking up of the army of the Punjab, it is the intention of his Lordship to cause the necessary steps to be taken, for setting apart ground as gardens for the European troops at other stations of the army besides Lahore, in accordance with the desire of your Honourable Court, as expressed in paragraph 76 of your letter to the Government of Bengal, No. 70, dated the 20th September, 1848.

FORT WILLIAM, MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, the 11th August, 1849.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

*Calcutta, dated the 24th of July, 1849.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable the President of the Council of India, and such orders as may be necessary, copy of a despatch from the Adjutant-General of the Army, No. 601, dated the 12th instant, and of my reply thereto, No. 124, of this date.

Col. J. Stuart  
to Maj. R. Wylle,  
24th July, 1849.

I have, &c.

Simla,  
the 24th of July, 1849.

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India in the  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

From Lieutenant-Colonel P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated the 12th of July, 1849.*

SIR,—

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to transmit to you, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, copy of a letter, No. 17, of date the 1st instant, from Surgeon J. McCosh, M.D., in medical charge of the 2nd European regiment, forwarding a half-yearly return of the sickness, mortality and invaliding in that corps, and reporting that scurvy to a great extent is still very prevalent among the men, and suggesting that certain measures be adopted for providing them with an increased vegetable diet, a proposal of which his Excellency highly approves, and recommends for the earnest consideration and orders of his Lordship.

The Adjutant-  
General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
12th July, 1849.

In the concluding paragraph of his communication under advertence, Surgeon McCosh states that, in his opinion, vegetables of all descriptions may be grown in the vicinity of Lahore, either by the construction of regimental gardens for the purpose, or by entering into contracts for the supply of the vegetables considered requisite; and I am to request you will have the goodness to state, that Sir Charles Napier is of opinion, that one or other of the surgeon's suggestions should be adopted, and acted upon without loss of time.

I have the honour to be, &c. •

Head-Quarters, Simla,  
the 12th of July, 1849.

(Signed) P. GRANT, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

From Surgeon J. McCOSH, M.D., in Medical Charge of 2nd European Regiment, to Lieut.-Col. P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

*Dated the 1st of July, 1849.*

SIR,—

In forwarding the accompanying report for the past half-year, some explanation of the unusual sickness and mortality of the regiment may not be out of place. Many causes combined to produce this effect, some remote, others recent. The regiment left the hills at Subathoo in September last, a season of the year most unfavourable for the descent of Europeans to the plains, and till the 8th of May remained under canvas, and shared in the fortunes of the late campaign.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Adjutant-  
General,  
1st July, 1849.

At the battles of Chillianwalla and Goojerat its loss in killed and wounded was very heavy, and the closing pursuit of the flying Sikhs and Afghans to Peshawur exposed the men to great hardship and privation, and brought on diseases that were greatly

EXTRACTS, &c. aggravated by the long march, many of which ended fatally after its return to cantonments.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Adjutant-  
General,  
1st July, 1849.

On arriving at Lahore on the 8th May, the hot season had set in; the usual comfort and accommodation in barracks were not available; the whole regiment was, up to the 30th May, crowded into the quarters now occupied by only seven companies; cots and punkahs were not generally supplied till late in June. The men were obliged to lie upon the hard punkah floors, and without their natural rest, during the intense heat and dust of June, with the thermometer seldom under blood heat, and frequently above 100°. Violent fever prevailed; the hospital accommodation was by a third part too limited; the sick were packed together like bales of goods, to a most injurious extent, and six cases of apoplexy occurred, and ended fatally.

Much scurvy existed, and when dropsy, or diarrhœa, or dysentery set in upon a constitution enfeebled by it, the issue was in many cases fatal.

I was, from want of room, obliged to treat many men as out-door patients, and the women and children in their barracks,—both modes unsatisfactory. On the 22nd June, this pressure was relieved; a new hospital was made over to the regiment, equal to its wants, and I hope likely to conduce greatly to its health and comfort.

At Peshawur, in the month of March last, shortly after taking medical charge of the regiment, I made a special report of the prevalence of scurvy, and lately another to the same effect; my object in either case being to have a certain extra allowance of fruit or vegetable diet, served out to the men as a daily portion of their rations. But difficulties, partly, I believe, financial, partly owing to the scarcity of the principal article, the potato, prevented my wishes being complied with.

I regret to state that scurvy, in all its numerous varieties, still exists to a large extent, and what is remarkable, as much among the raw recruits lately from England as among the seasoned soldiers; many of the most serious cases now in hospital, as well as of the late fatal cases, were more or less connected with it; and, as I have already remarked, when diarrhœa or dysentery supervenes upon a constitution debilitated by scurvy, it is a very difficult matter to save the patient.

My opinion is, that scurvy has for years past been undermining the health of the regiment, in Scinde, at Subathoo, and in the Punjab: that there is a predisposition to it at Lahore; that a deficiency of fresh vegetable diet, as much as climate or locality, constitutes that predisposition; and till some means are adopted to supply vegetables cheap and in abundance, to the sound men in barracks, as well as to the sick in hospital, I believe scurvy will continue to cripple the regiment, impair its efficiency, and add largely to its mortality.

Though no disease is more difficult to treat than scurvy in its advanced stage, fortunately no disease is more easily arrested in its incipient stage; and the best antidote I could suggest for counteracting it, would be half a pound of potatoes a day being served out to each man in barracks, in lieu of his usual quarter of a pound of rice. But potatoes are not at present procurable in the requisite quantity, and though the supply of melons and cucumbers in the bazar is considerable, yet it is too limited for general consumption, and too expensive for the limited means of the soldier. The season has now gone by for making due arrangements for the desirable increase of vegetable diet; but I feel assured, if the proper precautions were taken at the time of sowing, either by contract or by regimental gardens, the best vegetables of all descriptions, potatoes included, might be grown in the vicinity of Lahore.

Lahore,  
1st July, 1849.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. McCOSH, M.D., Surgeon in medical  
charge of 2nd European Regiment.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Half-Yearly Return, showing the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding in the Hon. Company's 2nd European Regiment on the Bengal Establishment, for the Months of January, February, March, April, May, and June, 1849.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Adjutant-  
General.  
1st July, 1849.

Lahore, 1st July, 1849.

Months.	Description of troops.	Number of admissions into hospital during the month.	Deaths from ordinary causes during the month.	Deaths from cholera during the month.	Number invalided during the month.	Remarks.
January, 1849	European	79	9	—	—	6 killed in action at Chillianwallah, 2 afterwards died of their wounds.
February, "	Ditto	126	13	—	—	5 killed in action at Goojerat, 2 blown up by gunpowder at ditto, 6 died of wounds in field hospital.
March, "	Ditto	81	2	—	—	
April, "	Ditto	48	—	—	—	
May, "	Ditto	277	9	—	—	
June, "	Ditto	249	16	1	—	6 died of apoplexy.

(Signed) J. McCOSH, M.D.,  
Surgeon Hon. Company's 2nd European Regiment.  
H. MACKENZIE, Captain,  
Commanding 2nd European Regiment.

From Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

Dated 24th July, 1849.

SIR,—

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 601, of the 12th instant, reporting that scurvy is still very prevalent in the 2nd European regiment, and suggesting that certain measures be adopted for providing the men with an increased vegetable diet.

Col. J. Stuart  
to Adjutant-  
General.  
24th July, 1849.

2. In reply, I am instructed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Most Noble the Governor-General quite concurs in the suggestion for the preparation of vegetable gardens for European troops. These, however, will not meet the present case of the 2nd European regiment.

3. His Lordship therefore authorizes the general officer commanding the Punjab division to obtain by contract, vegetables, if procurable, and issue a sufficient quantity to the men of that corps, in lieu, as suggested, of their allowance of rice.

4. I am desired to refer his Excellency to the extract of a letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors, No. 70, dated 20th September, 1848, paragraph 76, a copy of which is annexed, regarding ground being set apart as gardens for the European troops at other stations besides Lahore, and the reply of the Quartermaster-General of the Army to the Officiating Secretary, Military Department, Calcutta, intimating that the wishes of the Honourable Court would be duly attended to, on the breaking up of the army of the Punjab and the return of the European troops to their respective quarters.

I have, &c.

Simla,  
24th July, 1849.

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel, Secretary to the Government  
of India in the Military Department, with  
the Governor-General.



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 19th March, 1850 (No. 31).*

Reply to Letter dated 24th September, 1849 (No. 182, paras. 85 to 88).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
19th March, 1850.

30. The measures taken to give to the soldiers of this regiment the benefit of an antiscorbutic diet were very proper. As the tendency to scorbutic disease is referred to a period when the regiment was at Subathoo, it would appear to be necessary that measures should be taken at that and other hill stations to supply the European soldiery with vegetables as a part of their daily diet.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 27th November, 1849 (No. 220).*Government of  
Bengal to Court  
of Directors,  
27th Nov. 1849.Consultations,  
26th Oct. 1849.

Para. 84. In continuation of paragraphs 85 to 88 of our general letter, No. 182, dated 24th September, 1849, we have the honour to transmit the papers recorded as per margin, comprising the proceedings of a Special Medical Committee, convened for the purpose of instituting minute inquiries into the causes of the sickness and debility prevailing among the men of the 2nd Bengal European regiment at Lahore.

85. The Most Noble the Governor-General concurs in opinion with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the propriety of the measures recommended by this committee, which are daily being acted upon.

## FORT WILLIAM, MILITARY CONSULTATIONS

26th October, 1849.

From Lieut.-Colonel P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

*Dated 13th September, 1849.*

SIR,—

Adjutant-General  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
13th Sept. 1849.

I am directed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to transmit, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General, copy of a letter from Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, G.C.B., commanding the Punjab division, No. 1,004, dated the 29th ultimo, and of the proceedings of the Special Medical Committee and other documents which accompanied it, as specified in the annexed list, and in soliciting the earnest attention of his Lordship to the able report of this committee, on the causes of the present sickness in the 2nd European regiment, to request that you will bring to the special notice of the Marquis of Dalhousie the remarks of the committee, as contained in the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 10th, 12th, 13th, and 14th paragraphs of their report, which completely corroborate the opinions of the Commander-in-Chief, as expressed in a private letter, which his Excellency took occasion to address to the Most Noble the Governor-General on the 16th ultimo.

I have, &amp;c.

Head-Quarters, Simla,  
the 13th Sept. 1849.

(Signed)

P. GRANT, Lieut.-Col.  
Adjt.-Gen. of the Army.

## LIST.

Proceedings of committee, dated 16th August, 1849.

Letter from Surgeon J. McCosh, M.D., 2nd European regiment, dated 22nd July, and four accompanying statements.

Letter from Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab division, to Colonel N. Penny, C.B., commanding at Lahore, No. 679, 1st August.

. No. 1,004.

From Major-General Sir W. R. GILBERT, G.C.B., commanding the Punjab Division,  
to Lieut.-Colonel P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

Dated the 29th of August, 1849.

SIR,—

The state of health of the 2nd Bengal European regiment having come under my notice in June last, and finding that it had not improved up to the 19th ultimo, I directed a Special Medical Committee to be convened at Lahore, for the purpose of reporting upon the nature, duration, and origin of the sickness in this regiment, and now have the honour to forward the committee's report for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Major-Gen.  
Sir W. R. Gilbert  
to Adjutant-  
General,  
29th Aug. 1849.

The preliminary report mentioned in the 2nd paragraph of the present enclosure merely recommending the removal of the sick to any near locality for change of air was not acted upon, as no suitable accommodation could be obtained.

The accommodation at Anarkullie, both as regards barracks and barrack furniture, had been calculated for one European regiment only, and when a second regiment had to be located there, time was required not only for the conversion of some of the quarters formerly used by sepoys into barracks for European troops, but hospital furniture, cots, &c. had to be made. I mention this, as the want of cots is noticed in the 7th paragraph of the report.

I haae, &c.

(Signed)

W. R. GILBERT, M.G.  
Comg. the Punjab Div.

Lahore,  
the 29th Aug. 1849.

PROCEEDINGS of a SPECIAL MEDICAL COMMITTEE convened by Division Orders of the 19th July, for the purpose of instituting minute Inquiries into the Health of 2nd Bengal European Regiment.

Proceedings of  
Special Medical  
Committee,  
16th Aug. 1849.

*President*—S. Holmes, surgeon, 19th regiment native infantry.

*Members*—P. F. H. Baddeley, surgeon, foot artillery division; Archibald Stewart, surgeon, 14th light dragoons.

Anarkullie, 16th August, 1849.

1. In obedience to brigade orders of the 21st ultimo, the Committee assembled in front of the barracks of the Hon. Company's 2nd European regiment, on Monday, the 23rd of same, soon after gun-fire, when the regiment was paraded for inspection.

The object of the inquiry being to ascertain, as nearly as possible, the nature, duration, and origin, of the present sickness of the corps, and to offer such observations or suggestions as might be deemed calculated to improve the general health of the regiment.

2. The Committee did not feel prepared to submit a final report based on the inspection of the men alone, unsupported by the other more searching inquiries; but believing that immediate measures were requisite to restore those seriously ill, and to prevent the further advance of sickness, the Committee considered it a duty to submit a preliminary communication, recommending the removal of those then on the sick list to another near locality for change of air, provided suitable accommodation could be obtained; but having now completed its inquiries, the Committee has the honour to make the following remarks :—

3. On inspection of the regiment on the 23rd ultimo, the Committee were unanimous in the opinion that the men had a generally unhealthy appearance. Many of them, instead of exhibiting the stout, compact look of the hardy soldier, wore the appearance of dissipated, broken-down constitutions, and were more or less suffering from a generally debilitated system, and that amongst the recruits recently joined, there existed a greater number of undersized, ill-made, and sickly-looking men, than are usually to be met with in an equal number of recruits of other regiments.

4. The Committee then proceeded to examine the men in hospital, and found there 137 patients, being one-sixth of the whole regiment, and amongst these, a large proportion, nearly half the cases, consisting of ophthalmia, and the greater number of the rest of bowel complaints, and diseases of general debility, with, in some instances, strong symptoms of scurvy.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Proceedings of  
Special Medical  
Committee,  
16th Aug. 1849.

5. Before, however, alluding to these diseases, the Committee would briefly notice the state of the regiment for some years past, by referring to the severe, malignant, remittent fever that attacked it soon after its arrival at Sukkur in 1845, which may be considered the commencement of serious ill health in the corps, the effects of which were likely to prove more or less lasting.

6. When the corps was at Subathoo, in 1846-47-48, it was naturally supposed that in a climate so favourable to the European constitution, the men would soon shake off the effects of previous disease, and become robust and vigorous, but the contrary was the case; and the Committee, from its own knowledge and inquiries made on the subject, is satisfied, that the increased unhealthiness of the men during those years may, with safety, be ascribed to the over-crowded state of their barracks, and to the total want of ventilation, together with the absence of drainage and sewerage in and about the station, the whole of the filth, both from the troops and the adjoining bazars, being thrown out, and left to putrefy in the open air, so that on some occasions the stench pervading the atmosphere around was intolerable, and doubtless exerted a most baneful effect on all those exposed to its influence, and was, in all likelihood, one of the principal existing causes of the bowel complaints which were at times so prevalent.

7. Shortly after the arrival of the corps at this station, in the early part of May last, ophthalmia made its appearance, attacking alike the recruit and seasoned soldier.

The Committee is of opinion that this, as well as much of the other sickness, was occasioned by the excessive crowding of the men into barracks, only partially ventilated, during the greater part of the oppressive month of May, and by the want of punkahs and cots, which were not generally furnished till near the latter end of June; and until cots were supplied, men were obliged to sleep on the floor, and consequently compelled to breathe a very impure atmosphere.

8. In addition to this, the great distance of the privies from the barracks, and consequent exposure of the men to the direct rays of the sun in passing to and fro, may be supposed to have operated most injuriously to their health, as evidenced by the prevalence of severe fever with which they were afflicted, and the numerous fatal cases of apoplexy during the month of June.

9. It should also be remembered, that these men had just come off a fatiguing campaign, ended by the rapid advance of the force under Major-General Sir Walter R. Gilbert, K.C.B., in pursuit of the flying Sikhs and Afghans, and which, when followed by the several disadvantages above described (paragraphs 7 and 8), and acting upon a body of men whose health had been previously much impaired, may, it is believed, fully account not only for the large amount of sickness, but for the general prostration of strength and distressing appearance observable in so many of them, and which would doubtless have been increased to a greater extent, had the men been so crowded much longer.

10. The recovery of the sick was very greatly retarded, in consequence of excessive crowding into an ill-ventilated hospital, during the greater part of May and June, and there is great reason to fear, that not only was the sickness aggravated by this want of accommodation, but that very many of the fatal cases that occurred during these months must be ascribed to this cause.

11. It does not seem fair to blame the climate, or to attach an unnecessary degree of importance to any particular description of diet as the cause of the disease in the present instance. It is not a question of food or climate alone, but especially related to the aggregation of men; for no climate, however salubrious, would avail in obviating sickness when the human body is subject to the daily and hourly inhalation of an impure atmosphere, such as many of these men have been exposed to during the hottest part of the year; while on the contrary, in general cases, ordinary food, adequate shelter from the sun, cleanliness, and plenty of fresh air, will be found efficient means for the preservation of the health of troops in India.

12. Within the last few days, the admissions into hospital have been sensibly diminished, and it is observed that most of the cases of ophthalmia are assuming a more favourable appearance; the Committee is therefore of opinion that the necessity for the removal of the men, urged in their communication of the 31st ultimo, does not now appear so requisite. But with a view to assist improvements, and for the continued preservation of the health of the men, the Committee would recommend that a due proportion of vegetables be allowed as part of the daily rations, and although the potato may be the best, it is perhaps immaterial what vegetables be used, whether potatoes, carrots, turnips, or greens; and should the first not be procurable, some one of the other descriptions seem to be abundant at most seasons of the year.

The committee also conceive that it would tend greatly to the health and efficiency of the European soldier in general, were a portion of fresh vegetable food to form an item of his daily ration.

13. It has been before mentioned, that the predisposing cause of the unhealthy state of the regiment generally, is attributable to the effects of an over-crowded, unventilated state of their barracks while quartered at Subathoo in 1846-47-48.

This evil was still further increased by the absence of all drainage in and about the station. The absence of fresh and pure air may therefore be stated as the principal cause of the prevailing unhealthiness of the regiment; other causes, doubtless, concurred to aggravate the evil, but they are all of minor importance, when compared with the one above mentioned, and too much attention cannot be drawn to the necessity of securing an abundant supply of fresh air, and to the adequate ventilation of barracks, to which the committee would recommend that surface privies now in use should be abolished, and cesspools constructed for the reception of filth.

That privies should communicate with the barracks by means of a covered way, under shelter of which urinating cesspools should be placed.

That increased facilities should be afforded for promoting personal cleanliness among the men, as at present no adequate facility can be said to exist; and indeed this subject has not received that *practical* attention which its great importance in respect of the health of the European soldier in this climate so evidently demands. That stringent penalties should be attached to the sale of spirituous liquors to any of the soldiers, and that the rum ration (if it must be given) be dealt out in the afternoon instead of the morning.

14. It is astonishing to observe, how commonly a total disregard of first principles leads to the selection or construction of buildings altogether unfitted for the accommodation of large bodies of troops, the object being, in too many cases, to cram the largest possible number of persons into the smallest possible space, as if entirely ignorant of the consequences arising from the privation of the vital stimulus, in the shape of pure breathing air. The blood, the vital fluid by which the body is nourished, is dependent for its purity almost entirely on the action of atmospheric air. When this is impeded, the whole system suffers, just in proportion to the extent to which the evil is allowed to operate. This may be elucidated by attention to the process of the oration of the blood, as follows:—

The dark-blue venous blood arriving at the lungs, charged with carbonic acid, is there spread out over the numerous cells to the influence of the recently respired air. Simultaneously the blood parts with the poisonous carbonic acid, and absorbs in its place the vivifying oxygen, assuming at the same time the bright scarlet hue characteristic of the arterial fluid. This process is in constant operation, and only ceases with life; and circumstances which check the excretion of carbonic acid by the lungs will have an immediately injurious effect upon the system at large. Whenever the air becomes charged with carbonic acid, this check takes place. The air of crowded, unventilated barracks contains a large amount of this pernicious gas, as may be readily understood by the foregoing remarks on the change the blood undergoes while passing through the lungs; but in order to render the description clearer, it may be further explained, that an adult consumes, or renders irrespirable, about a cubic foot of atmospheric air in a minute.

This expired air no longer contains the life-giving oxygen; but, on the contrary, the noxious carbonic acid has taken its place; and in crowded, ill-ventilated rooms, the accumulation of this pernicious gas, together with the various exhalations from the skin, &c., &c., takes place to a fearful extent, and frequently lays the foundation of serious diseases. In fact, it may be laid down as an axiom, that whenever men are unduly crowded, in whatever climate, disease must sooner or later arise.

15. We are thus brought to acknowledge the high importance of ventilation, and the necessity for an ample supply of fresh air, in order to the preservation of health, and also the impossibility of obtaining the required advantages without possessing properly constructed buildings.

16. The hospital records for the last three years exhibit a somewhat large amount of sickness in the 2nd European regiment, and an unusually large proportion of cases of bowel complaints, generally averaging during the summer and autumn months one-sixth of the whole treated; and during the last two months of their stay at Subathoo in 1848, when the admissions into hospital were increased to an unusually large amount, the bowel complaints averaged as high as one-half of the whole.

But even this kind of testimony does not show correctly the real state of the corps, for many men labour under general debility without applying for medical aid, but if

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Proceedings of  
Special Medical  
Committee,  
16th Aug. 1849.

required for active service, would be found quite incapable of undergoing it; so that in fact, the only true test for the efficiency of a corps is actual experiment.

The monthly returns of sick in the 2nd European regiment, for the months of August, September, and October, 1848, exhibit a convincing proof of the truth of the foregoing remark, as well as the powerful influence of fatigue and exposure as exciting causes of disease.

In August, 1848, not a single case of scurvy was entered in the monthly return; but during the following month, when the corps descended to the plains, eleven cases occurred; and in October, these amounted to no less than eighty-three, which strengthens the idea that the above complaint (which, it is well known, may be engendered by crowded, ill-ventilated, incommodious barracks, in a locality defective in sewerage) was latent in the constitutions of many of the men, but was developed by the fatigue and exposure consequent on marching.

17. In concluding, the committee beg to quote a passage from a leading article in a late number of the *Medical Times*, on the subject of sanitary measures, as it confirms what has been already advanced regarding the value to be attached to ventilation.

“All sanitary measures, to be effective, must be based on ventilation, which, by striking at the root, will remedy all.

“Ventilation, by supplying the vital stimulus, the very *pabulum vitæ*, not only fortifies the system against the poisonous effects of the various deleterious compounds of the atmosphere, by enabling it to bear up against them, but also to resist, to a great extent, atmospheric vicissitudes, the grand excitant of all maladies, whether of an endemic or epidemic nature.”

The committee would, therefore, solicit the serious attention of Government to the measures recommended in this report.

(Signed) S. HOLMES, Surgeon, President.  
P. F. H. BADDELEY, Surgeon and Member.  
ARCH. STEWART, Surgeon, 14th Light Dragoons,  
Member.

From Surgeon J. McCOSH, M.D., of the 2nd European regiment, to Surgeon S. HOLMES, President of Special Medical Committee.

*Dated the 22nd of July, 1849.*

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Surgeon  
S. Holmes,  
22nd July, 1849.

SIR,—

In compliance with brigade orders of yesterday's date, I have the honour to present you with the following statement, relative to the health of the Honourable Company's 2nd European regiment.

The accompanying roll, No. I, will show that ever since the corps was raised, it has been constantly on the move, with very few intervals of rest, and exposed to great vicissitudes of climate and season. No. II. will show the diseases now prevalent in the regiment. No. III. is an abstract of the monthly return of the sick for the two last hot seasons at Subathoo. I have annexed it, as I believe an unfavourable impression exists respecting Subathoo, as a station for European troops; whereas this abstract exhibits a degree of health, rarely, if ever, equalled in the plains, and yet the regiment went there broken and sickly after a residence in Scinde.

The regiment left Subathoo in the month of September last, a season most unfavourable for the descent of European troops to the plains, and till the 8th May remained under canvass, and shared in the fortunes of the late campaign. At the battles of Chillianwalla and Goojerat its loss in killed and wounded was very heavy; and the closing pursuit of the flying Sikhs and Afghans to Peshawur exposed the men to great hardship and privation, and brought on diseases that were greatly aggravated by the long march, and the necessity of carrying the sick along with the corps from Jhelum to Peshawur, and thence to Lahore. On arriving at Lahore on the 8th May, the hot season had set in; the usual comfort and accommodation, either in barracks or in hospital, was not available; the whole regiment was, up to the 30th May, crowded into quarters now thought necessary for only seven companies. Beds and punkahs were not generally furnished till late in June, and the men were obliged to sleep on the hard brick floors,

without their natural rest during the intense heat and dust of June, with the thermometer seldom under blood-heat, and frequently above 100°. Remittent fever prevailed to a large extent, requiring the most vigorous treatment to subdue it. The hospital was by a third part too limited; the sick were packed together like bales of goods to a most injurious extent, and six cases ended fatally in apoplexy, that under other circumstances might have recovered.

Much scurvy existed, both amongst the raw recruits as among the seasoned soldiers; and when dropsy, or diarrhœa, or dysentery supervened, the issue was in many cases fatal.

On the 22nd June, the pressure in hospital was relieved; a new hospital, additional, was made over to the regiment, hitherto not nearly equal to its wants, and followed by a very marked improvement in the condition of the sick and the decrease of mortality.

The "present state" exhibits the diseases now prevalent in the regiment generally, as also in the respective companies, viz., ophthalmia, diarrhœa, dysentery, fever, and scurvy.

The glare, and dust, and flies at Lahore may be partly the cause of this ophthalmia, and the system of whitewashing the punkahs without the necessary quantity of size to keep the lime adherent and prevent it from falling down into the men's eyes, may be another cause. Still these theories are inadequate; as I find the Grenadier Company without a case, while other companies under similar circumstances have many; I do not find any disposition to spread in hospital, though the patients are in the same wards as the other patients. 150 cases have been treated since 1st March. Diarrhœa, dysentery, and fever may be expected to be frequent anywhere at this season.

The cases of scurvy at present borne upon the rolls are not so numerous as they really are; for when diarrhœa, dysentery, or dropsy has become the most urgent symptom, the case is re-entered under that head. Most of the most serious cases of these diseases now in hospital had their origin in scurvy. Besides, the system I adopt at the weekly inspections, of sending men to hospital in the earliest stages, has been attended with the best effects, and reduced the number. I find that 140 cases of scurvy have been treated since 1st March last. I found it in all its numerous varieties, viz., pallid countenance, emaciation, general debility, relaxation or sloughing of gums, looseness or dropping out of teeth, bleeding from nose, mouth, lungs, or stomach, petecchiæ, from size of a mustard-seed to purple patches as large as the hand, with infiltration of cellular substance, stiffening of joints, rheumatic pains of limbs, exortoris or distortion of legs, anasarca of lower extremities, ending fatally in general, dropsy, internal hæmorrhage, diarrhœa, or dysentery.

The hospital treatment has generally consisted of two or three ounces of the following mixture, two or three times a day:—Lime juice, one quart; madeira, one ditto; sugar, one pound; nitrate potass, one dram; water, four quarts. In the early stages I have found the above a certain cure; but when the constitution is much broken and diarrhœa has set in, I find it very difficult to save the patient by any treatment whatever.

On a careful examination, I am of opinion that scurvy has for years past in Scinde, at Subathoo, and in the Punjab, been slowly sapping the constitution of the corps; till it is now completely undermined; and till some prophylactic means are adopted, I fear it will continue to impair its efficiency, and add largely to its mortality.

At Peshawur, on the 22nd March last, I made a report on the prevalence of scurvy in the regiment, and again on the 8th June; my object in either case being to get a certain quantity of fruit or vegetable diet served out to both sick and well, as a daily portion of rations; but difficulties, partly financial, partly owing to the scarcity of the most essential article, the potato, prevented my wishes being carried into effect.

My opinion is, that deficiency of vegetable diet is the principal cause of scurvy; and although I believe a predisposition to the disease exists at Lahore, that this deficiency, as much as climate or locality, constitutes the predisposing cause.

The supply of vegetables at present in the Lahore bazars is much too limited for general consumption, and in the quantity desirable; their price is much above the means of the soldier to purchase them; the season has gone by for sowing or planting more, and my utmost expectation can be to keep the disease in check, by careful selection of cases on their first appearance, trusting to future plans for exterminating it.

I believe it will be allowed that no article excels the potato in anti-scorbutic qualities; and I feel assured that if the usual  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb. of rice were withdrawn from the daily rations, and a pound, or even half a pound, of potatoes substituted in its stead, it would conduce more to the better health of the corps than any other means available. I therefore beg to recommend, whatever may be the destination of the regiment next

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Surgeon  
S. Holmes,  
22nd July, 1849.

EXTRACTS, &c. hot season, in the hills or in the plains, that effective arrangements be at the proper season prospectively made, either by regimental vegetable gardens, or by commissariat contract, to insure an adequate supply of fresh vegetables, especially potatoes.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Surgeon  
S. Holmes,  
22nd July, 1849.

TABLE I.

Marching History of the Honourable Company's 2nd Bengal European Regiment, from its formation on the 8th of October, 1839, to the present date.

*Lahore, 21st July, 1849.*

Marched from	Date.	Arrived at	Date.
Calcutta (first draught of recruits)	18th December, 1839	Hazareebaugh	16th January, 1840.
Hazareebaugh	4th November, 1840	Ghazeeapore	24th November, 1840.
Ghazeeapore	3rd March, 1842	Cawnpore	26th March, 1842.
Cawnpore	1st October, 1842	Ferozepore	21st November, 1842.
Ferozepore	6th January, 1843	Meerut	24th February, 1843.
Meerut	30th October, 1843	Umbala	10th November, 1843.
Umbala	3rd April, 1844	Meerut and Loodianah	9th April, 1844.
Meerut (left wing)	16th October, 1844	Loodianah	6th November, 1844.
Loodianah	15th November, 1844	Sukkur (after campaign).	26th March, 1845.
Sukkur	26th August and 2nd September, 1845	Karachee	13th September, 1845.
Karachee	25th November, 1845	Sukkur	24th and 30th Dec. 1845.
Sukkur	22nd January, 1846	Subathoo	20th April, 1846.
Subathoo	24th October, 1846	Jullunder	6th November, 1846.
Jullunder	23rd December, 1846	Lahore.	1st January, 1847.
Lahore	4th January, 1847	Jullunder	12th January, 1847.
Jullunder	26th February, 1847	Subathoo	12th March, 1847.
Subathoo	24th September, 1848	Peshawur	21st March, 1849.
Peshawur	4th April, 1849	Lahore.	8th May, 1849.

(Signed) G. R. TALBOT, Major,  
Commanding 2nd European Regiment.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Surgeon  
S. Holmes,  
22nd July, 1849.

TABLE II.

Honourable Company's 2nd Bengal European Regiment.  
Present State of Sick in Hospital.

Lahore, 22nd July, 1849.

Diseases.	Companies.										Remarks.	
	Grenadier.	No. 1.	No. 2.	No. 3.	No. 4.	No. 5.	No. 6.	No. 7.	Light.	Rifle.		Total.
Ascitis . . .	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
Colica . . .	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	
Diarrhœa . . .	1	—	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	2	14	
Dysenteria . . .	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	1	1	7	
Debilitas . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	
Epilepsia . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	
Febris intermittens	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	2	
„ continued . . .	1	—	—	1	1	2	1	2	5	2	15	
Gonorrhœa . . .	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	
Hemorrhois . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	
Hernia humoralis . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	
Ophthalmia . . .	—	7	4	5	10	2	14	7	9	5	63	
Phlegmon . . .	—	1	—	—	2	1	1	—	—	—	5	
Rheumatism . . .	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	1	—	—	4	
Scorbutus . . .	3	—	1	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	7	
Syphilis primitiva . . .	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	1	5	
„ consecutiva . . .	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
Ulcus . . .	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	
Vulnus incisum . . .	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
„ sclopitorum . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	
Delirium tremens . . .	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	
Grand total . . .	10	10	7	11	18	7	22	20	19	13	137	

Daily average sick for July . . . . . 135  
Strength, fighting men . . . . . 823

(Signed) J. McCOSH, M D.,  
Surgeon Hon. Company's 2nd European Regiment.



## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Surgeon J. McCosh  
to Surgeon  
S. Holmes,  
22nd July, 1849.

TABLE III.

ABSTRACT of MONTHLY REPORTS of SICK of 2nd European Regiment, stationed at Subathoo in 1847-48.

Years.	Months.	Strength.	Remained.	Admitted.	Total.	Discharged.	Died.	Remaining.	Scurvy.	Diarrhoea and Dysentery.	Daily Average Sick.	Daily Rates of Sick per Cent.
1847	January .	634	50	72	122	83	—	39	—	—	45	6
	February .	633	39	38	77	42	1	34	—	—	38	5
	March .	725	34	64	98	60	3	35	—	—	37	5
	April .	726	35	71	106	70	2	34	—	—	42	5
	May .	723	37	74	111	58	2	51	—	—	44	6
	June .	717	51	119	170	97	6	67	—	—	66	9
	July .	719	67	123	190	116	3	71	—	25	67	9
	August .	713	71	96	167	114	4	49	—	21	54	7
	September .	710	49	111	160	93	3	64	—	21	55	7
	October .	680	64	72	136	91	3	36	—	14	43	6
	November .	678	36	64	100	70	—	30	—	8	35	5
	December .	675	30	59	89	60	1	23	1	12	30	4
1848	January .	673	28	53	81	47	—	34	—	7	33	4
	February .	674	34	36	70	47	—	23	—	1	30	4
	March .	720	23	69	92	52	1	39	—	6	29	4
	April .	787	39	184	173	105	4	64	2	24	47	6
	May .	786	64	135	199	158	2	39	1	17	53	6
	June .	784	39	131	170	121	1	48	—	28	48	6
	July .	782	48	171	219	162	4	53	1	85	57	7
	August .	778	53	129	182	132	3	47	—	21	51	6
	September .	.	.	.	Marched to the Plains.							

(Signed) J. McCOSH, M.D.,  
Surgeon 2nd European Regiment.

TABLE IV.

ABSTRACT of MONTHLY REPORTS of SICK of the 2nd European Regiment from 26th March, 1845, to 1st January, 1847, and from 24th September, 1848, to 1st May, 1849.

Year.	Month.	Strength.	Remained.	Admitted.	Total.	Discharged.	Transferred.	Died.	Remaining.	Scurvy.	Diarrhoea and Dysentery.	Daily Average Sick.	Daily Rates of Sick per Cent.	Remarks.	
1845	March	879	36	40	76	15	—	—	61	5	—	75	7	Sukkur (26th to 31st).	
	April	879	61	145	206	107	—	4	95	25	2	75	8	Ditto.	
	May	884	95	168	263	159	—	3	101	23	2	105	11	Ditto.	
	June	866	101	168	269	172	—	17	80	28	5	90	10	Ditto.	
	July	851	80	173	253	152	—	12	89	32	9	84	9	Ditto.	
	August	731	89	91	180	135	15	2	28	20	4	61	8	Ditto.	
	September	732	28	164	192	148	—	—	44	30	1	54	7	Karachee.	
	October	732	44	91	135	96	—	—	39	26	—	40	5	Ditto.	
	November	369	39	59	98	54	16	—	28	12	—	21	4	Ditto.	
	December	808	28	82	110	54	—	9	47	11	—	25	6	Sukkur.	
	1846	January	787	47	71	118	60	48	1	9	15	—	40	5	} Roree, and on march towards Subathoo.
		February	684	9	77	86	43	—	2	34	12	—	28	6	
March		733	34	81	115	69	—	—	46	11	1	35	4	} Subathoo, from April 20.	
April		732	46	96	142	89	—	—	53	13	—	47	6		
May		731	53	105	158	94	—	—	64	6	—	56	7	Subathoo.	
June		799	64	148	212	129	—	—	83	45	—	67	8	Ditto.	
July		793	83	160	243	159	—	5	79	63	—	79	10	Ditto.	
August		792	79	122	201	144	—	—	57	28	—	64	8	Ditto.	
September		785	57	117	174	105	—	7	62	17	1	62	7	Ditto.	
October		722	62	108	170	97	50	3	20	26	—	49	6	Left Subathoo on 24th.	
November		658	20	78	98	75	—	—	23	15	—	22	3	Camp, Jullunder.	
December		655	23	90	113	61	—	2	50	15	—	29	4	On march.	
1848	September	758	—	48	48	7	—	—	41	11	—	19	3	} Left 24th to 30th, Subathoo, on the 24th September, 1848, for the Sutlej campaign.	
	October	692	41	136	177	126	—	2	36	83	—	39	5		
	November	678	36	67	103	64	—	2	37	41	—	39	5		
	December	646	37	79	116	42	33	4	37	43	1	27	4		
1849	January	642	37	73	110	56	—	3	51	23	—	47	7	} Left 24th to 30th, Subathoo, on the 24th September, 1848, for the Sutlej campaign.	
	February	594	51	120	171	32	111	7	21	27	—	30	5		
	March	538	21	81	102	61	—	2	39	26	2	36	6		
	April	554	39	48	87	32	—	—	55	15	5	46	8		

(Signed) J. M'CosH, M.D. Surgeon,  
Hon. Company's 2nd European Regiment.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

No. 679.

From Captain F. W. BURROUGHS, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Division, to Colonel N. PENNY, C.B., Commanding at Lahore.

*Dated 1st August, 1849.*

SIR,—

From Captain  
F. W. Burroughs to  
Col. N. Penny,  
1st August, 1849.

In acknowledging the receipt of the letter of yesterday's date from the Special Medical Committee, convened to inquire into the state of health of the 2nd Bengal European regiment, I am directed by Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, G.C.B., to observe in regard to the removal of 150 men (cases of ophthalmia, &c.) without delay, and to the remark, "It is understood that there are buildings capable of accommodating this number of troops, eligible places may be found on the road to the Shalimar Gardens;" that it must first be ascertained that such accommodation does exist, and that it is adapted for the reception of Europeans, as at this season, it is by no means desirable to act on vague information. The Major-General, therefore, recommends that whatever place may be selected, it should be examined and reported upon by a competent committee before the troops are moved to it.

Lahore,  
the 1st August, 1849.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. W. BURROUGHS, Captain,  
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General,  
Punjab Division.

No. 19.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel P. GRANT, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

*Dated the 6th October, 1849.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

From Col. J. Stuart,  
to  
Adjutant-General,  
6th Oct. 1849.

Having submitted your despatch, No. 835, of the 13th ult., submitting the report of the Medical Committee assembled to inquire into the causes of the present sickness in the 2nd European regiment, to the Most Noble the Governor-General, I am directed to acquaint you in reply, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that his Lordship concurs generally in all the recommendations which are daily being acted upon.

2. With reference to the concluding part of the third paragraph of the Committee's report, I am instructed to request that you will move his Excellency to call for some explanation of the cause of there being so many "undersized, ill-made, and sickly-looking recruits," recently posted to the 2nd European regiment, that the matter may be brought to the notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel, Secretary to the Government  
of India, Military Department, with the  
Governor-General.

Simla,  
the 6th October, 1849.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 22nd May, 1850 (No. 57).*

Reply to Letter dated 27th November, 1849 (No. 220), Paras. 84 to 86.

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
22nd May, 1850.

41. The report of this Committee merited your best attention, and we learn with satisfaction that their recommendations were duly being acted upon.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 26th March, 1850 (No. 49).*Consultation, 1st Feb. 1850.  
Nos. 112, 113.

2. The state of health of the men of her Majesty's 29th regiment at Wuzeerabad, though somewhat improved, is shown by the accompanying correspondence to be still very indifferent, and such general bodily weakness and depression of spirits prevail among even those who continue to perform their duty, that it has been found necessary to remove the regiment to Meerut, where it is hoped the advantages of an established station and good barracks will have the effect of speedily restoring it to perfect efficiency.

Government of  
Bombay to  
Court of Directors,  
26th March, 1850.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 21st August, 1850 (No. 96).*

Reply to Letter dated 26th March, 1850 (No. 49).

3. We approve of these proceedings.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
21st Aug. 1850.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 27th March, 1851 (No. 46).*

11. The proceedings of a Special Medical Committee, assembled at Lahore, for the purpose of reporting on the state of health of the 1st European Bengal fusiliers, is herewith transmitted.

12. Your Honourable Court will observe with regret, that the sickness and debility which have so long prevailed in this regiment continue undiminished.

13. The Most Noble the Governor-General has directed the most searching inquiry to be instituted into all the circumstances, connected with the origin, progress, and management of this pestilence, and has sanctioned all such additional accommodation in carriage and such comforts for the men, during the march of the corps from Lahore to Meerut, as its unfortunate circumstances seem to require.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
27th March, 1851.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS the 7th of February, 1851.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated the 11th of January, 1851.*

SIR,—

I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable the President of the Council of India, and such orders as may be necessary, copy of a despatch from the Major-General commanding the Punjab division, No. 22, dated 8th instant, and of my letters, Nos. 54 and 55, of this date.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
11th Jan. 1851.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,

Camp, Chicorie,  
11th January, 1851.Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From Major-General W. R. GILBERT, G.C.B., commanding the Punjab Division, to Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated the 8th of January, 1851.*

SIR,—

Major-Gen.  
W. R. Gilbert  
to Captain  
F. D. Atkinson,  
8th Jan. 1851.

In consequence of army head-quarters being at a distance, and it being most desirable that the enclosed proceedings of a special medical committee should be laid before the Most Noble the Governor-General without delay, I request you will accordingly submit them, and solicit his Lordship's orders thereon.

I would beg to draw attention to the observations of Surgeon A. Stewart, of the 14th light dragoons, a member of the committee, and to express my own concurrence therein.

H. M.'s 29th foot was attached to the division of the army of the Punjab under my command, and was to have proceeded with me in the field force, detached on special duty towards Peshawur. But from the sickly state in which it had returned from the hills (Kussowlie), and the privations of the campaign, it was unable to proceed further than Jhelum, and was relieved by another regiment.

The 29th marched back, and was quartered at Wuzeerabad, during the year 1849, where its health did not improve; and in the early part of 1850, this regiment was sent to Meerut, and I have reason to know that it has entirely recovered its health and efficiency since its arrival at that station.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) W. R. GILBERT, Major-General,  
commanding the Punjab Division.

Lahore,  
the 8th of January, 1851.

Proceedings of  
Special Medical  
Committee.

PROCEEDINGS of a SPECIAL MEDICAL COMMITTEE, ordered to assemble by Brigadier J. Tennent, C.B., commanding the Station of Lahore, in Station Order of 30th December, 1850, for the purpose of reporting on the State of Health, &c. of the 1st European Bengal Fusiliers.

*President*—Surgeon C. Mackinnon, M.D., horse artillery.

*Members*—Surgeon A. Stewart, H. M.'s 14th light dragoons; Assistant-Surgeon Wigstrom, H. M.'s 14th light dragoons; Assistant-Surgeon S. R. Tucker, horse artillery; Assistant-Surgeon Nisbett, 18th irregular cavalry.

The Committee having assembled, and perused a letter from the Brigade-Major to the address of the President of the Committee, proceeded to make a searching examination of the regiment, devoting two entire days to this purpose.

The following are the results of this examination:—

The strength of the corps is 732.

Of the men in hospital, in No. 196, affected with enlargement of spleen	32
Disease of liver	2
Dropsy	6
General debility, in many cases with tendency to dropsy	19
Total	59
Recommended by a previous committee to be sent to Landour	12
Total	71
Of the men in the ranks affected with enlargement of spleen	94
Disease of liver	10
General debility	28
Total	132
Grand Total	203

Most of these men, to give them a fair chance of recovery, absolutely require an entire change of climate, involving removal from the plains.

Of the remaining men of the regiment, 125 are sick in hospital, leaving 404 in the ranks, and of these, not above 150 look in health, or fit thoroughly to perform ordinary military duty.

The constitutions of the others are all more or less tainted with malaria; they have suffered from fever, and are liable to recurrences of it on any trifling exposure, unusual exertion, or change of weather.

In such a condition of the regiment, with so many men disabled, or partially disabled, from sickness in its ranks, the question arises, whether the entire change of climate, which we consider necessary for the 203 men we have selected, should not be extended to the whole corps. We are decidedly of opinion that, if practicable, it should. Even at the best station in the plains, the recovery of the corps must be tedious. It will be long ere it recovers its efficiency; and many of the men must die who, in a better climate, would recover.

We do not consider it beyond our province, in this report, to point out what we consider the station best adapted to the recovery of men in such a condition as those of this regiment. Past experience has already shown that hill stations, of low elevation or over-wooded, are not the best situations for the recovery of health lost in the plains. A high elevation, scantily wooded, not domineered over by surrounding hills, and with a free and extensive circulation of air around it, experience has shown to be the best location in a hill climate for the sick or climate-worn European. We have only two stations that answer these requirements—Landour and Dugshaie. The former does not afford the necessary room. The latter is at present occupied; but, if available, it is the station, of all others, which we would have recommended for this regiment.

As regards the best period for the march of the regiment, it is obvious, that a corps in such a condition could not bear exposure to the hot weather, and that to remain here until H.M.'s 96th arrived, would necessitate the prosecution of the march during the advancing hot season.

We therefore recommend that the regiment should march as soon as practicable, and, if possible, before the 25th of this month.

We further recommend that it should be amply supplied with spare carriage, as many men who are now moving about, will knock up on the march, when extra carriage may not be procurable. That, to obviate this as much as possible, the regiment should travel through a well-populated district, not only for the purpose of obtaining extra carriage if requisite, but to obtain supplies at easy stages, as the marches must necessarily be short.

We further recommend that the length of the marches be daily fixed by the officer commanding the regiment, in communication with the medical officer, who should adapt them to the diminished strength and disabled constitutions of the men; and that all drills, or duties of a fatiguing kind, involving exposure, should be discontinued until the regiment recovers its health.

As a minor, but far from unimportant consideration, we would suggest the propriety of every man being furnished with a couple of flannel under-vests.

In our examination of the regiment, we found many men without this garment, so necessary in protecting the invalid from those sudden chills and changes of atmosphere which induce returns of fever.

(Signed) C. MACKINNON, President,  
and Members of the Committee.

I regret that I cannot agree with the Committee in all its views, although I may, on a former occasion, have subscribed to them. With reference to the views declared at pages 3, 4, &c., of this report, I beg to state, that I by no means agree in the propriety of recommending the 1st fusiliers, or any other regiment in the same condition, being sent to *any* hill station *as a body*.

The men of the regiment may, in my opinion, be divided into two classes:—1st, certain selected cases, in which a change to a good hill station is likely to be beneficial, provided they have good, spacious barrack accommodation, good rations, vegetables, &c., &c., with due attention to internal economy; 2nd, others, in which removal to a hill station would most probably be injurious, if not fatal. The former the committee have selected abundantly; the latter would, in my opinion, be much better at a good station in the plains, where they could have good barrack and hospital accommodation, good rations, &c., &c., particular care being always directed to the maintenance of a good system of internal economy.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Proceedings of  
Special Medical  
Committee.

So far as I am aware, it remains to be proved that any regiment ever went to a hill station in a bad state of health, *as a body*, and returned in a better state. On the contrary, consider the history of H.M.'s 29th regiment, and that of the Honourable Company's 2nd European regiment. Both went to the hills in a bad state of health, and they came back in a worse state. The bad state of health of both these corps, twelve months ago, both of which had just come from the hills, is notorious. The result would most probably be the same in the case of the 1st fusiliers, or of any other corps going there *as a body*, and in a sickly state.

Dugshaie I believe to be the best hill station, so far as I have heard, exclusive of Landour.

But my experience, as respects Dugshaie in particular, is very limited, and that applicable only to a regiment which went there in *good* health.

Page 6. I do not agree in considering that the use of *flannel* among European troops is a point of "minor" consideration, but the contrary; *flannel waistcoats and drawers* should form part of every European soldier's kit, and be enforced by Government, as in all regiments of H.M.'s service.

(Signed) A. STEWART, Surgeon,  
14th Light Dragoons.

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From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major-General Sir W. R. GILBERT, G.C.B., or Officer commanding the Punjab Division.

*Dated the 11th January, 1851.*

SIR,—

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Major-Gen.  
Sir W. R. Gilbert,  
11th Jan. 1851.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 22, dated 8th inst., giving cover to the proceedings of a special Medical Committee on the 1st European Bengal fusiliers.

2. The committee recommend that the corps should commence its march before the 25th instant, without waiting for the arrival of her Majesty's 96th regiment.

3. A perusal of the report leads the Governor-General to doubt very much whether the corps can be in a fit state to march on the 25th instant, especially after the very heavy rains which have fallen in these provinces, and continue still to fall.

4. This point, however, his Lordship leaves to your discretion, as it can best be decided by you in communication with the medical authorities.

5. The Governor-General authorized you to direct the march of the 1st fusiliers, by such route as you may think best, and sanctions all such additional accommodation in carriage, and such comforts for the men, as the unfortunate circumstances of the corps seem to require.

6. You are requested to bear in mind that the 14th dragoons being under orders to march on an early day, the proposed removal of the fusiliers will leave the capital without any European infantry or cavalry near it.

7. The Governor-General does not anticipate any actual risk from this withdrawal, but his Lordship thinks that none should be incurred if it can be avoided. You will best judge how this is to be provided for.

8. I am directed to return the proceedings of the Medical Committee, with the view to its being forwarded by you in the usual manner, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Camp, Chicorie,  
the 11th of Jan., 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. H. T. TUCKER, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

*Dated the 11th of January, 1851.*

SIR,—

I am directed to transmit to you, for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the accompanying copy of a letter, this day addressed to the officer commanding the Punjab division, respecting the movement of the 1st European Bengal fusiliers.

2. A copy of Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert's letter to my address, No. 22, dated 8th instant, is also inclosed; but the original proceedings of the Special Medical Committee have been returned to the Major-General to be forwarded in the usual manner, for submission to the Commander-in-Chief; a copy, however, is enclosed.

3. Several references on the subject of the 1st fusiliers, relative to their health and to their movements, have been before the Governor-General of late. It will not escape his Excellency's observation that the movements proposed by the late Commander-in-Chief, Sir C. Napier, founded (as his Lordship understands) on high medical authority, are directly the reverse of those now urged by the Lahore Special Medical Committee.

4. The question is one exclusively for his Excellency's judgment in the first instance, and his Lordship is desirous not to interfere therein.

5. But as these several papers have been officially submitted to the Governor-General, I am to state that his Lordship has considered it his duty to remark, with reference to them, that the question seems to stand at present in a very unsatisfactory position, and to call for the inquiry and opinion of a Medical Committee of officers of established reputation and experience, who shall be competent to decide on the conflicting opinions now on record, concerning the proper destination of the corps, a question, of which the importance cannot well be exaggerated, since the future fate of the regiment seems to depend upon it.

6. I am further instructed to observe, that the mortality in the 1st fusiliers of late, and the actual prostration of almost the whole corps, are so extraordinary, both in their character and extent, that a searching and general inquiry into all the circumstances connected with the commencement of this pestilence, its progress and management, the position of the corps at Lahore, and every other circumstance which can be supposed to have, or to have had, any bearing on its present condition, appears to his Lordship indispensably necessary for the satisfaction of the Government, which is so deeply interested in the facts, as well as due to those immediately responsible for the welfare of the corps.

Camp, Chicorie,  
the 11th of Jan., 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson,  
to  
Adjutant General,  
11th Jan. 1851.

#### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 3rd September, 1851 (No. 94).*

Reply to Letter dated 27th March, 1851 (No. 46), paragraphs 11 and 13.

Proceedings of a Special Committee held to report on the health of the 1st European regiment.

6. It appears that, in December, 1850, out of a strength of 732, there were 196 in hospital, and 132 in the ranks affected with disease. Of the remaining 404, it is reported, that "not above 150 look in health, or

Court of Directors to Government of Bengal,  
3rd Sept. 1851.

"fit to perform ordinary duty."

7. An immediate change of station appears to have been indispensably necessary, and was accordingly ordered; but the medical authorities differed in opinion as to the station to which it was most advisable to send the regiment.

8. The Governor-General, in consequence, remarked that the question stood in a very unsatisfactory position, and that an inquiry and the opinion of the Medical Committee of officers of established reputation and experience, were required.

9. The Governor-General further observed, "that the mortality in the 1st fusiliers



EXTRACTS, &c.  
Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
3rd Sept. 1851.

“ of late, and the actual prostration of almost the whole corps, are so extraordinary, both  
“ in their character and extent, that a searching and general inquiry into all the circum-  
“ stances connected with the commencement of this pestilence, its progress and manage-  
“ ment, the position of the corps at Lahore, and every other circumstance which can be  
“ supposed to have, or have had, any bearing on its present condition, appears to his  
“ Lordship indispensably necessary for the satisfaction of the Government, which is so  
“ deeply interested in the facts, as well as due to those who are immediately responsible  
“ for the welfare of the corps.”

10. We entirely approve of the Governor-General's proceedings, and shall look with much interest to the result.

11. In the correspondence now before us we find the following remark by Surgeon A. Stewart, H.M.'s 14th dragoons.

“ I do not agree in considering that the use of *flannel* among the European troops, is a point of minor consideration, but the contrary. *Flannel waistcoats and drawers* should form part of every European soldier's kit, and be enforced by Government, as in all regiments of her Majesty's service.”

12. This suggestion appears to us to be well worthy of attention:

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GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 29th November, 1851 (No. 184).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
29th Nov. 1851.

Para. 19. We transmit, with much regret, the accompanying papers, regarding the great sickness prevailing at Lahore, amongst both the European and native troops, arising in a great measure from the necessary duties of the citadel, the extreme unhealthiness of which, already noticed to your Honourable Court, appears to be in no way diminished.

20. The superintending surgeon has recommended the removal of the European sick to the unfinished barracks at Meean Meer, a measure, the advantage of which appears doubtful to Brigadier J. Tennant, commanding the station, who, it will be observed, has been authorized by H. E. the Commander-in-Chief to act to the best of his judgment under the circumstances.

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From F. CORBYN, Esq., Superintending Surgeon, Punjab Division, to Lieut.-Colonel J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated 3rd September, 1851.*

Superintending  
Surgeon Corbyn,  
to Quartermaster-  
General,  
3rd Sept. 1851.

The dreadful state of the 1st fusilier regiment was solely attributable to their residence in the unwholesome city of Lahore. There they were crowded into low, unventilated barracks and hospital, with their filthy privies. This view of the case meets with corroboration from the fact of the native troops, sent from Meean Meer to occupy the vacated fusiliers' barrack, being speedily affected with a severe form of the disease then prevalent, and of which many of them died, and, in some instances, scarcely a man escaped fever. The native hospitals at Meean Meer were, from all I can learn, mostly filled by those who had become ill at Lahore, contrary to the supposition of some, who fancy the station of Meean Meer was equally unhealthy with Lahore during the late sickness, but such was not really the case; indeed, Meean Meer seemed to be one of the few stations almost exempted from this visitation, owing, in all probability, to its remoteness from any large body of water. I requested Dr. Nisbet to inform me particularly, whether bowel affections in like manner, originated in fresh cases, after the regiment reached Meean Meer. Dr. Nisbet remarks, “ While the fusilier regiment was encamped at Meean Meer, several fresh cases of dysentery were admitted into hospital, but were not so serious in their nature as those that had previously been attacked. The cases, however, were severe, from having occurred in men debilitated by previous attacks of fever, but their *result* was, for the most part, favourable. In several instances, the disease occurred while the patient was actually under treatment for fever.” A committee, directed to report on the state of the regiment on its reaching Meean Meer, thus remarks:

“The Committee, having carefully inspected the sick in hospital, 305 in number, are highly pleased to find them in so comfortable a state, as well as much gratified with the result of the experiment formerly recommended, namely, of removing the sick into the building they at present occupy. The building is dry, airy, and comfortable, and is reported by the medical officers of the regiment to have been so from the time it was first occupied. All the medical officers of the regiment, moreover, coincide in the opinion that the removal of the sick into this building has, so far as the sick are concerned, been highly conducive to their comfort and improvement generally.” Dr. Bruce reported, shortly after the corps got settled at Meean Meer, “Sickness is on the decrease, dysentery is less prevalent; we had 276 in hospital this morning.” Mr. M’Rae observes, “I ascribe the cause of the present sickness to two companies having been put on duty in the citadel of Lahore, to relieve the 1st European Bengal fusiliers. The men were attacked with the worst form of endemic fever, many having come into the hospital in the utmost state of debility, and two of them delirious. I believe they have all entered. I had four doolies and one elephant at my disposal, and even with these constantly going, I have had no small difficulty to keep the number of sick of other corps in my own hospital within bounds.

“Numbers of the sepoy have dropped, when on guard, attacked with a sudden congestion of the brain, liver, spleen, and lungs, which I attribute to the noxious gases (principally hydrosulphate of ammonia), the proceeds of accumulations of vegetable and animal matter in a state of decomposition.”

Assistant Surgeon Lacon, 39th regiment N.I., also observes, “Many contracted the disease whilst on duty in the city.” Assistant Surgeon George Sanders, 5th regiment N.I., states the same thing, “The health of the men suffered considerably from the duty assigned to them in garrison; very nearly all the severe cases of fever occurred in those men who were attacked by the disease whilst on monthly duty in the fort of Lahore.”

The foregoing exhibits the opinions, separately given, of medical officers. All concur in declaring that disease was arrested, and the men who were not in a dying state, recovered, of the 1st European Bengal fusiliers, on their being sent out to Meean Meer. Evidence cannot be more complete that the native hospitals at the cantonment were filled with sick, whose disease was contracted while on duty in the city and citadel. I was struck with the healthy appearance of every one, officers and servants, who had no duty to perform in the city and Anarkullie; but those who had, were dispirited and sickly, the sepoy especially.

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Under these pressing circumstances, I hope H.E. the Commander-in-Chief will pardon my forwarding this report direct,—its urgency has induced me to do so; it remains for me to solicit H.E.’s permission to the barracks being occupied at Meean Meer by the sick of H.M.’s 96th regiment, and troop and recruits of artillery. The last weekly report of H.M.’s 96th regiment shows that eleven deaths occurred during the past week; the hospital at Anarkullie is crowded to a degree, so as to produce contaminated atmosphere there. How necessary, therefore, that the sick be removed to where accommodation is ample and ready to receive them at Meean Meer.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 13th April, 1852 (No. 39).*

Reply to Letter, dated 24th November, 1851 (No. 184), paragraphs 19 and 20.

15. This communication has been received by us with great regret. We trust that measures will be devised, which will enable you to secure the required military possession of the citadel of Lahore, without exposing the troops to the serious sickness from which they have heretofore suffered, and which appears to have been principally occasioned by defective, ill-ventilated, and ill-drained barracks, and by want of cleanliness and drainage in the city.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Superintending  
Surgeon Corbyn,  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
3rd Sept. 1851.

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
13th April, 1852.

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In reply to this letter, the Government refer to their letters, Nos. 74 and 137 of 1852, as showing their proceedings with respect to the accommodation of the troops at Lahore. (See Meean Meer for these letters.)

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*23rd March, 1853 (No. 65).*Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
23rd March, 1853.

21. The arrangements sanctioned by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, at the requisition of the Board of Administration at Lahore, and approved by us, in regard to the occupation of the cantonment of Anarkullie and the citadel of Lahore, are detailed in the accompanying papers.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 2nd August, 1853 (No. 92).*

Reply to Letter dated 23rd March, 1853 (No. 65).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
2nd Aug. 1853.

Para. 14. These arrangements appear to have been well considered, and have our sanction.

## BARRACKS, &amp;c., at MEEAN MEER.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 26th March, 1850 (No. 49).*Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
26th March, 1850.

Consultations, 1st Feb. 1850.

28. The documents recorded, as per margin, comprise reports on the sites selected for the permanent cantonment of the troops now located at Lahore and Wuzeerabad; that for the former having been fixed at Meean Meer, 3 miles to the south-east of the city of Lahore, and for the latter at Sealkote, 33 miles on a north-easterly direction from the present temporary cantonment at Wuzeerabad, both situations appearing to be eminently adapted for military stations in every point of view; and the absolute necessity of the change rendering inevitable the great expense which must be incurred in their construction.

29. It will be seen that in the opinion of every officer, military or medical, to whom the question has been referred, the present temporary cantonment at Anarkullie is most unsuitable for troops; and further, that it is not susceptible of any adequate improvement. The reports now submitted, appear fully to account for the excessive sickness and mortality which have, as your Honourable Court has already been informed, prevailed there, as well as at Wuzeerabad during the past year.

30. The considerations which have guided the Most Noble the Governor-General to the conclusion, that the erection of new and permanent buildings, in preference to repairing the old, is a measure of real economy, are stated in his minute recorded on our proceedings of the 1st February, 1850, No. 6.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 1st February, 1850.

From the DEPUTY QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL of the ARMY to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated the 26th of December, 1849.*

SIR,—

Deputy  
Quartermaster-  
General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
25th Dec. 1849.

I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the purpose of being submitted to the Most Noble the Governor-General, the accompanying papers, containing the opinions of eleven medical officers, including the superintending surgeon, upon the present cantonment at "Anarkullie," who are unanimous in condemning it as a military station.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, having examined in person the extensive plain of "Meean Meer," which lies 3 miles to the south-east of the city of Lahore, is of opinion that it is in every respect fitted for an extensive cantonment; and he strongly recommends that the whole of the troops at Lahore, with the exception of a suitable garrison for the citadel, may be quartered at "Meean Meer," instead of "Anarkullie."

3. On the 21st instant, a committee of officers, consisting of the Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army, the Officiating Quartermaster-General of her Majesty's Forces, the Superintending Engineer, the Superintending Surgeon, and the Surgeon of her Majesty's 14th light dragoons, reported upon the proposed site for a new cantonment at "Meean Meer." They considered it to be by far the best spot for a cantonment in the neighbourhood of Lahore. It was found to be elevated, open, and airy, capable of perfect drainage, without swamps or many irrigated fields, and with only one small hamlet falling within the cantonment boundary; the soil a light clay, with a small mixture of sand and kunkun; the water of the wells of good quality, at an average depth of 33 feet from the surface; and the site about equidistant from the two great lines of road leading from Lahore to Umritsur and Ferozepore, respectively. In short, the situation was found to possess every requisite for a good and healthy cantonment.

4. Major-General Sir W. Gilbert, G.C.B., commanding the Punjab division, and Brigadier N. Penny, C.B., commanding the station at Lahore, have also frequently visited the proposed new site, and have added their testimony in its favour.

5. Sir W. Gilbert expressed his opinion to Sir Charles Napier, that, if an unhealthy season was to arrive, he thinks the whole of the Europeans quartered in "Anarkullie" would be swept away.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. G. DRUMMOND, Lieut.-Col.,  
Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army.

Quartermaster-General's Office, Head-Quarters,  
Camp, Eminabad, 26th December, 1849.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Deputy  
Quartermaster-  
General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
26th Dec. 1849.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

*Dated the 4th of January, 1850.*

I have read carefully the opinions of the several medical officers whose testimony has been called for, respecting the station of Anarkullie, near the city of Lahore.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
4th Jan. 1850.

They unanimously condemn the station as unhealthy, and they adduce facts which show conclusively that, in their judgment, the causes from which the unhealthiness arises are not susceptible of remedy.

The expense of forming a new cantonment for this large force, must be so considerable, as to render the Government reluctant to consent to the measure, unless their conviction of the absolute necessity of the change is complete.

I am bound to say that the inquiries I made, and my personal observation of the cantonment, while halting at Lahore, have satisfied me that the expenditure cannot be avoided.

The buildings at Anarkullie having been prepared for a temporary purpose, were avowedly of a slight and temporary character. Major-General Gilbert informed me that the whole of them are giving way, and are even now supported by props. If new barracks were not prepared, those at Anarkullie must of necessity receive repairs and additions so extensive, that the cost of them would go far towards the erection of new buildings, and yet leave the old ones a patched and insufficient work after all.

Since, then, a large expenditure of money is inevitable, I think true economy unites with other considerations in leading to the conclusion, that a new cantonment should be built at Meean Meer, where the site possesses all those qualifications of airiness, drainage, and salubrity, in which Anarkullie has been found so deficient.

The healthiness of Meean Meer has long since been shown by experience; for it was here that a large portion of the Sikh army was cantoned in excellent barracks, some of which still remain.

I request that a letter may be addressed to the Adjutant-General, intimating, for information of the Commander-in-Chief, that I have fully considered the documents he

EXTRACTS &c. has transmitted to me, and that I have come to the conclusion that it will be expedient to prepare a new cantonment at Meean Meer, for the force to be stationed near the city of Lahore.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
4th Jan. 1850.

Orders will be issued for the preparation of plans and estimates; and, in the mean time, measures will be taken for the collection of materials for building purposes.

Address the superintending engineer in the Punjab, desiring him to take steps for the collection of building materials accordingly. Early intimation will be made to him of the number of European troops for which barracks will be required, when plans and estimates must be prepared with all speed.

Acquaint the Military Board of these directions.

### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 21st August, 1850 (No. 96).*

Reply to Letter dated 26th March, 1850 (No. 49), Paras. 28 to 30.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
21st Aug. 1850.

22. The evidence furnished in these papers, is conclusive as to the unfitness of Anarkullie, as a permanent cantonment for any large body of troops.

23. The time having arrived when it was necessary to determine whether the temporary buildings at Anarkullie should be repaired, or, as to many of them, rebuilt and enlarged, we concur with the Governor-General that true economy was best consulted by abandoning that cantonment, and by constructing the requisite buildings on a site having the qualifications of "airiness, drainage, and salubrity, in which Anarkullie has "been found so deficient." Meean Meer, late the site of a Sikh cantonment, appears to possess those qualities, to be well supplied with water, and to be sufficiently near to the city for the purpose.

24. We approve, therefore, of your resolution to remove the cantonment to Meean Meer.

25. As his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the objections to the cantonment of Wuzeerabad are insuperable, we shall not object to its abandonment.

26. The report upon Sealkote, to which the Wuzeerabad force is to be removed, is satisfactory as to its salubrity.

27. We have not yet been informed of the plans and estimates for the barracks; and other requisite buildings at these cantonments. We must express our hope that they have been very carefully considered by the proper authorities intrusted with such matters, and due care taken in their construction. We are desirous of full information on these points.

### GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated the 27th March, 1851 (No. 46).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
27th March, 1851.

50. The progress and present state of the new cantonments in the Punjab will be gathered from the accompanying collection, which comprises two minutes recorded by the Most Noble the Governor-General, after personal inspection of the buildings, and full consideration of the manifold documents laid before him for his information and orders.

51. As regards the cantonments at Meean Meer, it will be perceived, that notwithstanding every exertion has been, and still continues to be made, to expedite the construction of the necessary barracks, they cannot possibly be got ready by the next rainy season. It has, therefore, been found indispensable to sanction some further outlay at Anarkullie, where only one regiment of Europeans, her Majesty's 96th foot, will be retained for the present. When other cover can be secured for European troops, this unhealthy cantonment will be permanently abandoned. The state of the citadel of Lahore, and the future arrangements connected therewith, are adverted to in another paragraph of this letter; it will, however, be noticed that in one of the letters of the present collection, his Lordship pronounces the barracks in the fort to be bad beyond redemption, and quite unfit for the lodgment of European soldiers in an Indian climate, unless under pressure of an extreme emergency.

52. The fortifications round Lahore, will be retained; but as the walls are un-

necessarily high, they will be reduced, and the materials transferred to Meean Meer, where they are much required. **EXTRACTS, &c.**

53. At Sealkote it will be seen that great difficulties have presented themselves, the principal of which are, the scarcity of materials of all kinds, and the impracticability of obtaining carriage; to meet these, his Lordship has authorized the employment of public cattle on a more extended scale. Much damage has been sustained by the partially-constructed buildings at this station, from heavy rain. **Government of Bengal to Court of Directors, 27th March, 1851.**

54. His Lordship has stated his approval of the site selected for the cantonment, which appears in every way unobjectionable.

55. As wooden bridges can be constructed here more cheaply and better than bridges of masonry, their adoption on the roads in the vicinity of Sealkote has been sanctioned.

56. The immediate execution of the works necessary for rendering the temporary cantonments at Wuzeerabad, habitable by Europeans for another season, with as much comfort as circumstances will admit, has been directed.

57. The cantonment of Jhelum is also well situated in all respects, but no public building had been commenced at the time of his Lordship's visit: as, however, materials are abundant, their immediate collection was directed by his Lordship, as also the construction of pukka wells, the want of which had been inconveniently felt, and an hospital for the two native infantry regiments; besides which, bungalows for the staff-sergeants were authorized, in preference to renewing the temporary ones. For the performance of these duties, a qualified officer will be selected, if possible, from those at the station.

58. At Rawul Pindée, his Lordship authorized such repairs to the barracks of the European regiment, as might be found practicable, and as at Jhelum, buildings for the native troops, and wells, which are much required, were ordered to be commenced at once.

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MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

*Dated the 11th of November, 1850.*

Buildings at Lahore. 1. At Hoshearpore, I learned from Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere the present state of the public works at Lahore. In conformity with a despatch recently received from the Court of Directors, it will probably be necessary to modify to a certain extent, the plans proposed for the barracks at Meean-Meer. I have just received, also, plans from the Military Board in connection with that subject.

2. In reply to a question which I put to him, Colonel Tremenheere stated that a decision on these points, which manifestly can be best formed on the spot, might be delayed until my arrival at Lahore, without interfering with the present progress of the works.

3. I have requested the superintending engineer to meet me at Lahore. In the mean time, an official letter may be addressed to him, directing him to meet me at Lahore on the 26th inst., and instructing him to proceed with the barracks which are in hand. I have ascertained that the work is in a state which will admit of its being carried on till then, without interfering with any modification of the plan of superstructure which may be thought expedient.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
11th Nov. 1850.

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BENGAL MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 20th September, 1850.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, with the Governor-General, to the OFFICIATING SECRETARY to the Government of India.

*Dated 7th September, 1850.*

7. The Military Board, in their letter of the 11th July last, advert to the increased dimensions of the military buildings at Meean Meer. His Lordship believes that the height of the barracks, as shown in the plans, was thirty feet on the inner walls. These dimensions are greater than those of the barracks formerly built, but they do not materially

Secretary  
to Government  
with the  
Governor-General  
to Officiating  
Secretary to  
Government of  
India,  
7th Sept. 1850.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
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 Secretary  
 to Government  
 with the  
 Governor-General  
 to Officiating  
 Secretary to  
 Government of  
 India,  
 7th Sept. 1850.

exceed the dimensions of those which have been erected of late years; and although a certain additional expense must be incurred in the construction of such barracks, through the above increase in their height, his Lordship thinks it right to express, strongly and earnestly his conviction, that such increase in the internal dimensions of soldiers' barracks, is a wise and wholesome policy, and a measure of true economy in the end.

8. The Governor-General would therefore, speaking at once for the interests of the State, and for the comfort, health, and efficiency of the soldiers who serve it, earnestly deprecate any reduction of the dimensions of barracks for European troops, in the plains of India, below thirty feet in height, and a proportionate breadth.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 17th January, 1851.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated the 19th of December, 1850.*

SIR,—

Captain  
 F. D. Atkinson  
 to Major R. Wyllie,  
 19th Dec. 1850.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 240, of the 11th October last, forwarding the Military Board's report, No. 4,045, of the 1st idem, on the military cantonments in the Punjab, and on the details of the buildings of which they were to be composed.

2. A few days after the receipt of your despatch, the Governor-General saw the superintending engineer, and ascertained from him that no inconvenience would arise from deferring final orders on the several matters, until his Lordship should reach Lahore, where a personal inspection of the buildings themselves, and of the ground, would better enable him to form a judgment on what had been proposed.

3. His Lordship directed the superintending engineer in the mean time to proceed with the works.

4. During his stay at Lahore, the Governor-General visited the cantonments, inspected the buildings in progress, and the former barracks; and having formed his conclusions, after full inquiry and frequent consultation with the engineers, his Lordship has now instructed me to communicate to you, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, the course he has deemed it expedient to follow.

5. The barracks near to the mosque, in the fort, which have been occupied by the 1st European Bengal fusiliers for the past year, are bad beyond all redemption, and are quite unfit for the lodgment of European soldiers in an Indian climate, unless under the pressure of an extreme emergency, which, the Governor-General thinks, does not now exist. His Lordship observed with dissatisfaction, that the barracks have been made worse than they would have been, by the neglect of all attempt at ventilation through the roofs of these low and crowded sheds. A very little trouble, a very little money, and a very little activity, would have modified the evil of low and crowded buildings, so far as ventilation could do it. Ample authority existed for so doing. There was most urgent necessity for it, but nobody has done it.

6. Still, with all the improvements that could be made, the Most Noble the Governor-General does not think it right, that European troops should be quartered in such places, a moment after other cover can be found. His Lordship thinks this can be effected, and has finally resolved that the sheds in the square of the Badshai Nusjid shall not be again occupied by European troops.

7. H. E. Sir C. Napier has recommended that the fusiliers should be removed to Meerut, and that H.M.'s 14th light dragoons should also be marched to that station. The Governor-General has assented to both proposals, and especially to the removal of the dragoons at once, as communicated in letter to your address, No. 35, of the 7th instant.

8. His Lordship has been of opinion from the first, that a regiment of European dragoons was not required at Lahore at any time. Their presence there just now in the confined cantonment of Anarkullie, the horses crowded round the barracks and along the lines, is liable to many objections, and their removal will be a great relief.

9. The 14th dragoons and the 1st European Bengal fusiliers are to be replaced, as arrangements now stand, by H. M.'s 96th regiment only. Ample and good accommodation for this corps will be found in the barracks now occupied by the dragoons. These are in very fair condition, and will be good quarters when some desirable repairs and additions have been made.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
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Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Major R. Wyllie,  
19th Dec. 1850.

10. Representations have been made to the Governor-General, with a view to retaining Anarkullie as a cantonment permanently. His Lordship can by no means accede to such a proposal. Last year, an unanimous opinion was given by twelve medical men, that the site of Anarkullie was unfit for a cantonment, and his Lordship consented, on the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation, founded on this authoritative document, to place the new cantonment at Meean Meer. In the face of such a document, the Governor-General cannot consent now to retain permanently any portion of the troops at Anarkullie.

11. His Lordship feels it his duty to decline doing so on sanitary grounds alone. On military grounds, the Governor-General cannot consent to have two cantonments at one station.

12. His Lordship therefore adheres entirely to the resolution adopted by the Government last year, to place all the troops who may be stationed at Lahore in the cantonment at Meean Meer.

13. Under these circumstances, the Governor-General has been reluctant to spend any money that could be avoided at Anarkullie. But to the extent pointed out in paragraphs 4 to 9 of my letter to the superintending engineer, No. 117 of this date, expenditure cannot be avoided.

14. It is physically and utterly impossible to prepare barracks at Meean Meer for two European regiments (a force which Lahore should ordinarily have), to be ready by the commencement of the next rainy season. It is extremely doubtful whether cover can be certainly relied upon for even *one* regiment at Meean Meer. His Lordship therefore considers it to be his duty, to authorize the expenditure of such a sum as will insure reasonably good cover in the present barracks at Anarkullie, so as to avert all risk of injury to the health of the troops, as far as it is in his Lordship's power to do so.

15. The artillery have been ordered out for practice at Meean Meer, and it is hoped that barracks will be ready for them there before the rains. If not, then by the orders which have been communicated to the superintending engineer, proper cover will have been provided for them also at Anarkullie, until their new buildings shall be completed.

16. It has been stated in paragraph 6, that the Governor-General does not propose to quarter European troops any longer in the barracks in the fort; but his Lordship considers that it is expedient for the present, that a company of European infantry should occupy the citadel, and they may be sent for that purpose from Anarkullie every day.

17. Instructions for the provision of accommodation for the company, as also for the reserve company of artillery, proposed to be permanently retained in the citadel, have been communicated to Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere, in my letter already quoted, to which I am also directed to refer you for the detailed directions, which have been given under the orders of the Most Noble the Governor-General, for the progress of the works at Meean Meer.

18. On his Lordship's visit to that cantonment, he found the buildings for the native troops completed. One horse artillery barrack was finished, and was occupied as an hospital by the 1st European Bengal fusiliers. Another artillery barrack was well advanced. On the opposite flank seven barracks for European infantry were in progress. The barracks for the 2nd regiment of European infantry, and for the regiment of dragoons have not been commenced.

19. The opinion of the Governor-General with regard to the inutility of a regiment of dragoons at Lahore, has already been expressed in paragraph 8. His Lordship believes that opinion is almost universal, and as stated in paragraph 7, the 14th dragoons have, at the recommendation of the (late) Commander-in-Chief, been ordered to Meerut. The abandonment of the intention of constructing a set of barracks for the dragoons will greatly diminish the expense of the cantonment and lighten the labours of the engineer department.

20. During the last rainy season the whole of the site of the new cantonment was covered with water. Whether the site has been erroneously selected as the highest, or whether the floods were unprecedentedly high, and not likely to recur, cannot be determined;



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Major R. Wyllie,  
19th Dec. 1850.

whichever may be the truth, every exertion should be made to provide by drainage against a recurrence of the evil, since it is now too late to change the general site. It will be observed, that instructions on this subject have also been communicated to Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere.

21. With regard to the recommendations of the Military Board on the detail of buildings connected with this cantonment contained in their report dated 1st October, 1850, I am directed to observe that, as regards the height of the proposed barracks, the original plan contemplated 30 feet. The Governor-General has expressed strongly his opinion in favour of lofty barracks, as undoubtedly superior and economical in the end.

Vide paragraph 7 of letter to your address, No. 53, 7th September, 1850.

22. The Military Board considers the height of 30 feet unnecessary, and that 24 feet would be quite sufficient. A recent despatch from the Honourable the Court of Directors pronounces an opinion adverse to such dimensions, preferring adherence to the standard plan which gave a height of only 20 feet.

No. 96, 21st August, 1850, paragraph 18.

23. The Governor-General lately visited the one barrack which has been finished at Meean Meer, and which is of the height of 30 feet. It is intended for a company, but contained when his Lordship visited it, nearly 300 cots of the sick men of the 1st Bengal European fusiliers. His Lordship visited the barracks before breakfast, without notice, and found the air pure and untainted, notwithstanding the great number of sick which it contained; and the serjeant assured his Lordship, that when the doors are first opened in the morning the air is equally free from impurity.

24. There can be no doubt that this is an infinite advantage in an eastern climate. To return to an aggregate of 20 feet would, in his Lordship's opinion, be unwise. For many years that standard has been departed from. All recent barracks at Umbala, at Jullunder, and at Dugshaie, have exceeded that height, ranging about 24 feet.

25. The Honourable the Court of Directors object to the extra dimensions of such buildings, and the Governor-General considers it his duty to conform to their wishes when he can do so without injury to their own interests. The barracks at the last-named stations are excellent, and his Lordship proposes to reduce the buildings now to be erected in the Punjab to the same height of 24 feet. Any buildings which have proceeded so far, that they cannot be reduced to that standard, without undoing what has been done, should be completed on the present plan, but such cases are rare.

26. The Governor-General has ascertained from the superintending engineer that the Military Board are mistaken in supposing that the foundations of the main walls are of kutchu pukka; they are pukka throughout. His Lordship thinks it quite indispensable that the foundations of all the barracks should be of pukka work, and earnestly desires that the whole of the main walls should be also pukka, if lime can by any exertion be secured immediately; if not, the superintending engineer has been instructed to construct them of kutchu pukka, in the same way as the excellent buildings at Umbala and Jullunder have been built.

27. With regard to roofing, the Governor-General observes that the buildings now in progress cannot wait for iron roofs.

28. His Lordship cannot concur with the Military Board in their objections to ridge ventilators, and has directed them to be fitted to each barrack.

29. Directions, as regards the outer walls, flooring, verandahs, and cesspools, have been given in the letter to the superintending engineer, that accompanies. The Military Board will determine, in communication with the superintending engineer, the question of thatch for the barracks. It will be observed, that Lieut.-Col. Tremenheere has been advised not to throw back on the maker's hands, the large quantity of roofing tiles which have been prepared.

30. The Military Board recommend such instructions being issued to the Board of Administration at Lahore, as may secure, in the first place, a continuous supply of wood for fuel for the cantonment, for the burning of bricks, &c.

31. The Governor-General observes that the Military Board and the engineer officers both appear to be inclined to throw upon the civil officers the task of supplying materials, which much more properly belongs to themselves.

32. As stated in the letter to the superintending engineer, the Board of Administration have been instructed, and will be instructed, to give every aid to the engineer officers, who must bear in mind, that their own exertions must supply the wants of their own department.

33. A further communication will, on receipt of the superintending engineer's reply, be made to the Honourable the President in Council, on the subject of the supply of bricks and timber.

34. The accompanying copy of a letter (No. 118), this day addressed to the major-general commanding the Punjab division, will advise his Honour in Council of the assistance which the commissariat officers are expected to afford.

35. A copy of my letter to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, No. 118A (enclosing Nos. 117 and 118), for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, accompanies.

36. I have to add, that the views of the Most Noble the Governor-General, respecting the cantonments at Sealkote and Wuzeerabad, and his Lordship's determination as to the fort of Lahore, will be communicated hereafter.

37. The original enclosures of your despatch under acknowledgment are retained for reference.

Camp, Wuzeerabad,  
the 19th of December, 1850.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assist.-Sec. to the Government of India  
in the Military Department,  
with the Governor-General.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
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Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
19th Dec. 1850.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. DRUMMOND, Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated the 19th of December, 1850.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

With advertence to previous correspondence on the subject of accommodation for the troops at Lahore, I am directed to enclose copies of the letters noted in the margin, which will advise H.E. the Commander-in-Chief of the arrangements that have been proposed, and are now in progress, for the provision of suitable quarters for the troops at Lahore, Anarkullie, and Meean Meer.

No. 117, 19th Dec. 1850, to Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle; No. 118, 19th Dec. 1850, to the Major-General commanding the Punjab division.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
19th Dec. 1850.

Camp, Wuzeerabad,  
the 19th of December, 1850.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assist.-Sec. to the Government of India  
in the Military Department,  
with the Governor-General.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

*Dated the 19th of December, 1850.*

1. With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of public buildings in the Punjab, I am now directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General, to communicate to you the following instructions, regarding the cantonment and buildings at Lahore.

2. The Governor-General has finally resolved that the barracks in the square of the Badshai Nusjid shall not again be occupied by European troops.

3. The 14th dragoons and 1st Bengal fusiliers, now at Lahore, are to be replaced, during the present season, by the 96th foot only. His Lordship thinks that ample and good accommodation for this corps, will be found in the barracks now occupied by the dragoons. These are in very fair condition, and will be good quarters when some desirable repairs and additions have been made.

4. The Governor-General requests that you will lose no time in executing these works. A verandah is to be added to each of these barracks, in order to shelter the walls from the rays of the sun, to which at present they are exposed.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Lieut.-Col.  
Tremenheere,  
19th Dec. 1850.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Lieut.-Col.  
Tremenheere,  
19th Dec. 1850.

5. The whole of the roofs must be strengthened and repaired in such sufficient manner, as you, in communication with the executive engineer, may resolve upon; and the ventilation, where it is required, is to be improved.

6. Similar additions and repairs are to be made to the artillery barrack. The whole must be entered upon without any delay whatever, and must be completed as rapidly as possible. The works will be of a very simple character, of which the estimates must be comparatively unimportant; and his Lordship therefore desires that they must be proceeded with at once, as a matter of emergency.

7. The Governor-General considers it expedient, for the present, that a company of European infantry should occupy the citadel, and they may be sent for that purpose from Anarkullie every day.

8. You are requested to make such alterations in the Dewan-i-am as his Lordship pointed out to you; the buildings behind, which interrupt the free current of air, must be removed. An outer verandah is to be built, and ventilators placed in the roof.

9. Temporary officers' quarters can be found near the Shishmahal, or elsewhere.

10. The sheds hitherto occupied by the artillery in the citadel, his Lordship thinks, are quite unfit for that purpose, and, as a reserve company of European artillery is to be retained permanently in the citadel, you are desired to prepare immediately a barrack for one company in the square of the citadel, on the left-hand side of the gateway, and close to the Toshakhana. The whole of the old buildings near it are to be removed, and the materials used for the construction of the new building.

11. These are the buildings required at Anarkullie and in the citadel, and I am now to specify the works to be carried on in the cantonments of Meean Meer.

12. Barracks for a regiment of European dragoons will not be required at Meean Meer.

13. The artillery barracks are to be proceeded with as rapidly as possible, so as to be completed before the hot weather. One barrack less will be required, in consequence of one reserve company being placed in the citadel.

14. The buildings required for the head-quarters of the brigade of artillery, should also be completed.

15. The barracks commenced for European infantry must also be pressed on to completion with all possible activity; and none others are to be commenced until these are completed.

16. The Governor-General learns, from the plan of the cantonment, that it is proposed to place the Sudder Bazar in the centre of one side of the cantonment, between the artillery and infantry barracks.

17. Strong objections have been suggested against such a position for the bazar. After full consideration on the question, and examination of the ground, his Lordship is convinced that such objections are well founded, and that, if to the very large body of troops who will be brought together, are added the thousands of followers that are the necessary accompaniments of a large bazar, the whole being packed into a comparatively limited space, great evil will result, and the cantonment will run the risk of becoming pestilential.

18. You are therefore requested to modify the plan of cantonment accordingly, by removing from it the Sudder Bazar.

19. The Governor-General thinks the bazar should be placed on the side towards the city, somewhere near the village of Meean Meer. On this point, you are requested to communicate with the major-general commanding the division and brigadier commanding the station, and submit the result for his Lordship's final orders.

20. The vacant space caused by the removal of the bazar may be occupied hereafter by a soldiers' garden, if one should be formed; and as the staff lines are understood to be rather crowded, two sites, each including double the usual space in depth, may be set apart on the side next the centre of the cantonment, as building sites, for the general and the brigadier, if they wish to use them.

21. The drainage is the only other point which calls for immediate instructions, in the general arrangements of the cantonment at Meean Meer.

22. You are requested to employ one of the officers of your department to take careful and accurate levels of the neighbourhood. If the site has, in truth, been unfortunately chosen, a thorough drainage of the cantonment will be an expensive undertaking.

23. But, under any circumstances, the immediate formation of large drains and construction of bunds, on the limits of cantonments, from which the flow of water is to

be expected, are measures which should be undertaken as soon as the levels are ascertained. EXTRACTS, &c.

24. With respect to the height of the barracks, the Governor-General proposes that the buildings now to be erected in the Punjab shall be reduced to 24 feet: any buildings which have proceeded so far that they cannot be reduced to that standard, without undoing what has been done, are to be completed on the present plan.

25. The floors of all barracks are to be raised about four feet from the ground.

26. The outer walls must be completed according to the section submitted:

27. The outer verandahs of the barracks, as recommended by the Military Board, are to be open.

28. The suggestions of the Military Board regarding iron roofs and window-frames, are questions of mere detail, on which you have communicated as the Board wished. The Governor-General desires it to be understood, however, that the buildings now in progress, are not to be delayed for iron roofs.

29. His Lordship desires that ridge-ventilators may be fitted to each barrack.

30. The cesspools are not to be constructed, until the experiment in progress at Jullunder has been fully tried.

31. The *foundations* of all the barracks are to be of pukka work, and his Lordship desires that the whole of the *main* walls shall be also pukka, if lime can by any exertions be secured immediately in sufficient quantities; if not, the main walls must be built of kutch-pukka, in the same way as the excellent buildings at Umbala and Jullunder have been built.

32. The Governor-General will leave it to the Military Board to decide with you what material is to be used for covering the roofs of the barracks; but I am to observe, that the large quantity of roofing-tiles which have been prepared, must be used, and must not be thrown back on the maker's hands.

33. With respect to the wood required for burning bricks, &c., the Board of Administration have been instructed, and will again be instructed, to give every aid to the executive engineers for that purpose; but his Lordship requests that you will bear in mind, that the exertions of the executive officers, ought to supply the wants of their own department.

34. With respect to the buildings, inclosures, &c., which you desire to pull down for the sake of the materials, some of these, which will be specified in a separate letter, will be placed at your disposal; with regard to the rest, you were probably not aware that they are private property, of very little value, perhaps, in our eyes, but prized by the owners, and therefore not to be unnecessarily destroyed, or even taken from their owners at their full price.

35. This destruction of private property is the more to be deprecated, that ample materials are available without it.

36. The Governor-General wishes to preserve the fortifications round the city of Lahore; but his Lordship is of opinion that the walls are a great deal too high, and might be lowered with advantage, and large quantities of materials may thus be obtained.

37. The available resources, then, are as follows:—

1st. The external wall from the Roshnee towards the muster gate, is half down already, and the rest may be used.

2nd. The quarters of the mosque which are no longer to be occupied by Europeans, will be available as quarters for the native regiment stationed in the city.

Thus the whole of the lines in the Rownee, and a number of other temporary buildings, will become disposable, and can be used at once.

3rd. The whole of the city wall, several miles in extent, may be lowered. This is to be done by you, in communication with the Board of Administration, under such regulations as may be proposed for his Lordship's approval; and this can be commenced at once.

38. The supply thereby given will be very large, and sufficient to keep in work all the hands that the executive engineer can obtain. But these bricks are small; there are yet another set of European infantry barracks to be built, and his Lordship therefore requests, that the executive engineer will continue to burn bricks for future use as fast and as continuously as fuel can be obtained.

39. With respect to timber, every endeavour will be made to furnish a full supply from the hills, through Lieutenant Heath, who is employed for its collection. In the mean time, you are requested to direct your attention towards the Sutlej and Beas, and

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Lieut.-Col.  
Tremenheere,  
19th Dec. 1850.

EXTRACTS, &c. the Governor-General authorizes timber to be conveyed from thence, even though the additional land-carriage will be expensive.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Lieut.-Col.  
Tremenheere,  
19th Dec. 1850.

40. It remains only to provide such aid in the conveyance of these materials, as the Government establishment can furnish.

41. The Governor-General desires that the executive engineer will prepare a statement, showing the number of bricks which he will require weekly or daily, and the place at which such bricks are to be delivered, and the place from whence they are to be brought.

42. The Major-General commanding the division will be directed to order the commissariat officer, on his receiving such statement, to comply with it in every respect, regularly and without fail.

43. Adverting to the additional labour which will be imposed on the engineer department, the Governor-General requests you to state how the proper supervision of them is to be provided for.

44. Instructions, in full detail, regarding the works to be carried on at Lahore during the present season, have thus been given to you. The Governor-General believes that, with a proper degree of energy and activity, all the works specified may be completed before the excessive heats in 1851 commence; but in order to prevent all misapprehension, I am desired to state that his Lordship's main object is to provide for the health, and as far as possible, for the comfort, of the European troops, who are to be quartered at Lahore, during the next year, with a certainty that his object shall be accomplished.

45. If, therefore, you and the executive engineer entertain any doubt of your being able to complete all that is herein expected, you will understand that the completion of the repairs of barracks at Anarkullie, of the quarters for artillery at Meean Meer, and of the small buildings in the citadel, are to be regarded as of primary importance, and must be accomplished without fail.

46. The other buildings at Meean Meer must be proceeded with as steadily and rapidly as is consistent with the attainment of the object on which his Lordship has above insisted.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India,  
in the Military Department, with  
the Governor-General.

Camp, Wuzeerabad,  
19th Dec. 1850.

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### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 3rd September, 1851 (No. 94).*

Reply to Letter dated 27th March, 1851, Paras. 50 to 58.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
3rd Sept. 1851.

30. We observe with much satisfaction that the Governor-General has been able to give his personal attention to the buildings in progress at Meean Meer, Sealkote, Jhelum, and Rawul Pindee; and has effected important changes, which will enable the engineers to carry on their works more rapidly and economically, whilst the buildings will be equally efficient for the purposes to which they are destined. We refer particularly to the reduction of the height of the barracks from 30 to 24 feet, and the use of sun-dried bricks for all interior work above the foundation, not exposed to the action of rain.

31. The height, 24 feet, is four feet above the standard plan, and the same as that of the barracks at Umbala, Jullunder, and Dugshaie, which have been found to be sufficiently lofty for all purposes of ventilation. Indeed, as you have observed, we have referred to the height of the standard plan as being sufficient, if proper means of ventilation are employed.

32. In consequence of the want of fuel for burning bricks at Sealkote, it appears that years would elapse if the barracks there were to be wholly pukka, as at first ordered. The change made by the Governor-General will allow of their being speedily constructed, and in a manner which, with due care, has been found quite effectual at other stations.

Military letter to Bengal, 21st  
Aug. 1850, No. 96, paragraphs 15 to  
19.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated the 24th November, 1851 (No. 186).*

34. The progress of the public works, as regards the military buildings in the Punjab, is shown in the accompanying papers, from which it will be gathered, that the completion before the next hot season, of barracks at Meean Meer, sufficient for the accommodation of a European regiment, having been found impracticable, the Most Noble the Governor-General has decided not to move her Majesty's 70th regiment to Lahore, preferring to retain only one European regiment at that station for the present, than risk the health of the troops by overcrowding them.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
24th Nov. 1851.

35. As the strength of her Majesty's 53rd foot, which is under orders to relieve her Majesty's 98th foot at Peshawur, exceeds that of the latter corps to an extent equal to three companies, his Lordship has authorized for their additional accommodation, the immediate construction of six half-company barracks, which, as well as all barracks to be built at Peshawur, are to have foundations of pukka-work, as ordered for the Meean Meer and Sealkote barracks.

36. His Lordship has further authorized the superintending engineer to proceed with the construction of the barrack in the citadel of Lahore, the work on which had been suspended.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 18th July, 1851.

From Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated 26th June, 1851.*

SIR,—

The annual period being now at hand for the arrangement of a relief of the corps of the army, I am directed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to request that you will submit, for the orders of the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, whether a second European infantry regiment will be required for Lahore; and if so, whether the situation of Cawnpore can be left without an European corps; as in this case his Excellency would propose to move the 70th foot, now at Cawnpore, to Lahore.

Quartermaster-  
General  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
26th June, 1851.

I have, &amp;c.,

Simla,  
26th June, 1851.

(Signed) J. G. DRUMMOND, Lieut.-Col.,  
Quartermaster-General of the Army,  
Military Department.

From Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated 2nd July, 1851.*

SIR,—

In reply to your despatch, No. 422, of the 26th ultimo, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, as a permanent arrangement, the Most Noble the Governor-General considers a second European regiment will be very necessary at Lahore.

Col. J. Stuart to  
Quartermaster-  
General.  
2nd July, 1851.

2. His Lordship, however, prefers waiting until it is seen whether the new barracks at Meean Meer will certainly be ready next cold season, before requesting his Excellency to order an European regiment there.

3. The difficulty of procuring timber at Lahore has hitherto been so great, that neither money nor exertions can obtain it. The Governor-General hopes that the buildings may with certainty be completed, in which case his Lordship will be glad to have a second European regiment there.

4. At the same time, having regard to the accumulation of European infantry to the westward, to the paucity of such corps east of Meerut, and to the political consi-

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Col. J. Stuart to  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
2nd July, 1851.

derations affecting the lower portion of our territories, the Governor-General would not consider himself justified in leaving Cawnpore without an European regiment of some kind.

5. His Lordship hopes shortly to be able to speak more decidedly as to the supply of timber for Lahore, and the probability of the barracks being completed there.

Simla,  
2nd July, 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India, Military  
Department, with the Governor-General.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 3rd October, 1851.

From Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated 9th August, 1851.*

SIR,—

Quartermaster-  
General  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
9th Aug. 1851.

With reference to your letter of 2nd ultimo, and particularly the 5th paragraph, in which the Most Noble the Governor-General seemed to contemplate the probability of a supply of timber, and the consequent more rapid completion of the new infantry barracks at Lahore, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inquire whether any information has been received on the subject, and what prospect there may be of accommodation being provided for another British regiment there, during the ensuing season.

2. His Excellency's object in making this reference is to put the officers of her Majesty's 70th regiment, now at Cawnpore, as early out of suspense as possible.

3. When the barracks are ready for the men, the regiment will be required to move, and if they are to change their quarters this year, it is high time for the officers to make arrangements for sheltering themselves.

4. The Commander-in-Chief understands that a large supply of timber has arrived, and continues to do so, at Lahore. This, his Excellency trusts, may enable the Governor-General to decide whether the barracks for the 70th shall be ready or not, since, as he apprehends, this late acquisition of material has occurred subsequently to the date of your letter of 2nd ultimo.

Simla,  
9th August, 1851.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. G. DRUMMOND, Lieut.-Col.,  
Quartermaster-General of the Army.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

*Dated 16th August, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Col. J. Stuart  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
16th Aug. 1851.

I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General to inquire of you what prospect there is of accommodation being provided for a second European infantry regiment at Lahore, during the present season.

2. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has intimated to the Governor-General that he understands that a large supply of timber has arrived at Lahore, and continues to do so.

3. His Lordship wishes to know, as soon as possible, if the European infantry barracks for one regiment, now under construction at Meean Meer, will be certainly ready by the end of the ensuing cold season.

Simla,  
16th August, 1851.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India, Military  
Department, with the Governor-General.

From Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated 26th August, 1851.*

SIR,—

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt, on the 22nd, of your letter, No. 84, of the 16th instant, enquiring what prospect there is of accommodation being provided for a second European infantry regiment at Lahore during the present season.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
26th Aug. 1851.

2. In reply, I can state with certainty that the whole of the permanent barracks for a European regiment at Meean Meer will not be completed by the end of the ensuing cold season.

3. I can, however, with equal confidence say, that if the Most Noble the Governor-General should decide on sending a second European regiment to Lahore, and will be pleased to allow me some discretionary power in preparing for their accommodation at Meean Meer, it can be done without risk, or any injurious exposure of the troops.

4. The executive engineer having been called upon to describe the exact state of the buildings, and what can be accomplished by the end of March, I have the honour to annex copy of his report.

5. The new barracks are so large that they will hold a company and a half of Europeans without any crowding whatever. One verandah will still be vacant, and available for the men to dine in it; but if both verandahs are occupied by cots, then each barrack will give excellent shelter for 200 men.

6. Major Glasfurd states, that four barracks may safely be depended on; but my opinion is, he will be able to do more than this.

7. The chief and almost only delay in the progress of the infantry barracks is the scarcity of beams for the flat verandahs.

I would suggest, that only the main wards and enclosed verandahs be covered in at first, and that the outer open verandahs be left unroofed for the present.

Every beam thus put up will give its quota of shelter, whereas the outer verandahs are merely for shade and afford no accommodation.

8. I would urge, also, that the roofings of main wards, be either of grass, or grass and tiles, like those hitherto done, whichever material might be most readily available.

9. I feel no doubt that in this way, the main wards and the inner enclosed verandahs of the seven barracks, the walls of which are now standing in the European infantry lines, can be roofed, and they would thus afford nearly all the accommodation required for a whole regiment, viz.—

In 5 barracks at 200 men each	...	...	...	1,000
1 ditto for the whole of the married soldiers, say	...	...	...	1,000 more.
1 ditto for the whole of the sick.				

10. Still, I should wish authority to resort to thatched tents for any portion of the regiment for which, in the opinion of myself and the brigadier on the spot, there might not appear, on the 15th of January, a reasonable prospect of being able to put into the permanent buildings.

I request the favour of early intimation of the orders his Lordship may issue on the subject.

11. With regard to the artillery, to give good accommodation to two troops—one light field battery and an hospital—Major Glasfurd asks to be allowed to proceed with No. 2 light field battery barracks, with foundations of verandah walls and cross walls of kucha-pucka work, the foundations of main walls being entirely pukka.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. B. TREMENHEERE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

26th August, 1851.



## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. TREMENHEERE, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

*Dated 4th September, 1851.*

SIR,—

Col. J. Stuart  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
4th Sept. 1851.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 2,150, of the 26th August, and, in reply, to acquaint you, that the Most Noble the Governor-General has resolved not to send a second European infantry regiment to Lahore this year.

2. His Lordship desires that the buildings may, nevertheless, be proceeded with uninterruptedly and substantially.

3. The Governor-General has already refused to sanction kutchapucka foundations.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,

Simla, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,  
4th September, 1851. with the Governor-General.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated 4th September, 1851.*

SIR,—

Col. J. Stuart  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
4th Sept. 1851.

In reply to your despatch, No. 515, of the 9th ultimo, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the superintending engineer, Punjab Circle, was asked what number of new barracks would be completed at Lahore during the next cold season, in order to determine whether the 70th regiment should be removed from Cawnpore or not.

2. The reply states that four barracks will be completed by March, and before the end of the hot weather, probably, the whole seven will be ready. Discretionary power is asked for in regard to thatching tents, &c. so as to ensure cover for all.

3. On full consideration, the Most Noble the Governor-General prefers not to move the 70th regiment, under the circumstances described by the superintending engineer.

4. While there is every appearance of the continuance of tranquillity, and while an infantry regiment is quartered at Ferozepore, his Lordship is content with one infantry regiment only at Lahore, as a temporary measure.

5. The improved condition of the barracks at Anarkullie, affords very sufficient accommodation for the infantry and artillery now there; and the completion successively of single barracks at Meean Meer will offer the means of lodging these troops even better than now, during the next hot season.

6. But if another infantry regiment be brought up, the whole European force will probably be crowded, and mischief will ensue.

7. On the whole, therefore, the Governor-General prefers not to move the 70th regiment to Lahore, during this year.

8. I am instructed to enclose a copy of Lieut.-Col. Tremeneere's despatch of the 26th ultimo, and of my reply of this date, from which his Excellency will perceive how great are the physical difficulties with which the Government has to contend, and that they are of a nature not to be obviated by any expenditure of public money, however lavish, or by any exertions, however zealous.

9. Time and perseverance and continued exertions will alone enable the Government to furnish fitting accommodation for the troops. The Governor-General is confident, his Excellency will feel that it is better to proceed on this sound principle, though the progress may be proportionally slow, than to hurry work, which will be imperfectly executed, and will thus in the end be injurious to the interests of the soldier as well as to those of the Government.

Simla,  
4th Sept. 1851.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,

Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

No. 2,351.

From Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, C.B., Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated 6th September, 1851.*

SIR,—

I have the honour to forward copy of a letter from Captain Oldfield, with return, showing the strength of H.M.'s 53rd foot, which is under orders to relieve H.M.'s 98th regiment at Peshawur.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremehere  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
6th Sept. 1851.

2. I annex also a return of numbers in the 98th regiment as it stood in March last.

3. For the difference between the two, which is equal to three companies, there is no accommodation ready, and I therefore request permission from the Most Noble the Governor-General to commence immediately six of the half-company permanent barracks in the lines of H.M.'s 98th, on the revised plan and estimate, which was submitted for his Lordship's inspection, with my letter, No. 741, of the 13th June, 1851.

This estimate was sent to the Military Board on the 5th of last month.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. B. TREMENHEERE, Lieut.-Col.  
Sup. Eng. Punjab Circle.

6th Sept. 1851.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 13th April, 1852 (No. 39).*

Reply to Letter dated 24th November, 1851 (No. 186), paragraphs 34 to 36.

20. The orders given by you, as now reported, for proceeding with the barracks at Meean Meer, "uninterruptedly and substantially," and for not increasing the number of troops there, until the requisite accommodation is finished, are quite approved. The other orders given by the Governor-General for buildings in the Punjab, as now reported, are also approved.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
13th April, 1852.

GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 24th May, 1852 (No. 74).*

5. The arrangements detailed in the accompanying papers, ordered by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for the accommodation of the European troops of her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service at Lahore, which, it will be seen, comprehends the removal, before the most unhealthy season, of the greatest number possible from the cantonment of Anarkullie to that of Meean Meer, have received our entire approval.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
24th May, 1852.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 10th of April, 1852.

LETTER from Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Lieut.-Col. A. BECHER, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated 23rd February, 1852.*

SIR,—

I have the honour to forward, for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a memorandum on the available accommodation for European troops at Meean Meer, together with a block plan describing the present state of the buildings.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremehere  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
23rd Feb. 1852.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. B. TREMENHEERE, Lieut.-Col.  
Sup. Eng. Punjab Circle.

23rd Feb. 1852.

MEMORANDUM by Lieutenant-Colonel TREMENHEERE, Superintending  
Engineer, Punjab Circle.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

—  
Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
Officiating  
Quarter-Master-  
General,  
23rd Feb. 1852.

It has been shown at Sealkote, that in one of the new barracks, two companies of Europeans (excluding married soldiers) can be accommodated without crowding. This is done by making use of the enclosed verandahs, and sufficient space is still left for the dining tables and forms.

2. At Sealkote, three out of the five barracks thus occupied, are unprotected by outer open verandahs. In those five, seven companies of H.M.'s 24th are put up, besides their women. The sick are in the building designed for a canteen, which answers for the present.

3. At Meean Meer, those barracks, which are habitable, have been provided with their outer arched verandahs, and give good protection to the enclosed verandahs, which are twelve feet wide. The temporary occupation of these verandahs, until more barracks are ready, is therefore open to fewer objections than at Sealkote, where the arrangements just described are preferred to temporary barracks in an inferior and comparatively unhealthy locality.

4. With regard to Lahore, the deplorable effects of a bad atmosphere on the European garrison of the city and Anarkullie, is seen in the graveyard. There cannot be less than 500 graves. The yard was enlarged two years ago, and there is now another call for space.

5. In order that the whole available shelter at Meean Meer, may go as far as possible in accommodating the artillery and such portion of the 96th regiment as can be provided for, on the principle adverted to in the first paragraph of this memorandum, the following proposition is made.

6. The strength of *European* artillery now at Meean Meer is—2 troops of horse artillery, 1 light field battery, 2 reserve companies.

The barracks in these lines *finished* are—2 horse artillery barracks, No. 1 light field battery ditto.

*Roofing, and will be finished in April*, No. 2 light field battery barrack.

7. No. 1 light field barrack is used as an hospital; but as this building last year held 350 sick of the Bengal fusiliers, some portion of it might be set aside for married soldiers.

8. Each of the horse artillery barracks will easily accommodate a troop, and a company of foot artillery (excluding married men); so that only one company remains to be provided for, and such portion of the married men as cannot have room in No. 1 light field battery barrack.

9. This company, and the married men, will soon have shelter in No. 2 light field battery barrack, which will be finished in April.

If it is thought better not to keep them in tents till the fourth barrack is ready, the company might go back for a short time to its old quarters at Anarkullie.

This provides for the artillery.

10. Besides the above, two reserve company barracks, one wing of an hospital, and a canteen, are about to be commenced.

11. In the European infantry lines, two barracks *finished*; three more are *finishing off*, and will be ready for occupation by the 1st of April.

There are besides *completed*—a canteen, a sergeants' mess, library, and orderly-room, school-house, two staff-sergeants' bungalows and a magazine.

In April there will be exactly the same number of finished buildings in these lines as there are for her Majesty's 24th at Sealkote, where, I have before stated, seven companies are already housed. The barracks are on precisely the same plan at both places.

12. Seven companies of the 96th regiment could therefore be quartered at Meean Meer in April, or six might be more conveniently accommodated.

13. There are four more barracks for the 96th nearly ready for roofing, and the superstructure of one wing of the hospital is in progress.

There seems every probability that some of these buildings, if not all, will be ready in July, if our expectations of materials should be realized; so that before the worst part of the hot season arrives, the whole regiment might be in their new quarters.

14. The officers of her Majesty's 96th have taken no steps to build for themselves at Meean Meer. This difficulty might be overcome by allowing them, for temporary shelter, all the buildings in No. 4, native infantry lines, which are not far from the barracks, and are still unoccupied.

There is an hospital, 144 feet long, 20 feet wide, and of good height, besides two staff sergeants' bungalows, a quarter-guard, 42 × 18, and small buildings for servants. EXTRACTS, &c.

15. If these are lent, it should be with a distinct understanding that all damages, during occupation, and from whatever causes, shall be made good; that they will have to be vacated on the 15th of November next, and not be again available during the hot season of 1853.

From Lieut.-Col. A. BECHER, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Brigadier J. TENNANT, C.B., commanding at Lahore.

*Dated the 29th February, 1852.*

SIR,—

I have had the honour to submit, for the consideration and orders of the Commander-in-Chief, your letter, No. 25, of the 23rd instant, setting forth in detail the disposition which you would propose to make for the accommodation of the European troops at Lahore during the approaching hot season and rains; at the same time I laid before his Excellency, a proposition on this important subject, from Lieut.-Col. Tremeneere, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, a copy of which is herewith attached for your information.

Officiating  
Quartermaster-  
General to  
Brig. J. Tennant,  
29th Feb. 1852  
f

The Commander-in-Chief having given these several projects the fullest consideration to which he deems them entitled, both from the vital importance of the subject, as also from the authorities from whence they emanated, has desired me to communicate his opinions and orders thereon for your guidance.

His Excellency having carefully examined the cantonment of Anarkullie, in actual occupation by the European portion of the garrison of Lahore, and also the accommodation in course of preparation for similar purposes at Meean Meer, and the state of the weather since the arrival of head-quarters of the army at Lahore, having moreover enabled him to form an opinion, from actual observation, of the manner in which the two localities are affected by a somewhat heavy, but not long-continued fall of rain; the whole circuit of Anarkullie was found to be buried in swamp, while that of Meean Meer has worn a totally different aspect, even before it has been submitted to the slightest process of drainage, presently to be extensively entered upon. The barracks at Meean Meer are roomy, lofty, perfectly ventilated, excellent in their construction throughout, and considerably advanced in preparation for occupation; those of Anarkullie are low, close, imperfectly ventilated, and only fitted for temporary occupation even in a favourable locality, their actual one being the very reverse of this, as too fatal experience has shown. From these established facts, his Excellency deems it a most imperative duty, to provide as early as possible for moving from Anarkullie, and locating in the healthy station of Meean Meer, as large a portion of the European force, composing the garrison of Lahore, as circumstances will admit of.

The plan which you have submitted, based upon the instructions furnished in the letters of the Assistant Secretary to Government, of the 19th and 25th December, 1850, has for its object the appropriation by the European artillery (for the approaching hot season) of the whole of the buildings completed and in course of completion, as well those intended for occupation by the artillery, as those designed for the accommodation of a British infantry battalion, while the project of the superintending engineer points out, how, in his estimation, the same amount of quarters may be made available for the accommodation of the troops of both arms, to a *very considerable extent* by the beginning of April, and to probable completion before the close of July. Following the suggestions made by you, Sir William Gomm thinks that much valuable space will be lost in the pursuit of the object of insuring proper supervision over that portion of the artillery, which you propose to locate at a distance of two miles from their own proper lines. An entire barrack, that is, a space which Lieut.-Col. Tremeneere pronounces to be (and which his Excellency has seen to be) capable of furnishing temporary accommodation to *two European companies*, exclusive of the married parties (such being now the case with her Majesty's 24th regiment at Sealkote), you would "allot to the accommodation of those "medical and other officers, who must, if possible be near their men." Your proposed distribution holds out little hope of even a wing of her Majesty's 96th regiment being brought up to Meean Meer, before they shall have been subjected to another sickly season at Anarkullie, the last having lodged 120 of their number in the graveyard hard by.

The Commander-in-Chief does not concur in your opinion that increased accommodation for her Majesty's 96th regiment in the barracks at Anarkullie, through the appropriation of space vacated by the artillery, would go far to obviate the recurrence of

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Officiating  
Quartermaster-  
General to  
Brig. J. Tennant,  
29th Feb. 1852

the visitation of last year, even should the regiment be required to run the hazard; nor in your recommendation, that unless driven to the measure by *indispensable necessity*, there should be no more than five companies until the cold season, in consideration of what you deem the imperative necessity of furnishing a daily relief of the company in the fort, and the impracticability of providing this relief from Meean Meer. His Excellency believes that no increase of accommodation in the fatal barracks at Anarkullie will remove from the men's minds the recurring disaster connected with the season: and it requires no medical faculty to estimate the value, in a prejudicial sense, of such impressions; and from his own acquired knowledge of the locality, Sir William Gomm feels satisfied they would be right in their convictions. So impressed, the Commander-in-Chief will not allow a man of the 96th regiment, for whom proper space can be allotted in his own appointed station at Meean Meer, to remain in the low ground of Anarkullie, beyond the close of March. The health of the regiment is unstable at this hour; the number in hospital is not excessive, but the countenances of the men who were looked at, at a review on their own company's parades, when his Excellency inspected their barracks, convinced the Commander-in-Chief that he ought to forego the satisfaction of seeing them in brigade field-day, through a fatiguing morning. Under these circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief directs, that six companies of her Majesty's 96th regiment may be held in readiness, and prepared to move up to the quarters which will be ready for their reception at Meean Meer, by the beginning of April.

The superintending engineer is prepared to show that they will be more amply, and in several essential respects better provided than seven companies of her Majesty's 24th regiment are at this moment at Sealkote.

Ninety-five recruits are in progress up the country to join the 96th regiment. Every man of this detachment must be located at Meean Meer, and included in the strength of the six companies before mentioned; and there is every reason for hoping that the remaining companies may be enabled to join their head-quarters in the course of the hot weather. His Excellency entirely concurs with the chief civil authorities, in the expediency of locating one company of European infantry in the fort, but thinks its daily relief quite unnecessary, and, as you justly observe, impracticable, when the corps shall have been established at Meean Meer. The distance is five miles from point to point, and a weekly relief therefore perfectly easy; and it may be hoped, far from prejudicial to health, probably the reverse, provided it is made at proper hours. It has yet to be shown that, unconnected with the deleterious climate of Anarkullie, the fort is found to work prejudicially upon health, through a weekly sojourn, passing thither from and back to Meean Meer. The newly-fitted-up quarter in the fort, is roomy, lofty, infinitely superior in every respect to anything at Anarkullie, much higher seated, of course, at least as little exposed to stagnant, swampy atmosphere, and was the coolest barrack in the whole region during the great heat; it deserves therefore a better trial than it has yet been subjected to, and if it is found to fail, a remedy will be promptly looked for. In the mean time, it is to be observed, that the relief of the company in the fort should be weekly, and at all seasons made in the early morning.

Sir William Gomm is ready to give every consideration to the observations you make, regarding the inconvenience that the officers of her Majesty's 96th regiment must perforce be subjected to, by a removal this year, of any portion of the corps from their present quarters, to the station of Meean Meer; but it appears difficult to account for their want of preparation for such a move, as soon as circumstances would admit of it, with the buildings for the accommodation of their men growing up under their eyes, and the crying necessity for as early a move as possible too palpable all around them. The season is, however, highly favourable for building at the present hour, and the superintending engineer proposes to place a certain number of quarters neighbouring to their own lines, but not connected with them, at their service, whilst their own arrangements are in progress, upon certain reasonable connections; and thus, inconvenience to a very serious extent, as anticipated by you, will, it is to be hoped, be obviated.

It is of consequence to the officers of the corps, when proceeding to provide themselves with quarters, in the manner in which all new stations have been taken up by her Majesty's regiments in India, that they should be apprised, that the Commander-in-Chief sees no prospect, in the course of regular relief, of the 96th being required to change its station for several years to come; subject, of course, to contingencies, which may at any hour call for a different disposition.

His Excellency is very desirous that it should not be supposed that, while making these dispositions for restoring the men of her Majesty's 96th to health and spirits, he

is losing sight of what is due to other parties, who have also suffered through the sickness of last year, though far less severely than the 96th regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Tremeneere shows, how, upon the same plan of occupation with that in force at Sealkote, with precisely the extent of accommodation in each separate barrack, and better provision, through the closing of verandahs, the artillery will be provided for, simultaneously with the infantry; and in furtherance of this plan, the Commander-in-Chief begs that Lieutenant Colonel Tremeneere's statement may be carefully referred to.

With respect to the instructions conveyed in the assistant secretary's letters, before adverted to, which you consider so binding in all arrangements connected with the disposal of the barrack buildings at Meean Meer, as they become ready, I am desired to observe, that you must have seen, by various communications made to you since the date of their issue, that his Excellency regarded them as subject to considerable modifications, especially through the calamitous mortality of the last rainy season among the 96th regiment; and Sir William Gomm feels sure that, in ordering these movements, he is carrying out the spirit of the instructions of the Most Noble the Governor-General, whose motives, like those of the Commander-in-Chief, are directed solely to the welfare and healthy preservation of the troops of both services.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. BECHER, Lieut.-Col.

Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

Quartermaster-General's Office, Head-Quarters,  
Camp, Meean Meer, 29th Feb. 1852.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
—  
Officiating  
Quartermaster-  
General to  
Brig. J. Tennant,  
29th Feb. 1852.

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From Lieut.-Col. R. J. H. BIRCH, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. A. M. BECHER, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated the 7th April, 1852.*

SIR,—

Having submitted to Government your despatch, No. 166, of the 9th March, 1852, I am desired to state, that the Governor-General in Council heartily approves of the orders given by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, relative to the accommodation of the European troops of H.M.'s and the Honourable Company's services at Lahore, as conveyed in your letter to Brigadier Tennant, C.B., No. 137, of the 29th February last.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Lieut.-Col.

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Military Department.

Council Chamber,  
Fort William, 7th April, 1852.

Lieut.-Col.  
R. J. H. Birch  
to Officiating  
Quartermaster-  
General to,  
7th April, 1852.

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#### COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 20th October, 1852 (No. 128).*

Reply to Letter dated 24th May, 1852 (No. 74), Para. 5.

5. We unite with you in cordially approving the measures taken by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, after a careful personal inspection of the localities, for removing, as soon as possible, from Anarkullie to Meean Meer, the greatest number of men which the barracks at that station can receive.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
20th Oct. 1852.

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#### GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 26th July, 1852 (No. 137).*

32. We transmit in this collection a highly satisfactory communication from the superintending engineer, Punjab Circle, regarding the progress of the barracks at Meean Meer, in which he states, that before quitting Lahore he had seen H.M.'s 96th regt. in possession of five of the new infantry barracks, the accommodation in which is described to be of a very superior description.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
26th July, 1852.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## BENGAL MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 25th June, 1852.

From Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to  
Lieut. J. P. BEADLE, Officiating Secretary, Military Board.

*Dated 11th May, 1852.*

SIR,—

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere  
to Lieut.  
J. P. Beadle,  
11th May, 1852.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Military Board, that before quitting Lahore, I saw H.M.'s 96th regt. in occupation of five of the new infantry barracks at Meean Meer. The buildings, which were given over in a perfectly finished state, are noted in the margin.\*

2. The regiment marched from Anarkullie on Monday, the 3rd of May. The sick moved out on the 1st, and occupy one entire barrack. In the other four, eight companies are put up without crowding. In the main wards, there are no more than the number for which the barrack is intended. In one of the long inclosed verandahs there is a row of cots, generally at three feet apart, except in the two flank companies, which, being rather stronger than the rest, are not quite so well accommodated, a few cots being placed alongside the verandah wall. The other long enclosed verandah contains only the men's dining-tables and forms. The commanding officer expressed himself satisfied.

3. The accommodation is in fact higher and better in those five barracks, with the slight exception noted in the flank companies, than exists in ten finished barracks at Jullunder, where one of the inclosed verandahs is permanently occupied by cots, and the other reserved for dining. When the Punjab barracks shall be completed, every man will have his place in the body of the building.

4. One more barrack in H.M.'s 96th lines will be habitable in July next, as well as one wing of the hospital and the medical subordinates' quarters; but in order to give the regiment the fullest room in our power as early as possible, it will be necessary to lay down kucha brick on the floors of the main wards and inner verandahs, as a temporary measure,—the outer verandahs only of these three buildings being finished with pukka floors at present.

5. The 7, 8, and 9 barracks in these lines are also well advanced. All verandahs covered, and roofing materials for main wards preparing.

A block plan of these lines, showing present state of all the buildings, is annexed.

6. I have the pleasure to add, that H.E. the Commander-in-Chief has expressed himself well pleased with the progress made in accommodating the troops at Meean Meer; and, in a demi-official note of the 27th ultimo, has communicated his acknowledgments for the zeal and diligence displayed by all portions of this department concerned.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 1st December, 1852 (No. 158).*

Reply to Letter dated 26th July, 1852 (No. 137).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal.  
1st Dec. 1852.

13. We have perused with much satisfaction Lieutenant-Colonel Tremeneere's report on the progress made with the barracks at Meean Meer.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 29th June, 1853 (No. 76).*

Letter dated 22nd February, 1853 (No. 36).

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal.  
29th June, 1853.

46 and 47. Advert to paragraphs 14 to 16 of No. 73 of 1849, and report proceedings regarding the provision of separate quarters for married soldiers in the Punjab.

27. We shall be glad to learn that the advantages anticipated from the alteration here described in the standard plan of barracks, to adapt a portion of them to the comfortable reception of the married men, have been realized.

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\* Five barracks, canteen, sergeants' mess, library and orderly-room, school-house, temporary cook-rooms, and privies.

## BARRACKS, &amp;c. AT PESHAWUR.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 31st October, 1849 (No. 96).*

Paragraph 45. Consequent on the annexation of the Punjab, we trust that you will soon be enabled to place the officers quartered at Lahore, on the same system of providing themselves with quarters, as prevails at all other stations of the army.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
31st Oct. 1849.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 28th May, 1850 (No. 88).*

17. In regard to the new cantonment at Peshawur, where it is alleged that the extent of available ground, and other circumstances, will not admit of compounds with separate houses for officers; we informed his Excellency, with reference to paragraph 45 of your Military Letter to Bengal (No. 96), dated 31st October, 1849, that if it were possible, on the site selected, for officers to provide houses for themselves, they should, in compliance with the wishes of your Honourable Court, do so; but if not, we sanctioned the formation of the cantonment on the plan submitted.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
28th May, 1850.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 19th of April, 1850.

From Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Head-Quarters, dated the 18th of February, 1850.*

SIR,—

By desire of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I have the honour to forward copy of instructions given to me relative to the new arrangements at Peshawur, and to request that you will be so good as to communicate their substance to Government, and obtain the requisite sanction.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere  
to Officiating,  
Quarter-Master-  
General,  
18th Feb. 1850.

I have the honour to be, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. B. TREMENHEERE, Lieut.-Col.,  
Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

Superintending Engineer's Office, Punjab Circle,  
Camp, Pubbee, the 18th of Feb. 1850.

## INSTRUCTIONS for LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TREMENHEERE, regarding Peshawur, the 18th of February, 1850.

The ridge of high ground west of Peshawur, extending from the lines of the 7th cavalry towards the village of Syudpore, has been selected as the site of a permanent station, for 1 company of sappers and pioneers; 2 Queen's regiments of infantry; 5 regiments of native infantry; 3 ditto of cavalry; 2 troops of European horse artillery; 2 light field batteries of ditto; 2 reserve companies of ditto; 1 ditto ditto in the fort.

Instructions by  
Commander-in-  
Chief to  
Superintending  
Engineer,  
Punjab Circle,  
18th Feb. 1850.

Neither the extent of available ground, nor other circumstances, admit of compounds with separate houses for officers.

Barracks, therefore, with ranges of out-offices and stables, are to be planned and estimated for all European officers, and the whole arrangement reported on, and submitted to Government, without delay.

House rent, at the rate of twenty rupees a month, might be charged to a subaltern, and to other ranks in proportion to the accommodation occupied.

A plan of the proposed cantonment has been seen and approved by me; and this,



EXTRACTS, &c. with the sanction of Government, is to be eventually carried into effect, so far as the nature of the ground will admit of it.

Instructions by  
Commander-in-  
Chief to  
Superintending  
Engineer,  
Punjab Circle,  
18th Feb. 1850.

The troops are to be concentrated as soon as possible on the ground selected; the regiments now on the east side of the city being brought into the positions which they will eventually occupy in the permanent cantonment.

The lines of two of these regiments, the 31st and the 70th native infantry, proved last year to be very unhealthy, and they are not again to be occupied. The temporary structures used as hospital, staff-sergeants' sheds, &c., should be taken down and rebuilt in the new locality.

H.M.'s 61st regiment is in a very crowded state in the Goorkuttree. If any other buildings can be found near at hand, and be put into repair for some of the married soldiers, it should be done; but no new sheds should be placed in this part of the town.

New lines for this regiment must be marked out on the ridge, and temporary barrack sheds erected there, to such extent as will afford 1,000 cubic feet of air per man, whether quartered in a shed or in the Goorkuttree. The hospital should be sent out, the married men, and three or four companies, as soon as sheds can be built. The barrack sheds of her Majesty's 98th regiment are to be extended till the same result is obtained.

The hospital accommodation of her Majesty's 98th is also to be increased.

Two of the reserve companies of European artillery, now in the fort, are to be moved out and placed in similar sheds on the high ground; and the company recently arrived with Captain Burnett's battery also requires accommodation.

A new hospital must be built for all artillery, and a guard-room at the fort gate, to contain fourteen Europeans with an officers' room.

A store-room, an orderly room, for each European regiment and artillery, as well as a proportion of temporary cells and dry rooms, for solitary and ordinary imprisonment, are to be constructed.

All repairs to the fort, which are essential to its stability, are to be immediately carried into effect; and the portion of wall which has recently fallen down is to be renewed.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief

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No. 486.

From Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, to Lieut.-Col. J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated the 13th of April, 1850.*

SIR,—

Major R. Wyllie  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
13th April, 1850.

In reply to your despatch, No. 180, of the 25th February last, with copy of the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to the superintending engineer, Punjab Circle, relative to the formation of a cantonment at Peshawur, I am directed to transmit to you the accompanying extract of a military letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors to this Government, No. 96, of the 31st October, 1849, paragraph 45, and to state, for his Excellency's information, that if the site selected is of such a nature as to admit the possibility of so far modifying the plan of cantonment at Peshawur as to permit officers to provide houses for themselves, the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council is desirous that the Court's wishes should be acted up to.

2. If the site, however, renders this impracticable, his Lordship in Council sanctions the formation of the cantonment, which cannot be delayed, on the plan submitted.

I have, &c.

Council Chamber, Fort William,  
the 13th of April, 1850.

(Signed) R. WYLLIE, Major,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Military Department.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS,

*Dated the 19th June, 1850 (No. 102).*

49. In continuation of paragraphs 16 and 17 of general letter, No. 88, dated 28th May, 1850, we have the honour to state that the Most Noble the Governor-General has finally sanctioned the construction of officers' quarters in the new cantonment at Peshawur, there being on the site selected, no room for separate compounds; besides which, the proposed arrangement will afford greater security to the families of officers, in the event of any considerable portion of the troops being withdrawn for service.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
19th June, 1850.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 31st May, 1850.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

*Dated the 11th May, 1850.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

With advertence to your letter to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, No. 486, dated the 13th ultimo, I am directed to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable the President of the Council of India in Council, and such orders as may be requisite, copy of a despatch from the Quartermaster-General of the Army, No. 329, dated the 30th ultimo, and of my reply thereto, No. 11 of this date.

Col. J. Stuart to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
11th May, 1850.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,

Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.Simla,  
11th May, 1850.

From Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Simla.

*Dated the 30th of April, 1850.*

SIR,—

I am directed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of a despatch, No. 486, dated 13th instant (copy of which is enclosed), from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with an extract of a military letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors, No. 96, dated 31st October, 1849, paragraph 45, and conveying the desire of the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, that the Court's wishes in regard to the system of officers providing themselves with quarters at the Punjab stations, should be acted up to, in respect to the new cantonment at Peshawur, if the site selected is of such a nature as to admit the possibility of the plan being modified for that purpose.

Quarter-Master-  
General  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
30th April, 1850.

2. In reply, I am instructed by his Excellency to state, that the Court's wishes have been already carried out, as regards all the new stations in the Punjab; but Peshawur, which is not in the Punjab, is in every respect differently situated as regards officers' quarters. Not only is it impossible to mark out separate compounds from the want of room, but his Excellency also begs to draw the attention of his Lordship to another fact. The Khyberies are such dangerous neighbours, that they even now steal horses from officers' compounds almost every night, so that in some instances officers are obliged to send their horses to the cavalry lines; and were the force at Peshawur called into the field, leaving a small garrison, every officer's bungalow would be rifled, and his family and property exposed to violence and plunder.

3. The whole of that neighbourhood is most dangerous, and therefore, with refer-

## PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO

EXTRACTS, &c. ence to paragraph 2 of the enclosed letter, the Commander-in-Chief is happy to observe, that his Lordship in Council sanctions the formation of the cantonment at Peshawur on the plan submitted.

Quarter-Master-General  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
30th April, 1815.

Quartermaster-General's Office,  
Head-Quarters, Simla,  
30th April, 1850.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. G. DRUMMOND, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Quartermaster-General of the Army.

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From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated the 11th of May, 1850.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Col. J. Stuart  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
11th May, 1850.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 329, of the 30th ultimo, and in reply, to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that as his Excellency states that want of room will not admit of compounds being included in the cantonment of Peshawur, the Most Noble the Governor-General finally sanctions it on the present plan.

2. His Lordship observes, that the spirit of the orders of the Honourable Court on the subject of officers' quarters, very evidently applies as well to Peshawur as to every cantonment in India.

I have, &c.,

Simla,  
11th May, 1850.

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

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## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 27th November, 1850 (No. 130).*

Reply to Letter dated 19th June, 1850 (No. 102).

Court of Directors  
to Quarter-Master-  
General,  
27th Nov. 1850.

26. It appearing to be absolutely necessary, under present circumstances, to build officers' quarters at Peshawur, that measure has our sanction. We are glad to find that at every other station in the newly-acquired territory, you have been able to act upon our views on this subject.

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## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to the COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated the 24th September, 1850 (No. 164).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
24th Sept. 1850.

42. At the request of the Most Noble the Governor-General, we transmit, in continuation of paragraph 49 of general letter, No. 102, dated 19th June, 1850, further proceedings regarding the construction of the new cantonment at Peshawur, the early completion of which, his Lordship considers of the utmost importance.

43. It will be seen that we have, in consideration of the extent of the public works now in progress in the Punjab, and the necessity which exists for their speedy completion, allowed Lieutenants Glover and Newmarch to be employed as extra officers in the Lahore and Peshawur divisions, on the same staff salaries as they received when in charge of those divisions.

44. The Military Board have been directed to submit, before next cold season, a report on the plans and estimates for the several cantonments in the Punjab.

FORT WILLIAM, MILITARY CONSULTATIONS,  
9th August, 1850.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated the 17th of July, 1850.*

SIR,—

In returning the original enclosures of your letter, No. 475, of the 21st ultimo, I am directed to state, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, that the case of Peshawur is in many ways peculiar in respect of quarters for troops.

Col. J. Stuart to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
17th July, 1850.

2. Very considerable sickness arose last year from the crowded state of the temporary quarters which were used, as well as from their situation; and although the expense of remedying this crowding is very great, the expense of loss of life from the continuance of such a state of things would be greater still.

3. The Governor-General has already recorded his views as to the provision of officers' quarters, and his Lordship has been obliged to sanction it, from the representations made of the absolute necessity of the case.

4. The Governor-General requests that the proceedings on this case may be reported to the Honourable Court; and begs that his Honour in Council will intimate to the Military Board, that his Lordship expects to receive from them, before the commencement of the next cold season, a report on the plans and estimates of the superintending engineer for the several cantonments in the Punjab.

5. In work so heavy, the Governor-General has not wished to press the department to undue haste. But ample time will have been allowed by the end of the rains, and his Lordship expects not to be disappointed.

6. Have the goodness to cause a copy of the Military Board's communication, No. 1,074, dated 30th May last, to be forwarded for record here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

Simla,  
17th July, 1850.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 2nd April, 1851 (No. 34).*

Reply to Letter dated 24th September, 1850 (No. 164), Paras. 42 to 44.

25. The several measures here reported, have our sanction.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
2nd April, 1851.

GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 19th November, 1850 (No. 185).*

49. Adverting to paragraphs 42 to 44 of general letter, No. 164, dated 24th September, 1850, we have the honour to transmit the proceedings of three Station Committees, assembled at Peshawur, for the purpose of defining the extent of additional accommodation required for the European troops at that station.

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
19th Nov. 1850.

50. It will be seen that the Most Noble the Governor-General considers the constitution of these committees to have been objectionable, as in each case they were composed of officers of the regiment for which the barracks were required. His Lordship has, however, assented to the provision of sufficient accommodation for the troops, strictly limiting the construction of solitary cells, store-rooms, &c., to the extent allowed by regulation.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS,  
25th October, 1850.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated 27th September, 1850.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Col. J. Stuart to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
27th Sept. 1850.

Your letter, No. 771, under date the 30th ultimo, and the despatch from the Military Board, No. 3,112, dated the 15th idem, with inclosures therewith received, have been duly laid before the Most Noble the Governor-General.

2. The Governor-General has perused with attention the proceedings of the three committees styled by the Military Board, Station Committees, though in each case composed exclusively of regimental officers,—an arrangement which appears open to objection.

3. Accommodation for the troops must be provided, and to that the Governor-General assents. Solitary cells, store-rooms, &c. &c. are to be provided in accordance with regulation, and no more.

GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 19th May, 1851 (No. 78).*

Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
19th May, 1851.

38. In continuation of paragraphs 26 to 29 of general letter, No. 66, dated 19th April, 1851, we have the honour to transmit the documents recorded as per margin, containing the orders of the Most Noble the Governor-General, on several subjects of detail connected with the departments of public works in the Punjab, and more particularly regarding the new cantonment of Peshawur, which has received the special attention of his Lordship during his recent visit to that station.

39. With advertence to paragraphs 30 and 31 of general letter, No. 47, dated 28th March, 1851, we have the honour to state, that we approved of all temporary barracks at Peshawur, being built in future one foot wider and three feet higher than the temporary buildings now under construction there, as it is probable that they will be occupied for some years before permanent buildings can be erected.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

*Dated 21st March, 1851.*

SIR,—

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
21st March, 1851.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 4,300, of the 10th instant, relative to the accommodation for the troops at Peshawur.

2. The Governor-General, on his arrival at Peshawur, authorized you to proceed, without waiting for estimates, with the twelve buildings required to complete the cover for the European troops. The cost of each building, as it is completed, is to be charged in a bill.

3. Improvements in the hospitals already erected, are desirable. Serjeants' messes, libraries, school-rooms, &c., are required; but all these works are to give way for the present to the immediate necessity of providing proper shelter for the troops, who as yet have none at all, except in choppered tents.

4. The Governor-General authorizes your obtaining, as proposed, from Lahore, for

the purpose of improving the ventilation of the hospitals and buildings already erected at Peshawur, such thermantidotes as may be found available, on your conferring with the military authorities at Lahore.

5. These thermantidotes are not meant to supersede the use of tatties and punkahs, and the establishments required for working them are sanctioned by his Lordship. In the necessarily inferior shelter, which alone it is practicable to give at present, all appliances will be required, and sanction is hereby given to them for this season.

6. By the authority which has already been given to you regarding the buildings which were still wanting, and by the instructions relative to the roads, &c., of the cantonments, the Governor-General has removed all difficulties in your way, and has afforded you the means of completing these barracks speedily and with certainty. You are requested to instruct the executive engineer accordingly, and to direct that a progress report shall be sent to his Lordship's military secretary during this season, on the 1st and 15th of each month.

7. The Governor-General requests that you will give the same orders regarding progress report, to the executive engineers at Sealkote, Lahore, and Murree.

8. The Governor-General has resolved that the permanent quarters for the European troops at Peshawur, shall be half-barracks of the dimensions proposed, namely, 17 or 18 feet high, the building being divided by a centre wall into two apartments, each of 14 feet in width, and of kutchha bricks.

9. The buildings already commenced on a scale to contain a whole company, may be completed, and an inner verandah with doors, and an outer verandah arcaded, are to be added.

10. The remaining barracks, each for fifty men, may be faced with pukka bricks as they are constructed.

11. You are requested to have plans and estimates in accordance with this decision, prepared for submission to the Military Board. In the mean time, you are to proceed under his Lordship's authority, with the buildings already in hand.

12. The executive engineer complains of the great scarcity of builders, and the impossibility of obtaining them in such numbers as to carry on the works in a satisfactory manner. He reports, that terms seventy-five per cent. higher than their usual wages have been offered; and that he has addressed requisitions to the civil officers in the Cis and Trans-Sutlej states, and requests that the Board of Administration may be directed to send 500 masons at once to Peshawur.

13. The Governor-General would suppose, that the terms offered would obtain the masons required; but his Lordship apprehends that you and the officers of your department must have better means of knowing where masons are to be got, and of how to get them, than the Board of Administration can have.

14. If the present attempt to obtain masons fails, the Governor-General will direct the Board of Administration to do their best.

15. In the event of masons arriving, the sepoys' palls you ask for, may be given, if the people cannot hut themselves.

16. The Governor-General authorizes one hundred carts to be purchased, or made up, for the use of the executive engineer, in constructing the buildings at Peshawur.

17. His Lordship would have sanctioned the transfer of the barrack duties to the conductor whom you recommend, if such a change had been necessary; but the appointment of Lieutenant Newmarch to the charge of the roads, &c. leaves Lieutenant Dennis available for the barrack duties, and they may be intrusted to him accordingly.

18. The additional office establishment, which you state has been sanctioned for the other stations in the Punjab, is also authorized at Peshawur.

19. The questions as to clerk and overseers, which are discussed in paragraphs 42 to 45 of your report, appear to be of a general character, and do not call for any orders on this occasion.

20. You suggest in paragraphs 46 and 47, that no estimate should be required, under the urgent circumstances which now exist at Peshawur.

21. So far as the temporary barracks adverted to in paragraph 2 are concerned, estimates may be dispensed with, as also for the other buildings sanctioned in paragraph 9; but for all others, the Governor-General directs that estimates shall be prepared in the usual manner.

22. The proposed increase of allowances for assistant executive officers does not call for his Lordship's interposition. It must be forwarded in the ordinary manner.

23. The whitewashing, for which sanction is asked, may be done at once, as well

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
21st March, 1851.

EXTRACTS, &c. as the terraces for the 7th cavalry. The picquet sheds, which are necessary for the protection of the cantonments, may be erected.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremenheere,  
21st March, 1851.

Camp, Khyrabad,  
21st of March, 1851.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Military Department, with the Most Noble  
the Governor-General.

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No. 154.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Lieutenant Colonel J. G. DRUMMOND, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated the 21st of March, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Quartermaster-  
General,  
21st March, 1851.

In continuation of my letter, No. 138, of the 18th instant, I am directed to transmit to you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a copy of a letter, No. 153, this day addressed to the superintending engineer, Punjab Circle, relative to the accommodation of the European troops at Peshawur.

2. The lines of the native troops have been completed by themselves, with the exception of the 66th regiment, who have only lately arrived. The Governor-General has had especial satisfaction in inspecting the lines of the 23rd regiment, which, under the guidance of their excellent commanding officer, Major Platt, have been made, by the aid of the men themselves, far superior to any others his Lordship has seen in India. They are built as barracks, not in separate huts; are laid out with regularity, are spacious, cleanly, and finished in a manner which reflects the highest credit both on the officers and on the men.

3. The permanent buildings for the native corps will be provided as soon as adequate temporary cover has been completed for the European troops.

4. The superintending engineer submitted to the Governor-General, on his arrival at Peshawur, a report, in which was shown the cover which already exists, and suggesting the measures which were necessary to supply the shelter which is deficient. The following is the result of the statements submitted :—

I. Her Majesty's 98th regiment, with all their married people, is already sheltered in temporary barracks, with the exception of 12 sergeants and 172 men.

II. Those who are at present sheltered are not crowded, and have upwards of 1,000 cubic feet of air for each person.

III. Her Majesty's 61st regiment will have very shortly three barracks, capable of containing 428 men, with 1,000 cubic feet of air for each person.

IV. There is also a large guard-room, to be used as a barrack for 50 men.

V. In the Goorkhuttree, formerly General Avitabile's house, in the city, there are lodged 300 men, and all the married people. These quarters do not afford 1,000 cubic feet of air for each man; but last year they contained double the number of men proposed for this season, and were nevertheless the healthiest barracks in the station.

VI. There remain 5 serjeants and 200 men to be provided for.

VII. In the artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Fordyce's and Major Waller's troops are housed in quarters, which give more than 1,000 cubic feet.

VIII. Captain Burnett's battery and two reserve companies will be similarly accommodated very soon.

IX. There remain Major Shakespear's battery and one reserve company to be accommodated.

5. From the impossibility of procuring workmen in sufficient numbers, at this distant station, while so many works are in progress elsewhere, there is little possibility of the executive engineer being able to provide buildings of the better sort, for all those who are without cover in the 61st, 98th, and artillery regiments, before the great heats commence.

6. It is of essential importance that the men should be supplied with the best shelter that the power and the funds of Government can supply. The Governor-General considers that it is the duty of the Government to avert, as far as it is within its own

power to do so, the risk of any recurrence of the grievous sickness from which the troops have suffered during the past season, and the sad mortality that ensued.

7. His Lordship has therefore approved of the proposal of the superintending engineer to erect, *at once*, four temporary buildings for each of the three corps, which will give cover to all who require shelter, and will afford nearly, though not quite, 1,000 cubic feet of air for each person.

8. The temporary buildings suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere will provide the best cover that is practicable at present, and they can be finished with certainty before the great heats begin.

9. There is another advantage connected with preparing these temporary buildings, viz., that, as they are to be supported by wooden posts, they will not interfere with the progress of the more substantial barracks, which the executive engineer is building. Some of these will probably be finished during the summer. The brigadier can then, at his discretion, occupy them either by men from the Goorkhuttree or from elsewhere, as he may deem best. If these better buildings should be completed, they will afford great relief; if not, the troops are still sheltered, and not dependent upon them.

Camp, Khyrabad,  
the 21st March, 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assist. Sec. to the Government of India  
in the Military Department,  
with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
21st March, 1851.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

*Dated the 24th of March, 1851.*

SIR,—

In continuation of previous communications with respect to the cantonment at Peshawur, I am directed to inform you, that it is the desire of the Most Noble the Governor-General, that you and the officers under you should not disregard some simple measures, which will tend to make the cantonment enjoyable to those, whose course of service may fix their residence there.

2. The natural qualities of the soil, and of the climate, are evidently calculated to render this an easy task.

3. Already on the vacant spaces, where cultivation has been stopped to make way for the cantonments, a spontaneous growth of clover is covering the ground, and is fast gathering to a natural sward. The valley shows more forest trees and verdure than all the rest of the province on this side of the Beas put together. Every village has its edging of trees; nothing therefore is required to give to the cantonment the luxury of verdure and shade, but a very little care and trouble.

4. In forming the main roads through the cantonment and across it, Lieutenant Newmarch is to cause trees to be planted, at proper intervals, when his work is completed. It is necessary that he should ascertain what trees are best adapted to the spot, and most likely to thrive. The culture of these trees, is to be as much a part of the duty of the officer in charge and his subordinates, as the formation and preservation of the roads. Such care will be necessary only for a short time. The avenue along the Anarkullie cantonment at Lahore, planted only four or five years ago, testifies to the success, which, in this province, is certain to attend a very slight exertion, and shows how easily the pleasure and comfort of the community may be promoted.

5. The Governor-General understands that it has been suggested, that a part of what was formerly the Residency compound, should be set apart for a public garden. If this should be found practicable, his Lordship will be glad to give all encouragement to it, when works more immediately urgent are completed.

6. The south-western end of the cantonment at this moment, illustrates the advantages which a little shade and verdure confer. If the brigadier should be of opinion that the planting of trees for shade near the barracks, either singly or in groves, would be desirable, the executive engineer is to take measures accordingly. His Lordship thinks

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremenheere,  
24th March, 1851.



EXTRACTS, &c. that these things have been overlooked in our cantonments. The Governor-General is disposed to set much store by them; and if others will take the same view, his Lordship will gladly give all the aid and encouragement in his power.

Camp, near Attock,  
the 24th of March 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assist. Sec. to the Government of India  
in the Military Department,  
with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS 19th April, 1851.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta.

*Dated the 25th March, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson to  
Major R. Wyllie,  
25th March, 1851.

I am directed to transmit, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, copies of the undermentioned correspondence, regarding irrigation in the neighbourhood of the cantonment at Peshawur:—

Minute by the Most Noble the Governor-General, dated 10th March, 1851.

Letter to the Brigadier commanding at Peshawur, No. 78, dated 10th instant.

Letter from ditto (with enclosure), No. 399, dated 13th instant.

Letter to ditto, No. 164, dated 22nd instant.

Communications, Nos. 188, 189, and 190, to Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Foreign Department, and to the Quartermaster-General of the Army.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India, in the  
Camp, Shumsabad,  
the 25th of March, 1851. Military Department, with the Governor-General.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
10th March, 1851.

1. I have learnt with much satisfaction, on my arrival at Peshawur, that the sickness which, during the autumn and for some months subsequently, prostrated the troops in this place, European and native alike, has almost entirely passed away.

Before I leave the station, I am desirous of taking every practicable precaution for the prevention of the recurrence of such an evil, so far as it may be created or aggravated by local circumstances. Various measures may be adopted, but at present I confine myself to one point,—I mean the stagnant water which, whether lodged in excavations, or escaping from the canals unintentionally, or used for the purposes of profuse irrigation, can hardly fail to exercise a very injurious influence on the general health of the large population included within the bounds of the cantonments.

2. Stagnant pools are everywhere to be seen within the cantonment itself. Whether irrigation is resorted to within the bounds I do not know, but it is general beyond those bounds in all directions.

3. The issue of a prohibitory order against irrigation, would necessarily involve a large sacrifice of revenue to the Government. I am prepared to make that sacrifice, if injury to the health of the troops would clearly be the consequence of permitting irrigation to be continued. At the same time it is my duty not to throw away the public revenue unnecessarily, by forbidding irrigation, if the practice does not prevail to an extent calculated to be injurious in the opinion of those competent to judge.

4. For the determination of this point, I should be glad to have the aid of the body of medical officers who have been quartered at Peshawur during the past season; I request the brigadier to direct that a committee be assembled, consisting of all the medical

BARRACKS FOR THE EUROPEAN TROOPS.

279

officers in the station, under the presidency of the superintending surgeon, for the purpose of considering and replying to the following questions:—

I. Whether the late epidemic is, in their opinion, traceable to the prevalence of the practice of irrigation within the cantonment, or beyond its limits?

II. If so, within what limits from the lines would the committee recommend that irrigation should be prohibited? In considering this question, the committee will have regard to the several considerations set forth in paragraph 3, and will weigh carefully the recommendation they may submit.

III. Whether there are any other suggestions in reference to the sanitary condition of the cantonment, which they desire to bring to my notice?

5. It is very desirable that this question should be decided before I leave Peshawur at the end of this week. I have therefore to request that the committee will favour me with their report on or before Thursday evening.

Camp, Peshawur,  
March 10th, 1851.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
10th March, 1851.

From Brigadier Sir C. CAMPBELL, K.C.B., commanding Peshawur District, to Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

*Dated the 13th of March, 1851.*

SIR,—

In obedience to the instructions contained in your letter, No. 78, of the 10th instant, I have the honour to enclose a report of the proceedings of a committee of all the medical officers at Peshawur assembled yesterday, for submission to the Most Noble the Governor-General.

Brigadier  
Sir C. Campbell to  
Captain  
F. D. Atkinson,  
13th March, 1851.

Peshawur,  
13th March, 1851.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

C. CAMPBELL, Brigadier,  
Commanding Peshawur District.

PROCEEDINGS of a COMMITTEE of all the MEDICAL OFFICERS at PESHAWUR, assembled by order of Brigadier Sir C. CAMPBELL, K.C.B., commanding Peshawur District, to report on a subject to be laid before it by the Major of Brigade.

*Peshawur, 12th March, 1851.*

The president and members being all present, except Assistant-Surgeon Young, 28th regiment native infantry, on the sick report; letter No. 395, of yesterday, from the brigade major, with copy of letter No. 78, of the 10th instant, from the assistant secretary to Government Military Department, are read by the president, in which the object of the assembly of the committee is detailed.

Proceedings of  
Committee of  
Medical Officers,  
12th March, 1851.

The committee, having most carefully considered the several points upon which they are called to report, have come to the following conclusions:—

1st. The committee are of opinion that irrigation, as at present conducted in cantonments and its vicinity, has to a certain extent been the cause of the late epidemic at Peshawur.

2nd. The Committee do not recommend the entire prohibition of irrigation, but suggest that proper drains be constructed, so as to carry off all stagnant water, at least within half a mile of cantonments.

3rd. The Committee beg respectfully to suggest, that the cantonment be thoroughly drained, the water-courses kept clear and put under proper control, the bridges made firm, so that the current of water may not be impeded, and that all stagnant pools or holes in which water collects be filled up; that all old walls and unoccupied huts be thrown down, as at present they merely serve as privies, and that the cantonment be made as clear and clean as possible.

The Committee would further beg to call—

4th. The attention of the authorities to a large jheel which exists on the north side of the cantonments, and which evidently has contributed its share to the late fevers, as shown by the returns of the 23rd and 71st regiments of native infantry, 15th irregular

EXTRACTS, &c.  
 —  
 Proceedings of  
 Committee of  
 Medical Officers,  
 12th March, 1851.

cavalry, and the reserve companies in the fort troops, which, from their locality, were more immediately exposed to its influence. The Committee would recommend that it be thoroughly drained, and converted into arable land.

5th. The Committee cannot close their proceedings without taking into consideration the accommodation of the troops at Peshawur; the crowded state of the barracks, and insufficiency of ventilation, having considerably added to the sickness of the European portion of the troops.

6th. The Committee recommend that a Board for sanitary purposes be appointed to suggest improvements from time to time.

(Signed) C. S. CURLING, Superintending Surgeon, President,  
 and fourteen other medical officers, members,

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From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Brigadier Sir C. CAMPBELL, K.C.B., commanding at Peshawur.

*Dated the 22nd of March, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Captain  
 F. D. Atkinson  
 to Brigadier  
 Sir C. Campbell,  
 22nd March, 1851.

With reference to the report of the Medical Committee assembled at Peshawur, according to the instructions conveyed in my letter, No. 78, of the 10th instant, and received with your letter, No. 399, dated 13th idem, I am now directed to communicate to you the orders of the Most Noble the Governor-General, on the several points connected with the sanitary condition of the cantonment at Peshawur.

2. The Committee have recommended—

I. That without entirely prohibiting irrigation, drains be constructed to carry off all stagnant water within half a mile of cantonments.

II. That the whole cantonment be drained, the water-courses kept clean, bridged, &c., and walls thrown down.

III. That the jheel on the north-east face of the cantonment should be drained thoroughly.

IV. That the accommodation for the European troops should be improved.

V. That a Sanitary Board should be appointed.

3. The drainage of the cantonment, the destruction of old walls, and the levelling of the surface, have been provided for by the instructions conveyed in my letter, No. 135, of the 18th instant, to the superintending engineer, a copy of which was sent for your information. Under those instructions, all excavations which have been made for public buildings and public purposes of any kind, will be filled up and made level, so that water may not lodge. Wherever excavations have been made by private parties, they must be filled up forthwith by the parties who have made them. In the Peshawur cantonment individuals have built with knowledge that they were liable to such orders as might be issued regarding dwelling-houses. But neither at Peshawur nor elsewhere, will the Government allow parties to do that which is calculated to be injurious to the general health or convenience, and if they do it, they may justly be called upon to remove at their own expense the evil they have created.

4. The Governor-General requests that you will consider the orders of the Government peremptory on this head, and that you will either prohibit the making of excavations for building purposes altogether, or if, for private convenience, they are or have been permitted, that you will require them to be filled up, and properly levelled, by the person by whom they were made, as soon as the buildings are completed.

5. His Lordship considers it necessary further that all irrigation by cuts from the canal should be positively prohibited *within* the cantonments.

6. Beyond the cantonment, irrigation is not to be permitted within half a mile from the outer buildings on each face of the cantonment. The Medical Committee, very reasonably, the Governor-General thinks, make no objection to cultivation without irrigation. Ordinary cultivation, producing crops without laying the ground artificially under water, cannot possibly be injurious; such cultivation may be permitted within the limits specified, but irrigation within those limits the Governor-General directs shall be prohibited.

7. The Deputy Commissioner will be instructed to mark out the limits, within which irrigation is prohibited, in concert with you. If the prohibition affects the interests of parties now assessed, just remission will be made.

8. The control and improvement of the canal which runs through cantonments will be placed under Lieutenant Newmarch.

9. The whole of the course of the canal within the cantonments will be put into repair, and be bunded so as to prevent the escape of water, either by overflow or leakage.

10. When these repairs have been made, no cut is to be made from it, by any person, or under any pretence.

11. Flights of steps will be made at convenient intervals in the bunds, where they may be formed, or in the banks of cuttings in which the stream may run, so as to give convenient access for drawing water.

12. All washing of clothes in the stream, and all similar acts, must be strictly prohibited. Tanks for dhobies may be constructed at convenient spots on the outside of cantonments.

13. Hereafter, large baths for the Europeans may, with great facility, be made by means of supply from the streams, in connection with the barracks.

14. To enforce the observance of these regulations, some establishments may be required, and will be considered when the canal is put into a thorough state of repair and security.

15. Many of the points adverted to are not immediately practicable. The Governor-General has directed plans and estimates to be prepared.

16. The drainage of the Jheel will also be placed under Lieutenant Newmarch, who will be called upon to submit plans and estimates.

17. The improvement of the barracks for the troops, which forms the fourth recommendation of the committee, has already received his Lordship's attention, and instructions on this point will be communicated to the superintending engineer.

18. The last suggestion, namely, the appointment of a Sanitary Board, does not meet with the Governor-General's assent. It is at least premature. The Governor-General considers that in a cantonment the multiplication of authorities is at all times objectionable. If the medical officers have sanitary improvements to suggest, it will be competent to them, and it will be their duty to do so, through the superintending surgeon to you, when it can at once be brought to your notice.

Camp, Khyrabad,  
22nd March, 1851.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assist. Secretary to the Government of India,  
Military Department, with the Governor-General.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Major R. WYLLIE, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department.

*Dated 26th March, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

In continuation of previous correspondence, I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable the President of the Council of India, copy of a minute by the Most Noble the Governor-General, dated 10th instant, of a letter to the brigadier commanding at Peshawur, No. 81, dated 11th instant, letter from the brigadier, dated 14th idem, and of communications Nos. 193, 194, and 195 of this date, regarding officers' quarters at Peshawur.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India,  
in the Military Department, with  
the Most Noble the Governor-General.

Camp Boorhan,  
the 26th of March, 1851.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Major R. Wyllie,  
26th March, 1851.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Brigadier  
Sir C. Campbell,  
22nd March, 1851.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
10th March, 1851.

The plan of the cantonment at Peshawur, sanctioned by the Government on the recommendation of Sir Charles Napier, included the provision of quarters for officers.

In reply to inquiries addressed to his Excellency regarding this proposal, which was novel, he stated that at Peshawur the building of officers' quarters was necessary; two reasons were given: first, because it was "impossible to mark out separate compounds, from the want of room;" secondly, because the Kyberries were "dangerous neighbours," and if the force at Peshawur were called into the field, leaving a small garrison, every officer's quarters would be rifled, and his family and property exposed to violence and plunder.

Quartermaster-General,  
No. 329, 30th April, 1850.

Officiating Secretary, Calcutta, to  
Secretary Military Department, No.  
251, 9th Aug. 1850.

The Government, on these representations, assented to the measure, though the expense and the labour would both have been very heavy, as is shown by the superintending engineer.

2. From the view which I have been able to take of this cantonment since I arrived here, two days ago, it would appear that one of the reasons given for providing officers' quarters must have been founded on a miscalculation. I find a vast number of bungalows actually built by officers within the cantonment, and within the spaces set apart for the purpose.

If officers, knowing that quarters were proposed to be furnished, have nevertheless chosen to build houses, it is evident both that it was not impossible to find room for separate compounds, and that they prefer their own lodgings to public quarters.

3. Should the result of inquiry show, that officers for the most part have provided their own lodgings already, I see no necessity whatever for Government going to the expense of providing quarters, as was represented to be necessary.

Nor do I think that the second reason given by Sir Charles Napier is sufficiently strong, to justify the Government in compelling officers to occupy quarters to be hereafter prepared, when they have already provided lodgings for themselves.

It has not been proposed that the staff should be placed in quarters, nor could it be expected; indeed, it would be hardly practicable that the Government should place married officers and families in such quarters. The inconvenience, therefore, to which Sir Charles Napier refers, must unavoidably be incurred to a very great extent, even if quarters should be provided for some.

If the force should take the field, I apprehend that such a garrison must be left behind as would be capable of defending the *whole cantonment*, which includes public buildings in every part of it. Such a garrison will, at the same time, be capable of defending everything within the limits of such cantonment.

If the emergency be such (a contingency very improbable), that a garrison capable of defending the whole cantonment could not be spared, then the Government property must take its chance; but in such case, private property must take its chance also. Personal security will be given by the fort, which is close at hand.

4. On these grounds I see no reason why the Government should adhere to the plan of providing officers' quarters, which it adopted reluctantly, since it does not appear impracticable for officers to find quarters for themselves, or expedient to compel them to relinquish those they have built already, for others which the Government would build for them hereafter.

5. But before abandoning so material a part of the plan of the Peshawur cantonments, I wish to be sure of the facts.

Accordingly, I wish a letter to be addressed to the Brigadier.

Say, that with reference to a proposal formerly submitted for providing quarters for European officers in this cantonment, I would observe that from the general aspect of the cantonment, I am led to believe that the officers attached to the force stationed here, have already very generally provided themselves with quarters; consequently I infer that they prefer such quarters, to those that may be provided by the Government.

Request the Brigadier to inform me whether I am right in this conclusion. Request that he will further favour me with his opinion: 1st, whether any reasons exist why the Government should still carry into effect the proposal formerly made to provide quarters for all officers; 2nd, whether his experience of the peculiar circumstances of Peshawur, as a frontier station, leads him to consider it incumbent on Government to

prepare such quarters, and to compel officers to occupy them; and 3rd, whether a greater amount of general convenience will be afforded by giving over the spaces hitherto reserved for officers' quarters as building sites, or by adhering to the original proposal of having the quarters built by Government. I propose to settle the question one way or the other before I leave Peshawur. I should therefore be glad to be favoured with a reply before that date.

10th of March, 1851.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
Minute by  
Governor-General,  
10th March, 1851.

From Brigadier C. CAMPBELL, commanding Peshawur district, to Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

*Dated the 14th of March, 1851.*

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 81, of the 11th instant, on the subject of the proposal formerly submitted, for providing quarters at this station for European officers; and desiring, by direction of the Most Noble the Governor-General, information on certain points connected with this proposal, to enable his Lordship to decide before his departure from Peshawur, as to the advisability or otherwise of building barracks for officers at this station.

Brig. C. Campbell,  
to Captain  
F. D. Atkinson,  
14th March, 1851.

The Governor-General is quite correct in the judgment his Lordship has formed, with respect to the number of officers that have already provided themselves with quarters.

With the exception of a few officers of H.M.'s 61st regiment, stationed in the Ghur Khuttree, all the other officers of the force have built for themselves houses; in doing which they have been necessarily obliged to incur a very heavy outlay of money.

They have housed themselves within the limits laid down for their barracks, and the outhouses to be attached to them; or, to speak more correctly, they have done so within the limits of the ground allotted for the outhouses; that for the barracks having been reserved.

It will be evident to his Lordship that the value of their houses would be entirely lost, in case of barracks being built.

With reference to the opinion required in the second question, I would observe, that one of the principal objects for which barracks were to be built may be considered, in a great measure, to have been obtained, viz., the restriction within narrow limits of the ground allotted for the accommodation of officers.

As regards security, the cantonment can be more easily defended as a whole than could each particular portion of it, whether consisting of barracks or of detached buildings.

A road runs *quite close* to the cantonment, all round, beyond which no buildings have been permitted upon this road. Guard-houses are being built for the quarter, and rear guards of corps. When these are completed, the cantonment will be encircled by Posts, whose sentries will be in communication with each other, and thus render it very secure, and, I trust, effectual against thieves, the annoyance most to be apprehended.

The officers' private dwellings, though detached from each other, are in separate blocks or portions of ground, each surrounded by an open space, or interval of 150 feet, having a road in the middle of such interval.

In the opinion of the executive engineer, the size of these blocks should, on no account, be increased, or the width of the intervals diminished, either now or at any future period.

If it should meet with the approbation of the Governor-General, the ground within these blocks, hitherto reserved for officers' barracks, might now be made over to them for their private convenience, either as additional building sites, or as additions to their present very limited compounds. It is of no value for any other purpose, and is already within the existing boundaries, which cannot, with reference to other arrangements, be contracted.

I have, &c., &c.,  
(Signed) C. CAMPBELL, Brigadier,  
Commanding Peshawur District.

Peshawur, 14th March, 1851.

## EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

From Captain F. D. ATKINSON, Assistant-Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, with the Most Noble the Governor-General, to Brigadier Sir C. CAMPBELL, K.C.B., commanding at Peshawur.

*Dated the 26th March, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Captain  
F. D. Atkinson  
to Brigadier  
Sir C. Campbell,  
26th March, 1851

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, on the subject of officers' quarters at Peshawur.

2. The opinion you have expressed confirms the Governor-General in the conclusion his Lordship was led to form by inspection of the cantonment, namely, that the building of officers' quarters by the Government was no longer necessary, and would, in truth, be a hardship on the body of officers who have already housed themselves. In abandoning the plan of building officers' quarters, the Government will act with consideration towards its servants, and will save a large and needless expense.

3. The reasons, however, which were alleged for laying out the cantonment in as compact a form as circumstances would allow, and within narrow limits, the Governor-General conceives remain in full force. When the main road round the cantonment has been decided upon and marked out, the rear guards and picquets will immediately be built, and on no pretence whatever is any house or building to be permitted within the limits of cantonment beyond such main road.

4. His Lordship considers that the executive engineer is right in urging that the size of the blocks in which officers' houses are built, should not be increased, and that the width of the intervals should not be diminished.

5. The spaces heretofore set apart for officers' quarters need not any longer be reserved; they may be given up for building sites; but the Governor-General thinks that such building sites should not be larger than those already obtained by officers, and that the spaces should not be parcelled out for additional compounds. His Lordship has determined so, because the limits of the cantonment cannot be enlarged: it contains all the officers' houses required at present. But other corps may come hereafter with more officers. More staff quarters may be required, if Peshawur should at any time become the head-quarters of a division. A church or churches will, his Lordship hopes, be sanctioned, and will require sites. Soldiers' gardens, his Lordship also hopes to see established. Room for all these objects require to be provided, and if the spaces now reserved should be made over for compounds, the accomplishment of such objects becomes impracticable; the Government, therefore, must require that the building spaces shall be limited in extent.

6. I am instructed to request of you information as to whether any stated space has been allotted for the houses already built; if not, what is the average space occupied, and what scale of spaces your experience and knowledge of the ground to be occupied would suggest, for the several ranks of officers, who may possibly desire to build on the spaces now vacant, and about to be given over by the Government.

7. The Governor-General particularly requests that a space centrally situated between the barracks of the 61st and 98th regiments, may be reserved for a church, in the event of one being sanctioned; such a site would be convenient and would fulfil the end which is so desirable, of not requiring the men to march a long distance before they reach the place of worship.

8. The spot marked in the executive engineer's plan for "barrack-master's godowns," seems to be an eligible site for this purpose.

9. Another site, somewhere near the engineer's godown or the woodyard, may be reserved for a similar purpose.

10. The Governor-General strongly urges on your attention the expediency of selecting another site for the burial-ground, on the verge of cantonments, and away from the hospitals, barracks, and dwellings.

11. Such a spot may readily be selected, and you are authorized to direct the executive engineer to enclose it at once with a proper wall.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Captain,  
Assist. Secretary to the Government of India, in the  
Military Department, with the Most Noble  
the Governor-General.

Camp, Boorhan,  
the 26th of March, 1851.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 5th November, 1851 (No. 123).*

Reply to Letter dated 19th May, 1851 (No. 78).

30. We learn with great satisfaction from these proceedings, that the Governor-General was able, during his Lordship's stay at Peshawur, to give his personal attention to many important matters connected with the cantonment and fort at that station, and was able to issue orders calculated to promote the health, comfort, and security of the troops.

Court of Directors  
to Government of  
Bengal,  
5th Nov. 1851.

31. We refer particularly to the completion of buildings for the cover of the European troops, the laying out of roads, the levelling the ground within and round the cantonment, the planting of trees, the placing the canal, and irrigation from it, under proper rules and restrictions, and the arrangement of spaces for officers' bungalows. With reference to this last point, we are glad to learn, that it was found to be quite feasible to dispense with the authority which had been previously given for building quarters for the European officers stationed there, and consistent with the personal interest and convenience of the officers, to allow them to occupy the quarters which they had themselves constructed.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 26th September, 1851 (No. 152).*

53. The orders of the Most Noble the Governor-General, connected with the Department of Public Works in the Punjab, which have reached us during the past month, are contained in the accompanying collection, which will inform your Honourable Court that the construction of a flat-roofed barrack, for a troop of horse artillery, and an hospital for one European infantry regiment, has been sanctioned at Peshawur, and that a new plan of barrack accommodation by the superintending engineer, Punjab Circle, has been approved by his Lordship, who has directed it to be generally adopted at that station. The barracks of H.M.'s 61st regiment, however, which are in progress, will be finished on the original plan.

Government of  
Bengal to Court  
of Directors,  
26th Sept. 1851.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 22nd of August, 1851.

From Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated the 13th of June, 1851.*

SIR,—

The executive engineer at Peshawur having represented that he has now burnt bricks sufficient to go on with the foundations of permanent barracks, and that there will be a great saving of time if he is allowed at once to commence the buildings, which are the subject of the accompanying estimate, No. 22, for a troop of horse artillery, I have the honour to request that you will solicit the Most Noble the Governor-General's permission to do so.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
13th June, 1851.

2. The design is for two half-barracks of equal size, and is the same in every essential particular of accommodation and comfort, as the European infantry barracks, of which I submitted an estimate, for the Governor-General's inspection, on the 11th of April last,\* and which has been subsequently forwarded to the Military Board.

3. But a pent roof is in this case proposed to be covered in the first instance with clay, and eventually tiled over a clear ward 24 feet wide, instead of the flat-roofed bar-

\* With letter No. 4,458, to Major J. Ramsay, Military Secretary to the Most Noble the Governor-General



EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
13th June, 1851.

racks, divided into two narrow wards by a longitudinal wall along the centre of the building, as at first decided.

4. Captain Oldfield states, he can make the pent roof water-tight; and as Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., has expressed an opinion\* very decidedly in favour of the clear single ward of 24 feet, I see no objection to its adoption, if the Most Noble the Governor-General will permit it.

5. The temporary sheds are reported to be on the point of completion, and several of them occupied.

Superintending Engineer's Office,  
Punjab Circle,  
the 13th of June, 1851.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. B. TREMENEERE, Lieut.-Col.,  
Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

Paragraph 4 of Letter, No. 49, dated Peshawur, 26th May, 1851.

Executive En-  
gineer, Peshawur,  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere.

From EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, Peshawur, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENEERE,  
Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

Para. 4. I have submitted the plan to the Brigadier-General commanding, who fully approves of it, and also of the section, which he considers so great an improvement on that of the proposed permanent barracks with a wall down the middle of it, that he requests I will submit an application to have these last built on the same section as is now proposed for the hospital.

FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 22nd of August, 1851.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

*Simla, 1st August, 1851.*

Minute by  
Governor-General,  
1st Aug. 1851.

Barracks at Peshawur. 1. With reference to the proposal submitted by the superintending engineer for a new plan of barracks at Peshawur, I have to observe, that although the present plan will undoubtedly give a much better building, it will considerably enhance its cost.

Nevertheless, after careful consideration of the question, adverting to the climate of the valley, and to the duty which is imposed upon the Government, of providing such accommodation for the troops as will best defend them against the unhealthy influence of the atmosphere; adverting further to the strong opinion expressed by the Brigadier-General in favour of the change now proposed, I think that the amended plan ought to be adopted.

2. The barracks for the 61st regiment ought to be finished on the plan on which they have been commenced.

The barracks of the other regiments may be built on the improved plan, but the estimates should be referred to the Military Board.

3. The hospitals on the new plan I have already authorized; they should be carried on as rapidly as possible.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

\* Extract of letter No. 49 annexed, paragraph 4th, May 26th, 1851.

## FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 29th August, 1851.

From Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, to Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated the 26th of July, 1851.*

Before the Governor-General's first visit to Sealkote, and the receipt of his Lordship's orders to construct open arcaded verandahs to the European barracks, instead of outer verandahs with doors as at first intended, three barracks had been completed with closed outer verandahs according to the original design; one of these is at Sealkote, one at Lahore, and the other at Jullunder.

Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere  
to Col. J. Stuart,  
26th July, 1851.

2. The double verandahs at Sealkote and Lahore have proved extremely useful, and will have fully repaid their cost. During last hot season and rains, one entire troop of horse artillery was sheltered in the outer verandah alone of the barracks at Sealkote, and in that of the foot artillery at Meean Meer, which was complete in every respect. The Most Noble the Governor-General saw, in December, the whole of the sick of the European Bengal fusiliers accommodated.

From Colonel J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General, to Lieut.-Col. G. B. TREMENHEERE, Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle.

*Dated the 11th of August, 1851.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Having submitted to the Most Noble the Governor-General, your despatch, No. 1,546, of the 26th ultimo, I am directed in reply to inform you, that his Lordship, presuming that the alteration in the barrack at Jullunder requires expedition, authorizes your carrying into execution at once, your proposal to construct an arcaded outer verandah of pukka brick throughout, in place of the present enclosed outer verandah.

Col. J. Stuart  
to Lieut.-Col.  
G. B. Tremeneere,  
11th Aug. 1851.

2. The Governor-General also authorizes a similar change being made in the horse artillery barrack at Sealkote, when the season and other circumstances may admit of your doing so.

3. The doors, which will be no longer required in their present position, must be made available for some of the new buildings in progress in the Punjab.

4. The enclosures of your despatch are herewith returned.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Simla,  
The 11th of August, 1851.

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,  
Secretary to the Government of India, Military  
Department, with the Governor-General.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 25th February, 1852 (No. 24).*

Letter dated 26th September, 1851 (No. 152).

53 and 54. Notice of several orders given by the Governor-General during the last month relating to military buildings at Peshawur and Jullunder.

33. We entirely approve of the remark made by the Governor-General, when considering a new plan of barrack for the horse artillery at Peshawur, which involved some additional cost, that, adverting to the climate of the valley of Peshawur, it was the duty of Government "to provide such accommodation for the troops as will best defend them against the unhealthy influence of the atmosphere." We are desirous of being furnished with a plan of the new description of barrack.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
25th Feb. 1852.

Minute dated 1st Aug. 1851.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
25th Feb. 1852.

34. We learn from these proceedings that the outer walls of barracks at Sealkote and Jullunder were built upon kucha foundations, and that in consequence of heavy rains, it has become necessary to take them down again; these were built before the order prohibiting such foundations was issued. They were especially objectionable at Sealkote and Jullunder, where the sites of the buildings are liable to be flooded, and we have expressed our dissatisfaction that the engineer department should have recommended them.

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GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 21st April, 1852 (No. 59).*

Government of  
Bengal to Court of  
Directors,  
21st April, 1852.

26. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, after personal inspection of the military buildings in progress at Peshawur, having stated his full concurrence in the opinion held by Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell and Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere, the superintending engineer, that barracks with pent roofs supported by trusses, and without central walls, were greatly preferable to those already erected with flat roofs, we sanctioned the remaining barracks in the lines, lately vacated by her Majesty's 61st regiment, being constructed with pent roofs, as authorized for the horse artillery and other European regiments at that station.

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FORT WILLIAM MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, 5th March, 1852.

N o. 60.

From Lieut.-Col. A. BECHER, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Col. J. STUART, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

*Dated 30th January, 1852.*

SIR,—

Officiating  
Quartermaster-  
General to  
Col. J. Stuart,  
30th Jan. 1852.

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward, for the favourable consideration of the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, the accompanying copies of letters noted on the margin,\* on the subject of barrack accommodation for her Majesty's regiments of infantry at Peshawur.

His Excellency, having carefully inspected the several public buildings now in progress at that station, fully concurs in the opinion expressed by Brigadier-General Sir Colin Campbell in favour of the barracks with the pent roofs, without the central walls; and as Lieut.-Col. Tremenheere, superintending engineer, is also of that opinion, as shown in the copy of his letter, No. 4,074, his Excellency requests that the Most Noble the Governor-General will be pleased to issue the necessary orders to the Barrack Department, to carry into effect the suggestions contained in Sir Colin Campbell's letter.

I have, &c.,

Quartermaster-General's Office,  
Head-Quarters, Camp,  
Kumhikhanpoor, 30th Jan., 1852.

(Signed) A. BECHER, Lieut.-Col.,  
Officiating Quartermaster-General  
of the Army.

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No. 111.

From Brigadier C. CAMPBELL, commanding Peshawur Field Force, to the  
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL of the ARMY.

*Dated 17th January, 1852.*

SIR,—

Brigadier  
[C. Campbell to  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
17th Jan. 1852.

I have the honour to beg that you will bring to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that when his Excellency visited Peshawur, his attention was called

\* Letter, No. 111, from the officer commanding the Peshawur field force, dated 17th January, 1852; letter, No. 4,074, from the Superintending Engineer, Punjab Circle, dated 28th January, 1852.

to the permanent buildings sanctioned as barracks in the right European infantry lines at that station, which have central rooms of 24 feet space, covered with a pent roof supported by trusses, and that his Excellency much preferred these buildings, to those erected in the lines of her Majesty's 61st regiment, consisting of two corridors of 14 feet each, with a central wall between them, supporting a flat roof.

The experience of last hot weather proved that these latter barracks were very close.

The executive engineer informs me, that in consequence of the order directing that all foundations, plinths, footing, and coping of the walls of permanent barracks shall be built of pukka masonry, the barracks with pent roofs, covered with mud plaster, can be built for the same sum as those with a central wall and flat roofs, the cost of pukka masonry in the more numerous walls of these last, balancing the more expensive construction of the roofs in the former.

I would, therefore, request the favour of his Excellency taking these facts into his consideration, in the hope that he will obtain the sanction of the Most Noble the Governor-General for the remaining barracks in the lines just vacated by her Majesty's 61st regiment, being built of the pattern authorized for those in the lines of her Majesty's 98th regiment.

Peshawur Field Office, Head Quarters  
Camp, Punj Pao, 17th Jan., 1852.

I have, &c.,  
C. CAMPBELL, Brigadier,  
Commanding Peshawur Field Force.

EXTRACTS, &c.

Brigadier  
C. Campbell to  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
17th Jan. 1852.

From Major J. S. BANKS, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. BECHER, Officiating Quartermaster-General of the Army.

*Dated 5th March, 1852.*

Military Department.

SIR,—

Having submitted to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, your despatch, No. 60, of the 30th January, 1852, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that his Lordship in Council has sanctioned the remaining barracks in the lines at Peshawur, lately vacated by her Majesty's 61st regiment, being constructed with pent roofs, on the plan already authorized for the horse artillery, and other European infantry regiments, at that station.

2. The necessary orders have been issued to the Military Board to carry this alteration into effect.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. S. BANKS,

Council Chamber,  
Fort William,  
the 5th March, 1852.

Deputy Secretary to the  
Government of India,  
in the Military Department.

Major J. S. Banks,  
to Officiating  
Quartermaster-  
General,  
5th March, 1852.

COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 31st August, 1852 (No. 105).*

Reply to Letter dated 21st April, 1852 (No. 59).

23. The several proceedings reported in these paragraphs have our approval.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
31st Aug. 1852.

EXTRACTS, &amp;c.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated the 14th June, 1852 (No. 91).*Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
14th June, 1852.

52. The progress and present state of the military buildings at Peshawur are shown in the accompanying report by the superintending engineer, Punjab circle, department of public works, who bears favourable testimony to the zeal and exertions of Major Oldfield, the late executive engineer.

53. It will be observed that we have authorized the several buildings regarding which Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere solicits instructions, and have directed the quarters for the men to be completed, before any of the other works are commenced.

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From Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. BIRCH, C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department, to the MILITARY BOARD, Department of Public Works.

*Dated the 10th of May, 1852.*

GENTLEMEN,—

Lieut.-Col.  
R. J. H. Birch  
to Military Board,  
10th May, 1852.

In reply to your despatch, No. 11,641, of the 6th ultimo, I am directed to acquaint you that the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council authorises several buildings and works, regarding which Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere solicits instructions, in his report on the military buildings at Peshawur, dated 11th January last, viz. :—

1. To construct permanent accommodation for the troop of horse artillery, which now occupies the old Sikh gun-sheds.

2. To build school-rooms at Peshawur and at Meean Meer, for the artillery.

3. To erect a horse hospital for the artillery, at Peshawur.

4. To add ventilators to the old temporary barracks, occupied by one of the European infantry regiments.

And to make cesspool privies for the barracks and hospitals.

5. The executive engineer should be called upon to submit estimates, but the Governor-General in Council requests, that Lieut.-Colonel Tremenheere may be instructed to finish all the quarters for the men, before he begins the horse hospital, or even the schools.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Council Chamber,  
Fort William,  
the 10th of May, 1852.

(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,  
in the Military Department.

## COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 3rd November, 1852, (No. 143).*

Reply to Letter, dated 14th June, 1852, No. 91, paragraphs 52 and 53.

Court of Directors  
to Government  
of Bengal,  
3rd Nov. 1852.

34. This report is satisfactory. Your proceedings thereon, as now reported, have our approval.

## GOVERNMENT of BENGAL to COURT of DIRECTORS.

*Dated 14th June, 1852 (No. 91).*Government of  
Bengal to  
Court of Directors,  
14th June, 1852.

64. The arrangements authorized by the Governor-General, during his visit to Peshawur in March, 1851, for levelling the surface of the cantonment, the formation of roads, &c., were reported to your Honourable Court in paragraphs 38 and 39 of general letter, No. 78, dated 19th May, 1851, in continuation of which we have the honour to forward the accompanying reports of a committee, showing the amount of work completed, and the portion still remaining to be executed.

65. These reports appear very satisfactory, and with exception to a few points on which we have called for further information, we have sanctioned the whole of the

measures recommended by the committee, including the removal of a house stated to be an impediment to the construction of one of the roads, and the payment of compensation to its owner, the provision of tanks for maintaining a supply of drinking-water to the different regiments and for watering the horses of mounted corps; the construction of bridges where required, and the grant of forty-five thousand rupees, for metalling the roads, that sum, however, to be extended over a period of three years.

EXTRACTS, &c.  
 ———  
 Government of  
 Bengal to  
 Court of Directors,  
 14th June, 1852.

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COURT of DIRECTORS to GOVERNMENT of BENGAL.

*Dated 3rd November, 1852 (No. 143).*

Reply to Letter dated 14th June, 1852 (No. 91).

50. We concur with you in considering the progress made in completing the works already authorized, as being very satisfactory. The authority given for further works to complete the laying out of the cantonments at Peshawur, has our approval.

Court of Directors  
 to Government  
 of Bengal,  
 3rd Nov. 1852.

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