

**Secret History of the English  
Occupation of Egypt**

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Occupation of Egypt

BEING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF  
EVENTS

BY  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

*SECOND EDITION*  
*WITH SPECIAL APPENDICES*

LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN  
ADELPHI TERRACE MCMVII



*Sheykh Mohammed . Abdu*

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## NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

A SECOND Edition of this work having become necessary, a few words correcting mistakes in the text and in answer to criticism may not be out of place.

It was of course hardly to be expected that, in the present state of public opinion, truths so little palatable to our English imperial pride and condemnatory of financial ways should find much welcome in the capitalist press, or that a narrative sparing the public action of neither Political Party should escape Party reproof. Party feeling is ingrained in all our conceptions of recent history, and a chronicler whose avowed position is that of recording facts as they occurred, not as they ought in Whig or Tory interests to have occurred, was sure to find himself isolated and without strong support. Nevertheless, though reserved in its approval, the London press has, as a rule, treated the work fairly, and, except in the "Times," comment has been offered without unreasoning heat. It is a satisfaction to the author to note that hardly any serious attempt has been made to controvert his facts, little as they agree with official pseudo-history, and that the blame dealt him has been rather for his having told too much than too little of the reality. He has been "indiscreet," it has been said "culpably indiscreet," not in any serious fashion inaccurate, careless, or untrue.

Of the actors themselves in the tragedy of 1882 one only of those still living, Sir Charles Dilke, has come forward in open correction of any important statement made regarding him in the text. As to this, the author would draw attention to an interesting

### *Note to the Second Edition*

correspondence, now printed in a separate Appendix, between Sir Charles and himself, in which the question of the responsibility for the fatal "Joint Note" of January, 1882, will be found discussed with knowledge and authority. At the author's instance Sir Charles has consented that his letters should find a place at the end of the present Edition, where they must be taken as correcting the text of pages 182 and 183, and to a certain extent of page 160, though this does not imply a change in the author's recollection of the conversation there recorded.

Other rectifications made in the Appendices are (1) in regard to a misstatement on page 19, where the late Nubar Pasha has been represented as having been the Khedive Ismail's financial agent for the raising of his loans in Europe. As to this, his son, Boghos Pasha Nubar, has been good enough to write a long letter to the author, clearing his father of that responsibility, and adding a detailed account of the fortune left by him at his death, showing that the vast wealth generally attributed to Nubar Pasha has been much exaggerated; (2) in regard to the account given, at page 35, of the Berlin Congress, a confusion having been made between the Cyprus Convention with Turkey and the secret agreement with Russia. This confusion was pointed out by Mr. Lucy in the "Westminster Gazette"; (3) the discovery of a mis-reading of the text of one of Mr. Gladstone's letters, that printed at page 559, to which special attention is directed, as a false impression of Mr. Gladstone's meaning has thereby been given. The correct reading was suggested by a critic in the "Illustrated London News"; and (4) in regard to a complaint raised in the "Times" by Sir Edward Malet that the circumstances of his going on board ship at Alexandria in June, 1882, had been mis-

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represented. The complaint seems to the author a trivial one, due mainly to a misconception of the meaning of the text at page 337. But, as it formed the pretext of a public attack on the author in the "Times," it has been given a place in the Appendices. The author regrets that mistakes of any kind should have occurred in his work, and here thanks those who have enabled him to correct them, offering apology where apology is due. He thinks, however, that he may congratulate himself that, in a history of such extreme complexity as he had undertaken, so few corrections have had to be made. It is significant of the general accuracy of his narrative that, where so many important statements have been published contradicting the official version of events, so little of it should as yet have met with official denial.

Interesting new matter in support of and supplementing the narrative will be found in a letter written by General Sir William Butler, who served in Egypt on Lord Wolseley's staff, confirmatory of the account given; in an unpublished letter of July, 1904, from the late Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, which may be regarded as embodying his latest views of Constitutional Reform, a letter which the author commends to the notice of those actually responsible for English policy at Cairo; and in an additional account recently communicated to the author by Sir Rivers Wilson of his missions to Egypt in 1878 and 1879.

The author has thought it right to add to the volume a correspondence initiated with him by Mr. Frederic Harrison, in which the delicate question of the publication by historians of letters and conversations on public affairs, considered at the time they occurred to be "confidential," is treated, and with it the growing tendency to insincerity in Parliament and the Press. The author believes that its being



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included here, as authorized by Mr. Harrison, may have the effect of drawing attention to a defect in our public life greatly needing reform.

Lastly, it will perhaps not be without interest to readers of these Memoirs that two other volumes have within the present year been completed, carrying on the narrative of the English occupation of Egypt through its more recent developments. These will doubtless in due course be published, though probably not for some considerable time.

NEWBUILDINGS PLACE, SUSSEX.  
*November, 1907.*

## PREFACE OF 1895

I DESIRE to place on record in a succinct and tangible form the events which have come within my knowledge relating to the origin of the English occupation of Egypt—not necessarily for publication now, but as an available document for the history of our times. At one moment I played in these events a somewhat prominent part, and for nearly twenty years I have been a close and interested spectator of the drama which was being acted at Cairo.

It may well be, also, that the Egyptian question, though now quiescent, will reassert itself unexpectedly in some urgent form hereafter, requiring of Englishmen a new examination of their position there, political and moral; and I wish to have at hand and ready for their enlightenment the whole of the materials I possess. I will give these as clearly as I can, with such documents in the shape of letters and journals as I can bring together in corroboration of my evidence, disguising nothing and telling the whole truth as I know it. It is not always in official documents that the truest facts of history are to be read, and certainly in the case of Egypt, where intrigue of all kinds has been so rife, the sincere student needs help to understand the published parliamentary papers.

Lastly, for the Egyptians, if ever they succeed in re-establishing themselves as an autonomous nation, it will be of value that they should have recorded the evidence of one whom they know to be their sincere friend in regard to matters of diplomatic obscurity which to this day they fail to realize. My relations

## *Preface*

with Downing Street in 1882 need to be related in detail if Egyptians are ever to appreciate the exact causes which led to the bombardment of Alexandria and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, while justice to the patriot leader of their "rebellion" requires that I should give a no less detailed account of Arabi's trial, which still presents itself to some Egyptian as to all French minds, in the light of a pre-arranged comedy devised to screen a traitor. It does not do to leave truth to its own power of prevailing over lies, and history is full of calumnies which have remained unrefuted, and of ingratitude which nations have persisted in towards their worthiest sons.

SHEYKH OBEYD, EGYPT.  
1895.

## PREFACE ON PUBLICATION

**S**INCE the first brief preface to my manuscript work was written twelve years ago, events have happened which seem to indicate that the moment foreseen in it has at last arrived when to the public advantage and without risk of serious indiscretion as far as individuals are concerned, the whole truth may be given to the world.

Already in 1904 the original manuscript had been thoroughly revised, and in its purely Egyptian part remodelled under circumstances which add greatly to its historic value. My old Egyptian friend, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, of whom so much mention is made in it, had taken up his country residence at my doors at Sheykh Obeyd, and I found myself in almost daily intercourse with him, a most precious accident of which I did not fail to take full advantage. That great philosopher and patriot—now, alas, lost to us, for he died at Alexandria, 11th July, 1905, the day being the twenty-third anniversary of the bombardment of that city—after many vicissitudes of evil and good fortune had attained in the year 1899 to the supreme position in Egypt of Grand Mufti, and having thus acquired a wider sphere than ever of influence with his fellow countrymen, had it at heart to bequeath to them a true account of the events of his time, events which had become strangely misunderstood by them, and clothed with legends altogether fantastic and unreal.

On this subject he often spoke to me, regretting his lack of leisure to complete the historic work, and when I told him of my own memoir, he urged me

## *Preface on Publication*

very strongly to publish it, if not in English at least with his help in Arabic, and he undertook to go through it with me and see that all that part of it which related to matters within his knowledge was accurately and fully told. We had been personal friends and political allies almost from the date of my first visit to Egypt, and with his garden adjoining mine it was an easy matter for us to work together and compare our recollections of the men and things we had known. It was in this way that my history of an epoch so memorable to us both took final shape, and I was able (how fortunately!) to complete it and obtain from him his approval and *imprimatur* before his unlooked for death closed for ever the chief source of knowledge which he undoubtedly was of the political movement which led up to the revolution of 1881, and of the intrigues which marred it in the following year.

The Mufti's death, a severe blow to me as well as to Egypt, postponed indefinitely our plan of publishing in Arabic, nor till the present year has the time seemed politically ripe for the production of my work in English. The events, however, of 1906, and now Lord Cromer's retirement from the Egyptian scene, have so wholly changed the situation that I feel I ought no longer to delay, at least as far as my duty to my own countrymen is concerned. We English are confronted to-day in our dealings with Egypt with very much the same problem we misunderstood and blundered about so disastrously a generation ago, and if those of us who are responsible for public decisions are, in the words of my first preface, to "re-examine their position there, political and moral," honestly or to any profit, it is necessary they should first have set before them the past as it really was and not as it has been presented to them so long by

### *Preface on Publication*

the fallacious documents of their official Blue Books. I should probably not be wrong in asserting that neither Lord Cromer at Cairo nor Sir Edward Grey at home, nor yet Lord Cromer's successor Sir Eldon Gorst, have any accurate knowledge of what occurred in Egypt twenty-five years ago—this notwithstanding Lord Cromer's tardy recognition of the reform movement of 1881 and his eulogium of Sheykh Mohammed Abdu repeated so recently as in his last annual Report. Lord Cromer, it must be remembered, was not at Cairo during any part of the revolutionary period here described, and, until quite recently, has always assumed the "official truth" regarding it to be the only truth.

For this reason I have decided now finally on publication, giving the text of my Memoir as it was completed in January, 1905, the identical text of which my friend signified his approval, suppressing only certain brief passages which seem to me still too personal in regard to individuals living, and which could be excised without injury to the volume's complete historic value. I can sincerely say that in all I have written my one great aim has been to disclose the *veritt vraie* as it is known to me for misguided History's sake.

If there is at all a second reason with me, it must be looked for in a promise publicly made as long ago as in the September number of the "Nineteenth Century Review" of 1882 that I would complete some day my personal *Apologia* in regard to events then contemporary. At that time and out of consideration for Mr. Gladstone, and for the hope I had that he would yet repair the wrong he had done to liberty in Egypt, I forbore, in the face of much obloquy, to exculpate myself by a full revelation of the hidden circumstances which were my justifica-

### *Preface on Publication*

tion. I could not clear myself entirely without telling facts technically confidential, and I decided to be silent.

There is, however, a limit to the duty of reticence owed to public men in public affairs, and I am confident that my abstention of a quarter of a century will excuse me with fair judging minds if I now at last make my conduct quite clear in the only way possible to me, namely, by a complete exposure in detail of the whole drama of financial intrigue and political weakness as it was at the time revealed to me, substantiating it by the contemporary documents still in my possession. If the susceptibilities of some persons in high places are touched by a too candid recital, I can but reply that the necessity of speech has been put on me by their own long lack of candour and generosity. During all these years not one of those who knew the truth has said a confessing word on my behalf. It will be enough if I repeat with Raleigh:

Go, Soul, the Body's guest,  
Upon a thankless errand.  
Fear not to touch the best;  
The truth shall be thy warrant.  
Then go, for thou must die,  
And give the world the lie.

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

NEWBUILDINGS PLACE, SUSSEX.

*April, 1907.*

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## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I

ARABI'S ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND OF THE EVENTS OF 1881-1882,  
'AS TOLD TO ME, WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT, IN ARABIC YESTER-  
DAY, MARCH 16TH, 1903, AT SHEYKH OBEYD

I WAS born in the year 1840 at Horiyeh, near Zagazig, in the Sherkieh. My father was Sheykh of the village, and owned eight and a half feddans of land, which I inherited from him and gradually increased by savings out of my pay, which at one time was as much as £250 a month, till it amounted to 570 feddans, and that was the amount confiscated at the time of my trial. I bought the land cheaply in those days for a few pounds a feddan which is worth a great deal now, especially as it was in a poor state (*wahash*) when I bought it and now is in good cultivation. But none of it was given me by Said Pasha or any one, and the acreage I inherited was only eight and a half. I invested all the money I could save in land, and had no other invested money or movable property except a little furniture and some horses and such like, which may have been worth £1,000.

As a boy I studied for two years at the Azhar, but was taken for a soldier when I was only fourteen, as I was a tall well grown lad and Said Pasha wanted to have as many as possible of the sons of the village Sheykhs, and train them to be officers. I was made to go through an examination, and what I had learned at the Azhar served me well, and I was made a *boulouk-amin*, clerk, instead of serving in the ranks, at sixty piastres a month. I did not, however, like this, as I thought I should never rise to any high position, and I wished to be a personage like the Mudir of our province, so I petitioned Ibrahim Bey, who was my superior, to be put back into the ranks. Ibrahim Bey showed me that I should lose by this as my pay would then be only fifty piastres, but I insisted and so served. I was put soon after to another examination, out of which I came first, and they made me *chowish*, and then to a third and they made me lieutenant when I was only seventeen. Suliman Pasha el Franzawi was so pleased with me that he insisted with Said Pasha on giving me promotion, and I became captain at eighteen, major at nineteen, and Lieutenant-Colonel, *Caimakam*, at twenty. Then Said Pasha took me with him as A.D.C. when he went to Medina, about a year before he died. That was in A.H. 1279 (1862?).

## Appendix I

Said Pasha's death was a great misfortune to me and to all, as he was favourable to the children of the country. Ismail was quite otherwise. In his time everything was put back into the hands of the Turks and Circassians, and the Egyptians in the army got no protection and no promotion. I went on serving as Caimakam for twelve years without much incident till war came with Abyssinia. I was not sent to the war with Russia, but when the war with Abyssinia broke out all available troops were wanted, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the stations on the Haj Road, and I was sent to do this. I was sent quite alone without a single soldier or a single piastre and had to get there as best I could on a camel. I went in this way to Nakhl and Akaba and Wej collecting the garrisons and putting in Arabs to take charge of the forts there as *ghaffirs*. Then we crossed over the sea to Kosseir and so by Keneh to Cairo. I was not paid a penny for this service or even my expenses. The country was in a fearful state of oppression, and it was then I began to interest myself in politics to save my countrymen from ruin. I was sent on to Massowa from Cairo and took part in the campaign of which Ratib Pasha was commander-in-chief, with Loringe Pasha, the American, as Chief of the Staff. I was not present at the battle of Kora, being in charge of the transport service between Massowa and the army. It was a disastrous battle, seven *ortas* being completely destroyed. Loringe Pasha was the officer mostly in fault. The Khedive's son, Hassan, was there, but only as a boy, to learn soldiering. He was not in command nor is it true that he was taken prisoner by the Abyssinians.

After this I thought much about politics. I remember to have seen Sheykh Jemal ed Din, but not to speak to, but my former connection with the Azhar made me acquainted with several of his disciples. The most distinguished of them were Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and Sheykh Hassan el Towil. The first book that ever gave me ideas about political matters was an Arabic translation of the "Life of Bonaparte" by Colonel Louis. The book had been brought by Said Pasha with him to Medina, and its account of the conquest of Egypt by 30,000 Frenchmen so angered him that he threw the book on the ground, saying "See how your countrymen let themselves be beaten." And I took it up and read all that night, without sleeping, till the morning. Then I told Said Pasha that I had read it and that I saw that the French had been victorious because they were better drilled and organized, and that we could do as well in Egypt if we tried.

You ask me about the affair of the riot against Nubar Pasha in the time of Ismail and whether I had any hand in it. I had none, for the reason that I was away at Rashid (Rosetta) with my regi-

## *Arabi's Autobiography*

ment. But the day before the thing happened I was telegraphed for by the War Office with my fellow Caimakam, Mohammed Bey Nadi, to deal with the case of a number of soldiers that had been disbanded by the new Ministers without their arrears of pay or even bread to eat, and who were at Abbassiyeh. But I knew nothing of what was being arranged against Nubar. That was done by order of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, through a servant of his, Shahin Pasha, and his brother-in-law, Latif Eff. Jelim, director of the military college. These got up a demonstration of the students of the college, who went in a body to the Ministry of Finance. They were joined on the way by some of the disbanded soldiers and officers, not many, but some. At the Ministry they found Nubar getting into his carriage, and they assaulted him, pulled his moustache, and boxed his ears. Then Ismail Pasha was sent for to quell the riot and he came with Abdel Kader Pasha and Ali Bey Fehmy, the colonel of his guard, whom he ordered to fire on the students, but Ali Fehmy ordered his men to fire over their heads and nobody was hurt. Ali Fehmy was not with us at that time. He was devoted to Ismail, having married a lady of the palace, but he did not like to shed the blood of these young men.

Ismail Pasha, to conceal his part in it and that of those who got up the affair, accused Nadi Bey and me and Ali Bey Roubi of being their leaders and we were brought before a *mejliss* on which were Stone Pasha and Hassan Pasha Afflatoun with Osman Rifki, afterwards Under-Secretary of War, and others. I showed, however, that it was impossible we could be concerned in it as we had only that very night arrived from Rosetta. Nevertheless we were blamed and separated from our regiments, Nadi being sent to Mansura, Roubi to the Fayum, and I to Alexandria where I was given a nominal duty of acting as agent for the Sheykh of Upper Egypt, whose arrears of taxes in the shape of beans and other produce were to be collected and sent to Alexandria in security for money advanced to Ismail by certain Jews of that place. But before we separated we had a meeting at which I proposed that we should join together and depose Ismail Pasha. It would have been the best solution of the case, as the Consuls would have been glad to get rid of Ismail in any way, and it would have saved after complications as well as the fifteen millions Ismail took away with him when he was deposed. But there was nobody as yet to take the lead, and my proposal, though approved, was not executed. The deposition of Ismail lifted a heavy load from our shoulders and all the world rejoiced, but it would have been better if we had done it ourselves as we could then have got rid of the whole family of Mohammed Ali, who were none of them, except Said, fit to rule, and we could have proclaimed a republic. Sheykh

## Appendix I

Jemal-ed-Din proposed to Mohammed Abdu to kill Ismail at the Kasr el Nil, Bridge and Mohammed Abdu approved. Ismail collected the money of the Mudiriehs six months before his deposition. Latif afterwards avowed his part in the affair. Latif was put in prison but released on application of the freemasons to Nubar.

Tewfik Pasha, when he succeeded Ismail, by his first act made public promise of a Constitution. You ask me whether he was sincere in this. He never was sincere, but he was a man incredibly weak, who never could say "no," and he was under the influence of his Minister, Sherif Pasha, who was a sincere lover of free forms of government. Tewfik, in his father's reign, had amassed money, which was what he cared for most, by receiving presents from persons who had petitions to make, and who thought he could forward their ends. He had no wish for a Constitution, but he could not say "no" when Sherif pressed him. So he promised. Two months later he fell under the stronger influence of the Consuls, who forbade him to decree it. On this Sherif called the Ministers together, and they all gave him their words of honour that they would resign with him if he resigned. And so it happened. But some of them, notwithstanding their promise, joined Riaz Pasha when he became Prime Minister in Sherif's place. In order to persuade them Riaz engaged that each Minister should be supreme in his own department, and that they would not allow Tewfik to interfere in any way with the administration. Mahmud Sami joined him as Minister of the *Awkaf*, Ali Mubarak as Minister of Public Works, and Osman Pasha Rifki, a Turk of the old school, who hated the fellahin, was made Minister of War. The new government was a tyrannical one. Hassan Moussa el Akkad, for signing a petition against the breaking of the Moukabala arrangement, was exiled to the White Nile, and Ahmed Fehmi for another petition, and many other people were got rid of who incurred the displeasure of the Ministers. Of all the Ministers the worst was Osman Rifki.

We colonels were now once more with our regiments, and as native Egyptians subject to much oppression. On any pretext a fellah officer would be arrested, and his place filled by a Circassian. It was the plan to weed the whole army of its native officers. I was especially in ill favour because I had refused to allow my men to be taken from their military duty and put to dig the Tewfikieh Canal, which it was the practice to make them do without extra pay. Plans were made to involve me in some street quarrel with the view to my assassination, but through the love of my soldiers I always escaped. All officers who were not Circassians were in danger, and all were alarmed. It was thus that Ali Fehmy, who was a fellah born, though through his wife connected with the

## *Arabi's Autobiography*

Court, came to join us, for he feared he, too, would be superseded. He was Colonel of the 1st Regiment of Guards, and stationed at Abdin; I was at Abbassiyeh with the 3rd Regiment, and Abd-el-Aal Helmi was at Toura. Ali Roubi commanded the cavalry.

Matters came to a crisis in January, 1881. I had gone to spend the evening with Nejm ed Din Pasha, and there were at his house some pashas talking over the changes Osman Rifki had in hand, and I learned from them that it had been decided that I and Abd-el-Aal should be deprived of our commands, and our places given to officers of the Circassian class. At the same moment a message arrived for me from my house to say that Ali Fehmy had come there with Abd-el-Aal and was awaiting me. So I went home and I found them there, and from them I learned the same evil news. We therefore took council what was to be done. Abd-el-Aal proposed that we should go in force to Osman Rifki's house and arrest or kill him, but I said, "No, let us petition first the Prime Minister, and then, if he refuses, the Khedive." And they charged me to draw the petition up in form. And I did so, stating the case, and demanding the dismissal of Osman Rifki, and the raising of the army to 18,000 men, and the decreeing of the promised Constitution. [N.B.—I think Arabi makes a mistake here, confusing these last two demands with those made on the 9th September. But he insisted on it the three proposals were first made in February, and made in writing then.] This we all three signed, though knowing that our lives were at stake.

The following morning we went with our petition to the Minister of the Interior and asked to see Riaz. We were shown into an outer room and waited while the Minister read it in an inner room. Presently he came out. "Your petition," he said, "is *muhlik*" (a hanging matter). "What is it you want? to change the Ministry? And what would you put in its place? Whom do you propose to carry on the government?" And I answered him, "*Ya saat el Basha*, is Egypt then a woman who has borne but eight sons and then been barren?" By this I meant himself and the seven ministers under him. He was angry at this, but in the end said he would see into our affair, and so we left him. Immediately a council was assembled with the Khedive and all his Court, and Stone and Blitz also. And the Khedive proposed that we should be arrested and tried, but others said, "If these are put on trial, Osman Pasha also must be tried." Therefore Osman was left to deal with it alone. And the rest you know.

You ask did the Khedive at that time know of our intention to petition. He did not know that nor that Ali Fehmy came to us. But afterwards he knew. You ask did I know the Baron de Ring. I did not know him, nor any one of the Consuls, but I heard that

## Appendix I

the French Consul had the most influence, and I wrote to him telling him what our position was, and begging him to let the other Consuls know that there was no fear for their subjects. You ask if I knew Mahmud Sami. I did not know him yet. But he was friends with my friend Ali Roubi, and I had heard a good account of him as a lover of freedom. He was of a Circassian family, but one that had been 600 years in Egypt.

As to the second demonstration of September 9th, we knew then that the Khedive was with us. He wished to rid himself of Riaz, who disregarded his authority. I saw him but twice to speak to that summer, and never on politics. His communication was through Ali Fehmy, who brought us word to the following effect: "You three are soldiers. With me you make four." You ask me whether he was sincere. He never was sincere. But he wished an excuse to dismiss Riaz. We therefore demanded next time the dismissal of Riaz, as well as the rest, knowing he would be pleased. On the morning of the 9th September we sent word to the Khedive that we should come at the *asr* to Abdin to make demand of the fulfilment of his promises. He came, and with him Cookson, and it was with Cookson that I debated the various proposals made. He asked if we should be content with Haidar Pasha, but I said "we want no relation of the Khedive." There were no written demands the second time, only a renewal of the three demands of the 1st February, the Chamber of Notables, the raising of the army to 18,000 men, according to the firmans, and the dismissal of Riaz. They agreed to all. The Khedive was delighted. I know nothing of Colvin having been there, or of any advice he gave to the Khedive. The only ones I saw were Cookson and Goldsmid. It was Cookson who talked to me. If the Khedive had tried to shoot me, the guns would have been fired on him, and there would have been bad work. But he was entirely pleased with the whole of the proceedings.

You ask about Abu Sultan (Sultan Pasha). He was disappointed, because when the Ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha he was not included in it. It was thought, however, that the post of President of the Chamber of Deputies was more honourable and more important. Only he did not take this view, and was put out at being omitted from the Ministry. That was the beginning of his turning against us.

To your question about the ill-treatment of the Circassians arrested for a plot while I was Minister of War, I answer plainly, as I have answered before, I never went to the prison to see them tortured or ill-treated, I simply never went near them at all.

About the riots of Alexandria there is no question but that it was due to the Khedive and Omar Pasha Loutfi, and also to Mr.



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Cookson. The riots were certainly planned several days beforehand, and with the object of discrediting me, seeing that I had just given a guarantee of order being preserved. The Khedive sent the cyphered telegram you know of to Omar Loutfi, and Omar Loutfi arranged it with Seyd Kandil, the chief of the Alexandria *mustafezzin*. Seyd Kandil kept the thing from us who were at Cairo. Mr. Cookson's part in it was that a number of cases of firearms were landed, and sent to his consulate, obviously with the intention of arming somebody. The moment I heard of what had happened, I sent Yakub Sami to Alexandria with orders to make a full inquiry, and the facts were abundantly proved. Much of what has been said however was incorrect. It is not true that the bodies of Christians were found dressed as Moslems. The riot began with a Maltese donkey boy, but that was only the excuse. Omar Loutfi, as you say, was a strong partisan of Ismail's. You ask why a man so dangerous was left in a post where he could work so much mischief. I can only say that he was not under the orders of the Minister of War, but of the Interior. It was a misfortune he was left there. Neither Nadim nor Hassan Moussa el Akkad went to Alexandria on any business of that kind. Hassan Moussa went there on a money errand.

What you ask me is true about Ismail Pasha. He made us an offer of money. The circumstances of it were these. We had ordered a number of pieces of light artillery from Germany, but they would not deliver them without payment, and we had none. Ismail Pasha offered to let us have £30,000 to pay this, on condition that we would allow it to be said that we were acting in his interests. The offer was made through M. Mengs [Max Lavisson], Ismail's Russian agent, and Hassan Moussa had some hand in it. But it was never produced, and if Ismail really sent it to Alexandria, it remained there in their hands. We never touched it.

I do not remember to have heard of any offer such as you speak of having been made by the Rothschilds [this was an offer made as I heard at the time by the Paris Rothschilds of a pension to Arabi of £4,000 (100,000 francs) yearly, if he would leave Egypt], but I received soon after the *leyha* [the note sent in by the Consuls demanding the dismissal of the Mahmud Sami Ministry], a visit from the French Consul, during which he asked me what my pay then was, and offered me the double—that is to say, £500 a month from the French Government if I would consent to leave Egypt and go to Paris and be treated there as Abdel Kader was treated. I refused, however, to have anything to do with it, telling him that it was my business, if necessary, to fight and die for my country, not to abandon it. I never heard of the Rothschilds in connection with this offer.

## *Appendix I*

I will now give you an account of how Tel-el-Kebir was lost. Some days before, when the English were advancing, we made a plan to attack them at Kassassin. Mahmud Sami was to advance on their right flank from Salahieh, while we were to advance in front, and a third body was to go round by the desert, south of the Wady, and take them in the rear. The attack was tried and put partly in execution, but failed because the plan had been betrayed by Ali Bey Yusuf Khunfis, who sent the original sketch made by me to Lord Wolseley. He and others in the army had been corrupted by Abou Sultan acting for the Khedive. When Mahmud advanced, he found artillery posted to intercept him and retreated, leaving us unsupported, and the battle was lost. Sir Charles Wilson, while I was in prison at Cairo, brought me my plan, and asked me whether it was in my own hand, and I said "yes," and he told me how they had come by it. "It is a good plan," he said, "and you might have beaten us with it."

This was our first misfortune. At Tel-el-Kebir we were taken by surprise and for the same reason of treachery. The cavalry commanders were all seduced by Abou Sultan's promises. They occupied a position in advance of the lines, and it was their duty to give us warning of any advance by the English. But they moved aside and gave no warning. There was also one traitor in command within the lines, Ali Bey Yusuf Khunfis. He lit lamps to direct the enemy, and then withdrew his men, leaving a wide space open for them to pass through. You see the marks upon this carpet. They just represent the lines. That is where Ali Yusuf was posted. Mohammed Obeyd was there, and I was at this figure on the carpet a mile and a half to the rear. We were expecting no attack as no sound of firing had been heard. I was still asleep when we heard the firing close to the lines. Ali Roubi, who was in command in front, sent news to me to change my position as the enemy was taking us in flank. I said my prayer and galloped to where we had a reserve of volunteers, and called to them to follow me to support the front line. But they were only peasants, not soldiers, and the shells were falling among them and they ran away. I then rode forward alone with only my servant Mohammed with me, who, seeing that there was no one with me and that I was going to certain death, caught hold of my horse by the bridle and implored me to go back. Then seeing that the day was lost already, and that all were flying, I turned. Mohammed continued with me and we crossed the Wady at Tel-el-Kebir, and keeping along the line of the Ismailia Canal reached Belbeis. There I had formed a second camp, and I found Ali Roubi arrived before me, and we thought to make a stand. But on the arrival of Drury Lowe's cavalry none would stay, and so we abandoned all and

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took train for Cairo. Ali Roubi made mistakes by extending the lines too far northwards, but he was loyal. The traitors were Abdul Ghaffar, I think, and certainly his second in command of the cavalry, Abd-el-Rahman Bey Hassan, and Ali Yusuf Khunfis. You say Saoud el Tihawi, too. It may be so. Those Arabs were not to be trusted. His grandfather had joined Bonaparte when he invaded us a hundred years ago.

Now I return home after twenty years of sorrowful exile, and my own people I laboured to deliver have come to believe, because the French papers have told them so, that I sold them to the English!

### THE GRAND MUFTI'S REMARKS ON THE ABOVE

[N.B.—On March 18th, 1903, I read the foregoing account to Sheykh Mohammed Abdu at his house at Ain Shems. He approved most of it as correct, but made the following remarks:

1. *As to the riot against Nubar.*—Arabi's account of this is correct, except that the order given to Ali Fehmy to fire on the students was not intended to be obeyed and was part of the comedy. Ali Fehmy fired over their heads by order. Latif Bey was arrested and imprisoned after the riot by Nubar, but was released on an application made to Nubar by the freemasons, Latif being a member of that body. Latif in after days freely acknowledged his share in the affair. As to what Arabi says of his having proposed at that time to depose Ismail, there was certainly secret talk of such action. Sheykh Jemal ed Din was in favour of it, and proposed to me, Mohammed Abdu, that Ismail should be assassinated some day as he passed in his carriage daily over the Kasr el Nil bridge, and I strongly approved, but it was only talk between ourselves, and we lacked a person capable of taking lead in the affair. If we had known Arabi at that time, we might have arranged it with him, and it would have been the best thing that could have happened, as it would have prevented the intervention of Europe. It would not, however, have been possible to establish a republic in the then state of political ignorance of the people. As to Ismail's having taken away fifteen millions with him to Naples, nobody knows the amount. All that is known is that it was very large. For the last few months of his reign Ismail had been hoarding money, which he intercepted as it was sent in to the Finance Office from the Mudiriehs.

2. *As to Tewfik in his father's time.*—What Arabi says of Tewfik having taken presents for presenting petitions to Ismail may be true, but the thing was not talked of, nor is it in accordance with Tewfik's conduct when in power. I do not believe it.

## Appendix I

3. *As to Riaz' tyranny.*—Riaz was tyrannical, but not to the point of shedding blood. This he was always averse to. I do not remember any talk about people being made away with secretly by him. There was no danger of such at any rate before the affair of the Kasr el Nil. During the summer, however, of that year, 1881, there was talk of attempts against Arabi and the other colonels.

4. *As to the affair of the Kasr el Nil, February 1st, 1881.*—Arabi's account is confused and incorrect. The first petition made by Arabi and the officers was simply one of injustice being done them. It was made by Osman Rifki, and it drew down upon them the anger of the Minister of War, who determined to get rid of them, and first brought Arabi under the notice of the Consuls. Baron de Ring, who had a quarrel with Riaz, interested himself in their case, but only indirectly. The petition talked of by Arabi as having been drawn up in January by him and taken to Riaz, certainly contained no reference to a Constitution or to the increase of the army to 18,000 men. These demands were not made till the September demonstration. The petition of the Kasr el Nil time was simply a strong complaint to Riaz of Osman Rifki's misdoings, and demanding his dismissal from the Ministry of War. Riaz, at the council after the demonstration, was in favour of its being made the subject of an inquiry, which would have necessitated the trial by court-martial not only of the petitioners, but also of Osman Rifki. Riaz was not in favour of violence. But it was pointed out to him, privately, that if he opposed the more violent plan it would be said he was seeking to curry favour with the soldiers as against the Khedive, and he, therefore, left the matter to Osman Rifki, to be dealt with as he pleased.

5. *As to the demonstration of Abdin, September 9th, 1881.*—The seven months between the affair of Kasr el Nil and the demonstration of September were months of great political activity, which pervaded all classes. Arabi's action gained him much popularity, and put him into communication with the civilian members of the National party, such as Sultan Pasha, Suliman Abaza, Hassan Sherei, and myself, and it was we who put forward the idea of renewing the demand for a Constitution. The point of view from which he at that time regarded it was as giving him and his military friends a security against reprisals by the Khedive of his Ministers. He told me this repeatedly during the summer. We consequently organized petitions for a Constitution, and carried on a campaign for it in the press. Arabi saw a great deal of Sultan Pasha during the summer, and Sultan, who was very rich, made much of him, sending him presents, such as farm produce, horses, and the rest, in order to encourage him, and to get his support for

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the constitutional movement. It was in concert with Sultan that the demonstration of Abdin was arranged, and it is quite true that Sultan expected to be named to a Ministry after the fall of Riaz, But Sherif Pasha, who became Prime Minister, did not think of him and overlooked him. Afterwards Sultan was pacified and pleased when he was offered the presidency of the new Chamber of Notables. It was not till after the *leyha*, ultimatum, that he had any quarrel with Arabi. Then it is true that Arabi drew his sword in Sultan's presence and that of other members of the Chamber when they hesitated and were afraid to oppose the *leyha*. Up to this they had acted together. Arabi's account of the Khedive's message, "You three are soldiers. With me you are four," is excellent, and exactly shows the situation as between him and the officers. Colvin certainly was with the Khedive at Abdin, but as he knew no Arabic he probably was not noticed by Arabi. It was Cookson who did the talking. Baron de Ring had been recalled by his Government on the request of Riaz, who complained of his encouragement of the officers.

6. *As to the riots of Alexandria.*—Arabi is correct in his account as regards Omar Loutfi and the Khedive, who had been arranging the riot for some weeks. But it is not true as regards Seyd Kandil, who was only weak and failed to prevent it. He is also wrong about Cookson. The firearms introduced into the Consulate were for the defence of the Maltese and other English subjects. Seyd Kandil was exiled for twenty years, but was allowed quietly to come back, and is now at his country place in Egypt, and I have often talked over the affair with him. If you like we will go together and pay him a visit next autumn. Arabi is right in saying that neither Hassan Moussa nor Nadim were concerned in the riot. Nadim went down to Alexandria to deliver a lecture and Hassan on money business.]

[The Mufti also added the following remarks on March 20th, 1903.

There was an attempt to introduce freemasonry into Egypt in the later years of Ismail Pasha. The lodges were all connected with lodges in Europe. Sheykh Jemal ed Din joined one, but he soon found out that there was nothing of any value in it and withdrew. Ismail encouraged it for his purposes when he began to be in difficulties, but freemasonry never was a power in Egypt.

Mohammed Obeyd was certainly killed at Tel-el-Kebir. There were rumours for a long time of his having been seen in Syria, and we used to send from Beyrout when we were living there in exile to try and find him for his wife's sake, who was at Beyrout, but they always turned out to be false reports.

## *Appendix I*

Mahmud Sami was one of the original Constitutionalists, dating from the time of Ismail. He was a friend of Sherif and belonged to the same school of ideas. It is most probable that he gave warning to Arabi of his intended arrest, as he was one of the Council of Ministers and must have known. After the affair of Kasr el Nil he was altogether with Arabi and the Colonels. That was why Riaz got rid of him from the Ministry and appointed Daoud Pasha in his place.

Riaz, at the beginning, underrated the importance of Arabi's action. Afterwards he was afraid of it. He began by despising it as he did all fellah influence in politics.

Sherif Pasha resigned in February, 1882, not on account of any quarrel with Arabi, but because he was afraid of European intervention. He was opposed to an insistence on the power of voting the budget claimed by the Chamber of Notables, and he retired so as not to be compromised.

Ragheb Pasha is (as mentioned by Ninet) of Greek descent, though a Moslem. He had been Minister under Ismail, but was a Constitutionalist. After the leyha he was named Prime Minister, with Arabi for Minister of War. He acted honestly with Arabi, and remained with the National Party during the war.

Butler gives May 20th, 1880, as the date of the first military petition. That is probably correct.

Ibrahim el Aghany was one of the best and ablest of Jemal ed Din's disciples at the Azhar. He is still living and employed in the Mékhemeh (?).

When the Council was summoned to consider Arabi's petition asking for Osman Rifky's dismissal, the Khedive was with Osman Rifky for having Arabi arrested and sent up the Nile, but Riaz at first was for an inquiry. During an adjournment, however, of the Council, Taha Pasha persuaded Riaz that if he was for lenient measures it would be thought he was intriguing with the soldiers against the Khedive—to make himself Khedive—and Riaz thereupon made no further opposition. This I learned afterwards from Mahmud Sami who, as one of the Ministers, was present at the Council.

✓ Ibrahim Eff. el Wakil with Hassan Sherei and Ahmed Mahmud were the leaders of the liberal party in the Chamber of Notables.]

FURTHER ACCOUNT GIVEN BY SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU,  
DECEMBER 22ND, 1903

[When Sheykh Jemal ed Din was exiled a few days after Sherif's dismissal in 1879, I was told to leave Cairo where I was professor in the normal school, and to go to my village. My successor at

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the school was Sheykh Hassan the blind. I was soon tired of being in my village and went to Alexandria where I was watched by the police, so I went secretly to Tantah and wandered about for a long while. Then I came back to Cairo hoping to see Mahmud Sami, who was my friend, and at that time Minister of the Awkaf, but he was away, so I went to Ali Pasha Mubarak's, Minister of Public Works, who was also a friend, but he received me badly, and everybody advised me not to stay, as it would be thought I came in connection with a secret society which had been recently formed by Shahin Pasha and Omar Lutfi and other Ismailists against Riaz, so I went to my village again. But again I grew tired of it, as the villagers were always quarrelling and resolved to return once more and lecture at the Azhar. Riaz Pasha was at that time in difficulty to find any one who could write good Arabic in the Official Paper, and he consulted Mahmud Sami, who told him that if there were but three more like me Egypt could be saved. And my successor, Sheykh Hassan, gave him the same opinion of me.

So I was appointed at the end of Ramadan (October, 1880), third Editor of the Journal. But my two senior Editors were jealous and would give me no work to do. So the Journal was no better written. At this Riaz was displeased, and made an inquiry, and as the result I was made Editor, and a little later Director of the Press. This was before the end of 1880. The first time I saw you was when I called on you with Rogers Bey at the Hôtel du Nil, and it was I who recommended to you Mohammed Khalil, and afterwards he brought you to see me at my house. I criticized the Government strongly in the Official Journal, and as Director of the Press allowed all liberty. But I was not in favour of a revolution, and thought that it would be enough if we had a Constitution in five years' time. I disapproved of the overthrow of Riaz in September, 1881, and, about ten days before the military demonstration at Abdin, I met Arabi at the house of Toulba Ismat, and Latif Bey Selim had come with him, and there were many there. And I urged him to moderation, and said, "I foresee that a foreign occupation will come and that a malediction will rest for ever on him who provokes it." On this Arabi said that he hoped it would not be he. And he told me at the same time that Sultan Pasha had promised to bring petitions from every Notable in Egypt in favour of the Constitution. This was true, for all the Omdehs were angry with Riaz for having put down their habit of employing forced labour. Suliman Abaza would not join in the revolution as he thought it premature, and Sherei Pasha was also against it. But when once the Constitution was granted we all joined to protect it. But Arabi could not control the army, where there were many ambitions.

## *Appendix I*

I did not know of the intended demonstration at Abdin, as I was known to be friendly to Riaz, but it was arranged with Sultan Pasha and Sherif Pasha. The Khedive was in a constant change of mind about Arabi at that time, and joined Riaz and Daoud Pasha in their attempt to crush Arabi, but the day before the event they told the Khedive, who, to overthrow Riaz, approved.]

### CONVERSATION WITH ARABI AT SHEYKH OBEYD, JANUARY 2ND, 1904

You ask me at what date the Khedive Tewfik put himself first into communication with us soldiers. It was in this way. Shortly before the affair of the Kasr el Nil he encouraged Ali Fehmy to go to us, with whom we were already friends, his intention being to use him as a spy on us, he being Colonel of the Guard. But Ali Fehmy joined us in our petition to Riaz Pasha, and was involved with us in our arrest. After the affair of the Kasr el Nil, and seeing the position we had gained in the minds of the people, the Khedive thought to make use of us against Riaz, and he sent Ali Fehmy to us with the message, "You three are soldiers. With me you make four." That was about a month after the affair, and we knew he was favourable to us also through Mahmud Sami, who was then Minister of War. And Mahmud Sami told us, "If ever you see me leave the Ministry, know that the Khedive's mind is changed to you, and that there is danger." In the course, therefore, of the summer (1881) when trouble began to begin for us through the spies of Riaz Pasha, who was Minister of the Interior, and who had us watched by the police, we had confidence in Mahmud Sami.

And I was specially involved in displeasure through my refusal to allow my soldiers to be taken from their military work to dig the Towfikieh Canal, they being impressed for the labour by Ali Pasha Moubarak as Minister of Public Works. For this and for other reasons the Khedive turned from us, and resolved, with Riaz Pasha, to separate and disunite the army; and the regiments were to be sent to distant places so that we should not communicate one with the other. And Mahmud Sami was called upon, as Minister of War, to work their plan against us, the Khedive at that time being at Alexandria with the rest of the Ministers. And when Mahmud Sami refused, Riaz Pasha wrote to him, "The Khedive has accepted your resignation." And both he and the Khedive notified to Mahmud Sami that he was to go at once to his village in the neighbourhood of Tantah, and remain there, and not to go to Cairo, and on no account to have communication with us. He nevertheless came to Cairo to his house there, and we called on him, but he refused to see us. Then we knew that evil was in-



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tended against us. And the Khedive appointed Daoud Pasha Yeghen in his place, and the vexation on us increased, and we knew that attempts were to be made against us. At the beginning of September the Khedive returned to Cairo with Riaz and the Ministers, and it was resolved to deal with us. Then I took counsel with Abd-el-Aal and Abd-el-Ghaffar, the commander of the cavalry at Gesireh, and Fuda Bey Hassan, *Caimakam* in command at the Kaláa. The miralái in command at the Kaláa had been dismissed by Mahmud Sami shortly before leaving office, and had not been replaced. This miralái was of us but *khain* (a traitor), and we agreed that we would make a demonstration and demand the dismissal of the whole Ministry, and that a Ministry favourable to the Wattan should replace them, and that a Mejliss el Nawwab should be assembled, and that the army should be raised to 18,000 men. But we did not tell Ali Fehmy of our design, for we did not wholly at that time trust him. And the next morning I wrote stating our demands, and sent it to the Khedive at Ismailia Palace, saying that we should march to Abdin Palace at the *asr*, there to receive his answer. And the reason of our going to Abdin and not to Ismailia, where he lived, was that Abdin was his public residence, and we did not wish to alarm the ladies of his household. But if he had not come to Abdin we should have marched on to Ismailia.

When, therefore, the Khedive received our message he sent for Riaz Pasha and Khairy Pasha and Stone Pasha, and they went first to Abdin Barracks, where both the Khedive and Riaz Pasha spoke to the soldiers, and they gave orders to Ali Fehmy that he should, with his regiment, occupy the palace of Abdin. And Ali Fehmy assented, and he posted his men in the upper rooms out of sight, so that they should be ready to fire on us from the windows. But I do not know whether they were given ball cartridge or not. Then the Khedive with the Generals went on to the Kaláa, and they spoke to the soldiers there in the same sense, calling on Fuda Bey to support the Khedive against us, the Khedive scolding him and saying, "I shall put you in prison"; but the soldiers surrounded the carriage, and the Khedive was afraid and drove away, and he went on by the advice of Riaz to Abassiyeh to speak to me, but I had already marched with my regiment through the Hassaneyn quarter to Abdin. They asked about the artillery and were told that it also had gone to Abdin, and when the Khedive arrived there he found us occupying the square, the artillery and cavalry being before the west entrance, and I with my troops before the main entrance, and already when I arrived before the palace I had sent in to Ali Fehmy, who I had heard was there, and had spoken to him, and he had withdrawn his men from the palace, and they stood with us.

## Appendix I

And the Khedive entered by the back door on the east side, and presently he came out to us with his generals and aides-de-camp, but I did not see Colvin with him, though he may have been there, and he called on me to dismount, and I dismounted, and he called on me to put up my sword, and I put up my sword, but the officers approached with me to prevent treachery, about fifty in number, and some of them placed themselves between him and the palace, but Riaz Pasha was not with the Khedive in the square, and remained in the palace. And when I had delivered my message and made my three demands to the Khedive, he said "I am Khedive of the country and shall do as I like" ("*ana Khedeywi 'l beled wa 'amal zey ma inni awze*"). I replied, "We are not slaves, and we shall never more be inherited from this day forth" ("*Nahnu ma abid wa la nurithu ba'd el yom*"). He said nothing more, but turned and went back into the palace. And presently they sent out Cookson to me with his interpreter, and he asked me why, being a soldier, I made demand of a parliament, and I said that it was to put an end to arbitrary rule, and pointed to the crowd of citizens supporting us behind the soldiers. He threatened me, saying, "We shall bring a British army," and much discussion took place between us, and he returned six or seven times to the palace and came out again six or seven times to me, until finally he informed me that the Khedive had agreed to all, and the Khedive wished for Haidar Pasha to replace Riaz. But I would not consent, and when it was put to me to say I named Sherif Pasha, because he had declared himself in favour of a Mejliss el Nawwab, and I had known him a little in former times, in the time of Saïd Pasha, when he served with the army. And in the evening the Khedive sent for me and I went to him at Ismailia Palace, and I thanked him for having agreed to our request, but he said only, "That is enough. Go now and occupy Abdin, and let it be without music in the streets" (lest that should be taken as a token of rejoicing).

And when Ali Pasha Nizami came to Cairo with Ahmed Pasha Ratib from the Sultan, the Khedive was alarmed lest an inquiry should be made, and Mahmud Sami being again Minister of War ordered us to leave Cairo, and I went to Ras el Wady and Abd el Aal to Damiatra, but Ali Fehmy remained at Cairo. And I saw nothing of Ali Nizami. But being at Zagazig on a visit to friends, Ahmed Eff. Shemsi and Suliman Pasha Abaza, as I was returning by train to Ras el Wady, it happened that Ahmed Pasha Ratib was on his way to Suez, for he was going on to Mecca on pilgrimage. And I found myself in the same carriage with him, and we exchanged compliments as strangers, and I asked him his name, and he asked me my name, and he told me of his pilgrimage and other things, but he did not speak of his mission to the Khedive, nor

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did I say that I told him that I was loyal to the Sultan as the head of my religion, and I also related to him all that had occurred, and he said, "You did well." And at Ras el Wady I left him, and afterwards he sent me a Koran from Jeddah, and later, on his return to Stamboul, he wrote to me, saying that he had spoken favourably of me to the Sultan, and afterwards I received a letter dictated by the Sultan to Sheykh Mohammed Dhaffar telling me what you know.

As to Yakub Sami, he was of family originally Greek from Stamboul. He went by my order to Alexandria to inquire into the affair of the riot, but they would not allow a true inquiry to be made into it. It was Yakub Sami who, with Ragheb Pasha, proposed that we should cut off the Khedive's head. You say we should have done better to do so, but I wished to gain the end of our revolution without the shedding of a drop of blood.

## APPENDIX II

ALEXANDRIAN RIOT, JUNE 11TH, 1882. HISTORICAL MEMORANDUM DRAWN UP IN 1883, BASED ON EVIDENCE OFFERED WITH REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE RIOT OF JUNE 11TH; AT ALEXANDRIA

IT appears:—1. That soon after the Khedive's quarrel with his Ministers and the National Party on the subject of the Circasian plot—that is to say, in May, 1882—he, the Khedive, sought to secure himself a counterpoise to the army, which supported the Ministers, in buying the help of certain Bedouin tribes of Boheyra and the west through the instrumentality of one Ibrahim Bey Towfik, and that a sum stated at £20,000 was expended for this purpose, especially among the Oulad Ali tribe, who occupy the western desert from the latitude of Cairo to that of Alexandria. That the Sheykhs of these tribes came to Cairo, and there it was arranged with them by the Khedive, who received them with great honour, that they should introduce a large number of their followers into Cairo by way of Ghizeh, with a view of creating disturbances in the town—for at that time it was sought by the Court party to prove the existence of anarchy in Egypt in order to discredit the Nationalist Ministry. The plan, however, failed through the timidity of the Bedouins who could not be induced to enter the city, which is separated from their own district by the Nile, in

sufficient numbers, and were afraid of the same Bedouins, the Oulad Ali, were never... June, by Omar Pasha Lutfi, the Circassian Governor of Alexandria, where they were in their own district, to enter unarmed and take part in the riot there, their arms having previously been deposited with the police, who, however, restored them on the day of the riot.

2. That until the middle of May Omar Lutfi, though a Circassian, professed, in common with most officials, Nationalist sympathies; but, on the delivery of the Consular Ultimatum of the 24th of May, and the consequent resignation of the Nationalist Ministry, the Khedive sent for Omar Lutfi to come to Cairo, and there on the 26th offered him a seat in the new Cabinet he was seeking to form, an appointment which was frustrated only by the return of Arabi to power. (This is a point of importance as it shows the personal interest Omar Lutfi thenceforward had in the overthrow of Arabi.)

3. That, with the return of Arabi to power as the sole competent maintainer of order, and on his guarantee of order being given to the Consuls, the Khedive reverted to his former plan of creating anarchy, though no longer at Cairo. Dervish Pasha was expected shortly as arbiter between the Khedive and his Ministry, and it was necessary that the Khedive should be able to show cause against his Minister. He accordingly sent, on the 3rd of June, a cyphered telegram to Omar Lutfi, at Alexandria, to the following effect:

"Arabi has guaranteed public safety and published it in the newspapers, and has made himself responsible to the Consuls; and if he succeeds in his guarantee the Powers will trust him, and our consideration will be lost. Also the fleets of the Powers are in Alexandrian waters, and men's minds are excited, and quarrels are not far off between Europeans and others. Now, therefore, choose for yourself whether you will serve Arabi in his guarantee, or whether you will serve us."

4. That the Khedive sent his cousin, Haidar Pasha, twice during the ensuing week to Alexandria, receiving him secretly each time before and after his return. That Haidar was also at Alexandria on the day of the riot, returning thence to the Khedive immediately the affair was over.

5. That during this week (the week before the riot) the Mahroussa paper, an organ of Sherif Pasha edited by Selim Nakash, a Syrian Maronite, published accounts of riots supposed to have occurred at Cairo, thus exciting and predisposing men's minds for what was to happen at Alexandria. These reports were circulated in official quarters at Alexandria, and have been traced to their origin.

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That the Bedouins above-mentioned were assembled during this week in the vicinity of Alexandria. That the attention of Omar Lutfi, the Governor, was called, but without effect, to the circumstance, and to that of unusual assemblages of men of the lowest class in the European quarter of the city.

7. That on the 9th of June (two days before the riot) the Khedive, after communication with Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's Commissioner, sent for Omar Lutfi by special train to Alexandria, and having conferred with him at great length, sent him back to Alexandria. There is evidence, but not of a direct character, that on their arrival Dervish Pasha and Sheykh Assad received each a bribe from the Khedive of £30,000 and £9,000 respectively, sums raised by mortgage on the Khedive's wife's property.

8. That on the 10th of June (the day before the riot) an interview took place at Cairo at the house of Dervish Pasha, between Dervish Pasha and Sheykh Assad Ahmed (the Sultan's two commissioners), on the one hand, and Mahmoud Sami and Arabi Pashas on the other hand—this being the first interview between Dervish and Arabi. That Dervish's reception was professedly friendly—that he urged Arabi for the public good to resign to him his command of the army, and to consent to go to Constantinople. That Arabi consented to both these proposals, but on certain conditions, the chief of which was that Dervish should give him a written release from his guarantee of public security. This Dervish promised, but proposed that Arabi should wait for the document till the following Monday, the 12th, giving as his reason that there would be a meeting of the Consuls with the Khedive on that day. So the matter of the command of the army was left in abeyance between them till the Monday.

9. That on the same day, the day after his return to Alexandria, Omar Lutfi sent for Kandil, the chief of police, to concert measures with him for arranging a riot which was to last two hours. Kandil either was or pretended to be ill, but nevertheless came. Kandil did not wish to embroil himself in the matter; and on his return home took again to his bed, leaving Hassan Bey Sadyk to fill his place in command of the police. There is no evidence that more than a riot "to last 2 hours" was in contemplation—and it is probable that, if Arabi had resigned as Dervish expected him to do, the riot would have been either counterordered or stopped by an early appeal to the regular troops in the Sultan's name. It must be remembered that the police and Mustafezin were under Omar Lutfi's orders as Governor of the town, drawing their pay from him; and that no state of siege having been proclaimed the garrison could not legally interfere without a written order from the Governor. The Governor himself was legally responsible

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to the Khedive only, as, from the date of Mahmud Sami's resignation, no Minister of the Interior had been appointed.

10. That on the 11th, Sunday, the day of the riot, a certain Maltese hired a donkey (according to one account a carriage) and, having ridden round the various drinking houses in the European quarter, stopped at the Café "El Gazaz." There he entered into an altercation as to his fare with the man, a Moslem named Seyd el Ajjan, who followed him into the Café, where the Maltese stabbed him. This led to a general quarrel. The police, and later the Mustafezin, when called in, refused to interfere or interfered to add to the confusion. A house inhabited by Maltese opened fire on the crowd in the street. Moslems, principally Berberins, came armed with sticks from the Moslem quarter of the town. The Bedouins before-mentioned entered and took part in the affray, and the fighting became general. The English Consul, having received a message from Omar Lutfi, was assaulted and beaten. Omar Lutfi did not at first come to the scene of the riot, and when he did come came in plain clothes, and did nothing to stop what was happening. On the contrary he was heard encouraging certain Bedouins to strike. During the early afternoon no communication was made by Omar Lutfi either to the military Commander or to Arabi at Cairo. But numerous telegrams passed between him and the Khedive. In one of these the Khedive forbade him to apply to the regular troops, but suggested that he should stop the riot, which had become a massacre, and ask help from the Admirals. No message therefore was sent to Suliman Sami, the Commandant, till after 4 o'clock, and then not in writing, which caused additional delay, and accompanied with a suggestion that the troops should be sent *unarmed*. Finally Suliman Sami sent troops at 5 o'clock, armed on his own responsibility, and quelled the riot.

11. That at Cairo during that afternoon great joy was manifested at the Palace and in the office of the Court, it being freely stated there that Arabi was now ruined. There is abundant evidence of the joy of the Palace and of the consternation of the Nationalists. Arabi was not called upon to intervene till nearly 5 o'clock.

12. That after the 11th of June no real inquiry into the causes of the riot was permitted, although urged repeatedly by Arabi. That the Khedive was supported by certain of the Consuls in frustrating this, as it was known that many Europeans had taken part in the earlier stages of the riot. That later, on the formation of the Ragheb Ministry, and the ostensible reconciliation of the Khedive with the National party, the inquiry was allowed on all hands to drop, although the truth was known.

13. That neither Omar Lutfi nor Hassan Bey Sadyk (acting

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chief of the police on the day of the riot) were ever examined publicly or brought to trial. That on the contrary Omar Lutfi was given leave of absence by the Khedive shortly after the event, and was on the point of leaving Egypt when the bombardment occurred, while after it he was cordially received at Court, and given the place promised him on the fall of Arabi, that of Minister of War, a place which he now holds in high honour.

### AHMED BEY RIFAAT'S ACCOUNT WRITTEN WHILE HE WAS IN PRISON, 1882

Things known with regard to the causes of the event of the 11th of June, and as to certain attempts which were made to cause another such, with the object of discrediting, before the eyes of Europe, the Ministry and the officers and the party whose thoughts were directing the policy at that time.

When the disagreement arose between the Khedive and the Mahmoud Sami Ministry (before the ultimatum), it was rumoured in Cairo that the Khedive would endeavour, through the instrumentality of some of his followers, to cause a massacre in Cairo itself—so much so, that one night, while Mahmoud Sami (then Minister of the Interior) was at an entertainment at Omar Bey Rahmi's house, the rumour of what was intended reached him, and he sent for the Prefect of Police and gave him orders that he should go at once and direct the night-watch to be strengthened, and by all the means in his power keep order, and he went out straightway to do this. And as long as they were in office the Ministry especially watched this matter.

But, when the Khedive saw that he would not succeed by this road, he sent for Ibrahim Bey Towfik, Mudir of Boheyra, and required of him that he should assemble the Sheykhs of the Bedouin tribes and bring them to him, and this he did. And, when he saw them, he received them with great cordiality, and made them promises, and directed the Mudir to order them to collect 3,000 Bedouin Arabs and bring them into the Capital from the side of Ghizeh—hoping thus that, there being no discipline among them, disturbance would result in the town, and peace be broken, and that this would be attributed to the army. They were to enter as guards to the Khedive; and thus for about a month the Sheykhs of the Tribes came and went, but they found it difficult to collect so many men as were wanted or to bring them into the town, owing to the fear the tribes had of the soldiers.

And having again failed in this other road, the Khedive wrote to Omar Lutfi, then Governor of Alexandria, a cyphered telegram, and told him "Arabi has guaranteed public safety and published

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it in the newspapers, and has made himself responsible to the Consuls, and if he succeeds in his guarantee the Powers will trust him and our consideration will be lost. Also the fleets of the Powers are in Alexandrian waters and men's minds are excited, and quarrels are not far off between Europeans and others. Now, therefore, choose for yourself whether you will serve Arabi in his guarantee or whether you will serve us."

And the news of this telegram spread on the tongues of the people, and they said that it was from some of the employés of the Court telegraph.

And on the day of the events (11th of June) I went to the office of the Court, *maiyat* [as we should say "Lord Chamberlain's office"], and I saw that the Court officials were in great joy and merriment on account of what had happened. And they were talking about it and were exaggerating the news of it, and they scoffed at Arabi's pledge to keep the peace.

Now it has been always the custom, from the time of the late Khedive, that the men of the Court say nothing but what is agreeable to the Khedive. Every day, indeed, as news reaches them they talk and laugh if it is agreeable to him, and if otherwise they feign all the sorrow they can.

And on the day after the event the news was spread in Cairo that the Khedive had telegraphed during the massacre to Omar Lutfi, ordering him "Ask for soldiers from the Admiral and do not ask for Egyptian soldiers." And Omar Lutfi answered "The Admiral cannot comply; because something further might happen which it would be difficult to stop, from the soldiers in the town."

And when I was at Alexandria twelve days after the event I heard all the people saying with one voice that it was the Governor (Omar Lutfi) who made it go so far, for he was there and did not give any order to prevent it or go to the place except after some hours, or ask for the regular soldiers in spite of their being so near the scene of action, and all the people said that this was at the instigation of the Khedive. And I heard from them that near the end of the massacre the Governor was passing from point to point, and there was an European at a window holding in his hand a revolver, and one of the Bedouins said "Shall I shoot that one O Pasha?" and he said to him "Shoot him," and the Arab fired a bullet at him and killed him. And much of the stolen goods entered his house and the houses of his relations on that black day.

I heard also from them (the people) that he incited some of the people during the massacre with encouragement and made signs to the police-soldiers (*mustafezin*) not to take any notice, saying "Let them die, the sons of dogs." Before the event Haidar Pasha went twice to Alexandria and returned to Cairo both times, and on



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the day of the event he was at Alexandria, and when it was over he came to Cairo; then he travelled with the Khedive on the day of his going (to Alexandria).

When the Commission was formed to inquire the causes of the event, Omar Lutfi was not questioned about anything at all. On the contrary the Khedive directed him to resign under pretext of illness, and to say that he wished to visit Europe for medical treatment, and after that he kept going backwards and forwards between Cairo and Alexandria for a time, till the war broke out and then he stayed at Alexandria and became (was made) Minister of War.

Arabi during the whole of that time was doing his utmost for the honour of his pledge, he was continually patrolling the streets of Cairo by night to inspect in person the posts (stations) of the mustafezin, and he sent orders to all the quarters to watch over the keeping of the peace.

Omar Lutfi Pasha was Governor of Alexandria during the riot; he was the person legally responsible for security, and he neglected it completely even if we do not say that he helped to increase the disorder.

Now if that was in obedience to Arabi—as he (Lutfi) pretended, although his office was now in immediate dependence on the Khedive, since the Khedive had issued a special decree declaring that after Sami's resignation all matters relating to the Interior devolved upon the Court—how came he (Lutfi) to be appointed Minister of War as a recompense of his obedience to Arabi and his disobedience to his Lord the Khedive? But if it was negligence of his own, how is it that with that negligence and incapacity he was appointed Minister of War? How is it that he was never asked a single question although he was the first (person) who should have been questioned? Truly the march of events proclaims aloud the cause of that riot to be the Khedive in concert with Omar Lutfi.

The Khedive worked the same sort of intrigues in the Sudan and used to write to the Governor not to mind about the Mahdi's progress so as to increase the embarrassment. The telegrams received at Court about the Mahdi, from the Governor (of Sudan), were different from those sent to the Diwan of the Government, and on the day that news reached the Diwan of the Government that the Mahdi was killed, the Court endeavoured to contradict it, and the Khedive used to be annoyed with any one who tried to keep things quiet.

When he (the Khedive) was at the Ramleh Palace during the war the Bedouin Arabs of Boheyra, who had pledged themselves to him to get up disturbances, had been assembled round his palace;

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and it was they who pillaged and burned Alexandria and then returned and robbed the fugitives and the country people (of Boheyra) until the removal of the Mudir who encouraged them, and many of them were punished till they desisted, fearing the soldiers who came and occupied the mudierieh.

These are things known to me on this question, and if I were out of prison I could have them confirmed by witnesses who could not be controverted.

### SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU'S ACCOUNT WRITTEN WHILE IN EXILE IN SYRIA, 1883

A few days before the incident of June 11th the "Mahrusa" newspaper (Omar Lutfi's organ) announced that the Europeans of Alexandria were making military preparations. It proclaimed this not only to the inhabitants of the city, but to the whole population of Egypt, stating also the number of those thus arming themselves.

The strangeness of this intimation—there being no apparent reason for such preparation—led certain Notables to question one of the writers in that journal. He stated that he had been ordered to publish it, but he would not divulge the name of the person who had instructed him to do so.

Yakub Sami (Under-Secretary of War) went to Alexandria about five days before the riot, to receive Dervish Pasha. On his arrival in the port he heard that a telegram had come from Cairo to the effect that the Khedive had been assassinated. He telegraphed at once to inquire, and got an answer that it was true that the Khedive had been killed, the Capital was in disorder, and that Europeans were being massacred. He, in consternation, telegraphed again, this time to the Kasr el Nil office, and had a reply contradicting the report. It was afterwards discovered that this false report came through the Ezbekieh office in Cairo, and had been intended to excite disturbance at Alexandria, but that the presence there of Yakub Sami had caused the outbreak to be deferred.

Some few days before the actual outbreak an unusual stir was observed among the Europeans in the neighbourhood of the Great Square (Place des Consuls), to which Ahmed Eff. Nabih, Police Superintendent of the quarter, twice called the attention of the Chief of the Police (Zaptieh) and the Governor, but without avail. Taher Eff. el Kiridli, another police officer, also reported to the Governor of what had come under his own observation, but Omar Lutfi would not have any measures of precaution taken.

Omar Lutfi had been himself one of the most prominent persons in giving fêtes in honour of the military, inviting orators to his

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house who exhorted everybody to espouse the cause of the army. It was he who set the example, followed by other influential people, of holding such gatherings at which indeed he was the principal guest; they were frequented by editors of newspapers, foreigners, and others. Speeches were delivered in his presence which he never showed the slightest sign of wishing to check. The first that has been heard of any such desire is his declaration lately published.

His Excellency, the Governor, now pretends that the disturbance was caused by the speeches of Nadim, whereas the speeches of Nadim at that time were calculated to keep the people quiet, explaining to them that even if they were abused or beaten by some of the low class Europeans they must beware of being drawn into a quarrel, as this was the object in order to give a pretext for the English fleet to bombard the city. Many of the Notables can bear witness to this. As a matter of fact Nadim was not at Alexandria when the riot occurred, but was at Cairo. ✓

The riot began at 1 p.m. in the Ibrahim Street near the Police station, between a native named El Ajjan and a Maltese, who struck this man and knocked him down wounded. His brother then desired an Italian policeman to arrest the aggressor, instead of which the policeman abused and hit him, he returning the blows. A crowd gathered, and a policeman was hurt by the wounded man's brother. The police were so few that they could not disperse the mob, but there was no fighting to speak of until shots were fired from the windows into the crowd by Europeans.

Armed Europeans attacked the roughs of Alexandria, who snatched up, where they could find them, sticks, umbrellas, chairs from the shops, legs of tables, etc. As for His Excellency the Governor, he never came on the scene of disturbance until two and a half hours had passed. He sent to the British Consul, Mr. Cookson, asking him to come, we do not know for what purpose, who, when he came, had to push his way through the crowd at the risk of his life.

Omar Lutfi made no haste to send for the division of the police (mustafezin) which was specially under his orders belonging to the Zaptieh. It had no connection whatever with the Ministry of War, its pay and management were in the hands of the Government. When at length he was moved to summon them he sent for them to come unarmed, which convinced them that the Governor's only wish was to increase the disturbance. They came in that strange guise, and took part with the murderers and pillagers, sending many of the articles looted to His Excellency's own residence.

When the Governor saw that things had gone so far as to in-

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criminate him he sent for the arms to be brought in cabs, but too late for their distribution, as the mustafezzin had already dispersed.

The head-quarters of the regular troops were close at hand, but he allowed four hours to elapse before calling them out, and when he did so it was by an irregular message, so that the Colonel, Mustafa Abd-el-Rahim, afraid of accepting the responsibility, sent back a request that the order should come in the official form. This being done the troops came out, dispersed the crowd, and restored order. All the foreign Consuls bore witness to this.

In disregarding the military regulations the Governor's object was, by a protracted discussion between him and the Colonel, to allow the flames of sedition to spread. It had been reported that His Excellency had egged on the mob to pillage, and when taken to task about it by some one who had heard the rumour, he replied, "Certainly, in order to take off their attention from murdering people." By heaven, a wise policy!

During the riot some of Mr. Cookson's consular servants went round among the Europeans, inciting them to come forward and persevere in the fight.

While the Governor, the Colonel of the troops, and the Wakil of the Zaptieh were sitting together in the *diwan* of the Mixed Tribunals about an hour after sunset, news was brought to them that a cartload of arms was on its way to the British Consulate. The Governor would do nothing, but the Colonel had it stopped and deposited its contents at the Zaptieh.

As it appeared to the Colonel in command at Bab Sherky that Omar Lutfi himself was instigating the disturbance, he would have liked to arrest him, but he was unable to do so, the country not being under martial law, and he waited the arrival of the Under-Secretary for War, Yakub Sami, to lay the matter before him. However, on his arrival the idea of arrest was abandoned.

About the seventh hour of the night tidings reached Colonel Mustafa Abd-el-Rahim that *felucas* were approaching the shore apparently with the object of landing British soldiers. He informed the Governor, who said it could not possibly be, but to make sure he then went to the French Consul, who accompanied him and several other officers with a small detachment of soldiers to the shore. There they found confirmation of the report, and went on in consequence to the British Consulate, from where, after some parleying, the *felucas* were signalled to go back.

Most of the accused persons who were arrested on the following day protested that they were not at all to blame, for that His Excellency the Governor himself had given orders to them to attack and pillage. Had there been any real inquiry during those

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first few days, suspicion in accordance with the statements of the great majority of the accused would have rested on the Governor in person. But Admiral Seymour would have no such inquiry lest the pretext (for bombardment) should be lost.

Seyyid Kandil was in possession of documents showing clearly how the thing was organized by the Governor and the Khedive, and that it was a concerted plan. But after his arrest he was compelled to deliver up these papers. Yet Omar Lutfi was never called to account in any sort of way. On the contrary, he was promoted to the most important of posts.

Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, Mudir of the Gharbieh province, when the massacre occurred at Tantah, went into the Government House, having assembled there the other officials, clerks, and secretaries, and locked the door on the inside, leaving the populace to itself, so that disorder spread, and would have gone much further but for Ahmed Bey Minshawi and his brother—and these were not Government officials—who quelled the tumult, and saved Jews and Christians and rich people from the hands of the mob of roughs, fugitives from Alexandria. This Mudir was never examined, and was reinstated as Mudir of the Gharbieh after the war. May God reckon with him for the blood of the slain!

Moreover, among the sentences pronounced in these days we find one passed by the Alexandria court-martial on Abd el Rázak Alwan, wakfl of the Boheyra province during the war, of transportation for fifteen years to Massowa for "aiding and abetting the riot at Damanhur," although God knows, and everybody knows that he risked his own life there in serving other people's and protecting their property. Although the Damanhur riot was got up by Ibrahim Bey Towfik, the Mudir—who, though dismissed the day before it happened, managed, nevertheless, to carry out his plan before the new Mudir entered on his duties—that official was reinstated as Mudir of the Boheyra province after the war. He, too, had extracted from the unfortunate population about £12,000 in the form of bribes. It would take years to repair the damage done by this man.

I verily believe that the British Government would forgive any crime committed for the sake of its *protégé*, His Highness the Khedive. At the present moment Great Britain's self-imposed task of "restoring order" appears to consist in gratifying the caprices and the thirst for vengeance of His Highness and his surroundings, and sacrificing the wretched inhabitants to their whims. They think we can be made to believe in the restoration of order and justice if only the newspapers assert that these have been established by the zeal of His Highness the Khedive, of his Ministers, and of the British army.

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There is no need to ask the people of Egypt what they are suffering, one only has to listen to their groaning and lamenting.

### ARABI'S ACCOUNT. THE TRUE CAUSES OF THE EVENTS OF THE 11TH JUNE, 1882, AT ALEXANDRIA

The Court party formed of Turks and Circassians are enemies of mankind, who believe that God Almighty created the Egyptians only to be their slaves and servants over whom they might wield absolute power according to their brutal caprices, treating them with contumely and oppression. When they (the Court party) saw that the endeavours of the Egyptian party began to bear fruit, and saw also that some persons of ability from among those they deemed to be their slaves had advanced so far as to become Ministers and sit with them on equal terms in their sacred councils, and that many others who showed capacity were advanced, and raised to high positions, and that the nation had scented the pleasant breeze of liberty and had thrown off the bonds of servitude, and that meanwhile nothing occurred to disturb security and public tranquillity—this was too much for the enemies of the Egyptians, and they knew that there was no other way for them to put a stop to the Egyptians' success, except by getting up some abominable and brutal outrage against all Europe, which should compel Europe to take effectual measures for destroying the educated Egyptians and removing them from their own country—for by so doing the field would be clear for the enemies of the Egyptians to re-establish servitude in the country—and they (the Court party) agreed upon that, and they availed themselves of my pledge with regard to the safety of Europeans and the preservation of public tranquillity in all the districts of Egypt (with which the Khedive had charged me in the presence of Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's envoy, and of all the Consuls of the European Powers), as an expedient for accomplishing what they had plotted—in order by this to deface in the eyes of all Europe the fair aspect of our actions.

1. First of all the Khedive sent for Omar Lutfi Pasha, the then Governor of Alexandria, requesting him to come to the Capital by a special train, on the 9th of June, 1882, and, on his arrival, conferred with him at great length, giving him the necessary instructions for the organization of a riot in Alexandria, after which he (Omar Lutfi) returned on the same day and put the designs in execution, so that, on the 11th of June (that is, two days after he had received his instructions from the Khedive) the sedition broke out—and a proof of that is that the soldiers of the Gendarmerie—*they* were those who did most of the killing in front of the door of

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the prefecture of police and the door of the Zaptieh; and the police-soldiers did not do their duty against all custom; and the soldiers of Gendarmerie did not come till after the affair had grown too hot, and when they did come they came like spectators—without arms—contrary to what was their duty;—all this, and that the Governor himself and the Commander of the Gendarmerie, Ismail Kamil Pasha, the Circassian, were witnesses of the riot from its beginning to its end, and yet did not care to ask for soldiers from the regiments (viz., “regular soldiers”)—or to quench the fire of the sedition till the riot had reached its climax and the secret orders of the Khedive had been carried out, although they could have done so.

2. Secondly. Omar Lutfi Pasha, the Governor, did not give me any information at all of this event, although he knew I had pledged myself to keep public peace and tranquillity throughout the country, and although a proclamation to that effect had been issued by the Khedive and published in all the journals, Arabic and European.

3. Thirdly. Omar Lutfi, after he had done this deed—he being the Governor responsible for all that happened in the city—was appointed President of the Commission of Inquiry into the deplorable event, and he asked leave to travel abroad for a change, which was granted to him by the Khedive. Afterwards he left office, but remained in Egypt on business of his own till when the war broke out he came to the Khedive in Alexandria by way of Port Said, and he then was appointed Minister of War. Likewise Ismail Kamil Pasha, his associate, did as he did, and was appointed Under-Secretary of War—all this is clear evidence that the riot was plotted or resolved on by the Khedive with Omar Lutfi Pasha and Ismail Kamil Pasha and the rest of the enemies of the Egyptians in order to excite Europe against us.

This is the truth—and therefore it becomes the duty of honest men to make a thorough investigation of what has been said above.

### AHMED BEY RIFAAT'S ACCOUNT FORWARDED TO MR. BLUNT FROM TUNIS IN 1883

There are those who still dare to say and write that the national Egyptian party and its chief are responsible for the unfortunate events of the 11th of June; some writers even do not hesitate to name persons whom, in spite of the last inquiry, they are bent on pointing out as the instigators of what took place on that fatal day. One of them, attempting to explain things, goes so far, regardless of contradiction, as to state the precise object of the riot. “Wish-

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ing," says he, "on one side to strike the imagination of the Turkish Pasha (Dervish Pasha) and on the other to *accentuate* the perfectly privileged position of Arabi, whom the Consuls wish to have held responsible for public order, the rebels imagined the plan for provoking a disturbance, whatever might be its nature, which Arabi alone could put down by merely raising his hand."

Having been myself secretary of the Egyptian Government under Arabi's Ministry, and knowing the men and the affairs of my own country, I feel bound, for the sake of truth and for the good of my country, to lay before you here information and data giving a most formal denial to such calumnies. These details I will give to you with all the more pleasure from knowing that you have always taken an interest in the fate of those whose only crime was that they loved and defended their country, and I did not fear to furnish them while I was in the same prison as Arabi, and saw many who seemed to consider it an honour to insult the man who represented, and by his honesty and liberalism still represents, the future of Egypt.

On Sunday, the 11th of June, the Ottoman Commissioner, Dervish Pasha, who had arrived three days before in Egypt, was driving in the avenue that leads from the Palace of Ghizerah to the bridge of Kasr el Nil. He had just had at his own residence a long interview with Arabi Pasha and all the ex-Ministers, and was going to the palace of Ismailia, where the Khedive resided, with a view to communicate to him a combination which had been agreed upon, and which might, it was said, reconcile the young recalcitrant Khedive with his Ministry. Near the bridge he was met by the Khedive's secretary, Talaat Pasha, who was sent by his master to announce to him that a riot had broken out at Alexandria, that it had been going on for three hours, and that Europeans and Christians were everywhere massacred. This communication was made with an air of triumph, Talaat looked beaming. He appeared to say that Arabi, for whom so much was being done, was the sole cause of the occurrence. In truth, Arabi had engaged, in presence of all the Consuls, to maintain public order, or to restore it if it should be disturbed. Events now gave him the lie; massacres had been going on three hours without his having been able to do anything towards restoring order. That was more than enough to satisfy the partisans of the Khedive, who dreamt of nothing but the fall and destruction of Arabi Pasha, even at the cost of public safety. Dervish Pasha delegated one of the aides-de-camp who were in the carriage with him to return immediately to Arabi. Being myself present, I offered a seat in my carriage to Dervish Pasha's messenger, and took him to the house of Mahmoud Pasha Sami, where Arabi was at the time.



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The news of what had happened soon spread through the town, everybody was alarmed, Arabi and his friends were distracted. In the Khedive's palace only there was joy. To despatches sent by Arabi the Governor of Alexandria replied that the army under his command had mastered the disturbance and restored order. Meanwhile the strangest rumours ran through the streets. . . . Some, as if answering a signal, gave it as a fact that Arabi had ordered the massacre, and gave no further explanation. Others, pretending to be better informed, said that the movement had been organized and conducted by the ex-Prime Minister, Mahmoud Pasha Sami. The most intelligent, without giving any decided opinion, saw in the affair some horrid plot. They could not believe or allow that Arabi was, either directly or indirectly, concerned with the occurrence.

On the 28th of May, that is fourteen days before, Arabi had declared to the Powers that he held himself personally responsible for order. He knew and declared loudly that the safety of Egypt depended on the maintenance of order; he had always opposed even the thought of the dethronement of the Khedive, declaring that he had guaranteed him against any such risk. In those two demonstrations his first thought had been to assure the Consuls of their personal safety, and to tranquillize the minds of the public. How could that same man, at a moment, the gravity of which he perfectly understood, belie his principles, act in opposition to his promises, and himself proclaim his own impotency? Had he ever been able, as the above quoted writer supposes, to stop the *émeute* by merely raising his hand, there might have been some reason for saying, as the same writer says, that Arabi wished to show his power; but the Khedive had not even taken the trouble to acquaint the Minister of War with what had occurred, Arabi only received the news through Dervish Pasha, three hours after the outbreak of the disturbance; he had not, therefore, it was impossible that he should have, the power of stopping the riot by the wave of his hand.

One thing, however, is certain, the rising was not unforeseen, it was combined beforehand, and conducted with diabolical skill. It has been proved that nabouts (thick sticks used by the Egyptian night watchmen) had, some days before the 11th of June, been distributed among the mob by secret agents; that these nabouts made their appearance almost at the same time from various quarters of the town at the very moment when a Maltese had just killed a donkey-man for some futile reason; that the donkey-men of Alexandria, a peaceable class, but very accessible to bakshish, under the influence of which they are capable of the most daring pranks, acted an important part on that unfortunate

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day; that during the riot Greeks and Arabs, armed with revolvers, placed in ambuscade in certain houses, fired from the windows into the crowd, their only object being to spread the massacre by firing indiscriminately on Europeans and Arabs; that fanatical sheykhs, starting no one knows whence, excited the peaceable inhabitants to murder all the Christians; that the mustafezins (municipal guards under the civil authority) sent by the Governor with the apparent object of quelling the tumult, bayoneted the unfortunate people whom it was their duty to protect; that helpless fugitives were positively murdered by those mustafezins in front of the prefecture of police; and lastly, that Bedouins, coming from the neighbourhood of Alexandria, were about to take a share in the plunder when the regular army, which only made its appearance four hours after the first knife was drawn, obliged them to retire.

It is worthy of notice that the principal actors in these scenes of crime and horrors were Greeks and Maltese, who certainly cannot be considered fanatic partisans of the cause of Islam, donkey-men, speaking a little broken English and French, who cannot be suspected of hatred to the Europeans, and Bedouins of the Moudirieh of Boheyra, who, before the massacres, had, through Reuter's Agency, made pompous professions of their loyalty and devotedness to the Khedive.

On the other hand, the Governor of Alexandria explained his delay in sending the regular army to put down the disturbance by his fear lest they might join the rioters; but His Excellency never explained, and never was asked, how that fear which he felt at the beginning of the rising vanished at the very moment when the massacre had gained its greatest intensity.

What is certain, and the telegraphists attached to the palace and the Khedive were ready to declare it, is that a long correspondence had been carried on between the Governor of Alexandria and the Khedive as soon as the riot broke out, and the question discussed was the sending of troops from the English or the French fleets. The young master of Egypt had been for some time impatient to see the forces, sent for the support of his authority, effect a landing, go to Cairo, take Arabi and all the patriots, and re-embark at once playing the Khedivial hymn to the great satisfaction of His Highness. Haidar Pasha, a cousin of the Khedive who had for several days together had long secret interviews with him through the gates of the harem, and always at nightfall, was in Alexandria at the time of the massacres, and helped, it is said, to assassinate the unfortunate Christians. It was only after useless debates with the admirals on the question of landing that the Governor, in accord with the Khedive, agreed to appeal to the army to put an

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end to the massacre. These facts have their significance in the minds of all those whom their position or their knowledge of Egyptian statesmen render capable of forming a fair opinion regarding the events of the 11th of June.

Another important point remains, however, which is not generally known. The Governor of Alexandria at the time of the rising was Omar Pasha Lutfi, the second self of Ibrahim Mufettish, the man of vigour and grand resources, the ex-inspector of Upper Egypt, known by the exploits of his whip. His appointment as Governor had taken place under the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami, in consequence of a warm recommendation by the Khedive. Arabi's personal tact and straightforwardness had caused him to dislike the appointment, and he felt some uneasiness in consequence of it. The Prime Minister, trusting to the ability of Omar Pasha, who, in his opinion, would never dare to betray the National party, though it was not his own, wishing, besides, to please the Khedive (this was before the arrival of the squadrons), who was always out of humour, pleaded for the appointment, urging the necessity for an energetic Governor of Alexandria who might maintain order in that post—and he had succeeded in obtaining for it the consent of the Council of Ministers. The day after the massacre Omar Lutfi Pasha obtained unlimited leave of absence from the Khedive, and secured his passage by the first boat about to start.

Three commissions were successively called to inquire into the facts and discover the real criminals. Not one succeeded, they were all without result. Even lately the Commission of Enquiry, at Alexandria, have only condemned a few of those whose hands had been dyed with blood as unintelligent machines. Of those who planned everything and pushed it forward no notice has been taken.—Why? That is the question.

These are, Sir, the facts and the information that I am able to lay before you. Whatever deductions may be drawn from them, I have, I think, proved the emptiness of the charges brought, either intentionally or through ignorance, against the Egyptian National party and its chief.

These statements I am ready to confirm on oath before any tribunal, and would even go to London either to make them more complete or to give any necessary explanation.

The good of my country and the triumph of truth are my only objects.

N.B.—All these accounts of the riot were submitted to Lord Randolph Churchill in 1883, and were, I believe, by him laid before the Foreign Office. Much additional evidence was afterwards obtained by me, which I offered to Mr. Gladstone if he would examine it personally, but he declined.

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### MEMORANDUM AS TO MR. BEAMAN'S VIEW OF THE CASE, DRAWN UP FOR LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL IN 1883

Mr. Beaman's evidence with regard to the origin of the massacre of the 11th June is most important, owing to the circumstances of his position in Egypt and the high character that he bears. It will be remembered that at the time of the massacre he was Student Interpreter to the English Residency, and in that capacity was in constant communication both with the Court and with the Nationalists on Sir E. Malet's behalf; that at the time of the panic in July he was left by Sir E. Malet in charge of the diplomatic archives, and remained in Cairo till two days before the bombardment; that he was among the first to land, after that event, at Alexandria, where he served for a month with Lord Charles Beresford on the Police Commission, improvised to try offenders for acts of murder, pillage, and arson; that he then joined Sir Garnet Wolseley's staff, being present at all the engagements of the campaign; that on Sir E. Malet's return to Cairo he appointed him, in conjunction with Sir Charles Wilson, to watch the proceedings in the Arabi trial on behalf of Her Majesty's Government; that he was employed in translating the Arabic documents connected with that case, including Arabi's private papers; that he is the joint author with Major Chermiside of a report published in the Blue Books on the state of the Egyptian prisons, a work for which he received Lord Granville's thanks; that on his retirement from Her Majesty's service in December, 1882, he was thanked for his services both by Lord Granville and Lord Dufferin, and that he has since resided in Egypt, where he lately undertook the defence of Kandil and other prisoners charged with complicity in the massacre. His testimony is therefore of a high order, the highest indeed that could be offered, and it may be gathered from the following extracts from his letters.

Writing to Mr. Blunt in England on the 6th November, 1882, he says: "The Palace people here are in a great stew at the advent of Lord Dufferin who arrives to-morrow. Broadley's arrival has been an agony to them, but this is the last blow. I believe Lord Dufferin is a man who will pretty quickly see through our friend Tewfik, and as I hear that his ears are open to everybody, the temporary Embassy will be better informed, I expect, than the Agency has ever been. I had a great deal of intercourse lately with natives before the bombardment, of all classes and parties, and knew the whole of the game from the four sides—England, Turkey, Arabi, and Tewfik. They were each quite distinct."  
. . . "I think the Ibrahim Agha business itself is quite enough to show the Khedive in his true colours. I heard the whole story

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direct from the Palace—how the Titunji had kissed the Khedive's hand and asked permission to spit in the faces of the prisoners, etc., and it was on this that Sir Charles Wilson made inquiry and found it all true. Nevertheless, because the Khedive had a very dirty piece of linen to be washed in the business it was left alone. I suggested, when all the witnesses swore falsely, that the oath of triple divorce should be administered to them (*talâk eth thalathet*), and Sir Charles Wilson was in favour of it too, but it was hushed up. His Highness's own family now no longer pretend to deny it among themselves. And this is the man for whom we came to Egypt to fight!"

On the 17th of the same month he says: "The only question seems to be, if the prisoners will have a chance of being fairly heard in their own defence. I am convinced that the Government here is using every effort to quash the proceedings, as the facts that would come out in cross-examination would be compromising to every man almost now in power, and would lay bare some very unpleasant facts about the Khedive. For this last reason it is just possible that our Government may feel inclined to propose terms to Arabi, as it will be a rough *exposé* if the trial proves that the biggest scamp in Egypt is the man whom we brought an army here to uphold. Personally I have very little doubt that the Khedive and Omar Lutfi arranged the Alexandrian massacre in order to aim a blow at Arabi, who had just declared himself responsible for public safety. I hold proofs which carry me half way to conviction, but the time has not yet come to produce them."

In answer to a letter asking him for further information and propounding a theory of the events of the 11th June, Mr. Beaman says:

*February 17th, 1883.*

I am delighted to hear of the campaign you are organizing, but you will find it extremely difficult to shame the Government, as they know the whole story, and have gone through the mud most gallantly. You ask me what proof I could give to support your theory. Personally I have no testimony to give. When Lord Dufferin came I told him my belief that the massacres originated from the Pharaoh (Khedivial) party, and it was not a bad move for them, being evidently intended to discredit Arabi after his declaration of responsibility for public peace, and to force the European hand to put Arabi down. The idea of attributing it to Arabi was ridiculous, as it was a death blow to them, and they all felt it as such at the time, as I know. The idea was quite a new one to Lord Dufferin, and he asked me if I could bring proof. I finally went to

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him and said if he would give a written guarantee that no harm should be done to the men, I would bring witnesses—I could not bring them now—Abdu and Rifaat know the whole story well—to prove that Omar Lutfi had ordered Suliman Sami to bring his regiment down unarmed, that Suliman Sami had refused thus to be made a fool of, seeing well the construction that would be put upon it. And also, perceiving what would be said if he stayed away while massacre was going on, after an hour's delay he came with his troops in arms in distinct contradiction to Omar Lutfi's orders and quelled the riot. I would bring the man who had received the order and taken it to Suliman Sami. I would bring another who had heard Omar Lutfi in the streets, exhorting the massacrers to strike home on the heads of the Christians and not to spare. Lord Dufferin then cried off and said it was not his business to prosecute Omar Lutfi. This was before Broadley's appearance on the scene. I then went on to work on my own account and then with Broadley, and at last we had witnesses who had sent the cypher message from the Khedive to Omar Lutfi the night before, ordering a disturbance—to prove the mad delight in the Palace when the news was brought—"Now we have done for them"; all the aides-de-camp and valets in waiting performing a dance of delight, etc. For confirmation we have Omar Lutfi appointed Minister of War (in recognition of his services that day) without any reason whatever or any qualification for the post. Had he not been guilty even, he could never escape the imputation of the grossest incompetency and want of energy as Governor in not quelling the riot, whose responsibility falls entirely on him. Yet he is made Minister of War. With these facts Broadley at once subdued the enemy at all points. You must have noticed—every one here did—how the massacre question, at first a *cheval de bataille* against the accused (Arabi), was suddenly dropped like a red hot coal at the trial, and then the whole thing collapsed with the farcical sentence."

On the 4th March Mr. Beaman wrote to tell Mr. Blunt that Kandil, Suliman Sami, and others had asked him to defend them in the Alexandrian court-martial which was bent on hanging them, and he adds:

"My trump cards, of course, will be the witnesses I should threaten to bring to implicate Omar Lutfi directly, and the big man indirectly with the massacres. I think rather than stand an *exposé* the Government will let the prisoners off easy." And on the 18th: "I am certain of an acquittal, with a probable substitution and conviction of the present Minister of War." This plan, however, was defeated by the monstrous procedure adopted, by the refusal of counsel to admission until the trial was practically

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over, and in Suliman Sami's case by his being allowed no defence whatever.

In these circumstances Mr. Napier, who had joined Mr. Beaman in the hope of defending the prisoners, returned home, and by Mr. Blunt's advice saw Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Wilfrid Lawson; and it was on Mr. Napier's report thus made that in May Lord Randolph made his first public statement of the Khedive's connection with the massacres—the statement which elicited from Mr. Gladstone a promise that the prisoners should have a fair trial.

Nevertheless, Mr. Napier considered it hopeless to return to Egypt, and Mr. Beaman, though no lawyer, with much public spirit carried on the defence of Kandil alone, Mr. Blunt aiding him with the few pounds required for the necessary expenses, for he has never received a fee. It was not till after the trial of his fellow prisoner, Suliman Sami, had proved to be a mockery, and till he had himself been subjected to interrogation by a packed court of his enemies, that Kandil was at last allowed to see his counsel. He had been nine months in prison, and had committed himself to a line of defence which precluded a counter attack, if he in reality had one to make. He was pleading for mercy, not justice, for that was out of the question.

"He swears," Mr. Beaman writes on the 22nd of June, "he knows nothing to connect Lutfi with the massacres except such circumstantial evidence as is in everybody's possession. Omar Lutfi never made him any proposition. He does not think the massacres were organized regularly, but the feeling was so strong [*sic*] that Omar Lutfi knew pretty well that it would soon break out. When it did break out Kandil was in bed, but he says Omar Lutfi, or any one on the spot, could have put a stop to it. A telegram to Arabi would have crushed it at once. A proper appeal to the soldiery would have stopped it. But Omar Lutfi contented himself with strolling about the town and telegraphing to the Khedive in cypher. It is impossible to know what passed between these two. The clerks merely cypher the figures. The cypher telegrams were all destroyed by order (they always are, it appears). Rifaat says the telegrams were in reference to a landing of troops. If the Khedive was apprised of this massacre at two or three o'clock, why did he not call in Sir E. Malet? Sir E. Malet learned it through private telegram stuck up by Clere in Zigada's billiard room at about six o'clock! This is the only evidence whatever against the Khedive. Against Omar Lutfi it is much stronger, but the unfortunate part of it is that I cannot lay hand on the witnesses whom I offered to bring to Lord Dufferin. I never knew their names myself. I was told by two individuals that on a safe conduct from Lord Dufferin they would hand me in the

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names and produce the people. As you know, this was refused. I am not able to go into any details for reasons which you must take my word for to be insuperable. The witnesses might be got at in another way, but I cannot now get them through the mediums I once could have. It is sufficient proof of my *bona fides* that whilst in the Government service I should have made such an offer which would have ruined me if I had not been sure of being able to fulfil it. But the time has now passed, and I could not bring the men. At least, at the present moment I have no means of doing so. Later on I might be able to."

He adds in the same letter: "I think the idea of challenging Mr. Gladstone with a historical Memorandum is a very good one. But do not let yourself be caught by trying to prove too much, or rather by asserting more than we could prove. Mohammed Abdu and Rifaat would be two necessary witnesses. I should not at all mind giving out what I know, but as I have said, I could not name my authorities."

He also alludes to Lord Randolph Churchill's second attack made on the occasion of Suliman Sami's execution, an event which had decided Mr. Blunt on placing all the papers in his possession, including the earlier extracts just quoted, in Lord Randolph's hands, *as the only means of preventing further bloodshed*; and to Mr. Eve's letter which had appeared at the same time in the "Times." He says: "I am sorry rather that Eve published those extracts from my letter . . . because they were written carelessly and not in a way I should have stated the fact for publication. First of all, I did not make the offer to Lord Dufferin personally, but to Nicholson (Lord Dufferin's private secretary) who, however, gave me Lord Dufferin's answer. I think I once recurred to the subject with Lord Dufferin, and he answered in a way to show that he had cognisance of my offer, but at the time I was so engrossed with the trial (Arabi's) that I have no very clear recollection of what passed. . . . I don't mind what you publish of mine against Omar Lutfi, but I would rather you did not implicate me against the Khedive. I have rather modified my ideas respecting his guiltiness and do not care to attack him. If afterwards his responsibility is impugned through Omar Lutfi, well and good, but I do not want any direct attack upon him in my name. At present I find myself *bien vu* to a certain degree with most of the officials, and I keep this good feeling up in the interests of my clients. But if I came suddenly to some grand rupture with the Khedive, it would be they and not I who would suffer."



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### SYNOPSIS OF EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM THE BLUE BOOKS, DRAWN UP IN 1883

The history of the massacres of Alexandria as taken from the Blue Books (Egypt, No. 16, 1882, Egypt, No. 17, 1882, and Egypt, No. 4, 1883) conclusively proves the guilt of the civil authorities and the police, and the absolute innocence and honourable conduct of the military authorities and the Egyptian troops. An overwhelming concurrence of testimony also establishes the preconcerted character of the riots. The police, it must always be remembered, and the gendarmerie were under the exclusive control of the civil Governor, Omar Loufi, who in his turn was responsible, not to the Minister of War, Arabi, but directly to the Khedive. The troops were under the sole control of Arabi Pasha, Minister of War. Mr. Grosjean, who was appointed by Sir Edward Malet, under the instructions of Lord Granville, to collect evidence at Alexandria for the purpose of implicating Arabi Pasha as the author of the riots, states (Egypt, No. 16, page 9) that the police a few days previously had purchased a large quantity of naboots, quarter staves, and had distributed them to the lowest class of Arabs and Bedouins, and that these naboots were distributed from a house in close proximity to the Great Zaptieh. See also deposition of Mr. Edward Barber (Egypt, No. 16, page 17). Mr. Grosjean states that no proceedings had been taken against the persons who distributed naboots, and the medical evidence, embodied in a report by ten European doctors who examined the dead bodies at the hospitals, proves that all the wounds were inflicted either by naboots, or by knives and bayonets. The knives and bayonets being chiefly the arms of the police, and it is in evidence that the Mustafezzin on the day of the riots were without their firearms, and were only armed with bayonets (Egypt, No. 4, page 75, enclosure 3 in No. 92, Mr. Petrovitch to Mr. Grosjean). This man's report is most valuable, for he proves the utter absence in the streets of the soldiers of the regular troops, and here it must be remarked that in studying the evidence of the riots in the Blue Books above referred to, the expression "soldiers" refers exclusively to the gendarmerie, and in hardly any case denotes the soldiers of the regular army.

Now for the conduct of the police. Mr. Joyce, engineer in the English fleet (Egypt, No. 16, page 2, enclosure 2 in No. 2), states: "The Mustafezzin or gendarmes directly under the orders of the Prefect of police, took an active part in the fray, killing Christians when the mob was not doing so, and looking on quietly in the contrary case." Mr. Hewat, an English accountant, who had lived for seventeen years in Alexandria (Egypt, No. 16, enclosure 4 in

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No. 2), states: "As to the attitude assumed by the Egyptian authorities and the military during the disturbances these must be divided into two categories, namely, the police and the military proper. As to the first, I have no hesitation in saying that it, instead of suppressing the riot, did all in its power to increase it, and their conduct on the occasion was most barbarous, violent, and fanatical. It will be found, I think, from surgical testimony that the wounds received by many Europeans were inflicted by the police corps, Mustaphezzin, or gendarmerie. It is, further, beyond question that this police force served out naboots (*i.e.*, bludgeons) freely to the natives, while at the same time they disarmed Europeans of what weapons of defence they possessed down to walking-canes even. I have been informed upon the best authority that Europeans who happened to be in the native quarters of the city during the riot naturally fled to refuge to the chief police station (Zaptieh), and, to one at least of the police guard houses, and were most cruelly butchered as soon as they entered these places. On the other hand, from what motives I need not say, I am convinced that were it not for the military having been called out the riot of the 11th could have ended in nothing short of a most dreadful slaughter. It is entirely to the soldiery that Europeans are indebted for the preservation of their lives." Mr. George Pilavachi (enclosure 5 in No. 2, page 6, Egypt, No. 16) states: "The police openly took part in favour of the Arabs, and many victims led by policemen to the police station were made to descend from their carriages and killed with the bayonets." Mr. Stephen Ralli (Egypt, No. 16, page 7, No. 3) states: "To show the treachery of the authorities one has only to know the following—The street disturbance began at 3 o'clock, the policemen doing the most of the killing, until past 7 o'clock; this went on when at last a regiment of soldiers was sent out to stop the disturbance, whereas they could have stopped it in a quarter of an hour if they had chosen."

N.B.—With reference to this remark it must be remembered that Suliman Sami, the Colonel of the regulars, was not summoned until late in the afternoon.

Mr. Grosjean (Egypt, No. 16, page 10), states: "All the wounded at the hospitals referred to the Mustaphezzin as taking part with the mob, and many wounded bore wounds as of sword bayonets." Annibale Scognamiglio of Alexandria (Egypt, No. 16, page 16) states: "The three gentlemen killed, namely, Dr. Ripton, Senor Aligrette and Von Rupp, and other forty Europeans, had taken shelter in the Zaptieh, or guard house, guarded by Mustaphezzin. On the following evening I went to the European hospital to see whether I could find my friend Senor Van Rupp. The soldiers on

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duty first asked me whether I had the courage of so doing, but as soon as I went in, the hour being late, and at the sight of a large number of corpses, I went back and went on the following day, when I found more than sixty dead, all perfectly naked, and covered with bayonet and naboot wounds. The Mustaphezzin wounded Europeans, and looked with pleasure on Europeans wounded by the Arabs" (Egypt, No. 16, page 16). Mr. Robert Giglio, British subject, Mr. Joseph Levy of the firm of Piso M. Levy of Manchester, and Mr. Vivanti of the firm of S. Vivanti & Son of Manchester, have informed the acting British Consul at Leghorn "that the native public force took part in the massacre." Also on the same page the following is the statement of Colonel —, a known European officer of high standing, made at Trieste on the 28th June:—"A respectable native of the name of Wazes Bey, who lives in the first floor of a house opposite the Prefecture of police, declared in my presence and in the presence of the Governor of the town and several of the highest officials of the country, that he saw the naboots being handed out of the windows to the mob. This in the Frank quarter and at the time when a mob was invading Rue des Seurs and Place de la Pie in two different and separate quarters. He saw later on, and also his wife and servants, thirteen Europeans who had taken refuge in the Prefecture dragged out in the state of denuded and disfigured bodies towards the sea." Mr. Edwin Barber (page 17) states, "during this short conversation a large number of Arabs came rushing from all quarters, and they were supplied with clubs thrown from a tall Arab house close to the Zaptieh." He states further, "after closing the door, I went up stairs and saw several Europeans murdered in the street, and the assassins were assisted by the police." Further, "The police, not having pockets, hid their share of the spoil behind barrels and in some cases below sewer gratings." Mr. John Wallace (page 17) states: "At this time the Mustaphezzin arrived, about thirty or forty men, who began to fire their rifles without apparently any definite motive. They saw the Europeans being killed at their feet and did nothing to part them." Further, "I also saw several Mustaphezzins pass carrying stolen goods. When the regular troops arrived order appeared at once to be restored." The deposition of Senor Vernoni (Egypt, No. 16, page 19): "After a short time I saw several carriages full of Mustaphezzins (soldiers in blue uniform) come from the direction of the principal police station, all looking at the windows, towards which their muskets were directed, and shouting to the Arabs, 'Courage, hit them.'" (Egypt, No. 4, page 10, enclosure 4 in No. 4.) Mr. Staunton, Paymaster of the "Invincible," states: "During the attack alluded to the police and local officials looked on with apathy, and took no steps to protect the Christians or

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restrain the mob, nor were any regular troops visible in the street at the time."

With respect to the conduct of the troops Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour writes to the Admiralty (Egypt, No. 11, page 108): "The disturbance had been going on for two or three hours before the garrison was got under arms; the streets were then cleared with fair rapidity and order maintained during the remainder of the night." Mr. Calvert, Vice-Consul, who took charge of the Consulate when Mr. Cookson was wounded (Egypt, No. 11, page 39, No. 97) on June 12th says: "The police did not interfere to protect Europeans. Troops have come to restore order." Also (in Egypt, No. 17, page 24, enclosure 3 in No. 2) on the same day he writes that "The soldiers thus far have behaved tolerably well, and have not sided with the mob"; and in the same despatch, "the mob has plundered both houses and shops. After I telegraphed to you fighting was renewed in a low quarter of the town, but a body of cavalry dispersed the rioters. At present the town appears perfectly quiet." In the proclamation to the European population issued and signed by all the Foreign Consuls after the meeting at the Governor's House on the 12th of June, is to be found the following sentence: "Grave disorders broke out yesterday at Alexandria, the Egyptian army has re-established order and its chiefs engage to preserve it. We have confidence in the Egyptian army."

*Preconcerted Character of the Riot.*—(Egypt, No. 16, page 2, enclosure 2), statement of Mr. Joyce, English Engineer: "Without doubt, planned beforehand, little indications which one did not pay attention to at the time, such as on Saturday morning on leaving my house a vegetable seller in the street told me to buy and eat as to-morrow the Christians would be massacred. These words I found afterwards were said to a great many people, who paid little or no attention to them." (Enclosure No. 4 in No. 2) Mr. Hewat: "From information gathered from many sources I am fully of opinion that the riot of the 11th was the issue of a preconcerted plan." (Enclosure No. 5 in No. 2) Mr. Alexander Vais states: "Owing to information that I subsequently received I formed a decided opinion that the affair was pre-arranged and began almost simultaneously in several quarters. (Enclosure No. 5, No. 2, page 6, Egypt, No. 16) Mr. George Palavachi states: "The row on Sunday with the Maltese, so artfully prepared by the agency of the police, gave rise to these ferocious and awful scenes of rapine and murder of which we have been eye-witnesses and victims. The fact that the sedition broke out in three different places proves that it was premeditated." Phillipo Lais states: "On the 8th of June I was in the market about 4.30 p.m. I saw many Bedouins who were carrying guns and were leaving them in stores apparently to be

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kept there. On the following day I was sitting in a Café when an Arab, a friend of mine, approached me to take care, because the Arabs were going to kill the Christians, either that day or the following." (Egypt, No. 16, page 7, No. 3) Lord Granville writes: "Mr. Sinadino, a member of a Greek banking firm at Alexandria informed me that he had every reason to believe that the recent riot at Alexandria had been preconcerted." An American missionary named in the same despatch states: "Many persons told us that the riots commenced simultaneously in different and distant parts of the City, and they therefore believe that it was preconcerted." (Egypt, No. 4, 1883, enclosure 3 in No. 4) Dr. Joyce states: "I consider the massacre must have been not only premeditated but skilfully executed, and those engaged in it appeared also to be on the look out for loot; in fact they combined both operations at the same time." (Enclosure No. 4 in No. 4) Mr. Staunton: "On landing and driving through the town I found the people in the streets and roads leading to the public garden very quiet and inoffensive. As the alarm of the riot reached us only three hours afterwards, when we saw hundreds of natives all armed with sticks and knives, I am of opinion that the riot was premeditated." Mr. Grosjean, though acting on express instructions from Lord Granville to collect evidence implicating, if possible, Arabi Pasha as the author of the riots (Egypt, No. 4, 1883, page 73 and page 87), while proving the preconcerted character of the riots fails to connect Arabi with them. With reference to his statement, "I have fixed the departure from Cairo of Hassan Mussa el Akhad at 6 a.m., 11th June, from Cairo station: he travelled in a first class carriage to Alexandria, accompanied by John Ninet, the Genoese, arriving at Alexandria shortly after mid-day," it can conclusively be proved to be untrue by John Ninet himself. This is of the utmost importance, for Mr. Grosjean (enclosure 1, No. 92, Egypt, No. 4, 1883, on page 74) states: "In my opinion the connecting link between Saïd Bey Ghandil and Arabi is Hussin Mussa el Akhad." (Egypt, No. 16, despatch, No. 3, page 9) Count Della Sala, aide-de-camp to the Khedive, informed Her Majesty's Charge d'Affairs at Berlin that he had told Count Hatzfeldt that the attack at Alexandria was unquestionably a planned affair in which the gendarmerie participated.

### *The conduct of the Governor Omar Loutfi on the day of the riots:*

The evidence with respect to this man's conduct in the Blue Books is scanty, which is to be accounted for by the fact that the efforts of the English Government after the riots were directed to proving the complicity of Arabi Pasha, and, failing that object, no anxiety was evinced to discover the real author; but (in Egypt,

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No. 16, page 11) in two Affidavits forwarded by Lord Granville to Sir Edward Malet (despatch No. 3), made by Luiji Onofrio and Paolo Onofrio, lately of Alexandria, then residing in Valetta, Island of Malta, these make oath and say as follows: "On Sunday, the 11th day of the past month of June, at about 2.30 p.m., I was in my house at Alexandria, when I heard loud cries in the street, and looking out of the window I saw Mr. Cookson, the English Consul, accompanied by other Consuls, assaulted by the Arab mob. Soldiers were also taking part in the assault, and struck those gentlemen with the butts of their guns. The Governor of Alexandria, Omar Loutfi, was present, but he made no attempt to protect any of those European gentlemen, or to disperse the crowd. I saw likewise Arabs and soldiers strike Senor Carpi, Senor Macvalli, the Italian Consul, and Senor R (?), the Austrian Consul. These gentlemen were severely wounded, particularly Senor Carpi." The two Affidavits are in identical terms. (Page 9, of Egypt, No. 16) Mr. Grosjean, instructed by Lord Granville to collect evidence implicating Arabi Pasha, writes thus: "I find I have a note for evidence, but the stage was not reached when it could be called for. It causes a strong doubt as to whether the request to the Consuls to go to Caracol Liban on the afternoon of the 11th of June ever emanated from the Governor Omar Pasha Loutfi. My present impression is, that the requests, which were verbal, were sent to decoy the Consuls into the mob"; and lower down, "there were apparently considerable intervals of time between the delivery of the messages, not warranted by the distance separated by the Consulates, which is suggestive of a preconcerted scheme to cause the Consuls to arrive separately and at the spot where the mob was densest. The French was first notified, then the Italian, then, probably, the Greek and German, and lastly the English." Mr. Cookson, in his despatch to Sir Edward Malet (enclosure 1 in No. 22, Egypt, 17, 1883) writes: "Only half an hour after. I was summoned by the local police to the quarter of the Caracol Liban [police station] where a disturbance had broken out between the Arab population and some Maltese in the neighbourhood. . . . I returned to this Consulate about 3.30 p.m. and immediately went out again on finding a messenger waiting to summon me, with all the other Consuls, to a meeting at the Caracol Liban." It appears, therefore, that there was a conspiracy to decoy the Consuls into the mob, and the presence and attitude of Omar Loutfi when they were assaulted, according to the sworn evidence above quoted, raises a presumption that Omar Loutfi was engaged in this conspiracy. It can be proved that Omar Loutfi never summoned the military till after the riot had proceeded for a considerable time,

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and that he then sent a verbal, not a written, message to Suliman Sami, telling him to come with his regiment, unarmed, into the town. The opinion of Suliman Sami on Omar Loutfi's conduct will be found in the printed statement of Mr. John Ninet. Suliman Sami and his brother colonels knew that Arabi Pasha, as Minister of War and head of the Egyptian army, had guaranteed the preservation of order, and that that guarantee had been proved worthless, and the Egyptian army discredited, by the occurrence of the massacres. The knowledge of Arabi's guarantee is proved by Mr. Cookson's despatch to Sir Edward Malet (Egypt, No. 11, 1882, enclosure 4 in No. 126), dated 6th June, in which he writes: "In continuation of my despatch of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that perfect quiet reigns in this City. The declaration of Arabi Pasha, communicated to me by your despatch of the 2nd instant, by which he engaged to be responsible for the public peace and for the safety of Europeans, contributed much to calm their fears." The anger of Suliman Sami and his brother colonels at the conduct of the Governor on the 11th June is demonstrated by a despatch by Mr. Cookson to Sir Edward Malet (No. 17, 1882, enclosure 1 in No. 23, page 23) where he writes: "that he was informed that a serious altercation had taken place between the Governor and the Colonels of the Regiments, his Excellency the Governor remonstrated with the Colonels, and they in the most violent language denounced him as a Traitor to his Religion and refused to obey his orders." The colonels knew well enough that Arabi's guarantee having been proved worthless, European intervention was thereby precipitated, and the Egyptian National cause to that extent considerably damaged.

Arabi's anxiety to clear the Egyptian army from any suspicion of participation or complicity with the massacres is shown by the instructions given by him to Yacoub Sami, specially appointed by him to serve on the Commission of Enquiry, nominated by the Egyptian Government immediately after the riots, in which he says: "You are not ignorant of the importance of the place you hold at the present moment with regard to the Commission of Enquiry, for as you know, the members of this Commission are not of the number of those who are concerned with the honour of the Army or the Nation. This makes it necessary to take every possible measure of precaution during the course of the enquiry, and to discover what was the principal motive of the rising." And further, the anxiety of Arabi Pasha to prevent any more discredit being thrown on the Egyptian army and on his guarantee is proved by the despatch of Mr. Huri, dragoman of the British Consulate at Alexandria, dated 12th June (enclosure 4 No. 22,

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Egypt, No. 17), where he writes: "The Consuls engaged themselves to make the most strenuous efforts towards that end, and promised to enjoin their subjects not to fire on the people and the troops, and the officers have undertaken to keep and preserve peace and public order, declaring themselves to be answerable for the lives of Europeans. His Excellency Yacoub Pasha, Under-Secretary of State for War, then addressed the colonels in these words: 'As long as a drop of blood remains in your veins, you shall protect and defend the Consuls and their subjects.' The Colonels answered in the affirmative. . . . Then the Governor formally asked the Egyptian Officers whether they would answer for the safety of the Town and Public order, and they all answered in the affirmative. . . . The greatest value was attached by the Consuls to the soldiers' power of preventing the assembly of natives in the European quarters, and the Egyptian senior officers have undertaken to disperse any assemblage of natives in the European quarters." It is to be remembered that from the date of their meeting, when Alexandria was placed formally under the protection of the Egyptian Army, up to the time of bombardment, no riots of any importance took place, and absolutely no massacres.

With respect to the conduct of Omar Pasha Lutfi, it must under no circumstances be forgotten that he, as Civil Governor of Alexandria, having under his sole orders and control the police and mustafezzin of that city, was primarily responsible for the peace, and order of the town; that he was at that time under the sole orders of the Khedive, who, not having appointed any Minister of the Interior, was himself acting in that capacity, and had directed that the Governors of Upper and Lower Egypt should refer any important business, which would ordinarily come before the Minister of the Interior, to his own private Cabinet. (Egypt, No. 8, page 40, despatch No. 90. Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville.) It is perhaps unnecessary to add that Arabi Pasha, as Minister of War and Marine, had no authority over Omar Lutfi, the Civil Governor of Alexandria, and it is proved by the appended statement of Mr. John Ninet that Arabi Pasha received no intelligence of the riots till 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th, and that the Telegraph Offices at Cairo and at Alexandria, on that day, were reserved for the exclusive use of the Khedive and Omar Lutfi. Into the conduct of this man, Omar Lutfi, from the day of the massacre to the present day, no public enquiry has ever been made, either by the Egyptian or British Governments, but the Khedive appointed him Minister of War in the place of Arabi Pasha on the 26th July following. (*See* Egypt, No. 17, page 223, despatch No. 446.)



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Said Bey Kandil, Prefect of police, now on his trial, was confined to his house on the day of the riots, and subsequent days, under a plea of sickness, but Hassan Bey Sadyk, the sub-Prefect of police, who was acting in his place, of whom Mr. Cartwright says (in Egypt, No. 17, despatch No. 31, page 35) that he belonged to the Military party, and complained that he had not yet been suspended for his conduct in connection with the disturbance, has since been appointed to an important military post in the Soudan for his conduct on the 11th June, and conveniently got out of the way for all purposes of enquiry.

In considering the foregoing memorandum, compiled from the Blue Books, it must be borne in mind that all the despatches written and all the evidence collected in those Blue Books, were written and collected under the belief that the massacres were the work of Arabi and the National party, and the desire to convict them on this charge.

To show this it is only necessary to quote the words of Lord Granville, contained in his despatch to Sir Edward Malet (Egypt, No. 15, No. 3, page 7): "I have to request that you will take steps to supplement this evidence, and especially that portion of it which bears on the conduct of Nedhim and of Arabi's Vakeels and on the connection of Khandeel with Arabi." A truly monstrous and unscrupulous direction, proving beyond all doubt that the necessity of discovering the real authors of the atrocities at Alexandria was less in Lord Granville's mind than his desire to bring the charge home to Arabi Pasha.

The success of this endeavour, however, may be gathered from the fact that—on Charge 4 in the Acte d'Accusation against Arabi, Mahmoud Sami, Toulba, Mahmoud Fehmi, Omar Rahmi, and Said Kandil, to the effect "that they had incited the people to Civil War, and with having committed acts of destruction, massacre, and pillage, on Egyptian Territory"—Sir Charles Wilson thus writes (Egypt, No. 1, 1883, despatch, No. 45, enclosure, page 28): "I must express my belief that on the existing evidence, no English Court-martial would connect the Prisoners except perhaps Toulba and Said Khandeel of any greater crime than that of taking part in a successful Military revolt against the Khedive."

Further (in Egypt, No 5, 1883, despatch, No. 41, enclosure, page 61) Sir Charles Wilson writes: "The prosecution seemed to be based on the theory that certain events such as the massacre of the 11th of June could not have happened unless Arabi had ordered them, and that this was sufficient proof in itself that he had ordered them. . . . On the other hand, it would have been possible to construct a fair defence from the evidence taken for

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prosecution without calling witnesses for the defence, and without cross-examination."

The English Government apparently only gave up the idea of a preconcerted and deliberate massacre on the impossibility being forced upon them of connecting Arabi with that event.\* The last sentence is pregnant with suggestions, and I would direct to it special attention. Sir Charles Wilson writes lower down in the same despatch "that there was no evidence to connect Arabi with the massacre at Alexandria on the 11th June, and that it is doubtful whether a deliberate massacre of Europeans was ever intended."

The fact that no telegrams or messages between the Governor, Omar Lutfi, and the Khedive, between the Khedive and Sir E. Malet, or between the Admiral and Sir E. Malet and the English Consulate, which must have been passing continually while the riots were proceeding, have been produced, is highly suspicious, and requires explanation.

It will be conceded by any impartial mind that the above extracts from the Blue Books, from which beyond doubt everything compromising to the Khedive, Omar Lutfi, and the civil authorities has been carefully excluded (as far as was compatible with common decency), go to show that a strong *prima facie* case against those persons has been made out, and demand the most rigorous and searching inquiry.

### DECLARATION OF MR. JOHN NINET REGARDING THE EVENTS AT ALEXANDRIA OF JUNE, 1882, SIGNED BY HIM, JANUARY 30, 1883

I was present at Alexandria when Dervish arrived on Wednesday the 7th of June, 1882. I saw him on the quay on his way to Ras el Tin with Zulficar Pasha (the Khedive's delegate, a Greek Moslem and a creature of Said Pasha's) and Yakub Pasha (Arabi's delegate, a Circassian but an honest man) also Sheykh Assad and Omar Lutfi (Governor of Alexandria).

In the afternoon the Ulemas and some of the Notables and the officials called on Dervish, who received them without much ceremony. Also came the Consuls, Mr. Cookson and M. Kleckowski together in plain clothes—also the French and English Admirals in uniform. I was present when Mr. Cookson was received. He reminded Dervish that Admiral Seymour was the same who had commanded at Dulcigno, on which Dervish smiled without answer-

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ing. The Notables, after the Consuls had retired, presented a petition in which they exposed the grievances of the Egyptian nation and complained of the presence of the Fleet, and stated its desire of self-government, and he had a long conversation with them on the subject and promised to have the Fleet sent away before long. I was not present at this but I heard of it from my friends the Gariani, and also from Nadim, who were there. Sheykh el Hajjrasi was there also. Nadim at this time was constantly to and fro between Alexandria and Cairo. Akkad was not to my knowledge in Alexandria till after the riots.

The next morning, the 8th, Dervish went to Cairo. On his way to the station a great crowd followed him shouting about the Sultan and the Fleet. On the platform Zulficar and the rest of the Khedive's officers expostulated about Yakub Pasha's entering Dervish's carriage, but Dervish took Yakub by the shoulder and made him enter, so that the following four were in the carriage: Dervish, Assad, Zulficar, and Yakub. Nadim managed to get conveyed among the secretaries and servants by the same train. At Damanhur, Tantah, and Kafr el Zaiat deputations met them protesting their loyalty to the Sultan. It is probable that this was ordered.

The following particulars I heard from Arabi and those sent by him, and I believe them to be true: Dervish was met at the station by the troops and officials, but by none of the National Ministry. There was no particular excitement in the crowd, and he drove straight to Abdin. He received no one that day, and saw only the Khedive and his household at Abdin, and slept at Kasr el Noussa, which had been prepared for him. That night or the next morning I have heard the Khedive sent a eunuch, who arranged with Dervish, through his secretary, that he should have £50,000 as soon as the money could be raised; and thus gained him to his side, for Dervish's instructions had been to depose Tewfik and replace him by Halim. He consequently saw no more of Yakub Pasha.

Friday was spent in visiting the Mosques and praying. In one of these certain of the Ulema presented him with a petition. This annoyed Dervish; and in the afternoon, when the Ulema came to pay him their respects and to state their grievances, as had been done at Alexandria, he was very rude to them and told them that he had come to speak, not to be spoken to. This caused much excitement in the town and messengers were sent by evening trains to all parts of the country with the news that Dervish was not to be trusted.

On the Saturday Dervish sent for Arabi and Mahmud Sami. He received them with a great show of politeness, made them sit

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by him and explained the situation. This Arabi described to me as follows: "We are all here as brothers, the sons of the Sultan, and I with my white beard can be as a father to you, and we have the same object in view, to oppose the Ghiaours and obtain the departure of the Fleet, which is a disgrace to the Sultan and a menace to Egypt"—that they were all bound to act together to this end, and especially Arabi and the Ministry to show their zeal for their master; and this could best be done by their resigning their military power, at least in appearance; also to please the Sultan he must go to Constantinople for a while. To this Arabi replied that he was ready to resign, but that the situation was very strained, and as he had assumed a great responsibility of keeping order he would not consent to a half measure. If he resigned he would resign in fact as well as in name. But he would do neither without a written discharge, because he would not be held responsible for things which he had not done. He had been accused of malversation, tyrannical government, and other matters, and he would not leave his office without a full discharge from such accusations. He would also go to Constantinople when matters were settled, as a private man, to pay his respects to the Sultan. Dervish was not prepared for this answer and he did not like it. His countenance changed. But he said, "Let us consider the matter settled. You will telegraph at once to the Governor of Alexandria and the commander of the garrison to say that you have resigned your charge to me and that you are acting as my *wakil*, and on Monday, when there will be a meeting of the Consuls and the Khedive in Abdin, we will give you your discharge." Arabi, however, refused absolutely to do this, saying that until he had his written discharge he should retain his post and responsibility, and there the matter remained. No coffee or cigarettes were offered at this meeting. Mahmud Sami confirmed the whole of this account to me later. Nadim took the news of this interview at once to Alexandria and returned by the early train on Sunday morning to Cairo.

Next day, Sunday, I was still at Alexandria, and the town was quite quiet. At two o'clock I sent my servant, a Soudani, to fetch a carriage to call on the commandant of the garrison, and was away half an hour. The commander was Kurshid Pasha, a Circassian, but a good man, formerly attached to Ismail, and so opposed to the Khedive. My servant on his return begged me not to go where I had intended, as there was fighting in the Kahwat el Gezaz, in the Rue des Sœurs—a place where all the European roughs and Arab porters congregate on Sundays. They had already killed two Mussulmen. So I went to the place on foot, but not through the Square, by a back street. I found the Rue des Sœurs full of

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people, Europeans and Mussulmen, but there was no fighting near me. But not two hundred yards off the mob was waving like the sea, and I saw pistol shots fired from the windows. All at once the fighting came in our direction, so we retired until we got near the Bazarist school, where I saw in front of a café some dozen Greeks armed with ordnance rifles, who began firing into the crowd indiscriminately just after we had gone by. Then I saw a carriage with a Mustaphiz wounded or dead in it. This seemed to have given the alarm, for immediately afterwards a number of Moslems, mostly Berberins or Arabs from the Saïd, came running towards us from several quarters with sticks with which they laid about them. Then the firing and the fighting became general, and I went towards home. On my way I met Mr. Cookson in a carriage, and I was told by a bystander that he had been in the house of a Maltese, where the pistol shots were fired, and that it was coming out of that house that he was beaten, because the mob considered him responsible for the firing. He was known to have advised the Maltese, some time before, to protect themselves in case of disturbance. Later at about three o'clock I happened to meet Omar Lutfi walking in plain clothes with some policemen, and I asked him why he did nothing to stop the fighting. He said, "I have been with the English Consul, who has been beaten." I said, "Why did you not go in uniform and take fifty mounted policemen to stop it?" He said that Kandil the chief of the police could not be found. "And the soldiers, why do they do nothing?" He answered, "They won't move, they have no orders." "And the Consuls?" "They are making a meeting." I asked him why he had not telegraphed to the Viceroy? and he answered rudely, "What is that to you?" The French Consulate was full of refugee Europeans.

Then I went home, put on my worst clothes, and took a stick with me and went out again. Some boys were running about with property they had taken from the shops. The Mustaphizin did not interfere to prevent the fighting, but I have it from a Christian, who was in the Zabıt, that it is untrue that any one was ill-treated by them inside. I met a janissary of the Russian Consulate who told me that the fight was going on near the Marina, and that people who had been on board the ships for the day had been beaten and killed and that the Consuls were telegraphing to the Viceroy. This was at half past three or four; they expected the troops to interfere. At about five o'clock the troops appeared and the thing ended. I am of opinion from Omar Lutfi's manner and other circumstances that he was responsible for the continuation of the fighting. The troops would certainly have intervened if he had ordered them to do so.

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A strong corroboration is the following circumstance. Four days after the riot Omar Lutfi went on board the flag-ship and informed Admiral Seymour that he could not be responsible for order, that Arabi was not able to keep order; and he begged him to land troops—this although the town was absolutely quiet. Omar Lutfi was an enemy of Arabi's and a friend of the Khedive. He was removed from his office, as I have heard, on the demand of the Consuls as a satisfaction to public opinion when the Ragheb Ministry was formed and was replaced by Zulficar. The Commission of inquiry was stopped by the Consuls when Arabi demanded that the inquiry should be a full one, including Europeans as well as Egyptians.

I learned the facts of the interview on board the flag-ship through Mr. Marriott, employed as Secretary by Admiral Seymour, and some other of the circumstances from M. de Lex the Russian Consul.

With regard to the origin of the riot it was as follows: The arrival of the Fleet at Alexandria caused an immense amount of ill feeling between the Egyptians and the European colony. The Europeans looked upon it as a first act of war and their demeanour towards the natives became threatening. "Now," they said, "you will see what we are going to do." Among the Egyptians it became the theme of everyday conversation, and great apprehension was excited. It was thought that troops were going to be landed and Egypt taken possession of by the English. I was constantly asked at this time whether such was the intention. This was increased when it became known that a contract had been made for the provisioning of the Fleet by Sir B. Seymour and M. Conrad for three months. This was in the mouth of every one and caused great irritation. Against the French there was not this feeling because the attitude assumed by M. Conrad, the Admiral, was not aggressive. On the contrary he did his best to conciliate the natives. The irritation alarmed in their turn the Europeans and especially the English and Maltese, who applied constantly to their Consul for information in what way they were to be protected in case of disturbance. Mr. Cookson told them to protect themselves about the end of May or the beginning of June; and just about the same time it became known that firearms had been sent from Greece to arm the Greeks of Alexandria. The English subjects consequently bought up all the weapons they could find in the town, and I know from officials of the Custom House that Snider rifles and revolvers were landed for their use from the Fleet. It became, therefore, almost certain that a conflict would arise, and as Sunday is the day on which the Europeans were most in the habit of collecting together at the cafés and in the streets drinking, each Sunday was

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looked upon with special apprehension. So strong was the feeling of impending danger that peaceable persons, natives as well as Europeans, began to leave the country. The Moslems began also to arm themselves with sticks, especially the Barbarins (Nubians) of whom there were some 30,000 in Alexandria. The Barbarins are quarrelsome people and fond of fighting. Many of them were on the side of the Circassians in the affair.

The story of the origin of the riot as I heard it at the time was this. On the morning of the 11th, Sunday, a Maltese, brother of one of Mr. Cookson's servants, came to pay his brother a visit, and received a present from the Consul of a sovereign, with which he immediately went to amuse himself in the town. He took a carriage and went the round of the drinking shops in the Frank quarter and came at last to the Kawat et Gezaz. He was by that time drunk and wished to dismiss his carriage by paying the man a piastre. This caused a dispute which ended by the Maltese taking up a knife, one belonging to the Café and used for cutting cheese and which was kept tied with a long string to the table, and stabbed the coachman with it. The man was mortally wounded in the belly, and another who came to assist him was killed on the spot by a Greek. In the scuffle which followed a Greek baker living next door was killed and the fight became general. The Moahin, chief of the police, of the district of Laban was an Italian who could not speak Arabic, and he could not stop it. One of his mustaphezins in his suite was wounded, and the rest joined in the fight, taking part with the natives. These particulars I had next day from a Christian policeman who was present at the Zabit.

With respect to Kandil, chief of the police, I had seen him on the Thursday in Sommariva's shop and knew that he was ill, for I had felt his pulse and found he was suffering from a fever. Omar Lutfi could certainly have stopped the thing if he had chosen.

What spread the rioting so rapidly was the fact that the Moslem dead were taken to the Morgue. I saw 67 Europeans dead and I have it from the Mussulman Secretary of the Commission of Inquiry, and also from a Mussulman doctor, Mustafa Bey Nejdî, that 140 was the number of the Moslem, of whom about 25 Berberins.

The Oulad Ali Bedouins also took part in the riot. I saw 20 to 25 of them near Gibara's house where they had broken open a shop known as a depôt of firearms. These Oulad Ali were at that time on the side of the Khedive, having been bribed for £20,000 by Ibrahim Towfik, Mudir of Boheyrâ, at Dumanhur. I heard afterwards from a certain official of the local tele-

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graph that Omar Lutfi sent many cypher telegrams that day to the Viceroy.

I further declare that I never left Alexandria for many days before the 11th of June, till after the bombardment.

### APPENDIX III

LETTERS FROM ARABI PASHA NOT INCLUDED IN THE TEXT,  
TRANSLATED FROM THE ARABIC

TO MR. BLUNT, FROM CAIRO

23 November, 1882.

TO my friend, preserver of my life (lit. spirit of my life), Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. May God keep and preserve him.

After presenting to you my best salutations and expressing the extreme of my longing to behold the brightness of your blessed countenance. I have been honoured by the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd of November, 1882, and I thanked the Lord for your good health of which I hope the continuance. May God clothe you with the garments of health and prosperity! Indeed, your letter filled me with joy, such that its measure cannot be measured. I beg you also to convey my best salutation to your honoured consort Lady Blunt.

Now I have to tell you (*hadrat*) that I care not for what I suffer, for prison, for insults, or for what may happen afterwards, since I have offered myself a legacy (*wakf*) to the freedom of my country, and nothing interests me except the drawing up of the people of my native land from out of the pit of poisonous vipers and their deliverance from the fangs of that great dragon—(and this) by the wisdom of the wise men among the English nation, zealous for her honour.

And, next to this, if there is time in my term of life, I should wish to live free at Damascus with my children, keeping aloof from political affairs as long as I am out of Egypt, and if the Sultan of the Muslims will not permit my dwelling among the Muslims, I should prefer to live in London among our brethren, helpers of humanity, as a free man in the land of freedom—not under custody or supervision. Thus, also, my comrades who laid down their souls in the path of patriotism should live free; and I solemnly pledge my word not to interfere in political affairs while I remain far from my country “until God shall have completed what he has decreed.”



## *Arabi Pasha's Letters*

But as to how the enemy has attempted to cast suspicion on me with respect to the events of the 11th of June and the 12th of July—this is sheer calumny, nor can it be supported by the smallest evidence or proof, since such deeds are contrary to our honourable deeds. By this our enemies endeavoured to excite Europe so as to make as atoms in the air all the liberties we had gained for our country; and perhaps some good may come of this to the people of the country, so that she may obtain the completion of her freedom and deliverance by the turning towards her of the thoughts of the free English people, and in spite of the effort of her open enemy.

I care not for accidental titles of honour which I never at all desired; I am satisfied with my personal honour which will accompany me through life and after death. I wish to be called only by the name of Ahmed Arabi, the Egyptian.

Now I beg you to convey my best salutations to (*hadrat*) our dear friends Mr. Sabunji and Monsieur John (Ninet), and your friends who joined you in the cause of humanity, and from here Mahmud Pasha Sami and Ali Pasha Fehmy and Abd el Aal Pasha Helmy, and Sheykh Mohammed Abdu and Ahmed Bey Rifaat, all of them—all of them present you their salutations. May you remain in prosperity my beloved friend.

Your friend AHMED ARABI.

### TO MR. BLUNT, FROM CAIRO

To the soul of our lives, our deliverer Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. May God keep and preserve him.

After presenting our best salutations and offering the honour due to you, which is beyond expression, I inform you that, following your instructions and the advice of the honourable gentlemen, Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, we pleaded guilty to rebellion against the Khedive; and sentence was passed on us of perpetual exile. But our consent was not given to this except to smooth the difficulties which beset English policy, and we trust in the justice of the English people that they will so treat us in the future as to increase their good name in history. The Egyptian Government, on their part, have treated us with a treatment contrary to the law and civil customs of Islam; and this by putting forth a decree confiscating our property and our lands and our cattle, and the whole of our effects, although no such decree was pronounced on us at the Court Martial, nor was it legal in any way by Mohammedan religious law, nor, except in our case, has it an example. For in the case of Shahin Pasha, who was condemned to exile and forfeiture of appointments, honours, and the rest, yet there was

### *Appendix III*

left to him his property—about thirty thousand guineas—or more. It is even more strange that inheritance, according to Mohammedan law, should be forbidden us for the future, and the most unjust part of the business is, as everybody knows, that a prohibition has been inflicted on us of what is a right according to religious law—that our sons should inherit the property of their fathers and grandfathers; and on this account we have protested against this sentence through our counsel representing us.

And now we turn ourselves towards the garden of Adam, Ceylon; I having first set forth my views to Sir Charles Wilson as to what is needed for the prosperity of Egypt and the happiness of her people, that he may lay them before Lord Dufferin. I shall take with me my son, Mohammed, and his wife, and her maid servant, and my servant only, and shall leave at Cairo my other children and their mother, and my mother, till after the lying-in. Then in four months from now, that is forty days after the event, I shall send my son to fetch them and return with them to Ceylon. My brothers will stay with their relations in their village. Now, as the Egyptian Government has not fixed the amount of our incomes per month, and the decision is left to His Excellency, the Governor of Ceylon, as he shall see fit according to the needs in that country, I and my comrades, all of us, hope in your compassion and kind regard to write to the Governor of Ceylon, and that our friend Sir William Gregory will also write, and that we may be well treated and our incomes determined in a fair manner. We also beg you to try and save our property from confiscation, and to get us treated in respect of it according to the religious law and customs of Islam; and to obtain from the Egyptian Government to send out our families to Ceylon at Government expense, as it is impossible for us to pay, and indeed our destitute condition is well known.

We earnestly hope that our friends and relations will be placed under the protection of the representative of the English Government in Egypt, so that the (Egyptian) Government shall not maltreat them and take vengeance on them by illegal proceedings, and for that we place ourselves and our friends and relations under the shadow of the protection of England with a quiet mind. Here, O my beloved friend, taking your just advice, given in your honoured letter of the 8th of December, 1882, we shall spend our days in learning the English language, and in giving ourselves to the service of Almighty God, and not interfering in any political affair at all—till such time as God shall appoint, or haply He may decree some circumstance by which England shall be convinced that indeed we were not rebels—but that on the contrary we were defending our country with a legitimate defence.

We beg you not to deprive us of good news of yourself which

## *Arabi Pasha's Letters*

we long for earnestly. I request you to give my salutation, and that of all my family, to the honourable Lady Anne Blunt and to Lady Gregory, and our best thanks for all they have done for us in support of humanity.

All my comrades here—Yacoub Sami, Mahmud Sami, Mahmud Fehmy, Ali Fehmy, Abd el Aal Hilmy, Tulby Asmat, and Ahmed Bey Abd el Gaffar, desire to be remembered to you with best salutations, and I and they beg you to convey our salutations to our friend Sir William Gregory and to Mr. Louis Sabunji and to Monsieur John Ninet, and to all those friends of humanity who have helped you to uphold justice.

May God our Lord preserve your life to us in continued good, O dear friend.

Your friend, in obedience to God,

AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.

22 December, 1882.

LETTER RECEIVED IN LONDON, AUGUST 14, 1883, FROM ARABI,  
DATED COLOMBO, JULY 7, 1883

To my dear friend, etc., compliments, etc. . . . Mr. Sabunji.

After salutations; I have been glad to receive your letters of June 9th and 15th, with good news of your health, etc., etc.

I thank you and your friends, helpers of humanity, for continuing to fight against the army of oppressors, and to disperse them through your steadfastness. And although it is my duty not to interfere in political affairs, yet for the sake of justice I must exonerate Dervish Pasha from participation in the massacres of Alexandria—and this with all certainty. But I do not exonerate him from having been bribed by the Khedive—such is indeed the Turkish custom; the money, however, was not that which was obtained on mortgage of the property of Mayit Khallit belonging to the Khedive's wife, for that (sum) was the bribe to the preceding Ottoman Mission headed by (Ali) Nizami Pasha which (bribe), with all his (Nizami's) honesty, was sent to Constantinople through Thâbit Pasha the Circassian—the amount being £60,000 (drawn) from the English Bank to which Norson Bey (belongs). Nor did Dervish ask anything of me except to go to Constantinople with some of my comrades—setting himself forth to the officers of the army as their superior and father, so as to inspire them with confidence that he might succeed in his efforts to persuade us—but he did not succeed.

As I had previously made a special declaration with respect to the massacre in Alexandria and given it to Mr. Broadley, and another to the same effect to our noble friend Mr. Blunt, both of

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these (declarations) show the circumstances of that event. I have heard that the former (one) did not reach Mr. Blunt, but it does not differ from the second, which is sufficient. But in order that you may be informed, and to prevent your paying attention to untruthful rumours, I shall detail to you what I recollect of the circumstances which occurred previous to the event of June 11th, as well as on the day itself, and subsequently—that so you may be aware of them (all). They are these:

As regards circumstances preceding:

*Firstly.* The Khedive, when he saw the progress of the National Party, found it too much for himself and his advisers and his party—and they were Khairi Pasha the Circassian, Talaat Pasha el Rumi, and the like of them—and they began to organize a plan for disturbances. Accordingly the Khedive summoned the Chiefs of the Bedouins through Abu Sultan Pasha, and through Hammed Sultan of the Sherkiyeh Bedouins, and set them against the National Party, giving to some of them swords ornamented with silver and encouraging and exciting their hopes, so that it seemed to people (in general) that the Ismailia had become the camping ground of the Bedouins. This was well known to the Europeans and the Consuls in Cairo; and the arrivals of Bedouins increased so much as to cause apprehensions of disturbance, and it was then that all the Europeans tried to buy up all the arms to be found in the shops in Cairo and in Alexandria. This is confirmed by Sir (Edward) Malet's despatch to the Foreign Office dated June 11th.

*Secondly.* The secret correspondence between the Khedive and Omar Lutfi never ceased until it resulted in the massacre of Alexandria. Some of those communications were oral and some by telegrams in cypher under the direction of Khairi Pasha the Circassian and Talaat Pasha el Rumi, and when the organization was complete Omar Pasha Lutfi carried it into execution with Ismail Kamil Pasha the Circassian. But the Seyyid Kandil being of the National Party, did not participate with them in that, nor was he even allowed to let know what they had planned, because he might have rendered their evil actions innocuous through the action of the National Party; and he is clear of all suspicion.

*Thirdly.* An Italian *Bash Chawish* in the police, whose name I do not remember, said to a friend of his the day before the event "that he had better leave Alexandria with him because he knew that some disturbance would take place afterwards—and in fact he fled. The Wakil of the Zaptieh, Hassan Bey Sadyk, knows his name, and so do the officers of the police, as also they must know the name of the policeman who arrested the Maltese. But as to the story of the Bedouins depositing their arms in the Zaptieh before the riot it is a mere invention.

## *Arabi Pasha's Letters*

Now, as regards the circumstances on the day of the massacre, they are as follows:

*First.* The Governor of Alexandria did not send me news of it (the massacre) as was his duty, but I was informed by the Khedive, on the morning of the 12th of June, that the Governor, Omar Lutfi, had telegraphed to him that a Maltese had struck a native with a knife and had taken refuge in a house occupied by Europeans, and that the people had gathered together to see the aggressor arrested, and that then guns and revolvers were fired on them from the houses of the Europeans and that this had caused great slaughter.

*Secondly.* The Khedive, when thus informed of the event, did not inform me of it at the time, although he knew that the executive power was not in his hands and that he had transferred to me the guarantee for public safety which he had taken advantage of to sow disturbance. On the contrary, he summoned the Under-Secretary of War by night and sent him off to Alexandria by special train with Butros Pasha, and Dervish Pasha's first A.D.C. to join Omar Lutfi in suppressing the riot.

*Thirdly.* The whole crowd dispersed at the mere appearance of Suliman Bey Sami and his soldiers on the scene of the disturbance; and he then distributed the troops, posting them about the streets, and himself went the round of the quarters of the city—and the disturbance was thus stopped at once. But he was only informed and summoned by the Governor after the riot had assumed great proportions, and the Khedive's and his associates' plans had been carried out so as to deface the aspect of our deeds and to violate (lit. wound) my guarantee for public safety.

As regards what happened subsequently to the day of the event it is this:

*First.* As soon as the Khedive informed me, as mentioned above, I knew that it was a trap. I insisted with him on the necessity of an inquiry into the riot and the appointment of Commissioners by the European Powers as well as among the natives, in the hope of discovering the truth. And, accordingly, he issued a decree for the formation of a Commission as mentioned, under the presidency of this same Omar Lutfi, who was himself really responsible. The Under-Secretary of War and Butros Pasha were also members, but I do not know the names of the representatives chosen by the Powers whose subjects had been injured.

*Secondly.* The Under-Secretary of War on reaching Alexandria and examining into the matter requested me to send a military force to establish (confirm) tranquillity, and I sent, the day after the riot, two regiments of foot and two squadrons (?) of cavalry and

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two batteries of artillery the moment they were asked for. Also I wrote a letter to the Under-Secretary of War (to beg him) to exert himself strenuously to remove disturbance and establish peace and tranquillity within and without the town, and to be prudent when the inquiry should take place, and careful not to be taken in by the deceits of the deceivers—that is to say, Omar Lutfi and the faction of the Khedive—and that he should endeavour to defend the honour of the army and the Government, and that he should be determined to find out the truth and discover the real culprit—and so forth.

*Thirdly.* The Governor had ordered the dead to be buried without medical examination (inquest), against the rules, and without the presence of any representatives of the Powers.

*Fourthly.* The Commission of Inquiry never inquired into the cause of the massacre, nor about the dead, but its researches were limited to a knowledge of the property looted, under pretext that the representatives of the Powers were not authorized to inquire into anything except the property stolen.

*Fifthly.* Omar Lutfi asked permission from the Khedive for a change of air to Syria to escape from the inquiry, and be free from responsibility, for he knew that the war was near, and he got leave. He went to Cairo until after the war began, when he joined the Khedive by the way of Port Saïd, and he was rewarded by the Khedive's giving him the Ministry of War for his success in kindling the fire of the riot. On his resignation of the Governorship of Alexandria and the Presidency of the Commission of Inquiry, the Khedive's Master of the Ceremonies, Zulficar Pasha, was appointed in his stead, and did not transact any real business.

*Sixthly.* The papers of the Inquiry were with the Governor, Omar Lutfi, and were not founded on anything true. They were kept in the Governorat of Alexandria and must be there now if they have not been destroyed by the Khedive.

Now it is well known that the transactions of the Khedive and his faction were kept secret, and it was not in our power to get a knowledge of them—for they were in opposition to our actions. And all our own papers and evidence have been seized by the Government with all our property, and we cannot remember the dates of events with exactness, but with this and what has been previously sent there will be enough.

From here all our friends send salutations, and we all entreat you to endeavour to prevent any but a Moslem ruler being appointed for Egypt, for you know that any other would prejudice the rights of the Egyptians.

I have written my views to my dear friend Mr. Blunt, which

## *Arabi Pasha's Letters*

when you see you will join in helping us. Remain preserved in all honour and success,

Your friend,  
AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.

7th July, 1883.

LETTER RECEIVED AUGUST 14TH, 1883, FROM ARABI TO MR. SABUNJI

To my dear friend (compliments), etc., etc., Mr. Louis Sabunji.—  
After salutations.

I was very glad to receive your letter dated June 22nd. May God be your supporter and prosper your actions! We have conveyed your salutations to all our comrades, and they all send you their best salutations.

This—We beg you to remind our friend Mr. Blunt, in addition to what we had already written to him under date of the 15th instant, that the expenses incurred for 100,000 Egyptian soldiers during the war were (defrayed) entirely by donations offered by the Egyptian nation without distinction of creed. At the beginning of the war there were not more than 10,000 soldiers under arms, nor were there more than 1,200 uniforms in store, and these were not complete, nor were there more than 1,500 bushels of grain. But at the end of the war there were existing in the depots of the army and of the various mudirieh's and in the magazines, an amount exceeding the value of £1,000,000 sterling in money, produce, cattle, buffaloes, sheep, and cloth-stuffs, which had been offered as gifts, by the nation, to the army defending their country. To this, those bear witness who saw the abundance of stores left at Tel-el-Kebir and Kafr Dawâr and Kafr Zeyyât and other military centres. And during that time (of the war) there was not spent on the army one single dirhem of the Government funds—on the contrary the Treasury of the Malieh (Finance) and the Caisse of the Debt and the Treasuries of the Mudirieh's were (left) full of cash. To this, then, bear witness again what was published (at the time) in the local and other newspapers; (the fact) that the cash found in the Caisse of the Debt exceeded the (amount required for the) payment of the Coupon for the two months of October and November 1882, by a surplus of £350,000. And it has never even been rumoured that the Government property had been confiscated or plundered. Had we been of those who would sell their honour, or of those who prefer their own welfare and private interests to the public interest of their country, we should have taken what was in those full treasuries, and should have done deeds by the influence of wealth, quite different from what we did do,

### Appendix III

and should not have gone straight, guiding the people in defending their country, while respecting the rights and interests both of the nation at war with us and of other European nations during the war, and we should not have handed over the deposit conscientiously and honourably. And one who was thus (conscientious), and his deeds thus (honourable)—such a one it would not become to make himself a tool to evil-minded despots, nor to hire himself—neither for money from the Sultan or the Devil (Sheytan)—he being zealous for his own honour and conduct lest any spot should tarnish them.

Sent enclosed is a letter to our friend Sir William Gregory; I beg you to translate and send it with the translation to his address, after having shown it to our dear friend Mr. Blunt. And may God prosper you in all good, dear friend,

Your sincere friend,

AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.

Memorandum. My dear friend, I beg you, *à propos*, to remind our honoured friend of what I said (mentioned) at the end of my declaration to my Counsel, and it is this:

O helpers of humanity, if there was no National movement, nor any public opinion in Egypt, but (if) on the contrary it was only a military movement as the prejudiced (people) pretend, why were twenty thousand of the natives imprisoned (after the war)? Among them were Hassan Pasha Sherei, lord of the Southern province from ancestor to ancestor, and lord of Abu Sultan, and he who had helped him on while he (Abu Sultan) was only in the ranks among Government officials; so also his (Hassan Pasha Sherei's) friend, the learned and celebrated Abdullah Pasha Fikri; among them also my two friends Mahmud Pasha Sami and Mahmud Pasha Fehmi, who volunteered and served in the army during the war; among them also many of the principal Pashas, chiefs of civil departments, like Huseyn Pasha Daramelli and Mustafa Pasha Nail and others; among them many of the principal Ulemas and Members of the Chamber of Deputies, and magistrates, and muftis, and Mudirs, and civil officials of all ranks, and notable merchants and Omdehs, and Sheykhhs of Bedouins and Sheykhhs of religious bodies, men of God—so that the prisons of Cairo and Alexandria, and the mudiriehs and Governorships were choked up with them, during our imprisonment—till at last they expelled many of the most intelligent (men) among them from Egyptian territory. And if the army only was considered in rebellion, why this treatment of the nation?

But, on the other hand, if the army and the chiefs of the nation itself—indeed the whole Egyptian nation—notwithstanding dif-



## *Arabi Pasha's Letters*

ferences of creed, were of one mind, and that the right—why did the pillars of truth and justice, craved and engaged a room in nation, to gratify one individual who tried European fugitives. In not permit to be its ruler at all—arrogance to see Arabi Pasha, the respect of the English Government vain to about the Suez Canal, shall such conduct appear to the civilisedness days of the European Ahm. Abbas, a national highway to all Egypt, and no man-of-should pass through it

LETTER FROM ARABI PASHA TO MR. COLombo, No. 1

To my friend, beloved, distinguished, etc., etc., Mr. Power under the Govern-

God preserve him:

I recall to mind now the circumstances of the year 1869, when the British fleets to which came upon our country of Egypt, and impelled the tranquillity of Mr. Louis Sabunji to write you a letter in my name, the Flegha to what would be the consequences of the English war in Egypt—pointing out what the state of the country would lead to—and asking you to represent this to the Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, and I had hoped for the acceptance of, and some good from, this statement; this was a few days before the beginning of the war, and he wrote thus by my desire and by my order, although it was not in my handwriting, nor with my seal. And in order to your information of the truth of that, I have written this to you, O my generous friend,

Your friend,  
AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.

*November 10th, 1883.*

### LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL SUBSCRIBERS TO THE ARABI DEFENCE FUND

Lord Wentworth	...	...	...	...	£100	0	0
Sum collected by Frederic Harrison...	...	...	...	...	61	17	6
J. Passmore Edwards, M.P.	...	...	...	...	50	0	0
Richard Eve	...	...	...	...	50	0	0
Sir Wm. Gregory	...	...	...	...	25	0	0
Wm. John Evelyn, M.P.	...	...	...	...	20	0	0
Robt. Harrison	...	...	...	...	20	0	0
Sir Wilfrid Lawson, M.P.	...	...	...	...	20	0	0
Earl of Wemyss	...	...	...	...	20	0	0
Hon. A. Bourke	...	...	...	...	10	10	0
Spencer Charrington	...	...	...	...	10	10	0
Frederic Harrison	...	...	...	...	10	10	0
General Lord Mark Kerr	...	...	...	...	10	10	0

## *Appendix IV*

and should not have gone strai...	...	...	...	£10	10	0
ing their country, while respecti...	...	...	...	10	0	0
the nation at war with us and ...	...	...	...	10	0	0
the war, and we should not t...	...	...	...	10	0	0
scientiously and honourably. A ...	...	...	...	10	0	0
and his deeds thus (honourab ...	...	...	...	10	0	0
to make himself a tool to evi ...	...	...	...	5	0	0
—neither for money from t <sup>h</sup> M.P.	...	...	...	5	0	0
being zealous for his own ...	...	...	...	5	0	0
tarnish them.	...	...	...	5	0	0
Sent enclosed p <sup>r</sup> don (with promise of £1 yearly) ...	...	...	...	5	0	0
beg you to trans <sup>r</sup> Herbert	...	...	...	5	0	0
after having sh <sup>d</sup> Holdsworth	...	...	...	5	0	0
prosper you in <sup>w</sup> orth, M.P.	...	...	...	5	0	0
...	...	...	...	5	0	0
...ington	...	...	...	5	0	0
Sir A <sup>r</sup> rummond Wolff, M.P.	...	...	...	5	0	0
Edgar grandmond	...	...	...	to	3	0

N.B.—George Meredith, Wilfrid Meynell, and myself; contributed smaller sums; Lord De la Warr, I believe, £100, but I have no memorandum of it.

## APPENDIX IV

MR. SABUNJI'S LETTERS RECEIVED FROM EGYPT, IN CONTINUATION  
OF THOSE IN THE TEXT (*abridged and corrected as  
to English, spelling, grammar, etc.*)

Cairo, June 27, 1882.

LAST night, Sunday, I called at Mahmud Sami's house, where the leaders of the National Party meet every night to discuss their plans. In the meantime attention had been called by Fawsi Bey, Prefect of police, to a proclamation from the Khedive, in the official paper, concerning the late riot at Alexandria. The newspaper was at once brought and given to Nadim, who read the article with much animation and excitement. It produced a very bad effect; as to myself I did not find anything wrong in the proclamation, which described summarily the state of the country, expressed regret for what had happened, and for the want of confidence on the part of Europeans, and inculcated peace, tranquillity, and friendly behaviour with all Christians of every description, etc., etc. Nadim and some others found fault with the proclama-

## Mr. Sabunji's Letters

tion, and raised a very animated disor and engaged a room in 2 o'clock in the morning. In vain I tried a European fugitives. In their excited spirits; they insisted on saying to see Arabi Pasha, no business to promulgate such a proclamation I wrote him a note to Malet who advised him. I tried in vain to about the Suez Canal, Malet had left Alexandria since Wednesday of the European Tewfik should be deposed and his son, Abbas on a highway to all under a regency. Nadim, in spite of all his Egyptian, and no man-of-reforming character, is, I must confess, hast should pass through it impulsive. The worst thing I discover in how should transgress ever he finds himself overcome in argument once destroy the canal once to religious and fanatical resources, all on the Power under far from being a religious man himself, yet Secondly, the Government of the Sheykh el Islam. Arabi Pasha ise sent their fleets to has already advised him to be moderate, and tranquillity from going to Alexandria for fear he should cause of the Fleet in he is more influential there than anywhere else. I am certainly best to guide them, and spare no trouble, but I am afraid of Nadim's excitable character. He can at any moment kindle the fire of a religious war.

The National Party, who, up to yesterday, were satisfied with the new Ministry, have to-day turned against them. Nadim and Sami had suggested that in the new Cabinet's programme all official foreign communications should be entirely carried on through no other channel than that of the Cabinet, and that the Khedive should have no right to accept them except with the Cabinet's approval. The Khedive having refused to accept this restriction, the Ministers, to avoid new troubles, agreed to soften the words of the article; this mild measure, prudently taken by Arabi and other Ministers, roused Nadim's feelings, and he rebelled against the Ministers as well as against the Khedive, and began to preach the Khedive's deposition. The telegraph at this moment announces the departure of Malet for Venice and the appointment of Mr. Cartwright in his place. Another telegram announces that the Sultan has sent to Arabi Pasha the decoration of the Mejdieh, and to the Khedive a "souvenir" set in diamonds.

Cairo, June 29.

I went yesterday to see your garden. I had Nadim with me. The heat was suffocating, and we stayed there all day. The European *wakeel*, whose name I do not know [this was Mr. Rowsell, of the Domains Commission] has run away with the rest of the Europeans who have left Egypt lately. The Arab gardener complained of not knowing whom to refer to in case of need. He called on me on Saturday to bring his accounts which he wished

## Appendix IV

and should not have gone to procure him a trustworthy Egyptian ing their country, while re-<sup>im</sup> to name one from among his acquaint- the nation at war with us, <sup>is</sup> year is more prosperous than usual, the the war, and we should <sup>dance</sup>. In my last letter I forgot to tell you scientiously and honor-<sup>partisans</sup> attempted to poison Nadim with a and his deeds thus (h<sup>adim</sup>, suspecting nothing, smoked a part of it, to make himself a to-<sup>o</sup> make him lose his mind and sight for about —neither for money <sup>adim</sup> is a *motus perpetuus*. being zealous for his o<sup>n</sup> Alexandria the 27th inst., came to Cairo tarnish them.

Sent enclosed ir<sup>don</sup> you the telegram. I spent all that night with beg you to trans<sup>rHerber</sup>, the other Pashas, Nadim and Abdu were after having sh-<sup>Holdsw</sup> if-past eleven all were gone, but I remained prosper you in<sup>worth, M.</sup> Nadim, and he spoke to me about the pre-<sup>ch</sup> were going on at the different strategic

... measures have been taken to destroy the Suez  
ington <sup>urs</sup> at the first notice of hostility on the part of  
The foolish naval demonstration by England and France has strengthened the National Party one hundred times, and it has become the Nation itself. You know full well that religious motives play great part on such occasions, and that some who are less influenced by political and patriotic feelings are led on through religious excitement. Such is the case in Egypt. From what I hear and see, I fear that on the first notice of hostility by any Power a religious war will be preached and declared. Things at present are very bad; I hear from the Italian Consul that about 100,000 people have left Egypt since the arrival of the Fleet. The British Consulate has invited the remaining British subjects to leave Egypt at once, but those who choose to remain must sign a declaration that they do so on their own responsibility. A deadly panic reigns among all classes of Europeans. Not more than a dozen of European shops are open. Hotels are closing and furnished apartments exist no more. Cairo presents a mournful aspect in the European quarters, but the Arab quarters are still as they were, enjoying life in their own way. Only the fellaheen are uneasy at not finding any one to buy their produce. It is six years since crops have been so abundant; wheat which always fetched twenty-five francs at the lowest cannot be sold for fifteen francs, while its present value in England is thirty-five francs the quarter. There is always fifty per cent. profit. The Europeans who used to travel in the interior and buy the produce from the fellaheen have run away and taken with them their capital.

Alexandria, July 1.

As Arabi has been obliged to stay at Alexandria with Ragheb Pasha and the Khedive, I thought it better to go to Alexandria;

### *Mr. Sabunji's Letters*

accordingly I came to Alexandria to-day and engaged a room in the Hotel Abbat, which is crowded with European fugitives. In the evening I went to the Ras el Tin Palace to see Arabi Pasha, but he was engaged in a council of war, and I wrote him a note to say, first, as England is making such trouble about the Suez Canal, it is advisable to inform the representatives of the European Powers that the Canal, being an international highway to all nations, must be neutral in case of war with Egypt, and no man-of-war or any vessel with arms and munitions should pass through it from such a date to such a date. If any Power should transgress this, the Egyptian Government would at once destroy the canal and the responsibility of the deed would fall on the Power under whose flag the vessel entered the canal. Secondly, the Government should inform the Powers who have sent their fleets to Alexandria, and peace being now established, and tranquillity reigning throughout the country, the continued stay of the Fleet in Alexandrian waters keeps the spirits of the Egyptians in agitation, which is dangerous to public security, and prevents people from coming back to Alexandria while they know the Fleet is still here. Therefore an ultimatum should be sent to the Powers concerned stating that, within twenty-four hours, if the Fleet is not withdrawn of its own accord, the Forts will open fire on it and compel it to withdraw. I also added that it would be to the great credit of Arabi himself to take the initiative in this case, and show those who threatened him a month ago that he is now so strong as to threaten and defy them. Thirdly, I suggested to Arabi Pasha that he should be wary of Turkish troops. He must not allow them to land. The former hatred between Turks and Arabs is not dead. Turkish and Arab soldiers will never agree together. The presence of Turkish troops in Egypt will throw the country into confusion. It will cause a division in the Army and the Nation and paralyse the efforts of the Government with the usual intrigues. He had better, therefore, advise the Sultan to abstain from sending troops to Egypt, but in case the Sultan should insist upon sending troops, he must be considered an invading power and be resisted as such.

*July 3.*—Last night while at dinner Arabi Pasha sent an officer and his own dragoman requesting me to go and see him. As soon as I entered the reception room he politely got up and, with a serene smile, said: "I was just going to send you a telegram to Cairo, but learned you were in Alexandria, and that you had come this afternoon to see me while I was in council with Ragheb." After coffee the Pasha inquired after you and Her Ladyship, and asked whether I had lately heard from you and how things were going in the British Parliament. I said all I knew. He then

## *Appendix IV*

told me that a new correspondent of the "Standard" had just arrived and had called on him with a wish to know his political view on the situation. "I told him," Arabi said, "I was sorry he should have taken the trouble to come to me, as he could have got all the information he wanted in England from Mr. Blunt, who knows me as well as I know myself." The correspondent said that the English people were quite aware now that Mr. Blunt was one of his greatest friends and admirers, and for this reason they thought him prejudiced and exaggerating things. A dialogue then passed between Arabi and the correspondent, which you will probably read in the "Standard." The correspondent also told Arabi that there is in England a society for the protection of British subjects abroad. This society was now claiming the blood of the British subjects killed in Alexandria on June 11. Arabi replied saying that he was very glad to hear it, and he himself would join the society to claim the blood not only of British subjects, but also the blood of all the victims of every nationality who were sacrificed on Egyptian soil, from the authors of that catastrophe. It would be his duty to claim the blood of his Egyptian brothers who had been massacred by Europeans; the British Government itself being the cause of the mischief through their representatives in Egypt. His Excellency requested me five times in the presence of all to send you his most hearty compliments and his respectful regards to Her Ladyship. He talked about you to those assembled, and about the great interest you take in the National cause. If all Englishmen were like you England would be a paradise and Englishmen so many angels.

In your last letter you expressed a wish to hear from me an account of the late riot in Alexandria which took place on June 11. As I was not in Alexandria at the time of the riot I must relate it as I heard it since from the officers, Arabs, and from Europeans, and from the Pasha himself three times, and again last night. On Sunday, June 11th, a Maltese stabbed a donkey boy and killed him on the spot. The bystanders (Arabs) did not wait for the police, but rushed on the Maltese and killed him over the donkey. The Maltese population, who had been already armed and prepared a few days before, began to fire from the windows. This caused a general confusion in the crowd which had assembled in the square, and from thence the riot extended to several parts of the town and lasted till six o'clock (about five hours), till the police and soldiers were brought to act and disperse the rioters.

The British Consul, who is considered to be the author or instigator of the row, was slightly wounded in the back with a stick, but did not go out of doors, more for fear of being killed than on account of the gravity of his wound. Notwithstanding this, Sir Malet sent

### *Mr. Sabunji's Letters*

word at midnight to the new correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" saying that the British Consul was mortally wounded and would die before sunrise, and requested him to telegraph the news to England at once. But I told the correspondent at the time not to be hasty and that he had better wait until I could get him the correct information from Arabi himself. I went that very night to Arabi Pasha and inquired from him about the matter. He told me he had already telegraphed four times and had received no answer, but while I was still there a telegram came, and five minutes afterwards Hajrasi, who had been sent especially from Alexandria to inform Arabi of the real cause and state of the riot. I returned at once to the correspondent and told him there was nothing the matter with the Consul. When the police dispersed the crowd, they found at the door of the Consulate a cab containing twenty-four rifles, two revolvers, and two cases of powder the Consul himself had prepared for the use of the Maltese. Arabi Pasha told me last night that it was proved by the Commission of Inquiry that the riot was premeditated. On Sunday morning on the very day the riot took place, an Italian serving as a constable in the Egyptian police told a fellow constable that a serious riot was going to be on that day and that they had better run away at once and for good; accordingly they both disappeared and are now in Italy. The German papers do not make any secret of the matter and declare that the riot was premeditated and organized by the British Consul at Alexandria for political purposes. The number of victims is unknown. The European and Egyptian authorities agreed to let the matter drop without going into exact calculations. The riot was more serious than it was represented by the press. Over 1,400 victims, most of them Europeans, fell on that day. The Europeans, all of them, had firearms, and the Arabs had only sticks, and yet they had the best of it. It was this preliminary trial that discouraged the Europeans and made them fly away from Egypt like fools and cowards.

Your book, "The Future of Islam," has reached Nadim, and I gave him the summary of it. Your letter to Mr. Gladstone, published in the "Times," has been translated into Arabic for publication in the "Taif." Arabi Pasha is very much pleased with it. He tells me that the political atmosphere is dark, and likely to become more stormy. War is now nearer than peace. Activity in preparing for war has no equal at present in Egypt. Soldiers as well as fellaheen and Bedouins prepare for war. The day war is declared I shall leave Egypt. Though the Pashas and other officers wish me to remain in Egypt during war, I do not think it would be prudent to remain. I hope you will be able to know the possibility of war, and warn me beforehand by telegraph, the signal.

## *Appendix IV*

for leaving Egypt being the word "exodus." If war takes place, Egypt will be completely ruined. Alexandria and two provinces will be flooded, and the canal destroyed for ever by the sea water that will rush from the dyke at Aboukir. It will be a desperate war. They will never yield till every soul is sacrificed, and of what I see and of what I hear it has been already arranged to render the war in Egypt a general rising of the Moslems in Asia and Africa.

Alexandria, July 3rd.

His Excellency, Ahmed Arabi Pasha, has requested me to write down the following communication, which he dictated to me in Arabic, in the presence of Abd el Aal Pasha, Mahmoud Pasha Fehmy, inspector of the Egyptian fortifications, and in presence of many other Pashas and officers, and wished me to translate it into English and send it to you, that you may kindly present it to the Right Hon. Mr. Gladstone in his name. [Here follows Arabi's letter to Mr. Gladstone, already printed in the text.]

P.S.—I am authorized by His Excellency, Arabi Pasha, to tell you that you can, after submitting this letter to the Right Hon. Mr. Gladstone, make use of it as you choose, either by publishing it or otherwise.

Alexandria, July 4th, 1882.

I have received with thanks your kind note together with the newspaper cuttings. Turkish politics are looked upon here with a bad eye and suspicion. Arabi, the Pashas, officers, and nation are determined to prevent the landing of Turkish troops. They say they do not want their help on land. "If they are earnest in helping us, let them fight our common enemy only by sea."

Alexandria, July 5th, 1882.

Last night I was with Arabi Pasha till midnight; on my entering the reception room I found it crowded with Pashas, officers, and others, who were assembled there to congratulate him on the occasion of his being invested with the Grand Cordon of the Mejidieh. At about 11 p.m. they cleared away, and we were left only four in the room till midnight. We talked freely about many subjects. I read to him your telegram of July 1, and he was very much pleased. When I mentioned to him Dervish's name, he shook his head in such a manner as to say, "We know that fellow too well." "As to my going to Constantinople," he said, "people may say as they like, I was born in the land of the Pharaohs, and the eternal pyramids will shadow my grave. The Porte will not attempt to destroy one of the Ottoman dependencies. We say in Arabic, 'No one cuts off his own nose with his own hand.'



## *Mr. Sabunji's Letters*

The Sultan will think twice before he makes up his mind to call me to Constantinople or to send troops to Egypt."

There is here in Egypt just now a strong feeling against the Turks as well as the English nation. I find after all that the Admiral of the British fleet is another Malet or Colvin or worse. Yesterday he sent a kind of ultimatum (ultimatums seem to be in fashion just now) of which I enclose a copy. The ultimatum was addressed to Toulbeh Pasha. It created a fearful panic among the Arabs as well as among the very few Europeans who are still in Egypt. I was in my room writing when one of the hotel servants came to me trembling and told me something which I couldn't understand at first, because his fear made him swallow half his words. I tried to calm him, and asked him what was the matter. "Do you not know," he said, "that the town will be bombarded to-day by the British fleet?" I smiled to inspire him with more courage, and told him not to be afraid, there was no danger; but he, still trembling, said that the Consuls had ordered all the Europeans to go at once on board the steamers. "Has this order come officially to the hotel?" I inquired. "No, sir," he rejoined, "but every one in the hotel is going away." I told him not to mind them, and to take my washing to the laundress, but he refused to do so and went away. I got up and went at once to Arabi Pasha in order to see what was going on. I found that there was nothing new—only that Ragheb Pasha had already informed the Admiral that there were no works going on in the fortifications. This calmed the Admiral, but it did not calm the frightened people. I went, therefore, again to Toulbeh Pasha and asked him to send me two soldiers to guard the entrance of the Hôtel des Messageries, where I am staying at present, in order to inspire confidence in the minds of the inmates. When the ultimatum reached Toulbeh Pasha I was there, and he gave it to me to translate into Arabic, which I did at once in Arabi Pasha's presence and that of other officers. When they read it Colonel Aid Bey said: "Is it possible that England should always send us a staff of fools? This Admiral, instead of showing himself to be a wise and courageous man, shows fear at the slightest movement made in the fortifications, and keeps molesting us with his ultimatums, disturbing the people and exasperating the Arabs. He does more harm than good." In fact the town of Alexandria has become desolate.

I drove yesterday through the town and scarcely saw twenty or thirty Europeans. Shops and cafés are closed. The exodus from the interior continues. The employés of the Domain, Control agents, bankers, etc., are ordered to leave Egypt. Even the instruments of the Eastern Telegraph Company are transported on board the Admiral's man-of-war. The communications by tele-

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graph have become very difficult and unsafe. The way of sending a despatch now is most inconvenient. One must write the despatch and give it to a clerk, who has shut himself in a very small room where there is a window barred with iron, and in which a small hole about five inches wide is left open. Such are the courageous Englishmen who have come here with their fleet to smash the Arabs, who still live with their usual calmness.

As for myself I do not know if it would be prudent to remain in Egypt in case of war or not. Our friends wish me to remain, but I do not know if it would be safe. I should like you to watch the Foreign Office proceedings, and the moment you come to learn that war is decided upon, telegraph at once the word "Moses."

*July 8.*—This morning I went to see Arabi Pasha, who told me that he had received an American young lady of Philadelphia who begs for his autograph. He had written the answer in Arabic, and begged me to translate it into English. He told me also that two days ago, when he was coming from Cairo to Alexandria, he met about 500 Italians at the station ready to leave Egypt. He began to talk to them and encourage them to stay in their homes as there would be no danger whatever, and he guaranteed their lives and properties as he would do for everybody. His words encouraged the panic-stricken people and they rushed towards him, men, women, girls, and children to kiss his hand and thank him. There was among the crowd an old man as tall as Arabi himself, who forced his way through the crowd, and when he reached him put both his hands upon his shoulders exclaiming, "Dio vi benedica." In the end a third of them went away to their homes in Cairo.

While I was still with Arabi he received a letter from an Italian gentleman asking him to accept him as a volunteer in the Egyptian army. He had formerly been in the Italian army under Garibaldi, and he wished now to fight for the freedom of Egypt.

The Sultan does not much trust Dervish Pasha. He sent with him as a spy on him Sheykh Ahmed Assād, the Sultan's agent at Medina to watch Dervish's movements. The Sultan gave Dervish a private cypher to telegraph his proceedings, and at the same time gave another private cypher to Ahmed Assād, so he has set these two commissioners against each other and each telegraphs independently. This Ahmed Assād is an intimate friend of Arabi, and he helped him greatly in his last crisis with the Khedive.

Two days ago, when I was with Arabi, a letter was brought him by an Arab. He opened it and read it to me and to the officers with him. It was written by the keeper of the Kaaba who is attached to the Sherif of Mecca. The letter was written in an elegant style and was very flattering; the writer stated that all the people of Mecca were praying for Arabi and for his triumph.

## *Mr. Sabunji's Letters*

Prayers are being made for him at the Kaaba, at the sanctuary of Ismail, at Zemzem, at Arafat, at Mena, at Maalat, and in every holy place in Mecca for Arabi's success; the writer did not hesitate to give Arabi the title of Defender of the Faith and of the Moslem Empire. The letter came by a special messenger. All Hejaz is with Arabi. The Sherif of Mecca not wishing to disturb his good relations with the Porte had this letter written by one of his suite, Abbas Aga Zemzem. The letter having been read it was agreed that a letter of thanks should be written.

The French Admiral here seems to be very suspicious about the British Admiral's movements. Whenever the French Admiral sees the British Admiral shifting his men-of-war he follows him at once. If an English man-of-war goes out of the harbour a French man-of-war follows her. If a new British man-of-war arrives at Alexandria, the French Admiral telegraphs at once for a French man-of-war. In fact these two Powers follow each other like rats and cats.

There is a famous Sheykh of Algiers now in Alexandria called Sheykh Mohammed el Jezairli. He is highly respected by all Mohammedans and by the Sultan himself. He had given much trouble to the French in Algiers and lately in Tunis. When he first came to Egypt, four months ago, he preached against Arabi, and denounced him to the Khedive as a rebel to the Sultan. Being a man of great learning, eloquence, and influence he did much harm to Arabi, and helped on the fatal quarrel that took place between Sultan Pasha and the deputies and Arabi. Once when he was denouncing Arabi at a meeting one of those present asked him whether he knew Arabi personally, but the Sheykh indignantly replied that he had never seen Arabi nor had any wish to see him. (The letter then goes on to describe how a little later the Sheykh met Arabi at dinner, without knowing him, and discussed the matter of reform, and was so much struck with his arguments that he became his devoted adherent.) Three nights ago I saw him in Arabi's house, where he had come to take leave of him to go to the Sultan and beg him, in the name of all the Moslems, to abstain from sending Turkish troops to Egypt. When I heard that, I asked him how it was that when I had first had the pleasure of seeing him he had advocated Turkish intervention on the plea that Egypt was an Ottoman dependency, and consequently if Turkish troops came to Egypt they would come to their own country. "It is true," he replied, "this was my conviction at the time, but when I heard you say that if Turkish troops came to Egypt they would never leave it, and that their presence in the country would renew the former exasperation which existed between the Arab soldiers and the Turks I found that you were right, and I have now come

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to beg leave from His Excellency to go with some of my friends to Constantinople to prevent the Sultan sending troops here." I think Arabi told him that he had been assured by the Sultan that no troops would be sent to Egypt.

*July 9.*—I hear on good authority that Khair el Din Pasha and Said Pasha, the former an ex-Prime Minister at Constantinople, are opposed to the idea of sending troops to Egypt. It is reported that while the Ministers were discussing the question in Council, Khair el Din got up and showed from the Koran and the Hadith that it was against the Mohammedan religion to send Moslem troops against a peaceful Mohammedan community, and he concluded by quoting the Prophet's saying, which runs thus: "If two Moslems be engaged in a war against one another, both the killer and the killed shall suffer eternal punishment in hell."

I saw in the papers which you kindly sent that you have been attacked by Malet and Colvin, and I hope you remember now that I was right in the opinion which I formed of these two men from the very day we entered Cairo. You relied too much on Malet's friendship and on Colvin's pretended sincerity; our friends here are furious against them. I read Sir William Gregory's letter in the "Times" and translated it into Arabic for Arabi Pasha, who was very much pleased with it.

*July 10.*—This is the day of the greatest confusion, the day of terror, of misery, and of general runaway. This morning, while I was still in bed, an Arab servant of the hotel came to me saying, "Get up, and prepare to go away." I asked him, "What for?" He said, "Because master is going to shut up the hotel and not a single soul will remain. All have gone on board the steamers." I got up and told the servant to get me a cup of tea. He said "There is none." I dressed myself and went down into the dining room, where I found the proprietor in confusion and despair. "What is the matter?" I inquired. "All the Consuls have ordered their subjects to leave Alexandria before noon." I said, "Will you let me stay alone in the hotel, and I will take care of it?" "No," he said, "I cannot do so." I begged of him to wait at least an hour that I might go to the Ministry of Marine and back. I at once took a cab and went to see Arabi, but I could see none of the Ministers. All were in Council. I saw Arabi's private secretary, who informed me that the British Admiral had sent word, verbally only, to say he would bombard the forts within twenty-four hours, and that the Consuls of the other nations had gone to see the British Admiral to inquire into the matter. When I came back to the hotel I found that the proprietor had packed up and loaded his baggage on carriages ready to start. I had scarcely time to bring down my small valises and take a cab and go. I did not

## *Mr. Sabunji's Letters*

know where. The fleets had already left the harbour and gone to sea, ready to open fire. People—I mean those few who remained till the last moment—were running away in precipitate haste to different steamers which had stayed in the harbour to receive the fugitives. I do not think that the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt could have been anything equal to this. Men, women, children, babes crying in their mothers' arms, old men unable to walk, invalids unable to help themselves were driven to sea with such panic as to make one think of the final day of judgement. Poor people, their fear and despair had no other relief than cursing the Consuls and the British Government, which had brought on Egypt such a catastrophe.

Having witnessed this heartrending scene I began to think for myself, but wherever I went I found the people I knew had already gone; the only place I could have at my disposal was the arsenal, but the arsenal being close to the fortifications I did not find it to be a desirable safe place in case of bombardment. In the meanwhile time was flying, and the twenty-four hours were drawing to their end. The idea struck me to go on board a steamer, but all I heard were crowded. A boatman who was worrying to take my valises in his boat offered to take me to the British steamer *Tanjore*, but I declined the offer, because all the British subjects, Consuls, newspaper correspondents, who most of them knew me, were on board, therefore I did not think it prudent to find myself among them, and I made up my mind to remain on shore and be the last one to leave Alexandria. But the last hour was near, and the last boats leaving. At that moment I met a French gentleman who was embarking with his lady, and he invited me to go with him to the steamer "*Said*" of the *Messageries Maritimes*, and I went on board, and am here writing to you now. I do not think I shall be able to send this letter to-morrow as there is no British post. All posts, including the Egyptian, are closed. The Eastern Telegraph Company has left Alexandria and carried away their instruments to the British Admiral's ship.

When I saw our friends about two hours ago I found them firm and ready to fight and resist to the last drop of blood, cost what it would.

*July 11.*—This morning, Tuesday, at 7 o'clock sharp, the signal gun for bombarding the forts was fired from the British Fleet. I was on board the *Said*, at a short distance from the Fleet. The "memoranda dies" for Arabi had begun. Dervish left Alexandria as soon as the bombardment began, and sailed nobody knows where. Among 1,170 persons who were with me this morning to witness the bombardment, I was the only one who wished good

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luck and success to Arabi and his colleagues. As the first shot started, hats, handkerchiefs, and hands waved in the air, with applause and exclamations of satisfaction. Men and women, bishops, priests, monks and nuns, who were in great numbers, were in high spirits and predicted the surrender of the forts in two hours; but their disappointment has already begun. It is 1.30 p.m. and the fire has not ceased yet on either side. The resistance has been excellent till now. Some of the Egyptian shots pass the Fleet and some fall short; the distance is evidently too great, but nobody can tell the result as yet. I am sitting on deck looking at the bombardment, and writing all I can see, but what can a man see from a distance and through a dense cloud of dark smoke except the lightning and thundering of the guns. I have been without your news for about a week. I expected to hear from you as soon as war was decided on by the English Government, but you left me in the dark till the last moment. Our friends, and even the other Consuls, were not sure of England's earnest wish for war—nor was I.

I have made up my mind to go to Naples or Venice till things are settled in Egypt, which I think will take months. From Arabi's letter to Mr. Gladstone, which you ought to have received yesterday and presented to him as I hope, and published, you can judge of the intentions of the Egyptians and the disorder that will reign in this country for some time to come. The first shot has already torn in pieces all the treaties and sends the Rothschilds' millions to hell and dismissed the man whose authority England and France joined hands to establish. The Suez Canal, if by this time it is not destroyed, will be in the course of a few days filled up by 600,000 Fellaheen and Bedouins, who were instructed beforehand how to effect their work.

[Mr. Sabunji reached Venice on the 19th July, and London some weeks later.]

## APPENDIX V

PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL PARTY OF EGYPT, FORWARDED BY  
MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE, DEC. 20TH, 1881,  
WITH MR. GLADSTONE'S ANSWERS

I.

THE National party of Egypt accept the existing relations of Egypt with the Porte as the basis of their movement. That is to say: They acknowledge the Sultan Abd el Hamid Khan as

## *National Programme*

their Suzerain and Lord, and as actual Caliph or Head of the Mussulman religion; nor do they propose, while his empire stands, to alter this relationship. They admit the right of the Porte to the tribute fixed by law, and to military assistance in case of foreign war. At the same time, they are firmly determined to defend their national rights and privileges, and to oppose, by every means in their power, the attempts of those who would reduce Egypt again to the condition of a Turkish Pashalik. They trust in the protecting Powers of Europe, and especially in England, to continue their guarantee of Egypt's administrative independence.

2. The National party express their loyal allegiance to the person of the reigning Khedive. They will continue to support Mohammed Towfik's authority as long as he shall rule in accordance with justice and the law, and in fulfilment of his promises made to the people of Egypt in September 1881. They declare, however, their intention to permit no renewal of that despotic reign of injustice which Egypt has so often witnessed, and to insist upon the exact execution of his promise of Parliamentary government and of giving the country freedom. They invite His Highness, Mohammed Towfik, to act honestly by them in these matters, promising him their cordial help; but they warn him against listening to those who would persuade him to continue his despotic power, to betray their national rights, or to elude his promises.

3. The National party fully recognize the services rendered to Egypt by the Governments of England and France, and they are aware that all freedom and justice they have obtained in the past has been due to them. For this they tender them their thanks. They recognize the European Control as a necessity of their financial position, and the present continuance of it as the best guarantee of their prosperity. They declare their entire acceptance of the foreign debt as a matter of *national honour*—this, although they know that it was incurred, not for Egypt's benefit, but in the private interests of a dishonest and irresponsible ruler—and they are ready to assist the Controllers in discharging the full national obligations. They look, nevertheless, upon the existing order of things as in its nature temporary, and avow it as their hope gradually to redeem the country out of the hands of its creditors. Their object is, some day to see Egypt entirely in Egyptian hands. Also they are not blind to the imperfections of the Control, which they are ready to point out. They know that many abuses are committed by those employed by it, whether Europeans or others. They see some of these incapable, others dishonest, others too highly paid. They know that many offices, now held by strangers, would be better discharged by Egyptians, and at a fifth of the

## *Appendix V*

cost; and they believe there is still much waste and much injustice. They cannot understand that Europeans living in the land should remain for ever exempt from the general taxation, or from obedience to the general law. The National party does not, however, propose to remedy these evils by any violent action; only it would protest against their unchecked continuance. They would have the Governments of France and England consider that, having taken the control of their finances out of the hands of the Egyptians, they are responsible for their prosperity, and are bound to see that efficient and honest persons only are employed by them.

4. The National party disclaim all connection with those who, in the interest of Powers jealous of Egypt's independence, seek to trouble the peace of the country—and there are many such—or with those who find their private advantage in disturbance. At the same time they are aware that a merely passive attitude will not secure them liberty in a land which is still ruled by a class to whom liberty is hateful. The silence of the people made Ismail Pasha's rule possible in Egypt, and silence now would leave their hope of political liberty unfulfilled. The Egyptians have learned in the last few years what freedom means, and they are resolved to complete their national education. This they look to find in the Parliament just assembling, in a fair measure of freedom for the press, and in the general growth of knowledge among all classes of the people. They know, however, that none of these means of education can be secured except by the firm attitude of the national leaders. The Egyptian parliament may be cajoled or frightened into silence, as at Constantinople; the press may be used as an instrument against them, and the sources of instruction cut off. It is for this reason and for no other that the National party has confided its interests at the present time to the army, believing them to be the only power in the country able and willing to protect its growing liberties. It is not, however, in the plans of the party that this state of things shall continue; and as soon as the people shall have established their rights securely the army will abandon its present political attitude. In this the military leaders fully concur. They trust that on the assembling of the Parliament their further interference in affairs of State may be unnecessary. But for the present they will continue to perform their duty as the armed guardians of the unarmed people. Such being their position, they hold it imperative that their force should be maintained efficient, and their complement made up to the full number of 18,000 men. They trust that the European Control will keep this necessity in view when considering the army estimates.

5. The National party of Egypt is a political, not a religious



## *Gladstone's Correspondence*

party. It includes within its ranks men of various races and various creeds. It is principally Mohammedan, because nine-tenths of the Egyptians are Mohammedans; but it has the support of the Moors, of the Coptic Christians, of the Jews, and others who cultivate the soil and speak the language of Egypt. Between these it makes no distinction whatever, holding all men to be brothers and to have equal rights, both political and before the law. This principle is accepted by all the chief Sheykh's of the Azhar who support the party, holding the true law of Islam to forbid religious hatred and religious disabilities. With Europeans resident in Egypt the National party has no quarrel, either as Christians or as strangers, so long as these shall live conformably with the laws and bear their share of the burdens of the State.

6. Finally, the general end of the National party is the intellectual and moral regeneration of the country by a better observance of the law, by increased education, and by political liberty, which they hold to be the life of the people. They trust in the sympathy of those of the nations of Europe which enjoy the blessing of self-government to aid Egypt in gaining for itself that blessing; but they are aware that no nation ever yet achieved liberty except by its own endeavours; and they are resolved to stand firm in the position they have won, trusting to God's help if all other be denied them.

*December 18, 1881.*

### MR. GLADSTONE'S ANSWER

Hawarden Castle, Chester,

*Jan. 20th, 1882.*

MY DEAR SIR,

You will I am sure appreciate the reasons which disable me from offering anything like a becoming reply to your very interesting letter on Egyptian affairs, which occupy, I am sorry to say, an insignificant share of my daily attention.

But I am sensible of the advantage of having such a letter from such an authority, and I feel quite sure that unless there be a sad failure of good sense on one or both, or, as I should say, all sides, we shall be enabled to bring this question to a favourable issue.

My own opinions about Egypt were set forth in the "19th Century" a short time before we took office, and I am not aware as yet of having seen any reason to change them.

I remain, my Dear Sir,

Faithfully yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

Wilfrid S. Blunt, Esq.

## Appendix V

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,  
*Jan. 21st, 1882.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

I feel I owe you a great apology for your not having received an earlier acknowledgment of your most able and interesting communication on the Egyptian movement. Holiday making must be my excuse; but my absence from Downing Street did not prevent the prompt submission of your letter to Mr. Gladstone, from whom I enclose a note. He is sorry that it is somewhat tardy in its despatch.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to write on the present critical state of affairs, when the situation may alter from day to day.

You may imagine that the alleged national character to the movement necessarily commends itself to Mr. Gladstone with his well-known sympathy with young nationalities struggling for independence. The great crux (I am of course only speaking for myself, and with a strong consciousness of ignorance) seems to be, how to favour such a movement with due regard to the responsibilities in which we have been involved, and the vested interests which are at stake. Every alternative seems to be beset with insuperable objections and insurmountable difficulties. I can only say that if you can do anything towards finding a solution for these difficulties you will be doing a great work for Egypt, for the country, and for the present Government. I know that you have already been of great service, and are entitled to speak on this question with greater authority than almost any one else.

With special regards to Lady Anne, and apologies for such a cursory uninteresting note in return for your information,

Always yrs. affy.

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. GLADSTONE'S ANSWER TO MR. BLUNT'S SECOND LETTER  
DATED CAIRO, FEBRUARY 7TH, 1882

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,  
*2nd March, 1882.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone has read with much interest your further letter, for which he is much obliged. He hopes that you will have felt, or will feel, assured from the language in the speech from the Throne, of which I enclose by his desire a copy, that the British Government, while intending firmly to uphold international engagements, have a sympathy with Egyptian feelings in reference to the purposes and means of good government.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

## *Gladstone's Correspondence*

EXTRACT FROM THE QUEEN'S SPEECH FORWARDED BY  
MR. HAMILTON

In concert with the President of the French Republic, I have given careful attention to the affairs of Egypt, where existing arrangements have imposed on me special obligations. I shall use my influence to maintain the rights already established, whether by the Firmans of the Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable to the good government of the country and the prudent development of its institutions.

### APPENDIX VI

TEXT OF THE EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION OF FEBRUARY 7TH,  
1882

(*N.B.*—This occurs in Blue Book, Egypt, No. 7 (1882), but is given there in French only. The clauses embodying the amendments or explanations obtained at Sir Edward Malet's and Sir Auckland Colvin's instance by the author on January 19th, 1882, are marked with an asterisk.)

LETTER FROM MAHMOUD SAMY PASHA ON TAKING OFFICE,  
FEBRUARY 2ND, 1882, TO HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE

MONSEIGNEUR,

**Y**OUR Highness has condescended to entrust to me the care of forming a new Cabinet; I consider it as the first of my duties to submit to you the principles which will guide my conduct and inspire that of the Ministry over which I am to preside.

The events which have succeeded each other in Egypt for some years past have prejudiced public opinion in various ways here, and in foreign countries. These prejudices relate to two orders of ideas: our financial expenditure and our internal reforms.

The general debt of the country was definitely regulated by a series of Decrees which was itself completed by the Law of Liquidation of 19th July, 1880.

These laws have acquired the character of International Conventions. Your Highness's Government has never ceased to respect them. The Ministry will watch over their exact and faithful execution.

The liquidation of the floating debt is an accomplished fact for all those interested (and they are immensely in the majority) whose

## *Appendix VI*

rights have been recognized up to now by the competent authorities; it will continue to be actively proceeded with.

The service of the Consolidated Debt, which includes the special administrations of the Daira and the Domains employed to guarantee the Loan of 1878 is being regularly performed. The administrations which were created to secure this service, the General Control, the Commission of the Debt, the Control of the Daira, the Commission of Domains, are institutions which must be always loyally supported by the Government; they have always been so up to the present day.

Nothing will be changed in this state of things in the future: the Ministry will endeavour to consolidate these institutions and to facilitate their action. It considers harmony in all these public services as an essential condition to the regular course of affairs, and it thinks that the general administration of the country owes incontestable advantages to this policy.

Your Highness has always been convinced that, to accomplish internal reforms with wisdom and security, the co-operation of a Chamber of Deputies was necessary, and it is with this idea that the present Chamber has been convoked.

The Ministry share these sentiments. They will concentrate all their attention upon the reorganization of the Tribunals, the reform of the administration, the improvements necessary in public education to aid the country to advance in the path of progress and civilization. They will study measures suitable for the development of agriculture, commerce, and industry, as well as all the other projects of reform which have been the object of your Highness's constant solicitude. But before all they believe it necessary to determine the powers of the Chamber of Deputies, in order to enable it to give to the Government the co-operation which it expects, and to realize the hopes of the people.

This is why the Cabinet's first act will be to sanction an Organic Law for the Chamber of Deputies.

This law will respect all rights and obligations of a private or international character, as well as all engagements relating to the Public Debt and to the charges which the latter imposes upon the State Budget. It will determine wisely the responsibility of the Ministers before the Chamber, as well as the mode of discussing the laws.

Far from being a source of anxiety, this Organic Law will unite all the conditions necessary for securing the interests of the public.

Such is, Monseigneur, the programme of the new Ministry, conformable to the wishes of the country.

The High Powers—and particularly the Sublime Porte, whose

## *Text of the Constitution of 1882*

friendly support has never failed us in the exercise of the rights and privileges which it has granted us—will continue, I confidently hope, to lend to your Highness's Government, as in the past, that valuable co-operation which has always been beneficial to Egypt.

I also hope that the authority of your Government will be devoted solely to safeguarding individual rights and the maintenance of order, and that it will guide the nation in the way of progress and prosperity.

The day on which your Highness took in hand the reins of power you promised to Egypt a new era of progress. We come to assure your Highness of our absolute unanimity for the realization of that promise. The goal you would attain, Monseigneur, is the same which we are striving for. Full of confidence in you, we have faith in the future.

If your Highness deigns to consent to the programme which I submit, I have the honour to beg your Highness to sanction the decrees which I present for signature, to constitute the Ministry.

MAHMOUD SAMY.

### LETTER FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEWIVE TO HIS EXCELLENCE MAHMOUD SAMY PASHA

15, Rabi-Awel, 1299.  
(February 4, 1882.)

MY DEAR MAHMOUD SAMY PASHA,

In accepting the task of forming a new Cabinet, without being ignorant of the importance of this undertaking, you give a new proof of your devotion and of your patriotism. If I have charged you with this mission, it is because I knew these your noble sentiments, of which you have given many proofs, by the numerous services you have rendered in the various offices you have already filled. I approve of your programme, and of the principles which you develop in it. These principles are the foundation of justice. They are calculated to maintain and assure order in the country as well to give security to all those who inhabit it.

I share your opinion that my Government should take the necessary measures to ensure judicial and administrative reforms, and that it should promulgate for the Chamber of Deputies the Organic Law in conformity with the ideas explained in your programme.

My Government ought also to take upon itself the task of developing public instruction, agriculture, commerce, and industry.

## Appendix VI

My loyal and sincere co-operation shall always be yours in the accomplishment of this object.

I pray God to crown our common efforts for the benefit and prosperity of the people.

MEHEMET TEWFIK.

### DECREE

We, Khedive of Egypt,

In view of our Decree of the 4th October, 1881 (11 Zilcadé, 1298)

In view of the decision of the Chamber of Delegates, and conformably with the advice of our Council of Ministers,

Have decreed and decree,

*Art. 1.* The Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected. An ulterior and special Law will make known the conditions of electorability and of eligibility for election, and at the same time the mode of election to the Chamber of Deputies.

*Art. 2.* The Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected for a period of five years. They receive an annual payment of £E.100.

*Art. 3.* The Deputies are free in the exercise of their mandates. They cannot be bound either by promises or by (government) instructions, or by an (administrative) order, or by menaces of a nature to interfere with the free expression of their opinions.

*Art. 4.* The Deputies are inviolable. In case of crime or misdemeanour committed during the course of the Session, they cannot be put under arrest except with the leave of the Chamber.

*Art. 5.* The Chamber may also, after its convocation, demand, provisionally and for the duration of the Session, that any one of its Members who has been imprisoned shall be set at liberty, or that all action directed against him shall be suspended during the Chamber's recess, if for a criminal matter, where no judgment has yet been pronounced.

*Art. 6.* Each Deputy represents not only the interests of the constituency which has elected him, but also the interests of the Egyptian people in general.

*Art. 7.* The Chamber of Deputies shall sit at Cairo. It is convoked each year by Decree of the Khedive, and according to the advice of the Council of Ministers.

*Art. 8.* The ordinary annual Session of the Chamber of Deputies shall be for three months, viz., from the 1st November

## *Text of the Constitution of 1882*

to the 31st January. But if the work of the Chamber is not finished by the 31st January, it may then demand a prolongation of fifteen to thirty days. This prolongation will be accorded by Decree of the Khedive.

*Art. 9.* In case of necessity the Chamber will be convoked in Extraordinary Session by the Khedive. The duration of the Extraordinary Session will be fixed by the Decree convoking it.

*Art. 10.* The Sessions of the Chamber shall be opened in the presence of the Ministers either by the Khedive or by the President of the Council of Ministers, acting by delegation of the Khedive.

*Art. 11.* At the first sitting of each annual Session an opening Speech shall be pronounced by the Khedive, or in his name by the President of the Council of Ministers. It shall have for its object to make known to the Chamber the principal questions to be presented to it in the course of the session. After the reading of the opening speech the sitting shall be adjourned.

*Art. 12.* During the three following days, the Chamber, having named a Committee for the purpose of preparing a reply to the opening speech, shall vote its reply, which shall be presented to the Khedive by a deputation chosen from amongst its members.

*Art. 13.* The reply to the opening speech may not treat of any question in a decisive sense, nor contain any opinion which has been the object of previous deliberations.

*Art. 14.* The Chamber shall submit to the Khedive a list containing the names of three Members whom it may propose for the office of President. The Khedive shall name by Decree one of the Members, thus designated, President of the Chamber of Deputies. The office of President shall continue for five years.

*Art. 15.* The Chamber shall elect two Vice-Presidents which it shall choose from among its Members, and shall name the Secretaries of its Bureau.

*Art. 16.* An official report of the sittings of the Chamber shall be drawn up under the direction of the Bureau of the Chamber, composed of its President, Vice-Presidents, and Secretaries.

*Art. 17.* The official language for the Chamber shall be Arabic. The proceedings and reports of the Chamber shall be drawn up in the official language.

*Art. 18.* The Ministers shall have the right of being present at the sittings of the Chamber, and of speaking there, when they shall think fit. They may cause themselves to be represented there by high state officials.

*Art. 19.* If the Chamber decides that there is reason for summoning one of the Ministers to appear before it to give explanations on any question, the Minister shall appear in person or cause

## Appendix VI

himself to be represented by another official to give the required explanations.

*\*Art. 20.* The Deputies shall have the right to supervise the acts of all public functionaries during the Session, and through the President of the Chamber they may report to the Minister concerned all abuses, irregularities, or negligences charged against a public official, in the exercise of his functions.

*Art. 21.* The Ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Chamber for every measure taken in Council, which may violate existing rules and regulations.

*Art. 22.* Each Minister is individually responsible, in the cases foreseen in the preceding article, for his acts occurring in the exercise of his functions.

*\*Art. 23.* In case of persistent disagreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministry; when repeated interchanges of views and motives shall have taken place between them, if then the Ministry does not withdraw, the Khedive shall dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and decree that new elections shall be proceeded with, within a period of time not exceeding three months, counted from the day of dissolution to that of re-assembly. All Deputies thus dismissed shall be eligible for re-election.

*Art. 24.* If the new Chamber confirms by its vote that of the preceding Chamber which had provoked the disagreement, this vote shall be accepted as final.

*\*Art. 25.* The Bills and Regulations emanating from the initiative of the Government shall be brought into the Chamber of Deputies by the Ministers, to be examined, discussed and voted. No Law shall become valid until it has been read before the Chamber of Deputies, Article by Article, voted clause by clause, and consented to by the Khedive. Each Bill shall be read three times and between each reading there shall have been an interval of fifteen days. In case of urgency a single reading shall, by a special vote of the Chamber, be declared sufficient. If the Chamber judges it necessary to demand the introduction of a Bill from the Council of Ministers, it shall make the demand through the intermediary of the President of the Chamber, and in case of the approval of the Government, the Bill shall be prepared by the Ministry and introduced to the Chamber according to the forms fixed by this Article.

*Art. 26.* The Chamber shall choose from amongst its Members a Committee, charged to examine all Bills and Regulations submitted to it. This Committee may propose to the Government amendments of such bills as it has been charged to examine; in which case, the bill and the amendments proposed shall be sent



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back, before any general discussion, by the President of the Chamber, to the President of the Council of Ministers.

*Art. 27.* If the Committee does not propose any amendments or if those proposed are not adopted by the Government, the original text of the Bill shall be placed for discussion before the Chamber. If the amendments proposed by the Committee are accepted by the Government, then the text thus amended shall be placed for discussion before the Chamber. In case the Government should not accept the amendments proposed by the Committee, then the latter shall have the right of submitting its opinion and observations to the Chamber.

*Art. 28.* The Chamber of Deputies may adopt or reject all Bills submitted to it by the Committee. It may also return them to the Committee to be examined a second time.

*Art. 29.* The President of the Chamber shall convey to the President of the Council of Ministers the Laws and Regulations voted by the Chamber.

*Art. 30.* No fresh tax—direct or indirect—on movable, immovable or personal property may be imposed in Egypt without a Law voted by the Chamber. It is therefore formally forbidden that any new tax shall be levied, under whatever title or denomination it may be, without having been previously voted by the Chamber of Deputies, under penalty, against the authority which shall have ordered it, against the employes who shall have drawn up the schedules and tariffs and against those who shall have effected the recovery of the amounts, of being prosecuted as speculators. All contributions thus unduly levied shall be returned to those who have paid them.

*Art. 31.* The Annual Budget of the Receipts and Expenditure of the State shall be communicated to the Chamber of Deputies not later than the 5th of November of each year.

*Art. 32.* The General Budget of Receipts shall be presented to the Chamber, accompanied by notes explanatory of the nature of each receipt.

*Art. 33.* The Budget of Expenditure shall be divided Department by Department, and shall be subdivided into sections and chapters, corresponding to the various branches of the public service depending upon each Ministry.

*Art. 34.* The following cannot on any account be objects of discussion in the Chamber:

The service of the Tribute due to the Sublime Porte.

The service of the Public Debt.

Also all matters relating to the Debt and resulting from the Law of Liquidation, or Conventions existing between the Foreign Powers and the Egyptian Government.

## Appendix VI

\**Art. 35.* The Budget shall be sent to the Chamber, to be examined and discussed there (under reserve of the preceding Article).

A Committee composed of as many Deputies, and having the same number of votes as the Members of the Council of Ministers and its President, shall be named by the Chamber to discuss, in common with the Council of Ministers, the Budget Estimates, and to vote them either unanimously or according to the majority.

*Art. 36.* In case of an exact division of votes between the Commission of the Chamber and the Council of Ministers, the Budget shall be returned to the Chamber and, should the Chamber confirm (by its vote) that of the Council of Ministers, this vote shall become executory (*executoire*). But if the Chamber should maintain the vote of its Committee, then the procedure shall be according to Articles 23 and 24 of the present Law. In this case, the credits of the Budget Estimates which shall have caused the division of votes, if they figured in the Budget of the preceding year, and if they are not affected to any new object of expenditure, such as public works or others, shall be employed provisionally and until the meeting of the new Chamber, according to Article 23.

*Art. 37.* If the new Chamber confirms the vote of the preceding Chamber, on the Budget, this vote shall become definitely executory, in conformity with Article 23.

*Art. 38.* No Treaty or contract between the Government and third parties and no farming concession shall acquire a final character without having been first approved by a vote of the Chamber, provided that such Treaty, contract or concession does not relate to an object for which a sum has already figured in the approved Budget, corresponding to the year for which the Treaty, contract or concession shall have been proposed. Likewise no concession for public works, the execution of which shall not have been foreseen by the Budget, and no sale, or gratuitous alienation of the State domains, nor concession of privilege of any kind shall become definitive until it shall have been approved by the Chamber.

*Art. 39.* All Egyptians may address a petition to the Chamber of Deputies. The petitions shall be sent to a Committee chosen by the Chamber from among its Members. Upon the report of this Committee the Chamber shall take into consideration or reject the petitions. The petitions taken into consideration shall be sent back to the Minister concerned.

*Art. 40.* All petitions relative to personal rights or interests shall be rejected if they are outside the competence of the Ad-

## *Text of the Constitution of 1882*

ministrative and Civil Tribunals, or if they have not been previously addressed to the competent administrative authority.

*Art. 41.* If during the recess of the Chamber grave circumstances shall demand that urgent measures be taken to avoid a danger menacing the State, or to assure public order, the Council of Ministers may, then, upon its own responsibility and with the sanction of the Khedive, order those measures to be taken, even if they should be within the competence of the Chamber, supposing the time to be too short for the convocation of the latter. Nevertheless, the affair should be submitted for examination, at its next sitting, to the Chamber.

*Art. 42.* No one may be admitted to explain or discuss questions or to take part in the deliberations of the Chamber other than its Members, with the exception of the Ministers or of those who are assisting or representing them.

*Art. 43.* The votes of the Chamber shall be given by the holding up of hands or by the calling over of names or by ballot.

*Art. 44.* The vote by calling over of names shall only be on the demand of at least ten Members of the Chamber of Deputies. All votes which may affect the provisions of Article 47 shall be made openly.

*Art. 45.* The naming of the three candidates for the Presidency of the Chamber, as well as the election of the two Vice-Presidents and the nomination of the first and second Secretaries to the Chamber shall be made by ballot.

*Art. 46.* The Chamber of Deputies may not validly deliberate unless at least two-thirds of its Members are present at the deliberation. All decisions shall be taken absolutely according to the majority of votes.

*Art. 47.* No vote entailing Ministerial responsibility shall be given without a majority of at least three-quarters of the Members present.

*Art. 48.* No opinion shall be given by proxy.

*Art. 49.* The Chamber of Deputies shall elaborate its own internal Regulations. These shall be made executory by Decree of the Khedive.

\**Art. 50.* The present Organic Law may be amended after agreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers.

\**Art. 51.* The interpretation of all Articles and phrases of the present law which it may be necessary to make clear shall be made on agreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers.

*Art. 52.* All the provisions of Laws, Decrees, Superior Orders, Regulations, or Usages contrary to the present Law are and shall remain revoked.

## Appendix VII

*Art. 53.* Our Ministers are charged, each in what concerns him, with the execution of the present Law.

Done in the Palace of Ismailieh, 7th February, 1882  
(18 Rabi Awel, 1299).

(Signed) MEHEMET TEWFIK.

By the Khedive:

The President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior.

(Signed) MAHMOUD SAMY.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Justice.

MOUSTAPHA FEHMY.

The Minister of War and Marine.

AHMED ARABI.

The Minister of Finance.

ALI SADIK.

The Minister of Public Works.

MAHMOUD FEHMY.

The Minister of Public Instruction.

ABDALLAH FIKRY.

The Minister of the Wakfs.

HASSAN CHÉRÉY.

## APPENDIX VII

ARABI'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH COMTE FERDINAND DE LESSEPS  
DURING THE WAR

La Chénade (Indre), 21 8<sup>bre</sup> 1882.

CHER MONSIEUR.—Je m'empresse de répondre à votre lettre du 17. Lorsque nous nous trouvions ensemble, au commencement de cette année, en Egypte où Arabi était ministre de la guerre j'ai été le voir une fois à son Divan. Pendant ma visite il était entouré avec respect par les principaux personnages du Caire ayant dans la vaste cour de Kasr-el-Nil une nombreuse population de fellahs; la salle qui précédait son Divan était en outre pleine de monde. Il m'a donc paru entouré de la considération publique et le soir même je l'ai trouvé au théâtre dans la loge du Khédive à côté de son Altesse.

Dans la conversation que j'ai eue avec lui, il m'a dit ces propres paroles: *Je sais M. de Lesseps que vous avez été toute votre vie un*

## *Lesseps' Correspondence*

*homme de progrès et de liberté. Je ne désire pas autre chose pour mon pays.*

Je l'ai revu suite avec les autres ministres au banquet qui a eu lieu à New York à l'occasion de l'anniversaire de l'Indépendance Américaine, j'ai participé au toast en l'honneur du Khédive. Depuis lors je suis rentré en France et ne suis revenu en Egypte qu'après le bombardement d'Alexandrie. Je n'ai eu à cette époque, jusqu'au débarquement des troupes anglaises à Ismaïlia, d'autres relations avec Arabi Pacha que celles qui sont consignées dans sa correspondance, sans que nous nous soyons rencontrés une seule fois.

Cette correspondance en langue arabe que j'ai envoyée en original au Président du conseil de guerre siégeant au Caire, n'avait d'autre but que la protection du canal maritime à laquelle Arabi a été constamment fidèle et à la sauvegarde des propriétés et de la vie des sujets Européens restés en Egypte.

Je vous envoie la traduction en français de ces documents qui font honneur au client dont vous avez généreusement pris la défense.

Il me paraît difficile qu'un général commandant une armée puisse encourir la peine capitale après avoir remis son épée à un général anglais victorieux.

Veuillez agréer, cher Monsieur, les assurances de ma considération la plus distinguée.

C<sup>te</sup> ferd de Lesseps.

à Monsieur Blunt.

### ENCLOSURES

(Port Saïd, 27 Juillet, 1882; arrivé du camp.)

A Monsieur de Lesseps, à Port Saïd.

Je remercie Votre Excellence des nobles efforts qu'elle a bien voulu faire à l'effet d'empêcher le débarquement dans la ville de Port Saïd des troupes appartenant aux vaisseaux des puissances, ainsi que des encouragements donnés aux habitants de cette ville et aux Européens pour les engager à rester. C'est là ce que je puis espérer de mieux. Recevez donc l'expression de mon profond respect pour votre personne.

Le Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine.

(Ismaïlia le matin, Arrivé à 12<sup>h</sup> 45<sup>m</sup> le 1<sup>er</sup> Août, 1882; venant de Kafr-ed-Douard.)

A S. E. mon honoré ami M. de Lesseps à Ismaïlia.

J'ai reçu votre message rédigé en Français, et, conformément à ce qui était dit, nous avons écrit au chef de la police du Caire pour

## Appendix VII

qu'il prenne les mesures nécessaires à l'effet d'assurer la tranquillité des Européens qui se trouvent dans l'hôpital Européen de l'Abbasieh au Caire, et pour leur laisser toute liberté soit de rester soit de partir nous avons aussi écrit au Gouverneur d'Ech-Charkiyeh de redoubler de soins pour les Européens qui sont à Er-Rakadiyeh et de leur assurer la plus complète sécurité. Je vous suis très reconnaissant et obligé de voir confirmées nos relations de bonne amitié.

Le Ministre de la guerre et de la marine au camp.

(Ismailia 4 [?] Août, 1882.)

A Monsieur Ferdinand de Lesseps à Ismailia.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que le commandant des vaisseaux Anglais à Ismailia a envoyé au chef de la garnison de cette ville des proclamations destinées à y être affichées. Ce fait a été porté à la connaissance des membres du Conseil général, qui est chargé des affaires gouvernementales et qui a pris la présente décision, dont copie a été télégraphiée au chef de la garnison d'Ismailia.

Le Conseil réuni en date de ce jour à Kasr-en-Nil a décidé que les proclamations qui vous ont été adressées pour être affichées dans la ville de la part du Commandant des bâtiments anglais et portant que les habitants doivent rester chez eux et donner leurs noms, n'y ont aucune force obligatoire, car des proclamations de l'espèce sont de la compétence exclusives des autorités locales et sont sans valeur venant d'un autre qu'elles.

C'est sur l'ordre du Conseil que nous transmettons cette nouvelle à V. E. Comme je respecte scrupuleusement la neutralité du Canal, surtout par cette considération que c'est l'œuvre la plus remarquable à raison de laquelle V. E. sera cité dans l'histoire, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre excellence que le Gouvernement égyptien ne violera cette neutralité qu'à la dernière extrémité, dans le cas seulement où il serait commis par les Anglais quelque acte d'hostilité contre Ismailia, Port Saïd ou quelque autre point du Canal. Les autorités locales devront prendre les précautions nécessaires pour empêcher toute mesure hostile, mais ne seront pas responsables des conséquences qui en résulteront plus tard, ainsi que le sait V. E. Je suis assuré que V. E. prendra les meilleures mesures à cet effet, avant que pareille chose ne se fasse par les gens en question.

Je vous salue très respectueusement.

Le Ministre de la guerre et de la marine à Kafr-ed-Douar.

## *Lesseps' Correspondence*

(7<sup>h</sup> 45m. [sans date])

A Monsieur de Lesseps à Ismaïlia.

Un télégramme du Commandant des troupes de Nefiche m'a appris votre présence avec votre femme et votre gendre dans l'endroit où sont les troupes. Je vous remercie de votre présence en ce lieu, à cause de la confiance et de la sécurité que cela assure à Ismaïlia et à tout le Canal. Que V. E. sache bien que tout ce que nous recherchons et désirons, c'est la sécurité et les bons procédés. Vous y contribuerez pour votre part avec l'aide de Dieu.

Recevez l'expression de notre considération.

Le Commandant de l'aile Orientale à El-Tell.

(Ismaïlia, 4<sup>h</sup> 15m. soir [sans date])

A Monsieur Ferd. de Lesseps à Ismaïlia.

Voici la copie du télégramme que nous avons reçu du Chef de l'Etat Major de l'aile orientale de Tell-el-Kébir, et qui prouvera à V. E. que les Anglais ne respectant pas la neutralité du Canal.

De Yakoub Pacha, lieutenant du Ministre de la Guerre à Kasr-el-Tell:

Le Chef de l'Etat Major de l'aile orientale à Tell-el-Kébir à S. E. le lieutenant du Ministre de la Guerre au Caire:

Nous informons V. E. que le mercredi correspondant au 1<sup>er</sup> Chauvial, 1299, nous sommes partis de Tell pour passer sur tous les points où ont lieu les hostilités. Arrivés à l'aile ech-Chaloufa, nous avons pris connaissance des nouvelles apportées par les éclaireurs d'avant garde, et, vérification faite de ces nouvelles nous avons trouvé qu'un corps de reconnaissance en passant sur la rive occidentale du Canal d'eau douce, avait vu près du côté d'El-Ouchra, quelques soldats ennemis. Quand nos troupes s'approchèrent, l'ennemi ouvrit le feu, mais les nôtres ripostèrent bravement; le détachement ennemi fut mis en fuite à Birket-el-Karib. Nos troupes le (sic) firent prisonniers et l'amèrent à l'aile Chalouf; on y (dans le détachement?) trouva cent trente-trois bêtes de somme.

Cela se passa le dit jour, et depuis lors l'ennemi n'a plus paru. Les nouvelles du camp oriental sont bonnes. Le nombre des blessés ennemis n'est pas connu; de notre côté pas un homme n'a été atteint. Il était nécessaire de vous prévenir de cet engagement, qui a duré environ dix minutes.

(sans signature.)

(20 Août, 1882, après midi.)

Le Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine, à Kafr-ed-Douar.

A S. E. M. de Lesseps à Ismaïlia.

Un télégramme du Commandant de l'aile orientale nous informe que les Anglais ont ouvert le feu de leurs bâtiments contre nos

## *Appendix VII*

troupes du côté d'Ismailia. Cet acte d'hostilité de la part des Anglais est contraire à l'inviolabilité du Canal et en voile la neutralité. L'Egypte est prête à anéantir le Canal pour repousser les actes de guerre que les Anglais y commettent. Quel est l'avis de V. E.? Nous espérons avoir votre réponse dans les 24 heures. Vous avez déployé les efforts les plus énergiques, et de notre côté, nous avons respecté le Canal jusqu'au moment où a été commise cette violence par les Anglais contrairement à vos efforts et à notre respect pour la neutralité.

(Ismailia, 15 Août, 1882, soir; venant du camp.)

A Monsieur Ferdinand de Lesseps à Ismailia.

Nous avons appris que les Anglais sont occupées à élever des fortifications du côté de Suez et du Canal, et que les engins de guerre, canons et cetera passent par le Canal avec l'autorisation de la Compagnie.

Le fait d'élever ces fortifications violant le principe du respect dû au Canal, la présence de V. E. s'impose, à l'effet de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher ces actes et faire respecter la neutralité, à la quelle je n'ai, en ce qui me concerne, porté nulle atteinte jusqu'à ce jour.

Le Ministre de la guerre et de la marine à Kafr-ed-Douar.

(Ismailia, 19 Août, 1882.)

A Monsieur de Lesseps à Ismailia.

Un télégramme nous apprend à l'instant que le canal est menacé, avec emploi de la force contre votre personne, que le télégraphe français du Canal est coupé vers Suez et que tout passage des bâtiments des puissances est interdit vers Port Saïd et Suez.

Si les choses sont telles qu'on les annonce, quelles sont les précautions que vous prendrez?

Le Ministre de la guerre et de la marine à Kafr-ed-Douar.

A Monsieur de Lesseps à Ismailia,

(Suite du télégramme 717).

Si les choses sont telles qu'on les annonce, quelles sont les précautions que vous prendrez pour défendre la neutralité du Canal?

Le Ministre de la guerre et de la marine.

Mercredi premier Schauval 1299 nos troupes d'escorte rencontrèrent les soldats Anglais envers le Canal d'eau douce et il a eu une bataille de sorte que ce cas nous oblige de rembler le dit Canal en respectant le Grand Canal c'est pour cela que je vous avertis.

Le Ministre.



## *Ninet's Statement*

### APPENDIX VIII

#### MR. NINET'S SWORN STATEMENT AS TO EVENTS DURING THE WAR

**I** JOHN NINET late of Alexandria but now residing in London M.D. make Oath and say

That I am sixty five years of age and am a native of Switzerland. I lived in Egypt for forty two years previous to October One thousand eight hundred and eighty two. I went to Egypt first as a Director of the Cotton Plantation of Mehemet Ali. I afterwards became a Merchant but retired from business Twenty years since. During my residence in Egypt I became well acquainted with the manners and customs of the people and formed many private friendships and amongst others with Arabi Bey afterwards Arabi Pasha.

I was residing in Alexandria prior to and on the day of the bombardment of the place by the British Navy. That morning I saw a large number of shells passing over my house. Some of the shells of the largest description bearing the name "Alexandria" were thrown into the house adjoining my own. One of the shells the third that passed over my house killed eleven persons and two horses near the Gate of Moharrem Bey. Houses and buildings were burned and destroyed in all directions by the Shells from the Ships that day. The following morning the Ships recommenced firing and were feebly answered from one or two forts. A white flag was hoisted on the Arsenal and Toulba Pasha was sent to the British Commander to enquire why the firing had recommenced as the forts were silenced.

The answer received from the Admiral as stated by Toulba Pasha to others in my presence was that it had been observed that some of the forts had been repaired during the night and as the defence was prolonged the day before the Admiral had decided to fire on all the forts including the fort Com el Dik (Damascus) and fort Com el Nadour (Napoleon) unless all the forts with the Barracks were surrendered to him. Toulba Pasha explained that he had no power to surrender any forts or Barracks without the sanction of the Khedive's Ministry and that it would be cruel to fire on the two forts Com el Dik and Com el Nadour, Arabi Pasha having decided not to use or defend those forts as they were situate in the Town and shots from those forts would have occasioned the destruction of the Town. The answer was that the British could not consider that, and that unless at

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three o'Clock all the forts and Barracks were surrendered they should recommence firing and should destroy them. Toulba explained he could not possibly communicate with the Khedive and his Council who were at Ramleh to get an answer in time and he left but returned again to enquire what the British would do if the forts and Barracks were not surrendered and no soldiers were left in them to defend the forts, and the answer was "we shall fire on and destroy the whole unless surrendered by three o'Clock." Toulba left for Ramleh and the same white flag was still flying from the Arsenal till he could return. There was no other white flag flying. Great consternation and alarm prevailed amongst the natives on hearing the firing would recommence at three o'clock and a general exodus of the inhabitants and the Army took place. At two o'clock I was in the Consul's Square which was full of soldiers and many officers of distinction marching in the direction of Rosetta Gate. Suleiman Bey Sami an Officer I knew was leading the soldiers to the Rosetta Gate for the purpose of evacuating the Town of Alexandria as the destruction of all the Forts and the shelling of the Barracks had been ordered by three o'Clock.

Thousands of the poor population carrying their moveables were leaving the Town. Dead bodies of soldiers were being carried away. Cries were raised against me by the people of "kill that dog of an Inglese" "kill the Christian." Fortunately a company of Infantry marching from the Town came up at the time. I joined them, they protected me and I was saved. At about three o'clock I saw Arabi Pasha who was leaving the Town with the two first Regiments in the direction of the Canal. He directed me to join the Doctors and the Red Crescent and follow. Before I could join the Doctors I heard the roar of cannon from the ships and in about half an hour as there was no answer from the forts the firing ceased.

The Bedouins of Oulad Ali tribe who had entered the Town by the Gabary or Pompey Column Gate were looting the shops. I saw many of them seized and bastinadoed by orders of Suleiman Bey Sami they being found with loot trying to leave the Town. Arabi Pasha before leaving gave an order to close the gate to prevent Bedouins entering the Town or leaving with loot and two companies of Radifs were ordered to remain in Town to take charge of the principal streets and preserve order. The order to close the Gate proved useless for all the soldiers did the best they could to get out of the place. Toulba Pasha was during the afternoon at Ramleh conferring with the Khedive. I was all this time at the Officers Mess Room near Rosetta Gate. Many Pashas were there amongst others Mahmoud Sami Barroudi, Mahmoud Fahmi Pasha. I left the Town with them and a number of Doctors and Officers by the Rosetta Gate before six to rejoin the Army. I slept

## *Ninet's Statement*

in some Palace in the suburbs that night. After I had left the Town the wind during the night blew smoke from the Town which was evidently on fire in various places. There was no fire in the Town when we left. The soldiers did not set fire to the Town. They did their best to prevent any extension of the fires occasioned by the Bombardment and to prevent plunder and looting by the Bedouins and others. It is possible that some of the soldiers of the two companies left to preserve order joined the Bedouins in looting the place but this was distinctly against the orders of Arabi Pasha and other officers.

I can positively say that neither Arabi Pasha nor any of the other Officers had any idea whatever that the Town of Alexandria would be set on fire by Bedouins or any others and I know that Arabi Pasha and all the other Officers were grieved and surprised to see the place burning after they had left and they all expressed hopes that Zoulphechar Pasha the Governor of Alexandria a great friend of the Khedive's with his staff of Pompiers would do everything to extinguish the fire and preserve order. I say distinctly that the only white flag hoisted was the one hoisted at the Arsenal when Toulba Pasha went to the Admiral and it was not taken down by Toulba Pasha who went to Ramleh hoping to get back with the answer from the Khedive's Ministry. Toulba was detained at Ramleh till nearly five o'clock by the Khedive and his Ministry with Dervisch Pasha and on Toulba Pasha's return the Town had been evacuated by the Army and it was then impossible to take the white flag down. At daylight next day we walked for three hours along the Mahmoudieh Canal and were eventually taken in a Steam launch down towards Kafr Dowr with Arabi Pasha.

We stopped at a place called Kurschid Pasha's Farm where a portion of the Army was encamped. Whilst there a train of State Carriages passed towards Alexandria. Arabi Pasha said that the train was asked for and ordered for the Khedive and his family to go to Cairo. After waiting two hours for the return of the train a telegram came stating the Khedive had changed his mind and would not leave Alexandria. Arabi Pasha remained for the night on the Steam Launch. While there news came of Massacres at Damanhour and Tantah. Arabi immediately despatched three companies of soldiers with strict orders to the Moodiers of those places to send all Europeans down free of charge to Ismailia and to Port Said and to protect them under penalty of death. While I was with Arabi Pasha news came that Ahmed Bey Minshawi a rich man at Tantah had at the peril of his life saved Five hundred Europeans Jews and Christians. Arabi wrote a special complimentary letter to Ahmed thanking him for

## *Appendix VIII*

the protection he had afforded the Europeans. Arabi made and published an Order of the day that all foreigners whosoever they might be were to be treated with humanity everywhere and protected by the Civil and Military Authorities under pain of death. This was conveyed by Arabi's order all over the Country and throughout the Army and also to Cairo with special stringent instructions to the Zabet or Prefect of Police of the Capital to see that the order was duly enforced. The safety of the Europeans in Cairo and elsewhere was due entirely to Arabi. I know that Arabi caused thirty six Bedouins to be shot for murdering Europeans and looting and he caused a number of natives to be hung at Damanhour and Tantah for causing the massacres of Europeans. The looted articles taken from the looters he sent to Cairo. I remember De Chair being brought in as a Prisoner. He was properly taken care of and kindly treated. I arranged for him under the directions of Arabi.

I was with Arabi on the delivery of the Khedive's letter wishing Arabi to go to Alexandria. Arabi answered that letter by informing the Khedive that he Arabi was at Kafr Dowr to do the work ordered by the Council of Ministers held at Alexandria at which the Khedive and Dervish Pasha were present and that he intended to act upon that order and carry it out faithfully. I was also with Arabi when the second letter arrived from the Khedive dismissing Arabi as Minister of War from the Fifth of Ramadan and declaring him a rebel. The Meglis assembled at Cairo at which Arabi was not present was numerously attended by upwards of six hundred notables who had come on purpose from all parts of the Country. The assembly decided that Arabi could only be declared a Hassey (Rebel) by the Sultan and that the Khedive had no power to do so. It was also then decided by the Assembly to continue the National defence in accordance with the Council held at Alexandria when the Khedive and Dervisch Pasha were present and entrusting Arabi Pasha with the defence of the Country.

Ten days after about the twentieth of Ramadan Fifth of August another Maglis was held when it was decided that the Suez Canal should be cut in four places at Ras el Esch, Cantara, Senil and Chalouf. Arabi and Mahmoud Fami Pasha were the opponents of the proposition to cut the Canal and urged it should not be done until the British Army made an act of hostility on that side. Everything was prepared men and apparatus to destroy the Canal in one night by order of the Meglis when the last telegram from De Lesseps came on the evening Twenty second of August. The dynamite was then withdrawn by Arabi's orders and the world has to thank Arabi Pasha for saving the Canal.

## *Ninet's Statement*

Whenever Arabi was appealed to he afforded every assistance for the protection and safe conduct of Europeans. I know that he afforded protection to Europeans on the application of De Lesseps, the French Consul and Greek Consul at Zagazig and others. Those Gentlemen declared openly they would not leave the Country they had lived in so long having nothing to fear under the protection of such an enlightened man as Arabi Pasha. There were Officers under him who would have acted harshly to Europeans but Arabi opposed them and secured as far as he possibly could liberty and protection for all. I well remember it was stated that false telegrams were being sent through the Eastern telegraph to Europe which did great injury and it was resolved that an Officer should be sent to the Telegraph Office to prevent telegrams in cypher being sent out. Arabi refused to sanction any interference saying the commercial community would accuse him with injuring commerce.

The steps taken by Arabi to defend his Country at Alexandria Kafr Dour Tel el Kebir and elsewhere were by order of the Council of Ministers at Alexandria in the first instance when the Khedive was himself President of the Council and Dervisch Pasha and other envoys of the Sultan were present which order was never revoked. In making his stand and constructing the defence of Kafr Dour Arabi acted under the orders of the Meglis and received the support and sympathy of the Egyptian People. The Notables of all the corporations the Merchants and the authorities civil and religious came from all parts of the Country to Kafr Dour day after day and week after week to congratulate and thank Arabi the Patriot whom they entrusted with the defence of the Country and they all took up earth in their hands and threw it on the entrenchments to shew they took part in the work.

Amongst other Notables who so visited the Camp and thanked Arabi at Kafr Dour I saw Fahry Pasha, Ahmed Pasha Nachat the Director of the Daira, all the members of the Native Tribunal, Native Judges, substitute of the Procureur General of the Mixed Tribunals, Osman Pasha Fenzi, Reouf Pasha, Orbi Pasha, Moharreth, the Ulemas, The Mufti of Constantinople, many Marogins and Maugrabins of distinction, many Chiefs of the Esnafs, Professors of the Azar, Several members of Riaz Pasha's family, Adaramli Pasha, Hassan el Hacat and many Omdés or great proprietors and particularly Ahmed Bey Menshaoui of Tantah before referred to. All contributed to the expenses of the war of defence some very largely, and a few I could name as much as Ten thousand pounds each. All the money was sent to Cairo and nothing came into Camp but supplies of food corn and fruit. The principal Visitors kissed Arabi and embraced him in their arms. The Old Mufti

## *Appendix VIII*

of Cairo said to him we are the representatives of more than Fifty thousand notables Sheiks el Beled proprietors &c. and we all thank you for having taken in your hands the cause of Islam and of the Nation. You are really the first Watani patriot of the Nilotic land. In reply to the Chief of the Ulemas Arabi said "we want nothing but justice for all. Security for our lives our persons our property our rights—a Parliament independent and freely elected—a Ministry responsible—a Khedive reigning without governing—strict economy in our administration—no control politique and no foreigners at the head of our ministry with enormous pay—Egypt for the Egyptians but liberty and protection for all Strangers if they submit to the same taxes and imposts as ourselves."

I say unhesitatingly that Arabi Pasha never carried pillage and massacre into Egyptian Territory. The defence of Egyptian Territory was placed in his hands by the Egyptian people and Notables. Arabi did not cause any Egyptians or others to be pillaged or massacred but on the contrary did his utmost to protect the lives and property of Egyptians and foreigners alike and to punish all guilty of pillaging and massacre.

I was with Arabi from the day he left Alexandria until the Twenty fourth of August when he left for the Army near Ismailia. I joined Arabi in Cairo on the morning after the Battle. A meeting was held in Arabi's house in Cairo on the Thursday to discuss the question of the surrender of Cairo. Arabi's opinion to surrender Cairo without defence prevailed. News came that the English troops were at Abassieh. Arabi and Toulba Pasha asked my advice what they should do. I advised that they should go to the British General and give up their swords to him as Prisoners of War and the honor of England would be engaged for their protection. They left me at Arabi's house and drove to Abassieh together.

Sworn at Westminster Hall  
in the County of Middlesex  
England this tenth day  
of November 1882 before us  
(Signatures.)

JOHN NINET.

*The Wind and the Whirlwind*

APPENDIX IX

THE WIND AND THE WHIRLWIND

A POEM BY WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT  
PUBLISHED 1883

I

I HAVE a thing to say. But how to say it?  
I have a cause to plead. But to what ears?  
How shall I move a world by lamentation—  
A world which heeded not a Nation's tears?

How shall I speak of justice to the aggressors,—  
Of right to Kings whose rights include all wrong,—  
Of truth to Statecraft, true but in deceiving,—  
Of peace to Prelates, pity to the Strong?

Where shall I find a hearing? In high places?  
The voice of havock drowns the voice of good.  
On the throne's steps? The elders of the nation  
Rise in their ranks and call aloud for blood.

Where? In the street? Alas for the world's reason!  
Not Peers not Priests alone this deed have done.  
The clothes of those high Hebrews stoning Stephen  
Were held by all of us,—ay every one.

Yet none the less I speak. Nay, here by Heaven  
This task at least a poet best may do,—  
To stand alone against the mighty many,  
To force a hearing for the weak and few.

Unthanked, unhonoured,—yet a task of glory,—  
Not in his day, but in an age more wise,  
When those poor Chancellors have found their portion  
And lie forgotten in their dust of lies.

And who shall say that this year's cause of freedom  
Lost on the Nile has not as worthy proved  
Of poet's hymning as the cause which Milton  
Sang in his blindness or which Dante loved?

## Appendix IX

The fall of Guelph beneath the spears of Valois,  
Freedom betrayed, the Ghibelline restored,  
—Have we not seen it, we who caused this anguish,  
Exile and fear proscription and the sword?

Or shall God less avenge in their wild valley  
Where they lie slaughtered those poor sheep whose fold  
In the gray twilight of our wrath we harried  
To serve the worshippers of stocks and gold?

This fails. That finds its hour. This fights. That falters.  
Greece is stamped out beneath a Wolseley's heels.  
Or Egypt is avenged of her long mourning,  
And hurls her Persians back to their own keels.

'Tis not alone the victor who is noble.  
'Tis not alone the wise man who is wise.  
There is a voice of sorrow in all shouting,  
And shame pursues not only him who flies.

To fight and conquer—'tis the boast of heroes.  
To fight and fly--of this men do not speak.  
Yet shall there come a day when men shall tremble  
Rather than do misdeeds upon the weak,—

—A day when statesmen baffled in their daring  
Shall rather fear to wield the sword in vain  
Than to give back their charge to a hurt nation,  
And own their frailties, and resign their reign,—

—A day of wrath when all fame shall remember  
Of this year's work shall be the fall of one  
Who, standing foremost in her paths of virtue,  
Bent a fool's knee at War's red altar stone.

And left all virtue beggared in his falling,  
A sign to England of new griefs to come,  
Her priest of peace who sold his creed for glory  
And marched to carnage at the tuck of drum.

Therefore I fear not. Rather let this record  
Stand of the past, ere God's revenge shall chase  
From place to punishment His sad vicegerents  
Of power on Earth.—I fling it in their face.



## *The Wind and the Whirlwind*

### II

I have a thing to say. But how to say it?  
Out of the East a twilight had been born.  
It was not day. Yet the long night was waning,  
And the spent nations watched it less forlorn.

Out of the silence of the joyless ages  
A voice had spoken, such as the first bird  
Speaks to the woods, before the morning wakens,—  
And the World starting to its feet had heard.

Men hailed it as a prophecy. Its utterance  
Was in that tongue divine the Orient knew.  
It spoke of hope. Men hailed it as a brother's.  
It spoke of happiness. Men deemed it true.

There in the land of Death, where toil is cradled,  
That tearful Nile, unknown to Liberty,  
It spoke in passionate tones of human freedom,  
And of those rights of Man which cannot die,—

—Till from the cavern of long fear, whose portals  
Had backward rolled, and hardly yet aloud,  
Men prisoned stole like ghosts and joined the chorus,  
And chaunted trembling, each man in his shroud.

Justice and peace, the brotherhood of nations,—  
Love and goodwill of all mankind to man,—  
These were the words they caught and echoed strangely,  
Deeming them portions of some Godlike plan,—

A plan thus first to their own land imparted.  
They did not know the irony of Fate,  
The mockery of man's freedom, and the laughter  
Which greets a brother's love from those that hate.

Oh for the beauty of hope's dreams! The childhood  
Of that old land, long impotent in pain,  
Cast of its slough of sorrow with its silence,  
And laughed and shouted and grew new again.

And in the streets, where still the shade of Pharaoh  
Stalked in his sons, the Mamelukian horde,  
Youth greeted youth with words of exultation  
And shook his chains and clutched as for a sword.

## *Appendix IX*

Student and merchant,—Jew, and Copt, and Moslem,—  
All whose scarred backs had bent to the same rod,—  
Fired with one mighty thought, their feuds forgotten,  
Stood hand in hand and praising the same God.

### III

I have a thing to say. But how to say it?  
As in the days of Moses in the land,  
God sent a man of prayer before his people  
To speak to Pharaoh, and to loose his hand.

Injustice, that hard step-mother of heroes,  
Had taught him justice. Him the sight of pain  
Moved into anger, and the voice of weeping  
Made his eyes weep as for a comrade slain.

A soldier in the bands of his proud masters  
It was his lot to serve. But of his soul  
None owned allegiance save the Lord of Armies.  
No worship from his God's might him cajole.

Strict was his service. In the law of Heaven  
He comfort took and patient under wrong.  
And all men loved him for his heart unquailing,  
And for the words of pity on his tongue.

Knowledge had come to him in the night-watches,  
And strength with fasting, eloquence with prayer.  
He stood a Judge from God before the strangers,  
The one just man among his people there.

Strongly he spoke: "Now, Heaven be our witness!  
Egypt this day has risen from her sleep.  
She has put off her mourning and her silence.  
It was no law of God that she should weep.

"It was no law of God nor of the Nations  
That in this land, alone of the fair Earth,  
The hand that sowed should reap not of its labour,  
The heart that grieved should profit not of mirth.

"How have we suffered at the hands of strangers,  
Binding their sheaves, and harvesting their wrath!

## *The Wind and the Whirlwind*

Our service has been bitter, and our wages  
Hunger and pain and nakedness and drouth.

"Which of them pitied us? Of all our princes,  
Was there one Sultan listened to our cry?  
Their palaces we built, their tombs, their temples.  
What did they build but tombs for Liberty?

"To live in ignorance, to die by service;  
To pay our tribute and our stripes receive:  
This was the ransom of our toil in Eden,  
This, and our one sad liberty—to grieve.

"We have had enough of strangers and of princes  
Nursed on our knees and lords within our house.  
The bread which they have eaten was our children's,  
For them the feasting and the shame for us.

"The shadow of their palaces, fair dwellings  
Built with our blood and kneaded with our tears,  
Darkens the land with darkness of Gehennem,  
The lust, the crime, the infamy of years.

"Did ye not hear it? From those muffled windows  
A sound of women rises and of mirth.  
These are our daughters—ay our sons—in prison,  
Captives to shame with those who rule the Earth.

"The silent river by those gardens lapping  
To-night receives its burden of new dead,  
A man of age sent home with his lord's wages,  
Stones to his feet, a grave-cloth to his head.

"Walls infamous in beauty, gardens fragrant  
With rose and citron and the scent of blood.  
God shall blot out the memory of all laughter,  
Rather than leave you standing where you stood.

"We have had enough of princes and of strangers,  
Slaves that were Sultans, eunuchs that were kings,  
The shame of Sodom is on all their faces.  
The curse of Cain pursues them, and it clings.

## *Appendix IX*

- "Is there no virtue? See the pale Greek smiling,  
Virtue for him is as a tale of old.  
Which be his gods? The cent. per cent. in silver.  
His God of gods? The world's creator, Gold.
- "The Turk that plunders and the Frank that panders,  
These are our lords who ply with lust and fraud.  
The brothel and the winepress and the dancers  
Are gifts unneeded in the lands of God.
- "We need them not. We heed them not. Our faces  
Are turned to a new Kebla, a new truth,  
Proclaimed by the one God of all the nations  
To save His people and renew their youth.
- "A truth which is of knowledge and of reason;  
Which teaches men to mourn no more and live;  
Which tells them of things good as well as evil,  
And gives what Liberty alone can give,
- "The counsel to be strong, the will to conquer,  
The love of all things just and kind and wise,  
Freedom for slaves, fair rights for all as brothers,  
The triumph of things true, the scorn of lies.
- "O men, who are my brethren, my soul's kindred!  
That which our fathers dreamed of as a dream,  
The sun of peace and justice, has arisen  
And God shall work in you His perfect scheme.
- "The rulers of your Earth shall cease deceiving,  
The men of usury shall fly your land.  
Your princes shall be numbered with your servants,  
And peace shall guide the sword in your right hand.
- "You shall become a nation with the nations.  
Lift up your voices, for the night is past.  
Stretch forth your hands. The hands of the free peoples  
Have beckoned you the youngest and the last.
- "And in the brotherhood of Man reposing,  
Joined to their hopes and nursed in their new day,  
The anguish of the years shall be forgotten  
And God, with these, shall wipe your tears away."

## *The Wind and the Whirlwind*

### IV

I have a thing to say. But how to say it?  
How shall I tell the mystery of guile—  
The fraud that fought—the treason that disbanded—  
The gold that slew the children of the Nile?

The ways of violence are hard to reckon,  
And men of right grow feeble in their will,  
And Virtue of her sons has been forsaken,  
And men of peace have turned aside to kill.

How shall I speak of them, the priests of Baal,  
The men who sowed the wind for their ill ends?  
The reapers of the whirlwind in that harvest  
Were all my countrymen, were some my friends.

Friends, countrymen and lovers of fair freedom—  
Souls to whom still my soul laments and cries.  
I would not tell the shame of your false dealings,  
Save for the blood which clamours to the skies.

A curse on Statecraft, not on you my Country!  
The men you slew were not more foully slain  
Than was your honour at their hands you trusted.  
They died, you conquered,—both alike in vain.

Crime finds accomplices, and Murder weapons.  
The ways of Statesmen are an easy road.  
All swords are theirs, the noblest with the neediest.  
And those who serve them best are men of good.

What need to blush, to trifle with dissembling?  
A score of honest tongues anon shall swear.  
Blood flows. The Senate's self shall spread its mantle  
In the world's face, nor own a Cæsar there.

"Silence! Who spoke?" "The voice of one disclosing  
A truth untimely." "With what right to speak?  
Holds he the Queen's commission?" "No, God's only."  
A hundred hands shall smite him on the cheek.

The "truth" of Statesmen is the thing they publish,  
Their "falsehood" the thing done they do not say,  
Their "honour" what they win from the world's trouble,  
Their "shame" the "ay" which reasons with their "nay."

## *Appendix IX*

Alas for Liberty, alas for Egypt!  
What chance was yours in this ignoble strife?  
Scorned and betrayed, dishonoured and rejected,  
What was there left you but to fight for life?

The men of honour sold you to dishonour.  
The men of truth betrayed you with a kiss.  
Your strategy of love too soon outplotted,  
What was there left you of your dreams but this?

You thought to win a world by your fair dealing,  
To conquer freedom with no drop of blood.  
This was your crime. The world knows no such reasoning.  
It neither bore with you nor understood.

Your Pharaoh with his chariots and his dancers,  
Him they could understand as of their kin.  
He spoke in their own tongue and as their servant,  
And owned no virtue they could call a sin.

They took him for his pleasure and their purpose.  
They fashioned him as clay to their own pride.  
His name they made a cudgel to your hurting,  
His treachery a spear-point to your side.

They knew him, and they scorned him and upheld him.  
They strengthened him with honours and with ships.  
They used him as a shadow for seditions.  
They stabbed you with the lying of his lips.

Sad Egypt! Since that night of misadventure  
Which slew your first-born for your Pharaoh's crime,  
No plague like this has God decreed against you,  
No punishment of all foredoomed in Time.

### V

I have a thing to say. Oh how to say it!  
One summer morning, at the hour of prayer,  
And in the face of Man and Man's high Maker,  
The thunder of their cannon rent the air.

## *The Wind and the*

The flames of death were on you and  
A hail of iron on your heads they  
You fought, you fell, you died until the  
And then you fled forsaken of the Lord

I care not if you fled. What men call  
Is the least noble thing of which they  
Their victors always are great men of valour  
Find me the valour of the beaten host!

It may be you were cowards. Let them prove  
What matter? Were you women in the fight,  
Your courage were the greater that a moment  
You steeled your weakness in the cause of right.

Oh I would rather fly with the first craven  
Who flung his arms away in your good cause,  
Than head the hottest charge by England vaunted  
In all the record of her unjust wars.

Poor sheep! they scattered you. Poor slaves! they bowed you.  
You prayed for your dear lives with your mute hands.  
They answered you with laughter and with shouting,  
And slew you in your thousands on the sands.

They led you with arms bound to your betrayer—  
His slaves, they said, recaptured for his will.  
They bade him to take heart and fill his vengeance.  
They gave him his lost sword that he might kill.

They filled for him his dungeons with your children.  
They chartered him new gaolers from strange shores.  
The Arnaout and the Cherkess for his minions,  
Their soldiers for the sentries at his doors.

He plied you with the whip, the rope, the thumb-screw.  
They plied you with the scourging of vain words.  
He sent his slaves, his eunuchs, to insult you.  
They sent you laughter on the lips of Lords.

They bound you to the pillar of their firmans.  
They placed for sceptre in your hand a pen.  
They cast lots for the garments of your treaties,  
And brought you naked to the gaze of men.

## *Appendix IX*

High Priest for your death mandate.  
S<sup>s</sup>entments on you from your laws.  
S<sup>s</sup> they offered a Barabbas.  
T<sup>r</sup> their hands and found you without cause.

you and pointed in derision,  
f<sup>t</sup> in their thorns and nailed upon their tree.  
e<sup>d</sup> their Pilate wrote the inscription—  
e<sup>e</sup> land restored to Liberty.”

ce of strength! Oh boast of wisdom!  
erty in all things truly wise!  
est thou, England, God can be outwitted  
r ever thus by him who sells and buys?

Thou sellest the sad nations to their ruin.  
What hast thou bought? The child within the womb,  
The son of him thou slayest to thy hurting,  
Shall answer thee “an Empire for thy tomb.”

Thou hast joined house to house for thy perdition.  
Thou hast done evil in the name of right.  
Thou hast made bitter sweet and the sweet bitter,  
And called light darkness and the darkness light.

Thou art become a bye-word for dissembling,  
A beacon to thy neighbours for all fraud.  
Thy deeds of violence men count and reckon.  
Who takes the sword shall perish by the sword.

Thou hast deserved men's hatred. They shall hate thee.  
Thou hast deserved men's fear. Their fear shall kill.  
Thou hast thy foot upon the weak. The weakest  
With his bruised head shall strike thee on the heel.

Thou wentest to this Egypt for thy pleasure.  
Thou shalt remain with her for thy sore pain.  
Thou hast possessed her beauty. Thou wouldst leave her.  
Nay. Thou shalt lie with her as thou hast lain.

She shall bring shame upon thy face with all men.  
She shall disease thee with her grief and fear.  
Thou shalt grow sick and feeble in her ruin.  
Thou shalt repay her to the last sad tear.



## *The Wind and I*

Her kindred shall surround thee  
Dogging thy steps till thou see  
The friends thou hast deceived  
Thy children shall upbraid thee

All shall be counted thee a criminal  
With thy impatience. Thy beseechings  
Thou shalt grow weary of thy work  
And walk in fear with eyes upon

The Empire thou didst build shall be  
Thou shalt be weighed in thine own  
Of usury to peoples and to princes,  
And be found wanting by the world and thee

They shall possess the lands by thee forsaken  
And not regret thee. On their seas no more  
Thy ships shall bear destruction to the nations,  
Or thy guns thunder on a fenceless shore.

Thou hast no pity in thy day of triumph.  
These shall not pity thee. The world shall move  
On its high course and leave thee to thy silence,  
Scorned by the creatures that thou couldst not love.

Thy Empire shall be parted, and thy kingdom.  
At thy own doors a kingdom shall arise,  
Where freedom shall be preached and the wrong righted  
Which thy unwisdom wrought in days unwise.

Truth yet shall triumph in a world of justice.  
This is of faith. I swear it. East and west  
The law of Man's progression shall accomplish  
Even this last great marvel with the rest.

Thou wouldst not further it. Thou canst not hinder.  
If thou shalt learn in time thou yet shalt live.  
But God shall ease thy hand of its dominion,  
And give to these the rights thou wouldst not give.

The nations of the East have left their childhood.  
Thou art grown old. Their manhood is to come;  
And they shall carry on Earth's high tradition  
Through the long ages when thy lips are dumb,

## *Appendix IX*

Figur. O Lands of weeping,  
Thou thieves of old Time,  
These streams of Eden,  
Their birth the world's sublime.

Thou art man's first inspiration,  
From their whence he earliest drew.  
Thou hadst the flood time of his reason,  
The land of strength which shall his strength renew.

Thou art the source of strength, but a madness,  
Thou art the source of low waters in their bed.  
Thou art the source of flow, the fulness of Man's patience  
Thou art the source of God's rest inherited.

And thou too, Egypt, mourner of the nations,  
Though thou hast died to-day in all men's sight,  
And though upon thy cross with thieves thou hangest,  
Yet shall thy wrong be justified in right.

'Twas meet one man should die for the whole people.  
Thou wert the victim chosen to retrieve  
The sorrows of the Earth with full deliverance.  
And, as thou diest, these shall surely live.

Thy prophets have been scattered through the cities.  
The seed of martyrdom thy sons have sown  
Shall make of thee a glory and a witness  
In all men's hearts held captive with thine own.

Thou shalt not be forsaken in thy children.  
Thy righteous blood shall fructify the Earth.  
The virtuous of all lands shall be thy kindred,  
And death shall be to thee a better birth.

Therefore I do not grieve. Oh hear me, Egypt!  
Even in death thou art not wholly dead.  
And hear me, England! Nay. Thou needs must hear me.  
I had a thing to say. And it is said.

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## APPENDICES

### TO THE SECOND EDITION

#### I. CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIR CHARLES DILKE, BART., M.P., IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE JOINT NOTE OF 6TH JANUARY, 1882.

SIR CHARLES DILKE TO THE EDITOR OF THE "MANCHESTER  
GUARDIAN."

SIR,—

In a review of a book by Mr. Wilfrid Blunt you write as follows: "It is to the co-operation of the two friendly statesmen, Gambetta and Sir Charles Dilke, that Mr. Blunt imputes the grave responsibility of initiating the policy of menace which by a natural process led to war and conquest." In the following sentence you suggest that I am accused by Mr. Blunt "of bartering Egypt to Gambetta's financial friends in exchange for the commercial treaty with France upon which our Under-Secretary had set his heart." This statement is made so much more directly in your abridgment than in the longer form of Mr. Blunt that it is right that I should say briefly that there is no foundation for his suggestion.

On many occasions the late Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett introduced the allegation into his speeches in the House of Commons and into articles written by him for "England" and other journals. In replying to him in the House I set forth the facts as I now repeat them.

Without offering an opinion on the historical problem whether the Joint Note was or was not a necessary or a prudent consequence of the Cave Mission, the Goschen Mission, and the dual control, I have to say that it was the act of the Cabinet before I became a member of that body, and that, owing to my absence in Paris as chairman of the Royal Commission for the commercial treaty with France, I did not—as I otherwise should have done—hear of the negotiation until it was complete. Egyptian affairs were not discussed between M. Gambetta and myself. So

## *es to the Second Editio.*

far was I, more from having "set my heart" upon the negotiation of a commercial treaty that it is known to my colleagues who were with me in Paris, all of whom are living, as is the then head of the Commercial Department, through whom we communicated with the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade upon the details, that I had from the first a disinclination to make a treaty and a preference for a most-favoured-nation arrangement. This I hoped would follow after we had obtained by discussion all the improvements in the French tariff as to the advantages of which we thought we could convince the Government of France.

In the House of Commons I went out of my way during the continuance of the prolonged negotiations to declare that I would not sign a treaty which did not fulfil two main conditions—(a) that it should be a further improvement on the whole over the improved state of things which had followed the reductions of tariff later than those of the Cobden Treaty, and (b) also should not sacrifice any principal branch of British trade.

The first condition was fulfilled as a result of the negotiations, but the second, though accomplished as regards the textiles, was not at any time within reach as regards the best Sheffield cutlery and certain other constituents of our export trade.

The great prolongation of the negotiations undoubtedly led our colleagues of the French High Commission under two successive French Administrations to believe that we intended to sign a treaty. It was publicly admitted on both sides that we were in a position to sign a treaty which would be on the whole defensible. The extraordinary duration of the negotiations were caused by the fact that most of the Continental Powers were negotiating with France "behind" us, as the phrase goes. With their representatives we were also in daily relations. As concessions were made for which certain interests in France pressed and which concerned chiefly British trade, our French colleagues granted these in their Swiss and other negotiations. At the last, when they signed treaties with Switzerland and several other Powers, the French Government came face to face with the necessity for either giving us all these favourable changes of their tariff in a most-favoured-nation law or treating us in an unfriendly fashion, which there was nothing to warrant. For some time it was thought that our refusal to sign would be visited upon our trade by such uselessly unfavourable treatment as was extended to us for a short time by Spain. Wisdom, however, prevailed in the French Legislature, and (after I had finally broken off the negotiations and, the other treaties having been signed by France, a pause had followed) a law was passed with singular rapidity by which there was extended to us that most-favoured-nation treat-

## *Correspondence with Sir Charles Dilke*

ment which has continued to the present time; although the lowest scale of duty has been raised for all Powers in the intervening years. At no time was the Egyptian policy of either Cabinet allowed to have a bearing upon the commercial relations of the Powers.

Yours, etc.,  
CHARLES W. DILKE.

MR. BLUNT TO SIR CHARLES DILKE.

Newbuildings Place,  
Sussex.

*June 29th, 1907.*

DEAR SIR CHARLES DILKE,

I have seen your letter in the "Manchester Guardian," and, before saying anything about it publicly, I think it best to write to you personally.

I need hardly tell you that I am most sorry if I have done you an injustice by exaggerating your responsibility for the events of 1882, and that I am quite prepared to publish whatever may be necessary in rectification. My only desire in regard to those events is that they should be accurately and fully told, and if you can help me to a more correct account of the genesis of the "Joint Note" I shall be most glad to include it in the second edition of my book, which will probably be issued in the autumn. The points which I would ask you to explain to me are:

(1) In the September number of the "Nineteenth Century Review" of 1882 I made practically the same statement in regard to your connection with the Joint Note as that given in my book, without, as far as I know, your having taken any notice of it at the time. But you say now that you repeatedly denied a similar statement made by the late Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett. Can you tell me where I can find these denials? I mean, about what date? I was never, that I can recollect, in communication with Ashmead-Bartlett about any Egyptian question, nor was I aware of this one having been raised by him. Had I known that you had denied the statement I should certainly have said so in my book.

(2) The circumstantial evidence, if I may so call it, of a connection between the policy of the Joint Note and the Commercial Treaty negotiations is so strong that it is difficult not to accept it as real. I notice that in your letter to the "Manchester Guardian" you do not say that there was no bargaining about it; only that as far as Egypt was concerned it was not done through you. Would you go so far as to say there was really no bargain, no connection between the two policies?

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(3) I do not quite understand why you should say that *owing to your absence in Paris* you did not hear of the negotiation about the Joint Note till it was complete. Surely it was precisely at Paris that the negotiation was going on between Gambetta and Lord Lyons. Though you were not a member of the Cabinet, you were Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and one would have expected that Lord Lyons would have talked the matter over with you. This seems to me to require explanation more than what you have given in your letter to the "Manchester Guardian."

These are difficulties which I trust you will not think me inquisitorial in consulting you about. At any rate I venture to do so, for I can assure you that I should be very glad to be able to say that I was mistaken in ascribing to you so large a share in the responsibility of what took place in 1882.

Believe me very truly yours,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

SIR CHARLES DILKE TO MR. BLUNT (ANNOTATED BY SIR CHARLES BEFORE PUBLICATION).

[*Private.*]

76, Sloane Street, S.W.

1st July, 1907.

MY DEAR SIR,

I do not consider that you have "done" me an "injustice." The point on which I have written to the "Manchester Guardian" is merely historical. The matter is of some interest and the best answer after all is that, if I had meant to make a Commercial Treaty, I should have made one. But I do not think that there would have been impropriety in connecting the two subjects, had that view been taken by Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville. I never thought of doing so, and it is only a good deal later, I think, that the connection was made by other people's suggestions. At all events I take no view of justice or injustice about the matter.<sup>1</sup>

As regards the Joint Note, I always maintained in the House of Commons, and have no fresh view, that it was a natural result of the previous joint policy. I imagine that it came entirely from Gambetta to our Government. Personally I disapproved of the previous policy. Moreover I did not like the sole action which was the ultimate result, and had a good deal to do with the proposal to Italy to act with us when it became necessary to act.

<sup>1</sup> The "matter" is not the Egyptian question, but "the injustice" of the second line of the letter.

## *Correspondence with Sir Charles Dilke*

It would give me a good deal of trouble to hunt through Hansard for the various occasions when Ashmead-Bartlett made the statement connecting the commercial negotiations with the Joint Note, but my impression is that there were many such occasions and that they lasted all through the Parliament, *i.e.*, up to 1885. I can however hunt through Hansard to see if they were reported, which they probably were.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to your (2) I feel sure that there was no connection between the two negotiations and no sort of bargain. Here is a fact which bears closely on the matter. The best offer that we ever obtained from France was that which preceded the Joint Note, namely the offer made in the Léon Say bases after the first private conference between the French Ambassador and myself: immediately after the formation of the Government of 1880. I have the original, but you will find the bases in the first of the Commercial Treaty Blue Books. The French Chambers gradually receded from the Léon Say proposals and did not at all return to them in practice until the very latest stages of the negotiations, long after the Joint Note, *i.e.*, just before I broke off negotiations.

In reply to your (3) Lord Lyons must have been acting, if he acted—for I am not sure whether the Joint Note was settled in Paris or in London—under the direct instructions of the Cabinet, and he did not as a fact shew me the Joint Note in advance of its being settled.

I have no desire to repudiate any "responsibility." My letter was solely historical and bore solely on a point where I had already been authorised to state the facts, or had done so on my own responsibility, in the House of Commons. I do not myself think that the time has come to "write" on the Egyptian Question generally. But I have made full notes upon that subject, which, having been agreed to as representing the facts accurately by others of a different opinion from my own, may one day see the light.

Yours very truly,  
CHARLES W. DILKE.

<sup>1</sup> I have let this stand, although subsequent enquiry showed that the chief statement in reply to Ashmead-Bartlett was in a letter to some paper in which he had written his view, and that the Parliamentary debate mainly in my mind was one subsequent to 1892, and not, as suggested in the letter, before 1885.

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SIR CHARLES DILKE TO MR. BLUNT.

76, Sloane Street, S.W.

11th July, 1907.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have now looked at some of my papers. I find that the best proposals that we ever got from the French are those of May, 1880. The Joint Note, I think, was Jan. 1882.

The Blue Book, Commercial 37 of 1881, shews fully the negotiations between me and the French High Commissioners of May, 1881, and reports what had passed at the sixteen meetings of the Joint Commission in London. When the French Government proposed that we should meet again in Paris in August, we stated the reasons why we could not agree to reassemble unless we received definite assurances from them. On receiving these assurances we explained that they were such as to warrant the continuation of negotiations, though hardly to make the conclusion of a treaty probable. On their stating in August that their concessions were not final, we agreed to resume negotiations.

The next Blue Book, Commercial No. 9, 1882, shews what passed at the meetings in Paris up to the 36th meeting in 1881; and contains my own full memorandum of my conversations with the Prime Minister, Gambetta, towards the end of the year. On the 31st December I informed my Government that it would be useless to prolong the meetings and that we proposed to return immediately to London. On the 4th January the French stated that they considered "the field of negotiating to be closed": though I added that I thought that some further concessions might still be obtained upon one class of woollen goods. After we had left, on the 17th January, Lord Lyons reported the French position as continuing to be unsatisfactory, and on the 26th January, 1882, my Commission wrote through me to Lord Granville that the French concessions were insufficient to change my view as to the unwisdom of a Treaty.

[*Private.*]

7th February, I find a private letter from Lord Lyons stating that he has on my behalf "told the new [French] Government distinctly this evening that we cannot accept Gambetta's last proposals." By a private letter of Lord Lyons of the 3rd February, I find that Léon Say had made it a condition of joining the Government that the new Government should not go back from the concessions already made. These however were insufficient, as I had said all along.

## *Correspondence with Sir Charles Dilke*

I have also looked over the private letters to me of Gladstone, Chamberlain, and Gambetta of January, 1882, and in none of them is there any allusion to the Joint Note or Egyptian Question.

I find that I made a speech about this time which was against the Joint Control and all that followed, and that that speech would have been stronger than it was if the original draft (which I possess) had not been modified by Lord Granville on the ground that, while he agreed in all I proposed to say, in the then dangerous "state of things it might be better to avoid running down the control more than is necessary." At the same time he agreed that it was "right to quote your opposition at the time and our want of responsibility for a position which was created for us."

I have also looked through the confidential print on the subject of the origin of the Joint Note (Gambetta, 15th December): and Lord Granville's subsequent explanation that it did "not indicate any change of policy." I think it is clear that this was his opinion and that less importance was attached to the Joint Note at the time than might afterwards be supposed.

I think you will see how completely the examination of the public documents confirms my distinct recollection and belief that there was no attempt at any bargain based on any political consideration or on the Egyptian Question in particular.

Yours very truly,

CHARLES W. DILKE.

*Note.*—On receiving the second of these two letters, I wrote to Sir Charles Dilke, asking his permission to print them in the second edition of this book. To this he replied, 16th July, saying that, though he had had no notion of publication when he wrote the letters, and although there were certain things in the letters which "inasmuch as they contained some allusion to papers which are the property of the Crown, and to many which come under the obligation of secrecy under the Official Secrets Act," nevertheless, he would see how far, with some editing, it might be possible. It was a question of form rather than of any real reason why the facts stated in the letters should not be made public. And he added:

"As regards my discussions with Ashmead-Bartlett, a search, far from complete, has failed to show the passages I expected would be found. My memory is distinct as to at least two occasions, but the report may not be full, and is no doubt most difficult to find. I am told that my chief and most definite statement in contradiction of his assertion was contained in a letter to some

## *Appendices to the Second Edition*

paper—probably to or about an article in ‘England.’ I fear, however, that this may be difficult to find. The matter is not material, as the contradiction then must have rested on the same search or recollection as is the basis of my letters to you; and it is safe for me, without finding the passages or published letter, to say that I had already contradicted it, much nearer the time, in reply to Ashmead-Bartlett, for of this I am sure. However, whether that is inserted or not does not really matter to me. The contradiction would be none the less clear or complete if it were entirely new.”

Subsequently, August 10th, I received a further reply from Sir Charles, finally granting me the permission to print the two letters, with some small modifications and notes, on the condition that I would explain the circumstances of his yielding to my request. He writes as follows:

“The wisdom of consenting to the publication of these private letters not written for publication depends on the way in which you would introduce them, *i.e.*, upon your own leading up to the supposed necessity of printing them at all. I can trust you upon this point, and must leave it to your judgment. But, as you know, I differ from you in thinking that the time has not yet come for writing fully on the period which you treat. I think you ought, if you are to use these letters, yourself to make it clear that *that* is my opinion, and that I only handle the subject on a specific point, where the facts are such as *can* be made known, to correct an erroneous impression. I should therefore think that you had better leave the words ‘private’ in the two cases, and state that under the circumstances I did not think it necessary to resist your request that these letters, not written for publication, should be made public by you.”

It is in compliance with Sir Charles’s request that I add this note.

W. S. B.

## II. ADDITIONAL FACTS COMMUNICATED BY SIR RIVERS WILSON.

Since the above correspondence with Sir Charles Dilke was closed I have had the opportunity of discussing this and other matters connected with my history thoroughly with Sir C. Rivers Wilson.

Sir Rivers confirms Sir Charles Dilke’s impression that there was no real connection between the Joint Note and the Com-



### *Facts communicated by Sir Rivers Wilson*

mercial Treaty. Wilson was himself in close communication about Egypt with Gambetta at the time the Note was drafted, and being well acquainted with the whole situation is sure that the Note was initiated and accepted independently of any bargain of the kind supposed by me. This therefore may be accepted as certain. At the same time he confirms the fact of Gambetta's prime responsibility for the Note, and adds that Freycinet's failure to carry out the policy of armed intervention, to which it committed the French no less than the English government, was a source to Gambetta of lasting annoyance. Freycinet, according to Wilson, was deterred from sending a French army with the English army into Egypt, mainly in consequence of representations made to him by Lesseps, who exaggerated to him the difficulties, military and other, to the extent of persuading him that a force of 60,000 men would be needed to overcome them. Lesseps had declared to Freycinet, at as late a date as a week before Tel-el-Kebir: "Il vous faudra 60,000 hommes et encore vous n'y arriverez pas. Je connais les fellahs, ce sont les meilleurs terrassiers du monde." This view of the situation was laughed at by Gambetta, who declared there were but two difficulties in the campaign, "flies and mosquitos."

Sir Rivers adds the following information as to the Nubar riot of February, 1879. He agrees with the account given me of it by Arabi and Mohammed Abdu of the origin of this affair (see pages 483 and 489), and gives additional details as to his own part in what happened. He says that on the morning of the event the Khedive Ismail had sent for him to the Abdin Palace, and had detained him talking there for a considerable time; he was therefore later than usual in going to his office at the Ministry of Finance. He thinks this was perhaps intentional on the Khedive's part, and is sure that the plot was designed against Nubar only, not against himself. When, after leaving the Khedive, he arrived at the end of the street leading to the Ministry of Finance, he noticed a noisy crowd in front of him, and presently saw a carriage being attacked by the mob, and in it Nubar, who was holding his arm over his head to shield it from their blows. There were men, officers apparently, with sticks striking at him, and others threatening him with their swords. Wilson instantly jumped from his own carriage and ran to Nubar's assistance. Wilson himself was roughly handled though not seriously injured by the mob; and his wife, who, hearing of the riot, came a little later in her carriage to look for him, was hustled and hurt. He and Nubar at last found refuge inside the Ministry, where they were practically blockaded until the arrival of the Khedive, who appeared attended by all the consular body and by Abd-el-

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Kader Pasha. On entering he came forward with an *empressé* manner, and his hand stretched out, but Wilson put his hands behind his back and refused to take the Khedive's. The Khedive then went down with them all, and coming forward addressed the crowd from the entrance steps in Arabic. He did this with considerable dignity of manner; but, on one of the rioters, an officer, approaching too near him, with a gesture as if to take hold of him, Ismail started back and at once ordered the soldiers to fire. The crowd then dispersed.

In correction of my account given in the text, Sir Rivers reminded me that all this had happened at Cairo on one and the same day, viz., 18th February, and no part of it at Alexandria. He added that when he brought the matter before the Consulate General, claiming reparation for the indignity done him, both as an Englishman and as one in whose mission in Egypt the British Government were interested, difficulties were made, nor was it till a week after the riot that anything was obtained. Then Prince Hassan, as commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, was sent to the British Agency and there, the British flag being hoisted, apologized to Wilson and Vivian in the Khedive's name. He confirms Arabi's statement that the inquiry subsequently made into the affair was a sham one, and says that Arabi's name, not then known to him, was one of those handed in to him with Latif's, the chief of them, as those of the ringleaders. His own opinion of Nubar is a very high one. Nubar was not, he says, a financier but a statesman; nor is it true, as stated in my text, that he made a fortune out of the loans raised by him for Ismail.

Sir Rivers considers, too, that I should add to my account, that shortly after the deposition of the Khedive Ismail, negotiations were initiated by Lord Salisbury for a final settlement between the Egyptian Government and its creditors; and it was proposed to the Powers interested that a commission should be appointed of which Wilson was to be the English representative and President. It was not, however, till the following year that the Commission was agreed to, and began its work; nor even then was it without great difficulty that a conclusion at all favourable to Egypt was arrived at, and the arrangement come to which resulted in the Law of Liquidation. This law was the starting point of the financial reform of Egypt, and is the basis of the whole present system.

W. S. B.

## *Letter from Boghos Pasha Nubar*

### III. LETTER RECEIVED BY MR. BLUNT FROM BOGHOS PASHA NUBAR AS TO HIS FATHER NUBAR PASHA'S POLITICAL CONNECTION WITH THE KHEDIVE ISMAÏL. (TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.)

Paris, September 26th, 1907.

SIR,

I have just read in the "Egyptian Gazette" of the 14th instant your reply to Mr. Lucy about the Cyprus Convention, and I was glad to observe the offer you made in it of correcting in your any errors which might be pointed out to you. It has pleased me to appeal to your loyalty in regard to a mistake about my father which has found its way into it. I do not know from what sources you have drawn your information, nor do I doubt your good faith, which has certainly been misled.

You say that Nubar Pasha was Ismail's Minister of Finance, and that in virtue of this office he was responsible for the ruinous loans contracted by the latter. This is evidently a complete mistake, my father never having been Minister of Finance, and having had nothing to do directly or indirectly with any of the loans.

The only offices which he filled during Ismail's reign were the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was never, I repeat, Minister of Finance, for this very good reason that, in spite of his great intelligence and qualities as a statesman, he recognized that he did not understand financial questions, and the Khedive, who also knew it, would never have thought of confiding a Ministry to him, which he himself felt he was incapable of directing.

Ismail's Minister of Finance was the Moufettish Ismail Pasha Sadek, whom you speak of on pages 18, 39 and 40 of your book. He was the sole collaborator and confidant of the Khedive upon financial matters, and it was he who organized the loans.

As to my father, I think what will best show you how entirely he was a stranger to financial administration, is a simple *résumé* of his career, under Ismail, which I shall try to condense into a few lines.

"In the very first year of Ismail's accession, 1863, Nubar Pasha was sent on a mission to Paris to regulate the differences relating to the Suez Canal. He remained there two years, and upon his

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return to Egypt he was appointed, first, Minister of Public Works, and then, Minister for Foreign Affairs. A year later, in 1866, he went once more on a mission to Europe, and remained three years absent. It was during this period that he obtained the Firman of 1867, granting to Egypt administrative autonomy, the right of making Customs Conventions with the Powers, and the title of Khedive for the Viceroy. It was at this time, too, that he commenced the first negotiations for Judicial Reform with the Powers. He did not return to Egypt till 1869, and then for six months only, in order to assist at the opening of the Suez Canal, and preside at the Commission of Inquiry for Judicial Reform which was sitting at Cairo, and he returned to Paris in 1870 to continue there the negotiations for the Reform. These negotiations, begun in 1867, lasted until 1875, about eight years, during which time Nubar Pasha lived almost entirely in Europe, with the exception of short intervals of a few months in Egypt. In 1874 he was dismissed by the Khedive on account of a difference of opinion relative to the said negotiations, and he remained in Europe without employment for a year. He was recalled by Ismaïl to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in June, 1875. Six months later, he was again dismissed, January, 1876. He then remained two years in Europe, exiled, and did not return until 1878, when recalled by the Khedive to form the Mixed Ministry in conjunction with Sir Rivers Wilson."

My father declares in his memoirs, which I hope one day to be able to publish, that during the fifteen years of Ismaïl's reign, he spent twelve in Europe on missions, on leave of absence, or in exile. The dates and facts which I have recited above prove the accuracy of this statement. During all these absences from Egypt, Nubar Pasha, exclusively occupied with his negotiations, could not take any part in the interior affairs of the country, about which he was not even consulted. Thus, while in Paris in 1869, he learnt from M. Béhic, Minister of Public Works to the Emperor Napoleon III, in the course of a conversation with him relative to the Judicial Reform, that the Khedive had just arranged a loan of ten millions sterling, of which my father had not even been informed; and again, at Constantinople in 1873, where he was pursuing his negotiations for the Reform, it was indirectly that he learned that the Khedive was negotiating a fresh loan of thirty millions.

You see, Sir, by these facts, which it will be easy for you to verify, that not only was my father never Minister of Finance, nor connected with the Khedive's loans, but that all his energy, his talents and the influence which he had acquired were employed in negotiations abroad: (1) for the regulation of the question of the

## *Letter from Boghos Pasha Nubar*

Suez Canal, which culminated in the arbitration of Napoleon III, through which Egypt obtained a verdict for the abolition of forced labour in the making of the Canal; (2) for obtaining Firmans from the Sublime Porte; (3) for the Judicial Reform which was his conception and his work, and to which he consecrated all his energy, his intelligence, and the best years of his life. I must also add that he continued to work zealously for the abolition of forced labour while Director of Railways and at the Ministry of Public Works. This we owe in large measure to him, as Sir W. Wilcocks so courteously testifies in his book on the Irrigation of Egypt.

Do you not think, Sir, that I have a right under these circumstances to appeal to your courtesy in asking you to rectify in the new edition of your book the erroneous passages which I have mentioned? You cannot fail to see the importance which I attach to these corrections, for it would not be just, in a work bearing upon history, for my father to be held responsible for government measures to which he was altogether a stranger.

My father in the course of his laborious career made many friends, but also many enemies, as all politicians do. His enemies have not failed to spread calumnies about him and to invent stories. I will only cite two: First, that concerning his nationality. His political adversaries, in the interest of their cause, successively reproached him with being an English and a German subject! These allegations, the object of which was to discredit him in the course of his negotiations for Judicial Reform by contesting, though he was a Minister of the Khedive, his Egyptian nationality, have since been recognized as being without any foundation. Another legend relates to his supposed immense fortune. The most calumnious and fantastic assertions have been made with regard to this, generally by people who were interested in tarnishing the memory of an adversary by leaving it to be understood that such great wealth could only have been acquired by unlawful means. They did not hesitate to say and write that he possessed more than four millions sterling. Although I have not condescended up to now to reply to calumnies which have appeared in newspapers, there is no reason why I should not give you, for your personal information, the precise facts and figures.

At his death my father left a fortune of £155,000, having settled upon my mother during his lifetime a personal fortune amounting to an equal sum. Thus the four millions, at which the most moderate estimators valued what he possessed, were not in reality more than about £300,000. This is a fact which can easily be verified, for the Deed of Partition of his inheritance—there being children who were minors among the heirs—was registered at the Mixed Tribunal at Cairo.

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It is equally easy to show the sources from which this fortune was derived. It consisted of donations, which he had received from the Khedive in recompense for services rendered, and of an exceptionally fortunate investment of a part of these donations.

By the *resumé* which I have given of his career, you will see the importance of the services he rendered to his country and the results obtained by his various negotiations. The Khedive did not fail to recompense him, as he had recompensed others of his Ministers, and as the British Parliament has recently done for Lord Cromer by voting him a donation of £50,000. Thus he received, upon the successful result of the negotiations relating to the Suez Canal, the Firman of 1867 and the Judicial Reform, various recompenses consisting of sums of money, of a property of nine hundred acres, and of a house in Alexandria—the whole being of the value of about £80,000.

My father had the fortunate inspiration, at the creation of the Cairo Water Company, of which he was President, to invest an important part of this sum, £25,000, in shares of the Company; and this investment alone sufficed to raise his fortune to the sum I have indicated, for it is a matter of public knowledge that the Cairo Water Company's shares had gone up to ten times their value at the date of Nubar Pasha's death.

I will end by begging you to excuse my having written you so long a letter, but your offer of rectification proves your anxiety to be impartial and has authorized my doing so. Thanking you in advance, therefore, for the corrections which my information will enable you to make, I beg you will accept, Sir, etc.,

BOGHOS NUBAR.

*Note.*—I am glad to have obtained Boghos Pasha's permission to publish the whole of this interesting letter, and regret that I cannot, at the late date of my receiving it, make any alteration in the text of this edition, such as he at first suggested. I think, however, that the letter, published in full, will be found more satisfactory than a mere omission of the passages it corrects could possibly have been.

W. S. B.

## *Note as to the Berlin*

### IV. NOTE AS TO THE BERLIN CON

It has been pointed out by Mr. Lucy, in the "Gazette," that the account given in the text, page quarrel between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury, at Congress, is manifestly incorrect, inasmuch as it was the Russian agreement of 31st May, not the Cyprus Convention of 4th June, that was published by the "Globe" newspaper through the instrumentality of Marvin, the Cyprus Convention being issued in the ordinary way. The confusion between the two instruments in the text is undeniable and needs correction. At the same time the result of a full enquiry as I have been able to make into the affair, by a reference to contemporary documents, is not such as to make me doubt the substantial truth of the story. What seems precisely to have happened is this:

Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, before entering the Congress, had concluded two separate agreements, both secret, regarding Ottoman affairs—the one with Russia, the other with Turkey. These, while conceding something to Russia, would, they thought, conjointly secure the integrity of the Sultan's dominions on the Asiatic side against further aggression. The agreement with Russia recognized her permanent possession of Batum, but was more than counterbalanced, in their opinion, by the second Convention, unknown to the Russian Government as to the rest of the world, guaranteeing the remainder of his Asiatic dominions under English protection to the Sultan. The two treaties were drafted at the Foreign Office almost simultaneously, and by accident or negligence that with Russia became known, the very day it was signed, to Mr. Charles Marvin, a poor journalist and teacher of languages, who had been taken on as extra Writer for his knowledge of Russian in the Treaty Department at the Foreign Office. Marvin, who was wretchedly underpaid at the rate of tenpence an hour, had been intrusted with the copying of the agreement, and yielded to the temptation of betraying a summary of it to his employers in the Press. This was on the 31st May, a fortnight before the Congress met.

For some days after this Marvin seems to have remained on unsuspected at the Foreign Office, it being imagined at first that it was perhaps Count Schouvalof himself, the Russian ambassador in London, who had given the information to the Press. Later, seeing that the summary was no more than a summary, and had appeared

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only, the "Globe," it was resolved to deny it; It had little difficulty in persuading the House of Commons that it lacked authenticity. In answer to a question put to him about it by Lord Grey, Lord Salisbury declared that the statement to which the noble Earl refers, and other statements that have been made that I have seen, are wholly untrue and are not deserving of the confidence of your House."

Nevertheless, the incident raised a suspicion of England's good faith, and doubtless was the cause of the declaration, mentioned in the text, being demanded of the Ambassadors at the opening of the Congress. This must have been subscribed to by Lord Beaconsfield and Salisbury on the 13th June, the earlier dates being:

The Agreement with Russia, signed in London, 31st May.

The "Globe" summary, published in the evening of the same day, 31st May.

Lord Salisbury's denial in the House of Lords, 3rd June.

First sitting of the Berlin Congress, 13th June.

Publication by the "Globe" of the full text of the Agreement, on the evening of 14th June.

Lord Beaconsfield's and Lord Salisbury's discomforture must consequently have been still more sudden than in my account of it when the news became public property at Berlin on the 15th; and doubtless the sensation caused there was primarily on account of the Agreement, not of the Convention, which latter was not published till 8th July. All the same I still adhere to my recollection of the letter shown me at Simla that it was the Cyprus Convention that was the main cause of M. Waddington's resentment, and of Lord Salisbury's concession to him about Tunis and the rest. That it was so is confirmed to me by a passage in my diary of 1884, when, being at Constantinople and having just had a conversation with Count Corti on the subject, I made the following entry. It must be remembered that the Count had been Italian ambassador at the Berlin Congress, and was actually ambassador to the Sultan at the date of the conversation; nor was he other than a friendly witness, for he was always regarded as an *Anglo-mane* and ally of our British diplomacy.

"October 26. Count Corti came to take us in a steam launch to Therapia. We had luncheon with the Wyndhams, and called on the Noailles (at the English and French Embassies). . . . On our way back to Constantinople Count Corti entertained us with stories of the Berlin Congress and of Lord Salisbury's antics there. Disraeli and Salisbury had gone there quite on their high horse to curb the territorial ambitions of Russia, and the publication of



### *Note as to the Berlin Congress*

the secret convention for the acquisition of Cyprus was a great shock to everybody. Salisbury broke it gently to Waddington before the news was published, and Waddington consulted his colleagues, it being generally agreed that there was no middle course between going to war and saying nothing. 'Il faut la guerre ou se taire.' But the publication was a great blow to Disraeli, who took to his bed and did not appear for four or five days. Lord Salisbury, however, brazened it out, and came to the Congress with an air of defiance. There was no rupture between him and Waddington, and they remained on apparently friendly terms; but Waddington had his revenge. He was sitting one day with Salisbury, and, the conversation leading that way, Waddington asked what the English Government would say to France taking Tunis, and Salisbury said he did not see the harm. Whereupon Waddington communicated this to Paris, and on his return the French ambassador in London was instructed to write to Lord Salisbury reminding him of his words. Thus Salisbury was caught. 'But,' said Corti, 'if he had known anything of his business he would have declined to answer the note officially and would have pleaded a private conversation.' He did not believe that any arrangement of *condominium* was come to between Salisbury and Waddington at that time, though I told him, without mentioning names, of the letter Lytton had shown me. Corti is interesting diplomatically, as he has been to more congresses than any man in Europe."

This entry, which is a contemporary record of Count Corti's recollection of the incident, five years after it happened, shows that the two secret agreements had remained closely connected in his mind as the cause of Waddington's displeasure. They certainly were present in the Duke of Richmond's mind when, representing the Foreign Office on 17th June, in answer to a further question about the authenticity of the full text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, he said "as an explanation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government it is *incomplete* and therefore inaccurate," for this *incompleteness* can only be understood as an allusion to the Cyprus Convention. We may therefore, I think, still hold to the reality of the connection as cause and effect between the signing of the Cyprus Convention in 1878, and the seizure of Tunis by France in 1881, which after all is the important matter. Some day, no doubt, the whole incident will be made clear by a publication of the secret records at the Foreign Office or at the Quai d'Orsay. In the meantime we may accept it as probable that, finding the Russian Agreement divulged, Lord Salisbury resolved to make a clean breast also of the other Agreement, and, in Count Corti's words, broke gently to M. Waddington

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the existence also of a Convention with Turkey. One thing I am certain of in my recollection, that the letter shown me at Simla described the quarrel and the terms obtained in the reconciliation with M. Waddington.

The Cyprus Convention was published in London on the 9th July, having been signed on the 4th June, but there is evidence of its having been in Lord Beaconsfield's thoughts at least three months earlier, for Lord Derby, speaking in the Lords, 18th July, gave it as his reason for leaving the Cabinet in March that the policy of the Government had become such, that it was already, at that date, being considered necessary "to seize and occupy the island of Cyprus."

W. S. B.

### V. CORRECTION OF A PASSAGE IN MR. GLADSTONE'S LETTER PRINTED AT PAGE 559.

The passage in Mr. Gladstone's letter, page 559, in which he is represented as saying, at the time of the crisis in Egypt caused by the publication of the Joint Note of 6th January, 1882, that Egyptian affairs were occupying, he was sorry to say, "an insignificant share of my daily attention," having caused considerable comment in the press, it was suggested to me by a critic in the "Illustrated London News" that this was perhaps a misreading of Mr. Gladstone's handwriting, and that the word "*an*" may have been in reality "*no*." I therefore re-read the original and find that without question such is the case. The passage must therefore be read as follows: "Egyptian affairs, which occupy, I am sorry to say, no insignificant share of my daily attention."

W. S. B.

### VI. SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU'S OPINIONS.

The following important letter was written to me by the late Grand Mufti shortly after the conclusion of the Anglo-French *entente* about Egypt and Morocco. I was in England, and had asked the Sheykh his opinion of the new situation created, especially as to the possibility acquired by the English Government under

## *Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's Opinions*

it of re-establishing native self-government at Cairo. In response, the Sheykh had written, May 16th, 1904:

"My idea of the proper administration of Egypt, if the Khedivate is to remain in the family of Mohammed Ali, is this:

"1. The first and fundamental rule of administration must be that the Khedive shall have no power of interference in the executive of any of the Ministerial Departments, nor yet in the *Awkaf*, nor in the Azhar, nor in the religious Courts. His personal intervention in the Egyptian Administration should be done away with, once and for all.

"2. A Chamber should be constituted, something after the fashion of the Legislative Council now existing, but on better lines than those on which the present Council was designed. The Ministers should be members of it, as also the principal officials. There would be no objection to including in it some English holders of high office. Among the functions of the Chamber would be that of passing new laws.

"3. Limits should be put to the powers of executive intervention claimed by English Officials, 'Advisers,' and others, so that the Egyptian Officials should no longer be mere dummies without initiative.

"4. In each Department—as for instance in that of Justice and in that of the Interior—there should be a Council of Administration where members should be elected through the Chamber, the 'General' Chamber, already mentioned. Its function should be to go into the details of all important matters, and to draw up projects and regulations for each Department.

"5. A Code of Rules should be drawn up for the Ministry of Public Instruction, obligatory as to instruction and education. A share of the public revenue should be allotted to the costs of education large enough to allow of the opening of sufficient schools for the needs of the country, both schools of general learning and technical schools.

"This is my general idea."

A couple of months later, in answer to a further request I made to him that he would develop his idea and propound a constitutional plan, the Mufti again wrote, this time after careful thought and consultation with his friends. Part of my request had been in regard to the difficulty, always present in Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's mind, of providing against the possible ill faith of the Khedive towards a Constitution, such as in the time of his father Tewfik had ruined the national hopes. I had asked whether, in the difficulty of finding a member of the Khedivial family

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thoroughly imbued with Constitutional ideas, a European prince might possibly be accepted in Egypt as Viceroy under the Sultan. The Mufti's answer was as follows:

SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO MR. BLUNT.

“Cairo, *July*, 1904.

“MY DEAR AND RESPECTED FRIEND,

“I send you my best greetings, and apologise for the delay in answering your letter of June 8th, but I have been so busied with the examination at the College of Teachers and at the Azhar, and with much else besides, that no time was left for answering, especially as the subject of the letter was exceedingly difficult and required great attention and consideration.

“I have thought much and have consulted with some of the most distinguished Egyptians, and with the result that all are agreed in laying it down as a first necessity for the good administration of Egypt that order shall be guaranteed by the British Government—the meaning of this being that the British Government shall watch over the maintenance of order and the safeguarding of the Constitution to be granted, and not leave it exposed to interference by the Khedives.

“This guarantee provided and the Constitution granted, there will then be no need to discard the family of Mohammed Ali from the sovereignty, or to appoint a European Prince. The appointment of a European Prince would be unwelcome to the natives of the country, and it would not help them to improve their condition.

“Now, as to the Constitution, these are the matters to which special regard must be had:

“1. That all matters of government shall be dependent on one or other of two authorities; first on a legislative authority, which shall be empowered to enact laws both judicial and administrative; and, second, on an executive authority charged with the carrying out of the laws. The legislative authority shall be vested in a Chamber of Deputies exceeding the present consultative Chamber in numbers, and with functions of wider scope. Its decisions shall be respected and obligatory as to the carrying out, neither the Ministers nor the Khedive being allowed to disregard them under any circumstances. It is to this Chamber that shall appertain the passing of all laws. The Ministers shall be chosen from among its members, and the executive power shall reside with the Ministers. These shall be privileged to bring forward all projects of law, but they shall have no independent right of

## *Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's Opinions*

passing them. This right shall belong to the Chamber of Deputies.

"2. All matters of government not connected with the passing of laws shall be in the hands of the Ministers, including the bestowal of grades and decorations. No Government business whatever shall be left to the Khedive. The departments of religious and other instruction, the wakfs, the religious courts, the native courts, the distribution of grades and decorations, the whole of these shall depend on the Cabinet, nor shall the Khedive be allowed any power of interference whatever with them.

"3. Where any of the Ministers shall be Englishmen, having Egyptians as subordinates under them, these subordinate Ministers shall be empowered to act in all matters relating to religion or the like, under the supervision of the Ministers. They shall not be mere puppets, as is the case now. All the posts of English Advisers shall be done away with, and the Ministers shall suffice. The Prime Minister shall of necessity be a Moslem, but his official position shall be limited to his presidency alone. He shall not hold any other portfolio.

"4. All other officials shall be Egyptians. The Mudirs, Deputy Mudirs, Judges of the Native Courts, both of the Appeal and of First Instance; the members of the Parquet and the rest shall all be Egyptians. But it shall be allowable to appoint Englishmen as inspectors, and to certain offices of the Engineering and Educational departments, and to posts in industrial works where special knowledge is needed for which no qualified Egyptian can be found. But in any case the action of such foreign officials shall be restricted to the functions which are specially theirs, and shall be subject to the supervision of the Ministers. They shall not have the smallest administrative or judicial power that can weaken the influence of the native officials.

"5. The members of the Chamber can question the Ministers as to the carrying out of the laws, and can criticise them as to irregularities. It shall be obligatory on the Ministers to show cause for their actions. If a dispute shall arise between the Deputies and the Ministers, the settlement of this difference shall be entrusted to a commission consisting of five members of the Chamber chosen by secret ballot, of five members of the Court of Appeal chosen in the same way, and, in addition to these, of the President of the Chamber, and the Prime Minister and the President of the Court of Appeal. Their judgement on the dispute shall be by an absolute majority. It shall be allowable to increase the number of members of the Chamber and of the Court of Appeal (on this commission) to a total larger than what we have mentioned.

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"I believe that an arrangement made on lines such as these, and guaranteed by the British Government, would suit the needs of the country, and that its Government would thus obtain an independence at present unknown.

"We must not forget the re-arrangement to be made of instruction and education. These, indeed, are the most pressing matters at which the Chamber will have to work.

"May God keep you and increase the time of seeing you and having your company.

"MOHAMMED ABDU."

"I forgot to speak of the military. There shall remain an English Sirdar for the Egyptian army and some English officers of rank, but the remaining military offices, or posts in the army should be held by natives, although if there is a difficulty about this, and the British Government is of opinion that there should still be English generals, *i.e.*, *bashawat*, in the army, there will be no very great harm."

### EXTRACTS FROM MR. BLUNT'S DIARY.

"*January 16, 1903.*—Mohammed Abdu spent an hour with us recounting the history of 1882. . . . I then asked the Mufti what was the real cause of the massacre of June 11 at Alexandria. He said: 'Without any doubt the Khedive and Omar Lutfi.' I asked him how he knew. He said: 'I went to Alexandria the day after, and was shown the telegram sent by the Khedive to Omar Lutfi. It was to this effect: "Arabi has guaranteed the safety of Europeans. It is for you to choose whether you will serve me or serve Arabi."' Mohammed Abdu was prepared for something of the sort, as an article had been published a fortnight before in a newspaper called the 'Mahroussa,' edited by a Syrian Christian, in which notice had been given that the Greeks of Alexandria were being armed, and warning the Moslems that, if they thought to kill Christians, Christians were also intending to kill them. In his capacity of Official Director of the Press he had in consequence suppressed the 'Mahroussa' as dangerous to public safety. The way in which the riot was organized was this. The Khedive got Ambrose Sinadino, with whom he was intimate, to advance money for the arming of the Greeks in Alexandria; and Omar Lutfi, on his side, instructed the chief of the police, who abetted the rioters, and who with his men joined in the killing. The regular army was not called in till much killing had been done, and then verbally at first, and, only when things had gone very far, at last in

## *Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's Opinions*

writing. There is no question that the riot was organized. I asked Abdu whether he thought our people knew about it beforehand. He said, certainly not Malet. He was a good fellow and did his best to calm things down and preserve the existing order. But it is certain that the English consul knew the truth the next day, as soon as the bodies were found of the Christians, disguised as Moslems, and only the bayonet wounds inflicted by the police upon some of the corpses. That is why the inquiry was hushed up and not gone on with. Omar Lutfi, however, was the main organizer of the affair. He, Abdu, had warned Arabi to get rid of Omar Lutfi long before as one that could not be trusted, and might do mischief at Alexandria. But Arabi would not listen. Arabi was very simple-minded and very obstinate, and any one who called him a great man he believed in and trusted. He, Abdu, had expostulated with him once about his attitude to the Khedive, and had told him that he ought either to make friends with him and keep him constantly under his influence, or else to cut his head off. Arabi did neither. At Alexandria Arabi entirely lost his head. Abdu went down there during the bombardment and found everything in the wildest confusion, Arabi unable to direct or decide what was to be done, and all the soldiers and civilians alike frightened out of their wits. The Khedive ought to have been brought a prisoner to Cairo. Instead of that he was allowed to escape to the English fleet.

"I asked him whether he believed the Circassians arrested by Arabi were tortured in prison. He said: 'No, but they were harshly treated.'"

"*March 9, 1905.*—To-day I went once more carefully through the whole history of the Alexandria riot with Mohammed Abdu and have now got, I think, every detail known, and am writing it out in my memoirs."

*Note.*—These extracts are added to the Appendix in special answer to the "Times," which, in its review of this book, has complained that the evidence given in it of the Khedive's telegram to Omar Lutfi "consists merely of an *ex parte* statement made by Ahmed Bey Rifaat, one of Arabi's officials, while he was in prison in 1882." As a matter of fact it was Mohammed Abdu's insistence on the guilt of the Khedive, as well as of Omar Lutfi, that decided me to write as positively as I have done in the text regarding it. The Sheykh is responsible for every word I have set down on that head, and nobody than he had more authority to speak.

W. S. B.

## *Appendices to the Second Edition*

### VII. CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. FREDERIC HARRISON.

THE FOLLOWING APPEARED IN THE "ATHENÆUM" OF  
JUNE 15TH, 1907.

Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's "Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt" (Fisher Unwin) has too close a bearing on politics to be reviewed at length in our pages. That the author is playing with fire he knows, as may be seen by his frank admissions, such as the following:

"I cannot wholly regret the course I took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in considerable measure responsible for the determination the Nationalists came to to risk their country's fortune on the die of battle."

A certain undue violence and rashness of statement is one of the "mistakes"; but the author is to be commended for the honesty which causes him to leave the dangerous passages for the judgment of the public. Among these is one on p. 497, which shows that Mr. Blunt—we hope only "in half-earnest"—agreed with a Nationalist leader that it would have been better "that we should cut off the Khedive's head." The book seems to have been written some little time ago, and revised only here and there within the last few months. There is an allusion to the retirement of Lord Cromer, but, on the other hand, "Sir Thomas Sanderson" still appears as being "now head of the Foreign Office." The important point, however, is that if we are to have such a volume it is right that we should have the exact truth as it appears to Mr. Blunt. On the other hand, it is, we should think, impossible that he should have received the permission of Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, Sir Edward Hamilton, and other distinguished officials, whose letters are given at full length, to publish their accounts of all that was passing when they were in the public service; and the printing of such letters, during the life of all concerned, without permission, is a practice almost unknown in this country, though common upon the Continent. The letters of Sir Edward Hamilton were written by him for Gladstone while he was private secretary to the Prime Minister, and are obviously in many cases of an official nature. The references to conversations in Downing Street with at least two of the Prime Minister's secretaries are even more indiscreet, if possible, than the printing of the letters. One



## *Correspondence with Frederic Harrison*

secretary, for example, assures the author "that my interference with Malet's diplomacy was in no way resented by his chief." Sir Edward Malet is still living, and such publication is calculated to make the courtesies of official life impossible. Another ambassador who is still serving this country in a great capital is also quoted as the authority for highly confidential statements. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt is so frank in his account of the Nationalist movement that he proves the case of the Government, against which he was acting in becoming the London adviser of those against whom this country was carrying on operations. Thus, for example, he establishes a real case for the bombardment of the forts at Alexandria. There were many who were still doubtful as to the accuracy of Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour's statements. Everything has been put into the volume, and we find for the first time a basis for the French charge that Tel-el-Kebir was won by "the cavalry of St. George," *i.e.*, by British gold-pieces. It amounts to little, but it is there, and the story put into the mouths of the Egyptian princes is worth some inquiry. It is stated that money was paid in pieces bearing the St. George, but false, and made up to contain lead. It ought to have been easy at the time, and might be possible now, to trace the origin of such coins. Undoubtedly money was paid to Arabs for spy work against the Egyptians, but paid in real gold or silver. Inquiry would probably show that the false pieces had a Levantine origin, and did not pass through British hands. We note a curious mistake which makes Sir Erskine May an Admiralty official.

MR. BLUNT'S REPLY TO THE "ATHENÆUM," JUNE 29TH, 1907.

Newbuildings Place, Sussex,

*June 23rd, 1907.*

Your notice of my book, while a perfectly fair criticism of it, raises a point of literary morality which needs from me, I think, an answer. You blame me for publishing correspondence and conversations of twenty-five years ago with public men, still living, apparently without their leave. I will say at once that it is true that in the instances you quote the leave of the persons was neither obtained nor asked—also that it was not through carelessness that I omitted to consult them, but after a long weighing in my own mind of the intrinsic right and wrong as well as of the accepted etiquette of the position. My view of the question of such publication is this:

First, as to the general case of the utterances of public men, I have always been of opinion that one of the chief causes of what

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I will call the "immorality" of our public affairs, especially of our international and imperial affairs, has been the licence allowed to politicians of saying one thing in public, and another in private, without thereby being blamed as prevaricators. It is perhaps tenable to argue, as you do in your criticism, that, without the distinction made between public and private utterances by the daily press, government by talk (in other words, government by Parliament and the press) would be impossible, and the "courtesies of official life" a constant danger to those charged with public affairs. It is not necessary for me to deny or argue about this. The rule may possibly be a necessary, if an immoral, one in the House of Commons, on the platform, and in newspaper offices. But what I do deny *in toto* is that it should be made applicable in any way to the larger and more equitable domain of the historian.

History, unless it is to become a mere stereotyping of the daily insincerities of Parliamentary and journalistic life, must keep itself free from every rule except that of telling the plain and simple truth, gleaned from whatever quarter, public or private, confidential or proclaimed. More than this, since it is accepted that Cabinet Ministers, for reasons of State, may every afternoon mislead questioners by equivocation, and on occasion, and when driven to the wall, even lie, without being thereby dishonoured, while in private they are still held to speak pretty frankly what they think, it is clear that their declarations in Parliament, their speeches to their constituents, and the dispatches printed in their Blue-Books can have little positive value, compared with the smallest contemporary and trustworthy record of their words in private. This is, indeed, now generally admitted, and the only question to determine is at what precise point the necessities of current politics, which admit of lying, end, and History, which demands truth and truth only, may begin to say her word. Is it to be after one hundred or fifty or after what lesser number of years, or generally after the death of all concerned, or, again, when no one living can seriously be injured?

Secondly, with regard to my own special case, how did the matter stand? As one intimately acquainted with, and to some extent an actor in, the Egyptian drama of 1882, I had a clear right to speak my word about it as its chronicler. To record in writing what I knew was not only my right, but my duty. About that I did not hesitate; also that, having decided to write the truth, it should be the whole truth, substantiated by the whole of the evidence in my hands. This last consisted mainly of letters received and diaries kept by me. Without them my narrative would not help history much. They were as necessary to it as the

## *Correspondence with Frederic Harrison*

foundations are to a building. It was a question, therefore, between publishing my *pieces justificatives* or not at all. What determined me to publish was that history was already beginning to be written, and on lines which I knew were wholly erroneous. Not only did the misleading Blue-Books, presented in 1882 and 1883, still hold the field, but they were being accepted as sufficient documents by men who had weight from their connection with the public affairs of the time. Gladstone's life had been written by Mr. Morley, and recollections of him by Sir Edward Hamilton. Sir Alfred Lyall had written Lord Dufferin's life; Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Lord Granville's. Sir Edward Malet had published a light volume of his personal memoirs; Sir Auckland Colvin, a ponderous one professing to be historical. In not one of them had anything approaching to the truth about the Egyptian events of 1882 been told. All had either slurred them over or misstated them. History was clearly being misled, or kept purposely in ignorance by those in a position to enlighten her. I found myself almost alone of my contemporaries possessed of knowledge who had not spoken. I decided therefore to publish, as one decides on calling out to a traveller taking a wrong road.

Thirdly, as to the persons whose letters and conversations were my corroborating documents, you mention four of them who, still living, would most probably have objected to their being included in my work: Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, Sir Edward Hamilton, Sir Edward Malet and "another ambassador who is still serving this country in a great capital," meaning, of course, Sir Frank Lascelles. You are, I dare say, right in your surmise regarding all of them; and you might have added Mr. Morley and others to your list. I myself felt certain that to ask the permission of any of them to publish would have been to invite a refusal, though at the same time I felt equally certain that, except on the theory which I did not acknowledge that history was destined to continue the work of deception practised daily in Parliament, they would have no right to refuse. The conventions of diplomacy and official life would have certainly obliged all these old friends to say "no" to me, and I should have found myself in a worse position than before in regard to my intended publication. Therefore I did not ask their leave. On the other hand, I knew that what I had to record could do them personally no kind of injury. As a matter of fact, two out of the four persons named by you have written to me since, saying that they approved the publication or that it did not matter; nor have I any reason to suppose that the other two will resent what I have recorded of their words. With Sir Auckland Colvin alone of those quoted in my book, though not by you, have I still any bone to

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pick; and I am quite prepared to deal with him as he deserves if he ventures to take up the challenge I have now in my history renewed. At the hands of all others of my old friends and acquaintance whose words I have reproduced I have good hope to obtain absolution, and to reach the end of my days undisturbed by any serious remonstrance from them connected with my "indiscretions."

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. FREDERIC HARRISON TO MR. BLUNT.

Elm Hill, Hawkhurst,  
*July 9th, 1907.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I have now read your book, which I find much difficulty in judging, and still more difficult in writing to you my judgment. I cannot agree with you about the unauthorized publication of very friendly confidential letters and conversations, and hence I shall now write with great caution, saying not a word that I do not hold it both on private and public grounds, desirable to be made public now or at any time. I will therefore state under separate heads the points I feel quite clearly established.

1. Egypt, the Islamic world, and *ultimately* (hereafter) the conscience of England, will feel a profound debt of gratitude to you and your memory (long years hence) for your courage, energy, and insight in championing the National movement in Egypt.

2. That will hold good, although the steps taken may not have been always wise or even justifiable, and in spite of your violating recognized rules of public and private life.

3. I have re-read everything I wrote and recalled everything I did in 1881-2, and I do not wish to recall or qualify a word or an act. I would even republish whatever I then wrote again, were it not that at present in the crisis I fear it would do more harm than good.

4. I regard the crisis as most grave, and likely to become far worse, ending, I fear, in insurrection, to be suppressed with renewed crimes and oppression.

5. Therefore I still think the present the wrong time to publish your book.

6. Your "secret history" is *prima facie* perfectly coherent and *vraisemblable* in the main. But neither the public, nor even your friends and colleagues, can accept the whole of it as *proven* until we hear what the public men incriminated will say or not say.

## *Correspondence with Frederic Harrison*

7. The story is utterly damning to the public characters of the agents, and especially to Gladstone, Morley, Dilke, and Colvin. All but Gladstone are alive, and the biographers of Gladstone and of Granville are in office, with access to all the documents public and private. All of these men *must* take some notice ere long. Till they do, the public will not be convinced by you.

8. Your history also will fail to convince through the way in which tremendous charges of crime are brought forward on hearsay, gossip, and suspicion.

9. The public will not believe, and I do not believe, that Gladstone, Granville, and Morley knowingly conspired to have the minister of a friendly state *murdered in cold blood* by the Turkish officials, and that all these intrigued to get the murder done.

10. I do not believe that John Morley wrote or even saw the passages you cite from "P. M. G." as to Arabi's murder. You attribute them to J. M. personally.

11. There are many other imputations of  *motive*  as to Gladstone, Morley, Colvin, Cookson, etc., etc., etc., which only rest on suspicion or hearsay, and which will fail to obtain credence.

12. The parliamentary rule *never impute motives* is right in politics. All public acts are incited by a set of various  *motives* , some of which  *cannot be known* , and certainly cannot be  *proved* .

13. Morley, Fitzmaurice, Dilke, Malet, Colvin, Moberly Bell, may all be able to produce documents displacing these suspicions and traversing your statements. And when they do, your whole case will be doubted.

14. I have read your defence in the "Athenæum," but am not convinced. The letters and conversations you use were written and spoken in the intimacy of private friendship and upon the understanding recognized by gentlemen that they were and would be regarded as confidential. Public life would have to be carried on in a very different way if this rule were frequently violated.

15. I have not changed by a hair's breadth my own opinion about Egypt and the Occupation. On the contrary it is very much deepened. I read the "Egyptian Standard" with fear and horror.

16. I wish I could see some practical mode of helping to solve this terrible problem.

17. Your book will be reviewed in the forthcoming "Positivist Review."

I am sorry to write like this, but really you force your friends and correspondents to hold you at arm's length.

I am yours sincerely,

FREDERIC HARRISON.

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MR. BLUNT TO MR. FREDERIC HARRISON.

Newbuildings Place, Sussex,  
*July 17th, 1907.*

DEAR HARRISON,

I am sorry to find myself in serious disagreement with you on any political subject, and especially about Egypt, after so many years of our campaigning there as allies. But your letter about my Egyptian Book needs an answer and one which I feel may lead to controversy, possibly of a public kind, and heaven knows what may then be the result.

The points in your letter which seem to me to call for an immediate reply from me are these:

1. You say that your ideas about Egypt and the events of 1881-82 have not changed since twenty-five years ago and that you do not wish to recall or qualify a word or an act you then said or did, and you still think that I was right in then championing the National Egyptian cause. But you think also that I have chosen the wrong time now to publish, that the present crisis is "most grave" and that silence would have been better. You are sure that the "conscience of England" will ultimately be touched to the point of being grateful to me, but apparently that it is dangerous to count upon it now, or else that the shaping of Egyptian affairs is in hands that may be trusted and in the safeguard of Ministerial consciences that need no public reminders.

I confess I cannot see things in this light. The crisis seems to me not a whit more grave to-day than it was in 1882, when you spoke out so manfully, while, as to the consciences of Ministers, what can you possibly find in Bannerman or Grey to inspire more confidence than formerly in Gladstone and Granville? With Morley arresting and deporting Hindoo patriots by *lettres de cachet*, and Bannerman proposing a vote of £50,000 to Cromer, after giving him the Order of Merit within a week of Denshawai, one must be green indeed to believe in the present Cabinet as one in the smallest degree to be trusted where national movements in the East are concerned, or even as coming up to the ordinary Whig standard of moral intelligence in dealing with such cases.

I believe, as you apparently still do, that Egypt will, in the new hurly-burly which is coming upon Asia, manage, if only by "the skin of her teeth," to save her national life. But it will not be by inaction, or by the silence of her few sympathisers among Englishmen, or by our waiting patiently for a spontaneous awakening of the conscience of British Ministers. What national cause

## Correspondence with Frederic Harrison

was ever won in this way or was injured by the free telling of the truth, as you have so often told it, to Kings and Potentates, to Prime Ministers and Parliaments? . . .

2. With regard to the matter of my book, you say my "Secret History" is *prima facie* coherent and *vraisemblable*, but that the story I tell is "too utterly damning to Gladstone, Morley, Dilke, and Colvin" to be believed until these or their literary executors shall have spoken—also that it will fail to convince "through the way in which tremendous charges of crime are brought forward on hearsay, gossip, and suspicion"; and you instance especially the case of the Dervish mission as to which you say nobody will believe and you yourself do not believe that Gladstone, Granville and Morley "knowingly conspired to have the Minister of a friendly state (Arabi) murdered in cold blood by Turkish officials and that all three intrigued to get the murder done."

As you have selected this case, as an extreme example against me, I answer your objection about it in detail. The charge thus epitomised is doubtless grave, even "tremendous." But the statement of it is yours, not mine. I nowhere talk of a "conspiracy," and do not suppose that the three "conspirators" ever talked it over together. I do not in my book affirm, nor do I think it likely that Gladstone was told of Dervish's antecedents nor exactly of what was expected he should do in Egypt. What I do say is that Granville relied on Dervish's being "quite unscrupulous," and that at the Foreign Office what was expected of him was that he should "get rid of" Arabi by fair means if possible—if not, by foul means. For my knowledge of this I give my reasons in my book.

That it was not a mere unfounded suspicion seems to me amply proved by this: I do not now for the first time after twenty-five years charge it against the Foreign Office. I brought forward precisely the same charge at the time it was happening, to Mr. Gladstone in a public letter, published next day in the "Times," and a little later presented to Parliament in a Blue Book. Yet, not only was the charge not met nor denied by those concerned, but, notwithstanding its gravity and its publicity and the fact that it was made to the Prime Minister, it was not resented by Mr. Gladstone, as a false charge certainly would have been resented, nor did it make a barrier to my continuing in honourable and even friendly correspondence with him then and for many years to come. It did not even exclude me permanently from the precincts of the Foreign Office. You seem to forget that, at that time, the official view of the position in Egypt was that the constitutional *régime* in Egypt had been imposed by military force. It had never been recognized in Downing Street. They

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chose to consider it a violation of international rights, and Arabi not as the legal Minister of War but as a revolutionary leader, almost a mutineer. If Arabi had been shot by Dervish, as was expected of him, all England would have probably applauded. As for Morley, he, as Ministerial apologist in the "P. M. G.," went with the rest. You say that you "do not believe that John Morley wrote or even saw the passages printed in the 'P. M. G.'" Unless he has told you so, you are a very bold man to disbelieve. Morley was the "P. M. G." editor, and a very careful one. Colvin was his Cairo correspondent. Brett was his collaborator. He was in close relations with the F. O. Even if he should now affirm anything so improbable as that he neither wrote nor saw the passages, what jury would accept his recollections? It is twenty-five years ago. He has been a busy man ever since. *Credat Judaeus!*

But this is not all. Now for your own personal disbelief in the story. You say you *do not believe* it. In regard to this I have just been looking through your letters to me of the time and comparing them with other memoranda in my possession, and I find that, at the date when it all happened, you not only had no hesitation in accepting what I told you as true, but that you took it up personally, that you urged me to write my public letter to Gladstone which included the charge, and that you did your best to help me to spread a knowledge of the whole affair. I will give you the exact dates. My first communication with you at all on the Egyptian crisis was in connection with your second letter published in the "P. M. G." of 9th June, the day after Dervish had landed in Egypt. I then wrote to you proposing to show you my correspondence, as yet unpublished, with Downing Street. On the 12th, by your appointment, we met, and I gave you the correspondence to read. Five days before, 7th June, I had learned from Lady Gregory, and afterwards separately from Sir William Gregory, who had it from himself, Granville's reliance on Dervish as a "quite unscrupulous man," who would "get rid of Arabi one way or other." On the 10th Morley had published his truculent article about Dervish, the "still strong man," who would "manipulate Arabi not in the Western but in the Oriental sense of that word." On the 11th the Alexandria riot had occurred; and on the day of our meeting, the 12th, the papers were full of it. Dervish's mission and what was expected of him was the thing uppermost at the time in my mind, and, though it is not in my diary, I know our conversation was about it and about the violent policy in dealing with Arabi first suggested in September by Colvin—Colvin's suggestion of shooting Arabi was alluded to in two of the letters of the correspondence I showed you, first in my



## *Correspondence with Frederic Harrison*

letter of 20th March to Granville, and secondly in my letter to Gladstone of 17th May.

Now this is what you write me next day, 13th June: "I have been deeply interested in these papers. They put the conduct of our government in a very melancholy light. Your letter to Mr. Gladstone of 17th May is especially significant, and it is to me extraordinary that Mr. Gladstone with this knowledge before him has allowed such things to be done. It seems plain to me that the main author of the mischief is Sir Auckland Colvin. The Indian officials are not the men to employ in foreign diplomacy. They introduce into politics the abominable Indian notions about driving the 'niggers.' If I find means of saying anything more I will publicly demand the recall of Sir A. Colvin on the ground of his intriguing against a Native Ministry and advising the arrest of the head of the National party. . . . I am also to give a lecture on the principles of the [Anti-aggression] League on the 26th to a representative body of political societies—Sir Wilfrid Lawson is to take the chair; and I think of making the address, with his consent, on the crisis in Egypt and calling for the dismissal of Sir A. C. I must say that your letters seem to show that you have been taking a part most useful and just; and I am astonished at the conduct Mr. Gladstone has permitted in his name. I am not yet in any position to assert confidence in the party as a matter of my own knowledge; but so far as I see I wish nothing but success to the National movement and hope it may live to get every European official and money agent and journalist out of the land altogether."

Again, on the 17th of June, you write: "I am following up the Egyptian crisis with all my strength. I hope the protest of the Anti-aggression League, which is very plain spoken, will be out to-day. I am urging what I believe to be the truth on Ministers, editors and M.P.s whenever I get a chance. . . . I hope to have a series of letters in the 'Daily News,' and on the 26th I am going to address a meeting of representative working men at the Memorial Hall."

On the 20th you advise me to write Gladstone a public letter and have it printed. This I do on the following day, the 21st, and on the 23rd it is published in the "Times." In this letter I say of Dervish's mission: "It is lamentable to record that the English Foreign Office seems to have counted mainly on the fact that he was a man notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have reason to know that what was expected of him was that he should summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople, that failing this he should have recourse to bribery, and that in the extreme resort he should arrest and shoot the

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Minister of War as a mutineer with his own hand." Here you will observe the charge against the Foreign Office is very distinctly made. You say now that you cannot believe it, yet here is what you wrote that very day, 23rd June: "I am rejoiced by your powerful and exhaustive letter in the 'Times.' I cannot imagine how any fair and honest mind can refuse to see its truth and justice. The case is too strong for the enemy. I have just read the new Blue Book issued to-day. Everything in it confirms your view. Pray print your letter on a loose sheet and send it round to M.P.s. If you will send a packet of them to the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, on Monday at 8 p.m., we will distribute them at the doors. For once in my life I am thankful to Bismarck and the Sultan. The cause of the National Party in Egypt is really gained."

3. A more difficult matter to deal with is your blame of my having quoted in my history private letters on public affairs and private conversations. You say you are not convinced by my letter to the "Athenæum" of my right in honour to do this. This from you is a severe reproof. All I can say in answer to it beyond what I have already said in the "Athenæum" is that, if I have noted private conversations with public men in my diary and preserved their letters, I have at least sinned in good and honourable company from John Evelyn downwards. The question of honour on the point of diary keeping is a nice one, and I do not know that any rule has ever been laid down about it. My own personal rule has been, first, to be carefully accurate and never to be tempted by my own political bias to exaggerate anything of what has been said, but as far as possible to record the very words spoken, indicating also, where necessary, the degree of seriousness to be attached to them, for without this things said merely in jest might stand recorded as grave utterances. My second rule has been not to use such records to the speakers' personal hurt. It is very rarely indeed that I have referred to my diaries in controversies of the day. At the same time I have always intended within the sphere of my own knowledge to be the chronicler of my time, and as I said in my "Athenæum" letter, I hold a chronicler or historian to be free of all conventions. Your rule about private and public letters, about confidential communications, and also that excellent one about not imputing motives are very necessary no doubt for Parliament which might become a bear garden without them, and it is also doubtless necessary, seeing how public life is carried on in England, to make distinction between public and private talk. But history knows nothing of these laws. Nor, even in current politics, should I be much frightened at what you say would have

*Correspona.*

*Frederic Harrison*

to be the alternative, namely, that "public life would have to be considered in a very different way if these rules were frequently violated." I should only reply to you: "Why not?"

According to my view, if the distinction between public and private utterances, between official and confidential despatches, and between open and secret communications were entirely done away with, it would be a very great gain to English politics and to national and international honour. We should have fewer misunderstandings abroad, and infinitely less hypocrisy and double dealing at home. For myself, though I have been engaged in a number of unusual adventures, which some have called unpatriotic and others treasonable, for the last thirty years, it would not disturb me if every word that I have uttered to my friends about any of them were repeated and made known, nor do I think that it would forfeit me my friends' regard. The reason is that I have made almost no difference between my language in public and my language in private. I am conscious of having said many unwise things, many imprudent things, and occasionally some violent things. But I should not resent the act of a friend who published them faithfully and without malice. The sole distinction, I think, which ought to be drawn between what is secret and what public, is as to really private life where politics are not in question. There the world at large has no concern. In every detail, however, of a statesman's public life, however he may hide it, I hold we have every one of us concern, legitimate and urgent. We are all entitled to know whether the man who is managing our national affairs is telling us what he really thinks or talking with his tongue in his cheek.

What surprises me most in your letter is that you of all men should have written it and been severe on this particular point. It puzzles me to account for it. Two years ago when I consulted you about these very memoirs, showing you the proofs then being privately printed, you expressed indeed your opinion very strongly that they could not be immediately published, but the reasons you gave me were quite others than you give now—possible legal actions, public and private recriminations, worries that would endanger my health. Of the graver reasons you now urge, including this question of honour—and the published volume has been purged of much personal matter—you did not say a word. You may be right in all you say about it now; but, I repeat, your severity puzzles me.

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

*Note.*—Lord Granville, questioned in the House of Lords as to my statement about Dervish Pasha, said, June 26th: "It is hardly

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necessary for me to state to the <sup>it</sup> that the Foreign Office have not endeavoured to support <sup>his o</sup> Fore Bey in any illegitimate mode of getting rid of Arabi Bey." <sup>can</sup>, however, was denying not what I had said in my letter to <sup>M</sup> Gladstone, but a great deal more than I had said—a common form of Parliamentary evasion.

MR. FREDERIC HARRISON TO MR. BLUNT.

Eln Hill, Hawkhurst,  
July 27, 1907.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

As your long letter (of five folios), dated 17th inst., is evidently written for present or future publication (whether with my consent or not), I can only answer it very shortly. I take the deepest interest in this and other Imperial questions, which seem to me now in a critical stage; I am doing my best to master an understanding of them. But I do not intend in a private correspondence to be drawn into a premature discussion of them, which may at any moment, without my knowledge, be made public in whole or in part.

I will, therefore, now say no more than that having read and considered what you write, I adhere to every word I have ever said or written about Egypt in public or in private. And you have my full consent to make public that on our recent correspondence, provided it be given in full.

I will only add that what I wrote and tried to do in 1882 is not the same thing as publishing a history of it in 1907. The situation in 1907 is different from what it was in 1905 when I read *parts only* of your book in proof. My letter of 13th June, 1882, which you quote, does not imply that I adopted every word in your "Times" letter. If I really thought in 1882 that Gladstone and Morley planned and encouraged the assassination of Arabi, I do not think so now.

Yours most sincerely,  
FREDERIC HARRISON.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HARRISON.

Newbuildings Place,  
Sussex.  
Aug. 6th, 1907.

DEAR HARRISON,

I am glad you say in so many words that you consent to the publication of our recent correspondence—you said it at the out-

## *Correspondence with Frederic Harrison*

set in regard to your own first letter—and I will certainly take an opportunity of having it printed in full. I consider it of very great importance, both as bearing on points of history and in connection with the question of literary morality raised by the "Athenæum." I only wish that those who are more directly concerned in these matters would speak their minds about it to me as plainly as you have done.

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

*Note.*—I publish Mr. Harrison's letters in their entirety according to his wish, notwithstanding the severe strictures they contain on my work, severer than any which have appeared in the press, and which are the weightier that they come from one whose opinions deserve all possible respect. I publish them for the two reasons given in my concluding letter to him.

In the first place, I hope and believe that my doing so, in conjunction with my own defence of my position, may have some small effect with public opinion by calling attention to the extreme lengths to which parliamentary insincerity and the double dealing of ministers, especially in foreign affairs, have of late years been carried, and to the corresponding necessity there has arisen for as extreme plain speaking in matters historical.

My second reason is that, though he does not avow it, Mr. Harrison must I think be looked upon as in some degree the semi-official apologist of those still living members of Mr. Gladstone's government and the Liberal Party whose violent acts in 1882 my work so severely condemns. His words in defence of Mr. Morley at any rate bear that interpretation. When Mr. Harrison affirms of some of these ministers that "they *must* take notice ere long" of a story so "utterly damning" to them and suggests that "with access to all the documents public and private" they may have a counter case which will yet disprove some portion of my narrative, and especially when he declares his belief that Mr. Morley neither "wrote or even saw" certain damnatory passages published by him as editor of the "Pall Mall Gazette," he is surely speaking with knowledge at least of the excuse these ministers would desire to have made for them.

For myself, having no desire in my Egyptian chronicle but that the whole truth should be revealed, whatever its nature and by whomsoever told, I gladly seize the opportunity Mr. Harrison allows me of printing his words, feeling sure that an opinion so strongly expressed by so high a priest of liberal ideas is more likely than anything else to force the doors of the long official reticence, if indeed there is any secret explanation or excuse of

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the Liberal Ministry's action other than the story told by their Blue Books, which I have shown to be fundamentally untrue. It is significant of the little real fault which can be officially found with my narrative that, at the moment of this Second Edition going to press, October 14th, Sir Edward Malet, between whose testimony and mine issues of such immense historical importance lay, should after four months' reflection have thought it worth while to write to the "Times," challenging my accuracy on a single insignificant point of detail, namely, whether his going on board ship at Alexandria was or was not connected with the warning I had given in Downing Street of his life being threatened.

W. S. B.

### VIII. NAPOLEON'S OPINION OF THE VALUE OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

THE following is from O'Meara's "Voice from St. Helena": "I observed that I believed all ambassadors and other official persons in all countries wrote two accounts, one for the public, and the other containing matters which it might not be right to divulge. 'True, Signor Medico,' replied Napoleon, taking me by the ear in a good-humoured manner, 'but there is not so Macchiavelian a Ministry in the world as your own. *Cela tient à votre système.* That, and the liberty of your press, obliges your Ministers to render some account to the Nation, and therefore they want to be able to deceive the public in many instances; but as it is also necessary for them to know the truth *themselves*, they have a double correspondence; one official and false, calculated to gull the Nation when published or called for by Parliament; the other private and true, to be kept locked up in their own possession and not deposited in the archives. In this way they manage to make everything appear as they wish to John Bull. Now this system of falsehood is not necessary in a country where there is no obligation to publish or to render an account; if the Sovereign does not like to make known any transaction *officially*, he keeps it to himself and gives no explanation; therefore there is no need for causing varnished accounts to be written in order to deceive the people. For these reasons there are more falsifications in your official documents than in those of any other Nation.'

W. S. B.

## *Sir Edward Malet on his leaving Egypt*

### IX. SIR EDWARD MALET ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS LEAVING EGYPT IN JUNE, 1882.

SIR EDWARD MALET has complained through the "Times" of a passage in this book (page 337) where I have recorded from my diary the fact of my having gone to Downing Street in June, 1882, and implored Mr. Hamilton to "get Malet ordered on board ship," adding a note in brackets, "this was done." Sir Edward argues from the note that I must have meant that I had got him withdrawn from his post by Her Majesty's Government because he had "incurred their gravest censure."

I do not believe that any such meaning can legitimately be read into the text. Certainly none such was in my mind, when many years afterwards, in transcribing the passage for print, I added the note in question. It is indeed impossible that I should have had such a meaning, knowing well as I did that his conduct of affairs was so little disapproved at the Foreign Office that he returned a month later to his post and remained on there as Consul-General till August, 1883. Incidentally his letter to the "Times" corroborates the entry in my diary, for he says, "I did indeed receive a telegram from Lord Granville on Friday the 16th saying that he had heard that my life was in danger, and asking whether I had not better go on board ship and transact business from the harbour." His contention, however, is that he was not "ordered" on board, but obliged to go on board a week later on account of "a mysterious fever of which I nearly died and most certainly should have died if it had not ceased at midnight on Sunday the 18th as mysteriously as it came." He adds that, after reading Mr. Blunt's book, "I have come to the conclusion that the telegram of Sabunji about my life being in danger was well founded, and that the fever which laid me low on June 17 was the result of a plot to poison me carried into execution two days after Sabunji telegraphed to Mr. Blunt that I should 'certainly be murdered if I continued.'"

In the same correspondence he prints a letter he received from Lord Dufferin, dated 14th January, 1883, while they were both at Cairo. In it Lord Dufferin says: "No one recognised sooner than myself the admirable judgment and correct appreciation of the situation which you exhibited, and long before I came here I never lost an opportunity of doing you justice. Since I have been here and learned more of what passed I am more than ever confirmed in my original impression."

I give this extract from what is apparently a written testimonial

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from Lord Dufferin, Sir Edward's chief at the time, for what it may be historically worth. There is no doubt that Sir Edward Malet's conduct of affairs in Egypt was officially approved.

### X. LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM BUTLER, G.C.B., TO MR. BLUNT.

Bansha, Ireland.

24th Oct., 1907.

DEAR MR. BLUNT.

Mr. Fisher Unwin has kindly sent me a copy of your recent work, "The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt." The book is of absorbing interest; but it seems to me to attempt the task—more difficult now than probably at any period of history—of telling the truth. How far you have succeeded in that task I am unable to say; but, speaking as an obscure actor in the drama which closed the story, I can say that, wherever my small personal path crossed the main road of the narrative told in your book, my recollection of events is in agreement with you.

Of course you will be abused by the Tribes and the Tetrarchs, that has ever been the cost, and it will continue. The greater the spread of education, as it is called, the greater will be the effort of manipulators of public opinion to mislead and delude the people. The old dynastic quarrels, which Europe was familiar with two hundred years ago, and the wars which arose through the interference of European Monarchs and Governments in the internal affairs of France at the close of the eighteenth century, were capable of being fairly weighed and judged by men of ordinary intelligence. But far more subtle in their inceptions, more delusive in their excuses, and more dangerous in their consequences, are those wars which have their secret origins in the minds of powerful financial combinations, or find their chief supporters among the dealers in speculative Finance.

These are powers which have grown to alarming proportions in our day, and the conflicts which they engineer or support, threaten greater evils to the human race than ever came from "the big wars that make ambition virtue." The only thing that can kill these sordid giants of our Time is Truth, and, if that is ever to have a chance, it can only be by making History the medium of teaching it, preventing the record being degraded to the level defined by the Master Maker of history one hundred years ago as "Fiction by Agreement."



### *Sir William Butler's Letter*

It is very interesting to read in your papers the quotations from Gladstone's article on Egypt written in 1877, so entirely true in its forecast, and then to follow the story down to the signal discomfiture and failure, to which acquiescence in the very policy he had once denounced finally led him. Were the secret sordid forces too strong for him in his old age?

How does the following extract from one of Mr. Bernard Shaw's plays fit your story :

"The Government of your country!" [It is Undershaft the millionaire explosive maker, who is speaking.] "I am the Government of your country. Do you suppose that you and half a dozen amateurs like you, sitting in a row in that foolish gabble-shop can govern Undershaft and Lazarus? No, my friend—*You* will do what pays *us*—You will make war when it suits us, and keep peace when it doesn't. You will find out that trade requires certain measures when we have decided on these measures. When I want anything to keep my dividends up, you will discover that my want is a national need ; when other people want something to keep my dividends down, you will call out the police and military, and in return you shall have the support and applause of my newspapers, and the delight of imagining that you are a great statesman.

"Government of your country! Be off with you, my boy, and play with your Caucuses and leading articles, and the rest of your toys. *I* am going back to my counting house—to pay the piper, and to call the tune."

But all this will pass from the valley of the Nile; and we may rest assured that the tunes of Messrs. Undershaft and Lazarus will not be the final note sounded by Memnon before the Tombs of the Kings.

Yours sincerely,  
W. F. BUTLER.



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