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Papers relating to the hostilities with
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BURMAH.

In the present posture of our affairs on the eastern frontier of India, it is not unimportant to consider the character of the people inhabiting the regions beyond the Ganges, when it is remembered how much our intercourse with those semi-barbarous nations has been impeded by our ignorance of their national prejudices and our contempt for their mental qualities.

The extra Gangetic nations divide themselves into upwards of thirty branches, which, they maintain, possess in common the same physical conformation. Their average height is 5 feet 3 inches, and they weigh about 120 lbs. each; they are active, fleshy, strong, and symmetrical in form. The Chinese, Siamese, and Kareens, are the fairest; the Arracanese, Burmese, and Peguers the darkest. The first three are of a bright cane colour; the last three are dark bamboo: the other tribes are of every intermediate shade. They have all a more uniform standard of conformation than prevails in the Caucasian race; the deviations from the fixed standard being few, and those not of an important character.

With regard to the Burmans, it is obvious to the most casual observer on the spot, that the country is gradually falling to decay. While the people of India are pressing forward with rapid strides, in defiance of the trammels of caste, scarcely glancing behind them, and then only to smile at the errors of their ancestors, the Burmese are receding from twilight into darkness, gathering their wisdom from books fourteen hundred years old, turning the fables of their forefathers into truths, pausing in puerile admiration over the knowledge and exploits of their ancestors, and lamenting their own fallen condition; the government meanwhile, regardless of the value of life, draining an already half-peopled country of its inhabitants, towns dwindling into villages, and villages disappearing altogether, communication becoming less frequent, the people, dispirited by oppression, passionately attached to the soil, anxiously waiting the fulfilment of the prediction, which promises them restoration of their lost happiness and power, under a wise and just dynasty.* The wars, which had prevailed since the twelfth century, at one time between the Shans and Burmans, at another between the Siamese and Peguers, and at a later period between the Peguers and Burmans, had almost stripped those regions of their inhabitants, when the warlike propensities of the successors of Alongpora gave the final blow to the prosperity of Burmah. They robbed their cities of every able-bodied man and carried their arms into Siam, Arracan, Assam and Cassay, exterminating the people wherever they came, till the whole tract, from the 95th to the 100th degree of longitude, and from Cape Nagrais to the Tropic, became nearly untenanted, by human beings. This vast tract is now overrun with an extensive jungle which encloses within its gigantic embrace the ruins of numerous forts and temples, that serve to indicate the spots which in former times were crowded with a dense population, whose descendants are gathered in scanty groups upon the banks of the magnificent rivers, which still water the land. But they have lost the enterprise and valour which for ages rendered them the terror of every neighbouring country, and retain only the vanity, obstinacy, and restlessness by which they have always been characterized. These degenerate people seldom engage in any pursuit which demands much mental application; their books upon religion and scientific subjects are translations from the Pales: they have no knowledge of perspective, their drawings being all in profile; their poetry is confined to odes and songs of love and war, the larger poems being paraphrastic translations of the great Hindu epics; their knowledge of music is very limited; their system of anatomy is imperfect; they are unacquainted with chemistry, and believe in the transmutation of metals. On the other hand, they are acquainted with vegetable physiology, and recognise the sexes of plants; they can work in gold with considerable taste; they can weave intricate patterns, which even in England have been found difficult to imitate, and they can carve in wood with tolerable ingenuity; but, upon the whole, they do not excel, or even attain mediocrity, in any art which demands elaborate manipulation; and the few manufactures which they still possess flourished among them in higher perfection at the moment of our first acquaintance with them than they do at the present moment.

The vivacity of the Burmans is observable in their conversation; they talk over trifles with the same zest and interest as the people of other countries discuss events of momentous importance. We are sorry to add, that they season their discourse with the most astounding falsehoods, which pass without any other notice than a smile, for lying is not held in much disesteem; on the contrary, it is a national boast, that the Burmans are without equals in their adroitness in concealing the truth. Candour and sincerity are unknown to them; they are early taught by experience to study precaution, and practice dissimulation in every action of their lives. Happy or sad, their physiognomies announce neither pleasure nor grief; questioned upon the simplest topic, they return an indirect reply. Empty are their promises, and idle their professions of regard; artifice and circumvention are resorted to as the legitimate means of obtaining their ends, and so necessary are they considered, that the man who should employ neither deceit nor stratagem in the attainment of his object would be looked upon as little better than a fool.

At the commencement of hostilities in 1823, such had been the discouragement to respectable English merchants, that there were no more than three houses in Ava, and four at Rangoon, to supply a population of nearly three millions with foreign goods, and it was not till the termination of the war that trade was placed upon a firm footing. Numerous restrictions having been removed by a commercial treaty, the return of peace brought a considerable influx of English traders, and imports of plain and coloured cottons, muslins, opium, arms, and wrought iron, were made to a large amount, which was annually increasing, the returns being teak, bullion, rice, and catch, when a suspension of friendly intercourse between the Company and Tharawaddy suddenly annihilated the trade, and what is infinitely more deplorable, left us without a guarantee for the performance of the remaining articles of the treaty of Yandabo.

The Burmans are vain, obstinate, and suspicious; the uniformity which prevails throughout the entire population, in their physical structure, extends in an equal degree to their moral development of character; the diversity of talent, the variety of aspect, and disparity of form, so conspicuous in individuals of the civilized countries of Europe, are scarcely to be found in Burmah; the king and the Mekran prince are almost the only exceptions to the mediocrity which every where prevails. The national characteristics are, perhaps, less strongly marked in the priests, arising from the life of study and devotion which they are compelled to observe; but these are not perpetuated, in consequence of their celibacy. Each person conforms to the habits of the mass; and, in respect of fortune, they are more upon a par with each other than any people who dwell in cities. Each has the same opinion of himself, of his country, and of foreigners in general. Symmetrical and robust, the Burman affects a contempt for the "black stranger" of India, who is lightly formed, and trammelled with the observances of caste. "With respect to his country, it is the most favoured region of the south-island; its rocks are rubies, gold its sand." Its king receives tribute from a hundred and one vassal princes of Shans and Kareens; he once conquered Arracan, Assam, Siam, Pegu, and Tenasserim, and drove away an army of Chinese invaders, "whose weight pressed the earth from its centre." With regard to foreigners, all living to the west of the Ganges (with the exception of the Arabs) are "strangers," divided by caste, black, poor, and timid. The Chinese live near the rising sun, are fair of complexion, ingenious, and industrious; the Siamese are the handsomest, and the most cowardly; the Arracanese the darkest, the poorest, and the most servile. With these extravagant notions of themselves, the Burmans entered upon the war with the company in 1823, and, notwithstanding our signal success, their ideas have undergone very little change. The courage and magnanimity of the English have excited no admiration; our moderation has been overlooked, and our retention of the kingdoms which we conquered has inflicted an incurable wound upon the national vanity. Even his highness, Tharawaddy, who fled before our troops at Prome, and entreated his brother to make peace with the terrible foreigners, has outlived his own fears, and forgotten his own advice. The rich presents from the viceroys to the north, south, and east, no longer pour into his treasury; the splendor of his court is diminished, and the reliance of the people upon the excellence of sovereign power has already begun to waver. In contemplating these evils, he ascribes them to the wrong cause, and is about to attempt their cure by the wrong means. Instead of looking to the insatiable ambition of his predecessors, and more immediately to the hostile propensities of his brother, as the cause of the invasion of Burmah in 1823, and to the inability of an impoverished country to maintain a struggle with a wealthy and flourishing state, as the occasion of the series of disasters which befel the Burman army, he traces the first to the artful policy of the company, in making the collision of two parties on the frontiers of the two states a pretext for quarrel between the powers themselves; and finds the origin of the second in the imbecility and treachery of his brother's advisers! Instead of seeking the remedy for the wasting malady which has brought the country to the point of dissolution, in remodelling the government and adapting it to the emergencies of the times, he imagines that the resumption of the lost provinces will arrest the progress of decay, and ultimately restore his kingdom to its former vigour. To accomplish this undertaking, he well knows he must be aided by other powers, and to enlist their sympathies he must make them sensible of the dangers which encompass them. The Company's inordinate thirst for universal dominion is the theme which they best understand; it speaks to their experience, and kindles their alarm; they have all suffered more or less by our propinquity, and if any of them have received occasional benefit from our protection, it has rendered them envious of our prowess.

To drive out the common enemy by a simultaneous movement of the Indian princes, has been contemplated a hundred times, and attempted upon more than one occasion; it is still the favourite project of the discontented, and will be put in operation again, whenever a fitting moment may present itself.

* A tradition is now circulating among the Burmans, that the seventh sovereign of the dynasty founded by Aiongya will be replaced by a prince of supernatural wisdom to whom universal dominion will be given over the "south island," that is, the world.

THE BIRMAN EMPIRE.

BIRMA, or the **BIRMAN EMPIRE**, of which other names are—**Butma**, **Brahma**, **Buragmah**, **Boman**, **Barma**, and **Varma**, called also the kingdom of **Ava**, extends over more than one-fourth of the surface of the Peninsula beyond the Ganges, and contains nearly the double of the area of the British islands. According to Crawford, it may be conjectured to contain in round numbers, about 184,000 square miles. But this is mere conjecture, its northern and eastern boundaries being imperfectly known. It is, however, certain that the most northern point of the empire extends considerably to the north of the 27th parallel, and probably passes the 28th, in the country of the **Bor Khamti** (Wilcox). We have still less information respecting the portion of Upper Lao, which is subject to the king of Ava. Berghaus, following Sir Francis Hamilton, extends it to 100° E. long., in the parallel of 22°. Farther south, where the river Saluen or Salween divides it from the kingdom of Siam and the English possessions of Martaban, the eastern frontier lies between 98° and 99° E. long. On the south, where it is bounded by the gulf of Martaban, it extends to 15° 44' lat., and on the west, where it borders on Aracan, it probably does not run west of 93° 20' long. The length of this country from the western mouth of the river Irawaddi to its source in the country of the **Bor Khamti**, may be about 950 miles. Its width to the south of the parallel of 24° amounts at an average to 220 miles, but to the north of it only to 130 miles. In this estimation, Upper Lao is not taken into account, which, between 21° 30' and 23° N. lat., extends perhaps 100 miles farther.

The Birman empire has about 240 miles of sea-coast along the gulf of Martaban, extending from the cape of **Kyai-kami**, near the British settlement of **Amherst** in Martaban, to **Cape Negrais**, the southern extremity of the **Aracan Mountains**. The whole of this coast is low, marshy, and broken by at least twenty considerable channels of rivers or arms of the sea.

The Birman territory is divided from the British province of **Aracan** by a range of mountains called by Europeans the **Aracan Mountains**, but by the natives **Anapectau-meaw** (**Anupectu-mew**) or the **Great Western Range**; also **Yeomadong** or **Romopokung Mountains**. It begins at 16° N. lat. with **Cape Negrais** (**Negraglia** of **Sangermano**), called by the **Birmans** **Modaen**, and extends in a northern direction with a slight bend westward to the northern boundary of **Aracan**, about 21° N. lat. The southern part of it, extending from 16° to 18° between the **Delta** of the **Irawaddi** and the **Gulf of Bengal**, presents one continued ridge of craggy rocks of a moderate height, whose bare cliffs of a reddish colour generally approach so near the sea as not to have any intermediate level ground between them and the ocean. This portion of the range is called by the **Birmans** **Modaen Garit**, from the Birman name of **Cape Negrais**. To the north of 18° N. **Aracan** on the west, while on the east extends the valley of the river **Irawaddi**. In this tract the mountains rise to a greater height, and between 20° and 21° N. lat. the highest summits are thought to attain 6000 feet above the level of the sea. Their western slope towards the plains of **Aracan** and the **Gulf of Bengal** is very rapid; but to the east they descend in a kind of terraces formed by three or four or more lateral ridges of less height, which however present rapid declivities on the east and west.

Three mountain-passes traverse the **Anapectau-meaw Mountains** and connect **Birma** with **Aracan**. The most southern, called the **Tongho Pass**, leads from **Padaong Mew** on the **Irawaddi**, 18° 34', to **Tongho** in **Aracan**, 19° 15' N. lat. The highest point of the pass is 4,692 feet above the sea, and many parts of it are so difficult that it cannot be travelled by beasts of burden. The eastern ridges are commonly covered with bamboo jungle, but on the western declivity there are extensive forests of lofty trees. The second pass connects **Sembeghewn**, in the valley of the **Irawaddi** (20° 40' N. lat.), with **Aeng** in **Aracan** (19° 53' N. lat.), and is called the **Nairiangain Pass**, from a small stockade of that name erected on the highest part of it. The **Birmans** used it as a military road to **Aracan**, and had rendered it passable for beasts of burden by building bridges over the precipices and cutting away the rocks in many places. Before the occupation of **Aracan** by the British, a considerable commerce was carried on by means of this road. This commerce is said to have occupied 40,000 persons, but this number seems greatly exaggerated. This road is now rapidly falling into decay, being exposed to the destructive influence of the south-west monsoons. The third mountain-pass begins likewise at **Sembeghewn** and leads to **Talak** in **Aracan**, 20° 10' N. lat.: by this Pass the **Birmans** entered **Aracan** at the time of the conquest of that country. But it seems that they did not use it afterwards, probably because that which leads to **Aeng** presented less difficulties. We have no information of any kind respecting this road.

To the north of 21° N. lat. the mountains appear to decrease considerably in height, but at the same time they divide into several ranges, running mostly north and south, and occupying a considerable tract of country. This rugged highland, which extends between and along the upper branches of the **Aracan** river, the **Surmah**, or river of **Sihet**, and some tributaries of the **Kyan Duayn**, a branch of the **Irawaddi**, is inhabited by savage nations which are independent of **Birma** and not subject to any of the princes protected by the British. The principal of these tribes are the **Kookis**, and on that account this country is called the highland of the **Kookis**. It has not been ascertained how far the authority of the court of **Ava** extends into this region.

Thus far the western boundary of the **Birman Empire** is formed by mountain-ranges. The remainder, from 24° N. lat. up to the **Nagas Mountains**, which divide it from **Assam**, is bounded by the territories of the **Rajah of Munipoore**, a prince who has placed himself under the protection of the British, and whose country extends eastward as far as the **Nampagna River**, a branch of the **Khyandusen**, which constitutes the boundary line of the **Birman Empire** in this part.

The northern extremity of **Birma** is again separated by mountain-ranges from the neighbouring country. The ranges called **Patkoi** or **Poapuo Mountains**, which rise to a great height, and the still higher **Langtan Mountains**, divide it from **Assam** and the countries along the **Upper Brahmapootra**. In the high summits, whence the **Brahmapootra** descends to the west, are also the sources of the **Irawaddi**, which river may with great propriety be called the river of **Birma**, as all the countries drained by it and its tributaries belong to that empire, with the single exception of the southern part of **Munipoore**. It has lately been ascertained that no part of the Chinese empire extends so far west as the banks of the **Irawaddi**. We shall, therefore, follow the course of this river, and make some observations on the countries drained by it.

The different opinions respecting the source of the **Irawaddi**, and its identity with the **Zangbo-tsin** of **Tibet**, will be examined under the head of **БРАХМАПООТРА**. Lieutenant **Wilcox** was informed that its source was at no great distance from that of the **Brahmapootra**, to the south of it, and about fifty miles from **Manchi**, a town of the **Bor Khamti**. The river soon issues from the mountains, and enters a plain, or rather an extensive valley, occupied by the **Bor Khamti**. The country here forms a perfect level, partly cultivated, and partly studded with clumps of trees and bamboos, and intersected by a number of rivulets. The **Irawaddi** opposite the town of **Manchi** is only eighty yards broad, and fordable. The plain on its banks is 1,855 feet above the level of the sea.

From the country of the Bor Khamti the Irawaddi continues its southern course through three degrees of latitude to Bhamnò, through countries about which we have scarcely any information at all. It would seem that high mountain-ranges frequently close upon it, and at other places plains of considerable extent border its banks. Such on its western side are the Samokhtura Mountains and the plain of Mungkung, extending on both sides of the Mungkung river far to the west. The mountain-ranges are partly in possession of the Singfos, a powerful mountain tribe which also occupies a considerable portion of the mountains south of Assam, and every where maintains its independence in the mountain-fastness. The ranges which divide this portion of Birma from the Chinese province of Yunnan seem to be exceedingly rugged, and the difficulties encountered in traversing them have always frustrated the attempts of the Chinese to conquer the countries along the Irawaddi. From Manchi to Bhamnò the river falls in the course of about 350 miles 1,300 feet, being at the latter place only 500 feet above the sea. This accounts for the river being unnavigable for the greater part of that distance, except for small canoes.

Bhamnò is a place of some note, being the principal market for Chinese goods, which are brought to this town on horses and asses. Below Bhamnò the river suddenly turns to the west, but soon resumes its southern course, and thus continues to a few miles east of Amarapoora. The river flows in this tract through a valley of no great breadth, the mountains inclosing it on each side, and frequently advancing to the very banks of the river, especially on the east. Between Bhamnò and Amarapoora the river is only navigable for small trading boats.

Above Amarapoora the Irawaddi begins to decline to the south-west, and from that town it runs in a western direction for nearly a hundred miles as far as the mouth of the Kyan-Duayn. With the change of the river the face of the country is changed. Issuing from the narrow valley it enters a very wide one, or rather a plain. Along its banks, and especially on the southern side, the level country extends for many miles, in some places even to thirty, and even then is not bounded by high mountains, but by moderate hills, which increase in height as they recede farther from the river. Considerable portions of this plain are covered by the inundations of the river in the wet season. On the north side of the river the hills are at no great distance from the banks, and here the ground is impregnated with muriate of soda and with nitre, of which great quantities are extracted. To the north of these hills is the lake of Nandagando, which extends in length from S. to N. above thirty miles; the country about it presents an undulating surface. At a considerable distance east of the mouth of the Kyan Duayn river the hills cease, and an open slightly-undulating country extends to its banks and beyond them. This portion of the valley of the Irawaddi seems to be the most fertile and most populous part of the Birman empire, and offers at the same time the most easy communication with its internal provinces. The Irawaddi opens an easy access to the north as well as to the south, and its two greatest tributaries, the Myit-ngè and the Kyan-Duayn, with the provinces lying east and north-west of the valley. The seat of government has for a long time been fixed in this central part of the empire, and here are the four capitals, Ava, Amarapoora, Sagaing (Zagain), and Monchabo.

The Myit-ngè, or 'Little river' (so called in comparison with the Irawaddi), which is named by Sir F. Hamilton the Mringugean, rises in the Chinese province of Yunnan, and runs a little to the west of south, nearly parallel with the Irawaddi, probably for more than three hundred miles. In this course it drains an elevated but wide, fertile, and well-peopled valley, in which its waters are employed to irrigate the cultivated lands. Arrived at the parallel of Ava, where it is still about eighty miles from the capital, it suddenly turns to the west, and continues generally in that direction to its mouth. Near its entrance into the Irawaddi it divides into two branches, of which the eastern retains the name of Myit-ngè; the western is called Myit-tha. On the island formed by these two branches of the Myit-ngè, the present capital of the country. Ava, is built, more especially near the mouth of the eastern or principal branch, which at this place is from 150 to 200 yards broad and very deep. It must be considered as the proper port of the capital, and a considerable number of war-boats are always stationed there.

Ava is called by the natives Angwa, meaning a fish-pond, because the town was erected on a place where such a pond had formerly been. This name has been corrupted by the Hindus and Malays into Awa, and by Europeans again into Ava; but in all public writings it bears the name of Ratnapoora, or the City of the Pearl.

Ava consists of the inner town or city and the outer town. The city occupies the north-east angle of the whole, and extends nearly up to the mouth of the Myit-ngè river. The outer town lies to the south-west of the city. The whole is surrounded by a brick wall fifteen and half feet high and ten feet in thickness, with innumerable embrasures about the distance of five feet from each other; on the island of the wall there is thrown up a bank of earth, forming an angle of about forty-five degrees. The ditch round this wall is inconsiderable, and during all the dry season fordable in every part. The Myit-ngè on the east face forms a considerable defence on that side. The city is enclosed by a separate wall, which is better constructed than that of the large town. The ditch on the south and west faces of it is also broader and deeper and not fordable; the east side is defended by the Myit-ngè, and the north by the Irawaddi. It is mostly occupied by the palace of the king, the Rung d'hau, or hall of justice, the Lut d'hau, or council chamber, the arsenal, and the habitations of a few courtiers of distinction. All these buildings are situated in a square, which is surrounded by a strong well-built wall about twenty feet in height; and on the outside of this wall and at no great distance is a teak-wood stockade of the same height as the wall.

The circumference of Ava round the walls and excluding the suburbs, is about five miles and a half. In general the houses are mere huts thatched with grass. Some of the dwellings of the chiefs are constructed of planks, and tiled; there are probably in all not half a dozen houses constructed of brick and mortar. Poor as the houses are, they are scattered over the extensive area of the place, and some large quarters are, indeed, wholly destitute of habitations. There are in the town eleven markets or bazars, composed of thatched huts and sheds, but well supplied with commodities, at least with reference to the wants and habits of the people.

The town of Ava, which twice before had been the capital of the Birman empire, became so a third time in 1822, and must therefore be considered as a new town. This accounts for its small population, which Crawford estimated in 1826 at only 25,000 inhabitants.

The town of Sagaing, or Zakkain, which was once the seat of government, is situated on the opposite side of the Irawaddi, directly fronting Ava. The river is at this place 1050 yards wide. On the river face the town has a brick wall, which extends for about half a mile: the height of this is not above ten feet; but it has a *terre pleine*, parapet, and embrasures, like the wall of Ava. On the land side there are no defences whatever. The town extends along the Irawaddi more than a mile and a half, but its depth towards the hills is very inconsiderable. It consists of mean houses thinly scattered among gardens and orchards. On the site of the town and its environs there are innumerable temples, ruinous, old or modern, which give it a striking appearance from a distance.

Moksobo, commonly called by Europeans Monchabo, is about fifty-two miles from Ava in a north-west direction, and at no great distance from the western shores of the lake of Nandagando. It is a walled town, and still a place of considerable traffic and population. In 1756, Alompra, the founder of the present dynasty, who was a native of the place, made it his capital, and gave it the Pali name of Ratna-sinha, or 'the pearl lion,' or lion of pearls.

Below the town of Ava the Irawaddi is a majestic river, whose breadth in some places extends to four miles and upwards, but it is commonly divided into many channels by sandy and uninhabited islands, which are inundated when the water of the river rises to its greatest height. Near the place where the river declines to the south-west begins an extensive island, called Ala-kyun or 'middle islands,' which extends for many miles to the confluence of the Kyan Duayn with the Irawaddi. It is the largest of all the islands in the river, high and not exposed to inundation, and consequently well cultivated and inhabited. Opposite this island on the eastern bank of the Irawaddi is the town of Yandabo, where the peace was concluded between the Birman and English in 1826.

The Kyan Duayn, by far the largest of the tributaries of the Irawaddi, drains an immense country, its further branches rising in the Patkoi Mountains and the Samokhtura, where these two chains meet the Langtan Mountains. The numerous streams which descend from these ranges unite in a country called Hukhung, which, according to our imperfect information, seems to be a large plain enclosed on all sides by mountains, but fertile, and offering extensive tracts for colonization. Hukhung lies between 26° and 27° N. lat. The river formed in this plain receives the name of the Tenni, and passes afterwards through a nearly unknown mountainous country in a narrow vale, till near 25° N. lat. it enters a wider valley, and unites with the Nampegna, which latter, for the greatest part of its course constitutes the boundary line between Birma and the kingdom of Munipoore. After this junction the country on the river begins to resemble an undulating plain, especially on the eastern banks of the river, which is here called the Ningthi. On the western banks the country belongs to Munipoore, and is much more hilly, and in some parts even mountainous. South of 24° N. lat. Birma extends on both banks of the Ningthi, which is here increased by the waters of the Kongba, or river of Munipoore, which comes from the west. This latter river runs nearly parallel to the Ningthi for about 200 miles from north to south, but then, suddenly turning to the east, breaks through the chain of the Danghi Hills and unites with the Ningthi. After this junction the river begins to be called Kyan Duayn, and to the west of it, at no great distance from its banks, rises a range of hills, the Danghi Hills, or Gnambeandong, which are of moderate height, but very barren and bleak. The level country on its eastern banks extends to a considerable distance, is in general well peopled, and contains extensive tracts of cultivated ground. It is bounded eastward by an undulating country, which becomes hilly only near the banks of the lake of Nandagando. The Kyan Duayn in the wet season is a considerable river, but in the dry season its mouth is not more than 200 yards wide. The whole of its course probably exceeds 600 miles.

From its confluence with the Kyan Duayn the Irawaddi continues, in general, its south-western direction, but with numerous bends on both sides, to the neighbourhood of Sembeghewn, where it turns to the south, and continues in that direction to the town of Padaong Mew. Hence it runs to the south-east, and after a few miles passes the promontory of Kyaok-ta-ran, and enters the low countries which form its delta. This promontory constitutes the boundary between the ancient kingdoms of Ava and Pegu. The population, which north of it consists principally of Birman, or Mrammas, is to the south of it almost entirely composed of Talains and Karians. In this part of its course the river sometimes expands to a width of three or four miles, and at other places it narrows to 600 or 800 yards. At the more narrow places it is commonly very rapid, and the navigation is also rendered difficult in the dry season by numerous shoals and a few ledges of rocks which traverse the bed of the stream.

The valley of the Irawaddi, south of its confluence with the Kyan Duayn, to the town of Melloon (south of 20° N. lat.), is, in its general aspect, hilly and very uneven, but the hills rise to no great height, at least not near the river, and are in many places separated by tracts of flat country, which in some places are extensive and well cultivated. South of Melloon the hills approach nearer the river, and often form its banks. They are in most places covered with forest-trees of considerable size, among which teak-trees are frequent. Cultivation is confined to the narrow flat tracts, which here and there separate the hills from the river.

The most important place on the Irawaddi, between the mouth of this river and the capital of the Birman empire, is Promé (about 18° 50' N. lat.), called by the Mahomedans Pron, whence the European name derives its origin: the Birman call it Pri (pronounced Pyi). It is a thriving town, and contained in 1827, shortly after the war, upwards of 10,000 inhabitants. This place, or rather one lying about six miles to the east of it, is reported to have been the most ancient seat of the Birman government, at an epoch which begins some centuries before the Christian era. The ruins of the ancient town consists of a broad, earthen wall, of a quadrangular form, from five to six feet in height.

The promontory of Kyaok-ta-ran, which forms the southern extremity of the valley of the Irawaddi, is the eastern extremity of one of the offsets of the Arracan mountains. Nearly opposite to it rises another chain of hills of very moderate elevation, which, however, in its progress to the east increases in height, and forms a range which is visible at a distance of fifty miles and upwards. The higher portion of these mountains, called the Galladzet Mountains, extends in an eastern direction probably to the banks of the Setang river. Nothing is known of this range but its geographical position; nor are we better acquainted with the country extending to the north of this chain up to the capital of the empire, and occupying the central parts of the southern portion of Birma, between 18° and 22° N. lat., and the rivers Irawaddi and Saluen. It is supposed to be a country of secondary and tertiary formation, and to constitute a kind of uneven table-land of very moderate elevation. As far as our information goes, it has in general a very sterile soil, consisting mostly of sand or gravel, and is very thinly inhabited. Perhaps the valleys along the rivers form an exception. The hills, which cover the whole surface, and are commonly low, rise to a considerable height in a few places. A conical mountain, called Poupá, several miles to the east of Pughan, is thought to attain an elevation of above 5000 feet. Crawford thinks that the ranges visible from Ava to the south-east exceeds the mountains of Aracan in height: and Sangermano states that the Kurians, who inhabit the neighbourhood of Tongo or Taunt, have been able to maintain their independence against the Birmans in their mountain-fastnesses; whence we may infer that this portion of the Birman territories contains extensive mountain ranges.

The southern portion of the Birman empire is a low, level country, without any hills. It comprehends the Delta of the Irawaddi, and all the extensive tract which spreads from its eastern branch to the banks of the Setang river. Hamilton estimates the southern line of the Delta at 135, the western at 145, and the eastern at 113 miles. It contains more than 10,000 square miles, and is considerably larger than the Delta of the Nile. The country east of it may extend over a tract of nearly the same area; and thus this level country contains considerably more than 20,000 square miles.

The Irawaddi enters the low lands near 18° N. lat., where it throws off a great number of branches of various magnitudes; watering an immense extent of country, and affording a convenient internal navigation, to which there are few parallels in any country. Many of these branches reunite and divide again. The river falls into the sea by fourteen different channels. The three principal are Bassein, Dalla, and Rangoon, or Syrian. The Bassein river, also called Anank Khiaun, that is, western channel, forms an excellent harbour near the island of Negrais (called by the Birmans Haingri Kyun, and by Sangermano, Negraglia), and is navigable for vessels of considerable burden up to the town of Bassein; farther upwards it is only navigated by the river barges, and this navigation extends in the dry season (from November to May) only to Lamena or Lemena. Higher up it is a trifling stream, nearly dry, and all water connexion with the main river is interrupted; but after the rains it becomes again navigable for the river barges. This channel branches off from the main river south of Myan-aong.

After having thrown off the Bassein-river on the right, the Irawaddi continues to flow in a southern direction, but with numerous windings, and sends off many smaller branches. At nearly the same distance from the sea and the place where the Bassein channel branches off, is the second great branch of the Irawaddi, at the village Yangain-chain-yah, the river here dividing its waters between the Dallah and Rangoon channels. The Dallah channel forms near the sea numerous wide branches, but they are not navigable, on account of the bars before their embouchures. The Rangoon or Syrian channel, which is also called the Asiae Khiaun, that is, the eastern channel, flows off nearly in an eastern direction, and affords in all seasons an uninterrupted navigation into the main river, being from 80 to 150 yards across, and generally three or four fathoms deep, which, however, on some shoals lessens to two and a half fathoms. At the lowest water the depth on these shoals is said to be not more than five feet; and hence Crawford infers, that the whole rise of the water in the river amounts to ten feet. The advantages which this branch of the Irawaddi offers for navigation have concentrated on its shores, especially at the town of Rangoon, all the maritime commerce of the Birman empire. [See RANGOON.] In the dry season the tides ascend the branches of the river to the place where the two principal branches meet at the village of Yangain-chain-yah, but in the wet season they are observable in the Rangoon channel only as far as the village of Panlang, which is many miles farther down.

The distance from Rangoon to Ava along the river, according to Colonel Wood's map, is 446 miles; according to Symes, 500; and according to the *Diana's* log-book 640. At the height of the freshes, a war-boat, proceeding day and night, has been known to go from Ava to Rangoon in four days. In the dry season, a war-boat, proceeding in the same manner, will go from Rangoon to Ava in eight days, and in the rainy season in ten.

The Delta of the Irawaddi, as far as the tide reaches, is covered with a thick forest of moderate-sized trees, sparingly interspersed with some grassy plains. As soon as the tides cease, the character of the vegetation is greatly altered. The country is covered with a tall rush grass (a species of *saccharum*), among which are scattered trees from twenty to sixty feet high, without any underwood. The appearance of inhabitants and cultivation is extremely scanty. Here and there, on the immediate banks of the river, are a few villages of Talain fishermen; and farther off are the Karian villages, somewhat more numerous, and with a few patches of rice-culture. As the banks of the river are a foot or two above the level of the surrounding country, this circumstance might be taken advantage of for watering the land to a great extent. But irrigation is neglected, and the country is covered with innumerable pools, which are often so extensive that they might be called lakes. In the province of Bassein alone, 127 of these lagoons were counted at the time when it was occupied by the British. In the northern district of the Delta, especially north of Henzadah, the cultivated portion of the country is much more considerable, and here the water of the river is used for irrigating the rice-grounds.

The country which extends to the eastward of the Delta seems to be of the same description. It is drained by the Pegu river and the Setang. The Pegu river, which is called by the natives Bagoo Kioup, or 'Pegu Rivulet,' has its source in the Galladzet hill, and unites with the Rangoon branch of the Irawaddi three miles below the town of Rangoon. It is navigable only a few miles to the northward of the town of Pegu, which advantage it owes wholly to the action of the tide. In the fair season it is almost dry at low-water. The Setang has its sources near the 20th parallel, and runs southward the whole of its course; till it empties its waters into the northernmost angle of the Bight of Martaban. This river, where it is of great breadth, is rather a considerable arm of the sea than a river. Beyond the reach of the tides it is an inconsiderable stream; and even as low down as the town of Tongo it is only navigable for boats. Its mouth is confined by sand-banks, and is liable to a dangerous bore, which renders its navigation impracticable for large vessels, and difficult for vessels of all descriptions.

That portion of the Birman empire which extends along the western banks of the Saluen river is almost entirely unknown. It seems to be more mountainous than the country along the middle course of the Irawaddi, but to contain some fertile tracts.

Of Upper Lao, or that portion of Birma which extends on the left bank of the Saluen river, between the Chinese province of Yunnan and the kingdom of Siam, we have so little information, that we only know it to be a mountainous country, which however contain some fertile and cultivated tracts along the courses of the rivers. It seems to be rich in metallic wealth.

We conclude our description of the Birman Empire with a short notice of the Saluen river, which forms the eastern boundary-line between it and Siam, and the British province of Martaban, for between 500 and 600 miles. The Saluen, or Thaluen, called also Sanluen, rises in the eastern districts of Tibet, in the country of the Nou or Noui and its upper course is called by the Chinese Nou-kiang. It afterwards passes through the Chinese province of Yunnan, where it is named the Lou-kiang. Continuing its southern course, it leaves China, and divides the province of Upper Lao from the remainder of the Birman territories, and afterwards forms the boundary between Siam and Martaban on one side, and the Birman empire on the other. This river is remarkable for the small number of large bends, and for not forming a Delta, as is the case with all larger rivers in this part of the world. It is likewise less navigable: vessels of moderate size can only come up to the town of Martaban, and with difficulty and danger. Small boats may ascend as far as Ka Kayet, at the confluence of the Yunzalaen river: but farther to the north the navigation in the wet season is entirely interrupted by numerous eddies, rapids, and cataracts. About twelve miles north of the town of Martaban, a creek, called the Kadachaong, leads from the Saluen to the Setang, and another channel hence to the Pegu river; so that there is an inland water communication between the Saluen and the Bassein branch of the Irawaddi, a direct distance of more than 200 miles. Near its mouth the Saluen is divided into two branches by the island of Balu, which is about twenty miles in length, and about half that extent in average breadth: it is noted for its great fertility in rice. The southern branch of the Saluen, between the island of Balu and the new settlement of Amherst, is seven miles across, and the wider of the two.

The climate of such an extensive country, which extends over twelve degrees of latitude, must, of course, vary very greatly. We are, however, acquainted only with a small portion of it. The greatest difference observed is that which prevails between the low country at the southern extremity and the valley of the Irawaddi before it branches off into different channels. In the low lands the south-west and north-east monsoons divide the year between them, and hence there are only two seasons, the wet and the dry. From the end of April or the beginning of May, to the end of July, or during the south-west monsoon, violent rains pour down nearly without intermission; and at the beginning, as well as at the end of this period, the rains are accompanied with tremendous thunder and lightning, and with violent winds. These rains are followed by an unsettled state of weather, which continues to the end of October or the beginning of November. But from this time to April the season is perfectly dry, except the month of February, in which a little rain sometimes falls; but it is very gentle, and never continues for several days. In the mornings however thick fogs are frequent in October and November.

In the valley of the Irawaddi and the adjacent hilly countries three seasons are observed, the cold, the hot, and the rainy. The cold season, which may be called the winter, though it never freezes nor snows, prevails during the two months which precede the winter solstice and the two which follow it. The air is dry, the nights and mornings chilly, and the heat of the day very moderate; but mists are frequent in November and December. This is the most pleasant part of the year, and the season of the harvest of rice, grain, and pulse. The transition from cold to heat is very sudden. In March and April it is often very hot, and the heat continues to the month of July. In May many trees shed their leaves, but they are instantly clothed with new ones. During the season of the heat the climate of the low lands is less warm than the valley, because the rain diminishes the heat. In the valley a little rain falls in May or the beginning of June, and this rain is called the first rain; but sometimes the rains do not come on, and even when they are abundant, they do not continue long enough to change the temperature very much. During the hot season the clouds are carried by the south-west monsoon between the two ranges of mountains which enclose the valley of the river to the hilly country adjacent to it on the north, where the moisture contained in them descends on the mountains which divide the Birman Empire from Asam, and pours down to the valley of the Irawaddi in torrents and streams, which cause the river to rise and to inundate the lower tracts on its banks during the months of June, July, and August. In some places the difference of the lowest and highest water-mark is not less than thirty-two feet. After the first rains in May, two months and a half follow in which not a drop of rain falls in the valley of the Irawaddi. The second or great rains begin in the middle of August, and last to the end of October. They are generally heavy, but it sometimes happens that these second rains do not come at all, or are not sufficiently plentiful, and in such an event scarcity is the natural consequence. Such a disaster never occurs in the low lands. During the second rains the river rises and falls several times; but in general the waters are not entirely drained off before the end of October, in which month the fair weather becomes settled, and the agricultural labours begin, as well on those fields which have only the advantage of the rains as on those annually inundated by the river, which, by its deposits, renders the soil more fertile.

The thermometer ranges in the low lands between 55° and 90°, rarely passing these two extreme points, but more frequently the latter than the former. In the valley of the Irawaddi it descends lower in the cold season and rises higher in the hot, occasionally to 94° and upwards.

We are unacquainted with the climate of the northern mountainous districts, except that of the country of the Bor Khamti, at the most northern extremity of Birma, which was visited in 1827 by Lieutenant Wilcox, who states that after the rain the thermometer fell five or six degrees, when the air was delightfully clear, and the sky partially covered with clouds. Within three or four days the atmosphere thickened, and the thermometer regained its highest range, when it became excessively close, till another storm reduced the heat. In the morning at sunrise the range was from 72° to 78° in the shade, and at the hottest time of the day from 84° to 94°. The nights were comparatively cool and pleasant. The observations were made in the month of May. From the 15th of October to February, the weather is clear and dry; the remainder is perfectly uncertain. The heavy rains set in about the 15th of June, and continue to the 15th of September.

If we may judge from the languages which are spoken in the Birman territories, the inhabitants are divided at least into five nations, some of which comprehend many tribes. Crawford states that eighteen different tribes or nations had been enumerated to him. Wilcox, in his attempt to reach the sources of the Irawaddi, found in the most northern corner of the kingdom seven dialects spoken in villages only one day's journey from one another, and differing so much that the inhabitants of one could not be understood by those of another village. He also found that the languages of the Bor Khamti, of the Singfos, and of the Kunungs, were entirely distinct from one another.

The Birmans, who call themselves Mrammas (pronounced Myanmas) or Brahmas (pronounced Byahmas), occupy the centre of the empire, between 18° and 22° or 23° N. lat., and extend from the Aracan mountains to the Saluen river. The languages spoken by the Yo or Io, and those of the Kyain and Karens, are only dialects of the Birman language. The Yo inhabit the hilly country extending west of the Danghii hills to the mountains of the Kookis; we know very little of them. The Kyains, who call themselves Koloun, are the inhabitants of the Aracan mountains, but many of them have settled in the valleys on the west of the Irawaddi; they are a peaceful industrious tribe, who cultivate the ground and weave cloth of cotton and silk. The men and women tattoo their faces all over, in lines mostly describing segments of circles. The Karens or Karians live partly intermixed with the Peguans in the Delta of the Irawaddi, where they call themselves Pflay, and are the most industrious cultivators of the soil. They occupy also the hilly and mountainous country on the upper branches of the Setaing, near Tongo, where, according to the statement of Sangermano, they have preserved their independence. Other Karens are found on the banks of the Saluen north of Martaban, as far as the mouth of the Junzalaen.

The Peguans, who at no distant time formed an independent and powerful nation, seem at present not to be very numerous. They are called Talains by the Birmans, and by themselves Moan: they occupy nearly exclusively the low country between the Delta of the Irawaddi and the Saluen river. In the Delta itself they are mingled with the Karens, but form the greater part of the population.

The Shans are the most numerous nation of the peninsula beyond the Ganges; they call themselves Tay. This nation is dispersed over nearly one half of the Birman empire, and all the tribes inhabiting the kingdom of Siam and Lao belong to it. In Birma four tribes of Shan are distinguished: the Lwa Shan occupy Upper Lao, the Tay-yay, called by the Birmans Mrelap-shan (pronounced Myelapshan), live on the western banks of the Saluen, and extend north of Amara-pooora to the banks of the Irawaddi, and even on the country to the west of that river. Their country is called Ko-shan-pri pronounced (Ko-sang-pyi), or the nine provinces of Shan. The country to the north of them is inhabited by the Tay-loong, called by the Birmans Casi-Shan; the Bor Khamti, visited by Wilcox, are only a smaller tribe of these Casi-Shan. Another numerous tribe of the Shan extends on both sides of the Kyan-Duayn up to the boundary of Munipoore, and the inhabitants of the last named country are likewise Shans. The Shans inhabiting the country along the Kyan-Duayn are called by the Birmans Kathu or Casi.

In the northern parts of the empire the tribes of the Shan appear to occupy only the plains and larger valleys. The mountains and the upper valleys are in possession of two numerous races of mountaineers, the Singfos and the Naga. The Singfos inhabit the mountains which skirt the Irawaddi on both sides and extend northward to the vale of the Brahmapootra in Assam. The Naga tribes are dispersed over the extensive mountain districts between the upper branches of the Kyan-Duayn, and as far as the boundary of Assam. They seem to belong to the same nation which, under the name of Kookis, occupies the country between Munipoore and Chittagong. The Singfos and the Naga live in a state of independence.

The Birmans are greatly inferior to the Hindoos in civilization, and still more so to the Chinese. Like the Talains or Peguans, they tattoo or stain the skin with an indelible tint, but this practice is confined to the men. Not to be tattooed is considered a sign of effeminacy, and there is no one who is not tattooed more or less. They bore the lobe of the ear, making a very large and unseemly aperture, into which a gold or silver ornament is put, or a piece of wood, or roll of paper. If the aperture is not occupied, a man or woman, after smoking half a cigar, thrusts the remainder into the ear for future use. They consume large quantities of tobacco in the form of cigars; and also much betel, which they mix with the areca nut, lime, and a little tobacco.

Their dress, though upon the whole not unbecoming, is much less so than the flowing and graceful garments of the western nations of India. Too much of the body is left naked, and the fabrics worn are comparatively coarse and homely. Umbrellas, which are in general use among all classes, are among the principal insignia of rank or office. The colour of the dress of the priests is yellow, and it would be deemed nothing less than sacrilege in any one else to use this colour.

The Birmans are very uncleanly in their food. They eat all kinds of reptiles, lizards, iguanas, and snakes; and as their religion forbids them killing animals for food, they generally eat those which have died of disease. Venison is the only meat permitted to be sold in the markets. The killing of a cow is punished with peculiar severity.

The Birmans are of a gay character, and fond of amusements, which are principally chess, music, the exhibition of fire-works, and some kinds of dramatic representations.

Their progress in the useful arts has not been great. All their cotton fabrics are coarse and high priced, and British piece-goods are imported in considerable quantity. Silk articles are coarse and high-priced, but durable. All the colours given to these fabrics are fugitive, especially those of the cottons. Coarse and unglazed earthenware is of very good quality, and cheap. Those known in India under the name of Pegu jars often contain 180 gallons; but the Birmans are unacquainted with the art of making any kind of porcelain. Their iron manufactures, which are always coarse and rude, consist of swords, spears, knives, scissors, and carpenters' tools. Muskets, or rather matchlocks, are made at Ava, and the best tempered swords are imported from the country of the Shans. Brass ware is not much used, lacquered ware being chiefly substituted for it. The manufacture of this ware is very much extended, and in this the Birmans display invention and taste, but the best description is imported from Lao. Gold and silver ornaments are manufactured at the capital; some are good, but in general the jewellery is clumsy and rude, and inferior to that of India.

In Birma, as among other nations which have embraced the religion of Buddha, education is in some degree attended to. It is a kind of religious duty in the priests to instruct youth. The monasteries are the only schools, and the priests generally the only teachers. Education is entirely eleemosynary: the children even live at the Kyaongs, and the parents only make occasional presents to the priests. The children are instructed for about six hours in the day in reading, writing, and the four common rules of arithmetic. There are few persons who do not know how to read, and not many who do not write. The girls are instructed by the nuns, or female priestesses, in reading, and some also in writing, but that is less general.

Like the other Hindu-Chinese nations the Birmans have two languages and two alphabets, the vernacular and the foreign, or Pali. In the Birman language all the words not derived from the Pali are monosyllables, and even the polysyllabic words derived from this source are pronounced as if each syllable were a distinct word. There is no inflexion of any part of speech. Relation, number, mode, and time are all expressed by prefixing or affixing certain particles. Some roots of this language may be converted into nouns, verbs, or adjectives by a similar simple contrivance. The Pali alphabet is very little used, even in their religious writings, for which they have recourse to the vernacular alphabet.

The literature of the Birmans consists of songs, religious romances, and chronological histories, of which the second class occupies the principal rank. The Budd'hist religion, as it exists among the Birmans, does not appear to differ materially from that practised in Ceylon, Siam, and Kamboja. Among the Birmans neither the Christian nor the Mahommedan religion has made any progress.

In Birma there is no census of the population, and accordingly there are no exact data for ascertaining the amount. There is consequently a great difference in estimating the number of inhabitants. Symes carried it to upwards of fourteen millions, which Cox reduced to from six to seven millions; and Crawford, who has been at great pains in collecting information on this subject, does not rate the population of the Birman empire higher than four millions, or about twenty-two inhabitants to a square mile.

The sovereign of Birma, who is called Boa, is lord of the life and property of all his subjects. The country and people are at his entire disposal, and the chief object of government is his personal honour and aggrandizement. No class of inhabitants possesses hereditary rights except the Taubwas, or Saubwas, who are the tributary princes of some of the subdued nations. Among the Birmans themselves there is no hereditary nobility. The first officers are appointed and dismissed at a nod, and neither their titles, rank, nor offices, and very often not even their property, can descend to their children. Any subject can aspire to the first office in the state, and such offices in reality are often held by persons of very mean origin.

In Birma there is no vizier or prime minister; but the king has two councils, a public and a privy one, through which the royal orders are issued. The first is called the *lut'-d'hau*, from the name of the hall in which the business is transacted, and consists commonly of four officers, called *wun-gyis*, who have the right of deliberating, and of voting, and four of less rank, called *wun-dauks*, who do not deliberate or vote; there are also eight secretaries, called *sare-d'hau-gyis*. The privy council consists likewise of four officers, called *atwen-wuns*, and thirty secretaries. Whatever emanates directly from the king is first discussed in the privy council and then transmitted to the *lut'-d'hau*.

For internal administration the country is divided into provinces, these into townships, the townships into districts, and the districts into villages and hamlets, and every one of these divisions has its political head. The governor of a province is called *myo-wun*, his first officer *re-wun*, who is, deputy, and then follow the *akhwon-wun*, or collector of taxes, and the *akaok-wun*, or collector of customs.

The Birmans have no standing army, nor is there any distinction between the civil and military classes, or between civil and military employments. As the sovereign is considered the lord of all his subjects, every male adult is obliged to become a soldier. In case of a war, all persons able to bear arms are brought together through the agency of the local officers, by an order of the *lut'-d'hau*; and they serve under the same leaders as when dwelling in their own districts or townships. The troops have no regular pay, but are armed and fed at the public expense. An army thus composed cannot be long kept together, and a defeat or difficulty is almost sure to disperse them. This accounts for the sudden disappearance of the numerous armies which the Birmans opposed to the British at the beginning of the last war. The Birmans, however, would be good soldiers if they were well disciplined and armed; but at present they are unable to withstand a European force. In their last contest with the English they displayed a good deal of skill in the construction of field-works, but they seldom knew how to defend them.

In Birma there is no land-tax; but the sovereign, being considered as the lord of all the inhabitants, assigns the labour of the peasants or cultivators to his favourites and public officers instead of stipends and salaries, or appropriates them to the expenses of public establishments, such as the war-boats, the elephants, &c. Those to whom the townships or villages are assigned in this way assess the cultivators at their discretion, usually by levying a kind of capitation-tax, which according to circumstances, is taken either in money, in kind, or in services. This manner of taxing the country is exceedingly oppressive, and whenever such high persons are in favour at court, the cultivators have no resource against oppression but to abandon the lands, and to take refuge in some other place. Hence the decay of established towns and villages and the rise of new ones is a thing of yearly occurrence.

The lords of the land make yearly offerings to the king, and it is supposed that these offerings amount to one-tenth of the income derived from the grant. These offerings constitute one of the principal sources of the king's revenue. The remainder arises from a tax on the petroleum, the *ngapi*, salt, and teak-timber, besides the customs on the merchandise exported and imported, the former paying five per cent., and the latter ten per cent. Crawford thinks that the whole revenue of the king does not exceed 25,000*l.* per annum. But his expenses are still less, as no public officer receives any fixed money salary. The principal officers are paid, as already stated, by assignments of land, or, more correctly by an assignment of the labour and industry of a given portion of the inhabitants; and the inferior ones by fees, perquisites, and irregular emoluments. Money therefore is seldom paid out of the royal treasury, unless for the personal gratification of the sovereign. In extraordinary cases, as for instance if a war be undertaken, an extraordinary contribution is levied on the people.

The circulating medium consists, for small payments, of lead; in the case of larger ones, of gold and silver, and chiefly of the latter; but there is no coin of any of these metals. The money must be weighed and generally assayed at every payment. Silver may be considered as the standard, and gold is about seventeen times as dear. Lead fluctuates according to its market value. The weighing and assaying of the metals, which is done by a class of brokers called *poe za*, causes an expense or loss of two and a half per cent. at every disbursement.

The commerce carried on in the interior of the country is considerable, the different portions of the empire producing several things which are not found in others. The inhabitants of the sea-coast and the lower country take to the capital and the upper provinces rice, salt, ngapi, dried fish, and foreign commodities. The Shans bring to Ava cotton and silk stuffs, some raw silk, varnish, stick-lac, ivory, bees-wax, lacquer ware, swords, gold, lead, and tin; and take in return the articles brought from the lower provinces, especially salt, ngapi, and dried fish. Ava sends to the lower provinces petroleum, saltpetre, lime, paper, lacquer ware, cotton and silk fabrics, iron, cutlery, some brass-ware, catechu, palm-sugar, &c.

The internal commerce is much facilitated by the easy water-communication, especially in the lower country, where the numerous branches and channels of the Irawaddi, together with the Pegu river and the Setaing, render the transport of commodities so easy that roads are nearly unknown. The hilly-country north of it possesses these advantages only so far as it approaches the Irawaddi or Kyan-Duayn. In this part roads are numerous, and the merchants travel for security in caravans, as in other parts of Asia. The trading vessels used on the Irawaddi for the transport of commodities are commonly small, not exceeding ten or fifteen tons burden; but larger vessels are also used, some of which may be 100 tons.

The foreign commerce of the Birmans is limited to that with China, carried on over land, and to that with the nations who visit the ports of the country. The traffic with China is considerable, and entirely carried on by the Chinese, who come in great numbers to the annual fairs of Bhanmo and Mide. Bhanmo is situated on the banks of the Irawaddi, and seems to be a considerable place. Mide is a small town about six miles to the north-east of Ava. This traffic resembles that between China and Russia at Kiachta and Maimatchin. The caravan arrives at Ava in the beginning of December, and is stated to be six weeks in travelling from Yunnan. The commodities are brought on small horses, mules, and asses. The principal fair is at Bhanmo, and few traders only come to Ava. The articles imported from China are copper, orpiment or yellow arsenic, quicksilver, vermilion, iron pans, brass-wire, tin, lead, alum, silver, gold and gold-leaf, earthen-ware, paints, carpets, rhubarb, tea, honey, raw silk, velvets and raw silks, spirits, musk, verdigris, dry fruits, paper, fans, umbrellas, shoes, wearing apparel, and a few live animals. The largest article of import is raw silk which is worked up in the manufactures of the country. The exports from Birma consist of raw cotton, ornamental feathers, esculent swallows' nests, ivory, rhinoceros and deer horns, sapphires, and noble serpentine, with a small quantity of British woollens. Raw cotton is by far the most considerable article. The average amount is stated to be not less than 14,000,000 lbs. The whole amount of the export trade with China is estimated at from 400,000*l.* to 700,000*l.*

The navigation of the Birmans does not generally extend beyond the Gulf of Bengal. The places visited by their vessels are Chittagong, Dacca, and Calcutta in Bengal; Madras and Musilipatnam on the coast of Coromandel; and the Nicobar islands, and a few places in Sumatra. Many foreign vessels, especially British, American, and Chinese, visit the harbour of Rangoon. The articles exported seaward are teak-wood, terra Japonica or catechu, stick-lac, bees-wax, ivory, raw cotton, orpiment, gold, silver, rubies, and sapphires, with horses. The most important article is teak timber, which is principally carried to Calcutta. Raw cotton goes to Dacca, and is used in the fabrication of the fine muslins.

The principal articles imported at Rangoon are cotton piece-goods, British, Bengal, and Madras; British woollens; iron, steel, quicksilver, copper, cordage, borax, sulphur, gunpowder, saltpetre, fire-arms, coarse porcelain, English glass-ware, opium, tobacco, cocoa and areca nuts, sugar and spirits. After cotton piece-goods the most important articles are areca and cocoa-nuts. The value of the cotton piece-goods was estimated in 1822 at 282,000*l.* Crawford thinks that the value of all the imports of Rangoon is not over-rated at 300,000*l.* a year and that the exports may be taken at the same amount. Bassein formerly was a place of considerable traffic, and some European nations had factories established there, but since the foundation of Rangoon it has lost all its commercial importance.

EXTERNAL

AVA.

The precise time of our arrival in Birman is uncertain, but we very early possessed factories at Prome, Ava, and on the borders of China, probably at the Birman frontier town of Bamau. These were afterwards forfeited by the misconduct of the Dutch, who likewise had settlements in the country; and Europeans of all nations were banished from Ava.

In 1687, Captain Weldon was sent to Mergui, to declare war against Siam, and on his return, he took possession of the Island of Negrais, in the name of the British. By Captain Weldon's report, the island appears to have belonged to the Siamese at that period. On this island the Government of Fort St. George established a settlement.

Prior to this, however, the British Government made two unsuccessful attempts to obtain a location in the country, and particularly 'at Peammoo on the confines of China.'

Notwithstanding the early date of the arrival of the British in Birman, no regular official intercourse appears to have been instituted until the year 1695, when Messrs. Fleetwood and Sealy were sent as ambassadors to the Court of Ava; some trifling advantages were obtained from this mission. In 1697 the Government of Madras again deputed a Mr. Bowyear as ambassador to the Birman Court. He did not however proceed to the capital; and commerce was carried on without further protecting efforts on the part of the British Government.

In 1709, Mr. Pitt, Governor of Madras, deputed a Mr. Allanson or Alison to the Court of Ava. This gentleman was twice at Ava, and we may reasonably conclude that his missions were successful; for several years after the date of his missions, the English were settled at Syriam, and trading freely between the British possessions and Birman, under the protection of residents, who were, however, supervisors of private trade, and not immediately in the service of the Company; that body itself having had no commerce with the Birman, after its expulsion in the 17th century.

The supremacy of the Birman over the Peguers continued throughout the seventeenth, and during the first forty years of the eighteenth century; when the Peguers in the provinces of Dalla, Martaban, Toungo, and Prome, revolted, a civil war ensued, which was prosecuted on both sides with savage ferocity. In the year 1744, the British factory at Syriam was destroyed by the contending parties, and the views of commerce were suspended by precautions of personal security.

Success long continued doubtful: at length the Peguers, by the aid of arms procured from Europeans trading to their ports, and with the assistance of some renegade Dutch and native Portuguese, gained several victories over the Birman in the years 1750 and 1751. These advantages they pursued with so much vigor that early in the year 1752, the capital of Ava was invested. The Birman, disheartened by repeated defeats, after a short siege surrendered at discretion.

In 1754, both the English and French nations had re-established their factories at Syriam, and of course had their separate interests. The French favored the Peguers, whilst the English leaned to the Birman; but until the vicinity of their residence again became the seat of war, neither engaged in open hostility; their partialities were manifested by giving assistance, but in secret, and supplies clandestinely conveyed, probably more with a view to private emolument than from any enlarged political consideration.

The seat of war between the Birman and Peguers becoming likely to be confined to the mouths of the navigable rivers, and the numerous creeks and canals that intersect the lower provinces of Pegue, and communicate between the larger streams, the Birman king Alonpra, formed a right estimation of the advantage to be derived from an alliance with nations versed in the arts of maritime war; in order, therefore, to gain the good offices of the English, or at least stipulate for their neutrality, he sent a deputation to Mr. Burke, Resident at Negrais, and at that time chief of all the English factories.

The Birman deputies were escorted by Captain Baker from Bassein, and arrived at Negrais on the night of the 22d March 1755. The deputies returned with a letter from the Resident at Negrais to Alonpra, who had reached Dagon (now Rangoon) early in the preceding month.

The French and English factories at Syriam were at this time in a state of rivalry; the situation of both became at this juncture highly critical. In this difficulty neither the French nor the English seem to have acted with policy or candour, and the imprudence of certain individuals finally involved others as well as themselves in fatal consequences.

The English, when it became necessary to avow the side they meant to espouse, seem to have declared explicitly for the Birman. Some vessels belonging to the India Company left Syriam, and joined the Birman at Dagon. In the beginning of June, the Company's *Snow*, *Arcoot*, bound to Negrais, commanded by a Captain Jackson, having on board Mr. Whitehill, a gentleman in the service of the East India Company, proceeding to Negrais in an official capacity, put into the Rangoon river through stress of weather. On an invitation from the Birman King, the vessel was taken up to the town, and Mr. Whitehill was received in a manner that gave no cause for complaint.

During the contest of the Birman and Peguers, Mr. Burke was advancing his negotiations with Alonpra; Captain Baker and Lieutenant North were delegated with presents and instructions to conclude a treaty of amity and alliance with the Birman Monarch.

The English deputation proceeded slowly up the river.

On the 8th of September, Captain Baker reached Ava, lately the metropolis of the empire. Alonpra had removed the seat of government to Moutshobo, which he constituted his capital. On the 12th he reached Kyouk Myoung, situated on the west bank of the Irrawaddy, and on the 16th he received a summons to attend "the golden feet." During the interview, the new monarch vaunted of his victories, and the extent of his empire; he upbraided our national character in an affair at Dagon, where some English had fired on some Birman, alleging that he had treated the English with kindness, which they repaid by perfidiously breaking

of friendship given to him on his departure from Dagon. The Birman could only reply by expressions of regret, and a

so far from having authorized, knew nothing

At a second audience, a few days subsequent to the first, his Majesty dictated a letter, addressed to Mr. Burke, in which he granted permission to the Company to establish factories at Dagon and Bassein, having determined on the total demolition of Syriam. Captain Baker made a further requisition of the island of Negrais. Although this desire was not refused, the formal assignment was postponed; but as it was his Majesty's intention shortly to repair to Rangoon, to conduct in person the Pegue war, the completion of the grant was deferred to a future opportunity. Captain Baker having obtained his dismissal set out for Khyouk Myoung, and on the 29th of September-embarked to return to Negrais.

The English interests in India, during the time that hostilities still continued between the Birmans and Peguers, were suspended in a doubtful scale; Negrais was in consequence neglected, though not yet abandoned. The Talion or Pegue government, by the surrender of their capital, being now extinct, it became necessary for foreigners to conciliate the new sovereign. Alonpra had summoned Mr. Newton, Resident on the part of the East India Company at Negrais, to attend him at Prome. On this occasion he also addressed a letter in his own name to the King of England, written on a leaf of virgin gold, ornamented with rubies, which he delivered to a Mr. John Dyer, and some other persons who visited him at Rangoon. Mr. Newton deputed Ensign Lister to the Birman Chief, with presents and instructions to obtain for the Company the settlement of Negrais, with certain immunities and privileges of trade.

In pursuance of his orders, Ensign Lister left Negrais on the 27th of June 1757; after some unnecessary delay, an instrument consisting of five distinct articles, was drawn up. The island of Negrais was granted to the India Company in perpetuity, together with a piece of ground opposite to the town of Bassein, for the purpose of erecting a factory; in return for which, the Company engaged to pay an annual tribute consisting of ordinance and military stores, and to aid and defend the King of Ava against all his enemies, the king to pay the expenses of any troops with which he may be furnished. A particular clause specified that aid should be given to the Birmans against the King of Tavoy.

Had this treaty being respected by the Birmans, it would have been most advantageous to the English; but its provisions were not observed, and rumour said, that Alonpra was ignorant of its import. On the 22d of August 1757, Ensign Lister measured the allotted portion of ground near Bassein, on which the British colours were hoisted, and three volleys of small arms fired to solemnize the act of occupancy.

The affairs of the British Government of India were by no means in such a state of prosperity, as to allow of sending the supplies that were necessary for the effectual support of the settlement of Negrais, it was therefore deemed expedient for the present, to withdraw the settlers from it. Captain Newton was accordingly recalled, and reached Bengal on the 14th of May 1759, having left a few persons to take care of the teak timbers and materials for ship-building, that could not conveniently be removed.

Soon after the return of Captain Newton with his party, the Government of Bengal sent Mr. Southby to Negrais, to take care of the materials collected there, and to retain possession of the settlement. In prosecution of this determination, the *Victoria*, *Snow*, anchored in the harbour of Negrais on the 14th of October. Mr. Southby disembarked on the evening of his arrival. One Antonio, an interpreter of the Birman King, came down to Negrais to meet him, and delivered to him a letter, purporting to be from the King.

Antonio, who had paid a visit to Mr. Southby on the morning of the 6th, was invited by him to dinner on the same day, to meet the European gentlemen of the settlement. Whilst the entertainment was serving up, the treacherous guest withdrew. At that instant, a number of armed Birmans rushed into the house, and barbarously murdered every soul except Mr. Robertson and three Europeans, who after defending themselves in a godown surrendered on an assurance that their lives would be spared. A midshipman was about to enter the house, when the slaughter commenced, but perceiving the danger, he fled to the water-side, and was brought away by one of the ship's boats. After the Europeans had been despatched, a general massacre of the natives took place; and of the whole settlement only 60 men, 4 women, and one child escaped to the ships.

The Birmans thus becoming masters of the fortified works, turned the guns of the battery against the English ships, which were greatly damaged. In the performance of this service, *Lavene*, the Frenchman, was conspicuously active; indeed the whole of this diabolical assassination seems to have been executed under his direction. Captain *Alves*, the Commander of the *Victoria*, was fortunately not on shore when the massacre took place: he returned to Bengal in the beginning of November, with the tidings of our misfortunes.

After so many proofs of a friendly disposition, the assurances given to Captain Baker, and the compact concluded with Ensign Lister, it is reasonable to suppose that some acts, not thoroughly explained, must have been committed or that very plausible misrepresentations must have been used, to excite the Birman monarch to take such sanguinary revenge. That Gregory, an Armenian, was the principal instigator, is a fact of which no native of the country, who mentions the transaction, entertains the smallest doubt, as well as that *Lavene* was the agent and instrument of execution.

Whatever might have been their inclination, the English settlements of India were not at this juncture in circumstances to revenge the murder of their servants, and exact retribution for the insult offered to their flag. Captain *Alves*, who in the preceding year had conveyed Mr. Southby to Negrais, was selected to return as the bearer of letters and presents to the Birman monarch from Mr. Holwell, Governor of Bengal, and Mr. Pigot, Governor of Madras.

In the beginning of June, Captain *Alves* reached Bassein, where he was well received. The Prince of Bassein, who was at that time in Rangoon, sent repeatedly for the king's presents, but Captain *Alves* had resolved to deliver them in person, and not yet being furnished with suitable boats, he declined giving them up, on which the Birmese carried off from the vessel muskets, and whatever else they could get at. At length he procured a boat, and quitted Bassein on the 30th of July; and on arriving at Dagon, the prince compelled him to deliver the king's presents, and ordered him up to Court, whither he would rather not have gone, as the country was in a very unsettled state. He remonstrated in vain against the treatment he met with.

On the 22nd of August, Captain Alvéz reached Tsagain, at this time the head quarters of the Birman king. On the 23rd he was honored with an audience to deliver his credentials; he, however, did not obtain any satisfaction for the massacre at Negrais. His Majesty was pleased to agree, that the property of the East India Company should be restored, and that all English subjects, who were prisoners in his dominions, should be released. He also consented to give the Company a grant of ground for a factory at Bassein, under the stipulation, that their chief settlement should be there, and not at Negrais; thus abolishing the previous grant of Negrais and the whole of Ensign Lister's treaty.

His Majesty was farther pleased, on the request of Captain Alvéz, to order the release of three Dutchmen who had been captured by Alonpra in his expedition to Siam. At length on the 10th of October, having received the replies to the letters brought by him, Captain Alvéz left Tsagain on the 14th, got to Bassein, whence he again embarked, leaving Messrs. Robertson and Helass to take care of the Company's property, and reached Calcutta a few days before the expiration of the year.

About the end of 1765, the Birmans undertook an expedition against Siam, the capital of which country they took in 1766. They likewise made an incursion into Munneepore, where they stayed one month, and returned laden with plunder.

In 1765, the Chinese, invaded the Birman territories in consequence of a Chinaman having been murdered in an affray, and the offender not being given up. They were, however, repulsed. In the successive years of 1767 to 1769, the Chinese armies invaded Birmah, but were all driven back, when, in December 1769, a peace was concluded between the two nations at the proposition of the Chinese. The treaty stipulates for an exchange of presents, both armies retiring and peace and friendship being firmly established between the two countries, and that letters on gold should be exchanged once every ten years by the two monarchs. Such at least is the Birman version of these invasions; but their own historians admit, that the King would not receive the presents, and was highly incensed against his officers for entering into such a treaty. It is rather to be surmised that the Chinese ravaged the country for three years, and on certain submissions being made to them by the Birmans, they retired. The convention by which the evacuation of the country was procured, was considered by the King of Ava so humiliating, that to mark his disapprobation, and satirize the cowardice of his general, he sent him a woman's dress. At the conferences with the British commissioners at Yandaboo, the Birman chiefs quoted the example of the Chinese, as one which they expected, we should imitate. Each party, they said, then retired from the contest on equal terms; the Chinese not claiming, as we did, territorial cession or pecuniary indemnity.

In 1774, Munneepore was again overrun, as was Cachar, by the Birmans.

The invasion of Arracan being determined on by the Birmans, a force left the Imperial City in September 1783, and having taken the country, brought the King prisoner to Amerpoora, where he soon died.

The surrender of Cheduba, Ramree, and the broken Isles, followed the conquest of Arracan. Arracan with its dependencies was constituted a province of the Birman Empire, and a viceroy appointed to govern it. In 1785, the Birman monarch resolved to invade Siam at the head of a large army, and marched from Martaban; but had scarcely entered the Siamese territories, when a furious engagement ensued, in which the Birmans were completely routed. The King himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner. In the year 1790 Tavoy was delivered over to the Siamese, but was retaken by treachery in 1791. The year 1793 opened with overtures for peace on the part the Siamese a negotiation commenced, which speedily terminated in the ratification of a treaty highly favorable to the Birman interests. By this compact the Siamese ceded to the Birmans the western maritime towns as far south as Mergui, thus yielding to them entire possession of Tenasserim.

Upon the subjugation of Arracan, great numbers of the native population fled from the cruelty and oppression of their conquerors, and either found an asylum in the British territories, or secreted themselves amongst the hills and thickets, and alluvial islands along its southern and eastern boundaries. From these haunts they occasionally sallied, and inflicted upon the Birmans in Arracan a feeble retaliation for the injuries they had sustained, retiring to their fastnesses when their purpose was effected, or when encountered by a superior force; and even taking refuge in Chittagong unknown to the British authorities. On its being ascertained that three distinguished leaders of these robbers had sought refuge in the British districts, a Birman army entered our territories in pursuit of them, without any previous representation of the cause of their aggression or intimation of their purpose, whilst a force of twenty thousand men was assembled at Arracan for their support. To meet these threatening and hostile demonstrations, the British Government promptly despatched a force under General Erskine to the Chitta-

gong frontier, where he had no sooner arrived, and the Burman General perceived our determination to resist them, than a messenger was deputed to the British camp, with proposals of friendship, followed shortly after by the Birman general himself. Previous to entering upon any discussion, General Erskine peremptorily demanded the removal of the Birman troops from their threatening position on the frontier, which being done, affairs were speedily accommodated, and the prisoners having been tried and found guilty were surrendered.

In consequence of the resort of the French about this time to Birmah and the neighbouring tracts and from a consideration of the political and commercial advantages to be derived from a more intimate connection with Birmah, the Right Honorable Sir John Shore, the then Governor General, deemed it advisable, if possible, to strengthen the existing intimacy and friendship with this state, and, therefore in the year 1795 deputed Captain Michael Symes as Ambassador to the Court of Ava, with suitable letters and presents.

On his arrival at Rangoon, he was doomed to experience the usual modicum of Birman insolence. After suffering neglect for some time, he informed the local government, that unless he was immediately acknowledged and respected as the representative of the Governor General he would return to Rengal with the letters and presents intended for the King. This remonstrance produced a good effect, and all vexatious restrictions were forthwith removed, and suitable boats were furnished for himself and suite to proceed to the capital.

By this mission, permission was obtained for a British Resident or superintendent to reside at Rangoon, for the protection of British subjects and British trade, and orders were issued, directing that the customary duties were only to be levied. Captain Symes, having, as far as practicable, considering the character of the people, completed the service on which he was deputed to Ava, returned to Bengal.

In pursuance of the paper given by the Birman government in 1795 to Captain Symes, and miscalled 'a treaty,' the Right Honorable the Governor General Sir John Shore, Bart., appointed Captain Hiram Cox to be Resident at Rangoon but not Ambassador, on the part of the Governor General. The principal objects of this mission were;—

1. To render permanent and effective the friendship and alliance formed by the treaty of 1795.

2. To protect the Political and Commercial interests of British India and its subjects from Birman oppression.

3. To counteract in a private manner, the designs of our enemies, and to endeavour to prevail on the King to send an Embassy to Bengal.

On the 12th October. Captain Cox landed at Rangoon, where he was treated with becoming civility, and on an invitation from the court, prepared to proceed to the capital. Notwithstanding that so large a sum as 30,000 Rupees was collected from the inhabitants of Rangoon, to defray the expenses of the journey, very unsuitable boats were provided. Having arrived at Amarapoora on the 24th January 1797, he was destined to suffer a series of premeditated insults. His Majesty at this time held his court at Mengwon, a few miles above Amarapoora, where he was superintending the building of an immense Pagoda, and to which place Captain Cox proceeded. No public notice was taken of him until the 6th February, when he was surprised at receiving an intimation, that the 8th was fixed on for his introduction to the King. The object of this precipitancy was evidently to get possession of a state carriage, coining apparatus, &c. which His Majesty had commissioned Captain Symes to procure for him, and the other presents, and which appeared to have ensured him a favorable reception from His Majesty.

After his audience, however, he continued unnoticed. At this time, a Rajah of Assam, who had usurped the throne, and had been deposed by the aid of the British, made an application to the Court of Ava for assistance, and great preparations were making for invading Assam, although Captain Cox had previously informed the ministers, that that state was under British protection. He reiterated his complaints, and applied officially for boats.

At length about the 21st or 22nd March, matters bore a more favorable appearance, and he was indebted for some tardy civilities to the King's desire to interest the British Government in obtaining for him one of Gaudama's teeth, which was in the possession of the King of Candy. He, however, soon found himself subjected to the same neglect as he had before experienced; and after two months' sojourn at Mengwon, he returned to Amarapoora.

In June, neglect still continuing his portion, he informed the ministers of his intention of immediately quitting the capital, on which they consulted upon the propriety of detaining the embassy as a hostage until the 7,000 persons, who were said to have fled from Arracan into Chittagong at the Birman conquests of that country, were delivered up; and Chittagong, Dacca, Luckipore, and Cassimbazar formerly under Arracan, were restored to Birmah, together with one half of the revenues collected from those countries since they first came into the British possession. Captain Cox now feared personal restraint. After suffering many indignities for a period of nine months, he at length resolved to bear them no longer and accordingly embarked himself and followers, and dropped four or five miles down the river on the 6th October 1797. A day or two after, however, overtures were made to him on the part of the heir apparent, whom he visited, but he had the mortification to find out that in reality no change had come over the sentiments of the court, and on the 17th he finally quitted the capital, and reached Rangoon on the 1st November.

The viceroy arrived at Rangoon a few days after, and issued a Court Order prohibiting the departure of the mission from the country, and instructions were issued to the pilots to run ashore all armed vessels entering the port.

At this time His Majesty had been taken with a mania for fire-arms, and wishing our Envoy's assistance to procure them, sent down an order acknowledging him as Resident at Rangoon, and granting ground for a factory and garden. This order came too late; for the mission was at the mouth of the river, on its return to Bengal, Captain Cox having left Rangoon on the 1st of March.

In November 1798. The Raja of Arracan wrote a most violent and menacing letter to the Governor General, demanding the instant surrender of some Mugh fugitives who had taken refuge in Chittagong from Birmese oppression.

The Governor General, (Marquis Wellesley) contemplated some further communication with the Birman Government, on which Major Franklin was to have been employed. Early in 1802, however, Captain Symes having arrived from Europe with the increased rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the Governor General resolved upon deputing him to the court of Ava.

The object of this mission was:—

1st. An improved treaty of friendship and alliance.

2d. Protection to commerce against the daily extortions of the Birmese.

3rd. To demand an acknowledgment or disavowal on the part of the King of the insolent and menacing threats of invasion, contained in the Governor of Arracan's letter to the Governor General, and to explain to the Court of Ava, that according to the laws of civilized nations the Mugh fugitives could not be surrendered, and that His Excellency's doubts of the authenticity of the letter, was his only reason for not immediately appealing to arms, to convince the Birman Government, that the British power could not be insulted with impunity.

4th. To establish a Resident at the Court of Ava and a Consul at Rangoon, for the protection of trade; and to procure the enforcement of the treaty of 1795.

5th. To claim the Island of Negrais, or to obtain some commercial advantages equivalent to its value.

Colonel Symes was well received and treated at Rangoon, but he was destined to experience the same slight and indignities, as Captain Cox at the Court where he arrived on the 30th September.

After great delay and difficulty, His Majesty deigned to acknowledge the British Ambassador, who received an audience of His Majesty on the 28th of November.

Lieutenant Colonel Symes quitted the court on the 27th of December, having only obtained in answer to the Governor's letter, a verbal message as if from the King, through the Viceroy of Rangoon, that no further demand should be made for the Arracan fugitives, and that the Governor of that district was not authorized to make any disrespectful or threatening demand for them. His Majesty would offer no apology, neither would he listen to any new treaty, nor permit the establishment of a British Resident at Rangoon, as promised to Captain Cox, but insisted that commercial affairs should remain on the footing settled by the treaty of 1795, and declared he would not grant either lands or settlements in Birmanah to any European power whatever.

At Rangoon further indignities were passed upon him. Colonel Symes, however, satisfied himself with forwarding a statement of the Rangoon Governor's conduct to the capital, and took his departure from Rangoon on the 20th January 1803.

We must next notice the appointment of Lieutenant Canning as Agent at Rangoon, on the part of Colonel Symes. The objects of the mission were:—

1. To give the Birman Court an opportunity of apologizing for the insults which had been offered to the two preceding missions.
2. To obtain good and early information of the state of French interests in Birmanah, and to observe the general conduct and feelings of the Birman Court towards the British Government.

Captain Canning having arrived at Rangoon was received with attention, and having duly forwarded Colonel Symes' letters to the Court, he received a reply with orders to the Rangoon Officers stating, that His Majesty having granted Colonel Symes every wish, saw no necessity for sending Birman Envoys to Calcutta as at first intended; and that, 'in consequence of the Governor General's desire to seek refuge under the Golden Feet, Lieutenant Canning was permitted to reside at Rangoon.' This unusual condescension from the Court, as well as the civility of the local officers, may probably be traced to the consternation created by the near approach to the walls of the capital of a Siamese army, which, however, after defeating the Birmans, and driving them from Zimmay, were obliged to return to the Eastern bank of the Salween, in consequence of the setting in of the rains. These civilities however were not of long duration; for in November, the Yewoom returned from the capital, and his first act was to order all English letters to be opened. To reason with him was found impossible, and the order being persisted in, Lieutenant Canning returned to Bengal.

During the year 1803, an Envoy arrived in Calcutta from the Governor of Arracan, but the object of his mission was not known.

The French Isles having been blockaded, Captain Canning was deputed to Rangoon as Governor General's Agent for the following objects:—

1. To acquaint the Birmans that the Isles of France were blockaded, and explain the custom on this head.
2. To soothe them for the consequent diminution of their Pegue trade, and to explain the nature of the blockade system.
3. To explain that the Brig 'Birmanah' had been seized, and condemned with her cargo, as it was proved to be French property.
4. To protect British persons and property in Birmanah, and to watch narrowly the intrigues of our enemies.

Captain Canning arrived at Rangoon on the 2nd October, and was invited to the capital by the Court, where he arrived on the 10th of February 1810, and was well received and treated, and though the ministers addressed a letter, in reply to those delivered by Captain Canning, to the Governor General, in their usual bombastic style, and threw out vague hints at the restoration of Dacca, &c. yet he satisfied the King and Court respecting the blockade system, and the Rangoon Government was forbidden from granting passes to vessels bound to the French Isles. The French interest had also in other ways been for some time on the decline at Court. Having brought his mission to a conclusion, Captain Canning returned to Calcutta in May 1804.

In the early part of the succeeding year a native of Arracan, named Khyen byen, a Mugh chief, who had before taken refuge with a number of his followers, in the District of Chittagong, made an aggression into Arracan of a most serious nature. He was joined by many Mughs from Chittagong, and being aided by those still resident in Arracan, they soon overran that province, and recovered the whole of it, except the capital, from the Birmans. The Indian Government, learning that the local authorities in Arracan entertained a conviction, that the invasion was supported by the British, and fearing that the first measure of the Birman Government of Rangoon would be to seize and barbarously revenge themselves on the persons and property of the British subjects residing there, determined on sending another mission to Ava. Captain Canning was for the third time deputed with the following instructions:—

1. To remove from the mind of the King and Court of Ava the conviction they appeared to entertain, that the invasion of Arracan was instigated or supported by the British Government.
2. To represent the unjust and unfriendly conduct of the local Government of Pegue with respect to British subjects and British ships trading to Rangoon; especially the unwarrantable conduct of that Government in seizing a ship, dispossessing the commander and sending her in charge of another person with troops to Tavoy, and refusing to offer any compensation for the injuries the vessel sustained, or for the heavy loss occasioned by her detention.
3. To explain certain other questions between the two Governments, respecting the seizure of a Birman vessel and her cargo; of the crew of another vessel charged with murder and piracy, and of certain Military Stores, which the Commander of a British Ship of War had taken out of a Brig, on her passage from Junk Ceylon to Tavoy.

Captain Canning was well received by the authorities at Rangoon, and the Viceroy of Pegue, on the part of his Government, declared himself satisfied with the explanations offered by Captain Canning respecting the disturbances in Arracan. Captain Canning took up his abode at Rangoon, waiting for the usual authority from the King to proceed to the Capital.

In January 1811, King Berring (Bhyen byen) and his colleague being defeated and driven out of Arracan, took refuge in the jungles of Chittagong, upon which the Governor of Arracan marched a considerable force to our frontiers, and demanded the surrender of the fugitives, in the language of menace and insult, whilst parties of his troops actually entered the Company's limits, and the Governor ostentatiously declared the expected approach of 80,000 men for the purpose of invading the British territories, the French having formed an alliance with them for the same purpose. Subsequent negotiations took place between him and the Magistrate of Chittagong, when he recalled his troops, denying all knowledge of their having exceeded the Birman territories.

Captain Canning was, therefore, desired to complain of this breach of friendship, and the violation of the British territories, and the insulting tone of the Arracan Governor's letters, and to communicate, that by their conduct they had created a state of affairs which, but for the friendly disposition of the Governor General, would justify an immediate appeal to arms; and that no negotiation could take place until the recall of the Birman troops from their threatening position on the frontier. That Chittagong had been fortified as a measure of defence, and though the Governor General's desire was peace, yet the British Government would be at all times ready to resist insolence and aggression, although open to the call of justice and reason, when urged in a suitable manner, and that the surrender of the Mugh rebels must be negotiated according to the usages of civilized nations.

Our differences were in a fair way of adjustment, and the Envoy was even preparing for his journey to the capital, when, on the 18th March, advices arrived from the Supreme Government of a second invasion of Chittagong by the Birman Army. Captain Canning therefore declined to proceed to the capital, and the Viceroy finding all his persuasions in vain, endeavoured to obtain forcible possession of the Envoy's person, but fortunately he escaped with his suite to the ship.

The Viceroy, sensible of the unjustifiable nature of his late attempt, made overtures to Captain Canning, and the latter returned to his residence on shore. In the meantime he was recalled, but peremptory orders had arrived from Ava to forward him to Court, by 'force, if necessary.'

The Viceroy, dreading the consequence of his disobedience to the royal orders to 'seize the Embassy,' proposed several plans to Captain Canning, to qualify his refusal, and, amongst others, that he would excuse his collecting a number of men as a shew of resistance to his departure, and not take offence at having a few shots fired at him, which would assure the Court of his exertions, and be satisfactory to all parties!

On the 31st of July 1812, a fifth and most peremptory order arrived to send Captain Canning to Court immediately 'by force, and well secured if necessary,' it being the anxious wish of this benighted Court, regardless of consequences, to obtain possession of the Envoy and followers, as hostages for the delivery of the Mugh rebels.

The very officers who had been sent from Court to convey Captain Canning thither, well secured, were astonished at the size and force of an English ship-of-war. The armed vessel 'Amboyna' was also present, and no doubt the dread of those two ships deterred the local Government from resorting to force. The Viceroy was superseded from Court, and disgraced for disobedience to orders, which he had not the means of enforcing. Captain Canning, however, having all things ready, embarked himself and suite the same day, and sailed for Bengal on the 16th of August.

In the early part of the succeeding year, Birman Vakeels arrived in Calcutta, with a renewal of the demand for the Mugh fugitives, and a Birman Shahbunder or custom-master was, during the year, arrested on his way to Delhi, whither he was proceeding ostensibly in search of religious books, but it was supposed, really to try and league the native powers against us.

During the year 1814, the Birmans made two more incursions into the British territories, and on both occasions they were guilty of seizing and murdering British subjects. They were discovered endeavouring to intrigue with the native powers in a scheme to drive us out of India, and they carried matters so far as to forcibly detain the Agent of the Magistrate of Chittagong at Arracan for twenty days under a guard. In consequence of this insult, all communication with the Rajah of Arracan ceased.

King Berring, who had been crippled by the efforts of the British and Birman Governments, died in 1815; the dispersion of his adherents, and the confinement of the principal leaders, produced a favorable change in the state of the country. The insurgents generally manifested a disposition to return quietly to their homes, but a few continued to lurk in the hills and jungles of Chittagong, under the command of Ryngunzing. The depredations of this chief and his adherents were finally suppressed by the surrender of the chief. Their existence, however, ought not to have furnished the Court of Ava with any additional ground of complaint, as the chiefs were kept as state prisoners, and persons of lesser rank and importance were liberated, but restricted to the Company's territories.

The perfect immunity of the Birman frontiers from aggression, and the assurances of the British Government, that so far as depended upon their officers, this desirable state of things should be perpetuated, might have satisfied the Government of Ava of sincerity of the pledge, and justified the expectation that amicable relations would be permanently formed.

The restoration of tranquillity had not, however, lasted long, when the demand was renewed for the surrender of the Mugh Chiefs. Several embassies were sent both to Bengal and Chittagong with the above object, but the Governor General, the Marquis of Hastings, refused to deliver them up, and wrote a temperate letter to the Rangoon Viceroy, to inform the King of Ava of the inutility of any further application on the subject.

The peremptory and firm tone assumed by the British Government was for a short time attended with salutary consequences, but in October 1817, an attempt at intrigue with the Court of Lahore was discovered and prevented.

After the expiration of nearly a year, a second letter was received from the Rajah of Ramree; making a demand, on the part of the King of Ava, for the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Moorshedabad, and Dacca, on the alleged grounds of their being ancient dependencies of Arracan. A letter in reply was written to the Viceroy of Pegue, treating this demand as the authorized act of the Rajah of Ramree; and stating, that if the Governor General could suppose it to have been dictated by the King of Ava, the British Government would be justified in considering it as a declaration of war. Previous to these communications, the Birmans were known to have made overtures to the Mahrattas, and by a simultaneous rising of these two states, the British were to have been annihilated. The Birmans, however, were too late in their arrangements, for the Mahrattas had been already crushed, and this ebullition of Birman insolence died a natural death.

The constitution of Assam comprised even to a greater extent than usual with Asiatic nations, the seeds of civil dissension. The succession to the throne of that country being disputed, the Birmans interfered in favor of Rajah Chunder Kaunt, who was successful. Poorunder Singh, who was disposed, applied to the Supreme Government for assistance, which was refused, though they afforded him and his followers an asylum in the British territories. Repeated applications were made for his seizure and surrender by Chunder Kaunt, and a minister of the King of Ava.

Towards the end of May 1821, Poorunder Singh invaded Assam with a force under the command of a Mr. Bruce, but this force was defeated, and the commander made prisoner. Rajah Chunder Kaunt though successful was not long allowed to enjoy his usurped power. He began to tire of his friends, the Birmans, and as a first act against them, is supposed to have ordered the murder of his chief minister, who was warm in their interests, and for this he was deposed. The Assamese were growing weary of the plundering and devastations of the Birman Army, which at this time had to contend against the forces of the two deposed princes; our frontiers, consequently, became the scene of various excesses, for which the Birman chief apologized, and stated, that our villages had been attacked by mistake, and offered remuneration for whatever injuries that had occurred.

Rajah Chunder Kaunt made head against his enemies in the latter part of the year, and having purchased supplies of arms and ammunition, and being joined by a number of Assamese, he became, in his turn, triumphant, and at the end of 1821, had again established his authority over the Western part of Assam.

The temporary successes of Chunder Kaunt were arrested by the reinforcement of the Birman Army; he was defeated and compelled to seek safety by flight.

In July a Birman Vakeel arrived in Calcutta, bearing letters from the Birman Commander in Assam, expressing a desire to remain on friendly terms with the Company, and to respect the British territories; yet should protection be given to Chunder Kaunt, he had received orders to follow him wherever he might go, and take him by force. In reply, the Governor General in Council expressed his desire for peace and friendly relations, but refused to surrender the fugitive, and remonstrated against a recent seizure and detention by the Governor of Arracan, of some of our elephant hunters from the province of Chittagong.

In the meantime Assam had ceased to be an independent state, and had become a province of the Birman Empire. Rajah Poorunder Singh, latterly supported by the Birmans, had been deposed, and the supreme authority vested in

The vicinity of a powerful and ambitious neighbour was, therefore, substituted for a feeble and distracted state. It was to be anticipated from the known pretensions of the Birman, and the spirit they had invariably displayed, that it would not be long before they found some excuse for disturbing the amicable relations. This anticipation was speedily realized. An island in the Brahmaputra, on which the British flag had been erected, was claimed by the Birman, the flag thrown down, and an armed force assembled to maintain the insult.

Under these circumstances, our line of defence on that frontier was strengthened, with a view of protecting our valuable provinces of Rungpore and Dacca, the possession of which had long been the anxious object of the King of Ava.

For years past, the Birman had been gradually encroaching on the Chittagong frontier, and advancing claims to the jungles frequented by our elephant hunters, whom they had unjustly seized and detained, notwithstanding the urgent applications which were made for their release.

Taking advantage of the conciliatory policy of the British Government, and misinterpreting its forbearance under insults to an inability to resent and punish them, they, in 1823, claimed the island of Shahpooree, which, independently of being situated on the Chittagong side of the river Naaf, and fordable at low water, had for years been occupied by British subjects, and paying revenue to the British Government. Early this year, the Birman, in pursuance of their arrogant pretensions, and with a view to deter our people from occupying the island, attacked a Mugh merchant boat, and wantonly shot the helmsman. The Magistrate immediately established a protecting guard upon it, and reported, that a Birman force was collecting on the East bank of the Naaf.

The determination thus shown by the British authorities to maintain the integrity of their frontier was immediately resented by the Birman Governor of Arracan desiring us 'immediately to evacuate the island,' denying our right to any portion of the boundary river, and declaring, that if the detachment was not immediately recalled, the consequences would be a war between the two countries. He also deputed an ambassador to Calcutta, to enforce his unjust demands, in which, however, he was unsuccessful.

The Rajah of Arracan was addressed on the subject, but he replied reiterating the demand for the concession of the island, and in answer to his demand, the right of the Company was asserted, though at the same time, a disposition to investigate the claim in a deliberate and friendly manner was expressed. Before this reply could reach the Rajah, he proceeded to carry his threat of applying force into execution, under the express orders, as was carefully promulgated, of his sovereign, the King of Ava. On the night of the 24th September 1823, a body of one thousand Birman attacked and took the island of Shahpooree, and retired to the main land. This outrage was followed by the assemblage of an Army of about 15,000 men in Arracan, and sixty boats were already prepared to transport it across the river into Chittagong.

In order to avoid till the last possible moment the necessity of hostilities, the Governor General, although determined to assert our just pretensions, resolved to afford the Court of Ava opportunity of avoiding any collision. With this intent, the Governor General resolved to consider the forcible occupation of Shahpooree as the act of the local authorities alone, and addressed a declaration to the Government of Ava, recapitulating the past occurrences, and calling upon that Court to disavow their officers in Arracan.

In the meantime, the orders of Government were restricted to the re-occupation of the island. The Rajah of Arracan, however, intimated to the Magistrate, that any attempt on our side to take possession of it, would be resisted. In reply to the Governor General's letter, he denied, that the English had any claims to the island, and if we persisted in the course we were pursuing, he would take from us Dacca, and Moorshedabad. On the 21st of November, our troops re-took the island, which was at this time unoccupied.

Sickness at length compelled the British troops to retire from the island to Tek Naaf, a post on the main land at no great distance from it; and Mr. Robertson informed the Birman, that any attempt on their part to retake it, would be punished by us. In the meantime, the King of Ava did not deign to answer the Governor General's letter, but peremptorily ordered the Arracan Governor, to retake the island at all hazards, and a large Birman force was assembled for this purpose. The Governor of Arracan made advances, and the messengers sent by him declared that they would be satisfied by a declaration that the island should be considered neutral ground, and not occupied by either party. This proposition which, if brought forward in a suitable manner in the earlier proceedings, might have been admitted without disgrace, could not be now listened to, and Government had decided to eject them by force.

In the beginning of 1824, two Birman armies actually invaded Cachar at the invitation of the Ex-Rajah Govind Chunder, although it had been previously communicated to them that the British Government, being in treaty with that state, would not permit Birman interference. The same protection was at the same time extended to the Rajah of Jyntea. A small force was in the meantime advanced from Dacca to Sylhet. The Birman armies, notwithstanding the representations of the Commissioner in Assam, entered Cachar in different quarters, the chief declaring that he had received the royal orders to reinstate Govind Chunder on the throne of Cachar, and to arrest the three Munneeporean Chiefs, Georgeet Singh, Marjeet Singh, and Gumbheer Singh. It therefore became necessary to resist their progress before they occupied positions, which would give them the command of the Sylhet frontier, and the British Officers were accordingly instructed to oppose the advance of the Birman by force, and hostilities shortly ensued.

Intelligence was also received, that the troops under Gumbheer Singh had been defeated by a Birman force from Munneepore, and that a third Birman division was passing into Jyntea immediately to the North of the station of Sylhet: It was therefore judged advisable by Major Newton, the Officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, to concentrate his detachments to advance against the invading party from Assam, before they should have time to complete their intrenchments. Arrangements were immediately made to oppose them; and on the 17th of January 1824, Major Newton fell in with the Northern Division of their army, which, after a severe struggle, he entirely defeated. Subsequently to the action, Major Newton returned with the force under his command to Sylhet, withdrawing the whole of the troops from Cachar. The Birman then advanced to Jatrapore, about five miles east of the frontier, and eight miles from Bhadrapore, where the two divisions from Assam and Munneepore effected a junction, and erected stockades on the other bank of the Soormah, connecting them by a bridge across the river. Their united force amounted to about six thousand men, of whom four thousand were Assamese and Cacharees:—a detachment of two thousand more was posted at Kila Kandy, in the South-east quarter of Cachar. The main body of the Birman proceeded to push their stockades on the North bank of the Soormah, within one thousand yards of the British post at Bhadrapore; but from these they were driven at the point of the bayonet. The Assam division fell back upon the Bherdeka pass and the Jetinghi river, whilst the Munneepore force stockaded itself at Doodputlee.

Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, who had joined and taken the command, marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy, and found them at the foot of the pass above mentioned, stockading themselves. The troops formed and carried the position at the point of the bayonet. The enemy fled to the hills, and left no further force in the direction of Assam to be encountered.

Still there remained the Munneepore Division to be expelled, and with this object Lieutenant Colonel Bowen directed his march against their position at Doodputlee, which proved much stronger than any yet assailed; after being exposed to their fire for some time, the attempt was abandoned, and the force was withdrawn to Jatrapore. In the meantime the Birman retreated from their position, and fell back to Munneepore, so that Cachar was freed from the presence of the enemy.

The Mahá Bundoolah took the supreme command of the troops of Arracan, having brought with him considerable reinforcements from Ava. Shortly prior to his arrival, however, four individuals said to have been deputed by the Court of Ava, arrived at Mungdoo. When the sepoys were withdrawn from Shahpooree, the Honorable Company's Pilot Vessel 'Sophia' was ordered to join the Gun boats off that Island, to serve in some degree as a substitute for the troops. Upon the arrival of the Deputies on the opposite bank of the Naaf, they invited the Commanding Officer of the 'Sophia' on shore, under the pretence of communicating

Rare section

P A P E R S

RELATING TO

HOSTILITIES WITH BURMAH.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Her Majesty's Command.
June 4, 1852.*

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SON.

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HOSTILITIES WITH BURMAH.

No. 1.

The President of the Council of India in Council to the Secret Committee of the East India Company.

Fort William, November 22, 1851. (No. 8.)

WE have the honor to transmit a copy of correspondence arising out of complaints of ill-treatment, preferred by certain British subjects trading to, or resident at, the Port of Rangoon, and alleged by them to have been experienced at the hands of the Burmese Governor of that place, and to report the measures adopted by us, in communication with the Governor-General, for obtaining redress.

Under the treaties* which exist between the Governments of India and Ava, the subjects of each are entitled, in ports belonging to the other, to "the utmost protection and security." In the cases now brought to notice, it was evident, that not only had these been withheld, but that gross injustice and oppression had been practised. We have deemed it incumbent upon us, therefore, to accede to the appeal made by the sufferers, and to demand reparation, in the first instance, from the Governor of Rangoon; and, in the event of that officer refusing to make a proper submission for the injury he has done, and the insult he has offered, to demand redress from the Government of Ava.

The absence of any accredited Agent of the British Government, at the Court, or in the territories, of Ava, has made it somewhat difficult to deal with such cases; but the opportune arrival, at Calcutta, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," under the command of Commodore Lambert, in some measure diminished this difficulty, and will, we hope, enable us to bring this affair to an early and satisfactory issue. We have availed ourselves of the Commodore's visit, to request of him to proceed to Rangoon with the ship under his command, and have placed under his orders the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine," properly armed and equipped, in order to endeavour to obtain from the Governor the reparation which is due, for the unjustifiable treatment which our subjects have recently met with at his hands. The instructions communicated to Commodore Lambert will be found in the letter addressed to him on the 11th instant, with which was forwarded a copy of the letter from the Secretary with the Governor-General, dated the 31st October, for his further guidance. The Commodore has been desired, in the event of his demands upon the Governor of Rangoon not being complied with, to forward to the King of Ava a letter, which we have addressed to His Majesty, and made over to him for that purpose. A copy, in English, of this letter forms one of the inclosures of this dispatch.

We have appointed Captain Latter, of the 67th Native Infantry, to assist Commodore Lambert, as interpreter, in his communications with the Burmese authorities. Captain Latter's military allowances, while so employed, will be

* The Treaties with the King of Burmah will be found at the end of this collection of Papers.

made up to Rs. 1000 per mensem; and we have placed under him Mr. Edwards, an assistant in our Foreign Secretary's Office, as his clerk. Mr. Edwards was selected for this duty on account of his knowledge of the Burmese language, and of the manners and customs of the Burmese people, acquired during his employment under the former Residents at the Court of Ava.

The expedition left Calcutta for Rangoon on the 18th instant.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bogle, Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces, to
F. Halliday, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.*

Moulmein, July 15, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, a copy of a letter addressed to me on the 27th June, 1851, by Mr. Robert Sheppard, master of the barque "Monarch," of Madras, which vessel is a permanent trader between this place and various ports.

Mr. Sheppard is well known here as a quiet, steady, and highly respectable person.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Robert Sheppard to Colonel Bogle.

THE respectful petition of Robert Sheppard, master and owner of the barque "Monarch," of the Port of Madras, humbly sheweth, That on the 24th of May, 1851, was chartered by Moolah Hassen, a native merchant, residing in Moulmein, to proceed to Rangoon, and take in a cargo of grain, catch, &c. for Penang and Singapore: the said charterer, Moolah Hassen, sent a man on board to pilot the ship up the coast, and into the Rangoon River, my being unacquainted with the coast [on the 2nd day of June, the Moulmein pilot left the ship]. At 8 A.M., 3rd of June, arrived on the Rangoon coast and gave charge to the pilot, having heard in Moulmein that he was fully competent to perform such duty; at 1.30 P.M. he got into shoal water, and did not know which way to extricate the ship; your petitioner then brought up in two fathoms low water, the wind was strong from the S.W., with a heavy sea on the bank, the ship struck aft four or five times with the lift of the sea, and unshipped the rudder out of the upper gudgeon; the crew were furling sails and getting the longboat ready in event she might be wanted; the pilot, through fear or shame, jumped overboard, first throwing a boom into the water; your petitioner was then on the poop, with three or four hands, lifting the rudder to ship it into the upper gudgeon; as soon as your petitioner heard that a man was overboard, ordered the boat to be lowered; that occupied some time, and as near as your petitioner could judge, the man must have been half-a-mile astern, as the flood-tide had made strong; the sea breaking on the bar, threw the boat against the ship's side and broke her stern and stove one of her planks; a heavy squall coming on at the time, obliged me to order the men out of the boat, or she would have swamped alongside.

Three days after the accident, your petitioner took the ship up to Rangoon, and reported the circumstance, on landing, to Moolah Ibrahim, the agent and brother of the charterer, Moolah Hassen.

Your petitioner has been obliged to enumerate the details of the case, that you may be enabled to judge of the injustice to which he was subjected, since his arrival in this port. On the second day your petitioner was ordered to wait on the Governor, and was taken by the peons to a writer of the police, and examined; he then desired your petitioner to send for the second mate, boy, William Anthony, and ten lascars; they were separately examined, and all stated that your petitioner had not thrown the man overboard; the report was then taken in to the Governor, who ordered we should be kept in confinement; the only person the Governor examined was the boy William Anthony (who speaks

the language), whom he ill-used by making his hands and feet fast; one of his people struck him on the thigh with an iron bolt, to make him say that your petitioner had thrown the man overboard; he told the Governor he had spoken the truth. He was then liberated and again questioned by the Governor, and gave the same answer; he ordered him to be put into the blocks, where he remained all night and part of the next day. Your petitioner was kept in confinement till 8 P.M., when Captain Crisp and three or four native merchants came out to the Governor; on Captain Crisp becoming my security, your petitioner was then liberated; the second mate and crew were kept in confinement; the next day your petitioner had to attend, and again taken before the police writer. Your petitioner requested that the crew might be discharged; after paying 40 Rs. for jail-fees; they complied, and ordered them to go on board. Your petitioner was desired to attend the next day, and, as on the former occasion, was taken to the police writer; your petitioner requested through an intrepeter that he might be taken before the Governor; he would not consent, stating it was contrary to the Burmese law; your petitioner then attempted to go, but was prevented by the peons.

Captain Crisp, Moolah Ibrahim, and two other native merchants, went to the Governor; he insisted upon my having thrown the man overboard, and gave them one day to arrange the case; it was finally settled by the agent paying 325 Rs.; the case was then dismissed. This act of injustice was done, notwithstanding the evidence of the second mate, boy, and ten lascars. The accident occurred outside of the Elephant Point. Had your petitioner been guilty of the crime alleged, he would be amenable to the laws of his country and not to the Burmese, particularly as the pilot was a British subject, a native of Chittagong, and lately resident in Moulmein.

Your petitioner humbly prayeth that this report may be laid before the Supreme Government of India, as it is not only a flagrant act of injustice, but also an infringement of the Treaty; your petitioner deferred writing in consequence of a report that the man had been seen at a village near the Elephant Point, and was desirous to ascertain the fact, but without success; in all probability he may have returned to Moulmein by one of the many vessels that have left this port.

Your petitioner humbly prayeth that you will take such steps as you may deem expedient, to prevent a repetition of the many acts of injustice, oppression, and tyranny, that so frequently occur to British subjects in this port. Your petitioner trusts you may be pleased to take this in due consideration, as it would not only confer on him, but all that trade to this port, a sincere and lasting obligation. Your petitioner will, as in duty bound, ever pray.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.

Moulmein, August 8, 1851.

IN continuation of my letter to your address of the 15th July, 1851, transmitting a letter from Mr. R. Sheppard, master of the barque "Monarch," dated Rangoon, the 27th June, 1851, complaining of the treatment he had then experienced from the Burmese Governor at that place, I have the honour to submit herewith communications detailing all the particulars of the treatment experienced, not only on his arrival at Rangoon, but just before his departure therefrom.

It appears that, besides the detention of his vessel, and the heavy loss thereby entailed upon him, a sum of 1005 Company's rupees was extorted from Mr. Sheppard, and that he was altogether very ill-treated.

Of the merits of the case, I know nothing more than is stated in Mr. Sheppard's protest; but I am disposed to credit what he states, because he bears such a high character at this place, and is well known to be a most quiet, inoffensive, and well-behaved man, correct and honorable in his dealings with all, and not likely to have committed any impropriety.

The lascar named Dewan Ali has been dismissed the service of Government.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

*Messrs. Creaton & Co. to Colonel Bogle.**Moulmein, August 4, 1851.*

WE have the honor to forward inclosed, the declaration and protest of Robert Sheppard, master of the barque "Monarch," recording the sufferings of himself and crew by the unjust and arbitrary acts of the Burmese authorities at Rangoon.

We are induced to take the liberty of respectfully calling your attention to this case, by the hope that the Government of India will, on consideration of the matter, be pleased to grant that reparation which the circumstances of the case demand; and by the belief that, to the absence of protection, which has, on the part of the Government, since the withdrawal of the Resident at the Court of Ava, attended British interests in that quarter, is mainly owing the audacity that has prompted the commission of this and other instances of oppression and wrong.

We feel confident that it cannot be contemplated by the Government of India to allow this very unsatisfactory state of our commerce with Rangoon always to exist, in contempt of international rights, or to leave unredressed and uncared for those who, in prosecution of their lawful business, and trusting in the protecting power of the Government under which they live, have been exposed in person and property to the injustice and rapacity of any native or foreign Power.

It will be observed that a prime mover in these transactions is a servant in the employ of Government, and that it was through his instrumentality so large a sum of money was extorted.

We have to solicit the favor of your submitting our claim to the Supreme Government, that compensation may be obtained for the injury, loss, and expenses sustained by reason of the said acts of the Burmese authorities at Rangoon, as set forth in the declaration and protest of the master of the "Monarch," and computed at the sum of 5000 Company's rupees.

We regret to be under the unfortunate necessity of making this complaint, but our duty, as agents of the ship and master, requires us to use every means to obtain redress.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Declaration of Mr. Sheppard.

ON the 29th day of July, 1851, personally appeared and presented himself before me, Henry Hopkinson, Esq., Principal Assistant Commissioner, Tenasserim Provinces, of Province Amherst, Robert Sheppard, master of the ship or vessel the "Monarch," which sailed on the 2nd of July last, on a voyage from Moulmein to Rangoon, there to load cargo to Penang and Singapore, who did solemnly declare and state as follows:—That he proceeded on his voyage without accident till the 3rd day of June last, when, at noon, off Chiner Bucker, on the Rangoon coast, in five fathoms water, the pilot running for the entrance of the river, suddenly shoaled two fathoms; hauled out to the eastward, shoaled one quarter less two fathoms; anchored and furled sails. Elephant Point N.W. $\frac{1}{4}$ W.; False Elephant, S.W. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. It being low water when the ship brought up, with a heavy swell breaking on the spit, caused her to strike very heavily abaft, and lifted the rudder, but apparently sustained no damage; the shock was only felt as far forward as the mizen-mast (the ship was 18 inches by the stern when she left the last port); sounded the well, found ten inches. At 1:30 P.M., the native pilot took the boom used for washing decks, and threw it into the water, and immediately jumped overboard; before the boat could be lowered, he must have been half-a-mile astern; the boat was nearly swamped alongside, in consequence of the heavy sea and flood-tide on the sand; a heavy squall coming on at the time, obliged him, this appearer, to order the people out of the boat, or in all probability their lives would have been sacrificed; and the vessel was in danger, and required the aid of all hands to work the ship into

deep water. At 4:30 P.M. weighed, it blowing fresh, and beat to the southward. At 9:30 P.M., anchored in four and a half fathoms.

On the 7th, arrived off Rangoon without further accident, and on landing, reported the above circumstances to Moolah Ibrahim, the agent for the ship; and noted protest of the ship having grounded outside the river.

On the 9th, at breakfast-time, the Governor sent on board the ship, and he, this appearer, was taken before the police, and examined on a charge of having thrown overboard the pilot Esoph, preferred by a man named Hajim, a native of Chittagong, who stated that he was brother to the said pilot. He was then ordered to send for the second mate, apprentice, and part of the crew, for examination. The second mate and lascars were examined by a police writer, and the boy William Anthony by the Governor, by whose orders he was tied hand and foot, struck on the thigh with an iron bolt, and otherwise ill-used, by being put into the blocks, where he remained all night, and part of the next day. After being examined, the Governor imposed a fine of 600 rupees, and ordered them into confinement, under the guard of armed police peons, where he, this appearer, was kept till 8 P.M., when Captain Crisp, Moolah Ibrahim, his agent, and three other native merchants, becoming his security, he was liberated; the second mate and lascars being detained until the next day, when they were allowed to go on board, upon this appearer paying the jail-fees, amounting to 40 rupees. Afterwards, and through the intercession of Captain Crisp, Moolah Ibrahim, and the other native merchants, who had become security for him, the fine was reduced to 325 rupees, which were paid, and the case dismissed, on the payment of court-fees, 70 rupees, and interpreter, 20 rupees. Continued taking in cargo; and, on the 6th of July, being ready for sea, unmoored ship, landed the missing pilot's things, and applied for a pass, which was granted. The pass was withdrawn in the evening, and the ship detained.

Next day, the Governor refused the pass, owing to a charge brought by a man, named Dewan Ali (employed in one of the Moulmein gun-boats), calling himself a brother of the pilot, bringing forward a claim for a sum of 500 rupees, which he stated his brother had taken with him. On the 8th, he, this appearer, was ordered to attend before the Governor, with his second mate, and others of the crew, to answer the charge; and afterwards, at the custom-house, before eight native merchants appointed by the Governor to arbitrate the case, by whom he was, on the 9th, fully acquitted of the charges preferred against him, viz., of throwing the man overboard, and of stealing the money.

On the 11th, the Governor declared the verdict to be unjust, and ordered the arbitrators to attend, and again to investigate the charges in his presence; insisting that the man had the money on board, and that the sum must be repaid. The arbitrators being kept at the Governor's house, and afraid of his threatenings, ultimately gave the decision required. The following day, he, this appearer, attended the court, and the Governor ordered him to pay 500 rupees: viz., 200 rupees for himself, 150 rupees blood-money for the missing man; and 150 rupees for court expenses, which was done, there being no help for it. The order for the pass was then given, and, after he left the court, again countermanded. The next day, Sunday, the 13th, the Deputy Governor, or some one of inferior authority to the Governor, demanded 50 rupees, which he, this appearer, had to comply with, and pay, the ship having already lost eight days by these various detentions. At 6 P.M., the pilot came on board, and the ship proceeded on her voyage. Thus, having been defrauded of the sum of 997 rupees, the ship forcibly prevented from performing her voyage, to the loss and injury of the freighters, &c., and himself and crew imprisoned and ill-used by the Governor of Rangoon and his people, as detailed in the foregoing.

Thus done and protested in Moulmein aforesaid, the day, month, and year hereinbefore written.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Declaration by Edward Antram, Second Mate of the "Monarch."

I, EDWARD ANTRAM, second mate of the barque "Monarch," and on board the vessel on the said voyage, do solemnly and sincerely declare, that the contents of the foregoing instrument of protest are, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, in all things true, and make this declaration, conscientiously believing the same to be true.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.

Moulmein, September 22, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, a copy of a letter, addressed to me, under date the 16th instant, and its accompaniments, by a Mr. Harold Lewis, master of the British barque "Champion," at the Port of Rangoon.

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

Mr. Lewis, Master of the "Champion," to Colonel Bogle.

Rangoon, September 16, 1851.

I TAKE the liberty of addressing you, as the nearest British authority, and have to request the favour of your forwarding my case to the Supreme Government of Bengal, as early as possible.

As it is my intention, on my arrival in Calcutta, to lay the whole case before the Government, I shall now condense the matter as much as possible.

I arrived here, from the Mauritius, 11th August. A few days after, a complaint, of a trivial nature, was brought against me, before the Governor, by two Bengal coolies, who had secreted themselves on board my vessel, at the Mauritius, without my knowledge; and after five days' attendance on the Governor, to the neglect of my duty to the ship, I was persuaded by the merchants, to give the Governor 100 rupees, to save myself from further annoyance.

Shortly after this matter was arranged, seven of my crew deserted, and endeavoured, by the Governor's assistance, to oblige me to give to them their discharge, and all their wages. I was again obliged to make him a present of 50 rupees, to come to a decision; and by which he obliged me to pay to them half their demand. This case also occupied me five days.

He has now got up a case of murder against me, one of my crew having died the day I anchored off the mouth of the river; three of the deserters, and the two coolies, being evidence against me. I have taken my chief officer, doctor, and serang; these he would not examine. And I have offered to bring my whole crew; but this neither will he allow; but threatens, unless I give him 200 rupees, to detain my vessel, and write to Ava for instructions. I am ready for sea, but he has refused four applications for my port-clearance.

I have decided upon resisting this attempt at extortion, though he has threatened me with imprisonment and the blocks, and has subjected me to every insult and indignity. Having broken no laws, and committed no crime, I trust to meet with protection from the British Government.

Inclosure 9 in No. 1.

*Mr. Lewis to the Governor of Rangoon.**Rangoon, September 15, 1851.*

BEFORE your court, I have been charged with murdering one of my crew at sea.

This charge is brought against me after my vessel has been at anchor off Rangoon thirty days, by a deserter from the vessel, who tried other means first of getting clear of the ship, and when ordered on board by your Excellency, brings this charge without the slightest foundation, but with the hope of forcing me to let him go.

I am an Englishman, commanding a British vessel; and on board of that vessel, one of the crew, a British subject, dies at sea. I am reported to have killed him. I can, therefore, only be tried by a British court of law. But, to leave no suspicion on my character at your court, I submitted to undergo an examination myself, and brought up the chief officer, doctor, and serang, of the vessel; these, your officers did not choose to question, but said they would call one or two of the men out of the vessel, and examine them privately. And I was threatened with immediate imprisonment and the blocks.

I now consider I have done all that, as a British subject, I have a right to do. I have broken none of the laws of Burmah; and I have conformed to all the regulations of the port.

I shall, therefore, now remain on board of my ship, and keep my crew, also, on board, until I obtain my port-clearance; and I claim your Excellency's protection from any further annoyance, under Article IX of the Treaty of Yandaboo. And I respectfully request your Excellency will, now that my vessel is ready for sea, have the three lascars, that are on shore, sent on board, as also the two coolies belonging to the Bengal Government, according to your former order.

Inclosure 10 in No. 1.

Mr. Halliday to Sir H. M. Elliot, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

(Extract.)

Fort William, October 10, 1851.

I AM directed to request that you will submit for the consideration of the Governor-General, papers regarding the ill-treatment suffered by Mr. Sheppard, master of the barque "Monarch," and his crew, at the hands of the Burmese officer at Rangoon.

The "Monarch" is a regular trader to that port, and on this occasion it seems that while the vessel was running for the entrance of the river at Rangoon, the pilot, a native of Chittagong, who had brought the vessel into a position of great danger, jumped overboard, through fear, it is believed; an attempt was made to rescue him, but from causes, over which there was no control, it was found impossible to save him. Upon the arrival of the vessel at Rangoon, Mr. Sheppard was ordered to attend at the Governor's to answer to a charge which had been preferred against him of having thrown the pilot overboard; and although, by the evidence of his crew, the accusation was disproved, he was fined and placed in confinement with his men, one of whom, a Christian lad, was most cruelly beaten and kept in the blocks for a whole night and day. Through the instrumentality of Mr. Crisp and the principal native merchants, Mr. Sheppard was himself liberated, after a short detention, but the rest remained in confinement until the following day, when they were set at liberty upon payment of 455 rs., of which 325 rs. was a fine imposed upon Mr. Sheppard. Scarcely had this matter been settled, when Mr. Sheppard was called to account for a sum of money alleged to have been left by the pilot on board. By this means a further sum of 550 rs. was extorted from him.

It appears to the President in Council, that there has been no disruption of the Treaty of 1826, or abandonment of its provisions, as affecting commercial and shipping interests, but that those provisions remain in full force, and are binding on the parties.

While this subject was still under the consideration of the President in Council, the letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, of the 22nd of September, was received, of which a copy is also transmitted. With this letter was forwarded a statement from Mr. Lewis, of the "Champion," detailing the vexatious treatment experienced by him at the port of Rangoon, and his ultimate detention upon the serious, and evidently false, charge of murder, alleged to have been committed at sea, got up with the view of extorting money.

It appears to the President in Council that it is incumbent on the British Government to take notice of these obvious infractions of the Treaty by the Burmese authorities, and to protect, from oppression and injury, British subjects engaged in the lawful prosecution of trade in a Burmese port. His Honor accordingly has directed that these papers should be submitted for the consideration of the Governor-General.

Inclosure 11 in No. 1.

Messrs. Mackey & Co. to J. P. Grant, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

Calcutta, October 21, 1851.

WE have the honor to transmit a copy of a communication* made by our Moulmein firm to the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, regarding the outrage committed by the Rangoon authorities on Captain Sheppard, of the barque "Monarch," who may be expected here by the early part of next month, when we shall again have the honor to address you, praying some measures may be taken to recover from the Burmans the loss and damage sustained by Captain Sheppard.

Inclosure 12 in No. 1.

Commodore George Lambert, R.N., to the Governor-General of India.

H.M.S. "Fox," Diamond Harbour, October 25, 1851.

A STATEMENT having been made to me by Mr. Lewis, master of the British barque "Champion," relating to injuries he has sustained by the conduct of the Governor of Rangoon, the particulars of which, he informs me, are now before the Bengal Government, I have informed that gentleman, that, however desirous I might feel of investigating his complaint, I do not feel myself justified in interfering while the subject is under the consideration of your Excellency, who, I felt assured, would fully inquire into the particulars of his case, as well as the insult stated to have been offered to the British flag.

Inclosure 13 in No. 1.

Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.

Moulmein, October 4, 1851.

IN continuation of my letter of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, a copy of a further letter, addressed to me, under date the 23rd ultimo, and its accompaniment, by Mr. Harold Lewis, master of the barque "Champion."

* See Inclosure No. 4.

Inclosure 14 in No. 1.

Mr. Lewis to Colonel Bogle.

Rangoon, September 25, 1851.

I TAKE the liberty of again troubling you in regard to the further oppression and extortion I have been, and am, suffering from the Governor of Rangoon, since last I had the honor of addressing you.

Inclosure 15 in No. 1.

Statement by Mr. Lewis.

AFTER producing the irons in open court and a man with a rattan to flog me, and threatened to send me in irons to Ava, or behead me here at Rangoon, in fact, having done all in his power to intimidate me into admitting his right to try the case, he declared that, "coûte qui coûte," he would try me, and on the evidence of the accusers alone; that should I prove guilty, he would take my life; however, by the intercession of the residents here, he at last reluctantly consented to have the whole crew examined. By the testimony of twenty-three men and officers, it was fully proved I never struck nor allowed to be struck any man on board the vessel. The Governor then acquitted me, and promised to give my pass on the following day. Two days after he re-tried me, throwing aside the evidence of the whole crew, and condemned me to pay 280 rs., detaining me a prisoner, until by the advice of the other gentlemen, I paid the amount. The next day he seized my serang, and re-tried him.

Mauritius coolies (which had been settled twenty-three days before and 100 rs. paid to the court), has thrown him into prison, and now refuses my pass till I release him by paying 200 rs. Thus at present stands the case. *Sic in orig.*

Inclosure 16 in No. 1.

Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.

Moulmein, October 21, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith, to be laid before the President in Council, in original, a letter, dated Rangoon, September 27, 1851, from a merchant, to my address, with a memorial from the inhabitants of Rangoon, to the address of the Governor-General of India in Council.

Inclosure 17 in No. 1.

A Merchant to Colonel Bogle.

Rangoon, September 27, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to forward the accompanying memorial from the European residents of this place, addressed to the Governor-General in Council; in doing which, I am directed to ask the favour of your forwarding the same by the first opportunity, accompanied by any remarks which you may deem important in bringing this subject fully before the Governor-General in Council.

I beg, further, to state, that a copy of the memorial has been forwarded to Calcutta, by the barque "Champion," which vessel left yesterday.

Inclosure 18 in No. 1.

Merchants of Rangoon to the Governor-General.

The respectful Memorial of the undersigned merchants, commanders of British vessels, and others, resident in Rangoon, in the Burman Empire,

Humbly showeth,

THAT your memorialists have, for a long time, suffered from the tyranny and gross injustice of the Burmese authorities ;

That trade is seriously obstructed, and almost suppressed, in consequence ;

That, contrary to the Treaty of Yandaboo, and good faith, a much larger sum is, on all occasions, exacted from vessels, in shape of harbour-dues, &c., and that many vessels are, in consequence, deterred from coming ;

That neither life nor property is safe, as the Governor has publicly stated to his dependants, that he has no money to pay them for their services, and has granted to them his permission to rob the inhabitants, and to get money as they best can ;

That, in consequence, robberies and false charges are of almost daily occurrence ;

That the Governor has frequently demanded money, without any pretext, and has tortured the parties till his demands were complied with ;

That now, affairs have arrived at such a crisis that, unless protected, your memorialists will be obliged to leave the country, and, in doing so, must sacrifice their property ;

That your memorialists are here under the provisions of the Treaty of Yandaboo, and beg to state, with all due deference and respect, that they claim the right to seek your protection ;

That they are striving, under every difficulty, to carry on a trade beneficial to Great Britain and the whole of British India ; and that, in support of the correctness of their statement, out of many instances of arbitrary injustice and oppression, a few of recent date may be mentioned :

The British barque "Champion," Harold Lewis, commander, arrived from the Mauritius, to load for Calcutta, on the 11th of August, 1851. It appears that two runaway coolies secreted themselves on board the vessel at the Mauritius (this fact did not come to the knowledge of the captain till the vessel had been three days at sea), and, soon after their arrival here, they were induced by the officers of the Government to prefer a charge against Captain Lewis, for the recovery of the sum of 90 rupees, paid to him by them as passage-money ; and they demanded, also, their discharge from the ship.

This case came before the Deputy Governor ; and Captain Lewis's ignorance of their having been on board was fully proved, also that he never received any money from them. The case was then dismissed by the Deputy Governor, on Captain Lewis paying 100 rupees for court expenses ; and, notwithstanding his remonstrance to the contrary, the Governor refused to give up the men, although informed that they were runaway coolies belonging to the Bengal Government.

On the 8th of September, seven lascars from the ship complained to the Governor of ill-treatment when on board, and demanded that he would order their discharge from the vessel, and the payment of all their wages. This charge was also proved unfounded ; but, after a vexatious trial of six days, during which the Governor repeatedly stated he must have money, Captain Lewis was ordered to pay the sum of 207 rupees, and the lascars were then ordered on board.

The men were, however, detained, and induced by the Governor to bring a charge against Captain Lewis, for the wilful murder of a lascar who died at sea while under the care of the native doctor of the ship.

When the captain appeared to answer this charge, the Governor, in the first place, said to him, "Give me 200 rupees, and I will dismiss the case ;" and, on Captain Lewis's refusal to do so, he was tried for murder, but the evidence of the deserters only was allowed to be taken.

Captain Lewis then remonstrated by letter to the Governor, stating that as an Englishman, in charge of a British vessel, he did not consider himself amenable to a Burmese court, but as he was forced to stand a trial, he demanded that

the whole ship's company should be allowed to give evidence. To this the Governor objected, threatened to put him in irons, and send him to Ava; and to intimidate him, the irons were brought into court.

After repeated remonstrances from the residents in Rangoon, the Governor consented to hear the evidence of the crew (23 in number), who unanimously proved the captain's innocence, and, also, that he never himself struck or flogged a lascar, or suffered his officers to strike or flog them.

The Governor then declared the case dismissed, and the captain at liberty to proceed on his voyage, saying he would forward his port-clearance in the morning. He did not do so, however, and two days after the captain was again ordered before the Governor, and the case for murder was re-tried, and the Governor ordered the captain to pay 280 rupees for what he called "death-money" and court expenses.

He then allowed four of the lascars to be sent on board, keeping the remainder. On the following day the three men detained by the Governor preferred a charge against the serang, of having some of their money, and breaking a Braminical thread. The serang was put into prison, and the sum of 200 rupees demanded from Captain Lewis for his release, the port-clearance being withheld to compel payment. Thirteen days since the captain asked for his port-clearance. For twenty-three days he has been obliged to attend court much of the time, from 10 A.M. till 5 P.M., and has suffered every form of rudeness and indignity from the Governor and his officials, and his life has repeatedly been threatened.

Your memorialists beg to mention that a similar case of injustice and oppression occurred to Captain Sheppard, of the barque "Monarch," about two months ago.

As this case was a similar tissue of false charges and extortions, and people were induced to swear falsely, and, in some instances, tortured till they did so, your memorialists merely advert to it as one out of the many.

Three days ago, the Mogul merchants here were ordered before the Governor, to answer a charge for refusing to sell goods to retailers on credit. They pleaded their inability to do so till the debts due were paid in. There were about thirty in number put in the blocks and in prison, and their lives threatened unless they paid the Governor the sum of 1500 rupees, which they did, and were ordered to sell on credit.

Within a short time, an Englishman, the master of a vessel, was seized by the officials on the public wharf, and his pockets rifled of some 35 rupees. Two other officers going to their vessels were seized in the same manner, and by the same officials, dragged to a distant part of the city, stripped of their clothes, money, and watches, and their arms bound with cords for several hours. No redress was sought, as from long experience foreigners have found that application for redress has resulted only in heavy court expenses.

Your memorialists would remark upon the small number of signatures affixed to this document, and beg to observe, that the merchants, although most anxious to sign it, are afraid to do so, dreading the possibility of its coming to the knowledge of the Governor; and indeed, should it be discovered that your memorialists have forwarded a document of this kind, the consequence to themselves it would be impossible to foretell.

We, your memorialists, humbly and respectfully pray that your Lordship in Council will take our case into your earliest consideration, and will adopt such measures for our relief, as may seem to you most expedient.

And your memorialists, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

Inclosure 19 in No. 1.

Sir Henry Elliot to Mr. Halliday.

(Extract.)

Camp, Pinjore, October 31, 1851.

YOUR letter, dated the 10th instant, with its inclosures, reached this office as the establishments were in the act of moving from the hills into camp. A short delay has thus been unavoidably caused in the transmission of my reply.

The Governor-General has considered the papers which have been laid before him, with a care and attention commensurate with the importance of the

case, and with the consequences which may possibly result from it. He has cautiously examined the Treaty of Yandaboo, and the subsequent Treaty of Commerce formed between the British Government and the King of Ava. The conclusion to which his Lordship has been led entirely corresponds with that which has been formed by the President in Council.

Whether the doubts of the validity of the Treaty of Yandaboo, which were once expressed by Tharawaddy, were the results of ignorance, or a mere outbreak of passion, or of pride, is a matter of no moment. No attempt was made to insist upon those doubts; and the binding nature of the Treaty was fully admitted in all subsequent communications between the States. No doubt of any kind has ever been raised respecting the Commercial Treaty negotiated in the same year as that of Yandaboo.

The First Article of the Commercial Treaty distinctly provides, that "The Governments of both countries also shall permit ships with cargoes, to enter ports, and to carry on trade, giving them the utmost security and protection."

If the facts to which Captain Sheppard, of the barque "Monarch," has deposed, are strictly accurate, these provisions of the first clause of the Treaty have been infringed by the officers of the Government at Rangoon.

Not only have the utmost "security and protection," which are promised by the Treaty, been withheld, but very gross injustice and oppression have been practised.

A British subject, the master of a British ship, has been carried by the police before the Governor of Rangoon, kept in confinement, for a crime which he had not committed, and not liberated until security was given for him by others. He was then fined by the Governor. He was a second time arrested by the Governor, on a charge of embezzlement; and, though acquitted by a Court of Arbitration assembled by the Governor himself, he was a second time arraigned for the same crimes before the court, thus subjected to manifest intimidation, and was a second time fined.

The crew of the ship were subjected to imprisonment; and one of them, the boy, was beaten and ill-used. From all, money was extorted, as fines, fees, or dues.

Finally, the pass for the ship was refused until a further sum of money had been extorted.

Thus, Article I of the Treaty has, in his Lordship's opinion, been violated at every point; and a British subject and his crew have been subjected to extortion, imprisonment, and personal violence, in disregard of the obligations of treaty, and in violation of the Law of Nations.

If Captain Sheppard had offended against the laws of the Kingdom of Ava, he would, of course, have been amenable to its courts, however widely they might differ from those of the offender's own country. But if these depositions, formally made by Captain Sheppard, whose respectability is vouched for by the authorities of the Tenasserim Provinces, be true, Captain Sheppard has committed no offence; and the proceedings of the Governor of Rangoon constitute a grievous and palpable act of injustice and oppression towards a British subject.

The infrequency, or even the total cessation of late years, of all official intercourse between the Government of India and the Court of Ava or its officers, does not in any respect weaken the force of existing treaties, by which both countries are bound. In dealing with a barbarous Court, such as that of Ava, it may be expedient to pass over trifling irregularities or annoyances, though not warranted by the recorded relations between the two countries, as insignificant in their character. But British subjects and traders have, undoubtedly, a just right to expect that they shall be protected by their own Government from injustice, oppression, and extortion, such as are alleged to have been inflicted in the case now before his Lordship.

Wherefore, his Lordship feels that it is incumbent upon the Government of India to accede to the appeal which has been made to them, and to demand reparation from the Government of Ava, if its officer should refuse to make a proper submission for the injury he has done, and the insult he has offered.

The absence of any accredited Agent of the British Government at the Court, or in the territories of Ava, increases the difficulty of dealing with such

cases as these. Experience of the course pursued by the Burmese authorities towards former Envoys, seems, at the same time, to dissuade the Government of India from having recourse to the employment of another Mission, if the object of the Government can be accomplished in any other way.

The presence of Her Majesty's ships "Fox" and "Serpent," under the command of Commodore Lambert, in the Hooghly at this moment, is opportune; and may, his Lordship hopes, enable the Government of India to bring this affair to an early and satisfactory issue.

His Lordship begs leave to suggest to the President in Council, that he should communicate to Commodore Lambert the documents connected with the cases which have now been submitted to his Lordship, and should request him to proceed to Rangoon with the ships under his command, and any other available vessels of war which he may desire (such as the "Tenasserim" and "Enterprise" steamers, and the "Proserpine," which his Lordship thinks is still at Moulmein), in order to endeavour to obtain from the Governor of Rangoon the reparation which is due to the British Government, for the unjustifiable treatment which its subjects have recently met with at his hands.

Although there seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of the depositions, or the veracity of the deponents, it would be right, his Lordship thinks, that the Commodore should, in the first instance, be satisfied on this head.

If the facts now in evidence should be established to his satisfaction, the Commodore should be requested to address a note to the Governor of Rangoon, briefly setting forth the facts of each case. He will point out that they constitute a very grave infraction of an existing Treaty. He will inform the Governor of Rangoon, that the British Government will not permit the obligations of treaty to be disregarded, the liberty of its subjects to be violated, or their interests injured by arbitrary acts of oppression and extortion; and he will demand from the Governor of Rangoon pecuniary compensation in favor of the injured parties, to such extent as the President in Council may think fit to name, on such better information as may probably be now before him.

It may be expected that the presence of British men-of-war in front of Rangoon, the obvious justice of the demand, and the indefensible character of the Governor's proceedings, may lead him at once to acquiesce in the Commodore's demand. If the Governor should unfortunately refuse to comply, the case will become more complicated.

The refusal of the Governor of Rangoon to accede to a demand of reparation for a distinct breach of the Treaty with Ava, if it should be upheld by his Government, would doubtless entitle the Government of India to proceed to exact reparation by force of arms, or to inflict such punishment on the Burmese State as circumstances might seem to require. But the Government of India could not, with justice, proceed to such extremities, until it had communicated with the Court of Ava, respecting the conduct of its servant, the Governor of Rangoon, and had thereby afforded it an opportunity of disavowing his acts, and of making the reparation which he had refused to concede.

It appears to his Lordship, therefore, that a letter should be addressed by the President in Council to the King of Ava, detailing the facts which have occurred, and pointing out the violation of Treaty which they involve.

The Government of India, desirous of acting with the justice and moderation by which all its acts are guided, has brought these facts under His Majesty's notice, in the full conviction that he will at once condemn the conduct of his officers, by whom this offence has been perpetrated, and will make to the parties who have been injured, that compensation which is most justly due to them for the injuries they have received.

And as the maintenance of friendly relations, and the mutual observance of good faith, is equally the desire of the British Government and of the Court of Ava, His Majesty will, doubtless, recognise the wisdom of removing the Governor of Rangoon from the office he has unworthily filled, in which his misconduct has tended to sow dissension between the States, and to break down the provisions of the Treaty, which it is, doubtless, His Majesty's wish most fully to uphold.

The Government of India, confident in the belief that the Court of Ava will take a just view of the circumstances which are now placed before it, and will manifest a just sense of its own duty and interests, abstains from every expression which would seem to be at variance with a spirit of friendliness.

The Government of India looks for prompt proof of a reciprocal feeling on the part of the Government of Ava, to be manifested in its ready compliance with the requirements of the Government of India.

If these just expectations should be disappointed, the Government of India will feel itself called upon to take such immediate measures as shall enforce the rights it possesses by virtue of existing treaties; shall effectually protect the interests of British subjects; and shall fully vindicate its own honor and power.

In the event of the Governor of Rangoon refusing, or evading, compliance with the demands conveyed to him by the Commodore, the letter addressed by the President in Council to the King should be delivered by the Commodore to the Governor of Rangoon, for transmission to Ava, accompanied by an intimation that an early reply from the Court of Ava will be expected; and that, if it should not in due time be received, the Government of India will proceed to take such measures as they may think necessary and right.

The delay thus interposed is unavoidable in the present anomalous relations of the two Governments. It will, moreover, admit of the Commodore proceeding to the Persian Gulf, whither, his Lordship understands, he is under orders to proceed.

If his Lordship's anticipation of the sufficiency of the present demonstration for bringing this question to a satisfactory settlement should be disappointed, considerable preparation will be necessary for those ulterior measures to which the Government of India will then be compelled to resort. The interval will thus be profitably employed.

If his Honor in Council should think fit, or if the Commodore should desire it, an officer, competent to the duty, may be employed to accompany Commodore Lambert, for the purpose of assisting in carrying on the necessary communications with the native functionaries of the Burmese State at Rangoon.

It is to be distinctly understood, that no act of hostility is to be committed at present, though the reply of the Governor should be unfavourable, nor until definite instructions regarding such hostilities shall be given by the Government of India.

Inclosure 20 in No. 1.

Mr. Halliday to Colonel Bogle.

Fort William, November 11, 1851.

ADVERTING to your letters and their inclosures, I am directed to inform you, that the treatment of Captains Sheppard and Lewis, by the Burmese authorities at Rangoon, as represented by them, appeared to the President in Council to have been such as urgently to demand the notice and interference of the Government of India; but so many possible and grave consequences seemed involved in any steps which might be taken, that he was desirous, before moving in the matter, to consult the Governor-General on the subject.

The result of the communications which have taken place is, that it has been determined, in maintenance of the Treaty of Yandaboo, and the Commercial Treaty of 1826, to demand full reparation for the injuries and oppression to which the above-named British subjects have been exposed. In furtherance of this object, Her Majesty's ship "Fox," accompanied by the steamer "Tenasserim," will, as soon as the requisite preparations can be made, sail for Rangoon. It is proposed that the steamer "Proserpine," now at Moulmein, should also form part of this expedition, and instructions to this effect will be communicated to you through the Government of Bengal.

Commodore Lambert, under whose orders the expedition has been placed, is in full possession of the views and intentions of Government, and will be accompanied by Captain Latter, as Burmese interpreter. The object, in the first instance, will be to endeavour to obtain, by negotiation, the reparation which is due to the British Government for the unjustifiable treatment which its subjects have recently experienced. Should these negotiations fail in producing the satisfactory results which are expected from them, further and more serious proceedings will have to be resorted to. The President in Council thinks it

necessary that you should be informed of the present position of affairs, and of what is in contemplation, in order that, without making any open or hostile demonstration, you may take what precautionary measures you may deem necessary to guard against any sudden attack or surprise on the part of the Burmese, as, although nothing of the kind is at present anticipated, it is impossible to foresee with certainty what may be result of the present remonstrance to the Burmese authorities.

Inclosure 21 in No. 1.

Mr. Halliday to Mr. Grant.

Fort William, November 11, 1851.

I AM directed to inform you, that the President in Council desires to have the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine" placed at his disposal, for a special service; and to request that you will, with the permission of the Deputy Governor, give directions to the Superintendent of Marine, and to the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, to have these vessels properly armed and equipped, and manned by European crews, with as little delay as possible. It is intended that they shall be employed, for the present, under the orders of Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox."

Inclosure 22 in No. 1.

Mr. Halliday to Commodore Lambert.

Fort William, November 11, 1851.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of the President in Council, to forward to you the accompanying copy of a dispatch from the Secretary to Government with the Governor-General, dated the 31st ultimo, together with the documents referred to; and to communicate to you the request of his Lordship, that you will have the goodness to carry out the instructions contained therein.

Orders will be at once given for placing under your command the Company's steamers "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine," properly armed and equipped, and manned by European crews, for the service on which you are about to proceed. The former of these vessels is now in this port, and the latter at Moulmein. The President in Council has also been pleased to direct that Captain Latter, an officer in every respect well qualified for the duty, shall be instructed to accompany you to Rangoon, for the purpose of assisting you, as interpreter, in your communications with the Burmese authorities.

You will observe that the Governor-General has requested that the President in Council will name the amount of damages, and other reparation, to be demanded, in the first instance, from the Governor of Rangoon. But his Honor has not before him, and has no means of obtaining, the requisite information, to enable him to decide on this point. In the case of Captain Sheppard, a distinct claim is put forward by his agents, of 5000 rupees, as compensation for injury, loss, and expenses; but how far this is an equitable claim can only be ascertained by an investigation into the extent of injury, of loss, and of expenses, which his Honor presumes will form part of the preliminary inquiry the Governor-General has requested you to make. In the case of Captain Lewis, no specific sum has been mentioned; but the reparation to which he is fairly entitled, will also, in the course of your inquiry, be made apparent; and his Honor requests that you will use your discretion in deciding what pecuniary compensation should be demanded on account of each of these parties.

The letter which, in the event of your demands upon the Governor of Rangoon not being complied with, the Governor-General has requested you to transmit to the King of Ava, will be placed in your hands before your departure from Calcutta, and a translation will be prepared by Captain Latter.

Inclosure 23 in No. 1.

Commodore Lambert to Lieutenant-General Sir John Littler, G.C.B., President of the Council of India.

H.M.S. "Fox," Calcutta, November 11, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Halliday's letter of this date, with its inclosures, calling on me for the aid of Her Majesty's ships under my command, to co-operate with, and assist the Government of India in demanding redress for alleged insults and cruelties committed on British subjects by the authorities of the Government at Rangoon.

In reply to which, I beg to assure you it will be my most earnest desire to carry out such arrangements as may be deemed necessary to accomplish this object.

The "Fox" will be ready for sea on Tuesday next, the 18th instant, when I shall immediately proceed to Rangoon.

I shall endeavour to obtain from the Governor the redress demanded, and, failing to do so, I shall use all possible means to forward the letter referred to, to the King of Ava, allowing him a full and reasonable time for an answer, during which period I shall remain off Rangoon, for the protection of British subjects.

Should it be necessary to dispatch the letter to the King of Ava, I will immediately inform the Indian Government thereof, in order that any further wishes of the Governor-General may be forwarded to me.

Inclosure 24 in No. 1.

Commodore Lambert to Sir John Littler.

H.M.S. "Fox," Calcutta, November 12, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to inclose to you two statements of the claims made by Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard, of the British merchant-vessels "Champion" and "Monarch," for money extorted from them by the Governor of Rangoon, and also for loss by detention of their ships.

In alluding to that part of Mr. Halliday's letter touching on this subject, I beg leave to observe, that I do not consider myself a judge to decide matters relating to mercantile transactions, and would, therefore, beg to decline giving an opinion on that subject.

As regards the money extorted from Captain Lewis, I am satisfied he is entitled to the full demand he has made; but not having seen Mr. Sheppard, or anybody that was present at the moment of his complaint alluded to, I am unable at present to form an opinion, but should no further evidence be able to be gained in Calcutta, it will be a subject of consideration when I reach Rangoon; and supposing his case to be correct, the same parties that decided the claim for remuneration on Mr. Lewis's case for demurrage, could give an opinion on the "Monarch's."

The third Inclosure is a demand made by Messrs. Mackey and Co., of Calcutta, of which I am unable to form any opinion.

Inclosure 25 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Claim against the Government of Rangoon, preferred on behalf of the owners of the "Champion," and Mr. H. Lewis, the Commander of the said vessel.

	Company's Rupees.
Cash extorted by the Governor of Rangoon at different times	700
Demurrage for detention of ship at Rangoon fifteen days, at 100 Rupees per day	1,500
Compensation for loss of freight, in consequence of being the last arrival in the market, instead of the first, which would have been the case had the ship not been detained	4,000
	<hr/> 6,200
Compensation to Mr. Lewis, for the continued insults and the ill-usage, as also the serious injury to his health, in consequence of daily exposure and constant anxiety from the ill-treatment of the Governor of Rangoon .	3,000

Inclosure 26 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Claim against the authorities at Rangoon, preferred on behalf of Captain Sheppard and the barque "Monarch."

	Company's Rupees.	Company's Rupees.
First arbitrary fine, 600 Rupees, reduced to	325	
Court fees	70	
Interpreter	20	
Jail fees	40	
	<hr/>	455
Second arbitrary fine of 500 Rupees: for the Governor ..	200	
Blood money	150	
Court fees	150	
	<hr/>	500
Third arbitrary fine, by the Deputy Governor, or some such authority	50.
Demurrage of the ship, and demurrage of the voyage, by deten- tion, put down as	4,000
Ship's claim	5,005
Captain's, officers' and men's compensation, for ill-usage and unlawful imprisonment	5,000

D. C. MACKEY & Co.

Inclosure 27 in No. 1.

Messrs. Mackey & Co. to Commodore Lambert.

Calcutta, November 11, 1851.

UNDERSTANDING from the communication made to us by Mr. Lewis, that you are about proceeding to Rangoon, we have the honor to inclose statements of our claims against the Burmese authorities, on our own behalf, and on behalf of the barque "Monarch" and her commander, the originals of which we have handed in to the Supreme Government, praying for redress.

We have appointed Captain Harold Lewis to act for us at Rangoon, should any question arise requiring any reference on our behalf.

Inclosure 28 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Claim against the Burmese authorities or Government, on account of the "Monarch."

	Co.'s Rs.	Co.'s Rs.
1845,		
Dec. 29. By balance due	2,437 13 3
To paid Willis and Earle, printing 50 pieces silk corahs	100 0 0	
To paid for Varnish, per Captain Songpie's note .	25 0 0	
" 30. To paid Syed Abdoollah per receipt of Government	1,100 0 0	
	<hr/>	1,225 0 0
		<hr/>
		3,662 13 3
1846	Co.'s Rs.	
Jan. 7. To paid inward pilotage of the Shooyhautha	110 0	
To Light dues 31 4; Magazine do. 15 10	46 14	
To paid outward pilotage of the Shooyhautha	140 0	
" 12. To paid Captain Songpie's order for tow- boat	9 0	
" 13. To paid harbour-master mooring the vessel from off town to Cooly Bazar	25 0	
" 21. To paid Captain Songpie's order to pilot .	150 0	
	<hr/>	480 14
" 26. To paid Syed Abdoollah's order for ship's dis- bursement	1,417 0	
	<hr/>	1,897 14 0

Oct. 31.	To Commission on disbursement Co.'s Rs. 3,122 14.			
	at 2 per cent.	62 7 3	
	To Interest at 10 per cent. per annum	249 10 9	
	To Postage	3 0 0	
			<u>315 2 0</u>	
				5,875 13 3
1847.				
Oct. 31.	To Interest for one year, at 10 per cent. per annum	587 9 4	
			<u>6,463 6 7</u>	
1848.				
May 4.	Deduct cash received from T. C. Arratoon	1,000 0 0	
			<u>5,463 6 7</u>	
Oct. 31.	Add Interest on Rs. 6,463 6 7, for 6 months 4 days; and on Rs. 5,463 6 7, for 5 months 26 days, at 10 per cent. per annum	597 7 0	
			<u>6,060 13 7</u>	
1849.				
Oct. 31.	To Interest for one year, at 10 per cent. per annum	606 1 4	
			<u>6,666 14 11</u>	
1850.				
Oct. 31.	To Interest for one year, at 10 per cent. per annum.	666 11 1	
			<u>7,333 10 0</u>	
1851.				
Oct. 31.	To Interest for one year, at 10 per cent. per annum	733 5 9	
			<u>8,066 15 9</u>	

D. C. MACKEY & Co.

Inclosure 29 in No. 1.

Declaration by Mr. Mackey.

Sic in orig. ON this 10th day of November, in the Christian year 1851, before me, Robert Mosely Thomas, Notary Public, residing and practising in Calcutta, in the East Indies, personally came and appeared, Donald Campbell Mackey, of Calcutta, aforesaid, carrying on business there as a merchant, under the firm of D. C. Mackey and Company, and did solemnly declare and affirm, that he did advance certain sums of money to one Syed Abdoollah, an accredited agent at Calcutta for the Burmese Government, at his request, for the loading and disbursement of the ship or vessel called the "Shooyhaua," commanded by one Shurghie, which said ship or vessel then belonged to the Burmese Government; and that the said moneys so advanced by him, as aforesaid, will fully appear from the account hereunto annexed, and also from a copy of a letter to the Shebendar of Rangoon, also hereunto annexed; and the said appearer did further state and declare, that after repeated applications by letter addressed to the Shebendar of Rangoon, he received from one T. C. Arratoon, the sum of 1000 Company's rupees, as a remittance on account of his said claim, with a promise of further remittance at a future period; and the said appearer did further state and declare, that he has not received any further or other remittance or sum of money whatever, on account of his said claim, and that after deducting the said remittance of 1000 rupees, and adding interest on the said sum due and owing up to the 31st of October last past, there is due and owing to him, the said appearer, the sum of 8,066 Company's rupees 15 annas and 9 pice, being the balance as appears mentioned in the said annexed account.

Inclosure 30 in No. 1.

Mr. Halliday to Commodore Lambert.

Fort William, November 14, 1851.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 12th instant, I am directed to inform you that the pecuniary compensation to be demanded from the Rangoon Governor, for the loss and injuries sustained by Messrs. Sheppard and Lewis, respectively, may, in the opinion of the President in Council, be fairly estimated as follows:

The money extorted from each of these gentlemen, on various pretexts, should be recovered in full, together with interest, at 12 per cent. per annum, up to the date of payment. In addition to this, there is an equitable claim for demurrage, loss of freight and market, and compensation for personal injuries and annoyances.

In the case of Captain Sheppard, the vessel he commanded, the "Monarch," is a barque of 250 tons, and he was detained at Rangoon eight days. For a vessel of this size, his Honor is informed that 40 rupees per diem would cover all expenses, including interest on the value of the vessel. The ship's demurrage, at this rate, would be 320 rupees. The loss to the shippers, in interest on the value of their cargo, and from arriving late in the market, and to the owners, for possible loss on freight, cannot be accurately ascertained, but may, his Honor thinks, be set down at 50 rupees, per 100 tons, per diem, and would amount, therefore, in this case, to 1000 rupees. For the ill-usage inflicted on the captain, officers, and men, 1000 rupees would, in his Honor's opinion, be a fair and adequate compensation. In this case, therefore, the remuneration to be exacted will probably amount to about 3,400 or 3,500 rupees.

The "Champion," which Captain Lewis commanded, is a vessel of 410 tons. In regard to the money extorted from Captain Lewis, you express yourself satisfied that he is entitled to the full amount he demands, namely, 700 rupees. He appears to have been detained at Rangoon by the Governor, 15 days, and for a vessel of 410 tons, his Honor is advised that 45 rupees a-day is the proper and fair demurrage. On this account, then, he should receive 675 rupees; and the other ship's charges, calculated as in Captain Sheppard's case, amount to 3,075 rupees. As compensation for the ill-treatment he received, his Honor thinks that 1000 rupees would be a suitable and sufficient award to Captain Lewis. In the case of the "Champion," therefore, the total pecuniary reparation to be demanded from the Governor of Rangoon will be 5,500 or 5,600 rupees.

His Honor has decided that the claim preferred by Messrs. Mackey and Co., of Calcutta, is not one which can be properly enforced by the Government of India.

Should you consider it necessary to take Captain Lewis with you to Rangoon, he might be provided with a free passage, and receive, while absent on this duty, at the rate of 300 rupees a-month, as compensation for loss of employment. The amount of this compensation, as well as his table expenses, should form an additional item in the demand to be made on the Governor of Rangoon.

Inclosure 31 in No. 1.

Mr. H. Potter, of the ship "Shilomith," to the Governor-General.

Calcutta, November 13, 1851.

UNDERSTANDING that the Government are about dispatching a naval force to Burmah, to demand reparation for injuries and insults offered to British subjects from time to time, I deem it a duty to bring to your Lordship's notice the following circumstances connected with my residence in Rangoon during a period of twenty months, from December 1849, to August 1851.

I proceeded to Rangoon, *vid* Moulmein, per East India Company's steamer

“Enterprise,” in September 1849, for the purpose of ascertaining if I could build a ship there, and on what terms. On my arrival there I called upon the head authority, the former Governor of Rangoon, and informed him of the object I had in view; the present Governor being then the Shebandar, that is to say the Collector of Customs, and second in power. My first inquiry was, in the event of my building a ship there, what protection and security I, as a British-born subject, would receive from the Burmese Government. In reply, I was assured by both the above functionaries, that every facility and assistance in their power would be afforded to me and to my property by way of encouraging foreigners to embark on similar enterprises; and that as I was the first to set an example of ship-building in Rangoon, after a lapse of many years, they would, agreeably to an old custom, allow me a remission of duties upon all my import stores, anchorage, and port-dues. Upon this promise and assurance, I returned to Calcutta, and after completing the necessary arrangements, I sailed again for Rangoon, in the “John Hepburn,” and arrived there with a portion of my building materials in January 1850. According to his promise, the former Governor permitted the same to be landed free of duty; and thus encouraged, I immediately laid down the keel of my ship, and commenced building operations. For about three months I was allowed to progress in my work without any molestation. At this time the Governor was recalled, and the present one, who was then the Collector of Customs, promoted to the supreme authority. Upon this change, I lost no time in waiting upon him, and offering him the usual formal civilities customary in the place, on which I was assured by him of the continuance of the same protection as I had hitherto enjoyed. He further voluntarily pledged himself to observe the Treaty of Yandaboo as his guide, and requested me to bring to his notice any deviation from the same on the part of the Government officers. To my utter astonishment and regret, many days had not elapsed since his assurance was given, when he commenced to interrupt my operations by all manner of petty annoyances, and under various false pretences, such as stopping my carpenters from working on the ship, &c., with the avowed intention of extorting money from me, to which, from necessity, I was obliged to submit, in order to prevent interruption to the building of my ship. Not satisfied with this breach of his engagement, he moreover levied heavy duties upon the stores I subsequently imported, in the very face of the King’s order, exempting me from the payment of all duties, which I had obtained from the Court of Ava, and which was read before him in open court. A copy of the document I submit for your Lordship’s information.

I respectfully, but firmly, remonstrated with him on the subject, but to no purpose; all the benefit and satisfaction that I received in return was nothing more than vile abuse, coupled with threats of castigation and imprisonment. His illegal proceedings and maltreatment lasted to the time of my departure from the place, and in the interval I was forced to submit to numberless unjust extortions. After a great deal of annoyance, delay, and loss to me, and when my ship was completed, and ready to be launched, he prevented the carpenters and all the workmen from rendering their assistance, by which alone the vessel could be launched, threatening them with the loss of their heads if they attempted it without an order or written document from him; and at the same time demanded of me the sum of 16,000 Company’s rupees, before he would allow me to launch my ship. For a considerable time matters remained in *statu quo*, owing to my determination not to submit to such unheard-of imposition, in which I would have continued, but for fear of the total destruction of my ship by fire, which was of frequent occurrence in the town; an alarming instance of it I witnessed during the interval, which destroyed nearly the whole town, and from the destructive effects of which my vessel narrowly escaped. Thus situated, and having no means of protection, I was reluctantly constrained to comply with the Governor’s unjust demands, and tyrannical extortions, which I could ill afford at the time.

Owing to the impositions I have detailed above, and the oppressive measures pursued against me by the Governor of Rangoon, without any cause or provocation on my part, I was detained there several months beyond the period necessary for the building of the ship, by which I suffered not only a serious loss on the spot, irrespective of the extortions enumerated in the statement I take the liberty to inclose herein; but I have been further a sufferer of several thousands of rupees, in consequence of my late arrival in Calcutta, and being deprived from

performing a particular voyage, and benefiting by a remunerating freight, which was in readiness for my ship,

In proof of the correctness of all that I have stated above, and of many more grievances, the circumstances connected with which I cannot at present exactly recollect, the principal European and other merchants in Rangoon can bear testimony, as well as my correspondence with my agents in Calcutta.

Inclosure 32 in No. 1.

MEMORANDUM of Claim against the Government of Burmah, submitted by the owners of the "Shilomith."

Calcutta, November 10, 1851.

	Co.'s Rs.
Amount of cash extorted from me at different periods by the Woon of Rangoon	2,916 12 0
Ditto in book-muslins	477 0 0
Cash to the authorities at Ava, for granting an order to land stores free of duty	447 0 0
Expense incurred with a full complement of officers and men, Insurance, and Interest of Money, &c., &c., by the unnecessary detention of the ship by the Governor of Rangoon	12,000 0 0
Compensation for loss on freight by the detention of my ship	10,000 0 0
	26,140 12 0

Sic in orig.

Inclosure 33 in No. 1.

A. Young, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, to Mr. Potter.

Fort William, November 14, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 13th instant, submitting a letter for the Governor-General, bringing to notice certain circumstances connected with your residence in Rangoon, from December 1849, to August 1851, and forwarding a memorandum of claims against the Burmese Government.

In reply, I am directed by the President in Council to state, that the circumstances now stated by you were brought to the notice of Government by the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, in February last, and, after consideration, his Honor in Council declined to interfere. There is nothing contained in your letter under reply, which induces the President in Council to depart from that determination.

Inclosure 34 in No. 1.

Messrs. Mackey & Co. to Mr. Grant.

Calcutta, November 10, 1851.

WE beg reference to the letter we had the honor to address you on the 21st ultimo, on the subject of Captain Sheppard and the barque "Monarch," and we now hand you herewith a statement* of claim against the Burmese authorities, for 5,005 Company's rupees, exclusive of any compensation to captain, officers, or men, for ill-usage.

We have also the honor to hand you a statement† of claim, which we prefer on our own behalf, against the authorities of Rangoon, for the sum of Co.'s Rs. 8,066 15 9.

We hand you these statements as formal claims against the Burmese Government, and we humbly petition for the protection and intervention of the East India Company to recover our rights.

* Inclosure 26.

† Inclosure 28.

Inclosure 35 in No. 1.

*Mr. Young to Messrs. Mackey & Co.**Fort William, November 14, 1851.*

IN reply to your letter of the 10th instant, I am directed to inform you, that both the claims preferred by you have been carefully considered by the President in Council; and in regard to that on behalf of Captain Sheppard and the barque "Monarch," the opinion of the President in Council has been communicated to Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," by whom it will be further considered and disposed of.

The claim advanced by yourselves for the recovery of a mercantile debt contracted by one Syed Abdoolah, said to be an agent of the Burmese Government, the President in Council considers to be one which could not properly be urged or enforced by the Government of India.

Inclosure 36 in No. 1.

*The President of the Council of India in Council to the King of Ava.**November 17, 1851.*

FROM time to time, complaints have been preferred to the Government of India by British subjects resident at, or frequenting the Port of Rangoon, of extortion and oppression exercised towards them by the Governor of that place. But the Government of India has been unwilling to believe that the provisions of the treaties of friendship and commerce which subsist between the two Governments had been disregarded by an officer of the Ava Government.

Recently, however, two cases have occurred, in which British subjects, commanding British vessels trading with Rangoon, have brought to notice ill usage which they alleged they had received at the hands of the Governor of that place. In these cases the ill-treatment represented seemed so gross and unjustifiable, that the Government of India considered it necessary to inquire carefully into the truth of the statements, and, finding the facts to be well established, deputed Commodore Lambert to demand from the Governor of Rangoon reparation for the injuries and insults he had inflicted. This demand has not been complied with.

The Government of India, desirous of acting with the justice and moderation by which all its acts are guided, has brought these facts under His Majesty's notice, in the full conviction that he will at once condemn the conduct of his officers by whom this offence has been perpetrated, and will make to the parties who have been injured, that compensation which is most justly due to them for the injuries they have received.

And as the maintenance of friendly relations, and as the mutual observance of good faith, is equally the desire of the British Government and of the Court of Ava, His Majesty will doubtless recognise the wisdom of removing the Governor of Rangoon from the office he has unworthily filled, in which his misconduct has tended to sow dissension between the States, and to break down the provisions of the Treaty, which it is doubtless His Majesty's wish most fully to uphold.

The Government of India, confident in the belief that the Court of Ava will take a just view of the circumstances which are now placed before it, and will manifest a just sense of its own duty and interests, abstains from every expression which could seem to be at variance with a spirit of friendliness.

The Government of India looks for prompt proof of a reciprocal feeling on the part of the Government of Ava, to be manifested in its ready compliance with the requirements of the Government of India.

If these just expectations should be disappointed, the Government of India will feel itself called upon to take such immediate measures as shall

enforce the rights it possesses by virtue of existing treaties, shall effectually protect the interests of British subjects, and shall fully vindicate its own honor and power.

Inclosure 37 in No. 1.

Mr. Young to Commodore Lambert.

Fort William, November 17, 1851.

HEREWITH I have the honor to forward the letter from the President in Council to the King of Ava referred to in Mr. Halliday's dispatch dated the 11th instant, together with a copy of the English draft from which it has been translated.

No. 2.

The President of the Council of India in Council to the Secret Committee of the East India Company.

Fort William, January 7, 1852. (No. 1.)

IN continuation of our dispatch No. 8, dated the 22nd of November last, on Rangoon affairs, we have the honor to transmit for your information, a copy of the correspondence detailed in the accompanying abstract.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Sir Henry Elliot to Mr. Halliday.

Camp, Kimkut, November 27, 1851.

I AM directed by the Governor-General of India to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Young's letter, dated the 18th instant, inclosing transcripts of a letter addressed by the President in Council to the King of Ava, and of the further correspondence that has taken place, connected with the recent transactions at Rangoon.

In reply I am desired to state that his Lordship concurs in the views expressed by his Honor in Council, respecting the reparation to be demanded from the Governor of Rangoon, and in the instructions which have been issued to Commodore Lambert.

His Lordship hopes that the appearance of the squadron in the river will procure at once the reparation now demanded.

If affairs should take an unfavorable turn, and more extended measures appear to be necessary, his Lordship will quit the camp, and proceed by dâk to Calcutta, in order to confer with his Honor in Council on the course to be adopted by the Government of India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Commodore Lambert to Sir John Littler.

Off Rangoon, November 28, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to inform you I have dispatched Captain Latter, in the "Proserpine," to Calcutta, to acquaint you with my reasons for deviating from part of your instructions in demanding redress from the Governor of Rangoon.

I have forwarded the letter intrusted to my care, through the Governor, to the King of Ava, together with a letter from myself to His Majesty's Chief Minister, stating my reason for doing so, a copy of which I inclose.

Captain Latter will inform you of the difficulties I have had to contend

with, in communicating with a person whose conduct renders him totally unworthy of any respect.

I beg to forward a copy of a memorial, signed by many residents in Rangoon, praying for protection.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Commodore Lambert to the Prime Minister of His Majesty the King of Ava.

*On board Her Britannic Majesty's ship of war "Fox,"
at anchor off the town of Rangoon,
November 28, 1851*

I HAVE the honor to forward, through the Governor of Rangoon, a letter intrusted to my care by the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, the Governor-General of British India, for the King of Ava, demanding the removal of the Governor of Rangoon.

My object in visiting His Majesty's dominions was to demand redress for the insults and injuries he has offered to Her Britannic Majesty's subjects.

Having obtained the recompense that was considered due, I should have felt satisfied; but, on my arrival here, I find such an addition of cruelties to the wrongs already named, that I have no alternative but to appeal direct to the Court of Ava, and feel sure that His Majesty will punish his subject, who has not only broken the Treaty of Peace that exists between the British Empire and the Kingdom of Ava, but has likewise insulted the British Nation, by the ill-treatment of its subjects.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Commodore Lambert to the Governor of Rangoon.

*On board Her Britannic Majesty's ship of war "Fox,"
at anchor off Rangoon, November 27, 1851.*

THE object of my visit to Rangoon was, at the request of the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, the Governor-General of British India, to demand redress for insults and injuries you have committed on subjects belonging to Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria.

Since my arrival, so many more complaints have been made by persons residing at Rangoon, who have a right to claim British protection, that I have deemed it my duty to withhold my original demand, until I have again made known their complaints to his Lordship.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Commodore Lambert to the Governor of Rangoon.

November 28, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to transmit you a letter for His Majesty the King of Ava, together with one for the Prime Minister of the King.

I shall expect that every dispatch will be used for forwarding the same, and I hold you responsible for an answer being delivered in these waters, within five weeks from this day.

Inclosure 6 in No. 2.

Merchants resident at Rangoon to Commodore Lambert.

Rangoon, November 28, 1851.

WE, the Undersigned, merchants and others, resident in Rangoon, beg most respectfully to address you on your arrival here in command of an expedition having for its object the redress of our grievances.

After suffering for many years (dating from the withdrawal of the British Resident) the grossest injustice and oppression from the Burmese authorities, you may imagine the feelings of joy and gratitude your arrival has caused.

The European residents in Rangoon, a short time ago, forwarded to the Governor-General in Council, a memorial, praying for the redress of their grievances, and protection from further injustice.

The memorialists alluded to two cases of recent occurrence, viz., those of Captain Sheppard and Captain Lewis. They alluded to them, not because they were singular, or marked by any peculiar acts of atrocity, above others of almost daily occurrence, but because they had, through them, a good opportunity of bringing the matter at once to the notice of the Bengal Government, by having the testimony of Captain Sheppard and Captain Lewis, both of whom were proceeding direct to Calcutta.

We will now, with your permission, bring forward numerous instances where greater injustice and oppression than that above alluded to, have been wantonly inflicted on British subjects resident here.

Your appearance has emboldened us to come forward on this occasion; and the reason why no other cases appeared in detail in our memorial above alluded to, can best be obvious to those who know Rangoon, where the slightest whisper of dissatisfaction would be visited with still greater acts of outrage, and, as in a number of instances, with cruel torturing and death.

We beg to refer you to the annexed list, which contains a few of the almost innumerable acts of atrocity, injustice, and cruelty.

We feel every confidence that the determination you may come to on our case will be one becoming your rank and position; but we earnestly pray that you will bear in mind, that the privilege you now concede to us, as British subjects, of making our complaints known to you, will, on your departure, if continued protection is not afforded us, be visited on us with ten-fold cruelty and outrage.

Inclosure 7 in No. 2.

List of Grievances.

1. A short time ago a charge was brought against Aga Sadduck, merchant in this town, by his wife, who had been separated from him fifteen years. No less a sum than 5,500 rupees was extorted from him by the present Governor.

2: In the case of Goolam Hussain, a merchant of Rangoon, against whom a charge was brought of alleged faithlessness of his wife, the sum of 1500 rupees was extorted from him.

3. In the case of Goolam Hussain (deceased), who was the owner of some mineral said to have had the virtue of completing the art of alchemy, the Governor wanted to get the mineral, which was refused him. In consequence of this a charge of theft was trumped up against him. The unfortunate man was seized, flogged in the most cruel manner, from the effects of which he died soon after.

4. Against Nicholas Johannes, an Armenian merchant, a story was got up, that in a piece of ground which he had lately purchased, there was buried a jar of silver. The Government people were ordered to dig for the jar in question, when Mr. Johannes detected them in the act of slipping money into the jar. The Governor decreed that he should pay 1000 rupees for these proceedings of his own men.

5. That in the case of Ally Iskar, he had taken from him 700 rupees, for

no other reason than that he had been agent to a merchant residing in Ava, who died, and whose property was in Calcutta.

6. In the case of Mr. Cowasjee, who, on his father dying, had to pay no less than 1500 rupees, besides 400 or 500 rupees more to prevent the Governor trying him on the false charge of the murder of his own father.

7. A schooner bound from this port to Moulmein, foundered while at sea. A man by the name of Ally Nucky was falsely charged with having shipped silver on board of her, for which 350 rupees were taken from him. On another occasion the same man had his house forcibly entered and plundered by order of the Governor, to the amount of 1500 rupees in cash, on suspicion of a similar offence. His wife was flogged to make her confess where they kept their money. Subsequently, 2 ticals of gold were missed from his house, for which he had to pay 200 rupees, besides losing the gold.

8. In the case of the principal native merchants, who, from previous heavy losses, found it necessary to agree among themselves not to sell goods on credit, a charge was trumped up, for which they had to pay the Governor 3000 rupees, and the Surrattee or retail merchants, 1000 rupees. At this present time a demand is still pending against them individually, from the Governor, for the sum of 200 rupees, which is only put off on account of the presence of Her Majesty's ships. On the above charge being first instituted, Moolah Ibrahim, Aga Juat, Aga See, were imprisoned, and Cassim placed in double irons.

9. In the case of Mr. J. M. Morris, part-owner and master of the schooner "Flora Macdonald," who was accidentally drowned in this river; after the death of her husband, the wife was required to pay the sum of 4000 rupees, as half the share of the vessel, which was subsequently proved to have been paid by her deceased husband. The King ordered the money to be returned to her, but to this day it has never been paid. The widow prays that it may yet be refunded to her.

10. In December last, when the great fire broke out in this town, the Governor himself prevented the people from putting it out; "let it burn," he heartlessly remarked. This fire occasioned a loss to the British subjects residing here, of over a lac of rupees, and from which many of them are still suffering.

11. The case of a young Armenian, Zachariah Caripet, whose father's house was robbed during his absence at the capital, of an iron chest containing about 10,000 rupees or upwards, his slaves were compelled to say that the son was the robber. On complaining of the robbery, he was imprisoned, bound with cords, and had to pay 300 rupees to escape a flogging. Besides this, by threats of still further violence, he was compelled to admit that he was guilty.

12. Frequently the servants and lascars in the employ of the merchants, are bribed by the Burmesé officers, to speak falsely and get up complaints, on which charges are founded, in order to inflict fines, court-expenses, &c., to the amount of many thousand rupees.

13. In the case of debts being due to British merchants, they have no chance of getting their rights. On complaining to the Governor, with a view of recovering them, the defendant, who is generally a Burman, is encouraged to pay a bribe of a few hundred rupees, or a smaller sum, as the parties may feel inclined, when the suit is immediately dismissed.

14. On passing imported goods through the custom-house, frequent robberies take place, which we have no means of preventing; to complain is only to involve the merchant in greater trouble and expense, without obtaining justice.

15. In their purchases of goods, particularly catch (a product of Burmah), on which a high duty is levied, the merchants are frequently robbed to such an extent, that out of 100 viss, they seldom get more than 80 viss. It is done with the countenance and approval of the authorities, and if you complain, you are subjected to a greater loss under various pretences.

16. Aga Juat, a native merchant, lost a small box belonging to himself, for which he was fined rupees 2063 8.

17. On one occasion, the Governor of Rangoon desired the merchants to send for muskets, promising them not to charge duty. On their arrival, however, he enforced payment of the duty; purchased the muskets himself; but to this day the whole of the money is not paid. The purchase was made two years ago.

18. Some time since, a Mussulman belonging to Moulmein, who was in the habit of trading between here and that port, was flogged to death by Iseet

Hay Morugchee, because he would not, or could not, pay him one hundred rupees.

19. In the case of the merchants forwarding rubies from Ava, for which, according to custom, they have to pay 28 rupees for a pass, to insure exportation. No other charge is sanctioned at the capital; but before the rubies can be exported from this place, the merchants have extorted from them, on every occasion, from 100 to 200 rupees.

20. On one occasion, two rubies were seized on board the British schooner "Tharrawaddy Merchant," valued at 40 rupees (rubies are not contraband articles), and from the owners of the rubies, and serang of the vessel, 600 rupees were extorted.

21. In respect to pilotage charged at this port, the Governor now pockets the whole of what the pilots earn, giving, however, these hard-working individuals, such small sum, occasionally, as his caprice may dictate. This act of gross injustice dispirits and discourages the pilots, rendering them less efficient, and less careful of the interests of vessels visiting this port.

22. The barque "Cecilia," bound from Calcutta to the Nicobar Islands, put into Rangoon, from stress of weather, and having two casks of rum on board; they were duly entered in the custom-house. After having been three months in dock, Mr. Crisp, Mr. Porter, the chief mate, and an apprentice lad, named Wales, were seized, thrown into prison, and kept there four days, and tortured. They were required to pay 1200 rupees, but, finally, were released by paying 500 rupees, demanded on account of the rum which had remained on board, at the particular request of the head custom-house officer.

23. Mr. M. P. Crisp, senior, a highly respectable and very long resident of this place, has been twice expelled from the country, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Yandaboo, since the withdrawal of the British Resident from Ava.

24. In the case of Messrs. Trill and Crisp, whose timber-yard, appliances for sawing timber, and other property, were seized, without any show of justice, by His Majesty, the late King Tharrawaddy, by which they were made sufferers to a very large amount.

25. Captain H. M. Potter, of Calcutta, came round here, and built a ship of 800 or 900 tons burden. The present Governor oppressively extorted from him, at different times, to the amount of several thousand rupees.

26. The Rev. Charles Pachiotti, Catholic priest, was accused about two years ago, of having caused a fire to take place in his cook-house. It was proved that the story was false, yet he had to pay about fifty rupees; was put into the blocks, tortured, and his feet hoisted up several times. On another occasion, about two months ago, some incendiaries set fire to the Catholic school-house at a late hour at night, by which the building was burnt to the ground. M. Pachiotti was charged with the deed, and fined 45 rupees.

27. In the case of Mr. Lewis, ship-builder, during Mr. Lewis' absence from Rangoon, his wife was fined 400 rupees, because part of a cask of salt beef was found in the house. This beef was imported by Mr. Lewis, passed through the custom-house, and paid duty.

28. Since the withdrawal of the British Resident from the Court of Ava, the port-charges have been continually increased, and are now so exorbitant as to amount to an almost entire prohibition to vessels visiting this port.

29. By Burman law and custom, the amount of duty to be levied on export produce (Cutch in particular) is $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*. The present Governor puts any value he thinks proper on the goods (sometimes double the market price), and levies the $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the value thus arbitrarily imposed.

30. In the case of Mahomed Hoosain, serang of a small schooner belonging to Moulmein; upon suspicion of his having smuggled silver on board his schooner, he was seized, tortured by having his mouth burnt, fined very heavily, and his wife, although eight months in the family-way, was most cruelly beaten, and died soon afterwards.

31. In the case of Aga, the post-office Dubash, he was fined 200 rupees for having built his house on ground a little higher than the houses around, and was compelled to pull his house down again.

32. The Nakodah of a British barque was ordered to pay 150 rupees, because

he dipped his ensign to salute Her Britannic Majesty's ship "Fox," as she passed his vessel off Rangoon town.

33. The Governor gave orders on the main wharf, as also in his court, that any persons, foreigners or natives, who should go down to any of the wharfs to witness the arrival of Her Majesty's ships of war and steamers, should be beheaded forthwith. This order was proclaimed through the town by beat of gong and a public crier.

34. In the case of Fakeer Sahib Korosawny, his house being robbed of property to a considerable amount, he was fined by the Governor, 350 rupees.

35. In the case of Gregory Johannes and seven other Armenian gentlemen, who went to the gardens on a party of pleasure. Whilst there they were all seized, and conveyed to prison, on the charge of having gone to the gardens to concoct a petition to the Governor of Bengal, and to give him intelligence concerning the state of affairs in Burmah. Gregory Johannes and his friends were detained three days in the custom-house jail, and afterwards fined 2,600 rupees. The same person was fined 300 rupees on account of a false accusation brought against him concerning some landed property.

36. In the case of a young girl, who, by permission of the King, went to Moulmein, and was married, the present Governor has often demanded her return, and as often fined her father heavily on her account; insomuch that Mr. Johannes Sarkies, her father, was compelled to go to Ava to escape further persecution.

37. In March last, the Reverend Mr. Kincaid, and Dr. J. Dawson, American missionaries, remained in Rangoon eight days, and put up in the house of a Hindoo, Mouny Rhine, who had been educated by the missionaries. Five days after they left, the Hindoo was seized, put in irons, tortured, fined 200 rupees, his life threatened, and a threat held out that his wife and three children should be sent to Ava in irons, and sold for slaves. The poor man soon sunk to the grave, under the effects of torture and fear. His only crime was giving to these gentlemen a room in his house for eight days.

38. Three days after the arrival of the Reverend E. Kincaid and Dr. J. Dawson, they were called before the Governor, and were threatened to be put in irons, and the life of Mr. Kincaid was threatened.

Inclosure 8 in No. 2.

Captain Latter to Mr. Halliday.

Calcutta, December 6, 1851.

WITH reference to your request that I should draw up a statement, for the information of the President in Council, of the matters which I have been charged by Commodore Lambert to communicate to the Government of India, I will commence by giving a simple account of what occurred from the time the expedition anchored off Rangoon, until I left.

As Her Majesty's ship "Fox" was proceeding up the river, with the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine," and on the day before we arrived off Rangoon, and at a spot some considerable distance from the town, a boat came off to the frigate, containing a Mr. Crisp, an English resident at Rangoon, with a message from the Governor, asking for what purpose the expedition had made its appearance in the river? Commodore Lambert replied, that he came for the purpose of making a communication to the Governor of Rangoon, on certain matters which he would not then allude to. He also requested Mr. Crisp to ask the Governor to appoint a day and hour to receive the said communication.

The next day, we arrived off Rangoon, when, after some time, Mr. Crisp wrote off, to say that the Governor had appointed the next day but one, Thursday, at 11 o'clock, to receive the communications, and fixed the custom-house, which was close to the wharf, as the place of meeting, his own house being some two and a-half miles inland. The whole of the remainder of Tuesday passed, and a portion of Wednesday morning, without any of the British subjects or Europeans coming off to the frigate, and information was conveyed to the Commodore, that the Governor had threatened to cut off the heads and break

the legs of all the foreigners, British or others, who went down the wharf to welcome the frigate. I consequently obtained the Commodore's permission to land, entirely alone, and unarmed, so as to give no cause or excuse for misinterpreting my mission, to call upon some of the English residents, and others, and to procure information of what was going on, as, from their total non-appearance, and no communications having been made from the shore to the frigate, there was no knowing but any mishap might have occurred. I landed, accordingly, and sent the frigate's boat back. No obstruction was made to my landing, further than a slight attempt to make me enter the custom-house, which I knew they would have interpreted into my having entered the frigate in the custom-house books, just as if it was a common merchant-ship. This I easily avoided. I consequently proceeded to visit several of the English residents, and they said that no boats would go off from the shore, they having been prohibited, and they likewise mentioned the threat given out publicly by the Governor.

On my way up, however, from the wharf, I met Mr. Crisp coming down the road, who stated that he was going off with a message from the Governor to Commodore Lambert, requesting the Commodore to unmoor his frigate, and to move a few yards lower down; in fact, among the mercantile shipping, the frigate having been moored a little above them, and in the middle of the stream. As I was on shore at the time, the Commodore sent for Mr. Edwards, my clerk, (who, as you are aware, was for many years the confidential clerk with the former Residencies, who was intimately acquainted with all the usages and etiquette of the Burmese Court), and asked him whether there was anything in the spot his frigate occupied, that its occupation should militate against the religious feelings or etiquette of the Court, or people of Burmah. Mr. Edwards replied, that nothing of the kind was the case, and that it was only their usual way in trying to commence a quantity of petty annoyances, such as were employed in cases of the former Residents and Agents. The Commodore consequently declined moving his frigate.

Several of the British inhabitants came off with me, and then stated their case to the Commodore.

During that day information, which appeared quite satisfactory to the Commodore, was brought off, that the Governor of Rangoon had sent for the Nakodah, or native captain, of a native Madras ship, a British subject, and had fined him 150 rupees, for having lowered the flag of his vessel, as the frigate passed up, in compliment to the Commodore's broad pendant. This appeared a second instance of what may be styled something like impertinence.

On that day (Wednesday), the British subjects who had come off, having made their complaints known, *vivâ voce*, to the Commodore, were told to put them in writing, which they did in apparently a somewhat hurried manner.

Early next morning two or three of the English residents came off with information, that during the night, information had been sent to them by one of the Governor's Council, to warn the party who were about to land, to be on their guard, as the Governor had mooted the subject of seizing the officers who landed as hostages, and if the whole expedition did not leave immediately, to threaten to cut off their heads; and what looked strange was, that the Governor of Rangoon had, that night, changed the place of meeting from the custom-house, near the wharf, within a few yards of the frigate, to his own house, some two and-a-half miles inland, and he never sent any notice of this change. Of course, as the threat of seizing the deputation which was to land, came in a very vague manner, not the slightest notice was taken of it. But, in the meanwhile, the Commodore, having weighed everything that had occurred, thought it advisable to suspend the discussion of his original demand, viz., an apology and compensation for the ill-treatment of Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard, captains of British merchant-ships, and to have a written letter delivered to the Governor by Captain Tarleton, commander of the frigate, and myself, stating that he, the Commodore, had intended to have communicated with the Governor of Rangoon on certain specific complaints made against him of maltreatment of British subjects, but that since his, the Commodore's, arrival in the Rangoon waters, many fresh instances of his, the Governor's, misconduct towards British subjects had been brought to his notice, and that he, the Commodore, thought it his duty to take other measures than those he had at first intended to pursue.

This letter was translated by me into Burmese. We landed, went to the Governor's house, escorted by some of the English residents and traders. I read

aloud to the Governor, first in English, and then in Burmese, the letter, and Captain Tarleton delivered it. The Governor made his appearance in a somewhat informal dress; being dressed in nothing but common white clothes, and smoking a cheroot; whilst all the under Governors were in their court dresses. This was the more to be remarked, because the Governor has several gold crowns, which he wears on State occasions. The European officers were of course in full uniform. The Governor wished us to stop and sit down, but Captain Tarleton thought it more prudent to say that we had only been charged to read and deliver the letter to him, and that we had received no instructions about holding any other communication. We then bowed, withdrew, and returned to the frigate. We received no opposition either going or coming.

The Commodore thought it advisable to send up to the Court of Ava, the letter, of which he was the bearer, from the Government of India to the King of Ava, together with an explanatory one from himself to the Prime Minister. These letters, viz., to the King and the Prime Minister, were made over to a députation sent by the Governor of Rangoon on the next day (Friday), on board the frigate, with his answer to the Commodore's previous communication. The Governor of Rangoon's answer contained merely a simple denial of ever doing any injury to British subjects. The person to whom the said letters were entrusted was represented by the deputation to be the Governor's confidential representative, and that any communication made to him was equivalent to being made to the Governor himself.

I will now proceed to state the reasons that Commodore Lambert expressed for deviating from his first intentions of demanding an apology from the Governor, and pecuniary reparation to Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard. They were, that the fresh complaints he had received of the Governor of Rangoon's misconduct to British subjects, some of which appeared to him well founded and deserving of notice, proved, in his opinion, that the Governor of Rangoon was unfit to be entrusted with the lives and property of British subjects; and he, the Commodore, appeared to think that when the Governor-General came to know of these fresh instances, he, the Governor-General, might not consider that the taking satisfaction for merely Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard's cases sufficient, but might wish to take further steps.

The Commodore likewise considered the two or three dubious and improper instances of the conduct of the Rangoon Governor towards his frigate and flag showed an inclination to give annoyance and irritation, and that there was much more chance of any discussion coming to a happy and peaceful termination, and no collision taking place, if held with a new Governor, than with the present incumbent. Thus he made his removal a preliminary to entering into any discussion.

Inclosure 9 in No. 2.

Mr. Halliday to Sir H. M. Elliot.

Fort William, December 6, 1851.

I AM instructed by the President in Council to transmit to you, to be laid before the Governor-General, the accompanying copy of a dispatch from Commodore Lambert, dated the 28th ultimo, together with a transcript of the inclosures therein referred to.

This dispatch, his Lordship will observe, has been brought from Rangoon by Captain Latter, the Interpreter to the expedition, who was charged by the Commodore to acquaint Government with his reasons for deviating from the instructions he had received, and to inform them of the difficulties he had had to contend with in communicating with the Governor. Captain Latter was requested to reduce what he had to say to writing; and a copy of the statement he has made in reply to this request is annexed for his Lordship's information.

Inclosure 10 in No. 2.

Mr. Halliday to Commodore Lambert.

(Extract.)

Fort William, December 27, 1851.

YOUR dispatch of the 28th ultimo, with its inclosures, was duly delivered to the President in Council by Captain Latter. Before replying to it, his Honor in Council considered it necessary to consult the Governor-General in reference to the altered circumstances of the negotiation with the Burmese authorities, consequent upon the change in your mode of conducting it. In order that his Lordship might be fully informed of the exact position of affairs, and of the reasons which had induced you to deviate from the instructions you had formerly received, his Honor in Council requested Captain Latter to draw up in writing a statement of the matters he had been charged by you to communicate to Government. This statement, which contained also a brief account of all that occurred from the time the expedition anchored off Rangoon till Captain Latter's departure, was forwarded, with the other papers, to the Governor-General.

I am directed now to communicate to you the views of his Lordship in regard both to what has been done, and what ought to be done hereafter.

Having regard to the additional long list which was delivered to you, of unwarrantable and oppressive acts committed upon British subjects by order of the Governor of Rangoon, as well as to the personal bearing of that functionary towards the Commodore of the squadron, and to his obvious intention of resorting to the usual policy of the Burmese Court by interposing endless delays, and disregard of official communications addressed to him; his Lordship is of opinion that you exercised a sound discretion in cutting short all discussion with the local Governor, and in transmitting at once to the King of Ava the letter addressed to His Majesty by the Government of India.

Thirty-five days have been allowed for the receipt of a reply from the King, and it is desirable that you should, in the meanwhile, be furnished with instructions for your guidance in every contingency that can be foreseen.

Either the King will send a reply, complying with the demand of the Government, by a removal of the Governor, and a payment of compensation to the parties whose cases have been taken up by us; or the King will give no answer, either from the known arrogance of that Court, or from his being kept in ignorance by his servants, of the letter addressed to him; or, lastly, His Majesty will refuse to concede to the demands of the Government of India.

If the King should recognise the justice of our representations, and should comply with them, all difficulty will be, happily, removed for the present. It will remain only to guard, if possible, against the recurrence of similar causes of complaint for the future.

The statements contained in the memorial presented by the British subjects at Rangoon must be received with caution; not having been made the subject of complaint at the time, these additional cases cannot now be made the groundwork of an increased demand for compensation. But it may reasonably be concluded from them, that the cases of Captain Lewis and Captain Sheppard are not isolated instances of oppression on the part of the Governor, but that there has long been a systematic course of oppression pursued by him, and habitual violation of rights and treaties.

The removal of the present Governor, therefore, will hardly be a sufficient guarantee against the renewal of such conduct by his successors. His Lordship conceives that a British Agent must be placed at Rangoon, in pursuance of the Treaty, with the guard of fifty men allowed by the VIIth Article. His influence should further be sustained, for some time to come, by stationing a war-steamer, well armed, in the river of Rangoon, which will probably insure his being treated with respect, and will, at all events, provide for the personal safety of himself and British subjects in the town, in the event of the Governor proceeding to extremities.

If, on the other hand, the King of Ava should refuse to concede the just demands we have made, or should fail, with the ample time allowed, to give any answer to the letter of the Government of India, whether through arrogance,

indifference, or the intrigues of his servants in keeping the letter from him, this Government cannot tamely submit to the injury and the insult it has received in the persons of its subjects.

At the same time, while it is the imperative duty of this Government to maintain the rights of its people, secured by solemn treaties to them, it is a duty not less imperative, that the Government should endeavour to obtain redress by the least violent means, and that it should not have recourse to the terrible extremity of war, except in the last resort, and after every other method has been tried without success.

If the King's reply should be unfavorable, the only course we can pursue, which would not, on the one hand, involve a dangerous submission to injury, or, on the other hand, precipitate us prematurely into a war which moderate counsels may still enable us with honor to avert, will be to establish a blockade of the two rivers at Rangoon and Moulmein, by which the great mass of the traffic of the Burmese Empire is understood to pass.

To bombard Rangoon would be easy, but it would, in his Lordship's judgment, be unjustifiable and cruel in the extreme, since the punishment would fall chiefly on the harmless population, who already suffer from the oppression of their rulers, even more than our own subjects.

To occupy Rangoon or Martaban with an armed force would be easy also, but it would probably render inevitable the war which we desire in the first instance by less stringent measures to avert.

An armed ship of war should remain off Rangoon, or near enough to receive British subjects, should they be threatened. If, however, the aspect of affairs on the receipt of the King's reply, should be menacing, his Lordship thinks that British subjects should, for security's sake, be brought away at once when the blockade is established.

The President in Council apprehends that you have already ample means at your disposal for carrying into effect the instructions of the Governor-General; but should this be otherwise, his Honor in Council will be ready, on your application, to afford you any further assistance in his power. I am to remind you, that, in the event of your blockading the Salween River, on which Martaban is situated, it will be necessary for you to give notice to the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces at Moulmein, of your intention to do so.

Inclosure 11 in No. 2.

A Merchant to Mr. Young.

Rangoon, November 8, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to inform you, for the information of Government, that the Governors of the principal towns, and the heads of villages will assemble at the capital in January next, to be present at a great charity which His Majesty intends giving to his subjects in that month. The Governor of this town is summoned to the capital, and will leave this in the course of fifteen days.

It would seem that the number of men capable of carrying arms, belonging to this town, is 3000; they were paraded round the town a few days ago.

Letters from the capital, of late date, mention that the American missionaries were expected to arrive. They will leave this place in all this month on their way to the capital.

Inclosure 12 in No. 2.

A Merchant to Mr. Young.

Rangoon, December 23, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to inform you, for the information of Government, that it is generally believed the letter to His Majesty would be presented to him on the 15th instant, and that an answer thereto might arrive here about the 25th

instant. I hear from several quarters that His Majesty is subject to fits of insanity, and I also understand that His Majesty's brother, the Meing Daur Meing, heir apparent, has written a friendly letter to this Governor, after receiving intelligence of the arrival of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," in this river.

Troops are daily arriving from the surrounding districts: yesterday, about 1000 came from below Prome; 10,000 armed men are said to be located at the big Pagoda. The number, however, bears no proportion to the number assembled during the period of Colonel Benson's mission.

I have done myself the honor to forward to Commodore Lambert the current reports, as they prevail, bearing on the object of his mission.

Inclosure 13 in No. 2.

Commodore Lambert to Sir John Littler.

H.M.S. "Fox," off Rangoon, December 18, 1851.

I HAVE the honor to inclose the copy of a letter I have received from Commander Luard, requesting Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent" may be supplied with four 12-pounder brass guns, with a proportion of shell, spherical, and common case-shot for them, in the event of hostilities taking place with the Burmese Nation.

I have not the power to authorize their supply from Her Majesty's stores, as they are not included in the established armament ordered by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for sloops of war, but I have no doubt that in river-service they would add considerably to the efficiency of the "Serpent."

I beg permission, therefore, to submit Commander Luard's application for your Honor's consideration, and suggest that the four guns required may be ordered to be lent from the arsenal at Fort William, to Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent," while she is employed in these waters.

Inclosure 14 in No. 2.

Commander Luard to Commodore Lambert.

H.M.S. "Serpent," off Rangoon, December 15, 1851.

WITH the possibility of hostilities breaking out in this river, I would suggest that Her Majesty's sloop under my command would be very much more efficient with a medium 12-pounder, 18 cwt. brass gun, six feet six inches long, in each bow and stern port.

Our ports being only eight inches above the deck, the lowest possible carriage would be required.

A supply of shell, spherical, and common case-shot, would also be necessary.

Inclosure 15 in No. 2.

Mr. Young to E. Thomas, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

Fort William, January 2, 1852.

I AM directed by the President in Council to forward to you, for the information of the Governor-General, the accompanying copy of the papers noted in the margin* on Rangoon affairs.

The necessary instructions will be issued from the Military department, for supplying Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent" with the guns and shells applied for by the Commodore.

* From Commodore Lambert, December 18, 1851; from a Merchant, December 23, 1851.

Inclosure 16 in No. 2.

*Commodore Lambert to Sir John Littler.**H.M.S. "Fox," off Rangoon, January 1, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, that an officer from the Court of Ava arrived on board of Her Majesty's ship under my command this morning, and delivered a letter from the King to the Government of India, in reply to the letter which I forwarded on the 28th of November.

I also had the honour of a reply from His Majesty's Minister to my communication of that date; a copy is inclosed; from the purport of which it appears the Burmese Government have dismissed the Governor of Rangoon, and promise to settle the demands made on them by the Government of India.

I am of opinion that the King is sincere, and that his Government will fully act up to what he has promised.

The future Governor of Rangoon, vested with full-powers to settle the demands, is daily expected from Prome.

In order that the Governor-General of India may be informed, as early as possible, of the state of affairs, I have dispatched the "Tenasserim" steam-vessel to Calcutta with the letter from the King of Ava, which has been translated by Mr. Edwards, in compliance with the directions he states he received.

Inclosure 17 in No. 2.

The Burmese Ministers to the President of the Council of India.

THEIR Excellencies the Great Ministers of State*, who transact all the affairs of the kingdom, bearing continually on their heads the two golden feet, resembling the germs of the Lotus, of His Most Glorious and Excellent Majesty, inform the President of the Council of India (war-chiefs), that they have received the letter said to have been forwarded by the President of the Council of India (war-chiefs), and which was inclosed in a tin-case and velvet-bag, with the seal of the Honorable the East India Company, from Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox;" also another letter from him (Commodore Lambert) to the Ministers of Ava. These letters having been delivered to the Governor of Rangoon, have reached the Golden Foot (City of Ava).

The purport and style of the aforesaid letter is not in accordance with friendship, or to those usually addressed [to the Burmese Government] viz., "that the British Government shall enforce the right it possesses." However, taking into consideration the great friendship existing between the two countries, a suitable reply, so as to meet your wishes and to establish peace and friendship, has been forwarded.

We consider it proper that, in the event of any future communication between the two great countries, the usual form and style, according to custom and agreement, should be carefully attended to.

Inclosure 18 in No. 2.

The Burmese Ministers to the President of the Council of India.

THEIR Excellencies the Great Ministers, who transact all the affairs of the Kingdom, bearing continually on their heads the two golden feet, resembling the germs of the Lotus, of His Most Glorious and Excellent Majesty, inform the President in Council of the Government of India† that, in the letter forwarded by the President of the Council of India, it is stated, That merchants and others who visit the Royal Port of Rangoon for the purpose of trade, are being unjustifiably insulted and ill-treated by the Governor of Rangoon; that reparation should be made to those who have been ill-treated by him; and also desiring his removal from office. Orders have been issued that, in accordance to the

* Ekka, Maha, Kena, Depadi.

† Literally, the great war-chiefs.

existing Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, foreign merchants and others who frequent the principal Royal Port of Rangoon for the purpose of trade, should be treated justly and according to law, by the officer appointed to administer the affairs of Rangoon. A Mussulman, called Dey Mahomed, was the bearer of a memorial, said to have been forwarded by the merchants (great and small) of Rangoon, complaining of the Governor's cruel treatment of them; but while we were endeavouring to ascertain the truth of the charges against him, Dey Mahomed, a Mussulman, merchant of Moulmein, forged and forwarded another memorial, said to have been signed and delivered by upwards of forty of the principal Mussulman merchants of Rangoon, viz., Moolla Ibrahim, Mahomed Usoff, Mahomed Sayer, Mahomed Kausim, Saib Jaim, Aga Sahduk, Ally Ashkill, Mashidy Hassein, Aga Jee, Meer Jan Nesar Allolea, Aga Namessa, and others. This memorial was delivered by the Mussulmans Hassem and Joor Ally Saib. It is therein falsely stated, that the Governor of Rangoon assists and protects the merchants, and that they are allowed to remain in peace and quietness under his administration. We have, in consequence of such representation, desisted from making further inquiries; but from the letter forwarded by the President of the Council of India, we have become acquainted [with the above-mentioned circumstance]. In accordance to the great friendship which now exists, and taking into consideration the subject of the letter from the President of the Council of India, we have to inform you, that we have recalled the Governor of Rangoon to the Golden Foot (Ava). A suitable Governor shall be appointed to administer the affairs of Rangoon; and with regard to the merchants who have been unjustifiably insulted and ill-treated, proper and strict inquiries shall be instituted, and in accordance to custom it shall be decided.

Inclosure 19 in No. 2.

The Burmese Ministers to Commodore Lambert.

THEIR Excellencies the great Ministers of State inform Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," that the letter which was delivered to the Governor of Rangoon, has been forwarded by him to the Golden Foot.* We have understood the contents of the letter transmitted by the President of the Council;† it is therein stated, that merchants and others who frequent the Royal Port of Rangoon, for the purpose of trade, are insulted and cruelly treated by the Governor of Rangoon; and, also desiring his removal from office. Orders have been issued in accordance to the existing Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, that foreign merchants, and others who frequent the principal Royal Port of Rangoon, should be treated justly and according to law, by the officer appointed to administer the affairs of Rangoon. A Mussulman called Dey Mahomed, was the bearer of a memorial, said to have been forwarded by the merchants (great and small) of Rangoon, complaining of the Governor's cruel treatment of them. While we were endeavouring to ascertain the truth of the charges against him, Dey Mahomed, a Mussulman merchant of Moulmein, forged and forwarded another memorial, said to have been signed and delivered by upwards of forty of the principal Mussulman merchants of Rangoon, viz., Moolla Ibrahim, Mahomed Usoff, Mahomed Sayer, Mahomed Kausim, Saib Jaim, Aga Sahduk, Ally Ashkill, Mashidy Hassein, Aga Jee, Meer Nan Jassar Ally, Aga Namassy, and others. This memorial was delivered by Hassein, and Joon Ally Saib, Mussulmans; it is therein falsely stated, that the Governor of Rangoon assists and protects the merchants, and that they are allowed to remain in peace and quietness under his administration. We have, in consequence of such representation, desisted from making any further inquiries. But from the letter forwarded by the President of the Council of India, it having been again represented that the Governor of Rangoon has been insulting and ill-treating the merchants and others, we have therefore recalled him to the Golden Foot, and shall appoint a suitable officer as Governor of Rangoon. With respect to the merchants who have been unjustifiably insulted and ill-treated, we have informed the President of the Council of India, that proper and strict inquiries shall be made, and in accordance to custom it shall be decided.

* The King of Ava.

† The great English war-chiefs.

We have to request that Commodore Lambert will with friendly feeling apprise us of the date of his departure from Rangoon, with the reply to the letter of the President of the Council of India.

Inclosure 20 in No. 2.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

H.M.S. "Fox," off Rangoon, January 2, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, by the "Proserpine," which has this moment arrived, and I hasten to dispatch the "Tenasserim," that the Government of India may receive as early as possible the King of Ava's reply to their demands, which I am in great hopes will all be acceded to, and amicable arrangements be made with the Burmese Government.

There is one subject in the letter, suggested by the Governor-General, in which I entirely concur, that is, the necessity of establishing a Resident at Rangoon, without which neither person nor property will be secure; and I think it would be very desirable to communicate the Governor-General's views on the subject to the Court of Ava, as early as possible.

No. 3.

The President of the Council of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, January 24, 1852. (No. 2.)

IN continuation of our dispatch No. 1, dated the 7th instant, on Rangoon affairs, we have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of the correspondence detailed in the accompanying abstract.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," in the Rangoon River,
January 9, 1852.*

(Extract.)

IN reference to my dispatch to the President in Council, dated January 1, I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Governor-General and the Government of India, that on the 4th, the newly appointed Governor, or special Commissioner from the Court of Ava, arrived at Rangoon with a numerous suite.

On the 5th, I sent Mr. Edwards, the assistant interpreter, to ascertain when it would be convenient for him to receive an officer with a letter from me, stating the nature of the claims which the Government of British India had made on that of Burmah, and that, when all had been adjusted, I should do myself the honor of personally paying my respects to him. The reply to which was, that he was ready at any time to receive communications from me; and the following day was fixed.

On the 6th, I ordered Commander E. G. Fishbourne, of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes," attended by some of his officers in their proper uniforms, and Captain Latter, of the Bengal army, to deliver my letter.

After an interval of two or three hours, Commander Fishbourne returned on board and reported to me that my letter had been rejected, and himself treated with great indignity. I immediately directed him to make his report officially to me in writing, and I beg to inclose a copy thereof.

In consequence of the deep insult thus offered by the representative of the Burmese Government to an officer of rank in the British Navy, I considered it my duty to suspend all further communications with that functionary, until I received instructions on the subject from the Governor-General of India.

My anxiety now, was for the safety of the British subjects resident in Rangoon. I accordingly sent Mr. Edwards on shore for a few of the leading merchants. On their arrival I explained the state of affairs, and offered every person claiming British protection an asylum on board the ships in port, and informed them that the boats of the squadron would be at the Jetty at 5 P.M., to embark their persons and property.

Before dark every one had embarked, under the superintendence of Commander Luard, of Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent," without molestation.

I had stationed the "Proserpine" off the Jetty, to cover the boats, in the event of any aggression being made on the part of the Burmese.

After careful re-perusal of your despatch dated the 27th ultimo, I decided that I should best carry out the Governor-General's instructions and wishes, by stopping the Burmese trade. I therefore declared the rivers of Rangoon, the Bassein, and Salween above Moulmein, to be in a state of blockade; these being the rivers specified in your despatch.

The notification is contained in Inclosure No. 4, and I have requested the Commissioner at Moulmein to promulgate the same through the public newspapers, and otherwise.

I then moved the squadron under my orders, and all British shipping, lower down the river, and placed such merchant-vessels as desired to avail themselves of it, under the protection of our arms.

Having failed in carrying out the instructions of the Government of India, by the conduct of the Governor of Rangoon, whom I considered as speaking the voice of the Court of Ava, I could regard it as nothing but a national insult that had been offered to the British flag, and accordingly gave directions to Commander Fishbourne, of the "Hermes," to take possession of a ship belonging to the King of Ava, by way of reprisal.

My next step was to forward a letter through the Governor of Dallah, to the King's Ministers at the Court of Ava, a copy of which will be found in Inclosure No. 5.

I cannot but deeply regret that the amicable arrangements which I anticipated when I last addressed you, should have been so peremptorily broken off.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Commodore Lambert to the Special Commissioner appointed by the Court of Ava.

*On board Her Britannic Majesty's ship of war "Fox,"
anchored off Rangoon, January 6, 1852.*

THE object of my visit to Rangoon has been hitherto so satisfactorily met by the prompt course the Government of Ava has adopted, in the permanent removal of the late Governor of Rangoon, for the cruelties and insults he had offered to British subjects, as to leave every assurance on my own mind, that an amicable settlement will be easily effected between myself and the officer now deputed by the Government of Ava, of the further matter to be discussed.

It would be endless to recapitulate the numerous charges made against the late Governor of Rangoon, of monies extorted from British subjects, and of insults offered to them, and could only lead to unpleasant discussions and unfriendly disputes between the two nations, which I am most anxious to avoid. I therefore shall confine myself to two specific cases, which have come under my own personal cognizance, which I have myself investigated, and of which I feel thoroughly satisfied the claims are just.

I allude to the cases of Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard, commanders of British merchant-ships, whose claims for compensation were decided, after the fullest investigation by the Government of India, to amount to 9,948 rupees.

This small sum I demand to be made good forthwith.

To avoid a recurrence of differences between the two Governments of Ava and Great Britain, I have pointed out to the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of British India, the necessity of a Resident Agent being established at Rangoon, in order to settle any differences, as they may arise, relative to commerce. This appointment will be left to the decision of the

Governor-General of India, who will select a person capable of cultivating that friendly feeling which ought to exist between the two allied Powers, and conversant with the laws of general commerce.

Should these demands, which I have now added to the one already so promptly and amicably met by the Court of Ava, be acceded to in the same spirit, I shall consider my mission terminated, and trust that it may be the means of insuring a permanent and cordial feeling of friendship between the Governments of Great Britain and Ava.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Commander Fishbourne to Commodore Lambert.

*H.M.'s steam-sloop "Hermes," off Rangoon,
January 6, 1852.*

S'c in orig. I HAVE the honor to represent to you that, in pursuance of your orders of the 6th instant, to me, to wait on the Governor of Rangoon, with a letter from you, and also to inquire why it was that Mr. Edwards, while bearing a friendly message, had a sword placed at his breast, and threatened within the precincts of the Governor's house?

I beg to state that I proceeded accordingly, accompanied by Captain Latter, and Mr. Edwards, as interpreter, and Lieutenant Lawrence, and Dr. McLeod, surgeon of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes."

When we arrived within a very short distance of the Governor's house, two sub-officials endeavoured to stop us. Captain Latter assuring me that this was intended rather as a slight, I did not deem it proper to stop. Mr. Edwards, however, communicated with them, on which they said that we could not see the Governor, but must go and wait on the Deputy Governor.

On arriving at the gate of the Governor's compound, there appeared to be a reluctance on the part of two or three, that we should enter.

On arriving at the foot of the stairs leading to the Governor's ante-chamber, there appeared at the top, Mounng Pogan, a man who had accompanied each deputation to the "Fox," in the professed character of interpreter, and another, I presume, one of the Governor's retinue, the latter of whom stated that we could not see the Governor, as he was asleep, and asked if we could not wait till he awoke. This he was informed by Captain Latter that we could not do, and that the Governor, if asleep, must be waked up, and informed that the Commander of one of the ships of war, bearing a letter from Commodore Lambert, waited to see him; on this, he, together with Mounng Pogan, went into the Governor's house, apparently to convey the message.

They soon after returned, the one stating that the Governor was a great man, and was asleep and could not be awaked, but Mounng Pogan called Mr. Edwards on one side, and asked him to go up, and speak with the Governor; understanding this by his grimace, without waiting to be confirmed in the correctness of my conclusion, I said he could not go, whereupon Captain Latter asked me for your letter (which I gave him), that he might point to it while explaining that it was one of a most peaceful kind, and insisted upon the necessity of our being received; whereupon the attendant and Mounng Pogan went again, as it were, to see the Governor, saying that we had better go and stand under the shed, a place where the common people usually assembled.

Meanwhile, expressing the great inconvenience of staying in the sun, I was going up stairs, with a view to sit in the Governor's waiting-room, but Captain Latter interposed, and said it was not according to etiquette; I was informed also that my going under the shed alluded to, for protection from the sun, would be considered by them as degrading; I refrained from going, or rather returned to my original position, at the foot of the stairs, for I had gone under the shed.

The attendant and Mounng Pogan returned, the former again repeating that the Governor was asleep, and Mounng Pogan again expressed a wish that Mr. Edwards should go up, and, on this being again refused, proposed that your letter should be sent to the Governor by them, which I considered it my duty to refuse; Captain Latter, at the same time, explaining that if it were proper to

send the letter by them, it were unnecessary to have sent the captain of an English man-of-war, and the next in command to the Commodore, with it.

About this time, an officer came up, whom I recognised as one who had been on a deputation from the Governor to the Commodore; and, being anxious to have matters settled amicably, I requested Captain Latter to explain to him how improper the treatment we had received had been; that he must be well aware that every deputation from the Governor and Deputy Governor had been received by the Commodore at all times, and with courtesy; and, if it had been that the Commodore had been asleep, his principal officer would have had him awakened, and made acquainted with the fact of a deputation being in waiting for an audience with him, that he might receive it; and to impress upon him the propriety and necessity for me, bearing a friendly letter from the Commodore, being received immediately; for if I was not, I must consider it a premeditated insult, and go away and report the circumstance.

I was quite satisfied of the insincerity of the statement relating to the Governor being asleep, from the manner of the attendant, and from the fact of Mounq Pogan asking Mr. Edwards to go up to the Governor, and indeed from his appearing at the Governor's when we arrived—for, when we were getting our horses, to ride up, this Mounq Pogan appeared, and was asked by Captain Latter if the Governor knew we were coming, and he said he did not know; then Captain Latter said, "You had better go up, and say that we are coming;" to which he answered, "I am a subject of Burmah, and cannot take a message to my Lord the Governor, unless I had permission from him."

Finding, after some little time, that the officer alluded to above did not return, I conceived it to be my duty to return, and report the circumstance; in doing so, I returned most leisurely, to give them time to send after me with an apology; and not finding my boat at the landing-place, I waited her arrival (for the same purpose), rather than come off earlier in a merchant-ship's boat, which was offered me.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Notification.

IN virtue of authority from the Governor-General of British India, I do hereby declare the rivers of Rangoon, the Bassein, and the Salween above Moulmein, to be in a state of blockade; and, with the view to the strict enforcement thereof, a competent force will be stationed in, or near, the entrance of the said rivers immediately.

Neutral vessels, lying in either of the blockaded rivers, will be permitted to retire within twenty days from the commencement of the blockade.

Given under my hand, on board Her Britannic Majesty's frigate "Fox," off the town of Rangoon, the 6th of January, 1852.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT,
Commodore in Her Britannic Majesty's Navy.

By command of the Commodore,
J. L. SOUTHEY, *Secretary.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

Commodore Lambert to the Great Ministers of State of His Majesty the King of Ava.

On board Her Britannic Majesty's ship of war "Fox," anchored off Rangoon, January 7, 1852.

IT is with deep regret I have to inform you that, in consequence of the insults offered by the Governor of Rangoon, I have been obliged to suspend all further communication with the Burmese Empire, until I have received further

instructions from the Governor-General of British India, and to declare its coasts under a state of blockade.

I have further to acquaint you, I have detained a vessel belonging to the Government, until the claims that were demanded for money extorted by the late Governor are paid.

I was in hopes, from the tone of the letter addressed to me by your Excellencies, that all differences that had previously existed would have been speedily and amicably arranged; but you may imagine my surprise and indignation, on sending a deputation to wait on the Governor with a letter, a copy of which I inclose, to learn that the officers I had sent for that purpose had been treated in a most degrading manner, and my letter rejected.

I have further to add, that the Governor actually issued orders to the British merchants, that they were not to go on board the ship I command.

Any explanation the Court of Ava may wish to make on the subject, I shall be ready to forward to the Governor-General of India.

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," in the Rangoon River,
January 9, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inclose a letter I have received from the Governor of Rangoon, addressed to the Governor-General of India, with a translation thereof by Captain Latter.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Letter delivered to Commodore Lambert by a Deputation from the Governor of Rangoon.

I, MAHAMENGLA MENG KHANNYGYAN, appointed by the King of Ava (here follow the Royal titles) and by the great Ministers of State, after due consultation, to rule all the Southern Districts (*i. e.*, from Prome to Martaban, including Rangoon), and to have my residence at Rangoon, inform the English rulers and war-chiefs:

That in conformity with the demand made by the English rulers, that the former Governor of Rangoon should be removed from his situation, on account of having oppressed and maltreated British merchants trading with the Port of Rangoon, and in order that a proper person might be appointed as Governor of Rangoon, who would be capable of protecting the merchants and poor people, the former Governor was recalled to the Royal presence. A letter was sent to the English rulers, informing them that a proper investigation into all complaints should be made, and I arrived at Rangoon.

Being actuated by the highest feelings of friendship to Commodore Lambert, whilst I was intending to send for him, the interpreter, Edwards, came and told me that he had come to acquaint me that Commodore Lambert wished to have an interview with me; and, as I was fearful that any of the others might behave discourteously, and not according to the rules of etiquette, I decreed that the interpreter, Edwards, might come with the letter or communication. But after some time, four inferior officers, an American clergyman, called Kincaid, and the interpreter Edwards, came in a state of intoxication, and, contrary to custom, entered the compound on horseback; and whilst I was asleep, and the Deputy Governor was waking me, used violent and abusive language. They then went away, and conveyed an irritating message to the Commodore; and that officer, listening to their improper and unbecoming representations, and with a manifest inclination to implicate the two nations in war, on the 6th of January, 1852, at night, with secrecy, took away the ship belonging to His Majesty the King of Ava.

I, however, in consequence of there being a treaty of peace between the two nations, did not re-seize the vessel; and though they were the bearers of a Royal message, on account of their unjustifiable conduct. The frigate stuck on the shore near Dallah. I did not, however, molest them, or destroy them, but acted worthily to these unworthy men; and I now represent this conduct of Commodore Lambert to the English rulers, who came from one country to another, and behaved in a manner unbecoming an Ambassador. *Sic in orig.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," in the Rangoon River,
January 10, 1852.*

I HAVE to request you will inform the Governor-General, in continuation of my despatch of yesterday's date, that, subsequent to the interviews I had with the Governor of Dallah, and the other Burmese officials, of which Captain Latter will have acquainted you, I received a message from the Governor of Rangoon, to the effect that if I attempted to take the King of Ava's ship out of the river, he would fire on me. In reply to which, I recommended that, as the Governor of Rangoon had complained to the Government of India, of what had taken place, it would be advisable that matters should remain as they were, until further instructions were sent from our respective Governments. But I plainly told him, that if a shot was fired by the Burmese, at either of Her Britannic Majesty's ships, I would return it.

During yesterday afternoon a number of large war-boats went down the river, the crews of which, on passing the squadron, behaved in a very menacing manner; and being informed a considerable force of men and ordnance had been sent to the lower stockades, and as it was my intention to move to the entrance of the river, for the purpose of better carrying on the blockade, I judged it advisable, in conveying the merchant-vessels out, to place Her Majesty's ship "Fox" abreast of these stockades, for their protection.

Shortly after daylight this morning I weighed, and caused the merchant-vessels to follow me. They were assisted and guarded by the East India Company's steam-vessel "Phlegethon," and the boats of this ship. On my arrival off the great stockade, I anchored, and found it occupied by a considerable force. An immense number of large war-boats, with guns mounted in them, were also lying close to the shore, and at the entrance of a small creek, under the walls of the stockade, and were fully manned. Their behaviour was exceedingly threatening, but I refrained from interfering with them, as I had promised yesterday that I would not fire on the Burmese first.

Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes," with the King of Ava's ship in tow, passed us at half-past 9, when the stockade opened a sharp cannonade on Her Majesty's ship "Fox," which was instantly returned with shot and shell, and the Burmese battery was in a short time silenced. On the smoke clearing away, not a person was to be seen on the shore or in the boats.

Our fire, I have no doubt, must have done great execution, for I have reason to believe at least 3000 men were opposed against us. One or two of the enemy's shot struck the "Fox," but did very trifling damage. Their shot in general fell short, a few only passing over us, and their small arms did no execution.

I then sent the "Phlegethon" and the boats of the "Fox" close in shore, to destroy the war-boats, which was easily accomplished, and their guns spiked, or thrown into the river. Their crews, being unable to stand our fire, had fled on the first broadside.

The "Hermes," in the meantime, engaged a stockade on the opposite side of the river, which had opened a fire on her; her heavy guns and a few rockets soon silenced this battery, and compelled the Burmese to retire.

I am now following the shipping down the river, and, when I have seen all the merchant-vessels to sea, I shall anchor in a convenient situation for blockading this port. The "Serpent" will carry out the blockade of the Bassein River.

• It is with deep regret I have had to commence hostilities with the Burmese Nation, but I am confident the Marquis of Dalhousie and the Government of India will see it was unavoidable, and necessary to vindicate the honor of the British flag.

I have the satisfaction of stating that the squadron under my orders have not sustained any loss.

Inclosure 9 in No. 3.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," in the Rangoon River,
January 12, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inclose the translation of a document I have just received from Rangoon by a flag of truce, to which no reply was given.

Inclosure 10 in No. 3.

Petition from the Armenian, Mogul, Soorattee, Nurrapoor, Parsee, Chuliah, and Mussulman Inhabitants and Merchants of Rangoon, to Commodore Lambert.

January 11, 1852.

THE two great countries being in peace, your petitioners have continued with their wives and children, for many years to reside and trade in this country.

The late Governor (of Rangoon) having been dismissed for unjustifiable and improper conduct, was taken to the Golden Feet (capital of Ava), in obedience to the Royal order, for punishment.

Subsequently, the Aye Bain* (present Governor) having arrived, was prepared to meet and discuss with the Commodore whatever remained to be adjusted. Not having been enabled to do so, he has sent for, and desired your petitioners to make the following representation, respecting the communication made to the Governor of Dallah, viz. :

That he is willing to abide by the provisions of the Yandaboo Treaty.

To agree to a Resident being appointed.

To pay the sum of upwards of 9000 rupees.

And to have a Residency House† erected.

In accordance with the Royal order, the above subjects were to have been discussed by the two great men, in an amicable and friendly manner ; but Commodore Lambert has not given him an opportunity of doing so.

Your petitioners and the merchants, both great and small, at Rangoon and at the capital of Ava, amount to upwards of 600 souls, "who are in a condition of being stranded in shallow water."

Your petitioners, therefore, most humbly entreat you, in the name of Almighty God, to have pity upon them, and to save and protect them from ruin and destruction.

Inclosure 11 in No. 3.

Narrative by Captain Latter.

(Extract.)

ON Friday, the 2nd of January, 1852, I arrived at Rangoon, in the Company's steamer "Proserpine," and immediately delivered the dispatches from the Government of India to Commodore Lambert. I there learned that the new Governor appointed by the Court of Ava, with plenary powers to settle

* An officer appointed to settle all the affairs of the Burmese Government, from Prome to Martaban.

† Officer's house.

all questions in dispute between the two Governments, was hourly expected; and that the former Governor, who had been removed by the Court of Ava, was suspended from his functions, and was awaiting the arrival of his successor; also, that, during the period that had elapsed from the time of my taking up the Commodore's dispatches to the Government of India, until my return with their reply, the conduct of the late Governor had been most insolent and irritating. Among other acts, he had appeared in the town, inflamed with wine, and had threatened to murder all the European inhabitants on shore. He had also endeavoured to burn down the town; and the subordinate Governors, collecting more men than he had, prevented his doing so. The European inhabitants had, consequently, determined, at the first alarm, to take refuge in the house of a Mr. Birrell, one of their number, which being capable of defence, Mr. Birrell had placed a small 2-pounder gun on the landing inside, and had erected a large bamboo on the roof, so as to hoist a signal of distress, if necessary, for the information of Commodore Lambert. This pole on the top of Mr. Birrell's house was still a matter of discussion when the "Proserpine" arrived.

But whilst the conduct of the Rangoon authorities was so unsatisfactory, a marked exception existed in the person of the Governor of Dallah, a town on the other side of the river. Commodore Lambert, from information he had received of the favourable disposition of the Governor, had paid him an unofficial visit, in order, personally, to impress upon an officer of his rank and respectable character, his (the Commodore's) peaceful views and wishes. The Commodore was received by the Dallah Governor with the greatest courtesy and respect; and throughout the whole of the subsequent annoying transactions, the conduct of the Dallah Governor was all that could be expected from a good man and a gentleman.

As soon as information had been received from the capital, that the Court of Ava had determined to remove the Governor of Rangoon, and to appoint another, the Under-Governor of Rangoon promised to inform the Commodore as soon as the new Governor arrived.

On Saturday, the 3rd, a fleet of boats, with above 3000 men, made its appearance, coming down the river, which, of course, we concluded to be the new Governor. Information was brought by some of the English, from shore, to that effect; but neither on that day, nor the next, was any information given by the Burmese authorities, of the new Governor's arrival. This alone was a discourteous, or even contemptuous, act. From shore, information was brought that the new Governor had adopted the same line of policy as his predecessor, who was allowed to take his departure in a manner unlike a disgraced Burmese official.

The new Governor at once issued orders to prevent any communication of British subjects on shore with any vessels in the river; and it was only by means of the boats of the squadron, which he did not dare molest, that any information could be received. The subject of the gun and pole at Mr. Birrell's house he took up at once, threatening to punish him if they were not instantly removed. Mr. Birrell said that he must receive the Commodore's orders on the subject. Commodore Lambert ordered him to say that the pole had been merely erected to hoist a signal of distress, if necessary, and the gun to defend himself till he could be relieved from the squadron, as the former Governor had, in the most public manner, threatened to seize the European inhabitants, and, if the squadron did not leave, to massacre them. But that, as the new Governor had arrived, charged, from all that could be learnt, with friendly and peaceful intentions, the Commodore had directed him to remove them, and he felt every confidence that the new Governor would give every protection to the British inhabitants.

The gun and pole were removed accordingly; but in spite of this courteous act on the part of the Commodore, the new Governor proclaimed, by beat of drum, and also served a written notice to the principal Moguls and other British subjects, that they were not, on pain of death, to hold any communication with the vessels in the river.

Monday, the 5th, arrived without any, the slightest, information or official communication being made to Commodore Lambert, of the new Governor's arrival; and as he was anxious that the affair should be speedily settled, and was above allowing any foolish point of etiquette unnecessarily to interfere with

even a chance of its being so, at my suggestion he allowed Mr. Edwards to go first to the Governor of Dallah, and inquire whether the new Governor had arrived, and whether any information of the fact was going to be sent in an official manner, and afterwards to go in an unofficial manner to the Governor of Rangoon's house, and see whether he could learn anything of his future intentions. On this occasion, I charged Mr. Edwards on his departure, should he see the new Governor, to impress upon him, that independent of the cordial feelings of friendship which actuated the Commodore personally, as was evinced by the way in which he had always received the Burmese deputations on board the frigate, composed though they were of the humblest rank of officials, he was charged with a communication from the Government of India, of which the demands were trifling in the extreme, and couched in the most considerate and amicable language.

Furthermore, to beg of him, for the sake of peace between the two countries, not to allow himself to be influenced by any false rumours that were circulated by evil-designing persons, who were like firebrands (English as well as native), and not to consider anything as authentic, unless he received it from some Government official in the squadron. Mr. Edwards faithfully delivered these sentiments.

The Dallah Governor, on seeing Mr. Edwards, stated that the new Governor had arrived, and that he appeared to think the fact of the appearance of his flotilla of boats sufficient notice of his arrival. Mr. Edwards replied, that it was true that the show had made a very pretty appearance, but that, after all, there were only 25 or 30 boats, and at the most barely 3000 men, but that there was no knowing, until positive notice was given, whether it might be only part of his retinue, and that the new Governor, with the remainder, might be behind. The Dallah Governor acknowledged the justice of the remark, but said he had received no orders on the subject. Mr. Edwards then crossed the river to Rangoon, went to the Governor's house, stated that he had come merely to inquire whether the new Governor had arrived. At the foot of the outer steps, one of the Governor's suite drew his dagger on him, and threateningly asked him how he dared thus to approach the Governor's house. Mr. Edwards replied that he had no intention of entering without the Governor's permission. On being called into the Governor's presence, he stated that his life had been threatened, and mentioned what had occurred. The Governor sent for the offender, and punished him in the presence of Mr. Edwards, in the usual Burmese manner, namely, by having him taken by the hair of the head, swung round three times, his face dashed to the ground, himself dragged out by the hair, and pitched down stairs*.

Mr. Edwards then mentioned that the Commodore was most anxious to have the present business speedily settled, and, in fact, delivered the sentiments he was charged with. The Governor replied that he would be most happy at any time to receive any communication from the Commodore, and he moreover directed the embargo on the boats and inhabitants to be removed.

The next day, Tuesday the 6th, the Commodore directed Captain Fishbourne, commanding Her Majesty's steamer "Hermes," myself, and two officers of the "Hermes," with Mr. Edwards, to proceed and deliver to the Governor the letter containing the demands he was charged to make. I was at the time on board the "Proserpine," finishing the Burmese translation of the letter which was to be given to the Governor, and to give him due warning of our approach; and, on my own responsibility, as there was no time to spare, sent Mr. Edwards on shore to him, to give notice of our coming, and charged him to say, that as he had already shown his friendly feelings, by his amicable expressions of the day before, with a reference to any time to receive any communication from Commodore Lambert, there would be no necessity to make any display in receiving us, so that there was no necessity for any delay. The more I have reconsidered all that happened, the more do I feel glad that I was induced to take the step of sending Mr. Edwards on shore to announce our

* Captain Latta has requested that a correction should be made in his statement in regard to the meeting at which the circumstance described of Mr. Edwards having been threatened with a dagger occurred. This was not at his first interview with the Governor on the 5th, but when he went on the 6th to give notice that the deputation was coming, and, consequently, on the same day that the deputation went.

approach, as it removed the only excuse the Governor could have had for not receiving us, namely, his not being aware of our approach.

Mr. Edwards accordingly told the Governor what he was directed to say. Then commenced a specimen of those slippery tactics so characteristic of Burmese Government officials. He immediately said, "he wished to receive the communication through Mr. Edwards, and no one else." Mr. Edwards replied, "that that would not be for two reasons: first, that a communication of such importance could not be made through a person holding his subordinate position, being only a clerk under my orders; and secondly, that, even if it could be so made, it was too late now, as the officers entrusted with it, one of whom was in rank next to the Commodore himself, were now preparing to come." Mr. Edwards took his leave and joined us.

We accordingly landed at about noon, and proceeded to Mr. Birrell's house to procure horses to take us up, as the distance (about two miles) was too much to walk in the sun. Whilst we were making the necessary arrangements, Moug Pogan, the recognised Burmese and English interpreter of the Governor, who had accompanied every deputation on board the frigate in that capacity, came on the pretext of seeing whether the pole and gun had been removed from Mr. Birrell's house. After having been shown that they were so, I said to him in English, "Go to the Governor's house, and give him our compliments, and say we will soon be with him, bringing letters from Commodore Lambert," &c. He replied, "I am a Burmese subject, and cannot deliver any message without the orders of my superiors."

We proceeded to the Governor's house, and on arrival near it, two under-officials made their appearance and tried to stop us, telling us we must make our communication to the Under-Governor. Captain Fishbourne, at my request, took no notice of this, and they were told that our orders were to present a letter to the Governor. On this occasion they said nothing about the Governor being asleep. I was too well acquainted with the trickery of Burmese officials not to know that the only chance of our carrying out our mission successfully, was, not to deviate from our instructions, but to go up in a firm and decided manner to the steps of the Governor's house, and there inform him of our arrival.

When arrived there at the doorway, we found Moug Pogan, the very person whom a few minutes previously we had met at our outset, and who had then declined going up to the Governor's house to give him notice of our arrival, and yet he had contrived to precede us; there were also some other subordinate attendants. I told them all in Burmese, showing them the letter which Captain Fishbourne held, that we had come to deliver it to the new Governor, and begged them to inform him of our arrival. They replied that he was asleep. I then continued, in Burmese, to say that, taking into consideration the distance we had come in the sun, and the importance of the communication we were entrusted to deliver, and the fact of our having already but a very short time previously given him notice of our intention of coming, if he really were asleep, he would be angry with them for not awaking him. Moug Pogan on this went in, and after a short time came out and beckoning to Mr. Edwards, told him that the Governor wished to see him. I said that this was out of the question, and I warned him and the rest against the gross insult they would be offering us, if they kept us waiting any longer, at the foot of the outer stairs and in the sun, and not, if we were waiting, asking us inside. To this they replied, pointing to an open shed, that we might get shade there. To this I indignantly replied, that they were well aware that none but the lowest rabble ever collected there, and that it was a shelter thrown up for the reception of persons waiting to have their cases tried, and that certainly none of us would go there.

At this moment a person of somewhat higher, though still inferior rank, passed by me to go up the steps. I stopped him, and holding his hand in mine, I spoke to him in the most earnest but kindly manner, of the madness of what they were doing; that the officer who had charge of the letter, pointing to Captain Fishbourne, was next in rank to the Commodore; that we were all officers, who held the commission of our Queen; and that the way they were behaving towards us was worse than madness; that, if persisted in, it would be visited with the most condign punishment, either by their own King, for the

salvation of his throne, the safety of which they were fearfully perilling, or if not, by our own Government, who would conspicuously display their power to protect us, their officers, and to resent any insult that might be offered to us.

After a few minutes, followed another officer of similar rank, whom Captain Fishbourne recognised as having met in some of the deputations which had been received on board the frigate. Captain Fishbourne begged me to remind him of the way he and all others had been received; how that, however the Commodore may have been occupied, he was instantly informed of their arrival, and they were never kept in the humiliating position in which we were now. I did so; he likewise passed on. No notice was taken of our presence, and as any longer delay would have shown us deficient in the common sensitiveness of gentlemen, we were fain to turn our backs and depart.

I can conscientiously say, that whilst addressing them aloud in Burmese, so that all might hear, I exhausted every argument in the most earnest manner, to recall them to a sense of propriety.

That the Governor was not asleep there can be no moral doubt in the mind of any person of sense, 1st. Because Mounng Pogan, his recognised interpreter, had preceded us. I had told him that we were going to the Governor's: 2nd. During the time we were kept waiting, Mounng Pogan came out, and asked Mr. Edwards to step into the Governor's presence; but even had he been asleep, we ought to have been asked into the hall of audience, and not kept waiting outside.

Taking all these things into consideration, no person of any acquaintance with Burmese customs, will hesitate to say that what occurred was as gross and studied insult as could be devised. Nothing, in my opinion, but our knowledge of Commodore Lambert's anxious wish that everything reasonable and honorable should be done, to abstain from any misunderstanding, added to the dignity of our position, as representing an important public cause, enabling us to be less sensitive in seeing offence, could have warranted our remaining even so long as we did.

On our return to the frigate, Captain Fishbourne reported to Commodore Lambert the treatment we had received. The Commodore forthwith directed a boat to be sent to summon some of the English residents from the shore. On their arrival, he warned them to be prepared to leave the town during the afternoon, and requested them to give notice to all other British subjects. He ordered all the boats of the squadron to assist in bringing them off, and a steamer to be off the wharf to cover their embarkation. Whilst these orders were being carried into effect, three Burmese, of whom Mounng Pogan was one, for I cannot call them a deputation, the highest among them being merely a *Tseetkay*, a rank which in Moulmein never sits in the presence of an European superior, came on board the frigate, apparently more for the purpose of seeing how the matter had been taken, for they were not charged with any explanation or expression of regret, further than that they tried to make us believe that the Governor was really asleep at the time, and they wanted to know whether Commodore Lambert would himself go on shore and see the Governor. Commodore Lambert replied, that after the insolence with which the Governor had treated his officers, he would have nothing more to say to him, that he would receive no apology whatsoever, but that now the affair must rest in the hands of the Government of India; that as to himself, he would be trifled with no longer.

The British subjects—men, women, and children, to the amount of several hundred, took refuge during the afternoon, on board the shipping in the river, and, before evening had set in, the vessels had commenced dropping down the river. There can be no doubt that it was nothing but the panic caused among the Burmese authorities, by the report that must have reached them through the three emissaries last mentioned, of the high indignation evinced by Commodore Lambert, and their consequent fear of provoking him to extremities, that induced them not to interfere with the embarkation of the British subjects and their families. This was a most difficult undertaking, carried out without let or accident.

As the evening had set in before all the British subjects had made their escape from Rangoon, it was dark before the Commodore issued orders to seize what was usually styled the "Yellow Ship." This vessel had been built for the

purposes of trade, and was the property of the King of Ava; she was anchored a little above the squadron; the seizure of this ship appeared to convince the Burmese that the time for trifling had passed, and that Commodore Lambert was in earnest; they even seemed alarmed for the safety of their own heads.

On Wednesday the 7th, at daybreak, Her Majesty's steamer "Hermes" took the King's ship in tow, and the whole squadron proceeded down the river a short distance, the frigate remaining a little below Dallah. Up to this date, from the time of the squadron first entering the Rangoon waters, consisting of a period of nearly a month and a half, the Burmese appeared systematically to have adopted one line of policy, namely, never to send anybody on board the frigate to hold personal communication with the Commodore, but the lowest class of officers, thus, in their silly arrogance, making it appear as if they held him in a corresponding rank. But now their tactics changed, yet not in a manly, straightforward manner, but little by little.

During the morning of this day, the Dallah Governor came off, being sent by the Governor of Rangoon to see what he could do in the business. The Commodore informed him, that, in consideration of his (the Commodore's) personal regard for him, and as a mark of the appreciation in which he held his admirable conduct during the whole time the expedition had been lying off Rangoon, he would, in a measure, deviate from his first intentions, and that he would again open communications with the present Governor, if that officer would come himself on board his frigate, and express his regret for the insult that he had offered to the British Flag, in the persons of the députation sent to him the previous day. The Dallah Governor took his leave, and after some hours, the Under-Governor of Rangoon, with the interpreter, Moug Pogan, made his appearance. He was the bearer of a letter from the Governor, declaring that he really was asleep when the deputation reached him; that he did not wish to see a deputation of inferior officers; that he would see the Commodore, and wished the Commodore to go to him. He did not in the slightest degree express any regret or sorrow for what had occurred. The Commodore informed the Under-Governor, that he would not swerve from the ultimatum he had already given through the Governor of Dallah, and he gave him till noon of the next day to make up his mind. A good deal more conversation took place, owing to the Under-Governor endeavouring to shake the Commodore's determination. Both he and the others contradicted themselves every few minutes; now asserting that the Governor was asleep at the time the deputation came to his door; next asking why Mr. Edwards did not come to him when he sent to call him. At one time the Under-Governor denied being at the interview in which Mr. Edwards complained of having been threatened with a dagger; then, when pressed, acknowledging that he was at the interview, but that he had neither seen or heard anything about it. It would be as tedious, as it would be unnecessary, to enter into a detail of all the lies and subterfuges they were guilty of, till at last they left the frigate, when they complained of the seizure of the King's ship. The Commodore informed them that he had seized it because it was the King's ship; that had it been a common Burmese merchant-ship, he would not have taken possession of it; and that he seized it, as much for the purpose of showing them that the acts of subordinates, if not promptly disowned and punished by those whom they represented, would be inevitably visited on the principals; that he had no doubt, that when the King of Ava became acquainted with the insolent conduct of his subordinates to those who came to make a friendly communication, refusing to receive such communication, and thus jeopardizing his Throne, he would visit them with condign punishment; that if the Governor of Rangoon wished to avoid such a fate, he had only to accede to his, the Commodore's, demands in everything; that then, when all his demands had been fully complied with, he would give back the King's ship, and salute the flag of Burmah with a royal salute. He furthermore impressively added, that until further instructions came from the Governor-General of India, of which they would be duly informed, nothing should induce him to act aggressively, unless they commenced hostilities themselves; and he concluded by saying, that should any detriment occur to the King of Ava, from what had occurred, it would wholly rest upon the head of the Governor of Rangoon.

During the day I was engaged translating into Burmese the letter sent by the Commodore to the Prime Minister, the English copy of which has doubtless been forwarded to Government, informing the Court of Ava of the blockade of its ports, &c. This I finished towards evening, and, accompanied by Lieutenant Spratt, Her Majesty's ship "Fox," took it the Governor of Dallah to send up to his Court.

During the next day, Thursday the 8th, the Dallah Governor came on board the frigate to state that he had forwarded the Commodore's letter to the Prime Minister, given to him by me the previous evening. He added, that he was very anxious that the Commodore should give up the King's ship, as that any punishment the King might inflict upon his servants for its loss might be partially visited upon him, as the ship was taken away in the waters between his Government, and that of the Governor of Rangoon. The Commodore said that he could not give it up except on the conditions he had made known to the Under-Governor of Rangoon the day before; that he had given them up to noon of the present day to consider of it; but that in consideration of the Dallah Governor's uniform conduct, and as a mark of the personal esteem he held him in, he would prolong the time for the Rangoon Governor to accede to his terms, from noon till sunset. The Dallah Governor took his leave.

In the evening we saw from the frigate's decks several large war-canoes, containing about 100 men each, proceeding apparently to man the stockades down the river. They all carried the red flag, which, among the Burmese, is a sign of hostilities; but shortly afterwards, Mounng Pogan, the interpreter, with two Burmese under-officials, came on board, bringing a letter from the Governor of Rangoon, addressed to the Government of India. This letter I translated, and it, with its translation, is, I believe, included in the despatches I have the honor to convey; it will speak for itself.

Friday, 9th.—The "Proserpine" left Rangoon *via* Moulmein, with Commodore Lambert's despatches for the Governor-General.

Inclosure 12 in No. 3.

Mr. Halliday to Sir H. Elliot.

(Extract.)

Fort William, January 18, 1852.

I AM directed to forward, to be laid before the Governor-General, the papers noted in the margin.

The first portion of the Rangoon dispatches, and that from the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, arrived yesterday in the "Proserpine," and, in the evening, Her Majesty's steamer "Hermes" was announced, bringing further dispatches, and having on board Commodore Lambert himself.

The Commodore has communicated in person with the President in Council, and proposes returning to Rangoon on Wednesday morning to await there the instructions of the Governor-General. Pending the receipt of these instructions, his intention is not to act on any overtures for apology or reconciliation, should such be made to him, but to refer any communication of the kind that he may receive, for the orders of the Government of India.

The President in Council will cause a wing of Her Majesty's 18th Foot, and a company of European Artillery, to be sent down to Moulmein by the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Fire Queen," which are both in harbour.

The "Proserpine" will be detained here to convey to the Commodore the Governor-General's orders, as soon as they reach Calcutta.

Inclosure 13 in No. 3.

*Mr. Young to Captain Rogers, Superintendent of Marine.**Fort William, January 18, 1852.*

I AM directed to request that you will, with as little delay as possible, place at the disposal of Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," a properly equipped gun-boat, for employment in the blockade of the rivers of Burmah.

The President in Council also desires that the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Fire Queen" may be got ready for sea, to convey troops to Moulmein, as soon as intimation shall be conveyed to you from the Military Department, of their being ready to embark.

Inclosure 14 in No. 3.

*Mr. Young to Colonel Bogle.**Fort William, January 20, 1852.*

IN reply to your letter of the 11th instant, I am directed to inform you, that, in accordance with your requisition, a wing of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment (Royal Irish), and a company of European Artillery, with such stores, &c., as were thought necessary, have been dispatched to Moulmein in the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine."

Inclosure 15 in No. 3.

*Notification.**Fort William, January 20, 1852.*

THE following notification of blockade, issued by Commodore G. R. Lambert, under authority from the Government of India, is published for general information.

(Here enter Notification, dated January 6, 1852.)

By order of the Honorable the President of the Council of India in Council.

F. J. HALLIDAY,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 16 in No. 3.

*Captain Rogers to Mr. Young.**Fort William, January 19, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, requesting that I will, with as little delay as possible, place at the disposal of Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," a properly-equipped gun-boat, for employment in the blockade of the rivers of Burmah; and further conveying the orders of the President in Council, that the steamers "Tenasserim" and "Fire Queen" may be got ready for sea, to convey troops to Moulmein, as soon as intimation shall be conveyed to me from the Military Department, of their being ready to embark.

In reference to the above, I beg to inform you, that having received intimation from Commodore Lambert, that the steamer "Proserpine," which vessel is armed, and has an European crew, would be of great service to him in the Gulf of Martaban, either as a relief to the "Phlegethon," or for keeping up communication with different vessels, I have taken upon me to substitute the "Proserpine" for the "Fire Queen," the latter vessel being in dock, having a

fresh coat of paint put on her bottom; and although, had the emergency required it, she could at once have been hauled out, I was anxious to have the paint well dry before she is floated.

The "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine" will embark the troops this afternoon, and take their departure this evening, or early in the morning.

With regard to a gun-boat, I have already given orders to have one of the best of our row-boats placed in the builder's hands, to be fitted for the service, and will have her properly equipped as soon as possible.

Inclosure 17 in No. 3.

Mr. Young to Captain Rogers.

Fort William, January 23, 1852.

ADVERTING to late occurrences at Rangoon, and the possibility of the Arracan frontier being threatened by the Burmese, or further reinforcements being required in the Tenasserim Provinces, the President in Council is desirous that you should take into consideration, and report on the means of conveying to those provinces, at a short notice, one or two Native regiments, according as circumstances may require.

No. 4.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Camp, Benares, January 25, 1852. (No. 5.)*

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 9th instant, No. 2,* I have the honor to transmit, for your information, the accompanying copy of further dispatches received from the President in Council, and of their inclosures, regarding the present state of affairs at Rangoon.

It is probable that these papers may have been dispatched from Calcutta, but, to prevent any mistake, I beg also to forward them.

The reply of the King of Ava was friendly, and promised to prove in all respects satisfactory. The former Governor of Rangoon was recalled immediately, and his successor arrived; so that the Government had every reason to hope that the differences between the States would be finally adjusted.

You will be concerned, however, to know that these anticipations have not yet been fulfilled.

The acts of the new Governor were not only discourteous, but disrespectful and unfriendly to the British Government; and, latterly, his treatment of the officers deputed to him by the Commodore was so grossly insulting, that the Commodore broke off all further intercourse with the Governor, prepared to withdraw his squadron, and declared the establishment of a blockade, in accordance with his instructions.

Before quitting Rangoon, the Commodore thought proper to seize a vessel of the King of Ava, by way of reprisal. His ship was fired upon by the Burmese batteries, in consequence of this act. The Commodore immediately returned the fire, killing, as is stated, great numbers of the Burmese troops, driving them out of the stockades, and destroying their war-boats and guns.

In this state matters now stand.

You, I trust, will be of opinion that throughout these transactions the Government of India have shown no undue sensitiveness; that they have properly protected the rights of British subjects; and have properly insisted on that respect, which is necessary to insure protection for the rights and security for the persons of British traders in Ava; while, at the same time, they have evinced a sincere desire to avoid having recourse to war, if the security and respect which are guaranteed by treaty to our traders and subjects, can be obtained by any less violent means.

* This letter only transmitted a duplicate of papers sent to the Secret Committee by the President in Council.

I still entertain a hope that a peaceable adjustment will be obtained. In the meantime, all due precautions for the defence of our eastern frontier are being taken by the Government of India.

No. 5.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, February 7, 1852. (No. 3.)

IN continuation of the dispatch No. 2, dated the 24th ultimo, from the President of the Council of India in Council, on Rangoon affairs, we have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of the correspondence detailed in the accompanying abstract.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Mr. Halliday to Commodore Lambert.

(Extract.)

Fort William, January 26, 1852.

YOUR dispatches of the 9th and 10th instant, with their inclosures, having been submitted for the consideration of the Governor-General, his Lordship has recorded upon them the following remarks, in the tenor of which the President in Council entirely concurs, and which I am directed to communicate to you :

“The letter addressed by the Ministers of the King of Ava to the Government of India, was friendly in its tone, and entirely satisfactory in its tenor. The Court of Ava promised at once to remove the Governor of Rangoon, and to inquire into, in order to redress, the injuries complained of.

“If there had been any good reason to doubt the sincerity of these assurances, their prompt fulfilment must have cleared away those doubts. The offending Governor was at once removed, and his successor took his place at Rangoon.

“Although the first acts of the new Governor, as detailed in the report of Captain Latter, were undoubtedly unfriendly in appearance, and open to just objection, his communications with the Commodore bore no such aspect. He expressed his readiness to receive him, and showed a more conciliatory disposition.

“The expectations of a speedy adjustment of differences were, however, disappointed, by his conduct towards the officers who, on the 6th of January, were deputed to convey to him a letter from the Commodore. Those officers were, undoubtedly, subjected to insults and indignities, by which the Government they serve must necessarily feel itself aggrieved, for which it has a right to demand fitting apology, and which justified the Commodore in refusing to hold any further communication with the Burmese authorities at Rangoon.

“Having regard to the long-continued course of offensive demeanour and insulting acts of the Burmese officers and their people, I conceive that Commodore Lambert was justified in refusing to hold any further communication with them, after the gross public insult which was put upon his officers, on the occasion to which I have referred.

“I conceive that no blame could attach to the Government of India, if it abstained from any further efforts to bring about reconciliation between the States, pursuing such measures as it deemed necessary to enforce the reparation it required. But I apprehend that the President in Council is as desirous as myself that the breach which has been made should still be repaired, if possible, without recourse to war.

“The insults offered to our officers cannot be permitted to pass without notice; the compensation demanded must be paid; and the precautions contemplated for the future must be taken.

“Those points being conceded, the Government of India ought to be prepared to renew relations of amity with the Court of Ava.”

In accordance, therefore, with the views of the Governor-General, I am directed by the President in Council, to request that you will forward the accom-

panying reply to the letter addressed to the Government of India by the Governor of Rangoon, and that you will transmit to the Government of India any letter which you may receive in return. It is not necessary that you should enter into any further communication with the authorities in Ava, but maintain the blockade for the present, and engage in no other hostile operations. Upon any future arrangements that may become necessary, you will be addressed by the Government of India hereafter.

My letter to the Governor of Rangoon, and the memorandum which accompanies it, are transmitted to you in an open envelope, in order that transactions of them may be made, with which they will of course be accompanied, when they are delivered to the Governor of Rangoon.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Mr. Halliday to the Governor of Rangoon.

Fort William, January 26, 1852.

THE letter addressed by you to the Government of India, relative to the transactions between yourself and Commodore Lambert, has been received, and at the same time letters have also been received from the Commodore and other officers, reporting the course of those transactions, to which your letter refers.

In reply to your letter, I am directed to forward the accompanying official memorandum by the President in Council.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Memorandum from the President of the Council of India in Council to the Governor of Rangoon.

THE Government of India perceives with extreme surprise, that the Governor of Rangoon has listened to the falsehoods which his servants have attempted to impose upon him, relative to the conduct of the British officers who were deputed to wait upon him on the 6th of January. British officers in the discharge of their duty, are incapable of the disgraceful acts which have been basely alleged against them. The statement of his officers is a falsehood and a calumny.

The Government of India, upon its part, has just cause to complain of the treatment which these officers have received at the hands of the present Governor of Rangoon.

The letter from the King of Ava at once recognised the justice of the complaints which were transmitted to it by the Government of India. The former Governor of Rangoon was removed, and redress was promised to those who had been injured.

The Governor, Mahamenghla Meng Khanny Gyan, on his arrival, made no communication whatever to Commodore Lambert, the Representative of the British Government. He issued orders utterly at variance with friendship to that Government, and disrespectful to it. Finally, when the Commodore deputed his principal officers in order to deliver to him a letter, which he had already expressed his willingness to receive, those officers were refused admittance, and were subjected to public insult and indignity at the gates of the Governor's palace.

If those officers were inferior in rank, as the Governor now declares, and if the customs of his country were thereby violated, or any apparent disrespect were shown to the Governor, or his Sovereign, the departure from custom ought to have been properly represented by the Governor, when the error would, doubtless, have been corrected.

This was not done, but the officers were exposed by the Governor to public insult at his door. The British Government in India will not permit any officer in the performance of his duty, to suffer insult or injury without requiring reparation therefrom. It will exact the fullest reparation for every such insult, which, inflicted upon its officer, is offered to itself.

If, therefore, the Governor of Rangoon is in truth actuated by feelings of friendship, as he declares, and if he desires to avert from the Kingdom of Ava, the evils which the recent conduct of its officers will unquestionably bring upon it, unless timely reparation be made, he will not delay in intimating his readiness to agree to those demands which the British Government is entitled to make, and some of which are mentioned in the petition of the inhabitants of Rangoon, dated the 11th of January, which the petitioners declare they were desired by the Governor to prepare.

1. The Governor will express, in writing, to the Government of India, his deep regret that Commander Fishbourne, and the officers deputed by Commodore Lambert to the Governor, should have been treated with disrespect, and exposed to public insult at his own residence, on the 6th of January.

2. He will consent to pay immediately the compensation already demanded of 9,948 rupees, for injuries done to Captain Sheppard and Captain Lewis.

3. He will consent to receive with the honor due to the Representative of the British Government, the accredited Agent whom, in accordance with the 7th clause of the Treaty of Yandaboo, the Government is prepared to appoint.

If these concessions shall be made, the British Government will agree as follows :

1. The Government of India will depute an officer of rank to proceed to Rangoon, in order to adjust the final settlement of the questions above mentioned, and to arrange the details for the reception of the Agent. The preliminaries having been settled by the subordinates of the chiefs, a meeting shall take place, and all differences shall be composed.

2. On this settlement being completed, the ship belonging to the King of Ava, which has been seized by the squadron, shall be released.

3. The blockade shall be removed, and entire concord shall be restored.

If these demands shall be refused; the British Government will thereafter exact for itself the reparation which is due for the wrong it has suffered.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

Mr. Young to Captain A. Phayre, Commissioner of Arracan.

Fort William, January 27, 1852.

I AM directed to inform you, that, in consequence of the unsettled state of our present relations with Ava, the President in Council has considered it advisable, as a precautionary measure, to send a regiment of Native infantry and some artillery, as a reinforcement to the Arracan Province.

Arrangements have been made for embarking these troops on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer "Precursor," and instructions have been given for landing them at Kyouk Phyoo, where they will be available for any duty on which it may become necessary to employ them.

A copy of this letter will be delivered to your principal Assistant on the arrival of the steamer at Kyouk Phyoo, that he may be informed of the object of the Government in sending these troops.

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

A Merchant to Mr. Young.

Rangoon River, January 13, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that the first act of the new Governor, after his arrival, was to issue an order in the most public manner, that no foreigners were to visit the squadron.

The large force of 3000 men which the Governor came down with, indicated the Court of Ava's intentions to have been unfriendly to the Mission, which was further shown by the treatment of the deputation.

The Commodore's dispatches will have fully informed Government of the occurrences which took place on the 10th instant, when the Burmese fired on the frigate from the upper stockade.

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

*A Merchant to Mr. Young.**Rangoon River, January 23, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inform you that a few days ago, on the boat of the frigate attempting to land at a village, the headman of the village informed the officer in charge of the boat, that he had positive orders to fire on any one who should land.

On the 17th, the nakodah of a Burmah boat from Rangoon informed me that the Governor had ordered the town to be entirely destroyed; the merchants' houses had been plundered, and that the inhabitants had been removed to the new town, the defences of which were being repaired.

No. 6.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.**February 23, 1852. (No. 4.)*

IN continuation of our despatch of the 7th instant, No. 3, on Rangoon affairs, we have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of the correspondence detailed in the accompanying abstract.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

*Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.**H.M.S. "Fox," in the Rangoon River,
January 31, 1852.*

ON receipt of your dispatch of the 26th instant, I proceeded with Her Majesty's ship "Fox," in tow of the "Fire Queen" steamer, to the anchorage off the Hastings Shoal, for the purpose of sending a boat with the letter addressed by the Government of India to the Governor of Rangoon, the distance the ships were anchored from the town being far too great for me to detach a boat, independent of the risk of its being fired at from the stockades.

However, much to my surprise, on my passing the lower stockade, at 3.40 A.M., a cannonade was opened on Her Majesty's ship "Fox," which was instantly returned; in three minutes the Burmese battery was silenced, and I ceased firing, and proceeded up the river.

I regret to state a seaman* of the "Fox" lost his leg by a round-shot from the enemy.

Shortly afterwards I passed the stockade, which the "Fox" had engaged on the 10th instant, without molestation.

I beg to remark, for the information of the Government of India, that so far from anticipating that the Burmese would fire on Her Majesty's ship, the guns were not loaded; the tompions were in, nor was the slightest preparation made for such an event.

By the officer who conveys your letter to the Governor of Rangoon I shall send one from myself, of which the inclosed is a copy.

* He died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

*Commodore Lambert to the Governor of Rangoon.**H.M.S. "Fox," at anchor in the Rangoon River,
January 31, 1852.*

I HAVE to express my surprise that on Her Britannic Majesty's ship under my command passing the lower stockade, on my way up the river to-day, bearing a peaceable letter from the Government of India, in reply to one forwarded by you, she was fired at by the Burmese, after I had pledged my word as a British officer, that I would not act in any hostile manner until I received instructions from the Governor-General of India.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you, that if any further aggression is made on Her Britannic Majesty's ships, I shall not only silence the fire, but destroy the stockades from which it proceeds.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

*Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.**February 2, 1852.*

IN reference to my letter of the 31st ultimo, I have the honor to request you will lay before the President in Council, the inclosed copy of a reply I have received from the Governor of Rangoon, to my letter on the subject of Her Majesty's ship "Fox" having been fired at by the Burmese.

The statement of the Governor of Rangoon, that I agreed to obtain the permission of the officers of the stockades, before I would attempt to pass them, is utterly false; nor had I any communication with these officers.

All communications made by me have been through the two interpreters appointed by the Indian Government; and to these my orders were, to inform the Burmese authorities, that I should not molest them unless they fired at me; and on the answer from the Governor-General arriving, it would be immediately taken up to Rangoon. During my absence from the "Fox," a message was sent from the Governor of Rangoon, to know if the answer had arrived to his letter. Commander Tarleton informed the bearer that it had not, but that, when it did, it should immediately be delivered.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

*The Governor of Rangoon to Commodore Lambert.**February 2, 1852.*

THA Doh Mengyee Maha Ming Tha Meng Khoung Gyan, the Governor of Prome and Thivedoung, and who is invested with power to administer the affairs of all the Southern Provinces, informs Commodore Lambert, with reference to his letter apprising him of having been fired at by the Burmese while passing the lower stockades of Dunout and Thilawa, that, on a former occasion, when the Royal vessel* was seized and taken away, the officers and soldiers in charge of the said stockades fired at the frigate. The officers of the frigate also returned the fire. Subsequently the Governor of Dallah and other officers were deputed to Commodore Lambert, to inform him that ships or boats proceeding up or down the river, should first obtain the permission of the officers in charge of the stockades. This was not attended to; and on your proceeding up the river, contrary to the orders issued, the officers at the stockades fired at the frigate, which was likewise returned by the officers of the frigate, as reported to him by the officers in charge of the stockades. In future, if you desire to proceed up, or down the river, you should obtain permission from the officers in charge of the stockades. I have to request that the

* Yi-thana Ye-mhoon.

reply to the letter from the Government of India be forwarded, and their acknowledgment of the same sent to me without delay.

Written in the year 1213, on the 13th day of the waxing moon, Tahodire (2nd February, 1852.)

Commodore Lambert expresses surprise at having been fired at by the officers in charge of the stockades of Dunout and Thilawa, but it is a matter of greater surprise, that the Royal ship of His Majesty should have been seized at midnight, contrary to the custom of great nations and the rules of justice. And Commodore Lambert, after having agreed to obtain the permission of the officers at the stockades, in accordance to established usage, proceeded up the river without communicating with them. These are subjects not only of extreme surprise, but also for traditional record.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

February 2, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to inclose, for the information of the Government of India, the copy of a letter I have received from the Commander of the Company's steam-vessel "Tenasserim," reporting his having been fired into by the Burmese in the Rangoon River.

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

Mr. W. Dicey, of the East India Company's steam-vessel "Tenasserim," to Commodore Lambert.

H.C.S. "Tenasserim," February 2, 1852.

IN compliance with your orders received by the "Fire-Queen," I beg to inform you, that after making over charge of the Burman ship to the Company's steamer "Phlegethon" yesterday morning, I proceeded up the river to join you; and when passing the De Silva and Chokey Stockades, the Burmese opened fire on us, the shot passing close under our stern. We returned the fire; but as you directed me not to stop on the way, even should we be fired on, I accordingly made the best of my way up, and anchored near Her Majesty's ship "Fox," at 1 P.M. yesterday.

Inclosure 7 in No. 6.

Burmese Paper forwarded to Commander Luard, of Her Majesty's brig "Serpent," by the Burmese, from one of the Chokeys at the mouth of the Bassein River.

THE reply is, that, heretofore, frigates did not enter or quit the river as you* have done, and that you infringe the rules of the Preventive Establishment of a great country, in anchoring your vessel, and remaining here.

The Writer of the Governor of the thirty-two districts of Bassein having informed his chief of the above circumstance, was ordered to convey a letter to the English officers, and to go down with quick dispatch with an interpreter. But after waiting for two months he was unable to communicate with you, as you enter and quit the river just as you please to do so. This is not in accordance to custom.

The boundaries of the territories of our King of the Rising Sun, and of that of the foreigners, have been established and defined; you should not, therefore, transgress, by entering our boundary.

If you have any communication to make, you should anchor your vessel at seat, at the usual place appointed by those in authority, and in accordance to the custom formerly established, to state what you may wish to communicate.

* The inferior personal pronoun is used throughout this paper.
 † Outside of the mouth of the river.

Inclosure 8 in No. 6.

*Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.**Moulmein, January 27, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith in original the inclosed Burmese letters, and have to state that just as the mail-steamer "Enterprise" was leaving this place on Thursday the 22nd instant, two messengers, bearing these documents, arrived alongside of the Company's steamer "Phlegethon," at the time lying off Martaban, and requested to be allowed to proceed to Moulmein.

Captain Neblett, Commander of the "Phlegethon," thinking that these communications might be of great consequence, and seeing that the "Enterprise" was just starting, immediately got into his gig with the messengers, and pulled for this shore, but before he could reach, the "Enterprise" had started; he, however, proceeded to the main wharf with the utmost expedition, and caused guns to be fired, and signals of recall to be hoisted, but all in vain, the steamer was off, and nothing could be done to stop her.

The letters were then brought to me, and I now transmit them to Commodore Lambert, who will forward them by the first steamer leaving the Rangoon River for Calcutta. I adopt this course, as I have no other that promises to be equally expeditious, and I have no steamer at my disposal to send to Bengal.

Being apprehensive that some difficulty might be experienced in having the letters for the Governor-General translated at the Presidency, I considered it proper to open them, and to have them, as also those addressed to myself, carefully translated by Lieutenant Hopkinson. His translation is accordingly annexed to each document, and I trust my proceeding will meet with approval.

I have further to state that I did not think it necessary immediately to return any answer to the letters addressed to myself; but the Burmese at Martaban having seen two steamers arrive here on Sunday the 25th instant, and, probably suspecting that they brought troops, sent messengers over on Monday morning, ostensibly to remind me that I had not yet answered their previous letter; but no doubt the real object was to learn what was going on here. They became aware that a large reinforcement of European troops had arrived, which has produced a sensible alteration in their tone.

Inclosure 9 in No. 6.

*The Governor of Rangoon to the English Government.**January 16, 1852.*

THE declaration of Tha do Mengyee Maha Mengtha Meng Khoung-yan Menggyee of Shewedoung, commanding the forces at Rangoon, and appointed to go and rule a large territory and brave army, having after due prostration at the Royal Feet, together with the Egah Maha Thanapatee, and the great officers and Ministers of the State, taken counsel of the Meng Tarahgyee Phooyah, who is all-powerful Lord of the Universe, Master of the T'shat-tang Elephant, and all White Elephants, and Lord of Life, he who is like unto the Lotus Flower.

As the letter transmitted by the English authorities sets forth the unjust oppression to which the merchants trading at Rangoon had been subjected by the Governor of Rangoon; that those who had been thus oppressed should receive redress; and that it would be proper to remove the Governor of Rangoon (or that a good understanding required the removal of the Governor of Rangoon). In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, a person disposed to cherish and protect the people and merchants, was placed at Rangoon, and dispatches for the English Government, purporting that the Mywoon of Rangoon would be recalled to the Royal presence, and that a decision would be passed after due investigation, were delivered to the officer commanding the man-of-war which had come to Rangoon, and, in pursuance with these letters, the Rangoon Mywoon was sent off to the Throne, that his case might be inquired into and decided.

After this, when I was considering how I should invite Commodore Lambert, desiring to conciliate him to the utmost, and thus establish a warm friendship, the interpreter, Mr. Edwards, came to me, and stated that the Commodore desired an interview with me very much, and begged that he might be permitted to come. As this was a proper and friendly overture, after having settled with Mr. Edwards that he should join me beforehand, that I might perfectly observe the etiquette which the visit required, there came riding into my court-yard four subordinate officers, with the American missionary Kincaid, and Edwards, the interpreter. They had been drinking, and it happened that I was asleep, just at that time; whereupon, telling the Yaywoon and the other officers present, to awake me, they returned and made a false representation to the Commodore, who gave ear to what they said, without duly considering the circumstances of the case, and unlike a man of the world (son of a great country), and actuated only by the wish to create a quarrel, he, on the first Lah-pyeegyan of Pyatho 1213 (6th January, 1852), at 2 P.M., covertly unmoored and carried off the great ship "Ye-thenah-ye-moon," belonging to His Majesty Meng Tarahgyee Phooyah, the all-powerful Lord of the Universe, Master of Tshat-tang Elephant and all White Elephants, and Lord of Life.

In consequence, however, of the Treaty of Peace which subsisted between the countries, we did not attempt her recapture, lest it should lead to hostilities, but allowed her to be carried off; furthermore, when, in retribution of the wrongful and unjust conduct of one who had been charged with dispatches from the English Government, the ship in which he had come got aground, in shallow water, near Dallah, we did not annoy or molest her, but let her remain. I desire that there should be justice, where there is misrepresentation and injustice. This is not in accordance with the purport of the letters which were forwarded in the first instance. These mediators between two countries, Commodore Lambert and his officers, have violated the functions of a great embassy; therefore have I written, desiring that the facts may be known.

Inclosure 10 in No. 6.

The Governor of Rangoon to the British Commissioner at Moulmein.

January 16, 1852.

THE Commander-in-chief of forces in Hauthawadee, and the Controller of the Southern Provinces of His Majesty's dominions, Min Thada Mengyee Maha Minlah Min Goung Gyo, informs the Moulmein Mengyee, that two letters for the chief authorities (or Company Mingdo) of India in Bengal, are dispatched for delivery through the Martaban Mingyee (or Governor), which, on arrival, it is requested may be forwarded to the said chief authorities of India in Bengal, so as to reach them with all expedition.

Inclosure 11 in No. 6.

Petition from Merchants residing at Rangoon to the Governor-General.

The humble petition of the Mahomedan, Mogul, Nagore, Suratee, and Armenian merchants of Rangoon,

Showeth,

THE Naval Commander, Commodore Lambert, was dispatched with steamers and men-of-war, to consolidate the alliance and friendship subsisting between the two countries, and on his arrival at Rangoon, he transmitted a letter by a deputation of subordinate officers, to the Mywoon of Rangoon, setting forth how that he, the Mywoon of Rangoon, had been extorting money and oppressing the merchants; further also, Commodore Lambert forwarded a letter from the chief commanders of the English Nation, for transmission to the chief commanders of His Majesty of the Rising Sun. Thirty-five days was fixed upon as the time for the dispatch and receipt of the answer to this communication, and at the expiration of the stipulated period, His Majesty's mandate was delivered

to Commodore Lambert; the Myowoon of Rangoon was recalled to Ava, in compliance with the representations of the Bengal Government, there to have the charges of extortion preferred against him, investigated and disposed of; and on the 14th of waxing Pyatho, 1213, there arrived from the Court of Ava, the Narthawady Ayabine Pyee Shuay Down Myowoon Thado Menggree Maha Meng tha Meng Khoung Kyan, with orders to proceed to Rangoon as Plenipotentiary; Commodore Lambert then sent the interpreter Edwards to him to request an interview, and the Ayabine told the interpreter that he must return to him, and tell him on what day the Commodore proposed coming. This communication took place in the morning, and at about 10 A.M., the interpreter Edwards, accompanied by some subordinate officers, who had all been drinking to excess, came riding into the Ayabine's court-yard, and overbearing all the attempts made to stop them; they were, however, desired to wait, as the Ayabine was then asleep, but they would not, and went off, and the man-of-war afterwards weighing anchor and dropping down; the Ayabine sent off the Dallah woon, the Yewoon, and Tseetkay, to her, to say that the provisions of the Yandaboo Treaty would be henceforth respected; that the money taken from the two English captains would be immediately returned; and that temporary accommodation should be provided for the Commodore, befitting a great Ambassador, and where the two authorities could meet and discuss matters. The Dallah woon, the Yewoon, and the Tseetkay, however, returned with a reply as contrary to established etiquette as it was calculated to disturb existing relations between the two countries, that the affair could only be settled by the Ayabine repairing on board the frigate. Some time after, 4 P.M. of the same day, we merchants having become alarmed, some of our wives got on board of ships, leaving their husbands behind, and husbands went, and left their wives behind, and our property altogether suffered considerable damage on the occasion. Besides all this, at 12 P.M. that night, the King's ship "Ratuna Yeng no woon" had her chain-cable cut, and was forcibly carried off by two steamers. Eight Chullia vessels were forced to quit the port without their papers, and under pain of being fired into. The crews who had been thus threatened, came ashore to communicate with their owners, but, in the meantime, their ships were forcibly carried away by the steamers, and the shipowners and masters, Wustan, Mahomed Akhbar, Marec ooddeen, and Mahomed, were left behind with some of their lascars; these vessels had neither taken in their provisions, nor had they completed their cargo, which was a great loss. In consequence, also, of the officer commanding, Commodore Lambert, carrying the King's ship off at night, with his steamers, all the merchants, great and small, both at Rangoon and at Ava, have been put to great trouble and vexation, and their occupation as merchants is gone. We, therefore, pray that your Lordship will, in equity, issue such instructions as may relieve us from our troubles, place our trade on its former footing, and restore peace.

Inclosure 12 in No. 6.

The Governor of Martaban to the British Commissioner at Moulmein.

January 21, 1852.

Tikla Myo tsa Motama Myo Mingyee (Martaban Governor), Mingyee Maha thinkha yah, informs the Moulmein Mingyee and Ayabine Ming (Commissioner and Principal Assistant Commissioner), that, forasmuch as peace and tranquillity is the sole object in view between the two great kingdoms, a friendly intercourse being established, traffic has hitherto been carried on between the merchants of the two countries without interruption. In consequence, however, of complaints having been preferred against the former Rangoon Myowoon, that he oppressed foreign merchants, certain English officers were dispatched on a mission to represent them. These officers arrived, and thirty-five days being fixed as the period within which their dispatches were to be transmitted, and the Royal answer received, while yet the mandate issued from the Shuay Shoot Tah (the Golden Royal Court) was on its way to India, there came the intelligence that the English officers had attacked and carried off the King's ship out of the port of Rangoon. Now the Governor-General of India simply appointed the

Mission to treat ; they had no instructions to fight ; and, should this capture of His Majesty's ship prove the occasion of a fierce war, the trade between the two countries will be sacrificed for an unprofitable quarrel. It is not right that there should be a war. The character of those in authority depends upon peace, and a free and uninterrupted trade ; hence, therefore, the dispatch of these letters ; and it is requested that the English Government will return a full and explicit answer to them.

Inclosure 13 in No. 6.

Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.

Moulmein, January 30, 1852.

ON Wednesday, the 28th instant, two messengers came over from Martaban, bringing a letter to the Principal Assistant Commissioner, to say that a party of our police up the Salween had attacked the Burmese village of Pagat ; that the people there had driven back the police ; but, being apprehensive that a more serious collision might take place, the Burmese authorities earnestly requested that measures might be taken to repress any aggressive disposition on the part of our people, and to preserve peace.

It appearing to me, from the tone of the Burmese authorities, that the intelligence they had sent was true, and that they were actuated by a very friendly feeling, and not having received any report of the matter from any other source, I thought that the best way of settling the affair was to get into a steamer, and proceed to the spot at once.

I accordingly embarked in the "Phlegethon" at 4 P.M. of the 28th, taking with me the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Province Amherst, Lieutenant Hopkinson, and proceeded up the Salween.

In passing Martaban, in the evening, we saw the Burmese messengers, who had been sent back a few hours before, with the answer which I had directed to be written to the Governor, assuring him of my unwillingness that any acts of hostility should at present be perpetrated, and of my resolution to have the matter, which he had brought to notice, immediately inquired into, just about to land ; and in a very short time after this the steamer took the ground close to the Martaban fortification, and remained fast for twenty minutes, within short musket-range of the walls. The place was well filled with men, and I observed a couple of guns mounted on the ramparts ; but no advantage was taken of the steamer being aground ; and we remained unmolested until the tide rose, and the "Phlegethon" proceeded on her voyage.

Nor did the Burmese appear to entertain any fears that we would annoy them ; the wharf near their large pagoda, and their walls on which, when passing a fortnight before, I did not see a single soul, were now crowded with men sitting quietly looking at us ; the red flag—emblem of war—was flying arrogantly enough at many points all along the line ; but women were also to be seen seated along the bank, which indicated perfect confidence that the steamer had not suddenly appeared within pistol-shot of the place with the intention of harassing any one.

As I passed the two gun-boats employed in blockading Martaban, I learnt from the Commanders of each, that a kind of war-boat, containing fifty or sixty men, all dressed in red jackets, had proceeded up the Salween, about two hours before. These men were, no doubt, dispatched as a reinforcement to the village of Pagat.

In the course of the night, Lieutenant Hopkinson received a dispatch from Mr. Dray, superintendent of river police, stating that, having been directed to proceed to Pagat, to reconnoitre it, in consequence of its having some days before been reported that an assemblage of armed men had taken place there, and that they were engaged in stockading their position, and threatened an attack on our villages, he had accordingly proceeded to reconnoitre the place on Tuesday, the 27th instant, but that on approaching it (it is situated on the right bank of the Salween), his party had been fired into, on which he returned the fire, and seeing one large boat of a kind commonly used for offensive purposes, though not absolutely deserving to be classed as a war-

boat, he had seized it and carried it off, as also some six or eight other boats of a smaller description.

Next morning I arrived at the place where Mr. Dray was with these boats, but it appearing to me that they were not such as need be taken, I ordered them to be towed to Pagat, which place I reached about noon. On approaching it, a number of armed men moving about in the jungle, and hurrying towards the landing-place, with muskets on shoulder, were distinctly visible from the deck of the steamer, and among them were a good many in red jackets, some of whom, I have reason to believe, were the men who had been sent up from Martaban the day before, and they seemed prepared to dispute any attempt at landing. On getting close into the shore, it was, however, observed that some men were at the water's edge, as if awaiting a communication from the steamer; they were accordingly hailed, and told to come on board, bringing with them any headman who might be there; on which a boat immediately pushed off, without the least hesitation, and without a single armed man, and in it I was surprised to find the Martaban official, who had the day before brought the letter respecting the collision which had occurred, over to Moulmein, and whom, at sunset, I had seen landing at Martaban.

From him I learnt, that during the night he had been dispatched by the Governor of Martaban, to summon the chief of Pagat to his presence, and to take every possible measure to prevent hostilities; and he assured me, that, having pulled all night, he had arrived that morning, and had, in conformity with his instructions, dispatched the chief to Martaban, and caused it to be intimated to all the inhabitants of Pagat and the neighbourhood, that they were to conduct themselves in the most peaceful manner possible, and to do nothing that could be offensive to the English authorities; and he begged that the people on the British side might receive similar orders.

He was immediately assured that I had no other desire than that all should remain quiet and peaceful, and, as a proof of my reluctance to avail myself of the power at my command, I directed all the boats which had been taken from Pagat, to be cast adrift from the stern of the "Phlegethon," and restored to the Burmese, at the same time administering a stern warning to the recipients, that if the people of Pagat, who are notorious robbers, put a foot on the British side of the river, under the present state of affairs, they might chance to receive a less agreeable visit from the steamer, at whose crew and armament they gazed with considerable interest.

Having settled this matter to the entire satisfaction of the Burmese functionary, and received his earnest protestations of a desire to remain at peace, I visited several of our police ports and villages, where Lieutenant Hopkinson issued such orders as seemed proper; we then returned towards Moulmein, but again got aground under the walls of Martaban, and remained six hours hard and fast, within pistol-range of the shore; during the time (it was night) we could distinctly see crowds of Burmese around their watch-fires, but except just when the steam was blowing off with the remarkable noise which it always makes, they took no notice of us.

Now, coupling all the circumstances of this trip with the recent communications from the Governors of Rangoon and Martaban, noticed in my letter of the 27th instant, it appears to me probable that the pacific tone assumed by the Burmese is in consequence of orders from the Governor of Rangoon, to whom Martaban is now subordinate, or it may be dictated by weakness, and a backward state of preparation.

It is very true that a number of armed men, several thousands, have been collected in Martaban, and that smaller bodies have been collected at Pagat, and various other places along the frontier, and that these men conduct themselves with much arrogance; as an instance of which I may mention that about a week ago a message was sent, first in the morning, and repeated in the evening, to the gun-boat "Trusty," four 12-pounders, anchored on blockading duty right in front of Martaban, to say that if she did not move out of shot she would be fired into, but the threat was not attended to; and none of our posts or boats have yet been attacked; on the contrary, an apparent desire has been shown to avert hostilities, and to await in peace the fiat of the two Governments, or, perhaps, I should say, of the Governor-General alone; whether this proceeds from a pacific intention, or merely a desire to gain time, is a matter which will

soon develop itself; in the meantime the force now here, with the aid of a steamer and gun-boats, may be considered sufficient for all probable exigencies.

A river steamer would certainly be a valuable acquisition, and if it is intended that a defensive course should be long maintained, I would recommend that one should be sent down.

Inclosure 14 in No. 6.

Mr. Halliday to Colonel Bogle.

Fort William, February 13, 1852.

I AM directed by the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch by the "Fire Queen," received on the 9th instant, inclosing certain letters with translations, forwarded to you from Martaban, for transmission to the Government of India.

It is not, I am directed to state, necessary that you should make any reply to the letters which the Governors of Rangoon and Martaban have sent.

The Burmese authorities having thought proper to reject the demands which the Government of India has made, that Government will proceed to exact the reparation which has been unjustifiably withheld from it.

Should any further communications be received from the Burmese authorities, you are requested to transmit them to me, with translations, to be laid before the Governor-General in Council.

You will be informed by a future dispatch, of the precise nature of the measures to be adopted by the Government of India, in order to compel the Burmese Government to accede to its demands.

Inclosure 15 in No. 6.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," in the Rangoon River,
February 2, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to transmit a letter, with a translation by Captain Latter, which I received to-day from the Governor of Rangoon, in reply to your communication to him dated the 26th ultimo.

Inclosure 16 in No. 6.

The Governor of Rangoon to Mr. Halliday.

Rangoon, February 2, 1852.

MAHAMENGLA MENGKHOMYGYAN (with titles), Governor of Rangoon, informs Mr. Frederick James Halliday, Secretary to the Government of India (with titles).

With reference to the demand of an expression of deep regret for the circumstance of the deputation of officers sent by Commodore Lambert on the 6th of January last, being said to have been publicly treated with disrespect;

With reference to the being willing immediately to make good the sum of 9,948 rupees, said to have been extorted from Captains Lewis and Sheppard, by the former Governor of Rangoon;

With reference to being willing to receive a Resident with all honor due to his rank and station, in conformity to the VIIth Article of the Treaty of Yandaboo;

That with reference to the above three points, if they are acceded to by the Governor of Rangoon, first, the ship belonging to the King of Ava, which has been seized, will be given back; secondly, the blockade now existing will be raised, and perfect concord restored.

With reference to the above points contained in your letter, I, the Governor of Rangoon, taking them into my careful consideration, give the following reply:—

On the 6th of January, 1852, Commodore Lambert, at midnight, took away the ship belonging to His Majesty the King of Ava. On the following day, I sent the Deputy Governor of Rangoon to represent to Commodore Lambert, that the act of taking His Majesty's ship by stealth, and unjustly, was in no wise in accordance with the acts proper to two great nations.

Commodore Lambert stated in reply, that his reason for seizing the King's ship was, because a deputation of subordinate officers sent by him had not been received.

Commodore Lambert then wrote a letter to the Prime Ministers of Ava, as also a transmitting one to myself, which were delivered to one of my subordinate officers. These letters were to the effect, that he, Commodore Lambert, had seized the King's ship, because the pecuniary claims under discussion had not been satisfied.

What Commodore Lambert expressed, as above stated, both verbally and in writing, was not in conformity with the custom of great nations. This the Government of India are aware of; moreover, being aware of it, they have written a friendly letter, evincing their wish that the long-existing good understanding between the two nations should be renewed, and commerce and communication restored as they were before.

Therefore, as soon as the officer which the Government of India is prepared to appoint in conformity with existing treaties, shall arrive, a satisfactory and amicable arrangement can be made of the payment of the 9,948 rupees extorted from Captains Lewis and Sheppard; also with reference to the re-delivery of the King of Ava's ship, seized by Commodore Lambert.

With reference to the question of the disrespect said to have been shown to the deputation sent with a letter by Commodore Lambert, it should be borne in mind, that the English officers have been stating their own version of the case, and consequently, whilst shielding themselves, they have thrown all the blame on the other side.

Inclosure 17 in No. 6.

Minute by the Governor-General.

(Extract.)

February 12, 1852.

THE dispatch of Commodore Lambert dated the 2nd instant, contains the reply of the Governor of Rangoon, to the letter from the Government of India, dated the 26th ultimo.

That letter contained the *ultimatum* of the British Government. It required—

1st. That the Government should transmit a written apology for the insult to which the British officers had been subjected at Rangoon on the 6th of January last.

2nd. That he should pay, immediately, the sum of 9,900 rupees, demanded as compensation to Captain Sheppard and Captain Lewis.

3rd. That he should consent to receive in due and fitting manner, the Agent who should be appointed under the Treaty of Yandaboo.

If the Governor of Rangoon should at once make these concessions, the Government of India agreed to send an Envoy for the adjustment of every difference, and the King's ship was to be restored.

The reply of the Governor of Rangoon, far from making the required concessions, has evaded them all.

The demand for an apology on account of the insult offered to British officers at Rangoon is practically rejected, with a remark most offensive in the inference it implies.

The reparation to the persons plundered has not been paid.

There is no consent given to an Agent being received.

The reply of the Governor, after reiterating complaints of the proceedings of our officers, simply states that the Envoy of rank, to whom reference was

made, should be sent, and that conference would then be held regarding payment of reparation, and the restoration of the King's ship.

This letter leaves to the Government of India, in my deliberate judgment, no alternative but to exact reparation by force of arms.

If, allured by the specious appearance of a desire for reconciliation, contained in the Governor's suggestion that an Envoy should now be sent, the Government of India shall acquiesce in that request, it will suffer itself to be decoyed into a feeble and false position.

It will, in so doing, openly abandon every demand for reparation it has so peremptorily and justly advanced. It will tamely submit itself to national insult. It will give reasonable ground, for all who desire it, to assert, that the offensive accusation of its officers, by the Governor of Rangoon, must needs be true, since his treatment of those officers, and his subsequent accusation of them, are alike unresented; and not only so, but they are themselves superseded by another negotiation. In one word, the position of the two Governments will be suddenly and wholly reversed.

These acts on the part of the Government of India will, undoubtedly, be misconstrued; its motives in so acting will be misunderstood; and, in the eyes of the Burmese Nation, and of every Eastern people that is looking on, the British Government, having relinquished the demands it had peremptorily advanced, and having abandoned the officers it was bound to uphold, will, unquestionably, be regarded as having submitted to humiliation and avowed defeat.

I have sincerely desired, and have earnestly laboured, for the preservation of peace; but I cannot, consistently with the duty which I owe to the State, consent to purchase a present peace at so costly a price.

The commencement of war is an act of such solemn importance, and involves so deep a responsibility, that I consider it right to pass in review the events which have led, so rapidly and so unexpectedly, to the present hostilities with Burmah, in order to absolve the Government of India from the reproach of having lightly sought a quarrel, or insufficiently striven to avert it.

For many years past complaints, from time to time, have been made of acts of oppression and of violation of Treaty by the Burmese Governors. None, however, had been brought forward of sufficient extent or significancy, to call for the formal notice of this Government.

But a few months ago, representations were addressed to the Government of India by the captains of two English merchantmen, setting forth very gross acts of violence and outrageous violation of the rights of British subjects by the Governor of Rangoon. The facts appeared unquestioned,—the right of those persons to claim the protection of their Government, and through it to obtain redress and reparation, was undoubted.

The Government of India accordingly requested Commodore Lambert, in command of certain of Her Majesty's ships, to proceed to Rangoon, for the purpose of representing the wrong that had been done, and of seeking redress.

The rank of that officer, and his standing, not merely pointed him out as the proper officer to be entrusted with this demand, but seemed to render it inexpedient that any officer of less rank should be employed while he was present. Commodore Lambert was supplied with precise instructions for his guidance; and it was specially enjoined upon him, that no act of hostility should be committed, though the reply of the Governor should be unfavourable; nor until definite instructions,* regarding such hostilities, should be given by the Government of India.

Upon his arrival at Rangoon, Commodore Lambert found it, in his judgment, impracticable to treat in any way with the then Governor of that province; and, as the most probable mode of conducting the matter to a peaceable conclusion, he transmitted, at once, the letter from the Government of India to the King of Ava, requiring the removal of the Governor, and the reparation claimed for the injury done to the captains of the ships.

In due time, an answer was received at Rangoon from the King. It was couched in friendly terms, and promised that the Governor should be removed, and that redress should be afforded.

The Governor was accordingly removed, and his successor arrived at Rangoon.

In reply to a message which was conveyed to him on the 5th of January,

* Letter of Secretary to Government, October 31, 1851.

the Governor stated that "he would be most happy, at any time, to receive any communication from the Commodore."*

On the following day, the 6th of January, a deputation, headed by Captain Fishbourne, the next officer in rank to Commodore Lambert, proceeded to the Governor's residence, for the purpose of delivering to him a letter from the Commodore, on behalf of the British Government.

The officers were refused admittance.

Assuming that there was, in the deputing of these officers, a neglect of strict form, although (be it observed) no such forms had been attended to on his own part, by the Governor of Rangoon, whose letter had been conveyed to the Commodore by officers of the humblest rank, and admittance had been freely granted to them; admitting, I say, that ceremonial had not been duly observed, the omission affords no justification whatever, for the insult and contumely which were publicly heaped upon these officers, the known agents, for the time, of the Government they served.

They were not merely denied admittance to the presence of the Governor, upon pleas whose falsehood was proved by his own messages at the time; but they were not permitted to enter within the door. No officer was deputed to them for explanation; one official after another passed them without notice, while standing in the public court, under the heat of the sun, and when they sought shelter from its rays, they were bidden to go under a shed provided for the lowest classes of the people when attending the courts.

No further notice was taken of their presence, and the officers, after long delay, at length were compelled to retire from the door.

The persons of the officers were known, their mission was known, their approach had been announced; and although the omission of ceremonial form to which I have alluded, might have given to the Governor a plausible pretext for declining to receive the officers in person, his own conduct in the transmission of his communications had greatly weakened that pretext; while nothing could justify the gross, deliberate, and studied affront which was put upon the British Government, in the person of its officers, conveying a communication on its behalf to the Representative of the King of Ava.

No apology whatever was made by the Governor of Rangoon; that which the Commodore required was rejected, and none was offered in any other form.

On the contrary, the Governor of Rangoon addressed to the Government of India a letter, accusing the officers, on the occasion to which I have referred, of having presented themselves in a state of intoxication; thus aggravating the insult he was bound to repair.

Since this imputation has been placed upon record, I think it right to express my conviction, that if such conduct were not altogether incredible in any British officer engaged in a formal mission to a foreign Governor, at noon-day, the unimpeachable character of Captain Fishbourne is in itself a sufficient guarantee that no one permitted to accompany him could be in any degree open to so scandalous a charge. The statement is truly that which I have designated it—an insult at once to the officers employed, and to their Government, to which it has been addressed.

The act of the Governor of Rangoon, in refusing admittance to the deputation, under the circumstances of insolence and contumely which I have described, and in withholding all amends for his conduct, was rightly viewed by the Commodore as a rejection of the demand he had been sent to make. He at once established the blockade which had been enjoined as the consequence of such rejection.

No blame could have attached to the Government of India, if it had sought no further for the reconciliation of these differences, but had proceeded to exert its power for the enforcement of its rights. But the desire of the Government of India for an amicable adjustment of existing differences was genuine; it sought no conquest, or pretext for war.

The terms of the letter from the Governor of Rangoon, in respect of the conduct of the officers, would have justified the Government in treating it with contemptuous silence. The rejection of our demand for reparation would have justified an enhancement of the demand. But, in its desire for the maintenance of peace, the Government of India did not reject the letter of the Governor, or

* Captain Letter's Report.

enhance its demands for reparation. It raised no new difficulties, and once again renewed its exertions for reconciliation.

It demanded only an expression of the Governor's regret for the treatment to which the officers had been exposed, the payment of the original compensation, and an honourable reception for the Agent whom the Treaty of 1826 entitled us to depute.

These most just and moderate terms have been, one and all, evaded; and thus the Government of India is thrown back upon the alternative, which it formally announced to the Governor, would be the result of his failing to acquiesce in our demands, namely, the exaction of reparation by our own power.

If it be objected, that the main cause of the present rupture appears to be but a question of form; that a great Government may well afford to treat such petty slights with indifference; and that it would be wise for the Government of India to pass by unnoticed as well the offence itself, as the present refusal of apology for it, rather than to be drawn by it into all the evils of a war with Burmah, I desire to record my fixed conviction, that the Government of India will commit an error, perilous to its own security, and at variance with real humanity, if, acting on this view, it shall yield to the pretensions of the Burmese, and shall now patch up a hollow and unsubstantial peace.

Among all the nations of the East, none is more arrogant in its pretensions of superiority, and none more pertinacious in its assertion of them, than the people of Burmah. With them, forms are essential substance, and the method of communication and the style of address are not words, but acts.

The conduct of the Governor of Rangoon towards the British officers, on the 6th of January, would have been felt as ignominious by the lowest subordinate at his Durbar, if he had himself been subjected to it. The ignominy inflicted on these officers, if it be not resented, will be, and must be, regarded, as the humiliation of the Power they serve. The insult has been persisted in to the last. The form of address in the letters of the Burmese officers has been that employed towards other inferiors; and in the conveyance of their official communications, a studied disrespect, the most elaborate insolence, have been exhibited.

Were all this to be passed over, and friendly relations renewed, the ground thus gained by the Burmese would be fully taken advantage of. The oppressions and exactions to which British subjects at Rangoon have been exposed would be redoubled; the impracticable discourtesies which have been the steady policy of the Government of Ava since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1826, and which have driven away one British Envoy after another from Ava, and subsequently from Rangoon (till for many years past there has been no Representative of this Government in Burmah at all), would be habitually practised towards the Agent who may be placed at Rangoon; and, within a very brief period of time, the Government of India would be reduced to the same alternative which it has now before it, of either abandoning its subjects, and acknowledging its inability to protect them, or of engaging in a war; on which it would enter with the disadvantage of having, by its previous concessions, given spirit to the exertions of the enemy, and strengthened their already overweening confidence in their means of successful resistance.

The British power in India cannot safely afford to exhibit even a temporary appearance of inferiority. Whilst I should be reluctant to believe that our empire in India has no stay but the sword alone, it is vain to doubt that our hold must mainly rest upon the might of the conqueror, and must be maintained by that power. The Government of India cannot, consistently with its own safety, appear for one day in an attitude of inferiority; or hope to maintain peace and submission among the numberless princes and people embraced within the vast circuit of the empire, if, for one day, it give countenance to a doubt of the absolute superiority of its arms, and of its continued resolution to assert it.

The recital I have given in the preceding paragraphs of the course of recent events, will show that the original demand of the Government of India for redress was just and necessary; and that it was sought in a manner respectful to an independent nation. It will show, that a gross insult having been put upon this Government in the persons of its officers, the Government has not been eager to take offence, or perverse in refusing amends. It has shown itself

sincerely desirous to open a way to reconciliation; it has practised the utmost moderation and forbearance. Notwithstanding intervening events, it has not enhanced its original demand, and it has offered the restoration of friendly relations on mild and most reasonable terms. If the rejection of those terms shall now lead to war between the States, the Government of India must be absolved in the sight of those for whom it rules, from the responsibility of hostilities, which it cannot decline without submitting to a discredit of its power, that would place in jeopardy the stability of its authority throughout the East.

The necessity for exacting reparation from Burmah by force of arms having been established, it has been necessary to consider the mode of operation.

I do not by any means intend to intimate that hostilities should be entered upon even though the demands we have made should be previously conceded by the King or his officers.

If, on the arrival of the force off Rangoon, the required apology shall be actually made, it may be accepted; but the former reparation demanded is not now sufficient. The expenses of the war, and the probable claims for compensation, must be provided for.

If, therefore, overtures of peace should be made before the war shall actually commence, it is my opinion that we must now require:

1. The apology previously demanded.
2. The payment of 9,900 rupees, formerly demanded for Captain Sheppard and Captain Lewis.
3. The honorable reception of the Agent at Rangoon.
4. In consideration of the expenses of the expedition, and of compensation for property, ten lacs of rupees.

If these demands are complied with, and paid at once, the force should be at once withdrawn. If they are agreed to, but the larger sum is not producible, the possession of Rangoon and Martaban, until the payment of the specified sum, should be insisted upon.

If these demands shall be rejected, or if the possession of Rangoon and Martaban, until they are fulfilled, shall be refused, operations of war should commence.

The course to be pursued by the Government of India, in the event of the Burmese policy rendering it necessary to attack and occupy Rangoon and Martaban, will be considered, and determined upon before the expedition shall be dispatched.

Inclosure 18 in No. 6.

Mr. Halliday to Commodore Lambert.

(Extract.)

Fort William, February 13, 1852.

THE Burmese authorities having now finally rejected the demands that were last transmitted through you, the Government of India has determined to proceed at once to exact by force of arms the reparation which it has failed to obtain by other means.

In the hope that a severe blow struck at once may possibly have the effect of bringing the King of Ava, or his officers, to reason, and of thus averting a protracted war hereafter, the Governor-General in Council has directed the assembly of such a force as the present distribution of troops in Bengal and Madras, and the present season of the year, will permit.

It is expected that a considerable force from Bengal and Madras may be dispatched soon after the 20th of March. The troops from Madras will be conveyed, it is expected, by the steamers from Bombay. As many steam-ships as can be made available will be in like manner required for the conveyance of troops from Calcutta; and I am directed to request that you will dispatch any such vessels as you can dispense with, so as to be here by the 15th of March.

I am further desired to request that you will be so good as to specify the points at which the ships from Madras and Calcutta may most conveniently rendezvous,

Inclosure 19 in No. 6.

*Colonel Bogle to Mr. Halliday.**(Extract.)**Moulmein, February 8, 1852.*

ON the 6th instant, a letter was sent over to me, stating that a special messenger had just arrived, in eleven days, direct from the capital, with a letter from the King, to the address of the Governor-General, which the Governor of Martaban was, in accordance with the orders he had received, most anxious to deliver to me, for transmission to Calcutta; and that if I would receive it, he would depute the two Tseetkays to wait upon me with it, at any hour I pleased.

It was arranged that it should be delivered to me at 11 A.M., yesterday, at my court-house. The officials mentioned accordingly arrived, with three gold umbrellas, and were duly conducted to the place of meeting, when, after delivering the letter with all proper ceremony, they entered into some discussion on the present state of affairs, and expressed the great anxiety of their Government that the existing differences should be amicably arranged, and the Treaty of Yandaboo maintained.

They were most particularly desirous that further negotiations should not be conducted through Rangoon; and that I would do all in my power to procure a reply from the Governor-General, and transmit it through Martaban; in reply to which I told them, that I could do nothing more than send on the King's letter; that if an answer came to me I would, of course, forward it to Martaban with all dispatch; but that I thought it more probable it would be sent through Commodore Lambert and the shorter route of Rangoon; and that I had no control whatever in a matter of the kind. They did not seem at all pleased at this, but at once suggested that I might at least enable them to communicate direct with the Indian Government, by sending the Principal Assistant Commissioner (Lieutenant Hopkinson) with them to Calcutta, in which case they were prepared to do without negotiators, and go and deliver the letter themselves. Of course I declined to depute my Assistant with them, but offered them a passage in the steamer.

They expressed great regret that affairs had not been settled peaceably at Rangoon, and that the King's ship had been taken; but I clearly pointed out to them, that I had no power to enter upon the discussion of matters connected with that place; and explained to them, that, if there was any sincerity in their professions of a desire for peace, they should shape their conduct more in accordance with them; and that if their Government really desired a settlement of differences, it should lose no time in forwarding proper persons with sufficient powers to Commodore Lambert, with whom alone negotiations could be carried on.

To this the Tseetkays expressed some dislike, and strongly dwelt upon the circumstance, that everything having taken an unsatisfactory turn at Rangoon, it would be much better to forget all that had occurred there, and to begin the negotiations at the beginning again. I took some pains to have it clearly explained to them, that I had no power to do more than simply forward the King's letter; but that, as regarded all negotiations, the duty of conducting them had been assigned to Commodore Lambert, and it was to him that their Government must address itself; but the more I dwelt upon the propriety of following this course of proceeding, the more they urged the expediency of setting aside all that had already occurred, and beginning anew.

The circumstance of the King of Burmah having sent a letter to the Governor-General at all, and with such haste, is remarkable; and that he should have chosen this route, probably under the supposition that, with a blockade established, there might be difficulties on the Rangoon side, would indicate much anxiety to obtain an early reply; and from what the Tseetkays said, there is no doubt that the answer will be looked for with great impatience. I may as well mention, that on my alluding to the stoppage of trade and intercourse as one of the evils that had already overtaken them, consequent on the acts of their rulers, the Tseetkays expressed the most perfect indifference to that, and treated it as a matter of no moment whatever.

For the same reasons which induced me to open, and have translated, the last letters for the Governor-General, I have opened this letter also, and beg to transmit with it a translation prepared by Lieutenant Hopkinson, Principal Assistant Commissioner; and as I have no other means of communication, I have forwarded the packet to Commodore Lambert, that he may transmit it to Calcutta by a steamer, or otherwise dispose of it as he may think proper.

Inclosure 20 in No. 6.

The Burmese Ministers to the English Government.

THE Egga Maha Thanadee Patee, and the great officers and Ministers of the State, who are ever prostrate at the royal feet of the Meng Tarahgyee Phcoya, who is all-powerful, Lord of the Universe, Master of the Tsat-tang Elephant, and all White Elephants in the Burman Dominion, Lord of Life, who is like unto the Lotus Flower, declare that—

Commodore Lambert, the officer in command of the war-vessels of the Queen of England, came to Rangoon, in the Burmese dominions, with a letter requesting that certain merchants who had been unjustly oppressed by the Governor of Rangoon, should have reparation made them, and suggesting the propriety of the dismissal of the Governor.

In accordance, therefore, with the great friendship existing between the two countries, the Atwengdaw-mre (perpetual Privy Councillor), Mahameng Gyam, and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Menggyee Mengteng Raza, were deputed with letters to the officer in command of the war-vessels, Commodore Lambert, and with a dispatch to be transmitted by him to the English Government, to the effect that the Governor of Rangoon would be recalled, and a fit person appointed in his room.

On the 12th waxing Pyatho, 1213 (2nd January, 1852), the officer in command, Commodore Lambert, wrote and delivered a letter to the Deputy Governor of Rangoon, urging that equal promptitude should be shown in the final settlement, as had attended the dismissal of those officers, who had been the cause of the misunderstanding between the two countries.

While thus the original business was in a fair way of adjustment, there came from the Commodore Lambert, the interpreter Edwards, and some superior officers, with a letter, but in consequence of their not immediately finding the Ayaboing of Hanthawadee Pyee Shewedoung Mywoon Thado Mengyee Maha Mengtha Meng Goung Gyo (the present Governor of Rangoon), the Yewoon (Deputy Governor) and other officers requested them as they were about to return, to leave the letter with them; this they refused to do, and after they had gone back, they made a report so calculated to breed discord, that the Commodore, saying that he felt angered and insulted, took possession of the King's ship. The Governor of Dallah was then sent to wait upon the Commodore, who informed him that he desired that the sum of 9,948 rupees which Captains Lewis and Sheppard had been required to disburse to the former Governor of Rangoon, should be repaid, when the ship might be returned.

To this a reply was made, that to prevent any misunderstanding arising between the two countries, the sum of 9,948 rupees should be repaid, but that His Majesty's ship must be brought back to the place whence she was removed.

Intimation was then given that the negotiation would be proceeded with, upon the Ayaboin Pyee Shewe Doung Mywoon repairing in person on board the [Commodore's] vessel, which was met by a proposition to provide temporary accommodation at some place half-way (between the Viceroy's house and the Commodore's vessel), where the two Plenipotentiaries might confer together; but the officer in command of the war-vessels, Commodore Lambert, making no reply whatever, and persisting in silence, a subsequent message was sent to him on the 5th Pyatho waning (10th January, 1852), begging him not to take away the vessel; to which he replied, that he would not carry her off, and that she might be sent for and taken back; but before the persons sent to take her could arrive,

the Commodore went off with her in tow, and, being opposed by the military posts on the way, a conflict ensued.

This communication is now made with the view of eliciting, in reply, the intentions of the English Government; and it cannot be determined whether it has deputed Commodore Lambert simply to dispose of the question relating to the merchants, or whether he has been sent to begin by an attack, which should have the effect of bringing on hostilities between the two countries.

Inclosure 21 in No. 6.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," off the Island of Negrais,
February 9, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a report I received yesterday from Commander Luard, acquainting me that Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent," under his command, had been fired at by the Burmese in the Bassein River, and of a letter addressed to him by the Governor of Bassein, with the reply I sent to that functionary.

Inclosure 22 in No. 6.

Commander Luard to Commodore Lambert.

*H.M.S. "Serpent," in the Bassein River,
February 8, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inform you, that, on the 4th instant, I left Diamond Island, in order to return to the anchorage inside Negrais; and whilst entering the Western Channel, the stockades on the mainland opened fire upon the ship, which I returned with one broadside of shot and one of shell, and afterwards sent the armed boats under charge of Lieutenant L. W. Hammet, to destroy the stockades, which he effectually accomplished. The two upon the hill, mentioned in my last letter, were supported by four others lower down, almost entirely concealed by the jungle, and might have been defended against a much superior force.

Three small guns, a large quantity of rice, and shelter for about 500 men, were destroyed with the stockades; four war-boats, and one large cargo boat loaded with rice and stockading tools, were also brought off, and have since been destroyed.

On the following morning, after having examined the south end of Negrais, and the opposite shore, without finding either of the stockades marked down in the old chart. I proceeded up the river, and, on opening the village of Negrais, perceived that a stockade had been built up during our absence. I immediately anchored, and sent an officer to inquire if this stockade also had orders to fire upon us. He returned, bringing off an interpreter, who stated they were quite ready to fight. The stockade, however, was so completely under our guns, and so full of men, that being unwilling to cause such a great loss of life as must have ensued, had we commenced firing, I sent the interpreter back to his chief to tell him I would give him till sunrise the next morning, by which time, if the stockade was not pulled down, I should most certainly destroy it. About 9:30 that evening, the stockade opened fire upon us, and was evidently immediately deserted. In the morning, I again sent the armed boats, in charge of Lieutenant Hammet, to pull down and burn this stockade, which was done without opposition. No single article of private property has been touched, and the priest's house, together with a building covering some images, although inside the stockade, were scrupulously protected from injury.

The village, although at present deserted, will, I have no doubt, be soon re-occupied by its inhabitants.

The accompanying is a translation of a Burmese document received this morning, the bearers of which are now on board, awaiting an answer.

Inclosure 23 in No. 6.

X *The Governor of Bassein to the English Officers.*

January 26, 1852.

I, MAHA THA-MIMDAN RAJAH, Governor of Bassein and its thirty-two dependent districts, an inner Minister of State of His Majesty the King of Ava [here Royal titles], give this order.

English Chiefs—Ye came to our country for the purpose, apparently, of giving a letter (from your Governor) to our Monarch; but not daring (in other words afraid) to hold any communication on matters with the Governor of Rangoon, who has been appointed to the charge of all the lower districts, in a manner unbecoming the sons of a great nation, you secretly stole, and took away the ship belonging to the King of Ava. Therefore, lest you should make your appearance at the mouth of the Bassein River and the Island of Negrais, I, who have charge of Bassein and its thirty-two dependencies, in conformity to my orders from my Royal Master, have assembled upwards of 10,000 fighting men, capable of expelling you and destroying you. They have cannon, and blunderbusses, and bombs, and muskets, swords and spears, gunpowder, bullets, flints, and, in fact, all the munitions and appurtenances of war, and all placed on guard around. Moreover, in all those parts of the river below Bassein, in which there is any difficulty for ships to come and go, there are at different points upwards of thirty armed positions, each under a different chief, and on the alert.

The man-of-war has no right to remain anchored within the Island of Negrais. If, relying on the strength of your right arm, you are anxious to fight, you should bear in mind that your vessel is a very small one. If you do not wish to fight, you must not remain at anchor inside of our outpost. Even if you remain where you are without fighting, or doing harm, the interests of my King require that I should attack you; and drive you out, and this is to give you notice of the same.

Inclosure 24 in No. 6.

Commodore Lambert to the Rajah Governor of Bassein.

H.M.S. "Fox," off Negrais, February 8, 1852.

I HAVE to inform you, that in compliance with instructions I have received from the Governor-General of India, I have placed the whole coast of the Burmese territories, from Cape Negrais to the Salween River, under a state of blockade.

But, pending the negotiations that are now going on between the Government of India and the Governor of Rangoon, I have given directions to the different officers serving under my orders, not to assume any hostile measures against the Burmese, unless they commence firing on Her Britannic Majesty's ships, which they have done on two occasions, by firing on Her Britannic Majesty's ship "Serpent," and for which her commander has my full approval for having destroyed their stockades.

Inclosure 25 in No. 6.

*Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.**Off Diamond Island, Bassein River,
February 10, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inclose the copy of a letter I have just received from the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, forwarding a letter he had received from the King of Ava, addressed to the Governor-General of India.

I have, in consequence, dispatched the "Phlegethon" steam-vessel to Calcutta, and desired Commander Neblett to deliver it to you, with this dispatch.

I also transmit an explanatory letter from Captain Latter, as to certain false statements made in the said letter from the King of Ava.

Inclosure 26 in No. 6.

*Colonel Bogle to Commodore Lambert.**Moulmein, February 8, 1852.*

IN charge of Captain Neblett, of the Company's steamer "Phlegethon," I have the honor to transmit herewith, a letter from the King of Burmah, translation of which is inclosed, for your information, to the address of the Governor-General, together with a mail-packet; and I take the liberty of suggesting that, should the exigencies of the service admit of it, a steamer may be dispatched with them to Calcutta.

The letter from the King is inclosed in an ivory case and a red velvet cover: it reached Martaban in eleven days, and was brought over, by permission, and delivered to me yesterday, with all proper ceremony, by the two officers next in rank to the Governor of Martaban, and who are entitled to use golden umbrellas.

For what passed on the occasion, I beg to refer you to Captain Neblett, of the "Phlegethon," Lieutenant Lawrence, of Her Majesty's ship "Hermes," with Dr. Macleod, who did me the favor to be present at the interview.

The circumstance of the Burmese Government having sent a letter to the Governor-General at all, and the speed with which it has come, would certainly indicate a desire that hostilities may be averted, at least for the present; and the very convenient opportunity which this letter will afford the Indian Government of categorically detailing its demands and intentions, induces me to attach more importance to it than it would otherwise, perhaps, deserve.

Inclosure 27 in No. 6.

*Captain Latter to Commodore Lambert.**Bassein River, February 10, 1852.*

IN conformity to your suggestions, I beg to submit to you the following remarks on the letter from the Burmese Government, the English translation of which has been forwarded to you by Colonel Bogle, Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces.

With reference to the remarks in its 5th paragraph, that the Deputy Governor of Rangoon begged us, on the occasion of the deputation of which I was a member having been kept waiting for a full quarter of an hour in the sun, to leave the letter with him; it is a statement entirely against the fact. The Deputy Governor never was seen by any one in the squadron until next day, when, for fear of his master, he came on board the frigate, to try and get back the King's ship. No officer of any rank came to us, or spoke to us. One of inferior rank passed up the steps, and I urged him to the necessity of giving us some sort of a reception.

The statement in the 6th paragraph is likewise without a particle of truth. I was present at every communication, verbal or written, made to you by the Burmese authorities, and no statement of the kind was made.

The same may be said of the 7th paragraph; there was no proposition of the kind made, and there is not a particle of truth in the whole of it.

The communication is what any one, with a knowledge of the Burmese, might have expected; truth not being considered a desirable quality among them, and falsehood looked upon as the highest art of diplomacy.

P.S.—The observations I have made in this letter, with reference to the incorrectness of the statements contained in the letter from the Burmese Government under consideration, of course apply to the representation which the present Governor of Rangon must have made to his superiors.

Inclosure 28 in No. 6.

Mr. Halliday to Colonel Bogle.

February 18, 1852.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated the 8th instant, accompanying the letter from the King of Ava.

The Governor-General in Council approves of the course you pursued in receiving and forwarding the letter from the King, while, at the same time, you informed the messengers from Martaban, that you were not empowered to enter into any negotiations, or to engage in any discussions with them.

His Lordship desires me to request that you will continue to observe this course, unless specially instructed to the contrary.

You will be so good as to cause a translation to be made of the reply addressed by the Governor-General to the King, and will forward the English letter, with the translation, in the accompanying case to Ava, through the parties who delivered the King's letter from Martaban.

While, however, you continue to hold the same language to these functionaries as before, and refuse all negotiation with them, you are at liberty to inform them, that it consists with your knowledge, that the Government of India is preparing for the immediate exaction of the reparation which has been refused, and that if they desire to avert from the Kingdom of Ava, and from themselves, the blow which is impending over them, they will exert themselves to obtain from Ava, with every practicable speed, full compliance with, and performance of those conditions on which alone a war can be avoided.

If in due time a reply should be received, through the same channel, complying with the demands of the Government of India, you will be pleased to receive the letter, distinctly intimating that you are not empowered to declare the difference between the States adjusted, but that you will transmit the letter to the Governor-General in Council, whose final reply will be communicated to them as soon as received. You will inform the Burmese authorities, at the same time, that you are not authorized to receive the money, which must be paid at Rangoon to the British officer who may be appointed to receive it there.

Under all circumstances any letter from the Court of Ava should be transmitted, and always with a translation.

Inclosure 29 in No. 6.

Mr. Halliday to Commodore Lambert.

Fort William, February 18, 1852.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches by the "Phlegethon," dated the 9th and 10th instant, with their respective inclosures.

To the letter from the King of Ava forwarded by you, a reply has been transmitted, in which are set forth the enhanced conditions on which alone war can now be averted.

In the meantime, the Governor-General in Council has neither relaxed

the preparations in which he was engaged, nor will he delay the dispatch of the expedition, nor will he enter into any further negotiation, or abstain from action, unless the conditions he has put forward shall be not only acceded to, but fulfilled.

You are, therefore, requested to abstain, for the present, from all correspondence, if such should again be commenced with you.

The conduct of Captain Luard in the respect shown for private property, after Her Majesty's ship "Serpent" had been fired upon by the Burinese, is, his Lordship desires me to observe, very honorable to that officer, and to his crew.

Inclosure 30 in No. 6.

The Governor-General to the King of Ava.

Fort William, February 18, 1852.

I HAVE received the letter which your Majesty caused to be addressed to me, relative to the events which have recently taken place at Rangoon, and which was transmitted through the hands of the Governor of Martaban.

Your Majesty desires to elicit a declaration of the intentions of the British Government, and inquires whether Commodore Lambert was deputed simply to dispose of the question relating to the merchants, or whether he has been sent to begin an attack which should have the effect of bringing on hostilities between the two countries.

If your Majesty's servants at Rangoon had been faithful to your Majesty's interests, and had conveyed to you a truthful report of all that passed between them and the British officers on the occasion to which reference is made, your Majesty would have seen no cause to inquire what were the intentions of the Government of India, or to doubt the pacific character of its mission. Your Majesty's officers have not correctly represented to you the events which occurred, but have concealed from your knowledge their own misconduct, which has compelled the British Government to change its language, and to prepare for compelling, by force of arms, the reparation it sought by a friendly representation.

The reply which your Majesty addressed to the letter from the Government of India was, in all respects, worthy of a just and sagacious Ruler. It admitted the justice of the claims which had been advanced, directed the removal of the Governor of Rangoon, and promised redress by the hands of a new Governor, fully armed with powers to afford it.

That redress has not been granted by your Majesty's servant at Rangoon; on the contrary, gross and repeated insults have since been offered by him to the British Government, in the person of its officers, and every amende has been evaded or refused.

When Commodore Lambert, on the arrival of the new Governor, proposed to renew negotiations relative to the merchants who had been oppressed, the Governor intimated his readiness to receive, at any time, a communication from Commodore Lambert upon the subject. On the following day, a letter written on behalf of the British Government, was addressed by the Commodore to the Governor of Rangoon. Although the present Governor and his predecessor had not observed the respect which was due, nor the custom of their own country, and had sent their letters by the hands of men of no rank or consideration whatever, yet these persons were not rejected by the Commodore. And when he dispatched his letter to the Governor of Rangoon, it was sent, not by the hands of any such inconsiderable persons, but by the officer next in rank to himself, accompanied by officers of the army and of the fleet.

Yet the Governor of Rangoon presumed to refuse all admittance to these officers, bearing a letter to him on the part of the British Government.

He not only presumed to refuse to them admittance, but he offered to them insult and indignity. The Deputy Governor did not approach them, as your servants have falsely reported to your Majesty. No officer was deputed to them. They were approached only by the lowest; they were compelled to remain beyond the door; and were publicly subjected to disrespect and insolence, such as would have been regarded as ignominious by the meanest subordinate in your servant's Durbar. The Governor of Rangoon aggravated the injury he

thus offered to the British Government, by the audacious and offensive assertion, that British officers, thus deputed on an important duty to a high officer, at noon-day, presented themselves at his residence in a state of intoxication.

A deliberate insult can never be offered with impunity to the British Government, or to its servants.

The Governor of Rangoon having persisted in refusing to express his regret for the conduct of which he had been guilty, Commodore Lambert rightly considered that the negotiations were at an end, that the demands of the British Government had been refused, and he proceeded (as your Majesty had been informed he would do, if the demands of this Government should not be complied with) to take such measures as should enforce the rights conferred by treaties, should effectually protect the interests of the subjects of the British Government; and should fully vindicate its honor and power.

This Government would thereafter have been justified in rejecting all communication with the Governor of Rangoon; but having no secret intentions, and seeking no pretext for war or conquest, it once more endeavoured to effect an adjustment of the differences that had arisen.

The Government of India added nothing to its demands. It required only the reparation it originally specified, together with the indispensable condition that the Governor of Rangoon should express his deep regret for the insult he had put upon the officers of this Government.

These most moderate and just demands have been rejected by your Majesty's servant, whom you deputed with power to settle the differences between the States.

Its demand having thus been rejected by your Majesty's servant on your behalf, the Government of India resolved at once to enforce its rights, and to vindicate its power. For that purpose, large preparations were at once commenced, and are now in progress. The receipt of your Majesty's letter has not interfered with, and will not delay, or diminish, these preparations.

It is still within your Majesty's power to avert from your kingdom the disasters of war; but this can only now be done by a prompt disavowal of the acts of your Majesty's servant at Rangoon, and by a full compliance with the several demands which are hereinafter enumerated:

1. Your Majesty, disavowing the acts of the present Governor of Rangoon, shall, by the hands of your Ministers, express regret that Captain Fishbourne and the British officers who accompanied him were exposed to insult at the hand of your servants at Rangoon, on the 6th of January last.

2. In satisfaction of the claims of the two captains who suffered exactions from the late Governor of Rangoon; in compensation for the loss of property which British merchants may have suffered in the burning of that city by the acts of the present Governor; and in consideration of the expenses of preparation for war, your Majesty will agree to pay, and will pay at once, ten lacs of rupees to the Government of India.

3. Your Majesty will direct that an accredited Agent, to be appointed in conformity with the VIIth Article of the Treaty of Yandaboo, and to reside at Rangoon, shall be received by your Majesty's servants there; and shall, at all times, be treated with the respect due to the Representative of the British Government.

4. Your Majesty will direct the removal of the present Governor of Rangoon, whose conduct renders it impossible that the Government of India should consent to any official intercourse with him.

If, without further delay, negotiation, or correspondence, these conditions shall be consented to, and shall fulfilled on, or before, the 1st day of April next, hostile operations shall be stayed, peace between the States shall be renewed, and the King's ship shall be restored.

But if—untaught by former experience; forgetful of the irresistible power of the British arms in India; and heedless of the many additional proofs that have been given of its might, in the successful fall of the powerful Sovereigns of Bhurtpore, of Scinde, of the Sikhs, and of many other Princes, since last the Burman Rulers vainly attempted to resist the British troops in war—the King of Ava shall unwisely refuse the just and lenient conditions which are now set before him, the British Government will have no alternative but immediate war.

The guilt and the consequences of war will rest upon the head of the Ruler of Ava.

No. 7.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.**Fort William, March 8, 1852. (No. 8.)*

IN continuation of our dispatch of the 23rd ultimo, No. 4, we have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of the documents enumerated in the accompanying abstract, relative to Rangoon affairs.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Additional Notification.

THE Baragu River, and other outlets of the Irrawady, are included in the blockade declared by me on the 6th instant.

Given under my hand, on board Her Britannic Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes," in the Bassein River, the 25th of January, 1852.

G. R. LAMBERT,
Commodore in Her Britannic Majesty's Navy.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Messrs. Thomas A. Apcar and Stephen Gabriel to Sir H. Elliot.

WE have the honor to wait upon you with the accompanying memorial from the Armenian inhabitants of this city; and as the prayer of it is of the greatest importance to us, we beg to solicit the favor of your laying the same before the Governor-General in Council, with as little delay as practicable.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Petition of the Armenian Inhabitants of Calcutta to the Governor-General of India in Council.

THAT intelligence of the most distressing and alarming nature has reached your petitioners from Rangoon, concerning their unfortunate countrymen in that place. That all their houses, including the church, have been burnt down to the ground, or otherwise destroyed by the Burmese. That the property of the wretched sufferers has been plundered, or taken possession of by the local authorities, without the least regard to law or reason. That all the Armenians, thus unmercifully reduced to a state of utter destitution, have been made prisoners, and subjected to every manner of hardship and surveillance. That the number of the Armenians residing at Ava is nearly 40, and that of their fellow-countrymen now at Rangoon, is upwards of 60. That the aggregate amount of their property is very considerable, and is supposed to be about ten lacs of rupees, which they have been dispossessed and deprived of. That your petitioners are not unaware that Commodore Lambert had warned the Armenians of Rangoon to quit that place, and to go to Moulmein; but the notice of this warning was so sudden and so short, that, with but a few solitary exceptions, they could not in time come out of the Burmese territories, and place themselves under British protection. That several of the Armenians, now at Rangoon and Ava, are relatives and friends of your petitioners, to whom it is natural keenly to feel for the most critical and dangerous situation in which they are placed, and deeply to sympathize with them for the hardships to which they are subjected.

That having thus briefly stated above the subject of their humble petition, your petitioners most respectfully but earnestly beg your Lordship to take into consideration the lamentable condition of their unfortunate countrymen in Burmah, and, by an exercise of the native benevolence for which your Lordship is so eminently and so deservedly distinguished far and wide, to adopt immediate and prompt measures for the liberation of the Armenian Christians in Rangoon and Ava from their imprisonment, and for the restitution of the property, of which they have been thus spoliated. Convinced of the innate goodness with which your Lordship is so solicitous to insure the welfare of the millions placed under your Lordship's mild rule and fostering care, your petitioners entertain

hopes that their prayer will be humanely responded to, and that their humble request will be complied with, in such a manner as may appear most expedient and politic to your Lordship.

That, in conclusion, your Lordship's petitioners take the liberty to inclose, in the shape of a memorandum, and for the information and guidance of your Lordship, a paper containing the names of the Armenians now at Rangoon and Ava, and a statement of the respective property, both real and personal, which each of them is, by a pretty near guess, supposed to have been possessed of. And your petitioners, as in duty bound, shall ever pray for your Lordship's health, prosperity, and happiness.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Statement as to the Property of Armenians in Ava.

Calcutta, February 12, 1852.

	Houses, Lands, and Personal Property.	Personal Property.
	Co.'s Rs.	Co.'s Rs.
<i>Armenians at Rangoon.</i>		
Late Arrakil Ter Mines, who after being driven from the old town, is reported to have died by cholera, in the middle of last month, his wife and son, sister and her daughter, sister-in-law and her daughter	50,000	
Mrs. George Aviet		8,000
Mrs. Gregory Sarkies Manook, and her daughter		10,000
Mrs. Alexianus Ter George, and her three children		3,000
Mrs. Arratoon Jacob, and her son	30,000	
Mrs. Carapiet Jacob	1,50,000	
Mrs. Aviet Bejann, and her two children		3,000
Mrs. Mangasar Carapiet, and son		8,000
Mrs. Moses Zacaria, and her son		2,000
Esaiah Manook, and his wife	10,000	
Gabriel Eleazar, his wife, daughter, and two sons	1,00,000	
Nicholas S. Johannes, his wife, and children	20,000	
Galston Mackertoom, his wife, and one child		5,000
Carapiet Zacaria, and his wife	50,000	
Arratoon C. Zacaria, his wife, and two children		5,000
Stephen A. Calchick, and his seven children	10,000	
Calchatoor J. Arratoon, his wife, and six children	15,000	
David Arrakil, his wife, and brother-in-law		5,000
Arratoon P. Varden		10,000
Stephen Arratoon		1,000
Nazar Johannes		2,000
Carapiet Chatoor		2,000
Chatoor D. Galston		2,000
Thomas Serges		1,000
Rangoon Armenian Church	30,000	
	4,65,000	67,000
<i>Armenians at Ameerapoor (Ava).</i>		
Carapiet Ter Mines, his wife, and three children		10,000
Mackertich Ter Mines, his wife, and two children	1,00,000	
Isaac Ter Mines		10,000
Avdal Gregory, and his wife		5,000
Sarkis Galstan Mackertoom		5,000
Isaac Jacob, his wife, and children		10,000
Behnan Elias, and his wife		1,000
Johannes Sarkis, his wife, and children		20,000
Mercer David Abraham, and children		20,000
M. J. Mines, and children		20,000
Gregory Sarkies and Manook	1,50,000	
Alexianus Ter George	10,000	
Pogose Thevakalian		5,000
Stephen Agabab		5,000
Galstan Cajamal		5,000
Moses Sarkis Manook		2,000
Elias Galstan		5,000
Johannes Sarkis Manook		2,000
	7,25,000	1,92,000

							Houses, Land, and Personal Property.	Personal Property.
							Co.'s Rs.	Co.'s Rs.
<i>List of those Armenians who departed to Moulmein from Rangoon.</i>							7,25,000	1,92,000
Mrs. Melitus Pogose	3,000		
Gregory Johannes	5,000		
Cavona M. Avetoon	10,000		
Arratoon Araham	10,000		
Mines Anthony	3,000	
Peter Gregory	2,000	
Kerakoose Ter Mackertich	1,000	
Martinose David	5,000	
Parsie A. Petroose	1,000	
Navasara Nicolus	1,000	
Co.'s Rs.							7,53,000	2,05,000

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

Mr. Thomas to Messrs. Apar & Gabriel.

Fort William, February 20, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that I have received and laid before the Governor-General in Council your letter, without date, forwarding a memorial from the Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta.

In reply, I am desired to request that you will inform the memorialists that his Lordship in Council sympathizes with their anxiety regarding the condition of their relations and connexions in Ava; but he trusts that the measures about to be adopted for asserting the power and authority of the British Government for the redress of the grievance of its subjects trading to Rangoon, will ultimately lead to a satisfactory settlement of affairs between the two nations, without compromise of the security of any of those in whom the memorialists are interested.

Inclosure 6 in No. 7.

Commodore Lambert to Mr. Halliday.

*H.M.S. "Fox," off Diamond Island, Bassein River,
February 12, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inclose, for the information of the Governor-General of India, a copy of a letter I received this morning from the Governor of Bassein, and of my reply thereto.

Inclosure 7 in No. 7.

The Governor of Bassein to Commodore Lambert.

I, MAHA THAMIENDAN RAJAH, appointed by the King of Ava [here follow the Royal titles], Governor of Bassein and its thirty-two dependencies, a nobleman, and inner Minister of State, send this communication:—

On your Government making a charge against the late Governor of Rangoon, for oppressing and maltreating British subjects trading to Rangoon, my Sovereign, the King of Ava, sent down the Prince Mahamengthla-meng-khoung-yan, Governor of Prome, as a Plenipotentiary, to inquire into the truth of these charges; and he removed the former Governor from his post, and recalled him to the Royal presence, where he now is. And you, though sons of a great

country, without having entered into any of the business for which you came, took away secretly the King's ship; and having come without giving information, and anchored within the outposts of Negrais, in the district of Bassein, which is guarded by upwards of thirty military posts, I sent a messenger with a letter to inform you that it was improper for you to remain there as long as the Rangoon business was unsettled; but he did not find you. But on your again coming without giving information within the posts of Pagoda Point and Thay, the messenger was again sent to you, but before he reached you I am informed the outposts of Pagoda Point, Thay, and Negrais, attacked you without giving notice. If these outposts should act on the aggressive, you must let me know, and not attack them, and burn them down. I have reported to the King the actions with the Stockades, and shall be able to receive his orders in forty days.

Moreover, if you really are the legitimate forces of Her Majesty the Queen of England, you ought to act in conformity to Article III of the Commercial Treaty of Yandaboo, and not prevent traders and merchants coming and going in their boats and ships; for this reason you ought to anchor beyond Pagoda Point, where there is seven fathoms of water.

Inclosure 8 in No. 7.

Commodore Lambert to the Governor of Bassein.

COMMODORE LAMBERT has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Governor of Bassein's letter. He is glad to find the Governor of Bassein has given directions to his officers not to fire on Her Britannic Majesty's ships, which will prevent any further hostilities, as Commodore Lambert has already given directions not to fire on the Burmese, unless they first fire at the English flag.

The blockade has been established by order of the Governor-General of India; and until Commodore Lambert receives further instructions, it is not in his power to permit any vessels to enter any of the ports or rivers belonging to the Burmese.

Inclosure 9 in No. 7.

Mr. Thomas to Commodore Lambert.

(Extract.)

Fort William, March 3, 1852.

I HAVE received and laid before the Governor-General in Council your dispatches of the 9th and 12th ultimo.

In reply, I am directed to inform you, that the letters from the Governor of Bassein deserve no notice from the Government of India; and that as the Governor-General in Council has finally addressed the King of Ava, it is essential for the prevention of all misapprehension or misrepresentation, that no communication whatever should, at present, be held with any of the officers of the Burmese Government.

I am directed to request that you will, therefore, give no reply to, and take no notice of, any letters any of them may address to you, but merely transmit to the Government any communication which may appear to be of sufficient importance, an occurrence which is extremely improbable.

I am instructed to acquaint you that the ships and transports will be ordered to rendezvous at the mouth of the Rangoon River.

I am further directed to acquaint you that Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., has been appointed to the command of troops selected for the expedition; and that as soon as any decision can be formed as to the details of military operations, you will be fully informed of the same.

No. 8.

The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, April 6, 1852. (No. 14.)

IN continuation of our dispatch No. 8, of the 8th ultimo, we have the honor to forward herewith, copies of the further correspondence relative to Rangoon affairs.

We beg to draw especial attention to the minute recorded by the Governor-General, containing an exposition of his views as to the course of policy to be pursued towards the Burmese Government, and the measures to be adopted for the speedy termination of hostilities.

The letter of instructions to Lieutenant-General Godwin, who has been nominated to the command of the land force, provides for every contingency which may arise in connexion with the present expedition.

A further communication on the same subject will be addressed to you by the ensuing mail.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Colonel Bogle to C. Allen, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.

Moulmein, March 26, 1852.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the afternoon of the 27th ultimo, of your letter of the 18th ultimo, inclosing a letter from the Governor-General to the King of Burmah.

As soon as a translation could be prepared, I caused it to be intimated to the Burmese authorities, that an answer to the King's letter had arrived, and that I would be ready to receive a deputation at 2 P.M., of the 1st, and to deliver it to them for transmission to the capital.

I would have named an earlier date and hour, but the translation occupied much time, and Sunday intervened.

The two Tseetkays of Martaban, who brought over the letter to the Governor-General, were accordingly deputed to wait upon me, but instead of arriving about the hour of meeting, they came over before 11 A.M.

On their reaching my court-house I received them as on the former occasion, and very fully and distinctly explained to them the circumstances attending the present misunderstanding between the two Governments, and the evils which would inevitably result from a non-compliance with the demands contained in his Lordship's letter. I also pointed out to the Tseetkays, the expediency of the Burmese Government avoiding a course which must compel the British Government to adopt coercive measures; and in delivering the letter to them, I strongly impressed on them the importance of their forwarding it to the capital with the least possible delay.

It was very distinctly explained to them, that the sum of money mentioned in the letter of the Governor-General, was to be paid at Rangoon, and that full and complete compliance with all the terms mentioned must be signified by the 1st of April.

The Tseetkays appeared to be much grieved that further negotiation was not to be permitted, and that their case was closed. They immediately left Moulmein, and I am informed that the Governor-General's letter was that evening sent off towards the capital. I however regret to say, that no answer has as yet been received, and it is reported that preparations for resistance are being made at Martaban, as well as Rangoon.

There is no doubt that at the latter place extensive works of defence have been constructed; but at the former nothing seems as yet to have been done of material consequence. On the 19th instant I proceeded up the Salween in the steamer "Phlegethon," a little beyond Martaban, in company with Commodore Lambert, Colonel Reignolds, C.B., commanding the troops, and Major Reid, commanding the artillery. We passed close along the front of

the place, and reconnoitered it with tolerable certainty; but although it was evident that a good many men had arrived since I last passed it, and that some works were in progress, we were unable to discern anything of importance.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Mr. Allen to Commodore Lambert.

Fort William, March 22, 1852.

WITH reference to Mr. Thomas's letter, dated the 3rd instant, I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to transmit for your information the accompanying statement, exhibiting an outline of the naval and military force it is proposed to employ in the expedition against the Burmese.

Troops ordered from Bengal :

1 Company European Artillery.		Her Majesty's 80th Regiment of Foot.
Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish.		40th Regiment Native Infantry.

Troops ordered from Madras :

3 Companies European Artillery.		Her Majesty's 51st Regiment of Foot.
2 Companies Sappers and Miners.		3 Regiments of Native Infantry.

Steamers from Bombay :

	Tons.		Tons.
Mofuzzur	1,440	Berenice	7
Feroze	1,440	Zenobia	1,000
Sesostris	900	Medusa	300

Steamers available in Calcutta :

	Tons.		Tons.
Erin	about 900	Fire Queen	about 570
Tenasserim	700	Phlegethon	400
Enterprise	570	Exclusive of Hermes.	

Transports :

	Tons.		Tons.
Futtay Allum	609	Lahore	535
Futil Rozack	519	Favorite	403
Tubal Cain	787	Monarch	249
Bengal	667		

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Minute by the Governor-General of India, concurred in by the Members of the Board.

(Extract.)

March 23, 1852.

THE preparations for the expedition which it was resolved to dispatch to the Coast of Burmah, have been carried on in every quarter with great alacrity, and with such success, that we are in a condition to commence operations even earlier than I had anticipated.

The troops from this Presidency have either been dispatched, or are ready to embark. The wing of the 18th has sailed to rejoin the head-quarters at Moulmein.

A wing of Her Majesty's 80th has also sailed. The other wing will garrison Fort William.

The company of Artillery has also arrived. The 40th Regiment of Native Infantry is here. The Ordnance and Commissariat stores are embarked, and the whole will be ready to sail on the 25th instant.

Lieutenant-General Godwin has been nominated to the command, and the Staff appointments have been filled up.

The troops from Madras, if they have not already sailed, will sail in accordance with instructions from this Government, about the same date.

They will be conveyed by a squadron of steamers, powerfully armed, which has been provided by the Bombay Government with the utmost promptitude, and in the highest efficiency.

The 67th Regiment, which was intended to form part of the expedition, must of necessity be kept in Arracan for the present, in consequence of the 38th Regiment having declined either to volunteer for Burmah, or to proceed to Arracan by sea. The 67th will be relieved, however, or its place taken at Rangoon by another Madras regiment, which that Government has been requested to send.

With this exception, the whole force will be at the rendezvous in the Rangoon River, by the 1st of April.

It is necessary to furnish Lieutenant-General Godwin with general instructions for his guidance.

Having regard to the advantage of uniting all authority upon such occasions in one person, and having confidence in the ability, judgment, and experience which General Godwin will bring to the duties with which he is to be entrusted, I would propose that the whole political authority connected with the expedition should be vested in him, as the officer commanding the troops in the field.

The instructions of the Governor-General in Council, while they leave General Godwin unfettered in all details of military operations, should clearly indicate the general objects of the Government, and should, as far as possible, provide for every contingency which may arise in connexion with the present expedition.

The Government has declared that it directed the assembling of this force, in the hope that a powerful blow, struck promptly now, might reduce the Burmese to reason, obtain compliance with our demands, and avert war upon a more extended scale at the end of the coming monsoon. To this end, the speedy termination of hostilities, all the efforts of the force should now be directed; while in any negotiations that may be opened, no demands of unnecessary severity or extent should be advanced by us, which would tend to avert a settlement, and thus to defeat the object of our present movement.

General Godwin, having been put in possession of this leading principle in the views of the Government of India, should be informed that the ultimatum of the Government, some time since transmitted to the King of Ava, was to the following effect:

"1st. Your Majesty, disavowing the acts of the present Governor of Rangoon, shall, by the hands of your Ministers, express regret that Captain Fishbourne and the British officers who accompanied him, were exposed to insult at the hand of your servant at Rangoon, on the 6th of January last.

"2nd. In satisfaction of the claims of the two captains who suffered exactions from the late Governor of Rangoon, in compensation for the loss of property which British merchants may have suffered in the burning of that city by the acts of the present Governor, and in consideration of the expenses of preparation for war, your Majesty will agree to pay, and will pay at once, ten lacs of rupees to the Government of India.

"3rd. Your Majesty will direct that an accredited Agent, to be appointed in conformity with the VIIth Article of Yandaboo, and to reside at Rangoon, shall be received by your Majesty's servants there, and shall, at all times, be treated with the respect due to the Representative of the British Government.

"4th. Your Majesty will direct the removal of the present Governor of Rangoon, whose conduct renders it impossible that the Government of India should consent to any official intercourse with him."

Upon arriving at the rendezvous, and before moving to Rangoon, General Godwin should ascertain, by an ordinary flag of truce, whether any letter from the Court of Ava to the Government of India is forthcoming.

If there should be such a letter, General Godwin should be authorized to examine its contents.

If the letter should accede to the demands of the British Government, and if effect should at once be given to it by the King's officers, hostilities will be stayed. In that case, General Godwin will intimate to the Burmese officers,

that it is his intention to proceed to Rangoon for the purpose of receiving the fulfilment of the terms.

If this shall be duly accomplished, General Godwin will finally arrange a meeting with the chief officer of the King of Ava at Rangoon, for the purpose of formally placing in charge of his functions, the officer who shall be appointed to act at Rangoon as the Agent of this Government. The forms of such meetings should be arranged previously, and a record made of them; it being understood that they are to be the recognised forms of reception of the British Agent for the future.

When all this has been done, and not before, the King's ship should be restored to its place, and former friendly relations will be renewed.

If the letter from the Court of Ava should not, distinctly and at once, concede all the demands, but should express an intention of doing so, General Godwin should construe it in a fair and liberal spirit. If he shall consider that it is the real intention of the Court of Ava to meet our demands as soon as it is practicable for them to do so, he is authorized to suspend hostilities. But if General Godwin should see good cause to believe that the Court of Ava is attempting to practise the same evasive policy of which General Godwin has himself had experience, and is seeking merely to gain time against us, General Godwin should proceed to act in concert with the officer commanding the Naval Forces.

If again there should be no letter from the Court of Ava, or if it should directly refuse, or manifestly evade our demands, General Godwin in like manner will proceed to act.

It has been the earnest desire of the Government of India, from the commencement of these differences with the Court of Ava, to avert, if possible, another war. I have already said that the object of dispatching promptly the present force is to seize the last chance of preventing the necessity for sending a large army hereafter. It is in my judgment equally the policy and the duty of the Government of India to adhere to that principle, in every one of its acts, in this untoward affair.

Our demands have been based on a resolution to obtain full compensation for the injuries inflicted on British subjects, and reimbursement of the expenses to which the State has been put by the proceedings of the Burmese Government. The sum of 10 lacs was not set down arbitrarily, but was the result of calculation, so far as it could be made.

More time will have elapsed before a reconciliation can be effected, and the heavy current expenses must be provided for. Moreover, if hostilities be commenced, if actions be fought, the charges of the Government will be greatly increased.

I therefore beg leave to suggest, that as the conditions of peace offered immediately after the capture of these places, we should demand:

1st. The payment of 15 lacs of rupees. Such a payment would not be beyond the means of the Burmese Government, and it will most certainly not do more than afford the compensation and reimbursement to which we are entitled.

2nd. To obviate any attempt at evasion, by delay, and to meet the strict justice of the case, an additional payment should be demanded of 3 lacs for every month which may elapse after the 1st of May, until satisfaction of our demands is afforded.

3rd. Until these payments are made, the British troops shall remain in undisturbed possession of such captured places as they may choose to retain.

4th. If these conditions are not complied with, the Government of India will take such measures as it may think necessary and right.

I conceive that these conditions afford the best and safest solution of the difficulties of our present position.

With regard to the 1st and 2nd I have already said that the demand is just, and within the means of the Burmese Government.

The 3rd condition enables us either to retain possession of the whole we may have captured, or, without disadvantage or discredit, to retire from Rangoon, if it should appear desirable to do so.

The general terms of the 4th condition leave it open to the Government to adopt whatever course it may prefer, after the monsoon shall have passed, or the season for operations shall again approach.

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

Mr. Allen to Lieutenant-General Godwin.

(Extract.)

Fort William, March 24, 1852.

THE force which has been placed under your command for service upon the coast of Burmah being now complete in all respects, you will be enabled to proceed to the rendezvous selected by Commodore Lambert, at the mouth of the Rangoon River, upon the 25th instant.

The Governor-General in Council has the honor to address to you the following instructions for your guidance.

Having regard to the advantage of uniting all authority in one person upon such occasions as the present, and having confidence in the ability, the judgment, and experience which you will bring to the duty with which you are to be entrusted, the Governor-General in Council has resolved that the whole political authority connected with the expedition should be vested in you, as the officer commanding the troops in the field.

The Governor-General in Council has directed the assembling of this force, in the hope that a powerful blow, struck promptly now, may reduce the Burmese to reason, may obtain compliance with our demands, and so may avert the necessity for war upon a more extended scale, after the close of the coming monsoon.

The ultimatum of the British Government, transmitted to the Court of Ava some time ago, was to the following effect :

“1st. Your Majesty, disavowing the acts of the present Governor of Rangoon, shall, by the hands of your Ministers, express regret that Captain Fishbourne and the British officers who accompanied him were exposed to insult at the hand of your servants at Rangoon, on the 6th of January last.

“2nd. In satisfaction of the claims of the two captains who suffered exactions from the late Governor of Rangoon, in compensation for the loss of property which British merchants may have suffered in the burning of that city by the acts of the present Governor, and in consideration of the expenses of preparation for war, your Majesty will agree to pay, and will pay at once, ten lacs of rupees to the Government of India.

“3rd. Your Majesty will direct that an accredited Agent, to be appointed in conformity with the VIIth Article of Yandaboo, and to reside at Rangoon, shall be received by your Majesty’s servants there, and shall, at all times, be treated with the respect due to the Representative of the British Government.

“4th. Your Majesty will direct the removal of the present Governor of Rangoon, whose conduct renders it impossible that the Government of India should consent to any official intercourse with him.”

Upon arriving at the rendezvous, you are requested to communicate with Commodore Lambert, in command of the naval squadron there. The accompanying letter to Commodore Lambert contains a copy of the instructions now conveyed to you, and a request that he will cooperate with you in every way for securing the successful performance of the service with which you have been entrusted.

The Governor-General in Council entertains the fullest confidence that Commodore Lambert and yourself will act together in entire harmony and concert upon a service, where you have as your common object the protection of British subjects, and the maintenance of the honor and power of our name.

Before moving up to Rangoon you are requested to ascertain, by such means as may seem best, through a flag of truce, whether any letter from the Court of Ava to the Government of India has been received. If there should be such a letter, you are authorized to examine its contents.

If the letter should accede to the demands of the British Government, and if effect should at once be given to it by the King’s officers, hostilities will be stayed.

In that case you are requested to intimate to the Burmese officers, that it is your intention to proceed to Rangoon for the purpose of receiving the fulfilment of the terms.

If this shall be duly accomplished, you will finally arrange a meeting with

the chief officer of the King of Ava, for the purpose of formally placing in charge of his functions the officer who shall be appointed to act at Rangoon as the Agent of this Government.

The forms of such meetings should be arranged previously, and a record made of them; it being understood that they are to be the recognised forms of reception of the British Agent for the future.

When all this has been done, and not before, the King's ship should be restored to its place, and former friendly relations will be renewed.

If the letter from the Court of Ava should not distinctly and at once concede all our demands, but should express an intention of doing so, you are requested to construe it in a fair and liberal spirit.

If you shall consider that it is the real intention of the Court of Ava to meet our demands as soon as it is practicable for it to do so, you are authorized to suspend hostilities. But if you should see good cause to believe that the Court of Ava is attempting to practise the same evasive policy of which you have yourself had experience, and is seeking merely to gain time against us, you should proceed to act, in concert with the officer commanding the naval forces.

If, again, there should be no letter from the Court of Ava, or if it should directly refuse, or manifestly evade, our demands, you, in like manner, will proceed to act.

It is assumed by the Government, that operations would be most effectually directed against Martaban and Rangoon.

If the result of that operation should be in accordance with the hopes of the Government, and if the Burmese should either make overtures for peace, or should be supposed likely to accept them, you are authorized to agree to, or to offer the following terms of accommodation:—

1st. The payment of 15 lacs of rupees.

2nd. The payment of 3 lacs of rupees, in addition to the above sum, for every month which may elapse after the 1st May, until full payment is made.

3rd. Until these conditions shall be fulfilled, the British troops shall remain in undisturbed possession of such captured places as they may choose to retain.

4th. If the conditions shall not be fulfilled on or before the 1st October, the Government of India will take such measures as it may think right.

Upon the acceptance of such overtures being reported, the Government of India would transmit to you such further instructions as might be required.

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

Mr. Allen to Commodore Lambert.

Fort William, March 24, 1852.

I AM directed by the Governor-General in Council to acquaint you, that the land force, which has been prepared with a view to active operations in Burmah, being about to sail, Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., has been appointed to the command.

As there appears to be little probability of the demands of the British Government being acceded to by the Government of Ava, except as the consequence of successful operations by the military force which has been dispatched, the Governor-General in Council, having regard to the expediency of uniting every power in the hands of one person on such occasions, has resolved to invest Lieutenant-General Godwin, the officer in command of the troops, with the whole political authority connected with the expedition.

You are requested to place the services of Captain Latter, Burmese interpreter to the expedition, at the disposal of Lieutenant-General Godwin.

A copy of the instructions addressed to that officer is transmitted for your information.

In addition to the steam-vessels which have already been under your orders, those named in the margin* will join you at the rendezvous.

* Feroze, Mozuffer, Sesostris, Zenobia, Medusa, Berenice, and, probably, Hugh Lindsay.

In soliciting your cooperation for accomplishing fully the objects of this Government, the Governor-General in Council has only to repeat the expression of his perfect confidence that the officers commanding the naval and military forces respectively, will act together in entire harmony and concert upon a service in which they have for their common object, the protection of British subjects, and the maintenance of the honor and power of our name.

Treaty with the King of Ava.

Signed at Yandaboo, February 24, 1826.

TREATY of PEACE between the Honorable East India Company on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava on the other, settled by Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K.C.B. and K.C.T.S., commanding the Expedition, and Senior Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, Thomas Campbell Robertson, Esquire, Civil Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, and Henry Ducie Chads, Esquire, Captain, commanding His Britannic Majesty's and the Honorable Company's Naval Force on the Irrawaddy River, on the part of the Honorable Company; and by Mengyee-Maha-Men-Klah-Kyan-Ten Woongyee, Lord of Lay-Kaeng, and Mengyee Mahah-Men-Klah-Shee-hah-the-Ahren-Woon, Lord of the Revenue, on the part of the King of Ava; who have each communicated to the other their full-powers; agreed to and executed at Yandaboo, in the Kingdom of Ava, on this 24th day of February, in the year of our Lord 1826, corresponding with the fourth day of the decrease of the Moon Tuboung, in the year 1187, Mandina Era :

ARTICLE I.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava, on the other.

ARTICLE II.

His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims upon, and will abstain from all future interference with, the Principality of Assam and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty States of Cachar and Jyntia. With regard to Manipore, it is stipulated that should Ghumbheer Singh desire to return to that country, he shall be recognised by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof.

ARTICLE III.

To prevent all future disputes respecting the boundary-line between the two great nations, the British Government will retain the conquered Provinces of Arracan, including the four divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandowey, and His Majesty the King of Ava cedes all right thereto. The Annonpeeteetonmien, or Arracan Mountains (known in Arracan by the name of the Yeornabourg or Pokhengloun range), will henceforth form the boundary between the two great nations on that side. Any doubts regarding the said line of demarcation will be settled by Commissioners appointed by the respective Governments for that purpose, such Commissioners from both Powers to be of suitable and corresponding rank.

ARTICLE IV.

His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the British Government the conquered Provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, and Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining, taking the Saluen River as the line of demarcation on that frontier. Any doubts regarding their boundaries will be settled as specified in the concluding part of Article III.

ARTICLE V.

In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese Government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the nations, and as part indemnification to the British Government for the expenses of the war, His Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of one crore of rupees.

ARTICLE VI.

No person whatever, whether native or foreign, is hereafter to be molested by either party, on account of the part which he may have taken, or have been compelled to take, in the present war.

ARTICLE VII.

In order to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two Governments, it is agreed that accredited Ministers, retaining an escort or safeguard of fifty men, from each, shall reside at the Durbar of the other, who shall be permitted to purchase or to build a suitable place of residence, of permanent materials; and a Commercial Treaty, upon principles of reciprocal advantage, will be entered into by the two High Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE VIII.

All public and private debts contracted by either Government, or by the subjects of either Government, with the other, previous to the war, to be recognised and liquidated upon the same principles of honor and good faith as if hostilities had not taken place between the two nations; and no advantage shall be taken by either party, of the period that may have elapsed since the debts were incurred, or in consequence of the war; and, according to the universal Law of Nations, it is further stipulated, that the property of all British subjects who may die in the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava, shall, in the absence of legal heirs, be placed in the hands of the British Resident or Consul in the said dominions, who will dispose of the same according to the tenor of the British Law. In like manner, the property of Burmese subjects, dying under the same circumstances in any part of the British Dominions, shall be made over to the Minister or other authority delegated by His Burmese Majesty to the Supreme Government of India.

ARTICLE IX.

The King of Ava will abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports, that are not required from Burman ships or vessels in British ports; nor shall ships or vessels, the property of British subjects, whether European or Indian, entering the Rangoon River or other Burman ports, be required to land their guns or unship their rudders, or to do any other act not required of Burmese ships or vessels in British ports.

ARTICLE X.

The good and faithful ally of the British Government, His Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war, will, to the fullest extent, as far as regards His Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above Treaty.

ARTICLE XI.

This Treaty to be ratified by the Burmese authorities competent in the like cases, and the ratification to be accompanied by all British, whether European

or native (American) and other prisoners, who will be delivered over to the British Commissioners. The British Commissioners, on their part, engaging that the said Treaty shall be ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to His Majesty the King of Ava in four months, or sooner if possible; and all the Burmese prisoners shall, in like manner, be delivered over to their own Government as soon as they arrive from Bengal.

LARGEEN MEONJA WOONGHEE.	(L.S.)	A. CAMPBELL, Major-General, and Senior Commissioner.
[Seal of the Lotoo.]	(L.S.)	T. C. ROBERTSON, Civil Commissioner.
SHWAGUM WOON ATAWOON.	(L.S.)	H. D. CHADS, Captain Royal Navy.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

The British Commissioners being most anxiously desirous to manifest the sincerity of their wish for peace, and to make the immediate execution of the Fifth Article of this Treaty as little irksome, or inconvenient as possible to His Majesty the King of Ava, consent to the following arrangements, with respect to the division of the sum total, as specified in the Article before referred to, into instalments, viz. : upon the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, or one-fourth of the sum total (the other Articles of the Treaty being executed), the army will retire to Rangoon; upon the further payment of a similar sum at that place, within one hundred days from this date, with the proviso as above, the army will evacuate the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava, with the least possible delay; leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid by equal annual instalments in two years, from this 24th day of February, 1826, A. D., through the Consul, or Resident in Ava, or Pegu, on the part of the Honourable the East India Company.

LARGEEN MEONJA WOONGHEE.	(L.S.)	A. CAMPBELL, Major-General, and Senior Commissioner.
* [Seal of the Lotoo.]	(L.S.)	T. C. ROBERTSON, Civil Commissioner.
SHWAGUM WOON ATAWOON.	(L.S.)	H. D. CHADS, Captain Royal Navy.

Commercial Treaty with Ava.

Signed November 23, 1826.

A Commercial Treaty, signed and sealed at the golden city of Ra-ta-na-para, on the 23rd of November, 1826, according to the English, and the h of the decrease of the moon Tan-Soung-mong, 1188, according to the Burmans, by the Envoy Crawford, appointed by the English Ruler the Company's Buren, who governs India, and the Commissioners, the Atenwoon Mengyee-thi-ha-maha-then-Kyan, Lord of Sau, and the Atenwoon Mengyee-maha-men-lha-thi-ha-thee, Lord of the Revenue, appointed by His Majesty the Burmese Rising Sun Buren, who reigns over Thu-na-pa-ran-ta-Tam-pa-di-pa, and many other great countries.

According to the Treaty of Peace between the two great nations, made at Yandaboo, in order to promote the prosperity of both countries, and with a desire to assist and protect the trade of both, the Commissioner and Envoy Crawford, appointed by the English Company's Buren, who rules India, and the Commissioners the Atenwoon Mengyee-thi-ha-maha-nauda-then-Kyan, Lord of Sau, and the Atenwoon Mengyee-maha-men-lha-ti-ha-thu, Lord of the Revenue, appointed by His Majesty the Burmese Rising Sun Buren, who rules over Thu-na-para-Tam-pa-di-pa, and many other great countries. These three, in the conference-tent at the landing-place of Ze-ya-pu-ra, north of the golden city of Ye-ta-na-pura, with mutual consent completed this Engagement.

ARTICLE I.

Peace being made between the great country governed by the English Prince the India Company Buren, and the great country of Ya-ta-na-pura, which rules over Thu-na-para-Tam-pa-di-pa, and many other great countries, when merchants with an English stamped pass from the country of the English Prince, and merchants from the Kingdom of Burmah, pass from one country to the other, selling and buying merchandize, the sentinels at the passes and entrances, the established gatekeepers of the country, shall make inquiry as usual, but without demanding any money; and all merchants coming truly for the purpose of trade with merchandize, shall be suffered to pass without hindrance or molestation. The Governments of both countries also shall permit ships with cargoes to enter ports and carry on trade, giving them the utmost protection and security; and in regard to duties, there shall none be taken beside the customary duties at the landing-places of trade.

ARTICLE II.

Ships whose breadth of beam on the inside (opening of the hold) is 8 Royal Burmese cubits of $19\frac{1}{16}$ th English inches each, and all ships of smaller size, whether merchants from the Burmese Country entering an English port under the Burmese flag, or merchants from the English country with an English stamped pass entering a Burmese port under the English flag, shall be subjected to no other demands beside the payment of duties, and 10 ticals 25 per cent. (10 sicca rupees) for a chokey pass on leaving. Nor shall pilotage be demanded, unless the captain voluntarily requires a pilot. However, when ships arrive, information shall be given to the officer stationed at the entrance of the sea, in regard to vessels whose breadth of beam exceeds 8 Royal cubits, and remain, according to Article IX of the Treaty of Yandaboo, without unshipping their rudders or landing their guns, and be free from trouble and molestation, as Burmese vessels in British ports. Besides the Royal duties, no more duties shall be given or taken than such as are customary.

ARTICLE III.

Merchants belonging to one, who go to the other country and remain there, shall, when they desire to return, go to whatever place and by whatever vessel they may desire, without hindrance. Property owned by merchants they shall be allowed to sell, and property not sold and household furniture, they shall be allowed to take away, without hindrance or incurring any expense.

ARTICLE IV.

English and Burmese vessels meeting with contrary winds, or sustaining damage in masts, rigging, &c., or suffering shipwreck on the shore, shall, according to the laws of charity, receive assistance from the inhabitants of the towns and villages that may be near, the master of the wrecked ship paying to those that assist, suitable salvage, according to the circumstances of the case; and whatever property may remain in the case of shipwreck, shall be restored to the owner.

(L.S.) J. CRAWFURD.

[King of Ava's Seal.]

ATWENWOON MENGYEE-THI-HAMAHANAUDA-THEN-KYAN, *Lord of Sau.*
ATWENWOON MENGYEE-MAHA-MEN-THI-HA-THU, *Lord of the Revenue.*

Ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor-General, on the first day of September, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven, A.D.

A. STERLING, *Secretary to Government.*

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RELATING TO

HOSTILITIES WITH BURMAH.

(In continuation of Papers presented June 4, 1852.)

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Her Majesty's Command,
March 15, 1853.*

LONDON:
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The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee of the East India Company.

Fort William, April 24, 1852. (No. 17.)

WE have the highest satisfaction in transmitting to you the inclosed copy of dispatches just received from his Excellency Rear-Admiral Austen, C.B., and Lieutenant-General Godwin, commanding the naval and military forces employed in Burmah.

They report the assault and capture of Martaban on the 5th, and of Rangoon on the 14th of April; and announce the complete success of the combined operations of the army and fleet.

The necessity for immediately dispatching this intelligence now, by the last express which can safely be relied upon, renders it impossible for us to convey to your Committee our sentiments on the gratifying results which are announced, as fully as we desire to do. This duty we shall have the satisfaction of discharging by the ensuing mail.

But we beg leave to take this earliest opportunity of assuring you, that we feel we cannot use language too strong in making known to you our unqualified approbation of the admirable spirit which has been displayed in these combined operations of the naval and military forces; or express too warmly our gratitude to the Rear-Admiral and to the Lieutenant-General by whom the operations have been conducted, and to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, of both services, who, as the several dispatches will show you, have so nobly performed their duty in the field.

We have, &c.

DALHOUSIE.
F. CURRIE.
J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

The Secretary to Rear-Admiral Austen to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

“Rattler,” Rangoon River, April 2, 1852.

REFERRING to the 7th paragraph of the instructions from the Indian Government to the Commander of the Forces, in which that functionary is desired, before proceeding to Rangoon, to ascertain, by such means as may seem best, through a flag of truce, whether any letter from the Court of Ava to the Government had been received, I have the honor, by the desire of the Rear-Admiral Commander-in-chief, to state, for the information of the Governor-General, that the East India Company's steamer “Proserpine” was sent up the river with Captain Latter, Burmese interpreter, to the Governor of Dalla, to ascertain whether any letter had been received.

The steamer, with a flag of truce, was permitted to pass two stockades on the right bank of the river, unmolested; but a third, upon the left bank, opened fire upon her.

In obedience to the instructions his Excellency had given her commander,

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she turned back; but, as the flood tide was running very strong, this was a work of difficulty, and she had to remain some time under fire, which she returned with shell and shot, and blew up the stockade. The other two stockades then opened fire, but she succeeded in returning to the anchorage without damage, having been struck by only one shot from a 12-pounder gun.

I have, &c.

G. P. MARTIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

The Secretary to Rear-Admiral Austen to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

"Rattler," Rangoon River, April 9, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to request you will be pleased to inform the Governor-General, that, agreeably with the intention expressed in my letter of the 25th ultimo, the Rear-Admiral Commander-in-chief hoisted his flag on board Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Rattler;" and, accompanied by Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Salamander," left Penang on the 28th of March.

On the 1st of April, his Excellency arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river, where he found lying Her Majesty's ships "Fox" and "Serpent," the East India Company's steamers "Phlegethon" and "Proserpine," three transports, and the ship taken from the King of Ava. On the following morning, the steamers and transports, named in the margin,* arrived from Calcutta, with the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces on board; and the "Salamander" came in shortly after.

The "Proserpine" was sent to Moulmein the same day, to give notice of projected movements; and on the 3rd instant, the "Rattler," bearing his Excellency's flag; the "Hermes," with the Commander of the Forces on board; and the "Salamander," sailed for Moulmein. Receiving troops on board there, to the number of 1500, the squadron proceeded off Martaban, and assisted at the capture of that place on the 5th instant, the particulars of which the Commander of the Forces will have the honor of communicating to his Lordship. The "Hermes" grounded too far off to be of much use. The "Salamander," owing to her draught of water, could not come so near as was desirable; nevertheless, the shelling was most effective. The "Rattler" took up an admirable position, 214 yards from the stockades; her shot and shell did much execution. The "Proserpine," admirably managed by her able commander (whom his Excellency would beg to bring under favorable notice), received the troops from the larger steamers, and landed them, and at the same time kept up a constant fire upon the stockades. The only casualties that occurred in the squadron were on board the "Rattler," where one seaman was wounded in the arm, and two of the Madras Native Infantry.

On the 7th instant, 1100 European troops, with camp-followers, baggage, &c., were embarked in the squadron, and the transport "Jessie;" and all sailed for the rendezvous, arriving on the 8th instant.

The steamers and transports named in the margin† had arrived at the rendezvous, and arrangements are this day being made for an advance upon Rangoon.

The Rear-Admiral will have the honor of communicating future proceedings as opportunities occur.

I have, &c.

G. P. MARTIN.

* Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes." East India Company's steamers "Fire-Queen," "Enterprize," "Tenasserim." Transports, "Tubal Cain," "Julia," "Monarch," "Lahore."
 † Steamers, "Feroze," "Sesostris," "Moozuffer," "Zenobia," "Berenice," "Medusa." Transports, "Rockliff," "Hempsyke," "Atalanta," "Sir Thos. Gresham."

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

The Secretary to Rear-Admiral Austen to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

"Rattler," Rangoon River, April 9, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to inform you, by desire of the Rear-Admiral Commander-in-chief, that, in compliance with an arrangement entered into between the Lieutenant-General Commander of the Forces and his Excellency, Commodore G. R. Lambert, in Her Majesty's ship "Fox," ascended this river, in force, on the 4th instant, for the purpose of destroying the stockades below Rangoon; thus clearing the way for the advance of the squadron.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter* from the Commodore, reporting the execution of this service in a manner which, in the opinion of the Rear-Admiral, must meet with approval.

I have, &c.

GEO. P. MARTIN.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Commodore G. R. Lambert, R.N., to Rear-Admiral Austen.

Sir,

"Fox," Rangoon River, April 6, 1852.

IN pursuance of the instructions I had received from your Excellency, I proceeded up the Rangoon river on the afternoon of the 4th instant, taking under my orders Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent," and the "Tenasserim" and "Phlegethon" steamers belonging to the East India Company, with three companies of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Coote. I anchored off the Bassein Creek the same evening.

At daylight on the morning of the 5th, I again weighed and went up the river, having previously given directions to Commander Luard, with the "Serpent" and "Phlegethon," which I placed under his orders, with one company of the 18th Regiment, to attack and destroy the De Silva stockade; which service he most effectually performed.

I proceeded myself with the "Fox" and "Tenasserim" to the Dunnout, and a new stockade that had recently been erected, nearly opposite on the other side of the river; as we approached, the enemy opened an ill-regulated fire on us, (two of their shot striking the "Fox,") which was soon silenced by Her Majesty's ship and the steamer. The troops and the marines of the "Fox" were then landed, and by the evening both stockades were burnt, and the whole force re-embarked without any casualty.

I have great satisfaction in stating that the energy and good feeling displayed by both services in performing this duty was such as to meet my highest approval, and I have to express my thanks for the assistance I received from Lieutenant-Colonel Coote and Commanders Tarleton and Luard, as well as from the Commanders of the East India Company's steam-vessels of war "Tenasserim" and "Phlegethon."

I have, &c.

G. R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

The Secretary to Rear-Admiral Austen to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

"Rattler," Rangoon River, April 10, 1852.

I HAVE the honor, by desire of the Rear-Admiral Commander-in-chief, to inclose a return, showing, at one view, the force assembled for proceeding against Burmah; together with a list of the transports employed.

I have, &c.

G. P. MARTIN.

* April 6, 1852.

Force employed in the Expedition against Burmah.

Her Majesty's Ships.

"Rattler," Commander A. Mellersh, 130 men, 11 guns. Flag-ship. Two guns received from "Fox."
 "Fox," Commodore G. R. Lambert, 298 men, 40 guns. Two guns lent to "Rattler," and 12 seamen to "Maha Nuddie."
 "Hermes," Commander E. Fishbourne, 120 men, 6 guns.
 "Salamander," Commander J. S. Ellman, 135 men, 6 guns.
 "Serpent," Commander W. Inard, 125 men, 16 guns. Four guns received from Calcutta.
 A gun-boat, Mr. R. C. Copland, Acting Mate, 10 men, 1 gun.
 Total—818 men, 80 guns.

Steamers of the Indian Navy.

"Feroze," Captain H. B. Lynch, 230 men, 7 guns. Senior officer.
 "Moozuffer," Commander H. H. Hewett, 230 men, 7 guns.
 "Zenobia," Commander A. Ball, 200 men, 6 guns.
 "Sesostris," Commander C. Campbell, 135 men, 4 guns.
 "Medusa," Lieutenant H. A. Fraser, 60 men, 5 guns.
 "Berenice," Lieutenant A. Nisbett, 97 men, 1 gun.
 Total—952 men, 30 guns.

Uncovenanted Service.

"Tenasserim," Captain W. Dicey, 80 men, 6 guns.
 "Pluto," Captain C. Burbank, 86 men, 7 guns.
 "Phlegethon," Captain G. T. Neblett, 86 men, 6 guns.
 "Proserpine," Captain A. Brooking, 86 men, 6 guns.
 "Enterprize," Captain A. Fryer, 70 men, 2 guns.
 "Fire-Queen," Captain H. Boon, 70 men, 2 guns.
 "Maha Nuddie," Lieutenant G. W. Rice, R.N., in temporary charge, 22 men, 4 guns. Tender to "Fox." 12 men received from "Fox."
 Total—500 men, 33 guns.

Troops.

Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish	850 men.
" 51st Regiment	900 "
" 80th "	460 "
Five companies of Artillery	517 "
Three regiments of Native Infantry..	2,800 "
Gun Lascars	70 "
Two companies of Sappers and Miners	170 "
				Total 5,767 "

Ordnance.

Howitzers,—8-inch, 2; 24-pounders, 6; Guns,—9-pounders, 8; Total, 16 guns.
 Ships of war, 19; men, 8,037; guns, 159.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

The Secretary to Rear-Admiral Austen to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

"Rattler," at Rangoon, April 16, 1852.

IN continuation of my letter of the 9th instant, reporting, for the information of the Governor-General of India, the proceedings of the naval squadron employed in these waters, I have the honor further to report, by desire of the Rear-Admiral Commander-in-Chief, that, on the 10th instant, the ships, steamers, and transports commenced an advance up the river, and anchored below the Hastings Shoal that evening.

The "Zenobia" had been sent a part of the way up on the day previous, for the purpose of watering; but, grounding on the De Silva Shoal, was unfortunately unable to get out of her difficulties in time to take a part in the proceedings against Rangoon.

A copy of the Rear-Admiral's order to advance is annexed,* by which it will be seen that it was intended on the following morning (Easter Sunday) to anchor above the shoal, but out of the range of fire from the enemy. I have

* April 10, 1852.

the honor also to inclose a copy of the General Order* for the proceedings of the squadron while off Rangoon. Some alteration had, however, to be made in the arrangements proposed. It was found that there would not be room for all the ships to anchor above the shoal out of gunshot, without a risk of their grounding, and it was for some time debated whether the squadron should remain below the shoal until Monday, or advance on the Sunday morning to take up their positions off Rangoon, and risk the commencement of the action on that day. The tides and other causes decided the authorities on adopting the latter course, and accordingly the shoal was crossed on the morning of the 11th by each ship as the water served. When the first vessels had anchored above it, the Dagon Pagoda fired several guns, apparently with a view to call in the people. Upon the East India Company's steamers, "Feroze," "Moozuffer," and "Sesostris," taking up their positions, fire was opened upon them from the stockades on either side, which was returned with shot and shell. In the course of an hour an explosion took place, the importance of which was only afterwards discovered. It was that of a stockade mounting nine 18-pounder guns, well planted, and would doubtless have done great mischief to our shipping, if not thus accidentally silenced so early. Upon the "Fox" advancing to take up her position, she poured effective broadsides into the stockades on both sides of the river. After consulting the Lieutenant-General Commander of the Forces, the boats of the "Fox" landed with a party of seamen and marines and a company of the 18th Royal Irish, and, under cover of the ships' guns, stormed two stockades on the Dalla side. Although a rapid fire of musketry was kept up from many hundreds of the enemy in these defences, yet this service was happily effected with but one man wounded on our side. Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent" and the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon" then passed up the river, and anchored above Kemmendine, in order to capture the war-boats, and to prevent fire-rafts being sent down upon the squadron. The "Rattler" and "Tenasserim" next advanced along the line, and succeeded in silencing three more stockades. The party before alluded to in the boats of the "Fox," and a few seamen, with thirty of the Royal Irish, from the "Rattler," stormed another on the Dalla side, driving hundreds of the enemy out of it into the jungle. All the stockades that had been taken were then set fire to and burnt in succession. The ships returned to their respective positions, in readiness to land the troops, which commenced at four o'clock on the morning of the 12th, without opposition from the enemy. It was discovered that the Dagon Pagoda was not so far from the ships as was laid down in the charts, being at a good shelling distance; the ships accordingly commenced throwing shells into it. In the course of the evening a magazine blew up, and the outskirts of the Pagoda were set on fire in several directions, creating great confusion among the enemy. Shells were occasionally thrown from the ships on the 13th instant, during the day and night, frequently setting fire to the stockades in various places. On the afternoon of that day a large party of men, with two elephants and riders, were seen to leave the Pagoda. It was afterwards understood that this was the Governor of Rangoon, who had quitted the Pagoda in despair of being able to hold it.

* It will be the pleasing duty of the Commander of the Forces to report the advance of the troops and the gallant storming of the White Stockade, about half-a-mile from the landing-place, and ultimately the storming and capture of the Dagon Pagoda. The Rear-Admiral desires further to observe that he leaves to the Lieutenant-General to report upon the conduct of the small naval brigade, composed as per margin,† under the command of Senior Lieutenant J. W. Dorville of the flag-ship, employed with the forces upon this occasion, in the utmost confidence that ample justice will be done to them.

Inclosed is a list of the casualties that took place in the squadron while employed upon this service, and his Excellency desires to remark, that it is a subject not less of surprise than thankfulness that so few have taken place on the occasion.

I am, &c.

G. P. MARTIN.

* April 11.

† "Rattler."—Senior Lieutenant J. W. Dorville, commanding; Mr. T. S. Gooch, mate (second in command); Mr. O. J. Llewellyn, acting assistant-surgeon; 30 able seamen (10 lent from "Hastings").

"Hermes."—Mr. E. A. Tweeddale, mate, and 40 seamen.

"Salamander."—Mr. W. H. Nurse, acting mate, and 30 seamen.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

General Memorandum.

To the Captains and Commanders of Her Majesty's ships and vessels, and the East India Company's steamers in the Rangoon river.

"Rattler," Rangoon River, April 10, 1852.

IT having been determined that the squadron of steamers and transports shall commence their advance up the Rangoon river at 1.30 P.M. of this day, it is my direction that the following arrangements be observed.

The steamers will, at the hour above named, take in tow the ships and transports expressed against their names.

"Tenasserim."—Her Majesty's ship "Fox."
 "Enterprise."—King of Ava's ship.
 "Fire Queen."—"Tubal Cain," "Lahore."
 "Moozuffer."—"Atalanta," "Rockliff."
 "Feroze."—"Sir Thomas Gresham," "Hempsyke."
 "Sesostris."—"Futtee Allum," "Fatel Rozaek."
 "Zenobia."—"Bengal," "Monarch."
 "Berenice."—"Juliana."
 "Salamander."—"Jessie."

The steamers not named will take up their positions in the advance as convenient.

The gun-boat has been placed at the end of the De Silva shoal to mark its position. Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent," and the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon," have been sent to place themselves in mid-channel off the Hastings Sand, in order to point it out.

It is intended that the squadron shall anchor this evening in two divisions at the lower end of the Hastings shoal; the first to consist of Her Majesty's ships, and the East India Company's steamers from Calcutta, anchoring with their transports on the starboard hand; the second division, to consist of the steamers of the Indian Navy, under the immediate charge of Captain Lynch, with their transports, are to anchor on the port hand.

The following forenoon, upon the signal to weigh being given, the steamers, with their ships and transports in tow, will proceed across the Hastings Sand, and anchor above the shoal, but not so far up as to be within range of fire from the stockades.

Directions for future movements will hereafter be given.

Particular attention is to be paid to signals, and an officer on board each ship is to be appointed to this important duty.

C. J. AUSTEN, *Rear-Admiral.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

General Memorandum.

To the Captains and Commanders of Her Majesty's ships and vessels, and the East India Company's steamers in the Rangoon River.

"Rattler," Rangoon River, April 11, 1852.

THE Captains, Commanders, and Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's ships and vessels, and of the East India Company's steamers under my orders, are hereby informed of the proposed arrangements for the contemplated attack upon Rangoon.

At 4.30 A.M. to-morrow, the steamers will weigh and proceed to take up their positions off Rangoon in the following order:—

East India Company's steamers—"Zenobia" (headmost up the river), "Moozuffer," "Sesostris," "Feroze."

Her Majesty's ships—"Fox" (Commodore's broad pendant), "Rattler" (flag ship), "Hermes" (head-quarters), "Salamander."

The especial duty of the East India Company's steamers, "Tenasserim," "Enterprise," "Medusa," "Pluto," and "Maha Nuddie," will be to assist in landing the troops, by towing the boats on shore, and in such other manner as they will from time to time be directed.

The "Fire-Queen" is to take up a position close to the flag-ship, as a tender to her and the head-quarters; but, upon the signal to land being given, she is to draw near the ship "King of Ava," to assist in landing her troops.

The order in which it is proposed landing the men and guns comprising the land force, is as follows:—

First, Her Majesty's 51st Regiment.—Ex "Feroze," 515; ex "Sesostris," 380; total, 895.

Second, Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish.—Ex "Fox," 115; ex "Tenasserim," 102; ex "Maha Nuddie," 81; ex "Hermes," 300; ex "Rattler," 100; ex "Fatel Rozaek," 96; total, 794.

Third, the 40th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—Ex "Enterprise," 270; ex "Fire-Queen," 240; ex "King's Ship," 550; total, 1060.

The Artillery and Park will be landed at this time in long-boats belonging to the transports, and towed by the "Medusa" and ships' boats.

Artillery.—Ex "Hermes," 120; ex "Bengal," 120; ex "Berenice," 277; total, 517.

Ordnance.—Ex "Berenice," two 24-pound howitzers, four 9-pounders; ex "Lahore," two 24-pound howitzers, four 9-pounders; ex "Hermes," two 24-pound howitzers.

Park.—Ex "Salamander," Sappers and Miners, 160; ex "Hermes," one boat for ladders and powder bags; ex "Monarch," one boat for tools and materials.

There are also a few ladders on board the "Fox," "Monarch," "Tenasserim," and "Phlegethon," which it is desirable to be landed.

Finally, the Madras Infantry will be landed.

9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—Ex "Moozuffer," 583, ex "Medusa," 100; total, 683.

35th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—Ex "Zenobia," 350; ex "Sir Thomas Gresham," 350; total, 700.

Commander E. G. Fishbourne, of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes," is to be on shore at the spot which will be pointed out to him by the Commander of the Forces, to superintend the landing of the troops, and from which place a white ensign will be hoisted, as a signal to the boats as the place at which to land.

Captain H. B. Lynch, Senior Officer of the Indian Navy, will make the necessary arrangements for the debarkation of Her Majesty's 51st Foot, by means of the boats of the steamers under his immediate orders. The boats are to be alongside of the steamers containing that regiment, in readiness to take them on shore directly the signal to land is given, which will be a white ensign hoisted from head-quarters, and repeated along the line.

The Commodore undertakes the arrangement for debarking Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, and will issue the necessary directions for this purpose, as also for the landing of the Artillery and Park.

The landing of the 40th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry is to be superintended by Commander J. S. Ellman, of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Salamander," which will be accomplished by his own boats, assisted by the "Medusa."

The Madras Native Infantry will finally be landed by the small steamers and the boats of the squadron, after their duties, before detailed, have been executed.

The troops having been landed, and the stockades having been silenced by the fire from the squadron, a party of seamen and marines will probably be directed by signal (a white ensign from the flag-ship to be repeated along the

line), to land from each ship, armed with pistols and cutlasses only, under the charge of a Lieutenant; the whole to be commanded by Commander Tarleton, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox."

The vessels are not to land more men than will enable them in their absence to work the guns.

It is necessary that particular directions be given as to the necessity of keeping a vigilant look-out for signals. Any that should not be answered at once by the ship or ships indicated, are to be repeated by the other vessels.

The troops are to be landed with one day's provisions in their knapsacks.

C. J. AUSTEN, *Rear-Admiral.*

Inclosure 9 in No. 1.

A List of Casualties that took place on board Her Majesty's ships and vessels, and the East India Company's steamers, under the Orders of Rear-Admiral Austen, during the Operations against Rangoon and Dalla, 11th—14th April, 1852.

"Fox."—Henry White, marine, burnt from gunpowder in stockade, not severe. James Minton, boatswain's mate, burnt from explosion of a gun, not severe. Charles Pittis, A.B., accidentally drowned on boat service. Thomas Working, private 18th R. I., shot through parietes of the chest not severe.

"Hermes." William Chapman, stoker, wounded, dangerously. Geo. J. Whitehead, ordinary, wounded, right arm amputated. Henry Thompson, A.B., wounded, slightly. William H. Parker, A.B., wounded slightly. John Jusset, A.B., wounded, slightly. George Wright, A.B., coup de soleil.

"Salamander."—John Chapman, stoker, gun-shot wound in left leg; has since undergone amputation of the limb.

"Feroze."—Michael Moore, gunner, Artillery, gun-shot wound in right breast, severe.

"Moozuffer."—Two seamen, wounded, slightly. Five privates, 9th Regiment, M.N.I., wounded, severely.

"Sesostris."—Ensign Armstrong, H.M.'s 51st Regiment, wounded, mortally, at 10·30 A.M., died at 1·30 P.M.

"Tenasserim."—William Poole, A.B., blown away from after pivot gun, gun exploded while loading.

"Serpent."—Mr. C. Sproull, assistant-surgeon, and 7 seamen, wounded.

"Rattler."—Mr. L. Campbell, boatswain, wounded, slightly. Francis Skinner, wounded, slightly.

G. P. MARTIN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure 10 in No. 1.

Rear-Admiral Austen to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis,

"Rattler," at Rangoon, April 16, 1852.

WHILE congratulating your Lordship on the success that has hitherto attended the expedition against Burmah, in the storming and capture of the strongholds of Martaban and Rangoon, I trust your Lordship will permit me to bring under notice the support that I have received from all the officers and men under my command, forming the naval part of the expedition. The embarking and disembarking the troops, baggage, and military stores, the arrangements for the transports, and for victualling the combined forces, have furnished almost incessant night and day work for the officers and men under my orders. It has been done on all sides with the utmost cheerfulness, and this large force has been moved up a rapid river, without any accident of moment having occurred; and I have, up to the present time, to thank every officer and man employed under my orders for the cheerful manner in which they have undergone so much toil in this distressing climate.

To the Commodore I feel under especial obligation. His local knowledge proved valuable, as his judgment and discretion were most useful. It would be impossible to value the services of an officer, second in command, more highly than I do those of the Commodore.

Captain Lynch, Senior Officer of the Indian Navy, has, by his ability, judgment, and discretion, rendered essential service.

Commander Mellersh of my flag ship, and Commanders Fishbourne and Tarleton, have rendered every possible assistance in carrying out all necessary arrangements. I was an eye-witness to Commander Tarleton's bravely leading his men to storm a stockade, to his being the first to mount the walls, and enter it. Commander Luard, of Her Majesty's sloop "Serpent," has been employed many months in these waters. A more zealous and indefatigable officer is not to be met with, and, relying upon his ability, he has frequently been placed in charge of responsible duties. With the assistance of the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon," commanded by G. T. Neblett, Esq., he destroyed the De Silva stockades. When the action on the 11th of April commenced, he passed along the line of fire in the sloop under his command, to above Kemmendine, for the purpose of preventing the removal of the war-boats; and while on this service he was attacked by a very important stockade, and an officer (Mr. C. Sproull, Assistant-Surgeon,) and seven of his men were wounded, but which he ultimately succeeded in silencing. Before the commencement of the war he took great pains in surveying the coast and river, and his information was afterwards of great use.

The Commanders and officers of the Indian Navy and East India Company's Uncovenanted Service have, without a single exception, performed their duties with all possible alacrity. Commander Brooking, of the "Proserpine," had at Martaban an opportunity of particularly distinguishing himself, of which he took good care to avail himself; and it is with great regret that I found myself under the necessity of leaving him at Moulmein for the protection of British interests, and thus losing his valuable services here.

Lieutenant George Rice, in temporary command of the "Maha Nuddie," rendered essential service to the cause, admirably handling his little vessel; he landed men on the beach to storm stockades, covering their landing with his own guns; and at the storming of them he was to be seen among the foremost ranks. In landing men, stores, and baggage, and ascending the narrow creeks of this river, the "Maha Nuddie" has proved most useful.

Senior Lieutenant Dorville, of my flag ship, commanded the naval brigade at the capture of Rangoon, and from the flattering manner in which the Commander of the forces has been pleased to speak of his services, I feel assured he must be honorably mentioned in the Lieutenant General's dispatches.

Among those that have fallen victims in the service of their country upon this occasion, it is my painful duty to record that of the Rev. Thomas T. Baker, Chaplain of Her Majesty's ship "Fox." Incessantly employed in administering to the wounded and dying, and in burying the dead, he fell a victim to the prevailing epidemic, cholera, on the 16th instant, leaving, I am informed, a widow and young family, who were wholly dependent on him for support.

I was an eye-witness to the indefatigable exertions of Dr. Minter, Surgeon of the "Fox," at the hospital on shore and on board the "Tubal Cain." Dr. Montgomery, Superintending Surgeon, expressed himself to me as being under the greatest obligations to him for his assistance. In addition to the duties performed by Dr. Minter at the hospital, he had those of his own ship to attend to, where the cholera had broken out with some virulence. Mr. Seccombe, Assistant-Surgeon of the "Hermes," was also employed at the hospital on shore.

In conclusion, I beg to remark that the whole conduct of the officers and men under my orders, employed on the present expedition, has been such as reflects much credit on themselves, and on the services to which they respectively belong.

I have, &c.

CHAS. JNO. AUSTEN, *Rear-Admiral.*

Inclosure 11 in No. 1.

Lieutenant-General H. Godwin, C.B., to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Moulmein, April 6, 1852.

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, that the force under my command left the Sand Heads on the 28th of March, for the Rangoon river, the place of rendezvous for the combined force from Bengal and Madras, where it arrived on the 2nd of April.

In obedience to my instructions, a flag of truce was immediately sent up to Rangoon, to inquire if any communication had arrived from the Court of Ava, in reply to the terms sent up to the Burmese Government, for the adjustment of the violences committed on the subjects of Her Majesty by the authorities at Rangoon: the flag was in charge of Captain Latter, of the Bengal army, and conveyed in the East India Company's steamer "Proserpine," Commander Brooking.

On reaching the stockades that guarded the river on both its banks, the flag was fired on; and it was only by the excellent arrangement and brave conduct of Commander Brooking that his ship extricated herself, inflicting on the enemy a severe chastisement, by blowing up a powder magazine and destroying many men.

I found, on my arrival at the rendezvous, that the Madras division had not made its appearance, nor were there tidings of it, so that I resolved to go to Moulmein, and make arrangements for the capture of Martaban.

In the Rangoon river I found that Rear-Admiral Austen, C.B., the naval Commander-in-Chief, had just arrived from Penang, in Her Majesty's steamer "Rattler." His Excellency and Commodore Lambert immediately came on board the "Hermes," Commander Fishbourne, in which I had my head-quarters, when it was agreed, in conference, that the Admiral would accompany me to Moulmein with Her Majesty's steamers "Hermes," "Rattler," and "Salamander,"—sending in advance to the mouth of the Martaban river the East India Company's steamer "Proserpine." We accordingly left the Rangoon river at daybreak on the 3rd of April; reached Moulmein the next day at noon. Orders were immediately issued for the troops to be in readiness for embarkation by 4 P.M., and by 9 that evening a wing of Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, a wing of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, a wing of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, with detachments of Bengal European Artillery, and Madras Sappers—in all about 1400 men—were on board.

Martaban stands on a noble sheet of water, with a river line of defences of about 800 yards. Inland lies a large pagoda, a wall running along the whole front, with an ascent from the water's edge of about 500 feet, on the top of which small pagodas stand, the slope being partially covered with fine trees and close jungle.

Arrangements were made for the attack at daybreak of the 5th. The Rear-Admiral made every disposition possible, in waters full of shoals and violent currents, for bombarding the position with his five steamers, and to cover the landing of the troops. It was the admiration of every one to witness the noble manner the "Rattler" worked her way within 200 yards of the wall, and close to the pagoda, doing tremendous execution. I changed from the "Rattler" at 6 o'clock, to superintend the landing of the troops, and went on board the "Proserpine," a smaller vessel, with my staff. Colonel Reignolds commanded the attack. At half-past 6 the steamer opened fire, and at 7 the troops were in the boats, and landed, by the indefatigable exertions of Commander Brooking, under a smart fire of musketry and guns. Soon was the storming party under the walls, and over them, with less loss than I thought possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Reignolds immediately ascended to the pagodas on the height, and took possession of them, after some skirmishing with the enemy.

At 8 A.M. Martaban was won; and, considering the enemy's position and numbers, which report gives at 5000 men, we have got it very cheaply.

I have to ask his Lordship's and the Council of India's best consideration of the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Reignolds, of the 18th Royal Irish, to whom is due the credit of this day's endurance of severe fatigue and privation under a burning sun.

To Captain Gillespie, in command of the Grenadiers of the 18th Royal Irish, whom I saw first on the wall, the soldier following him receiving three wounds; to Captain Campbell, who commanded the wing of the 18th Royal Irish; to Major Lockhart, in command of the wing of the 80th Foot; to Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, commanding the wing of the 26th Regiment Madras Native Infantry; and to Captain Rundall, commanding the detachment of Madras Sappers and Miners, my warm approbation is due.

I beg also to recommend to the consideration of his Lordship in Council, the Assistant-Adjutant-General of the Forces, Captain Mayhew, whose exertions during the disembarkation of the troops, tended greatly to its success; as also my Aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Chads, of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment; and Lieutenant Lambert, of the 56th Bengal Native Infantry, son of the Commodore, who were highly useful to me during the whole day.

Major Fraser, the Commanding Engineer of the Force, and Major Turton, in command of the Bengal Artillery, were with me the whole day, but from the nature of the operations, their particular services were not called into play, though they had made every disposition for the efficiency of their respective departments:

It will be obvious from the foregoing how greatly the success of the operations I have detailed, has depended on the co-operation of the sister branch of the service. His Excellency Rear-Admiral Austen, C.B., has throughout afforded me the most cordial assistance. Her Majesty's steamers "Rattler," "Hermes," and "Salamander," worked in concert with the troops throughout the day.

On my departure to-morrow, I intend to take with me to the Rangoon river the wings of the 18th and 80th Regiments, and the Company of Bengal Artillery, and the detachment of Madras Sappers and Miners doing duty at Moulmein.

In conjunction with Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, the Commissioner of these Provinces, I have put the 26th Madras Native Infantry, and a Company of European Madras Artillery, with a suitable battery of guns, as a garrison at Martaban, relievable from Moulmein, when it may be thought desirable.

In addition to which a war steamer has been placed by the Naval Commander-in-chief on the station. These arrangements are, I think, adequate to the protection of the place, and will, I trust, meet with the approbation of the Government of India.

In conclusion, I beg to remark that I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, who accompanied me during the whole of the operations of the 5th, and was, from his local knowledge, of much use to me.

I have, &c.

HENRY GODWIN.

Inclosure 12 in No. 1.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the Attack and Capture of Martaban, on the 5th of April, 1852.

*Assistant Adjutant-General's Office,
Rangoon, April 17, 1852.*

Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish Regiment of Foot.—7 rank and file wounded.

26th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—1 havildar, wounded.

Total.—1 havildar, 7 rank and file, wounded.

— Warrant and non-commissioned officers, rank and file, 8 wounded.

Grand total of killed, wounded, and missing.—8.

W. MAYHEW,
Captain, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Forces.

Inclosure 13 in No. 1.

Lieutenant-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Rangoon, April 18, 1852.

ON my return from Martaban on the 8th of April, I had the satisfaction to find the Madras division had arrived on the previous day, so that no time had been lost by my going to Martaban.

It was arranged that, during my absence at Moulmein, Commodore Lambert should, on the 5th instant, aided by some troops, destroy the stockades on the Rangoon river, which had long been troublesome, and had fired on the flag of truce. This had been so effectually performed as to leave hardly a sign of where the stockade had stood.

I shall now have the satisfaction of acquainting you, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, of the proceedings of this force, inclusive of the capture of the Great Dagon Pagoda at Rangoon, and the consequent fall of all around it.

The 9th of April I devoted to making every disposition for the landing of the troops, and to becoming acquainted with the heads of the departments of the Madras Division. I informed the Admiral, on the evening of that day, that my preparations were complete; and his Excellency proceeded up the river next day, close off Rangoon.

On the 11th, the Admiral moved opposite the old town, with the intention, the next morning, to bombard the whole line of stockades on both banks of the river; but some of the flotilla getting very near the shore were fired on, which brought on a return from our side, and ended in the general destruction of the whole line of defences, though the fire of the enemy proved fatal to many on board the shipping. The Admiral and Commodore took a most distinguished part in the operations, landing and setting fire to all around them. This powerful attack, from the steam-frigates of both Her Majesty's and the East India Company's Navy, completely cleared the ground for nearly a mile for our landing.

On Monday the 12th, at daybreak, the troops were ready, and by about 7 I had landed Her Majesty's 51st Light Infantry, the 18th Royal Irish, the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, and part of my Artillery. The Bengal guns, under Major Reid, were ordered to move in advance, covered by four companies of the 51st Light Infantry. They had not proceeded far, however, when, on opening some rising ground to our right, guns opened on us, and shortly after skirmishers showed themselves in the jungle. This was a new mode of fighting with the Burmese; no instance having occurred last war of their attacking our flanks, or leaving their stockades, that I remember ever to have taken place. I make this remark, as they are now not only good shots, but bold in their operations, and clever in selecting their ground, and covering themselves. Our casualties for the past three days will prove it—our dress exposing us, and their garb and colour concealing them.

On looking at the stockade whence the fire came, I perceived it was a strong work, which used to be called in the last war the White House Picket, a very strong position, and just in the way of our advance. A battery of four guns was immediately opened on it by Majors Reid and Oakes, the whole being under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Foord, Commandant of that arm. The fire of these guns was very effective. A storming party was formed of four companies of the 51st Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel St. Maur, with the Madras Sappers, under Major H. Fraser, Commanding Engineer, and advanced under cover of a jungle, on getting through which the musketry was so steady and effective from the stockades and adjoining buildings, that a great many of our party were killed and wounded; amongst whom were several officers.

I have to deplore the temporary loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, who was very bravely attending the army to witness its operation. Major Fraser took the ladders to the stockade most gallantly, and alone mounted the defences of the enemy, where his example soon brought around him the storming party, which carried the stockade, but at very severe loss on our part.

It was my intention to move on to the main object of our operations; but on looking around me at the complete exhaustion of the storming party, it now being 11 o'clock, under a sun that may be understood since Major Oakes, of the Madras Artillery, was struck down by it at his battery, and died; Brevet-Major Griffith, Madras Army, whilst conveying an order, died on the road; Lieutenant-Colonel Foord, Commandant of Artillery, was nearly a victim to the heat, and obliged to quit the field; Brigadier Warren and Lieutenant-Colonel St. Maur also suffered greatly; so that, under such destruction, I resolved to half where I was, and to concentrate the force in as strong a position as the country admitted of. We were teased by parties of the enemy hovering around us till the night closed, when all was quiet under the protection of our guns, which had been brought up to the front.

On Tuesday the 13th it was reported the heavy battery guns could not be landed and with me before the middle of that day, and also that rations for the troops could not be prepared in time to enable me to advance. I therefore held my position till the next morning.

His Lordship in Council knows well the spot where I proposed to force my way into the Great Pagoda; and the road I was about to move on, entirely turned all the defences of this real stronghold. The present position of Rangoon is entirely altered since the last war; within a few years, the old town, which stood on the river bank, has been utterly destroyed, its bricks now lying in heaps on its site. A new town has been formed about a mile and a quarter from the river; it is nearly a square, with a bund or mud wall about sixteen feet high, and eight broad: a ditch runs along each side of the square; and on the north side, where the Pagoda stands, it has been very cleverly worked into the defences, to which it forms a sort of citadel. The distance from the Pagoda to the south entrance of the town is about three quarters of a mile, and it is something more than that breadth from east to west. The old road from the river to the Pagoda comes up to the South Gate, running through the new town, and it was by this road the Burmese had settled that we should attack it, and where they had made every preparation to receive us, having armed the defences with nearly 100 pieces of cannon and other missiles, and with a garrison of at least 10,000 men. The attempt to assault on this side would, I am convinced, from the steady way the Burmese defend their works, have cost us half our force.

On Wednesday, the 14th, the troops were under arms at 5 A.M., all in as fine a temper as ever men were. Our march was to the north-west, through thick jungle; four light guns, 9-pounders, their flanks protected by two companies of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, the rest of the wing of that corps following, with two more guns, and the 18th Royal Irish and the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, formed the advance. The 51st Light Infantry, and the 35th Madras Native Infantry, were in reserve; the 9th Madras Native Infantry keeping open the communication with the shipping. We proceeded in this order for about a mile, when we opened the Great Pagoda, and its fire was turned on us. An excellent position for two guns was taken by Major Turton to our left flank; these were left under the command of Major Montgomery of the Madras Artillery, who served them well. The ground to the front, getting very difficult, barely admitted of the 80th and Royal Irish occupying it in close order. We had now completely turned the enemy's position, having passed their stockaded town, and got opposite the east side of the Great Pagoda, our main object. Major Turton informed me, that he had a favorable position to place in battery his heavy guns; but it took some time to bring them up, a service in which the navy brigade of about 120 men, under the command of Lieutenant Dorville, of Her Majesty's frigate "Fox," assisted by the Artillery, rendered their invaluable aid, under a heavy fire of guns and wall-pieces from the Great Pagoda and town, from which they suffered severely. Whilst this was going on, the enemy's artillery had got the range of our crowded position, and their skirmishers had somewhat closed upon us, and it took 500 men to keep down their fire. The practice of the heavy battery under Major Back was very effective. My intention was to have stormed the Pagoda at noon, but at a little after 11, Captain Latter, of the Bengal Army, my interpreter, assured me he felt confident, from what he could see of the east entrance to the Pagoda, on which our battery was playing, that the entrance was clear, and that he was prepared to show the way. As our people were dropping fast where we stood, I determined on an immediate assault. The storming party was formed of the

wing of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, under Major Lockhart, two companies of the Royal Irish, under Lieutenant Hewitt, and of two companies of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieutenant White, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, of the 18th Royal Irish, Captain Latter accompanying the party to show the road. The advance to the east entrance to the Pagoda was of about 800 yards, which the troops crossed in a most steady manner, under the fire of the walls crowded with the enemy, the remainder of the force following closely. When the storming party reached the steps, a tremendous rush was made to the upper terrace, and a deafening cheer told that the Pagoda no longer belonged to the Burmese. The enemy ran in confusion from the southern and western gates, where they were met by the fire of the steamers. All the country around has fallen with the Pagoda; and I understand the once strong post of Kemmendine has been abandoned and destroyed.

In this united service there has been not only a cordial cooperation between the army and navy, but so much good-heartedness, that their joint efforts have tended to secure the rapid success of this expedition. I cannot presume to say of Rear-Admiral Austen, C.B., commanding the Navy, more than to express my admiration and respect for his qualities, and to thank him for his able and never-failing assistance. Commodore Lambert, whose spirit never is at rest whilst any thing is to be done, and whose heart is ever ready to accomplish what he undertakes, has my cordial thanks and warmest gratitude. I particularly wish to draw the attention of his Lordship in Council to Commander Fishbourne, of Her Majesty's steamer "Hermes," who, from the first fitting out of the expedition in Calcutta to the close of these operations, has been indefatigable in assisting in the embarkation of stores and troops, and in removing difficulties, and finding resources, which alone enabled the expedition to sail at the time appointed; and nothing will give me such satisfaction as his aid, were a forward movement to be made hereafter.

My most difficult task now commences, that of recommending to the protection of the Governor-General in Council a number of brave men who have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves in a service where the utmost emulation and gallant devotion were shown by all.

I beg the Governor-General's consideration of the services of Brigadier Elliot, who was conspicuous in every place where he could be useful; of Lieutenant-Colonel Reignolds, who commands the Bengal Brigade, in consequence of Brigadier Warren's prostration by the sun, and who has borne a very large share in these operations, including Martaban; of Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, of the 18th Royal Irish, who commanded the storming party, when he was severely wounded; of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson, commanding the 40th Bengal Native Infantry in the assault; of Major Lockhart, commanding the wing of Her Majesty's 80th, on the same occasion; of Major Fraser, Commanding Engineer of the Force, who not only distinguished himself most gallantly at the White House stockade, but whose indefatigable exertions have never for a moment ceased; of Major Turton, who commanded the Artillery after Lieutenant-Colonel Foord's retirement, from illness, and whose labours in his department have been the cause of his suffering, I regret to say, under severe indisposition at the present moment; of Majors Reid, of the Bengal, and Montgomery, of the Madras Artillery; of Captain Rundall, commanding the Sappers and Miners; to all of whom I am deeply indebted.

The Assistant Adjutant-General of the Force, Captain Mayhew, was everywhere present during these three days' operations, and the assistance he has rendered me on all occasions has been very valuable. Major Allan, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, was severely wounded at the White House stockade; since when, Major Boulderson, my Deputy Judge Advocate-General, has been performing his duties, and has rendered essential assistance since the operations commenced. I beg to bring all three to the notice of Government.

The officers commanding brigades have recommended to my notice the valuable aid they have received from their respective Brigade Majors, Captain Call, of the 18th Royal Irish, and Captain Smith, of the 13th Madras Native Infantry; and Major Turton has brought to my attention the indefatigable exertions of Lieutenant Robertson, the Deputy Commissary of Ordnance, in landing his guns and stores.

I beg leave to bring to his Lordship's notice the assistance I have received from my aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Chads, of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment,

who was wounded at the White House stockade, but did not leave me during the operations, and Lieutenant Lambert, of the 56th Bengal Native Infantry, who, after great exertion, was one of the victims to the sun on that day, which obliges him to return to Calcutta, and who will convey these despatches.

In conclusion, I regret that the order of the landing of the troops did not afford me an opportunity of availing myself of the services of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, and 35th Madras Native Infantry, in the front; but they tended greatly to give freedom to my leading column, and will, from their soldierly bearing, doubtless do honor to the distinguished service to which they belong, when they are brought more closely under fire.

I have, &c.

HENRY GODWIN, *Lt.-Gen.*

Inclosure 14 in No. 1.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the Attack and Storming of Rangoon, on the 11th, 12th, and 14th April, 1852.

*Assistant Adjutant-General's Office,
Rangoon, April 17, 1852.*

Personal Staff.—1 European officer, wounded.

General Staff.—1 European officer, 1 serjeant, wounded.

Total.—2 European officers, 1 serjeant, wounded.

Engineer Department.—3 European officers, wounded.

Madras Sappers and Miners.—3 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 1 havildar, 8 rank and file, wounded.

Artillery.

Bengal Contingent.—1 serjeant, killed; 6 serjeants, wounded.

Madras Contingent.—1 serjeant, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 lascar, 3 syce drivers, wounded.

Infantry.—1st, or Bengal Brigade.

Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish.—1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, killed; 3 European officers, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 37 rank and file, wounded.

Her Majesty's 80th Foot (one wing).—1 serjeant, killed; 1 European officer, 3 serjeants, 1 drummer, 21 rank and file, wounded.

40th Bengal Native Infantry.—1 drummer, 3 rank and file, killed; 11 rank and file, wounded.

2nd, or Madras Brigade.

Her Majesty's 51st Regiment of Foot.—1 European officer, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 3 serjeants, 13 rank and file, wounded.

9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—1 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, wounded.

35th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—1 European officer, 1 havildar, 5 rank and file, wounded.

Total.—2 European officers, 4 serjeants, 1 drummer, 10 rank and file, killed; 12 European officers, 16 serjeants or havildars, 2 drummers, 95 rank and file, 1 lascar, 3 syce drivers, wounded.

European officers, 2 killed; 14 wounded.

Warrant and non-commissioned officers, rank and file, &c., 15 killed; 114 wounded.

Lascars, syce drivers, syces, &c., 4 wounded.

Total.—17 killed; 132 wounded.

Grand Total of killed, wounded, and missing.—149.

H. GODWIN, *Lieutenant-General, Commanding
the Forces in Ava, Arracan, and Tenasserim.*

W. MAYHEW, *Captain, Assistant Adjutant-
General of the Force.*

Officers Killed and Wounded.

Killed.

Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish.—Lieutenant R. Doran, April 14.

Her Majesty's 51st Foot.—Ensign A. N. Armstrong, April 11.

Wounded.

Personal Staff.—Lieutenant W. J. Chads, slightly.
 General Staff.—Captain G. Allen, severely.
 Engineer Department.—Second Lieutenant E. C. S. Williams, slightly; Second Lieutenant L. Donaldson, mortally, April 12; Second Lieutenant W. S. Trevor, slightly.
 Madras Sappers and Miners.—Captain J. W. Rundall, slightly; Lieutenant B. Ford, slightly.
 Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish.—Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Coote, severely; Captain W. T. Bruce, slightly; Lieutenant G. A. Elliot, slightly.
 Her Majesty's 80th Foot.—Lieutenant J. L. W. Nunn, slightly.
 Her Majesty's 51st Foot.—Captain W. Blundell, dangerously.
 9th Madras Native Infantry.—Ensign G. F. C. B. Hawkes, slightly.
 35th Madras Native Infantry.—Lieutenant W. C. P. Haines, dangerously.
 Commissioner, Tenasserim Provinces, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bogle, severely.

Inclosure 15 in No. 1.

Notification.

April 23, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council has the highest satisfaction in announcing that dispatches have this day been received, reporting the capture of Martaban and of Rangoon, by combined attacks of the naval and military forces now employed in Burmah.

The Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that, in honor of this success, a royal salute shall be fired at every principal station in India.

The dispatches will be published for general information.

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 2.

The Governor of Bombay in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

May 3, 1852. (No. 42.)

WE beg to forward a copy of a letter from Captain H. B. Lynch, of the Indian Navy, commanding the Indian Naval Squadron in the Bay of Bengal, to the address of Sir Henry Leeke, containing particulars of the capture of Rangoon by the British Naval and Military Forces, on the afternoon of the 14th ultimo.

Inclosure in No. 2.

*Captain H. B. Lynch, of the Indian Navy, to Commodore Sir Henry Leeke,
 Commander-in-chief of the Indian Navy.*

Sir,

Off Rangoon, April 14, 1852.

IN continuation of my last letter of the 10th instant, I have the honor to inform you that, Rear-Admiral Austen and the whole of the squadron having joined us below the Hastings Sand, on the evening of Saturday the 10th, the squadron under my command, each vessel having two transports in tow, on the morning of the 11th (with the exception of the "Zenobia," which vessel unfortunately grounded on the De Silva Shoal, and was not in company), crossed the Hastings Sand, and anchored a little below the stockades, having cast off the transports when clear over the Hastings Shoal. Almost immediately on our anchoring at 9.30 A.M. the enemy opened fire, which was returned by the "Feroze," "Sesostris," and "Moozuffer;" the "Berenice" and "Medusa" having anchored some distance below. At 9.40 A.M. the magazine of the principal stockade, at the King's Wharf, was blown up by a shell from the squadron; at 10 A.M. Her Majesty's ship "Fox" passed up in tow, and opened fire; the enemy's fire was soon silenced; at 10.15 A.M. ceased firing; and at 30 minutes past noon, a party from the "Fox" landed, took and burnt the Dalla stockade, on the right hand of the river. At 5 P.M. weighed and stood up the

river, anchoring ahead of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," abreast of the King's Wharf, the Admiral having previously taken and burnt the stockades on the right or Dalla bank of the river. At 5.15 P.M. two stockades, just above us, having opened fire, were quickly silenced by our fire, and the magazine of the stockade, on the upper wharf, blown up, when the enemy's fire ceased for the night. At 4 A.M. next morning (12th April), landed Her Majesty's 51st Regiment from the "Feroze" and "Sesostris," and the 9th and 35th Madras Native Infantry from the "Moozuffer" and "Zenobia;" the "Zenobia" having joined during the night. Having landed the troops, and obtained the Admiral's permission, proceeded up the river and anchored abreast the upper stockade, with the "Sesostris," "Moozuffer," and "Zenobia," and landed parties from the vessels of the squadron under the command of Captain Campbell, and burnt the stockades without opposition, the enemy having evacuated them previously to the landing of the party. Being now abreast the Great Pagoda, and the line of the principal stockade at the upper end of an open plain, commenced shelling, and found we could do so with effect, the shells bursting over the pagoda. Ceased firing by signal from the Admiral.

Commodore Lambert came on board and desired me to proceed to Kemmendine, where Her Majesty's brig "Serpent" and "Phlegethon" steamer had attacked the stockade; weighed and stood up, "Moozuffer" in company, and anchored at dark, ahead of the "Serpent," about three-quarters of a mile below the Kemmendine stockade.

The next morning (13th of April), flood tide having made (the river being too narrow to allow the ship to swing at anchor off the stockade), dropped up in company with the "Serpent," "Moozuffer," and "Phlegethon," abreast the stockade, which not returning our fire, landed a party from the vessels, as previously arranged, under command of the First Lieutenant of the "Serpent," and burnt the stockade, the enemy having evacuated it on the approach of the steamers. I then returned, "Moozuffer" in company, and rejoined the Admiral off Rangoon, anchoring in the same position as yesterday, abreast the Great Pagoda, and the squadron shelled the Pagoda during the night, by order of the Admiral; at 2 A.M. ceased firing, to allow the troops then near the stockade, to advance, and I am happy to inform you that Rangoon was taken by our troops this afternoon.

I send this off too hurriedly to be able to forward any other papers from the squadron, which I am happy to state is all in good order and health.

It is probable the "Moozuffer" will be detached for the protection of Martaban, the "Zenobia" and "Berenice" for troops to Vizagapatam, and "Sesostris" for Calcutta, with dispatches.

I have, &c.

H. B. LYNCH.

No. 3.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, May 3, 1852. (No. 20.)

WE have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the further papers regarding Rangoon affairs.

In these documents, our sentiments are expressed in warm, but not exaggerated, terms; for, in truth, no language could be employed too strong to convey the praise which is justly due to the gallantry, the fortitude, the patience, temper and discipline which have been exhibited, during the several operations on the coast, by all branches of the combined force, and by those who have led them so well.

We beg, most respectfully and most earnestly, to commend the services of these brave men, according to their several ranks, and recorded merit, to the gracious consideration of Her Majesty the Queen, and to the approbation and favour of the Court of Directors.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

*Notification.**Fort William, April 28, 1852.*

THE Governor-General of India in Council, having failed to obtain redress from the Court of Ava for injuries which had been inflicted on British subjects, in gross violation of existing treaties, was compelled to declare that reparation should be exacted by force of arms.

To that end an expedition was immediately prepared and dispatched to the coast, in the hope that a blow promptly struck against the Burmese Power might possibly lead to a concession of the just and moderate demands advanced by the Government of India, and might thus avert the necessity for engaging in extended and costly war.

The Governor-General in Council has had the satisfaction of publishing, for general information, dispatches which announce the success of the expedition, in the capture of Martaban, in the destruction of the formidable defences constructed along the river, and in the assault and occupation of the fortifications of Rangoon.

The Governor-General in Council cannot employ terms too strong in expressing his unqualified approbation of the brilliant service which has thus been performed, and his gratitude to those by whose joint exertions it has been achieved.

His admiration is due equally to the perfect cordiality and concert with which Navy and Army have acted together; to the gallantry which has been conspicuous in the field; and to the fortitude and patience with which all have endured, without a murmur, a fierceness of climate whose deadly influence is unhappily too well attested by the number of those who have fallen victims to its effects.

The Governor-General in Council especially desires to offer to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in these seas his warm acknowledgments of the ready cooperation, and of the very effective aid which his Excellency has afforded to the Government of India, by the powerful squadron under his command, whose operations he has so ably directed, and in whose services he has borne so distinguished a part.

To Lieutenant-General Godwin, commanding the forces in Ava, the Governor-General in Council begs leave to tender his most full and cordial thanks for the manner in which, by his intrepidity, his energy, and ability, he has brought the military operations of the force to their present successful issue; and to congratulate him upon having thus won fresh and higher honors upon the same scene on which he formerly gained so much distinction.

The Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in publicly rendering to Commodore Lambert his sincere acknowledgments of the promptitude with which he gave his assistance to the Government of India, of his constant exertion on its behalf during a trying service, and especially of the prominent share he has now borne in the destruction of the river defences; thus materially facilitating the movements of the squadron, and the ultimate success of the attack.

The best thanks of the Governor-General in Council are due to Brigadier Elliot, commanding the Madras Brigade, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Reignolds, who, after having taken a part in every operation of the troops, has assumed the command of the Bengal Brigade, from which, illness, which the Governor-General in Council regrets, has removed Brigadier Warren.

The Governor-General in Council is happy to record his appreciation of the essential service rendered by Captain Lynch, the senior officer of the Indian Navy, to whose ability, judgment, and discretion his Excellency the Rear-Admiral has borne his testimony on this occasion.

And his Lordship in Council, at the same time, desires to mark his sense of the services of Commander Mellersh, of Commander Fishbourne, by whose aid the Government has largely profited, of Commander Tarleton, Commander Luard, Lieutenant Rice, R. N., Captain Neblett, of E. I. C. steamer "Phlegethon," and of Surgeon Minter, whose personal exertions have been severally commended by his Excellency.

The Governor-General in Council has to add his marked acknowledgments of the valuable assistance afforded during the attack on the land defences of Rangoon by Lieutenant Dorville, R.N., and the Naval Brigade under his orders.

The Governor-General in Council has further remarked with gratification the distinguished conduct of Captain Brooking, of E. I. C. steamer "Proserpine." His Lordship in Council wishes to express his warm approbation of conduct which has elicited the applause both of the Admiral and of the General who witnessed it.

The conspicuous gallantry of Major Fraser, commanding the Engineers, and his indefatigable exertions since the expedition was resolved upon, more especially in the field, command the highest praise, and the best thanks of the Supreme Government.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Foord, commanding the Artillery; to Major Turton and Major Reid, of the Bengal Artillery; to Major Montgomery, of the Madras Artillery; to Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, of Her Majesty's 18th, who has been severely wounded; to Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson, of the 40th Native Infantry; to Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, of the 26th Madras Native Infantry; and to Major Lockhart, of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment; to Captain Mayhew, Deputy Adjutant-General, whose value is specially remarked; to Captain Allan, Deputy Quartermaster-General; to Captain Call and Captain Smith, Brigade Majors; to Lieutenant Robertson, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance; to Captain Gillespie, who led the assault at Martaban; and Captain Campbell, of Her Majesty's 18th; to Captain Rundall, commanding Madras Sappers and Miners; to Captain Chads and Lieutenant Lambert, Aides-de-Camp to the Lieutenant-General; the services of all of whom have been noticed with approbation by General Godwin; the Governor-General in Council begs to offer his earnest thanks.

The Governor-General in Council has to offer his thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Bogle, Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, for the valuable aid he rendered to General Godwin in connexion with the attack upon Martaban; and his Lordship in Council particularly desires to record his approbation of the energetic and successful exertions of the Commissioner in giving effect to the preparations of the Government for ensuring, as far as possible, the health and comfort of the troops to be employed upon the expedition.

Captain Latter, who has discharged his functions hitherto to the entire satisfaction of the Government, has added to his claims by the duty which he well performed in the assault on the Pagoda at Rangoon.

Not only to the officers he has thus specially named, but to all the officers, to the non-commissioned officers, of whatever designation, and to the soldiers and sailors of the force, the Governor-General in Council desires to convey his true and hearty thanks for the alacrity, the endurance, the bravery and good conduct they have displayed during the several operations in which they have been engaged.

The Governor-General in Council deeply laments to know that our success has not been achieved without the sacrifice of valued lives.

He deplores the loss of Major Oakes, and of Brevet Major Griffith, of the Madras Army; of Lieutenant Armstrong, of Her Majesty's 51st Regiment; of Lieutenant Donaldson, of the Bengal Engineers; of Lieutenant Doran, of Her Majesty's 18th, who nobly perished in the front of the assault; and of the Reverend Mr. Baker, Chaplain of Her Majesty's ship Fox, and other brave men, who died in the performance of their several duties in the service of their country.

It shall be the first care of the Governor-General in Council to bring the conduct and services of the naval and military forces on the coast of Burmah under the most favorable notice of Her Majesty's Government, and of the East India Company.

By order of the Governor-General in Council,

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Lieutenant-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, April 22, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to advise you, for the information of the Governor-General of India in Council, that everything remains quiet in this neighbourhood. There are various accounts of the defeated Burmese army, under the late Governor of Rangoon, and they tend to the conclusion that he may be retreating up the country with a very small force.

The inhabitants of the villages around visit Rangoon, and bring in various articles for sale. The old inhabitants are partially settling themselves in the vicinity of the Old Town; and great numbers of Burmese are in our employ as coolies.

It has been reported to me that a detachment of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, in garrison at Martaban, had marched against a post occupied by the enemy, which it most spiritedly routed on the 11th instant, without loss; and that, on the 14th, the pickets at Martaban were attacked, and the enemy beaten off with great spirit by the same corps, commanded by Captain Welch, at a very trifling loss. All this will, I have no doubt, subside on the fall of Rangoon becoming known.

I sincerely regret having omitted to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council, in my dispatch of the 18th instant, how much I am indebted to Mr. Crisp, junior, for his able assistance in conducting the army through very difficult ground, on its progress to the Great Pagoda, which he performed, under the fire of the enemy, with great coolness and courage.

I rejoice greatly to say the wounded are doing very well. The skill, the labour, the attention, and the humanity of Superintending-Surgeon Montgomerie, and of the Medical department generally under him, call for the warmest approbation of the Government.

Major Fraser, Commanding Engineer, has been indefatigable in his exertions in his own department, and indeed everywhere, to get this place into some order and cleanliness.

He has requested me to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council the gallant conduct of Second Lieutenant W. S. Trevor, Assistant Field Engineer, who was the first on the ladder, and there wounded, at the White House Stockade, on the 12th; as also of Lieutenants Craster (Bengal) and Mayne (Madras), Engineers, who were very forward on the same occasion.

My greatest pleasure, however, is to bring before his Lordship in Council the admirable conduct and temper of this force:—its discipline and regularity of demeanour are unexceptionable.

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN,

*Lieutenant-General, Commanding the Forces in Ava,
Arracan, and Tenasserim Provinces.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Notification.

Fort William, May 1, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council directs that the following extract of a further dispatch received from Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., commanding the Forces in Ava, Arracan, and Tenasserim Provinces, dated the 22nd ultimo, be published for general information:

“I sincerely regret having omitted to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council, in my dispatch of the 18th instant, how much I am indebted to Mr. Crisp, junior, for his able assistance in conducting the army through very difficult ground, on its progress to the Great Pagoda, which he performed, under the fire of the enemy, with great coolness and courage.

“I rejoice greatly to say the wounded are doing very well. The skill, the

labour, the attention, and the humanity of Superintending-Surgeon Montgomerie, and of the Medical department generally under him, call for the warmest approbation of the Government.

“Major Fraser, Commanding Engineer, has been indefatigable in his exertions in his own department, and indeed everywhere, to get this place into some order and cleanliness.

“He has requested me to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council the gallant conduct of Second Lieutenant W. S. Trevor, Assistant Field Engineer, who was the first on the ladder, and there wounded, at the White House stockade on the 12th, as also of Lieutenants Craster (Bengal), and Mayne (Madras), Engineers, who were very forward on the same occasion.

“My greatest pleasure, however, is to bring before his Lordship in Council the admirable conduct and temper of this force:—its discipline and regularity of demeanour are unexceptionable.”

The Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in acknowledging the skill and attention exhibited by Superintending-Surgeon Montgomerie; and he rejoices to learn that by the exertions of the Medical department, the wounded men are doing well.

The Governor-General in Council begs to offer his thanks to the officers now brought under his notice; to Lieutenant Trevor and to Lieutenant Craster, Bengal Engineers; to Lieutenant Mayne, Madras Engineers; as well as to Mr. Crisp, junior, whose service has been noticed by the Lieutenant-General.

By order of the Governor-General of India in Council.

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 4.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, June 2, 1852. (No. 23.)

WE beg to transmit herewith a copy of further correspondence connected with Rangoon affairs.

Inclosure I in No. 4.

Lieutenant-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

(Extract.)

Head-Quarters, Rangoon, May 14, 1852.

IN my report of the 18th of April, I had the honor to recommend to the favorable consideration of the Governor-General in Council the valuable service I had received during the operations of the 12th, 13th, and 14th, from Brevet Major Boulderson, the Deputy Judge Advocate-General of the force, who had requested to follow me in the field, and who, when Captain Allan, the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, was wounded at the White House stockade, was appointed to officiate for him. He has been of the greatest assistance to me in both departments by his ability and zeal, and I therefore venture to bring to notice the omission of his name in the General Orders of the 28th of April, which I entirely attribute to oversight, and earnestly request may be rectified.

A few omissions and errors, inseparable from the recent formation of the forces I command, have occurred in the preparation of my dispatch of the 18th of April, which I solicit the favor of being allowed to correct, should his Lordship in Council see fit to extend his grace.

Brigadier Warren, whose absence from the army I greatly regret, has reported to me the services of the companies of the 18th Royal Irish, which under his immediate command assisted, in the ‘Tenasserim,’ at the destruction of the three stockades at the entrance of the Rangoon river on the 5th of April. The Brigadier was, with the same companies, under the heavy fire of the stockades on the Dalla and Rangoon sides of the river, on the 11th of April. He also was in command of his brigade during the greater part of the 12th of April.

Major Fraser has brought to my notice the very gallant conduct of his Adjutant, Lieutenant Williams, of the Engineers, at the White House stockade, where he was very prominent. The Major has also pointed out that Lieutenant Ford was the officer who commanded the detachment of Madras Sappers and Miners at Martaban, and who should have received the thanks of Government, instead of Captain Rundall, who had not joined the force, and who very honorably disclaims the praise.

Captain Christie, of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, has been brought to my notice as the officer who commanded the portion of the storming party from that corps at Martaban; he partook in the subsequent operations on that day.

The Commandant of Artillery has also pointed out the omission, on my part, of the services of Brevet Major Back, in command of the Madras Artillery contingent, who directed the heavy battery in the action of the 14th April, which I commended as having been served with precision and effect.

The services of Brevet Captain Scott, of the Madras Brigade of the Artillery, have also escaped my notice; he has been mentioned in very complimentary terms by the officers commanding the Bengal and Madras contingents of Artillery.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Notification.

Fort William, May 27, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council having learnt by a dispatch from Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., commanding the forces in Ava, Arracan, and the Tenasserim Provinces, that the name of Brevet-Major Boulderson, Deputy Judge Advocate-General of the Force, who had also acted as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, and was commended by the Lieutenant-General, was omitted in the Governor-General's Order, dated April the 28th, and having further been informed that Captain Rundall had been erroneously mentioned in the dispatch as commanding the Madras Sappers and Miners, instead of Lieutenant Ford, his Lordship in Council desires to correct the omission and the error, and to offer to Major Boulderson and to Lieutenant Ford the thanks which are their due.

C. ALLEN,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 5.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, June 2, 1852. (No. 24.)

WE have much satisfaction in forwarding for your information the accompanying copy of dispatches from Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., and Commodore Lambert, announcing the gratifying intelligence of the capture of the city of Bassein by the combined Military and Naval Forces.

We have, &c.

DALHOUSIE.
F. CURRIE.
J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Lieutenant-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, Head-Quarters, May 24, 1852.

THE Governor-General having expressed some anxiety about the south part of Arracan, as being in the neighbourhood of Bassein, I resolved, as soon as I could conveniently leave Rangoon, to take a detachment, and personally visit the place. On expressing this intention to Commodore Lambert, he, to my very great pleasure, said he would accompany me. I fixed on Monday, the 17th of May, and had a detachment warned to be ready to embark on that morning, consisting of 400 of the 51st King's Own Light Infantry, 300 of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, 67 Madras Sappers, and a serjeant and 6 gunners of the Bengal Artillery. The whole party was placed under the command of Major Errington, of the 51st Light Infantry.

The Commodore appointed three fine vessels to carry the troops, the East India Company's steam-frigates "Sesostris" and "Moozuffer" and the "Tenasserim," with a smaller steamer, the "Pluto," carrying the naval brigade and Marines of Her Majesty's frigate "Fox."

We cleared the Rangoon river on the afternoon of Monday, the 17th, and on the next evening anchored off Negrais Island, leading into the Bassein river. At daybreak the next morning, the flotilla weighed, and we ascended that most beautiful stream for sixty miles, which, at four o'clock, brought us in view of the defences, of about a mile long, of the city of Bassein: we had passed some new stockades, one at, and the other south of, Naputa, a few miles below the town, which were not armed; but these consisted of one extensive stockade, with several hundred men in it, fully armed, and with cannon.

The enemy looked at us, but did not show any disposition to molest us. The flotilla arrived at the left of their position, a strong well-built mud fort, armed with cannon and men. This we passed within two hundred yards, and so in succession all their defences for nearly a mile, till the "Tenasserim," with the Commodore and myself on board, anchored opposite a golden pagoda, centrally situated within the defences. The steamers anchored in succession, without bringing down the fire of a single musket.

The admirable position taken up by the steamers induced me to order the immediate landing of the troops. The enemy appeared so completely surprised and paralyzed by our approach, that I gave orders not to fire unless fired on, and to take possession of the pagoda. Nearly all the men of Her Majesty's 51st Foot got on shore under the pagoda, before a shot was fired. Captain Latter, my interpreter, accompanied Captain Darroch, with a company of the 51st, on shore, and landed on the extreme right of the works, opposite a traverse covering a gateway; and there a parley was held between Captain Latter and some Burmese on the walls, which brought on the first discharge of musketry, killing a serjeant and wounding two men. This fire was taken up, ran down the works, but soon ceased.

At this time Major Errington made his advance on the pagoda, and carried it in most gallant style, the 51st Light Infantry maintaining nobly the character they had ever commanded by their courage and distinguished conduct in the field.

The contest that stamped the operations of this remarkable day with a brilliant conclusion was the attack on the mud fort, most scientifically built, and of great extent, which could only have been constructed, under a despotism that commanded the labour of its subjects, in the short time they had been about it. It was not entirely completed in its details within. The storming party under Major Errington proceeding to the left of the Burmese works, accompanied by Lieutenant Rice, of Her Majesty's frigate "Fox," and Lieutenant Ford, of the Madras Sappers, came upon this mud fort fully garrisoned and well armed. The attack was most determined, as was the defence obstinate. It was bravely stormed, but with the consequence of Major Errington and several officers and men being severely wounded. Lieutenant Ansléy, with a small detachment of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, shared in this contest; he was severely wounded, and the corps proved itself to be as good as it looks, and it is one of the nicest corps I have ever seen; its gallantry and devotion on this occasion claiming the

admiration of all who witnessed it. The whole affair was over a little after six o'clock.

While these operations had been going on, the Commodore had claimed the services of Captain Campbell, of the "Sesostris," and his men, in destroying a large stockade on the opposite bank of the river; they drove off the Burmese, fired the stockade, and took six guns.

I am informed from several sources that the enemy suffered very severely in the contest in the mud fort.

In having the honor, as well as the gratification, of reporting to the Governor-General in Council the possession of this important station, I will observe that, from every indication of preparation going on, the Government of this country intended to make it a most powerful place, and to repair the loss of Rangoon by establishing Bassein as their mart of communication with this country, as well as a powerful position to keep in subjection the Pegu population, so decidedly and ever our friends, and also to maintain a threatening attitude towards the south of Arracan.

By leaving Bassein to itself, I should have been giving it back to the soldiery just driven out, as the defences had been built, and put into the improved state I have described by five thousand men from the upper country, commanded by a man of reputation. To secure it, I have left a garrison of two companies (160 men) of the 51st Light Infantry, and 300 men of the 9th Madras Native Infantry. These will be reinforced by an officer of Artillery and half a company, with two 9-pounder guns; the garrison now possessing two 12-inch howitzers. These, with two months' rations, will leave this on, or about, the 26th instant. Major Roberts, of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, will proceed in the same vessel to take command of Bassein: he is an experienced and excellent officer.

I consider that in a few weeks the Burmese soldiery of the upper country will have returned to their homes, meeting with no sympathy from the Pegu population; and the Pegu soldiers themselves are already with their families; so that the garrison I have left could, in a military point of view, be withdrawn in six weeks, and it will then remain with the Government of India to decide whether it hold during the war this very important place. If so, further arrangements will be very necessary. Major Fraser, the commanding engineer, should visit it: a very little expense will make it a secure position. The barrack houses the soldiery are now in are excellent, and well built of wood. Fresh meat can be had, as the population of the place are coming under our protection in great numbers.

I may here remark, that that most admirable officer and clear-seeing man, my most respected late commander, Sir A. Campbell, attached great importance to the holding of Bassein.

After passing two clear days in arranging for the stability of the detachment to be left there, on the morning of the 22nd, the flotilla, with the exception of the "Sesostris," which remains, weighed at daybreak, and reached Rangoon on the 23rd of May, after an absence of only seven days.

To Commodore Lambert, and to this combined expedition, the Governor-General in Council owes all that professional ability and unremitting exertion could accomplish towards success, to which they so largely contributed. The East India Company's steamer "Proserpine," Commander Brooking, arrived twenty-four hours after the place was taken; but even so, his activity was not lost, for he and his vessel went off the morning before we weighed, and destroyed the stockade that I mentioned to have passed on the way up the river.

Major Errington, of Her Majesty's 51st Light Infantry, who commanded the detachment of troops embarked for Bassein, who principally directed this detachment, and who fought this detachment, deserves the particular thanks of the Governor-General in Council. I have great pleasure in forwarding his report of the operations for the perusal of his Lordship in Council.

I beg the best consideration of Government for Captain Rice and Lieutenant Carter, of the 51st Light Infantry, and for Lieutenant Ansley of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, all three severely wounded at the assault of the fort, and also for Lieutenant Ford, of the Sappers and Miners, on the same occasion, for Lieutenant Rice, of Her Majesty's frigate "Fox," who commanded the naval brigade, and who was severely wounded whilst particularly distinguishing himself in the attack of the fort.

It has been brought to my notice that Mr. Duncan, the second officer of the East India Company's ship "Tenasserim," at the head of a party of men of his ship, behaved most gallantly upon the same occasion.

To Captain Darroch, of the 51st Light Infantry, and to Captain Latter, my interpreter, thanks are due for their gallantry in forcing the traverse, and entering at the gate on the right of the enemy's position. Lieutenant Craster, of the Bengal Engineers, also merits thanks, and the plan of Bassein, which I inclose for the Governor-General's inspection, will prove his professional competency. To Lieutenants Elliott and Nightingale, with the marines of Her Majesty's frigate "Fox," and to Captain Campbell, of the East India Company's frigate "Sesostris," I beg your Lordship in Council's kind consideration. To Doctor M'Cosh, and the officers of the medical department, thanks are particularly due.

The naval part of the expedition, both sailors and marines, supported the character that has ever been theirs, of undaunted courage.

I have been considered wanting sometimes in not more particularly naming corps or individuals; but in this peculiar warfare of constant assaults on well-armed and strong positions, often well defended, it has been the noble emulation of all to be first into the enemy's works. It was in such an effort of ambition that that fine and gallant young officer, Lieutenant Doran, of the 18th Royal Irish, fell, pierced with four balls, far in advance of his proper post; indeed I might fill my report with names, were all to be individualized.

I now beg particularly to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council Major Boulderson, of the Madras Army, the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General of the Force, who on this occasion accompanied me, and filled the two posts of Assistant Adjutant and Assistant Quartermaster-General to the expedition, as I could not move from their important duties at Rangoon Adjutant-General Mayhew nor Quartermaster-General Allan.

The Major has been of much essential service to me in various ways; and the judicious manner in which he posted the pickets after the capture of Bassein, in that wilderness of houses and jungle, tended to the perfect security of the force. Captain Chads, my aide-de-camp, never leaves me, and always makes himself particularly useful.

Since my last report, nothing worthy of note has occurred at Rangoon. The town is increasing in importance by the crowds of natives who daily come in, with their families and goods, as is the case throughout the neighbourhood, but especially at Kemmendine, which is as large a place as Rangoon.

The conduct of the troops is excellent, and their health is improving daily since the rain has set in.

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN.

P.S.—When recalling the omissions I have been unaware of in my dispatches, it has occurred to me that I have not done justice to Captain J. J. Wood, of the 18th Royal Irish, who, on the 14th of April, commanded his corps, during the storm, into the Great Pagoda, Lieutenant-Colonel Coote holding at the time a separate command, that of the storming party. I shall feel greatly obliged by the notice of the Governor-General in Council of this deserving officer, who is of long standing.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Major A. C. Errington, of Her Majesty's 51st Foot, to Lieutenant-General Godwin.

Sir,

Off Bassein, May 22, 1852.

THE operations being concluded, I have the honor now to lay before you a report of the assault and capture of the strong stockades erected by the enemy at Bassein, by the troops under my command, on the 19th instant.

The East India Company's steamers having anchored in succession at about half-past 4, P.M., in front of Bassein, a signal was made for the troops to land. This was effected in a very short time, and the ground occupied was an open space running along the river in front of the stockade. The work was full of armed men, and several guns were in position. I formed the troops in line.

The whole force had not landed when a fire from the enemy was opened upon us. This was a signal for the troops to advance, which was done in the

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most gallant style; the stockade was surmounted, the Chief Pagoda gained, and the enemy were driven in every direction. Considering the sharp fire that was opened upon us in this gallant attack, our loss of killed and wounded was small.

Having formed the troops in the Pagoda, companies were sent out by your orders in different directions to disperse the enemy.

A most important duty still remained to be performed. The enemy's stronghold, a fortified position to the south of the town, was still unmolested.

A company of Her Majesty's 51st, under Captain Rice, and two of the Madras Native Infantry, under Captain Borthwick, were selected to assault this position. I accompanied this detachment myself, in order to be an eye-witness of what I knew would be a most dashing operation. I halted the party for a few minutes on the road, as Captain Borthwick had not come up, where I was joined by a few seamen and marines, under Lieutenant Rice, Royal Navy, by a party of Madras Sappers, with ladders, under Lieutenant Ford, and by a subdivision of the 9th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Ansley. As it was getting late, I decided upon not waiting for the remainder of the 9th.

Taking a circuitous route, we came out in rear of the stockade, in an open space, which afforded us a distinct view of this formidable position. I here detached Lieutenant Ansley, with his party, to the right, to attack in reverse the north-east side.

Our further progress was impeded by water and low thick jungle, obliging us to take another direction, which brought the party out upon a brick road leading straight up to the north-east angle of the work. Upon opening the position, and when within fifteen yards of it, a severe fire of musketry, guns, and jingals, was opened upon us by the enemy. I was struck in the groin, which disabled me at once. Lieutenant Rice, Royal Navy, whilst bravely leading on his men, was shot through the hand. Captain Rice, Her Majesty's 51st Light Infantry, whilst gallantly leading his company up to the assault, was shot through the lower part of the neck; his place was gallantly taken by his subaltern, Lieutenant Carter, who, followed by his men, was the first on the parapet. He was struck down by a musket-ball, and rolled over the exterior slope, but still insisted upon being carried into the work. Lieutenant Ansley, of the Madras 9th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Ford, Madras Sappers, mounted the parapet in the most gallant manner, the former receiving a wound through the right hand. The enemy now gave way in every direction, followed by the victorious troops under the command of Lieutenant Ford.

Thus, in forty minutes from the time the troops landed, the whole of the enemy's works were in possession.

In conclusion, I beg to bring to your notice the noble conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of all arms, who took place in the assault, and the cheerfulness and alacrity with which every individual appeared anxious to perform his duty.

I beg to inclose a list of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.

A. C. ERRINGTON, Major.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the Attack and Capture of Bassein, on the 19th of May, 1852.

Head-Quarters, Rangoon, May 24, 1852.

Her Majesty's 51st Regiment of King's Own Light Infantry.—2 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 11 rank and file, wounded.

9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—1 European officer, 1 havildar, 6 rank and file, wounded.

Total.—2 rank and file, killed; 5 European officers, 1 havildar, 17 rank and file, wounded.

European Officers, 5 wounded.

Warrant and non-commissioned officers, rank and file, &c., 2 killed; 18 wounded.

Total.—2 killed; 23 wounded.

Grand Total of killed, wounded, and missing.—25.

W. MAYHEW, Captain,
Assistant Adjutant-General of the Barmah Field Force.

Officers Wounded.

Her Majesty's 51st Foot.—Major Errington, slightly; Captain Darroch, slightly; Captain Rice, very severely; Lieutenant Carter, severely.
9th Madras Native Infantry.—Lieutenant Ansley, severely.

W. MAYHEW.

*Return of Ordnance captured in the Fortifications of the City of Bassein,
on the 19th of May, 1852.*

On the works round the city.—Guns, 30; jingals, 6.
In the mud-fort.—Guns, 16; jingals, 20.
In the stockade opposite the town.—Guns, 6; jingals, 6.
In a mud-fort at Naputa.—Guns, 2.
Total.—Guns, 54; jingals, 32.
Grand Total.—86.

W. MAYHEW.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

*Her Majesty's ship "Fox's" Boat, at Bassein,
May 20, 1852.*

Sir,

I REQUEST you may be pleased to inform the Governor-General of India in Council, that the Lieutenant-General commanding the Forces having communicated his wish to make an attack on the city of Bassein, I placed a squadron of four steamers at his disposal for this service.

On the morning of the 17th instant, Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., the Commander of the Forces, embarked in the squadron with 400 of Her Majesty's 51st Regiment, 300 of the 9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, 60 Sappers and Miners, the Royal Marines, and a detachment of seamen with a field-gun from Her Majesty's ship "Fox."

I left the naval force at Rangoon, in charge of Commander Tarleton, with the "Fox," and went with my boat to the "Tenasserim," in which steamer I hoisted my broad pendant, and put to sea at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, with the steamers named in the inclosure marked A.

The Lieutenant-General accompanied me in the "Tenasserim."

On the evening of the 28th, we anchored off the Island of Negrais, at the entrance of the Bassein river, where the "Pluto" joined us. I had sent her on from Rangoon a day previously, as her small power could not have enabled her to keep up with the steam-frigates.

At daylight on the 19th, the squadron weighed and proceeded up the river, the "Pluto," from her light draught, being a-head, showing the soundings. The "Tenasserim" led, followed by the "Sesostris" and "Moozuffer," at half a cable's length distant.

At a few minutes after 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the fortifications of Bassein appeared in sight, consisting of a very extensive mud fort, and a long line of stockade on the left bank, on which the city stands, and a strong stockade round the Pagoda, with a brick parapet fronting the river. Then, in an admirable position on the right bank, stood a very large stockade, mounting several cannon.

The enemy permitted the squadron to approach unmolested.

At half-past 4, when abreast the stockade, I made the signal to anchor; immediately afterwards, Lieutenant-General Godwin expressed his wish to land the troops, which was effected in perfect order in a very short period. They had scarcely formed, under the Lieutenant-General's direction, when a heavy fire was opened, both with cannon and musketry, from the various stockades, which was instantly answered by a cheer from the party landed, who stormed and carried the Pagoda.

As soon as the enemy commenced firing, the ships opened their fire on the different batteries.

Observing the stockade opposite the town had been silenced, I directed

Commander Campbell, of the "Sesostris," to land with the boats of his own ship and the "Moozuffer's," and to storm it, which he effected in gallant style, driving the Burmese from their guns with considerable loss to them in killed and wounded.

Commander Campbell has called my special attention to the zeal and activity displayed on this occasion by Lieutenants Robinson and Lewis, of the Indian Navy.

At half-past 5, I had the satisfaction of hearing that the last and most formidable of the stockades had been carried, but not without considerable loss on our part, from the great resistance shown by the enemy.

Amongst those I have to enumerate as sufferers on this occasion, I have to name Lieutenant George W. Rice, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," who received a severe and painful wound through the right hand, whilst gallantly leading his party of seamen into the stockade.

I feel it my duty also to mention the steady conduct of the Royal Marines, under the command of First-Lieutenant John Elliott; and I cannot conclude without expressing my best thanks to Commanders Campbell and Hewett, of the Indian Navy, for the skill and ability with which they brought their ships up a river, which had hitherto been but imperfectly surveyed, for a distance of more than sixty miles; nor can I refrain from expressing how much I am indebted to Commanders Dicey and Burbank, of the Bengal Marine, for the assistance I received from them; and I attribute our being able to perform this service without accident to the careful and judicious manner with which the commander of the "Pluto" went in advance, and communicated the soundings.

I cannot forbear bringing to his Lordship's notice, Mr. Francis Duncan, second officer of the "Tenasserim;" he was by the side of Lieutenant Rice when he was wounded; and in storming the stockade his conduct was most gallant.

My thanks are general to the officers and men who served under my orders on this occasion, for the steady, gallant, and cheerful conduct with which they performed the duty; neither can I omit remarking that the most perfect unanimity prevailed between the two services.

Since my last visit to Negrais, the old Governor of Bassein has been removed, and the government entrusted to another officer who arrived here from Ava with 4000 regular troops, which increased the strength of the garrison to 6000 men.

I have the honor to forward herewith a list of killed and wounded in the squadron: the casualties among the troops, I understand, amounted to about twenty-five more: and I also inclose a return of the number of cannon captured from the enemy.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT, *Commodore.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

A List of the Naval Force commanded by Commodore Lambert in the Action and Capture at the City of Bassein, on the 19th of May, 1852.

East India Company's steam-sloop "Tenasserim;" Commander, W. Dicey, broad pendant of Commodore Lambert, R.N.—8-inch, 2; 32-pounder, 4; total, 6 guns. Officers and crew, 139. Also on board, Commodore Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox;" James L. Southey, Esq., Secretary; Mr. G. Digby Morant, Signal Midshipman; and a boat's crew of the "Fox."

East India Company's steam-frigate "Sesostris;" Commander, C. D. Campbell, I.N.—8-inch, 2; 32-pounders, 2; 12-pounders, 2; total, 6 guns. Officers and crew, 168.

East India Company's steam-frigate "Moozuffer;" Commander, H. H. Hewett, I.N.—8-inch, 5; 32-pounders, 2; total, 7 guns. Officers and crew, 228.

East India Company's steam-vessel "Pluto;" Commander, C. Burbank.—32-pounder, 1; 12-pounders, 4; 6-pounders, 2; total, 7 guns. Officers and crew, 80.

A party of seamen from Her Majesty's ship "Fox;" Lieutenant Geo. W. Rice in command—12-pounder, 1; total, 1 gun. Officers and crew, 19. Includes Mr. F. M. Lisboa, Midshipman; and Mr. Fred. Morgan, Assistant-Surgeon.

Royal Marines of Her Majesty's ship "Fox;" First Lieutenant John Elliott in command. Officers and crew, 45. Includes Second Lieutenant Nightingale.

Total.—8-inch, 9; 32-pounders, 9; 12-pounders, 7; 6-pounders, 2. Total of guns, 27. Total of officers and crews, 679.

G. R. LAMBERT, *Commodore.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

List of Killed and Wounded in the Squadron under the command of Commodore Lambert, at the Capture of the City of Bassein, on the 19th of May, 1852.

"Tenasserim," David Hughes, A.B., wounded, slightly; contused wound by a bullet.

"Pluto," Mr. Charles Bolt, purser, wounded, slightly; contused wound.

Party of seamen from Her Majesty's ship "Fox," under the command of Lieutenant George Rice.—George Woolridge, boatswain's mate, killed; shot through the head. George W. Rice, Lieutenant, Royal Navy, wounded, severely; musket-ball through hand and wrist. George Odgers, A.B., wounded, severely; musket-ball through fleshy part of thigh. Thomas Metcalfe, A.B., wounded, severely; musket-ball through the right shoulder.

Royal Marines of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," under the command of First Lieutenant John Elliott.—John Elliott, First Lieutenant, wounded, slightly; contused wound by a bullet in right arm. Samuel Gray, private, wounded, dangerously; musket-ball through the arm. George Davis, private, wounded, slightly; musket-ball through the finger. George Jones, private, wounded, slightly; bayonet wound in the thigh.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox," 1 killed and 7 wounded;

"Tenasserim," 1 wounded.

"Pluto," 1 wounded.

Total.—1 killed, and nine wounded.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure 7 in No. 5.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

H.M.S. "Fox," Rangoon, May 24, 1852.

REFERRING to my dispatch of the 20th instant, I request you will inform his Lordship in Council, that after we had obtained possession of the city of Bassein, I sent the "Pluto" a short distance up the river, to endeavour to intercept the retreating army.

She returned next morning, and Commander Burbank acquainted me that he proceeded up the river above Bassein about forty miles; that he communicated with the village of Mamoon, from which the inhabitants came off, and informed him that one of the party then on board was a person of high command at Bassein during the attack; that he then arrested this person, and he has delivered him over to me, together with another officer of high rank.

Commander Burbank having been informed that a party of the retreating force, in two boats, had that night left the village, he proceeded in chase, succeeded in capturing one of the boats, in which he found a quantity of arms and ammunition, which he destroyed; the troops landed, and fled into the jungle.

The "Pluto" afterwards fell in with another portion of the defeated Burmese, encamped, but who fled on being observed, leaving their arms, all which have been destroyed, as well as their barracks.

A party of seamen from the "Fox" embarked in the "Pluto," to assist in the operations, under Mr. Lisboa, midshipman (Brazilian Navy).

The "Proserpine" steam-vessel, having joined me from Moulmein, I dispatched her, with the "Fox's" marines, to destroy some unoccupied stockades in the neighbourhood of the village of Naputa, which was accomplished without any opposition, assisted by the villagers.

I also request you will inform his Lordship that the squadron under my command, detached to Bassein, returned to Rangoon on the 23rd, with the exception of the "Sesostris," which I left to cooperate with the troops in garrisoning that place, and of the "Pluto," which I have sent to Penang, agreeably to orders I had received from Rear-Admiral Austen.

In continuation of my letter of the 11th of May, I request that his Lordship may be informed that the "Phlegethon" returned here to-day, having made a most successful expedition, in conjunction with the barge of this ship, in charge of Acting-Lieutenant Lawrence, which I had dispatched to rejoin that vessel.

While Commander Neblett was waiting for sufficient water to get into the Rangoon river, I directed him to reconnoitre Donabew; he accordingly proceeded to that place, and found that the Governor of Dallah had fled, and that this once famous stronghold was unoccupied and defenceless. The inhabitants

seemed desirous of affording every assistance, and informed him that a considerable force was collected further up the river, to which spot he also proceeded, and at about ten miles above Donabew, near the town of Sagadjee, he fell in with them.

The "Phlegethon" opened fire upon this force, consisting of about 5000 men, which retreated and fell back upon Sarawah, a town thirty miles higher up the river: he afterwards ascertained that a portion of them crossed over to Henzadah at the junction of the Bassein river.

Commander Neblett informs me that, wherever the "Phlegethon" made her appearance, he was received by the natives with every demonstration of friendship, and an anxiety for him to afford them protection from the marauders and Burmese troops.

I have, &c.

G. R. LAMBERT.

No. 6.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

June 15, 1852. (No. 26.)

WE beg to refer the Committee to the Notification of the 5th instant, in which we have publicly expressed our sense of the promptitude, skill, and gallantry, displayed by Lieutenant-General Godwin, Commodore Lambert, and all the officers and men engaged in the combined operations against Bassein.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Notification.

Fort William, June 5, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council has the gratification of announcing the capture of Bassein, and of publishing for general information the dispatches which report the combined operations of the naval and military force by which this service has been executed.

In ascending for sixty miles a river still very imperfectly known; in effecting the landing of the troops and capturing the city, the fort, and the stockaded defences on both sides of the river, fully garrisoned and armed; and in accomplishing all this with very unequal numbers, and within the limits of a single day; the combined forces at Bassein performed a gallant and spirited service, which well deserves the approbation and applause of the Government of India.

To Major-General Godwin, C.B., and to Commodore Lambert, the Governor-General in Council has again the satisfaction of offering his cordial acknowledgments of the ability and goodwill with which they have united their exertions for ensuring success to the operations in which they were engaged.

The Governor-General in Council begs to repeat his thanks to Major Boulderson, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General, to Captain Latter, to Captain Chads, Aide-de-camp, and to Lieutenant Ford, of the Madras Sappers, for their conduct in the field on this occasion.

His Lordship in Council desires especially to mark his sense of the services rendered by Major Errington, Her Majesty's 51st Light Infantry, commanding the detachment of troops at Bassein; and to Commander Campbell, of the Indian Navy, by whom the stockade upon the right bank of the river was stormed and taken.

To Captain Rice, Captain Darroch, and Lieutenant Carter, of Her Majesty's 51st Light Infantry; to Lieutenant Ansley, 9th Madras Native Infantry; to Lieutenant Craster, Bengal Engineers; and to Doctor M'Cosh, of the Medical Department; the Governor-General in Council begs leave to convey his best thanks.

Equal acknowledgments are due to Lieutenant Rice, Royal Navy; to Lieutenant Elliott, and Lieutenant Nightingale, Royal Marines; to Commander

Hewett, to Lieutenant Robinson, and Lieutenant Lewis, Indian Navy; and to Captain Dicey, Captain Burbank, and Mr. F. Duncan, of the Bengal Marine, whose services have been commended.

The Governor-General in Council has particular satisfaction in adding the expression of his entire approbation of the gallantry and good conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of Her Majesty's 51st Regiment, of the 9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, of the Madras Sappers and Miners, and of the Seamen and Marines employed in the capture of the city of Bassein.

By order of the Governor-General of India in Council,

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 7.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

July 2, 1852. (No. 29.)

THE dispatches of Commodore Lambert and Major-General Godwin will lay before you the result of the operations of the naval and military forces, detached against the City of Pegu, on the 3rd of June. We have conveyed our approbation of the conduct of the officers and men engaged on the occasion to the Commodore and the Major-General commanding.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

(Extract.)

Head-Quarters, Rangoon, June 9, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Government, that, on the morning of the 26th of May, Martaban was attacked by a Burmese force of 10,000 or 12,000 men, which was gallantly beaten back by the 49th Madras Native Infantry in garrison there under the command of Major Hall. The operations are reported to me as follows:

At about half-past 6 A.M. of the 26th of May, the pickets at Martaban were fired on in a desultory manner by the enemy for upwards of an hour, when a strong skirmishing party led by Captain Stewart sufficed to dislodge them. Our loss has been very trifling; 1 private killed, and 1 subadar, 1 naick, and 11 privates wounded.

During the day a party was sent out by the officer commanding to scour the country around, but they met with no opposition, and the place had been unmolested up to the time of the last report. On the opening of the fire of our guns, the steam-frigate "Feroze," which had 200 men of the 51st Light Infantry on board, landed part of them at Martaban, to aid in the defence of the place, and the remainder proceeded in boats up the river, and took the enemy in reverse and caused them considerable loss.

The troops appear to have behaved very well, and the exertions of Major Hall, who commanded the post; of Captains Rickards and Stewart, of the 49th Madras Native Infantry, who commanded the party that went to scour the country; and of Lieutenant Purvis, who commanded the Artillery, were very meritorious. Captain Lynch and the troops on board the "Feroze," under Captain Anderson, were as usual prompt, and the good judgment displayed by the former officer tended to the complete confusion of the enemy.

I have had excellent accounts from Bassein, of the 31st of May, from Captain Darroch, whom I left in command of the place, till the arrival of Major Roberts, of the 9th Madras Native Infantry. These are highly creditable to that officer, and to Lieutenant Craster, of the Bengal Engineers, and show what a few days' well-directed exertions may do in placing a post in a state of excellent defence.

Captain Darroch further reports that everything is quiet around Bassein: the enemy had left the neighbourhood, and the inhabitants were coming in, in numbers, to seek protection under our rule.

The head-men of twenty-six villages had come to tender services, and to bring provisions of all sorts for the troops.

I have also the honor to report, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, the operations of a small expedition which I detached against Pegu on the 3rd instant, under the command of Major Cotton, of the 67th Regiment Native Infantry, to cooperate with Captain Tarleton, of Her Majesty's frigate "Fox," in driving out a strong force, either from Sitang or Bileng, who had taken possession of that city, so lately filled with a friendly population, and where there was a large granary.

I inclose Major Cotton's own report of his operations, which show great promptitude, good judgment, and brave conduct, in himself and the troops he commanded.

The particulars, as to the conduct of the officers and men, and also the cheerful assistance given by Captain Tarleton and his naval contingent, I feel assured the Governor-General in Council will appreciate most favorably.

In concluding my dispatch, I have only to congratulate the Government on the continued good conduct of its troops, on their excellent health, and perfect state of discipline for any duty they may be called on to perform.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

*Major H. Cotton, of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, to Captain Mayhew,
Assistant Adjutant-General of the Burmah Field Force.*

Sir,

Rangoon, June 9, 1852.

AGREEABLY to instructions furnished me by Lieutenant-Colonel Sturt, commanding the 67th Regiment Native Infantry, I embarked on board the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon," Captain Neblett, on the morning of the 3rd instant, in command of a detachment, of the strength mentioned in the margin,* to cooperate with Captain Tarleton, Her Majesty's frigate "Fox," in command of the naval portion of the expedition, in carrying out the instructions detailed in Lieutenant-Colonel Sturt's letter, and I have the honor to make the following report for the information of Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., commanding the Burmah field force.

We reached the village Peinkeong the same evening, and anchored; the next morning, the troops were embarked in boats, and we proceeded up the Pegu river; when within a few miles, heavy firing was heard a-head, and, from information obtained from the Peguers, I learnt that the enemy were in force on the right bank of the river opposite the town. I immediately landed my detachment at half-past 9 o'clock, A.M. to attack them, and Captain Tarleton agreed to take the naval force, and cooperate on the right. I shall leave Captain Tarleton to detail to Commodore Lambert his part of the engagement. I proceeded in skirmishing order with the detachment along the right bank of the river, for nearly two miles through heavy swamp, and jungle, and drove the enemy completely across the river, in the direction of the Great Pagoda; when, hearing heavy firing from the direction of the boats, I returned to render my aid to Captain Tarleton. I found, on crossing the river, he had had a smart engagement with the enemy, and repelled an attack made by them on the boats, and I was much gratified to hear from Captain Tarleton, of the admirable conduct of a section of the Rifle Company of the 67th Regiment Native Infantry present at it, under the command of Captain E. W. Hicks. The men were by this time (one o'clock) much fatigued, and I resolved to remain for a couple of hours, and then proceed to attack the Great Pagoda, whither the enemy had been seen to retreat, having arranged with Captain Latter, that he should guard the boats with a party of Peguers.

* 100 men, Her Majesty's 80th Foot, under command of Captain Ormsby. 100 Rifles, 67th Regiment Native Infantry, under Captain Hicks. 30 Madras Sappers, under Lieutenant Mackintosh. Lieutenant Mayne, Madras Engineers, Field Engineer. Dr. M'Kellar, East India Company's service, in Medical charge.

We had not, however, rested very long, when a report was brought from the picket that the Burmese were coming down upon us in great numbers from the pagoda. I went down and ascertained that such was the case, that they were coming down in skirmishing order, I should say at least 1000 men, and amongst them 30 or 40 were mounted upon ponies. I could plainly discern their leader from his dress and gold chattah. I immediately got my party under arms in extended order, Captains Tarleton and Neblett, the former with 30, and the latter with 20, seamen, joining. When the enemy had got well across the plain, in extent about three quarters of a mile, consisting of rice fields partially covered with water, I advanced with the whole detachment, and, after a smart fire, drove them into the jungle which surrounds the pagoda. I then formed my detachment into column of sections, and, steadily advancing, stormed the south gate with the 80th and Sappers, while the Rifles under Captain Hicks extended to the left, and rushed in at the west gate. So sudden was the assault that the enemy had not time to fire their guns, which were found loaded, and covering the entrances to the gates. At the west gate were four guns, two brass and two iron, and at the south gate two guns and two jingals.

We drove the enemy through the pagoda, and succeeded in killing and wounding a number of them as they retreated down the gateway. It was impossible to pursue them, as the men were much knocked up, having been under arms since one o'clock in the morning, and all overcome by the excessive heat and fatigue encountered during the day.

I am happy to say that no soldier was killed, and only two sepoys and one dooley bearer wounded: this small loss is to be attributed to the fact that the enemy, for the most part, fired too high.

My detachment occupied the pagoda during our stay, and I employed the time in carrying out the wishes of the Lieutenant-General in destroying some parts of the fortifications surrounding the pagoda; this was done by Lieutenant Mayne, Field Engineer, whose report I beg leave to attach.

In the town, on the river side, there was a great quantity of rice, which I permitted the Peguers to carry away in boats.

Surrounding the Pagoda there is also another town, in which much rice was found; this I caused to be burnt, after allowing the inhabitants to carry away as much as they could.

The cooperation of the naval force under Captain Tarleton, Her Majesty's ship "Fox," and under Captain Neblett, East India Company's ship "Phlegethon," was most active and efficient, and I would beg my most sincere thanks and congratulations for success should be conveyed to them, officers and men, through the proper channel. Before concluding this report, I hope I may be permitted to mention my admiration at the gallantry displayed by all comprising my detachment, including the naval parties, officers and men. The union, cordiality, and good feeling which existed are beyond all praise, and not a single complaint was made against any one during the whole time. I beg to notice, for the information of the Lieutenant-General, Captain Ormsby, commanding a company of Her Majesty's 80th, and Lieutenants Amiel and Fraser, of the same Regiment, and Dr. M'Kellar, East India Company's Service, in medical charge, who, in addition to his other duties, displayed great humanity in attending to the wounded Burmese; Lieutenant Mackintosh, 52nd Regiment Madras Native Infantry, Second Lieutenant Mayne, Assistant Field Engineer, who entered the Pagoda with the Sappers and 80th, and Captain Hicks, commanding Rifle Company, 67th Regiment Native Infantry, Lieutenant Clarke and Ensign Thompson, of the 67th Regiment; all of whom rendered me the greatest assistance, and with whose conduct I was much pleased. I left Pegu at 12 o'clock A.M. on Saturday last, with my detachment, in progress to Rangoon.

I have, &c.

H. COTTON, 67th Regiment.

P.S.—I beg to inclose a list of casualties; of guns and arms captured; also a plan of operations, drawn by Lieutenant Mayne, Madras Engineers, Assistant Field Engineer.

Return of Ordnance captured at Pegu, June 4, 1852.

Small calibre.—2 brass guns, good; carriages destroyed. 6 iron guns; 2 good, 4 very bad carriages destroyed.
10 jingals; 3 sunk in the river at Pegu.
400 to 500 lbs. of powder; 100 lbs. used in blasting.

List of Casualties in the Detachment under the Command of Major Cotton, 67th Regiment, at the Capture of Pegu, June 4, 1852.

Wounded.

67th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—2 rank and file; 1 camp follower.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, June 8, 1852.

THE Lieutenant-General commanding having expressed his wish that a military and naval force should make an attack upon the City of Pegu, I therefore sent Commander Tarleton, with the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Fox" and the East India Company's steam-vessel "Phlegethon," to perform this service, in conjunction with 230 troops, under the command of Major Cotton, and I have the honor to request you may be pleased to lay Commander Tarleton's report of proceedings before the Governor-General.

I inclose also a list of killed and wounded in the naval force.

I have, &c.

G. R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Commander J. W. Tarleton, R.N., to Commodore Lambert.

Sir,

*Her Majesty's ship "Fox," Rangoon,
June 8, 1852.*

I HAVE the honor to inform you that, in pursuance of your orders, I proceeded on the morning of the 3rd instant, with the boats expressed in the margin,* to the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon," which vessel, having embarked 98 men Bengal Native Infantry Rifle Company, Major Cotton commanding the detachment; 100 men, Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, Captain Ormsby; 30 men, Sappers and Miners of the Madras Division, Lieutenant Mackintosh; Lieutenant Mayne, Assistant Engineer; Captain Latter, Interpreter to the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces, also accompanied us.

We proceeded up the Pegu river, as far as the village of Peinkeong, which we reached a little before 8 P.M., it being then high water. The stream becoming extremely narrow and shallow at this point, I did not deem it prudent to ascend it further, and therefore arranged with Major Cotton for proceeding with his detachment in the boats, on the next flood tide, which I looked for about 2 A.M., but the ebb ran for 9½ hours, so that we could not leave the steamer before 5:30 A.M. on the 4th. At Peinkeong, Captain Latter obtained information that a large number of Peguers had put themselves under the direction of one of their countrymen named Mounpta; that they had assembled on the right bank of the river, where the day previous they had been engaged with a body of men under Moungyawik, the Burman Governor of Pegu. By the villagers' account,

* Her Majesty's ship "Fox." Launch—Mr. McMurdo, mate; Mr. Lucas, Midshipman; crew, 15 men. Pinnace—Mr. Copland, Mate; Mr. Hudson, Midshipman; crew, 15 men. Gig—Mr. Cotiam; crew, 6 men. Cutters—Mr. Alexander, Mr. Lisboa; crew, 9 men each. Mr. Morgan, Assistant-Surgeon, Her Majesty's ship "Fox." East India Company's steamer "Moozuffer." Mr. Harding; crew, natives, in paddle-box boats. A large canoe, fitted for the conveyance of the camp-followers.

the latter had been worsted, and had retired in the direction of Zangauain, situated on the river bank, immediately opposite Pegu. When within about five miles of this place, the chief, Moungha, came off to the boats, and confirmed the reports which had been previously received. His force, consisting of about 1,500 men (imperfectly armed), lined the right bank of the river, and advanced with the boats. From his communication with Moungha, Captain Latter was satisfied that the enemy's chief strength lay on the right bank. Major Cotton therefore decided on landing his detachment on that side, while I proceeded with the boats (as soon as the men were disembarked), to cooperate on his right flank. The river at this point is not more than sixty yards wide. The present village of Pegu stands on the left bank, which is steep and muddy below high-water mark. About a quarter of a mile in the rear of the houses there is a broad ditch, the bottom of which, at this season, is a swamp; it runs along the west face of the old wall of Pegu for the distance of two or three miles; the wall has been originally built of brick, and the top (which may be twenty feet above the bottom of the ditch) is now covered with jungle. The village of Zangauain, as I before mentioned, stands immediately opposite; it possesses a small pagoda, and is surrounded by a low growth of jungle.

I had proceeded a short distance in the boats, when a sharp fire of musketry was opened upon us from the Pegu side. Feeling the disadvantage we laboured under by being underneath the enemy's fire, with no effectual means of returning it, I at once landed with the boats' crews of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," and was shortly after joined by Captain Neblett and boats' crews of the "Phlegethon,"* in all about 50 men. The Burmese fired upon us as we advanced, but were driven from point to point until completely broken; one party retreating by the river's side to the northward, and the other within the old wall before mentioned. Our object being attained, I was retiring in close order to the boats, when a fire of jingals and musketry was opened upon us from the wall: deeming it unwise to permit the Burmese to suppose we had retreated from them, I instantly engaged a native guide to show us the causeway through the ditch, and then advanced to the attack. We halted a few seconds to gain breath, under shelter of an old house; then rushed in over the causeway, and through a breach to the right of the gateway. On getting over the wall, we found ourselves among some fine trees, free from underwood; behind these the enemy stood with great resolution, until they were, in many instances, driven out by the bayonet; the defect in their firing was here very observable, as their shot in most cases struck the branches above our heads. We pushed them through to the plain beyond, when they broke and fled, leaving many dead. Their number engaged might probably have been 100 men, and they also had a reserve of about 200 more, commanded by officers on horseback, beyond the reach of musketry. The whole party retired within the Great Pagoda, about a mile and a-half to the eastward. I am glad to say that this service was performed with only one casualty on our side,—one man having received a severe sword-cut in a personal encounter.

Information was now brought me that our boats had been attacked by another party of the enemy from the southward; I accordingly hastened down to their relief, and happily found them safe. Mr. McMurdo, Mate of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," who had been left with a few men in charge, reported that a very heavy fire had been opened upon them, to which he had endeavoured to reply with the pinnace's gun and a small-arm party, but the water was too low to do this with effect, and, having one man killed and two wounded, he judiciously removed the remainder to the right bank, sending an application to Major Cotton for support. A party of Rifles, returning, fortunately met the messenger, and, coming on with all speed, took up a position on the river side, from which they kept up so true and incessant a fire across the water that the enemy were compelled to abandon their attempt, and, on our approach, to retreat. Major Cotton, having overcome all opposition on the opposite side, now crossed over with his detachment.

On a consultation with him, it was determined to wait until 3 P.M. before we should advance to attack the Great Pagoda, the men being absolutely in need of repose after so much fatigue under a burning sun. The rifle company of the

* East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon." Two Cutters—Messrs. T. M. Hulke, 3rd Officer; C. C. Sevenoaks, Midshipman; crew, 22 men.

67th was therefore bivouacked in the wood within the wall, Her Majesty's 80th Regiment on the river face; and the seamen returned to their boats. At 2 P.M. the alarm-bugle was sounded, and, on my landing, I discovered that the Burmese had issued from the Pagoda in considerable strength, with the evident intention of attacking us. The troops lost not a moment in getting under arms, and the seamen* came on shore.

The enemy fell back on our advance; a movement he appeared to have so little expected, that many of his men were unable to regain their position in time to defend it, and those who did were so taken by surprise that their fire was ineffectual, and their four guns, which pointed down the steps leading up to the gateway, were found loaded by Her Majesty's 80th, who gallantly led the assault; and this naturally strong place was happily carried without a casualty on our side.

I returned with the seamen to the boats as soon as the Pagoda was in our possession; embarked the detachment at 0.30 P.M.; on the 6th reached the steamer, at Peinkeong, at 5 P.M.; she weighed on her return at 8 A.M.; on the 7th, at noon, she took the ground, and, as the tide was ebbing, and there was no possibility of her moving for several hours, I ordered the "Fox's" boats to take the canoe with the camp-followers in tow; I passed them in the gig, and arrived on board Her Majesty's ship "Fox" at 3 A.M. on the 8th.

I have the honor to inclose a list of casualties.

I beg leave to add, that the conduct of both officers and men under my orders has been most exemplary; and to represent to you the valuable assistance and cooperation I received on all occasions from Captain Neblett, Commander of the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon."

I have, &c.

J. W. TARLETON.

Inclosure 5 in No 7.

List of Men, belonging to the Naval Forces, Killed and Wounded during the Action at Pegu, on the 4th June, 1852.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox"—3 seamen wounded.

East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon."—1 seaman killed.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox"—Andrew Walker, A.B., wounded, severely; incised wound of right shoulder, from a sword-cut. Henry Ingram, Ordinary, wounded, slightly; superficial wound of the right shoulder, from a musket-ball. John Taylor, A.B., wounded, slightly; graze of the right leg, from a musket-ball.

East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon."—James Shields, killed.

No. 8.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, July 2, 1852., (No. 30.)

WE have the honor to submit, for your consideration, the minutes which have severally been recorded by us, upon the important question of the policy which the Governor-General in Council shall establish towards the neighbouring Kingdom of Burmah, upon the termination of present hostilities.

We have purposely delayed submitting the question to you until now, for we were desirous of giving, to the Court of Ava, the fullest opportunity for offering redress, and seeking reconciliation, that could be conceded to it, without detriment to our own interests. Further delay could not be permitted; because the preparations which are necessary for a force to take the field in November, can no longer be safely postponed, and the time is not more than sufficient to insure our being in the possession of your instructions, before the military operations shall be recommenced. It is of the utmost consequence that we should be so instructed, previous to that date.

* Her Majesty's ship "Fox." Officers, Mr. M'Murdo, Mate; Mr. Hudson and Mr. Lucas, Midshipmen; 38 men.
East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon." Captain Neblett; 22 men.

We have, therefore, the honor respectfully to request that you will be pleased to make known to us your decision on the question, now submitted to you, with as little delay as may be consistent with a deliberate consideration of the subject.

If the policy we have suggested should not meet with your concurrence, we trust that the Governor-General in Council will, in such case, receive explicit directions from you as to the specific measure which it may be your pleasure he should adopt.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Minute by the Governor-General of India.

(Extract.)

June 30, 1852.

IN a minute, dated the 12th of February, 1852, I had the honor to record the grounds upon which, in my judgment, hostilities with Burmah had become unavoidable; and upon which I had resolved to propose, that an expedition should immediately be prepared and dispatched to Rangoon, for the purpose of exacting the redress which the officers of the King of Ava had wholly refused.

Every consideration of sound policy urged the Government of India to the adoption of this measure.

If the Court of Ava should finally uphold the acts of its officers, and should refuse redress, as was anticipated, a delay of eight months, in acting upon the intimation which the Government had given to the King, that it would proceed to exact redress by force of arms, would have been greatly to the disadvantage of the British Government, while it would both have encouraged the Burmese Court to resistance, and would have increased its means of resisting. It was known that already, even before negotiations had been concluded, preparations for war had been commenced at Rangoon, and the formidable defences which had been constructed within a very short time, both there and at Bassein, have since shown that the Government of India judged rightly in assuming that the Burmese would busily turn to good account any delay that might be made in attacking them.

To enter into a general campaign against Burmah, at the season of the year which we had reached, was impracticable. But it was felt that a blow, promptly struck, and severely, might possibly give to the Burmese such evidence of our power and resources, as might recall to their memories the issue of their last contest with us, and might possibly deter them from entering on the hazards of another encounter.

If no such demonstration were made by us, upon the moment, extended war would be rendered certain, when the season for operations should reopen. If such a demonstration were made, and should produce the consequences that were so earnestly desired, a vast political advantage would be gained by the restoration of friendly relations between the States, and by the avoidance of a conflict, equally to be deprecated for its present evils, and for its probable consequences.

If the demonstration should not produce immediate submission, nevertheless, the defeat of the Burmese army, the capture and retention of the second city in the kingdom, results which the force proposed was fully adequate to insure, were measures eminently calculated to convince the Burmese of their inferiority, and to aid the Government of India materially in prosecuting the war, if they did not altogether avert it.

I have said the "retention" of Rangoon, because the information I received, at the Presidency, as to the climate and condition of that town, the study of official documents relating to the pestilence by which the troops there were prostrated in 1842, and more full consideration of the great difference there was in the circumstances under which a military occupation of Rangoon would now be undertaken, had removed the objections which, at first, I felt, to holding the city, when we should have taken it, and had led me to the conviction that it might be done with perfect safety to the health of the troops, and with great advantage to the public service.

The Government of India never ceased to regard the lives and health of the troops as a consideration paramount to every other, and it was resolved, that

if, contrary to its expectations, the same grievous sickness should again appear, the troops should be withdrawn to Moulmein, or elsewhere. The mere possibility, however, of this contingency, which was not anticipated, did not deter the Government from dispatching the expedition. For although a withdrawal after the capture would of course have greatly weakened the effect of our success, still its effect would not have been entirely lost. The work of war must have been recommenced; but it would have been against an enemy who had already been defeated, and would have been stripped, by our previous success, of much of his means of defence.

In every point of view, therefore, sound policy dictated the immediate dispatch of an expedition.

If it should accomplish the full measure of success, an infinite gain would be secured; for a long and costly war would be avoided.

If the expedition were partially successful, and though no submission were made by the Burmese, the best of their cities and forts would be captured, and occupied by British troops, and a valuable advantage would be gained for the early and effectual renewal of hostilities hereafter.

Even though we were unable, from climate, to hold what we had taken, the effect of our success would not be lost; for we should have materially weakened the strength of our enemies.

And, in each of these events, the Government of India would have the satisfaction of feeling that, if it had not achieved, by the dispatch of the expedition, the full success of averting prolonged war with Burmah, it had at least lost no opportunity; it had thrown away no chance of securing it.

The expedition was prepared and dispatched accordingly. The circumstances connected with the preparation of it have already been reported to the Secret Committee.

It had been necessary to allow a sufficient interval of time for receiving from Ava the reply of the King to the ultimatum of the Government of India. The 1st of April had been named, as the day beyond which the forbearance of this Government would not be prolonged. On the 2nd of April, the first ships of the expedition reached the rendezvous, at the mouth of the Irrawaddy. By the 14th of that month, the cities of Martaban and of Rangoon had been captured, and were in possession of the British troops. Since that time we have had the honour to report the capture of Bassein, and the occupation of that important point also. The Burmese armies, numerically strong at both places, and strengthened at Rangoon by the regular troops from the capital, have been scattered, and, for the present at least, have wholly disappeared.

In spite of every exertion, it has been found almost impossible as yet to obtain any correct information of what is going on at Ava, or in the Upper Provinces. But in the Lower Provinces there seems every reason to believe, that we are correctly informed of the present state of affairs. Bands of marauders are wandering about the districts of Martaban and Pegu. They attacked lately the detachment at the former city, and were repulsed; and they were driven from the latter, by a very small force sent from Rangoon. Such bands can hardly be called troops; and this Government has discouraged the exposure of our troops in petty expeditions for the purpose of dislodging them.

The remnant of the force defeated at Bassein has scattered; a portion retreating northwards, the rest retiring to their villages.

Steamers have penetrated up the Bassein branch, nearly to its junction with the main stream of the Irrawaddy, and again up the main stream to the junction, which it ascertained to be not safely navigable at present.

None of these steamers have been able to hear of any troops anywhere remaining in the Delta.

The great stockades at Donabew, so conspicuous in the last war, have been found in utter ruin. Whenever any of the smaller stockades along the river-banks have been approached by the steamer, they have instantly been abandoned by the garrison, and have been destroyed by us. And when the little vessel came upon a body of troops, on the left bank of the Irrawaddy (of whose existence they had heard from the headmen of the villages, and of whom they had gone in search), the whole body, amounting, it was said, to 5000 men, retired before the vessel, and retreated into the jungle, as soon as a few shells had been thrown among them.

No intelligence can be obtained of any large force, or of any preparations

in the Lower Province. Nor can we learn anything, with certainty, of preparations being in progress; but it is stated that a force is gradually collecting at Prome, and that the Burmese are strongly fortifying that position.

On the other hand, it is ascertained that there is no force near to Aeng; and the Deputy Commissioner of Assam has lately reported to me, demi-officially, that the Singphoos on the frontier—tribes strongly opposed to the Burmese—have sent in, to inform him, that the northern Shans, on being required by the King to send their levies to Ava, for the prosecution of the war, have peremptorily refused to do so.

The Secret Committee is probably aware that, during the summer, large fleets of boats of considerable burden descend the Irrawaddy, and, entering the branches of the Delta, load with grain, and, on the rising of the river, are carried up the stream, by the aid of the strong monsoon. Upon these supplies the Capital and the Upper Provinces are stated to depend largely, if not mainly, for the food of the population.

Commodore Lambert has been directed by the Government of India to intercept these boats—which, by the last intelligence received, were commencing their return—by means of the steamers at his disposal, and to bring them to Rangoon, where both the grain and the boats that convey it may be useful hereafter. Already some fleets had been seized; and there seems good ground to hope that this measure may exercise a material influence upon the resources of the Court of Ava, and possibly upon its conduct.

While the Government of India is enabled to offer to the Secret Committee this favorable representation of the success of the expedition thus far, it is still more a subject of congratulation that the anticipations which the Government were led to entertain of the practicability of maintaining the health of the troops at Rangoon have, under the blessing of Providence, been completely realized up to the present date.

As soon as a breach with Burmah was seen to be inevitable, the Commissioner of Tenasserim was requested, by the Governor-General, demi-officially, to strain every nerve in preparing cover for the troops, and in providing well for the Commissariat.

That officer indefatigably, and most successfully, discharged the task entrusted to him, and practically proved at the very outset the vast superiority which the possession of the Tenasserim Provinces would give us during the present war over our predecessors, in those matters where they met with most difficulty, and from which the worst sufferings of the army proceeded.

Large supplies of slaughter-cattle were collected before the present expedition arrived, and an ample supply may be relied upon from those provinces. Besides fresh meat thus prepared in abundance, stores of almost every sort that are required by troops are procurable at Moulmein, now a town of flourishing trade, but in the last war unheard of.

Wooden barracks in frames, with thatching, had been prepared. They were sixty in number, each capable of holding a company. They were sufficient, with what could be made available at Rangoon, to give cover to all the troops, and were sent over as fast as they could be put up. They are rude, but they are of the same materials as most buildings in that part of the world, and they are effective.

In like manner, ranges of hospitals were prepared at Amherst, and thither the wounded and sick have been conveyed, by the steamers, as occasion required.

The result of these precautions has been, that while the troops necessarily suffered much from the unrelieved exposure of the first three days in the field, from the terrible power of the sun, and the great alternations of temperature during the night and day, these effects of climate were temporary. Successive mails have brought improved accounts, and, up to the 22nd of June, the Major-General reports that the health of the troops is still improving, and excellent upon the whole.

For this happy state of the health of the troops occupying Rangoon, the Government lies under great obligations to the activity and laborious zeal of many, and chiefly of Major-General Godwin, of Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, and of Major Fraser, chief engineer with the force. The Government of India is very sensible of these obligations, and desires to lose no opportunity of publicly acknowledging them.

The conduct of the inhabitants of Pegu has also conducted greatly to the health and comfort of the force at Rangoon. Both there, and elsewhere throughout the province, it stands in very marked contrast to their conduct at the commencement of the former war.

Then, no communication was held by the inhabitants with the force under Sir Archibald Campbell, and for a long time neither labour nor any of the commonest articles of produce were by any means procurable. Upon this occasion, whatever may be the cause, the population has flocked round the troops from the day the Pagoda was assaulted, and the Burmese force driven out. There is a large settlement at Kemmending; and a very considerable population, stated at not less than 40,000 souls, has already gathered at Rangoon, where they have rebuilt the houses, and are living in perfect confidence. Labourers have from the first been obtained in great quantities; they have not only returned themselves, but have brought back their families, their bullocks, and hackeries. And General Godwin in his last letter informed me that the people resort to the bazaars from all the country round, and sell beef, mutton, venison, fish, fowls, eggs, milk, butter, vegetables, and fruit, in great abundance, and at moderate rates.

The same feeling of confidence was shown at Bassein as soon as the British had occupied it; and supplies, including cattle, were brought in equal abundance.

Nor is this friendly spirit traceable only to the self-interest which might be supposed to persuade the people of Pegu to this freedom of intercourse. It has been apparent where no such interested feeling could actuate their conduct. Wherever the steamers have gone, whether up the Bassein branch, or the Panlang branch, or the Pegu river, or the main stream of the Irrawaddy itself, everywhere the villagers have come forth on their appearance. Information has been given by them, of where troops were in their retreat, or of where any bodies were collecting; and nowhere has their intelligence proved false. All have shown satisfaction at the appearance of our boats or troops, and have proved the sincerity of it by giving such assistance as they could, and everywhere they have sought our protection, and asked for the continuance of it.

At Pegu they have gone a step further, and have sought, in some degree, to act with us, and for themselves. In that district, under the leadership of a descendant of their former chiefs, the Peguers rose against the Burmese troops at the town of Pegu and expelled them. When in their turn they were expelled by a larger force, they invoked our aid, and when the Burmese bands had been driven afresh out of the city, the occupation of it was undertaken by the Peguers. Whether they will be able to hold their ground there, is doubtful. But this circumstance serves, with the rest of my statement, to show the marked difference which there has been in the conduct of the Peguers towards the British upon this occasion, as compared with the unfriendly demeanour exhibited towards them, on the first occupation of Rangoon, in 1824.

Such is the actual condition of affairs, at the present time, in Pegu. Such is the issue of the expedition which it was resolved to dispatch against Burmah. The most complete success has attended every military operation. A very severe blow has been promptly struck. The three first cities in the Burman Kingdom next to the capital have been taken. The whole seaboard of Burmah is in our possession. The trade of the country, both external and internal, has been stopped. The troops have achieved all this, now as ever, with a spirit that does honour to their nation; they are in excellent health, and in full flush of confidence. No army can be heard of in the field near us; and the inhabitants of the enemy's country that we hold are entirely friendly, and voluntarily aid us to their very best.

But, for all that, the Court of Ava has made no sign of submission, and a final result has not yet been obtained.

I have already recorded my conviction that it is indispensably necessary, for the security, and for the supremacy of the British power in India, that it should not, in this matter, stay its hand, until it shall have fully vindicated the superiority of its arms, and, having established the sufficiency of its power to protect its subjects, and to enforce its rights, shall have taken effectual pledges against any renewal, by the Burman power, of outrage against the one, or violation of the other.

I had the honor to declare my opinion, that "the Government of India cannot, consistently with its own safety, appear for one day, in an attitude of

inferiority; or hope to maintain peace and submission among the numberless princes and people embraced within the vast circuit of the empire, if, for one day, it give countenance to a doubt of the absolute superiority of its arms, and of its continued resolution to assert it.”*

This maxim applies with especial force, to any matter of dispute or conflict with the Burman Kingdom. There is now no power in Asia to which the British Government can less afford to give even an apparent advantage; for there is none which ventures to assert the same pretensions to superiority in strength and dignity, and none so ready to support those pretensions by force of arms.

The presumptuous arrogance with which the Burmese entered upon the former war with the British, in full belief—King, Court, and People—that their success was certain, and that fresh conquests were about to be opened to them, is a matter of history. The doggedness with which they opposed our troops during three continuous campaigns, disputing the line of advance to their capital, shows how slowly they consented to relinquish the ideas they had cherished of their invincible superiority.

The fact that they were ultimately compelled to sign submission, in a treaty, within forty miles of Ava, and to a force hardly amounting to 2000 effective troops, might naturally lead to the inference that the Burmese must then have been convinced of their absolute inferiority. It might well be thought that, heavily mulcted for the expenses of the war, and punished by the loss of several extensive provinces, the Burmese would have been taught never again to engage in battle with troops of whom so few had been able to effect so much.

Such appears to have been the impression left upon the minds of our countrymen at the close of the last war, in 1826, and such views are commonly entertained now. It has been thought that so keen was the recollection of former defeats, and so heavy the punishment of its former aggressions, that the Court of Ava would shrink from any probability of collision with us, and would at once concede whatever we might demand.

But the Government of India, while it entertained the hope that a sense of their own interest, if not a sense of justice, might lead the Burmese to redress the wrong they had done in the first instance; and while it subsequently hoped that the reparation which had not been afforded by right feeling, or prudence, would be conceded to a hostile demonstration, which showed danger, more close to them, and imminent; has never relied with any assured confidence on the belief that the result of the last Burmese war would, with certainty, prevent the recurrence of another, upon the present occasion.

The Burmese could not possibly disguise from themselves, in 1826, that their armies had been unable to stop the progress of the British troops, and that one after another they had been defeated and dispersed. But there is abundant evidence to be found, as well upon written record as in the subsequent conduct of the Court of Ava, that neither the King nor his Chiefs regarded themselves as conquered; and that they have neither recognised their actual inferiority to the British power, nor were at all anxious to avoid a fresh encounter with it.

So early after the close of the last war as the year 1830, when Lieutenant-Colonel Burney was the Resident at Ava, he reported thus, to the Government of India:

“The King and Ministers had been assured by Dr. Price, when he returned from Calcutta, and by Mr. Sarkies, when he visited Ava, in 1826, that the late war had nearly ruined us, and that our financial difficulties and embarrassments were so great, that we would submit to anything rather than engage in another war with Ava And it is well known that the King, when he insisted upon Mr. Crawford delivering up the British subjects whom he was about to take away with him in the ‘Diana,’ presumed so far as to say that he would not mind risking another war with us, and that he would use force to make Mr. Crawford deliver up those people. . . .

“Although the respectable portion of the Burmese are, at present, disinclined to engage in another war with us, yet it cannot be denied that the late war has failed to leave a permanent impression on their minds of our superiority. We evinced too great an eagerness, during the contest, to conclude it; and all

* Minute, February 12.

our offers to treat served only to encourage the Burmese Court to make greater exertions. There is no question, that the very first opportunity which may appear favorable, will be seized for renewing hostilities with us, and that the feelings of the majority of the inhabitants are decidedly unfriendly to us. Under these circumstances, it may be questioned how far it would be good policy in us to restore any territory to the Burmese, and thus add to their pride and strength. I am satisfied that it is not by means of conciliation, but by holding a firm and high hand over them, we shall be able to keep this people quiet, and prevent them from molesting us again."*

The correctness of the view thus taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Burney of the light impression produced, by our successes in the last war, upon the minds of the King and his advisers, of the absence of any reluctance to engage in war with us again, and of any clear conviction of our superiority, has been proved by the disregard with which they have viewed the treaties they signed, by the conduct of their Court, at various times, and by the refusal of redress for outrages, with which the public records abound.

With much importunity, indeed, and after long delay, the payment of the million sterling, to which they were bound by the treaty, was obtained. But the maintenance of a resident at Ava, on which so much stress was laid, has not merely become, long since, a dead letter, but the operation of the clause was practically, almost avowedly, defeated by the resistance of the Burman Court to its fulfilment.

No mission has been retained at Calcutta, nor is even a Vakeel deputed from the Court of Ava. The mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Burney was, in reality, compelled to leave Ava, by the treatment which, as the representative of the British Government, he received.

In like manner, the mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Benson was withdrawn; and for the same reason. The Agent who was still retained at Rangoon after the departure of Colonel Benson, remained but a short time; and he too was withdrawn.

Ostensibly the departure of these missions was caused by the failure of each Resident's health. But I apprehend that it will not be denied, that the real reason of their total withdrawal was the intolerable arrogance of the Burman Court, which could not be submitted to, and which would probably have led to an immediate rupture if it had then been resisted to extremity.

To the Court of Ava, which ever regarded the presence of a British Envoy with dislike and suspicion, the withdrawal of successive Envoys was, of course, a cause of triumph, and was interpreted as a plain evidence of our inferiority to a power with which, as it seemed, we could not venture to quarrel.

And as this main clause of the treaty, upon which was placed our reliance, for the protection of our subjects and traders, was wholly set aside by the Court of Ava, other clauses of the treaties have been violated by its officers. At one time, the treaty was entirely repudiated by the King: for long, complaints have been frequent of exactions practised upon the traders of Rangoon, in open violation of it, till at length, in the cases which primarily led to the present hostilities, the extortion of the Burmese Governor, his imprisonment of British subjects, and his violence towards them, compelled the Government of India to seek the redress which, as yet, has been refused to it.

During the whole period, since the close of the war, outrages have been frequent upon our borders, especially on the borders of Moulmein. Such outrages were to be expected; but the aid which also we had a right to expect from the Burmese authorities, in repressing such outrages, or in detecting and punishing the perpetrators of them, with hardly an exception, has been withheld from us.

The proofs of the readiness of the Court of Ava for renewed war with the British Government, do not rest entirely upon the facts I have recited above, and which show the Burmese to have stood in no fear of the British Government, and to have been indifferent as to collision with it. In 1839, the records of the Government of India evince the conviction which was then entertained, that war with Burmah was unavoidable; and, in the year 1841, the King Tharawaddy formed a large army, amounting, it was said, to 50,000 men. He collected his war-boats, and marched down to Rangoon, with the intention, it was then supposed, of boldly taking the initiative, and of invading the British provinces in his vicinity.

* Journal of Major H. Burney, Resident at the Court of Ava, 1830.

Thus, through the whole period, from the close of the last war to the present moment, when, as I have stated, they are pursuing their preparations to meet us, the Burmese Government is seen inflated with the same overweening arrogance as before, and pursuing a line of conduct which shows that they are still convinced of their power to defy us, and not reluctant to make the attempt.

Hence it follows, that the necessity is now even more urgent than before for asserting the full power of the British Government to protect its subjects, to enforce its rights, and to establish throughout all India the conviction of its superiority over every enemy. No result of the present hostilities can be regarded as final and complete, which does not include a vindication of the superiority of our military power; reimbursement from the Court of Ava, in some form, of the expenses of the war; and an effectual guarantee against renewed war with that Government hereafter, either by the reduction of the substantial power of the Burmese State, or by such other means as may be determined upon.

I have endeavoured, in the preceding paragraphs, to state clearly and fairly the actual condition of our affairs in Burmah; and to define what are the political ends which, in my humble judgment, it is indispensable for us to secure, as the issues of the war in which we are engaged. I shall proceed now to consider by what means those ends are to be obtained.

Ample opportunity has been given for the consideration and transmission of overtures of peace by the Court of Ava, in the two months which have purposely been suffered to elapse without any further political movement on the part of the Government of India. There is no ground whatever for believing, as was alleged during the last war, and has sometimes been surmised of late, that the King or his Ministers are not informed of what has taken place. On the contrary, there is every reason to be convinced that the Burman Government is fully acquainted with every event, and is pursuing its own fixed course of policy. It will wait, in the hope that the rains at Rangoon will have the same injurious influence upon the health of the troops as they exercised in 1824; and that our further advance will be thus delayed, if not altogether prevented.

If on seeing, as the season advances, as we trust will be the case, that the health of the troops has not been affected, the Court of Ava should seek for terms of reconciliation, I am of opinion that, after the events of the last three months, we ought not to concede to them terms so light as General Godwin, in his instructions, was authorized to grant.

The determined spirit exhibited in the fortifications constructed at Bassein and Rangoon, the continuance of the contest up to the present time, and the preparations which we are credibly informed they are making to oppose our advance, all tend to show that such a punishment must be inflicted upon the Burmese as will be sensibly felt, if we desire to secure at all the observance of peace hereafter.

In this view I conceive that, if overtures should be made before large additional charges have been incurred by the Government of India, in the preparation of an army to take the field in November, the Court of Ava should be required to pay down promptly 15 lacs of rupees, to cede the Negrais and Diamond Islands, and the district of Martaban, to a point upon the Sitang river near to Shoee-Gyne.

This district has been the scourge of Moulmein, its inhabitants and its trade. Its possession by us, and the introduction of order and obedience there, will be of essential value; and its annual revenue is estimated to amount to four lacs of rupees.

This payment, with the cession of territory, and the re-establishment of our relations with Ava by means of an agent at Rangoon, upon which we have insisted, might be held sufficient to satisfy our demands, and to accomplish the ends we have in view, if the proposal for peace shall be made by the Burmese Government at an early day.

It is not anticipated, I think, by any one, that overtures of peace will be made at present.

In the meantime, we can no longer with prudence delay the commencement of additional preparations for carrying on, with vigour, the war against Burmah, at the earliest date at which the opening season may permit.

Before he left Calcutta, General Godwin, at my request, submitted his opinion as to the force which would be necessary for pursuing the war, by an advance towards Ava.

He desired to have in the field, four brigades of infantry, each consisting of one European and two Native corps, together with three batteries, one a horse field-battery, and two troops of horse-artillery.

The Government of India has assumed that General Godwin desires to have this force in the field, in addition to what he already has under his command. It is believed that no difficulty will be found in providing this force, without unduly weakening any quarter of the empire in its present circumstances. The Government of India was of opinion, that the troops above mentioned should be provided jointly by the Presidency of Bengal and by the Presidency of Madras, aided by that of Bombay. The Government of Madras and his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India have been addressed accordingly. I have no doubt whatever that the full force named will be ready, and perfectly equipped, at the time which may be fixed for its advance.

The line of its advance, and the plan of operations generally, are matters on which the Government of India will seek the advice of the military authorities.

The late Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, at the request of the Governor-General in Council, in the year 1829, recorded his views as to the proper line of attack in the event of our again going to war with Burmah. He strongly advocated an advance from Arracan, by the Aeng Pass. When Sir Archibald Campbell wrote, the pass had been traversed by a single regiment on its return to Madras. Since that time many examinations have been made of the Aeng, and other passes through the Arracan Mountains, into Burmah. In the year 1839, when renewed hostilities were looked for, the question was elaborately discussed, in minutes by members of the Government, and especially by Major-General Sir William Casement. Very recently, new and valuable reports have been submitted upon the present condition of these passes, especially the Aeng, and the Thonghoo, by Captain Nuthall, and Lieutenant Fytche.

After a careful consideration of all these documents, together with reference to the widely different condition of affairs in the British provinces south of Burmah, and to the greater variety and extent of our resources now, as compared with the state of things which existed in 1829, I venture, with deference, to question whether Sir Archibald Campbell would now give the same opinion as he recorded in 1829.

Whether the advance of the British force shall be made, either by the Aeng route, or by the river route, or by both, the ultimate result will be the same. The Burmese forces will be defeated wherever they may stand, and the British army will reach the capital. The King will either offer submission, and seek for terms of peace, on the approach of our army, or, as, in my opinion, is more probable, he will retire from Ava to Umerapoor, and from Umerapoor into the highlands beyond, with his family, such treasure as he has, and the remnant of his troops; and there he will oppose to our advance, the passive resistance of a retreat beyond our reach.

Such were the tactics which, it has been stated, the King had resolved to practise in 1826, if Sir Archibald Campbell's army had not halted at Yandaboo; and such, I am inclined to think, would be the plan resorted to upon the present occasion.

Whether the King shall make submission on our advance, or shall evade it by retreat, the question for the decision of the Government of India will remain the same; namely, what measures should the Governor-General in Council adopt for confirming the vindication of our power, for obtaining reimbursement of the expenses of the war, and for providing a security against its recurrence?

In the earliest stage of the present dispute, I avowed my opinion that conquest in Burmah would be a calamity second only to the calamity of war: that opinion remains unchanged. If any adequate alternative for the confiscation of territory could have been found by me, or had been suggested to me, my mind would most readily have adopted it. If conquest is contemplated by me now, it is not as a positive good, but solely as the least of those evils before us, from which we must, of necessity, select one. But, after constant and anxious

reflection, through the months during which hostilities have been in progress, I can discover no escape from the necessity. I have been driven, most reluctantly, to the conclusion, that no measure will adequately meet the objects which, in my judgment, it is indispensable for us to secure, namely, the establishment of our superiority now, and its maintenance in peace hereafter, except the seizure and occupation of a portion of the territories of the Burman Kingdom. In like manner as in 1826 it was felt to be necessary to deprive the Burmese of the Provinces of Tenasserim, Arracan, and Assam; so now, for stronger reasons, and with better effect, the occupation of the Province of Pegu appears to me to be unavoidably demanded by sound views of general policy.

I have been led to this conclusion, by the conviction with which my judgment has been impressed, of the total insufficiency of every other measure that has come under review, for effecting a permanent termination of wars between the States, or for establishing, in fact, anything better than an unsubstantial and short-lived truce.

The course of policy which would be open to the Government of India, upon the termination of hostilities, either by the submission of the Court of Ava, or by the total defeat of its armies, without any submission made by the King, offers five alternatives :

1st. The Government of India, satisfied of the proved superiority of its arms, by the result of the war, may withdraw its armies from all Burmah; and exacting nothing, retaining nothing, it may trust entirely to the influence of this second manifestation of its power, for protecting its subjects and territories against Burmese violence, in the future.

But, if the King shall have made no submission, a withdrawal of our army from Burmah, thus exacting and retaining nothing, would, in the eyes of Asia, be tantamount to a defeat. Though our troops had scattered every force that met them, had levelled every defence opposed to them, and had overrun the land from north to south, their departure would be regarded, not as a proof of superiority, and of contemptuous indifference to the power of Burmah, but as an unequivocal, though tacit confession, of our inferiority, and as an irrefragable proof that we had, in truth, been beaten by Burmah in the end. The British had a treaty, it would be said, but they have failed to enforce its observance; their subjects had rights by it in Burmah, but the Government of India has been unable to maintain them in those rights; the British had, by solemn agreement, a footing in Burmah, but they have been driven forth from it. Our power would be measured not by the position we had been able to reach, but by that which we were seen to hold; and the issue of all this would be, that far from avoiding risk of future war by withdrawal, we should only invite and encourage aggression, by the Burmese, on our frontier provinces, still in their neighbourhood, and should incur the danger of weakening our ascendancy, in other parts of India, to which the tidings of apparently successful resistance to our authority would speedily reach.

If, on the other hand, the King should have made submission, relations with the Burman Government would be restored, and some of the objections to withdrawal, which are stated in the preceding sentences, would be lessened in force. But the case would remain substantially the same. Exempted from the mulct of reimbursement, its ports restored, its territories undiminished, the Court of Ava would interpret, in its own way, a moderation which neither it, nor its neighbour nations, could comprehend,* and would exult, in the issue of the war, as in reality a homage to its power, which would be far from discouraging its tendency to outrage, and would rather inflame the arrogance from which offences would speedily arise.

In any case, therefore, I consider that a recurrence to the relative positions in which the States were placed before the war, would be in the highest degree impolitic.

2ndly. The army may be withdrawn from Burmah generally, but possession may be retained of the district of Martaban.

If the King shall have made no submission, a retirement from Rangoon without establishing there the Agency, to which we are entitled by treaty, and

* "They believe that the conquering party will always keep what it has got, if it can, and that negotiation is therefore useless. Overtures to treat are always looked upon either as a mark of weakness, or are considered as an artifice to gain time."—Rev. Mr. Judson's *Deposition*, *Wilson's Coll.*, p. 234.

without any concession of the redress we have demanded, for rights already violated, would lay our policy open to the weightiest objections; while, if submission shall have been made by the Court of Ava, but no greater punishment shall be inflicted than the occupation of what they would affect to consider a petty district, the policy would still be liable to have its moderation misunderstood and misrepresented, and no valid security would be afforded for future peace.

3rdly. Possession may be retained of Rangoon, as well as of the district of Martaban.

But, if Rangoon be so occupied, it must be held by a garrison sufficient to sustain itself at all times against any attack which the Burmese might make upon it, deliberately or suddenly. The necessity for a garrison of sufficient strength to hold Rangoon against attack, would not be lessened by the renewal of the Treaty, if the King by submission should bind himself afresh. One who knew them well, the Rev. Mr. Judson,* testified officially regarding the Burmese some years ago, that they were "utterly" faithless. "They would consider it nothing less than folly to keep a treaty, if they could gain anything by breaking it."

But this force would be a heavy charge on the finances of India; for no territory, such as it was capable of protecting immediately round Rangoon, would afford a revenue sufficient to pay for even a portion of the troops.

And, if the object were to give us command over the trade of Burmah, I question whether the measure would effect that object. Excluded from Rangoon, the Burmese would probably resort to Bassein, where a fine navigable river is open to the sea; while, upwards, it communicates with the Irrawaddy, by a channel available for small boats at all seasons of the year, and navigable by all native craft during the monsoon.

The exertions which the Burmese were found to have made, when the British troops lately captured Bassein, lead to the belief that they had already begun to provide for the transfer thither of the trade of Rangoon.

4thly. The British troops may continue to hold what they now occupy, —Martaban, Rangoon, and Bassein.

The same objections apply to this scheme as to the preceding one. The expenses of such a force would be very heavy, and no local income would be derived to meet the charge.

The amount of troops to be employed on this service, and the cost of maintaining them, would not fall far short of such a force as, properly placed upon the frontier, towards Prome, would be capable of holding all Pegu; while, at the same time, the revenues of the province would be commanded for the payment of the force.

Neither examination of maps, nor study of official documents, nor reference to the knowledge and experience of persons acquainted with the country, have enabled me to select any portion of territory which could be held effectually, and with advantage, by us, intermediately between the single district of Martaban and the whole province of Pegu.

5thly. This province of Pegu, extending somewhat above Prome, may be retained and permanently occupied as British territory, on the termination of the war.

If it be admitted that a confiscation of territory is requisite to our interests and security, the advantages belonging to the possession of the Province of Pegu appear, to me, to be not inconsiderable in themselves.

The northern frontier, indeed, would not be strong in itself; for it presents no natural features in the formation of the country which would facilitate its defence, or save us from the worry of predatory attacks, even if invasion were not attempted by the Burmese. And although a very large force would not be required for its protection, it would undoubtedly be necessary to increase the European force at the disposal of the Government of India, by three regiments. The means of doing so will be adverted to separately. Some small increase of general service regiments would probably be required in the Bengal Army. For both the armies of Bengal and Madras appear now to be not more than adequate for the permanent discharge of the duties they have to perform.

On the other hand, if the frontier to the north be indefinite or weak, the

* Wilson's Burmese War, p. 234.

boundaries to the south-east and west are excellent. The sea, with its trade, will be our own. On the west, are the mountains of Arracan, with our own province beyond. On the east, are hills inhabited by the Shans, tribes who border also on Tenasserim, and who have ever held the most friendly feelings towards us, and have cultivated constant intercourse with us. They will, so far as we are concerned, enjoy entire independence, and will probably rejoice in any diminution of the power of the Court of Ava, which claims supremacy over them.

The climate of this province has ever been regarded as excellent, exception being made generally of Rangoon. That exception, however, has not been admitted by others well qualified to judge, who have maintained that the sickness which prevailed among the troops there in 1824, was not referable to the general insalubrity of the place, but to the influence of an epidemic universal in that year, and to temporary causes connected with the formation of the expedition. This consideration forms so important an element in the question to be decided, that I think it right to quote, in support of my view, the following passage from a report by Dr. Martin, a medical officer of eminence in the service of the East India Company, who served in Burmah, and whose authority is high. He says :*

“ Viewing the Delta of the Irrawaddy in connection with its known medical topography, its latitude, and, in short, its general climate, it stands in favorable comparison with that of any known river. Such I believe to be the general opinion entertained of it by professional men; and its salubrity, together with the superior physical character of its inhabitants, was early noticed by that distinguished writer and observer, Dr. Francis Buchanan Hamilton, who, I believe, visited that country twice, and who ascribed the general comparative healthfulness of Lower Pegu, to the geological nature of the soil and its undulating surface, which left no room for stagnation, in the numerous communicating branches of the Irrawaddy.

“ An evil impression of the climate of Rangoon especially, has arisen from the enormous loss of European life, during the last war; but I believe I am correct in stating, that general or local climate formed one of the least of the causes of the excessive mortality spoken of; and that, beyond a heavier fall of rain, during the south-west monsoon, and consequently a greater degree of humidity in the atmosphere than generally occurs in Bengal, the climate contributed little or nothing to the result. It was scorbutic disease that destroyed so large a portion of the European force; and as the powerful causes which led to its development are now well understood, I need not dwell upon them.

“ Of ordinary tropical disease, such as fever, tropical dysentery, and liver disease, there existed but little, comparatively, amongst the troops, European or Native; and in the Governor-General's body-guard, in which I personally served, we had but little disease of any kind, and very few deaths, other than casualties in the field. The health of the European portion of our force improved also amazingly by the time of our entry into Prome, on the 25th of April.

“ By measures of local improvement, easy of execution, Prome might be made a place of uncommon salubrity.”

While the climate of Pegu is thus shown to be healthy, its soil is fertile, and adapted to products available for commerce. The population, except upon the rivers, is believed at present to be thin; and vast tracts of land lie wholly uncultivated. Peace, with security to person and property, will, in time, produce, upon this state of things, the effect which has ever followed it elsewhere. The valuable forests of teak, which cover the whole face of many portions of this province, are too well known to need remark.

Of the revenues of the province, I do not venture to speak with certainty; for, in truth, from the nature of the public income, and its mode of levy under the Burmese, no certain knowledge of its amount could be obtained. The Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces has stated it, to me, on a cautious estimate, † as being from twenty to twenty-five lacs per annum.

Besides these positive advantages, there are other circumstances connected with the possession of Pegu, which, although they would not be sufficient to

* Report to Government, October 1, 1839.

† Mr. Crawford, in his official report in 1826, estimated the revenues of Pegu at thirty-six lacs of rupees.

recommend the annexation of the province, are not without their value, if circumstances should compel us to adopt that course.

An occupation of Pegu would be a very different measure from the occupation of a conquered province, as it usually occurs; for it is to be observed, that we shall have no hostile population to provide against. In the course of this minute, I have shown that the feeling of the people of Pegu towards us has appeared to be actively friendly. If it be thought too sanguine to count upon this feeling being displayed generally, at least we may safely count upon the absence of hostility. It is in the nature of things that it should be so. Pegu is a province of Burmah: but it is a conquered province, and conquered after having been itself the conqueror. The days of its supremacy are not so far gone by as to have been forgotten by the people; while the severe oppression under which they have laboured, and the cruel tyranny of the Burman rule, render it certain that they will heartily rejoice in their liberation, and will give their best support to those who have restored to them their freedom, though they may have no affection for the foreign race, apart from the advantages they have derived from its power.

While, therefore, in the Punjab and other acquisitions, the Government had carefully to provide as much against its new subjects as against any foreign enemy beyond; in Pegu the whole care of the army will be to guard the northern frontier from attack, secure that the territories recently acquired, on the Irrawaddy, behind them, will remain as peaceable, and as worthy of trust as the British provinces of Tenasserim and Arracan on either side.

Nor can it be objected correctly, that the occupation of Pegu would be an extension of our territory, in the ordinary sense of that phrase. It is undoubtedly an enlargement of our territory; but uniting, as it would, into one continuous tract, our present provinces of Arracan and Tenasserim, between which it now intervenes, it is rather to be regarded as a consolidation than as an extension of our territories.

In the preceding remarks, I do not wish to be understood as parading advantages which would render the province of Pegu a desirable possession in itself. My true object has been to show that if the presumption and injustice of the Burman Government have compelled us to take possession of Pegu, as, in my judgment, necessary to our interests and security, the acquisition of it is not without certain advantages, which may countervail some of the many objections against it; and that although the conquest be an evil, it will not be an evil altogether without mitigation.

The disposition of the people of Pegu, towards those who shall free them from bondage to Burmah, is in my mind a consideration of so great weight, that it has seemed to me well worthy of consideration whether, in the event of the King evading submission, and of the occupation of Pegu being finally resolved upon, we should not confine our military operations against the Burmese, to driving them before us, out of every part of the province of Pegu, and then occupying it with the declared intention of holding it permanently, without proceeding onwards to the capital.

This plan of operations would save the State and the Army from the enormous cost, and from the toil of a march which, of course, would give us victory, but which I very much doubt, as I have already said, being successful in compelling the declared submission of our enemy. Moreover, as the occupation of the upper provinces has never been in contemplation, the plan in question would obviate the misrepresentation which, in Burmah, has ever attached to the retirement of a force, from whatever motive the retirement might have been made, and which would be a source of weakness to us, since it would tend to give hope and spirit to the enemy.

In a strong position at Prome, with a healthy climate, having all the resources of our elder provinces at our back, and the resources also of the new province close at hand, while the good will of its population, being assured to us by their own personal interests, will free us from all anxiety regarding internal tranquillity among them; with such advantages as these, our hold of the province of Pegu would, I humbly conceive, be speedily made unassailable, without the necessity for an advance to Ava.

Nor is this all our advantage. For, inasmuch as the upper province is believed to be almost wholly dependent upon the trade and produce of Pegu, our position at Prome, on the outermost frontier of that province, and com-

manding the Irrawaddy, its great highway, will enable us to command, also, at will, the supplies of Ava, and will thus give to our local position a coercive influence hardly inferior to the influence of our arms.

In a minute, discussing the several modes of proceeding which may be open to the Government of India, I have presumed to suggest a view which has seemed to me to be, at least, worthy of some consideration. I have done so, however, subject to the opinion of the military authorities, whose advice will, of course, be sought, and who may see and make good objections, which have not presented themselves to my mind during my consideration of the subject.

My colleague, Mr. Lewis, has observed, —

“ But there is one point, which appears, to me, connected with the subject of the anticipated campaign, to which I desire to draw his Lordship’s attention. It is, whether the time has not come when it will be useful to give some assurance to the Peguers and Taliens of Pegu, that they shall not again be abandoned by us. That we can never relinquish this province, appears to be now certain, and, during the ensuing four months, something might be done to organize its government and its means of self-defence, and to make the people feel that they are no longer Burmese, but British, subjects; a feeling which will not be without its value, when our troops are marching through the country.”

Assuming the feelings of the people of Pegu to be friendly to us, or even assuming only that they would hail the substitution of any dominion for the savage oppression of the Burman Government, a fact which no one seeks to dispute, it cannot be doubted, that the issue of a declaration, such as is proposed, would materially aid the policy which should aim at securing the sovereignty of Pegu. In the present minute, I have recorded my conviction that the necessity of assuming that sovereignty is forced upon us, however reluctant we may be to admit it. But, nevertheless, I must continue to deprecate, as I have hitherto done, the issue of a declaration of the tenor suggested, or any overt act calculated to lead the Peguers by implication to believe that the British Government will certainly retain in perpetuity the possession of their country. If the Government of India were an independent authority, such a proclamation should, in my opinion, at once be issued. But, as the views of the Governor-General in Council are subject to the controlling commands of the higher authorities which he serves, and as I do not feel the same confidence as my colleague evidently entertains, that the authorities in England will certainly ratify the policy which has commended itself to our deliberate judgment here, I think it more prudent and more just to abstain from an act which is not absolutely necessary, and which might become the cause of grievous suffering to the people of Pegu. For, if the assurance of protection which we might give, and the declaration that we should not again abandon them, should induce the Peguers to lay aside all reserve, and everywhere to favor our objects, and to aid our progress; and, if we should subsequently receive peremptory orders from the Secret Committee to withdraw from Pegu, the result would be disastrous to the population of the province, and would gravely affect our national reputation by impugning its highest characteristic, the observance of strict good faith.

Our troops would no sooner be withdrawn, than the Burmese would inflict upon the whole body of hapless Taliens, not oppressions merely, but those horrible cruelties which they are known to practise, and of which ghastly examples were exposed to view, even after the recent capture of Rangoon. And the victims of their cruelty would, apparently, have just reason to execrate the name of the British Government in India, which, by promises it failed to redeem, and by pledges never to abandon those whom it straightway forsook, had induced them to commit themselves by overt acts, for which they, and their children after them, would be made to pay a fearful penalty.

I would submit, too, that the promulgation of such a declaration as has been referred to, would tend to fetter the authorities in England, in their determination regarding the policy they may desire to pursue in this case. They would, doubtless, recognise the consequences to the people of Pegu, of their refusing to ratify the assurances which the Government of India might have given of full and permanent protection; and they might thereby feel themselves compelled, from motives of humanity, to sanction a policy of which they did not approve. Or, if they still objected to the policy so strongly as to determine to disallow it, they would feel that the act of the Governor-General in Council

had given to their resolution a harshness, and had laid it open to objections, which silence on the part of the Government of India would have entirely obviated.

Since, then, I cannot feel confident that the policy recommended by the Governor-General in Council, in regard to Pegu, will certainly be adopted in England, I would earnestly advise that we should forego all the advantages which an open declaration of our intentions now would undoubtedly secure to us, in the further prosecution of hostilities, rather than run the risk of exposing the people of Pegu to consequences which all of us alike would deprecate.

I have now fully and faithfully set forth the actual position of our affairs, in connection with the hostilities commenced against Burmah. I have discussed the measures to be adopted, in each contingency that can be anticipated; and have advised the Secret Committee as to the policy which it is, in my judgment, our duty and our interest to pursue, towards the kingdom of Burmah, upon the termination of the war. It remains for the Committee to pronounce its decision, and to convey its instructions to the Government of India.

I presume most earnestly to express my hope, that the Committee will not be deterred, by any considerations of present convenience, from boldly meeting our difficulties face to face. I heartily trust that, whatever their decision may be, it will be framed upon a far-sighted view of sound policy, which shall seek, above all things, to provide with certainty against the recurrence of harassing war, while it shall be calculated to uphold, in all its authority, the supremacy of the British power throughout these regions of the East.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Minute by Sir Frederic Currie.

July 1, 1852.

THE minute of the Governor-General of yesterday's date has reached me this afternoon. The mail, by which it has to be dispatched to England, will be made up to-morrow evening. The minute has yet to be read and studied by Mr. Lewis, and the subject to be considered in Council to-morrow.

My remarks must, therefore, necessarily be brief; but the very full and lucid narrative of all the circumstances, connected with our present position, in respect to Burmah, and our pending operations; the full account of the proceedings of the Burmese Court and army; and the clear description of the state and disposition of the frontier Provinces, and their inhabitants, contained in the Governor-General's minute; together with the explicit statement of the different modes of meeting and overcoming our present difficulties, suggested by his Lordship, for the consideration and orders of the Home Government, render any detailed comments on my part quite unnecessary.

I entirely concur with the Governor-General in the views set forth by his Lordship in this minute. I am reluctantly brought, by the circumstances described, to the conclusion, that the annexation of the Province of Pegu is, for the reasons stated, inevitable.

I incline very much to the measure of taking forcible possession of the whole of Pegu, and going no further; giving the Court of Ava to understand, that this is the punishment which we have decided to inflict on that Government, for the insult and injury we have received at their hands.

We could, without much difficulty or great cost, defend our new frontier, and maintain our position, with our own provinces, east and west, and the sea, with our own posts, to the south.

The Burmese would be without resources for continued operations of aggression; and amicable relations might, ere very long, I think, be established.

This, in the event of no terms being offered by the Burmese, before the breaking up of the monsoon.

I concur with the Governor-General in the inexpediency of making any declaration of our intention, or of holding out any expectations to the Peguers, at the present moment.

Independently of the considerations mentioned by the Governor-General, in reference to the uncertainty of the views of the Secret Committee, and the impropriety of doing anything, not absolutely necessary, which might tend to embarrass their decision, I think, until we have fairly occupied the province, or are, at any rate, in circumstances immediately to do so, the time has not arrived for making assurances of protection to the inhabitants; and that our holding out any promises to them beforehand would, if it were not interpreted as desiring their aid in accomplishing our object, be certainly taken as a declaration that we are purposing to do hereafter that which we cannot now perform.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Minute by Mr. Lewis.

July 2, 1852.

THE minute of the Governor-General places the position of this Government, and that of Ava, in so clear a light, and discusses the whole subject of our relations with that Government in so complete a manner, that, except on one point, I have only to express my concurrence in the views set forth by his Lordship.

The excepted point is that noticed in the concluding portion of his Lordship's minute, which animadverts on a suggestion recently thrown out by me, that, perhaps, the time was now come when some assurance might be given to the Peguers and Taliens that they should not be again abandoned to the tender mercies of the Burmese.

Of course it was far from my intention to hamper, in any way, the decision of the authorities in England on any open question; and, in that point of view, the suggestion was premature. But I think that both the Governor-General and Sir F. Currie have arrived, however unwillingly, at the conclusion that there is no safe and honorable method of retreat open to us. His Lordship's argument, indeed, amounts to a demonstration that the province must be retained; and as, to my own mind, the course of events had made withdrawal a political impossibility, I had ceased to consider the question an open one, and had, in my contemplation, at the time I wrote, only the easiest, safest, and least expensive manner of completing and consolidating the conquest which we have been compelled to make.

I gather from his Lordship's observations that, except for the reason specified, he approves of the suggestion which has elicited these remarks; but as that reason deserves the greatest possible weight, I willingly withdraw the suggestion. At the same time, it may be worth while to consider whether, if we continue to act towards the inhabitants of Pegu as if they were our subjects, and encourage them to act as if their legitimate Government were British, a moral obligation will not grow up, to the full as binding upon a just Government, as a positive assurance of ultimate protection, and whether, if we allow these men to sell to us, and hire themselves to us, and do us all manner of good offices, as they have been doing for the last ten weeks, we shall not be bound to protect them from the brutal vengeance of the Burmese, just as certainly as if we had undertaken to do so in set terms. I believe that we shall be so-bound, that if things go on in the neighbourhood of the great towns and along the rivers as they have done since the fall of Rangoon, for this cause alone withdrawal will be unjust, as well as disgraceful, and that that which I now believe to be politically impossible, will become so on still higher grounds.

The Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India in Council.

September 6, 1852.

YOUR very important dispatch of the 2nd of July, conveying to us the minute by the Governor-General in Council, of the 30th of June, with the minutes thereupon of Sir Frederick Currie and Mr. Lewis, of the 1st and 2nd of July, has received our most careful consideration.

The minute by the Governor-General exhibits an ample and distinct recapitulation of all the circumstances which led to, and have hitherto accompanied, the hostilities with the King of Ava. It also shows, in accurate detail, the grounds on which you have proceeded in every stage of the warfare in which you have, with so much reluctance, unavoidably been engaged.

We concur in the perfect accuracy of the retrospect thus taken by the Governor-General. Our several secret dispatches, with reference to these hostilities, have already made known to you our agreement with you in opinion, and our approbation of your conduct. We have had every reason for conveying to you our warmest approbation of your endeavours, continued to the very latest moment, for averting the calamity of a war with Ava: and we witnessed with great satisfaction the judgment and decision with which, before that latest moment had elapsed, you struck the vigorous blow, whereby the whole of the maritime possessions remaining to Burmah have been wrested from that Power.

You have received our cordial approval of the skilful combinations with which the expedition against Rangoon was prepared, and the celerity with which it was dispatched. The skill, valour, and discipline displayed by the forces employed on the occasion, have been graciously acknowledged from the Throne.

After thus noticing the lucid exposition, by the Governor-General, of the origin and progress of this war, we have now to advert to your opinions and suggestions with respect to the further prosecution and possible conclusion of it.

Having regard to the history of our former transactions, in war and in peace, with the Burmese; to the rash, arrogant, and presumptuous character of that nation; and to the present position of our empire in India; we fully concur with the Governor-General, that the necessity is now more urgent than ever, "for asserting the full power of the British Government to protect its subjects, to enforce its rights, and to establish throughout all India the conviction of its superiority over every enemy:" and that "no result of the present hostilities can be regarded as final and complete, which does not include a vindication of the superiority of our military power; a reimbursement from the Court of Ava, in some form, of the expenses of the war; and an effectual guarantee against renewed war with that Government, hereafter."

Entertaining, in common with you, these sentiments, we have to consider the several alternatives for your future proceedings, which are set before us in the minute by the Governor-General.

It is observed that, in the improbable event of overtures being made by the King of Ava, before larger expenses have been incurred for the prosecution of the war in November, we should require the payment, promptly to be made, of 15 lacs of rupees; the cession of the Negrais and Diamond Islands, and the districts of Martaban to a point on the Sitang river, near to Shoee-Gyne.

This payment and cession of territory, accompanied by the re-establishment of our relations with Ava, by means of an Agent at Rangoon, might, he observes, "be held sufficient to satisfy our demands, if the proposal for peace should be made by the Burmese at an early day."

It appears that you entertain no expectation that any such timely overture will be made. If it should, nevertheless, arrive, we are of opinion that it would greatly depend upon the character and circumstances of the communication, whether the terms above stated would be sufficient for the honor and interests which you are so justly solicitous to uphold. There might probably not be time, in such a contingency, for a reference to us; and we rely upon your

judgment and prudence for adapting to the existing circumstances of the case, any treaty which you may be induced, consistently with your views of our interests and honor, to conclude.

But supposing the Court of Ava not to be sufficiently well advised to afford an opportunity for such an early conclusion of the war, the Governor-General adverts to five alternatives which would "be open to the Government of India, upon the termination of hostilities, either by the submission of the Court of Ava, or by the total defeat of its armies without any submission made by the King."

The first of these, "that, satisfied with the proved superiority of our arms, by the result of the war, the Indian Government should withdraw its armies from all Burmah, and, exacting nothing, retaining nothing, trust entirely to the influence of this second manifestation of its power for protecting its subjects and territories against Burmese violence in future;" we discard at once, in perfect accordance with the Governor-General's opinion, that it would be in the highest degree impolitic.

Secondly, "that the army might be withdrawn from Burmah generally, but possession be retained of the district of Martaban. as already referred to."

Thirdly, "that the same course might be pursued, retaining Rangoon in addition to the district of Martaban."

For the reasons which are assigned in the minute, we regard both of these as wholly unfit to be adopted.

Fourthly, the Governor-General suggests that "the British troops might continue simply to hold what they now occupy;" but he correctly adds, the same objections apply to this scheme as to the two preceding. The expenses of such a force would be very heavy, and no local income would be derived to meet the charge.

Fifthly, "the Province of Pegu, extending somewhat above Prome, might be retained, and permanently occupied as British territory, on the termination of the war."

We concur with the Governor-General in his opinion, that extension of territory is not in itself desirable; and that the annexation, even of a province possessing so many advantages as Pegu, is to be looked upon rather in the light of a choice of evils, than a positive and unmixed good. But we think with him that, if the presumption and injustice of the Burmese Government compel us to take possession of Pegu, as being necessary to our security, the objections which may be urged against its acquisition may be counterbalanced by no inconsiderable advantages. And we entirely agree with the Governor-General in his estimate of the important bearing which the occupation of this fine province, with reference to its position, its climate, and its adaptation, in a commercial and maritime point of view, to the interests of this country, may have upon the security and advancement of our Eastern Empire.

After presenting to us these five alternatives, it is stated in the minute of the Governor-General (having reference more particularly to the disposition of the inhabitants of Pegu), "that it may be well worthy of consideration whether, in the event of the King of Ava evading submission, and of the occupation of Pegu being finally resolved upon, we should not confine our military operations to driving the Burmese before us out of every part of that province, and then occupying it, with the declared intention of holding it permanently, without proceeding onward to the capital."

"We are of opinion that the permanent annexation to the British dominions, of the Province of Pegu, including Prome within its northern limit, should be adopted as the measure of compensation and redress for the past, and of security for the future, which we ought to insist upon.

If that object could be accomplished without a further expenditure of life and treasure, it would undoubtedly be the most satisfactory termination of a war into which you have been so unwillingly compelled to enter. But we see material difficulties opposed to the retaining possession of the district, without bringing the war to a conclusion, either by a treaty with the King of Ava, of which that cession should be the basis (*sine qua non*), or by the entire subjugation of that Power. The mere annexation and occupation of the province, with an indefinite continuance of hostilities between the two States, and with a professed determination not to extend our military operations further, would place

us in a precarious and undefined position, and entail upon us the necessity of constantly maintaining a force upon a war footing in that district, for the defence of it. It might also leave an unfavorable impression upon the minds of the people of India, who might be disposed to ascribe our forbearance to a want of power, rather than to a spirit of moderation.

We therefore consider that, simultaneously with the advance of the force under General Godwin (or earlier, if you think it more expedient), it should be announced to the King of Ava, that you are prepared to adopt the cession of the Province of Pegu as the measure of compensation by which your farther advance into his kingdom may be stayed, and to conclude a Treaty of Peace with him, upon the foundation of that concession, accompanied by the necessary stipulations for the future maintenance of a friendly intercourse between the two nations; but that, in the event of his refusing, or delaying, to accede to that proposal, he must be prepared for all the consequences which he will bring upon himself, by the further prosecution of the war in his dominions.

We observe, with satisfaction, that you are enabled to furnish to General Godwin all the force which he estimates to be necessary for the advance upon Ava, "without unduly weakening any quarter of the empire in its present circumstances." As this force would be required under any of the contingencies contemplated by you (except the very improbable one of a timely submission by the Burmese), we doubt not that your preparations for the dispatch of it will have been completed in due time to take advantage of the favorable season for its employment.

We observe, with great satisfaction, the very friendly disposition of the inhabitants of Pegu. The Governor-General, undoubtedly, judged wisely in not yielding to the desire of the Peguans to place themselves formally under the protection of the British power, while any uncertainty remained with regard to the intentions of the Government at home, as to the final annexation of the district. That uncertainty will be removed by the present dispatch, which is intended to convey to you our authority, under the sanction of the Queen's Government, to consider the permanent occupation of Pegu, and its final annexation to the East Indian Dominions of Her Majesty, as the just and necessary result of those military operations which you have been driven to direct against the Burmese Empire.

Having embraced that determination, you will not hesitate to avail yourselves of the favorable disposition of the Peguans, and derive from them all the assistance which their good will and zeal can afford to you. It may be doubted, indeed, whether the relations even now established between you and that people have not already imposed upon you the obligation of protecting them.

Their attachment to our Government cannot fail to add greatly to the facility of occupying and defending the new territory, and will render it the more easy to establish hereafter such an administration of the province, economical and political, as may be productive of great benefits to them, and may open large sources of advantage to British commerce and enterprise.

You will, therefore, consider yourselves authorized to proclaim the annexation of Pegu to the British Empire in the East, as soon as the forces under General Godwin shall be in possession of the whole of it, by the capture of Prome.

When we speak of the annexation of the whole province of Pegu, we do not lose sight of your remarks relating to its northern boundary, which appears to present no well-defined military line of defence. You will be well advised on that point by the military authorities whom you will be enabled to consult; and you will, no doubt, fix the precise limits of the cession which you will insist upon, with a due regard to the line most available for giving security to the new possession.

No. 10.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, July 12, 1852. (No. 31.)

WE have the honour to lay before you the accompanying copy of the minutes noted in the margin,* from which you will learn that it has been deemed expedient by us that the Governor-General should pay a brief visit to Rangoon, for the purpose of arranging personally with the military and naval commanders there, the plans of such further operations in Burmah, as circumstances may render necessary.

We have, &c.

DALHOUSIE.

F. CURRIE.

J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Minute by the Governor-General.

(Extract.)

July 8, 1852.

THE orders for preparing a force to take the field in Burmah at the opening of the season have already been issued.

The main outlines of future proceedings have already been marked out; but much detail remains to be filled up for insuring that the army shall be in a state of preparation to move at the time proposed.

Notwithstanding the great difference of local circumstances and feelings, which appears to be so much in our favor during the present war, great difficulties will be found in the way of a movement of the army, both in respect to carriage and supplies. The former will probably be found necessary both by water and by land. The latter will probably require to be drawn from a distance, though not from so great a distance as in the former war.

All these points require to be provided for completely and early. A correspondence for the purpose of conducting all these details, and determining upon them, would be tedious, and comparatively ineffectual, because tardy.

In order to bring the whole prospective arrangements into one view, and to determine upon, and distribute them among the different officers, who are to be responsible for them, with the least practicable delay, I proposed, if my colleagues saw no objection, to proceed myself to Rangoon, taking some heads of departments with me, and then and there to settle with the commanders of the naval and military forces all that was requisite.

I can see no real risk, or public inconvenience, in my taking this step. The affairs of the north-west frontier, by the reports of the Board, are, for the present, tranquil, and likely to continue so at this season: Nothing is at all likely to occur within so short a time which could render my brief temporary absence injurious, while the object for which I go is undoubtedly worth some risk.

My absence would not extend beyond eighteen days, or so.

DALHOUSIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Minute by Sir F. Currie.

(Extract.)

July 9, 1852.

WHEN the suggestion was made some days ago in Council, by the Governor-General, that his Lordship should pay a brief visit to Rangoon, for the purpose of arranging personally with the military and naval commanders, the plans of such operations in Burmah, as circumstances may render necessary, and the details of the forces to be employed, I stated my opinion that such a

* Minute of the Governor-General, dated July 8, 1852.

„ Sir F. Currie, „ 9, ———

„ Mr. Lewis, „ 9, ———

visit would be highly advantageous in facilitating future arrangements; and, in many obvious respects, conducive to the public interests connected with operations in that quarter.

I do not anticipate that the brief absence of his Lordship will be attended with any inconvenience; at any rate with inconvenience commensurate with the benefits likely to accrue from his visit at the present time.

It is, of course, desirable that the Governor-General should be absent from the seat of Government for as short a time as is consistent with the object in view. I do not anticipate that such absence would exceed twenty days; and I think that the great advantage likely to result is such as fully to warrant the Governor-General's undertaking the trip.

F. CURRIE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Minute by Mr. Lewis.

July 9, 1852.

I CONCUR in these views. I anticipate no material inconvenience from the absence of the Governor-General, for a fortnight or three weeks, in carrying on the executive government here; and I am satisfied that ulterior arrangements for the operations in Burmah, which appear now inevitable, will be infinitely facilitated by personal communication between his Lordship and General Godwin.

J. LOWIS.

No. 11.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, August 7, 1852. (No. 35.)

THE Governor-General embarked on board the East India Company's steamer "Feroze," on the 21st ultimo; and we have the honor to report that he returned yesterday from Rangoon, and resumed his seat in Council.

It is in the highest degree satisfactory to us to be enabled to report that the health of the troops on service in Burmah continues good.

Supplies are superabundant. An immense population has collected round Rangoon and Kemmendine. They are quiet and manageable, and they exhibit the most perfect confidence in the troops of every description—a testimony to the forbearance and good conduct of the force which will be appreciated by you.

The advance of the steam flotilla on Prome, during which fifty-six pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy, is reported to you.

By the ensuing mail we shall have the honour of addressing you, on affairs in Burmah, more fully than time will admit of at present.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Commodore Lambert to the Governor-General of India.

(Extract.)

Her Majesty's ship "Fox," at Rangoon, July 14, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to forward to you a copy of a letter I have received from Commander Tarleton, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," detailing the services he has performed while in charge of the flotilla in the Irrawaddy.

It gives me great pleasure to state that, gallant and valuable as these services have been, they are strictly in accordance with what I considered were your Lordship's wishes, namely, to gain a correct knowledge of the river as far as Prome, which had hitherto been so imperfectly described, and to dislodge and harass the enemy wherever they appeared, if practicable. How this service has been performed I leave to your judgment to decide, after your perusal of Commander Tarleton's letter.

You will perceive, without particularizing any individual under his command, how fully he appreciates the aid he received from all who partook in this gallant enterprise.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Commander Tarleton to Commodore Lambert.

(Extract.)

Moniew, July 11, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your letter, addressed to me on the 30th ultimo, I proceeded up the Irrawaddy as far as Yeagaim, where I anchored on the 7th instant, having been joined on the way by the East India Company's steamers "Proserpine" and "Mahanuddy." This place is now deserted both by the enemy and its inhabitants, and we were thus compelled to procure our own fuel. While thus employed, the East India Company's steamer "Phlegethon" joined company; when, finding that she had coal sufficient to supply the other vessels, I immediately proceeded with the four steamers. At 2 P.M., when opposite to Kononghee, a large number of armed men were observed collected on the bank. On a shell being fired amongst them, they immediately disappeared, either into the jungle, or some holes or trenches near the water's edge, whence they opened a most vigorous fire from five or six guns, and a vast number of muskets. I remained with the flotilla abreast their position for an hour, shelling the enemy to the best of our ability; but, protected as they were by the embankment, no decided impression could be made on them. I have no doubt that we could have carried the work, by running one of the small steamers alongside, and throwing the small-arm men on shore, but this service could not have been performed without certain loss; and, beyond spiking the guns, there was no object to be gained, the jungle covering the bank offering a secure retreat to the Burmese, from which they would have returned as soon as we had re-embarked. I considered, therefore, that I should be more fully carrying out your instructions in making this a reconnoitring force, by pushing forwards, without further attempt to dislodge the enemy, reported by the neighbouring inhabitants to be 1500 strong. I have the honor to inclose a list of casualties on this occasion; they are confined to the "Medusa," at which, as the leading vessel, the enemy's fire seems to have been principally directed.

At sunset the flotilla anchored off Myan-aong; at daylight, on the 8th, it again weighed, and proceeded till within sight of an extensive fortification crowning the end of a ridge of hills about 300 feet high, terminating abruptly at the town of Akouk-toung (marked in the chart Peeinghee). Bundoola was reported to be here with 7000 men, and a number of guns, differently stated from fifteen to forty. Having ascertained from the pilot that a passage might probably be found at this season through a creek to the eastward of the island, opposite Akouk-toung, and thus completely out of range of the enemy's guns, I determined to attempt it, and happily succeeded in getting through, with not less than two fathoms water. Here we learnt that a small steamer belonging to the King of Ava had only left the day previous, and that the whole army of the country was centred at Akouk-toung, or its neighbourhood.

Foreseeing the panic which the presence of the steamers would create above the defensive force, I urged forwards with all speed, detaching the "Proserpine," as the fastest vessel, to endeavour, by proceeding through the night, to overtake the Government vessel. Mr. Brooking, however, found this impracticable, and was compelled to anchor.

The "Mahanuddy's" fuel being now exhausted, I left the "Phlegethon" with her, to supply her wants, and, by dint of great attention on the part of Lieutenant Fraser, Indian Navy, and the officers of the "Medusa," I succeeded in steaming through the night, and reached Prome at daylight on the 9th. At the south end of the town, near the water's edge, I observed four heavy guns, but no armed men near them. I accordingly anchored the vessel abreast the spot, landed, and made fast a hawser to them, and hove them off: the iron guns were disabled, and sunk in deep water, and the brass ones taken on board. At seven, the "Proserpine" joined, and a few hours afterwards, the two other vessels, and, with the boats' crews of the "Fox" heartily entering on the work, every gun in Prome, twenty-three in number (see Return), was thus brought off. In the afternoon, I ascended ten miles higher up the river, as far as Zeegain, where I anchored for the night, leaving the other vessels at Prome to transfer fuel.

I had now, Sir, fully carried out the instructions contained in your letter of the 30th of June. There was no prospect of overtaking the steamer, and I had seriously to consider the safety of the vessels under my orders. With an enterprising foe, I was aware that the creek near Akouk-toung might be made impassable; and even by the Burmese, when, by the large force in the neighbourhood, such means were at their command. I, therefore, decided on an immediate return, with the view to prevent their having time to complete their preparations. I rejoined the vessels off Prome, at daylight on the 10th, and commenced the descent of the river. The city had been in our possession for twenty-four hours, the Governor, Mounghwine, having fled at our approach. At 10 A.M. we arrived at the entrance of Akouk-toung Creek; when about half way through, we observed several large boats crowded with armed men: at first it was difficult to make out their intentions, whether these were to attack the vessels, supported by a fire from the shore, or were crossing. It proved to be the latter; and they succeeded, before our guns could be brought to bear upon them, in reaching the bank; from which a straggling fire of musketry was opened, but soon silenced by the great guns of the flotilla. Ten men, who had not time to escape from one of the boats, were made prisoners, and will be sent to Rangoon for interrogation. The steamers now turned round, and ascended the creek again, dispersing the enemy wherever he was to be seen, brought away five brass guns on field-piece carriages that were still in the boats, and burnt the general's state barge and a number of war boats, with a large quantity of arms and ammunition.

I am not quite certain as to the movements of the enemy; the reports of the natives not entirely agreeing. They stated that the force began to cross at 3 P.M. on the 9th, and continued to do so through the night, and until we reached them at 10 A.M. on the 10th, as above related. One party insisted that the whole army had crossed; but this was not true, as men could be seen still on the fortifications opposite. The other stated that a thousand men only had been sent over to defend the creek. I am inclined to believe that the principal part of the army, including the general, had crossed (as our informant told us) on their way to Prome, the road to which leads from here, leaving a small force only at Akouk-toung. The barge, with the two gilt umbrellas and flag, would certainly not have been on this side had Bundoola not crossed himself; and I do not think it probable he would have come over with a detachment. I now continued the descent of the river, being joined by the East India Company's steamer "Pluto," at 3 P.M. The enemy had evacuated his trenches at Kanaong, and gone upward. At sunset, the flotilla was anchored off this place, where it is employed provisioning, and getting into readiness for further service.

I trust that this expedition has, for the present, entirely freed the lower country of the presence of the enemy, and I do not apprehend that they will again venture so far from Prome. This will be an incalculable blessing to the inhabitants, who evince to us everywhere the most friendly disposition, and only require security to become contented and happy.

I should be doing great injustice to every officer and man in this little force (consisting of the "Medusa," "Phlegethon," "Proserpine," "Mahanuddy," with three boats of the "Fox," and twenty marines, the officer commanding whom I regret to say is severely wounded) if I failed to represent to you the zeal and attention that has been shown on this service by all; without it, I have no hesitation in saying that it could not have been brought to a successful issue.

List of Casualties on board the East India Company's steamer "Medusa," during the Engagement at Konnonghee, on the 7th of July, 1852.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox."—Mr. John Elliott, First Lieutenant, Royal Marines, wounded, severely; musket-ball wound of the right foot. Mr. Frederick Morgan, Assistant Surgeon, wounded, slightly; contusion from a splinter. George Cook, boy, wounded, slightly; contusion from a splinter.

East India Company's steamer "Medusa."—Mr T. Rose Hunter, mate, Indian Navy, wounded, dangerously; gun-shot wound, and amputation of left arm. James Cummings, artillery man, wounded, dangerously; gun-shot wound of the chest.

FREDERICK MORGAN,
Assistant Surgeon, Her Majesty's ship "Fox."

*Return of Ordnance captured by the Steam Flotilla in the Irrawaddy, on the
9th and 10th of July, 1852.*

At Prome, July 9, 1852.

Iron.—12-pounder carronades.. .. .	4
12-pounders, 6 feet in length	3
32-pounders, 9 feet in length (3 of wrought-iron)	4
24-pounders, 6 feet in length	4
18-pounders, 6 feet in length	2
42-pounder	1
6-pounder	1
	19
Brass—8½-inch, 8 feet 2 inches in length	1
8½-inch, 6 feet in length	1
7½-inch, 7 feet 6 inches in length	1
8½-inch mortar, 3 feet 6 inches in length	1
At Akouk-toung Creek, July 10, 1852	5 brass field-pieces.
	9
Total	28
Destroyed and sunk	19
Brought away	9
	28

J. W. TARLETON, *Commander, R.N.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

Commodore Lambert to the Governor-General of India.

(Extract.) *Her Majesty's ship "Fox," Rangoon, July 21, 1852.*

IN continuation of my dispatch, dated the 14th instant, I have the honor to inform you that this morning I received a report* from Commander Tarleton, detailing further successful operations against the enemy in the neighbourhood of Prome, by a portion of the flotilla under his orders.

Mr. Burbank, the Commander of the "Pluto," having been informed that the Burmese troops had evacuated the fortified post on the heights of Akouk-toung, and had left their artillery there, he sent a force on shore to demolish the works, and to destroy or bring on board the guns.

This was accomplished on the 14th instant, without any opposition, after five hours' hard work under a burning sun; when all the enemy's guns on the heights of Akouk-toung, 28 in number, were either destroyed or brought off to the steamers. Their calibre was from 4 to 18-pounders.

Next day the steamers proceeded to Sahlaydan, where they captured six large boats laden with grain and arms, which were being conveyed upwards; and, on the 16th, arrived off Podangmew, where some Government boats were destroyed.

On the morning of the 17th, Mr. Burbank anchored off Prome. Some of the inhabitants immediately came off with the intelligence that 500 troops had been stationed on the hill at the back of the town, but decamped directly the steamers came in sight. He also learnt that General Bundoola, with the remnant of his army, consisting of only 2000 men, the rest having deserted, was encamped at Ethaymew, a town without any defences, nine miles inland. The inhabitants of Prome, as well as of all the other towns, are most anxious that a steamer shall be permitted to remain off their city, to protect them from the lawless gangs of disbanded soldiers.

In bringing Mr. Burbank's zeal and activity to my notice, Commander Tarleton recapitulates the services performed by the small steam force under his orders, assisted by three boats and 60 seamen and marines from Her Majesty's ship "Fox," during the last ten days.

The river has been ascended to Prome, 56 guns have been captured, 10 war boats, and several boats containing military stores and ammunition have been burnt; and an army of 7000 men, commanded by one of the highest officers in the Burman Empire, dispersed, with the exception of 2000 who are collected in the neighbourhood of Prome, where, without artillery or defences, they are no longer formidable.

* Not received in England.

No. 12.

*The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.**Fort William, August 21, 1852. (No. 38.)*

IN continuation of our dispatch, dated the 7th instant, No. 35, we have the honor to transmit for your information a copy of further papers, relating to the present state of affairs at Burmah.

We beg to draw the especial attention of your Committee to the minute recorded by the Governor-General, concurred in by Sir F. Currie and Mr. Lewis, showing what are, in the opinion of his Lordship in Council, the most effectual means of securing the ends which the Government has sought to obtain from the state of Burmah.

We have, &c.,
DALHOUSIE.
F. CURRIE.
J. LEWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

*Minute by the Governor-General of India.**August 13, 1852.*

ADDRESS Major-General Godwin.

Acquaint him that the Governor-General in Council, after having had the advantage of conferring personally at Rangoon with himself and with Commodore Lambert, commanding the naval force, has, since his return to the Presidency, maturely deliberated upon the position of our affairs in Burmah, upon the objects which the Government of India has had in view, in reference to that State, and upon the most effectual means of securing the political ends it has sought to obtain.

The Governor-General in Council has finally resolved that, under present circumstances, he will not direct the Major-General, with the army which shall be assembled under his command, to undertake a march upon the capital of Burmah.

His Lordship in Council has determined that the present operations of the army shall be limited to the complete subjection, and present military occupation of the province of Pegu, up to whatever point to the northward of Prome we may, on examination, find it convenient to fix.

In the Memorandum which was submitted by General Godwin to the Governor General at Rangoon, two brigades, composed each of one European and two Native Infantry regiments, one troop of horse artillery, one horse light field battery, and one corps of irregular cavalry, were specified as the force which the Major-General would require, in addition to that already under his command, for the subjection of Pegu, and its secure occupation.

Accordingly, a brigade, composed as above, will be embarked as soon as possible from Bengal.

The horses, and a battery of nine-pounders, will be sent from Dum Dum, to be attached to the artillery company, which formerly held them.

Two rissallas, amounting to 200 men of the Ramghur Horse, being Irregular Cavalry, will be embarked for Burmah. The only corps of Irregular Horse which have volunteered for service across the sea, are at a great distance. Though some time must necessarily elapse, the other two rissallas will be sent afterwards, if required.

A similar brigade will be embarked from the Presidency of Madras. It is understood that the regiments composing it are ready for immediate embarkation. One of them, the 5th Madras Native Infantry, will very shortly be relieved in Arracan by the 68th Bengal Native Infantry. Measures have been taken to provide immediate transport for the rest, namely one European and one Native Infantry regiment, with a troop of horse artillery, to which the Governor-General in Council has added two additional companies of Madras sappers and miners.

The East India Company's frigate "Feroze" will sail to-morrow morning to Madras, for the conveyance of a portion of these reinforcements to Rangoon.

Commodore Lambert has been requested to despatch all the steamers to Madras, which he can make available for the same purpose; and the Government of Fort St. George will employ sailing transports if it thinks fit.

By these arrangements, the Governor-General in Council anticipates that the force under the command of the Major-General, exclusive of the troops in Arracan, will, by the 10th of September, amount to four regiments European Infantry, nine regiments Native Infantry, one troop horse artillery, four companies artillery, with a bullock battery, four companies of sappers.

By the 10th of October it is probable that that force will be further increased by one regiment European, two regiments Native Infantry, one horse field battery, and possibly the Irregular Cavalry.

In order to provide for every contingency, two other brigades, as originally ordered, will be held in readiness at the Presidencies; though the Governor-General in Council does not anticipate that their services will be required in Burmah.

The attention of the Governor-General in Council has long been given to the matter which is noticed in the Major-General's Memorandum, namely, the means of rendering the flotilla on the Irrawaddy powerful and effective. While at Rangoon, the Governor-General requested Commodore Lambert to make every exertion, and to spare no expense in collecting and fitting native boats to be employed with the flotilla.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle was requested to cooperate by similar exertions on the rivers to the eastward.

At the Commodore's request, the "Enterprize" is now despatched to strengthen the flotilla; and whenever the state of the monsoon will permit, His Lordship in Council hopes to add three other river boats of the same class as the "Mahanuddy;" beyond these, none can be sent, for there are no others fit for the work in the possession of the Government, and none can be obtained.

Shortly after the arrival of the expedition at Rangoon, Major-General Godwin laid before the Governor-General in Council the grounds on which, in a military point of view, he objected to an immediate advance of the force to Prome.

The want of support without reinforcements, which could not then be given; the uncertainty as to the plans and movements of the Burmese; and the insecurity of the communication by the rivers, upon which the Major-General must have exclusively relied; were the chief objections advanced by the Major-General; and they appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be valid and sound. He therefore fully approved of the resolution not to make an immediate advance to Prome.

Though subsequent events have weakened some of these objections to an advance, still the absence of reinforcements hitherto, and the inexpediency of moving the European troops out of the good and healthy quarters which had been provided for them at Rangoon, and of exposing them to the injurious influences of climate and the season, appeared to the Governor-General in Council fully to justify the continued resolution of the Major-General not to advance to Prome during the strength of the rains, when no object of first importance was to be gained by the movement.

But the year is now advancing; the monsoon will diminish in violence; and it is understood that at Prome little rain falls after September.

Early in that month, as has been shewn above, a considerable reinforcement will have been added to the original force. Every account that has been received goes to shew that the Burmese are not in a condition for formidable resistance, and the flotilla has complete command of the river, from Prome to the Sea.

It would obviously be advantageous, if it can be safely effected, to convey a force to Prome, while the river is still swollen by the rains, upon the flotilla and boats. The quantity of carriage required for the movement of the force by land is so great, as shewn by the memorandum submitted by the Major-General; the difficulty of obtaining such carriage on the spot is apparently so insuperable; and the cost of bringing it by sea from the Presidencies would be so enormous; that it is in the highest degree desirable to move the troops as much as possible by way of the river.

Since, then, the available force at Rangoon will be greatly increased early in September; since the river communications will be quite secure; since the climate of Prome, as is believed, will not then be injurious; and since the political ends of the Government of India will be promoted by the further advance of the force to Prome, the Governor-General in Council has the honour of suggesting, for the consideration of Major-General Godwin, whether, if a force of from 2,000 to 2,500 men, with provisions and stores, could be conveyed simultaneously upon the flotilla to Prome, such force could not, under existing circumstances, maintain itself in perfect safety there, against any Burmese attacks, while the flotilla should return to Rangoon, and bring up a reinforcement of similar amount. This question is, of course, left for the determination of the Major-General on military grounds, and according to his own judgment.

But if the Governor-General in Council does not err in believing that such a movement may be made with safety, his Lordship in Council would be glad that it were executed, as soon as it can be undertaken without serious risk to the health of the troops.

If the Major-General should determine in the affirmative, the Governor-General in Council requests that he will give early information to Commodore Lambert regarding his intentions, with a view to expediting the preparation of the flotilla.

The further measures which may be necessary for driving the Burmese troops out of the district of Martaban, and for completing the military subjection of the Province of Pegu, are left to the judgment of Major-General Godwin.

In the former instructions addressed to the Major-General, in March 1852, certain terms were named in the event of the Court of Aya making overtures for peace.

The course of events has subsequently rendered these instructions inapplicable to the present state of affairs.

The Governor-General in Council has the honor to request that in the event of any communication being made by the Court of Ava, he will transmit it at once to the Governor-General in Council. The Major-General will not, however, by reason of any such overtures having been made, delay his advance, or the preparation for his advance, or any operations in which he may be engaged.

DALHOUSIE.

I entirely concur.

F. CURRIE.
J. LOWIS.

No. 13:

The Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India in Council.

October 7, 1852.

WE have received your dispatch of the 21st of August, with its several inclosures.

We observe, with great pleasure, the favorable impression which the Governor-General had received from his visit to Rangoon, of the conduct of the naval and military officers in charge of the several departments of the forces assembled in the Province of Pegu; and of the generally effective condition of the troops under their command. The Governor-General's commendations appear to have been very judiciously bestowed.

We also learn, with entire satisfaction, the arrangements which you had made for adding to the military and naval strength of the combined force under General Godwin, observing that you intended to dispatch, forthwith, a considerable reinforcement to him, and that you had made provision for a further augmentation of his army, when the occasion should require it.

Our instructions to you by the mail of the 8th of September will have conveyed to you, in the clear and explicit manner which you so naturally and justly required, our views with respect to the policy to be adopted in the prosecution

and conclusion of the war into which you have been so reluctantly, but unavoidably, forced, by the conduct of the Burmese authorities.

We continue to be decidedly of opinion that the war, thus unwillingly commenced on our part, cannot be satisfactorily terminated except by a treaty, upon the conditions which were pointed out in our instructions, or upon such other terms as the obstinacy and folly of the Court of Ava may compel you to impose upon it.

We observe that, after the visit of the Governor-General to Rangoon, you had come to the conclusion that an advance of the troops upon Prome would be more advantageous, under all the circumstances of the climate, in the month of September, than at the more advanced period of the year (November) which you had originally contemplated. We rely entirely upon your judgment and discretion in that respect, as well as for your directing the employment of the force under General Godwin, for the accomplishment of the policy recommended by our instructions, in the manner best adapted to the nature of the climate to which the troops will be exposed, and to the character of the enemy with which they will have to deal.

No. 14.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, September 7, 1852. (No. 42.)

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of our dispatch dated the 7th of August last, No. 35, we now fulfil our promise of addressing you fully on the affairs of Burmah.

A copy of the minute recorded by the Governor-General on the 10th ultimo, is herewith inclosed, embodying the results of his Lordship's inquiries, and of his personal communications, while at the seat of war; together with a transcript of the minute recorded by Sir F. Currie, and concurred in by Mr. Lewis.

We must apologize for neglecting to forward the above by the last mail; the omission occurred through an oversight.

We take this opportunity to forward, for your information, copies of further dispatches received from Major-General Godwin, and from Commodore Lambert, and of the instructions we have issued to those officers, regarding the military occupation of the country, the construction of barracks for the troops, and the naval preparation for the advance of the troops to Prome by water.

We have, &c.,

DALHOUSIE.
F. CURRIE.
J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Minute by the Governor-General.

(Extract.)

August 10, 1852.

IT has been my desire to submit to my colleagues, as soon as possible after my return from Rangoon, the results of my inquiries, and of my personal communications, while at the seat of war. And having read and considered the several dispatches from the Commander-in-chief in India, and from the Government of Fort St. George, relative to the reinforcements for General Godwin's force, I beg leave to submit a brief summary of the state of affairs in Burmah, as they appeared to me, after conference with the General and the Commodore; together with a statement of the view which I take of our present position, our means, and our future prospects and requirements.

In consequence of successive accidents to the "Feroze," caused by the violence of the tides, and of the strength of the monsoon which met the vessel in the bay, I was so much delayed as to render my stay in Rangoon necessarily very short; since I was desirous of returning to the Presidency before the

departure of the mail of the 8th of August. Nevertheless, I had sufficient opportunities for full conference with Major-General Godwin, with Commodore Lambert, with the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, whom I had requested to meet me there, and with other officers who had been employed on the several services.

No military movement of any kind had been made upon our part since the General last reported to the Government. He had visited Martaban and Bassein, and having corrected the omission at the former post, by which the hill was left unfortified, he now considers everything secure, at both places, under all circumstances.

Attacks were reported to have been made upon Martaban, or alarms of attack to have been given, twice during my short stay at Rangoon. They were regarded as of no moment.

Some Burmese troops were certainly still in the Martaban district. They had detached a portion of their force, and had again, as we anticipated, taken possession of Pegu, wresting it from the Taliens, who undertook to hold it.

In the Delta of the Irrawaddy, and in the Bassein district, no enemy's force could be found.

A flotilla, composed of several steamers and of ships' boats, had been sent up the river by the Commodore, under the command of Captain Tarleton, R.N. The annexed dispatches, which were delivered to me on my arrival, describe another very dashing piece of service performed by this little squadron.

Avoiding a strong stockade at Akouk-toung, armed with heavy guns, by discovering a new and unused channel, Captain Tarleton found his way to Prome. Very few troops were there. He landed, seized the river stockade, destroyed or carried away twenty-three pieces of artillery, and again returned down the river. As he had calculated, he came upon the troops crossing over from Akouk-toung to the Prome side. Having thus cut them off from their guns in the stockade, he subsequently attacked it, and captured twenty-eight more guns, making in all fifty-six pieces of artillery captured at that time, many of which were heavy.

The full benefit of the advance to Prome has not been secured, because it was impracticable, with the numbers they had, to hold what they had seized. But still to have acquired the certainty that there is no large force assembled, and that there are no strong defences as yet constructed at Prome; to have captured fifty-six pieces of artillery; routed the chief Burmese Commander, Bundoola, out of a strong stockade at Akouk-toung, and obtained a complete command of the river from Prome to the Sea, is good service done; and I propose that these gallant sailors should receive a full measure of praise for their enterprise, bravery, and success.

With the exception of the 5000 men, or thereabouts, said to be under Bundoola, and a few thousands more whom I have mentioned, towards Martaban, no Burmese army can by any means be heard of in the Lower Province.

We have every reason to believe that no army has been assembled in the Upper Province either. The last dispatch from the Commissioner of Arracan, conveying the report of the scout whom he sent into Burmah, clearly states that no army has been prepared to advance towards Prome. The report of this man has been proved to be so accurate in regard to the amount of force, and to the state of affairs in the Lower Province, that I think the Government may reasonably place reliance on his statements as to the Upper Province; and may assume that up to this time at least, no army has been assembled, nor any preparations made to advance towards the lower country.

Wherever the troops or the ships of the expedition have gone, they have been received with unequivocal marks of friendship and goodwill. The people everywhere bring supplies; they bring fuel for the steamers; they seek our protection; and it will be seen that even at Prome the inhabitants begged for a steamer to be left, in order to protect them from the plunderers to whom they are exposed, undefended by their own troops or rulers.

The same confidence and goodwill have been displayed by the people at Rangoon, in a very extraordinary degree. The population of that place, and of Kemmendine, has, it is calculated, increased to not less than 60,000 persons. The bazaars are filled with goods; while every description of violence or plunder, or outrage by the soldiery, has been avoided; and the intercourse between the

people, the troops, and the ships, has been marked by the most complete reliance, and by a singularly amicable spirit, on both sides, from the beginning.

Such a result is the highest testimony that could be afforded to the orderly conduct of the force. Their discipline, and inoffensive behaviour in quarters, have been equally applauded by the General and their several Commanders. These facts appeared to me so honorable to the character of the force, as to merit the praise of the Government; and as the value of any such eulogy is always enhanced by its being expressed at the moment, and on the spot, I took the liberty of expressing at once my sentiments to the force, in the general order, of which a copy is annexed, without waiting for my return to Council.

It is gratifying to be able to report, that the most sanguine hopes of the Government have been realized in regard to the preservation of the health of the troops at Rangoon, by the precautions that have been taken. I found the men of the 18th and 80th housed in excellent wooden barracks, provided by the exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, and constructed with not less energy and success by the devoted exertions of Major Fraser.

Besides these barracks, excellent hospitals, and numerous officers' quarters, have been constructed, and fresh ranges for the 51st Regiment were in rapid progress. In the meantime, the men of that corps are very sufficiently lodged in the Phoongyes', or Priests', houses, near the Pagoda. The Artillery are well quartered in the Pagoda Square.

The supply of fresh meat has been excellent and abundant. The stock of 2000 cattle, which had been collected at Moulmein and Amherst, before the troops landed at Rangoon, has been drawn upon, and still the stock now consists of 3000 head. Major Budd, the Commissariat officer, so reported to me. A supply of beef is readily obtained also upon the spot.

The season, by the favor of Providence, has been good, and the monsoon unusually mild. One of the great causes of the sickness which exists, is the abundance of fruit, and the inordinate quantities which the men naturally devour, from its great cheapness. Still, by good lodging, care, and the excellent and successful regulations which have been made and enforced by the Commodore, to prevent the introduction of liquor by way of the river, the sickness is such as must, under the circumstances, be considered light. For the month of July, as the return of Dr. Montgomery will show, it amounted to about $10\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the European, and 9 per cent. of the Native troops. This percentage, though it rises above the general average in India, does not exceed the amount of sickness in many corps now in cantonments. It certainly is not large, considering the position of the troops on service, and it bears no resemblance whatever to the state of things which prevailed in 1824, at the same period of the year, and the recurrence of which has been so much dreaded, and so confidently predicted upon this occasion.

If the troops should remain at Rangoon during the months of September and October, the same increase of sickness must be looked for there which usually prevails everywhere in India during those months. But lodged, fed, and cared for as they are, I think the Government may feel confident that the troops will even then suffer as little as any troops employed on service in the field can be expected to suffer.

The state of our affairs in Burmah may be concisely summed up thus :

We are masters of the sea-coast from east to west. We control by our steamers the whole of the streams of the Irrawaddy, from Prome to the Sea. With the exception of a few thousand men near Prome, and a still smaller body towards Martaban, no Burmese troops whatever can be heard of in the Lower Province. In the Upper Province, no army has been collected. No defences have been constructed at Prome, and no force remains there.

The Burmese have betrayed a total want of enterprise, courage, power, and resource. Large bodies of them retire at the mere sight of a steamer, or in the presence of a few Europeans, so soon as they are landed. At the same time, no sign has been shown of an intention to submit, or to treat, nor is there the slightest ground for believing that any such overtures will be made.

The population of the country, while they evidently cannot be depended upon to fight, either for us or for themselves, have everywhere shown the strongest and most unequivocal desire to aid our operations, to furnish us with supplies, and to obtain our protection.

Our troops are healthy, their discipline excellent, their spirits confident and high.

Commodore Lambert, it was agreed, should make every exertion for the collection of boats, and for the fitting of them for the conveyance of troops and stores, to be attached to the flotilla, which he requested might be strengthened by the "Enterprise." This vessel, though condemned for heavy work at sea, will be most effective and useful, if well armed, and stationed in the deep water near to Prome. The fitting of the other river steamers, also, is rapidly proceeding. The strengthening of the flotilla, in country boats, &c., will be aided by Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, in the eastern rivers.

Lastly, the reinforcements which were ordered for the army are rapidly collecting, and some are already prepared for embarkation.

The review I have thus taken of the present position of our affairs in Burmah, of our preparations, our means, and our future prospects, will naturally have led my colleagues to expect the declaration which it is now my duty to make, that everything which has occurred in the course of recent events, and all that I have learned by personal conference, and inquiry, at the seat of war, have confirmed my convictions of the necessity and soundness of that policy which the Government of India has advised, with a view to establishing our superiority over Burmah, now, and its maintenance in peace, hereafter; while, at the same time, I have seen stronger grounds than before, for believing that this Government will experience no difficulty in attaining and securing the object which it has proposed to itself.

But the Government of India is at present incompetent to determine the question of policy. No reply can be expected to their application for instructions, for some time to come.

The absence of definite orders, now, upon the ultimate policy to be adopted, is so far to be regretted, that it necessarily hampers the Government, in some degree, as to present measures. For, so long as it continues doubtful whether the permanent occupation of Pegu will be permitted, I feel reluctant to direct an advance of the army, even as far as Prome, because I am most unwilling to expose the people (who would be led by our advance to commit themselves still more deeply to us than they have yet done) to all the horrors which I have already described, as the certain consequence to them of any subsequent retirement by us.

But while I conceive that the Government of India should be induced by this consideration to refrain from ordering or permitting an advance to Prome in undue haste, I hold that it would not be justified, on that ground, in withholding the order to advance from Rangoon, after the period when the issue of such order has become practicable, and, moreover, expedient, with reference to the complete success of our future operations, whether these shall consist of a march upon Ava, or only of an advance through, and an occupation of the Province of Pegu.

The determination of this important question,—namely, whether the ensuing campaign shall include a march upon Ava, or shall be restricted to an advance to Prome and an occupation of Pegu, can no longer be delayed. Its decision is essential for guiding the Government in the preparations it has now to make for the future prosecution of the war.

In the minute dated the 30th of June, a plan of campaign, similar to that which was carried on in the last war, was contemplated, and the additional military force which General Godwin had named as necessary for the execution of it now, was stated to have been called for from the Government of Madras, and from the Commander-in-chief of this Presidency. At the same time, I ventured to submit my opinion, that if no further annexation of territory than that of the Province of Pegu, were contemplated, it would be expedient, for reasons which were fully stated, that the advance of the army should be restricted to the limits which it was intended permanently to occupy. At the same time, it was added, that this proposal might be open to objections which could be seen, and appreciated by the military authorities, though they had not been detected by the Government, and that the scheme would, of course, not be adopted without previously consulting the military commander.

Accordingly, upon my arrival at Rangoon, I entered upon the consideration of the future operations of the army with Major-General Godwin. The Major-General laid before me the memorandum marked A, which had been prepared

previous to my arrival, and in which he specified the force he would require for an advance to Ava.

Subsequently I unfolded to him the views which the Government were inclined to entertain in favor of more restricted operations, and assuring him that those views had been entertained subject to any military objections which might be shown to weigh conclusively against their final adoption, I requested him to consider the subject maturely, and thereafter to state to me his opinions.

Two days afterwards, our conference was renewed, when the Major-General submitted to me the memorandum marked B. In that document he did not set forth any military objections to the proposed plan of limited operations, but simply stated the force which he considered would be sufficient for its successful execution, and which amounted to little more than half of what he considered requisite for the more extensive operations.

In the conversation which ensued, and in reply to the inquiries I addressed to him, the Major-General alleged no military objections to the view I had ventured to bring forward, and he orally expressed himself with confidence to the same effect as in that paragraph of the memorandum in which he states, that "5000 men at Prome would repel any force that an enemy might attempt to stockade with, or to offer any violence to the Pegu people."

An advance to Ava could not, according to the best information I have been able to obtain, be made wholly by water. I greatly doubt whether the steamers, which, during this autumn, would go to Prome, could, in the ensuing winter, mount the stream to Ava. In any case, a heavy land column would, I humbly conceive, be unavoidable for some part of the way. Greatly as everything in that country has changed for the better, compared with what it was in 1824, I apprehend that the difficulty of obtaining land-carriage would be hardly less now than then. Carts are extremely scarce, and they are not fitted for the heavy draught of the stores and equipage of the troops. The chief animal of the country is the buffalo, which, excellent for purposes of tillage, is almost useless for heavy draught. Roads there are none. Yet with all these disadvantages, the annexed return will show the vast amount of carriage held necessary to move even a small force. To supply this, including, as will be seen, nearly 300 elephants, would be practicable no doubt. Everything of that sort is practicable, if one is resolved to do it; but it could be effected only at an enormous cost, which nothing but a proved indispensable necessity would justify this Government in incurring.

Giving its full value to the friendly spirit of the people, the cost of supplies on such a march would still be very heavy indeed; and if, as is probable, much of those required for the European troops should, of necessity, be drawn from our stores by the sea, that heavy cost would be grievously enhanced.

Judging by the course of the present war, much loss need not be feared from the enemy: but some loss must be looked for from that cause: climate, fatigue, exposure, and disease, would sweep away more; and the expenditure of good and gallant lives, on such a march, would be far more costly than the expenditure of our treasure. Moreover, time would be, as I conceive, unprofitably consumed, when it might be far better employed in securing our conquest, if we are permitted to occupy, or in removing our troops, if we should be ordered to evacuate.

Major-General Godwin declared his opinion distinctly, that leaving Rangoon, and effecting successfully his march upon Ava, his operations would still occupy so many months as would render it necessary for the army to pass the hot season of 1853 at Ava. "In such case every channel of expense for a numerous and distant army would still be kept open; and a state of actual hostilities, unconcluded by any declared result, would be protracted over almost as long a period as was occupied by the war from 1824 to 1826."

And all this expenditure of treasure and of life—all this prolongation of a state of war—would be for no good end, after all. For as no one has advocated the retention of the upper provinces of the empire, we shall conquer, only to relinquish them. In relinquishing them, we shall, as I have already ventured to contend, sacrifice far more than we may have gained by our conquests; and shall, by our retirement, weaken the reputation of our military power far more than we strengthened it by our previous advance, however numerous might be its successes, however complete might be its triumph."

On the other hand, if it be resolved to limit the advance to the ground which it is proposed to occupy permanently, the greater part of the objections which have been stated to the alternative course will be obviated at once. The amount of troops required by the General will be diminished by one half. The force required for Prome may, it is expected, be entirely conveyed by the flotilla; land-carriage will be little, if at all, required; the troops will not be exposed, but will be transported easily, and in a comparatively short time, to their ultimate destination. Every expense will be vastly diminished; life will be saved; and time will be economized. The whole of the cold season will be before us, in which to confirm our position and to provide against the future; and if the decision of the authorities in England shall confirm the proposals of the Government of India, the war may be declared at an end in November, and the annexation of the province proclaimed. The treaty relations which have been violated by the Burmese will not be renewed. Doubts and uncertainties, both in Pegu and among ourselves, will be removed, and thenceforward we shall have only to defend our frontier against attack. Each day, of late, has convinced me more and more that the defence will be an easy task.

Such are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the two plans of operation. The latter of the two appears to me to be so greatly preferable, in every view of sound policy, that I have no hesitation in recommending that the Government of India shall now finally resolve upon adopting it, and carrying it into effect.

Having decided that the advance should be limited to Prome, it remains to consider when that advance shall be made.

It will be in the recollection of my colleagues, that the subject of an immediate advance to Prome was officially discussed by the Major-General shortly after the first operations of the army at Rangoon. He stated strong military objections to the movement; he pointed out that his force was comparatively small, and that no reinforcements could be obtained at that season; he showed that we were totally ignorant of the plans and movements of the enemy. Hence he argued, that if he should take his force to Prome, it would be placed there in the heart of an enemy's country, wholly without support, if attacked (which was an event at least as possible then as in 1825), and with his sole communication by the river insecure; and, consequently, that he would be altogether in a weak and false position.

These reasons against an immediate advance seemed to me to be unanswerable.

The Major-General has subsequently been strongly urged by many to advance during the rains. He has informed me that he had declined to do so. Though some of his previous objections were removed by the command obtained over the river by the flotilla, he would still, in the absence of reinforcements, have been wholly without support; and he alleged as an additional reason for declining to advance, that while no object of importance had been pointed out, as likely to be secured by the early occupation of Prome, it would have been unwise and culpable to remove the troops, without positive necessity, from the barracks which had been provided for them, and where they were enjoying comparatively good health, in order to expose them at Prome to effects of climate and the season, from which they were likely to suffer severely.

I consider that these reasons of General Godwin, for refusing to advance hitherto, during the rains, to Prome, were sound and good.

But the season is now advancing, the monsoon is wearing away, and during the ensuing month it is understood that the rains cease at Prome.

There would be advantage in moving up as soon as possible after the first cessation of the rains, because the river will then be more favorable for the movement of the flotilla than it would be a few weeks later. And the sooner the troops are placed at Prome, the longer will be the time before them for establishing themselves, and for making every necessary arrangement in respect of barracks, &c., before the commencement of the ensuing hot season.

Very early in the ensuing month the force under the Major-General's command will be increased (by arrangements which will presently be detailed) to—

4 Regiments European Infantry,
9 Regiments Native Infantry,
1 Troop Horse Artillery,

1 Bullock Field-Battery,
4 Companies European Artillery,
4 Companies Madras Sappers.

By the beginning of October I expect that the force will be still further increased by—

1 Regiment European Infantry,
2 Regiments Native Infantry,
Horses for 1 Field-Battery,
200 Irregular Cavalry.

Wherefore I conceive that by the beginning of the month of September, sufficient support will have been supplied, the communications by the river will be secure, and the flotilla will be effective.

In such case I propose that the advantages of as early a movement as is consistent with military considerations, having been stated to the Major-General, he should be requested to consider the practicability of moving up to Prome, by the flotilla on the river, a force of from 2,000 to 2,500 men. Such a force, it is considered, with a steamer stationed upon the river, off Prome, would be able to hold its position against any army at all likely to be brought against it, until the flotilla should return to Rangoon, and bring up the remainder of the force intended for Prome.

With the details of these movements the Government of India of course will not interfere. But orders are necessary for the completion of those arrangements by which, the reinforcements necessary to any movement from Rangoon are to be provided.

I propose that the Government of Madras, and the Commander-in-chief, Sir W. Gomm, should respectively be informed that, having regard to the position of affairs in Burmah, as they appear to the Governor-General in Council, after conference with the military and naval commanders at Rangoon, we do not anticipate that the whole amount of reinforcements recently called for will be required. At present we propose to dispatch only one brigade from each Presidency. At the same time, considering it prudent to provide for every contingency, we propose that the remaining brigades shall be held in readiness for embarkation, if they should be required.

The details of the instructions which it will be necessary to issue, will be found in the annexed memorandum which I have drawn up.

A letter must be addressed to Captain Lynch, commanding the "Feroze," requesting him to proceed to Madras, and to place himself at the disposal of the Government there, for the conveyance of reinforcements.

The Commodore must be requested to dispatch every available steamer, for the same purpose, to Madras.

By the time that these vessels have transported the reinforcements from Madras, their services will be required here, for a similar duty. Orders to that effect may be issued hereafter.

Only one point more occurs to me, requiring the orders of the Government of India.

The Court of Ava has made no overture for terms; it shows no signs of doing so; even if it should do so now, the proposal will not reach us until a vast additional expense will have been actually incurred, in the movement of troops and steamers, and in the hiring of transports, which must be taken up immediately. I conceive, therefore, that the terms which the General was empowered to concede four months ago, and even the terms which are mentioned in the *Minute* of the 30th of June, would be quite insufficient to meet the present circumstances of the case.

As the General is not to advance beyond Prome, I would now instruct him, that in the improbable event of his receiving any overtures of submission from the Court of Ava, he should forward them for the consideration of the Government of India. In the meantime he will not, by reason of such communication, suspend any advance, or preparations for an advance, to Prome, in which he may be engaged.

This precaution is necessary for the purpose of counteracting any design they may have of gaining time, for which purpose alone, as is well known, such pretended negotiations are frequently opened by the Burman Court.

DALHOUSIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

General Order by the Governor-General to the Forces at Rangoon.

Rangoon, July 31, 1852.

THE Governor-General of India cannot forego the opportunity which is afforded him, by his visit to Rangoon, of again offering to the combined force his most cordial acknowledgments of the valuable and distinguished service they have rendered here.

The gratification which the Governor-General experiences in thus congratulating the force upon its success in the field, is greatly enhanced by his being enabled to add the expression of his unqualified approbation of its conduct in quarters.

In every branch, whether naval or military, European or Native, the force has exhibited an orderly conduct, an inoffensive demeanour towards the people of the country, and a spirit of sound discipline, which are as truly honorable to its character as the high distinction it has won in battle.

Whatever may be the future course of this service, whatever may be the ultimate fate of this country, the Governor-General has had the proud satisfaction of feeling that the people of Burmah will hereafter associate with the presence of a British force among them, no other recollections than those of its irresistible bravery in the field, of its order, forbearance, and obedience in the camp.

Inclosure 3 in No 14.

A.—MEMORANDUM on the strength of the army I think requisite to enable me to march into the heart of Burmah and to subjugate it.

ON this point I have the same opinion I had the honor to express to the Governor-General of India at Calcutta.

Four European regiments, six Native ones, two troops Horse Artillery, one field battery, horsed, and 350 Sappers and Miners, in addition to the force I now command at Rangoon, will be the increase I think indispensable to such a step.

Out of this force I shall have to leave a garrison at Rangoon of from 2,000 to 2,500 men, and for this purpose, I shall select the least robust men of the various corps.

Bassein will require 600 men, and Martaban about 100 Europeans to give confidence to its native garrison.

At Prome at least 800 to 1000 men must be left, to protect the stores and depôts that will be formed there.

It may be necessary also to place a small force at or near Shoee-Gyne, so as to cover Martaban and Pegu, and to give security to my right flank and rear on the advance.

I would suggest also, but without making a point of it, the great advantage that would be derived from the services of a corps of Irregular Cavalry. Its moral effect would be as great as the many uses it could be put to in the field.

It is not to be supposed that so large a force as I have named can be required at any one point, but it will not more than provide for the unavoidable drain by loss in action and by sickness at so long a distance from any reinforcement.

On the assembly of this army, I would submit, for the favorable consideration of the Governor-General, some increase to the department of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General. The heads of these offices might be made deputies; and a deputy-assistant be given to each. Some addition should be made to the office establishment of the Adjutant-General; and that of the Quartermaster-General should be put on the following footing, which I am inclined to think is not excessive, viz.:

One head draughtsman	Rs. 150	monthly
One assistant	70	„
One head writer	120	„
One assistant writer	70	„
Charges contingent	40	„
Total	450	„

An officer might with advantage be appointed to survey and map the country, and he should be attached to the Quarter-Master General's department.

The arrangements for the Commissariat I leave to the consideration of Government, for I have not sufficient data on which to base calculations.

I have received from the several departments returns of what carriage they think sufficient for moving efficiently the stores and baggage, an abstract of which I have the honor to send herewith.

I beg to recommend to your Lordship's favourable consideration, Captain Bruce, of Her Majesty's 18th regiment, for the Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General's post, when that department shall be increased.

As also Captain Keighly 49th Madras Native infantry, for the post of Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master General.

Your Lordship will excuse me for pressing on your Lordship's best consideration, the providing for this army a well constructed and convenient flotilla, to be formed by some well-informed person, for this department of naval utility.

There can be no exertion, no business at this time, and for some time to come, of equal importance, if this army is ever to move.

H. GODWIN,
Major-General.

STATEMENT of the Carriage required for the Ordnance, including Artillery, and portion of the two Brigades of Infantry, &c., now at Rangoon.

Corps and Detachments.	Elephants.	Artillery Bullocks.	Ponies, or Carriage Bullocks.	Carts, two Bullocks each.	Dooley Bearers.	Tons.	REMARKS.
ARTILLERY.							
2 Companies Bengal	18	1178	65	457	..	634	1. The carriage required by the Commissariat has not been included in this statement.
2 ditto Madras							
Ordnance Department							
BENGAL BRIGADE.							
Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish Wing, 80th Regiment	69	..	628	207	..	126	3. If tents are carried on bullocks, a cooley will be required for the poles of each European tent, and two coolies for the poles of every three native tents.
40th Regiment Native Infantry							
67th Regiment Native Infantry							
MADRAS BRIGADE.							
Her Majesty's 51st Regiment Detachment 9th Madras Native Infantry 35th Regiment Native Infantry	39	..	356	129	..	75	4. An elephant has been calculated to carry 1000 lbs. only, a cart 600, and a bullock 140. These loads are considered the maximum for a country like Ava.
Sappers and Miners, and Engineer Department							
Superintending Surgeon's Department	2	60	1268	17	5. Fractional parts have not been calculated.
TOTAL	284	1178		853	1268	923	6. The number of tons inserted, is the dead weight alone. This calculation will answer for guns, shot, and stores of that description; but for baggage, tonnage must be calculated by measurement. Tents, for instance, will require 1 ton for every 50 cubic feet; the number of tons that would be required may therefore safely be doubled, or 184 instead of 923 inserted in the column of the statement. A nearer approximation cannot be arrived at without measuring the whole of the baggage of officers and men.

Inclosure 4 in No. 14.

B.—MEMORANDUM.

Rangoon, July 31, 1852.

SHOULD the Governor-General deem it advantageous to annex Pegu, and to take possession of this lower country, confining his military operations to the line west to east, Prome and Tonghoo, Major-General Godwin conceives that two more brigades of two European and four Native regiments, with one troop of Horse Artillery, one troop (horse?) light Field Battery, and a corps of Irregular Horse, in addition to the force he now commands, are sufficient.

Five thousand men at Prome would repel any force that an enemy might attempt to stockade with, or offer any violence to the Pegu people.

The remaining 4,000 would be disposable for garrisoning Rangoon, Bassein, Martaban; and he believes a force would be most effective, posted at Shoee-Gyne or at Sitang.

H. GODWIN,
Major-General.

Inclosure 5 in No. 14.

Minute by Sir F. Currie.

August 13, 1852.

I ENTIRELY concur in the views of the Governor-General, as expressed in this minute, as to the operations which we should now direct to be undertaken in Burmah. I have already recorded my opinion, that we should not, unless forced to do so by circumstances, advance beyond the frontier of the province which we intend to occupy, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, and to secure the peace of our own provinces in future.

I think that we are now committed to the occupation and annexation of the Pegu Province, for the above purpose, and I think we should do everything in our power to effect that occupation as speedily and as effectually as possible.

I cannot anticipate that we shall be peremptorily instructed by the Home Government to evacuate the country, without having effected the purpose for which the war was undertaken. I see no other means of effecting that purpose than the one proposed; for if we do not declare the annexation of Pegu to be the punishment we have considered it imperative on us to inflict on the Burman State, and the indemnification for the cost we have been put to, we must necessarily advance to Ava; and an advance to Ava will involve such an immense expenditure, as the Burmese State can never, by any money payment, by any possibility make up to us.

I think, moreover, that the time is gone by for any negotiations by which we can relinquish what we have taken, even if the Burmese were now (which is not at all probable) to advance them. We cannot, after all that has taken place, again abandon the Peguers and Taliens to Burmese vengeance.

F. CURRIE.

I concur.

J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 14.

The Secretary to the Government of India to Major-General Godwin.

Sir,

Fort William, August 13, 1852.

I AM directed to acquaint you that the Governor-General, after having had the advantage of conferring personally at Rangoon with yourself and Commodore Lambert, commanding the naval force, has, since his return to the

Presidency, maturely deliberated upon the position of our affairs in Burmah; upon the objects which the Government of India has had in view in reference to that State; and upon the most effectual means of securing the political ends it has sought to obtain.

The Governor-General in Council has finally resolved, that, under present circumstances, he will not direct the Major-General, with the army which shall be assembled under his command, to undertake a march upon the capital of Burmah.

His Lordship in Council has determined that the present operations of the army shall be limited to the complete subjection, and present military occupation, of the Province of Pegu, up to whatever point to the northward of Prome we may, on examination, find it convenient to fix.

In the memorandum which was submitted by you to the Governor-General at Rangoon, two brigades, composed each of one European and two Native infantry regiments, one troop of horse artillery, one horse light field-battery, and one corps of Irregular Cavalry, were specified as the force which you would require, in addition to that already under your command, for the subjection of Pegu and its secure occupation.

Accordingly, a brigade, composed as above, will be embarked as soon as possible from Bengal.

The horses, and a battery of 9-pounders, will be sent from Dum Dum, to be attached to the artillery company which formerly held them.

Two rissallahs, amounting to 200 men, of the Ramghur Horse, being Irregular Cavalry, will be embarked for Burmah. The only corps of Irregular Horse which have volunteered for service across the sea, are at a great distance. Though some time must necessarily elapse, the other two rissallahs will be sent afterwards, if required.

A similar brigade will be embarked from the Presidency of Madras. It is understood that the regiments composing it are ready for immediate embarkation. One of them, the 5th Madras Native Infantry, will very shortly be relieved in Arracan by the 68th Bengal Native Infantry. Measures have been taken to provide immediate transport for the rest, namely, one European and one Native infantry regiment, with a troop of horse artillery, to which the Governor-General in Council has added two additional companies of Madras Sappers and Miners.

The East India Company's frigate "Feroze" will sail to-morrow morning, to Madras, for the conveyance of a portion of these reinforcements to Rangoon.

Commodore Lambert has been requested to dispatch all the steamers to Madras, which he can make available for the same purpose; and the Government of Fort St. George will employ sailing transports, if it thinks fit.

By these arrangements, the Governor-General in Council anticipates that the force, under your command, exclusive of the troops in Arracan, will, by the 10th of September, amount to—

- 4 Regiments European Infantry.
- 9 Regiments Native Infantry.
- 1 Troop Horse Artillery.
- 4 Companies Artillery with a Bullock Battery.
- 4 Companies of Sappers.

By the 10th of October, it is probable that that force will be further increased by 1 regiment European, 2 regiments Native Infantry, 1 horse field-battery, and possibly the Irregular Cavalry. In order to provide for every contingency, two other brigades, as originally ordered, will be held in readiness, at the Presidencies, though the Governor-General in Council does not anticipate that their services will be required in Burmah.

The attention of the Governor-General in Council has long been given to the matter which is noticed in your memorandum, namely, the means of rendering the flotilla on the Irrawaddy powerful and effective: while at Rangoon, the Governor-General requested Commodore Lambert to make every exertion, and to spare no expense, in collecting and fitting native boats, to be employed with the flotilla.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle was requested to cooperate by similar exertions, on the rivers to the eastward.

At the Commodore's request, the "Enterprise" is now dispatched to strengthen the flotilla; and whenever the state of the monsoon will permit, his Lordship in Council hopes to add three other river-boats of the same class as the "Mahanuddy." Beyond these none can be sent, for there are no others fit for the work in the possession of the Government, and none can be obtained.

Shortly after the arrival of the expedition at Rangoon, you laid before the Governor-General in Council the grounds on which, in a military point of view, you objected to an immediate advance of the force to Prome.

The want of support, without further reinforcements, which could not then be given; the uncertainty as to the plans and movements of the Burmese; and the insecurity of the communication by the rivers upon which you must have exclusively relied; were the chief objections advanced by you; and they appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be valid and sound. He therefore fully approved of the resolution not to make an immediate advance to Prome.

Though subsequent events have weakened some of these objections to an advance, still the absence of reinforcements hitherto, and the inexpediency of moving the European troops out of the good and healthy quarters which had been provided for them at Rangoon, and of exposing them to the injurious influences of climate and the season, appear to the Governor-General in Council fully to justify your continued resolution not to advance to Prome during the strength of the rains, when no object of first importance was to be gained by the movement.

But the year is now advancing; the monsoon will diminish in violence; and it is understood that at Prome little rain falls after September.

Early in that month, as has been shown above, a considerable reinforcement will have been added to the original force. Every account that has been received goes to show that the Burmese are not in a condition for formidable resistance, and the flotilla has complete command of the river from Prome to the Sea.

It would obviously be advantageous, if it could be safely effected, to convey a force to Prome, while the river is still swollen by the rains, upon the flotilla and boats. The quantity of carriage required for the movement of the force by land is so great, as shown by the memorandum submitted to you; the difficulty of obtaining such carriage on the spot is apparently so insuperable; and the cost of bringing it by sea from the Presidencies would be so enormous; that it is in the highest degree desirable to move the troops as much as possible by way of the rivers.

Since, then, the available force at Rangoon will be greatly increased early in September; since the river communications will be quite secure; since the climate of Prome, as is believed, will not then be injurious; and since the political ends of the Government of India will be promoted by the further advance of the force to Prome; the Governor-General in Council has the honor of suggesting for your consideration, whether, if a force of from 2000 to 2500 men, with provisions and stores, could be conveyed simultaneously upon the flotilla to Prome, such force could not, under existing circumstances, maintain itself in perfect safety there against any Burmese attacks, while the flotilla should return to Rangoon, and bring up a reinforcement of similar amount. This question is, of course, left for your determination, on military grounds, and according to your own judgment.

But if the Governor-General in Council does not err in believing that such a movement may be made with safety, his Lordship in Council would be glad that it were executed, as soon as it can be undertaken, without serious risk to the health of the troops.

If you should determine in the affirmative, the Governor-General in Council requests that you will give early information to Commodore Lambert regarding your intentions, with a view to expediting the preparation of the flotilla.

The further measures which may be necessary for driving the Burmese troops out of the district of Martaban, and for completing the military subjection of the Province of Pegu, are left to your judgment.

In the former instructions addressed to you in March last, certain terms were named in the event of the Court of Ava making overtures for peace. The course of events has subsequently rendered those instructions inapplicable to the present state of affairs.

The Governor-General in Council has the honor to request, that in the event of any communication being made by the Court of Ava, you will transmit it at once to the Governor-General in Council: you will not, however, by reason of any such overtures having been made, delay your advance, or the preparations for your advance, or any operations in which you may be engaged.

I have, &c.

C. ALLEN.

Inclosure 7 in No. 14.

Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, August 25, 1852.

I HAVE had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 13th instant.

I fully understand the instructions of the Governor-General in Council on the subject of confining my approaching movements in this country to the Province of Pegu. The force to be put under my command I consider, in consequence of this resolution, to be quite adequate to any call on it; and, indeed, the whole orders of Government are so clearly explained and laid down, as to prevent the least misconstruction on any point.

It had been my intention to propose the movement from this of about 2000 men up to Prome, about the 20th of September, when the violence of the rains may be presumed to be very much mitigated; and I feel no sort of doubt that such a force will be perfectly able to hold its position.

It is my intention to take up the first detachment myself, to see to its quarters, as well as for those of the succeeding detachments. I shall immediately return to Rangoon, to expedite the advance of the different branches of the force.

The only failure to be apprehended is the power to get cover, however indifferent, for our men. I know Prome, its capabilities, and its climate, as I was there for eight months, and have traversed its neighbourhood in every direction on service during that time; it has not one-tenth part of the capabilities of Rangoon, and the late measures there may have rendered that even less, as it has been for some time in the possession of the Burmans.

I feel assured great efforts will have to be made from Rangoon to give quarters to our force at Prome. I shall take Major Fraser with me, and also the Quartermaster-General. If the town has not been entirely burnt, as part has been, when the force shall amount to 4000 or 5000 men, I shall quarter them in the city, but it would not be prudent to do so till I am so strong.

I have been in communication with Commodore Lambert on the subject of this advance; he was with me this morning, when we mutually understood each other, so that by the end of September I look to having military possession of Prome.

I have a very strong persuasion that our advance will draw a good many of the troublesome people from Beling and Sitang up to our neighbourhood. As we cannot reach those places by water, but shall have to march about 100 miles, any operations against them must be postponed until the ground becomes so dry that the soldiers can lie on it safely, and our matériel move over it to take the field.

I am perfectly aware that my late instructions respecting a treaty with the Government of this country are null and void.

There have been repeated annoyances at Martaban, but as I have indirectly learned that the enemy have been turned out of their lurking-place near that post, we may hear no more of them. I have the honor to forward Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson's report of these demonstrations.

To expedite the preparation of boats for stores and baggage, I have procured a most respectable and capable man from Moulmein. I have also sent for Brevet Captain Keighly, 49th Madras Native Infantry, whom his Lordship may remember I recommended for employment in the Quartermaster-General's department. He has informed me that he understands boat-building, and I

know his activity and resources to be great, so that he will be of much service in taking superintendence of the whole.

Captain Keighly and Mr. Chisholm are now busily repairing, classing, and measuring a great number of boats. The Commodore is also taking up some small vessels for the same purpose.

The health and conduct of the troops remain most satisfactory.

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN.

No. 15.

The Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India in Council.

October 23, 1852.

SINCE the date of our last dispatch to you (the 7th of October), we have received your letter of the 7th of September, No. 42.

It has brought to us the minute of the Governor-General of the 10th of August, a very important and interesting document, which appears to have been omitted from the mail of the 21st of August, by some inadvertency at Calcutta.

The material variation from your original plan of postponing the re-opening of the campaign until the month of November, by directing the advance of the troops in September,—adopted, we doubt not, with your usual prudence and judgment, upon the latest and most careful review of all the circumstances of the case,—appears to have induced you to form your conclusions upon the ulterior policy of your proceedings, in anticipation of those precise instructions for which you applied to us by your dispatch of the 2nd of July, No. 30.

The Marquis of Dalhousie correctly observes, in his minute of the 10th of August, that our instructions could not reach you in sufficient time to meet the more early dispositions which you then felt called upon to make.

We consider that you will be in possession of those instructions by the middle of October, when the forces under Major-General Godwin will be established on the frontier of Pegu, and, therefore, fully in a condition for the fulfilment of our intentions, should no intervening circumstances have occurred to render them inapplicable.

Lord Dalhousie's remarks on the feeble character of the military dispositions of the Burmese, whether for defence or aggression, supported as they are by all the secret information you have obtained, encourage us to expect that General Godwin, under your directions, will experience no material obstacle to such a termination of the war as we have pointed out in our instructions to you.

We can hardly suppose that the enemy will continue so deaf to the suggestions of prudence, and so blind to a just view of his own position, as to resist the appeal which you will make to him when you are in full possession of his southern province, and within a moderate distance of his capital. He cannot remain ignorant of the extent of the military and naval strength which General Godwin will be enabled to wield for his destruction; and we hope and trust that he will not persevere in the folly of setting at defiance such a fearful preponderance of power against him.

No. 16.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, October 25, 1852. (No. 50.)

From the General Order, and the dispatches published on the 23rd instant, you will learn with satisfaction the capture of Prome, on the 9th and 10th idem, with but a trifling loss on our side.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

*General Orders issued by the Governor-General of India in Council.**Fort William, October 23, 1852.*

THE Governor-General in Council has much gratification in publishing for general information, dispatches received from Commodore Lambert and from Major-General Godwin, which report the capture and occupation of the city of Prome, after some resistance, and with comparatively trifling loss.

The steam squadron and the boats of Her Majesty's ships, conveying the troops upon the Irrawaddy, anchored off Prome on the 9th of October. A fire from the shore was silenced by the fire of the steamers and of the boats. The troops having been landed, drove the enemy, some three or four thousand strong, from the suburbs; and, on subsequently advancing to the Great Pagoda and to the heights beyond, they found the position wholly abandoned by the Burman force.

The Governor-General in Council desires to express in the strongest terms his obligations to Commodore Lambert, for the care, the energy, and unwearied zeal which he has shown in directing the naval preparations for advance, and which have conduced so largely to the early and successful renewal of operations in the field.

His Lordship in Council begs to offer his thanks to Captain Loch, and to Commander Shadwell, for their conduct of the service on the river; and to Commander Rice, for his direction of the body of seamen upon shore.

His thanks are also due to Commander Campbell, of the Indian Navy, whose merit has been acknowledged by the Commodore.

The Governor-General in Council has viewed with high approbation the services of the officers and men, who, upon this occasion and for several months past, have been employed in boats upon the river, subjected to severe exposure, and engaged in harassing duties, which they have performed with the utmost alacrity and cheerfulness, and with conspicuous advantage to the public service.

To the officers, seamen, and marines of Her Majesty's ships, of the Indian Navy, and of the Bengal Marine, who have been serving upon the Irrawaddy, and to Commander Tarleton, who long commanded them, the Governor-General in Council is desirous of offering his hearty thanks.

The Governor-General in Council has in like manner to assure Major-General Godwin of the satisfaction with which he has viewed the skill and judgment by which the Major-General enabled the troops to obtain possession of an important post, without delay, and with but little loss.

To Major Mayhew, Deputy Adjutant-General; to Major Allan, Deputy Quarter-Master-General; to Captain Smith, Interpreter; to Captain Burne, Military Secretary; and Captain Chads, A. D. C.; the Governor-General in Council tenders his thanks.

Especially to Captain Christie and to Captain Welsh, of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, for the gallant manner in which they led their men to the attack, and to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the force, the Governor-General in Council desires to give assurance of his cordial approbation.

While thus congratulating the naval and military forces on the first result of their advance, the Governor-General in Council feels it to be due to the memory of an old and gallant sailor, that he should add a public expression of the deep regret with which he has received intimation of the death of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's ships in the Indian Seas.

Although Admiral Austen did not survive to witness the successful conclusion of the operations in which he had shared, the Governor-General in Council desires to record his admiration of the staunch high spirit which, notwithstanding his age and previous suffering, had led the Rear-Admiral to take his part in the trying service which has closed his career.

His Excellency Rear-Admiral Austen has afforded to the Government of India at all times a cordial and constant aid.

The Governor-General in Council has been grateful for his services, and laments his death.

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

*Her Majesty's ship "Fox's" Boat, on board the "Fire Queen,"
Prome, October 11, 1852.*

Sir,

I REQUEST you may be pleased to inform the Governor-General in Council that, having embarked on board the East India Company's steam-vessels under my orders Her Majesty's 18th and 80th Regiments, the 35th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, a detachment of Sappers and Miners, and of the Bengal Artillery with their field guns, I dispatched them as they were ready to rendezvous off Yangernsiah, a town situated at the upper end of the Panglang creek, which joins the Irrawaddy to the Rangoon river.

The Commissariat, Ordnance, and Engineers' stores, and about 1000 followers attached to the regiments, were conveyed in the steamers, large Burmese cargo boats, five small schooners and a barque.

The cargo boats, manned by Burmese crews, advanced in three divisions under convoy of the barges and pinnaces of Her Majesty's ships "Fox," "Winchester," and "Hastings;" the barque and schooners were towed by the steamers.

These arrangements being completed, I left Rangoon on the 24th ultimo, and Major-General Godwin joined me on the following day at Yangernsiah.

Having hoisted my broad pendant on board the "Fire-Queen," the steamer in which the Major-General embarked, I weighed from Yangernsiah on September the 27th, with the steam squadron specified in Inclosure No. 1, and proceeded up the Irrawaddy to Prome, calling at Henzadah on my way.

On the morning of the 9th of October, Prome was in sight, and on the squadron nearing the city, the enemy opened fire with a couple of guns and musketry, which was returned by the steamers as we proceeded into the bay, where I anchored in a convenient position, abreast of the town, for landing the troops.

The enemy continuing to keep up a fire after we had anchored, I sent the boats of the squadron, under the command of Captain Loch, C.B., of Her Majesty's ship "Winchester," to throw in a few shells and canister shot amongst them, which had the effect of silencing it for a time, although they kept up a very spirited fire on the boats, which wounded two seamen.

They then brought a gun down abreast of the "Fire-Queen," but had only time to give us one shot before it was dismantled by the fire from the steamers, which effectually cleared a landing place.

Major-General Godwin now expressed his wish to land the 80th Regiment and a party of artillery with two guns, at half-past 4, which was effected without any opposition, and the lower town cleared of the enemy.

At daylight next morning, the remainder of the troops were landed, and a brigade of 50 seamen being formed under Commander Rice, at the Major-General's request, to assist in working the guns, the pagoda and other parts of the city were taken possession of, the Burmese flying as the forces advanced.

Thus the important city of Prome was occupied by British troops with the trifling loss of one killed and three wounded on the part of the army, while in the squadron only four were wounded, who are named in Inclosure No. 2.

My thanks are due to Captain Loch, C.B., for the assistance he rendered me throughout these operations; also to Commanders Shadwell and Rice, of Her Majesty's ships "Sphinx" and "Hastings," the former for his unremitting attentions to the instructions I had sent him previously to my entering the Irrawaddy, and to the latter officer for the part he took when on shore with the brigade of seamen. Nor can I speak too highly of Commander Campbell, the officers and men of the Indian Navy and Bengal Marine.

The skill and perseverance displayed by the officers and men belonging to the boats appointed to convoy the cargo-boats from Rangoon to Prome, a distance of more than 200 miles, against a rapid stream, exposed occasionally to a fire from the enemy, is deserving of my highest praise.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT,
Commodore 1st Class, Commander-in-chief.

A List of the Naval Force employed at the Occupation of the City of Prome, under the Command of Commodore Lambert, on the 9th and 10th of October, 1852.

"Fire Queen," Bengal Marine (broad pendant of the Commodore); S. G. Boon, Commander. 8 guns. On board—Commodore George R. Lambert, commanding the East India and China Station; J. L. Southey, Esq., Secretary; Lieutenant George Rice, R.N., Flag-Lieutenant; Mr. Cottam, Midshipman; and the gig's crew of Her Majesty's ship "Fox."

"Enterprise," Bengal Marine; G. T. Neblett, Commander. 6 guns. On board—Captain G. G. Loch, C.B.; the Hon. Mr. Lascelles, Midshipman; and the gig's crew of Her Majesty's ship "Winchester."

"Mahanuddy," Bengal Marine; J. Simson, Commander. 4 guns. On board—Commander C. F. A. Shadwell; His Serene Highness Prince Ernest of Leiningen, Midshipman; and the gig's crew of Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx."

"Sesostris," steam-frigate, Indian Navy; C. D. Campbell, I.N., Commander. 5 guns; with two 8-inch guns.

"Medusa," Indian Navy; Lieutenant Fraser, N.I. 6 guns.

"Nemesis," Bengal Marine; R. Goodwin, Commander. 6 guns.

"Proserpine," Bengal Marine; A. Brooking, Commander. 6 guns.

"Phlegethon," Bengal Marine; A. Fryer, Commander. 6 guns.

Boats of the Squadron, conveying Cargo-boats laden with Stores and Provisions, under the Command of Commander E. B. Rice, of Her Majesty's ship "Hastings."

Her Majesty's ship "Fox," barge and pinnace, 2 guns.

" " "Winchester," barge and pinnace, 2 guns.

" " "Hastings," launch and gig, 1 gun.

" " "Sphinx," pinnace, 1 gun.

Officers employed in these Boats.

Mr. Copland, Mate; Mr. Lucas, Midshipman; Mr. Hudson, Midshipman; Her Majesty's ship "Fox," under the superintendence of Lieutenant Rice.

Lieutenants H. S. Hillyar and R. B. Pearse; Messrs. Round and Wilson, and the Baron Van Otter, Mates; and Mr. Slade, Assistant Surgeon; Her Majesty's ship "Winchester."

Mr. Nott, Acting-Mate; and Lieutenant Holland, Royal Marines; Her Majesty's ship "Hastings."

Mr. Smith, Midshipman; Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx."

N.B.—The launch, 2nd pinnace, and cutter, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," under Lieutenants Kennedy and Mason, and launch of Her Majesty's ship "Winchester," assisted in conveying as far as Henzadah; and the barge and pinnace of Her Majesty's ship "Hastings," with Mr. Davidson, Acting-Mate, and Mr. Luttrell, Midshipman, and Dr. Woods, M.A., M.D., Assistant Surgeon on board, under the superintendence of Lieutenant Edye, from Henzadah to Prome.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT, *Commodore.*

List of Wounded in the Flotilla under the Command of Commodore Lambert, at Prome, the 9th of October, 1852.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox's" barge, David Reid, A.B.

" " "Winchester's" pinnace, David Evens, A.B.

East India Company's steam-vessel "Mahanuddy," two natives of India.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT, *Commodore.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Prome, October 12, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council was aware of my intention, at the proper season, when the monsoon here had in some measure subsided, to break up the army at Rangoon, and remove its head-quarters to Prome.

I have now the honor to inform you that the first division of this force is in possession of that city.

After some weeks of preparation, the embarkation commenced on the 16th of September, and the 1st Division, amounting to 2300 men, and consisting of one company of the Madras Foot Artillery, with two 24-pounder howitzers and four 9-pounder guns, Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, the 35th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, and 119 Sappers, were all on board by the 25th idem.

The flotilla arrived off Prome on the morning of the 9th of October; each ship was cannonaded from a projecting point on the hills, as it rounded to the city, with very little effect. This fire was returned with much spirit by the steamers.

The weather here is so intensely hot, that I disembarked the Artillery under Brigadier Foord; Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson, with the Sappers under Lieutenant Allen, on the evening of the same day; and, by sunrise the next morning, the 18th Royal Irish, under Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, and the 35th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Apthorp.

The enemy, consisting of three or four thousand men, occupied a very fine position on a range of hills about a thousand yards east from the point where they first opened fire, commanding the town and the large pagoda, which they also occupied.

The troops were landed in the evening, in a suburb to the north of, and beyond, the town. I then ordered them to advance towards the position I had selected for the night; when, upon the head of the column approaching a dry nullah dividing the suburb from the town, a very smart fire of musketry and jingals was simultaneously opened from some jungle and houses on our left, and a small pagoda in our front.

The grenadiers of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, under Captain Christie, immediately advanced at the double towards the pagoda, and a party, consisting of two companies of the same regiment, under Captain Welsh, and accompanied by Brigadier Reignolds, were detached to the left, and in a very short time most gallantly drove the enemy out of their position, with the loss of only one man killed and a few wounded, Captain Welsh's party bringing in a jingal.

The grenadiers of the 80th Regiment kept possession of the pagoda, which I made the right of my position, and the troops had excellent cover during the night, which was passed in perfect quietude.

The following morning, when the remainder of the troops were landed, I advanced through the town in a direction I had determined upon the day before, from plans of the place in my possession, covered by the flank companies of the 18th Royal Irish and Her Majesty's 80th Regiments, and two 24-pounder howitzers, which were drawn by a party of sailors, under Commander Rice, of Her Majesty's ship "Hastings." Upon our advanced guard reaching the pagoda, it found that the enemy had abandoned that position, as well as the heights beyond it, leaving in our possession an entirely evacuated town, overrun with thick and rank vegetation, and, I regret to add, abounding in swamps.

It is evident that the enemy expected our force to land, and advance up the direct road to the pagoda, along which they had erected two or three small breastworks, as well as removed the planking of several wooden bridges leading to the pagoda, and the heights beyond it; but landing at the point we did, not only gave us an excellent road, but at the same time completely turned their position, rendering it impossible for them to hold it.

I have been for a long time aware of the assemblage of a large force about ten miles east of Prome, and at which place they also had a very formidable force in the last war, which took Sir Archibald Campbell several days to disperse. I have ascertained, from very good authority, that they have now about 18,000 men well posted in two or more stockades. It is not my intention to disturb them at present in any way, as by their concentration at that place the fine force now assembling here will have an opportunity of striking a blow which may put an end to much future opposition. It was on this Burmese Army that the enemy retreated from Prome upon our entering it.

The bravery and alacrity of the troops on this occasion was as conspicuous as it ever is.

His Lordship's thanks are deserved by Captain Christie, of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, for the gallant manner in which he led his company to the attack and capture of the small pagoda in our front, and to Captain Welsh, who, with two companies of his regiment, drove the enemy out of their position on our left.

The general staff—Major Mayhew, Deputy Adjutant-General; Major Allan, Deputy Quartermaster-General; Captain Smith, Interpreter to the Force; as also my personal staff—Captain Burne, Military Secretary, and Lieutenant Chads; Aide-de-Camp, were active in rendering me every assistance.

Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, commanding the Bengal division, came up to Prome with the portion of his division embarked, and was present throughout the whole of these operations; and I have great satisfaction in being enabled to leave him in command upon my return to Rangoon, where I am required, and for which place I shall leave this to-morrow.

I leave Major Fraser, of the Engineers, and Major Allan, Deputy Quarter-master-General, at Prome, to carry out the necessary arrangements for the reception of the regiments which will hereafter arrive.

To Commodore Lambert your Lordship is deeply indebted for the unremitting exertions, calling forth all possible resources, and anxious solicitude, which have accomplished the conveyance of the force to its destination up this noble, but most difficult to be navigated, river. To Commander Rice, for the exertions of himself and men under his command, I feel greatly indebted.

I have the honor to inclose a return of the casualties which have occurred during our operations before Prome, and to remain. &c.

H. GODWIN, *Major-General.*

*Return of Killed and Wounded at the Attack and Capture of Prome,
on the 9th of October, 1852.*

Head-Quarters, Prome, October 12, 1852.

Engineers.—1 severely wounded.

Her Majesty's 80th Foot.—1 killed; 1 severely, and 5 slightly wounded.

35th Madras Native Infantry.—1 slightly wounded.

Total.—1 killed; 8 wounded.

H. GODWIN,

Major-General, Commanding Army of Burmah.

W. MAYHEW, *Major,*

Deputy Adjutant-General, Army of Burmah.

No. 17.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, November 6, 1852. (No. 53.)

IN reply to your dispatch of the 6th of September last, we have the honor to forward for your information the accompanying copies of minutes recorded by us on the affairs of Burmah, from which it will be seen that we are unanimous in deprecating an occupation of Burmah, and that we further deprecate an advance to Ava (with the exception of Sir John Littler, who advocates an advance, but without an occupation).

We have, &c.,

DALHOUSIE.

J. LITTLER.

F. CURRIE.

J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

Minute by the Governor-General of India.

(Extract.)

Fort William, November 3, 1852.

THE dispatch of the Secret Committee, dated the 6th of September, contains a reply to the dispatch from this Government, dated the 2nd of July, wherein our future relations with Burmah were discussed.

The Committee entirely approves of the steps that had been taken by this Government, and fully adopts its recommendation that the Province of Pegu should be annexed, as the least measure of reparation and security that ought to be obtained upon the conclusion of the war.

The cordial approval of the Committee bestowed upon our measures, and

its ratification of the principle of our proposed policy, must be in the highest degree gratifying to my colleagues and myself.

I regret, however, to observe that the Committee does not coincide with the Governor-General in Council regarding the manner in which the formal termination of the war is to be effected.

The Government of India had proposed that the Province of Pegu should be conquered and occupied; and that, content with this acquisition, and with the strength and advantages of the position which the army would occupy, the Government should not, without absolute necessity, direct the troops to march upon Ava.

The Committee observes upon this suggestion, that it sees "material difficulties opposed to the retaining possession of the district without bringing the war to a conclusion, either by a Treaty with the King of Ava, of which that cession should be the basis (*sine qua non*), or by the entire subjugation of that Power." The Committee, accordingly, directs that "it should be announced to the King of Ava, that you are prepared to adopt the cession of the Province of Pegu, as the measure of compensation by which your further advance into his kingdom may be stayed, and to conclude a Treaty of Peace with him upon the foundation of that cession, accompanied by the necessary stipulations for the future maintenance of a friendly intercourse between the two nations; but that, in the event of his refusing or delaying to accede to that proposal, he must be prepared for all the consequences which he will bring upon himself by the further prosecution of the war in his dominions."

The orders of the Committee, therefore, are, that, on the occupation of Pegu being completed, the King of Burmah shall be called upon to conclude a Treaty of Peace, of which the cession of Pegu shall be the basis; and threatened, if he refuses, with all the consequences that continued war will bring upon him.

The terms of this menace are general, and if they stood by themselves might leave some doubt as to what precise consequences were in the contemplation of the Committee, as the results of continued war.

Interpreted by the aid of the context, the intentions of the Committee are evident. The opening remarks in paragraph 21, make it clear that the alternative proposed by the Committee, if the Court of Ava should refuse to conclude a Treaty, is the "entire subjugation of that Power."

It is the duty of the Governor-General in Council to obey the instructions of the Secret Committee. But it is a duty not less imperative upon him, that he should respectfully and frankly set before the Committee such objections as careful consideration may, in his deliberate judgment, suggest to *details* of policy enjoined by the Committee; upon which, from his local position and local experience, he must be well qualified to advise it.

This duty it is my wish to perform now, with deference.

I would premise that, when the Government of India advised that no advance should be made beyond Prome, it was under the impression that a proposal for the occupation of the Upper Provinces of the Burman Empire would never be entertained. That impression was derived from the expressions which were reported in the journals as having been employed by Her Majesty's Ministers in Parliament, strongly deprecating all conquest in Burmah, and from the tone adopted by the Committee, as well as by the public voice in England, upon the same question. The Government of India, therefore, concurring in these views, argued against an advance as impolitic, on the assumption that a subsequent retirement was inevitable, by reason of the objections which would everywhere be made to any larger occupation than that of the Lower Province.

Although it now appears that the objections felt by the Committee to the larger occupation are not insuperable, I still adhere to the policy originally recommended; and still strongly urge that the army should not advance to Ava, excepting under a more cogent necessity than that contemplated by the Committee in their present dispatch.

The Committee regards the Treaty as of great importance.

I regret to feel myself compelled to differ from it so widely, that I regard a treaty with this Burman Power as an evil to be avoided. Treaties of peace and commerce between civilized States are instruments of great power and value. In them the contracting parties solemnly bind themselves by mutual obligations in the sight of all nations. The obligations thus assumed cannot be lightly

disregarded by either party. Neighbouring nations standing by, who have witnessed the formation of the contract, deter, by their very presence, either Contracting Power from wrongfully violating its engagements. And under certain circumstances they would even interpose to enforce an observance of the stipulations of treaty.

But the conclusion of a treaty between the British Government and such a Power as Burmah, has no such efficacy or solemnity. Eastern nations set little store by such instruments. Their opinion of any attempted violation of treaty by Burmah would certainly not be calculated to deter the Court of Ava from prosecuting its unfaithful projects; and the British Government would obtain neither moral nor physical aid from them in enforcement of its rights, either by their opinion or by their action. In truth, the conclusion of such a treaty serves only to impose obligations upon the British Government in proportion as it confers rights. A general stipulation for peace and friendship, and for the mutual security of the subjects of both States, is not open to so much objection. But when clauses are multiplied, as in the Treaty of Yandaboo, and in the subsequent Commercial Treaty with Burmah, giving to the British Government many rights specified in detail, points of contact, and consequently of conflict, are multiplied in the same proportion. The British Government is thereby reduced to the necessity, either of interfering upon every occasion on which a faithless and overbearing Power disregards the stipulated rights of our subjects, or of avoiding the perpetual risk of quarrel by overlooking such disregard of its subjects' rights and neglecting to enforce them.

Such was the course pursued through many years in regard to our treaties with Burmah. The violations of them were innumerable; but we passed them by, for they were matters that were thought to be not worth going to war about. Our Envoys were actually hunted out of the country, wherein they were present by treaty; but we sat still under the contumely, because our hands were full of wars.

I do not presume to condemn this policy; I only describe it. But I add, without fear of contradiction, that it did unquestionably encourage the Burmese in their arrogance, and presumptuous violation of public rights, which led at last to the present war, and to their refusal of any reparation for the purpose of averting it.

Similar treaties formed now would, in like manner, lead either to early quarrel, or to a repetition of the same process as before, with the same result.

These are the reasons for which I regard the negotiations of a formal treaty with Burmah as productive of evil.

Even if the treaty be couched in those general terms to which I have said there is less objection, it would still, in my humble judgment, be wholly useless. The only considerations which would induce such a Power as Burmah to refrain from hostilities, and to save our subjects harmless, is fear of our power, and of the consequences, if they should provoke its exercise. If they have that fear, a treaty is superfluous for our protection: if they have it not, a treaty is worthless. For they not only do not observe treaties, but they do not affect to do so; the whole Burman people would scout, as an absurdity, the notion of their observing them, if there was any reason persuading to the contrary. I beg to quote again the statements of Dr. Judson, to whom their customs and character were familiar. He says, "All idea of negotiation is repugnant to the pride of the Burmans, and contrary to their custom. They believe that the conquering party will always keep what it has got, if it can, and that negotiation is therefore useless. Overtures, to treat, are always looked upon either as a mark of weakness, or they are considered as an artifice to gain time." Again, Dr. Judson says, in reply to the question, whether he considered the Burman Government very faithless, "Utterly so. They have no idea of the moral excellence, or of the utility, of good faith. They would consider it nothing less than folly to keep a treaty, if they could gain any thing by breaking it."

When the Government of India has such good evidence as this before it, of the disregard of all treaty obligations by the Burman Government, and when its own experience in the twenty-six years which have elapsed since that evidence was given, has abundantly proved its accuracy; the Governor-General in Council can have no other opinion than that a treaty with Burmah is of no more value than the reed with which it is written—that, as a barrier against hostility, it is as flimsy as the paper on which it is traced. Holding that opinion,

the Government of India has not contemplated forming a Treaty of Peace, in which it well knows no security for peace will be found.

Since, however, the Committee has expressed an opinion that a treaty should be formed, its injunctions shall be obeyed. But in obeying them, I submit that some relaxation should be made in the extreme penalty which the Committee have attached to any refusal by the Court, or even to any delay on its part, in concluding the treaty required. For if that penalty shall be fully and immediately exacted, it is my duty to say that, in my deliberate judgment, the consequences will be most injurious to the interests of the British Government.

I regard it as in the last degree improbable that the King will consent to sign a treaty ceding Pegu. That province was the first and best of the conquests of Burmah, and is the last that it has retained. To cede it, would be to cut off a right hand and pluck out a right eye. National pride would struggle bitterly against the open humiliation of a formal surrender. These motives would strongly affect almost every Burman. The personal character of the present King would hold out no hope of his being exempt from the same influences; while the intelligence that we have received, gives us good reason to believe that the King obstinately refuses to listen to any reasonable counsels regarding the war.

When the Committee directed that a refusal to sign a Treaty of Cession, should be followed by the entire subjugation of the Burman power, it had not before it the full information that (in the Minute of the 10th of August) must subsequently have made it acquainted with the great difficulties by which the execution of such an enterprise would be obstructed.

Nor, I think, has the Committee been fully aware of what it is that a total conquest of Burmah would involve. I beg permission to set forth in this place the difficulties and disadvantages which I foresee in the course that has been enjoined.

No correct estimate can be formed of the difficulty of moving a force on Ava, by a reference to the previous movements of this campaign, or to the recent advance of the first division of the army from Rangoon to Prome. It has been usual with the public press in India and in Europe, and with many other persons, to urge the immediate dispatch of a force upon the steam flotilla to Ava; thus to strike at the heart of the capital, and to terminate the war at once.

Such a movement is simply impossible. The Government of India has not at its disposal the means of effecting it. The steam flotilla is limited in numbers, and its operations are still further limited by the nature of the waters in which it has to act. It consisted during the late advance of the nine steam-vessels named in the margin.* Since that time, the "Fire Queen" has necessarily been withdrawn from the river for the mail duty. Three small steamers† have been added. Thus the steam flotilla, now amounting to eleven vessels, is numerically stronger than before, but of about the same capacity for the conveyance of troops. On the late advance, the flotilla, towing boats and aided by the armed boats of the squadron escorting convoys, carried to Prome 2,300 men, with their equipments, stores, and ammunition. But this has been correctly described as a great effort, which could probably not be repeated even on the comparatively short passage from Rangoon to Prome. That it could not be repeated beyond Prome is very obvious. For, of the vessels I have named, the "Sesostris" is a steam frigate of 1000 tons, which it was resolved to put into the river while it was yet high. The "Enterprise" is a sea-going steamer, drawing twelve feet of water. The knowledge we obtained of the river by the voyage of the "Diana," and by the survey then made of the river, proves that it is physically impossible for these ships to navigate the Upper Irrawaddy in the dry season. The river has already fallen fifteen feet since the 9th of October.

Deducting these two large vessels, the remainder, having regard to the increased quantities of stores and supplies which must be carried as the force advances away from its depôts, could not convey more than 1000 or 1200 men upon the river.

If it be argued that advantage should be taken of the rains when the

* "Sesostris," "Enterprise," "Fire Queen," "Pluto," "Proserpine," "Phlegethon," "Nemesis," "Medusa," "Mahanuddy."

† "Lord William Bentinck," "Damooda," "Nerbudda."

swollen stream would admit of the larger vessels proceeding onwards, I submit that very slight consideration would show the inexpediency of such an attempt.

“No man in his senses—certainly no prudent Government—would attempt to carry steam frigates six hundred miles up a rocky, impetuous, and uncertain river, where so much may be risked by failure, so little obtained by complete success. It was but the other day that this same ship, “Sesostris,” in coming down the broad, deep Bassein river, safely traversed before by the entire squadron in a single day, struck upon a rock not laid down. For forty-eight hours the ship hung upon the rock, and was saved only by the skill of its commander, and the perseverance of the crew. Such an event is tenfold more probable in the Irrawaddy, where the unwieldy vessel would be contending with a most powerful current. If it should occur, let it be considered what would be the effect on a ship crowded with troops, and crammed with stores; let it be considered what would be the moral effect which the loss of the ship would have upon our own men, not less than upon the enemy. Above all, what would become of the troops thus left without conveyance or cover?

And if all these misfortunes should be avoided, and the men should be landed, what effective operations could be carried on by them during the rainy season? For it is to be remembered, that although the monsoon above Prome is less heavy than at Rangoon, it is still the same as in other parts of India.

Similar consideration connected with the monsoon would greatly diminish the number of troops which the same ships could convey. Although 2300 men were recently brought to Prome, the voyage was comparatively short, and the weather was fine. Even then the men suffered from the crowding and confinement. If they are to be moved in the rains for nearly 400 miles further, the ships must be covered in, and the ships’ boats could not give the same aid as of late. Unless it was desired to invite the decimation of cholera, the numbers embarked on each ship must be greatly less than on the advance to Prome. I give a wide estimate, when I say that the whole steam flotilla could not, in the rains, convey more than 1500 men.

Moreover, the flotilla cannot be increased. Every vessel that could be fitted on the Ganges has already been prepared; and the “Indus,” the last of them, will shortly be sent. The steam-tugs, even if they could be brought, are useless; for they draw twelve feet of water.

On communicating with the Superintendent of the Indus flotilla, I found there were few which were not required for the service there, and that those few were old, and would be useless to contend with the stream of the Irrawaddy, even if they could be got safely across the sea, which was extremely doubtful. An attempt was made to buy a steamer at Bombay, but it was found to be unfit for the duty.

The facts I have detailed will show that the flotilla we have, can by no means be increased at present. They further show that whether, disregarding every risk, the advance be made from Prome in the rains, or in the dry season, the utmost amount of force that could be carried on the river alone would be 1500 men.

To rely upon this inconsiderable force for the conquest and occupation of Ava could not be gravely contemplated by the Government of India. The Burmese are styled a contemptible enemy, and they have shown themselves to be so during this war. But it is never wise to despise an enemy. To despise them so overmuch as to attempt the conquest of their empire with 1500 men, could not be justified: while our experience of Cabul is as yet but ten years old, it would be rash indeed thus to expose a handful of men, isolated in the midst of enemies, who, however immeasurably inferior to them in the field, yet might, by their mere numbers, cut off their supplies, harass them at every point, and, by the aid of climate, hunger, and fatigue, produce again the calamity which we have once had occasion to deplore.

If Sir Archibald Campbell at Yandaboo brought little more than 2000 effective men into the field, it is to be remembered that these were the remains of a conquering force opposed to the fragments of a broken and disheartened army. The conduct which in that gallant officer was a wise boldness would, if deliberately repeated by landing a still smaller force at Ava, be a reckless folly in the Government of to-day.

Having shewn that our means are wholly inadequate for conveying a

sufficient force by water to Ava, it follows that if an adequate force is to be sent, a large proportion of it must march by land.

The difficulties which would be found in moving such a force by land were pointed out in the Minute of the 10th. of August. It was there said :

“An advance to Ava could not, according to the best information I have been able to obtain, be made wholly by water. I greatly doubt whether the steamers which during this autumn would go to Prome could, in the ensuing winter, mount the stream to Ava. In any case a heavy land column would, I humbly conceive, be unavoidable for some part of the way. Greatly as everything in that country is changed for the better, compared with what it was in 1824, I apprehend that the difficulty of obtaining land carriage would be hardly less now than then. Carts are extremely scarce, and they are not fitted for the heavy draught of the stores and equipage of troops. The chief animal of the country is the buffalo, which, excellent for purposes of tillage, is almost useless for heavy draught. Roads there are none, yet, with all these disadvantages, the annexed return will shew the vast amount of carriage held necessary to move even a small force. To supply this, including, as will be seen, nearly 300 elephants, would be practicable, no doubt. Everything of that sort is practicable, if one is resolved to do it; but it could be effected only at an enormous cost, which nothing but a proved indispensable necessity would justify the Government in incurring.

“Giving its full value to the friendly spirit of the people, the cost of supplies on such a march would still be very heavy indeed; and if, as is probable, much of those required for the European troops should of necessity be drawn from our stores by the sea, that heavy cost would be grievously enhanced.”

No time has been lost nor any exertions spared, since the date of that Minute, to collect carriage for the army, with a view to enabling it to move against any force that might be in its neighbourhood. One hundred and fifty elephants have been dispatched from Bengal. The Assistant Commissioner in Arracan undertakes to pass them over the mountains, and they will probably be at Prome by January.

Colonel Bogle, acting on instructions issued while I was at Rangoon, has collected and purchased 100 elephants on the Tenasserim side. He has collected also other carriage; but these will not be sufficient for an advance to Ava.

Subsequent information has shewn that local supplies of carriage cannot be looked for at present. Our intelligence had informed us that for 100 miles above Prome the country is already deserted by the King's orders, and from that point onwards the inhabitants of the towns and villages are keeping their boats ready for flight on our appearance. The state of things which the first division has found at Prome fully confirms this intelligence. The country was deserted; no one was in the city; its streets were filled with swamp and grass; and, when we last heard, no supplies were procurable excepting those which accompanied the force from Rangoon. These difficulties are not insuperable. The advance doubtless would be made, but at an enormous cost of treasure, and with a certain sacrifice of life, far worse than the loss of treasure.

Heretofore the charges of the war have been light indeed, compared with the cost of the previous war. But if the army is to be advanced 400 miles beyond its present position, the Government of India can no longer regard its financial position with the confidence it is now warranted in entertaining. The Court of Directors has recently been arranging for the conversion of a portion of the public debt; and the Governor-General in Council, notwithstanding that the time for this proposal (coming as it did in the midst of a Burmese war) seemed neither appropriate nor propitious, fell at once into the views of the Court, in the belief that the war-charges would amount to no such sum as would interfere with operations of conversion. But if the Committee requires this Government to protract the war, to continue the advance to Ava, and to seize a vast and unprofitable region, such pleasing prospects as conversion of five per cents and surplus revenue, both of which are now in the view of the Committee, must be abandoned; and the Committee must be prepared to hear, in lieu thereof, of exhausted cash balances and re-opened loans.

If, nevertheless, the advance should be made, doubtless it would be made successfully, and Umerapoorá would be captured. When all this has been effected, our task will still be but half done. If the Committee will refer to the

map of Burmah, it will find that six degrees of latitude must still be traversed before the subjugation of the Burman power will be effected. That tract of country is mountainous, jungly, and peopled with wild tribes. The difficulties of subduing this tract cannot be stated, because they cannot be calculated. But supposing that its conquest has been effected, and that the subjugation of the Burman Empire has been completed, I respectfully request the Committee to consider the burden which they have bidden the Government of India to assume therein.

Territory, 800 miles in length, from the Sea to Assam, and varying in breadth from Arracan to the borders of China, will have been added to the British possessions in the East. Once taken, it must be held, or all the evils which accompany retrocession on our part will be brought upon us. Admitting that the Shans and the other Hill Tribes are insignificant in the plains, like the Nagas and Singphoes round Assam, we shall not be free from perplexity; for we shall have placed ourselves in contact with them among their hills. No hill people is contemptible among its own hills. That these people will not be so, whatever they may be in the plains, we may with certainty infer, when we recollect that our attempt to coerce the Nagas some two years ago was attended with no very brilliant results. At all events, local troops will be required for the purpose, at least as much as they have been required in Assam.

If our power is to be respected, and the subjugation of the Burman authority is to be complete, the machinery of civil government, however simple in form, must be established among them.

In Burmah Proper, as it may be called, an adequate military force must be placed, to hold the country after it has been taken. It is vain to contend that the same force which will suffice to hold Pegu, will suffice also to hold Ava. No Government can venture to risk its European and Native troops at great distances from any support, and with the sea intervening between them and the great body of the army; unless the force thus isolated, depending largely for its supplies upon the country round, and restricted in its efficiency by the power of climate, shall be strong enough in itself to hold its own for a considerable time against whatever may come against it.

If it should be said that once at Ava the force is not likely to be attacked, and that the people of Burmah are all desirous of our rule; I reply that the Government can give no heed to those who represent the feelings of the Burmese to be favorable to the British rule. The Government may safely assume that the Taliens are favourable to us, because their acts have proved it, and because the probabilities of the case are in favour of that assumption. The Taliens are a conquered and oppressed people. They hate their oppressors, and will gladly unite with any who will free them from the yoke. But the Burmans are the conquering race. They long reigned supreme over the nations round them. They are, as all know, arrogant, vaunting, and aggressive. It was the British who first checked their career, and humbled their pride. The British have stripped them of all their conquests one after another—Assam, Arracan, Tenasserim, and now Pegu. And if we shall still proceed, and, not content with depriving them of their conquests, shall invade their own soil, drive out their sovereign, and impose dominion upon them; on what conceivable ground can it be supposed that they will view us with favour, and hail our supremacy?

It may be that they would in time become reconciled to it; it may be, contrary to all probability, that they would not dislike, even now, the introduction of our authority. But, in common prudence, the Government of India must prepare itself for the other and more probable event; and must make itself strong enough to resist their hostility, at least until it has had substantial evidence that there is none to fear.

For this purpose a military force must be maintained, greatly exceeding that which has been stated by General Godwin to be necessary for the occupation of Pegu alone.

In the same manner as the military force must be increased, the means of civil government must be enlarged also. Territory so extensive as that which it is now proposed to occupy, cannot be sufficiently governed by the same amount of superintendence as would amply provide for Pegu. The scale of administration must be that of a kingdom, not of a mere province. And as

distances will be great, and population comparatively sparse, a larger proportionate number of civil officers would be required for the Upper Country, than for the more accessible, and compact districts of the Lower Provinces.

While military and civil expenses would thus be largely increased by the conquest of Burmah, no corresponding increase of revenue would be obtained to meet them. Revenue, of course, would be collected; but from all the information within my reach, I am satisfied that the revenues of Burmah would not be sufficient to meet the extra expense which the possession of Burmah would impose upon us.

If the words, "complete subjugation of the Burman power," shall be held to mean, not the conquest and annexation of the entire kingdom, as described above, but the defeat of the Burman army, the expulsion of the King from his capital, and the occupation of the country as far as the borders of the hilly country beyond Umerapoorah, some of the objections which have been stated to the entire conquest of Burmah will be removed. These, however, will only be such as are founded on the difficulty and cost involved in the military and civil control of the hill country. The main objections which I have stated, and which were based on the prospect of increased charges, and an inadequate revenue, remain as fully in force against this modified conquest as against entire subjugation.

And as the modified scheme of placing the frontier near to Ava is liable to almost every objection which I feel to the total conquest of Burmah, so it is liable to all the objections which the Committee have felt to our proposal for fixing the frontier at Prome.

The policy which would fix the frontier near to Ava would assuredly leave us still without a Treaty of Peace, and with the prospect of an indefinite continuance of hostilities between the two States. My own conviction remains as I have already expressed it,—that the King would make no overtures and no submission. On our approach to Ava he would retire into his highlands, as was their declared policy before, and as recent intelligence received through Armenian merchants at Ava shows to be the King's intention now.

Even if he should forego that intention, and should make his submission as we approached Ava, there is no hope whatever of his signing such a treaty as the Committee has required. If it be improbable that the King would consent by treaty to cede Pegu, it is absolutely certain that when the British army has advanced in consequence of that refusal, and the subjugation of his kingdom has been resolved upon, he will never consent to sign a treaty by which he shall cede the fairest portion of his kingdom to us, and shall confine himself for the future to forests and barren hills. Yet, if he does not do so, the British Government will then be in precisely the same position to which the Committee has objected at Prome. No peace will have been concluded;—the King will retire into his fastnesses; an indefinite continuance of hostilities will be as likely then as now, and our position at Ava will be, to say the least of it, not less precarious and undefined than at Prome. The only difference will be, that we shall be encumbered with four hundred miles of additional territory, with enhanced expenses and disproportionate returns.

Having endeavoured, in the preceding paragraph, to state, with deference but without reserve, the strong objections which I see to the adoption of a line of policy upon the occupation of the Lower Province, which must inevitably lead to consequences that seem to me to be most injurious to the public interests, whether they involve the total conquest of the Burman Empire, or the conquest of it as far as Ava, I beg permission to offer some explanations in reply to the objections which the Committee has stated to the course suggested by the Governor-General in Council.

The objections of the Committee are—First, That "a professed determination not to extend our military operations further, would place us in a precarious and undefined position:" Secondly, That it "would entail upon us the necessity of maintaining a force upon a war footing in that district for the defence of it:" Thirdly, That "it might leave an unfavorable impression upon the minds of the people of India, who might be disposed to ascribe its forbearance to a want of power rather than to a spirit of moderation."

The words of the minute which suggested the policy of occupying Pegu "with the declared intention of holding it permanently without proceeding onwards to the capital," have misled the Committee by the double construction

of which they are capable. Those words were not intended to mean that a resolution should be declared of holding Pegu and of not proceeding to the capital. They were intended only to mean that, without proceeding beyond Pegu, we should declare the resolution to hold that province permanently.

I had by no means intended either to content myself with a silent seizure of the province, or to allow the Court of Ava to suppose that it was free from all further risk from our arms. It was my intention to state, both in the Proclamation of Annexation, and in a Letter to be addressed to the King at the same time, that while we sought no further conquest, and did not wish to continue hostilities, any aggression on the part of the Burmese, or attempts to disturb the British Government in the peaceful possession of the province which it had declared its intention permanently to retain, would bring down upon the head of the King such further retribution as the Government of India might think proper to inflict.

The proposal of the Governor-General in Council was, therefore, not liable to the objection which has been seen to it by the Committee, viz., that it seemed to encourage aggressions on the part of the Burmese, by declaring an intention on our part which would have given impunity to them.

Secondly, I beg respectfully to state that the Committee is in error in supposing that the policy suggested by the Governor-General in Council would necessitate the maintenance in Pegu of any larger force for its defence than would be maintained if a treaty of peace were concluded.

I hold a treaty of any kind with the Burmese to be so valueless, that the conclusion of one would not induce me to keep one regiment less in Pegu than if there were no treaty. If peace be preserved, it will be only by their conviction of our power; and, to sustain that conviction, a force ample for our defence against external attack must long be maintained there.

The objection, therefore, which was founded on the supposition that the Government of India must maintain a larger force in Pegu if there were no treaty than it otherwise would do, falls to the ground.

Nor would the force be kept on a "war footing" if there were no treaty, any more than if it were negotiated. The allowances of the troops serving in Pegu will be nearly, if not quite, the same when the war is concluded as they are at present. By long established practice, all troops crossing the sea receive the higher allowances;—the Bengal troops have always received them in Arracan; the Madras troops habitually receive them when holding the Tenasserim Provinces in time of peace. Wherefore, for the present, at least, and until a great change be made, the higher allowances could not be withheld from the troops in Pegu.

From these remarks it will be seen that, as the number of troops in Pegu would not be increased by the want of a formal termination of hostilities, in the shape of a treaty of peace, so their allowances would not be on a more expensive footing.

I beg further to observe, in connexion with this portion of the subject, that the Committee was under a misapprehension when it remarked, with reference to the force which General Godwin estimated to be necessary for the advance upon Ava, that "this force would be required under any of the circumstances contemplated by you."

Subsequent minutes will have informed the Committee that, for the conquest and safe occupation of Pegu, General Godwin required only one half of the reinforcements which he had asked for an advance upon Ava.

Thirdly, I would, with deference, contend that the measures proposed by the Governor-General in Council could not possibly be attributed by the people of India to a want of power, rather than to a spirit of moderation.

I do not affect to claim the merit of being governed in the policy I have proposed by a spirit of moderation. I have been guided thereto by unmixed considerations of the self-interest of the British Government:—any larger acquisition than the Province of Pegu, was calculated, in my opinion, to be injurious to this Government. For that reason I have opposed, and still deprecate it.

While I do not wish that the people of India should ascribe our contenting ourselves with the occupation of Pegu to a spirit of moderation, I feel very confident that they would not see in it any want of power.

When the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, in 1849, entered the Punjab in

arms against the British Government, and occupied his old province of Peshawur, our army, after having received the surrender of the Sikhs, pursued the army of the Dost. He was chased out of the country, and we occupied it. No treaty was required from him; it has been our policy not to enter into any treaty with him; and that course has been approved by the Committee. Yet, although there was no treaty, and no definitive conclusion of hostilities, no one has ever seen in that fact any reason to doubt the substantial power of the British, of which they had positive evidence before their eyes, in our expulsion of the Dost through the Khyber, and our permanent occupation of the province he coveted.

So it will be in Pegu; Eastern nations do not view treaties as we do, or attach the same solemnity to them. They will miss nothing in the absence of a treaty of peace; while, in the news of the seizure and annexation of the Province of Pegu, the last remaining and fairest conquest of the Burman power, they will hear and acknowledge a resounding blow, which supplies effectual proof of the power that struck it.

By the explanations and observations in the preceding paragraphs, I have sought to remove the objections which the Committee has stated to the measures proposed by the Government of India. I beg leave now to state concisely the reasons which led me to suggest, and which urge me still to advocate, their adoption.

On considering the policy which the Government of India should pursue towards Burmah, and the mode in which it should be carried into effect, I have steadily guided myself by the one principle of obtaining a reparation for the past, and security for the future.

The occupation of Pegu does, in my judgment, afford reparation for the past, and will give effectual security for the future.

The physical and commercial advantages that would accompany the possession of Pegu by the British Government, were set forth in the Minute of the 30th of June. The inquiries which have sedulously been made since that time, tend, as far as they go, to confirm the safe and moderate estimate, which stated the revenues of Pegu at twenty-five lacs a-year. The annexation of a territory in perpetuity, producing the revenue above named, and susceptible of great and various improvement, will certainly pay for all the cost of its occupation and government, and fully reimburse the State for all the charges of the present war.

Further, the annexation of that territory will, I confidently hope, be sufficient to give us security for peace in the future, by depriving the Burmese of much of their means for carrying on war, and by arming us with commanding advantages calculated to deter them from attempting it.

The loss of Pegu will cut off from the Court of Ava its richest province, whereby its treasury will be impoverished, and the sinews of war will be shrivelled up. It will deprive them of the resource which they had for bringing an army into the field, by the operation of that tenure which made each man a soldier liable to take the field as a conscript whenever he was summoned to do so. However bitter, then, their feelings of hostility against the British may continue to be, the mere occupation of Pegu will very greatly curtail their means of indulging it, both in men and money.

Thus, our security for peace will be found in their being deprived of half the power they possessed for making war. The power that is left to them is little likely to be capable of real war. The trained troops of the Burmese, we have every reason to believe, have never exceeded three thousand men. Their temporary levies are neither trained nor properly armed. Brought together by conscription, they are available for local or temporary purposes, but they cannot be kept together as an army. Already, according to the information we have received, the system of levies is breaking down. In the north, as reported by the Political Officer in Assam, the Shans refused to send their quota. Excepting comparatively small bodies of men in Pegu, it is clear that there is no army on foot; and already the King has been obliged to pay largely, as at the close of the last war, for the men he has engaged and sent down. But if the system of levies fails, the treasury of Ava cannot long support the expense of keeping troops on a paid footing.

Thus the Government of Ava, deprived of Pegu, has not the means of protracting war against us.

If they should, nevertheless, collect an army for attack after the declared annexation of Pegu, we could desire nothing better. The frontier of Prome is not extensive. Its central portion is filled by the Galadzeh mountains, covered with jungle, and destitute of water, which are as impassable even to a Burmese army as to us. The valley of Prome and the valley of Tounghoo are the only points of attack. Major-General Godwin has given it as his opinion, that the smaller force he named would "repel any force that an enemy might attempt to stockade with, or to offer any violence to the Pegu people." Experience of both wars, and especially of the present one, justifies us in concluding, without any presumption, that as an *attacking* force a Burmese army is truly contemptible. If they should attempt so to attack with an army, its destruction, if it will stand, or its total dispersion, if it breaks, would be the certain consequence. A repetition of such attacks, or of the assemblage of armies, I have already stated to be impracticable, for the reasons I have given.

Although I hold attack from the Burmese in force to be in the highest degree improbable, it is very likely that for some time they may harass the border by guerilla inroads. Ample means for meeting such attacks are already at our disposal, without exposing the main body of our force to the worry of them.

The Arracan battalions have recently sent up to the Government, to entreat that it will employ them against their "hereditary enemies," the Burmese. The 68th N. I. being at Kyouk Phyoo, the battalion can well be spared, and will be most efficient for the purpose. The Sikh battalion, just now embarked, is excellently adapted for such service, and will be made use of.

Thus, while it is, in my opinion, impracticable for the Burmese to continue attacks in force, a predatory frontier skirmishing we have ample means of meeting. Being met, and the villagers themselves aiding, as they will do with confidence when supported, I am inclined to believe that it would very soon cease. But if it did not, it is my firm conviction that half a century of such forays would be infinitely preferable to the occupation of Burmah.

The superiority of our military power, and the great diminution of that of the Burmese by the annexation of Pegu, are not the only securities for peace on which I reckon. We obtain by the annexation commanding advantages, which would be calculated to deter the Burmese from continuing hostilities, though they had better means of carrying them on than they will henceforth possess.

Burmah depends largely upon Pegu for the supply of all its wants. Pegu is the outlet for its export, the sole channel for its commerce. Pegu is the storehouse, from which it draws almost exclusively its supply of articles of first necessity, rice and salt. Pegu is the mart from which alone it can derive ngapé, or preserved fish, an article of such universal consumption that it has almost become a necessary food; and every other object of use or luxury which it employs.

In occupying Pegu at Prome, the Government of India holds in its hand the key of the food, and of the enjoyment of Burmah. How effectually we are therefore enabled to lock up the supplies of both, the present campaign has shewn. Although the Irrawaddy has of course been less effectually stopped than it will be by arrangements made at Prome, the effect of our partial command over the traffic of country-boats on the river, has been most severely felt. Setting aside as exaggerations, the statement made by the natives, that the Burmese force near Prome were reduced to feed "on ponies and plantain-stalks," we have positive proof that they and the population have been reduced to great straits; for the fact has been authenticated through several channels, that two months ago the basket of rice, whose price was usually half a rupee, was then selling at five rupees.

With such a power as this in our hands, the Burmese will not be likely to provoke its exercise. If peace be observed, their usual supplies will be permitted to pass. But if we should be harassed in our possession of Pegu, the traffic will be stopped, as an instrument of most effectual blockade; even though the stoppage must necessarily be detrimental to our own subjects and to our revenue for the time.

These considerations of our own superiority in military power and naval means, of the diminished resources and straitened revenue of the Burman Government, and of the absolute control we shall hold over the supplies and the trade of Burmah, are to my mind effectual guarantees that the security of our

possession of Pegu will not be long or seriously disturbed by the hostility of the Court of Ava.

If my anticipations should be fulfilled, the British Government will gain a vast advantage by limiting its acquisition to Pegu, and avoiding the extension of its dominion over Burmah. Pegu is manageable in extent, accessible and compact. Its people are friendly and unwarlike; hence internal Government will be easy and cheap. Its external defence, as I have already shewn, will not be difficult. The ports of Pegu, its tidal rivers, its fertile soil, its products, and its forests, hold out a fair promise of commerce and of public wealth. In one word, by the annexation of Pegu, we hold in the easy grasp of our hand, the kernel of the Burman Empire. Why should we, by the occupation of Ava, encumber ourselves with an armful of worthless rind?

Should it be objected that there is inconsistency in my anticipation that our possession of Pegu will not be long or seriously disturbed by the Burmese, when I have elsewhere expressed my conviction that they would not conclude a Treaty of Cession; I would observe that there is no inconsistency herein.

I believe that the Court of Ava would silently acquiesce in a loss, though it would not openly assent to a cession. A conviction of its own interests would dissuade it from disputing our possession, while its extravagant pride would not allow it to give us possession by a formal act of its own.

Such distinctions no doubt are senseless. But it needs little experience of native chiefs and people, to teach how often their acts are irreconcilable with common sense, or traceable to any intelligible motive.

But if my anticipations should not be fulfilled, and if, notwithstanding the superiority which they cannot deny, and the risk which they cannot fail to recognise, the Burmese should really dispute our possession; still I earnestly contend that an onward territorial movement should be avoided to the last. So injurious do I consider the extension of our sovereignty over Burmah would be, that I would exhaust every honorable expedient before I would advise recourse to that measure. Though I am strongly opposed to an advance on Ava, followed by a retirement to Prome, I would advise that even that costly military operation should be undertaken before Burmah be made and declared a British possession.

But if, after all, peace cannot be procured by any thing short of the conquest of Burmah; if the lapse of time and the course of events shall establish a real necessity for advance, then let us advance—let us fulfil the destiny which there, as elsewhere, will have compelled us forward in spite of our own wishes; and let us reconcile ourselves to a course which will then have no alternative. Having made every honest exertion to stand fast, we shall go on with a clear conscience—with motives unimpeached; and we may rest tranquil as to the ultimate result.

I advocate this policy with the more confidence that, if we should hereafter be obliged to depart from it, we may do so without having lost anything by the delay.

If we advance now, everything must be done in haste, from a new possession, and with limited means. If advance should be resolved upon hereafter, I know of no advantage that will have been sacrificed by the delay; while the interval will have greatly increased our means of movement and the power with which we shall move. The new province will in a few months be well known to us, and its resources ascertained. The communication on the river will be established; supplies and carriage will be more abundant; military stores and appliances will be brought to Prome. We shall move more deliberately, more easily, more cheaply, and more effectually than we could do at the present time.

My object in recording this Minute has been partly to explain and to remove the objections which the Secret Committee has felt to the course of policy which the Governor-General in Council has proposed to pursue at the termination of the war, and partly to perform my duty by stating the objections which, in my judgment, apply to the larger military operations, and to the extended conquests, which are involved in a literal obedience to the instructions of the Committee.

The moment for action on the part of the Government of India has nearly arrived. In a few weeks the occupation of Pegu will be complete, and the expulsion of the Burmese from the Eastern districts will be a minor affair. The

proclamation of annexation must then be issued, and the immediate measures of the Government must be taken.

Under these circumstances, I propose to give effect to the orders of the Committee by endeavouring to form a Treaty of Peace; but I propose also so far to modify these orders as to abstain from attaching to the refusal, or neglect, of our offer of a Treaty, a menace so worded as that it must inevitably lead to the immediate advance of the army, and to the ultimate conquest of Burmah. The modification in question will in no respect preclude the Committee from issuing positive orders for the conquest of Burmah, if it should be so minded after weighing and deliberating upon the additional considerations that have now been set before it.

When the occupation of Pegu shall be complete, a proclamation should be issued concisely stating the object and results of the war, and declaring the perpetual annexation of Pegu to the British dominions in India.

The precise terms of the proclamation will be decided hereafter: but it should contain a distinct statement that if the King of Burmah shall refuse to renew relations of peace with the British Government, and shall seek to disturb its peaceable possession of the province of Pegu, the strength of our arms will be again put forth for the vindication of our power by measures which can lead only to the subversion of his kingdom.

At the same time a letter should be addressed to the King of Burmah, reciting more fully the origin, the object, and the results of the war. He should be told that, having now fulfilled its threat, and exacted reparation by force of arms, the Government of India desires no further conquest, and is prepared to admit the Court of Ava to the former relations of peace and amity, by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the States. If the Court of Ava desires to secure itself from further assaults by the power which it has found itself wholly unable to resist, it will cause the proper officers, duly accredited on its part, to repair to Prome, within one month from the dispatch of the letter to the King from that place, there to sign a treaty, by which the Province of Pegu shall be ceded to the British Government, and relations of friendship shall be renewed.

If the King of Ava shall fail to conclude the treaty abovementioned, and if he shall attempt to disturb the British Government in the quiet possession of the province which it has conquered, and intends to retain, the King will be prepared for the consequences that his reckless hostility may provoke—an hostility which, if long persisted in, can only end in the utter subversion of his kingdom, and in the exile and ruin of his race.

It is not easy to say how this letter shall be made to reach the hands of the King. To depute British officers to bear it, would be, in all probability, to send them to immediate death, and it is not to be thought of. It will be no easy matter to find any Burman who would undertake to be the bearer of such a missive to the King; for, if the accounts be true which we receive, and if the King be obstinately set against submission, and infuriated by tidings of defeat, the messenger is very likely to meet his death at the King's own hand.

Precise instructions will hereafter be prepared, including the letter to the King, and the proclamation of annexation. The latter shall be printed at Moulmein, and distributed in large numbers over the country, by which means it may come to the King's ears, though the letter should never reach him.

The Governor-General in Council has selected Captain Phayre, the present Commissioner of Arracan, to be Commissioner of Pegu. He has been directed to repair to the Presidency. An outline of the form of government has been prepared, and in consultation with the Commissioner its details will speedily be matured, and officers for the Civil Government will be chosen, so that the whole may be ready to come into operation, so soon as the proclamation annexing Pegu shall have been publicly promulgated there.

DALHOUSIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

Minute by Sir John Littler.

November 4, 1852.

WE should certainly drive the Burmese out of Pegu, and occupy it with the declared intention of retaining permanent possession.

Nothing, however, should, in my opinion, prevent our proceeding on to the capital, should the King obstinately hold out, and evade submission.

No treaty, in fact, can ever be effected with the King of Ava, until we either reach the capital, or advance very near it. Should His Majesty refuse to conclude a treaty, there appears to me no other alternative but an entire overthrow of his power; but, at the same time, I do not consider a treaty with such an uncivilized race as the Burmese of any great importance, or that can be depended upon. A treaty with them is useless, for they set little value upon such documents.

The difficulties attending the march of troops to the capital will doubtless be great, but by no means insuperable. If it be attempted, it must be done with a firm determination to carry it through, and I am induced to suppose that the attempt would be perfectly successful. In all such movements, difficulties must and will occur.

The march beyond Prome, it appears to me, will be similar to an advance into any other hostile country; and supplies, &c. will have to be carried with the troops, as usual in such cases: there will be no greater difficulty in this advance than in any other hostile country.

In various parts of India I have witnessed similar movements, but they have always been carried through by the exertions and precautions of the several authorities and heads of departments to whom they have been intrusted. I have no doubt but such will be the case on a forward movement towards Ava. It was never contemplated, I presume, to retain permanent possession of Ava.

The mere presence of our troops at their capital will suffice to show the Burmese what can be accomplished, and that we are determined to bring His Majesty to a just and proper sense of his own position, and of what is due to the British Government.

A certain number of troops will, of course, have to be left at Prome, as a support to the advance. The number of troops to be maintained for the permanent occupation of Pegu can be decided upon when military operations in the field have terminated. I do not think myself that an advance on Ava will be attended with anything like the difficulty anticipated. The Burmese force is said to be assembled there; and where they can go, British troops can surely follow.

J. H. LITTLER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 17.

Minute by Sir F. Currie.

November 4, 1852.

I CONCUR with the Governor-General in the views recorded in his Lordship's minute of yesterday's date.

I see no reason, upon further consideration of the subject, to depart from the opinion already expressed by me, which opinion was formed upon full deliberation of the difficulties of our position, and the circumstances described in ample detail by his Lordship in the present paper.

If the Government of Ava, as I expect it will, refuses or evades all treaty, on our completing the occupation of the Province of Pegu, there will, doubtless, be some difficulty in terminating the war, without concluding a peace; but this difficulty appears to me the least in magnitude of those which present themselves on the horizon of future operations.

Every step that we take in advance of the Province of Pegu will involve enormous expense, without a prospect of remuneration—any position that we

may occupy, in the upper country, whether at Umerapoorra, or further on, will be ruinous to our resources to maintain, and disparaging to our credit to abandon.

The British Government in the East never can fall back, or retrace its steps, without far more damage to the prestige of its power, than abstinence from advance, under almost any circumstances. The native powers may give us credit for moderation, and a reluctance to extend our conquests beyond reasonable limits; but they will never believe that we would give up what we have once acquired, save from inability to retain it.

I concur with the Governor-General in his estimation of a treaty with Burmah: I do not think it of great importance, whether a treaty is concluded or not: if it be, the terms should, as observed by his Lordship, be general, and the conditions few—any value which may attach to it will be rather as a mark of submission by the Burmese, than on account of the stipulations which the document may contain. The Burmese feel this, and they will be the more reluctant to make a treaty.

I concur in all the measures which the Governor-General proposes to adopt for proclaiming the annexation of Pegu, and for promulgating the intelligence of that annexation to Ava and elsewhere.

F. CURRIE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 17.

Minute by Mr. Lewis.

November 5, 1852.

I BEG to record my entire and hearty concurrence in the views of the Governor-General, propounded in his Lordship's minute, dated the 3rd instant.

I quite agree with my colleagues in the estimate which they all have formed of the value of a treaty with a prince so ignorant and untruthful as this Burman is known to be; but I would respectfully suggest to my colleague, Sir John Littler, that if such a document is not of "any great importance," or "cannot be depended upon," and "is useless," that the Government would scarcely be justified in expending blood and treasure in procuring its execution. It has never been questioned, least of all by his Lordship, that this Government is strong enough to plant the British flag on the ramparts of Umerapoorra, should sufficient grounds exist, or arise, for doing so. Yet such an expedition would only be made at vast cost; and the argument is, that it should not be undertaken for the sole purpose of exacting from the Burmese a treaty, the value of which is truly described in the words which I have quoted above, from my colleague's minute, who, I observe, repudiates, as his Lordship proposes to do, the permanent possession of Ava.

J. LEWIS.

No. 18.

The Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India in Council.

December 23, 1852.

WE have received your dispatch of the 6th of November, No. 53, covering the Governor-General's minute of the 3rd of November, and the minutes of Sir John Littler and Sir Frederick Currie, of the 4th, and of Mr. Lewis of the 5th, on the subject of the war with Burmah, and more particularly with reference to our instructions conveyed to you by the mail of the 8th of September.

The course which the Governor-General proposes to pursue in accordance with those instructions, as expressed in the concluding part of paragraph 43, and in the subsequent paragraphs 44, 45, and 46 of his Lordship's minute, is so well adapted to the fulfilment of our directions, and the attainment of the conclusion which they pointed out to you, namely, the accomplishment of a peace with Burmah on the condition of the permanent annexation of the Province of Pegu to Her Majesty's dominions in the East, that they have our entire approbation.

We should deplore the necessity of further conquest, and we strongly feel the many serious objections to the annexation of any other portion of the Burman Empire.

We see with satisfaction, by the minute of Sir John Littler, whose military experience entitles his opinion to great consideration, that he does not estimate the difficulties of an advance upon Ava as being of so grave a character as to present a material obstacle to the adoption of that course, if it should be rendered necessary by the persevering hostility of the Burmese.

No. 19.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Fort William, November 22, 1852. (No. 55.)*

GENERAL BUNDOOLA, the late Commander of the Burmese Army at Prome, surrendered himself on the morning of the 15th of October last.

No. 20.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

(Extract.) *Fort William, December 7, 1852.*

WITH reference to certain statements reflecting upon those who are responsible for the conduct of the present war in Burmah, by alleging against them neglect of every precaution for the health and comfort of the troops employed, we have the honor to submit for your perusal the following documents in refutation of the allegations, and we trust the record will prove satisfactory to your Court.

We have, &c.

DALHOUSIE.
J. H. LITTLER.
F. CURRIE.
J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

Minute by the Governor-General of India.

(Extract.) *September 21, 1852.*

STATEMENTS having been made which impute to the Government of India scandalous neglect of the health and safety of the troops employed in Burmah, I think it expedient to notice them, in order to place the facts correctly before the Court.

The statements made are the very reverse of fact. Certain official documents will be necessary to prove that they are so; and it is my wish to call for them from the several departments.

I propose, therefore, that the Secretary should address the Military Board, and request to know, for the information of the Government:

1st. What quantity of provisions were sent with the expedition to Rangoon in the month of March?

2nd. What those provisions were? Whether any complaint has been made of the quality of them? And whether, so far as the Board know, there is any foundation for the statement which has been made, that "measly pork," or bad pork of any kind, was served out as rations to the troops at Rangoon, from the Commissariat stores?

3rd. On what date fresh provisions were first furnished to the troops after their landing at Rangoon? How often they have been issued since that time? And what was the stock available by the last advice?

4th. What was the prospective supply, stated briefly?

I propose further that inquiry be made in the proper department to know what proportion of camp equipage was sent with the troops on that service.

A letter should be addressed to Major-General Godwin informing him that the notice of the Government has been drawn to certain statements which have been publicly made, and which it believes to be unfounded, regarding the provisions issued to the troops upon their landing at Rangoon in April last.

The Government requests him, as the officer commanding the expedition, to state whether the food provided for the troops by the Government was, as has been alleged, insufficient in quantity, and unwholesome in quality, consisting of "measly" or ill-cured pork. The Major-General is requested to put these questions to the Commissariat officers with the forces, as well as to the several commanding officers of regiments at that time under his orders, and to transmit copies of their replies.

The Major-General is further requested to obtain from the Superintending Surgeon with the force, the following medical returns:

1st. Number of deaths of Cholera in the European troops during the month of April, and the same statement from April to the 30th of August.

2nd. A similar return regarding the Native troops.

3rd. If it can be obtained, a return of any deaths by Cholera on board ship during the voyage from Calcutta and Madras respectively.

The Secretary will be so good as to obtain a return of the deaths by Cholera in Fort William (stated monthly), from the 1st of March to the 1st of September, 1852; the strength of Europeans in the Fort (monthly) being also stated.

These returns, with information already in my possession, will enable the Government to place the question fully before the Court.

DALHOUSIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

The Military Board to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

Fort William, September 29, 1852.

WE have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Lieutenant-Colonel Birch's letter, of the 23rd of September, requesting an early report as to the quantity and quality of the provisions sent with the expedition to Rangoon in March last, and, in reply to the several points on which information is therein called for, to state:

1st. The instructions contained in the Government letter, dated the 19th of March, 1852, for increasing the supply of provisions with the Expedition to a four months' stock, were complied with, as reported in our letter, the 18th of May, 1852, by sending one half in the transports with the troops, and the remainder by the "Cecilia."

2nd. Our Board have received the Presidency Disbursements, charging in detail for the provisions and other stores dispatched to Rangoon; but the information required by your Lordship in Council will be more readily available by a perusal of the annexed abstract half-monthly statements of the provisions in store at Rangoon, one of these giving the quantities received and issued, and balances in hand; and the other, the periods for which such balances would meet the demands of the troops. The statements commence from the return by Assistant Commissary-General Captain Simpson, dated the 6th of May, 1852, submitted to Government with our letter dated the 2nd of June. No complaint has been made to the Board of any inferior or damaged provisions having been issued to the troops; some of the biscuit and pork* sent by the "Cecilia," was damaged, as brought to the notice of your Lordship in Council in our dispatch, dated the 16th of September, 1852, but without affecting the supply to the troops, the damaged casks having been surveyed and condemned. Captain Simpson has always reported in most favorable terms of the stores sent to him, and our Board have had the satisfaction of soliciting the attention of your Lordship in Council to these remarks in our letters dated the 10th and the 16th of September, 1852.

* Biscuit, 1 cask; salt pork, 9 casks.

3rd. The Batta Rolls for the month of April shew that Her Majesty's 18th Foot received fresh provisions for the first time after landing on the 21st of April, and Her Majesty's 80th on the 23rd idem; and that salt rations were only once again issued to them during the remainder of that month. Batta Rolls of subsequent months have not been received in our office, but Assistant Commissary-General Major Budd shews, in the 2nd paragraph of his report on the supply of slaughter cattle at Rangoon, a copy of which was transmitted to our Board with Lieutenant-Colonel Birch's letter, dated the 9th of July, that fresh provisions were given five times a-week, the troops drawing rations, salt meat, on Wednesdays and Saturdays; in his 4th paragraph he reports the practicability of a daily issue of fresh provisions, and a sufficiency for the whole force to the end of the year. Such an extension of the supply was not ordered, for it appears from Assistant Commissary-General Captain Simpson's latest return (for the 1st of September, 1852), that, during the preceding fortnight, salt provisions had been issued four days, and fresh ten days. In the above quoted return Assistant Commissary-General Captain Simpson reports on hand 156 slaughter cattle, and 237 sheep (for hospital issue only), or 7 days' supply of the former, and 43 of the latter; an abundant stock of cattle, however, as shewn in Major Budd's report, being kept up at Moulmein.

4th. The information submitted in the preceding paragraph shews an ample supply of fresh provisions for the troops at Rangoon: as regards those advancing to Prome, Captain Simpson states in his letter dated the 11th of September, submitted to your Lordship in Council in our letter dated the 20th of September, that he had little doubt but that live stock would be available, but that salt provisions would be dispatched with them.

We have, &c.

G. E. GOWAN, *Brigadier.*

F. S. HAWKINS, *Colonel.*

W. MACTIER, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

Inclosure 3 in No 20.

STATEMENT of Victualling Land Stores for the European and Native Troops of the Bengal Division of the Burmah Field-Force for Four Months.

Land provisions, May 6, 1852.	Slaughter Cattle.	Biscuit.	Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Flour.	Rice Moonghy.	Sugar.	Tea.	Coffee.	Salt.	Rum.	Dholl.	Ghee.	Cleaned Wheat for attah.	Cleaned Wheat for bread.	Total Wheat.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	galls.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.
Four months' consumption ..	600	85,337	42,718	24,234	53,855	203,662	53,068	5,718	16,610	51,629	10,125	133,420	60,527	880,000	150,000	1,030,000
Deduct—																
In hand	15,992	11,950	11,226	28,696	89,310	45,927	516	4,110	11,629	7,565	83,420	60,527	110,000	45,000	155,000
Expected per "Cecilia"	69,345	30,768	13,008	10,159	34,352	7,141	1,202								
Expected from Amherst	90,000	..	90,000
Total	85,337	42,718	24,234	38,855	123,662	53,068	1,718	4,110	11,629	7,565	83,420	60,527	200,000	45,000	245,000
Wanting to complete four months' consumption ..	600	15,000	80,000	..	4,000	12,500	40,000	2,550	50,000	..	680,000	105,000	785,000

100

Rangoon Field Commissariat Office of Control and Accounts,
Bengal Division, May 6, 1852.

R. S. SIMPSON,
Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General.

Inclosure 4 in No. 20.

RETURNS showing the quantity of Stores for European and Native Troops, on hand on the dates specified below,

LAND PROVISIONS.		Biscuit.	Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Flour.	Rice.	Sugar.	Tea.	Coffee.	Salt.	Rum.	Dholl.	Ghee.	Attah.	Wheat.	Gram.	Oil.	Wood.	Soojee.	Slaughter Bullocks.	Sheep.	REMARKS.	
<i>May 15, 1852.</i>		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	galls.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.							
Balance per last Return . . .	15,992	11,950	11,226	28,696	89,310	45,927	1,016	4,110	11,629	7,565	83,420	60,527	1,462	155,040									Since the last Return, advice has been received that the whole of the Dholl arrived per "Ago Bukkurand Sagoff," is for the Madras Commissariat at Moulmein, which reduces the supply in hand to a few days' consumption.
Add, since received . . .	-	15,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	-	-	4,847										
Total . . .	15,992	26,950	11,226	28,696	89,310	45,927	1,016	4,110	11,629	8,765	83,420	60,527	6,309	155,040									
Deduct Issues . . .	13,118	4,372	2,858	4,688	9,225	3,445	273	1,273	1,862	921	5,014	415	3,181	59,265									
Balance in hand . . .	2,874	22,578	8,368	24,008	80,085	42,482	743	2,837	9,767	7,844	78,406	60,112	3,128	96,775									
Average daily consumption	1,400	1,400	1,400	320	190	62	85	500	70	330	315	4,200	5,200										
Number of days . . .	2	22	17	250	223	12	30	20	112	236	190	1	20										
<i>June 1, 1852.</i>																							
Balance per last Return . . .	2,874	22,578	8,368	24,008	80,085	42,482	743	2,837	9,767	7,844	78,406	60,112	3,128	96,775	70,894	27,521							
Add, since received . . .	69,345	30,768	13,008	10,159	34,352	30,141	1,202	-	2,000	-	-	-	15,000	80,000	90,000	3,000							
Total . . .	72,219	53,346	21,376	34,167	114,437	72,623	1,945	2,837	11,767	7,844	78,406	60,112	18,128	176,775	160,894	20,521							
Deduct Issues . . .	5,012	17,394	8,308	20,780	11,522	2,326	710	937	889	4,112	73,264	27,881	5,022	11,075	10,492	74							
Balance in hand . . .	67,207	35,952	13,068	13,387	103,915	70,297	1,235	1,900	10,886	3,732	5,142	32,231	13,106	165,700	150,402	20,447							
Average daily consumption	1,400	1,400	1,400	350	190	62	95	500	70	350	320	3,500	5,200	720	40								
Number of days . . .	60	35	10	300	300	20	20	25	60	12	100	3	35	180	210								

RETURNS showing the quantity of Stores, &c.—Continued.

LAND PROVISIONS.		Biscuit.	Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Flour.]	Rice.	Sugar.	Tea.	Coffee.	Salt.	Runn.	Dhoil.	Ghee.	A t. h.	Wheat.	Gram.	Oil.	Wood.	Soojee.	Slaughter Lullocks.	Sheep.	REMARKS.
<i>June 15, 1852.</i>		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	galls.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	20,447	18,000	lbs.			
Balance per last Return .	67,359	85,952	13,068	13,387	103,915	70,297	1,235	1,900	10,886	3,732	5,142	32,231	23,106	165,700	150,402	20,447		18,000	23,631			
Add, since received .	27,880	-	-	3,437	12,000	2,574	4,210	-	4,964	2,871	48,240	19,010	25,600	392,008	-	-		18,000	23,631			
Total .	95,239	85,952	13,068	16,824	115,915	72,871	5,445	1,900	15,850	6,603	53,382	51,241	48,706	557,708	150,402	20,447		18,000	23,631			
Deduct Issues .	10,509	4,469	243	13,266	66,866	33,487	520	665	2,540	539	15,106	6,328	11,931	96,980	71,055	2,835						
Balance in hand.	84,730	81,483	12,825	3,658	49,149	39,384	4,925	1,235	13,310	6,064	38,276	44,913	36,775	460,728	79,347	16,622		18,000	23,631			
Average daily consumption	1,400	1,400	1,400	350	190	62	95	500	70	350	320	3,500	5,200	720	40	-		-	1,500			
Number of days .	60	31	3	140	200	80	13	26	86	108	240	10	88	110	415	-		-	15			
<i>July 1, 1852.</i>																						
Balance per last Return .	84,730	81,483	12,825	3,658	49,000	39,384	4,925	1,235	13,310	6,064	38,276	44,913	36,776	460,728	79,347	16,622		18,000	23,637	-	-	Eullocks procur- able for purchase
Add, since received .	83,964	68,540	7,573	55,220	184,166	51,949	526	955	1,690	4,173	-	-	108,511	203,072	-	-		-	13,590	142	24	Sheep not procur- able.
Total .	168,694	150,023	20,398	58,878	233,166	91,333	5,451	2,190	15,000	10,237	38,276	44,913	145,286	663,800	79,347	16,622		18,000	37,227	142	24	
Deduct Issues .	12,000	6,000	6,000	15,000	50,000	3,000	900	1,500	7,500	1,050	7,936	8,647	52,000	78,000	4,834	2,722		18,000	3,931			
Balance in hand.	167,494	150,023	14,398	43,878	183,166	88,333	4,551	690	7,500	9,187	30,340	36,266	93,286	585,800	74,513	13,900		-	33,296	142	24	
Average daily consumption	1,400	1,400	750	350	200	62	100	500	70	350	320	3,500	5,200	720	40	-		-	750	7	4	
Number of days .	120	83	60	50	440	70	6	150	120	90	115	25	110	100	350	-		-	40	20	6	

RETURNS showing the Quantity of Stores; &c.—Continued.

LAND PROVISIONS. July 15, 1852.	Biscuit.	Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Slaughter Cattle.	Sheep.	Table Rice.	Coarse Rice.	Sugar.	Tea.	Coffee.	Salt.	Rum.	Dholl.	Ghee.	Attah.	Flour.	Wheat.	Soojees.	Gram.	Oil.	Ale.	Porter.	REMARKS.	
Balance per last Return .	167,494	100,023	14,398	142	24	183,166	-	88,333	4,551	690	75,000	9,187	30,340	36,266	93,286	43,378	585,800	33,296	74,513	13,900			Salt selling at nearly 2 maunds per rupee at Raangoon. Gram about 32 seers per rupee. The Marine and Mouline Commissariat stores have not been included in this return.	
Add, since received .	-	-	-	84	50	-	54,120	-	4,000	12,160	-	-	64,000											
Total .	167,494	100,023	14,398	226	74	183,166	54,120	88,333	8,551	12,790	75,000	9,187	94,340	36,266	93,286	43,878	585,800	33,296	74,513	13,900				
Deduct Issues .	104,984	45,923	3,198	69	57	149,338	-	16,417	226	-	41,679	4,728	8,382	15,166	61,512	12,786	2,047	3,760	1,205	750				
Balance in hand .	62,510	51,100	11,200	157	17	33,828	54,120	71,916	8,325	12,790	33,321	4,459	85,958	21,100	31,674	31,092	583,753	24,536	73,308	13,150				
Average daily consumption	1,400	1,400		7	4	100	250	200	62	100	500	70	350	320	3,500	750	5,200	500	720	40				
Number of days .	45	45		23	4	338	210	360	134	127	66	64	245	66	9	41	112	49	100	329				
<i>August 1, 1852.</i>																								
Balance per last Return .	62,510	51,100	11,200	157	17	53,828	54,120	71,916	8,325	12,790	33,321	4,459	85,958	21,100	31,674	31,092	583,753	24,536	73,318	13,150				
Add, since received .	14,470	-	-	108	33	48,000	98,400	28,465	4,400	8,400	35,520	1,801	32,000	46,916	163,170	31,816	740,960	449	26,000	-	50	50		
Total .	76,980	51,100	11,200	265	50	101,828	152,520	100,381	12,999	21,190	68,841	6,260	117,958	68,016	194,844	62,908	1,324,713	14,985	99,318	13,150	50	50		
Deduct Issues .	8,932	2,284	2,877	59	22	4,975	28,840	2,723	582	497	3,559	467	15,958	2,196	21,514	5,992	143,753	6,359	2,146	469				
Balance in hand .	68,048	48,816	8,323	206	28	76,853	123,680	97,658	12,417	20,693	65,282	5,793	102,000	65,820	173,330	56,916	1,180,960	18,626	97,172	12,681	50	50		
Average daily consumption	1,400	1,400		7	3	100	250	200	62	100	500	70	350	320	3,000	750	5,200	500	720	40				
Number of days .	48	40		34	9	76	490	478	200	172	180	82	300	200	50	75	230	37	135	320				

RETURNS showing the quantity of Stores, &c.—Continued.

LAND PROVISIONS.		Biscuit.	Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Slaughter Cattle.	Sheep.	Table Rice.	Coarse Rice.	Sugar.	Tea.	Coffee.	Salt.	Rum.	Dholl.]	Ghee.	Attah.	Flour.	Wheat.	Soyjee.	Gram.	Oil.	Ale.	Porter.	REMARKS.
<i>August 15, 1852.</i>		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	206	28	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	galls.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	12,681		
Balance per last Return .		68,048	48,836	8,323	206	28	76,853	123,680	95,658	12,417	20,693	65,282	5,793	102,000	65,820	56,916	173,330	1,180,960	18,626	97,172	12,681			
Add, since received .		12,314	21,000	15,000	10	236	-	-	24,760	4,000	-	24,218	2,448	40,000	32,829	29,711	14,150	488,000	12,964					
Total .		80,362	69,836	23,323	216	234	76,853	123,680	120,418	16,417	20,693	89,500	8,241	142,000	98,649	86,627	287,480	1,668,960	31,590	97,172	12,681			
Deduct Issues .		8,308	3,131	7,165	60	60	5,319	56,860	5,143	2,336	898	1,953	193	9,361	6,554	10,934	29,348	12,780	4,662	5,632	746			
Balance in hand .		72,054	66,705	16,158	156	174	71,534	66,820	115,275	14,081	19,795	87,547	8,048	132,639	92,095	75,693	158,132	1,646,180	26,928	91,540	11,935			
Average daily consumption		1,800	1,800		9	4	120	300	200	112	500	90	350	320	800		5,000	600	750	50				
Number of days .		40	45		17	43	600	224	570	30	175	90	380	290	95		360	45	122	240				
<i>September 1, 1852.</i>		Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Biscuit.	Flour.	Sugar.	Wheat.	Attah.	Rice, table.	Rice, coarse.	Sugar.	Tea, Black.	Coffee.	Salt.	Rum.	Dholl.	Ghee.	Gram.	Oil.	Slaughter Cattle.	Sheep.	Porter.	Ale.	REMARKS.
Balance per last Return .		66,905	16,158	72,054	75,693	26,928	1,646,180	158,132	71,534	66,820	115,275	14,081	19,795	87,547	8,048	132,639	92,095	91,540	11,935	156	174			
Add, since received .		-	-	20,520	22,351	43,824	332,800	52,963	-	80,000	-	2,000	-	-	1,200	40,000	16,458	80,000	-	-	63	40	40	
Total .		66,905	16,158	92,574	98,044	70,752	1,978,980	211,095	71,534	146,820	115,275	16,081	19,795	87,547	9,248	172,639	108,553	171,540	11,935	156	237	40	40	
Deduct Issues .		4,940	976	39,949	33,185	6,256	40,000	142,294	15,902	66,030	2,636	1,784	2,621	1,379	1,438	91,855	5,420	74,172	631	92	64			
Balance .		61,963	15,182	52,625	63,859	64,496	1,938,980	68,801	55,632	80,790	112,639	14,297	17,174	86,168	7,810	80,784	103,133	97,367	11,304	64	173	40	20	
Average daily consumption		1,800	-	1,800	-	-	5,000	120	300	200	112	500	90	350	320	750	320	750	50	9	4			
Number of days .		42	-	99	-	-	224	463	269	563	281	172	87	230	322	129	226	7	43					

Fort William, September 29, 1852.

J. P. BEADLE, *Officiating Secretary.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 20.

STATEMENT showing the Number of Days, Land Provisions are calculated to last on the dates specified.

LAND PROVISIONS.	May 15, 1852.	June 1, 1852.	June 15, 1852.	July 1, 1852.	July 15, 1852.	Aug. 1, 1852.	Aug. 15, 1852.	Sept. 1, 1852.
Biscuits ..	2	60	60	120	45	48	40	99
Salt, Beef } ..	22	35	31	82	45	40	45	42
Salt Pork } ..								
Flour	17	10	3	60	41	75	95	99
Rice	250	300	140	50				
Sugar	223	300	200	440	360	478	570	563
Tea	12	20	80	70	134	200	300	281
Coffee	30	20	13	6	127	172		
Salt	20	25	26	150	66	180	175	172
Rum	112	60	86	120	64	82	90	87
Dholl	236	12	108	90	245	300	380	230
Ghee	190	100	140	115	65	200	290	322
Attah	1	3	10	25	9	50	360	224
Wheat	20	35	88	110	112	230		
Gram	180	110	100	100	135	122	129
Oil	210	415	350	329	320	240	226
Wood
Soojee	15	40	49	37	45	99
Slaughter Bullocks	20	23	34	17	7
Sheep	6	4	9	43	43
Rice, Table	338	76	600	463
Rice, Coarse	216	490	224	269
Porter
Ale

♦ J. P. BEADLE, *Officiating Secretary.*

*Fort William, Military Board Office,
September 29, 1852.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 20.

RETURNS showing the Quantity of Stores for European and Native Troops, on hand on the dates specified below.

SEA PROVISIONS.	Firewood.	Mustard Seed.	Peas.	Lime Juice.	Raisins.	Vinegar.	Choorah.	Bhood Gram.	Eating Tobacco.	Smoking Tobacco.	Tamarinds.	Chillies.	Betel Nuts.	Chunam.	Khut.	Oil.	Turmeric.	Garlic.	Onions.	Black Pepper.
<i>15th May, 1852.</i>																				
Balance per last Return ..	3,411	81	4,967	595	14	1,322	82,000	77,256	13,105	7,515	44,192	2,079	1,968	300	646	17,808	1,335	656	296	560
Add, since received*
Total ..	3,411	81	4,967	595	14	1,322	82,000	77,256	13,105	7,515	44,192	2,079	1,968	300	646	17,808	1,335	656	296	560
Deduct Issues	260	22	..	6,362	287
Balance in hand ..	3,411	81	4,777	593	14	1,300	82,000	70,894	13,105	7,515	44,192	2,079	1,968	300	646	17,521	1,335	656	296	560
Average daily consumption..	720	40
Number of days	90	438

* Sea provisions not in use.

RETURN, &c.—Continued.

SEA PROVISIONS.	Firewood.	Mustard Oil.	Peas.	Lime Juice.	Raisins, or Suet.	Vinegar.	Choorah.	Black Pepper.	Eating Tobacco.	Smoking Tobacco.	Tamarinds.	Chillies.	Betel Nuts.	Chunam.	Khut.	Turmeric.	Garlic.	Onions.
<i>June 1, 1852.</i>																		
Balance per last Return ..	3,411	81	4,707	595	14	1,300	8,200	560	13,105	7,515	44,142	2,079	1,968	300	646	1,335	658	296
Add, since received	1,617	15,131	150	3,550	647	17,127	618	..	7,876	7,248	2,682	2,218	..	1,547	..	117	
Total ..	3,411	1,698	19,838	745	3,564	1,947	99,127	1,178	13,105	15,391	51,390	4,761	6,186	300	2,193	1,335	773	296
Deduct Issues ..	3,411	16	1,017	73	..	563	..	7	2,405	218	..	458	..	103
Balance in hand	1,682	8,821	672	3,564	1,384	99,127	1,171	10,700	15,391	51,390	4,761	6,186	82	2,193	877	773	193
<i>June 15, 1852.</i>																		
1400 Europeans. 4000 Natives.																		
Balance per last Return ..	1,682	18,821	672	3,564	1,364	99,127	1,171	10,700	15,391	51,390	2,760	4,186	82	2,193	877	773	193	
Add, since received ..	429	4,960	50	855	215	..	215	12,454	26,450	..	12,000	..	300	..	2,000	2,000	2,051	
Total ..	2,111	23,781	722	4,419	1,599	99,127	1,386	23,154	41,841	51,390	16,760	4,186	382	2,193	2,877	2,773	2,244	
Deduct Issues ..	1,682	15,171	240	3,069	885	..	1,121	2,600	3,891	8,628	1,268	686	62	459	77	73	193	
Balance in hand ..	429	8,610	482	1,350	714	99,127	265	20,554	37,950	42,762	15,492	3,500	320	1,734	2,800	2,700	2,051	
Average daily consumption..	180	262	22	350	12	2,250	8	151	300	1,000	62	8,000	62	31	16	16	16	
Number of days ..	2	32	22	4	60	45	30	136	126	42	249	1	5	55	175	170	130	

RETURN, &c.—Continued.

<i>July 1, 1852.</i>		Mustard.	Peas.	Lime Juice.	Raisins, Suet.	Vinegar.	Choorah.	Black Pepper.	Eating Tobacco.	Smoking Tobacco.	Tamarinds.	Chillies.	Betel Nuts.	Chunam.	Khut.	Turmeric.	Garlic.	Onions.	
Balance per last Return ..	439	8,610	482	1,350	714	99,127	265	20,554	37,950	47,762	15,492	3,500	320	1,734	2,800	2,700			
Add, since received ..	671	13,475	42	29,038	536	..	390	183	4,050	4,310	2,000	
Total ..	1,110	22,085	524	30,388	1,250	99,127	655	20,737	42,000	47,072	15,492	3,500	320	1,734	2,800	2,700		2,000	
Deduct Issues	6,857	4,074	500	40	650	..	40			
Balance in hand ...	1,110	22,085	524	30,388	1,250	92,270	655	20,737	42,000	47,072	11,418	3,000	280	1,084	2,800	2,660		2,000	
<i>July 15, 1852.</i>		Mustard Seed.	Peas.	Lime Juice.	Raisins.	Suet.	Vinegar.	Choorah.	Black Pepper.	Eating Tobacco.	Smoking Tobacco.	Tamarinds.	Chillies.	Betel Nuts.	Chunam.	Khut.	Turmeric.	Garlic.	Onions.
Balance per last Return ..	1,110	22,085	524	6,146	24,242	1,250	92,270	655	20,737	43,000	47,072	11,418	3,000	280	1,084	2,870	2,660		2,000
Add, since received ..	5,593	..	16																
Total ..	6,703	22,085	540	6,146	24,242	1,250	92,270	655	20,737	43,000	47,072	11,418	3,000	280	1,084	2,870	2,660		2,000
Deduct Issues	7,040	..	2,140	21,796	61	..	7	36	10,956	..	43	..	260	63		1,993
Balance in hand ..	6,703	15,045	540	4,006	2,446	1,189	92,270	648	20,701	32,044	47,072	11,375	3,000	20	1,084	2,870	2,597		7

RETURN, &c.—Continued.

SEA PROVISIONS.	Mustard Seed.	Peas.	Lime Juice.	Raisins.	Suet.	Vinegar.	Choorah.	Black Pepper.	Eating Tobacco.	Smoking Tobacco.	Tamarinds.	Chillies.	Betel Nuts.	Chunam.	Khut.	Turmeric.	Garlic.	Onions.
<i>August 1, 1852.</i>																		
Balance per last Return	6,703	15,045	540	4,006	2,446	1,189	92,270	648	20,701	32,044	47,072	11,375	3,000	20	1,084	2,870	2,597	7
Add, since received	1,890	32,556	405	1,410	..	957
Total	8,593	47,601	945	4,006	2,446	2,599	92,270	1,605	20,701	32,044	47,072	11,375	3,000	20	1,084	2,870	2,597	7
Deduct issues	6,087	..	414	..	100	73	..	106	14
Balance in hand	2,506	47,601	531	4,006	2,346	2,526	92,270	1,499	20,701	32,044	47,072	11,361	3,000	20	1,084	2,870	2,597	7
<i>August 15, 1852.</i>																		
Balance per last Return	2,506	47,601	531	4,006	2,346	2,526	92,270	1,499	20,701	32,044	47,072	11,361	3,000	20	1,084	2,870	2,597	..
Add, since received	26,000	26,000	484	500	..	1,500	100
Total	28,506	73,601	1,015	4,006	2,346	3,026	92,270	2,999	20,701	32,044	47,072	11,361	3,000	120	1,084	2,870	2,597	..
Deduct issues	2,658	4,124	226	1,119	349	267	..	187	..	1,204	..	166	..	6	..	139	47	..
Balance in hand	25,848	69,477	889	2,887	1,997	2,759	92,270	2,812	20,701	30,840	47,072	11,195	3,000	114	1,084	2,731	2,500	..

RETURN, &c.—Continued.

SEA PROVISIONS.	Mustard Seed	Peas.	Lime Juice.	Raisins.	Suet.	Vinegar.	Choorah.	Black Pepper.	Eating Tobacco.	Smoking Tobacco.	Tamarinds.	Chillies.	Turmeric.	Garlic.	Onions.	Betel Nuts.	Chunam.	Khut.
<i>September 1, 1852.</i>																		
Balance per last Return	25,848	69,477	889	2,887	1,997	2,759	92,270	2,812	20,701	30,840	47,072	11,195	2,731	2,500	..	3,000	114	1,084
Add, since received	488	250	2,050
Total	25,848	69,477	1,377	2,887	1,997	3,009	92,270	2,812	20,701	30,840	47,072	11,195	2,731	2,500	2,050	3,000	114	1,084
Deduct Issues	2,074	42,258	..	187	1,225	1,285	..	991	8,057	2,040	..	1,985	301	140
Balance	23,774	27,219	1,377	277	772	1,724	92,270	1,821	12,644	28,800	47,072	9,210	2,430	2,360	2,050	3,000	114	1,084

Fort William, Military Board Office,
September 29, 1852.

J. P. BEADLE,
Officiating Secretary.

Inclosure 7 in No. 20.

Major A. Sanders, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Military Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Fort William, October 7, 1852.

I HAVE the honor, in reply to your letter dated the 23rd ultimo, to state that I have no exact return of the number of tents embarked with the company of Artillery, which quitted Calcutta in March last for Rangoon, but with it was its full proportion of camp equipage, as well as with the wing of Her Majesty's 80th Foot and the 40th Native Infantry, a return of which I beg to annex.

I have, &c.

*A. SANDERS, Major,
Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army.*

 Inclosure 8 in No. 20.

W. Jackson, Esq., Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division, to Lieutenant-Colonel Birch.

Sir,

Simla, October 20, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 4th of October, 1852, requesting me to transmit direct, for the information of Government, a return of the number of cases of cholera which have taken place at Umballah, and of the number of deaths from that disease.

To meet the wishes of Government, I have drawn out the inclosed "Return of the number of cases of cholera which have taken place recently at Umballah, showing the number of deaths in each month, with the strength of each corps, European and Native, and the proportion per cent. of deaths to strength."

The period included is the whole month of August, September, and to the 18th day of October, the current month. This mysterious epidemic first appeared in the city and gaol of Umballah, about the 17th of July, but did not assail the military cantonment till August, where it first attacked the Native corps, as will be observed by the return; and in the 15th Regiment Native Infantry there are 2 deaths; in the 56th Native Infantry, 1 death; in the 70th Native Infantry, 5 deaths: making a total of 8 deaths in the Native soldiery, while one solitary death of a European occurred in the 5th Battalion of Artillery.

The next month, September, always the most unhealthy of the year, shows the ravages of this fatal scourge among the European troops.

The total loss of both arms of the Artillery, horse and foot, during that month, is 10 men; of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, 18; and of Her Majesty's 75th Regiment, 36; and the proportion to strength in those corps is as follows:—

	Strength.	Deaths.	Proportion per cent. to Strength.
Artillery Division, Horse and Foot ..	368	10	2.71
Her Majesty's 9th Lancers	627	18	2.87
Her Majesty's 75th Regiment ..	991	36	3.63

I have, in these calculations, taken the rates of deaths to strength for the month of September only, among the Europeans, and, while the loss of the European Artillery and 9th Lancers nearly approximate, Her Majesty's 75th Regiment is nearly 1 per cent. in excess. That regiment has been otherwise very sickly, from fevers and other diseases, and if any opportunity occurred of removing it to a hill sanitarium, no corps seems to require more the bracing effect of a mountain climate.

In the tabular return, the strength is taken from the average of the three months; the per-centage in Her Majesty's 75th Regiment is increased by 7 deaths in October, which brings it, up to the 18th, for the three months, to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. within a fraction.

The disease is entirely removed from the Artillery and 9th Lancers, and the last weekly report of Her Majesty's 75th Regiment, from the 10th to the 17th of October, only exhibits 1 death from cholera.

On the Native troops no observation seems necessary, as the highest mortality, in the 70th Native Infantry, is under 1 per cent., and the combined deaths of the 2nd Light Cavalry, 15th Native Infantry, and 56th Native Infantry, amount to little more than $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for two months and eighteen days.

Fortunately the epidemic was late in commencing in the year 1852, and the total deaths among the Europeans are 72; while in 1845, when the disease began in May and ended in September, 206 European soldiers fell under the visitation.

It may be asked whether the cholera could not have been prevented by any previous measure? I foresaw that it would come from the city to the cantonments, and on the 27th of August recommended a Committee "to consider what measures should be adopted to arrest the sickness which will probably attack the troops, especially the European portion, during the hot months of September and October, caused by the malaria likely to be generated by the late flood, from stagnant pools, choked nullahs, and rank vegetation." Measures were carried into execution, and all done that human sagacity could suggest; and therefore I say we have yet to discover the mode of preventing, as well as of cure of cholera, both of which are still hid in impenetrable obscurity. The disease now raging at Warsaw will, no doubt, pervade the rest of Europe.

I have, &c.

W. JACKSON.

Inclosure 9 in No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bogle, Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Moulmein, October 21, 1852.

THE material required at Rangoon and Prome for the accommodation of officers and soldiers having all been dispatched, with the exception of a few pieces of trifling importance, and now in progress of shipment, I feel it a pleasing part of my duty to bring to the favorable notice of the Governor-General in Council the invaluable assistance I have received, first of all from Lieutenant Drummond, Executive Engineer, who furnished me with the plans and specifications from which the material required was duly calculated and ascertained; next from Lieutenant Hopkinson, Principal Assistant Commissioner, by whom contracts, and other detailed arrangements for procuring the material, were made, and the whole collected and dispatched, and the money for everything disbursed; and, lastly, from Captain Tapley, Master Attendant, by whom vessels were sought out and engaged, the materials shipped, and the vessels dispatched to Rangoon.

The number of buildings provided was 71 barracks (41 for four European regiments, and 30 for three Native regiments, hospitals included); 60 of which were 120 feet by 20, with a 10-foot verandah all round, and 11 (for Prome) 140 feet by 20, with a verandah the same as above; 12 bungalows, of three rooms each, with bathing-rooms and verandahs for Generals, Brigadiers, and other Field Officers; 15 also of three rooms each, with verandahs, &c., for Captains; and 10 of six rooms, 15 feet square, and 6 bathing-rooms, with spacious verandahs all round, for Subalterns. A vast quantity of spare leaves for roofing, mats and battens for walls and so forth, was also supplied to enable the engineers readily to adapt religious and other buildings for the accommodation of officers and men.

The material required (every piece of which was cut to size) was under instructions from myself, all collected, purchased, and paid for by Lieutenant Hopkinson. His Lordship in Council may therefore believe that his duty and

responsibility, even in the matter of account, was very heavy; but it did not end here: he had also to engage and dispatch 500 workmen, including Chinese and Burmese carpenters, to erect the buildings, and he had to supervise the arrangements made by the Master Attendant's department for engaging vessels to convey the material to Rangoon, and for loading and dispatching them, and he had finally to settle accounts with the masters and owners, and, under due check, to pay the freight earned; and all this in addition to his usual duties, which have from other causes been greatly increased during the last year; and supplying materials for the Amherst barracks, and something too, I believe, for Martaban.

Captain Tapley's part of the labor, although not involving heavy pecuniary responsibilities and the details of accounts which devolved on Lieutenant Hopkinson, was very arduous and troublesome; comprising all the details of inspecting and engaging vessels, loading boats, conveying cargo alongside, and stowing it in the vessels destined to carry it to Rangoon, and keeping coolies, lascars, ships' officers and crews all up to their work, checking every attempt at idleness and delay, and insisting upon honest and complete stowage in the vessels hired, a matter which it is not easy to control. This task, involving much fatigue and exposure, Mr. Tapley performed most satisfactorily, and he was ably assisted in it by Mr. Fox, the Assistant Master Attendant.

To the officers whom I have already named, but more especially to Lieutenant Hopkinson, is the success of the novel effort to send an army into the field not merely with its camp equipage, but with its barracks and quarters at its back, to be attributed; and now that their labors have come to an end, I should not feel satisfied with myself were I to omit bringing to the notice of Government the great exertions they have made to carry out my instructions, and the very valuable and most zealous assistance they have given me throughout.

It was my intention to have submitted a statement showing the quantity of material of all kinds, but I find that it will not be ready for some time, and it is uncertain when there will be another opportunity of sending letters.

I am therefore obliged simply to mention that the quantity of wood alone amounted to upwards of 3000 tons, and the number of ships and other vessels, large and small, employed in conveying it exceeded twenty, besides native boats, which brought leaves, mats, and rattans from Mergui and Tavoy, and conveyed the same light kind of material to Rangoon.

I have, &c.

A. BOGLE,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces.

Inclosure 10 in No. 20.

Major-General Godwin to Lieutenant-Colonel Birch.

Sir,

Rangoon, October 26, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo, and, in reply, beg to forward, for submission, to Government letters in original which I have received from the various departments of the Force under my command, respecting the quantity and quality of the food issued to the troops on their landing at Rangoon in April last.

I also beg to inclose medical returns of cholera amongst the European and Native troops, from April to September.

These documents will, I trust, satisfy Government that the statements which have been publicly made relative to the "measly" or ill-cured pork served out to the troops, are utterly false.

From my own knowledge I can certify that the troops have been plentifully and wholesomely rationed, from the moment of their embarkation to the present day.

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN.

Inclosure 11 in No. 20.

*Lieutenant W. H. Budd, Deputy Commissary-General, to Major Mayhew,
Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army of Ava.*

Sir,

Rangoon, October 20, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, and in reply, to state that salt provisions shipped from Madras with the troops from that Residency, consisted of 220 tierces of beef and pork, containing 72,180 lbs., sufficient for two months' consumption. The whole was Irish meat, in the most perfect condition, and of the very finest quality,—not a single tierce proved objectionable; as far, therefore, as the Madras provisions are concerned, there is not the slightest foundation for the allegation mentioned in your letter now under reply.

A copy of your letter was sent by me to Captain Simpson, Bengal Commissariat, with a request that he would enable me to answer the question as regards the Bengal provisions. I find that you had previously made a direct application to him on the subject, and received from him a direct report, a copy of which he has communicated to me. From this it would appear that the Bengal provisions also were sufficient in quantity, and unobjectionable in quality.

I have, &c.

W. H. BUDD,

Lieutenant, Deputy Commissary-General.

Inclosure 12 in No. 20.

Captain R. S. Simpson, Assistant Commissary-General, to Major Mayhew.

Sir,

Rangoon, October 25, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of October, 1852, and in reply to state, for the information of the Major-General commanding, that the food provided by the Government for the troops on landing in April last was, as far as this department was concerned, neither insufficient in quantity or unwholesome in quality, neither was it confined to salt pork.

The provisions were on that occasion issued from the supplies from which the troops were rationed on the passage from Calcutta, and subsequently for a period of two months, and regarding which there was not one instance of rejection or complaint.

The stores provided for the force, procured from the first houses in Calcutta, were all submitted to committees of officers in Calcutta before shipment, and every cask of salt meat was opened and inspected by committees in my presence.

Regarding the quantities of complete rations issued, there was but a solitary instance of complaint, arising from some delay in the supply of half of the usual quantity of rum issued to Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, which omission was immediately supplied.

I have, &c.

R. S. SIMPSON,

Captain, Assistant Commissary-General.

Inclosure 13 in No. 20.

Brigadier H. S. Foord, Commandant of Artillery in Burmah, to Major Mayhew.

Sir,

Rangoon, October 24, 1852.

IN reply to your letter of this date I have the honor to state, for the information of the Major-General commanding, that the food provided by the Government for the Artillery on their landing in Rangoon in April last, was wholesome and good and of sufficient quantity, and that neither then nor until now has any complaint ever been made by the men respecting their rations.

I have, &c.

H. S. FOORD.

Inclosure 14 in No. 20.

Major J. C. Errington, Commanding 51st K. O. L. I., to Major Mayhew.

Sir,

Head Quarters' Camp, Rangoon, October 25, 1852.

IN reply to your letter of the 23rd instant, requesting me to inform you whether the food provided by the Government for the troops upon their landing at Rangoon in April last, was, as has been alleged, insufficient in quantity and unwholesome in quality, consisting of measly or ill-cured pork; I beg now to state that the pork and beef issued to the regiment under my command was excellent in every respect. It might have been insufficient in quantity, upon one or two days of issue, but, under the circumstances, nothing could be done in the matter.

I have, &c.

A. C. ERRINGTON,

Major, Commanding 51st K. O. L. I.

Inclosure 15 in No. 20.

W. Montgomerie, M.D., Superintending Surgeon of the Burmah Field Force, to Major Mayhew.

Sir,

Rangoon, October 25, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, directing me to furnish you, with the least practicable delay, returns as follows:—

1st. Number of deaths from cholera in the European troops during the month of April, and the same statement from April to the 31st of August.

2nd. Similar returns regarding the Native troops.

3rd. If it can be obtained, a return of every death by cholera on board ship during the voyage from Madras and Calcutta respectively.

In compliance with your request I have the honor to send, 1st, a return of deaths from cholera in the European force from April to August inclusive; 2nd, a similar return of the Native troops of the force; these returns I have been enabled to draw up from the documents in my office.

I regret I have no document or any papers to enable me to furnish at once a return of any deaths from cholera on ship-board during the voyage to Rangoon. I shall however address the various medical officers in charge of corps on the subject, but as they are at different stations, some time must elapse before the information can be obtained; but from the surgeon of Her Majesty's 51st Regiment I learn that one case of death, which occurred on board-ship during the voyage, and was admitted and registered as diarrhoea, had

assumed the character of cholera before the man died; there were also several cases of cholera admitted on board the "Tubal Cain," hospital-ship, on the 10th, from Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, which came on the "Jessie," from Moulmein; and Captain Hunt, paymaster of the regiment, who did not land, died from the same disease on the 14th.

On reference to the returns, it will be observed that by far the greater number of deaths from cholera, viz., ninety-four, occurred in April, for which several causes can be assigned. The men had been for a short time on board crowded transports; they were suddenly employed in fatiguing and harassing duty, exposed without cover to excessive heat by day, and cold chills by night, to which they were subjected for three days and two nights, and this at the very season of the year when cholera is found to be most prevalent in Lower Bengal, and similar localities.

I have, &c.

W. MONTGOMERIE,
Superintending Surgeon, Burmah Field Force.

Inclosure 16 in No. 20.

RETURN of Mortality from Cholera in the European Corps serving with the Burmah Field Force, from the month of April to August 1852, inclusive.

Rangoon, October 25, 1852.

Corps.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	Total.	Average Strength for Five Months.	Remarks.
Her Majesty 18th Royal Irish Regiment	11	1	1	1	..	14	820	
Her Majesty's 80th Regiment	8	1	9	432, in August 693	
„ 51st „	33	..	2	35	890	
Bengal Artillery	9	..	1	10	143	
Madras „	11	11	242	
Field Hospital	22	22	..	These were men from all the European Corps, treated at the Field Hospital on the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th of April.
Depôt Hospital, Amherst	
Total ..	94	2	4	1	..	101	..	

W. MONTGOMERIE, M.D.,
Superintending Surgeon, Burmah Field Force.

Inclosure 17 in No. 20.

RETURNS of Mortality from Cholera in the Native Corps serving with the Burmah Field Force, from the month of April to August 1852, inclusive.

Rangoon, October 25, 1852.

Corps.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	Total.	Average Strength for Five Months.	Remarks.
40th Bengal Native Infantry	1	3	..	1	..	5	1,080	This corps did not arrive till May.
67th " " "	1,034	
35th Madras " "	2	2	715	
9th " " "	770	
Bengal Artillery	57	
Madras " ..	3	3	309	
Engineer Department and Madras Sappers and Miners }	3	5	3	11	513	
Total ..	9	8	3	1	..	21	..	

W. MONTGOMERIE, M.D.

Inclosure 18 in No. 20.

No. 1.—RETURN showing the Numerical Strength of European Troops at Rangoon, the number of Deaths by Cholera, and ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength, during the months of April, May, and June, 1852.

Average Strength.	Deaths by Cholera.	Ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Remarks.
2,527	100	3.95	

No. 2.—RETURN showing the Numerical Strength of European Troops at Umballah, the number of Deaths by Cholera, and ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength, during the months of August, September, and October, 1852.

Average Strength.	Deaths by Cholera.	Ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Remarks.
1,983	73	3.68	

No. 3.—RETURN showing the Numerical Strength of European Troops at Rangoon, the number of Deaths by Cholera, and ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength, during the month of April 1852.

Strength.	Deaths by Cholera.	Ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Remarks.
2,527	94	3·71	

No. 4.—RETURN showing the Numerical Strength of European Troops at Umballah, the number of Deaths by Cholera, and ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength, during the month of September 1852.

Strength.	Deaths by Cholera.	Ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Remarks.
1,986	64	3·22	

No. 5.—RETURN showing the Numerical Strength of Her Majesty's 51st Regiment at Rangoon, the number of Deaths by Cholera, and the ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength, during the months of April, May, and June, 1852.

Strength.	Deaths by Cholera.	Ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Remarks.
890	35	3·93	

No. 6.—RETURN showing the Numerical Strength of Her Majesty's 75th Regiment at Umballah, the number of Deaths by Cholera, and ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength, during the months of August, September, and October, 1852.

Average Strength.	Deaths by Cholera.	Ratio per cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Remarks.
981	43	4·38	

Inclosure 19 in No. 20.

RETURN showing the Strength of the European Troops serving at Rangoon, and of the Queen's Troops serving in Bengal; the numbers of Sick; and the ratio of Sick to Strength, from April to September 1852.

European Troops serving at Rangoon.				Queen's Troops serving in Bengal.			Remarks.
	Strength.	Sick.	Ratio of Sick to Strength.	Strength.	Sick.	Ratio of Sick to Strength.	
April ..	2,657	294	11·06	14,967	1,167	7·79	Entered as in June, owing to one of the Returns being missing.
May ..	2,274	258	11·34	14,854	1,382	9·29	
June .	2,234	272	12·17	14,854	1,382	9·29	
July ..	2,062	222	10·76	14,775	1,382	9·35	
August ..	2,386	206	8·63	14,727	1,612	10·94	
September ..	2,537	240	8·19	14,587	1,943	13·18	

Compiled from returns sent by the Superintending Surgeon at Rangoon, and by the Commander-in-chief.

J. RAMSAY,
Military Secretary.

Inclosure 20 in No. 20.

RETURN of the Number of Cases of Cholera which have taken place recently at Umballah, showing the number of Deaths in each Month, with the Strength of each Corps, European and Native, and the proportion per cent. of Deaths to Strength.

Umballah, October 18, 1852.

Regiments.	Cases of Cholera for the Month of August 1852.							Cases of Cholera for the Month of September 1852.							Cases of Cholera until the 18th of October, 1852.							Remarks.	
	Strength.	Remained.	Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Remaining.	Proportion of Deaths to Strength.	Strength.	Remained.	Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Remaining.	Proportion of Deaths to Strength.	Strength.	Remained.	Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Remaining.	Proportion of Deaths to Strength.		
2nd Brigade Horse Artillery, 1st and 3rd Troops ..	193	1	..	1	185	..	18	7	6	5	3.24	185	5	2	6	1	..	0.54	Proceeded to Peshawur on the 16th of October, 1852.	
5th Battalion Artillery, 1st and 4th Companies ..	185	1	1	1	1	183	..	15	9	4	2	2.18	180	2	2	4
Her Majesty's 9th Royal Lancers ..	647	0.54	627	..	39	20	18	1	2.87	621	1	..	1
Her Majesty's 75th Regiment Foot ..	1007	991	..	63	27	36	..	3.63	945	..	8	1	7	..	0.74		..
Native details attached 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery ..	703	710	709	..	1	1
5th Battalion Artillery ..	109	109	114
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry ..	365	357	..	2	1	1	..	0.28	372
15th Regiment Native Infantry ..	912	..	2	..	2	..	0.21	935	935
56th " " " ..	928	..	3	2	1	..	0.1	928	810
70th " " " ..	737	..	8	1	5	2	0.67	854	2	13	5	3	7	0.35	847	7	2	4	..	5

	Strength.	Total Deaths in each Regiment.	Total Deaths.	Proportion of Deaths to Strength.
2nd Brigade Horse Artillery ..	188	6	..	3.2
5th Battalion Artillery ..	183	5	..	2.73
Her Majesty's 9th Royal Lancers ..	632	18	..	2.84
" 75th Regiment Foot ..	981	43	..	4.49
Native details attached 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery ..	709	..	72 Europeans	..
" 5th Battalion Artillery ..	110
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry ..	364	1	..	0.27
15th Regiment Native Infantry ..	927	2	..	0.21
56th " " " ..	889	1	..	0.11
70th " " " ..	810	8	..	0.99
		84	12 Natives	..
			84	..

W. JACKSON, Superintending Surgeon, Sirhind Division.

Inclosure 21 in No. 20.

W. Montgomerie, Esq., to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bogle.

Sir,

Moulmein, May 9, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that I arrived early this morning from Amherst, where I have proceeded to establish the Depôt Hospital for the Burmah field force.

I am happy to say that I have fairly housed all the invalids, officers as well as men; and I have great pleasure in stating that I consider the arrangements that have been made are most admirable. The bungalow affords comfortable accommodation for five or six officers, and the five ranges of substantial structures are amply sufficient for 200* patients. Some little addition, which I shall be happy to point out, is necessary for the security of the medicines and stores, and accommodation for hospital attendants, with convenience of communication between the ranges in bad weather, all of which can, however, be done very easily and quickly; also a few necessary out-houses are required. With these slight additions, and a sufficient native hospital establishment, for which I have indented on the Commissariat, the Depôt Hospital will be as complete and efficient as can possibly be desired.

I have, &c.

W. MONTGOMERIE.

Inclosure 22 in No. 20.

Minute by the Governor-General.

(Extract.)

November 18, 1852.

SOME time ago I called the attention of the Council to certain statements reflecting very strongly upon those who are responsible for the conduct of the present Burmese war, by alleging against them neglect of every precaution for the health and comfort of the troops employed therein.

“It seemed to me, therefore, expedient that these statements should be met, for the purpose of satisfying the Home Authorities that the injurious allegations advanced against the Government of India were wholly untrue, and for the purpose of ensuring that the public records of the present war should furnish trustworthy materials for future history, and for counteracting the injurious effects of erroneous contemporary criticism.

Certain Returns were called for in this view, and they are now submitted.

I have the honor to affirm, and I shall proceed to prove, that the present Government took every precaution to provide for the troops. I shall prove that no force was ever more fully, more tenderly, or more successfully cared for; that there was no deficiency in the quantity of their provisions, and no inferiority, still less any unwholesomeness in the quality of them; and, lastly, that, although there existed sickness and cholera, they did not prevail to an alarming extent, and were greatly less severe than might have been expected in the case of any force in the field at that season of the year.”

“The causes of the sufferings of the troops at Rangoon in 1824, were partly the want of cover, but principally the deficiency of food, the inferiority of its quality, and the deficiency of medical arrangements at a time when epidemic fever was wasting the whole of India.

Simultaneously with the issue of orders in 1852, for assembling an expedition to act against Rangoon, instructions were given by the Government of India calculated to provide effectually against the recurrence of any of these evils, whether it were the want of food or of medicines.

The instructions to the Commissariat regarding the food are already on record: how they were fulfilled, shall be shown presently.

To prevent the risk of any failure, the Government of India took upon itself the organization of medical arrangements at Calcutta for the whole expedition, including both the troops from Bengal and Madras.”

* Afterwards admitted to be sufficient for 300 men.

A Superintending Surgeon was appointed for the force; a numerous Medical Staff, consisting of five Assistant-Surgeons, besides those with corps, was nominated. The amplest store of medicines; doolies, bearers, and of all that could be required for the sick, was furnished; and a large ship was hired and fitted up expressly as an hospital-ship, with every care, and at great cost to the Government.

"The Government did not limit its care for the troops and the sick to what could be done at the Presidencies. It caused the most strenuous exertions to be commenced in the provinces near to the seat of war, on the instant that war became imminent, and long before the expedition arrived.

February 10, 1852. On the 10th of February, 1852, being the day before the expedition was announced, in order to save time, I myself addressed the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, demi-officially. I said: "Supposing Rangoon should be held for the summer, how far may we depend upon Moulmein for food and supplies of every kind for the troops, European and Native?"

"In the same supposition, what can you do for us in the way of facilitating the provision of cover for the troops who may be kept at Rangoon?"

"If you can aid in respect to cover materially, pray commence collecting materials, and all that will be needed, immediately."

On receiving a satisfactory reply to both questions, I again addressed the Commissioner, on the 3rd of March, to this effect:

March 3, 1852.

"The force will leave Calcutta and Madras thoroughly provided, I think, in everything they can require in the way of ordnance and medical stores.

"With your aid, we shall be at our ease as to Commissariat supplies. The real difficulty is cover for the troops; and that want you are meeting energetically and most usefully. I beg you to continue your exertions, and to provide all that is necessary. Do not let any responsibility as to expense cause you to hold your hand. I will take upon myself the responsibility of all your outlay.

"I avoided the war as long as I could; once having resolved upon it, I look to thorough efficiency in all respects as the first object, and money as secondary."

The official documents to which I have thus referred, and the extracts of my own demi-official letters which I have given, fully prove the correctness of my words when I affirmed that the Government of India did not neglect the "lessons of experience" derivable from the preceding war; but laboured, from the earliest moment at which another Burmese war was in prospect, to prevent a recurrence of the wants and sufferings which were lamented in the first."

I proceed now to show how effectual those labours were, and how unfounded are the allegations that the Government of India made insufficient provision for the cover of the troops; for their food, either in quantity or quality; or for their medical treatment.

First, with respect to cover.

I presume it will not be contended that an invading army must be held to be "unnecessarily exposed," unless barracks are previously erected for them by their own Government in the country they are to invade, and found by them ready built when they land there; yet, unless this absurdity and impossibility had been expected of the Government of India, it would be difficult to point out what more could have been done for the cover of the troops that invaded Burmah than was actually done by this Government.

Full camp equipage was embarked with all the troops that proceeded from Bengal and Madras.

The immediate wants of the whole army on its first landing, in respect of cover, were thus most fully provided for by the Government of India.

Within one week from the day on which Rangoon was captured, wooden barracks, which alone are used in those provinces, were on their way, and were expected to arrive there from Moulmein. The Commissioner, in reply to my letter of February 10, which was quoted above, informed me that he had proceeded at once to have timbers cut up so as to form the frames of barracks, and all the more important buildings; to collect planks for raised floors; mats and battens for walls; rafters, leaves, and rattans for roofs; and that he proposed to have all ready at Moulmein, even to the nails, so as to be dispatched as soon as they were required; at the same time, a body of Chinese and Burmese carpenters were engaged to put up the houses when they were carried to Rangoon.

Deputy Quarter-master-General, Bengal, October 7, 1852. Secretary to Government, Madras, April 3, 1852.

So energetically were these exertions continued, and so fully were the Commissioner's anticipations fulfilled, that the first ship-loads of materials for barracks arrived at Rangoon in April, long before the ground could be cleared on which to erect them. Six ship-loads arrived in April; six more were dispatched in the first half of May; and more would have been sent but that the Engineer informed the Commissioner that materials were arriving faster than they could be put up.

In less than two months the force was supplied with sixty barracks from Moulmein, each 120 feet by 20, with a ten-foot verandah all round, and each capable of accommodating one company. There were supplied, besides, eighty officers' quarters, and a vast quantity of material for other purposes, together with five hundred workmen to construct the buildings.

This simple statement of facts effectually refutes the allegation that the Government of India neglected the cover for the troops, and "unnecessarily exposed" them to the effects of climate.

So far was this from being the case, that I confidently submit it would be difficult to find a parallel, either for the attempting, or for the full success, of what the Commissioner has justly designated this "novel" effort to send an army into the field "not merely with its camp equipage, but with its barracks and quarters at its back."

The allegation that the provisions supplied to the troops were deficient in quantity, or unwholesome in quality, is as unfounded as the allegation of unnecessary exposure to the climate. Letter, October 21, 1852.

Annexed to this minute are the official reports, which concur unanimously in proving that the provisions supplied were ample in quantity, and excellent in quality.

The Military Board in Calcutta states, that, in compliance with the orders of Government, a stock of four months' provisions of beef and pork, accompanied the brigade from Bengal, of which two months were on the transports, and the rest accompanied them. Military Board, September 29, 1852.

The letter of the Commissariat officer with the Madras Brigade states that the stock dispatched with it consisted of beef and pork, sufficient for two months' consumption. Major Budd, October 26.

In regard to the quality of the Bengal supplies, the Military Board reports that "no complaint has been made to the Board of any inferior or damaged provisions:" of the whole stock, nine casks were damaged, but these were condemned; and were never issued to the troops; and the Commissariat officer at Rangoon has "always reported in the most favorable terms of the stores sent to him."

The Commissariat officer in question confirms this report in his letter: He observes that there was but a "solitary instance of complaint," and that not regarding provisions, but regarding "half of the usual supply of rum to the 18th Royal Irish, which was accidentally delayed, but immediately supplied." Regarding the provisions, he states that "there was not one instance of rejection or complaint."

The Commissariat officer of the Madras force states that "the whole was Irish meat in the most perfect condition, and of the finest quality, and not a single tierce proved objectionable."

But it must not be supposed that the troops were confined to these salt rations, excellent as their quality was. In reply to my letter of the 10th of February, the Commissioner informed me that they could at once supply cattle sufficient for from three to four months' consumption, and that more could readily be procured.

So ample has been the supply from the first, and so speedily was it made available by the exertions of the local officers, that it is reported by the Military Board that fresh provisions were first issued at Rangoon on the 21st of April, seven days after the capture of the place, and that salt rations were only once again issued during that month; since that time, fresh provisions have been issued five times a-week, salt meat being given on Wednesdays and Saturdays. That salt provisions were issued at all during that period, was not from any scarcity of fresh meat; for, in the same sentence in which its issue is reported, the Board report also "the practicability of a daily issue of fresh provisions, and a sufficiency for the whole force to the end of the year."

The testimony of the Departmental officer to the quantity and quality of

the provisions is in every respect borne out by the testimony of officers connected with the troops.

The Major-General commanding the force in Ava declares that the "statements which have been publicly made relative to the measly or ill-cured pork being served out to the troops are utterly false."

October 26, 1852.

He adds, "From my own knowledge I can certify that the troops have been plentifully and wholesomely rationed from the moment of their embarkation to the present day."

October 24, 1852.

The Commandant of Artillery reports, that "the food provided by the Government for the Artillery, on their landing at Rangoon in April last, was wholesome and good, and of sufficient quantity; and that neither then, nor until now, has any complaint ever been made by the men respecting their rations."

October 25, 1852.

The only exception to an unanimous, and wholly unqualified testimony regarding the sufficient quantity and excellent quality of the rations, is to be found in the letter of Major Errington, commanding Her Majesty's 51st Regiment. He says, "I beg now to state that the pork and beef issued to the regiment under my command was excellent in every respect. It might have been insufficient in quantity upon one or two days of issue, but under the circumstances nothing could be done in the matter."

When the only complaint, from officers and men in the force, goes no further than to state that, in the case of one corps, the quantity "might have been insufficient on one or two days during the course of a summer campaign, and when, even then, it is added, that under the circumstances it was unavoidable, the Government of India may confidently appeal to these documents as unqualified proof, that the quantity of the provisions supplied to the troops at Rangoon has been sufficient; that their quality has been excellent; and that the assertions as to unwholesome meat and measly pork are absolute fictions.

With respect to the medical arrangements, I beg to refer to the whole series of dispatches from the Force, in evidence of the complete sufficiency and success of the preparations made by the Government, and detailed in this minute.

I have to add that by the exertions of the Commissioner, five excellent hospitals, capable of containing 300 patients, were constructed and ready in the first week of May, at Amherst, whither wounded and sick officers and men were conveyed, from time to time, greatly to their comfort and advantage.

Having shewn that the Government of India did not disregard past experience, but endeavoured to take every possible precaution to avert in all respects the evils attending the former occupation of Rangoon, I shall now shew the actual result of those endeavours, and shall prove that the precautions taken by the Government have been most successful for the preservation of the health and efficiency of the troops; and that, while no foresight and no exertions could have prevented an outbreak of cholera, the foresight and exertions of the Government did so far limit the duration of the pestilence, and did so protect the men, that both cholera, and sickness generally, among the troops thus exposed on service in the field, have hardly, if at all, exceeded the effects of similar visitations of cholera, and the ordinary sickness of European troops, in cantonments in India.

During the month of April the losses in the force at Rangoon, by cholera, were undoubtedly severe, and they were deplored by the Government of India; but the occurrence of the terrible pestilence is a misfortune inevitably attendant upon the prosecution of military operations in the field, by Europeans, in the East, at that season of the year.

The commencement of operations at that season was not resolved upon without consideration of the probable consequences. Grievous as these were, the operations were nevertheless undertaken in the hope of averting still greater evils, and the necessity of the measure has been very generally admitted.

The month of April in these latitudes is marked, by terrific heat: at Rangoon, the perils of a hot climate are aggravated by comparatively chill, damp nights, succeeding days of intense heat; and in the present season, these characteristics of the climate were of more than usual intensity. The troops had been for some time on shipboard; the exposure to which they were subjected during the operations for the capture of Rangoon united with the effects of previous confinement to render them especially liable to the deadly influences of cholera, and they were unhappily not exempted from the losses

which others in the like circumstances have endured. But these are the ordinary consequences of service in eastern fields by Europeans during the summer heats. They are traceable to no want of precautions on the part of the Government: everything that the Government could give was given, and no exertions on its part could have saved the troops from what they suffered. Nor were the ravages of cholera, much as we deplore them, as extensive or unusual as the language that has been employed in describing them would lead an uninformed bystander to suppose. Out of 101 deaths by cholera in the whole force, 94 occurred during the month of April, while the troops were subjected to the first exposure, and to every other disadvantage incident to the landing and establishing of an invading army. Subsequently, when those measures of the Government for providing barracks, which it was physically impossible to carry into effect at the actual time of landing, had been brought into play, the number of deaths by cholera amounted only to seven.

Yet, although every circumstance which was calculated to induce a visitation of cholera among the troops at Rangoon was in fullest force, their actual loss from it, far from being alarmingly excessive, hardly, if at all, exceeded the loss which occurred by cholera during the same season in one of the healthiest cantonments in Hindostan. The sickness in the force generally has been singularly and happily slight, with reference to the circumstances of the troops.

The Returns which I annex, compiled from the ordinary monthly returns, will make good my assertion. Return No. 1 shows the number of deaths from cholera among the troops at Rangoon in the three months of April, May, and June; to which months, the deaths, with one exception, were confined.

But during three other months of the same season, this inscrutable pestilence made almost equal ravages at Umballah, where such an event was least likely to occur.

Umballah contains a considerable European force. It has always been regarded as one of the healthiest stations in Hindostan. The barracks, built a few years ago, are admirable, and everything connected with the place, and the position of the men, is of the most favorable description.

Yet cholera raged here to an extent which, in most points, equalled its destructiveness at Rangoon, and, in one respect, even exceeded it.

These Returns will show that, while the European troops at Rangoon, in three months, lost by cholera 3·95 per cent. of their strength, the European troops at Umballah in three months lost 3·68 per cent.; while, in the single month of April, the troops at Rangoon, subject to all the influences of active service in the field under trying circumstances, lost by cholera 3·71 per cent of their strength, in the single month of September the troops at Umballah, subject to no such influences, healthy before that time, well lodged and well fed, lost by cholera not less than 3·22 per cent. of their strength.

It so happened that, at each place, one corps suffered more severely than the rest; Her Majesty's 51st at Rangoon, and Her Majesty's 75th at Umballah.

These Returns show that, in the three months during which cholera prevailed at each place, a larger proportion died from it in the corps which was quiet in cantonments than in the regiment which was on service in the field. During three months (April, May, and June,) the 51st at Rangoon lost 3·93 per cent. of their strength; while, during August, September, and October, the 75th at Umballah lost 4·38 per cent. Thus it appears that, in respect of cholera, the troops at Rangoon were not exposed to extraordinary mortality; and that, while their losses by it generally were only fractionally larger than those of troops in cantonments in Hindostan, the loss of the corps which suffered most severely at Rangoon, was actually less than the loss of the corps which suffered most severely at Umballah.

If we turn from the loss by cholera alone to the sickness of the troops generally, the result is, I take leave to say, gratifying far beyond what we had any right to expect.

The Return No. 2 shows the ratio of sick to strength among the troops at Rangoon, from the period of their landing till they commenced their advance to Prome. It shows also the ratio of sick to strength in sixteen regiments of Her Majesty's troops in the several cantonments of the Bengal Presidency, including the sanatoria in the hills during the same months.

In this Return it will be seen that the sickness at Rangoon, though in the

first three months it exceeded the average sickness in the same three months in the Presidency of Bengal, was never very large; that it never exceeded 12 per cent.; that it reached that amount only in one month; and that even this percentage of 12 per cent. in the worst of the six months at Rangoon, was less than the percentage of sick in the worst of the six months in the Presidency Stations. Lastly, it is to be observed that, as the summer advanced, the percentage of sick at Rangoon steadily diminished, till, in August and September (two of the worst months in the year), it actually was less at Rangoon than in the Presidency of Bengal by more than 2 per cent. in the former month, and, in the latter, by 5 per cent..

Having thus brought together, in succession, the several documents on which I am content to rest my refutation of the injurious allegations advanced against the Government of India, I shall not add one word of comment.

I point with confidence to the statements which are contained in the paragraphs of this minute, and supported by the documents above mentioned, as demonstrative proof of the correctness of my words when I affirmed that the present Government made every exertion, and took every precaution to provide for the troops; that no force was ever more fully, more tenderly, or more successfully cared for; that there was no deficiency in the quantity of their provisions, and no inferiority, still less any unwholesomeness, in the quality of them; and, lastly, that, although there were sickness and cholera, they did not prevail to an alarming extent, and were greatly less severe than might have been expected in the case of any force in the field at that season of the year.

DALHOUSIE.

Inclosure 23 in No. 20.

Minute by Mr. Lewis and Sir Frederick Currie.

(Extract.)

December 3, 1852.

THIS vindication of the Government, which the Governor-General has thought it right to put on record, is conclusive and irrefragable.

Every precaution that human foresight could devise for securing the health and comfort of the troops was taken; their food was as good as they would have been supplied with in their own quarters, and disease from exposure, the usual concomitant of war in a tropical climate, was mitigated, by God's blessing upon the exertions of the Government, to a degree which I believe to be altogether without precedent.

J. LEWIS.
F. CURRIE.

Inclosure 24 in No. 20.

Minute by Sir John Littler.

(Extract.)

December 4, 1852.

THE very full and minute explanations, as well as the collection of facts, which his Lordship has deemed proper to record, will suffice, I imagine, to convince and satisfy the most sceptical that every precaution was taken which human foresight could possibly devise for the real comfort and health of the troops and all connected with them.

The instructions of the Government, and the laudable exertions of all entrusted with the duty of superintending and carrying them into effect, have been successful beyond the most sanguine expectations.

The charges of neglect and indifference to the wants and necessities of the troops, are entirely groundless.

J. H. LITTLER.

No. 21.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, December 7, 1852. (No. 56.)

WE have the honor to forward herewith a copy of further papers relative to the affairs of Burmah.

You will learn from the dispatches of his Excellency Commodore Lambert, and Major-General Godwin, C.B., that the city of Pegu was captured and occupied by our troops on the 21st ultimo, after some resistance and with some loss. We have issued a General Order on the occasion, and have expressed our approbation of the steadiness and gallantry displayed by all who were engaged in the expedition.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Fox's" Boat, in the Panglang Creek,
Irrawaddy River, November 2, 1852.*

Sir,

I REQUEST you may be pleased to lay before the Governor-General in Council, the enclosed copy of a letter from Commander Shadwell, R.N., reporting the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Henzadah.

His Lordship in Council is fully aware of the importance of Henzadah as a Depôt and Wooding Station, and, as the protection of this town is essential to the navigation of the Irrawaddy, I have adopted every precaution in my power for its security; yet I fear, now the country is drying up, that I shall not be able effectually to continue to do so, without the aid of a military force.

The opportune arrival of Captain Becher's party, and the assistance that officer so readily gave, has checked the advance of the enemy, and thus saved the town from destruction.

As I am now on my way into the Irrawaddy, having left Rangoon this morning in the "Proserpine," I shall, by actual inspection, make myself acquainted with the plans necessary for carrying on future operations with the flotilla. The river has fallen so much lately that I find only five and a half feet water on the bar at Yangernsiah, and that the "Pluto" and "Nemesis," which left Rangoon a few days ago with troops for Prome, cannot cross it.

I have, therefore, decided on trans-shipping the troops they have, together with those on board the "Proserpine," to the "Damooda," "Lord William Bentinck," and "Nerbudda," the two former being now in sight coming down the river, and the latter vessel at Rangoon. I shall then send the "Proserpine," "Pluto," and "Nemesis," by the way of the China Buckeer river into the Irrawaddy. They will be employed with great advantage in the transport of stores and provisions from Yandoon to Prome, while the smaller steamers can convey the men.

I have, &c.

G. R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Commander Charles Shadwell, R.N., to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Steam-sloop "Sphinx's" Pinnace,
Henzadah, November 1, 1852.*

(Extract.)

I HAVE the honor to inform you that, after the detachment of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, under command of Captain A. Becher, was left at this place on the 29th ultimo, in pursuance of the arrangements of Captain Loch, Captain Becher and myself, having reconnoitered the ground in rear of the town, and having collected information from the headman, determined on removing his men to a Phongyee house, nearly in the rear of the centre of the town, and, according to present information, facing the advanced posts of the dacoits.

On Saturday evening I advanced the marines to the Phongyee house, on the left of our position, which had been previously occupied by the sepoy.

I may observe, *en passant*, that a paved road, running fore and aft the town, parallel to the bank of the river in rear of these two positions, afforded the means of retreat, if necessary, to the boats.

Arrangements were made with the headman, Moun-g-lou-glay, to station his armed men in intermediate stations between these two positions (which are about a mile and a half apart), so as to keep up the communication, and also to keep armed parties on our flanks.

This morning at 8.30, A.M., I received a message from Lieutenant Nightingale, Royal Marines, to the effect that the dacoits had advanced in force along the banks of the river, and were burning the detached villages on his left; I immediately sent to Captain Becher to acquaint him, and advanced with all the available seamen to the support of the marines.

On arrival I found that the enemy were within long musket range of the quarters of the marines; after a sharp fusillade they retired; we cautiously advanced under cover of the growing paddy fields, and ultimately drove the enemy back into the open country, the sepoy, under Captain Becher, clearing the ground to our right and in our front.

As an illustration of their boldness, I may mention that the dacoits have burnt some houses in a grove half a mile to the left of our position.

The Henzadah people report only one of their men wounded, but several of the enemy; and as an earnest of success, they have taken two prisoners, and report five or six wounded. None of our men were hurt.

Inclosure 3 in No. 21.

General Order by the Governor-General in Council.

Fort William, December 6, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council has much satisfaction in publishing, for general information, dispatches which have been received from his Excellency Commodore Lambert, and from Major-General Godwin, C.B., reporting the capture and occupation of the town of Pegu, after resistance, and with some loss.

The Governor-General in Council desires to express his full approbation of the steadiness and gallantry that have been displayed by all who were engaged upon this service.

His Lordship in Council offers his best thanks to Major-General Godwin, C.B.; to Brigadier McNeill, in command of the troops; to Commander Shadwell, R.N., who directed the naval arrangements; to Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor, Bengal Fusiliers; to Major Hill, Madras Fusiliers; to Major Shubrick, 5th Madras Native Infantry; to Captain Mallock, with the guns; and Captain Brown, in command of the Rifle Company, 5th Madras Native Infantry.

His Lordship in Council desires also to offer his thanks to the officers of the Staff; to Major Mayhew, Deputy Adjutant-General; Major Boulderson, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General; Captain Hamilton, Assistant-Adjutant-General; Captain Darroch, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General; Captain Burne, Military Secretary; Captain Renaud, Brigade-Major; Captain Latter, Interpreter with the Force; Captain Chads, Aide-de-camp; and to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and sailors, who were engaged upon the expedition.

By order of the Governor-General of India in Council.

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 4 in No. 21.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Fox," at Rangoon,
November 25, 1852.*

Sir,

MAJOR-GENERAL GODWIN having decided on driving the enemy out of the city, of Pegu, where they had re-assembled, and occupying it with a British force, I placed at his disposal four small steamers and the boats of the squadron, under Commander Shadwell, of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Sphinx," and have the honor to forward to you, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, the report of that officer, detailing the result of the expedition.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 21.

Commander Shadwell to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Steam-sloop "Sphinx's" Gig, attached
to the East India Company's steamer "Mahanuddy," Pegu, November 23, 1852.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to report, for your Excellency's information, the proceedings of the expedition to Pegu.

The troops having embarked at Rangoon on the evening of the 18th instant, on board the East India Company's steamers "Mahanuddy," "Nerbudda," "Damooda," and "Lord William Bentinck," as set forth in the accompanying memorandum, showing the details of the whole force, dropped down the river below the Hastings' Shoal, and waited for the morning tide.

A convoy of boats, containing provisions, stores, and camp-followers, escorted by the gun-boats, under the command of Lieutenant Mason, preceded the steamers on the afternoon of the 18th.

Weighing at early daylight on the 19th, and taking the whole of the flood-tide with them, the vessels, led by the "Lord William Bentinck," proceeded up the Pegu river, and arrived in the evening at stations a few miles below Pegu.

The "Lord William Bentinck," more fortunate than the rest, (Mr. Digney having previously acquired some knowledge of the river on a former occasion,) reached a point two miles below the position it was proposed to take up; the "Damooda," "Nerbudda," and "Mahanuddy," remaining for the night at stations lower down the river.

The further advance of the vessels on the following day was tedious, and a matter of considerable difficulty, owing to the decreasing width and depth of the channel, and the serpentine bends of the river.

By the evening, the "Lord William Bentinck" had pushed on to a position about a quarter of a mile below the south-east angle of the old ruined city of Pegu; the "Nerbudda" reached a point half a mile further down; the "Damooda," three-quarters; and the "Mahanuddy," a mile and three-quarters below the "Lord William Bentinck."

After anchoring, the Major-General, accompanied by some staff officers and myself, proceeded up the river to reconnoitre, and make arrangements for landing on the following morning.

In the evening, and during the early part of the night, some desultory firing took place from the enemy's river-stockades on the headmost steamer, which was returned by her and the boats, while pickets were thrown out from the steamers on the banks during the night, to prevent the accident of a night attack.

The disembarkation of the troops commenced on the following morning, Sunday, 21st, at 4 A.M., each steamer landing her men on the left bank of the river, abreast of her own position, from whence the different columns marched

along the bank to the point of concentration abreast of the headmost steamer, the "Lord William Bentinck."

At the same time the artillery, two 24-pounder howitzers (which had been previously transferred from the "Mahanuddy" to the paddle-box boats), were landed by the seamen, under the directions of Commander Lambert.

The ancient city of Pegu is of a quadrangular form; the ruined walls or ramparts are still clearly defined, and are surrounded on all sides by a moat, much choked with mud and rubbish, its sides being about a mile and three-quarters in length; the Pagoda, which forms the key of the position, lying in the north-east division of the space inclosed by the ruined ramparts.

The enemy, whose numbers are stated to have amounted to between 3000 and 4000, were strongly posted at the south-east angle of the walls, and also along the river front of their position, which was strongly stockaded. The enemy made no opposition to our landing, owing to our movements being concealed by the fog, which prevailed in the early morning.

The concentration of the troops, and the arrangements for the advance, were completed by about 6:30 A.M.; at 7 the advance commenced, the columns moving along the outer edge of the southern moat towards the eastward, so as to turn the flank of the enemy's position, their progress being necessarily extremely slow, on account of the difficult nature of the ground, which was covered with high grass and jungle, and over which there was no regular road.

The enemy immediately commenced a sharp fire, which soon caused some casualties, and as the troops advanced along the edge of the moat, they moved along the ramparts parallel to them, and maintained a constant fire. At about 9:15 the European troops who were in advance reached a point opposite to a broken opening in the rampart, where the moat seemed passable, and, after a short halt to refresh the men, and form them under cover of a wood, they advanced at 9:45 A.M., in column of attack, charged gallantly across the moat, entered the line of the enemy's defence, and drove the Burmese before them, the enemy retreating towards the Pagoda.

I had remained a little behind to assist the advance of the Artillery, about which the General had been anxious, and, on my arrival at 10 A.M., had the satisfaction of seeing our troops in possession of the enemy's ramparts.

After refreshing the men, the troops advanced, at 10:45 A.M., to the left along the bund, towards the line of the river defences, for the purpose of dispersing the enemy in that quarter: but on perceiving them in full retreat towards the Pagoda, owing to the efficient fire of shell and canister, which from the commencement of the affair had been kept up on them by the "Lord William Bentinck" and the gun-boats, the General countermarched the troops to the right again, and returned to our original position.

At 12 o'clock the columns again advanced by the direct road leading towards the Pagoda, without meeting any opposition, and on arriving near it, at 0:45 P.M., the columns were formed for the assault. On approaching it, we perceived some Burmese stealthily watching our movements; our men advanced with a rush, the enemy fired a volley and fled, we entered the Pagoda, and Pegu was ours.

It could scarcely be expected that this service could be performed without some loss; and I regret to say that the military force had six men killed and thirty-one wounded, including, among the latter, three officers; most providentially none of the seamen in the boats, or on board the "Lord William Bentinck" (which vessel alone was near enough to take part in the attack), were either killed or wounded, although continually exposed to a warm fire.

It is with much gratification that I have to report to your Excellency, the zeal, energy, and good conduct, of the officers and seamen attached to the expedition.

To Commander Rowley Lambert, of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," praise is due for the able manner in which the guns were promptly landed by the seamen under his directions, and, subsequently, for the efficient manner in which he directed the fire from the gun-boats on the enemy's position, by which they were ultimately dislodged.

Messrs. Digney, Porter, Berwick, and Simson, respectively commanding the East India Company's steamers, deserve great credit for the perseverance and energy they displayed in pushing their vessels up the river, under circumstances of most difficult navigation, as well as for their general assistance.

Lieutenants Mason and Glover, and Mr. Pocock, mate, and the subordinate officers in charge of boats, acquitted themselves to my entire satisfaction.

The services of Mr. J. F. Johnson, Assistant-Surgeon of Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx," were extremely valuable in attending on the wounded, many of whom were sent on board the "Lord William Bentinck" at the commencement of the affair.

Commander Beauchamp Seymour, R.N., accompanied the expedition as a volunteer, and was present with the Major-General Commanding, throughout the operations of the day.

I have, &c.

CHARLES D. A. SHADWELL, *Commander.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 21.

*Memorandum showing the Strength of the Expedition to Pegu,
November 18, 1852.*

East India Company's steam-vessel "Mahanuddy;" J. Simson, Esq., commanding.—Major-General Godwin and Staff; 50 Bengal Fusiliers; 50 Madras Fusiliers; 120 Fifth Madras Native Infantry; 30 Artillery; 2 guns.

East India Company's steam-vessel "Nerbudda;" W. Porter, Esq., commanding.—Brigadier McNeill and Staff; 250 Madras Fusiliers.

East India Company's steam-vessel "Damooda;" R. Berwick, Esq., commanding—250 Bengal Fusiliers.

East India Company's steam-vessel "Lord William Bentinck;" J. Digney, Esq., commanding.—250 Madras Native Infantry.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox;" Rowley Lambert, commanding.—Pinnace: Lieutenant Mason; Mr. Dunlop, midshipman; 15 men. Barge: Mr. C. Pocock, mate; and Mr. Lucas, midshipman; 13 men. Gig: Mr. W. Dawes, midshipman; 6 men. Gun-boat: Mr. A. Villiers, midshipman; 6 men.

Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx;" Charles D. A. Shadwell, commanding.—Paddle-box boat No. 1: Lieutenant J. H. Glover; 15 men. Paddle-box boat No. 2: Mr. A. Morphy, master's-assistant; 15 men; conveying 30 sappers each, the first towed by the East India Company's steam-vessel "Nerbudda," the second by the East India Company's steam-vessel "Damooda." Cutter: Mr. A. Webb, midshipman; 9 men. Gig: Mr. W. E. Cookson, midshipman; 5 men; Mr. J. F. Johnson, Assistant-Surgeon.

CHARLES D. A. SHADWELL, *Commander.*

Inclosure 7 in No. 21.

Commander Shadwell to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Sphinx,"
Rangoon, November 24, 1852.*

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter relative to the expedition to Pegu, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that, in accordance with the wishes of the Major-General commanding the Forces, the troops, who it was proposed should return to Rangoon, were embarked on board the East India Company's steamers "Mahanuddy," "Damooda," and "Lord William Bentinck," on the evening of the 22nd. The two latter vessels left for Rangoon on the morning of the 23rd; and General Godwin and Staff having embarked on board the "Mahanuddy" during the afternoon, the vessel proceeded, and returned to Rangoon at noon this day.

A garrison of 430 men remains at Pegu, 230 Europeans and 200 Sepoys.

The Major-General at first wished the "Nerbudda" to remain at Pegu for a few days; but having subsequently changed his mind, I ordered that vessel to return also, and desired one of the "Sphinx's" paddle-box boats to remain until further orders.

Mr. Barnadiston, in charge of the yawl of Her Majesty's ship "Winchester," arrived at Pegu, with a convoy of provision boats from Rangoon, on the morning of the 23rd. I have instructed that officer to return to Rangoon with the empty boats as soon as they have been cleared.

I have, &c.

CHARLES D. A. SHADWELL, *Commander.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 21.

Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Pegu, November 22, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to state, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, that Pegu was captured yesterday.

In June last I was induced, by strong representations from various sources, to send a small force to drive out some Burmese from Pegu. We had had some friendly intercourse with the inhabitants of that place, who declared to me that if they were put again in possession of their town they would be able to hold it. There was an armed party of Taliens at the time from the villages around, who promised their support.

The Burmese were driven out, and the people recovered possession of their town, but, as I feared, they did not hold it a week.

At this time it would have been inconvenient in many ways to have stationed a force there at the commencement of the monsoon.

Since that time, I have had various reports of the enemy being in great force at Pegu, and that they had thrown up strong defences on the river, and from it to the Pagoda, within the site of the old city; they became troublesome also to several villages between this and Rangoon.

As the army will shortly be at Prome, with a garrison only at Rangoon, it became imperative to take possession of, and garrison Pegu.

I had determined upon this for some time, and the three small river steamers, with the "Mahanuddy," having returned from Prome on the 16th of November, I arranged with Commodore Lambert that the troops should embark on Thursday evening, the 18th; when 300 men of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor; 300 of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, under Major Hill; 400 men of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, under Major Shubrick; 70 Sappers, with two 24-pounder howitzers and 32 artillerymen; embarked by 7 o'clock, P.M.

This force I placed under the command of Brigadier McNeill, of the Madras Army.

I also embarked with my own Staff in the "Mahanuddy," for the purpose of accompanying the expedition.

Commander Shadwell, of the Royal Navy, had charge of the flotilla.

This town is situated about 60 miles from Rangoon, on a fine creek called the Pegu river, which runs into the Rangoon river, just below the town of Rangoon.

We started on Friday morning, the 19th, at daybreak, and, in consequence of the shallow water, were obliged to anchor about two miles below Pegu, at sunset, on the evening of the 20th.

The troops commenced disembarking at 4 A.M. the next morning, and were all assembled on shore by half-past 6 o'clock; and when I joined the force at this hour, I found it buried in high grass jungle, and the whole country enveloped in a thick fog.

I was in some degree aware of the position of the enemy,—from a plan I had had in my possession for some time, furnished by Captain Latter, he having accompanied the former expedition in June,—but not the particulars of it until I saw it on the ground. The site of the old city, wherein the enemy was posted, is formed by a square, surrounded by a high bund, each side of which is presumed to be about two miles in length, the west side facing the river; and the square is surrounded by a wet moat, between 70 and 80 paces wide.

From the south-west angle there is a causeway over the moat, close to, and parallel with, the river. This causeway the enemy had made exceedingly strong by traverses, and breaking it down at various intervals to prevent our advance. On the whole of the south face of the bund, fronting our position, they had bodies of troops stationed, extending for about a mile and a quarter.

As the causeway on the right of their position was so narrow that only a file of men could advance along it against their numerous musketry and local impediments, I abandoned all idea of attacking them there. It was, therefore, determined to force our way along the moat, and to turn the left of their position, on the south face of the square.

Captain Latter, my interpreter, who was with me, had with him a Burmese, who promised to find us a causeway leading into the bund, close to the left of their position. We commenced our advance, the Bengal Fusiliers leading, covered by the Rifle Company of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, and followed by the Madras Fusiliers and 5th Native Infantry, in file; and for two hours was this force struggling through the almost impenetrable grass and jungle along the outer edge of the moat, and exposed to a very warm fire from the enemy.

We had at last reached a part of the moat which admitted of a passage for the troops, and marked by the extreme left of the enemy's position, and where they had a strong post and two guns.

I here directed Colonel Tudor to form a storming party of 150 of his own men, and 100 of the Madras Fusiliers, which the Lieutenant-Colonel led. At the signal given, they crossed the moat through mud and water, and most gallantly stormed the enemy's post. We were now masters of their position.

Our own guns were actively employed under Captain Mallock, at the spot from which we first commenced our move, and after some time they were brought up, over almost impassable ground, nearly to the spot where we effected our entrance into the enemy's position, and they were protected by the Grenadiers of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, under Captain Wyndham.

After resting the troops for some time, and collecting the wounded men, we again advanced by an excellent path in the direction of the large Pagoda. We suffered no molestation from the enemy, but, on approaching the Pagoda, I formed a party for its attack under Major Hill of the Madras Fusiliers, consisting of 100 of his own regiment, with a similar number of the Bengal Fusiliers. They advanced up to the steps of the Pagoda, and on ascending received a fire of musketry, which they soon silenced, and took possession of the place at about one o'clock P.M.

The fatigues of the day were now over, and I am certain that while they lasted no soldiers ever met with more arduous ones, nor ever met the obstacles of such an advance with more cheerful and steady perseverance than did this little band of brave and determined men.

The enemy, by the least computation, could not number less than 5,000 men, evidently headed by people of consideration, by the numerous mounted people, as well as elephants, which were seen retiring by the road to Sitang.

Our loss is not nearly what I apprehended in the morning it might have been, and, considering the difficulties of the ground, and exposure to the enemy, I congratulate myself that it is so small.

I have now to ask the Governor-General in Council's consideration of the services performed on this expedition by the officers and men engaged.

To Brigadier McNeill, who formed up the force in the morning as it disembarked, and whose indefatigable exertions during the day brought on an exhaustion, which occasioned me much distress to witness, and which deprived me of his valuable assistance for a short time.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor, of the Bengal Fusiliers, who led the storming party, and carried the enemy's position.

To Major Hill, of the Madras Fusiliers, who led the party which carried the Pagoda.

To Major Shubrick, of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, whose position in the "Bentinck," which was considerably in advance of the rest of the flotilla, called forth his greatest vigilance to protect his people from the enemy, who were around him, as also for his exertions during the day.

To Captain Mallock, for his exertions with the guns.

To Captain Brown, who commanded the Rifle Company of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, who covered our advance, and whose conduct I witnessed with much pleasure during the day.

I feel most particularly indebted to the attention and devotion paid to the sick and wounded by the medical officers who accompanied the force.

The Brigadier has brought to my notice Captain Renaud, his Brigade-Major, whose services he highly appreciates.

To Captain Latter, whose distinguished gallantry, on this as on all occasions, has been conspicuous, as also his local information and active assistance, I beg to call your Lordship's particular attention.

To Commander Shadwell, who had charge of the naval part of this expedition, I am deeply indebted for the most unremitting exertions by night and

day, and for the disembarkation of the troops, which was conducted as quietly as expeditiously. Neither the steamers nor the boats could get up to the enemy's defences, owing to the shallowness of the river.

Captain Shadwell personally accompanied me throughout the day.

Will your Lordship permit me to introduce to your notice Commander Beauchamp Seymour, of the Royal Navy, who is here on a visit to many friends, who accompanied me during the day, and whose conduct was conspicuous on every occasion.

To Major Mayhew, Deputy Adjutant-General; Major Boulderson, Deputy Judge Advocate-General; Captain Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Darroch, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Burne, Military Secretary; and Captain Chads, Aide-de-camp; the general and my personal Staff, whose duties were most arduous, being carried on on foot, and whose exertions to keep up the communication with the force in this broken ground were incessant, I beg to call your Lordship's attention.

I leave a garrison of 400 men, 200 of the Madras Fusiliers, and 200 of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, with two 24-pounder howitzers, and a detail of Artillery with 40 Sappers, which the upper terrace of the Pagoda will hold most commodiously, including the magazine and stores. This party will be under the command of Major Hill, of the Madras Fusiliers, a most excellent officer.

Lieutenant Campbell, of the Bengal Engineers, will see to its necessary defences.

Eight guns were taken, and it is supposed that more will be found.

I purpose leaving this for Rangoon to-morrow morning.

Inclosing a list of casualties,

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN,
*Major-General, Commanding the Forces in Ava,
Arracan, and Tenasserim Provinces.*

Inclosure 9 in No. 21.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing at the Attack and Capture of the
Pagoda, and its Defences at Pegu, on the 21st of November, 1852.*

Head-Quarters, Pegu, November 22, 1852.

General Staff.—1 European officer, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 rank and file, wounded.

Infantry.

1st European Bengal Fusiliers.—2 rank and file, killed; 9 rank and file, wounded.

1st European Madras Fusiliers.—1 serjeant, and 14 rank and file, wounded.

5th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—1 havildar, and 2 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 2 Native officers, 2 havildars, and 2 rank and file, wounded.

Grand total.—1 havildar, 4 rank and file, killed; 3 European officers, 2 Native officers, 1 serjeant, 2 havildars, and 26 rank and file, wounded.

European officers.—3 wounded.

Native officers.—2 wounded.

Warrant and non-commissioned officers, rank and file, &c.—5 killed; 29 wounded.

Total.—5 killed; 34 wounded.

Grand total of killed and wounded.—39.

H. GODWIN,
Major-General, Commanding the Army of Burmah.
W. MAYHEW,
Major, Deputy Adjutant-General.

Officers Wounded.

Madras Commissariat Department.—Lieutenant W. Cook, dangerously.
5th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.—Lieutenant W. H. Whitlock, very severely; and
Lieutenant H. D. Cloete, dangerously.

No. 22.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, December 24, 1852. (No. 63.)

TWO dispatches have been received from Major-General Godwin; the first, without date, incloses reports from Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, relative to several small expeditions which have been dispatched from Prome against the Burmese.

The satisfaction of the Government has been expressed with the conduct of officers and men on these occasions.

The second dispatch, dated the 11th instant, reports that the Burmese in force had invested Pegu, which was held by 400 men. The General's dispatch closes with the announcement that he was about to proceed to Pegu again with reinforcements.

We are enabled to add, that a private letter from Commodore Lambert, dated the 16th instant, to the address of the Governor-General, intimates that the garrison of Pegu had been relieved with a trifling loss.

Inclosure 1 in No. 22.

Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to forward to you, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, reports forwarded to the Deputy-Adjutant-General of this army for my information, from Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, K.C.B., commanding at Prome.

No. 1, reporting a successful attack by his order on a stockade, on the right bank of the river, opposite Prome, which his Lordship will perceive was conducted with good judgment by Major Wigston, of Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish.

No. 2, containing the account of an unfortunate reconnoissance made at Akouktoung, from the steamer "Enterprise," by Captain Gardner, stationed with a party of the 40th Regiment Bengal N.I. on board that vessel, to prevent any occupation of that place by the enemy; wherein, I grieve to report that Captain Gardner lost his life, as also a havildar and five men were wounded from an ambuscade of the enemy. It also contains the account of a successful expedition, sent by Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, under Lieutenant-Colonel Handscomb, of the 40th Bengal N.I., to Podang and its neighbourhood. This expedition, his Lordship will observe, has been conducted with judgment and gallantry by the Lieutenant-Colonel, who reports very particularly on the assistance he received from Brevet-Major Edwards, of the 18th Royal Irish.

I have also the honor to forward a report, No. 3, from Major Hill, of the Madras Fusiliers, of a formidable attack on his post—the Pagoda at Pegu—by a very strong body of Burmese; as also, at the same time, on a picket over stores on the beach, commanded by Lieutenant Perceval Brown, of the Madras Fusiliers, aided by a gun-boat of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," commanded by Lieutenant Mason. These attacks were repulsed, as his Lordship will read, with great gallantry, and with considerable loss to the enemy.

Every exertion is making to push up to Prome the cavalry, with other details.

I shall leave this with the staff to establish the head-quarters of the army at Prome in a few days.

I leave in command of Rangoon with great satisfaction Brigadier-General Steel, of the Madras army, where there are always so many calls on the active exertions of any officer in command.

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, K.C.B., to Major Mayhew, Assistant Adjutant-General, Burmah Field Force.

Sir,

Prome, November 19, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Major-General commanding the Force, that the enemy, on the opposite side of the river just above Prome, appearing to have become rather formidable, and having got up more guns on their two breast-works, from which they fired on boats passing up, and on our guard-boat stationed at the post of Nawaen, I conceived it advisable to dislodge them.

Their force was reported to consist of 500 men in the lower fort, under Mong Oke, with two guns and two jingals; and 500 men in the upper fort, with two jingals and two guns, under Mong-men Lowen.

A party was accordingly ordered, under the command of Major Wigston, of Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, on the 12th instant, to perform this service; and I inclose a letter from Major Wigston, reporting that the forts had been entirely destroyed.

The troops behaved exceedingly well; and Major Wigston most ably performed the duty entrusted to him.

I was a witness to the gallant manner in which the detachment was carried up the river, in face of the fire of the forts, by the "Mahanuddy" and "Medusa" steamers, under the direction of Captain Loch; and Commodore Lambert, who was present, will be able to inform you of any other particulars.

The chiefs have fled, it is said, to the north, and have taken post at a stockade, called Yaythayah, on the river bank, about two miles higher up, with about half the number of their followers.

I have, &c.

J. CHEAPE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Bengal Division.

Inclosure 3 in No. 22.

Major Francis Wigston, 18th Royal Irish Regiment, to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Bengal Division, at Prome.

Sir,

Prome, November 13, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, K.C.B., commanding the troops at Prome, that, in compliance with division orders of the 11th instant—details as per margin,* embarked under my command on board the "Lord William Bentinck" steamer, at 5 A.M., on the morning of the 12th instant; and I, at the same time, directed details, as per margin, under the command of Captain Montgomery, 80th Regiment, to embark on board the steamers "Mahanuddy" and "Medusa," for the purpose of cooperating with a naval force under Captain Loch, C.B., R.N., destined to attack in front, and on the left flank, two forts on the opposite side of the river, while that under my orders was to operate on the right and rear of the position.

The party under my command having landed without opposition on the right bank, proceeded through a very jungly and mountainous path, being directed by a guide for about two miles towards the right flank and rear of the forts, when we surprised a number of the enemy in the act of retiring and drawing off one of their guns; on our immediately closing them the gun was aban-

* 18th Royal Irish Regiment—1 captain, 5 subalterns, 1 assistant surgeon, 5 serjeants, 2 buglers, 121 rank and file. 80th Regiment—1 captain, 2 subalterns, 2 serjeants, 2 drummers, 81 rank and file. 35th Madras Native Infantry—1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 assistant surgeon, 1 subadar, 2 havildars, 2 naicks, 46 privates. 40th Bengal Native Infantry—1 captain, 1 subadar, 1 jemadar, 4 havildars, 4 naicks, 42 privates. Madras Sappers—1 lieutenant, 25 sappers. 80th Regiment, Captain Montgomery—1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 assistant surgeon, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 52 rank and file. 51st King's Own Light Infantry—1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 1 bugler, 50 rank and file.

done, and the enemy retreated, pursued by us for a long distance over very difficult ground, where they must have suffered considerably from our fire.

This portion of the enemy having been dispersed, we proceeded, after some difficulty, in finding a path (the guide having disappeared) to the rear of the forts; and on entering that on the right flank, found it already in possession of Captain Montgomery, 80th Regiment, and his detachment, the whole front of the works having been cleared.

These forts were admirably constructed, and, in the hands of a resolute enemy, would not easily have fallen. In them we found three guns, from 9 to 12-pounders (in addition to that previously captured), and a variety of small arms, ammunition, &c.; and two chiefs' gilt umbrellas also fell into our hands.

After remaining for about two hours to refresh the men, who were much exhausted, the whole of the Europeans of the force were re-embarked on board the "Lord William Bentinck" steamer, and returned to Prome at about 11 o'clock A.M. The detachments of the 35th Madras Native Infantry, 40th Bengal Native Infantry, and Madras Sappers, under the command of Captain Lloyd, 21st Madras Native Infantry (attached to the 35th Madras Native Infantry), were directed to stand fast until the demolition of the guns and works, under the superintendence of Captain Young, Bengal Engineers, was completed, which duty was effectually performed by about 2 o'clock P.M., when the whole recrossed the river to Prome.

I have the honor to inclose Captain Young's report and plan of the works.

Captain Montgomery, 80th Regiment, reports that he passed the forts in the "Mahanuddy" steamer, under a well-directed and heavy fire from them; and the "Medusa" steamer not having got up, he landed his detachment of the 80th Regiment, and proceeded with a party of seamen, under Captain Loch, C.B., R.N., by a path in rear of the fort on the left flank, which they entered, and afterwards advanced to that on the right, which they soon deserted.

I have much satisfaction in reporting that, owing to the well-timed combined movement against their position, by which the enemy was completely surprised, the service was effected without any casualty on our part.

The whole of the detachments behaved admirably, and were judiciously led by their respective commanders; viz.: 18th Royal Irish Regiment, by Captain Gillespie, the advance by Lieutenant Swinburn, of that corps; the 80th Regiment, by Captain Christie; 35th Madras Native Infantry, by Captain Lloyd; 40th Bengal Native Infantry, by Captain Becher; and Madras Sappers, by Lieutenant Allen, 21st Madras Native Infantry (attached to the Madras Sappers); a detachment of the 18th Royal Irish Regiment, and 35th Madras Native Infantry, by Lieutenant Hewitt, 18th Royal Irish Regiment, whom I directed to prevent the retreat of the enemy on the right flank; also that of the 80th Regiment, under Captain Montgomery, of that corps; and 51st Regiment, under Lieutenant Sheaffe. I received every assistance from Captain Young, Bengal Engineers, who accompanied me.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS WIGSTON,
Major, 18th Royal Irish Regiment.

Inclosure 4 in No. 22.

Captain C. B. Young, Bengal Engineers, to Major Wigston.

Sir,

Camp, Prome, November 13, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for your information, that the two forts on the opposite bank of the River Irrawaddy, northward of Prome, which were yesterday captured by the detachment under your command, have been completely destroyed, together with the guns and ammunition taken in them, by the party of Sappers under Lieutenant Allen, deputed for the purpose.

Annexed are the plans and sections of the forts, which will, I think, serve to show that these works were very carefully and substantially built, and in a manner which would have done no discredit to a European engineer, being rivetted throughout with stout posts and planks; provided with powder magazines of the best construction; that is, built with a return, covered in with earth,

and sheeted with planks; also with lean-to earth-covered casements, to protect the defenders from the fire of shells, &c.; they also contained a long and capacious under-ground gallery for stores.

All these works, after being filled with combustibles, were set fire to and demolished.

The guns taken in the forts were,—three iron 9 to 12-pounders, and two jingals; the former were loaded with powder, tamped up, and blown into fragments; the latter carried away.

A large quantity of shot was also carried away, and thrown into the river; and the powder and cartridges found in the works served to assist in their destruction.

I have, &c.

CHAS. B. YOUNG,

Brevet Captain, Bengal Engineers.

Inclosure 5 in No. 22.

Brigadier-General Sir J. Cheape to Major Mayhew, Assistant Adjutant-General, Rangoon.

Sir,

Prome, December 1, 1852.

IN my letter to your address, of the 19th ultimo, I had the honor to report, for the information of the Major-General commanding the Force, that a party of 60 men of the 40th Regiment, under the command of Captain Gardner, had been detached on the 16th ultimo, to be quartered on board the "Enterprise," stationed off Akouktoung.

Captain Gardner was instructed to patrol the heights, so as to prevent the occupation of them by the enemy, to the annoyance of our boats and vessels that might be passing up and down the river.

I now regret to inform you that intelligence reached me on the morning of the 20th ultimo, of the attack by the enemy on Captain Gardner's party, on their landing to patrol on the morning of the 19th—of Captain Gardner and his havildar being killed and six sepoy's wounded—and that, the enemy being in force, the party had retired to the boats and returned to the "Enterprise," without being able to bring away the bodies of their officers. The intelligence first reached me from native rumour and other sources, but was almost immediately afterwards confirmed by an official letter from the Commander of the "Enterprise," to Captain Loch, a copy of which accompanies, together with a return of the killed and wounded.

This unfortunate occurrence appears to me attributable in some degree to a want of caution on the part of Captain Gardner, who landed his men without the support of the gun-boat, which was detached from this for the purpose, but was not on the spot at the time, and to his taking a most difficult route without any previous precautions of cutting the road, and clearing the jungle: the enemy, from what I can learn, must have observed the manner in which the heights had been patrolled for the two or three preceding days, and laid an ambush for the party. I have, however, had no accounts that can be accurately relied upon; but Colonel Handscomb, who has since been detached, may, I think, be able to ascertain more particulars of the affair, and will no doubt make an official report. It is satisfactory, however, to state, that all accounts I have had, concur in praise of the conduct of the sepoy's, who retired in good formation and steadily, and did not recover the bodies of their officers solely in consequence of the narrowness of the road, or declivity of steps across which trees and bushes had been thrown; and it was in stepping over those that the unfortunate officers were shot and immediately dragged off, and the men following in support of them wounded.

On receipt of the above intelligence, and on consulting with Captain Loch, commanding our naval force here, it was immediately resolved to dispatch the "Pluto," the only steamer then at this place besides the "Sesostris," with a detachment of 200 men of Her Majesty's 18th, 100 of the 40th Regiment of Native Infantry, and 50 Sappers, the whole under the command of Colonel Handscomb; Captain Loch to accompany the party with his seamen in the

"Pluto," and sixteen country boats to convey the tents, stores, &c., and be kept so as to be available to carry the men in the event of the steamer grounding.

The object of the expedition was to disperse the enemy, who, it was evident from the information we possessed, detached men to these heights from their quarters at Guamyetna (the Red Pagoda), about six or eight miles to the north-west, and from Payhee, a village south of Akouktoung, and distant from Kaengaen, on the bank of the river, three or four miles.

It was most desirable to surprise the Chief Mony Mounng, who resided at Guamyetna; and I hoped, at the close of the operations against the enemy, who might be located at Guamyetna, on the Akouktoung heights, or at Payhee, to be able to locate the detachment, or a part of them, at Podangmew, which I have been long desirous of doing, for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants, and drawing supplies from the Podang district, as well as to enable us to keep open a communication by the hill passes to Sandoway.

Colonel Handscomb's letter, of date 29th ultimo, of which a copy is now forwarded, will show that the enemy were completely surprised at Guamyetna, and that the Chief very narrowly escaped being taken; that the heights have been cleared; and that, although Colonel Handscomb did not succeed in getting to Payhee, he surprised a number of the enemy at Tomboo, and in different villages on the bank of the river, on returning to Guamyetna and to Podang, which latter place he reached on the 29th ultimo, and where he now is: and I have the gratification to learn his being in position there promises to be attended with the best effect, the inhabitants beginning to come in with their bullocks and property, and upwards of 100 hackeries having, as I hear, been already collected there.

I have detached a force to proceed to-morrow to occupy the heights of Akouktoung, but am at present in communication with Captain Loch, as to how far he considers the measure still necessary, as it seems the last fleet of boats came up by a different channel, quite out of reach of gun-shot from the Akouktoung heights.

I trust the General will approve of the expedition against Guamyetna, &c. having been undertaken, and that the manner in which the service has been performed by Colonel Handscomb and the troops with him, in conjunction with Captain Loch and the naval party, will have his approbation.

I would particularly solicit the notice of the General commanding to Colonel Handscomb's favorable mention of Major Edwards.

I have, &c.

J. CHEAPE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Bengal Division.

Inclosure 6 in No. 22.

*Commander Geo. Neblett, of the Bengal Marine, to Captain Granville Loch, R.N.,
C.B., Senior Officer in the Irrawaddy River, Prome.*

*East India Company's steam-vessel "Enterprise,"
Akouk-toung, November 19, 1852.*

Sir,

I EXCEEDINGLY regret to have to report to you an unfortunate encounter this morning about 7 o'clock, between the detachment of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry attached to the "Enterprise," and the enemy, in the immediate vicinity of two white pagodas on the western slope of Akouk-toung, just above the village of Tomboo, in which Captain Gardner, the commanding officer, and a havildar were killed, and six sepoy wounded, one dangerously; and I am sorry to add that the bodies of both the killed have been left to the Burmese, by whom the sepoy say, they were so pressed as to make it impossible for them to bring their fallen officers away. They were both in advance in a narrow path, which admitted not two abreast, and is skirted by a thick jungle on either side, and both were shot through the head; I cannot state with any probable accuracy the number of the enemy, as they did not venture from the jungle, being kept in check, doubtless by the fear of our guns and the "Winchester" pinnace, which was not far off. Whilst the unfortunate skirmish was going on it was impossible to distinguish our troops, who were concealed by the

jungle, together with the Burmese, which made it dangerous to them to use our guns, and therefore we could render them but little assistance, save by throwing a few shells on the upper part of the hill, where they had several jingals mounted, from which they kept up a sharp fire upon our troops below.

I have, &c.

GEORGE NEBLETT, *Commander.*

Inclosure 7 in No. 22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Handscomb, Commanding Detached Force from Prome, to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Bengal Division, Army of Burmah.

Sir,

Podang Mew, November 29, 1852.

I NOW avail myself of the first leisure time I have had, since I embarked on board the East India Company's war-steamer "Pluto," with the force under my command, named in the margin,* and have the honor to report my proceedings for the information of Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, K.C.B., commanding at Prome.

The steamer grounded on the evening of the 20th, which delayed the departure of the expedition till the next day. On the morning of the 22nd, the force landed at 2 o'clock A.M., and moved in two columns for the surprise of Guamyetna.

The left column under Captain Forrest, 40th Regiment Native Infantry, consisting of thirty-eight of the 18th Royal Irish, and fifty of the 40th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, proceeded to cut off the retreat of the Governor Mounghoe-mong. The right column, being the remaining portion of the force, reinforced by the naval division under Captain Loch, C. B., R. N., marched direct upon the village, pressing the Burmese picket, that fired both jingal and musketry, without any return being made by the column, in order to effect the surprise which proved decisive, as the enemy (after a desultory fire) left all their ammunition and arms, viz., seven jingals, a number of muskets, swords, and spears.

The village being the head-quarters of the enemy, I decided on burning it. The heights above were taken without resistance. I regret to say that Lieutenant Gahagan, of the Madras Engineers, was severely wounded, when destroying the captured jingals.

On the 23rd I made a reconnoissance of the heights above Akouk-toung, to allow me to proceed the next morning, without molestation, to Payhee, for which purpose I started early on the morning of the 24th, but, unluckily, the guides had lost their way, and could not recover their path; and, after wandering for some time in a dense jungle, intersected with numerous breastworks, I returned with the force to Akouk-toung. I was there informed the Governor Mounghoe-mong had returned with a large force to the Red Pagoda, on the heights above Guamyetna.

I apparently made arrangements to make another attempt to reach Payhee, but determined to advance by land, on the Red Pagoda, in the hope of finding the Governor; having previously routed a strong picket of the enemy in a village at the foot of the hills, distant nearly two miles from Akouk-toung, by a party of 100 men under the command of Captain Forrest, 40th Regiment Native Infantry.

Early on the morning of the 26th, I started for the Red Pagoda, and was for a long time delayed by the badness of the roads and a very deep creek, so that I did not reach the vicinity of the pagoda till nearly 4 o'clock P.M. This movement could not have been anticipated by the enemy, who made a stand at the village of Philloydan, and commenced firing musketry and jingal on the advanced guard, led on by Lieutenant Piercey, of Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, who immediately secured the bridge that the enemy had commenced destroying,

* Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish Regiment—8 officers and 200 men, under Brevet Major Edwards. 2 European commissioned officers, 2 Native commissioned officers, and 112 fighting men of all grades, under Captain Forrest, 40th Native Infantry. 1 officer and 51 fighting men, Madras Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant Wilson. Staff—Lieutenant Gahagan, Madras Engineers; Lieutenant Miller, 40th Native Infantry; Assistant Surgeon Chalmers, 18th Royal Irish, in medical charge.

and advancing, formed with the main body, and drove the enemy off, after some slight resistance. They, however, harassed the column during its advance forwards, and after occupying the heights, by which I had three men wounded, two severely, and one slightly. On the following morning I cleared the whole neighbourhood of all the small parties of the enemy.

On the 28th, having burnt all the places occupied by the Burmese pickets, I took up a position here. The occupation of Podang-mew will, I hope, prevent the reassembly of the enemy, and open the resources of this part of the country to us.

I find it difficult to describe all the attempts I have made to dislodge the enemy, who, though offering no great resistance, appears always on the alert; and the pursuit of them has been attended with great exposure and fatigue to the troops under my command, which has been endured with much cheerfulness, highly creditable to them, Captain Loch, C.B., Royal Navy, kindly assisted me in the surprise of Moungh-shoe-mong on the morning of the 22nd, and contributed materially to the success of the operations. Captain Forrest, on two occasions when detached, showed much zeal and good judgment in conducting his detachments. Lieutenant Miller assisted me as detachment staff; and Assistant-Surgeon Chalmers, 18th Royal Irish, was very assiduous in attending to the sick and wounded.

In concluding this report it affords me great satisfaction in acknowledging my obligations to Major Edwards, Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, and my second in command: his assistance and uniform support, under every circumstance, has enabled me to carry out the instructions furnished by the General, as far as feasible, and I hope he will do me the favor of bringing him to the favorable consideration of higher authority, that some mode of approbation may be conferred on him.

I have, &c.

J. H. HANDSCOMB, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Detached Force from Prome.

Inclosure 8 in No. 22.

Major W. Hill, Commanding at Pegu, to the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Forces serving in Burmah.

Sir,

Pegu, November 28, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Major-General commanding the forces, that a simultaneous attack was made last night upon the Pagoda and picket and boats, a little after 9 o'clock, and continued uninterruptedly until 12 o'clock, when the main body moved away, leaving a small portion of their men about the base of the Pagoda, under good cover to keep up a straggling fire, which forced me to keep the men exposed until 3 o'clock in the morning, when all firing ceased.

From the space over which their force was spread last night, their numbers must have been from 4 to 5,000 men; and though none of our men in the Pagoda were wounded, three of the enemy are now lying dead outside, others were heard to fall from the trees, and many were seen taking away their dead, besides blood having been seen in many places this morning; all of which show that their loss must have been considerable. Many escalading ladders were left by the Burmese, which we brought in for our own use.

A picket of 30 fusiliers and 20 sepoy of the 5th Native Infantry were posted on the bank of the river to protect the provisions of the garrison; this picket had much difficulty in keeping their ground, having the gun boats only to look to for support. Lieutenant Mason of Her Majesty's ship "Fox" has reported to me this morning the able judgment and coolness with which Lieutenant Percival Ashley Brown, of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, the officer in command of the picket, gave directions from the shore to enable him to point his guns and fire his rockets upon such places as the enemy appeared to be in force, and Lieutenant Mason adds that the steady fire of the picket was of the greatest use to his boats also, as they were attacked from both sides of the river.

Lieutenant Brown has brought to my notice the gallantry of Private John Clancey, of No. 1 Company, and 6 men of his picket, who volunteered to charge forward upon a part of the provisions which were on fire, and the enemy were driven away from it. Three men of the picket were wounded, and Lieutenant Mason reports two of his own men also wounded, but they are all slight wounds.

I trust I may be permitted to bring Lieutenant Brown to the Major-General's favorable consideration, as he is a young officer of promise in his profession: if I may also be permitted to bring Private Clancey to the Major-General's favorable consideration for promotion for his conduct last night, I think it would have a good effect upon his comrades in the regiment.

I have, &c.

W. HILL, *Major, Commanding at Pegu.*

Inclosure 9 in No. 22.

Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

(Extract.)

Rangoon, December 11, 1852.

I HAVE very little time to inform you, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, that since I left a garrison in the Pagoda at Pegu, it has been harassed by strong parties of Burmese from Sitang and Shoee-Gyne.

These were twice beaten off without loss to us, but with severe loss to the enemy; and in a dispatch from Major Hill, of the Madras Fusiliers, announcing these events, I was led to hope all would be quiet there, as some hundreds of families had come in, and the banks of the river were entirely open.

I sent the Major some guns and ammunition on the 1st instant, which were landed safely and reached him; but a boat with bullocks and four carts, following by the next tide with 20 sepoy, was attacked, taken, and the jemadar, naick, and 2 men killed; the remainder reached the Pagoda.

A letter inclosed in wax reached me on the morning of the 9th, brought by some Taliens from Major Hill, informing me he was again beleaguered by a very large force of Burmese, that he required ammunition, and that he could not communicate with the river.

The Commodore sent his boats to open the communication, and I sent, in a steamer, ammunition, and 240 men of the Madras Fusiliers. The boats reached the landing-place after great opposition from the enemy on the banks of the river, and endeavoured to force their way to the Pagoda, but were repulsed with considerable loss.

The enemy appeared so strong that it was deemed impracticable for the 240 Europeans to force their way to the Pagoda, and they have returned with the boats this morning.

I am now (3 o'clock, P.M.) preparing a considerable force, which will embark this evening, and I hope soon to give the Governor-General in Council a good account of these people.

The garrison had had only one man killed, with a few cases of contusions, up to sending the waxed letter.

Inclosure 10 in No. 22.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

"Fox's" Boat, Prome, November 14, 1852.

IN continuation of my letter of the 2nd instant, I request you may be pleased to inform the Governor-General in Council that, as soon as I had transferred the troops from the "Proserpine," "Pluto," and "Nemesis" to the small steamers, I desired them to return to Rangoon, with orders to proceed into the Irrawaddy, under the care of the master of the "Fox," by way of the China Buckeer. The "Pluto" entered the river easily, never having had less than one and a-half fathoms; the "Nemesis" is on her way, but the "Proserpine" had so damaged her bottom while on shore, that I was compelled to order her to Moulinein to be repaired.

On my arrival at Henzadah I found the town to be in perfect safety, since it has been garrisoned by a few troops sent by Major-General Godwin, in addition to the little force I have constantly kept there. The dacoits have disappeared, and the inhabitants are much pleased with the protection afforded them.

Inclosures Nos. 1 to 4 will inform his Lordship in Council of the operations conducted by Captain Loch, C.B., of Her Majesty's ship "Winchester," in charge of the flotilla in the Irrawaddy.

The enemy having taken advantage of our not occupying the heights of Akouk-toung, sent a force to do so, and mounted five guns on them; but by the energy and skill of Captain Loch, who stormed the battery as described in Inclosure No. 2, they were dispersed, the cannon destroyed, and a convoy of cargo-boats coming up the river were consequently saved; since which I have stationed the "Enterprise" off that place, and the General has embarked sixty men on board of her to drive away the enemy in the event of their again attempting to take possession.

The service detailed in Inclosures No. 1 and 4 will probably have a beneficial effect, bringing supplies into Prome, and restoring confidence to the friendly villagers.

His Lordship in Council will, I feel sure, fully coincide with me in my approval of the services rendered by Captain Loch, C.B., the officers, seamen, and marines under his command, on the occasions herein referred to.

The navigation of the Irrawaddy is now intricate, and requires care, owing to the shallowness of the water in many parts; but, by proper attention, the small steamers will find no difficulty in proceeding up and down the river, and the boats under convoy can at all times keep up a supply of provisions and stores; though I would suggest it would be desirable if a small military force occupied the two or three stations on the banks, for the purpose of protecting the people who supply the steamers with wood, &c., from the bands of troops, or dacoits, which are continually lurking in the neighbourhood.

It is my intention to return to Rangoon to-morrow.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure 11 in No. 22.

Captain Loch to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Winchester's" Gig,
Prome, November 2, 1852.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to report to your Excellency, that this morning I proceeded down the River Irrawaddy, in the East India Company's steamer "Medusa," for the purpose of making a combined reconnoissance with Brigadier Sir John Cheape, K.C.B., of the right bank of the river, from Podangmew to the White Pagoda, a mile and a-half below Prome.

At daylight Sir John embarked with his personal staff and the light company of Her Majesty's 18th Royal Irish, eighty strong; at the same time the boats named in the margin* having joined us, I quitted Prome and steamed down the river. On passing the White Pagoda (from whence our boats have been frequently annoyed with a distant fire of jingals and musketry), I perceived that a strong breastwork was in the course of construction on its right, not a vestige of which was perceptible when I quitted Prome on the 13th instant; and that some two and a-half or three miles inland the jungle was being cleared, and two stockades were being built.

Leaving the boats, with the exception of my gig, anchored out of musket-range of the enemy's shore, we stood down the river, and at 8.30 A.M. anchored

* "Winchester's" boats—Gig, Commander F. B. Seymour, volunteer; Mr. Gregory, naval cadet; 5 men, 3 marines. Barge, Lieutenant Hillyar; Mr. Round, mate; Mr. Slade, assistant surgeon; 15 men. Pinnace, Lieutenant Pearse; Mr. Bond, mate; 13 men. "Sesostris" boats—Pinnace, Lieutenant Lewis; Mr. Capel, midshipman; Dr. Walsh, assistant surgeon; 14 men; 11 marine artillerymen. 1st Cutter, Lieutenant Windus, 11 men. 2nd Cutter, Mr. Duval, mate; 11 men. "Medusa's" cutter, Mr. Harris, midshipman; 10 men; 6 marine artillerymen.—Total force landed, 74.

abreast the East India Company's steamer "Enterprise," off Podangmew. I directed Captain Neblett to proceed to the anchorage under the heights of Akouk-toung, and remain there until he received further orders.

I then steamed back to the boats anchored within 300 yards above the White House Pagoda, and disembarked the brigadier, his escort, and the naval brigade. Sir John Cheape ordered an advance, and immediately on our crowning the terrace beneath the Pagoda, the enemy's skirmishers, who lined the jungle, were discovered, evidently expecting that we should have come on by the lane beneath the Pagoda; on their being driven in, a fire was opened by them from the high ground inland, their stockade being unoccupied. They were immediately driven from their different posts with the utmost expedition, until we attained our object, viz., a distinct view of the two stockades, which they are throwing up, and a knowledge of the country in the vicinity.

At this time, the enemy were in possession of two commanding positions between us and their stockade, which they were immediately driven out of. The heat was now so intense, and three men having received strokes from the sun, I halted under cover of the enemy's look-out houses for an hour.

Having accomplished our reconnoissance, I caused the naval brigade to return to the river stockade; Sir John Cheape recalled the Royal Irish at the same time; and we burned the greater part of the lower breastwork, leaving the larger and more valuable timbers on the beach to be brought to Prome tomorrow, for the use of the steamers.

It is with much satisfaction that I have to express my approbation of the zeal, good conduct, and bravery of every officer and man of the force employed.

I have to mention the conspicuous zeal and gallantry displayed by Commander F. Beauchamp Seymour, R.N., serving with me as a volunteer, from whom I received most useful and ready assistance.

I beg to bring before your Excellency's favorable notice the zeal and gallant conduct of Lieutenants Hillyar and Pearse, of the "Winchester;" also Lieutenants Lewis and Windus, of "Sesostris;" and I have to notice the officers named in the margin, all of whom merit my thanks and approbation.

Lieutenant Hillyar has, while serving in the Irrawaddy, always shown himself foremost in the performance of every duty required of him.

I am happy to state that the reconnoissance and destruction of the stockades was effected with only the single casualty of a marine artilleryman* of the "Medusa," wounded badly in the arm.

The loss of the enemy I am unable to state, for they retreated through thick jungle.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE G. LOCH,
Captain and Senior Naval Officer in the Irrawaddy.

Inclosure 12 in No. 22.

Captain Loch to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Winchester's" Gig,
Prome, November 5, 1852.*

(Extract.)

I HAVE the honor to inform your Excellency that I landed with the seamen and marines named in the margin,† stormed the heights of Akouk-toung, and captured five guns, defended by 350 or 400 men, yesterday afternoon, between the hours of 3 and half-past 5 p.m., and I am happy to say without the loss of a man.

The landing was covered by the fire of the East India Company's steamer "Medusa," Lieutenant Fraser commanding, which was so admirable that to it I attribute our good fortune in being able to ascend a narrow pathway, winding

* Christopher Byrne.

† "Winchester's" boats—Gig, Commander F. B. Seymour, volunteer; Mr. Gregory, naval cadet; 4 men; 3 marines. Barge, Lieutenant Hillyar; Mr. Round, mate; Mr. Slade, assistant surgeon; 15 men. Pinnace, Lieutenant Pearse; Mr. Bond, mate; 13 men. East India Company's steam-frigate "Sesostris," Lieutenant Lewis; Mr. Duval, mate; 22 seamen; 8 marine artillerymen. East India Company's ship "Medusa," Mr. Brazier, mate; Mr. Harris, midshipman; 15 seamen; 12 artillerymen.—Total force landed, 82.

up the ridge of the hill to the outer breastwork, every yard of which might have been defended by a handful of men, screened from sight in the dense underwood growing on either side, against almost any number of assailants. We found a Burmese, wounded by a shell from the steamer, lying in the intrenchment; he told me the troops were before us, so on we went, and at last were met by a partial fire, which, after an immediate and rapid charge, was never renewed, nor could we again see the enemy, through jungle everywhere as thick as a bramble-bush.

The guns were loaded and primed, with the exception of one which was fired with a volley of musketry and some jingals at the "Medusa" as she approached the cliff, just before anchoring; four of them were iron, 9-foot 18-pounders, one an iron 6-foot 9-pounder: having no powder to burst them, I threw them over the cliff, and moved the force slowly back to the boats, protected by a rear-guard. When it was embarked, I directed Lieutenant Fraser to anchor the "Medusa" for the night at the entrance of the creek, facing the creek, and commanding its entire front.

I experience great pleasure in having so soon again to bring before your Excellency's notice the gallant bearing and good conduct of all the officers and men engaged.

When they landed, they saw the difficulty and apparent danger of the pass, and they knew the superiority in numbers of the enemy: they had no reason to contemplate so easy a victory; yet they formed with as much steadiness as old soldiers, and with that cheerful alacrity which always distinguishes British seamen and marines. Lieutenant Hillyar, of the "Winchester," commanded under me, and again added to his well-known character of an able, zealous officer.

Lieutenant Lewis, first of the East India Company's steamer "Sesostris," formed and led his marines and seamen in a masterly manner; and I gladly recommend him to your Excellency's notice.

Mr. Brazier, senior mate of the "Medusa," landed with his men, and attracted my attention by his zeal.

To Lieutenant Fraser, commanding the "Medusa," much is due for the able way he handled his vessel in the strong tides and eddies where he had to anchor; and the most effective aid he rendered by his fire. He is a most zealous officer, and has, and is rendering daily, most valuable service to the naval and military force at Prome.

I cannot refrain mentioning, that a quarter of an hour did not elapse from the time the "Medusa" anchored, before my people were formed on the beach, and the boats safely moored under charge of men to fight their guns.

Commander F. Beauchamp Seymour, a volunteer serving up this river, landed with me, and was always to be found in the front.

The capture of these three guns has again opened the river to Prome; and I rejoice that the information I received of their having been planted there, reached me in time to secure the safety of the expected steamers from Rangoon, laden with troops.

Inclosure 13 in No. 22.

Captain Loch to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Winchester's" Gig,
Prome, November 10, 1852.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to inform your Excellency that, having received intelligence from the officer commanding the gun-boat which I left to watch the heights of Akouk-toung, to the effect that the men had reappeared there in force, armed with jingals and musketry, with which they had opened a fire on him, and that he was apprehensive during the night they might possibly succeed in mounting guns there; I decided immediately on proceeding there with a detachment of seamen and marines, to which Sir John Cheape kindly added a party of twelve sappers under Lieutenant Denison; and I accordingly quitted Prome yesterday morning in the "Medusa" steamer, accompanied by Major Allan, Quarter-

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master-General of the Forces in Burmah. On arriving off the village, situated a little above the slope leading to the upper ridge of the heights, I disembarked, and, after ascending them, detached Lieutenant Hillyar, with thirty men, to endeavour by a circuitous route to get into the enemy's rear; we then continued our march along the ridge, and at 3 P.M. reached the position where we captured the enemy's guns on the 4th instant, which appeared much in the same state as we had left it, with the exception that the enemy had partially succeeded in raising one of the guns, which had fallen on a ledge below the parapet.

At this moment the "Bentinck," bearing your Excellency's pendant, was descried beneath us, and at the same time the party under Lieutenant Hillyar joined us, having met a few of the enemy, and captured some of their muskets.

Having with much difficulty succeeded in getting the only two guns which had not fallen into the river into a position where we might burst them, and it being nearly dark, I re-embarked the men, and next morning sent them ashore under Lieutenant Hillyar, who effected the destruction of the guns by bursting them.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE G. LOCH.

Inclosure 14 in No. 22.

Captain Loch to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Winchester's" Gig,
Prome, November 12, 1852.*

Sir,

THE attack and capture of the forts opposite Upper Prome took place so immediately under your Excellency's notice, that but little is left for me to detail.

The force placed by you under my orders consisted of the steamers and boats named in the margin.*

I intended the "Sesostris" to take up a position to cover the advance of the two small steamers containing troops; but on observing her take the ground, I desired the commander of the "Mahanuddy" to proceed ahead of her, pass the batteries, and anchor his ship close to the bank above them. The "Medusa" was to follow us, but that vessel having unfortunately got into the Chow-chow water, was unable to keep her station, notwithstanding Lieutenant Fraser used every exertion to do so.

On arriving within range of the forts, they opened a steady and well directed fire on the "Mahanuddy," which was returned with shell; and having most fortunately passed them without a casualty, I disembarked at a landing-place just above them, which the native guide pointed out. We formed on the beach, and I found myself at the head of a reduced force of 42 men, who, with 50 men of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment under Captain Montgomery, made a total of 104 officers and men.

We advanced by a narrow pathway leading to the rear of the Upper Stockade. When in sight of this work, I had the gratification also of seeing the "Bentinck," bearing your Excellency's pendant, open fire upon it. We advanced at the double, charged into the fort, and found that the enemy had retreated to the second.

Leaving a party in possession, we at once moved rapidly on to the Lower Stockade, which was also deserted by the time we entered it, and I regret to say

* East India Company's steamer "Mahanuddy," H. Simpson, Esq., Commander, towing "Winchester's" gig, 6 men; barge, 15 men, Lieutenant Hillyar, Mr. Round, mate, and Mr. Slade, assistant surgeon; launch, 21 men, Lieutenant Nelson, Mr. Hinde, mate, and the Hon. H. D. Lascelles, midshipman. East India Company's steam-frigate "Sesostris," Commander Campbell. East India Company's steamer "Medusa," Lieutenant Fraser, commanding, towing "Winchester's" pinnace, 8 men, Lieutenant Pearse, and Mr. Bond, mate; cutter, 9 men, Mr. Allingham, midshipman, Mr. Gregory, naval cadet. "Sesostris" and "Medusa's" landing party, Lieutenant Lewis, Mr. Duval, mate, 42 men; Lieutenant Fraser, Mr. Douglas, mate, 25 men. "Feroze," Mr. Hurlock, midshipman, 8 men.

that the enemy had here succeeded in removing their ordnance. From the position we found the guns in on the larger work, it was evident that they were in the act of withdrawing them also, when we appeared. We captured five guns and a jingal, besides a considerable supply of ammunition.

Although your Excellency visited the works yourself, might I be permitted to call your attention to their admirable construction. They were casemated stockades, formed in the shape of a horse-shoe, with three strong lines of abattis in their front; within, they had circular shell-proof galleries, into which they could retreat, and also use them for magazines.

The officers and men behaved with spirit and coolness, and I have great satisfaction in repeating to your Excellency names mentioned on previous occasions.

Commander F. Beauchamp Seymour again volunteered, and was forward on every occasion.

Lieutenant Hillyar brought up his small detachment rapidly and well. I left him in charge to burst the guns and destroy the works, in conjunction with the Sappers, which service was effectually performed.

The "Medusa" came up after we had captured the forts, and instantly landed the seamen and marine-artillerymen enumerated in the margin, and fifty men of Her Majesty's 51st Regiment, who chased the retreating enemy into the jungle.

The East India Company's steam-frigate "Sesostris," Commander Campbell, after she floated, opened her fire on the forts at a distant range.

The cooperation of the half company of Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, under Captain Montgomery, with my broken party, was most satisfactory; and had we not advanced on the instant, it is my opinion the enemy would have continued longer at their guns, besides lining the jungle with skirmishers, through which the narrow pathway went.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE G. LOCH.

Inclosure 15 in No. 22.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir, *Her Majesty's ship "Fox," Rangoon, December 11, 1852.*

IN continuation of my letter of the 9th instant, I request you may be pleased to inform the Governor-General in Council that, on the 5th, Captain Loch having observed the enemy re-constructing the forts of Phoo-u-doung, opposite Prome, landed at daylight the next morning a party of 103 seamen from the boats of the "Winchester" and "Sesostris," commanded by Commander Wainwright, under a fire from the Burmese, and advancing at a run, stormed the two forts in succession, capturing one long 9-pounder and two 6-pounder guns, without a casualty; excepting a slight wound received by Lieutenant Windus, of the "Sesostris," from a bamboo spike.

The enemy fled as the seamen stormed, keeping up a fire from a thicket into which they retired, but out of which they were soon driven.

Captain Loch demolished the works, burnt the stockades, and burst the guns. By noon the party had re-embarked.

Captain Loch makes honorable mention of Commander Wainwright of the "Winchester," and speaks in high terms of the conduct of the officers and men under his orders on this occasion.

It appears these guns had been sent as a reinforcement from Meeaday.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT.

No. 23.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, January 5, 1853. (No. 2.)

THE annexed dispatches from Major-General Godwin and Commodore Lambert, report the operations connected with the relief of Pegu. Our entire satisfaction has been expressed to these officers at the successful accomplishment of this service.

 Inclosure 1 in No. 23.
Major-General Godwin to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Pegu, December 15, 1852.

IN continuation of my dispatch of the 11th instant from Rangoon, I have the satisfaction to state, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, that the garrison I left at this place was relieved from its investment by the Burmese, on my arrival here yesterday at one o'clock. The strength of the enemy, added to their formidable position, the very small garrison, and its falling short of ammunition, though strongly posted and with a large supply of provisions, caused me very great anxiety.

At nine o'clock, in the night of the 11th instant, 1200 men were embarked at Rangoon in two steamers and a number of boats, and were disembarked about six miles below the Ghaut, at Pegu, on the morning of the 14th instant, and the whole ready to move off their ground by sunrise.

I had resolved to march and enter the Pagoda by the eastern gate. The last time I was here I did so by the southern gate at its capture, because the enemy from Shoee-Gyne had marched from the east, and established their batteries on that face of the Pagoda. This turned all their defences and their works on and from the banks of the river, and round the Pagoda, and this move brought me directly on their rear, only having to drive in numbers of well-conducted skirmishers, and a force of about 200 men on ponies, which hung on the right flank of the column during its march, against whom, however, I hardly returned a shot.

Three miles from the pagoda I passed a gun-carriage burning, which told me what I apprehended was the case, that, finding themselves between two fires, the pagoda and my own, their defences useless, I should find they had retired; and on coming close to the rear of their defences, and pushing on the advance, we met only a large body of skirmishers, who were gallantly repulsed by some of the Bengal and Madras Fusiliers and the Sikhs.

The march through such a close country without a road was well got over. I had with me two guns from the navy boats, drawn by a party of sailors, under Commander Shadwell, whose excessive labors were most cheerfully borne.

Our loss has been 3 killed and 9 wounded, as they had no chance of injuring us seriously. The Burmese will fight if you take your people up to the muzzle of their guns, but wisely retire when they find they are morally beaten, as they ever have been in this war.

They have hidden their guns, two only have been found as yet; but in the thick grass jungle a gun is easily hidden.

I have had the aid of Brigadier-General Steel, who particularly requested to accompany me.

It was a hard day's work for all, but well accomplished; and I know few moments that have been more gratifying to me than when I met that excellent and brave officer, Major Hill, of the Madras Fusiliers, in the pagoda.

His report cannot be prepared to-day, for there is detail respecting the admirable conduct of the Peguers, whose families came under his protection, and he has wonderfully managed to save them.

I have come the second time to Pegu, with the full intention of going onwards, as ten miles from this, at a place called Sephangoon, on the road to Shoee-Gyne, there are the Pegu families in bond at a Burmese station there, held,

for the fidelity of their husbands, in the Burmese ranks, which I hope to release to-morrow; at all events to follow the force that has been troubling this country, and break it up; but I cannot state how far I can go, as the progress of all soldiers depends upon feeding them, which can never be left to accident.

I have found more carriage than I expected here, which will assist us very much.

I have ordered a land column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sturt, of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, to march on the right bank of the river—where I have been informed there is a good hackery road to Pegu,—consisting of half the Madras Horse Artillery, 50 of the Ramghur Horse, and 400 of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry; but with instructions, if he should meet with any serious difficulty, to return: and I hope to have them up at Sephangoon.

I expect soon to furnish the Government with a detailed account of the proceedings of this army.

Commodore Lambert has a steamer ready to convey this dispatch on its arrival at Rangoon.

I have, &c.

H. GODWIN, *Major-General.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Commodore Lambert to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, December 18, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to request you may be pleased to inform the Governor-General of India in Council, that, shortly after my return from Prome, on the 6th instant, I learned that a large flat, which the military authorities had sent up to Pegu, laden with commissariat stores and bullocks, under charge of 24 Sepoys, had been attacked and burnt by the Burmese. A havildar and three of the men being killed, the remainder had by some means reached Pegu, with the loss of their arms and accoutrements.

Considering it desirable to keep open a communication with the garrison at Pegu, and being anxious to ascertain the true state of things, I sent Commander Shadwell, of Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx," with the boats of the squadron specified in Inclosure A, on the 8th instant, on that service.

The day after his departure, a letter was brought to Rangoon by a friendly Burman, who found the greatest difficulty in escaping from Pegu. Major Hill stated he was surrounded on all sides and hardly pressed, and that his ammunition was getting very short. On receipt of this intelligence, Major-General Godwin decided to send 200 European troops to Pegu, and they embarked in the "Nerbudda," and left the same evening, in company with a force of armed boats from the squadron, under command of Commander Rowley Lambert.

On the 11th, Commander Shadwell returned from Pegu, having failed to communicate with the garrison. On reaching the usual landing-place he was received by the enemy with a heavy fire, and on landing he found the Burmese too numerous to contend with. He therefore deemed it prudent to retreat, having in a very short time had 4 men killed and 28 wounded, amongst the latter, 2 officers severely; and his coxswain was shot dead by his side. A return of the casualties on this occasion is inclosed, marked B.

On his return he met the "Nerbudda," but, being quite uncertain as to the extent of the force he would be exposed to, he determined to bring them back.

I immediately consulted with Major-General Godwin, who determined to go himself to Pegu with a considerable force, and I appropriated for this service the "Mahanuddy" and "Nerbudda" steamers, and a number of native cargo boats, the long-boats of the transports, and the boats of the squadron.

Before ten o'clock that night Captain Tarleton had embarked a thousand and fifty men, composing the land force, in the boats, and left Rangoon for Pegu. The armed force under his command, belonging to the squadron, is detailed in Inclosure C.

The steam-vessels "Mahanuddy" and "Nerbudda" had both been disabled, but, through the activity and ability of Mr. Berry, the superintending engineer, they were temporarily repaired; and Major-General Godwin, having embarked with 400 more Europeans in these vessels, started next morning.

A land force, under Colonel Sturt, of the 67th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, also marched for Pegu, leaving Rangoon on the morning of the 13th.

I will now refer his Lordship in Council to Captain Tarleton's letter of the 16th instant, for details of the naval operations at Pegu.

I fully coincide with the encomiums expressed by Captain Tarleton respecting the officers and seamen of this squadron serving under his orders—who, on this occasion, have been actuated by the same gallant and cheerful spirit to fulfil their duty that they have displayed throughout the war.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. LAMBERT.

Inclosure A.

Memorandum showing the Force of the Expedition to Pegu.

Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx's" boat; Commander Shadwell.—4 men. Starboard paddle-box boat: 24-pounder howitzer, 1; Mr. Edgar Cookson, Midshipman; 15 men, 6 marines. Port paddle-box boat: 24-pounder howitzer, 1; Mr. Arthur Morphy, Master's Assistant; Mr. John F. Johnson, Assistant Surgeon; 15 men.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox."—Pinnace: 12-pounder howitzer, 1; Lieutenant Mason; Mr. Hudson, Midshipman; 15 men, 6 marines. Barge: 12-pounder howitzer, 1; Mr. Pocock, Mate; Lieutenant Nightingale, Royal Marines; 13 men, 6 marines.

East India Company's steamer "Moozuffer."—Paddle-box boat No. 1: 12-pounder howitzer, 1; Lieutenant Robinson, Indian Navy; the Boatswain; 21 men. Paddle-box boat No. 2: 12-pounder howitzer, 1; Mr. Templer, Midshipman; an Apothecary; 20 men.

Total.—133 officers and men, accompanied by Captain Mallock, Bengal Artillery, and 12 artillerymen, in two cargo-boats.

CHARLES F. A. SHADWELL, *Commander.*

Inclosure B.

List of Killed and Wounded at Pegu, December 10, 1852.

Her Majesty's ship "Fox."—Mr. C. A. B. Pocock, mate, wounded, severely. James Tilman, A.B., wounded, severely. John Jones, A.B., wounded, severely. Michael Mc Avoy, ordinary, wounded, dangerously. Thomas Christian, marine, wounded, dangerously; since dead. William Tucker, marine, wounded, dangerously; since dead. Henry Budd, marine, wounded, severely. Walter Bell, marine, wounded, slightly. Charles Smith, marine, wounded, slightly.

Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx."—Mr. W. E. Cookson, midshipman, wounded, very severely. Thomas Davis, gunner's mate, killed. William Mitchell, captain foretop, wounded, slightly. James Blanch, captain maintop, wounded, slightly. Stephen Collison, stoker, killed. John Stevens, gunner, Royal Marine Artillery, wounded, severely.

East India Company's steamer "Moozuffer."—John Willis, A.B., wounded, very severely; since dead. John Asboin, gunner, Bengal Artillery, wounded, severely. Thomas Mac Kissick, A.B., wounded, severely. William Robinson, A.B., wounded, severely. James Pearson, gunner's mate, wounded, severely. Daniel Watson, A.B., wounded, slightly. Joseph Fraser, A.B., wounded, slightly. John Barnsley, gunner, Bengal Artillery, wounded, slightly. John Bence, A.B., wounded, slightly. William Brown, A.B., wounded, slightly. A Burmese boatman, very severely; in the convoy.

JOHN F. JOHNSON, *R.N.,*
Assistant Surgeon, Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx."

In addition to the above, the detachment of artillery serving with the naval force, sustained the following loss:

1 serjeant, 1 gunner, killed; 1 bugler, 1 gunner, severely wounded; 2 gunners, slightly wounded.

Total.—32. Of these killed in action, 4; wounded in action, 28; since dead, 3.

J. F. JOHNSON.

Inclosure C.

Memorandum of the Naval Force employed at Pegu.

Boats of Her Majesty's ship "Fox," manned and armed.—Captain Tarleton, in command; Commander R. Lambert; Lieutenant W. B. Mason; Mr. R. Sturgess, second master; Mr. T. Seccombe, assistant surgeon; Mr. Villiers, midshipman; Mr. Rason, midshipman.

Boats of "Sphinx," manned and armed.—Mr. Augustus H. Webb, midshipman; Mr. Arthur Morphy, master's-assistant.

Boats of "Moozuffer," manned and armed.—Mr. Freeman, master; Mr. Templer, midshipman.

Boats of "Berenice," manned and armed.—Mr. Mannerly, master.

East India Company's steam-vessel "Fire-Queen's" paddle-box boats.—Gun party. Commander Charles F. A. Shadwell, Royal Navy, "Sphinx;" Lieutenant Robinson, Indian Navy, "Moozuffer;" Mr. J. S. Hudson, midshipman, "Fox;" Mr. A. A. Smith, midshipman, "Sphinx;" Mr. Dawkins, midshipman, "Moozuffer."

G. W. TARLETON, *Captain.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 23.

Captain Tarleton to Commodore Lambert.

*Her Majesty's Ship "Fox's" Gig, in the Pegu River,
December 16, 1852.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to inform your Excellency that, in pursuance of your instructions, at 2 P.M. of the 11th, 1400 men, under the command of Major-General Godwin, C.B., should be embarked with the greatest dispatch for Pegu, and placing Commanders Shadwell and Lambert under my orders, I put myself in communication with the Quartermaster-General's department; and, after ascertaining the number of native boats that could be supplied for the conveyance of troops, stores, and provisions, with Commander Lambert's assistance, I embarked 1050 men in the boats, and left Rangoon at 11 P.M., leaving Commander Shadwell to follow in the steamer, with Major-General Godwin and the remainder of the troops.

I proceeded with the boats up the Pegu river, and, about 2 P.M., on the 12th, when about two-thirds of the distance, I had the satisfaction of communicating with the Major-General on board the "Nerbudda," and to observe the "Mahanuddy" following: the former vessel preceded us up the river. At the end of the flood-tide at 8 P.M., the boats were anchored within hail of the steamer, twelve miles below Pegu. On the morning of the 13th, the "Nerbudda" leading, I proceeded with the boats, and happily arrived so as to be able to effect a simultaneous landing of the troops, about 5 miles below Pegu, and half-a-mile from the first stockade, at 7 A.M. The "Mahanuddy" not appearing, and the General having expressed his intention to me of waiting the arrival of the troops on board her before he advanced, I proceeded in the "Nerbudda" to bring them up. I found the "Mahanuddy" where we had anchored on the previous evening, she having been detained by her broken rudder-head. I immediately transferred the troops to the "Nerbudda," but by this time the water had fallen so much that she was compelled to wait for the flood-tide to proceed, and did not reach the place of disembarkation till 9 P.M. The troops were landed from her at 4 A.M. on the 14th, and at 7 the army advanced.

I appointed Commander Shadwell to take command of two of the boats' guns fitted as field-pieces, with seventy-five men to drag them, to accompany the force.

Commander Lambert assisted me in the protection of the steamer and boats.

At noon some of the camp followers, having straggled a short distance from the bank, were fired at from a Phoongye house in our vicinity; two were taken, and the others pursued by the enemy, who evinced an intention of coming down to attack us. I immediately landed all the disposable men, leaving only sufficient to work the guns in the boats. This demonstration, and the fire of a few shell and rockets, served to check their advance. At this time the "Nerbudda," on the falling tide, had unfortunately grounded on a stake, and her two foremost compartments filled with water. It became necessary to put her on shore to

repair the damage. To move from our position was therefore impossible, and I proceeded to strengthen it by landing some rockets, felling trees, and throwing up intrenchments. The march of the army to the eastward of the Pagoda had left the enemy in possession of the lower defences on the river's bank, and I was sensible that he had it in his power greatly to annoy us. He reconnoitred our position with a few horse, in the evening, but did not further molest us. At 2 P.M., I had the satisfaction of observing the preconcerted signal that the army had forced its way into the Pagoda, which intelligence was confirmed to me by Commander Shadwell, on the morning of the 15th.

In the evening this officer returned, with his party of seamen and a guard. He informed me of the river bank being cleared of the enemy; and it is, therefore, my intention to move up with the boats with the morning flood-tide. I reconnoitred the river defences now evacuated, and am only surprised that Commander Shadwell should have been able to pass and repass them in his late attempt to communicate with the garrison at Pegu. They are, for the purpose, of the most formidable description, and completely command the passage of the river, for a distance of nearly five miles.

Your Excellency, knowing the nature of the service that has been performed, will appreciate the zeal of both officers and men who have carried it out: but I feel I shall fail in my duty to them, if I did not bring to your notice the exertions made by Commander Shadwell and the men under him, in taking the guns a distance of eight or nine miles through a difficult country, under an ardent sun; by Commander Lambert and Lieutenants Mason, R.N., and Robinson, I.N., and Mr. Freeman, Master, I.N., in their constant attention and watchfulness in bringing up so large a convoy in the boats. Lieutenant Robinson was afterwards attached to the gun party, and Mr. Freeman was most useful to me in directing our rocket battery, and in the construction of our intrenchments. I exceedingly admired the skilful manner in which Captain Porter brought the "Nerbudda" up this difficult river; and the energy that his officers and crew displayed in making her again effective was most praiseworthy.

I am happy to say that only one casualty has occurred on the part of the naval force; Thomas Saunders, A.B., of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Sphinx," who died of a wound he received while encamped with the army on the evening of the 13th instant.

I have, &c.

J. W. TARLETON, *Captain.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 23.

Notification.

Fort William, January 4, 1853.

THE Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the following extracts from dispatches relative to recent operations in the neighbourhood of Pegu, shall be published for general information.

The Governor-General in Council has to express his approbation of the alacrity and spirit with which this harassing duty has been performed, and his sense of the services of the Major-General commanding, and of the officers whose names he has specially brought to the notice of his Lordship in Council, in the dispatch of the 24th ultimo.

The Governor-General in Council particularly desires to record his high approbation of the gallant conduct of Major Hill, of the Madras Fusiliers, and of the officers and men under his command, in their defence of the position they held at Pegu.

By order of the Governor-General in Council.

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 5 in No. 23.

Extract from a Despatch from Major-General Godwin.

December 24, 1852.

IN my last dispatch from Pegu, dated the 15th instant, after having relieved it from the enemy, I had the honor of informing you, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, that it was my intention to advance into the country, and free that garrison from the near position of the Burmese army.

At that time I had been informed they were at Sephangoon; but, from subsequent information, I found them entrenched and entrenching themselves in great numbers on a plain about four miles north of the Pagoda, at a place called Kaleetat. It took till the 17th instant to procure what little carriage was available for the Commissariat stores, when eighteen buffalo hackeries were prepared to contain six day's provisions.

The troops left the Pagoda about 7 o'clock A.M. on that date, to the amount of about 1,200 men, consisting of about 600 of the Bengal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor; 150 of the Madras Fusiliers, under Captain Renaud; 300 Sikhs under Major Armstrong, and 160 of the 10th Bengal Native Infantry, under Captain Munro. I had no guns, for I had no means of drawing them. We had to pass through a very thick jungle for about two miles, when we debouched on a noble plain, miles in extent, covered with ripe paddy. We then had a good view of the position of the enemy, and their probable numbers. They were admirably posted behind an entrenchment with a battie: large spars formed their breastwork, and it appeared to be about a mile long, filled with masses of men, a few hundreds of the Cassay horse, some elephants, and a few guns.

It was from this post that the men were furnished to invest our garrison at Pegu. From my force I had to give a baggage-guard of 200 men; with the remainder I quietly advanced on their position, inclining to my own right to threaten their left, which was open, their right being supported by a large tope of trees, and flanked by a thick jungle. They fired a gun occasionally as we advanced, and from their quiet and determined attitude behind their strong defences, with at least ten men for one of mine, I had great expectation that they would stand our assault. These men were from the garrisons of Shoee-Gyne, Sitang, and Beling; had been very active in giving constant alarms to Martaban and Moulmein; and had the character, too, of being men who would fight, and some of these men had been killed on the walls in their assaults on Pegu.

When I was within about 400 yards of their position, I detached 200 men of the Bengal Fusiliers, under Major Seaton, to drive in two outposts in front of the right of their position, for I changed my mind, and determined to attack them upon their right, in the hope of our meeting. Major Seaton very soon performed this service, the enemy retiring upon their main entrenchments, exchanging musketry.

I now formed the columns of attack, Major Seaton's party of the Bengal Fusiliers, and Major Armstrong with his Sikhs, to attack the tope, with two companies of the Bengal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Lambert, but attached to Major Armstrong's column.

I stopped Major Seaton's attack, seeing that they had loaded the jungle, which his left flank would have had to pass in gaining the tope, with hundreds of men.

I had strong reserves close up, and ready to assist in the assault. It was a very interesting sight to see our little columns moving up to the attack of this host of people, so strongly posted, and in a plain where every object was visible. I was so confident we should get in amongst them, that when the smoke cleared away after the impetuosity of the attack, it was like magic, their escaping us. The Sikhs at the tope were like lightning at them, and Lieutenant Lambert, who had thrown his column in the very flank of the long entrenchment close to the tope, would have prevented their firing except on each other, and I believe the rapidity with which the advance closed upon them, threw them off all guard, and they considered flight their only safety.

After the action the troops rested in the shade of the tope for an hour; we then proceeded on to Sephangoon, a distance of ten miles, which we reached at 4:30 P.M., marching altogether about fourteen miles. This is the largest and finest village I have seen in the country, with a great many excellent farm-houses in it; it stands on both sides of the river, which is here fordable, and is surrounded by fine plains covered with grain.

We were aware that the enemy had retreated on this village, but they left it on our approach, and the force found good quarters for the night.

The village was totally abandoned; not a soul was seen, nor a grain to be found in it, which I had trusted to for the followers; so they fell back on the Commissariat, which I could with difficulty spare them, and this, added to the breaking down of one of our carts with beef and biscuit, crippled me much.

The next day, the 18th instant, we marched to Montsanganoo, ten miles, where we arrived about 12 o'clock, noon; there the enemy had passed the night. It is an inconsiderable village, and we were in bivouac.

About 3 o'clock P.M. I was informed that some of the enemy were hovering about, who, I believe, were only observing us; but shortly they came down in large masses, and formed in a line about two miles in our front.

Our men were soon under arms, and I marched towards them in two separate columns of an equal division of the force under my command. Brigadier-General Steel took charge of the left column; Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor of the right. Skirmishers were thrown out on both sides, but, as we advanced, they retired for about two miles further, when they took up an alignment close to a long range of barracks, which they had evidently occupied on different occasions. The two columns threw out advanced parties for attack, but as we neared them they again retired, leaving the barracks in our possession. It was now nearly dark, and as they appeared to be going away altogether, we burnt their barracks and retired to our bivouac, three miles, where our baggage and followers had remained under a strong guard.

The next day, the 19th instant, on inquiry into the state of the Commissariat, I found I had not quite three days' provisions left, and very deficient in some articles, and it became imperative on me to return to Pegu, which I did that day. Had I had the means of carrying with me twelve days' provisions, I would have pursued them over the Sitang river; but I am sadly crippled everywhere for want of carriage, except at Rangoon, where I do not require it.

I propose to detach Brigadier-General Steel with a force to Moulmein, where he will find every description of carriage in abundance for tents, and material of all kinds, to proceed to Beling, Sitang, and Shoee-Gyne, and, crossing that river, to return by Pegu to Rangoon, as he may deem practicable, which may force this army north towards Prome—which it must, I think, as it cannot go to Pegu, and which will be the best course for us it can take.

I embarked at Pegu on the 20th, and arrived on the morning of the 22nd, leaving a reinforcement with the garrison at Pegu, and strengthening their party of Sappers as a temporary measure, to allow of their putting themselves in a perfect state of defence.

Now, Sir, I have to ask the estimation of the Governor-General in Council for a service that has been most harassing and arduous, and for which no force ever took the field so little prepared, but which was borne with a cheerfulness and alacrity—where the least chance of a contest with the enemy presented itself—that was enthusiastic, and which confers the highest honor on the whole force.

To Brigadier-General Steel I am most obliged for the warmest cooperation throughout this service.

To Brigadier Dickenson, who was ever ready and anxious to render me his able assistance.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor, who was very often called upon with his regiment, the Bengal Fusiliers, to give parties for assaults; and on the day of my relieving the garrison at Pegu I detached the Lieutenant-Colonel to clear the road communicating with the landing-place on the river. The Lieutenant-Colonel performed this duty most effectually, under a heavy fire.

To Captain Latter, my interpreter, who had the guides always under his charge, and who was present everywhere with his usual gallantry.

To Major Armstrong, with his Sikhs, conspicuous wherever they were called upon.

To Majors Gerrard and Seaton, of the Bengal Fusiliers; Captain Renaud,

commanding a detachment of the Madras Fusiliers; Captain Munro, commanding a detachment of the 10th Bengal Native Infantry; Captain Hawkes, Brigade Major; Lieutenant Lambert, of the Bengal Fusiliers; Lieutenant Elliot, of the Madras Fusiliers; and Lieutenant Harris, of the Sappers, who rendered important assistance, I am much indebted.

The General Staff, Major Mayhew, Deputy Adjutant-General, and Captain Hamilton, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Burne, Military Secretary, and Captain Chads, Aide-de-camp, I warmly thank; as also Major Neill, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Major Atkinson, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Madras Division, and Captains Dallas and Travers, Aides-de-camp on the Staff of Brigadier-General Steel, for their uncommon exertions during this service.

To Surgeons McCosh and Balfour, and the Medical Department, the Service is much indebted.

The short interval between the time I received the intelligence of the investment of Pegu from Captains Tarleton and Shadwell, and the embarkation of the troops the same evening, when by 9 o'clock P.M., 1400 men, with their matériel, were sent on board, under the eye of that valuable officer, Captain Tarleton, of the Royal Navy, till its disembarkation near Pegu, and its re-embarkation on return here, was marked by wonderful exertion and arrangement; and that, with the aid and assistance I received from him with the men-of-war's boats, call for every acknowledgment.

To Captain Shadwell I also feel greatly indebted, for his assistance and exertions on this occasion.

I forward to the Governor-General in Council the detailed account of the investment of Pegu by the Burmese army, and the noble defence made by Major Hill and his brave garrison, for the Government to select what in its wisdom it may think proper to publish.

I have this morning received the gratifying information from Major Hill that some thousand families are coming in, and which I hope in a future dispatch to confirm positively. It is my intention to proceed to Prome in three days, and to take the field immediately. I am happy to say that the general health of the troops here, as well as their conduct, is very satisfactory.

Inclosure 6 in No. 23.

Extract from a Letter from Major Hill to Major Mayhew.

December 18, 1852.

A TERMINATION to unremitting assaults from the enemy, from the 5th to the 14th instant, having been brought about by the arrival of a reinforcement of troops under the personal command of Major-General Godwin, Commanding the Forces, I am now enabled to place before the Major-General a detailed report of the operations during that period.

I do myself the honor to report, for the Major-General's information, that, for some days previous to the enemy appearing in our vicinity, several of their advanced posts were seen within two miles of us, in a northerly direction. Elephants and gold umbrellas plainly indicated that their main army was not far off, and as I had been informed that Moung Keya Soungé commanded 10,000 men at Shoee-Gyne, I felt it necessary to keep the garrison alert, in case that portion of his force, which was then so near us, might make a sudden descent upon the garrison.

Shortly after eight o'clock on the night of the 5th instant, a few shots were fired by our sentries, which were answered by the enemy, and soon the firing became general. After 11 o'clock, as the moon rose, the fire slackened and gradually ceased. Large bodies of infantry were seen the next morning, from the elevated post of the Pagoda, moving in different directions, and from 150 to 200 Cassay horsemen; and by half-past 9, A.M., a very heavy fire was opened upon the south-west angle of the pagoda, immediately adjoining which I had stockaded in about 2000 Peguers with their families.

On the 3rd instant I was informed that for some distance to the southward and eastward a very large number of carts were approaching the Pagoda, and by sunset 216, filled mostly with women and children, besides a great many men, arrived, and claimed British protection; I felt this to be a greater charge

than defending the garrison, having perfect confidence in the troops; I resolved, therefore, on the following morning to draw the whole of the Peguers into a compact body under the walls of the Pagoda. Working parties from all the European and Native troops in the garrison, with the officers, besides every disposable public follower, were ready by six o'clock the following morning to clear away a tope of large trees for their accommodation. Every one worked with such hearty goodwill that by mid-day every tree was felled, and the Sappers were in readiness, with the assistance of the Peguers, to make a stockade. By nightfall two sides of the stockades were completed, and the greater portion of the bandies brought within it, thus enabling the families to have both food and shelter in their carts.

The enemy having taken up their position round us, never left it until the day on which General Godwin relieved the garrison. I believe I am speaking within bounds, when I say there must have been fully 6000 men regularly employed in investing the Pagoda, from the space they covered; and so did they find safe cover from our fire, that it became the more necessary to preserve the greatest vigilance to prevent surprise at any time they wished to attempt it; their attacks were chiefly directed against the Peguers, and on the night of the 8th, a very spirited and well-kept-up assault was made upon them for about two hours.

Night after night gongs were sounding in different parts of the jungle, which, and their shouting, informed us where they were collecting their troops. Several other determined assaults were made on various sides of the Pagoda, which were repelled by our guns and heavy file-firing, which drove them back. The last attack was made the day before the arrival of the troops. On the morning in question (the 13th), at twenty minutes past 5 o'clock, under cover of a dense fog which hung over the ground below the Pagoda, a shout was suddenly heard, and a large body of men rushed across an open piece of ground on the south-east angle of the stockade, which was the weakest point of the Peguers' position. A picket, which was always kept in readiness at the head of the steps, immediately ran to their assistance, the men ranging themselves among the Peguers; and so determined was the attack, that our Peguers and the enemy had a hand-to-hand contest with their spears, and several were dangerously wounded, the pickets also using the bayonet at the same time. There must have been great loss on the part of the enemy, as the ground was open both to our battery and the musketry from our walls; but as the fog hung over the lowlands for some time after, they were able to convey away their dead, and only three or four were found killed close to the stockade.

In conclusion, I beg to say a few words in reference to the officers and men composing this garrison.

Little that I can say with respect to the practical knowledge of Lieutenant Campbell, of the Bengal Engineers, which he has already gained on field-service, could add to his reputation as a good service officer; but his unremitting zeal in planning and carrying out his suggestions has mainly contributed to the small loss sustained by the troops.

Lieutenant James, of the Bengal Artillery, who was the only artillery officer I had to give directions for the working of the guns on the four angles of the Pagoda, has performed his arduous duties much to my satisfaction.

Lieutenant Harris, of the Madras Sappers, who has but recently joined that distinguished corps, has proved himself to be a most efficient sapper officer, from the short time he took to finish the stockade for the Peguers, and the manner in which he executed a plan for a covered gallery to enable the water-carriers to supply the troops with water with safety to themselves.

Lieutenant Dangerfield of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, my Staff-officer, is an intelligent, enterprising, and most promising officer, and I found I could entrust duties to him which required coolness and judgment, with perfect confidence.

The officers and men, both European and Native, composing the garrison, have performed their duties in a most admirable and satisfactory manner. The harassing duties all were exposed to for eight days and nights, without intermission, requires no further comment than by my adding that their constant vigilance and steadiness were conspicuous throughout the whole of the operations.

A return of killed and wounded of the troops, as well as all other classes, accompanies this report.

*Return showing the number of Killed and Wounded in the Garrison of Pegu,
from the 5th to the 14th of December, 1852.*

Madras Sappers and Miners.—1 non-commissioned officer, 1 rank and file, wounded.

1st Madras Fusiliers.—1 European commissioned officer, 4 rank and file (1 since dead), 6 followers, wounded.

5th Madras Native Infantry.—1 rank and file, 1 follower, killed; 1 European commissioned officer, 1 Native commissioned officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 11 rank and file, 3 followers, wounded.

Peguers.—3 killed, 10 wounded.

Total.—1 rank and file, 1 follower, 3 Peguers, killed; 2 European commissioned officers, 1 Native commissioned officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, 16 rank and file, 9 followers, 10 Peguers, wounded.

European officers.—2 wounded.

Native officer.—1.

Non-commissioned officers, rank and file, &c.—37 wounded.

Total.—5 killed; 40 wounded.

Grand total of killed and wounded.—45.

European Commissioned Officers Wounded.

Lieutenant P. A. Brown, 1st Madras Fusiliers, severe contusion.
Ensign Chadwick, 5th Madras Native Infantry, severe contusion.

W. HILL, Major, Commanding Pegu.

Inclosure 7 in No. 23.

*Extract from a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Sturt, Commanding the
Land Column.*

Pegu, December 19, 1852.

LEAVING Rangoon on the morning of the 13th of December, yesterday afternoon my detachment came in sight of Pegu, and I moved my camp only a short distance this morning towards the river, for the purpose of facilitating its crossing when necessary.

Aware of the value of light artillery and cavalry in support of a movement against foes so difficult to be approached as the Burmese, it was my most earnest desire to have placed the services of these two arms, composing a part of the column under my command, at Major-General Godwin's disposal at the earliest possible period, and it was not therefore without a feeling of great regret I found my best exertions ineffectual to secure the above object, the General commanding the forces having left Pegu two days previous to my arrival.

The extent of country traversed by my column, though not exceeding perhaps 72 miles, presented considerable obstacles to the rapid advance of artillery, and a long train of carriages with supplies for the troops.

Three bridges were obliged to be constructed over tidal nullahs, marshy tracts to be rendered firm, roads to be cut, and their course even to be marked out by the friendly Karens.

These people, to the number of upwards of one hundred, made themselves very useful on the road, and the bridges were all constructed by them with a degree of goodwill and promptness, much to the credit of the poor people. I beg to bring specially to the notice of the Major-General the great assistance received from a Karen of much influence with his tribe, named Kyook-khê, who accompanied the column the whole way from Rangoon.

After leaving Rangoon to our rear about 7 miles, the country began to disclose its plains, belted at distances by jungle. The course of the column often lay closely skirting the jungles for miles, and frequently directly through them,—glades suddenly opening out, and again giving place to jungle.

Between Thoung-too-Loo, distant about 15 miles from Rangoon, and Theda-mu-thaee, 19 miles from Pegu, nothing could exceed the richness of the soil; in some parts dark alluvial, in others sandy loam; the herbage was of the finest description, and where rice crops were seen, their luxuriance and height

were remarkable; the cattle, invariably in the finest condition, were of a very superior hardy breed, with large carcasses.

The space between Theda-mu-thae to within three or four miles of Pegu was found to be of a dense jungly description, forest trees with low brushwood and bamboos, clumps upon clumps forming the most formidable natural barriers and breastworks. Artillery and baggage-carts once having entered these narrow tracks, skirted on either side by such cover, without the possibility of counter-marching if required, could not possibly escape early destruction at the hands of a small body of resolute determined men, who would themselves be perfectly secure from pursuit. Where occasionally an opening occurred in this wild portion of the march, it presented a clear grass-plain of some five, ten, fifteen, or more acres surrounded by the densest jungle. My column was obliged to halt fifteen times during this march, which occupied the troops ten hours and a-half, and my baggage was not up till night.

Not any enemy was seen throughout our whole course, though evidences of their having lately vacated these wilds were frequently observed.

No. 24.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Fort William, January 5, 1853. (No. 3.)

WE have the honor to forward herewith copies of papers relative to the annexation of Pegu.

The country has, by proclamation, been duly declared a portion of the British Territories. The eastern portion, being the Province of Martaban, and situated to the east of the Sitang River, has been annexed to the Tenasserim Provinces, and placed under Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle, the Commissioner of those provinces.

The remainder of the new country, with that portion of the district of Sandoway which is to the south of the Kintalee Passes, has been placed under Captain Phayre, who has been appointed Commissioner of the Province of Pegu.

Inclosure 1 in No. 24.

Minute by the Governor-General, concurred in by the Members of Council.

(Extract.)

October 22, 1852.

THE annexation of the Province of Pegu, as one of the results of the present Burmese war, has been advised by the Government of India, and sanctioned by the Secret Committee.

In the contemplation of this sanction I have long been considering the arrangements which may best be made for the Government of that province.

I would suggest that the district between the Salween and the Sitang should be attached to the Commissionership of the Tenasserim provinces, and that the rest of Pegu be made a separate Commissionership.

In selecting an officer to fill this important post in the new territory, I naturally turned first to Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle. His qualifications and his exertions during the war fully entitle him to any distinction the Government may have to confer; but, as I propose to add 500 rupees to his salary, on account of the addition of Martaban,—while his experience and local knowledge would be of value at Moulmein,—I do not propose his removal to Pegu, which will be a Commissionership of less value.

The officer whom I desire to propose is Captain Phayre, now Commissioner of Arracan; his character stands extremely high in every respect; he has had long experience of the Burmese in Arracan and at Moulmein; he speaks and writes their language perfectly, and is especially qualified for the charge of a new province. I beg leave to propose him as Commissioner of Pegu.

Although I do not propose to issue the proclamation forthwith, the presence of Captain Phayre here at present, and at an early date in Pegu, would be of great value.

DALHOUSIE.

I entirely concur.

J. H. LITTLER.

I entirely concur.

F. CURRIE.

I entirely concur.

J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

Minute by the Governor-General, concurred in by the Members of the Board.

(Extract.)

November 17, 1852.

IN pursuance of the conclusions which the Government of India has formed, regarding the policy to be observed in Burmah for the present, I have prepared drafts of a Proclamation of annexation, of a Letter to the King of Ava, and of a Treaty of Peace.

I have made the Proclamation short and simple, stating in it concisely the course of events, the resolution of the Government to retain Pegu, and its intentions as to the future, if its peaceful possession of Pegu shall be seriously disputed by the Burmese. I have inserted the latter clause, in the hope that a copy of the Proclamation may reach the King, though the Letter should never be delivered.

In the letter I have traced somewhat more at length the origin of the war, the conduct of the Court of Ava, and the progress of hostilities. I have intimated the annexation of Pegu, and the determination of the Government of India to retain it.

Reminding the King of the powerful control over the condition of his kingdom and subjects, which is given to us by our possession of Pegu, and urging upon him a consideration of the irresistible character and extent of our Naval and Military power, I have thereby endeavoured to impress upon the King the prudence and wisdom of his taking advantage of the willingness of the Government of India to terminate hostilities; and I have stated the terms on which peace will be restored, and his tenure of his remaining dominions rendered secure.

I have thought it right to conclude by plainly, though not discourteously, setting before the King the certain ultimate consequences of his provoking further hostilities with us.

I have employed the language of warning, as the most likely means of obtaining for us the peace and quiet submission we desire to secure in Pegu.

The Treaty is very short, and has purposely been made general in its terms. Its form is assimilated to that of preceding treaties.

In the preamble the name of General Godwin is inserted, but it may be omitted in the actual Treaty, if he should wish to be absent, as I infer he may, in the Eastern part of the province.

In Article II, the boundary, as it may be fixed, will be inserted.

I propose to entrust these documents to Captain Phayre, for translation, instructing him, while he rigidly adheres to the sense, not to be bound by the literal terms so closely as to affect the clearness or force of the documents in the Burmese tongue, which, from the difference of the two languages, might possibly be the case.

There are no means of printing a Burmese document in Calcutta. It must therefore, be printed at Moulmein. I propose that a large number of copies be struck off, with a view to their being circulated as widely as possible, both in the Lower Province, and, if it can be effected, in Burmah.

The proper time for the issue of this Proclamation of Annexation is

open to some doubt. On the one hand, it seems inconsistent to declare a province ours, while any of the enemy's forces remain within it. On the other hand, all agree that the moral effect of issuing the Proclamation at once would be greatly in our favour. That explicit declaration of our future policy would daunt, it is said, the Burmese troops, and dishearten them for further resistance; while it would give confidence to the Taliens, and encourage them to give more active and effectual assistance to us, especially against the bands of Dacoits, than they have yet ventured to do, while they had no security for the future.

Feeling the latter consideration to be the stronger, I propose to issue the Proclamation so soon as General Godwin can report that the only Burmese force we know of, and which is now near Prome, has been expelled.

I think Captain Phayre should proceed to Prome without much delay. On his arrival, the letter from the Governor-General to the King of Ava, should be dispatched, inclosed in a letter from the Commissioners, which should specify the date on which it is dispatched.

I have already alluded to the difficulty of conveying the letter to the King. To employ British officers on that duty, is not to be thought of; and the reception which the bearer of such tidings has usually received at the Court of Ava has not been such as to encourage any Burman subject to undertake the duty.

This matter of detail should be left to the Commissioners on the spot. It may, however, be worthy of their consideration whether a Phoongye would not be the best messenger whom they could select. Such a person would be protected from violence by his priestly character; and the sense of security, with, if it be necessary, promise of reward, might induce him to accept, and enable him to accomplish the mission.

The Treaty should be retained in the hands of the Commissioners until the Burmese Commissioners shall arrive, or until the time within which they are to arrive shall have expired.

DALHOUSIE.

I fully concur.

J. H. LITTLER.

I fully concur.

F. CURRIE.

I fully concur in these views, and in the course of procedure laid down by the Governor-General.

J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 24.

Proclamation.

[December 20, 1852.]

THE Court of Ava having refused to make amends for the injuries and insults which British subjects had suffered at the hands of its servants, the Governor-General of India in Council resolved to exact reparation by force of arms.

The forts and cities upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured. The Burman forces have been dispersed, wherever they have been met; and the Province of Pegu is now in the occupation of British troops.

The just and moderate demands of the Government of India have been rejected by the King. The ample opportunity that has been afforded him for repairing the injury that was done, has been disregarded; and the timely submission, which alone could have been effectual to prevent the dismemberment of his kingdom, is still withheld.

Wherefore, in compensation for the past, and for better security in the future, the Governor-General in Council has resolved, and hereby proclaims, that the Province of Pegu is now, and shall be henceforth, a portion of the British Territories in the East.

Such Burman troops as may still remain within the province, shall be

driven out. Civil Government shall immediately be established, and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs of the several districts.

The Governor-General in Council hereby calls on the inhabitants of Pegu to submit themselves to the authority, and to confide securely in the protection, of the British Government, whose power they have seen to be irresistible, and whose rule is marked by justice and beneficence.

The Governor-General in Council, having exacted the reparation he deems sufficient, desires no further conquest in Burmah, and is willing to consent that hostilities should cease.

But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations of friendship with the British Government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the Governor-General in Council will again put forth the power he holds, and will visit, with full retribution, aggressions which, if they be persisted in, must, of necessity, lead to the total subversion of the Burman State, and to the ruin and exile of the King and his race.

By order of the Governor-General in Council,

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 4 in No. 24.

The Governor-General to His Majesty the King of Ava.

November 16, 1852.

IN reply to the letter which, some time since, your Majesty caused to be addressed to the Governor-General of India, regarding events that had occurred at Rangoon, your Majesty was made acquainted with the reparation which the Government of India required for the insults and injuries which your servants had inflicted on its subjects there. Your Majesty was further informed, that if such reparation were not afforded within a time which was named, the Government of India would proceed to exact it by force of arms.

Those just and moderate demands of the Government of India were not complied with. Accordingly, your Majesty's cities and forts upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured by its ships and troops.

The Government of India thereafter afforded to your Majesty ample time and opportunity still to repair the injury that had been done; but your Majesty took no steps for that purpose.

Wherefore, the troops and ships were again advanced. Your Majesty's troops have been defeated and dispersed by them, wherever they could be found; and the Province of Pegu has been conquered, and is now occupied by the British forces.

Since all reparation has been refused by your Majesty, for the offences committed by your servants; since no amends have been made for violation of Treaty; and no submission offered to the State that has been wronged thereby; the Government of India, in pursuance of its word, has exacted for itself the reparation it required. For that purpose, it has resolved and publicly proclaimed, that the Province of Pegu is now, and henceforth for ever, a portion of the British Empire in the East.

The Government of India might justly continue to prosecute the hostilities in which it has been engaged, to the entire extinction of your Majesty's kingdom.

Your Majesty is well aware that the possession of Pegu, and the command of the River Irrawaddy, have placed in the hands of the Government of India full control over the trade and the supplies upon which your kingdom so largely depends, and the stoppage of which, by the British ships, during the past summer, has already brought grievous suffering upon your kingdom and people.

Further, your Majesty can no longer disguise from yourself that the British Government, by its steam-ships on the river, and by the troops which it can dispatch, in overwhelming numbers, from the shores of India, against your territories, could speedily seize and occupy, at its will, the rest of the Burman territories, as surely as it has already conquered the Province of Pegu.

But the Government of India desires no further conquest, and does not seek to inflict further injuries upon Burmah. Satisfied with the reparation it has exacted, and with the punishment it has inflicted, it is willing now to consent that hostilities should cease.

If your Majesty desires to secure your remaining territories from further war, and to avert from yourself, and from your subjects, the evils which the Government of India has it now in its power to inflict, your Majesty will take immediate measures for renewing the relations of friendship which formerly existed between the States.

If within one month from the date upon which this letter shall be dispatched from Prome, officers, of fitting rank and duly accredited, shall arrive in Prome, and, on your Majesty's behalf, shall there sign a treaty by which the conquered Province of Pegu, within such limits as may be pointed out by the British officers accredited by this Government, shall be ceded to the Government of India, and by which liberty to trade in security within your Majesty's dominions shall be granted to British subjects; the Government of India, on its part, will bind itself to renew relations of friendship with your Majesty, and to grant liberty to trade in security, within the British Territories, to your Majesty's subjects, permitting the usual trade and supplies of your kingdom to pass its frontier in Pegu, on the payment of such moderate duties as it may fix.

If, your Majesty shall refuse, or neglect, to conclude a treaty in the terms above mentioned, and, above all, if your Majesty, regardless of the danger in which your kingdom is placed, should attempt to dispute with the Government of India the possession of the province it has declared its intention to retain, your Majesty is solemnly warned of the consequences which will follow your acts.

In such case, the Government of India will exercise the control it holds over the supplies and resources of your kingdom; and will again put forth the power it commands, in order to repel, and still more severely to punish the aggression.

Hostilities thus renewed, if your Majesty shall venture to provoke them, can have but one termination. Your Majesty may be assured that they will end, whensoever the Government of India may so determine, in the entire subjection of the Burman power, and in the ruin and exile of yourself and your race.

DALHOUSIE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 24.

Draft of Treaty.

TREATY of Peace between the Honorable East India Company, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava, on the other; settled by his Excellency Commodore G. R. Lambert, Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's Naval Force in the East Indies, Major-General Henry Godwin, C.B., commanding the British Forces in Ava, and Captain Arthur Purves Phayre, Commissioner of Pegu, on the part of the Honorable Company; and by

on the part of the King of Ava; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

ARTICLE I.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable East India Company, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava, on the other.

ARTICLE II.

His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the Honorable East India Company, in perpetual sovereignty, the Province of Pegu, being the territories to the southward of the boundary hereinafter described; namely:

ARTICLE III.

The Honorable East India Company, and His Majesty the King of Ava, will each permit the subjects of the other to carry on trade within their respective dominions, and they will give to such traders full protection and security.

ARTICLE IV.

This Treaty shall be ratified by His Majesty the King of Ava, within one month; the British Commissioners engaging that it shall be ratified by the Governor-General in Council, and delivered to the Burmese Commissioners, within one month, at Prome.

Done at _____ this _____ day of _____ 185

Inclosure 6 in No. 24.

Minute by the Governor-General, concurred in by the Members of the Board.

(Extract.)

December 1, 1852.

WHEN recently submitting, for the consideration of my colleagues, drafts of a proclamation for the annexation of Pegu, and of a letter to the King of Ava, I observed, with reference to the period at which these documents should be put forth, that it would appear to be incongruous to declare a country annexed before we were even in general possession of it; and that this Government could not fitly issue the proclamation till it had heard of the Burmese forces having been driven from their position at Ethaymew.

Captain Phayre was permitted to return to Arracan, where he holds himself in readiness to proceed to Pegu at any moment.

The translation of the proclamation which he made was at the same time sent to Colonel Bogle, with a request that he would have it printed at Moulmein, where alone are Burmese types, and would forward the copies to Captain Phayre at Rangoon.

The preliminary measures of the Government are therefore fully prepared; and the present aspect of affairs induces me to advise that the date of their execution should be as much as possible advanced.

I believe it will hereafter appear that there has been very little progress in the conveyance of troops on the river. The river has greatly fallen. Some of the steamers have been unluckily disabled, and the work of moving the second division up to Prome is, of necessity, slow.

I propose not to wait for General Godwin's action at Ethaymew, but to direct Captain Phayre to proceed at once to Rangoon.

A letter of instructions should be addressed to Captain Phayre, which should convey to him official information, that the Governor-General in Council having resolved to annex the province of Pegu to the British possessions in India, has been led by the confidence he has seen reason to place in his ability, judgment, and experience as a civil officer, to appoint him to the important charge of the new province.

A copy of the Proclamation of Annexation and the Letter to the King of Ava (which is to be translated and inclosed in a fitting case) should be sent to Captain Phayre.

He should be directed to proceed at once to Rangoon, and he should be authorized to exercise his discretion as to the time at which the Proclamation should be issued.

Upon its issue Captain Phayre should at once assume charge of the Local Government, and enter upon his functions. He should officially address the Commander-in-chief of the naval force, and the officer commanding at Rangoon, as well as the General in command, and inclose to them letters from the Government of India: these letters should intimate the resolution of the Government to annex Pegu, should inclose the Proclamation, and should direct that a Royal salute should be fired on the occasion.

The first object which would appear to require the early attention of the Commissioner would be the settlement of the northern boundary.

It would seem necessary, therefore, that the Commissioner should proceed at once to Prome, after the issue of the Proclamation, for the purpose; 1st, of dispatching the letter to the King of Ava, by such means as the Commissioner may judge best, care being taken that the date of its dispatch from Prome should be made clear to the King; 2ndly, for the purpose of fixing the new boundary; and 3rdly, for the purpose of forming, as soon as possible, his views regarding the arrangements to be made for the protection of the frontier.

First, with respect to the dispatch of the letter to the King, the mode of doing so is left entirely to the discretion of the Commissioner. British officers, it may be observed, cannot be employed on this duty consistently with the safety of their lives, which ought not to be risked.

Secondly, with regard to the boundary, its position should be fixed with reference to joint considerations of a military and political character. In considering it, therefore, the Major-General will be associated with the Commissioner. The Commissioner, however, will form his own judgment upon the whole question, and if he should not concur with the General, will report his opinion to the Government of India. It is hoped, however, that the civil and military authority may each arrive at the same conclusion regarding the frontier.

Thirdly, the Commissioner will, in like manner, report fully his opinion to the Government of India, regarding the measures which he would advise for the protection of our frontier, and of our subjects who may be near it.

I have no doubt that Captain Phayre will be able to suggest to us, in what mode it should be given in Pegu. The means by which any proposed arrangements may be effected, are fortunately at our disposal. The Arracan Battalion volunteered for duty in Burmah, and will, I dare say, perform it excellently well. The Sikhs also will be very effective for such service.

For the purpose of signing the Treaty of Peace, if the King of Ava should agree to make one, and for the purpose of settling the boundary, Major-General Godwin will be associated as Commissioner with Captain Phayre. For the purpose of signing the Treaty, the Commodore also should be a Commissioner.

For all other purposes Captain Phayre, after the issue of the Proclamation, is, by his appointment, the sole political and civil authority; and the Major-General will exercise military functions only.

The letter of instructions should next proceed to give directions regarding the civil government of the Province of Pegu.

The inquiries which have been diligently made during the summer have led to the conclusion, that the whole social and existing administrative system in Pegu assimilates so closely to that existing in the Tenasserim Provinces and Arracan, that the details of the administration for the new province, not less than its general form, may be taken from the administration which has long been in force in the provinces on each side of it.

DALHOUSIE.

J. H. LITTLER.

I concur.

F. CURRIE.

I entirely concur.

J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 7 in No. 24.

The Secretary to the Government of India to Major-General Godwin.

(Extract.)

Fort William, December 3, 1852.

I AM directed to acquaint you that the Governor-General in Council, having resolved to annex the Province of Pegu to the territories of the East India Company, has been pleased to direct that a Proclamation of Annexation should be issued, of which a copy has been forwarded to you with my separate letter of this date.

In pursuance of the Proclamation, a Civil Government has been organized in the Province of Pegu, and Captain Phayre, now Commissioner of Arracan, has been appointed Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the new province.

The sovereignty of the British Government having been established in Pegu, all political and civil authority is henceforth vested in the Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General with the following exceptions.

A letter has been addressed to the King of Ava, of which a copy is inclosed, offering him the opportunity of concluding a Treaty of Peace.

For the conclusion of this Treaty, of which a copy has been forwarded to you, you have been named a Commissioner, with his Excellency Commodore Lambert and the Commissioner of Pegu.

The frontier boundaries of the Province of Pegu must be laid down. The settlement of the boundary must depend on joint considerations of a military and political character; you are therefore associated with the Commissioner of Pegu for this purpose.

It is necessary that the boundary to be adopted should be determined upon as soon as possible.

Inclosure 8 in No. 24.

The Secretary to the Government of India to Captain A. P. Phayre.

(Extract.)

Fort William, December 3, 1852.

I AM directed to inform you, that the Governor-General in Council having resolved to annex the Province of Pegu to the British Possessions in India, has been led, by the confidence he has seen reason to place in your ability, judgment, and experience, as a civil officer, to appoint you to the important charge of the new province.

A copy of the Proclamation of Annexation has been furnished to you, with my separate letter of this date; and I am now directed to forward to you the accompanying letter to the King of Ava (which is to be translated and inclosed in a fitting case).

The Governor-General in Council desires that you will proceed at once to Rangoon; and his Lordship in Council authorizes you to exercise your discretion, as to the time at which the Proclamation should be issued.

Upon its issue you should at once assume charge of the Local Government, and enter upon your functions. You should officially address the Commander-in-chief of the Naval Force, and the officer commanding at Rangoon, as well as the General in command, and inclose to them the letters from the Government of India.

The first object which would appear to require your early attention, would be the settlement of the northern boundary.

It would seem necessary, therefore, that you should proceed at once to Prome, after the issue of the Proclamation; 1st: for the purpose of despatching the letter to the King of Ava by such means as you may judge best, care being taken that the date of its despatch from Prome shall be made clear to the King; 2ndly: for the purpose of fixing the new boundary; and 3rdly: for the purpose of forming, as soon as possible, your views regarding the arrangements to be made for the protection of the frontier.

1st. With respect to the dispatch of the letter to the King, the mode of doing so is left entirely to your discretion. British officers, it may be observed, cannot be employed on this duty consistently with the safety of their lives, which ought not to be risked.

2ndly. With regard to the boundary, its position should be fixed with reference to joint considerations of a military and political character. In considering it, therefore, the Major-General has been associated with you as Commissioner. You will, however, form your own judgment upon the whole question, and if you should not concur with the General you will report your opinion to the Government of India. It is hoped, however, that the civil and military authority may each arrive at the same conclusion regarding the frontier.

3rdly. You will, in like manner, report fully your opinion to the Government

of India regarding the measures which you would advise for the protection of our frontier, and of our subjects who may be near it.

The Governor-General in Council has no doubt that you will be able to suggest to the Government in what mode the frontier villages in Pegu can be defended. The means by which any proposed arrangements may be effected are fortunately at our disposal. The Arracan Battalion have volunteered for duty in Burmah, and will, it is presumed, perform it excellently well. The Sikhs also will be very effective for such service.

For the purpose of signing the Treaty of Peace, if the King of Ava should agree to make one, his Excellency Commodore Lambert, and Major-General Godwin, have been associated as Commissioners with you.

For all other purposes, after the issue of the Proclamation, you are by your appointment the sole political and civil authority, and the Major-General will exercise military functions only.

The inquiries which have been diligently made during the summer have led to the conclusion, that the whole social and existing administrative system in Pegu assimilates so closely to that existing in the Tenasserim Provinces and in Arracan, that the details of the administration for the new province, not less than its general form, may be taken from the administration which has long been in force in the provinces on each side of it.

Inclosure 9 in No. 24.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to Commodore Lambert, R.N.,
Major-General Godwin, and Captain Phayre.*

Sirs,

Fort William, December 3, 1852.

THE Governor-General in Council having resolved that the Province of Pegu shall be annexed henceforth to the territories under the authority of the Honorable East India Company, has been pleased to direct the issue of a Proclamation of Annexation, of which a copy is inclosed.

The Governor-General in Council is willing to afford the King of Ava an opportunity of averting the evils of further war, by concluding a Treaty of Peace. A draft of a Treaty is inclosed, by which the Province of Pegu is ceded, relations of peace are restored, and liberty of trade is assured.

The Governor-General in Council is pleased to appoint you to be Commissioners for the conclusion of the aforesaid Treaty, and hereby conveys to you full powers for the purpose, subject to the ratification of the Governor-General in Council.

I have, &c.

C. ALLEN.

Inclosure 10 in No. 24.

Minute by the Governor-General, concurred in by the Members of Council.

(Extract.)

December 9, 1852.

THERE are several minor points connected with the annexation of Pegu which require the orders of the Government.

It appears to me to be expedient that the Government should have two lines of communication with Prome, if it can be accomplished. It is, I think, already established, that the postal communication between Calcutta and Prome would be as rapid, if not more so, by way of Rangoon, than on any other line.

It appears equally clear that troops designed for Prome would reach it as rapidly, and much more easily, if sent by steam to Rangoon, and up the Irrawaddy, than if they were conveyed by sea to Sandoway, and thence marched across the hills to Prome. But a second line of communication could not be otherwise than advantageous; and would have this further advantage, that it would enable the Government to get rid altogether of the obstacle arising from

the necessity of crossing the sea, and would make every regiment in the service as available for employment in Pegu as the General Service Corps.

The road from Dacca to Chittagong requires little to make it excellent. A survey has already been ordered of a good new road from Chittagong to Akyab. This extended a little further to the neighbourhood of the Thonghoo Pass, and a road engineered across the hills, would open an excellent military line between Bengal and Pegu, by which regiments, if it be necessary, may be marched in relief.

That a good road can be constructed across the hills, is to my mind quite certain. We know that the Burmese themselves formed one by which they carried away into Pegu the colossal image that was famous in Arracan. If the rains are heavy there, they are certainly not so heavy as in Sylhet, where I am told the roads are well kept up. For these reasons I feel confident that a good line may be found, and a good road made and maintained, if it be properly set about.

DALHOUSIE.

I concur.
F. CURRIE.

I concur.
J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 11 in No. 24.

Minute by the Governor-General, concurred in by the Members of the Board.

(Extract.)

December 9, 1852.

IN a former minute I stated that it was my intention to propose that the district east of the Sitang, should be attached to the Tenasserim provinces, after the annexation of Pegu, and should be placed under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle. The Commissioner, it was added, would be addressed more fully on the subject hereafter.

The several questions connected with Pegu having been decided, as far as can be done at this stage of affairs, it remains to indicate the arrangements necessary for the district of Martaban.

I propose generally that the districts east of the Sitang river should be attached to the Tenasserim provinces. It may prove on further inquiry that the river cannot be taken as a boundary, universally, without some inconvenience. In such case, the actual distribution of districts and villages may be settled between the Commissioners of Tenasserim and Pegu; it being understood that the River Sitang shall, as far as possible, be made the boundary.

This district must be governed by the Commissioner of Tenasserim, under the rules which have been approved of for Pegu. The Commissioner will correspond, in all matters regarding it, direct with the Governor-General in Council.

The account of its revenue and expenses must be kept distinct from those of the present Tenasserim provinces, so as to enable the Government to see at any time the financial result of the annexation of Pegu.

DALHOUSIE.

I concur.
F. CURRIE.

I concur.
J. LOWIS.

Inclosure 12 in No. 24.

The Commissioner and Governor-General's Agent in Pegu to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, December 24, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Governor-General of India in Council, that, in obedience to the instructions conveyed in your letter to my address dated the 3rd instant, I proceeded to Rangoon on the East India Company's steam-frigate "Zenobia," and arrived there on the 19th instant. Major-General Godwin being absent at Pegu, I, without delay, visited his Excellency Commodore Lambert.

Being of opinion that the immediate issue of the Governor-General's Proclamation was desirable; and as his Excellency the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces coincided therein, I resolved to avail myself of the discretionary power granted to me by the Governor-General in Council, and to issue the Proclamation without delay.

It was accordingly issued, on Monday, the 20th of December, 1852, and on that day read on board Her Majesty's ship "Fox," in the presence of his Excellency Commodore Lambert, Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. Duke, commanding at Rangoon, and several other naval and military officers. A Royal salute was fired on the occasion. A number of printed copies of the Proclamation were posted in the town of Rangoon, and distributed for circulation in the surrounding country.

On the morning of the 21st of December, the Proclamation was read at a general parade of the troops composing the garrison of Rangoon; after which, a Royal salute was fired.

I have reason to believe that the Proclamation will have a powerful effect in inducing the people of the Province of Pegu to combine, and resist the bands of marauders who have, for some time past, infested the country.

I beg to inclose herewith six copies of the printed Proclamation.

I have, &c.

A. P. PHAYRE.

Inclosure 13 in No. 24.

The Commissioner in Pegu to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Rangoon, December 28, 1852.

THERE are, at the present time, in the vicinity of Rangoon, several bands of marauders, acting under the orders of two well-known leaders, named Myat Htoon and Shewe-ban, which it is desirable to break up, and, if possible, to capture the leaders. These men are the terror of the surrounding country, and are known to keep in captivity a number of women and children, as security for the neutrality of the villagers in their vicinity.

A number of the Talien population, however, have come in, and offered to cooperate in an attempt to capture Shewe-ban. His Excellency Commodore Lambert has dispatched some boats against that leader. Yesterday a considerable number of the Karen tribe came in, accompanied by the American missionaries, Messrs. Kincaid and Vaiton; and offered, if supplied with ammunition, to proceed, with 1000 men of their race, against Myat Htoon, who is the more powerful of the two leaders. I have full confidence in the fidelity of these Karens, and am now endeavouring to procure ammunition to supply to them.

I consider it of importance to disperse the bands of marauders which now exist, as much as possible, by means of the people themselves. But the latter were ill-armed, and have great difficulty in procuring ammunition. I therefore request that the Governor-General in Council will be pleased to direct that I may be supplied, from the arsenal of Fort William, with 500 flint-muskets, 2000 flints, and 30,000 ball cartridges, in order that I may be able to distribute these arms to such persons as I may think fit to be trusted with

them, for the purpose of effecting the dispersion of the bands of plunderers which now infest the country.

Should the Governor-General in Council see fit to comply with my request, I beg that the arms and ammunition may be sent down by the first opportunity.

I have, &c.

A. P. PHAYRE.

Inclosure 14 in No. 24.

Minute by the Governor-General, concurred in by the Members of the Board.

December 31, 1852.

IN a private letter, written after his dispatch, Captain Phayre expresses his conviction, that much valuable aid against the dacoits may be obtained from the Karens, who are eager to be employed. He expressed a strong wish to have 500 muskets for use by these people.

Immediately on receiving this letter, yesterday, I directed the Secretary to cause 1000 flint-muskets, 4000 flints, and 50,000 rounds of ammunition, to be sent down on "Phlegethon," which sails to-morrow, and "Tenasserim," on the 4th. They are to be placed in the Magazine, at Rangoon, to meet the indents of the Commissioner.

DALHOUSIE.

F. CURRIE.

J. LOWIS.

W. R. GILBERT.

Inclosure 15 in No. 24.

The Commissioner in Pegu to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir

Rangoon, December 28, 1852.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, I have deemed it advisable to give public notice (of which I beg to inclose a copy), that duties will be levied at the Custom-houses of Rangoon and Bassein, according to the Import Tariff now in use at Calcutta, on and from the 1st of February, 1853. The valuation of articles for the Export Tariff, I propose should be made here; and this will be submitted for the sanction of Government, with as little delay as possible.

I have fixed upon the 1st of February next, as the date on which to commence levying customs duties, in order that persons in the Straits Settlements, and elsewhere, interested in the trade of Pegu, may receive due notice. I trust this will be approved by the Governor-General in Council.

I have, &c.

A. P. PHAYRE.

Inclosure 16 in No. 24.

Notification.

Rangoon, December 27, 1852.

Notice is hereby given, that, on and from the 1st of February, 1853, duties upon imports and exports, at the Ports of Rangoon and Bassein, will be levied, according to the Tariff now in use at Calcutta.

Provisional rules will be deposited at the custom-houses of Rangoon and Bassein, where they may be perused, on application by parties wishing to do so.

A. P. PHAYRE.

Inclosure 17 in No. 24.

The Secretary to the Government of India to the Commissioner in Pegu.

Sir,

Fort William, January 3, 1853.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated the 28th ultimo, reporting that you have publicly notified that duties will be levied at the Custom-houses of Rangoon and Bassein, according to the Import Tariff now in use at Calcutta, on and from the 1st proximo.

In reply, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council is pleased to approve of your proceedings. Any necessary modifications in the Tariff may be made, when experience shall show them to be required.

I have, &c.

C. ALLEN.

**Further Papers relating to Hostilities with
Burmah.**

(In continuation of Papers presented June 4, 1852.)

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Her
Majesty's Command, March 15, 1853.*

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