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THE *Rare section*
DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

OF THE
MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K. G.

DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN
INDIA.

EDITED BY
MONTGOMERY MARTIN.

VOL. V.

LONDON:
Wm. H. L. EN AND CO. LEADENHALL-STREET.

MDCCCXXXVII.

INTRODUCTION.

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THIS Supplemental Volume of the Marquess Wellesley's Indian Despatches, contains various documents illustrative of proceedings detailed in the four previous Volumes. These documents are divided into separate Supplements according to the transactions to which they belong.

1. *The Mysore War Supplement.*—The Correspondence of Tippoo Suldaun with the Executive Government of France, with Zemaun Shah, and with the Grand Seignior, which was discovered after the capture of Seringapatam, fully corroborates the views entertained by the Governor-General in 1798, and while Tippoo was professing amity, and peace towards Great Britain.

The whole of this Correspondence establishes the treachery of Tippoo Suldaun, and his implacable hostility to the English, together with the efforts which he was making for the ruin of the British Empire in India; thus proving the correctness of the opinions of the Governor-General, long before these proofs of the Suldaun's duplicity and animosity had been obtained. The Mysore Supplement together with the first volume, leaves nothing unexplained relative to this momentous era in the History of India.

2. *Tanjore Supplement* contains a letter from the Governor-General to the Acting Governor of Madras, explanatory of his Lordship's sentiments respecting the Rajah of Tanjore; and a private minute of the Right Honourable Henry Dundas in explanation of the policy pursued relative to the settlement of Tanjore.

3. *The Carnatic Supplement.*—The proceedings relative to the Carnatic were fully detailed in Volume II. but it has been deemed useful to give a connected narrative of those events written by Major (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, which contains an historical summary prepared at Calcutta in 1802 or 1803 from official papers.

4. *The Oude Supplement* contains some documents relative to the Honourable Henry Wellesley, (now Lord Cowley) which were not found when Volume II. was printing; they shew the true position and conduct of the Lieut.-Governor of the ceded provinces, and the feelings entertained thereof by the Honourable East India Company's civil servants abroad, and by the Board of Control and the Court of Directors at home.

5. *Persia*.—This Supplement furnishes a letter to the King of Persia from the Governor-General, on the occasion of the death of the Persian Ambassador in a disturbance at Bombay, as explained in Volume II. p. 668; and it also contains the instructions of the Governor-General to the Ambassador, whom his Lordship sent from India to Persia with the view of cementing the alliance existing between the two governments, and of thus affording a counteraction to the designs of Zemaun Shah on Hindostan in alliance with Tippoo Sultaan.

6. *The Financial Supplement* explains the deranged state of the finances on the Governor-General's arrival in India, the difficulties that existed in restoring public credit; the state of the government debt and securities on the succession of the Governor-General and on his Lordship's relinquishment of office, and the additions, which were made to the revenues of the East India Company.

7. *The Private Trade* being one of those subjects which at the period in question gave rise to much discussion and acrimonious feelings, it has been deemed proper to print several papers illustrative of the prevailing opinions on either side of the question, and to publish also some documents shewing the result of admitting private merchants to compete with foreigners in the commerce of British India.

8. *The Red Sea Expedition*—which was projected by the Governor-General in May 1799, (see Vol. I. p. 587) for the expulsion of the French from Egypt, by the combined and simultaneous efforts of an English and Indian army, had also connected therewith an amicable intercourse with the Native Arabian Chiefs, as shewn in the Supplement under this head.

A table has also been given of the Supplies furnished to the army under the command of Sir David Baird, as illustrative of the attention paid by the Governor-General at all times to the Commissariat department, on which the success of every war so materially depends.*

9. *The Miscellaneous Supplement* embraces several documents not specifically referring to any of the foregoing heads, but of essential importance when considering the relative position of British India at the close of the last, and at the beginning of the present century. These documents are given on the authority of their respective writers without any intention to express any opinion on the several matters discussed.

10. *The Mahratta Supplement* is necessarily of considerable length as many documents connected with the war of 1803-4, were omitted in the previous volumes for want of space. The Supplement contains an accurate narrative of the origin of the contests with Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and with Holkar; and it also supplies a minute account of the evasive and menacing conduct of Scindiah in 1805.

General Lake's letters to the Duke of York afford a succinct, clear and modest narrative of his gallant achievements in 1803-4. The disastrous retreat of the Honourable Colonel Monson is fully explained.

Lord Castlereagh's opinions on the Mahratta war, and the treaty of Bassein were answered fully by the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, (see p. 318) while on a visit to the Governor-General at Calcutta, at the close of the year 1804. The cantonment and force of the Anglo-Indian army is shewn at p. 374 *et seq.* and the opinions entertained on the subject by the Governor-General, and the authorities at home.

Some intercepted French letters demonstrative of the

* When the Supplement was closed, the Editor received Mr. Cockburn's notes relative to the supplies furnished to the Mysore army in 1798-9, and they demonstrate that nothing which prudence and foresight could imagine, was left by the Governor-General to chance. This Gentleman was employed by Lord Cornwallis in conducting the supplies for the army during his second campaign in Mysore, and by Lord Mornington in 1798-9.

designs of France on British India, and the danger which would have resulted from the establishment of a foreign European power in Hindostan close this Supplement.

11. *The Miscellaneous Correspondence Supplement* contains a variety of letters on the different subjects which the whole work embraces, and which are printed as indicative of the prevailing opinion entertained in England and in India, when the events to which they refer occurred.

12. Some Addresses to the Governor-General which have been found since the previous volumes went to press, close the Work.

There are still several points in the Indian Government of the Marquess Wellesley which it would have been desirable to have illustrated, namely, the improvements in the establishments of the Protestant Church at Calcutta, and at the other Presidencies, while the religion of the Natives (both of the Hindoo and Mahomedan faith,) was scrupulously respected; the encouragement given to Missionaries, and to learned and scientific individuals of every country; the translation of the Holy Scriptures into almost every oriental language;* and the suppression of the horrid annual practice of human sacrifice at the island of Saugur, near one of the mouths of the Ganges.

An injustice would be committed against the present Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, did the Editor omit the publication of the following Correspondence between the Marquess Wellesley and the Honourable Court (through their respected Chairman and Deputy) on the occasion of the first appearance of the present Work: to this is added, a circular letter from the Honourable Court to their Governments in India, which was issued on the appearance of the fourth volume.

This Correspondence and circular letter require no other comment than that these documents afford a gratifying proof of the effect of truth plainly and authentically stated, upon noble and manly minds.

* See letter from Mr. Charles Grant, page 143.

Despatch from the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company to the Governor-General of India in Council in the Public Department, dated India House, 21st September, 1836.

The Despatches of the Marquess Wellesley which have been recently collected and arranged for publication embody so much that is important in connection with the Administration of Affairs of India, that we have deemed it right to furnish our Governments with the means of consulting so valuable a Work.

We therefore forward (a No. in the Packet) Thirty Copies of Volumes I. and II., and a similar number of the succeeding volumes relative to the Affairs of India will be transmitted as they appear. We desire that a sufficient number of these copies may be placed in the Public Library at Calcutta and in your Office of public records, and the remainder distributed in the manner best calculated to render them extensively useful. We shall also transmit to each of the Presidencies of Mádras and Bombay Fifteen Copies of the same Work for distribution in a similar manner.

The Marquess Wellesley to Sir James Rivett Carnac, Bart. Chairman of the Court of Directors.

SIR,

Hurlingham House, Sept. 28th, 1836.

The orders of the Court of Directors respecting the publication of my Indian Official Papers are most acceptable and satisfactory to me; it has appeared to me that the enclosed letter to the Honourable Court on this occasion would not be deemed improper; if you should honour it with your approbation, perhaps you would have the goodness to submit it to the Court of Directors.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Hurlingham House, Sept. 27th, 1836.

In permitting the publication of my official documents during my government of your possessions in India, my principal object was to serve those valuable interests, which, under the authority of your Honourable Court, were entrusted to my charge for so long and so memorable a period of time.

It affords me most sincere and cordial satisfaction to learn, that in the high judgment of your Honourable Court, this publication is calculated to be useful to your Service in India.

To your Service the best years of my life were devoted with zeal and industry; and to the last moment of my existence, I must regard with parental attachment and affection the welfare and honour of your servants, and the prosperity and glory of the British Empire in the East.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

Sir James Rivett Carnac, Bart. Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company.

MY LORD, East India House, October 6th, 1836.

I availed myself of the first opportunity that presented itself of laying before the Court of Directors your Lordship's letter of the 27th ultimo.

In forwarding to your Lordship the accompanying reply, I trust that it is unnecessary to assure your Lordship how cordially I participate in the sentiments, which as the organ of the Court it is now my duty to convey and how highly I esteem the honour of being the channel of communicating the feeling of the Court on the present occasion.

I have the honour to be,

with great respect,

your Lordship's faithful servant,

J. R. CARNAC.

[Enclosure.]

*The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors
to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD,

East India House, October 6th, 1836.

We have laid before the Court of Directors of the East India Company your Lordship's letter of the 27th ultimo, relating to the publication of your Indian Despatches, and the Orders of the Court in connection with the work.

It is with the highest satisfaction that we now perform the duty of conveying to your Lordship on the part of the Court of Directors an assurance of their conviction that those Despatches were made public in the same spirit in which they were composed—an ardent zeal to promote the well-being of India, and to uphold the interest and honour of the British Empire.

To the eventful and brilliant period of your Lordship's Government, the Court look back with the feelings common to their countrymen; and anxious that the minds of their Servants should be enlarged by the instruction to be derived from the accumulated experience of eminent Statesmen, they felt it a duty to diffuse widely the means of consulting a work unfolding the principles upon which the supremacy of Britain in India was successfully maintained and enlarged under a combination of circumstances, in the highest degree critical and difficult.

It affords great satisfaction to the Court to learn that this act of attention to the improvement of their Servants has been acceptable to your Lordship; and it is their fervent wish that you may long continue to enjoy the pleasure resulting from the recollection of the Services which you have rendered to your own Country and to British India.

We have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's

most obedient humble servants,

J. R. CARNAC.

JOHN LOCH.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Chairman of the Honourable Court of
Directors.*

SIR,

Hurlingham, 10th October. 1836.

I request you to accept my grateful acknowledgements for your obliging kindness in submitting my letter of the 27th of September to the Court of Directors, with so much expedition and promptitude.

The reply, which you have transmitted to me under the

authority of the Court, confers one of the highest and most acceptable honours, which I have ever received, in a long and eventful course of Public Service. That the authentic record of the principles on which I acted, during the most critical and difficult exigency of the affairs of the British Empire in India, should be deemed by the Court of Directors to contain an instructive and useful lesson for their Servants, is a testimony most glorious to the memory of my Services. I receive this most distinguished mark of consideration with the warmest sense of its value, and with the most cordial sentiments of respectful gratitude.

The kind feelings which dictated the wish expressed by the Court at the close of your letter, are well calculated to revive early and ardent impressions of sincere zeal, attachment, and affection. To whatever period of time my days may be extended, I can never forget my duty towards the East India Company.

I assure you that the favour of the Court receives additional value in my estimation, from being communicated to me through a channel, so justly respected and esteemed in India, as well as in the United Kingdom.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest esteem, Sir,
your faithful and obliged servant,

WELLESLEY.

Circular (Public.) From the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company to their respective Governments in India.

London, 2nd June, 1837.

We have always been desirous that our civil and military servants should possess an accurate and minute knowledge of those events which have led to the supremacy of the British authority in India. To all classes of our officers this knowledge will be found of the highest value, but more especially to those engaged in political and military duties.

We have already expressed our sense of the improvement which may be derived from the study of the Despatches of the Marquess Wellesley, now in the course of publication; rela-

ting as they do to a period unusually eventful and important; expounding the principles upon which the British Government in India was then administered, and containing a fund of information of incalculable value to those actively engaged in the diplomatic, legislative and military business of India.

Entertaining these views, we have felt it incumbent upon us to remove as far as possible, every difficulty which may obstruct the access of our servants to a source of so much instruction; and we therefore now forward for the use of Bengal fifty, Maḍras thirty, Bombay twenty, additional copies of the volumes already published. A sufficient number of copies of the remaining volumes will on their appearance, be sent to complete the sets.

. An Analytical Index will be found at the end of this Volume.

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DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

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[SUPPLEMENT—MYSORE WAR.]

[The following documents, together with many other papers of a similar tenor, were found in the palace of Tippoo Sultaun at Seringapatam after the capture of that fortress: they were attested at Seringapatam by Captain Macauley, Private Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief. These documents prove the danger which menaced our Indian empire at the period when the Marquess Wellesley arrived in India as Governor-General, and the absolute necessity that existed for the annihilation of all French influence in the peninsula of Hindostan.—Ed.]

No. I.

Tippoo Sultaun the Victorious to the Citizens composing the Executive Power of the French Republic.

CITIZENS,

Seringapatam, 2d of April, 1797.

I salute you, and wish every happiness to you and your nation. Citizen Ripaud arrived in my country after having sustained an engagement, his small vessel had nearly foundered at sea; as I have for a long time been desirous of receiving intelligence from your nation, I brought him to my usual place of residence. I questioned him with regard to the operations of the war and to your condition, and I enquired whether you thought of our antient ally; he informed me of all your plans and of your good intentions towards me and my country. His communications gave me cordial satisfaction, and encouraged me to make the present advances towards a revival of intercourse, by sending to you three of my confidential chiefs to testify to you my friendship, and to renew our antient alliance; in the writing which I send to you, you will perceive my attachment, my disposition, and the sentiments of my heart for your nation, which I have always loved—study the welfare of my country as I study that of yours.

Your Ally,

* TIPPOO SULTAUN.

* Here follows the Byze or abbreviated signature of Tippoo Sultaun himself.

No. II.

Tippoo Sultaun the Victorious to the Representatives of the People residing in the Isles of France and of La Reunion.

CITIZENS REPRESENTATIVES, Seringapatam, 2d of April, 1797.

You cannot be ignorant of the friendship which my father and myself have ever entertained for the French. I sought every opportunity of proving it during your former government, and *I have done all in my power since the commencement of your revolution to make known to you the sentiments of my heart.* From want of opportunity and of intercourse with persons acquainted with your customs and manners, I have not been able before this time to inform you of my intentions. A fortunate chance has sent me Citizen Ripaud (one of your officers) who at my request has answered all the questions which I put to him. I consider him to be worthy of my confidence, and from what he has told me, I perceive it is now the moment for me to revive the friendship which I have always entertained for your nation; I acknowledge the sublimity of your constitution; and as a proof of my sincerity I propose to your nation and to you a treaty of alliance and fraternity, which shall be for ever indissoluble, and shall be founded on republican principles, of sincerity and good faith; to the end that you and your nation with myself and my people may become one Family; that the same oath may bind us for life or for death; that your enemies may be mine and those of my people; and that my enemies may be considered as yours. Thus do I wish henceforth to treat with my allies. You now see my disposition towards your country; when I shall receive a proof of yours, I will fulfil my promises; but, Citizens Representatives, I will not fulfil these engagements with you until I see your forces as well naval as military actually arrive in India. During the last war (it is with regret that I am obliged to recall to your memory the disasters which my friendship for the French nation has brought upon me) I maintained with zeal and courage, all the pretensions of the French. The English, the ambitious English, not having sufficient confidence in their own strength and courage to attack me singly, formed an alliance with the Mahratt, and the Nizam; and attacked me in every quarter. At the very moment when I was on the point of conquering them, the French army under the command of M. de Cossigny, received an order from M. de Bussi to abandon me, though I had paid them well, and they were in want of nothing; but what filled me with indignation was, that those orders extended to M. de Lally, who commanded a body of French in my pay, to withdraw himself with his party; this I opposed, and on just grounds. From that moment, my army became disgusted. Reduced singly to my own resources, and abandoned by my allies, I was compelled to make peace, with the loss of half of my dominions, and three Crores and thirty thousand rupees in specie. Behold what have been my losses Representatives! What is past is past. I have cited these truths in order to apprise you, that if I should declare war against your enemies, I will not be deserted, nor shall you have the power of making peace without my

previous consent, nor without including myself and my people in the treaty. For the security of our reciprocal friendship and good faith it is necessary to stipulate one preliminary condition. It is this, that as my people are ignorant of the customs of the French republicans, and as the republicans are equally unacquainted with the customs of my country, if one of the citizens of either party should violate the customs of the other, he shall be reprimanded immediately by his own superior, without any interruption of the good understanding and harmony, which ought to subsist between good allies. I insert this clause, although Citizen Ripaud has assured me, that the observance of the most severe discipling and of respect for the laws exists in the republican army: mine shall always be conducted in the same manner. I require also that the commanding officer shall always consult me on every measure which he may undertake for the destruction of our common enemy, because I am acquainted with the country, its customs and manners. This is a reservation that he cannot consider as offensive. *Happy moment! the time is come when I can deposit in the bosom of my friends, the hatred which I bear against these oppressors of the human race. If you will assist me, in a short time not an Englishman shall remain in India; you have the power and the means of effecting it by your free negroes; with these new citizens (much dreaded by the English) joined to your troops of the line, we will purge India of these villains. The springs which I have touched have put all India in motion, my friends are ready to fall upon the English; for everything here rely on my discretion. Your enemies, as I have apprized you, shall be mine.* Now you are apprized of my designs, delay not to inform me of yours, but make no promises which you cannot perform. I have retained Citizen Ripaud to answer your letters, and I will give him a salary worthy of the situation which he holds near my person. I entreat you not to be offended with him, but on the contrary to approve of what he has done, and to quiet his apprehensions of being considered as a deserter of his country and of his colours, (a laudable motive which interests me for his welfare). I request you to authorize him to remain in his present station with me for the service of his country, of your colonies, and of myself. *I detained him, nor did he consent to remain till after much solicitation,* being extremely attached to the Island of Bourbon, to which he belongs. In case you should consent to my propositions, it is necessary that you should know the extent of my power to assist the French Republic and its army.

Article 1. I engage, immediately on the arrival of the French troops on the coast, to victual both the land and sea forces, (European liquors excepted) and I will furnish all necessaries, such as flour, rice, meat, wood, &c.

Article 2. I engage also to make advances of money for all the wants of the land and sea equipments.

Article 3. I engage to provide all the bullocks necessary for the artillery of the republican troops, as well as the bullocks, camels, and Lascars, for carrying the baggage of the officers and soldiers.

Article 4. I engage to provide palanquins for the Generals, and horses for the officers, of the troops of the Republic.

Article 5. In case the French army should happen to be in want of gunpowder, or other ammunition, I engage to supply it.

Article 6. As soon as the French army shall have disembarked, I engage to march with my troops; which shall in the first instance consist of 30,000 cavalry, and 30,000 infantry and artillery, well disciplined, with arms, ammunition, and everything necessary for the success of our enterprise.

What I require on the part of France is as follows :

Article 1. That the French Republic shall not, under any pretence whatever, conclude peace, but with the consent of me and my people, nor without including us in such treaty.

Article 2. That as the troops of the Republic will derive such advantages from me, the Generals in command shall undertake nothing without first consulting me, to ensure the success of the common cause, and of our respective armies.

Article 3. Should the French General or republican troops detect traitors in my country, or should I or my troops come to the knowledge of any such in the French army, the chief of the party wherein the traitor may be found, shall cause him to be seized and executed, upon authentic proofs of his guilt, without prejudice to our mutual friendship; since engaged in the same cause, our interests are the same.

Article 4. As I propose to make the advances, and furnish the necessary supplies of money to the French Republic, both for the land and the sea forces, it is just that I should be reimbursed at the end of the war, from the sums of money which may be taken from our common enemy.

Article 5. Every capture made from our common enemy, as towns, forts, territory, money, merchandize, ships, ammunition, &c. shall be equally divided at a fair valuation, fraternally between the troops of the Republic, me, and my people.

Article 6. As I have suffered greatly in supporting the cause of the French in the last war, when I lost the best part of my country, I require that all the towns, forts, territories, or contributions, which I may be able to seize within my former boundaries, be exempted from the 4th article, that they shall become mine by *right*, and that the republican troops shall have no pretensions or claims thereto. I claim this act of justice from my brethren.

Article 7. If the fortune of war shall put us in possession of Goa and Bombay, the port of Bombay and the territories dependent on it, belonging to the English, shall belong of right to the French; but Goa and its dependencies shall be mine.

Article 8. I demand that all male and female prisoners, as well English as Portuguese, which shall be taken by the republican troops or by mine, shall be treated with humanity, and with regard to their persons, that they shall (their property becoming the right of the allies) be transported at our joint expence, out of India, to some place far distant from the territories of the allies.

Article 9. As the towns, ports, forts, and territories stipulated in the 6th article, are to be divided between the allies, they shall be garrisoned as

they may fall into our hands, and the stipulations of that article, shall be afterwards arranged by the French general and myself, with a discretion, if circumstances require it, to blow up any fort which may be deemed useless.

Article 10. In order to achieve the conquest of the English and Portuguese possessions, and those of their allies, it is necessary that I should be assisted with from five to ten thousand regular troops or national guards, and from twenty-five to thirty thousand of your *new citizens*, (if you have put the decree into execution;) selecting the most *subtle and best instructed* of them; *those, in short, who are likely to disturb the peace in your own colonies*; I will answer for our quick and easy success.

Article 11. To facilitate the attack and capture of Goa, a port essential for your squadron and your transports, it will be necessary to disembark at my port of Onore, situated in latitude 14. 35 N. and 70 longitude.

Article 12. That I may be apprized whether you accept or reject my propositions, I request, that after having fully considered them, you will despatch a packet-boat to Mangalore, to inform me of your decision as expeditiously as possible. That nothing may be wanting on the arrival of your squadron, a French officer will be stationed at Mangalore, to afford the necessary assistance, and to advise me of your intentions. To avoid any surprize or doubt, the ship, during the time she may remain at anchor in the roads, shall hoist American colours, with the national flag at the main-top-mast head, over that of the Suldaun, which my envoys carry for that purpose. I am desirous, and therefore particularly request that Citizen Aubaigne may be appointed to command this packet-boat, as he knows my harbours, and is acquainted with the customs of my country.

Article 13. I depute four of my chiefs who have proved themselves worthy of my confidence, to treat in my name on the articles which I transmit to you; but should you neither have the power of accepting them altogether, nor of carrying them into effect without an order from the executive government of your mother country, I request you to despatch three of my chiefs in one of your best vessels for France, and to join with them some citizen whom your wisdom may select, to guide and to advise them in France. I despatch these chiefs for this express purpose: they are charged with a packet, and with orders to explain my intentions to the executive power; I cannot send my ship thither without giving the English reason to suspect some hostile designs on my part; if you send a squadron, send with it the remaining one of the four chiefs and also my ship, which I request may be coppered, and we will arrange matters accordingly. If, however, you think that the ship cannot be coppered without delaying the voyage of the convoy, you will send the ship back at the proper season, with a captain and two officers, whom I will pay.

Article 14. We will commence hostilities against the English and Portuguese; when, in case the Nizam and the Mahrattas should join them, we will make war against them also, for it will then be necessary to subjugate them also, and to render them also tributaries to us.

These, Representatives, are my intentions; do not let my attachment

to your nation expose me to the same calamity which I formerly suffered; I entreat you to reflect well before you return an answer, or you may expose me to great anguish of heart, since I shall act according to the tenor of your answer. I offer up my vows for the success of our enterprize, for the continuation of prosperity to the arms of the French Republic, one and indivisible, and for a speedy answer. I swear an inviolable friendship for your nation.

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

(A true Copy.)

C. MACAULAY, Secretary.

(A true Translation.)

G. G. KEBLE, French Translator.

No. III.

CITIZENS REPRESENTATIVES, Seringapatam, 21st of April, 1797.

Since I manifested my friendship in writing to you, my messengers have arrived with the following intelligence, which will not be displeasing to you.

The Nizam, an ally of the English and the chief of the Moguls is very ill, and his great age leaves no prospect of his recovery. He has four children, who are disputing the right of succession; one of them, who is much attached to me, is the favourite of the chiefs and of the people, and is expected to succeed.

Sewoy Mad' hoo Row, one of the great Mahratta chiefs, and a strenuous supporter of the English, is dead, and by a singular accident, in falling from the top of a palace. He had no children, and the disputed succession has kindled a civil war in that state. Delhi is thrown into confusion by the arrival of Zemaun Shah, my friend, who has attacked the Mahrattas and completely defeated them in that quarter. This is the act of Providence.—Heaven seems to revenge us on the Mahrattas.—All the princes of India have reason to complain of them. The Mahrattas relied on the English who could not assist them, being fully employed in defending themselves.

Whilst a civil war exists in the Mahratta and the Nizam's dominions, the English are not better situated, for the Nabob Mirza Amanis (Asoph ud Doulah), chief of Bengal, having heard of the arrival of Zemaun Shah at Delhi, commenced hostilities against them, and with some advantage. At Calicut they have been attacked by the Cotiote Rajah, Conjes Ram Ram, who has killed in three sallies 1000 Europeans and 3000 Sepoys. On the coast of Malabar they are attacked on every side and the revolt is general, owing to their vexatious government and the taxes which they have imposed.

On the coast of Coromandel, from Masulipatam to Madras and Arcot, their tyranny has excited revolt amongst all the princes, powerful and weak, who all assert their rights; and a nephew of the Nabob of Madras,

who held a command under the English, has lately been killed by his own chiefs, who were become desperate.

I inform you of these events in order to prove to you that it is now the moment for you to invade India. With little trouble we shall drive them out of India. Rely on my friendship.

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

P. S. Since writing my letter, I have learnt by an Arab ship that great disturbances prevail in Bengal; the arrival of the Nabob Zemaun Shah at Lucknow has made the English tremble, particularly at Calcutta, where they are in great consternation, as they are unable to prevent Mirza Amanis (Asoph ud Doulah) from joining Zemaun Shah; it appears that both these princes are determined to be revenged of the English; send me then troops to join with mine, that I too may treat them as they deserve.

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

No. IV.

To the Governor-General of the Isle of France, &c.

GENERAL,

The Isle of France, 26th January, 1798.

The king has commanded us, for the confirmation of the alliance with the French republic, to take a solemn oath under the standard of the two nations, and to perform this ceremony according to your customs; therefore we address this request to you; your compliance will render the bonds of our friendship, and of the offensive and defensive alliance, indissoluble. We request you to assemble all the officers and men necessary for this ceremony, and in our presence to draw up a written instrument to be signed by all parties present, sealed with the seal of the French republic, and delivered into our hands; this will weaken our enemies, and rejoice the two allied powers.

This is what we wish to make known to you, and we entreat you to believe us the most sincere of your servants,

ASSEN ALI KHAN,
MAHOMED HIBRAHIM.

A true copy, by order of the ambassadors,
DEBAY, interpreter.

No. V.

Copy of the stipulations and proposals of the prince Tippoo Sultaun, which his ambassadors Assen Ali Khan and Mahomed Hibrahim, have despatched to Europe from the Isle of France, by two frigates which sailed from thence on the 5th of February, 1798, for establishing an offensive and defensive alliance with the French republic, and for soliciting the assistance of France to subdue our common enemy the English, and to drive them out of India if possible.

The prince engages to furnish the whole French army with the necessary provi-

sions, such as rice, meat, ghee, &c. Spirituous liquors he cannot supply; he will provide the French army with carriage for the officers and for their baggage; he will also provide all military stores. Done at the Isle of France the 4th of February, 1798.

A true copy—DEBAY.

ASSEN ALI CAWN.
MAHOMMED HIBRAHIM.
DEBAY, interpreter.

No. VI.

The Representatives of the Colony of the Isle of France to Tippoo Sultaun,

SALUTATION and FRATERNITY,

Your ambassadors have communicated to us your intention of forming, with the colony of the Isle of France, a connection equally advantageous to both nations.

We shall make every effort in our power to answer your wishes.

We have communicated the object of your embassy to the legislative body of the French Government, and we are convinced that France will enter completely into your views.

The Governor-General Malartic will apprise you of the steps which he has taken already, and of those which he has in contemplation, for promoting our mutual interests.

The produce and manufactures of your dominions will find a market in this colony, either for internal consumption or exportation; and we can supply you in return with all the articles which the execution of your military projects requires.

FOUQUEREAUX, President.

By order of the Colonial Assembly,

HAULNIER, Secretary.

No. VII.

Rear Admiral Sercéy, commanding the naval forces of France in the Indian Seas, to the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun in his territories.

Isle of France, the 14th Ventose, the 6th year of the French Republic, or the 4th of March, 1798.

PRINCE TIPPOO,

Your ambassadors, Assen Ali Khan and Ibrahim Saib, have delivered to me the letter with which you have honoured me, by which I learnt that they possessed your confidence, and that you desired that France should send you troops in order that you might declare war against the English, the oppressors of India. *I am extremely concerned that the naval force under my command, is not at present sufficiently considerable to admit of my proceeding to India, to make such a diversion as might forward your interests,*

but if I should be reinforced as I expect, I shall be very eager to seek our common enemies, and to assist you in their reduction. Previous to the arrival of your ambassadors, I had addressed the Government of my country in Europe on the necessity of expediting this measure, and the day subsequent to their arrival I despatched two frigates to France with the new proposals which you offer. It is to be regretted that you did not sooner apprise us of your favourable disposition.

Prince Tippoo, your ambassadors have exerted great zeal for your service, but unfortunately we were not at liberty to divert to any other object, the means confided to us for the protection of our colony: your ambassadors having however informed me of your wish to have some well instructed officers to form your marine, I hastened to send you Captain Dubuc, who commands a vessel in the service of France, and six other officers, whom I particularly recommend to your favour, and who, I hope, will answer your views by their good conduct, and their naval skill.

Your ambassadors having testified an anxious wish to return to you as speedily as possible, I have given them one of my best frigates, commanded by Captain L'Hermitte, a distinguished officer whom I recommend to you.

Salutation.

SERCEY, Rear Admiral.

No. VIII.

The French Republic. Our Country, honour, and Liberty. Magallon, General of a Division, to the Nabob Tippoo Saib.

Head Quarters, Isle of France, 4th of March, 1798, the 6th Year of the French Republic.

PRINCE,

I received the letter with which you honoured me; sickness prevented me from attending the various conferences which your ambassadors held with the Governor-General on the subject of the mission with which you had charged them. *I have however no doubt, that the French Republic will soon learn and joyfully partake your overtures of friendship and alliance.*

I should have been glad if the state of the French force at this time in India had allowed me in person to have assured you of the friendship of the Republic, and to have participated in the glory of your arms against our common enemy, but the actual state of affairs deprives me of that double honour.

I entreat you, Prince, to accept my wishes for the prosperity of your arms, and the continuation of your glory.

MAGALLON.

No. IX.

To the Great Prince, Tippoo Sultaun Bacha, at his Court of Seringapatam.

GREAT PRINCE,

Permit me, Great Prince, to converse a moment with you. My love for my country, my attachment to its allies, particularly to the deserving son of the renowned Hyder Alli, and *my well founded hatred of the English, or rather of their Government; all this, I say, shall convince you that I shall say nothing which is not dictated by a regard for your true interests.*

What is then the fatality which has hitherto divided the princes of Asia? Nothing is more easily understood. It is the dark policy of the English, their Machiavelian principles, which have subjected so many nations to their yoke, and rendered them the oppressors of Asia.

There is still time, however, to crush this ambitious nation; but it is necessary that the Court of Poonah, the Soobah of the Deccan, the Tartars, the Rajah of Travancore, all the Rajahs, Nabobs, and Soobahs, that all the Chiefs of Asia, in short, should unite to attack, to overthrow, and finally to expel those haughty English: but it is absolutely necessary that the alliance should be founded on good faith, and that it should be skilfully formed, in order that the princes whose forces are inconsiderable may not find themselves overpowered in consequence of a want of concert between the parties; but when the plan shall have been properly arranged, and when the English shall find themselves assailed from every quarter of Asia, their destruction will be inevitable. You have been at war with all the princes of Asia, you must now become their friend and prove to them, by the proposals you make, that you are really willing to become such. One prince must not aggrandize himself at the expense of another; but it is proper that those who groan under the bondage of the English should be emancipated, and that each individual should participate in their spoils, in proportion to the aid which he shall furnish, as well as to his local position. I will repeat, that if the alliance be made with good faith, if each of the contracting parties shall find his interest in it, the engagements will be observed; but should it prove otherwise, should any one of the contracting parties be injured, he will observe his engagements no longer than until some circumstance or favourable event shall give him an opportunity of infringing them. If, fortunately, we should receive troops from Europe which we can dispose of in your favour; if the commission with which the naval and military generals of the colony have entrusted citizens Magot and Seguin, the former the commander of the frigate which carries your despatches to the French Government, and the latter Aid-de-Camp to Major-General Malartic, sent to give greater efficacy to the application which he has made for as large a reinforcement as possible; I say, if this deputation be fortunate, what will not be your advantage in having prepared beforehand the means of avenging yourself by punishing those who have caused you to be betrayed by your own subjects; and of recovering that inheritance of which you have been in part deprived, because the princes of Asia who took up arms against you were not sensible

that in proportion as the English became powerful, they would furnish the powers of the East with arms against each other.

The difference of religion has often prevented alliances which would have proved advantageous to diverse nations, but these false principles have disappeared. Philosophy and Reason have silenced prejudice, and the same state in Europe tolerates the Roman Catholic, the Calvinist, and the Lutheran churches: the man who adores the Creator, and offers up vòws which are sincere and proceed from the heart, is regarded by his God with an eye of benignity and forgiveness.

The dispositions of the Soubah of the Deccan are known to you, as are also those of the Mahrattah and Tartar states. I think I may venture to assure you, that the good Prince Ram Rajah of Travancore is tired of the oppression of the English: Raman Keswin, his Prime Minister, would I conceive be well disposed to act against these despots; had he the means: I know that it was with great reluctance he consented to send away Migot de la Combe, who commanded his troops at Parour, as well as the other French officers who commanded his battalions. The interests of this Rajah, if I am not deceived, require equally with your own that you should propose to him an alliance; that all resentment should cease; and that your ancient feuds should be extinguished and forgotten for ever: but above all, Great Prince, conduct the negotiation in such a manner that the English may not suspect it; for otherwise this prince will be totally crushed, and the English, in despoiling him, will increase their means of acting against you. Believe me, Great Prince, one of the brightest days of my life will be that on which I shall hear that, by reuniting with the princes of Asia, you have acquired the means of annihilating the power of the English in India.

I know not, Great Prince, whether my frankness will be pleasing to you, or whether you may not consider my observations as officious, but of this I am certain, that my anxious wish is that you may make great conquests from the English, and that by this success you may be enabled to render your people and yourself happy. This is the sincere prayer of a true Frenchman, who is, with esteem and respect,

Great Prince,

your most humble and most obedient servant,

M. DESCOMBER.

Isle of France, the 15th Ventose, in the 6th Year of the French Republic, or the 5th of March, 1798, Old Stile.

No. X.

The Governor-General of the Isles of France and La Reunion to the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun.

Isle of France, Port North West, the 17th Ventose, in the 6th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible, answering to the 7th March, 1798, Old Stile.

I received on the 20th January last (Old Stile) your letter under date the 9th October, 1797, which announced to me that you had deputed Captain

Ripaud, whom you had engaged in your service, and two Ambassadors, to confer with me respecting the state of your affairs, and that I might place the greatest confidence in whatever they might communicate. Your Ambassadors afterwards delivered to me your memorandum of proposals to the Executive Directory, tending to form an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, and by which you offer to entertain, at your own expense, as long as the war in India shall last, the troops they may be able to send you.

Not thinking myself authorized by my powers to conclude this alliance with you, I immediately despatched two frigates to France with your propositions to the Executive Directory; I have not the smallest doubt, but that they will take your proposal into their most serious consideration; and I am persuaded that they will send you as speedily as possible the succours of men which you demand, and which you require for the purpose of attacking your enemies, who are also the enemies of the French Republic.

In the mean time, and whilst waiting the arrival of these succours, I despatch the *Preneuse* frigate, commanded by Captain L'Hermitte, to convey back your Ambassadors and their suite, with the officers, surgeons, and volunteers, whom I have recruited in the two islands for your service.

MALARTIC.

No. XI.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Forces sent by the French Government to the Pacha Tippoo, the Victorious.

SOVEREIGN PACHA,

I hasten to announce to your Majesty my arrival in your kingdom, and that of the French officers and volunteers sent to you by the Governor-General Malartic, of whom you will find the muster-roll annexed.

Your Majesty will observe that among the volunteers, there are about twenty soldiers of colour, of different nations and castes, the greater part of whom may be employed with advantage in the artillery.

You will there observe the Chief of a legion possessing every military qualification for filling with distinction the station of Commander-in-Chief, and two officers of artillery, with whom I hope you will be satisfied.

I flatter myself that your Majesty will afford an opportunity to the military which the French government already has sent, and may hereafter send you, of shewing that they never will make any distinction between the service of a prince, whose alliance we so highly esteem and appreciate, and the service of their country.

I have the honour to inform your Majesty, that I have found here almost all the assistance which I could desire for my troops.

The zeal and activity shewn by the Commandant of Mangalore in the disembarkation and reception of the troops, has convinced me of the great attention which he has paid to every thing that regarded us.

I can add nothing to the well-deserved commendation which General Malartic has expressed to your Majesty, of your Ambassadors Assen Ally

Khan and Mahomed Ibrahim; their exemplary conduct on every occasion at the Isle of France, on the passage, and particularly during the action which we had in Tellicherry Roads with two English ships, mounting 52 guns, having on board the officers of a regiment, a battalion of Sepoys, and two standards, all which we captured and despatched to the Isle of France, has merited our general esteem.

I have the honour to express to your Majesty the extreme desire which I feel to present my homage to you in person, and to communicate all the details respecting the mission with which the French Government has entrusted me; and also to assure you, that I shall seize every opportunity of proving to you, that your interests and your glory shall henceforth be considered by me as united with those of my country.

I request your Majesty will enable me to proceed to your presence as soon as possible, and issue your orders that the detachment with the baggage, which is considerable, may follow without delay.

General Dubuc and myself hope to precede the detachment, which will be left under the orders of Dumoulin, the Chief of a legion.

I have the honour to be respectfully,

Sovereign Pacha,

your most obedient and most humble servant,

CHAPPUIS.

No. XII.

The Captain of the ships of war of the French Republic, one and indivisible, appointed by the Government to the chief command of the naval force acting under the Sovereign Pacha Tippoo Sultaun, the Victorious.

SOVEREIGN PACHA,

I unite with General Chappuis in apprizing your Majesty of my arrival, and of that of my officers despatched by Generals Malartic and Sercey to serve under your orders.

We have no wish but to convince your Majesty of the zeal and fidelity with which we shall act in every service which can contribute to your glory, and to the success of your arms.

The French Republic, the ancient ally of your august father, has received your embassy to the Isle of France, in a manner which cannot fail to convince you that the respective interests of the two nations will be considered as one; and we are especially deputed to your Majesty, for the purpose of renewing and consolidating that friendship and harmony which has hitherto reigned between you and the French.

The near approach of the rainy season renders it necessary that your Majesty should give orders for our journey to your presence with our baggage as speedily as possible, that we may incur no risk of delay in our mission.

I enclose a return of the officers under my command; it seems advisable that they should remain at Mangalore until your naval establishment shall be fixed by the report which I shall have the honour to submit to

you, with regard to the situation of the coast and harbour of Mangalore ; and in the meantime you should issue orders to the Governor of that place, to supply them with every thing necessary, until your final pleasure shall be known.

I have the honour to be very respectfully,
Sovereign Pacha,
your most obedient humble servant,

- DUBUC, Captain of the ships of war of the French Republic,
one and indivisible, and commanding a naval force.

Mangalore, the 28th April, 1798.

No. XIII.

The Circar Coudadad to the Executive Directory, representing the French Republic, one and indivisible, at Paris.

In the name of that friendship which the Circar Coudadad and the subjects of the Circar vow to the French Republic, which friendship and alliance shall endure as long as the sun and moon shine in the heavens, and which shall be so solid, that the most extraordinary events shall neither break nor disunite them.

The English, jealous of the connexion and friendship which for so long a time has subsisted between my Circar and France, some years ago united against me with the Mahrattas, the Nizam Ali Khan, and my other enemies ; and declared a war as odious as unjust, which lasted several years, and of which the result was so fatal that it cost me three crores and thirty lacs of rupees in money, and my finest provinces.

The Republic is certainly not ignorant of any of these unfortunate circumstances, nor of the many efforts I made to dispute inch by inch the possession of that country which at last I was obliged to relinquish to our common enemy. I should not have been driven to such cruel sacrifices, had I been aided by my ancient allies the French, who were deceived by the perfidious machinations of Conway, the Governor-General of Pondicherry, who was then plotting with Campbell, the Governor of Madras, for the evacuation of the place commanded by the former. No doubt the Republic will now repair the fault of their former government, by driving the English from their rich possessions in India.

These sentiments, with which I have long been animated, I have made known to the Government of the Isle of France through the organ of two Ambassadors, from whom I have had the great satisfaction of receiving such an answer as I desired, together with the Republican flag, by the hands of Chappuis, chief of a brigade, and Dubuc, a captain of a ship, who also brought with them the inconsiderable succour of officers and men with which circumstances permitted General Malartic and Rear-Admiral Sercey to supply me.

I retain with me the first of these officers, and send the second to you as my Ambassador, who, in requesting your alliance, offensive and defensive, will,

I trust, obtain such a reinforcement of troops as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack and annihilate for ever our common enemies in Asia.

I send you my standard (which, united with that of the Republic, will serve as a basis for the alliance into which our respective nations are about to contract) and with it the particular articles which I have charged Captain Dubuc to communicate to you.

I join with him my subjects Sheik Abdoulraim and Mahomet Bismilla, who are equally authorized to represent me with your government.

Whatever may be the future state of our two nations, whether blended or separate; into whatever engagements they may respectively enter; may the prosperity, the glory, and the success of both be still the common object of each—may the sentiments which they feel for each other be guaranteed by mutual assurances of fidelity, and by oaths of reciprocal obligation, and may the heavens and the earth meet and unite ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest alteration.

In my palace at Seringapatam, 20th July, 1793.

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

No. XIV.

A note of the proposals to be made by my Ambassadors to the Executive Directory at Paris.

Article 1. For ten or fifteen thousand troops of every description, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Article 2. A naval force to act on the coast where our armies may be, to favour and to reinforce them in case of necessity.

Article 3. The Sirkar will furnish all military stores and provisions for the army of the Republic, as well as horses, bullocks, carts, and tents, together with every other necessary, excepting European liquors, which his country does not afford.

Article 4. On all marches and military operations the King's orders are to be observed.

Article 5. The expedition shall be directed to some point of the Coromandel coast, and in preference to Porto Novo, where the disembarkation of the troops shall take place; and where the King, with his whole army, will appear, either before the arrival of the French army, or at any time appointed; it being his intention to commence operations in the heart of the enemy's country.

Article 6. The King desires that the Republic will inform him, by despatching to Mangalore two corvettes from Europe, within twenty days of each other, of the number of ships and troops which are to be sent from France, in order that he may take the field immediately, and be master of the Coromandel coast before the arrival of the Republican forces, and thus be enabled to provide for all their wants.

Article 7. All the conquests which may be made from the enemy, excepting those provinces which the King has been obliged to cede to the English, to the Mahrattas, and to the Nizam Ali Khan, shall be equally divided between the two nations, and according to their respective convenience. The same division shall also be made of the enemy's ships, and of the Portuguese colonies, in order to indemnify the King for the expenses of the war.

Article 8. Should any difficulty arise between the allied armies, each shall ob-

serve justice according to their own laws and customs, and every discussion relating to them shall be conducted in writing between the two nations.

Article 9. *Whatever may be the desire of the Republic, whether to give peace to England, or to continue the war, the King trusts the Republic will always have the kindness to consider him as a friend and faithful ally; and accordingly comprehend him in all its treaties, and apprise him of all its intentions.*

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

Article 10. *All French whatever, who now are or may hereafter come within the territories of the King, shall be treated as friends and allies; they shall have the liberty of passing and repassing, and of trading, without any molestation or hindrance, on the contrary, they shall receive every assistance and succour which they may want.*

Article 11. To procure for my service four founders of brass, and four founders of iron cannon, four paper-makers, twelve manufacturers of glass, in different branches of the manufacture, two naval engineers, and two good ship-builders.

Given in my palace of Seringapatam, under my signature, and that of my prime minister, with the seal of State affixed, the 20th July, 1798.

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

[The following letters comprize a part only of the voluminous correspondence between the late Tippoo Sultaun and the court and agents of Zemaun Shah, found in the palace of Seringapatam. This correspondence, it appears, commenced before the war between Tippoo Sultaun and the English, which terminated in 1792; and the same ambitious and hostile views against the English power in India have marked it, from its commencement to its close.

The present series commences with the deputation of two ambassadors, on the part of the Sultaun, to Zemaun Shah, in the year 1796, for the express purpose of encouraging that prince to prosecute his design of invading Hindostan, and to form a plan of co-operation for the subversion of the British power in India. Many letters belonging to this series are omitted, because they were thought unnecessary to elucidate the Sultaun views, so completely developed by those which are now printed.]

No. XV.

Translation of a paper entitled Proposition to his Majesty Zemaun Shah.*

The imbecility and ruinous condition of the kingdom of Delhi, are more obvious than the sun. As, therefore, Delhi, which is one of the seats of government of the Mahomedan faith, has been reduced to this state of ruin, so that the infidels altogether prevail, it is become proper and incumbent upon the leaders of the faithful, that uniting together, they exterminate the infidels.

I am very desirous of engaging in this pursuit, but there are three sects.

* This appears to be a memorandum of a plan of co-operation between Tippoo Sultaun and Zemaun Shah, which the ambassadors of the former were instructed to propose to the latter.

of infidels in the way of it; and although, when we are united, there is little ground for apprehension, yet the union of the followers of the faith is necessary. If that ornament of the throne, that conqueror of kingdoms, should adopt (*one of*) two plans for effecting this, it will tend to the glory of the faith. One of them is as follows :

That your Majesty should remain in your capital, and send one of your noblemen, in whom you have confidence, to Delhi, with an army; that this person, on his arrival there, should make the necessary arrangements, and, after deposing the infirm King, who has reduced the faith to this state of weakness, select from among the family some one properly qualified for the government: he should remain one year, for the purpose of settling the country; and, taking with him the chiefs of the country who are Rajpoots and others, direct his standard towards the Deccan, so that the Brahmins and others on the road may come forward and present themselves to him. Whilst I, from this quarter, with the aid of God, will raise the standard of holy war, and make the infidels bow down under the sword of the faith; after these shall have been sacrificed to the sword, and no longer exist, the remaining infidels will be nothing; afterwards, the settlement of the Deccan may be concluded in any manner which shall be mutually agreed upon.*

The second plan is this :

If none of your Majesty's noblemen should be sufficiently in your confidence, or equal to the undertaking, and if your Majesty should be entirely at ease with respect to the state of your country and government, it is proposed that you should in person proceed to Delhi, and, having made the necessary arrangements there, establish one of your confidential servants in the office of the Vizier (*or Minister*) and return to your own capital. The person who may be selected for the office of Vizier, must be a man of address and enterprize; that, remaining a twelvemonth with his army at Delhi, he may be able to bring under subjection the chiefs of the neighbouring country. The second year your Majesty should also send from your capital a small army as a reinforcement; so that the Vizier appointed by you, as above-mentioned, may proceed with the chiefs of Hindostan towards the Deccan. Should those infidel Brahmins direct their power to that quarter, by the grace of God the hands of the heroes of the faith in this part of the world shall be raised for their chastisement. After their extirpation, it will be proper to enjoin the Vizier acting on your Majesty's part, to fix upon a place of rendezvous, and there to meet me, that the proper means may be adopted for the settlement of the country.

You are to make a proposition to his Majesty to the above effect, and so request him to determine upon whichever of the two plans he may prefer, and then furnish you with a written engagement accordingly, under his Majesty's hand and seal, adding, that if his Majesty will be pleased to give both of you permission, and have the goodness to send a confidential person

* These propositions demonstrate most forcibly the danger that menaced our possessions in India, from the state in which the Emperor Shah Aulum was retained by the Mahrattas.—[E.D.]

with you, you will repair to the presence of your Sovereign, and having also obtained from him an engagement in writing, corresponding with the instrument above alluded to, you will return with the confidential person above-mentioned to the presence of his Majesty. But that, should his Majesty desire one of you to remain with him, one of you will continue in attendance accordingly, and the other will proceed with his Majesty's confidential servant to the Deccan, and return with the writing from thence to the presence of his Majesty.

(A true translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

P. T. to the Government.

No. XVI.

Translation of the draft of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Zemaun Shah.

[The letter commences with an invocation to the Deity, and to Mahomed, &c. as usual in the correspondence of persons of the rank of Zemaun Shah and Tippoo Sultaun. As the idiom of the English language will not admit of an adequate translation of the figurative expressions used upon these occasions, and as it is not in any degree essential to insert them, they are wholly omitted: for the same reason, the complimentary titles and designations applied to Zemaun Shah throughout the letter, are for the most part left out in the translation.]

Thanks to God, that at this happy time I have the satisfaction to hear that your Majesty, the ornament of the throne, the promoter of religion, the destroyer of heretics and oppressors, &c. employs your whole time, and exerts every faculty, in support of the enlightened religion, and is wholly devoted to its cause. The report of your Majesty's piety, justice, religious zeal, and courage so grateful to the feelings of all the followers of the faith, and especially to me, has afforded me inexpressible joy and satisfaction: in return for this, near an hundred thousand of the followers of the faith, nay more, assemble every Friday, the sabbath of the Musselmans, in the two mosques of the capital, called the Aulah and the Askah Mosque; and after the prescribed forms of prayer, supplicate the Bestower of all things, according to the words of scripture, "Grant thy aid, O God, to those who aid the religion of Mohommud, and let us be of that number at the last day: destroy those, O God, who would destroy the religion of Mohommud, and let not us be of their number at the last day;" and pray that the Almighty will render your Majesty, who is the supporter of the faith, and all its followers, victorious and successful over their enemies. I confidently trust, that the Almighty, in conformity to his holy word, "He who prayeth unto me, his prayer shall be granted," will listen to their supplication, and render your Majesty, who is the defender of the faith, and one of its brightest ornaments, successful and victorious.

Your Majesty must doubtless have been informed, that my exalted ambition has for its object a holy war. The fruit of this just design has been, that in the midst of this land of heretics, the Almighty protects this tract of Mohommedan dominion like the ark of Noah, and cuts short the extended

arm of the abandoned heretic. The report of your Majesty's zeal and piety render me, and all the followers of the faith, most anxious to open a personal and direct communication of sentiments with your Majesty, but the obstacles to this are fully apparent to your Majesty; and therefore, upon the principle (as laid down in the law) that it is sufficient that two persons should have the honour to see the new moon,* in order to establish its actual appearance, the respected Meer Hubbeeb Qolla, and Meer Mohummud Rezza, who are among the highest in rank in the Khooda-daud Sircar, and are worthy of admission to the presence, are now sent as ambassadors to your Majesty's Imperial Court with letters (which, according to the saying, "a letter is half a meeting," may be considered as an invaluable substitute for personal communication;) in order that I may be gratified, not only by obtaining accounts of your Majesty's prosperity, success, and glory, but enjoy the pleasure of seeing your Majesty as it were by substitution; and that the foundations of friendship and attachment, which are productive of benefits, both spiritual and temporal, may be strengthened and improved; and also, that the persons above-mentioned may have the honour to represent to your Majesty my sentiments upon some important subjects, and the circumstances of the enfeebled condition of the faith in the regions of Hindostan, which I have entrusted to their verbal communication. But besides this I would propose, if it meets your Majesty's approbation, that two persons of rank may constantly reside at your Majesty's court, to be the channel of correspondence, and the means of improving mutual harmony and attachment.

Under the sacred exhortation, "Bestow presents among one another," I beg leave to send, by the persons above-mentioned, a few of the articles of this country, as is due among those who are connected by the ties of religion. I confidently trust that your Majesty will gratify me by accepting them, and honour the ambassadors by admitting them to the presence, and by hearing what has been entrusted to their verbal communication, and that you will despatch them back again to this quarter with the utmost expedition.

[Here follows a list of the presents.]

(A true Translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

P. T. to the Government.

* The Mahomedan months are lunar, and their commencement respectively depends upon the actual appearance of the moon's first quarter. As the intervention of clouds or vapours often obscures the moon at one place when it is visible at another, the evidence of any two persons, declaring that they have seen it, is deemed sufficient to establish the fact of its appearance, and the first day of the month (or moon) is assumed accordingly. Should the moon, however, not be seen before the 31st of the month, the following day is considered as the first of the ensuing. It is a common practice among the Mussulmen of high rank, to salute the appearance of the new moon by cannon, and to send to each other congratulatory messages upon the occasion; hence the figurative allusion in the text will be easily understood.—[Ed.]

No. XVII.

Translation of the draft of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Zemaun Shah, dated the 7th of Shabaun, 1211 Hedgerree, or 5th February 1797.

[After the usual address and exordium, as adverted to in No. 16, the letter proceeds as follows:]

By the favour of God, your Majesty, the ornament of the throne of power and greatness, has for the most part occupied your time in extending the religion of the prophet, in destroying the foundation of heresy and infidelity, and in establishing the basis of the true faith; and continues so to do. The fame of these has amply pervaded the world. These circumstances, which are as well known from east to west as the sun in the centre of the heavens, suggested to my mind that, agreeably to the command of God and his apostle, declared in these words, "Slay the divisor of the Godhead," we should unite in carrying on the holy war against the infidels, and free the region of Hindostan from the contamination of the enemies of our religion. The followers of the faith in these territories, always assembling at a select time on Fridays, offer up their prayers in the words—"Oh God, slay the infidels who have closed thy way! Let their sins return upon their own heads, with the punishment that is due to them!"

I trust that Almighty God, for the sake of his beloved, will accept their prayers, and, through the merit of a holy cause, prosper our mutual exertions to that end. And, through the influence of the words, "Thine armies shall conquer," will render us victorious and successful. Through the aid of the Giver of all victory, in reward of my meritorious resolution to prosecute a holy war (which is the proper end and object of life to those who adorn the throne of religion and dominion) I have ever been happy in the fruits of his unbounded goodness, and have continued safe under the divine protection, and still remain so. The proof of this is, that the dominion of the Khoodadaud Sircar, which is surrounded by infidels, has stood aloof, like the ark of Noah, keeping the enemies of the faithful in effectual check. The words of scripture, "impurity and purity are not equal, however the prevalence of the former may excite astonishment," are hereby verified.

Prior to this, two respectable Syuds, Meer Hubbeeb-oolla and Meer Ghoolaum Rezza, were deputed to your Majesty on the part of the Khoodadaud Sircar, by sea, with the utmost expedition; through the guidance of the Almighty, they will have the honour of paying their respects to your Majesty, and will represent the points which have been entrusted to their verbal communication; your Majesty will also receive detailed accounts from your Majesty's agent Ghoolaum Mohummud Khaun, of affairs to the south and east, and also the circumstances of this quarter.

May the sun of dignity and splendour rise from the horizon of success and glory!

(A true translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XVIII.

Translation of an original Letter from Zemaun Shah to Tippoo Sultaun.

[After the customary invocation to the Deity and the prophet, &c. and a figurative address to the Sultaun, the letter proceeds as follows:]

Your letter, replete with sentiments of friendship and regard, expressing your solicitude for the propagation of the faith, and the extirpation of the abandoned irreligious infidels; informing us that in the mosques, after the conclusion of public worship, supplications are made at the throne of grace for the encrease of our dominion, and the success of our triumphant banners; referring us for a further exposition of your sentiments to the verbal explanation of your ambassadors Syed Hubbeeboollah and Syed Mohummud Rezza; signifying that you had sent a few presents by the ambassadors, requesting that two persons of your Sircar might reside at our court, and stating other particulars of friendship, arrived in a most auspicious season, and added new ardour to our mutual friendship.

As the object of your well-directed mind is the destruction of the infidels and the extension of the faith of the prophet, please God, we shall soon march with our conquering army to wage war with the infidels and polytheists, and to free those regions from the contamination of these shameless tribes with the edge of the sword; so that the inhabitants of those regions may be restored to comfort and repose. Be therefore perfectly satisfied in this respect.

With regard to your request for deputing two persons to reside at our court, with a view to strengthen the ties of friendship, we have to express our acquiescence.

We have sent a few articles hereunder mentioned, as a memorial of our regard, by your ambassadors, who have explained to us the message with which you had commissioned them.

Continue to gratify us, by communicating to us by letters your situation and sentiments.

[Here follows a list of dresses, &c. sent as presents.]

(A true Translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XIX.

Translation of the draft of a Letter from the late Tippoo Sultaun to Zemaun Shah, dated the 24th of Rehmauny of the year Shedaub 1226 from the birth of Mohummud, answering to the 23rd of Shaabaun 1213 Hedjree (corresponding with the 30th of January 1799.)

[The exordium, consisting of the usual invocation to the Deity and the prophet, &c. together with the figurative titles and designations addressed to Zemaun Shah, are omitted.]

Your Majesty's gracious letter, in reply to my friendly address, and which was brought by Syud Hubbeeb-oollah and Syud Mohommud Rezza, the ambassadors of the Khoodadaud Sircar, has been received—has given increase to friendship, and augmented the sources of joy and satisfaction. Your Majesty was pleased to write, that as it was the object of your mind to crush the infidels and to propagate the religion of Mohummud, please God, your Majesty would soon proceed with a conquering army to prosecute a holy war against the infidels, polytheists, and heretics, and free the religion of these regions from the contamination of those shameless tribes, that the profanation of polytheism should be done away by the exertions of the relentless sword, and repose and happiness be restored to the inhabitants of this country, and desiring that I would set my mind at ease upon every point. This has been fully understood, and I have also been informed word by word of what your Majesty was pleased to confide to the verbal communication of the ambassadors; all which afforded me boundless satisfaction.

It is my hope and my prayer to the Almighty, that the oppressions of the infidels and polytheists may be destroyed, by the avenging sword of those who have been selected by God to exercise dominion, and of warriors in the field of conquest; and that these regions may acquire prosperity and splendour, by maintaining the cause of religion.

At this time, the English having received intimation of the arrival of the ambassadors of the Sircar at your Highness's court, and of the firm connection established between the two States, have taken umbrage, and in concert with the infidels and the turbulent, taken up arms against me; * and they have written, † that they entertain the design to subvert the reli-

* In his letters to France Tippoo Sultaun ascribes the hostile preparations of the British Government, to his connection with the French.

† It appears from the testimony of Hubbeeb-oollah, the late Tippoo Sultaun's head monshee, that this assertion is founded on the passage at the close of the 4th paragraph of the Right Honourable the Governor-General's letter to Tippoo Sultaun, of the 8th of November 1798; * which points out to the Sultaun, the dangers to which he will expose his authority, the tranquillity of his dominions, the prosperity of his government,

* See Vol. I. of these Despatches page 326.

gion of Islaum, "many are the words that proceed from their lips, but their words are nought but lies." Please God, they shall become food for the unrelenting sword of the pious warriors, "evil designs return upon the heads of the inventors." We are labourers in the way of the Lord, and obedient to the command of God. We have no support, but the aid of the king of the world, who is great and powerful, and the true apostle, the head of the true religion, the destroyer of former abominations. Placing my dependance upon those tidings of joy, "often doth God permit the inferior number to overpower the superior." I am prepared to exert the energies of my mind and of my faculties, inwardly and outwardly, to carry on a holy war. Agreeably to the command of God, believing it a duty of religion to communicate affairs of great importance, when the interests of religion are one and the same, the Syuds before-mentioned, are now a second time despatched to your Majesty's court, for the purpose of representing all circumstances fully and personally; and from them, your Majesty will be amply informed of every thing. Impelled by a solicitude for the defence of religion, which is incumbent upon all the princes of Islaum to feel, let your Majesty display your grateful endeavours, both by word and deed, to repel these abandoned infidels. "God will aid the pure of heart and pious."

(A true Translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

P. T. to the Government.

and the permanence of his religion, by his connection with the French. Although Hubbeeb-oolah and Meer Saudick pointed out to the Sulṭaun, and proved by various arguments, that the passage in question was applicable only to the views of the French, yet anxious to avail himself of even this shadow of a pretext to justify his rancour, he continued to maintain his own construction of the passage, and persisted in his resolution to insert this gross calumny in his letters to Zemaun Shah, to the Grand Seignior, and others. The numerous instances of the Sulṭaun's duplicity, and virulent animosity against the English, leave no room for surprize at his wilful perversion of this passage. A copy of the Governor-General's letter in question, was communicated to his Highness the Nizam; who, as a Mussulman, cannot be supposed to have observed with indifference, a declaration, pointing equally to the destruction of his power, as to that of Tippoo Sulṭaun; his Highness, however, expressed his highest approbation of the whole of the Governor-General's letter of the 8th November 1798.—[Ed.]

No. XX.

[The following Memorandum is written in the first leaf of the book which contains the original of this Translation :]

“ In this book are entered the drafts of the letters which were written to the Grand Seignior, Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul, and Futteh Alli Khaun, King of Eeraun, under date the 4th of Ramzaun 1213 of the Hedjree,” (*answering to the 10th of February, 1799.*)

Translation of the Draft of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Grand Seignior.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God !

[After the customary invocation to the Deity and the Prophet, and a series of pompous titles, addressed to the Grand Seignior, the letter proceeds as follows :]

Your Highness's august letter,* written on the 11th of Rubbee oossaunee 1213 of the Hedjree (*answering to the 23d September, 1798*) which was conveyed through the English,† honoured me by its gracious arrival, was the means of glory and distinction, and the productive source of boundless favour. Its contents added strength and firmness to the foundations of union and attachment; and its gracious expressions gave stability to the fabric of friendship.

With respect to what your Highness wrote, of the invasion of the venerated land of Egypt by the devoted French, by treachery and deceit, notwithstanding the observance of long subsisting friendship on the part of your Highness. The objects of that irreligious, turbulent people; the determination of the Ottoman Porte to employ the most vigorous measures to repel that rebellious race; of my assisting and joining my brethren Musselmans in the general cause of religion, and defending the regions of Hindostan from the machinations of this enemy; that I would communicate to your Highness whatever subject of complaint I might have against the English, when, by the aid of God and your Highness's good offices, those complaints should be removed to my satisfaction, and the grounds of opposition and estrangement be exchanged for the desirable objects of harmony and union. This, which you Highness did me the honour to write, has been understood.

By the favour of God, and the benevolence of the prophet, all the

* Tippoo Sultaun transmitted to the Governor-General, a letter addressed to the Grand Seignior (vide the correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Governor-General)—pretending that it contained the whole of his reply to the letter from the Grand Seignior. It appears from the above that Tippoo Sultaun had privately despatched this virulent invective against the British Nation to Constantinople, by ambassadors extraordinary.

† Over this word is written, “ *The Governor of Madras.*”

followers of the faith hold fraternity in religion; particularly the exalted Ottoman State and the Khoodadaud Sirkar (between which, regard and attachment are established firmly as columns, and of which friendship and union, repeated tokens have been interchanged) are aiding and assisting each other. -As this labourer in the way of the Lord, is a brother in the faith, is obedient to, your Highness's all powerful will, and does not conceive any difference to exist between us; I beg you will communicate to me what your Highness's exalted mind conceives will be conducive to the welfare and interests of the followers of the faith. As the French have made themselves your Highness's enemies, they have made themselves so to all the followers of the Faith—God is the protector and defender of the land of Hindostan; next to him, this suppliant at the Almighty Throne, does not and will not neglect the defence and service of the people. I am fully confident that your Highness will be disposed to afford your assistance and support, in all matters, to us Labourers. All Hindostan is over-run with infidels and polytheists, excepting the dominions of the Khoodadaud Sirkar, which like the Ark of Noah are safe under the protection and bounteous aid of God. It is my hope, from the supreme king of kings, that as at the appearance of a second Adam, the religion of Islaum will obtain exclusive prevalence over the whole country of Hindostan, and that all the sinful heretics will with the utmost ease become the prey of the swords of the combatants in the cause of religion. Be it known to those who stand at the foot of the imperial throne, that the treachery, deceit, and supremacy of the christians in the regions of Hindostan, are beyond the power of expression. A summary elucidation of this, will be found as follows :

A person, by name Da-ood Khaun, an Afghaun, was appointed to the Soobadarry of Arcot, on the part of the Emperor of Delhi. About that time, the French and English, each with one of their detested ships, and a few Kaufers (*Infidels*) on board, came to the coast, expressly for the purpose of trade; bringing with them some of the products of their country, such as knives, scissors, needles, china and glass-ware, for sale. After presenting several articles to the deluded Soobadar, as a Nuzzer (*or offering, expressive of submission*) they requested the grant of a spot of ground, sufficient for a single house, for their residence, in order that they might import the products of Europe, paying the proper duties, and there remain with a dozen of their people. The Soobadar complied with their request; and there the English resided for some time.

It happened, that the exalted Firmaun of Behaudur Shah, Son of Aulumgeer, Emperor of Shahjehaun-abaud (*Delhi*) addressed to Da-ood Khaun, arrived, directing him to leave a trusty Dewan (*Manager*) in Arcot, and repair himself to the presence. In conformity to the Emperor's summons, Da-ood Khaun repaired to Delhi, leaving Saadut-oolla Khaun as his deputy. Owing to the negligence and folly of the ministers at Delhi, Saadut-oolla Khaun became a traitor, and usurped the dominion of the country. About that period, the English and the French applied to the Soobadar for the grant of a little ground round about their houses; to which the Soobadar, from his want of foresight, and from his innate folly,

consented; and accordingly granted them the ground which they asked. After this, both these nations erected small forts, and stationed about a hundred men to garrison them, (*verses*) "Where a country is abandoned by its prince, every village becomes a principality." The relations and followers of Saadut-oolla Khaun, each took possession of Taalooks (*districts*) and erecting fortresses, established their abode. At the same time, the French and English, taking with them some of the products of Europe, repaired to the districts of the relations and followers of Saadut-oolla Khaun, and contracted friendship with them; and under this cover, obtaining a complete insight into their characters, their mode of living, the structure of their forts, the administration of their territories, and the condition of their forces, they entertained from four to five hundred men of that country and waited their opportunity. In the mean time Saadut-oolla Khaun died. After his death his relations and adherents, who were very numerous, quarrelled among themselves, and one of them, by the name of Sufder Alli Khaun, entered into an intrigue with the infidels of Poonah, and solicited military succours. Agreeably to his request, an army of the Poonah infidels, consisting of 50,000 horse, under the command of Rugghee Futteh Sing, invaded the province of Arcot; where Sufder Alli Khaun suffered his father Alli Doast Khaun to be slain in battle by the infidels of Poonah. After this, these infidels seeing the dissensions which prevailed amongst the adherents and relations of Sufder Alli Khaun, plundered all the inhabitants of that country, without discrimination of friend or foe; carried off a hundred thousand men and women prisoners to their own country, and sold them to slavery; they also took prisoner Hoossain Doast Khaun, known by the name of Chunda Khaun, who was the husband of Sufder Alli Khaun's sister, and carried him to Poonah. In the mean time, Mortiza Khaun, the governor of Vellore, and husband of another sister of Sufder Alli Khaun, enticed the latter to his house, and put him to death. After this event, Nizam-ool Mool the Vizier of Delhi, who had made himself master of the Deccan, arrived in the province of Arcot, and appointing Anwar-odeen Khaun, Soobadaur of that province, on his own part gave in charge to him the two infant sons of the late Sufder Alli Khaun, with injunctions to protect and educate them; and then returned to the Deccan. After this, Anwar-oo-deen Khaun incited the Afghauns to murder one of the children. A short time after, Chunda Khaun, who was in confinement at Poonah, bribing the infidels with a sum of money, obtained his release, and arrived in the province of Arcot, whence he proceeded to Pondicherry, a factory belonging to the French, where he took refuge: he there procured a body of French troops, with which he marched against Anwar-oo-deen Khaun, with a view to reduce the province of Arcot. In the mean time, Anwar-oo-deen Khaun sought the assistance of the English, who then held a factory at Cheenaputtun, (*Madras*.) Accordingly the English joined him with a body of troops. In proof of the words "He who afforded assistance to the oppressor, shall fall under subjection to the very man he assisted,"—both these persons becoming the objects of the divine anger, sought assistance from these two infidel tribes, and proceeded to hostilities. It

was so decreed, however, that Anwar-oo-deen Khaun fell by the hand of Hoossain Doast Khaun. After this, Mohummud Alli Khaun, son of Anwar-oo-deen Khaun, giving up both his worldly and spiritual concerns, to the direction of the English, and making them his protectors, prepared for hostilities against Chunda Khaun. In the mean time, Nizam-ool Moolk died, and was succeeded by his son Naussir Jung; whom Mohummud Alli Khaun invited to join him: but before his arrival, Naussir Jung's nephew, Hidaayet Mohee-oo-deen Khaun, fled with a small body of troops to Pondicherry; and the French collecting a force which consisted of about a thousand men of their own nation, and about four thousand sepoys, proceeded with the troops of Hidaayet Mohee-oo-deen Khaun, against Naussir Jung; who joined with Mohummud Alli Khaun, after sustaining repeated engagements with the French, laid siege to the fortress of Gingee, which is situated on a hill, and was then in the possession of the French. The latter entering into a collusion with the Sirdars of Naussir Jung's army, attacked it in the night. After the alarm was given; Naussir Jung mounted his elephant; when a man, named Behauder Khaun, an Afghaan in his service, had the baseness to kill him by a musket shot, and causing his elephant to be driven close to that of Naussir Jung, cut off his head and stuck it on the point of a spear. Upon this event, the French set up Hidaayet Moohet-oo-deen Khaun as his successor, and, accompanied by a body of their own troops under the command of an officer named Bussy, directed his march towards Hydrabad. In the course of their march, they halted at the fort of Raychota, where the traitor Behauder Khaun, and the French troops commanded by Bussy, quarrelled about the division of the plundered treasure and jewels, and an engagement took place, in which Bahauder Khaun, and the other cursed Afghaan chief, were slain, and precipitated to hell. Hidaayet Mohee-oo-deen Khaun, also fell in this engagement by a musket shot. The French then conferred the succession on the worthless Salibut Jung, second son of Nizaum-ool-moolk, and proceeded with him to Hydrabad; whereby the whole of the Deccan may be said to have come under the authority of the French at Hydrabad. The French christians (who amounted to near 1,200 men) in a state of intoxication, in open day, entered the houses of the votaries of Islam, and violated numbers of their women. Many of the females of the nobles ripped up their own bellies, and threw themselves into wells. Hence all the inhabitants of Hydrabad conceived enmity against the French.

In the mean time Nizam Alli Khaun, son of Nizam-ool-moolk, imprisoned his elder brother Silabut Jung, and established himself in his room. A short time afterwards, when the utmost disagreement had taken place between the people of Hydrabad and the French, the worthless Bussy marched from that city with his troops and returned to Pondicherry: During these transactions Mohummud Alli Khaun, in conjunction with the English, carried on the war against Chunda Khaun, who was cordially the friend of the French. The armies of both the infidel nations contended for the province of Arcot, and after many battles and much bloodshed, the English and Mohummud Alli Khaun, having pledged their faith to him, and under that sanction made him their prisoner, put him to death,

and obtained possession of the whole of the Arcot province, yielding a yearly revenue of near four crores of rupees.

When the English had thus established themselves in Arcot, they turned their views to the conquest of Bengal. To this end, with the same treachery and deceit which has been above described, they applied to the viceroy of Bengal also for a spot of ground; and having obtained possession of sufficient for a single house, they there stationed their people as for the purposes of trade, and waited their opportunity. About this time the viceroy of Bengal died, and contentions arose among his children and relations. The English taking part with the one, they subdued the other; and rendering that other entirely dependant upon them, obtained possession of the whole dominion of Bengal, a territory consisting of four Soobahs, and yielding an annual revenue of twenty crores of rupees. Not far from thence is a place called Lucknow, the ruler of which was Mirza Amauni* (*Assof-oo-Dowlah*) son of Shudah-oo-Dowlah. By intrigue and chicanery with him, they (*the English*) intruded themselves into that country also. What is more extraordinary is this: lately Mirza Amauni sent an ambassador to Zemaun Shah, the King of Cabul. This circumstance coming to the knowledge of the English (*Governor*) General † who resides at Calcutta, he proceeded thence on a visit to Mirza Amauni, and having leagued with the ministers of that country, caused Mirza Amauni to be poisoned, violated the chastity of his widow, and plundered his house of money and jewels, to the amount of twenty crores of Rupees. Throughout the territory of Bengal, wherever there were men of learning, science, and rank, the English have forcibly taken prisoners, wives and daughters, violated their chastity, and carried them off to their own islands and country; seizing the youths of the class of Syuds, ‡ devotees, and learned men, and obliging them to eat the flesh of swine, proclaimed it by beat of tom-tom. § In the country of Bengal, and in all other places where their authority prevail, they set up swine butchers, and cause them to sell the flesh of hogs publicly in the streets and markets.

All this power and authority have the English acquired in the space of forty years.

About twenty years ago, during the life-time of my late revered father Hyder Alli Khaun, disputes occurring among the worthless Sirdars of the Poonah infidels, Rogoo-naut Rao, the uncle of Narrain Rao, the head of the Poonah state, treacherously murdered his nephew: the turbulent spirit of the chiefs, however, obliged him to seek refuge at Bombay, a place in the possession of the English.

The English, obtaining from him money and jewels to a large amount,

* This is the name by which the late Vizier Assof-oo-Dowlah was called during the life-time of his father.

† Lord Teignmouth.

‡ The Syuds are those descended from the prophet.

§ A species of drum. Proclamations are usually made in India by beat of drum

detached an army with Roggoonaut Rao for the reduction of Poonah. The Poonah ministers, deceitfully selected a child of two or three days old from their own class, proclaimed him as the genuine offspring of the murdered Narrain Rao, and as the successor to the Musnud (*throne*) and assembling an army, marched to oppose the English and Roggoonaut Rao. Finding themselves unable to cope with the English, they repeatedly sent letters by ambassadors of rank to the presence of his late Highness (*Hyder Ali*) soliciting his assistance. His Highness prudently considering, that although it is declared "Heretics are impure," yet that it was more advisable to afford than refuse his assistance to the infidels belonging to the country (because the supremacy of the English was the source of evil to all God's creatures)—with a view to the aid of Poonah, marched to Madras with a vast army. Many engagements ensued, and many places fell, and Madras itself was near being taken; when it pleased God that his Highness should end his days in that expedition, and he died in the vicinity of Arcot. After this event, I continued the war; and after many victories, and the capture of numberless prisoners, the English sent their ambassadors, humbly, and by engagement and oath, to sue for peace. Although I was not myself disposed to grant them peace, yet by the earnest advice of the nobles of the Khoodadaud Sirkar, I consented. Four or five years after, when ambassadors from the Khoodadaud Sirkar, arrived at the Sublime Porte; * and after representing the sentiments of friendship, returned to the presence. The English, receiving information of this circumstance, with hearts inflamed, immediately conceived that all the tribe of Islaum were about to league together for their destruction. They knew too, that they had given your Highness proofs of their evil disposition, and therefore, uniting to themselves Nizam Alli Khaun, and the infidels of Poonah, they waged war against the Khoodadaud Sirkar for four years. At length, near a hundred thousand of the followers of the faith, had determined to slay their wives and families with their own hands, and rushing upon the infidels, drink the cup of martyrdom, and plunge the infidels into hell. The counsellors, the Lords, and the respected sages of Islaum, all agreed that this attack upon the dominions of Khoodadaud Sirkar was in consequence of the deputation of ambassadors with letters to the Sublime Porte, and therefore that it was advisable by any means to accommodate matters for the present; to communicate to your Highness all that occurred, and joined with your Highness's aid, proceed to exterminate the infidels. I approved the representation of my faithful servants, and surrendering three crores and thirty lacs of rupees in treasure, and half my country (which was all a dead loss to me) put an end to the contest.

The English having adopted a determined resolution to subdue the

* Tippoo Sultaan, in his letters to the French, ascribes the enmity of the British power to his friendship for them; in letters to Zemaun Shah, he ascribes it to his having deputed ambassadors to that Prince; and here he imputes it to his delegation of an embassy to the Ottoman Porte.—[Ed.]

whole of Hindoostan, and to subvert the Mussulman religion, and having united to themselves Nizam Ali Khan, and the infidels of Poonah, have for five years past been devising the means; accordingly they have lately written in plain and undisguised terms, that it is their intention to destroy the religion of Islam—"evil designs return upon the heads of the inventors." The infidels of Poonah, in consequence of the disagreements prevailing among the ministers at Delhi, have subverted that country, and having destroyed its houses, have erected their own temples on their ruins—they have possessed themselves entirely of that kingdom, whilst a poor sightless individual of the royal family of Delhi, whose servants put out his eyes, is seated in his house in a state the most abject. The resources of his maintenance are fixed from the sale of the fruits of his gardens; and he is obliged to pay the price (*of that maintenance*) by paying adulation to those treacherous infidels. Near five hundred thousand of the infidels of the district of Calicut, Nuzzurabad, Zafferabad, and Ashrufabad, who were wavering on the precincts of obedience, have been converted at different times. Praise be to God, that the whole energy of the well-directed mind of this labourer in the way of the Lord, on whose forehead is engraved the motto "They dread not the terrific day of judgment," is continually exerted to support the Religion of Mohummud. Accordingly, having lately been informed of the excessive commotions excited by the son of Abdool Wahaub* in the neighbourhood of Mecca the holy, I immediately addressed letters to the supreme minister Yoosuf Vizier, to the Sherreef of Mecca, and the servants of the holy receptacle (*meaning the place at Medina where Mohummud is buried*) purporting, that it was my intention to send a considerable force under the command of one of my approved sons, and desiring them to write to me a particular account of the situation of affairs in that quarter. For the illustrious Kaaba is the object of veneration to the followers of truth, and the object of the regard of the All Powerful; and to do services thereunto is productive of blessings, both in this world and the world to come.

The respected and accomplished Syuds, Syud Alli Mohummud and Syud Modanr-oo-deen, are now nominated and deputed with this friendly letter to represent various points of great importance, and to communicate the sentiments of my mind, and with instructions to remain in attendance on your Majesty during three years. I trust that they will be honoured by admission to your Highness's presence, and have an opportunity of a personal conference, and of stating to you my sentiments, and

* Abdool Wahaub, is the name of an enterprising Mahomedan Sceptic, who some years since established a new doctrine, the foundation of which is, the abjuration of the signal honours which are paid to Mohummud. His doctrine does not extend to a denial of the prophet's mission, but it places him in the condition merely of a messenger of the word of God, possessing in himself no title to the adoration of mankind. This man obtained very numerous proselytes, who traversed with him the countries of Syria, Arabia, and Egypt, propagating their tenets by the sword. His son succeeded him.—[Ed.]

that their representations will obtain full credit with your Highness. May the victorious banners of Islam be ever prevalent, and every trace of heresy and infidels be wiped away!

[A letter to the same effect as the foregoing, was also written to Zemaun Shah; several alterations, however, which were necessary to adapt the letter to the situation of Zemaun Shah, are inserted in the margin of the draft.]

(A true Translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XXI.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris, Lieut.-Governor of Madras.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, June 9th, 1798.

Although I imagine that the enclosed proclamation* must have reached you, I think it most advisable to transmit a copy of it to you. There seems to be so little doubt that the proclamation really was published at the Mauritius, that it must become a matter of serious discussion between this Government and Tippoo: how such a discussion may terminate it is utterly impossible to say. Perhaps the result of it may be, to prove that M. Malartic has exaggerated or wholly misrepresented the intentions of Tippoo; but on the other hand, if Tippoo should choose to avow the objects of his embassy to have been such as are described in the proclamation, the consequences may be very serious, and may ultimately involve us in the calamity of war. I wish you to be apprized of my apprehensions on this subject, and to prepare your mind for the possible event. You will therefore turn your attention to the means of collecting a force, if necessity should unfortunately require it; but it is not my desire that you should proceed to take any public steps towards the assembling of the army, before you receive some further intimation from me. In the interval you will have the goodness to keep this communication absolutely secret,† as the publi-

* See Vol. I. Intro.

† No individuals at Calcutta but Mr. G. H. Barlow (then Secretary to Government and Mr. Edmonstone then Persian Translator) knew anything of the proceedings of the Governor-General, and I have now before me the

cation of it might be attended with great danger. I propose to send you a letter to be forwarded to Tippoo in the course of a few days; by the same express you will receive my final decision upon the succession to the musnud of Tanjore,* which has been ready for despatch for some days, and has only been delayed by the translation of my letters to Ameer Sing and Serfogee. I return you many thanks for the letter from Major Agnew. I have been very diligently employed in endeavouring to collect a supply of money for the service of your government, and I hope to be able to forward a sum of eight or ten lacs of rupees to you in the course of a month; my wish is to send you fifteen, but I doubt whether I shall be able to provide so large a supply.†

I have the honour, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive, Governor of Madras.

MY LORD,

Fort William, October 11th, 1798.

I have the honour to transmit to you a paper containing intelligence of a most extraordinary nature,‡ but which I have every reason to credit. Your Lordship may be assured that I will, without delay, acquaint you with such suggestions as have arisen in my mind in consequence of this new feature in our situation. In the meanwhile, however, I will not omit even this occasion of renewing my earnest hope that you will compel the subordinate officers at Madras to proceed in forwarding your military preparations and the general arrangements for the defence of the Carnatic, with an alacrity proportioned to your Lordship's zeal for the public service. What has passed in the Guntgor Circar is a striking proof of

original copy of the depositions made by the mate and captain of a ship which had been at the Mauritius, who were privately examined by Lord Mornington and their examinations taken by Mr. Barlow.—[Ed.]

* See Vol. I. and Tanjore Supplement in this Vol.

† Only a part of this letter was given in Vol. I. p. 54.

‡ Referring to the landing of the French army in Egypt, and its meditated attack upon the British possessions in India.—[Ed.]

the mischief which may be occasioned by the indifference, negligence, or ill will of subordinate departments of office. It will be more owing to our good fortune than to any other cause if the whole of our plans for the expulsion of the French from Hyderabad are not frustrated by those who were employed to execute them: and this counteraction is to be apprehended at a moment when those who conduct the councils of both governments are animated by one spirit and united cordially in the same cause. Your Lordship will not be surprized if, under such circumstances, I should be desirous that the enquiry into the origin of our late embarrassments in the Guntoor Circar should be prosecuted with the utmost vigour; and the delinquents, if any, should be convicted, and punished with a severity, which shall teach every subordinate officer from one extremity of this great empire to the other, the duty of implicit and zealous obedience to the orders of government. Such an example I fear is become necessary, and it is peculiarly incumbent on us to enforce it at a moment when the pressure of affairs in every quarter leaves us no prospect of safety without unity of authority and promptitude of execution.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Fort William, Nov. 8th, 1798.

I have the honour to enclose a letter for Tippoo Sultaan,* the important nature of which induces me to convey it to your Lordship in this manner, rather than through the ordinary channel of communication. Your Lordship will have the goodness to forward the letter privately to Major Doveton together with the translation, and you will instruct him to forward it to Seringapatam without delay. You will take the trouble to enjoin Major Doveton to observe the strictest se-

* See Vol. I. p. 326.

secrecy with regard to the contents of this letter, and I am persuaded I need not point out to your Lordship the necessity of observing the same caution at Madras. When Tippoo's answer shall arrive at Fort St. George (your Lordship will have directed Major Doveton to transmit it privately to you) I request that you will open it for your own information. It will be necessary to use great caution in selecting a person on whose secrecy and discretion you can rely in the duty of translating Tippoo's answer for your Lordship. As soon as the translation shall have been made, I request you to forward the original to me by express under a private cover. Whatever may be the nature of Tippoo's answer, I am persuaded your Lordship will see that it should not in any degree divert us from the plain course of urging our war-like preparations with every degree of despatch. Your Lordship will recollect that his language was never more amicable or pacific than during the period of the residence of his ambassadors at the Isle of France.

I rejoice to hear that your battering train is in motion. I should be more at ease if I could think that your military Board was as zealous and cordial in its disposition to second our efforts in the public service as we could wish. But I am persuaded your Lordship will soon prove to them and to all who indicate symptoms of reluctant obedience, that such management instead of altering the course of public measures or of accommodating their form in any degree to the notions of these refractory servants, will answer no other purpose than to expose themselves to the certainty of censure, and to the risk of dismissal.

I am persuaded that the despatch of the 18th of June, 1798, from England,* was satisfactory to your Lordship.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* See Vol. I. p. 61.

No. XXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 14th Nov. 1798.

The cordial expressions of your approbation of the late measures at Hyderabad, and the zealous interest which you take in their prosperous issue confirm the impressions of respect and esteem which my intercourse with your Lordship had already produced upon my mind, and satisfy me, that in you I shall always meet with an unqualified and honourable support in the discharge of my arduous duties. Your Lordship may be assured that no part of my letters respecting the embarrassments of the Guntoor detachment was in any degree intended to express the slightest abatement of my entire confidence in your anxious solicitude for the success of my measures, and in your assiduous attention to the details of the public service. Some of my letters will have suggested to you the grounds of my apprehension that the instruments employed under your government are not as ready and willing as might be expected in such a crisis. On this subject I shall soon trouble you more fully; but I should be really unhappy, if the effect of any observation from me were to create a feeling of distress in a mind so framed as your Lordship's, or were to bear the appearance of conveying any insinuation unfavourable to the credit of a government, the honour and prosperity of which are inseparably united with my own. I have not yet been able to enter so accurately into the consideration of your letter in council on this subject, as to admit of my now giving a final opinion upon it, but within a few days you may rely on my opening my mind to your Lordship without reserve.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXV.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency General Anker.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 18th January, 1799.

Being charged with the general superintendence of the interests of the British nation in India, it is my duty to provide effectual protection against every danger which may threaten their security.

In the discharge of this duty I am concerned to find myself under the necessity of troubling your Excellency with a serious representation of the unwarrantable proceedings, not only of various persons protected by the Danish flag at Tranquebar, but of a member of the Government over which you preside.

The fictitious sea-passes which have for some time past been obtained from your Excellency's government for the purpose of covering the property of the enemies of Great Britain, under the mask of a fraudulent neutrality, and the information which has been conveyed constantly and assiduously to the French islands from Tranquebar, enabling the French to molest our commerce and protect their own, are circumstances so notorious and so injurious to every principle of the law of nations, as to warrant a strong remonstrance from the British Government. But as I have reason to believe that these practices have been conducted with such art as to have frustrated every effort of your Excellency's vigilance, I shall not at present trouble you on this part of the subject.

My present representation shall be confined to such transactions at Tranquebar, and to such correspondence carried on from thence, as tend to provoke or to favour direct hostility against the British Government; and I shall endeavour to state my determination on these points in such a manner as to preclude all future discussion.

The proclamation issued by the Governor-General of the French islands in the month of January, 1798, was published in this country in the month of June, 1798. The existence of an offensive alliance between Tippoo Sultaun and the French against the British Government in India was demon-

strated by that proclamation, and in consequence of so public an act of aggression, combined with other notorious circumstances of hostile preparation in Mysore, the British Government deemed it advisable to arm for the purpose of obtaining effectual protection and security against the designs of Tippoo Sul-taun and of the French. These transactions could not possibly be unknown at Tranquebar.

The Governor-General of the French Islands fulfilled his engagements under the alliance in question to the extent of the means which he possessed; and when the ambassadors of Tippoo Sul-taun returned to their master, they were accompanied by a body of Frenchmen and others enlisted by the ambassadors in the Isle of France under the terms of M. Malartic's proclamation, and for the express purpose of aiding in a war of aggression against the British possessions. These recruits were commanded by Messrs. Dubuc and Chapuy. The latter and his party still continue with Tippoo Sul-taun; but M. Dubuc was sent on a mission to Tranquebar, where he arrived with other Frenchmen in the month of August, 1798.

For the present, I wave the complaint which might justly be urged against the conduct of the government of Tranquebar in receiving with public honours an avowed agent of Tippoo Sul-taun and of the French, at a period when those powers had united in public preparations of hostility against the British possessions, and when that agent was employed to forward the same objects.

It is sufficient to remark, that M. Dubuc was known to your government in the character of an agent of Tippoo Sul-taun, who had entered into the service of that Prince under the terms of his recent engagements with the French, and for the avowed purpose of promoting the objects of an offensive alliance against the British Government.

The correspondence carried on by M. Dubuc from Tranquebar with Tippoo Sul-taun has been intercepted, and I now enclose a part of it to your Excellency. You will find (I trust with the same sentiments of astonishment and indignation which these letters raised in my mind), that a member of your government is distinctly stated by the French agent of Tippoo Sul-taun to have aided and abetted the system of correspondence and intrigue carried on by that agent, for the

accomplishment of the declared objects of his mission. That person is the second governor of Tranquebar, whose name I understand to be M. Lichtenstein.

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the original letter to which I now advert: the authenticity of this document is undeniable, and I am fully persuaded that this clear and incontrovertible evidence of a flagrant violation of the neutrality which M. Lichtenstein was bound to observe, will justify to your Excellency and to the world the requisitions which I now proceed to state to your Excellency in unequivocal terms.

On this single ground of M. Dubuc's intercepted letter, it is my duty and right to require that your Excellency should take effectual and speedy measures for securing the person of M. Lichtenstein, the second governor of Tranquebar; and that you should by the first opportunity send him to Europe, in order that such enquiry into his conduct may there be instituted, as his Danish Majesty in his wisdom may think proper to direct.

A denial of this just requisition would amount to a positive violation of neutrality on the part of the whole government of Tranquebar, and place them in the same predicament in which M. Lichtenstein now stands, that of a declared enemy of the British nation. I cannot suppose that your Excellency can refuse to remove from the seat of your government, for the judgment of your sovereign, a member of your government convicted of having aided an agent of our enemy in an attempt to provide the means of attacking our possessions.

The requisition which I have thus stated to your Excellency is further justified by circumstances which compel me to urge other demands of a similar nature.

Your Excellency does not require to be informed by me that a dangerous conspiracy has lately been discovered at Tranquebar, or that the object of the conspirators was to arm a number of Frenchmen and Topasses at Pondicherry, and in concert with their adherents at Tranquebar, and with such of the garrison of that place as could be seduced from their duty, either to join Tippoo Suldaun, should he enter the Carnatic, or if the British army should advance towards the frontier of Mysore, to form a small army on the coast for the purpose of offensive co-operation with that Prince.

The copy of an intercepted letter from a M. Pignolet residing at Tranquebar to Tippoo Sultaun has been already communicated to your Excellency. It deserves particular attention, that M. Dubuc publicly announced at Tranquebar, "That he had written to Tippoo Sultaun to demand that a body of not less than 2000 horse should be advanced towards the coast." And M. Dubuc stated "that this force would be under his orders."

This force was certainly intended for the purpose of forming a junction with the French at Pondicherry, and with the disaffected at Trahquebar.

A M. Poillevert is named in M. Dubuc's letters as being concerned in this design, and it appears that several other persons at Tranquebar embarked in the same project; the danger which this conspiracy menaces to the security of those interests which it is my duty to defend, is too obvious to require explanation. Your Excellency will I doubt not concur with me in opinion, that the necessity of insisting on the removal of M. Lichtenstein becomes more urgent in proportion to the magnitude of that danger; and I trust you will also admit my right to urge the further demand, that you should immediately secure the persons of M. Poillevert, of M. Dubuc, and of all who accompanied the latter from Seringapatam; M. Pignolet I understand is already in prison, where I must request you to detain him for the present.

My final request to your Excellency is, that you will take the first opportunity of expelling from the Danish limits Messrs. Dubuc, Poillevert, and Pignolet, with their adherents, and that you will for the future refuse the protection of the Danish flag to any agent or emissary of France or of Tippoo Sultaun who may repair to Tranquebar for purposes hostile to the British Government. I request your Excellency to understand that the requisitions which I have made respecting Messrs. Lichtenstein, Dubuc, Poillevert, and Pignolet, are considered by me to be founded in the perfect and unalterable claim of security, which is the most important branch of the rights of nations. The settlement of Tranquebar cannot expect to enjoy the advantages of neutrality, if its government shall afford protection to those who are actually employed in providing the means and instruments of war against the British possessions. To protect any indivi-

dual of this description is a forfeiture of the character of neutrality ; but to countenance practices of the nature which I have described in the person of a member of the government, would amount to an overt act of the most aggravated hostility.

Under all these circumstances I rely on your Excellency's acknowledged principles of justice and integrity, and on your regard for the faith and honour of your Sovereign, that you will immediately accede to the several demands stated in this letter, apprizing your Excellency at the same time of my unalterable opinion, that as these demands have not been made without full deliberation, to recede from any part of them would be a sacrifice of the most sacred obligations of my public duty.

I have the honour, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, 13th February, 1799.

The enclosed* will shew that the Sultaun is a little discomposed. You will observe how entirely he has perverted my letters, endeavouring to prove that I had authorized him to send for Major Doveton at his own will and pleasure. You will also remark that when his Highness pleases, he can forward a letter in *four days* from Seringapatam to Madras.

Yours most faithfully,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVII.

*William Palmer, Esq., Resident at the Peishwa's Court, to the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-General, &c. **

MY LORD,

Poonah, April 8, 1799.

Rubah Gauwar, vakeel at this court, has informed Moonshee Fuckeer ud Deen with whom he has long been on terms of great friendship and confidence, that having en-

* See Vol. I. page 433.

quired of Jahdoo Bauschar the state of affairs at Scindiah's Durbar, Bauschar communicated to him a plan concerted by the Peishwa and Scindiah to attack the Nizam, and eventually to form an alliance with Tippoo Suldaun.

2. Jahdoo Bauschar relates that in pursuance of this plan, a formal requisition under the signatures of Baajy Rao Emrut Row and Chimna appa was made to Scindiah to return to his cantonments. That the more immediate purpose of Scindiah's resuming this position is to secure the person of Nanna, and when this object shall be effected the Peishwa and Scindiah are to unite their forces and invade the Nabob's dominions. It is further provided that if the British Government shall engage in the defence of his Highness in opposition to the meditated attack as is expected, a Mah-ratta force shall be sent to the assistance of Tippoo.

3. I have no hesitation in giving credit to this information as far as it depends upon the characters and views of the principals said to be engaged in the plan; but I cannot obtain any satisfactory account of the motives which should induce Jahdoo Bauschar to disclose so important a secret to the friend of my Moonshee. Fuckeer ud Deen ascribes it to gratitude and attachment in the latter, for services formerly rendered to him by Rubah.

4. Jahdoo Bauschar is an old dependant of Baboo Khan Angria, and possesses the entire confidence of both that chieftain and Scindiah.

5. If on the one hand it may be doubted, that this man would be influenced by the motive assigned to so dangerous a confidence; it is on the other difficult to ascribe any reason for Rubah's fabricating such a communication, and Bauschar's relation is corroborated by Shesaudry Pundit, who has received similar information from another quarter as he has told Meer Fuckeer ud Deen whom I sent to him purposely to enquire. This testimony receives additional weight from the circumstances of Tippoo's vakeels having halted until this time, after the two successive marches which I informed your Lordship they had made, and which induced me to suppose, that they would prosecute their journey without further delay until Ranbah.

6. This shameful violation of the most solemn promises respecting the departure of the Mysore vakeels, certain.

information given to me of the Peishwa having within these few days received a letter from Seringapatam, and of an intercourse being still maintained between his agent Ragoo Pundit and the vakeels, impressing me with a conviction of his perfidious intention towards his allies; I conceived it my indispensable duty to remonstrate to him on these faithless proceedings, and to declare that I could no longer confide in his professions or designs and must in consequence of your Lordship's instructions direct the return of the Bombay detachment.

7. I have received a copy of your Lordship's letter of the 22nd ultimo to Lieut.-Colonel Little, I sincerely wish that the ships appointed to receive his detachment may have found him below the Ghauts, but I am yet without intelligence of his situation, and I fear that he must be in want of both money and provisions; in these circumstances I am not without suspicion of treachery from this Durbar in my correspondence with him.

8. The cases in which your Lordship has enjoined the reembarkation of the Bombay Detachment certainly exist; but I doubt whether Lieut.-Colonel Little will think himself competent to determine upon them as they have no dependence on his agency. The draft and carriage cattle were not to be provided by this government, but by me on the Company's account, and they were despatched so long ago as the 19th ultimo. The Durbar however certainly obstructed their proceeding as I informed your Lordship in my address of the 15th ultimo; the payment of the subsidy by this state is to be made to me, the abstracts of the actual disbursements of the detachment are drawn by the paymaster, either on Bombay or this Presidency, and must be defrayed whether a fund is secured to answer the subsidy or not. Colonel Little can have had no communication with Pursaram Bhow, but I have informed him of that chief's having declined the charge of the contingent, as well as of the general inability of this government to engage in any effectual co-operation with the troops of the allies.

9. I just now learn from the agent of the aumil of Rutnaghery, that Colonel Little had fixed on the 6th to commence his march through the Ghauts. If by these movements the detachment should miss the opportunity of returning by sea,

I shall direct Colonel Little to return to Bombay by the most direct practicable route.

10. I am firmly persuaded my Lord, that the services of the detachment would be totally lost in the present war, by its remaining in the Peishwa's territories, and that its detention or recal will make no difference in his conduct towards his allies. His professions in answer to your Lordship's representations, on his intercourse with Tippoo have been totally at variance with his actions, and can be considered only as mockery and insult, nor will he desist from his intrigues until the events of the war leave him exposed to your Lordship's resentment.

11. I forward to Mr. Edmonstone for your Lordship's information, copies of notes which have passed between Moonshes Fuker ud Deen and Gopaul Rao, in consequence of my directing the former to notify the intended recal of the detachment and the reasons for it, your Lordship will observe. In Gopaul Rao's answers, that although the continuance of the detachment is repeatedly desired, the flagrant deceit of detaining the vakeels so long after their pretended dismissal is not so much as attempted to be palliated, nor the existing intercourse with them and their master denied; neither have I yet received any formal satisfactory security or obligation for the payment of the subsidy, though the minister has informed me that Rowah has engaged to discharge it, and the latter acknowledges that he has.

12. The appointment of a force to serve as the Peishwa's contingent in the war against Tippoo, and of an officer to conduct it, is in the same state of uncertainty, as when the standard of the empire was erected near the beginning of December last.

13. Although both the Peishwa and Scindiah may be induced by their pecuniary necessities to temporize with Tippoo, I am of opinion that the Sultaun will experience only disappointment and the loss of his money in any negociation or engagement into which he may enter with them; unless it can be supposed that he will supply them with a sum sufficient to indemnify them for the retribution which the allies would exact from them. Nor do I think it likely that they will unite in the execution of any part of the plan related in the beginning of this letter, except the seizure of Nanna. It

is however necessary to watch the transactions of both Durbars with particular attention, and I trust that I shall not be unapprized of any measures which can materially affect the interests of the Company or its allies.

14. Last night Nana Furnavees sent for Moonshee Fuker ul Deen, he expressed great uneasiness at the recal of the Bombay detachment; but acknowledged that the measure was justified by the conduct of the Peishwa. He had endeavoured he said, to throw a veil over the defects of his master, but they were too glaring to be concealed. He wished the detachment to be continued, that the appearances of harmony and alliance might be preserved, and he declared, that he had no share in the proceedings which had justly excited your Lordship's displeasure. He was uninformed of any reasons for the detention of Tippoo's vakeels after they left Poonah, except such as they assigned themselves, which were the want of carriage and the dangers of the road.

15. Nana said, that he was fully informed of the designs meditated by the Peishwa and Scindiah against the Nizam and himself, and to mark the character of Scindiah, said, that he had lately received proposals from him for deposing the Peishwa.

16. He then told Meer Fukir ul Deen, that he must hurry him away, as he momentarily expected a visit from the Peishwa and Emrut Row, for the purpose of reconciling him with the latter, by the Peishwa's particular request, but he did not trust to this specious kindness, and rather considered it as an artifice to betray him more effectually.

17. Fuker ul Deen had only to reply to the minister's desire of retaining the detachment, which he told him could not be complied with, as he had not even attempted to give any assurance of its being employed in conjunction with the forces of this state against the common enemy, and had acknowledged that neither his own power nor the Peishwa's sincerity were to be depended upon.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. PALMER.

No. XXVIII.

*Lieut-General Sir Alured Clarke to the Marquess Wellesley.**

MY DEAR LORD,

Barrackpore, Jan. 27th, 1800.

I was honoured with your letter last night, but not till it was too late to answer it; permit me therefore, now to thank you for the extremely kind communication of the copy of your letter to the Court of Directors that accompanied it.

If I was to withhold an explicit avowal of the genuine satisfaction I felt on reading those parts of it which mention my humble services in a manner so highly honourable and flattering to me, I should be guilty of insincerity; and might appear devoid of that gratitude which I have pride in acknowledging to be due to your Lordship for so favorable a testimonial of your friendship and good opinion.

That circumstances, though of the public nature you so kindly describe, should have occurred to render me a less active instrument than I once expected to have been made in accomplishing the great and glorious work,† that by the wisdom and energy of your mind, was planned and executed with such complete success, would not but be somewhat mortifying to me; particularly as neither my friends or the public could know the cause. The pleasure however, that I experienced in the more than commonly fortunate result of the campaign found no alloy in my breast on this account; but if such sensation had been possible, your Lordship's liberal conduct towards me in the present instance would wholly have removed it.

I am ashamed to have taken up so much of your time on so selfish a subject, but the gratification your Lordship's kindness has afforded me would not allow me to be shorter, and will, I hope, plead my excuse.

I have the honour to be with true respect and esteem,
my dear Lord,

your faithful friend, and
humble servant

ALURED CLARKE.

* Referred to in Vol. II. p. 202, letter LX.

† The fall of Seringapatam and the annihilation of the French power in the South of India.—[Ed.]

No. XXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Hugh Inglis, Esq.

DEAR SIR,

Fort William, Jan. 27, 1800.

I return you many thanks for your obliging letters of the and 27th of September, 1799. The last I received at Fort William, on the 13th of January, 1800. It is highly satisfactory to me to find, that the solid advantages of our late glorious success* were so immediately anticipated in England: I trust in God that my brother Henry is now in London, and that my two treaties, together with the proceedings of the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, have given as general satisfaction in England as they have in India. I flatter myself that the settlement of Mysore has even surpassed your expectations.

The annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas, with the immediate increase of your revenue from your new territorial acquisitions, constitute an ample indemnification for the expenses of the war, and I have the pleasure to add, that the subsidy has been already paid with the utmost punctuality, and that no delay is likely to occur in the realization of the greater part of your new revenue. These circumstances are indeed most extraordinary, and I confess that they have exceeded any hope I had formed of the resources of a country which had so lately been the seat of war: all my accounts concur in stating the recovery of the country to be nearly as rapid as was the progress of our arms. I am persuaded you will feel a deep interest in its prosperity, not only from motives of humanity, but because the dominions of the Rajah of Mysore are inseparable from those of the Company, and he is as dependent on our power as the Nabob of Bengal or the Rajah of Benares.

I am extremely happy to find, that the Court of Directors entertain a due sense of the merits of Lord Clive, and of the advantages resulting from the cordiality which subsists between his Lordship's government and mine: as that cordiality is founded on sentiments of public duty, as well of private esteem, I trust it can never be shaken.

Believe me, dear Sir, with sincere regard and esteem,
your faithful servant,

MORNINGTON.

* Seringapatam.

[SUPPLEMENT—TANJORE.]

No. I.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris, Acting Governor of Madras.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, June 10, 1798.

This letter will be accompanied by a packet, containing my final decision upon the important question of the succession to the Musnud of Tanjore. As it is extremely desirable that the whole arrangement should be completed as speedily as possible, I trust that you will have the goodness to enter upon it without delay. It will not be necessary to wait for the arrival of Lord Clive, as nothing has happened which can possibly have varied the determination of the government at home. It is therefore my wish that you should proceed to the deposition of Amer Sing, and the restoration of Serfojee as soon as the proclamation, together with the other necessary papers can be ready for publication at Tanjore. The Residents at the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah should be furnished with copies of the proclamation, and of the questions put to the Pundits, with their answers; but they should be cautioned not to make any appeal to either of those courts on the subject of our proceedings at Tanjore; my only object being merely to put the Residents in possession of the grounds upon which the settlement of the Musnud has been made.

The public letter from this government is an exact transcript of a minute recorded by me,* and contains so full a detail of my views of the whole question, that I do not feel it to be necessary to trouble you at any length in this letter.

* See Vol. I. page 41.

You will perceive that my opinion has changed upon a fuller consideration of some parts of the subject. I think the assumption of the whole country without the consent of Serfogee even for the short period of a year, might bear a very odious appearance in the eyes of the native powers. But if Serfogee should really be sensible of the advantages to be derived to his own interests, as well as to those of his people from entrusting the management of his country to the servants of the Company for one or two years, I think such a measure would be very beneficial to all parties. On this point, however, my desire is, that the inclination of Serfogee should dictate the arrangement, and that no other means than those of advice and persuasion should be used to induce him to propose such a measure: the proposal must come from himself in a formal manner, and must originate in his conviction of the utility of the arrangement to his permanent welfare. I am persuaded that you will use the utmost caution in the choice of the commission. I shall naturally be very anxious to learn the most exact intelligence of the manner in which this important measure is carried into effect, and I shall also hope to receive from time to time the reports of the commission in order to enable me to complete my intentions of securing the ease and welfare of the new Rajah, the prosperity of his people, and the interests of the Company on a solid foundation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. II.

(Private Minute of Mr. Dundas afterwards Lord Melville.)

Walmer Castle, Sept. 11, 1797.

I have read with great attention the voluminous collection of papers relative to the Tanjore succession, containing an account of what passed both in 1787, and likewise of the investigation which has taken place at a very recent period. If the materials upon which the right decision of this question depends, rested on a few partial or equivocal documents, I should feel it impossible to disturb the possession which has been held in conse-

quence of the determination given by Sir Archibald Campbell in 1787 ; but when the whole evidence is collectively considered, and a great part of which consists of the information got from Bengal, through the medium of persons who cannot possibly have any interest in the question, it is impossible for me to entertain a doubt that the present Rajah holds his situation by error, or more probably by corruption, and that the adopted son of the late Rajah has been unduly deprived of his rightful inheritance through the injustice of the present possessor of the throne of Tanjore, carried into effect under the authority of our government.

Under these circumstances, now that the falsehood and injustice is clearly detected, I find it very difficult indeed to discover any principle upon which the British Government can co-operate in longer supporting this usurpation.

I am perfectly aware that a difficulty of considerable weight occurs against carrying this opinion into execution, it may be thought liable to the imputation of our wantonly and capriciously interfering in the succession and internal concerns of the native powers with whom we are connected, and thereby subjecting the national character to jealousy and reproach.

Both the principle of this objection, and the conclusion stated to result from it, are of such magnitude as undoubtedly to merit every attention, and if the unjust possession of the present Rajah and the deprivation of the rightful heir had taken place in consequence of any of those violences and convulsions by which the native governments in India are so apt to be distracted, I should have thought the objection insurmountable; but it must be recollected, that we are in a great degree the authors of this injustice. It was produced by our interference, obtained through the misrepresentations and corruptions of the person who is now reaping the benefit of it, and the rightful heir has a just claim that we should interfere to remedy that injustice which originated in our interference. If after such a lapse of time the native powers were to observe us interfering in order to carry into effect any forfeiture in our own favour, it would afford just cause of reproach, but in the present instance we would appear in the fair light of honourably repairing that injury which we ourselves have been the innocent instruments of committing.

At the same time that we are interfering to do justice to the rightful heir, we ought not to forget the claims the country has to our protection against oppression, and we have likewise a fair right to take care that the interests ascertained to us in the revenues of Tanjore be better guarded than they have been by any former treaties. The allegations which have been made to the Madras government, relative to the state of the Tanjore country, have been so contradictory and so much controverted, I don't think we should rest on the evidence we are yet in possession of respecting the oppressions or mismanagement said to exist in that country.

A commission, consisting of two or three of the most upright and intelligent servants upon the Madras establishment, and totally unconnected by local residence, or otherwise with any of the violent altercations which have hitherto so agitated the contending parties in that country

should be appointed to examine and accurately report the real state of the country, and according to the results of that report the new Rajah should be called upon to agree to such conditions and limitations in the management of his country as may ensure a just administration to his subjects, tending equally to protect them against oppression, and to secure us effectually in the regular and permanent payment of that contribution to which we are entitled under the treaty entered into with Lord Cornwallis.

I doubt much if this last point can in any way be effectually arranged, unless we are admitted either into the possession, or into some equally efficient control of the management of those districts, over which by the existing treaties, our security extends in the event of a failure, in the regular payment of the Rajah's instalments.

[SUPPLEMENT—CARNATIC.]

No. I.

*Abstract Narrative of Proceedings relative to the Settlement of the Carnatic.
By Major (afterwards) Sir John Malcolm.*

Calcutta, 14th August.

Omdut ul Omrah the late Nabob of the Carnatic succeeded his father on the 16th of October, 1795.

He took possession of the Musnud under the conditions of the treaty concluded between his father and the Marquess Cornwallis in 1792.

Omdut ul Omrah is specifically named in the preamble to that treaty, as the successor and eldest son of the Nawaub Mahomed Aly Khaun, and under that designation he is made a party in the engagement.

The treaty of 1792 which may be termed an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, was formed by Lord Cornwallis in the same spirit of honourable confidence, and dignified moderation, which marked every measure of that nobleman, but more particularly characterized the previous treaty into which he had entered in the hour of victory, with the late Tippoo Suldaun.

That a proceeding so generous should have failed of making those impressions which were expected, can alone be attributed to the perverseness and depravity of the natives of India in general, and in particular of those individuals whose safety it was intended to secure, and whose interest it was meant to promote. But though it failed in the object proposed, that of attaching the parties concerned to the British Government, it was of the highest advantage to the reputation of that nation, as it proved in the first instance, in the most demonstrative manner, the principles by which the British Government desired to regulate all its transactions with the native powers of India; whilst it established in the second, in a manner still less doubtful, the positive necessity of some departure from a system which, so far from being properly understood by those whom it was intended to benefit, was invariably considered as arising from weakness and apprehension, and viewed in that light, proved a constant incitement to revolt and hostility even in those who owed every thing they possessed to its operation.

The treaty of 1792 was soon found both by the administration at home and by the government abroad, to have produced few of those salutary effects which were anticipated; Mahomed Aly Khaun after its conclusion, pursued a conduct not more at variance with his own interests and with

those of the Company, than destructive to the happiness of his subjects and the prosperity of his country.

When Lord Hobart was appointed Governor of Fort St. George in 1794, he was instructed by the Court of Directors to endeavour to negotiate a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty on principles which were calculated to secure the interests of the Company, to improve the condition of the inhabitants of the Carnatic and to put an end to those vexatious disputes, which, from the perverse characters of the Nabob and his principal servants, were found to attend the fulfilment of several of the most important stipulations of the treaty of 1792.

The obstinate and intemperate resistance, which the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah (who succeeded his father soon after Lord Hobart's arrival) opposed to all his Lordship's endeavours to negotiate a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, appeared at the moment inexplicable, and the influence attributed to some low and interested counsellors, seemed insufficient to account for his steady refusal to listen to an arrangement which was so eagerly pressed upon his acceptance by his Majesty's Ministers, the Court of Directors, and the government of Fort St. George; and which could not under any construction be judged injurious to his personal interests or his power, as long as he stood in the relation he then bore to the Company.

That the Nabob's conduct in this instance was partly influenced by other motives than those which could have been suspected at the period of his negotiation, must since his secret views have been developed be evident. Acting with the schemes of independence on his mind which he unquestionably entertained at that period, it was impossible he could ever consent to make any territorial cessions as such would have been to diminish the only means through which he could ever hope to accomplish his projects of ambition.

When the Marquess Wellesley arrived at Madras in 1798, he employed the few days he remained at that Presidency (previously to embarking for Calcutta) in fruitless attempts to effect the same object, and the impression made upon his Lordship's mind by the mode in which the Nabob treated his proposal, was that further negotiation was useless; though he at the same time felt and expressed a conviction, that every moment tended more to prove the indispensable necessity of some arrangement to save the Company from loss, the Nabob from ruin, and the inhabitants of the country from misery; all which he considered the inevitable consequences of permitting affairs to remain in the state they were placed by the treaty of 1792.

When Lord Wellesley returned to Fort St. George to prosecute the war against Tippoo Sultaun in 1799, he became still more sensible of the inconveniences of the existing engagements with the Nabob which were aggravated by the conduct of that Prince, who on that critical occasion acted more like an enemy than a friend.

The want of exertion of his officers in every part of his government, when supplies were collecting for the army and the manner in which some of them obstructed that service, gave rise to suspicions in the mind

of the Governor-General, which were confirmed by a personal act of the Nabob's that had nearly defeated every object of the war. His Highness agreed on certain conditions to advance three lacs of pagodas for the immediate use of the army then on the eve of marching into Mysore; all the conditions which he required were agreed to by the Governor-General, and the Nabob succeeded so fully in establishing a belief of his sincerity respecting this important supply (the promise of which he reiterated in the most positive manner the very day the army moved) that all the cash in the treasury was appropriated in the confidence of its receipt, and it is impossible to calculate the evils which might have been the result of this deceit, had not the treasure arrived from Bengal. Lord Clive concludes a paper on the Nabob's conduct in this transaction with the following remarkable words. "I am unwilling to attribute systematic treachery to the Nabob, but I have looked in vain for another motive to account for his extraordinary conduct."

The impression made on the mind of the Governor-General by this conduct of the Nabob and his officers was such, that the Governor-General repeatedly declared that, if the Nabob had been decidedly in league with the enemy, he could not have adopted measures more calculated to embarrass the operations of the British Government and to favour the cause of the enemy than those which the Nabob and his officers had pursued, and that the conduct of the Nabob could not be rationally explained on any other grounds than that he actually was in league with Tippoo Sultaan.

In the month of April Lord Wellesley proposed a modification of the treaty of 1792 in a mode, and under circumstances, which had the Nabob not acted from motives irreconcilable to his own interests, as well as those of the Company, must have ensured success. This proposal was not only rejected but treated in a style which shewed the Nabob's positive determination to listen to no others of a similar nature. In his answer to this proposition the Nabob brought forward a claim of participation in the territories which had been subdued in the course of the war as extravagant as it was unfounded; he also denied in the most peremptory terms, the existence of that confusion in his government, or that embarrassment in his affairs, which Lord Wellesley had stated, and complained of the injury which he sustained from the credit given to reports to his disadvantage.

The false assertions, and the erroneous principles, contained in this letter of the Nabob's, furnished the most deplorable proofs of his dependence upon a low and intriguing set of individuals, who, dead to every principle but the promotion of their own interests, offered a violent opposition to all arrangements which were likely, by laying the basis of an orderly and just administration, to put an end to a system of usury, fraud, and oppression, on the continuance of which, the accomplishment of their hopes depended.

Soon after the capture of Seringapatam, documents were discovered among the secret records of the Sultaan, containing the most conclusive evidence of a secret intercourse between the Nabobs Walajah and Omdut

ul Omrah, and Tippoo Sultaun, directed to purposes hostile to the interests of the Company. These documents whilst they showed the imminent danger to which the English Government had been exposed, by the secret treachery of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali Khaun and Omdut ul Omrah, demanded the immediate exercise of all the wisdom and vigour of the government to counteract so dangerous a spirit of disaffection in an ally the nature of whose connection with the Company furnished him with the most dangerous of all means to strike a fatal blow at the interests of that state.

The documents discovered at Seringapatam were carefully examined and reported upon, under the orders of the Governor-General, by Mr. Ed. Rhonstone the Persian translator, and the evidence of those documents appeared to establish the following conclusions, in the most satisfactory manner.

1st. That in violation of an express article of the treaty of 1792, the Nabob Mahomed Aly Khaun by the agency and with the concurrence of his eldest son Omdut ul Omrah maintained a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun (through the medium of Gholam Aly Khaun and Aly Reza, Vakeels of that Prince.) That this secret intercourse was directed to objects hostile to the interests of the Company, and was consequently subversive of the fundamental principles of his alliance with the Company.

2nd. That the Nabobs Mahomed Aly Khaun and Omdut ul Omrah had made communications to Tippoo Sultaun on political subjects of a nature calculated to promote the interests of that Prince and eventually to injure those of the Company.

3rd. That the Nabob had both by communications from himself personally, and through Omdut ul Omrah to Gholam Aly Khaun and Aly Reza, manifested his marked disapprobation of the triple alliance (the English, Nizam, and Mahrattas) which had reduced the power of the Sultaun; and that he had on such occasions stigmatized the Nizam, as having acted contrary to the dictates of religion, which required that all true believers should join in support of that cause, of which he repeatedly stated, he considered Tippoo Sultaun the chief pillar.

4th. That the evidence contained in the communications made to Tippoo Sultaun by his vakeels, of the treacherous nature of the intercourse subsisting between the Nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah and Tippoo Sultaun, was confirmed by the discovery of a cypher, the key to which was found among the Sultaun's secret records, and which was not only written in the same hand in which all the letters of the Nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah to the English Government are written, but noted at the bottom by Tippoo's head Moonshy, as a paper of Omdut ul Omrah, and several of the fictitious designations in this cypher were found to have been used in the correspondence. If the very circumstance of Omdut ul Omrah's having transmitted a cypher to Tippoo Sultaun, was not of itself sufficient to establish the treacherous nature of his views, the names, which it was discovered by the key to the cypher were used to signify the English and their allies, removed all doubts upon this subject;

the English were designed by the name of *Tara Wareda* or *New Comers*, the Nizam by that of *Heech* or *Nothing*, and the Mahrattas by that of *Pooch* or *Contemptible*.

5th. That Omdut ul Omrah continued this secret intercourse as late as the year 1796, as appears by a letter found in the Suldaun's records, which though it has neither seal nor signature, is written by the person who wrote all the Nabob's letters to the British Government, and has the name of Gholam Hussein upon the cover, which it is established by incontrovertible documents, was the fictitious name, under which the Nabob corresponded in his own hand-writing with Gholam Aly Khan in 1794. The authenticity of this letter is also proved by its being found in the Suldaun's records along with the other correspondence of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and its evident connection with those letters, in subject.

These were the principal points which appeared to be established by the documents found in Tippoo's palace; they were not only in violation of the spirit of the whole treaty of 1792, but in direct breach of the letter of one of its most important articles, (the tenth) which expressly stipulates, "That the Nabob shall not enter into any negotiation or political correspondence with any European or Native power whatever without the consent of the Company."

That this article (which every person who consults the treaty of 1792, must consider as the most essential of the whole treaty, as it relates to the security of the British Government) was completely violated, there could not remain a doubt; and as it is established by the law of nations that the violation of any one article, but more particularly of a fundamental one, of a treaty, overthrows the whole; the treaty of 1792 was of course to be considered as dissolved, and the line to be pursued by the injured party was that, which a due regard for its own safety and interests, combined with a respect for the law of nations, demanded.

The relation in which the Nabob stood to the British Government was that of a dependent ally, whose rank and power had been preserved from motives of justice, not of policy; and who owed his accession to the musnud upon the same conditions which his father enjoyed it, to the honourable adherence of the English nation to its engagements, even when such were evidently in direct opposition to its interests.

The conduct which the Nabob had pursued from the commencement of his reign, has been already stated, and proves what sacrifices the English Government made, rather than violate in the smallest degree their good faith with his Highness. To preserve that faith the Company had been exposed to loss, and the Nabob had been permitted to involve himself in ruin, to destroy those resources on which not only his own safety, but that of the Company might eventually depend, and to impoverish and render miserable by his mismanagement, the country and inhabitants subject to his authority.

The overt acts of the Nabob previously to the discovery of his treachery though they might not be of a nature to absolve the Company from the obligation of an engagement into which they had deliberately entered, could not but operate unfavourably for him, in the situation in which his

own perfidy had placed him by diminishing his claim to a confidence and generosity which he had so systematically abused.

The light in which the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors viewed the conduct of the Nabob previously to the discovery of his treachery, appears from their despatch to Lord Wellesley under date the 18th of June, 1799, in which they express themselves as follows:—

“ In the event of a war with Tippoo Suldaun, the respective countries of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore will of course come under the Company’s management, and we direct that they be not relinquished without special orders from us, or from the Court of Directors for that purpose, in order to afford sufficient time for the formation of arrangements for relieving those respective Princes from all incumbrances on their revenues.”

This order from the Secret Committee shewed that the Indian Government in England considered the general conduct of Omdut ul Omrah, previously to the discovery of his treachery, of a nature to warrant their directing a departure from the stipulations of the treaty of 1792, of which the restoration of the Nabob’s country at the conclusion of the war, unless in certain cases (which are afterwards specified and which had not occurred at the date of the Committee’s orders) is an express condition.

This instruction, though it did not directly apply to the precise case under the consideration of the Governor-General, was conclusive as to the principle upon which the Court of Directors desired all transactions with the Nabob should be regulated.

The evidence of the Nabob’s treachery, which was as positive as it ever can be expected to obtain in such cases, added to his Highness’s conduct, which in every act, from the day of his accession, corroborated the truth of that evidence, would certainly have justified the Governor-General in immediately proceeding against him as an enemy to the state; and the intimacy of his connection with the Company, increased the danger to be apprehended from his defection; as his objects could only be accomplished by an insurrection in their own territories, and its having been proved that he had such measures in contemplation, appeared to forbid a moment’s reliance being put upon his acting under any impulse but that of the most desperate ambition, whenever an opportunity should occur for the gratification of it.

Lord Wellesley, though aware of the risk which might attend any delay in a case of so delicate and dangerous a nature, a risk which was rendered more serious by the disturbed state of most of the territories under Fort St. George, preferred incurring that danger to the adoption of any measures which might be deemed precipitate in an affair where the honour of the British nation was so much concerned. Acting upon that principle, his Lordship contented himself in the first instance with writing to the Government of Madras to prosecute their enquiry into the Nabob’s conduct by a personal examination of the vakeels Gholam Aly and Aly Reza Khan, and some other officers of the late Tippoo Suldaun, transmitting at the same time all the documents which had been discovered, with the Persian Translator’s report, and expressing his opinion

that, though the proofs obtained, were no doubt sufficient to justify the British Government in immediately depriving the Nabob of the means of abusing the protection of the Company, yet he had judged a cautious and moderate proceeding to be more consistent with the character and reputation of the British Government.

His Lordship had directed that the government of Madras should take no decisive steps in this affair unless the Nabob died (an event rendered probable from the bad state of his Highness's health) in which case the Madras Government was directed to raise one of two persons to the musnud, either Hussein Aly, the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, or Azeem ul Dowlah, the acknowledged son of Ameer ul Omrah; but as neither of these had a specific claim to the succession from the stipulations of the treaty of 1792, or from being heir to Omdut ul Omrah, whose own right was then considered by the Governor-General to be forfeited, the Government of Madras was prohibited from elevating either of them to the musnud, unless under the previous condition of their resigning to the Company the civil and military administration of the Carnatic; and as the elevation of either was to be considered as a measure of expediency, not of right; the Government of Madras was directed to make the first offer to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, and in the event of his refusing to subscribe to those conditions, which were thought indispensably necessary for the security of the Company's interest, the prosperity of the country, and the happiness of its inhabitants, to make a similar proposition to Azeem ul Dowlah, on whose refusal they were to refer for further orders to the Governor-General.

A remarkable fact is proved by this letter of instructions to the Government of Fort St. George, which is dated the 28th of March, 1800, long before any question of the respective claims to the succession was agitated. It appears from this document that the impression upon the Governor-General's mind was, that the right of inheritance, if any such had existed, belonged to Azeem ul Dowlah, and that the elevation of Aly Hussein, the reputed son, would probably give great disgust to the Mahomedans, and induce efforts to defeat the succession.

The Governor-General's reasons for directing the first option to be given to Aly Hussein are expressly stated in this letter to proceed from causes unconnected with any admission of his claim or title to the musnud. His elevation was to be considered an act of grace, and as such it could not be deemed improper to combine it with a promotion of the interests of the Company, and the full security of the British interests in the Carnatic.

The result of the enquiry which Lord Clive instituted in consequence of the Governor-General's orders, went to establish the principal facts of the treachery both of Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah; the evidences examined were, Gholam Aly Khan and Aly Reza Khan, and though some parts of the former proofs were invalidated, all the chief points upon which the proof of the Nabob's violation of the treaty of 1792 rested, were fully confirmed by their depositions.

The whole of these voluminous examinations, accompanied by a report

from Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe (the gentlemen who conducted the enquiry,) were transmitted to the Governor-General by Lord Clive, with a letter from himself under date the 23rd of May. The impressions which this farther prosecution of the enquiry into the conduct of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah made upon Lord Clive's mind, will be best judged from the two following paragraphs which concluded his Lordship's official address upon this occasion.

“With this strong evidence of internal treachery and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty; it is my deliberate opinion, that a farther adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah has been and now is perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the Company, would be as inconsistent with the true principles of public faith as it would be obviously incompatible with the preservation of our just rights and interests.

“On these grounds I have no hesitation in recommending to your Lordship the immediate assumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic under such provisions as your Lordship may be pleased to authorize for his Highness the Nabob, his Highness's family, and the principal officers of his government.”

Upon the receipt of this despatch the Governor-General resolved to proceed to Fort St. George as soon as the season permitted, for the purpose of settling in person an arrangement which should effectually secure the interests of the Company in the Carnatic, and in consequence of this determination, he gave no further instructions to Lord Clive upon the subject until the month of March, 1801, when finding that the state of affairs in Oude, combined with other circumstances relative to the general government of India, made it impossible for him to leave Fort William, he directed Lord Clive to send Mr. Webbe, the chief executive officer of the Madras Government, to Bengal, in order to have the fullest communications with that officer previously to issuing his final instructions for the settlement of the Carnatic, and several other important points intimately connected with that arrangement.

When Mr. Webbe was at Fort William, to which he had proceeded in consequence of the above orders, the alarming state of the Nabob's health induced Lord Clive to address a letter to Lord Wellesley, stating the conduct which he had resolved to pursue if the Nabob died previously to his receiving final instructions.

In this letter, which is dated the 21st of May, 1801, Lord Clive states that, though the Governor-General's letter of the 26th of March, 1800, prescribes the line of conduct he is to follow if the event apprehended should occur previously to his receiving further orders, he cannot but think circumstances, which have happened since that letter was written, may so materially have altered the whole case under consideration, as to render it probable that any measures grounded upon the Governor-General's instructions of that date, would be more likely to defeat than promote any objects which Lord Wellesley might have in contemplation, in consequence of the information he had obtained since that period. His

Lordship in the same letter stated, that if the Nabob should die previously to the arrival of further instructions, he would not follow those he had already received, but assume the civil and military government of the Carnatic in the name of the Company until a plan for its government should be finally arranged.

Lord Wellesley was at the period of receiving this despatch from Lord Clive in possession of every information and of every opinion which could guide or influence his judgment, on the decision of this important affair; sufficient time had elapsed from the first discovery of the original documents in the palace of Seringapatam for his Lordship to receive answers to the despatches he had sent upon that occasion to England.

A letter from the President of the Board of Control, fully concurred in the conclusions he had drawn from these documents, and in the measures which he had declared his intention of adopting, and a despatch from the Select Committee of the Court of Directors under date the 4th of December 1800, expressed their entire approbation of the resolution which the Governor-General informed them (in a letter under date the 9th of June 1800,) he had taken of demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut ul Omrah than the Company then possessed. The Secret Committee distinctly state in this despatch, that many other circumstances might in their opinion be urged besides those adduced by Lord Wellesley, to strengthen the doubts of the Nabob's fidelity to the fundamental principles of his engagements with the Company, and they particularly instance the mode in which he evacuated the Fort of Chandnagerry in 1796, on which they remark, "That a more decided instance of disaffection to the Company can scarcely be imagined."

In the full possession of the general sentiments of his superiors in England with an improved knowledge of every particular that had attended this important affair, Lord Wellesley sent his final instructions with respect to the measures that were to be pursued by Lord Clive.

These instructions which were dated the 28th of May, after taking a complete review of the whole affair, and showing in the most incontrovertible manner that his Highness the Nabob was reduced by his own conduct to the condition of a public enemy, that he had forfeited every claim to the confidence of the Company; and that it was neither conformable to the dictates of wisdom or prudence, nor reconcilable to justice or policy, to permit him to retain the possession of actual resources, greater than were requisite for the support of the rank, which it should be judged proper to permit him to hold in the Carnatic; directed Lord Clive to stipulate with his Highness for the complete resignation of the civil and military government of that Province, and to grant him (upon his agreeing to that and some other conditions) a stipend not exceeding three, and not under two lacs of pagodas annually; independent of a provision for the other branches of the family, and for his principal officers which was to be made from the revenues of the Carnatic.

Upon this basis, Lord Clive was instructed to negotiate a treaty with the Nabob, and he was authorized for the purpose of obtaining his High-

ness's consent to the terms proposed, to make him acquainted with the proofs of his treachery which were in the possession of the British Government.

Lord Wellesley expressly stated, that the proposition of forming a treaty on this occasion was dictated by a desire to consult the dignity of the British Government, and not from any disposition to admit the claims of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali Khan and Omdut ul Omrah to either forbearance or generosity; though he confessed it would be painful to be compelled to expose the humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery with which these infatuated Princes had acted towards that power which had uniformly proved their guardian and protector.

In the event of the Nabob's refusal of the treaty offered, Lord Clive was directed to assume the country under a proclamation which accompanied the letter of instructions, and which fully exhibited the causes of that measure; if matters came to this extremity, his Lordship was instructed to pay no attention to any appeal which the Nabob might desire to make to the Court of Directors, as it was both injudicious and unnecessary to listen to such, more particularly as the Governor-General was in possession of the sentiments of the Secret Committee, founded on the discovery of the Nabob's faithless conduct. The admission of any appeal the Governor-General stated, would be entering upon a formal trial of the Nabob's criminality, whereas the case was one which demanded an immediate exercise of those rights and privileges which every power possesses by the law of nations, to secure itself against the proved machinations of a faithless ally. Lord Clive was directed even under the extremity of assuming the civil and military government of the Carnatic to provide for the Nabob's support in a liberal manner, and also to make a suitable provision for the different branches of his family, and the various officers of his state.

The delays which had unavoidably occurred to prevent Lord Wellesley's taking any decisive steps for the security of the interests of the Company in the Carnatic were so far fortunate, as they had afforded his Lordship an opportunity of hearing from the superior and controlling authorities at home, and enabled him to proceed with more confidence in a course of action, the fundamental principles of which he knew were approved by the Indian government in England.

The conclusion of a treaty with the Nizam on the 8th of October 1800, by which that Prince ceded in perpetuity part of his dominions to the Company for the payment of that force which they were bound to support for his protection, was also favourable to the object which his Lordship had in contemplation, viz. "That of obtaining the completest security for the interests of the Company in the Carnatic with the consent of the Nabob." As it was certainly to be expected, that the example of a Prince whose obligations to the British nation were comparatively light to those of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and whose faithful observation of his engagements had been precisely the reverse, would make a serious impression upon his Highness's mind, and incline him to a conduct which would prevent the necessity of the British Government resorting to a

proceeding which though unavoidable if the Nabob continued to refuse such security as was demanded, was certainly to be deprecated as having the appearance of harshness and being liable to much misconstruction. Indeed the expectation which Lord Wellesley indulged of the Nizam's conduct making a favourable impression on the mind of Omdut ul Omrah, had been a strong cause with his Lordship for delaying the negotiation with the Nabob of the Carnatic until that with the Nizam was concluded.

At the period when Lord Wellesley's instructions bearing date the 28th of May, reached Madras, the state of the Nabob's health was so bad as to prevent Lord Clive taking any immediate measures on their receipt. When his Highness's malady had attained a height that left no hopes of his recovery, intrigues were commenced among the different branches of his family which disturbed the tranquillity of his palace, and a body of armed men were secretly introduced into it by his brother Hissam ul Mulk, who was loud in asserting his pretensions to the succession. These circumstances obliged Lord Clive to send a detachment of the Company's troops to occupy the chief entrance into the palace, and to preserve order and tranquillity within its walls; as also to guard against the seizure of any treasure, or the delapidation of any property belonging to the Nabob, both of which it was thought would probably be attempted at the moment of his death.

This step was taken with a degree of delicacy and precaution which perfectly reconciled it to the Nabob by the explanation given by Lord Clive, and who was fully satisfied by the conduct of the troops that the object of this measure was no more than what was professed; indeed its expediency and necessity were only arraigned by those whose wicked and sinister views were defeated by its adoption.

On the 15th of July, 1801, the Nabob expired. The dangerous intrigues which had been carried on in the Nabob's palace, the state of several provinces under the government of Fort St. George, and a variety of other cogent reasons, forbade a moment's delay in effecting a settlement of the country. Lord Clive in consequence, a few hours after he heard of his Highness's death, deputed Mr. Webbe and Lieut.-Colonel Close to confer with the principal officers of the Court in order to effect an immediate arrangement for the administration of the affairs of the Carnatic.

These gentlemen were received by Nujeeb Khan and Tukia Aly Khan, who produced to them an authentic will of the Nabob's, appointing his reputed son Aly Hussein his successor, and nominating the Khans above mentioned to be his guardians and advisers. Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe explained to the guardians the nature of the documents which had been discovered respecting the breach of the alliance between the Company and the late Nabobs Mahomed Aly Khan and Omdut ul Omrah, by the hostile conduct of their Highnesses; and after stating to them fully the grounds upon which the Company's government had acquired a right to exercise its discretion in securing its interests in the Carnatic, they proposed to the guardians to enter upon an immediate negotiation for the settlement of the administration of that country over which, they informed them, the Company would otherwise proceed to exercise its own rights and power.

The guardians solicited a short delay for the purpose of attending to the funeral of the Nabob; however urgent the negotiation appeared, it was judged impossible to refuse compliance to that request, and further communication was in consequence postponed till next day, at which period the two Omrahs promised, on taking leave, to be prepared to give a decisive answer to the proposition which the deputies had made.

Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe met the Khans next day, the 16th, and a long discussion took place, which after all terminated in the guardians declining to give any answer to the terms proposed by these gentlemen, which were those directed by the Governor-General, until they had consulted with the other branches of the family, for which purpose another day was allowed them.

On the 17th the Khans met the gentlemen deputed to negotiate with them, and after formally rejecting on the part of Ally Hossain and every branch of the family, the terms which had been proposed, and every treaty which went to alienate the exercise of the civil and military government of the Carnatic from the family of the Nabob, they brought forward a *contre projet*, which they requested might be submitted to Lord Clive. This *contre projet*, after denying the possibility of the authenticity of the proofs of the treachery of the Nabobs Mahomed Ally Khan and Omdut ul Omrah, which they alleged must have been forged by some secret enemies of the family, and asserting the right of the Nabob's son and heir to succeed to his father's dominions under the treaty of 1792, offered a slight modification of that treaty, by which a territory was to be ceded to the Company which, including the Poligar Peishcush, would yield a revenue of 8,54,848 pagodas. The remaining balance of the nine lacs, amounting to 45,152 pagodas, and the 6,21,105 pagodas for the Nabob's creditors, were to be paid by instalments in the mode prescribed by the treaty of 1792.

These with some lesser articles formed this *contre projet*, which Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe informed the Khans they could not attend to for one moment, as their orders were direct, and founded on principles from which no departure could possibly be made.

Although these gentlemen considered themselves fully authorized to break off the negotiation on the guardians formally refusing their assent to enter into any treaty which was grounded on the basis of "the civil and military government of the Carnatic being vested in the Company," yet a desire of an amicable adjustment made them wish to see Ally Hoossain, and to receive from him in person the final answer to a proposal in which his interests were so deeply concerned.

To their request for this interview the Khans made many objections, grounded on the alleged incapacity and inexperience of the young man, but these being obviated, they were at last obliged to give a reluctant consent to the meeting.

On the 18th, a communication of the Governor-General's positive orders respecting the final arrangement of the Carnatic was made to a person in the confidence of Ally Hoossain and his advisers, in order that he and they might entertain no vain hopes of any departure from the principle of the arrangement which Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe had offered

for their acceptance. This communication was made in a manner which left no doubt of its being imparted to the parties for the benefit of whose interests it was intended.

On the 19th, the two gentlemen above mentioned proceeded to the palace where they were met by the guardians, who on being asked if they adhered to their former opinions, answered that Ally Hoossain would consent to no terms but such as were stated in the paper which they had given in on the 17th. They were then asked if they were aware of the consequences of this resolution. They replied that they were, but relied implicitly on the adherence of the Company to the existing engagements with the Nabob and his family. Upon this they were informed that it was needless to recur to the treaty of 1792, as it was the violation of that treaty by the Nabob from which the right of the Company to demand the security now required arose.

After this communication with the guardians, Ally Hoossain, the reputed son of the Nabob (a youth of 18 years of age) was introduced, and Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe stated to him in a summary manner all that had passed with his guardians, adding, that in a point which so materially involved his interests, they were naturally desirous of hearing his own sentiments and resolution before they terminated a negotiation with which all his prospects of elevation must close. The young man answered (the guardians being present), that he considered the Khans to have been appointed by his father for the purpose of assisting him with advice, and that the object of his councils and theirs could never be separated.

On receiving this answer, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe informed the Khans that Lord Clive had resolved previously to the adoption of final measures on a subject of such importance, to have a personal interview with Ally Hoossain, and that his Lordship would come to the tent of the officer commanding the troops stationed at the palace for that purpose. This proposal was unexpected, and the Khans endeavoured to evade it by objections similar to those they had before urged relative to the incapacity and inexperience of the young man, but finding their arguments of no avail they consented, and both went to prepare Ally Hoossain's equipage and retinue. The young man, taking advantage of their momentary absence, whispered with much apparent anxiety to Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, that he had been deceived by his guardians; and after this communication he proceeded, without attending to the Khans, to the tent where it was fixed he should have an interview with Lord Clive.

When the ceremony of his introduction to his Lordship was over, Ally Hoossain's attendants (including the guardians), being desired to withdraw, Lord Clive, after adverting to the whole of the negotiation which had passed, informed him of the serious consequences of any resolution he might take, and stated the personal anxiety which he felt that Ally Hoossain should be clearly apprized of his situation, and determine with caution on a point of such importance to his individual interests and reputation as well as to those of his family.

Ally Hoossain without hesitation declared in the most explicit manner,

that the conferences had been conducted by the Khans without his participation, and that he much disapproved of the termination to which they had been brought.

Upon this declaration it was judged proper to recapitulate in the most distinct manner every part of the transaction ; and after the fullest comprehension of every part of the subject, the young man declared his readiness to enter into an arrangement grounded upon the basis of the Company's exercising the civil and military government of the Carnatic.

He was very particular as to the secondary parts of the arrangements, such as the provision for his personal expenses, and the extent of his power over the treasure of the late Nabob, which he evidently considered to be large.

This conference, which was frequently interrupted by the importunity of Nejeeb Khan, terminated by the young man's desiring that a treaty should be made out, resting upon a basis which vested the entire civil and military government of the Carnatic in the honourable Company, which, he said, a conviction that it was for his benefit, and that of his family, would lead him to execute with or without the consent of his guardians.

On the 20th, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe again went to the palace, where they were met by the two Khans and Ally Hossain. The latter began the conference by retracting every thing he had said to Lord Clive at the private interview, and declaring his fixed resolution to abide by the opinion of his guardians.

This extraordinary change was supposed at first to have proceeded from fear, and an adjournment to the tent to meet Lord Clive was proposed and carried into execution ; on their arrival there, the young man's attendants and guardians were dismissed, and he was left in private with his Lordship. He there repeated in the most firm tone his resolution to abide by the advice of the Khans, and his unalterable determination to accept of no engagement that had for its basis the cession of the civil and military government of the Carnatic. He had spoken the day before, he said, under the impression of the moment, but he had since received full information, and he now acted agreeably to his own sentiments and to those of the whole family, who had been convened for the purpose of assisting his judgment. He was fully convinced, he added, of the risks he encountered, having received communications, the truth of which he could not doubt, respecting the Governor-General's orders. But he was prepared to meet every danger rather than subscribe to the conditions proposed.

No argument was left un urged by Lord Clive which could persuade or convince this young man that he was misled to his ruin, and that his prosperity depended upon a compliance with the demands of the Company's government. It was in vain that his Lordship pointed out in the most clear manner the situation in which he stood, the motives which influenced his adherents in persuading him to a course incompatible with his true interests, and the certain distress into which he must inevitably bring himself and all those dependent upon him, by a perseverance in his refusal of the terms proposed.

Ally Hoossain remained unmoved, and Lord Clive was at length reluctantly obliged to inform him that he had forfeited all claims to consideration, and must await the extreme measures which his conduct had rendered unavoidable.

All hopes of concluding a treaty with the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah were now at an end; that young man had in the most deliberate manner terminated a negotiation (which had been conducted throughout with a degree of temper and moderation that reflected the highest credit upon those to whom it was entrusted, and which had been marked at its most important stages by the extreme of kindness and condescension on the part of Lord Clive), by refusing his assent to any engagement founded upon the principles which had been stated from the first as indispensable, viz. "the Company being vested with the civil and military government of the Carnatic:" and this refusal was given under circumstances which left no room to suppose that it would ever be retracted. It only remained therefore to Lord Clive to apply the principles of the Governor-General's orders to the unexpected change of circumstances that had occurred, and having no longer a prospect of making the settlement of the Carnatic in the mode (which a variety of considerations rendered the most advisable), to adopt the best which was practicable under the circumstances in which he was placed.

The whole proceeding was grounded on the violation of the treaty of 1792. From that violation arose the right of the British Government to exercise its power in such a manner and to such an extent as should be judged necessary for the adequate security of its rights and interest in the Carnatic.

The mode of exercising that right was solely to be governed by considerations of expediency; which considerations, however, were to be influenced in the first instance by the actual state of the affairs of the government of Fort St. George at the moment. In the second, by those general principles of forbearance, moderation, and magnanimity, which characterizes every act of the British Government; and in the third, by an attention to that particular indulgence and generosity which had invariably regulated every transaction of the Company with the family of Mahomed Ally Khan.

The immediate assumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic under a proclamation, though fully warranted by the conduct of the late Nabob and that of his adopted son, was liable to many serious objections as an act of expediency, when tried by the considerations above stated.

The actual situation of the territories under Fort St. George was unfavourable to such a measure: a most formidable rebellion existed among the southern Polygars, to subdue which it had been necessary to call troops from other quarters, and to weaken the defence of several provinces in a manner that would have made it dangerous to increase the number of the disaffected, more particularly as such an arrangement would have left a treasure in the hands of the family of the Nabob under circumstances

which would have rendered its application to purposes hostile to the British interests more than probable.

It would have been a very harsh and strong, if not an impolitic and unwise measure, to have substituted at once the Company's authority in place of that of the family of Mahomed Ally Khan, without consulting the dignity of that family by any previous arrangement for the support of its rank, consequence and reputation, and certainly would have been considered a departure from that line of moderation and magnanimity which the British Government had always observed in their transactions with the natives in India.

The family of Mahomed Ally Khan from the long period of its connection with the English, from the ties which subsisted between it and that government, and from the claims which had been established by its different branches on the Company's protection, was entitled to expect that all transactions with it should be regulated by principles of the greatest indulgence and generosity, and that the English Government should not, under any possible conduct of the heads of the family go farther in any proceedings against them, than what the adequate security of its own interests demanded.

From reasons of the *nature* of those above stated, it occurred to Lord Clive that the most safe, the most wise, the most conciliatory, and the most dignified proceeding which he could adopt (consistent with the preservation of that principle on which the security of the British interests in the Carnatic rested) was to raise to the musnud Azeem ul Dowlah, the eldest nephew of the late Nabob, the legitimate son of Ameer ul Omrah, the grandson of Mahomed Ally Khan, and the great grandson by both parents of Anwar ul Deen, the founder of the family of the Carnatic.

The right of this Prince to the succession (if all right had not been forfeited) was perhaps stronger than that of the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah; but this was not investigated, the act being declared one of expediency and grace, not of right or of justice, his claims were only to be considered of consequence as they served to reconcile the great body of the Mahomedan inhabitants of the English territories, and the Mahomedan rulers of neighbouring states to the measure.

When Lord Clive adopted this resolution, he deputed Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe to negotiate with the Prince Azeem ul Dowlah, a treaty founded on the same basis as that which they had been directed to propose to Ally Hoossain. Difficulties of a serious nature occurred as to their seeing this Prince, as he was kept in a most rigorous confinement, and it was feared that should any idea be entertained of his intended elevation, that it might prove dangerous to his life; the difficulties however, were removed by an occurrence which evinced a contempt for the Company's authority, that required immediate check and interference. The guardians of Ally Hoossain, impatient of the delays which had occurred, privately placed that Prince upon the musnud, and it was reported to Lord Clive that they proposed performing that ceremony publicly next day, as there was no calculating the confusion such a proceeding might occasion,

his Lordship gave immediate orders for the Company's troops to take possession of the whole palace, and to remove all the Nabob's guards.

One effect of this measure was to bring Azeem-u-Dowlah under the protection of the English troops; and on the 23d and 24th he had interviews with Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, at which he settled with those gentlemen the basis of a treaty which was finally concluded on the 25th of July, and on the 26th, this Prince was introduced to Lord Clive, and conducted to the palace of Ameer Bagh the residence of his father.

In the course of the interviews which Azeem-u-Dowlah had with Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, a good deal of discussion took place on the subordinate articles of the treaty, and the Prince shewed on the occasion that he was neither deficient in quickness or good sense, and that he was fully equal, as far as depended on personal qualifications, to the support of the rank to which he had been raised.

The treaty provided for the Prince's enjoyment of a clear revenue of from two to three lacs of pagodas annually, unencumbered by any charge, and also for the handsome support of all the different branches of the family of Mahomed Ally Khan. It vested the sovereignty of the Carnatic for ever in the Company, and by that one condition, the subsidy paid by the Nabob was secured on the basis of territorial possession; the resources of the Carnatic were increased, the state of the inhabitants improved, the restoration of that fine province to prosperity ensured, and the whole system of the British Government in the peninsula at once simplified and consolidated.

JOHN MALCOLM.

[SUPPLEMENT—OUDE.]

No. I.

*The Honourable Henry Wellesley to his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley,
Governor-General.*

MY LORD,

Bareilly, July 18, 1802.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's letter of the 24th ultimo, enclosing the ratified copy of the treaty for the cession of Furrukhabad.

2. I now forward to your Lordship a copy of the final instructions to the collectors for the settlement of the ceded Provinces.

3. This plan appears to me to be well calculated to promote the improvement of the country, and to secure the happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants, as well as their attachment to the British Government.

4. My report upon the commerce of the ceded provinces is now under your Lordship's consideration, and I am in daily expectation of receiving your Lordship's instructions upon this subject.

5. Nearly the whole of the land revenue for the current year has been collected, and I have every reason to expect that at the expiration of the current Fuslee year, when the collections on account of Sayer will be realized that the balances will be found to be very inconsiderable.

6. Ever since the introduction of the authority of the British Government into these provinces, their tranquillity has remained undisturbed. As a proof of the peaceable dispositions of the inhabitants, it is only necessary to observe that at the time of the removal of the Vizier's aumils, when disturbances were most to be apprehended, your Lordship was employed in effecting the very considerable reductions which

have lately taken place in the army, the largest proportion of which is stationed in the ceded provinces.

7. Reflecting upon the anxiety and suspense which prevailed among all classes of the inhabitants of these provinces, during the period of the negotiation at Lucknow, as well as on the advanced season of the year at which the cession was made, and on the obstacles which were industriously thrown in the way of our obtaining any accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, and comparing these circumstances with the increase of revenue obtained even in the current year, and with the actual state of the country, I trust it will appear that no exertions have been omitted on my part to establish confidence among the inhabitants in the good faith and integrity of the British Government, and to promote the improvement of the country. Your Lordship will also I hope, be of opinion, that the principal objects which induced you to appoint me to the situation of Lieut.-Governor of the ceded provinces have already been fulfilled.

8. I therefore take the earliest opportunity of requesting your Lordship's permission to resign my present situation whenever it may appear that I can do so without injury to the public interests. Circumstances may possibly render it desirable that I should continue in charge of these districts for a few months after the settlements shall have been concluded for the purpose of carrying into effect certain arrangements, not immediately connected with it, and of visiting those parts of the ceded provinces which I have not yet seen. I do not conceive it possible however, that any circumstances can occur to postpone my resignation to a later period than the expiration of the year 1802.

9. If the success which has attended all my measures should be equal to your Lordship's expectations, I claim no other merit than that of having endeavoured to make the best use of the extensive powers reposed in me, and conscious of having fulfilled the duties of this arduous situation with a zeal proportioned to its importance, I desire no greater reward than the satisfaction which I shall derive from your Lordship's approbation of my conduct.

I have the honor to be, &c.

HENRY WELLESLEY.

No. II.

The Honourable Henry Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Extract.)

MY LORD,

Bareilly, Aug. 5, 1802.

1. I have already had the Honourable address your Lordship respecting the conduct of General Perron's agents in the Punjab, and although my information upon this subject is extremely confined and imperfect, I think it my duty to continue to communicate to your Lordship any reports which may reach me upon a question in which our interests are so materially concerned.

2. Such is the distracted state of the Seik country, that Mr. Lewis (one of General Perron's officers) appears to have obtained possession of a considerable tract of country, without the least resistance having been opposed to him. There can be no doubt of General Perron's intention to assume as large a portion of the Punjab as he may think himself able to manage, or it may be convenient to him to retain, and it is equally certain that the actual state of that country will render it an easy conquest to anything like a regular force.

3. One of the greatest dangers to be apprehended from the establishment of a French force in the Punjab is the means it would afford the French of extending their conquests down the Indus, and of securing a communication with the sea by means of that river. This would remove every obstacle to their receiving supplies of men and stores from Europe, for there is no British force on that side of India, nor are there any native powers, situated at the mouths of the Indus, capable of opposing a regular force with any prospect of success.

4. It does not appear that General Perron's designs upon the Punjab are sanctioned by Scindiah, or that they are in any way connected with the interests of that chief.

5. Whenever it can be avoided with safety to ourselves and a due regard to the obligations attached to the possession of an extensive empire, it is extremely desirable not to interfere in the disputes between the native powers; but the policy which dictated a forbearance in this respect, is cer-

tainly weakened by the immense increase of territory, wealth, and power, which we have acquired within these few years. From the important stake which we now possess in the country, it is hardly possible that our interference should not be solicited by the native powers in any cases of emergency, and I am in daily expectation of receiving letters from Rajah Sahib Sing of Putteealeh, and from the Rajah of Amrutsir, both of whom are ready and willing to oppose General Perron, provided their exertions could be directed to any good end. These letters shall be forwarded to your Lordship as soon they reach me.

6. I understand it to be General Perron's intention to enter the Punjab, as soon as the rains shall have subsided. I am likewise informed that he is making every effort to raise troops.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HENRY WELLESLEY.

No. III.

*Proclamation for the Establishment of Fairs.**

(Translation.)

Bareilly, Aug. 31, 1802.

This is to give notice to the Beoparees of the Almorah and Kamaoun hills, who have been in the practice of bringing goods from their countries into the provinces now in possession of the British Government from Afzolgurh to Kyregurh, and of purchasing goods, the produce of the low countries, that as the British Government is anxious to promote and encourage the commercial intercourse subsisting between the inhabitants of the provinces and those of the hills. The honourable the Lieut.-Governor, with the view of protecting the Beoparees and merchants, has resolved to establish periods for holding fairs near the Ghauts, and to send troops for the protection of merchants at those fairs, in order that the merchants may resort thither for the purpose of traffic at the appointed periods without molestation, and that there may be a constant

* The efforts made by the honourable Henry Wellesley (now Lord Cowley) for the welfare of the people of the ceded provinces were not only very great, but they were attended with the most beneficial effects.

and free intercourse of trade between the two countries. It has therefore been settled that in the month of Aughun (beginning with the ninth day of November, 1802, and ending with the eighth day of December) a fair shall be held at Chilkeca Ghaut in Pergunnah Cashepoor for that month. After an interval of one month, in the month of Maug (beginning with the 7th of January, and ending with the 5th of February) another fair shall be held for that month at Belharee Ghaut, opposite to Peeleebheet. At both these places, during the times specified, the Company's troops shall be sent for the protection of the traders that no person may suffer injury nor oppression.

The merchants therefore of both countries will resort to the above-mentioned places at the specific times with all confidence, mutually to traffic in their respective commodities.

H. WELLESLEY.

No. IV.

Farewell Address of the Honourable East India Company's Covenanted Civil Servants in the Ceded Provinces to the Honourable Henry Wellesley Lieut.-Governor of the Ceded Provinces.

HONOURABLE SIR,

Bareilly, Dec. 29, 1802.

We the Covenanted Civil servants of the honourable the East India Company, who have acted under you in the ceded provinces, beg leave to express to you our grateful sense of your liberal and unwearied endeavours to give general satisfaction in every respect, both in your public and private character, and to assure you of the sincere regret which we feel at your departure.

Such of us as have had the good fortune to be employed more immediately under you, think it but just to declare, that by your indefatigable personal exertions, in the arduous task of arranging the business of a newly-acquired territory, where everything yet remained to be done, we have been encouraged to persevere with cheerfulness in the discharge of those laborious and important duties which you, honourable Sir, so cheerfully share with us. In witnessing such ready co-operation in you, the toilsome part of our own duty was no longer remembered.

Great and solid as are the advantages, in point of commerce, revenue and political security, which the honourable company, (and eventually Great Britain) must derive from the important acquisitions of these provinces, still we hesitate not to declare our fullest conviction, that their attainment has been greatly accelerated by the judicious exercise of the high discretionary powers of your elevated situation; and our own exertions were the more advantageously directed, by the favourable and highly satisfactory circumstance of acting under a power in full possession of the confidence of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General; a

confidence essential in every point of view on the first acquisition of these territories; and which, as the result of a thorough personal knowledge, could not, for obvious reasons, have been so completely bestowed elsewhere.

Strongly impressed with these sentiments of respectful and affectionate attachment, which such conduct must naturally inspire, we request your acceptance of our warmest and most heartfelt wishes for your future prosperity and happiness.

We have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect,
honourable Sir,

your most obliged and most obedient servants,

M. Leslie, Archibald Seton, Richard Becker, J. Fombelle, George Webb, Richard Shubrick, C. Russell, S. Swinton, William Leycester, C. Dumbleton, R. Cunninghame, J. Wemyss, J. E. Edmiston, A. Welland, R. Ahmuty, H. Cornish, J. Richardson, W. Orton Salmon, W. P. Potts, T. Thornhill, J. Routledge, G. D. Guthrie, R. Ross.

To the Gentlemen of the Honourable the East India Company's Covenanted Civil Service acting in the Ceded Provinces in Oude.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort William, Feb. 10, 1803.

The kind and flattering terms in which you have been pleased to express your approbation of my services, and your regret at my departure in your address of the 29th of December, demand my warmest and most grateful acknowledgements.

The extensive and salutary improvements which have already been introduced into the ceded provinces in Oude, are principally to be ascribed to the zealous and indefatigable exertions of the civil and commercial officers in the discharge of their respective duties. The tranquil conclusion of the triennial settlement, the confidence expressed by all classes of the inhabitants in the British Government, and the unusual success with which every branch of the public service has been conducted, are satisfactory proofs of the advantageous selection made by the Governor-General from the civil service of the honourable Company, for the introduction of the British system of government into these provinces.

In the exercise of the extensive powers entrusted to me, my acknowledgements are particularly due to the gentlemen joined with me in the temporary commission for the administration of the provisional government. I have derived the most effectual assistance from the aid of their talents, experience, and honourable support, and I am happy in the public opportunity afforded me of your address of expressing the high sense which I entertain of their valuable public services.

I shall never cease to retain a lively interest in the welfare of these important possessions, and I now reflect with peculiar satisfaction, that the foundation is established for their future affluence and prosperity; these sentiments are rendered still more gratifying by the honourable testimony

which your address has afforded me, that in the estimation of so large and respectable a part of the service of the honourable the East India Company, my appointment to the temporary charge of the ceded provinces in Oude has been advantageous to the execution of your respective services, and has facilitated the progress of the public business in your several departments.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect and esteem,
Gentlemen,
your most obedient and faithful servant,
HENRY WELLESLEY.

[The following letter, as it refers to the honourable Henry Wellesley's (now Lord Cowley) services in India, is here inserted.—Ed.]

No. V.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas.

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR,

Madras, August 14, 1799.

The extraordinary nature of the late events in India, and the extensive and intricate questions which have been involved in every measure of my government since the hour of my arrival, as well as the important consequences which must result from the new order of things in this quarter of our possessions, appeared to me to require a degree of communication with you more particular and minute than could be obtained by any correspondence in writing, even if it had been practicable for me to devote for that purpose a sufficient share of my time and labour to my European despatches. I have therefore thought it advisable to despatch to England a person intimately acquainted with the whole course of my thoughts and actions, and master of all my present views, as well as of the actual state and condition of India. In endeavouring to select such a person, my choice was confined to the very limited number of those with whom I transact the most secret affairs of the government, and I at length determined (whatever might be the personal sacrifice) to employ him who must naturally stand highest in my confidence and esteem, and who is without question most competent from his information, habits and discretion, to communicate confidentially with you. I have therefore appointed Sir Henry Wellesley to take charge of my present despatch, and I can safely refer you to him upon every point of importance which has

arisen in my mind or can arise in yours with relation to the government of India. As he is furnished by me with memoranda upon every subject which has appeared to me material for your consideration, I trust that you will enter without reserve into the most free communication with him; and that you will facilitate his return to India at the earliest possible period after your mind shall have formed a decision on the various points which he will submit to your view. Under this impression, and with this hope, I shall add nothing to this letter further than my acknowledgments for your very satisfactory despatches, Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, received on the 4th of August; on many of the points which they contain, you have already received my opinions by the *Eurydice* or by subsequent despatches. I trust that by the next ships from Bengal (whither I propose to return in the first week of September) I shall be able to transmit full and satisfactory answers to such of your suggestions as have not before been under my particular consideration.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
yours most faithfully,
WELLESLEY.

No. VI.

Oude, 9th June, 1800.

Additional force actually sent into Oude, since the beginning of the year.—1 regiment of cavalry (Native); $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies of artillery; 3 do. of Lascars; 4 regiments (or 8 battalions) Native infantry.

Remaining to be sent to complete the proposed augmentation.—1 regiment of Native cavalry; 1 do. Europeans; $\frac{1}{2}$ company of artillery, with their Lascars; 2 regiments (or 4 battalions) Native infantry.

Total augmentation to be a charge on the Vizier when completed will be—2 regiments Native cavalry; 1 do. Europeans; 2 companies of artillery, &c.; 6 regiments (or 12 battalions) Native infantry.

N. B. The funds for payment of augmentation by the Vizier, will be supplied by the reduction of his own troops.

No. VII.

Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control, to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD,

London, Sep. 23, 1802.

I cannot deny myself in forwarding the present despatches the satisfaction of sending you a few lines, written with

perfect unreserve on the important considerations to which they have reference.

The temper of the Court of Directors is no secret to your Lordship. I should not now refer to it, wishing to soften feelings rather than to aggravate them, were it not from a persuasion that your mind takes a higher range than to dwell on such a subordinate consideration. You will, I trust, only weigh what is due to the public interest, and to your own high reputation, and suffer the other point to operate only so far as it might be an obstacle to either, or both of these objects.

Looking at it in this point of view, I am sanguine in hoping, indeed I think I can venture to assure your Lordship, whatever sensations may exist in that quarter, that nothing unpleasant will proceed from hence during the remainder of your stay; always taking it for granted that your Lordship will consult as far as possible, the feelings which you know to exist at home, and that you will conform to the instructions sent out, except in so far as you may feel yourself called on to exercise the discretionary authority, which belongs to your situation; upon circumstances not foreseen when the decision was taken in Europe.

I think it necessary to send you, in confidence, the answer returned by the Board, in reply to a paragraph sent up by the Court, relative to Mr. Henry Wellesley's appointment; still trusting that any thing of unkindness which that paragraph may have breathed, will not dwell on your Lordship's mind, or alter the tone of respect and conciliation which you always feel disposed to observe towards the Court, as the ostensible authority in our system of Indian government. I am principally led to send you the paper in question, as it will apprize you of the grounds upon which the Board alone consider the appointment as justifiable, namely, on its being of the most temporary nature; indeed this obvious distinction appears from the despatches already received, to have been fully in your Lordship's contemplation when you placed Mr. Wellesley at the head of the commission. I should have been perfectly prepared to have expressed at once upon the transaction, as it stands self-explained, my distinct approbation, did I not conceive that I should have an opportunity of doing it with more weight, and with less awkwardness by the

Court, when the late transactions in Oude came regularly under consideration. I thought it better to confine myself at present to such reasons as I have stated, for not concurring in *their* opinion.

Having said so much of the temper of the Court, which I am satisfied will not be suffered by your Lordship to disturb you for a moment, I cannot avoid adverting to a consideration, which I am persuaded will affect your feelings with very opposite and highly satisfactory sensations—I mean the personal exertions which Mr. Addington has made throughout the whole of this transaction, to overcome every impediment, and to accomplish every purpose, which could relieve your private or gratify your public feelings. I am the more anxious to state what has been his conduct, knowing the long habits of private friendship which have subsisted between you, and thinking it possible that the fact might not reach you from any other quarter, certainly not from himself; indeed, from none could it come so well authenticated as from myself, who had an opportunity of watching his feelings and conduct from the moment your late despatches reached him.

I cannot close this letter without endeavouring to relieve your mind on one point, which must be a subject on every ground of much anxiety to your Lordship, namely, as to the hands in which the supreme government of India is likely to be placed after your Lordship shall withdraw from it. Exclusive of the public concern involved in the appointment, your Lordship has personally much to desire that it may pass into hands capable of supporting with dignity and effect the empire which you will have to bequeath to his management.

I cannot yet acquaint your Lordship that Mr. Yorke has made up a resolution to accept the trust, but I feel it due to you to mention, in perfect confidence, that it has been proposed to him, with the additional desire on the part of the King's Government, that he should proceed in the first instance to replace Lord Clive at Madras.

The high official situation Mr. Yorke at present holds in this country makes him hesitate in some degree as to his decision. I rather think however, that he will finally accept, as he feels in the strongest manner the importance of the trust that has been proposed to him.

We have felt some difficulty in bringing Mr. Yorke's mind to contemplate an appointment in the first instance to the government of Fort St. George, which we are extremely desirous he should undertake, as well with a view to the interests of that particular government as also for the purpose of acquiring that degree of local experience, which will enable him with the more effect to superintend the now much extended affairs of that Presidency, after he shall have taken upon himself the supreme government.

From the knowledge we have of your Lordship's feelings with respect to your return to Europe, and the evident proofs which your letters afford that even your continuance during the season 1803-4 in India, will be a sacrifice to public duty, we have felt ourselves sanctioned by your Lordship in specifying distinctly to Mr. Yorke the period when he may expect to enter upon the supreme government, which trust alone could induce him to leave Europe; and as the appointment to Madras will be accompanied with a conditional appointment to Bengal, I should hope on this ground both our objects may be reconciled.

Your Lordship has known Mr. Yorke too long to require from me any comment on his qualifications to fill the important station of Governor-General. As far as my acquaintance with Mr. Yorke enables me to form a judgment, I do not observe any public character whose services at present could be obtained by the Company, who possesses so many requisites to serve them with ability, and to preserve to them the empire, which has acquired great additional importance under your Lordship's administration. I am persuaded, if Mr. Yorke should ultimately accept, that the prospect of having an opportunity of communicating freely with you before your departure, and of possessing himself of your Lordship's views and opinions on all the complicated concerns of Indian government, will operate as a very material inducement to his taking charge in the first instance of the subordinate Presidency. We shall be fully prepared, before Mr. Yorke can be called on to leave the coast, to replace him at Madras by an appointment from home, being entirely persuaded in common with your Lordship, that the various and extended interests of that Presidency will require such an arrangement.

Wishing your Lordship all possible happiness and success both public and private, and anxious to contribute to both to the utmost of my power,

I am, my dear Lord,

with perfect truth and regard,

ever most sincerely and faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosure.]

Public Department. Draft paragraph proposed by the Court of Directors, to be sent to their Presidency at Fort William in Bengal. Appointment of Mr. Henry Wellesley, in the ceded Districts in Oude.

East India House, 19th August, 1802.

Our Secret Committee have had laid before us a letter from the Governor-General, dated the 14th of November 1801, enclosing copy of a treaty concluded with his Excellency the Nabob Vizier, on the 10th of that month. We observe that it is the intention of the Governor-General to transmit by the *Mornington Packet*, a detailed statement of the means which he has employed in accomplishing this important arrangement; being therefore not at present in possession of all the papers relative to the negotiation, we shall reserve our opinion upon the general subject until the several documents shall be completely before us.

We feel ourselves, however, particularly called upon to express our early sentiments on the appointment of Mr. Henry Wellesley in the ceded districts, with the most ample powers for the purpose of settling the country, with the aid and assistance of some of the Company's civil servants. Whatever abilities Mr. Wellesley may possess, it is impossible for us to signify our consent to that appointment, without abandoning the interests of our regular covenanted servants, which it is our duty at all times effectually to protect; nor can we consider this appointment in any point of view than as a virtual supercession of their just rights, and as a severe disappointment in the reasonable expectations of men, who having past many of their best years in the service, and who, after much labour having become sufficiently experienced in the manners and customs of the people, and having acquired a competent knowledge of the country languages, might naturally suppose themselves qualified for and look up to such an honourable situation. The Governor-General must be sensible of the mortification that must be felt upon this occasion by our civil servants, were we to sanction this appointment, and equally aware that it would be establishing a precedent, liable hereafter to great abuse.

The appointment in question is also liable to objection on account of its illegality. The act of the 33d of Geo. 3d. c. 52. s. 57, directs positively, that vacancies in the civil line of the Company's service in India, shall be supplied from amongst the Company's civil servants. The clause to which we have referred, has for its object the preservation of the just rights of the civil branch of the service, and the prevention of abuses, which had formerly existed. The act is binding both upon us, and upon our respective Indian governments. We therefore feel ourselves in this, and in every point of view of the subject, irresistibly called upon to disapprove of the appointment, and hereby direct that Mr. Wellesley be removed forthwith.

JAMES COBB, Assistant Secretary.

Answer of the Board of Controul to the foregoing paper.

GENTLEMEN,

Whitehall, 20th Sep. 1802.

We have the honour to return the paragraph relative to Mr. Henry Wellesley's appointment, and trust, the Court of Directors will coincide in opinion with us, that it is expedient to suspend for the present expressing any decision on this subject, for the following reasons :

We entirely concur with the Court of Directors in feeling it necessary to guard with extreme jealousy the rights of their civil servants, and shall always be disposed to co-operate with them in giving full effect to the provisions of the law framed for this salutary purpose. In the present instance, however, as far as the appointment stands explained in the despatches hitherto received from the Governor-General, we must hesitate in acceding to the opinion expressed by the Court, 1st. Because we are not convinced that the Governor-General, in entrusting to his private Secretary, Mr. Henry Wellesley, the conclusion of an important treaty, necessarily in itself a transaction of the most delicate and confidential nature, and one in which Mr. Wellesley's services from his close connexion with the Governor-General might be highly material to its success, has exceeded his authority, and 2ndly. If in entrusting Mr. Henry Wellesley with the execution of the treaty, the Governor-General has not gone beyond the exercise of a sound discretion, we trust the Court will be disposed with us to pause, and to await the explanations which the Governor-General has announced his intention of transmitting upon the subject, before they express any opinion, but more particularly before they disapprove the farther measure adopted by his Lordship of confiding to Mr. Henry Wellesley the temporary superintendence of the commission composed of the civil servants of the Company, to whom has been entrusted the settlement of the ceded Provinces.

Were the present appointment made in consequence of any vacancy in the regular establishment of the Company, or if it constituted a permanent part of any extension of that establishment rendered necessary by recent circumstances, no doubt could arise in respect to its illegality. We are not prepared however, to consider temporary duties, arising out of the peculiar situation of possessions newly acquired, and not yet reduced into a state of regular administration, as coming within the strict provisions of the act.

We have no hesitation at the same time in stating, it is our own decided opinion that the spirit of the law will in general be best consulted, by entrusting such special services to the civil and military servants of the Company. Although we hold this to be true as a general principle, yet we admit that circumstances may not only warrant, but require a relaxation of this rule, and in the present instance we trust the Court will feel it due to their Governor-General to suspend their decision, as it appears clearly, upon the face of the transaction, that none but public motives, and those of the highest description, could have induced your Governor-General to confide on Mr. Wellesley to undertake this delicate trust; the rather, as there is every reason to believe, from his Lordship's letter to the Court, dated on the Ganges near Benares, the 14th of November 1801, that Mr. Wellesley's appointment will have been determined by the nature of the service itself before the proposed paragraph could reach India.

At the same time, we are fully impressed with the importance of scrupulously adverting to any measure of the nature in question, which your Governors abroad, under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances distinct from the usual course of your service, may consider themselves called on, upon their personal respon-

sibility to adopt; and we shall be prepared, when the promised communications shall be received, to concur in such notice of this measure as may effectually guard (however the Court may be led from peculiar circumstances to give it their ultimate sanction) against its being made an injurious precedent hereafter.

We have the less hesitation in recommending this course of proceeding, as it appears by the advices from Bengal, received subsequent to the paragraph in question being approved by the Court, that Mr. Henry Wellesley receives no emoluments whatever from the late appointment, beyond those which he before enjoyed under the special authority of the Court of Directors, as Private Secretary to the Governor-General. This is a circumstance, which we are satisfied the Court (regard being had to the importance and responsibility of the trust) will not only consider as peculiarly honourable to Mr. Wellesley, but also as furnishing in itself, as far as the present proceedings might in future be hazardous as a precedent, no inconsiderable security against such a danger, especially as we may at all times safely rely on the vigilance and authority with which the Court will be prepared to enforce the regulations of its own service, whenever it shall appear to them that they have been unwisely or unnecessarily infringed.

We are, &c. &c.

CASTLEREAGH, &c.

No. VIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Mr. Petrie at Madras.

(Extract.)

DEAR SIR,

Fort William, July 2, 1802.

I received with great satisfaction your obliging congratulations on the settlement of Oude. No country can afford a more fair promise than the ceded Provinces. I expect that the revenue and police will be in such a state in the course of about three months, as to enable Mr. Henry Wellesley to return to me. The revenue will greatly exceed all my calculations of its amount; and the commerce will be a new mine of wealth hitherto unexplored.

You will be happy to hear that by the joint operation of increased resources and of reduced charges especially military, I have at length been able to accomplish the last object of my hopes and cares in India, the restoration of the finance. The current year 1802-3 will furnish a clear surplus applicable to investment of about a million sterling; and I entertain no doubt of surpassing the most sanguine expectations, which have ever yet been formed in England respecting the permanent augmentation of the sources of investment, and the speedy diminution of the Indian debt. Our revenue in this year in Bengal, exceeds Mr. Dundas's estimate by about half a million sterling, while our charges are below his estimate in a very considerable degree.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

WELLESLEY.

[SUPPLEMENT—PERSIA.]

No. I.

Colonel Kirkpatrick, Military Secretary, to Captain Malcolm, Envoy to the Court of Persia.

SIR,

Fort William, 10th Oct. 1799.

1. The right honourable the Governor-General having appointed you on the of August to be envoy from the Government-General in India to the court of Baba Khan, the present King of Persia, his Lordship now directs me to furnish you with the following instructions for the regulation of your conduct in that mission.

2. You are to proceed with all convenient expedition to Bombay, the government of which will be directed to furnish you with one of the honourable Company's cruizers for the purpose of conveying yourself and suite to Bussorah.

3. At Bombay you will also be furnished by the Governor-in-Council with copies of all the correspondence which has passed between him and Mehdi Alli Khan, a native agent employed for some time past by Mr. Duncan, under the instructions of the Governor-General, in opening and conducting a negotiation at the court of Persia, with a view to preventing Zemaun Shah from executing his frequently renewed projects against Hindostan.

4. No accounts have yet been received of the arrival of Mehdi Alli Khan at Tahiran, where Baba Khan holds his court. It may be expected, however, that before you can leave Bombay such advices will be received from Mehdi Alli Khan, as may be of considerable use in regulating the measures proper to be pursued by you either before or after you shall have reached your destination.

5. Mehdi Alli Khan is the Company's Agent at Bushire, and may possibly have returned thither from his temporary

mission to the court of Persia by the time of your arrival at Bushire, where it will be proper you should touch on your way to Bussorah. But however this may be, Mehdi Alli will be directed by the Governor of Bombay to place himself under your orders, and you will accordingly either take him with you from Bushire, should you find him there, or retain him with you should you find him at the court of Persia, or suffer him to resume the duties of his station at Bushire, as you may judge best for the public service.

6. You must exercise your discretion with regard to the degree of confidence to be reposed in Mehdi Alli and to the manner in which he shall be employed. Some circumstances make his circumspection doubtful; but as there appears no ground for questioning his integrity, or zeal for the public service, his Lordship thinks it may be in his power to afford you some useful assistance in the progress of your mission.

7. If the season should admit of it, his Lordship wishes you to touch at Muscat on your way up the Gulph. You will be furnished with letters from his Lordship to be eventually delivered to the Imaum of Muscat and to his Minister. You will receive from the government of Bombay copies of such parts of the correspondence of Mehdi Alli Khan as relates to his negotiation at Muscat in 1798. The Governor-General has but too much reason to believe, that, notwithstanding the engagements entered into on that occasion by the Imaum, that Prince has continued as favourably disposed as ever towards the French. During your stay therefore at Muscat, you must omit no endeavours to prevail on the government of that place to execute faithfully the conditions of the treaty of 1798, and effectually renounce all sort of connection with the French. His Lordship deems it unnecessary to suggest to you the topics proper to be employed for this purpose. The government of Bombay will on your application communicate to you all the information in their possession relative to the grounds on which the fidelity of the Imaum to his engagements has been suspected.

* 8. The Persian Translator has been directed to furnish you with copies and extracts of all the correspondence of the Governor-General with the late Tippoo Sultaun, and

of such of the papers found at Seringapatam as are calculated to prove the inimical designs entertained by that Prince against the English and their allies. You will make such use of these documents both at Muscat and every where else in the course of your mission as may appear to you to be necessary. You will particularly advert to the gross calumny which Tippoo Suldaun is now known to have industriously circulated in every Mahommedan state about the beginning of the present year; and which imputed to the British Government in India an avowed design of destroying every Mussulman Power in Asia. Mr. Edmonstone will point out to you the particular passage in his Lordship's letter of the 8th of November 1798 to Tippoo Suldaun, on which the latter affected to build this extraordinary accusation; and it will be easy for you to demonstrate its utter falsehood and absurdity even to the most bigoted Mahommedans.

9. You will endeavour to adjust while at Muscat any points relating to our interests at that place, which the government of Bombay may recommend particularly to your attention; but you are not to permit any object of this nature to delay your voyage to Persia.

10. From Bussorah you will proceed to the court of Persia either by the route of Bagdad, or by such other route as you may find to be most eligible. In case you should visit Bagdad, you will deliver to the Bashaw of that place the letter from the right honourable the Governor-General which you will receive with these instructions.

11. You will communicate fully and unreservedly both with Mr. Manesty the Company's Resident at Bussorah, and with Mr. Jones at Bagdad on the object of your mission, and you will arrange with those gentlemen the steps to be taken with a view to establishing as quick and secure a communication by letter between yourself and them as may be practicable.

12. You will apprise the court of Persia of your deputation as soon as possible after your arrival, either at Bussorah or at Bagdad, intimating in general terms, that the object of it is to revive the good understanding and friendship which antiently subsisted between the Persian and British Governments. It is not desirable that you should

be more particular with any person who may be sent to meet you, or to ascertain the design of your mission; but if much pressed on the subject you may signify, that, among other things, you have been instructed to endeavour to extend and improve the commercial intercourse between Persia and the British possessions in India.

13. The primary purpose of your mission is to prevent Zemaun Shah from invading Hindostan; or should he actually invade it; to oblige him, by alarming him for the safety of his own dominions, to relinquish the expedition. The next object of his Lordship is to engage the court of Persia to act vigorously and heartily against the French in the event of their attempting at any time to penetrate to India by any route in which it may be practicable for the King of Persia to oppose their progress.

14. With respect to the first of these objects, your manner of negotiating it will necessarily turn, in a great measure, upon the progress which Mehdi Alli Khan shall have made previously to your arrival at the court of Persia in pursuit of the same end. Should he have succeeded in disposing that court favourably towards his Lordship's views, you will confirm and improve this advantage by every means in your power. You will begin by expatiating on the mutual benefits which cannot fail to accrue to both nations from the establishment of a solid friendship between them, and of a commercial intercourse regulated on liberal and enlightened principles between the Persian dominions and the British possessions in India. The information necessary to enable you to state the advantages of a commercial connection in the most forcible manner cannot be any where better obtained than at Bombay; and accordingly that government will be directed to furnish you with such instructions and materials for this purpose as they may judge proper.

15. The period for agitating the question respecting Zemaun Shah must be regulated in some degree by the information which you may be in possession of relative to the motions of that Prince; and on this account it will be necessary that you should omit no means of obtaining the speediest and most authentic intelligence from his country. The government of Bombay will be instructed to transmit to you, by every opportunity, whatever information of this

nature they may receive either from the Governor-General, or from the Residents at Poonah and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, both of whom will be particularly directed to correspond punctually with Mr. Duncan on this subject.

16. If you should learn from authority to be depended on, that there is no probability of Zemaun Shah suddenly disturbing the tranquillity of Hindostan, there will be the less necessity for your immediately entering upon this point of your negotiation; but if you should be well assured of the contrary, no time must be lost in opening the business.

17. It is proper you should know, that the solicitude of the Governor-General with regard to Zemaun Shah arises at present almost solely from considerations which have reference to the actual circumstances of Oude: last year it was necessarily excited in a great degree by the nature of our situation with respect to Tippoo Suldaun. But now, if the civil and military branches of the Vizier's administration were upon that footing on which his Lordship is desirous (and not without hopes of being able) to place them, he would cease to feel any further degree of anxiety relative to the projects of Zemaun Shah, than what must always be raised by a prospect of any interruption to the tranquillity of our possessions in India.

18. It is this peculiar state of affairs with regard to Oude which renders it of the greatest importance, that Zemaun Shah should be prevented from making any attempt upon Hindostan for three years longer; by which time his Lordship expects that the Vizier's frontier will be put in such a respectable posture of permanent defence as, if it should not effectually discourage any invasion of his Excellency's territories, will at least render it difficult for a foreign enemy to make any serious impression upon them.

19. Upon this principle, his Lordship authorizes you, whenever circumstances shall appear to you to require the measure, to conclude a treaty with the court of Persia on the following basis.

First. The King of Persia to engage to prevent Zemaun Shah, by such means as shall be concerted between his Majesty and you, from invading any part of Hindostan, and in the event of his crossing the Attock, or of the actual invasion of Hindostan by that Prince, the King of Persia to

pledge himself to the adoption of such measures as shall be necessary for the purpose of compelling Zemaun Shah to return immediately to the defence of his own dominions.

Second. The Company to engage to pay to the King of Persia for this service, either an annual fixed subsidy of three lacs of rupees during the period that this treaty shall continue in force; or a proportion, not exceeding one-third, of such extraordinary expense as his Majesty shall at any time actually and bonâ fide incur for the specific purposes stated in the foregoing article. His Lordship leaves it to your discretion to adjust the amount of subsidy on either of these principles, according as may appear to you to be most favourable to the interests of the Company. But he is of opinion, that by absolutely fixing the amount of subsidy in the first instance many grounds of dispute and dissatisfaction would be precluded, which would otherwise be liable to arise; while being fixed at the standard which has been mentioned, the total charge to the Company for the term of the treaty would probably fall very short of what might be justly claimed under the other arrangement in the course of a single year.

Third. The Company not to be entitled to a participation in any conquests or spoils which may be acquired from Zemaun Shah in the event of hostilities between him and the King of Persia.

Fourth. The subsidy to be discharged by the Company in money and merchandize in such proportions, and by such instalments, as you shall settle with the court of Persia.

Fifth. The duration of this treaty to be limited to three years, and to be afterwards renewable at the option of the contracting parties.

20. His Lordship in fixing the subsidy at three lacs of rupees per annum, has been governed by a general consideration of the high comparative value of money in Persia. But if the principle of a fixed subsidy should be adopted, and if you should find an augmentation of the sum absolutely necessary, his Lordship empowers you to increase it to three and an half, or even to four lacs of rupees.

21. It has occurred to the Governor-General, that you may possibly find it practicable, by the judicious distribution

of presents, and offers of military and other supplies to accomplish his Lordship's objects with respect to Zemaun Shah without being obliged to bind the Company to the payment of any immediate or eventual subsidy; his Lordship recommends this point to your deliberate consideration, not doubting that you will exert yourself to the utmost to obtain the objects of your mission at as light a charge as possible to the Company.

22. With respect to the commercial points to be negotiated, his Lordship directs me to observe, that, when finally adjusted, they may either be included in a general treaty comprehending all the proposed objects of your mission, or be thrown into the form of a distinct convention, as you may find most convenient. The commercial arrangements, however, should be of a permanent and perpetual nature, and should not be made to expire with the subsidiary treaty. You have already been referred generally to the government of Bombay for the information necessary on this head; and that government will be directed to form an outline of such commercial arrangements as may appear to them to be desirable, and to submit the same to the Governor-General in Council for the consideration and approbation of his Lordship previously to your finally concluding upon them.

23. In considering the different means by which Zemaun Shah may be kept in check during the period required, you will naturally pay due attention to those which may be derived from the exiled brothers of that Prince, now resident in Persia under the protection of Baba Khan. If occasion should offer, you will cultivate a good understanding with those Princes, but you are not to contract any positive engagements with them without the specific authority of the Governor-General.

24. With respect to the second object of your mission, or the engaging the court of Persia to act eventually against the French, his Lordship deems it unnecessary to furnish you with any detailed instructions. The papers with which you will be furnished, and your own knowledge and reflection will suggest to you all the arguments proper to be used for the purpose of convincing the court of Persia of the deep interest it has in opposing the projects of that nation, and of inducing it to take an active and decisive part against

them. If in this event the co-operation of a British naval armament in the Gulph of Persia with the land forces of Baba Khan should be judged expedient, his Lordship directs me to say, that you may confidently promise it, as well as an ample supply of whatever arms or military stores may be required by his Majesty. His Lordship empowers you also, in the case here supposed, and on the condition of the most vigorous and decisive operations being undertaken against the enemy by Baba Khan, to engage to pay to that Prince, during the period of such operations, either a monthly subsidy to be previously fixed, or such a proportion of the expenses actually incurred by him on the occasion, as may be mutually agreed on between you and the court of Persia.

25. The subsidy which it may be stipulated to pay to Baba Khan, in either of the cases stated, must be discharged by funds which you will endeavour to raise by means of bills to be drawn by you either on the Supreme Government, or on the government of Bombay. In case of your being unable to raise the requisite funds by such means, the Governor-General will take the proper measures for making you the remittance from hence either in bills or specie.

26. You will be careful to regulate the conduct of the persons belonging to your mission, during your residence in Persia, in such manner as may most effectually conduce to the honour of the national character, and to the prevention of jealousy or misunderstandings.

27. His Lordship thinks it unnecessary to caution you against submitting to any ceremonies at the court of Persia which can have any tendency to degrade your representative character. He considers it sufficient to observe, that conformity to such usages as you shall find established in the case of ambassadors from other independent powers can never have such a tendency.

28. With respect to the nature and amount of the presents which it will be proper you should make to the King of Persia and the principal persons of his court, his Lordship confides in your discretion for observing such a degree of economy on this head as may be practicable consistently with a due regard to the honour of the British Government and to the usages of the country.

29. His Lordship authorizes you to purchase on your arrival at Bussorah, or as soon after as you may judge expedient, a sufficient number of horses for the use of the party of dismounted native cavalry ordered to be furnished you from the Presidency of Fort St. George, and to provide them with saddles and the other necessary articles of equipment. His Lordship relies on your mounting, equipping, and maintaining this part of your escort at as moderate a charge as may be practicable.

30. You will endeavour during your residence at the court of Baba Khan to obtain an accurate account of the strength and resources of Zemaun Shah, and of his political relations with his different neighbours, and to establish some means of obtaining hereafter the most correct and speedy information on the subject of his future intentions and movements.

31. His Lordship desires you will keep a regular journal of your public transactions; and that you advise him by every opportunity of the progress of your negotiations and of all important occurrences. It is also his Lordship's direction that you correspond occasionally with the right honourable Henry Dundas and with the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, on the affairs of your mission. A copy of the cypher No. 11 will be furnished you on application, by the government of Bombay.

32. In the event of the death of Baba Khan, or of any revolution in the government of Persia before you shall have entered into any engagements, you will either suspend or prosecute your negotiations with the new government according to the judgment which you may form of its character, its probable stability, and its means of fulfilling the ends of the proposed alliance.

I am, &c.

WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

No. II.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Futteh Allî Shah, King of Persia.**

Written 26th August, 1802.

The solicitude of the British Government of India to strengthen and improve the relations of amity and honourable alliance with your Majesty has been manifested by the most signal acts of systematic policy, and has been publicly acknowledged by all the states of Asia. The peculiar splendour of the embassy which conveyed the testimonies of my respect and attachment to your Majesty's august presence, the extraordinary honours with which your Majesty's ambassador was received under my express orders, on his Excellency's arrival in the British territories; the zeal and assiduity displayed by the government of Bombay and by all ranks of British subjects at that settlement to conciliate the good will of the Persian ambassador; and the public preparations conducted under my immediate and personal direction for his Excellency's reception with the most distinguished solemnity and honour, at the seat of the supreme British authority in India, have afforded sufficient demonstrations to the world of my high consideration for your Majesty's exalted dignity, and of my uniform intention to evince that unalterable sentiment towards the accredited representative of your royal person.

Reviewing these incontrovertible testimonies of my anxiety to establish a friendly and honourable alliance with the power of Persia on the most solid foundations, your Majesty and all the states of Asia will anticipate the deep affliction and anguish of mind with which I have witnessed the sudden interruption of our bright and happy prospects by a disaster, which as far eluded the scope of human prudence and foresight, as it surpassed the ordinary extent of human calamity and the common vicissitudes of fortune. To this awful dispensation of Providence I submit with resignation, but not without hope.

In the most painful moments of my disappointment and

* This letter was written by the Governor-General in consequence of the Persian ambassador being killed at Bombay, as explained in Vol. II. page 668.—[Ed.]

grief I have derived considerable consolation from the reflection, that, as I have hitherto assiduously employed every possible effort to cultivate a lasting friendship and harmony of interests between your Majesty and the British Government, my amicable sentiments have been uniformly returned with equal cordiality by your Majesty's auspicious disposition.

A dreadful, unforeseen, and uncontrollable calamity has intervened to afflict your Majesty and the British Government with mutual sorrow and consternation, and to retard the completion of our reciprocal wishes, but not to suspend our established friendship by groundless jealousy and unjust suspicion, not to frustrate the natural and propitious result of our united counsels, not to destroy the fruits of the mature wisdom and justice of both states, nor to dissolve those sacred engagements by which we had cemented the foundations of durable concord, secured the channels of free intercourse and beneficial communication, and enlarged the sources of our common safety, prosperity and glory.

Entertaining a due sense of the value and importance of those engagements to both states, I shall pursue, with unabated confidence and perseverance, the policy on which the subsisting treaties are founded, and the amicable and earnest exertions by which they were obtained. The pursuit of this course cannot ultimately fail to obtain success; the calamity which we have suffered is a just subject of lamentation, but its consequences are not irretrievable; from the reciprocal condolence of the two states may arise new motives of combined interest and additional securities of amity and alliance. A zealous interchange of the offices of humanity; a concurrent sense of common sorrow, and the conscious certainty of mutual sincerity and good faith may lead to a more intimate union of sentiments and views, and the temporary suspension of this important embassy, may tend to ensure and improve the benefits of our actual connection.

Supported by these hopes, and relying on the justice and integrity of the principles and motives which have actuated the British Government, I trust that the progress of my renewed intercourse with your Majesty will gradually obliterate the remembrance of this fatal and unparalleled disaster, and will amply compensate to my mind for its actual distress by

the final accomplishment of the same salutary plans of policy, which had rendered a personal interview with the deceased representative of your illustrious person, the object of my most cordial wishes and of my most anxious expectation.

To repair the severe loss sustained by his untimely decease, to demonstrate my sincere respect for his memory and my unfeigned regret that he should have fallen by a violent death within the British dominions, and in the immediate exercise of functions which the laws and usages of all civilized nations have rendered sacred, I have endeavoured to administer to his surviving relations and attendants every office of humanity and friendly compassion, every attainable comfort and alleviation of their just grief, and every possible compensation for the injuries which they have suffered.

In discharging this duty I have selected Major John Malcolm, the officer who was recently vested with the honourable character of envoy from this Government to your Majesty, and who now occupies the most confidential station in my family.

That officer proceeds immediately to Bombay, and he is directed to afford to the surviving relations and attendants of the late ambassador, in my name, such effectual aid and assistance, and such testimonies of affectionate commiseration as may tend to mitigate their sufferings, and to console their affliction.

With the same views, I have provided the most speedy means of offering to your Majesty the respectful expressions of my sincere condolence on this disastrous event, and of concerting with your Majesty such measures as may conduct the embassy to its original purpose, accelerate the favourable issue of every depending question, and confirm the subsisting relations between the two states, in the conciliatory spirit of the recent negotiations, and on the basis of the treaties already concluded.

Relying with confidence on the continuation of your Majesty's disposition to improve the relations of amity and alliance between the two states, I shall await the communication of your Majesty's sentiments with regard to the measures to be adopted for the accomplishment of the original objects of the mission of the deceased ambassador. •

The Government of Bombay has received my instructions

to conform to any directions which your Majesty may be pleased to transmit with respect to the persons who attended the late ambassador on his mission to this Government, I have directed that those persons should continue at that Presidency until your Majesty's intentions with respect to the progress of the embassy shall be notified to the British Government.

Your Majesty will justly estimate the distinguished proof which I have manifested of my anxiety to meet your royal pleasure in the appointment of Major Malcolm on this unhappy occasion.

In consequence with the satisfaction which that officer afforded to your Majesty in the discharge of the important duties of envoy to your Majesty's Court, he was selected by my orders, on his return from your Majesty's presence, to discharge the duties of the confidential station previously occupied by my brother. Major Malcolm relinquishes, for the present moment, the duties of that important station with the express view of expediting the affairs of your Majesty's embassy. Major Malcolm has received my commands to address your Majesty upon his arrival at Bombay.

This letter is despatched by a respectable gentleman, who has been appointed Résident at the British factory at Abou-sheher, and who has been directed by me to obey such commands as he may receive from your Majesty, and to proceed to Shiraz, or to your capital, if required by your Majesty, for the purpose of conveying to your Majesty any further explanations with respect to the circumstances of this disastrous event.

At a proper period of time, I propose to despatch a second embassy to your Majesty's Court, and to offer to your Majesty, through an envoy of rank, my sincere condolence on this unhappy occasion.

WELLESLEY.

A true Copy.
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. Sec. to Government.

[SUPPLEMENT—FINANCIAL.]

No. I.

*Financial Minute by the Earl of Mornington.**

Fort William, June 12, 1798.

The state of the finances of the government of Fort St. George necessarily became an object of my attention, during my continuance at that presidency. I found the pressure of the pecuniary distress of the government to be so severe, that the investment for the present year must be wholly relinquished unless immediate relief can be offered from Bengal.

My public duty therefore rendered it incumbent on me, to lose no time in ascertaining the situation of the finances of the government, with a view to the adoption of the earliest measures for furnishing such aid to the government of Fort St. George as might obviate the evil consequence to be apprehended, from any longer continuance of their present embarrassments.

Having directed the Accountant-General to prepare the most accurate estimate, which the materials in his possession with relation to this presidency, together with such as he has procured from the others, could enable him to form at this season of the year, of the probable receipts and disbursements of Bengal, Madras and Bombay for the year 1798-9, I now lay that estimate (No. I.) before the board for the purpose of bringing under their consideration, a general view of the actual state of the pecuniary affairs of the three Presidencies.

That estimate has been formed with the usual caution of calculating the receipts rather lower, and the charges rather higher, than either may be expected to prove, so that upon the whole the result will probably be more favourable than the present calculation.

With this observation, that estimate will be the foundation of the suggestions which I shall offer to the Board.

From that paper it appears, that allowing for a supply in the course of the year 1798-9 to Fort St. George of 75,00,000 sicca rupees, and to Bombay of 25,00,000, the deficiency for which provision must be made in order to meet the ex-

* Referred to in Vol. I. p. 54, where a part of this minute is printed.—[Ed.]

pected demands at the three presidencies respectively will be in—Bengal, 1,28,68,360; Madras, 43,45,350; Bombay, 41,67,611.

The total deficiency therefore at the three presidencies together will amount to sicca rupees, 2,13,81,321.*

The pressing exigencies of the government of Fort St. George require the most speedy assistance. I therefore propose that whatever sum in specie not exceeding the amount of 15,00,000 sicca rupees can be furnished in the course of the months of June and July, consistently with the other indispensable engagements of this government, shall be forwarded to Fort St. George on board His Majesty's ship *La Verginie*; that mode of conveyance being the safest, as well as the earliest and most expeditious that appears likely to offer.

The great amount of the probable deficiency of resources for the year 1798-9, as stated in the annexed estimate (No. I.) added to the possibility of an increase of demands upon us in that year, and to the still more aggravated pressure to be apprehended in the year 1799-1800,† requires the most serious consideration for the information of the Board, as well as that of the honourable the Court of Directors, I now proceed to consider this important subject in the several distinct points of view, in which it appears to me to demand attention.

In the first place I wish to examine the causes of the great deficiency in our actual resources, and the direct and collateral effect produced by those causes upon the whole system of public and private credit distinguishing such of those causes or effects as appear to me to be of a permanent nature from such as may be deemed temporary.

Secondly, I mean to propose such temporary expedients, as appear likely to enable us to meet our present exigencies, and to answer the demands of the other Presidencies, as well

* Let it be remembered also that this deficiency was existing after several years of profound peace.—[Ed. August, 1837.]

† Lord Castlereagh in his speech on the Indian budget in the House of Commons on the 24th of March, 1803—“complimented the Marquess Wellesley on the services he had rendered by his government, and observed that, through his judicious means, the empire of India was in a state to bid defiance to invasion. The Noble Lord then adverted to the situation of India previous to the war, which had left it with an increased debt of £10,000,000, and notwithstanding a long continued war, and the accumulation of additional burthens, the resources of the Company were undiminished and the revenues nearly double.”—*Public Journals for 1803.*

as of this Government without any diminution of the investments of Bengal, Madras or Bombay, for the current year.

And lastly, I will lay before the Board the only plan which in my opinion, can tend to check the progressive accumulation of our embarrassments, to afford the prospect of permanent relief to our resources, and to restore the foundation of public and private credit,

The immediate causes of the estimated deficiency will appear obvious from the annexed accounts.

By account (No. 2) the sums appropriated in India to the purposes of investment and commercial charges in the year 1796-7 and 1797-8, amounted to 4,96,15,165 current rupees, having been in 1796-7,—2,30,70,125; and in 1797-8,—2,65,45,040; and exceeding the amount of bills drawn upon the Court of Directors from India within the same period, by the sum of 3,83,39,263 current rupees, the bills drawn on the Court of Directors having been in 1796-7,—79,88,699; and in 1797-8, 32,87,203; and by the account No. 3, it appears that the proposed investment for 1798 from all our India possessions, including the supply promised to Canton, amounts to 2,40,88,000 current rupees.

But the accounts Nos. 4, 5 and 6, shew that the total sum applicable to the purchase of investments from the revenues in India and produce of sales of imports from Europe was in 1796-7,—81,43,858; 1797-8,—96,44,550; and is estimated to be in 1798-9, 78,20,133.

This annual demand for the purpose of investment upon a scale so far exceeding the annual means of the three presidencies is the cause of the present deficiency.

However disproportioned this demand may be to our resources in India, I neither expect nor desire it to be reduced, and being convinced of the great advantages derived from an enlarged scale of investment to the affairs of the company at home, to the most important interests of our India possessions, and to the general prosperity of the British Empire; I consider the present amount of the investment as a charge, of which no diminution can or ought to be made in a subsequent year.

A considerable increase of expense has arisen at each of the three presidencies from the late military regulations, as modified under the resolutions of this government, from the

various augmentations of our military force, and from the expeditions undertaken against the several foreign settlements, as well as from the expense incurred in maintaining the establishments in our numerous conquests.

Of these a great part of the charges incurred on account of the military regulations must be deemed permanent, and I shall take a future opportunity of stating the grounds of my opinion that at the present crisis it would not be prudent, to attempt any reduction of the augmented military force of this presidency.

I do not expect any further expense in the current year, on account of foreign expeditions.

The establishments maintained in our several conquests, must be considered as permanent charges, until the conclusion of peace; they may however very properly become the objects of immediate revision.

It is not at present possible to obtain an accurate statement either of the total amount of the expense incurred on account of the intended expedition to Manilla, or of the proportion of it which will fall upon this year, but this article whatever may have been its amount must be received among the number of the temporary demands which have contributed to our present embarrassment.

Under the same head must be considered the supplies advanced in Bengal to his Majesty's and the Company's ships for repairs and other purposes, of which no precise statement can now be procured.

The annual payments to the creditors of the Nabob of Arcot have been a heavy charge upon the resources of this Presidency, and will continue to be so, until they shall be completed.

Some increase has taken place in the charges of the civil establishment, amounting as appears by account No. 7. upon the comparison of the actual charges of 1796-7, being the latest period to which the account of the actual revenues and charges of Bengal has been made up with the estimated charges of 1798-9, to 9,25,000 sicca rupees, of these the increase under the general and judicial departments arises principally from the charge, for arrears of salary payable to the Governor-General and to the judges, under the regulations of the Act of 1773, from the period of the respective

embarkation of the persons appointed to those offices in England, while their immediate predecessors were in the receipt of the same allowances in Bengal. These charges of course are not of a permanent nature.

I am not at present in possession of materials to enable me to form a judgment upon the nature of the other articles of increased charge which appear upon this account.

But it is necessary to remark, that the total increase of charges civil and military as stated in this account amounts to 39,25,000. To balance this increase there has been an augmentation of the subsidy from Oude, to the amount of 26,50,000, and an increase upon the produce of the customs, from which however, is to be deducted the amount of the customs at Benares formerly carried to the account of the land revenue of that Province.

The complete accounts not having yet been received from Madras or Bombay, I am not at present enabled to enter into any detailed view of the several articles of increased charge at those Presidencies, but the estimate No. 1, founded upon communications from the accounts of each Presidency, sufficiently shews that the charges at Madras and Bombay have been augmented in an equal proportion with those in Bengal.

To this increase of charges must be added the failure of some branches of our ordinary resources.

The deficiency of the produce of the sales of opium has been frequently the subject of observation both at home and in Bengal, the causes of that deficiency have been well understood, and the most advisable means have been taken to restore this branch of revenue under the improved system of management by agency, which has been substituted in the place of the former mode of contract.

The full benefit of this improvement cannot however yet be realized, but there appears to be every rational ground of expectation that the revenues collected on opium, will reach their former amount within a period of three or four years, at present although the estimated amount of the profit upon opium is higher than the actual produce of the last year, yet the reduced scale both of the actual and estimated profit, upon this article compared with its former amount, must be deemed a failure in the ordinary resources of this Government.

The stamp duties imposed in place of the police tax, which were estimated at about five lacs of rupees, have not produced more than one; and are estimated at two lacs for the current year, this is a positive failure of resource for the present which, however, may be remedied in future. The duties have not yet been imposed for a period of time sufficiently long to justify any decisive opinion upon their permanent produce. In the meanwhile, I have every reason to believe, that improvements may be introduced in the mode of collecting them which will greatly increase their produce, without any augmentation of the burthen upon the people.

The outstanding balances upon the land revenue must be enumerated under the head of deficiency of resources for the current year, (vide account, No. 8.)

But I have the satisfaction to observe, that the greater part of the balances outstanding on the 30th of April in each year, since the year 1792-3 has been constantly realized within the course of the year; and that the sum which has ultimately remained in arrear, has borne a very inconsiderable proportion to the magnitude of the total collections of the land revenue, it is however to be remarked that for these last three years the increase has been progressive (though to no large amount) in the ultimate arrear which has been carried on to the account of the ensuing year. This has arisen chiefly from an irregularity in the payments of the Zemindars holding the largest tracts of lands; who, either derive an advantage in withholding their rents from Government until the latest possible moment of delay, or find a difficulty in collecting them from the inferior tenants. This subject has already been discussed in several of the general letters in the department of revenue.

It has occupied much of my attention since my arrival in Bengal, and I hope to be enabled to state my sentiments upon it more fully before the time of the next despatches to England, it may not be difficult, without any infringement of the lenient principles of the judicial system, to improve the mode of process now in use for the recovery of arrears of rent due either from the Zemindar to the Company, or from the inferior tenants to the Zemindar, by applying a proper remedy in both cases, the recovery of arrears may in future be rendered more easy and expeditious.

The last article which deserves notice under the head of failure of ordinary resources, is the arrear upon the subsidy payable by the Nabob Vizier, (vide account 9,) this amounted on the 30th of April to twelve lacs of Lucknow sicca rupees, of which about five may be placed to the account of the increased subsidy under the treaty lately concluded by Lord Teignmouth, and the remainder to that of the subsidy under the former treaty. This arrear is since increased to the amount of above eighteen lacs; I have however, great pleasure in stating my belief that the Nabob Vizier is sincerely disposed to make every possible effort for the liquidation of this arrear, as well as for introducing such a system of order and economy into the management of his finances, as will enable him to be more punctual in his future payments, under this impression, I trust I am not too sanguine in my hopes that an arrear to this amount cannot justly be stated under the head of a probable permanent deficiency in the receipts of this government.

I am not at present in possession of materials to enable me to state with accuracy the particulars of any deficiencies which may have arisen in the ordinary resources of Madras, I learnt that a considerable deficiency had happened in the produce of the two districts of Tanjore, assumed by that government under the treaty of 1792, in consequence of Ameer Sing's failure in his monthly payments; and that the Company was likely to suffer a heavy loss by the misconduct of one of their servants, in a district of the northern Circars.

The progress of expense accompanied by the failure of ordinary resources has compelled the governments of the three Presidencies to resort annually to the expedient of raising money by loan for the services of the current year, and as these sums of money have been borrowed at a rate of interest unusually high, and under engagements of repayment within short periods of time, the temporary relief which they have afforded has been closely followed by heavy additions to the annual charges, under the heads of payment of interest and principal of debt.

The increase of the debt in Bengal between the 31st of January 1797, and the 31st of January 1798, has been 1,21,63,033 Sicca rupees.

The nature of the difficulties to be expected at this Pre-

sidency in the present, and in the ensuing year from the increase of debt, and the engagements contracted with the public creditors, will be understood by referring to (vide account, No. 1,) the estimate of the extraordinary disbursements of the government of Bengal for 1798-9, where the annual charge of interest is stated at 50,00,000 of sicca rupees, and the sum to be paid upon the principal of the loans borrowed at 12 per cent, is 37,48,360 sicca rupees, in the course of the year 1799-1800 a further sum of sixty-two lacs will become due at this Presidency on the same account.

Although for the reasons already stated, I cannot particularize the increase of the debt at the other Presidencies, I have no reason to doubt that it has made nearly an equal progress with that of Bengal.

To recapitulate therefore the principal causes of our actual embarrassment, they are to be found in the great amount of the supplies furnished on account of investments to Europe and to China, in the increase of the civil and military establishments of all the Presidencies, in the expenses incident to the acquisition and maintenance of our several conquests in India, and to the intended expedition against Manilla, in the partial failure of certain branches of our ordinary resources, and finally in the heavy addition to our debt under the accumulated pressure of a high rate of interest, and of the obligations contracted for the annual discharge of large portions of the principal.

Upon the public records the considerations appear which induced this Government to borrow money for the public service upon the terms to which I have adverted.

A letter is recorded upon the proceedings of government from several respectable merchants at Calcutta concerned in the trade of indigo; stating that so early as the 17th of August 1796, a very unusual scarcity of current rupees had become a matter of general complaint and distress in the settlement, and that money could not at that time be borrowed at the interest of 12 per cent. even with a deposit of Company's paper. This distress is attributed to the spirit of adventure and commercial speculation, which had occasioned imprudent projects of trade beyond the real capital of the merchants concerned.

Under these circumstances it is stated, that the Govern-

ment could not have raised a sum sufficient to meet the public exigencies at any rate of interest lower than proposed by the order of the 19th of September 1796.

The same circumstances clearly prove, that the embarrassed state of private credit cannot be imputed entirely to the effect of the terms of that loan in raising the general rate of interest throughout India, since the early complaints of the merchants themselves have established the fact that the scarcity of money, the consequent increased rate of interest, and the embarrassments of private credit, existed to an unusual extent previously to the publication of the terms of that loan.

But although the loan of September 1796, may have been an unavoidable measure under the circumstances of that time, and although it cannot be said to have occasioned, it certainly greatly aggravated the existing embarrassments of private credit, they have since increased in a very alarming degree, and similar effects have been produced upon the public credit of the Company in India. These effects have been sensibly felt in every subsequent financial operation for the public service, and may now be traced in the general depreciation of the public securities at each of the three Presidencies.

*Bengal.**—On the 1st of June 1798, 12 per cent. from $\frac{3}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; 8 ditto 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 13 $\frac{1}{2}$; 6 ditto 20 to 21.

Madras.—On the 8th of May 1798, 12 per cent. from 3 to 4 per cent.; 8 ditto, 19 to 20; 6 ditto, 23 to 25; 6 ditto, acknowledgements to the Nabob's creditors, 28 to 30.

Bombay.—On the 16th of May 1798, 12 per cent. $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.; 9 ditto, 10; 6 ditto 20.

It is a great satisfaction to me to be enabled to add, that the plan lately adopted of applying a monthly sum to the purchase of the Company's outstanding paper, promises to pro-

* *Average value of the Public Securities in Bengal in the year 1803-4.*
 —12 per cent. premium, average 2,10-2,2; 10 per cent. ditto 7,14-6,14; 3d to 5th loan, at 8 per cent. ditto 2,1-1,9; 1st and 2nd ditto, at ditto, ditto 1,5-0,13; old 8 per cent. ditto 0,12-0,9; 6 per cent. discount 2,1-2,9. On the 29th of July 1805, when Lord Wellesley resigned the government of India, the current value and state of the public securities was as follows: 12 per cent.—none at market—all paid off; 10 ditto 4 to 3-8 premium; 8 ditto 3-4 to 3-12 discount; 6 ditto 8-4 to 8-12 discount.—[Ed.]

duce the beneficial consequences which might have been expected from it, in the course of the present month the discount upon the public securities in Bengal has already fallen in the following proportion :

On the 18th of June the discount on 6 per cent. was 17 per cent. ; on 8 per cent. 10 per cent.

Having thus examined the causes of the great deficiency of our own actual resources, as well as the effects produced upon the state of public and private credit by the combined operation of our increased expence, and of the means employed for defraying it, I cannot be insensible to the difficulties which must be encountered in devising any admissible expedient for raising the supplies required for immediate service.

In the present crisis, the common expedient of drawing bills upon the Court of Directors would not be an available resource in Bengal.

There is too much reason to apprehend that no considerable supply could at present be procured in Bengal for bills upon England, as the sum paid into the Treasury between the 3d of April and the 18th of May, for bills drawn on account of the Sinking Fund at so favourable an exchange at 2s. 6d. per sicca rupee, payable twelve months after date, is only 31,000 sicca rupees. But even if the necessary supplies could be raised by bills upon England, I should not think it advisable to incur the risk of embarrassing the affairs of the Company at home by adopting such a measure, without having first received the sanction of the orders of the honourable the Court of Directors.

The reduction of the investment which might be stated as another mode of affording a temporary relief to our distress, would be attended by so formidable a train of ruinous consequences, that I never would recommend such a step under any other circumstances than those of a most indispensable necessity, the only expedient therefore which remains is, that of endeavouring to raise a sum of money by loan.

The amount of the total estimated deficiency of Bengal for the present year, is 1,28,68,360 sicca rupees,* including a

* Through an inadvertency this sum which is deficiency in Bengal only (as stated in the former part of this Minute) was inserted in the original copy of this paragraph, as the deficiency of the three Presidencies.

supply of 1,00,00,000 rupees to Madras and Bombay. It is stated to me, that neither the twelve per cent. loan now open, nor any other upon a similar plan could be safely estimated to produce more than about two-thirds of this sum, (being about eighty lacs of rupees,) the sum therefore remaining to be produced in Bengal cannot be less than forty lacs of rupees.

The plan which I mean to propose for raising this supply has been adopted by me after full consideration as that which under all the circumstances of our situation appears calculated to afford the special relief to our present exigencies with the least probability of occasioning future distress.

For the details of the plan I must refer to the annexed paper (vide No. 10) prepared by the Accountant-General, being a modification of a plan submitted by him to the late Governor-General in Council on the 16th of November last, the modified plan appears to me to unite many recommendations which render it peculiarly well adapted to the present posture of our pecuniary affairs.

The rate of interest proposed being ten per cent., and the period of repayment of the principal ten years with an option reserved to the honourable Court of Directors of postponing the repayment of the principal for two years longer, the double advantage is obtained of a reduced rate of interest, and of every practicable degree of security against any material inconvenience to the Company with respect to the time of the demand for the repayment of the principal. •

On the other hand; the plan offers to the subscribers resident in India the temptation of a higher rate of interest for a longer term of years than can be obtained in any other existing public fund, and to persons returning to Europe it holds out the advantage of the high rate of interest payable in Europe at a favourable exchange, and finally the repayment of the principal in Europe upon the same beneficial terms.

Although by this plan a step is made towards the reduction of the rate of interest upon our loans, I still feel a great degree of reluctance in proposing to raise money for the public service at so high a rate as ten per cent., and I am also aware of the objections which might be stated against sub-

jecting the Company to the payment of such a rate of interest for so long a period as ten years.

By referring to the letter from the Accountant-General to the Governor-General in Council, dated the 16th November, 1797, (vide No. 11,) it will appear that the rate of interest afforded to the subscriber by the terms of the proposed loan is not so high as he might obtain, if he were to pursue the ordinary mode of placing his money in the Company's eight per cent. securities at the discount of the day.

No loan could be productive, the terms of which should not bear a just proportion to the existing value of money and to the actual state of the public securities. If any probable terms could be assigned to the continuance of the war in Europe, it might properly become a question, whether a loan for a shorter period and at a higher rate of interest, might not be preferable to that which I now propose; because in the event of peace, it might reasonably be expected, that means might speedily be found of raising money at a lower rate of interest than ten per cent.

But the prospect of peace in Europe appears to be so remote, and the pressure of our annual payments of the interest and principal of the late twelve per cent. loan is so heavy (the amount of the debt of Bengal at twelve per cent. being now sicca rupees* 1,05,68,658) that under all the circumstances of the case, no measure appears to me more eligible than that which combines an immediate, though small reduction of the rate of interest, with an extension of the period of redemption of the capital borrowed.

I have already stated that the rate of interest is below the actual value of money in Bengal, and if the proposed period of redemption of the capital were shorter than ten years, it would not hold out sufficient temptation to the subscriber whose money will now produce twelve per cent. upon public security, exclusive of the discount of the day.

With respect to the rate of exchange (being 2s. 6d. the sicca rupee upon bills payable fifteen months after date) it will be found to be considerably lower than the present ordi-

* This was the exact amount of the twelve per cent. debt of Bengal on the 12th of June, 1798.

nary rate of exchange between Bengal and England. The small sums paid into the treasury on account of the sinking fund for bills drawn on the honourable the Court of Directors even at 2s. 6d. the sicca rupee, payable twelve months after date, sufficiently proves the actual state of the exchange; if my information be correct, there is no probability of any great variation in the rate of exchange upon England even in the event of peace.

This is a subject which will hereafter demand further explanation, the principles on which I propose the loan for this year would require that I should also close the loan at twelve per cent., and encourage the transfer of the securities upon that loan to the new ten per cent. fund.

My wish was to have attempted this operation immediately. But understanding that the twelve per cent. loan now open produces a considerable monthly supply, I do not think it prudent to deprive the treasury of that resource until I shall have had some experience of the success of the new loan.

By the rough estimates received from Madras and Bombay, it appears that at Madras, after receiving from Bengal the proposed sum of 75,00,000, and calculating the loans now open at Madras to produce 22,45,350 sicca rupees within the current year, there will still remain a deficiency in the resources of the years 1798-9 of sicca rupees 21,00,000.

And at Bombay, after receiving the proposed sum of 25,00,000 sicca rupees from Bengal, and calculating the produce of the loans open at Bombay at 10,00,000 Bombay rupees within the current year, there will remain a deficiency in the resources of the year 1798-9 of 31,67,611 Bombay rupees.

As the supply to be furnished upon the scale proposed to Madras and Bombay would not be adequate to their demands, and as it is probable that a part of the deficiency at each of those Presidencies might be raised by loans founded on a similar plan to that which I propose for Bengal, my wish is to transmit that plan to the governments of Madras and Bombay, directing that it may be attempted in the first instance with the improvement of any practicable reduction on the rate of interest or of exchange, or if an apprehension should exist of its total failure, that those governments respectively should suggest for our consideration any other

mode of raising the supplies for their several services which may appear to them better adapted to the situation of their affairs.

The Government of Madras should be apprized of the provision of 75,00,000 rupees intended to be made in Bengal for their supply with a caution however, that it may possibly be reduced in the course of the year by the pressure of our own wants.

The Government of Bombay should also be directed to regulate their drafts upon Bengal at the rate of twenty-five lacs as their annual supply for 1798-9, under intimation of our intention to increase the amount of the sum now proposed if circumstances should admit of such an extension of their supply.

Having explained the nature of the temporary provisions calculated to enable us to meet the exigencies of the present moment, it is now my duty to enter upon the consideration of such measures as may open the prospect of future relief upon more solid and permanent foundations.

The comparative view which I have taken of our expenses and receipts in examining the causes of our actual distress, sufficiently proves that many of those causes are of an absolutely permanent nature, and that most of them must be expected to continue for a considerable time; that the investment (at once the most powerful cause of our temporary distress, the main spring of the industry and opulence of the people committed to our charge, and the active principle of the commercial interests of the Company) is more likely to be increased than to be diminished in any future year, and consequently that the embarrassments of our finances must be progressive, if some means be not devised for aiding the resources of this Presidency, which must now be considered as the general treasury and bank of our India empire, furnishing supplies for the services of all our other possessions in India, as well as a large and increasing proportion of the capital employed in the trade to Europe and to China.

The propositions which I shall lay before the Board with a view to this desirable object may be considered under two distinct heads.

The first will comprehend the consideration of such measures as may enable the honourable the Court of Directors to

assist the resources of Bengal by furnishing additional supplies from Europe in the mode the least inconvenient to the affairs of the Company at home.

The second will lead me to examine what may be gained by an effort of this government to relieve itself.

By the account No. 2, to which I have already adverted with a different view, it will appear that the sum of 3,83,39,263 current rupees has been or is to be appropriated to the investment in India from the commencement of 1796-7, excluding any supply furnished from England within that period.

To this sum of 3,83,39,263 current rupees, consisting of the prime cost of our investments from India and China of commercial charges defrayed in Asia, should be added the sale amount in Europe of the articles consigned, and the total would form a very considerable fund furnished from India to England. From this fund we may reasonably expect assistance in the great object of preventing the necessity of any reduction of the investment.

The mode of supplying this assistance, which I would recommend, has already been suggested by the Accountant-General, and seems to unite several advantages with relation to the interests both of India and Great Britain; it is comprized in the following propositions:—

That it be respectfully recommended to the honourable the Court of Directors to take the earliest occasion of sending out supplies to India to the amount of eighty-five lacs of rupees in addition to their usual consignments by an increase of their annual export of British manufactures and produce to Bengal and Bombay, to the full extent of the indents from Bengal and Bombay respectively, and by an annual supply of silver bullion to Bengal to the amount of fifty lacs, the supply of bullion to be provided in part by a proportionable reduction in their usual consignments to China.

The increase of the export of British manufacture and produce to Bengal and Bombay, will probably afford considerable relief to the finances of this government, as by reference to the account of sales of imports from England it appears that the average profits upon the imports from England sold in Bengal in 1796-7 has been above twenty per cent., and at Bombay thirty-five per cent., and that the de-

mand is increasing. The measure would at the same time obviously become highly beneficial to the interests of Great Britain.

The export of silver to Bengal would be more advantageous to the Company than the payment of bills at the present high rate of exchange; a rate which will probably continue for a considerable period of time. Such a stock of silver would be a relief both to public and private credit, and would invigorate all the financial operations of this government; from this resource supplies might easily be furnished to Canton through the medium of the trade in opium.

If the sale of British manufactures in Bengal and at Bombay should equal the general expectation, an additional supply of nearly a crore of rupees would accrue to this Presidency from the combined result of the two proposed measures. This supply would be nearly equal to the probable amount of the permanent deficiency of our resources.

This plan cannot be too earnestly recommended to the attention of the honourable the Court of Directors; the details of it will be found in the letters of the Accountant-General of the 16th of November, 1797, and are further explained in the annexed memorandum No. 12.

Nothing could be more just than to appropriate a portion of the profits arising from the sale amount of the investment in Europe to the augmentation of the funds necessary for the purchase of investment in India.

Unless some such plan be adopted, or other means devised of furnishing aid to the resources of Bengal from England, it is evident that a reduction in the amount of the India investment will soon become inevitable, for it cannot be denied that a very large proportion of the capital which has passed into Europe through the medium of India commerce for these last two years, and is about to pass in the present year, has been and must be created by loans of money raised in India under every circumstance of disadvantage. The increase of the investment, therefore, during the period described, must be viewed as representing not the surplus revenue, but the increased debt of India. The circulating capital of India, which is known to be very inconsiderable in proportion to the productive and commercial powers of the country, cannot supply so large a drain for any long period of time even in

the event of peace; but if the war in Europe should continue, the difficulty of raising money for the public service by loans to be negotiated in India must become nearly insurmountable.

The discussion of this important subject now leads me to that question which most nearly affects our own duty and character.

What means does this Government possess of relieving itself from its actual embarrassments, and in what manner is it most expedient for the public service to employ those means?

For the purpose of solving this question, it appears to me to be an urgent part of our duty to institute a diligent enquiry into the nature of all the branches both of our expenses and of our resources, in order to commence, without delay, every just and salutary reduction of the one, and every practicable improvement and augmentation of the other.*

MORNINGTON.

ACCOUNT OF THE COLLECTIONS OF GOVERNMENT CUSTOMS AND TOWN DUTIES FROM 1797-8 TO 1801-2.

	Government Customs.					Town Duties.
	1797-8	1798-9	1799-1800	1800-1	1801-2	1801-2
	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.
Calcutta . . .	4,62,510	5,57,592	8,92,470	9,17,344	9,62,397	6,99,047
Benares . . .	4,56,466	4,14,808	4,40,604	5,16,150	5,08,638	37,178
Mangee . . .	3,32,494	2,67,016	2,74,824	2,98,626	1,07,383	..
Patna	2,56,193	41,478
Moorshedabad	1,62,341	72,057
Dacca	58,034	16,912
Hooghly	79,487	..
Chittagong	4,004	..
Sicca Rupees	12,51,470	12,39,416	16,07,898	17,32,120	21,38,477	8,66,672
					Add Town Duties	8,66,672
					Total	30,05,149
					Collections in 1797-8	12,51,470
					Increase in 1801-2, S. R.	17,53,679

* The remainder of this minute, detailing the financial reductions and reforms of the Governor-General, is given in Vol. I. page 54.—Ed.]

**A GENERAL ABSTRACT OF THE ACTUAL RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE THREE PRESIDENCIES OF FORT WILLIAM,
FORT ST. GEORGE, AND BOMBAY, BETWEEN 30th OF APRIL, 1798, AND 1st OF MAY, 1799.**

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
ORDINARY RESOURCES.		ORDINARY CHARGES.—CIVIL DEPARTMENT.	
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 5,19,64,756	Bengal	Sicca Rupees 1,62,54,451
Madras	Pagodas 50,48,879 or 1,84,98,048	Madras	Pagodas 16,34,803 or 59,89,580
Bombay	32,64,373	Bombay	28,36,220
	<u>7,37,27,177</u>		<u>2,50,80,251</u>
Deficiency in the general resources of India to defray the Indian expenses	77,97,009		
		Military Department.	
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 1,66,05,259
		Madras	Pagodas 48,97,888 or 1,79,44,848
		Bombay	80,98,415
			<u>4,26,48,522</u>
		Interest on the Debt.	
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 43,47,143
		Deduct—Transferred to the Sinking Fund	51,249
			<u>42,95,894</u>
		Madras	Pagodas 4,01,218 or 14,69,980
		Bombay	5,07,622
			<u>62,73,496</u>
		EXTRAORDINARY CHARGES.	
		Disbursements on account of the Foreign and Sub- ordinate Settlements.	<u>7,40,02,269</u>
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 13,22,356
		Madras	Pagodas 9,81,017 or 35,94,243
		Bombay	31,897
			<u>49,48,496</u>
		Disbursements in the Civil and Military Departments on account of the Purchase of Stores, Cattle, Grain, &c. and on account of Buildings and other Dead Stock.	
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 5,54,613
		Madras	Pagodas 5,35,567 or 19,62,207
		Bombay	56,601
			<u>25,73,421</u>
			<u>75,21,917</u>
Sicca Rupees	<u>8,15,24,186</u>	Sicca Rupees	<u>8,15,24,186</u>

SUPPLIES FROM LONDON.		
Import Sales.		
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 18,75,009	
Madras	Pagodas 3,13,278 or 11,47,786	
Bombay	20,53,853	
		50,76,648
Bills upon the Court of Directors for Interest on the Debts, &c.		
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 19,09,858	
Madras	Pagodas 2,84,237 or 10,41,385	
Bombay	30,720	
		29,81,963
Bullion received from England in the course of the season of 1798-9.		
Madras	Pagodas 4,39,660 or	16,10,823
Receipts from the sale of Exports, comprehending salt petre and damaged goods, &c.		96,69,434
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 2,08,134	
Madras	Pagodas 44,845 or 1,64,303	
Bombay	70,818	
		4,43,255
Deficiency, viz.		1,01,12,689
In the general resources to defray the Indian expenses		77,97,009
In the supplies from Europe to provide the investments and the supplies to China, &c.		36,29,187
		1,14,26,196
Sicca Rupees		2,15,38,885

Deficit as above	Sicca Rupees	77,97,009
Investment for Europe.		
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 58,26,426	
Madras	Pagodas 8,87,741 or 32,52,499	
Bombay	14,89,851	
		1,05,68,776
Supplies to China.		
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 12,93,099	
Madras	Pagodas 2,65,242 or 9,71,792	
Bombay	17,474	
		22,82,365
SUPPLIES TO LONDON.		
Comprehending advances on account of his Majesty's ships and charter party allowance to the Company's freighted ships.		
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 6,03,272	
Madras	Pagodas 62,983 or 2,30,757	
Bombay	56,706	
		8,90,735
		1,37,41,878
	Sicca Rupees	2,15,58,885

A GENERAL ABSTRACT OF THE ESTIMATED RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE THREE PRESIDENCIES OF FORT WILLIAM, FORT ST. GEORGE AND BOMBAY, IN THE YEAR 1806-7.

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
ORDINARY RESOURCES.		ORDINARY CHARGES.—CIVIL DEPARTMENT.	
Bengal	Sicca Rupees 7,87,40,000	Bengal	Sicca Rupees 2,81,28,000
Madras Pagodas 134,54,089	4,92,92,998	Madras Pagodas 53,01,719	1,94,24,401
Bombay	65,50,000	Bombay	39,00,000
	<u>13,45,82,998</u>		<u>5,14,52,401</u>
Deficiency in the general resources of India, as applicable to the payment of charge	26,67,700		
		Military Department.	
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 2,25,00,000
		Madras Pagodas 77,74,736	2,84,85,024
		Bombay	70,00,000
			<u>5,79,85,024</u>
		Interest on the Debt.	
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 1,27,00,000
		Madras Pagodas 11,00,000	40,30,172
		Bombay	30,00,000
			<u>1,97,30,172</u>
			<u>12,91,67,597</u>
		EXTRAORDINARY CHARGES.	
		Disbursements on account of the foreign and subordinate settlements.	
		Bengal	9,00,000
		Deduct Surplus at	
		Madras Pagodas 18,901	69,250
			<u>8,30,750</u>
		Disbursements in the Civil and Military Departments on account of arrears, purchase of Stores, Cattle, Grain, &c. and on account of Buildings and other Dead Stock.	
		Bengal	Sicca Rupees 45,20,000
		Madras Pagodas 2,68,124	9,82,351
		Bombay	17,50,000
			<u>72,52,351</u>
			<u>80,83,101</u>
			<u>80,83,101</u>
			<u>13,72,50,698</u>
	Sicca Rupees 13,72,50,698		Sicca Rupees 13,72,50,698

**STATEMENT OF THE REVENUES AND SUBSIDIES, AND OF THE CHARGES AND OF THEIR CENTAGE UPON THE REVENUES OF THE
THREE PRESIDENCIES, FROM 1798-1799 TO 1802-1803, INCLUSIVE.**

	Revenue.			Total Revenue. Sicca Rupees.	Charges.						Total Charges. Sicca Rupees.	Centage of the Charge upon the Revenue.
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.		Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.			
					Civil.	Military.	Civil.	Military.	Civil.	Military.		
1798-1799	5,30,17,318	1,74,09,928	32,64,373	7,36,91,619	1,62,54,451	1,66,05,259	56,37,252	1,68,89,269	28,36,220	80,98,415	6,63,20,866	89,998
1799-1800	5,79,23,651	2,39,30,797	36,43,538	8,54,97,986	1,81,28,075	1,83,60,809	66,34,948	1,77,89,583	34,99,660	94,95,917	7,39,08,992	86,445
1800-1801	5,59,56,811	2,97,15,190	25,28,875	8,82,00,876	1,79,01,139	1,80,27,088	93,73,566	2,33,93,479	27,80,151	76,54,844	7,91,30,267	89,716
1801-1802	6,39,46,665	4,18,36,869	27,06,701	10,84,90,235	1,84,19,580	1,27,12,990	1,18,79,969	2,60,78,200	31,03,149	74,07,811	8,56,01,699	78,902
1802-1803	6,95,55,958	4,17,03,297	31,75,706	11,44,34,961	1,99,53,099	1,97,90,071	1,39,37,504	2,38,68,359	29,04,372	72,26,484	8,76,79,889	76,619
	30,04,00,403	15,45,96,081	1,53,19,193	47,03,15,677	9,06,56,344	9,14,96,217	4,74,63,239	10,80,18,890	1,51,23,552	3,98,83,471	39,26,41,713	

Fort William, Accountant-General's Office,
May 31, 1805,

S. DAVIS, Accountant-General.

[SUPPLEMENT.—PRIVATE TRADE.]

No. I.

*The Right Honourable Henry Dundas to John Perry, Esq. and the
Committee of Ship Builders.**

GENTLEMEN,

Wimbledon, 1st July, 1797.

I received your letter of the 15th ultimo, which the urgency of various pressing avocations has prevented me from sooner acknowledging. In the conversation I had with you in Downing Street, I shortly stated to you my opinion, that the idea of prohibiting all India built shipping from coming to Great Britain, was not only in itself an act of great injustice, but would in its tendency have an effect on the interest of the Ship Builders in the River Thames, directly the reverse of what they seemed to apprehend.

The injustice of the proposition consists in depriving a great description of the subjects of Great Britain of a right undoubtedly belonging to them. The British territories in India are under the sovereignty of Great Britain and the ships built there are equally entitled to all the privileges of British built shipping, as those built in the West Indies or Canada, or any other foreign dependency of the empire, and I have never heard that the Ship Builders in Great Britain have set up a claim to prohibit any of the shipping in those quarters from bringing home the produce of their territories in ships of their own building, if they found it convenient to do so, and yet it is obvious that the same plea of interest, and supposed injury would equally apply.

I think it however the less necessary to dwell upon this topic, because upon a due consideration of the subject, no proposition can be more clear to my mind than that the apprehension entertained is perfectly erroneous, and that the restriction wished for would prove of no immediate use and ultimately injurious to those who suggest it.

Upon grounds of general policy both political and commercial, I assume it as an incontrovertible proposition, that if possible the whole trade and produce of India should in the first instance centre in Great Britain; either for the consumption of this country, or for re-exportation to supply

* This letter is referred to in Vol. II. p. 106.

the wants of other countries. If I was to draw my conclusions from that proposition only, I should on commercial principles be obliged to say that the produce and trade of India should be brought home in that species of shipping which can be got at the cheapest rate; but I am well aware, that there are grounds of great and essential national importance which stand in the way of that general proposition. The large ships built for the service of the East India Company, have always appeared to me necessarily connected with the permanent interests of this country, in so far as they afford a steady and invariable employment to the ship building interests of Great Britain, and by that means secure to its naval interests a ready supply of workmen and manufacturers of ship building materials when the exigencies of the state may require it.

These considerations have always operated in my judgment as a satisfactory answer to the objections founded upon the larger freight required by those ships than it might otherwise be obtained for, and likewise to the objection founded on the quantity of large timbers which they necessarily consume, to the detriment of the supply requisite for the navy of Great Britain.

On these grounds I have never failed, so far as my authority had any weight, to give it as my opinion that the whole of the China trade, and the whole of the regular trade of the East India Company, should, if possible, be carried out and brought home in ships of the description of those to whom I have just alluded. By the regular trade of the East India Company, I mean the trade indented for by them, which they know is ready prepared for them by their servants abroad, and with regard to the provision of which they have no reason to apprehend any disappointment on the arrival of their ships in India. If this system is adhered to it is impossible that the ship-building interests of Great Britain can have any cause to complain, and they ought to recollect to what an additional extent this interest has been carried within these very few years, and is likely to be still further carried by the increased and increasing commerce of the East India Company, arising from various causes, but in a peculiar manner from the effects of the Commutation Act passed some years ago.

Those who bring forward the ideas on which your letter is founded, altogether forget that the commerce of the East India Company must of course be regulated by the extent of the capital which they can afford to lay out upon it or which, under all circumstances, it may be prudent for them to speculate with. It is a notorious fact, that at all times a great share of the produce and manufactures of India have been brought to Europe by other channels than that of the East India Company, and to other ports than those of Great Britain. The other channels, must remain more or less according to the circumstances I have referred to; but although there may be several channels for bringing that produce to Europe, I do think there must be a fatal error in the commercial policy of the East India Company, if those channels are not so connected with them and so much under their own eye and control, as in reality, to a certain extent to form a part of their own trade, and as a consequence of this, it would necessarily follow that the Port of London would, in the

first instance, be the Emporium of the great bulk of the commerce of Asia.

It is idle to suppose that all this can be effected by the regular ships in the actual employ of the East India Company; the large freight which the construction and outfit of those ships necessarily require, but, above all, the uncertainty to what extent those ships, if they were to be sent out, would find cargoes prepared for them, renders any such speculation altogether impracticable. These are no new sentiments of mine. It is more than two years and a half since I had occasion to give that opinion to the East India Company; I then stated to their Chairman, that when "the Company were certain of an investment being actually prepared, they should lay it down as a rule to send from this country their proper shipping to bring home that valuable investment. But whenever they saw it necessary to make experimental speculations of the nature then in question, or where they are bound to make provision for bringing home private or privileged trade, it would be infinitely more wise to give a power to their governments abroad to take up shipping on the spot to the full amount requisite."

These are the general principles by which, in my opinion, the question should be ruled, and if it was invariably adhered to I am positive it would amply protect the ship building interests of Great Britain, and at the same time extend the great interests of her commerce and navigation.

There are several material errors operating on the minds of those who have applied to you. They conceive that the prohibition of India built ships coming to Great Britain, would make a proportionate degree of room for the shipping of the East India Company. It would have no such effect. It would have no other effect than that which it has always had, of driving those ships with their cargoes into foreign ports, and thereby establishing in foreign countries an Asiatic commerce founded on British capital, which by a contrary policy ought in the first place to centre in the River Thames, and be from thence re-exported for the supply of other European nations.

They are not aware of another essential point; such a prohibition would very rapidly injure the regular trade of the East India Company itself, for in consequence of the trade being carried on, to which I have last referred, foreign nations would be supplied with their assortments of Indian produce and manufacture, without having recourse for that purpose to Leadenhall Street, and in proportion as that mode of supplying themselves increased, exactly in the same proportion would the regular trade and the regular shipping in the employment of the East India Company decrease. The decrease of British shipping would not be the only consequence, the loss of commission and other consequences of British agency being employed in providing assortments for foreign countries, would also be withdrawn from the national capital.

The Ship Builders in the River Thames are under another material error, if they suppose, that their own immediate interests would not be injured by driving the India built shipping from the British ports to be the carriers of Indian produce and manufactures into the ports of foreign nations.

This country in general, and they in particular would of course lose the benefit which in various shapes results to this country from the refitting of those ships in the River Thames. I have endeavoured to inform myself what were the Indian built ships, which came to this country in the course of last season, and what might be the probable amount of their expenditure in the articles of refitting; I believe my information is pretty accurate as to the number of ships of this description, which have entered during that period the River Thames, and they amount to twenty-five in number; I have not had time to inform myself as to the expenditure laid out in the refit of eight of those ships, but I have what I consider to be credible information as to the other seventeen, and it is stated, that upon these ships the expenditure of refitting amounted to near £117,000. this is exclusive of the premiums of insurance, which must be great, and arises from the following articles, viz.

Copper	£4,996	14	4
Butcher, Brewer, Cooper, Baker and Provisions	15,839	7	0
Brazier, Ironmonger, Ship Chandler	12,296	13	11
Rope Maker and Sail Maker	21,441	0	7
Carpenter, Mast and Block Maker	21,485	14	10
Advance to Seamen and contingent expenses	40,820	9	6

£116,880 0 2

You will not fail to observe how great a proportion of this sum has gone to those immediately connected with the ship building interests in the River Thames, all of which must of course be transferred to foreign ports, if the suggestions which have been laid before you were to be adopted.

From an anxiety that there should be no misunderstanding on this very important subject, and with a view to quiet the minds of a very useful and meritorious class of men, I have perhaps detailed my sentiments with more minuteness than may appear to be necessary. The result of my opinion is, that the regular shipping of the East India Company ought to be kept up at an extent equal to, nay greater than what it ever was, but it is an egregious error to suppose that this can be done by giving way to the unfounded alarms which have been taken up on the subject of India built shipping. The very reverse would be the consequence of adopting those inconsiderate suggestions which have been recently brought forward. It is however proper for me to observe, that the execution of the principles upon which my opinion rests, does not depend upon me; they are connected with the commercial system of the East India Company, upon which they are liable to no controul, but what Parliament may think proper to impose; but if it is any satisfaction to you to know the foundation of the opinions which an individual, whose public situation has led him to attend to subjects of this nature, entertains respecting them, I trust you will do me the justice to admit, that I have done it without reserve, ready, certainly, at all times, to alter those opinions, if upon candid discussion they shall be found to be erroneous.

I am Gentlemen,

your most obedient humble servant,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. II.

The Right Honourable Henry Dundas to the Chairman of the Honourable East India Company.

SIR,

Somerset Place, 2nd April, 1800.

The subject of this letter is the question of private trade and India built shipping, on which I am anxious to lay my sentiments before the Court in order to attract their early attention to a decision upon it, believing that from the state in which the question is now left, much mischief results to the interests both of the East India Company, and of the public at large.

I feel the more anxious to come forward on this subject, because it is impossible for me not to observe a shyness on all hands to come to the discussion and I am not surprized at it; because so far as my reading or observation go, there never was any question where those who differ upon it went into such opposite extremes as those have done who have taken an active part in the agitation of it. This very circumstance emboldens me to step forward in the manner I am now doing; because it being my lot to agree in the extreme of none of the opinions which have been held out to the public consideration; I am the more likely to suggest some proper medium between those extremes which may bring together the discordant sentiments which are entertained upon it.

In the first place, I set out with disclaiming being a party to those opinions which rest upon any general attack of the monopoly of the East India Company, either as to the government or commerce of India. My sentiments in that respect remain exactly the same as they were when I moved the renewal of the Charter in 1793, and if any thing I am still more confirmed in the principles I brought forward at that time. That a direct interference by government in the affairs of India is necessary for their stability and uniformity, I am more and more convinced; but that the ostensible form of government with all its consequent extent, and detail of patronage must remain as it now is, I am persuaded will never be called in question by any but those who may be disposed to sacrifice the freedom and security of our constitution to their own personal aggrandizement and ill directed ambition.

I remain equally satisfied as to the propriety of continuing a monopoly of the trade in the hands of the East India Company. Those who maintain the reverse, appear to me to be misled by general theories, without attending to the peculiar circumstances of the trade they are treating of. Viewing it even as a mere commercial question, I believe this proposition to be a sound one and if the trade were laid open the supposed advantages therein arising, are at but very problematical, and would certainly be very precarious and short lived. It is however totally to forget the question to treat it as a mere commercial one. The same principles which prove the necessity of the present form and mode of Indian government, evince the necessity of the monopoly of trade. The government and the trade

are interwoven together, and we have only to recur to very recent experience to learn the immense advantages which have flowed from that connexion of government and trade. By the commercial capital of the Company at home, acting in connexion with the public revenues under their administration abroad, they have mutually aided and administered to the wants of each other, and the result has been the fortunate achievement of those brilliant events, upon the success of which, depended the existence of the government, the territorial wealth, and the trade of India.

You will observe Sir, that it is not my intention to argue those topics at large, but merely to state the principles I hold upon such topics as may appear to be connected with the subject I wish to bring more particularly under your consideration.

With the same view, it is, that I find it necessary to say a few words upon the subject of what is called the shipping interest of the East India Company. Upon that subject there seems to be a greater abuse of terms, and a more palpable confusion of ideas, than upon almost any other part of this complicated question. In so far as any person is loud in declaiming against the abuse of that great interest being confined exclusively to a few hands, who by such a monopoly, might have it in their power to dictate such terms, as they pleased to the East India Company on the subject of freight; I am as prepared as any man in crying down that abuse. But I am equally adverse to the sentiments of those who contend that the great interest of the Company's trade is, to be left to the chance of the market at large, and that the extent of the freight is either wholly or primarily to be the exclusive object of the Company's attention. I am decisively of opinion, that both on views of public policy, and commercial security, the same description of ships should be continued in the Company's service, built under the same inspection and regulations, fitted and found in every circumstance in the same respectable way they have hitherto been, and though every partiality and lavish extravagance is to be avoided, a freight fully adequate to secure those advantages ought not to be churlishly withheld. To what extent of shipping of this description the Company ought to go, will be the subject of more minute discussion in a subsequent part of this letter.

Having I trust made myself distinctly understood on those leading points, I proceed next to state what I hold to be equally incontrovertible, that although the Legislature has for the wisest purposes given a monopoly of trade to the East India Company, it is a monopoly attended with these two material circumstances.

1st. That the exportable produce of India exceeds what at present the capital of the East India Company is capable of embracing. 2nd. That the monopoly of the East India Company does not rest on principles of Colonial exclusion, for the trade to and from India is open to the subjects of other countries in amity with Great Britain. We must therefore accurately attend to the considerations which naturally result from these last mentioned circumstances.

If it be true that the trade to be carried on by the East India Company

must of necessity be limited by the extent of their capital, the natural question is what is to become of the remainder of it? Is it to be left exclusively to foreign nations, or is the monopoly of the Company to be so modified in the exercise of it as to open this surplus market to the capital of British subjects? This is a mere question of policy, to be decided on principles of expediency and sound discretion, upon a due attention to all the considerations which enter into the discussion of it, and although nothing could be more invidious and impolitic than to attempt to apply the principles of Colonial exclusion to other independent nations, nothing certainly can be more just or natural than that those nations who trade to India should trade there on their own capital, and that the capital of the British subjects resident in India should be brought home to this country in the manner most beneficial to their own interests and to that of the mother country, where it is desirable all that capital should ultimately settle. This proposition then clearly points out the true appropriation of the surplus produce of India. When I state this, I am at the same time free to declare that I totally disapprove of attempting to accomplish this by Penal Restrictive Statutes. All such ever have been and ever will be nugatory when resorted to for such a purpose. Trade never can be regulated or directed by any other certain rule than the interest of those concerned in it. But it is so much the interest and natural bent of a British subject to send his fortune to that country which gave him birth and where he means to close his days, that nothing but the most unnatural and impolitic restraints can suggest to him to do otherwise.

But obvious as this principle may appear to be, it requires accurate attention in the application of it to the subject in question. If I am asked whether in stating this principle I mean that the trade to and from India in the common use of the terms ought to be free and open to all his Majesty's subjects in India, I answer distinctly in the negative. The nature of the Indian manufacture and the immemorial habits of the manufacturers exclude the practical application of so indefinite a principle to the export trade from India. The manufacture of the finer, and more valuable fabrics have always been produced by advances from the government or individuals for whose behalf those fabrics are manufactured, and if the dealing with the manufacturers was to be laid open to the uncontrolled competition of every individual, the consequence would be a boundless scene of confusion and fraud, and ultimately the ruin of the manufacturers themselves. It is unnecessary for me to detail this part of the subject at any length, because it is so clearly and ably explained in a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, dated 1st November, 1788, that I have only to refer you and the Court to the careful perusal of it. The whole of it is worthy of your serious attention, but paragraphs 24 and 31 inclusive, are those to which I particularly refer as bearing on the present question. It is not the purpose of the present letter to point out what the precise regulations ought to be, but it is obvious that those employed in the agency of such a trade, should be controlled by such regulations as may be requisite to secure both to the Company itself and to

other individuals, the full benefit of those advances they have made to the manufacturers of Indian fabrics.

It is immediately connected with the observations last offered to consider by what agency is the trade of individuals in India to be carried on? If this question was to be decided on the principles of an open and free trade, the answer to the question would be, that every individual should send out or employ any agent he thought best to manage his own business. But from what I have already stated on the former point, you will anticipate my opinion upon this, namely, that no agent should be employed in India, or permitted to reside there, except with the licence of the East India Company, and subject to the control of such regulations as the habits, prejudices and trade of the country may render expedient. In addition to every other consideration arising out of the peculiar nature of the trade and manners of the country, there is one decisive circumstance against the tolerance of the unlicensed adventurer in India. It would rapidly, though insensibly lead to the settlement and colonization of the worst kind of adventurers taking root in that country, than which there could not be a more fatal blow to the permanence of the British power and pre-eminence in India. No principle ought ever to be tolerated or acted upon, that does not proceed on the basis of India being considered as the temporary residence of a great British establishment for the good government of the Country upon steady and uniform principles, and of a large British factory for the beneficial management of its trade upon rules applicable to the state and manners of the country.

From these premises the conclusion I draw is, that the surplus produce of India, beyond what the appropriated capital of the East India Company can bring home, should be considered as the means of transferring the fortunes of the servants in India to Great Britain, and that the commerce should be managed there, either by the parties themselves interested in it, or by their agents, acting under the licence and subject to the control and regulations of the East India Company.

The question which naturally follows is, by what mode of conveyance is that trade to be brought home? I answer by the India built shipping. Upon the policy and beneficial tendency of this measure, I have only to refer you to the unanimous opinion of all your ablest servants in India, who have from time to time, and in the most explicit terms pointed out to you the expediency of this indulgence, both with a view to a just attention to the interests of your servants in India, and with a view to make Britain the great emporium of the trade of Asia. Indeed nothing has hindered your servants abroad sanctioned by the express advice of your Board of Trade, from acting upon these principles at different times, but the great quantity of unemployed shipping sent out by the East India Company. I trust henceforward you will see the wisdom of desisting from such a wasteful system.

If you fix the capital you mean to apply to investment, and accurately direct your servants to provide that investment, there can be no occasion for any extra shipping. Your investment and shipping will correspond accurately together, and your commerce be systematically conducted.

I mean in a separate letter to treat of what the amount of that investment ought to be, and what are the means by which it is to be provided. At present I mean only to state that whatever the regular investment is, it ought to be brought home in the regular home built ships, to which I have referred in the beginning of this letter. If any accident shall befall any of those ships in their outward passage, or if any circumstances exist to render it expedient for you to bring home gruff goods, or any other articles of commerce from India, a discretion should be left with your governments abroad to supply that deficiency from the shipping to be found in India.

But it ought to be adopted and adhered to, as an invariable rule, that the regular shipping to be sent from this country should be in exact proportion to the amount of the investment expected home.

When I am thus adding the concurrence of my opinion to the weight of authority, which the proposition derives from the unanimous sentiments of your most intelligent servants in India, I am only adhering to the principles I detailed when I moved the renewal of your charter in 1793. It was upon an application of those principles that the provision was made in the Act of Parliament, directing the East India Company to appropriate 3000 tons annually to the private trade to and from India. Although I proposed that measure, I should be uncandid if I did not fairly acknowledge, that experience has proved it to be inadequate to the purposes for which it was intended. If the object had been only to try an experiment how far individuals were more competent to the export of British produce and manufactures than the East India Company, no other objection would lay against the measure, except what may be supposed to arise from the dearness of freight at which the East India Company could afford to give shipping of that description. But in so far as the provision went to secure the transfer of the capital of our servants in India to this country through the medium of trade, it is clearly ascertained that the measure was a nugatory one. I need not enter into any explanation of the reasons, for they are so distinctly and unanswerably stated, both in the correspondence of your Board of Trade at Bengal, and in the memorials presented by the merchants at Calcutta to your supreme government in India, that I have only to refer you to the perusal of these documents, in proof of the inutility of that provision in the Act 1793.

I am therefore clear that clause in the act ought to be repealed and the Company relieved from the obligation it imposes upon them; and in place thereof a power given to your governments abroad to allow the British subjects resident in India, to bring home their funds to Britain in the shipping of the country. I see in the records of the Company abroad it is suggested that those ships should be contracted for by the government, and unfreighted to the individuals. I don't exactly perceive what benefit arises from the governments having that kind of interference in the business; but if there is any good reason for it, there is not certainly any material objection against it; but it is material to attend to, and of course regulations will be made as to the time of sailing, and other circumstances of detail connected with the safe execution of the measure.

It may perhaps be objected that this proposition is injurious to the regular shipping of the East India Company for the preservation of which system I have already given so decided an opinion.

The answer to this objection is twofold; first, in point of fact it will not diminish their shipping a single ton, for the East India Company would not, if the measure was not adopted, send out a single ship more; they ought and will send out as much of the regular British built India shipping as is necessary to bring home the whole of their investment, and they will act improvidently if they send out one ton more; the only effect of this measure not being adopted would be, to extend the trade and shipping of other nations, but in no respect to add to the regular shipping of the East India Company.

In the next place those interested in the regular shipping of the East India Company would do well to consider the benefits they already enjoy, in place of endeavouring to cramp and check the just pretensions of others, they ought to recollect the rapid progress they have made from the time of the commutation act, and above all they ought to recollect that it has always been considered as a very problematical question, how far consistent with the national interests, so much of the ship timber of the country ought to be appropriated to its commercial concerns in the manner practised by the builders of India shipping. I am one of those who think there are reasons of public expediency connected with the very interest on which the objection is founded, which ought to prevent any principle of that kind being inconsiderately acted upon, but one of the material grounds upon which I am disposed to think that the objection I have referred to, ought to be well weighed before it is given way to, arises from the reflection that we have a national resource in India which ought to lead to the reverse of any invidious or unjust discouragement being given to the ship building of India.

In some of the many speculations I have heard, and the publications I have perused on this subject it is usual to ask in a tone of complaint if it is not unjust and unfair that the merchants and shipping of this country, other than the shipping of the East India Company should be excluded from a participation of this trade which is allowed to the subjects of foreign nations.

This statement at first sight may appear plausible, but when examined to the bottom it has no solidity. In truth it is only another mode of objecting to the monopoly of the East India Company. If there are reasons of sound policy why the legislature has decided that the India trade should be carried on by a monopoly, it is because viewing the interests of the public as one aggregate, it is of opinion that those interests are but cared for by that mode of conducting the trade; those therefore who state this objection being themselves part of that whole, are in common with the rest of his Majesty's subjects reaping the benefit of that influx of national wealth and capital which the East India trade so conducted brings into the national stock; they cannot therefore more than others, because their occupation happens to be that of merchants or ship owners, complain of being injured by the means which the wisdom of Parliament has devised for introducing that flow of wealth into the kingdom.

The case is totally different with regard to the subjects of foreign nations ; they are not the objects of the care of the British Legislature, neither are their interests at all in the view of its provisions. They reap no benefit, but the reverse, from the growing wealth and prosperity of the British empire, and therefore are in no respect on a footing of comparison with any of the subjects of this country, to whom the restraints of the Company's charter, for the reasons already assigned, do with perfect propriety apply.

It is quite a separate question how far it would be right to hold our Indian possessions upon principles of Colonial monopoly, and it would be deviating from the strict matter of the objection to enter into that discussion in this place ; it is sufficient, in point of fact, to observe, in answer to the merchants and ship-owners, that it is thought expedient for the interests of the empire at large, that the East India possessions should not be regulated on the principles of colonial exclusion, and therefore no part of the subjects of Great Britain can be permitted to set up a separate interest of their own against that general policy. If the colonial principle was to be applied to the Indian territories, it would not advance, by one step, that separate interest set up by the merchants and ship-owners : to whom I now refer.

Another turn is given to this objection in the mouth of the same objectors, and it is asked why, at least, should not the merchants and ship-owners, subjects of His Majesty, living in Britain, have the same indulgences which are contended for by His Majesty's subjects resident in India? The answer is plain and conclusive, that in contending for this indulgence to the British subjects resident in India, I am contending for a material interest, which is no other than this,—that their fortunes and capitals created in India should be transferred from that country to this, in a manner most beneficial for themselves and the kingdom at large, in place of being transferred through the medium of conveyance by foreigners, and thereby adding to the wealth, capital, and navigation of foreign countries.

There is not a single circumstance in which this applies to the case of merchants in this country. It might be proved, if necessary, that the only effect of giving such an indulgence to the merchants resident in this country would be a temptation to withdraw a part of the capital of the country from a more profitable trade, and more beneficial application of it, in order to divert it to another trade, less profitable to themselves and less beneficial to the public. Without, therefore, one single reason, either of private justice or public policy, it would be introducing a rival capital in India against the remittance trade of the East India Company, and in competition likewise with those individuals whose capitals, by the proposed indulgence, it is wished to transfer to Great Britain.

It is argued, that the extension of this indulgence to the British merchants would be an additional encouragement to the export of British manufactures ; I need only observe that the argument proceeds on an erroneous view of the subject. The export trade to India can never be

extended in any degree proportionate to the wealth and population of the Indian empire, neither can the returns upon it be very profitable to individuals. Those who attend to the manners, the manufactures, the food, the raiment, the moral and religious prejudices of that country, can be at no loss to trace the causes why this proposition must be a true one; the importance of that immense empire to this country is rather to be estimated by the great annual addition it makes to the wealth and capital of the kingdom than by any eminent advantages which the manufacturers of the country can derive from the consumption of the natives of India. I do not mean to say that the exports from this country to India have not been very considerably increased of late years, and I make no doubt that from recent circumstances they may be still considerably increased; but the prospect from the causes I have already referred to, must always be a limited one, and I am positive that the shipping and exertions of the East India Company, joined to the return cargoes of those ships who bring home the private trade of India, is more than adequate to any present or future increase of export trade that the country can look to upon any rational ground of hope.

In this view, therefore, the British merchants are equally mistaken in supposing that there is any national interest implicated in this attempt to break in upon the monopoly of the Company, as they are in supposing that any material benefit would accrue to themselves individually.

In some of the collections of papers I have read upon the subject of private trade, I have observed a difference of opinion entertained to what places in India it has been or ought to be allowed. I am at a loss to discover the grounds of this controversy; if individuals are to be allowed to bring goods from India in India shipping and to carry back goods to India in the same shipping, I cannot see the ground for restraining them in coming from or returning to any part in India.

In like manner with regard to agents, provided they are licensed by the Company, and subject themselves to the contract of the regulations which the Company may see cause to establish for the conduct of agents in India, I see no reasons why those agents may not be permitted to exercise their agency for behoof of their constituents in any part of the territories of India. I state this with regard even to agency exercised for behoof of foreigners trading to India. It is clearly beneficial for the interests of India in every point of view, that foreigners should rather employ British agents residing under the protection of the Company in India, than that these foreign nations should establish agents of their own in any part of India. In the former case they are under the controul of the Company, and bound to adhere to such rules as the Company may think proper to lay down for the conduct of agency; but there can exist no such controul or restraint over the agents of the other description.

With regard to the agents to be employed at home, to manage the private trade of individuals from India, and to take care of their interests in the cargoes of the returning ships, I do not see the use of any interference by the Company. The great interest to be attended to on the part

of the Company is, that no goods come from India that are not deposited in Company warehouses, and that the goods so imported are exposed at the Company's sales, agreeable to the rules prescribed for that purpose.

This letter has extended to a length far beyond what I intended or expected; but I was desirous to have my opinion on all the points connected with the subject distinctly understood; and I shall less regret the trouble I have given you in the perusal of so long a letter, if I shall be successful in calling your attention to a speedy and final decision of the question, which has been too long in discussion, from the very discordant opinions and opposite extremes which have appeared in the agitation of it.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. III.

The Honourable G. Udny, Member of Council, to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Calcutta, 15th September, 1800.

I beg leave to offer, with diffidence, some observations upon the letter from Mr. Dundas to the chairman of the Court of Directors, which your Lordship put into my hands.

That the trade to be carried on by the East India Company must be limited by the extent of their capital; that this capital cannot embrace the whole trade of India, that of the remainder foreigners should participate in no greater degree than to the extent of their own capitals; and that the fortunes of the Company's servants resident in India should, by means of this trade, be carried to England, in the manner most beneficial to their interests and to that of the mother country, where it is desirable that all that capital should ultimately settle, are positions established in this letter.

In arguing on the fittest mode of conducting this trade, Mr. Dundas appears to consider it merely as a vehicle for conveying to England the fortunes of the Company's servants in India. But it may be shown that this is not strictly the case. The largest portion of the community of British India, viz. the servants of the Company in the military, judicial, and revenue lines (in Bengal at least) are prohibited from trade: of their servants who engage in it, trade is for a series of years carried on with a view first to acquire a fortune, and only ultimately does it serve, and that perhaps but in part, for the remittance of it.

The great channels of remittance for fortunes acquired in India are of late years,

1. By bills of exchange granted by the different governments of India on the Court of Directors, or by loan to the Company in India, payable at the expiration of their term, in England.

2. By bills drawn by the mercantile houses at the different Presidencies,

upon consignments of goods made by them to England, on their own proper account, or by the bills of their constituents, whether servants of the Company, traders, or free merchants or others out of the Company's employ, upon similar consignments of goods made on their behalf.

A great part of the capital of British subjects resident in India thus employed in the provision of goods for the purpose of consignment to England, is not that the produce of them may remain there, but that it may again be brought back to this country to be reinvested in the trade of it.

Merchantile houses also employ not only their own capital in this trade, but the capitals of the houses of agency with whom they are connected in England, and some capital borrowed from thence.

With respect to the mode in which the provision of goods in India for this trade should be made, Mr. Dundas lays it down as his settled opinion, "that no agent should be employed in India or permitted to reside there, except with the licence of the East India Company, subject to the controul of such regulations as the habits, prejudices, and trade of the country may render expedient, from this decisive circumstance, in addition to every other consideration, that the tolerance of unlicensed adventurers would lead to colonization of the worst kind, tending to undermine the permanence of the British power and pre-eminence in India." This unquestionably is the prime object to be kept in view, and to which all others must be made subservient. The restrictions now in force, both with respect to persons coming to, and residing in India, appear in the highest degree salutary and proper. Merchants procure all the goods they want from the places of their manufacture in the interior of the country, either through the Company's servants, or by licensed traders residing there, or through the medium of native agents.

In this regulated way all British subjects (under no prohibition) may participate in the trade, and whatever may be the speculative fancies of some men upon a more unrestrained order of things, dissatisfaction is rarely expressed with that which now prevails. No change therefore, in this respect, seems to be either desired or required.

We never hear of difficulty in procuring goods, but complaints are frequent of the want of proper conveyance for them to England after they are provided. This is certainly a grievance of no small moment to the merchant who wishes to act an honest part, and to conform to established regulations. With money in his hands, and with a desire to speculate in the purchase of goods for the English market, he is afraid to lay his money out, because either he may be disappointed in getting tonnage for the conveyance of it at all, or he may in the customary distribution of law tonnage amongst the several claimants, obtain only part of what he wants; or supposing him to be successful as to quantity, the rate of freight required by the Company may be so high as to preclude all expectation of profit (the only incentive to speculation), by the consignment of the description of goods he may wish to send. If he trades at all, therefore, he must do it to evident disadvantage, with this additional mortification, to see foreigners dealing in the same articles, and able from the advantages they

possess, to overbid him in the market here, and undersell him in that of Europe.

Of the 3,000 tons allotted by law for the annual conveyance of the goods of individuals from all parts of India to England, the other Presidencies have rarely applied for their proportions, and the whole tonnage has, with the exception of one year, been inadequate to the supply of Bengal alone.

The tonnage which has been occupied with Bengal private goods since the Act of Parliament of 1793 has had effect here, is as follows :—

In 1794-5—2,473 tons ; 1795-6—5,346 do. ; 1796-7—4,659 do. ; 1797-8—3,787 do. ; 1798-9—6,223 do. ; 1799-1800—7,748 do.

Through the liberality of your Lordship in granting a facility to the trade in 1798-9 by permitting ships to be hired by the Company, and afterwards relet to their owners, they settling with the shippers of goods for cargo and freight, the accommodation and the satisfaction to both parties were very great. Though this indulgence was discontinued last season, yet the amount of tonnage applied for by individuals was granted to the extent of the shipping which could be hired for the purpose. The tonnage occupied in 1798-9 exceeds that of the four preceding years, and 1799-1800 exhibits a further considerable increase. I have understood that the merchants adventured more largely last year in the purchase of goods for Europe, under the idea that the facilities of 1798 would have been continued to them. By being permitted to make their own terms with the shippers of goods, the ship-owners are enabled perfectly to assort their cargoes, to fill their ships in the most advantageous manner and at the most convenient times. They are freed from the loss which they are subject to under the present system from the delay which occurs in the payment of their freight and the settlement of their accounts in England by the Company (of which they complain heavily), and thus they can afford to provide tonnage on terms more reasonable than at present. By this mode the merchant also, besides the advantage of a lower rate of freight, derives another substantial benefit in the employment of his capital. He has it in his power to make his engagement with the ship owner before he begins the purchase of his goods, he can buy those only which it will answer for him to speculate in, at the ascertained rates of freight, and he suits the amount of his provision exactly to the carriage he has secured for it.

Whatever be the expediency of keeping up the Company's regular shipping on their present respectable and expensive footing, it can answer only for the conveyance of the Company's own valuable goods, of the finer sorts of indigo, and of some other valuable commodities of individuals ; the rates of freight chargeable thereon are too extravagant to be borne by sugar of the Company's investment, or by the gruff goods commonly provided by individuals. The extra shipping hired in England and sent out by the Company for the purpose of supplying the two last mentioned demands, is at a rate beyond what the most extensive exports from Bengal, viz. sugar and saltpetre, will reasonably bear.

It is in vain to expect that Great Britain should become the emporium

of the trade of Asia until a very considerable reduction be effected in the price of freight between India and the mother-country, and a blow be given by this means to the trade of foreigners.

It is by the employment of Indian built shipping that this desirable reduction can be effected. The proposition of Mr. Dundas, therefore, that this description of shipping shall be employed exclusively for carrying the goods of individuals from India to England, is a most wise, and, connected with the consideration of the trade of foreigners, a necessary measure.

It would open a prospect every way exhilarating; of increased prosperity to the country by the extension of its powers of produce and manufacture, and by opening new and unexplored sources of commerce; of increased benefit to the merchant by unloosing his hands and giving a scope for the fullest exertion of his capacities and of increased wealth to the nation, by promoting a more valuable importation into it, and reducing the foreign trade with India within its natural and proper bounds.

That the shipping of India would be adequate to the demand for it there can be no doubt. At this moment there are above 10,000 tons of shipping tendered and at command in Bengal, after two ships have been recently provided with cargoes to the amount of 1,500 tons; timber proper for ship-building here and in the vicinity abounds; the art has arrived in Bengal at a high pitch, a great number of artificers are constantly employed, and no sooner is a ship launched than the foundation of another is laid in her room. Spacious and convenient docks for repairing ships are also erected. Almost every article necessary for ship-building, except the timber, would come from England, namely,—iron, copper, nails, bolts, &c., or with canvas, guns, &c. for equipment, the value of which here is said to constitute full two-fifths of the cost of a ship when fitted for sea. This particular branch of the manufactures of England would consequently be more largely encouraged by the extension of ship-building in India, and that the manufactures of Great Britain in general would obtain a greater vent, when, by a reduction of freight, they could be exported to India, and sold there on cheaper terms, there is just reason to suppose.

There appears to be only one class of men who can, with any propriety, express dissatisfaction at such an employment as that under consideration, of India built shipping, and they are the ship-builders of Great Britain. It seems, however, very doubtful, whether even they would suffer in the end, as from the greater number of such ships, which would resort to England, than that now furnished by it for this trade, the expense for repairs which they would require to be laid out upon them there, might be expected, if not to equal, to fall little short of the original outlay of construction of the British shipping.

It is understood that the employment of Indian built shipping should be confined strictly between Great Britain and India. One instance has occurred lately of a ship of this description, the *Anna*, having made a voyage from England to the West Indies and back again; other similar instances, which have not come to my knowledge, may have occurred.

Mr. Dundas does not, he says, clearly perceive the benefit to arise from the interference of Government, in taking up the ships of India, though he

sees no objection to it. By means of such interference a controul is established which provides for the employment of ships duly qualified by law, and for the security of the property of individuals embarked in them, the same as if the property were the Company's; by the survey of the ships, their proper condition and equipment, their loading in due degree, besides other important and necessary regulations, amongst which are those for the proper care and treatment of the seamen, whether natives of Asia or of Africa, by which such ships are navigated.

But, it may be asked, will not the trade of the company suffer by such an unlimited importation of Indian produce into England as this system may induce, and on terms of freight more reasonable than what they are obliged to pay, whereby the demand for their goods will be reduced and the value of them lessened: To this it may be answered, that the London sales of East India Goods will be affected by the aggregate importation thereof into Europe at large, and the general state of the markets there, nearly in the same degree, whether the proportion imported into England itself be greater or less, and that the Company have, from the long establishment of their factories, from the skill of their servants, trained up and employed at them, and the confidence which the manufacturers repose in them, from long habit of dealing with the Company, handed down to them from their forefathers, obtained so decided a superiority in the provision of the most valuable articles, piece-goods and raw silk, that individual merchants cannot pretend, by any practicable reduction of freight to cope with them. In the article of sugar and other gruff goods, the private trade is more upon a par with the Company in the first purchase, and I do not see how the Company can maintain their ground in the market, unless they also resort to India built shipping for the conveyance of such like articles, sending out only regular Indiamen to carry home their valuable Investments, which experience will show to be a necessary and profitable arrangement.

It remains to speak of the trade of foreigners to this port, a subject which calls for the most serious attention.

The value of the cargoes imported into Bengal, in the year 1799-1800, by Americans and Portuguese, exceeds one million of pounds sterling, of which £.944,834 have been imported in treasure, whereas the value of imports from England by British individuals does not amount to £.600,000.

With such powerful means these two foreign nations have been enabled to increase their exports very considerably beyond those of British subjects.

• The export trade of the Americans,* in the last year, is nearly double to

• AMERICA.

The value of the imports during the year 1799-1800 : . 35,24,614

• The value of the average of the three preceding years . 13,10,151

Excess in 1799-1800 . . . Sicca Rupees 22,14,463

what it was, on an average of the three preceding years. The export trade of the Portuguese † has quadrupled within the same period, and but for

	Treasure.	Merchandize.	Total.
From America direct	7,36,320	1,42,499	8,78,819
" via London	15,88,899		15,88,899
" Hamburgh	2,55,069	1,43,871	3,98,940
" Madeira	76,461	2,60,748	3,37,220
" Leghorn	94,500	300	94,800
" Bremen	1,36,847	10,775	1,47,622
" Lisbon	77,700	624	78,324
Total, Sicca Rupees.	29,65,797	5,58,817	35,24,614

The value of the exports in 1799-1800 37,85,937

The value of the average of the three preceding years 19,25,137

Excess in 1799-1800 Sicca Rupees. 18,60,800

IMPORTS.

Woollens	2,499
Metals	23,398
Articles for manufacture and ship-building	32,885
Articles for the use of Europeans	61,899
Liquors	4,08,629
Eatables	6,829
Sundries	17,678
Treasure	29,65,797

Sicca Rupees. 35,24,614

EXPORTS.

Piece Goods	28,44,333
Sugar	6,59,340
Bengal Rum	612
Spices	6,888
Pepper	45,613
Tea	86,632
Sago	1,183
Sundries	1,41,336

Sicca Rupees. 37,85,937

† LISBON.

	Treasure.	Merchandize.	Total.
The value of the imports from Lisbon in 1799-1800	45,92,915	63,476	46,56,391
Average of the three preceding years	4,23,914	48,262	4,72,176
Excess in 1799-1800 Sic. Rup.	41,69,001	15,214	41,84,215

The value of the exports in 1799-1800 33,44,435

The value of the average of the three preceding years 8,12,467

Excess in 1799-1800 Sicca Rupees. 25,31,968

want of cargo for one of their largest ships, would have borne a higher proportion.

Even supposing that the capital with which these nations trade was all their own, the proportion of the trade to Bengal, which they enjoy, seems unnaturally great, compared † with that of British subjects; but considering a portion of that capital, as it must be considered, as being the capital of British subjects, it becomes a cause of alarm. §

What may be the proportion of British capital employed in the Portugal trade is not so clear; but the case respecting America is less doubtful.

IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
Metals	3,209	Piece Goods	32,83,185
Articles for the use of Europeans	3,616	Spices	3,274
Liquors	45,698	Pepper	957
Sundry Articles	953	Tea	45,180
	63,476	Tutenague	8,500
Treasure	45,92,915	Sundries	3,339
			Sicca Rupees. 33,44,435
	<u>Sicca Rupees. 46,56,391</u>		

† GENERAL IMPORTS.

	Treasure.	Merchandize.	Total.
America	29,65,797	5,58,817	35,24,614
Lisbon	45,92,915	63,476	46,56,391
	75,58,712	6,22,293	81,81,005
London	16,36,405	31,50,696	4787,101
Hamburgh		72,333	72,333
Copenhagen	5,09,398	5,07,076	10,16,474
Sicca Rupees.	97,04,515	43,52,398	1,40,56,913

§ Exports in 1799-1800.

To America	S. R. 37,85,937
• „ Portugal	33,44,435
	<u>71,30,372</u>
„ London	67,66,649
„ Hamburgh	61,582
„ Copenhagen	9,56,145
	<u>Sicca Rupees. 1,49,14,748</u>

The documents of the Custom House, collected by the reporter of External Commerce; and before cited, show that not quite one-fourth of the funds with which the Americans purchased their investments the last year, came from America;—£.200,000 in specie was imported direct from London, the remainder from the other ports in Europe and from the Island of Madeira, partly in exchange for the sugars of Bengal carried thither, and in exchange for their own corn, sold at Madeira, and part thence, it is supposed, on credit.

Under the present system of things the Americans bid fair to exclude us from the market for sugar in Europe; their ships are pouring into Bengal this season, and they are carrying very large cargoes of it from Batavia.

The celerity with which they conduct their commercial operations is surprizing. Instances occurred last season of several of their ships disposing of their imports, purchasing their export cargoes, and leaving the port in 20 and 25 days from the date of their arrival.

It is impossible that British merchants can, under the present order of things, cope successfully with such alert rivals; every consideration of benefit to British individuals, and of advantage to the British nation, calls for speedy measures of reform respecting the trade of India, to which the scarcity of English shipping available here this season, seems now more particularly to invite.

In addition to the immense advantages derived from your Lordship's government to the British nation, by securing and consolidating its dominion in India, it remains, by unfettering the trade of it to British subjects and affording to them the enjoyment of their natural privileges, so far as may be consistent with the rights of the Company, and thereby reducing foreigners within their just and natural bounds, to draw forth all the resources of these valuable possessions, and to accomplish the grand object, so long desired, of rendering Great Britain the emporium of the East.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servant,

G. UDNY.

No. IV.

*Charles Grant, Esq. of the Court of Directors, to J. Bebb, Esq.**

MY DEAR SIR,

Battersea Rise, June 4, 1799.

The Bengal government in the month of October last, gave permission to individuals to send home ships and cargoes on their own account through the medium of the Company. I yet know no more of this measure than the public advertisement of the Board of Trade announces. I have no letter from you respecting it, nor have I heard that the proceedings of the Governor-General in Council upon it are received, though advices of it through private channels arrived in London very early, and were not all relished by several members of the Court. I am not sure indeed that this was not

* Mr. Bebb was then I believe a Member of the Board of Trade.—[Ed.]

the first report which reached us after Lord Mornington's accession to the Government, an unfortunate circumstance which suggested the expediency of public functionaries being if possible, the earliest communicators of their own acts. This measure has not been publicly canvassed, but is likely to become the subject of particular discussion and debate. Were it indeed to be considered as a single, or temporary, or occasional measure, not as the beginning of a novel practice, involving important consequences, it might be passed over without any emphatic notice, or might receive a summary acquiescence; but it will be regarded as belonging to a question of great magnitude and complexity, respecting which there have been a diversity of opinions in Leadenhall Street, namely, "the proper rule or measure of intercourse between British India and Europe." And this question is now felt with a lively interest on account of the noise recently made about illicit trade, of which you will have heard a great deal; mens passions and prejudices having too much turned a business justly deserving attention, into a most cruel unfounded attack upon an individual, Mr. Scott, who has been long since acquitted by the Court of personal imputation, and in the end I believe, will stand clear with the public, though seldom has a character been more outrageously assailed. It seems moreover, that Mr. Dundas is meditating some new arrangements for regulating the private exports from British India, and drawing them more generally to this country. On all these accounts, I have been led to turn my thoughts to the comprehensive question above stated. I knew not exactly what your opinion is upon it, nor what share you have had in the particular measure of last year. I own I consider the one and the other not without some degree of solicitude, and I am desirous of sketching to you the train in which my reflections have gone; not meaning to propose dogmatical opinions, but views which on the whole I entertain, though with some mixture of diffidence, excepting only in respect to two points, to which in this subject I assign nearly the place of axioms. The first is, that the legislature having by the act of 1793 given the Company a monopoly of the India trade for twenty years under certain modifications, this compact; (for such it was) or this privilege, which is a term yet more indisputable, ought to be substantially maintained and preserved; and as a Director, I feel myself bound by the duty of my office to contend for it, and not to acquiesce in any voluntary surrender of it, unless such surrender were determined by some general solemn act of my constituents. The second point which I hold strongly is, that an unlimited intercourse between Britain and India, such as subsists between Britain and her American colonies, would thin this country of inhabitants, and fill our Eastern possessions with eager adventurers, even from all parts of Europe, who would vex, harrass and perplex the weak natives, and finally endanger, if not occasion the overthrow of our dominions in the East. In this proposition, another is implied which may also be stated distinctly, that all our measures for the advancement and prosperity of our Indian territories ought to be calculated with a reservation of the maintenance of our authority over them, a principle in which my mind acquiesces, because I believe our Government is on the whole the happiest they can have.

You probably know the sentiments which are severally held by different parties connected with the Company, and with India, on the question of the private commerce of British subjects between that country and Europe. Some seem to think on this question in the spirit of the old rigid system of strict monopoly; others are for a gradual melioration of that system, as time and circumstances will bear, with due safety to the political interest, and relation of the superior and dependant state; and others lean more to general ideas respecting the freedom of commerce, and the prosperity of our Indian possessions, ideas which if practically followed into all their augmentative consequences, would probably lead to the speedy supercession even of the modified monopoly. You and I, I suppose, have long been satisfied that the adherents to the old narrow principle of an exclusive trade, were men of very confined minds; in fact their temper could hardly have continued to shew itself, had not occasion been found for the indulgence of it, in the abuses of illicit intercourses between British India and Europe; as a cure for which, they are for resorting to restrictive measures, which would bring back the earlier times of the Company, and certainly dam up some of the present channels of commerce, which flowing with the current they do, might probably soon rise over the mounds opposed to them, or otherwise diffuse their waters very inconveniently.

The original strict monopoly was calculated for the then relative situation of this country, (I may say of Europe) and India. We had little or no Indian territory; few Europeans in our settlements. The commerce of other European nations to the East was carried on by companies; the most common article of exchange was bullion. The acquisition of great territorial dominion there by an European nation, would have made a material change in this state of things. Such an acquisition has fallen to Great Britain. The government of Indian provinces and kingdoms, has exceedingly enlarged the number of European residents in them, and has given to these residents a footing so solid, as to enable them to bring the energies of their character, and the superiority of their knowledge into activity. The influence of the governing people, and the revenues of those countries flowing into British channels, public or private, have commanded the exportable productions of them, and by the fall of the French and Dutch India Companies, together with other causes, a very great share of all the commerce carried on between India and Europe, exclusive of that which the English Company enjoys, is in the hands of British subjects. The taste for Indian commodities is increased in Europe, the imports of them there are greater. With the acquisition which British subjects have already made with their resources, and their growing spirit of enterprize, they feel more impatiently the restraints which remain, and the desire of breaking through them. In fact, under the protection of the Company's government, they participate very largely with the Company in commercial advantages, and are becoming gradually possessed of a spirit whose tendency is to undermine and abrogate the commercial privileges of that body altogether. Nor are there wanting arguments of real solidity, which they apply in an unqualified way in favour of their own aims. For true it is, "that our Indian possessions ought to be che-

rished, and then industry and trade encouraged and promoted. But much that has been said on this head, has I conceive been rashly and crudely taken up, and repeated and urged by persons having an immediate and direct interest in the most unlimited application of such principles, without regard to distant consequences. Those who have any share of administrative power are required to look further than mere merchants, or commercial arguments do. Dr. Adam Smith eminent as he was in political science, certainly went upon very erroneous and defective informations in his reasonings respecting the management of our Eastern possessions. Few persons living in them, or connected with the Company, have ventured expressly to contend with him, that the trade to India should be laid entirely open; but if this doctrine was not directly intended, it was virtually contained in various opinions advanced concerning freedom of trade, the prosperity of our provinces, and other relative topics; and even where general principles involving this conclusion are not employed, but only partial and particular concessions required. I own that whilst I may feel the necessity and even propriety of yielding to the course of things, I am not without fear of the ultimate issue even of this more gradual progress. For it is that commercial principles, extremely important in their place, are superseded in my mind by a more powerful consideration, already explained in the second position or axiom above stated, the danger of an unrestrained, unlimited intercourse between India and Great Britain, and in consequence between India and the other nations of Europe also. Free trade could not be permitted without being followed by a general intercourse, nor that as I conceive without finally hazarding our political power in the east. Now if there be any reality in the danger thus apprehended; the time to guard against it, is whilst it is still at a distance. To me it seems most clear, that neither this country nor India is yet prepared for such an unrestricted intercourse as I have mentioned; and that all circumstances considered, the safest way for both is to maintain their connection by means of such a natural organ as the India Company. Doubtless that organ cannot be confined to its original dimensions. I have always been one of those who were for enlarging it; and I believe it is still necessary to render it more comprehensive, though in doing this, circumspection should be used. Those who in the spirit of their arguments against illicit trade, &c. stickle for the original system of strict monopoly, and those who are for giving an unlimited scope to the exertions of individuals, seem equally to overlook circumstances necessary to be regarded in order to a sound determination. To cramp the industry of our provinces in articles of European demand, within what the Company can in any shape take off, is an absurd and intolerable idea; to say that every adventurer disposed to speculate in the trade between Europe and India should have free leave, seems on the other hand a proposition quite inadmissible. This proposition, perhaps, it might be answered, is not now in question; nobody engaged in the management of the Company's affairs is so wild as to entertain it. But I mean to imply that the general indefinite strain of the arguments and language held about freedom of trade, &c. will involve it; and I would add as more immediately applicable to the present purpose, that

statedly to give permission to all individuals to send home ships and goods of their own, though through the medium of the Company, appears to me to be going a great way towards the adoption of that proposition. I am a friend to this measure, properly adjusted, in every view except as it may tend to affect the stability of our dominion. In this respect I confess I am not without my fears. I would not merely from feeling them reject the measure, but I would have it cautiously and deliberately considered. Directly and consequentially it is a very large admission; and those who ask for it, as they usually argue upon those general grounds of commercial policy already mentioned, without limiting or defining the ultimate extent of their application, so probably in the arguments employed in the present case, several distinctions which ought to come into view have been overlooked. As 1st. The principle upon which all enlargements in the export trade of British India are required is, that the surplus of the industry of the country, all that it produces beyond its own wants and the tribute paid to the governing power (which is in effect paid in produce) may have a free vent. The surplus here intended is doubtless the surplus arising from the employment of its own resources; but the proposed measure would clearly open the way for the introduction of European capitals, I mean capitals remitted from London, &c. into India, whereby the productions of that country would be forced beyond the powers of its own native stock. This consequence, of great importance, would be unavoidable, yet it is not even contended for in the original principle. 2ndly. A trade which is greatly supported by the remittance of the fortunes of individuals, is different from that which flows from a source wholly commercial. And this trade is in effect engrossed by a very limited number of agents, who making themselves the medium both of private remittances and of private and foreign exports of goods, become bold speculators, and expose what ought to be a steady current to extraordinary rises and falls, to the distress perhaps of general credit, and even of government itself in its ways and means. 3rdly. To increase the commerce of British subjects from the east to Europe, is not always certainly to increase the profit of the British nation: the effect may be in some cases rather to supply the nations of Europe cheaper with Indian commodities than they had them before, and to buy them dearer. We well know that an unlimited competition abroad would of course enhance the cost of commodities and occasion a debasement of their qualities. Industry and improvement in manufactures would not among the Indian people keep pace with the eager spirit of demand which a new privilege would for a time raise among European individuals, and it is still true notwithstanding what Mr. Colebrooke has said on the other side, (as I think I could prove if I had leisure), that the institution of castes is an obstruction to the diffusion and extension of the manufacturing arts, though not equally to the increase of the productions of the soil, as sugar, indigo, &c. most of the manufacturing castes being also (or having the privilege of being) cultivators of the soil. England has had experience of the effect of throwing open the Indian trade to all her subjects. Cromwell, no friend to the Company, tried this course, but in four or five years, seeing that trade almost extinct in this kingdom, whilst it flourished in

other countries, he was glad to restore the Company. In like manner the old and new Companies having nearly ruined each other by their competitions in the Indian markets, were fain at length to unite. The same causes, notwithstanding other changes, would still produce the same effects.* It is now made a question whether the Company derives any profit from its Indian commerce. I take for granted they still purchase as they used to do in Bengal (at least since Lord Cornwallis's time) their goods at a cheaper rate than individuals paid, and if indeed the trade yields them no gain, it may be doubted whether private merchants could, even in ships of their own, at a moderate price of freight, bring home the like species of goods to this country to better account. This whole observation, however, applies more particularly to old staple imports from India, such as piece goods. Of these I believe it to be true that the profit is now at least as small as it ought to be; that rivalled as they are by British fabrics, it would not be very difficult to pour into Europe more of them than the demand of Europe requires, and that an unlimited power of importation to individuals would probably end only in giving to them a share of that trade which the Company at present possess in such articles, that is, provided individuals found they could carry it on, and if they could not, to what purpose should the present order of things have been disturbed? If even such an importation permitted to individuals in ships of their own were sufficient to pay the shipping employed in it, and afford a profit on that branch, though not on the sales of the cargoes, this does not appear an adequate motive for granting generally the privilege of such a trade. 4thly. Indeed if exports from Britain to India could be increased in any considerable degree by this or any other modification of the privilege of trading to and from that country, the question would be materially altered; but *mutual wants*, the great stimulus among the trading nations of Europe, is not the main support of the Indian trade. Our exports thither have of late been chiefly increased in marine stores, which fall in a certain degree within the observation above made concerning Indian shipping employed in an intercourse with Europe. To increase the use of European commodities among the natives of India a change in their habits and tastes seems necessary. 5thly. With respect, however, to *new* articles, the produce of India (new I mean as articles of importation to Europe) such as sugar, indigo, cochineal, there can be no other doubt I conceive (whatever West Indies may allege,) of the good policy of encouraging the growth of them there, and the exportation of them to this country even in Indian ships, through the medium of the Company, than that which may be raised by the danger before described of so general an intercourse as should unhinge our system of government in the east. But these articles being not numerous nor so likely to unite European speculation, nor requiring so great a capital as the finer productions, it seems probable, though they would indeed comparatively require more ships, that they might for a considerable time be adventured in, especially as the produce of sugar may be regarded as yet in its infancy, without the approach of the apprehended danger.

On the whole I am arguing in the present case at the instance of prudential considerations, against what would otherwise be the decided incli-

nation of my own mind; and I conclude by saying, that I am for permitting the native industry of our provinces to shoot freely, but rather for directing it to such new articles as are above mentioned; and I would conduct the surplus of that industry, after the country trade is supplied, into our own ports; yet I should not be for considering every adventurous movement of the agents of Calcutta or Bombay as the accurate index of the real commercial state of the country, nor if it became a question either in India or in England, as probably it may, to establish a general regulation of the nature now under consideration, would I wish such a regulation, which assuredly would have great effects, to be passed without previously and maturely weighing all the bearings and supposable contingencies of it, and without due discrimination as well as caution. With respect to the particular measure which has led to these observations, one great objection made to it in the India House is the permission it gives to Indian built ships to navigate to this country. To the principle of that objection I am no friend; it does not appear to me to be sound or just; it will one day be the theme of great debate here, but I trust the majority will refuse it their approbation.

I remain, &c.

C. GRANT.

No. V.

Charles Grant, Esq., to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Worthing in Sussex, Sept. 14, 1801,

I venture to presume on your Lordship's indulgence of a short intrusion on a subject respecting which I have already troubled you. The hope which I have long cherished of finding leisure in the year of my vacation from the direction for revising the tract which I had the honour to submit to your Lordship, in favour of introducing Christianity among the Indian subjects of Great Britain, is frustrated by a tedious course of ill health, under which I still labour. I have considered myself from my former situation in India, and subsequent one in England, as bound particularly to attend to this object. It is an abiding weight upon my spirits that I have not already performed what I conceived to be my duty respecting it, whether my endeavours should have had any success or not; and I still wish to provide for making an attempt to remove the prejudices which oppose the principle of communicating the light of true religion in the East.

But incapable myself of acting at present, and uncertain as to the future, I am induced to call in the aid of one or two friends in Bengal, whose sentiments I know to be congenial with my own on this matter, and upon whose secrecy I can rely, I mean Mr. Udny and the Rev. Mr. Brown. The former, in the elevated station in which he is now placed may, with his preceding knowledge of the country, seek and obtain much pertinent information, which at a distance I could not command, and the latter has I believe already made collections, which if he could resolve to bring them into notice, might prove not a little serviceable. I think these gentlemen not only capable of assisting, but very fit and likely to take

up my design, if I should not be able to prosecute it myself. I therefore now write to interest them in it, and with this view have to request that your Lordship will be pleased to put into Mr. Udny's hands the poor performance which my solicitude for the object of it urged me to take the liberty of exposing to you, perhaps rather hastily; but I then thought the public discussion of the question considered in it was near, and had no idea of cumbering your Lordship with so bulky a piece of confidence so long. No accounts from the East have afforded me so much pleasure as those of the countenance your Lordship has given to Religion.* If you had seen fit to recommend the diffusion of it among the Heathen, no one could have done this with so much effect; and though now diversities of opinion on some other Indian subjects, and consequent divisions unhappily prevail, yet in the true glory of espousing such an object, all the best judgments of the present and future times I am convinced would be agreed.

As to those other subjects of controversy, since they have been incidentally alluded to, though my weakness would not allow me to go into them here, if I had reason to think the way otherwise open, I cannot avoid adding that they have been to me the cause of unspeakable concern, not only for the troubles and discord they have already produced, but for the more serious consequences likely to result from them. A general view which I some years ago took of the tendencies of measures proposed for the enlargement of private trade, led me to regard them with considerable apprehension; and a more particular examination afterwards of their nature gave to my mind a conviction of their danger, in which I have been painfully confirmed by the conduct of a party here deeply interested in them. I tried what means I could for private accommodation, and having failed in this, I had only the alternative of openly resisting that party, though at the expense of differing also on some public points with the late President of the Board of Control, to which has been since added the mortification of finding myself in opposition to your Lordship's sentiments on the same topics. My opinions on these subjects may be regarded by some whose judgment I respect as visionary. To the test of time I must leave the decision of that point; but I trust a candour like your Lordship's will not readily suppose that I could adopt a course contrary to my habits, inclinations, and private interests, without a strong impelling sense of duty.

I have the honour to be,

with the greatest respect,

your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES GRANT.

* The Marquess Wellesley in his speech on the renewal of the E. I. charter on the 9th of April, 1813, stated at considerable length the efforts he had made for the dissemination of Christianity in India during his Lordship's government, with respect to putting the ecclesiastical establishments on a proper footing, with a Bishop at its head, and the encouragement given to prudent missionaries; he concluded by saying that "he had thought it his duty to have the Scriptures translated into the languages of the East, and to give the learned natives employed in the translation the advantages of access to the sacred fountains of Divine truth: he thought that a Christian Governor could not have done less, and knew that a British Governor ought not to do more."—*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 25, p. 698. [Ed.]

No. VI.

W. Twining, Esq. (one of the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company) to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

London, July 17, 1802.

I hope your Lordship will not be offended, if I indulge the great desire which I feel to return my best thanks for the many and important instances of kindness shewn by your Lordship to my son. Amongst those instances, that which has made the deepest impression upon me, and for which I am and ever shall be particularly grateful, is your Lordship's goodness in bestowing upon my son an appointment in that part of India which is suited to his constitution. Of his desire to make himself useful I was well assured; and I know his principles so well, that I could safely answer for his integrity. I had, then, some reason to hope that he would not be totally unsuccessful in that situation of life in which he was placed. But his health, if an appointment had been bestowed upon him in the climate of Calcutta would, in all probability, have prevented his remaining in India: and it is to your Lordship's kind consideration of this circumstance, that I am indebted for the revival of a hope, which was at one time—from the unfavourable accounts which I received of his health—nearly destroyed. I may venture to assure your Lordship that my son entertains a proper sense of the favours which have been bestowed upon him; and that by an honest and zealous discharge of his duty, he will make the best—the only—return in his power.

As I have taken the liberty of addressing your Lordship, I hope I shall be pardoned if I mention a subject which has frequently occupied my thoughts, and which has, in one respect, given me much concern. I allude to the subject of the private trade with India, and to my having, in some degree, differed from your Lordship upon that subject.

Soon after the renewal of the Company's charter, I was led, by accidental circumstances, to bestow a good deal of attention upon the private trade with India; and, since that time, I have had frequent opportunities of noticing the conduct of the private traders, both in the India House and out of it. The result of the consideration which I have bestowed upon this subject is, a firm belief that the indulgencies for which the private traders have contended, would prove highly injurious to the interests of the East India Company; and I have no doubt but your Lordship will readily allow that, whilst I entertained such an opinion, I could not with propriety do otherwise than oppose the granting of such indulgencies. I trust however that, though I have been unfortunate enough to differ in opinion upon this point from your Lordship, I have expressed that difference in a way which has not given offence. I have only contended for those interests of the East India Company which are, I am sure, full as dear to your Lordship as they can be to me: and I could not but oppose that plan of the private traders, which appeared to me to endanger the Company's commerce; and consequently those territories, for

the preservation or acquisition of which we are so much indebted to your Lordship.

I am, my Lord, with the highest respect,
your Lordship's most obliged and obedient humble servant,
R. TWINING.

No. VII.

STATEMENT OF IMPORTS FROM LONDON AND FOREIGN EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE FOLLOWING SEASON, viz.

Imports.	Foreign Europe and America.		London.		Foreign Europe and America.	
	Total.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Merchandise.	Treasure.
1797-1798	15,34,219	19,86,142	11,88,043	3,46,176	5,32,442	14,53,700
1798-1799	17,43,314	23,78,749	10,13,105	7,30,209	8,54,611	15,24,138
1799-1800	47,37,462	88,49,942	31,82,600	15,64,862	12,01,832	76,48,110
1800-1801	44,72,502	69,67,683	40,98,360	3,74,142	16,10,772	53,56,911
1801-1802	39,75,669	56,77,152	36,51,650	3,24,019	9,85,972	46,91,180

PRIVATE TONNAGE SHIPPED TO LONDON FROM CALCUTTA.

	Total.		Regular Indiamen.		Europe Extra Ships.		Bengal Chartered Ships.	
	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.
1796-1797	28	3,794	9	43	19	3,781		
1797-1798	36	3,432	18	1,107	18	2,325		
1798-1799	18	5,975	9	137	3	340	6	5,498
1799-1800	35	7,749	16	291	11	1,488	8	5,970
1800-1801	25	8,067	7	148	8	550	10	7,369
1801-1802	59	27,680	10	353	26	12,490	23	14,837

STATEMENT of the SALES of the AGENCY OPIUM from the Year 1797-8 to 1803-4.

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STATEMENT OF THE SALES

[Private

YEARS.	BEHAR.			BENARES.			TOTAL.		
	Chests Sold.	Produce in S. Rupees.	Average per Chest. Sicca Rupees.	Chests Sold.	Produce in S. Rupees.	Average per Chest. Sicca Rupees.	Chests Sold.	Produce in S. Rupees.	Average per Chest. Sicca Rupees.
1797-8.									
1st Sale 20 & 21 Dec. 1798	1,700	6,26,595	368 9 0	300	1,07,475	358 4 0	2,000	7,34,070	367 0 8
2d Sale 18 Feb. 1799	1,750	7,97,540	455 11 9	422	1,99,559	472 14 2	2,172	9,97,099	459 1 1
Total	3,450	14,24,135	412 12 8	722	3,07,034	425 4 0	4,172	17,31,169	414 15 2
1798-9.									
1st Sale, 16 Dec. 1799	1,650	12,96,570	785 12 9	350	2,66,895	762 8 11	2,000	15,63,465	781 11 8
2d Sale, 17 Feb. 1800	1,675	12,98,845	775 6 10	379	2,80,292	739 8 10	2,054	15,79,137	768 13 0
Total	3,325	25,95,415	780 9 2	729	5,47,187	750 9 7	4,054	31,42,602	775 3 0
1799-1800.									
1st Sale, 15 & 16 Dec. 1800.	1,850	13,23,330	715 5 0	430	2,82,455	656 13 11	2,280	16,05,785	704 4 8
2d Sale, 19 & 20 Feb. 1801.	1,815	12,48,680	687 15 7	475	2,88,575	607 8 5	2,290	15,37,255	671 4 7
Total	3,665	25,72,010	701 12 5	905	5,71,030	630 15 6	4,570	31,43,040	687 12 0

[Trade.]

OF THE AGENCY OPIUM.

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1800-1801.											
1st Sale,	15 Dec. 1801	1,575	11,73,305	744 15 0	400	2,92,650	731 10 0	1,975	14,65,955	742 4 0	
2d Sale,	18 Feb. 1802	1,573	13,20,363	839 6 3	399	3,34,398	838 1 5	1,972	16,54,761	839 2 0	
Total		3,148	24,93,668	792 2 3	799	6,27,048	784 12 7	3,947	31,20,716	790 10 6	
1801-1802.											
1st Sale,	15 Dec. 1802	1,285	17,68,400	1,376 2 11	360	4,97,125	1,380 14 5	1,645	22,65,525	1,377 3 6	
2d Sale,	18 Feb. 1803	1,285	18,02,950	1,403 1 2	362	4,87,253	1,346 0 0	1,647	22,90,203	1,390 8 5	
Total		2,570	35,71,350	1,389 10 1	722	9,84,378	1,363 6 5	3,292	45,55,728	1,383 14 0	
1802-1803.											
1st Sale,	15 Dec. 1803	1,112	14,92,070	1,341 12 7	308	3,69,900	1,200 15 7	1,420	18,61,970	1,311 3 11	
2d Sale,	17 Feb. 1804	1,112	16,46,146	1,480 5 6	308	4,36,479	1,417 2 2	1,420	20,82,625	1,466 10 2	
Total		2,224	31,38,216	1,411 1 1	616	8,06,379	1,309 0 10	2,840	39,44,595	1,388 15 0	
1803-1804.											
1st Sale,	14 Dec. 1804	1,190	20,08,220	1,687 9 3	390	6,86,990	1,761 8 2	1,580	26,95,210	1,705 13 3	

**COMPARATIVE ABSTRACT ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE EXPORT PRIVATE TRADE FROM CALCUTTA BY
SEA, FROM THE 1st OF JUNE, 1796, TO THE 1st OF MAY, 1802.**

Years.	Total.	London.	Hamburgh.	Copenhagen.	Lisbon.	America.	Arabian and Persian Gulphs.	Manilla.	New Guinea.
1796-1797	1,53,57,197	50,79,310	6,19,973	17,73,511	7,10,926	25,60,267	9,95,710	85,706	23,801
1797-1798	1,51,20,209	69,71,529	2,15,968	3,56,572	12,85,595	20,25,602	4,62,653	28,045	27,420
1798-1799	1,39,24,113	41,07,834	5,91,173	1,11,087	4,40,880	11,89,542	8,55,482	10,49,293	65,270
1799-1800	2,57,14,805	67,91,406	61,582	9,56,145	33,44,435	37,85,937	4,35,593	5,24,036	
1800-1801	2,80,83,816	84,87,336	„	7,14,825	20,57,936	61,06,733	4,06,031	5,95,775	
1801-1802	3,12,33,107	1,31,97,420	„	2,955	16,88,486	45,65,828	13,18,257	10,48,599	

Years.	Coast of Sumatra.	Coast of Malabar.	Coast of Coromandel.	Penang and Eastward.	Pegue.	China.	Maldiv Islands.	Cape of Good Hope.	New South Wales.
1796-1797	2,14,571	5,40,978	8,96,445	9,87,227	86,033	5,52,132	32,806	15,968	84,052
1797-1798	95,721	7,60,699	13,57,124	7,37,074	55,189	6,43,097	8,869	40,231	48,821
1798-1799	1,44,587	13,62,017	20,13,524	10,06,989	1,32,924	7,45,292	23,936	47,909
1799-1800	3,92,651	26,29,856	27,41,940	22,06,227	2,02,664	14,70,525	45,186	28,573	98,029
1800-1801	3,48,036	14,08,175	24,80,351	25,70,640	3,93,782	24,30,008	53,677	10,500	20,011
1801-1802	4,54,583	22,93,671	24,71,559	21,23,205	4,48,375	14,65,233	70,399	84,537

[SUPPLEMENT—RED SEA EXPEDITION.]

No. I.

The Marquess Wellesley to Sir Home Popham, K. M.

(Political and Secret.)

SIR,

Patna, October 16, 1801.

1. Having under my consideration the letter of the Secret Committee, addressed to you on the 10th of November, 1800, together with the various verbal and written communications which have passed between you and this government on the important subject of the condition of the British interests in the ports of the Red Sea, I now have the honour, in conformity to the orders of the honourable Committee, to state my sentiments to you for the purpose of enabling you to carry their instructions into effect on your return to the Red Sea.

2. The instructions of the honourable Committee indicate with sufficient precision the objects which it is the desire of the East India Company to attain by the proposed negotiation, but no suggestion has yet been furnished from the government at home, either with regard to the mode of conducting the embassy or to the nature of concessions to be offered on the part of the British Government, as an equivalent to the advantages and privileges which it is intended to acquire from the Arab chiefs.

3. My observations in this despatch will be directed to the purpose of supplying you with such suggestions on these points, as our limited knowledge of the political state of Arabia, and of the commercial interests of those countries enable me to state for your consideration.

4. I am not disposed to favour any objection to the establishment of political and commercial engagements with the Arab states on the coasts of the Red Sea, founded on the real or supposed connection of those states with the Ottoman

Porte. From the general tenor of my information, I am inclined to believe that those powers, particularly the Shereef of Mecca, and the Imaum of Senna, are nearly if not altogether independent of the Porte. Admitting, however, a contrary supposition, the proposed engagements with the British Government will have no tendency to affect any existing connection between the Arab states and the Porte, no valid objection therefore can arise against the policy of your mission from any relation which the states of Arabia may be found to bear towards the Porte, although it will undoubtedly be necessary to conduct the negotiation with every degree of attention to the jealousies and prejudices of that power. The correspondence of Captain Wilson with the government of Bombay on the subject of his mission in 1798-9 will probably supply more authentic information with respect to the actual power, resources, connection, and disposition of the Arab chieftains than can be derived from the accounts of historians, or from any other documents within our reach. I have directed the Vice-President in Council to furnish you with copies of that correspondence.

5. The Imaum of Senna being the most powerful of the Arab chieftains, you will direct your attention in the first instance to the conclusion of the projected engagements with that Prince. Those engagements will either include the remaining chieftains, or will facilitate similar arrangements with them.

6. Previously to the mission of Captain Wilson from Bombay, no intercourse of a political nature extending beyond the interchange of complimentary letters, had subsisted between the British Government in India and the Arabian States. The extent of the trade between Arabia and the ports of India has for many years been inconsiderable. The British Government in India being thus entirely unconnected with the states of Arabia, has possessed no opportunity of acquiring an intimate knowledge of the political relations, or of the commercial interests of those states: I am not therefore prepared to enter into a detail of the particular concessions either of a political or of a commercial nature which any of the states of Arabia would be disposed to receive or which I should be inclined to afford in return for the important advantages which it is our object to attain.

7. The information which you will acquire after your return to the Red Sea, will enable you to ascertain in what manner a political connection with the British Government in India may be rendered conducive to the interests of any or of all the Arabian states, and what engagements of a commercial nature would be calculated to ensure any essential advantages to the commercial interests of those countries. At present I must content myself with soliciting your attention to the general considerations which appear to me to affect this part of the question.

8. The promise of our protection against any attempt on the part of France to violate the independence of the Arab states might be deemed an advantage, for which those states would be disposed to pay a valuable consideration. But if the British arms should be completely successful in effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt, any apprehension which the Arab chiefs may hitherto have entertained of the future attempts of France may have ceased. It may therefore be advisable that you should endeavour to remove any such sentiments of false security, and to excite in the Arab chiefs a solicitude to obtain the protection of the British power against France. Such an offer on our part may lead to correspondent concessions on the part of the Arabs. It may be suggested, that although the favourite project of France to effect a permanent establishment in Egypt, and to extend her dominion over the countries adjacent to the Arabian Gulf, has been happily frustrated by the power and skill of the British army, the French will not therefore be induced to abandon this primary object of their ambition. Frustrated in their attempts to maintain themselves in Egypt they may hereafter resume the enterprize which they have frequently formed of making a descent on the coasts of the Red Sea; in this event, that part of the coast which is under the dominion of the Imaum of Senna will probably become the first point of attack. It is therefore the interest of the Imaum to provide, in the most effectual manner for the possibility of this event, by cultivating a connection with the British power, and by securing the co-operation of the British arms.

9. While the British power shall hold Egypt, although no immediate danger may be apprehended by the Arab chiefs

from any designs of France, it must be an object of the policy of those chiefs to cultivate the favour of a power which has possessed itself of Egypt under every circumstance calculated to inspire confidence in its good faith and respect for its vigour, energy, and military skill.

10. Even after the British army shall have evacuated Egypt and shall have delivered it over to the Porte (if such an adjustment shall be the termination of the war in Egypt) it may be expected that the fame and character of the British Empire will be so elevated in that quarter of the globe as to render the chiefs of Arabia and all the neighbouring states desirous of improving their relations with our government, and of entering with us into political and commercial engagements, founded on liberal and just principles of mutual interest and security.

11. Should the political situation of the Government of Senna or the condition of its internal affairs or that of any Arab state in the gulf be such as to expose the Imaum or chief to the hazard of external attack or of internal commotion, this state of circumstances will afford an additional ground for the conclusion of defensive engagements. Whatever exigency may induce the Imaum or chief to desire the protection of the British power, will facilitate the attainment of the primary objects of your mission.

12. In offering these suggestions, however, it is proper to state my decided opinion that we should abstain from any mixture in such political intrigues as may be connected with any design of subverting the established government, of effecting revolutions in the state, or of endangering the life or power of any reigning chieftain. The symptoms of such a disposition on our part would tend to create jealousies, and suspicions of which the effect might be felt beyond the limits of any interest which we might hope to establish in Arabia, while all our views in that quarter would certainly be defeated by the unjustifiable means employed to accomplish them.

13. This observation applies peculiarly to Mecca, where the state of the present Shereef's power renders it more especially necessary to use every degree of caution with regard to any interference in the internal affairs of the country.

14. The co-operation of a British force or of any public

officer of the British Government in any revolution at Mecca would undoubtedly create the strongest sentiments of indignation and disgust in the mind of the Grand Signor, and would irritate every Mussulman state in India.

15. You will observe from the preceding remarks, that in my judgment the first general proposition from the offer of which we may expect to derive concessions of the nature desired by the Secret Committee from the chiefs of Arabia, is the engagement to afford the protection and countenance of the British power to the established governments of those countries. The nature and extent of the protection to be offered to those chiefs from the government of India must be left to your discretion, subjecting any engagement which you may conclude to the ratification of the Governor-General in Council.

16. In concluding any treaty, of a subsidiary or defensive nature, you will endeavour to limit the guarantee to the case of an attack from France, and in no case will you enter into engagements to protect any Arab state against the authority of the Ottoman Porte.

17. The particular concessions of a commercial nature which it may be the wish of the Imaum of Senna or of any Arab chief to obtain, and which it may be consistent with the commercial interests of the Company to grant, cannot be precisely ascertained without a more perfect knowledge than we at present possess of the nature and extent of the trade between Senna, the Arabian gulf generally, and the ports of India. I am disposed to grant considerable privileges and immunities in favour of Arabian ships and merchants frequenting the British ports in India; to abate or relinquish the duties upon imports from that country; and to engage to take a certain quantity of coffee, the staple commodity of Senna, annually; to allow the Arabian merchants to export from the ports of India to Arabia to a certain extent any of the articles, the produce of the British empire in India, of which the export from India is now prohibited: to supply the Imaum or any other Arab power with broad cloth, iron, &c. the produce or manufacture of Europe, and with military and naval stores; to supply the Arab powers with ship builders, or to construct ships for them in our Docks, the Imaum or chief defraying the actual cost.

18. You will be guided by your own judgment and discretion, and by the actual state of circumstances in applying these general suggestions which are applicable not only to Senna, but to all other Arab states on the coasts of the Red Sea. Whatever commercial engagements you may contract with the Imaum of Senna, or with any other of the Arab states, will be subject to the ratification of the Governor-General in Council.

19. Whatever be the relation which the states of Arabia may bear towards the Porte, I deem it highly expedient that his Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of Constantinople should be enabled eventually to communicate to the Grand Seignor the object, extent, and progress of your negotiations with the chiefs of Arabia; I shall therefore transmit a copy of this despatch to the Earl of Elgin by the present overland despatch, and I request that you will avail yourself of every opportunity to communicate to his Lordship the progress of your negotiation.

20. With regard to the mode of conducting the negotiations entrusted to your charge, I am of opinion that you should be careful to impress the minds of the several chiefs of Arabia with due respect for the dignity of your situation as the representative of the British nation, a character, which in my judgment entitles you to claim the privilege of negotiating upon terms of equality with the Imaum of Senna, the Shereef of Mecca or any of the Arab chiefs. I am apprehensive that your proceeding in person to Senna, or to the residence of any chief in Arabia, situated in the interior of the country might tend to lessen the importance of your character in the opinion of the Arabs and might therefore prove injurious to the success of the negotiation. My judgment on this question arises from the knowledge that the several chieftains of Arabia however independent with respect to power and authority, are considered to be officers of the Turkish empire, and to derive their rank and appointments from the Grand Seignor. They are not therefore to be acknowledged as Sovereign Princes; any such acknowledgement on your part (according to the uniform disposition and character of every Eastern court) would infallibly weaken your influence, and increase the insolence and arrogance of the power with which you are to negotiate.

21. Unless therefore the Imaum of Senna, or his minister should proceed to Mocha, or unless a personal meeting with the Imaum should appear to you to be expedient, in which case you might require that the Imaum should leave his capital and should advance a considerable way for the purpose of meeting you, I would recommend, it to you to conduct your negotiation through the channel of a secretary to your mission.

22. The Eastern nations are so much influenced by exterior forms, that the greatest attention is requisite to points of ceremony and appearance. Any concessions in points of that nature on the part of an Ambassador to an Eastern court, tend to degrade his consequence and to impede the progress of his negotiation. It appears to me therefore to be extremely desirable that one of the Company's civil servants whose talents, and general knowledge especially of the Arabic and Persian languages, may qualify him for the situation of secretary to your embassy, should accompany you in that capacity and I have accordingly written to the Vice President on that subject, to whom I have the honour to refer you for further details relative to the selection of your secretary. If you should deem the services of Mr. Robertson whom you have appointed to act as your secretary to be necessary to the despatch of the affairs of your mission, he may be employed in the capacity of assistant to the secretary to your mission, the latter being a civil servant of the Company. I hereby confirm the temporary appointment of Mr. Robertson in the office in which you have employed him, referring you to the Vice President in Council for the scale on which his allowances are to be paid on account of the services which he has already performed, as well as for that by which his future salary is to be regulated, if you shall find it necessary to employ him in the capacity of assistant to your secretary.

23. Considering the office of political agent under the government of Bombay, at present held by Lieut.-Colonel Murray, to be incompatible with the efficiency of your representative character and powers in the same capacity, I have ordered the Governor-in-Council of Bombay to abolish Lieut.-Colonel Murray's appointment and it is my intention that you should exercise the sole and exclusive power of

conducting the political negotiations with the chiefs of Arabia under my authority, to which you will always directly refer; at the same time corresponding in the most unreserved manner with the Governor-in-Council of Bombay who will be directed to furnish you immediately with whatever information he may possess respecting the objects of your mission and also to afford you every degree of assistance in prosecuting them to a successful issue.

24. It is not to be expected that any extent of presents will suffice to purchase from the Arab chiefs the important advantages in view. The amount of your presents should therefore be limited to a value consistent with the dignity of the British Government. To exceed that limit would excite the degrading and probably injurious suspicion that it is the purpose of the British Government to conceal by the splendour of its presents, its inability to offer concessions of a political or commercial nature equivalent to those advantages which it is our object to obtain from the Arab chiefs.

25. I am aware of the importance of attaching adequate appointments to the embassy, for the purpose of producing an impression favourable to the dignity of your representative character, I have therefore issued the necessary directions for appointing the following escort:

Dismounted cavalry, 12 troopers from the body-guard;
Escort of Native infantry, one company of Sepoys.

It is not however practicable at this time to spare any Europeans for that part of the escort which is to be composed of cavalry.

26. I herewith transmit letters of credence to the several Arab chieftains specified in the accompanying list, and I enclose a copy of the English draft of those letters for your information.

27. I have issued directions to the several Presidencies to answer your drafts for such sums of money as you may require under regulations to be arranged with the Vice-President in Council to whom I have honour to refer you on this branch of the subject.

28. Although the Secret Committee have given me no orders respecting your allowances in the political character with which they have invested you; I conclude it to have

been their intention that you should be considered as a regular envoy from the British Government in India, and that your expences should be defrayed, and your services rewarded accordingly.

29. Being fully sensible of your uniform zeal, ability, and perseverance in prosecuting the objects of your mission, I consider you to be entitled to suitable allowances from the commencement of your operations in the Red Sea. Having therefore fixed the salary to be allowed to you at the sum of 2,000 rupees per mensem, I have directed the Vice-President in Council to pay to you the arrears which have accrued since the date of your arrival in the Red Sea.

30. All expenses connected with your official duties are to be charged separately, under the head of durbar charges; and your accounts of receipts and disbursements are to be made up monthly, and transmitted together with your Secretary's receipts for salary to the Private Secretary of the Governor-General. Receipts and vouchers for the pay of your escort, are to be sent to the Adjutant-General.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

[The difficulty of obtaining information from England relative to France may be judged of from the following letter.]

No. II.

Lord Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Pera, Nov. 10, 1802.

Colonel Harcourt will have prepared you for my silence on the sentiments of Government relative to the views and projects of France, to which my public letter of this date alludes. I have not had one line on politics since the peace. As to the Porte, I cannot persuade myself that she is prepared, or has been consulted on any of the plans, which Buonaparte may have conceived; but the belief of persons here, who may be supposed well informed, is, that Buonaparte has devoted this empire, or at least the European part of it, to destruction, meaning to make such arrangements for this territory, as may facilitate his further projects of ambition eastward. Every

measure which I can devise, shall be set on foot, to gain information and watch the motions of the French within my limits. But I labour under great disadvantage from having no notice from home, or from Paris, to guide my researches.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord,

with sincere respect,

yours most faithfully,

ELGIN.

*Abstract Statement of Provisions shipped from Bengal, Bombay and Fort St. George, 23d April 1801.**

PROVISIONS FOR 3500 EUROPEANS.

Salt Provisions,	lbs. 1,445,470 at 1 lb. each per day,	days 372
Biscuit,	1,092,294 at do. do.	231
Flour,	552,022 at 10 lbs. for five men per week,	487
Raisins,	81,178 at 4 lbs. for do. do.	180
Rum,	galls. 74,559 at $\frac{1}{2}$ pt. each per day,	294
Tea,	lbs. 49,744 at 1 lb. for five men per week,	440
Sugar,	208,000 at 1 lb. each per week,	379
Pease,	323,772 at 8 lbs. for five men do.	356
Rice,	208,000 at 1 lb. each per week,	379
Suet,	34,660 at 4 lbs. for five men do.	127
Mustard Seed,	41,600 at 1 lb. for do. do.	379
Salt,	73,429 at 1 oz. each per day,	200

PROVISIONS FOR 5000 NATIVES.

Salt,	lbs. 64,167 at 1 oz. each per day,	days 160
Sugar,	121,053 at 2 ozs. do.	131
Mustard Seed,	18,162 at 1 oz. do.	196
Dholl,	421,776 at 6 ozs. do.	304
Ghee,	157,610 at 2 ozs. do.	189
Turmeric,	10,184 at $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. do.	44
Garlic,	11,902 at $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. do.	52
Chillies,	11,902 at $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. do.	52
Boot Gram,	382,692 at 6 ozs. do.	138
Tamarinds,	91,898 at 2 ozs. do.	89
Oil,	20,123 at 1 oz. do.	44
Churah,	377,536 at 16 ozs. do.	52
Sweetmeats,	49,882 at 6 ozs. do.	20
Parched Gram,	34,176 at 4 ozs. do.	18
Rice,	2,009,476 at $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. do.	236

* For the Red Sea expedition. The document is given as an illustration of the system by which supplies were carefully provided by the Governor-General for the army.—[ED.]

Water, for 8,500 men for	days 126
Firewood, for 8,500 men for	314
Wheat, lbs. 665,248 at 1lb. each per day, for 8,500 men,	79
Vinegar, galls. 18,300 at 1qt. to five men per week,	250

HOSPITAL STORES.

Madeira, 45 pipes; Port Wine, 244 doz.; Lime Juice, 385 galls.; Vinegar, 1,175 do.; Essence of Malt, 3 casks; Molasses, 9 maunds, 30 seers; Medicines and Instruments, 20 cases.

GENERAL STORES.

Wax Candles, maunds 183,26; Cheese, lbs. 5,636; Potatoes, lbs. 177,828; Tobacco, lbs. 141,217.

In the above statement a deduction of 10 per cent. has been allowed on each article, and it will be found that the Europeans are provided in the essential articles of provisions for nearly twelve months; and the Natives taking into consideration the ration by which the daily issues are regulated, for about seven months.

To guard against the possibility of the troops suffering from a want of provisions, it is proposed to despatch in the course of next month the under-mentioned articles:

Biscuit, for two months, 3,000 maunds; Raisins, for do. 400 do.; Rum, for 70 days, 15,000 galls.; Sugar, for 200 do. 1,500; Ghee, for 90 do. 700 mds.; Turmeric, 60 do. 187 do.; Garlic, 60 do. 187 do.; Chillies, 60 do. 187 do.; Oil, 90 do. 360 do.; Boot Gram, 2,000 do.; Rice, 6,000.

J. GERARD.

[SUPPLEMENT—MISCELLANEOUS.]

No. I.

*The Right Honourable Henry Dundas to the Marquess Wellesley on the
Indian Military Establishments.*

MY DEAR LORD,*

Wimbledon, December 30th, 1800.

A few days ago brought me your overland despatch in cypher, dated 13th July last, and I conceive it so material to put your Lordship in immediate possession of the impression it has made upon me, it is my intention to suggest to the Chairman of the East India Company the propriety of despatching this letter by an overland conveyance.

In our various private correspondence I have had occasionally an opportunity of stating to your Lordship the deep importance I attach to the necessity of such a steady and regulated system of economy, as may enable us to reduce the great load of debt, by which our affairs in India are encumbered, and unless we are able to accomplish that important object, all our ideas of boasted prosperity are mere delusion, and the bubble will burst the first moment we are again involved in any severe struggle for the protection or security of our Indian interests. For my part I consider an overgrown and unwieldy load of Indian debt as our only mortal foe, our debt even at its present amount is of so formidable a nature as to blast every prospect of future prosperity, if it is permitted to remain at that amount. I must therefore fight it down, and unless that most dangerous of all enemies is subdued, the fall of Seringapatam and the acquisition of Mysore will only be found ultimately to encrease our weakness by

* This letter is given with a view of shewing the difficulties under which the Governor-General laboured, from almost the beginning of his administration. The Indian debt which caused such alarm to Mr. Dundas, did not amount to the revenue of the country for two years.—[Ed.]

having extended our establishments beyond our means of maintaining them. From the close of the former Mysore war down to the commencement of the present, I had the satisfaction, year after year, of detailing to the public, through the medium of my Indian exposition, the gradual diminution of our debt, and the gradual amelioration of our Indian concerns at home and abroad. Neither was I in any degree alarmed by the rapid progress of debt, which the late war in India has produced; but my reason for not being alarmed, was, that if our debt in India was not permitted upon the whole to exceed about fourteen millions sterling, I saw clearly before me the means of a rapid reduction of it, the moment that peace was restored in Europe, and there ceased to be any such exigency of affairs at home, as to render any further loans necessary on the part of the public. But every idea I entertain of seeing a rapid reduction of our Indian debt is bottomed on the foundation of believing, that the restoration of peace in India would be productive of such a state of our finances there, as would enable us at least to have a large surplus for the discharge of the principal, and interest of our debts, after defraying every necessary establishment. If such is the state of our finance, we know by experience that the provision of investment, and the discharge of our Indian debt can be made mutually and beneficially subservient to each other, and I have greatly deceived myself if I have not formed a plan, by which, on the restoration of peace in Europe, that system of combining the reduction of debt and the provision of investment may be improved upon in a degree hitherto unpractised; but I repeat again to your Lordship that this plan and every other for the solid and permanent prosperity of India must prove abortive if at that period we shall find the state of our finances in India, such as that our large revenues in that quarter are found inadequate even to the discharge of our establishments.

I have contented myself with giving your Lordship this general sketch of my ideas without troubling you with detailed explanations; because I am so confident in my own opinions, and in the certainty of the propositions and conclusions I have stated, that neither your Lordship, nor any man equally conversant with you in the affairs of India, can entertain a doubt of the truth of any thing I have stated. I

have therefore only to refer your Lordship to the facts as they exist, and the application of them is too obvious. I refer you to the statement prepared by Mr. Myers under your own authority, and transmitted by your Lordship for my information. I further refer you to the statement of the India budget as last prepared and transmitted to India for your perusal, and upon examining the statements therein contained, founded upon the data as I thought myself then warranted to assume them, you will perceive how much upon a level our revenues and establishments appear to be, and what a pittance only of surplus revenue is there held out in expectation; but even at that time, additions appear to have been made to the establishments of which I was then ignorant, and which when brought forward into calculation and statement, will be found to absorb and exceed every existing revenue.

With these feelings operating upon my mind, your Lordship will not be surprised, when I profess myself truly alarmed by the extent of establishment which your Lordship's letter of the 13th July recommends to my adoption. I lay entirely out of view all considerations of a collateral nature, and therefore do not enlarge upon the topic how far the population of the country amidst all the other calls upon it, could easily bear such a drain for the maintenance of its European establishment in India. I wish at the present moment to consider the subject merely upon the footing of finance, and in that view I should be without hope indeed, if I could be persuaded, that so great an establishment, especially of a European description was necessary to be kept up for the security of our Asiatic possessions. I should be without hope because in the present state of our finances or under any near prospect of what they may arrive at, it would be impossible for us to pay such an establishment without having recourse to the finances of this country, and in so far making our Indian Empire a burthen upon the mother country. I am sure your Lordship would be as sorry as I could be, to see such a new circumstance arise out of the events which have recently taken place in India; but it is altogether unnecessary to dwell upon such speculations, for I can venture to assert, that if such a contingency was to occur the disappointment and chagrin of the country would soon

put an end to any value they have recently been accustomed to attach to our Indian empire.

In considering this subject, I have made a comparison of the establishment at a former period, with that which would be the amount agreeable to the letter to which I am now replying. With this view I have referred back to the establishment as settled in 1796. This was a period when the establishments underwent a revision, and when the power of Tippoo Suldaun and the danger resulting from it, were fully before us, and yet including artillery, cavalry and infantry, European and native; the establishment does not seem to have exceeded eighty thousand men. Since that time, and particularly since the end of the late Mysore war, it has been increasing by rapid strides, and if put upon the scale recommended by your Lordship's letter, it would, notwithstanding the fall of Seringapatam, and the Mysorean power, amount to no less than 142,600 men. The addition of expense is enormous in proportion, and the addition alone which your Lordship recommends of European force, would, as nearly as I can conjecture, upon a rough guess, amount to above £500,000 sterling per annum.

I am sure, when I bring those particulars so pointedly before you, you will consider both your own time and mine as usefully employed, when we enter upon a calm discussion how far there can be a utility, far less a necessity, for such an overgrown establishment.

In the first place I greatly doubt if upon a re-examination of the particulars of your letter, your Lordship will find yourself accurate in the data on which you proceed. You rest your opinion of the European infantry establishment necessary for India on the following principle, viz. that whatever be the number actually borne on the army returns, one fourth must be deducted for the number probably sick, or otherwise unfit for duty. On this principle your Lordship argues, that an effective force for Bengal of 6,000 rank and file will require eight regiments or 9,600 rank and file; and that an effective force for Coromandel, Bombay, Malabar Ceylon, &c. of 12,000, will require 20,000 rank and file, or seventeen regiments taken together; that to furnish 18,000 effective men will require an establishment of twenty-five regiments of 1200 each, or 30,000 rank and file.

Even if the principle be allowed to be correct, the calculation does not appear to be so; 9,600 men or eight regiments less by one fourth, will leave 7,200 instead of 6,000, or one fifth more than you reckon upon, and 20,400 men or seventeen regiments less by one fourth, will leave 15,300 instead of 12,000, being above a quarter more than you reckon upon. Take both together; 30,000 men or twenty-five regiments as proposed by your Lordship, less by one fourth will leave 22,500 men, or more than the force wanted by your Lordship's statement by 4,500 or one fourth.

Admitting the principle to be just, viz. that whatever the establishment is, one fourth must be deducted for non effectives, and that the strength required in effective men is, as stated by your Lordship 18,000, the number of regiments necessary to furnish that force is twenty, or at 1200 rank and file each, 24,000 men, deduct one fourth, and we have 18,000 the required, and five regiments less than proposed by your Lordship, will be sufficient for the purpose.

But the deduction of one fourth of the number on the army returns for sick does not correspond with the actual state by the returns from Madras and Bombay in which alone the distinction is made; however as the greatest number of European regiments are stationed at those presidencies and their dependencies, (viz. 16 out of 21) it may be sufficient in a general view to take the calculation from those returns.

At the end of 1799 the number of King's infantry rank and file at Madras was 5941, of which sick or invalids 853, little more than 1-7th; the Company's infantry rank and file were 1286, of which sick 109, about 1-12th—both together 7227, sick, &c. 962—rather more than 1-8th.

At Bombay the King's infantry rank and file were 3837, of which sick, &c. 448 not 1-8th—the Company's 754, of which sick 65, not 1-11th; both together 4591 of which sick, &c. 513, or about 1-9th.

Take both establishments together, the total rank and file are 11,818, of which sick, &c. 1475 or 1-8th.

It appears from what is above stated, that an allowance of 1-8th for sick would be sufficient, and the force required to furnish 18,000 effective men, would therefore be about seventeen regiments of 1200 rank and file each, making 20,400, deducting 1-8th leaves 17,850 or 150 short of the complement.

But as the returns from Bengal do not specify the sick and as they may be more in proportion there, than at the other Presidencies; in order to make an apparently ample allowance let the deduction be stated at 1-6th. In this case, to furnish 18,000 effectives will require 18 regiments of 1200 each, or 21,600—deduct 1-6th or 3600, and we have the exact number. 18,000.

In the above observations your Lordship will perceive that I have proceeded upon the supposition, that your proposition of having, at all times, a force of 18,000 men for field service was necessary for the security of India. But you have not laid before me any detailed data by which to judge of this as a military proposition. If I judge from past experience and some general maxims which I have often heard stated on that subject, I should be disposed to doubt, if such an extent of European establishment was necessary.

Your Lordship's opinion upon this subject seems to rest upon two general grounds of reasoning. In the first place you state that our establishments ought to increase in proportion to the extent of our territory, and secondly, that our European establishment should increase in proportion as we increase our native.

Upon the first of those propositions, I must beg leave to pause, and to substitute another criterion as more applicable to the subject. The criterion by which that question ought to be decided, is rather, by the relative power of our supposed enemies than by our own extent of territory. I am perfectly aware that the internal peace and the security of a newly acquired territory may require an addition of establishment to a certain extent; but if, at the same moment, we acquire that territory, we have narrowed our former frontiers, and subdued a restless hostile and enterprising neighbour, it does by no means follow, that our new territory is to receive an establishment in proportion to our old one. The application of this principle to our present state in India is so obvious, I need not consume your time, by an illustration of it.

Your second proposition I admit to be true, in so far as to agree that there must be a certain proportion of European force, corresponding to the number of native troops maintained upon the establishment. But still the question occurs,

what that proportion ought to be. Some military men have stated a fifth of the whole to be sufficient. None with whom I have conversed have ever stated more than a fourth to be necessary. When your Lordship examines the extent of European establishment as detailed in the orders, which I hope the Court of Directors will send out without delay, and as more particularly to be stated in the sequel of this letter, I believe that your Lordship will find that the European force, consisting of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, amounts to about a fourth of the whole military establishment, which can, with any attention to economy, be maintained in our possessions in India.

Upon the best consideration, therefore, I can give to the subject, I do not find myself at liberty, consistently with any attention to necessary economy, to authorize an establishment of twenty-five European regiments of infantry. I am satisfied that seventeen is adequate to every purpose, even with a view to our subsidiary treaties, unless in one event, viz. that of a permanent arrangement being made with the Portuguese for retaining the possession of Goa. In that event, two more would be necessary; but even in that case it would be six short of what your Lordship proposes. I would propose six King's regiments at Bengal for the service of our own provinces and the Vizier's country. I would propose six King's regiments at Madras for the purposes of our former territories, together with our new acquisitions upon the coasts of Canara and Malabar, and to enable us to perform our engagements with the governments of Hydrabad and Mysore. I would propose two King's regiments for the protection of Bombay and its dependencies as now regulated.

These upon the whole amount to fourteen regiments, which together with one Company's European infantry regiment at each settlement, would make the whole seventeen regiments.

I have deliberated much in my own mind how far it would not be expedient to urge the Directors at the present moment to give up totally their European infantry, and to rest the whole of their European strength upon their artillery, which I agree with your Lordship ought to be put upon the most respectable footing. I hold a well regulated artillery

and a highly disciplined cavalry to form our most solid and permanent pre-eminence for the preservation of our military superiority in India. You will observe that I have proposed to get rid of one regiment of Company's European infantry, in order to make good a part of the expense necessary for the artillery. If I had been to consult my own judgement only, I should have urged the Court of Directors to get rid of their whole European infantry with the view of a still further immediate addition to their artillery, and I feel my reasons for the measure to be so forcible, I think I should have been successful in persuading the Court of Directors to acquiesce in my judgement; but as it has been stated to me from quarters too respectable to be resisted, that it is essential for preserving the strength and connection of their different establishments, that there should be a proportion of European infantry, from which their non-commissioned officers must be drafted for their native troops, I do not feel myself at liberty to be pertinacious in my own opinion; but acquiesce in the propriety of keeping up and recruiting, at each of the settlements, one European regiment of infantry, under the immediate authority of the Company.

I have another objection to the proposal of sending out such a multitude of regiments to India, for if ever any storm should arise in the north of Europe to threaten our Indian possessions, or if ever that menace should become more formidable by a union between any great European power and the northern tribes of India, it is not likely such a confederacy would be so sudden as not to enable us to take the necessary precautions. Against any combination that is not of a tremendous size, I hold the proposed establishment perfectly adequate to our security; but if from any such causes as I have suggested, it should become a necessary policy to increase our European force, your Lordship will agree with me in thinking, that it is always a matter of great importance to study how far you can add to your military strength without increasing the number of officers, which not only from the expense of their establishment, but from the contingent charges attending them, add greatly in proportion to the expense of a military establishment. If, therefore, at any time it should be necessary to add to our European force, it should be done, not by additional regiments with additional

field officers, but by additional companies to the 17 I have already mentioned. Two companies to each regiment would at once add an European force of above 3000 men, and so in proportion. Even if four companies were in case of urgency to be added, they could on a short warning be got from the army at home, and would, when added to the fourteen King's regiments established for India, make each regiment consist of not more than two battalions of 800 men each.

By adhering to the system I have mentioned, the expense and inconvenience of sending new and raw regiments would be avoided, and the addition made to your European infantry, when required, would have the advantage of being engrafted on old disciplined well seasoned regiments.

The same principle ought now to be applied to the other parts of the service in so far as there is just ground for the augmentation of any part of it. I entirely agree with your Lordship that the present artillery is inadequate to the great additional services now to be performed by that valuable corps; and I likewise agree with you in thinking, that the great extension of territory and the fulfilment of the subsidiary treaties must render an addition to our cavalry strength absolutely necessary. But in both those cases, it does not appear to me that there is at present any occasion either for new battalions of artillery or for those additional regiments of European cavalry which your Lordship's letter suggests. The Court of Directors, I make no doubt, will approve as a temporary expedient, under a pressing exigency, of the measure you have resolved to adopt of completing your artillery establishments by drafts from their European infantry; but besides completing that corps up to its former establishment, it is necessary to make an addition to it, and for the present this should be done by adding two companies to each battalion, and each company to have an additional Lieut.-Fireworker, and ten additional matrosses.

With regard to the cavalry, there are at present four European regiments, and in place of adding to the number of the regiments, the addition should be made to the strength of the existing regiments. This can be speedily and effectually done by adding two companies and twenty men to each regiment, whereby a very considerable addition of

strength would be obtained at a moderate expense of officers, namely, one field officer, and the officers necessary for the additional companies; whereas by additional regiments the expense is enhanced beyond all necessity by an addition of no less than five field officers, besides all the others of inferior rank.

This reasoning equally applies to the native cavalry. By adding two troops to each regiment, you will in like manner, at a moderate expense, comparatively speaking, make an addition to your cavalry strength both at Bengal and Madras of not less than twelve troops at each.

Upon the principles I have detailed, I have resolved to recommend to the Court of Directors a revision of their establishments, making every economical reduction where circumstances will admit of it, and at the same time, making such additions to some branches of their service as necessity dictates; but even in those additions consulting economy in every instance and adopting that mode, which gives the additional strength at the least possible expense.

In the detail I have given, it will not escape your observation, that I have taken no notice of Ceylon. It is because I have formed a decided opinion that the protection of that island cannot be left as a burthen upon the revenues of India. Indeed, at present those revenues cannot afford it. But independent of that consideration, I am fully satisfied that the measure of connecting the administration of that Island with the governments of India was prematurely and inadvertently adopted. The possession of Ceylon, I conceive to be of the last importance to the permanent security of India; but the principles by which it is to be governed, and the establishments by which its affairs are to be administered, cannot be formed upon the model of our Indian establishments. The European part must be very limited in point of number, and their establishments such as they may be settled, must be upon a scale of expense and allowances, far inferior to the establishments upon the Continent of India. I wish not to dwell upon the mischief which has already happened from blending the service of Ceylon with that of Madras. There may certainly be some exceptions to the observation; but as a general proposition, I am fully satisfied upon a minute examination of the subject for some months past, that as on the

one hand it would be unwise and inexpedient to admit only the refuse of the Indian servants to the charge of affairs at Ceylon, so on the other hand, it would be unreasonable to expect that the servants upon the Indian establishment of superior talents would be induced to come to Ceylon with the very limited prospects, which the service there would afford to them.

For these and various other considerations, unnecessary for the present purpose to be detailed, I shall submit to his Majesty my opinion, that Ceylon be restored to the state of a royal government, and administered upon the same principles as the government of the Cape is now conducted.

In the perusal of your Lordship's letter I have not been inattentive to what you state as to the deficiencies in the present establishment of our European force, and the inadequacy of the supply of recruits which latterly have been sent to India, and your observation is true in point of fact, that since the late war in Mysore, no augmentation of our European force has taken place; but your Lordship will recollect that, on the first suspicion which arose in my mind of the probability of a war in India, I sent near 5000 of the flower of the British army to the assistance of our Indian establishments; and that valuable force arrived in due time to perform most important service. And this very circumstance will fully account to your Lordship why there has been such a scanty supply of recruits from that period to the present. The defence of India was to the greatest degree pressing, and therefore the force I have referred to, was sent there in preference of every other service. But your Lordship knows enough of the state of Europe at that time and ever since, and likewise of the state of Ireland and our extended distant possessions, not to be aware how sensibly every other pressing service was affected by that great reinforcement sent to India, and therefore, when the immediate danger of India was at an end, and its safety ensured by the brilliant issue of the contest, it was natural and wise to appropriate all the recruits we could collect to supply the deficiencies in other quarters. I have only further to observe, that this inconvenience would not have been remedied if there had existed in India an establishment consisting of the number of regiments which your Lordship's letter suggests. The number of recruits for the service of

India could not have been larger than it was, and the only consequence would have been an immense additional expense without any additional strength. I have had a full communication with the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject, and I trust effectual means will be concerted for maintaining complete the European establishments to the amount I have mentioned in this letter, and which will be more accurately detailed in the official orders which will be sent without delay from the War Office and from the Court of Directors.

It only remains for me to advert to the concluding part of your Lordship's letter. I never before heard of the defective state of the foundry at Fort William, which your Lordship describes as no longer able to supply the ordnance required for the use of Bengal and the other Presidencies. Your Lordship may rest assured I shall, without delay, call the attention of the Court of Directors to the subject, and an immediate and radical cure must be administered to so serious an evil.

As your Lordship's letter was confined to the subject of military establishments, my reply is of course confined to the same topics. But I am sure when your Lordship adverts to the foundation of a deep-rooted anxiety, which I entertain upon one branch of our expenditure, you will so far concur with me in that feeling as to extend the same principles to every other species of expenditure. I am well aware that valuable improvements may still be made upon many of our Indian concerns, and I know that many of those improvements will likewise lead to expense. I am likewise aware that it is natural for men of ardent minds to wish the rapid execution of improvements which they reckon to be valuable and important, but in the present state of our finances, I have no hesitation in being of opinion that we had better for some time remain stationary and postpone for a while even desirable improvements, if they are to lead to immediate expense. In short, my present creed with regard to India is, that nothing new is to be attempted without weighing well every rupee it will cost.

I have troubled your Lordship with a long letter; but when you consider the importance and extent of the subject I have been under the necessity of discussing, your Lordship

will be satisfied that I could scarcely compress* the subject within a narrower compass.

I have the honour to be,
my dear Lord,
your most obedient humble servant,
HENRY DUNDAS.

No. II.

Copy of a private Paper written by General Stuart prior to his leaving India in January 1800, and submitted to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, on his arrival in England, in July in that year.

There are some important circumstances respecting Bombay and this side of India, which are neither understood in England, nor in this country.

As it is of consequence to the welfare of the British possessions in this part of the world, and of infinite moment to the interests of a large body of men; I would communicate although in ever so hasty a manner, the opinions which I have been led to form on this subject; connecting them with some more general observations on the state of our relations with India. It seems to be too much the practice to neglect the western parts of India, and to value nothing but the fertile fields of Bengal; while in point of real riches, I am not sure but we excel them. We have a variety of articles fit for commerce, and we occupy a soil fit for every production.

It may be doubted whether the revenue derived in cash from the ground in this country, is in any degree less hurtful in its effects with regard to us, than so much money dug from a mine. It is true, that it enables us to pay our troops, and keep up a formidable appearance; but without some other principle of vigour, this kind of wealth would lead to poverty and indolence, as has happened to the Spaniards in America, and to the Dutch in Asia. The true utility of our establishments in India arises from the commerce they produce, the sailors they maintain, the numbers of people to whom they afford food or labour, the commodities by this means exported, or imported, with the industry and the spirit of adventure thence created.

Commercial pursuits first made us visit India; but a scene of brilliant exploits, little connected with commerce, led to the establishment of an extensive empire, which must now be supported by a just combination of military strength, with objects relating to trade. Hence the encouragement of military and commercial exertion, is the chief object of national concern. By this means we have acquired, and by these means we must maintain our dominion over this country.

Whether or not we do wisely, in extending our possessions to the interior parts of India, further than we have already done, is a question of

great political consideration. It is difficult to resist the temptation and allurements of conquest. Nations and individuals are alike insatiable in their desires; and it is rarely, that either know the temperate medium which should bound their acquisitions. Prudent men, and those who have been accustomed to examine on the spot the state of India, and the nature of our connection with it, would rather see us in possession of the coasts, which would secure to us every where the commerce, and which would always be accessible to our fleets. We must at all times support a vast establishment to resist, or keep in awe the great Indian foreign powers; but this will be more formidable by being concentrated, than by an excessive extension of territory, which is more likely to produce weakness, from the necessity in that situation of scattering and dispersing our forces.

The expense of the armies can as well be maintained by territories near the sea, as by those more inaccessible and distant. Their efficiency can be much better supported, as when close to the shore their wants can be more easily supplied, and the connection with the parent state kept alive, an object which distance and time are apt to diminish, and which should therefore never be lost sight of. From the great superiority which we possess in courage and science, our danger from the nations of India, will never probably be very imminent. They have been from the remotest times successively reduced by men of colder regions, partaking of a fiercer and more hardy temperament. In the beginning exposed to the alternate ravages or conquest of the nations of the Caspian Tartary, and Persia; they were only at intervals relieved by the vast distance which separated them from these hordes, and which put a stop for a time to their incursions. It is now upwards of forty years since India was visited by these barbarians: and they are at present supplanted by the English. The facility afforded of reaching this country by ships, and the great ease of transporting men and stores, have obtained us this superiority. An attention to the same means may no doubt long maintain us in this advantage; but an advertency to the former periods of history, and in particular the recent attempts of Zeinaun Shah to march by land to India, ought to caution us to keep a watchful eye on this quarter, and not to conclude the danger to be over, because its effects have not been lately felt.

The route by which Alexander, and other conquerors arrived in India, is still open, and the people whose ancestors composed their armies, possess at this moment perhaps an equal degree of courage and adventure as their forefathers. They require but an ambitious or enterprising leader, to pour forth their uncivilized bands, and to overspread like a torrent, the fertile fields of Hindostan, which, aided by the remembrance of the exploits of their predecessors, holds out a perpetual object of temptation.

But it is easier to resist the unregulated efforts of barbarians, than the constant and systematic attempts of European nations. The superiority which has always attended the people in possession of the commerce, or power of this part of Asia, must ever excite jealousy and raise up opponents. The present interest, the ancient rivalry, and the fixed ambition of the French nation, will perpetually incite them to drive us from this

country. Under whatever government they may fall, and whatever diminution their power may sustain in the issue of this war, the principle will be pursued with the same vigour, and the first moment of prosperity, or of opportunity, will be seized to establish themselves in India, or to expel us from it. The first step indeed, will have in view the last.

To effectuate either of these objects, no resources of genius, policy, or activity will be wanting. It is on a return of peace probably, that we shall have to combat the practice of every art, which will, in spite of conventions, or treaties, and in defiance of their import, be resorted to by this enterprizing and unprincipled rival, to obtain a footing in India.

To accomplish this design, the French have in their power other advantages, of which they will not fail to avail themselves. The possession of the Mauritius affords them a safe harbour, a situation where they may concert their plans in secret; and containing a population that would contribute a considerable number of soldiers and sailors towards their success. The French at these Islands possess a colony within the tropics of white men, as active and ardent as the mother country. They are the only European nation in possession of this advantage; for the English colony of St. Helena is too weak to be any assistance; and it is yet to be seen whether the colonists at the Cape, who from their situation are able to give great support to our Indian empire, are more disposed to obstruct than promote the views of Government.

It is not perhaps so much to be imputed, as matter of blame to us, as to the natural consequence of superiority under the most circumspect behaviour, that the French character is more popular in India than ours. This is however very true, and individuals of that nation are always sure of a more favourable reception from the Native Princes. This predilection affords them an opportunity of introducing themselves at the principal durbars, where many of them have acquired great influence, and risen to the first offices of the state. It was chiefly by the degree of personal esteem and favour that they obtained such weight and power at the court of the Nizam. It was by the instrument of force, and the agency of fear, that we succeeded in expelling them from Hyderabad. The imbecility of the Nizam's government, and the need he was in of our protection against Tippoo, made him consent to a measure which otherwise it was his interest and inclination to oppose.

The Mahrattas more independent and with great prejudices, have not yet given themselves up to either nation. It cannot however be doubted, but that they are secretly disposed to the French, and will, whenever occasion may offer, assist their schemes of commerce, or aggrandizement in opposition to us.

In finishing this cursory and imperfect view of the danger to which our possessions in this country stand exposed; as I am of opinion that the greatest peril to them will proceed from the attempts of the French; I would according to that view regulate the distribution of the forces, and the choice of our positions. When we retire into the inland parts of India to collect the revenue of the ground, we are forgetful of our real welfare, our real strength, and the origin of both in this country. The

natives of India are ignorant of the value of the sea; trade is not their object; they neither know its importance, nor its principles. They would willingly relinquish a territory bordering on the sea, for one in an inland situation, which should produce a few more rupees per annum. They never would allow the vast benefits that might arise from the ocean, the source of all our greatness, to enter into their calculation. If this observation is a just one, it results from it, that without much difficulty we could secure to ourselves by exchange, every part of the coasts of India. The wealth and power of the interior states would then be equally at our disposal.

The late war with Tippoo Sultaun has shewn us pretty nearly what an Indian enemy can do, and that we have not much to fear from them alone. It cannot be too often repeated, that our danger will arise from a foreign enemy, who could secure alliances in this country. This ought to be the great object of our attention, as it is the true source of any apprehension.

The best way of considering this circumstance, is to take an impartial view of our situation in this country, and examine where we are sufficiently secure, or where we are defective in strength.

We are in the first place in possession of the sea coasts of Ceylon, and may be considered as the sovereigns of the whole Island. This is a possession of the greatest importance to the defence of all our Indian dominions, and in the hands of an active nation, would soon be turned into the most dangerous instrument of power against us. If the Island should be confirmed to us at a peace, it ought to be more strongly fortified, and defended by a large body of Europeans.

At present being in possession of the sea coasts of Ceylon, we have all the strength there than can be required from situation, more especially as there can be little danger from the native Prince of the Island.

The Bengal provinces appear very safe from an external enemy coming by sea to that side of India. The river is a dangerous one, of itself forming a strong defence, and we are in possession of nearly the whole of the coast towards Madras. The part that does not belong to us is savage and fruitless, and would never be thought of as the direction of entrance or attack from without. We have besides a large army in that valuable country; and Fort William, a very strong fortress, must in the first place fall before any invading enemy from the sea could make much progress against us in Bengal. The most immediate danger to these provinces will probably proceed from Zemaun Shah, or some of the northern states in conjunction with the Seykes and Mahrattas. As these nations are all ignorant of the art of sieges, the interior frontiers of Bengal ought to be strongly secured by fortifications, which would form insurmountable barriers to such enemies: and this is one of the few situations where the construction of forts appears advisable in India, or where it is necessary to keep up a large body of forces inland. The difficulty that an European enemy would have in reaching Bengal, either by land or sea, and of establishing themselves afterwards, seems fortunately to secure it for a long time from any attempt of the kind. Neither have any of the European

nations a sufficient footing there to begin upon, and we shall no doubt prevent their forming encroachments on our territories, for every step they advance must be a diminution of our power.

From Madras to the southernmost point of the Peninsula, the whole of the sea coast is in our possession. It is guarded by a powerful army, which if collected, would always overcome any force which could arrive there by sea, as there is no country power here that could lend material assistance to an enemy. The Nizam and the Mahrattas are too remote, and the former is besides watched by a large body of English troops quartered at his capital, who will be able to check the first symptoms of disaffection. Nor can the French have a direct communication with either of these states by sea from this quarter.

The coast is however open to invasion from the ocean, and there should constantly be a great army on foot in the Carnatic. It may therefore be doubted whether we have added to our security by fixing so large a part of the forces in Mysore, where they are at such a distance from the object of attack. The three Presidencies form the basis of our power in India, and an enemy landing on the coast of Coromandel would march directly to Madras, if he was not prevented by a superior army. The best part of a month would be consumed before the troops could collect and move to its succour from Mysore. What may not an enemy do in this time? It may also be asked what imminent danger threatens Mysore, or what particular interest have we there that requires a large force to be maintained in that country?—We must first fight on the sea coast for our empire in India; when defeated there, it may be necessary to retire to the interior holds, and all that should be done in this case is to secure the means of retreat. But when separated from the sea and obliged to seek for an inland posture of defence, our affairs must be in a desperate state.

Although the Carnatic is every where open to attack from the sea, this is certainly not the point where an European enemy will choose to invade India, nor even look for a commercial establishment. Both these objects will be sought for, I apprehend, on the western shores of the Peninsula, and it is now necessary to turn our attention to them.

Since the acquisition of Kanara, we may be considered as possessing the coast on this side from Cape Comorin to Goa, for it is needless to except the country of Travancore; and we may even include Goa while we have so large a body of troops there. By these late arrangements we have acquired an additional degree of safety in this quarter. But from the Carwar to the mouths of the Indus northward, the sea coast, with a few exceptions, is in the possession of the Mahrattas, the most formidable power of Hindostan. The intermediate, that are not in this situation, are the island of Bombay, Salsett, Carranjah, Demaun, Diu, the small settlement of Bancoote, and the City of Surat, the whole belonging either to the English or Portuguese.

The long tract of coast subject to the Mahrattas abounds with harbours where an enemy could easily land, and where in a fertile country he would find himself amply supplied with all he could want for nourishment or war. This is not the place to enquire into the causes that have kept Euro-

peans from acquiring settlements in this rich country; but as this only depends on their forbearance, it may be safely predicted that these valuable and defenceless possessions will not remain much longer neglected.

If a French force were to land in the Conkan or Guzerat with the *good-will* of the Mahrattas, they surely would not be less formidable than if they were set down at the gates of Fort William. On the contrary, they would be more formidable, for they would have leisure to secure whatever they had not time to bring with them, and to be joined by bodies of their friends. Such a combination is far from being improbable. The storm would fall on Bengal a little later, but not with less violence.

If they should land *without the consent* of the Mahrattas, they might effect an establishment in Guzerat in spite of their opposition, nor would it be difficult to reconcile them to a measure which would serve as a counterpoise to us. Before the reduction of Seringapatam, had the French succeeded in reaching this country, they would have landed in Tippoo's states or at Goa, which is in their neighbourhood, and which they looked on as an easy conquest.

The political change since that event will induce them to seek the same support from the only remaining independent power, the Mahrattas, whom they will conclude from that reason to be in a natural state of opposition to us.

From this circumstance and others which I have pointed out, the French will still be led to direct their designs on India to the western part of the Peninsula, where they can alone hope for an ally, and where an extensive region of fertile country lies open to their enterprize.

There is no individual, I believe, of any observation on this side of India, who does not look with the same apprehension at its defenceless state.

Notwithstanding every provision that has been made in the power of the Bombay government, if a body of French troops were to land at Surat, it must instantly fall into their hands, and laying aside all consideration for the misfortunes of 2 or 300,000 inhabitants which it contains, or the disgrace which would attend its loss to us, it is evident what resources of all kinds such a city and such a country would afford. It would open an immediate means of communication with the Mahrattas, and lay the foundation of a connection that might annihilate our commerce and our consequence in this part of the world.

The forts of Diu and Demaun belonging to the Portuguese are in this neighbourhood. They are both naturally strong, and they are well fortified but weakly garrisoned. These places would almost fall without resistance into the hands of an enemy, and he would thus find himself in possession of forts, than which we have perhaps nothing superior, and requiring only men to defend them. He would obtain this footing in a fertile, and probably too a friendly country. That this is not a needless cause of fear, I beg to call to remembrance that the French actually made an attack within these few years past on Diu, but fortunately with a very insufficient force.

While Tippoo's government existed, and he was holding out offers to the French, it is pretty certain, that if they had been able to come to

India, they would have endeavoured to get possession of Goa, or to land thereabouts.

The situation of all things is changed. The only power to which that nation can now look is the Mahrattas, and the place of attack, especially since we have secured Goa by our troops, will most probably be transferred to some part of the coast, to the northward of Bombay. Here besides easiness of conquest, they would find wealth and every thing necessary to support war.

We should on all these accounts strengthen ourselves not only at Bombay, the coast of Malabar and Surat, but endeavour to procure a part or the whole of Guzerat, which would give us a sufficient influence from Cape Comorin to the mouths of the Indus. The possession of the Guzerat would be attended with military and commercial advantages of the first importance. It is a small country; but it is the richest in India. From it almost all the cotton is brought which is exported from Bombay to China and Europe. The produce of sales at Canton in this article of the private trade alone, amounts to nearly a million a year. This serves to pay for the Company's investments, and makes an annual return of so much property to the mother country: the more valuable, as it is the entire fruit of industry. The landed revenues of Guzerat are also very considerable; and from its peculiar geography, it could be defended by a small number of troops.

When Mr. Hastings ceded Broach and Bassein to the Mahrattas, he certainly diminished the resources of Bombay, whether for its own defence, or the assistance it might afford the Company's finances.

The possession of Guzerat would give us a new bulwark against Zemaun Shah, whose possessions extend to the banks of the Indus. It would secure to us the best manufacture of piece goods; and the command of the cotton market, the most valuable staple of India.

Another evident advantage besides immediate security would arise from our possessing this line of coast. From its different ports all the pirates that infest this part of India are known to issue. It is our duty to protect the fair trader who daily suffers by those robbers: but putting this out of the question, the import trade from Europe can never be considerable while they are allowed to exist. This trade is carried on by boats or small vessels, who distribute to the different ports whatever production or manufacture of Europe is required for the internal consumption of India. The facility of entering rivers and shoal water, the want too of capital, with the necessity of retailing the goods at many different places, confining these vessels to a small size; they are thereby rendered an easy and constant object of piratical depredation.*

What kind of gain will make up for such a risk? The Company have desired to know why their exports of woollens have ceased to some ports? This is the solution of the question: The demand is not sufficient at one place for the cargoes of large ships that could protect themselves, and the smaller craft, that could distribute to a great amount, dare no longer venture to trade. The marine are quite incapable of affording the necessary degree of protection, nor does there appear any other way

than by possessing the coast, and subduing the strong holds of the pirates.

But, it will be asked, shall we go to war without a shew of justice, in order to accomplish all those desirable changes?

With respect to the pirates, this question is easily answered, as we are in fact in a state of hostility with them; and we are justly charged with imbecility for not ere now crushing the nests of so many robbers.

In regard to any views on the Guzerat, these will demand a more serious consideration; and we should not certainly go to war when that can be avoided. Something may be amicably settled by exchanging with the Mahrattas our inland territory, for what would be more for our advantage in all respects, and more acceptable to them. But this question of war will soon resolve itself. It may be considered as a thing certain that the time is not far distant when the avarice or ambition of some European state will lead them to form establishments in Guzerat. The bad government of the Mahrattas, the well-known wealth of the country, and the vast commercial advantages which it holds out, are temptations too powerful to be long resisted. The question then really is, whether we shall be the first to possess ourselves of these advantages, or wait until we have to dispute them with others?

To these arguments we may add, that the strongest political motives press us to secure the sea-coast of India, as the only effectual method of excluding Europeans from this country; and of preventing them disturbing its peace, either by their intrigues or their arms.

No native state can ever be very formidable without the assistance of an European ally; and there is but little reason of apprehension from their aggrandizement by an extension of territory, so long as that is confined to the inland countries.

A much greater intercourse seems to have formerly subsisted between the western ports of India and Persia than at present. A great quantity of English goods, particularly woollens, found their way into that country. We obtained in return silks and silver. This formed a considerable branch of commerce, which may be again revived, but which has long since had but a nominal existence.

In a political light our intercourse with Persia deserves attention, for it is in the power of the sovereigns of that country to repress or assist the hosts of barbarians ready at all times to precipitate themselves on India as on a certain prey.

Bombay is our natural emporium with Persia, as well as the Red Sea, which has acquired a new degree of political importance since the attempt of the French to reach India from Egypt. Whatever may be the present success of this attempt, it becomes incumbent on us to watch henceforward this avenue to India. The design is in itself practicable, and would most likely have succeeded, had the Turks either been in alliance with the French, or had the enemy pushed on, immediately after he reached Cairo.

However this may be, if we mean to secure ourselves in India, the evacuation of Egypt will be made the first condition of peace

The trade to the Red Sea also seems capable of improvement, and may probably defray the expense of the establishments, which it may be found necessary to maintain in that quarter. Piece goods and grain may be made barter for any quantity of coffee. The former and coarse woollens are in demand in Abyssinia.

The East India Company once carried on a considerable commerce with Japan. They lost this advantage by the ill-judged conduct of the Portuguese, and have been prevented regaining it by the intrigues of the Dutch. It is a censure on us that they have alone for such a period enjoyed the profits of this trade, and a reproach on the commercial spirit of the nation, that we have made no attempt to recover our former footing in Japan. The promotion of science should have been a sufficient incitement to the enterprize. The present low state of the Dutch nation would be favourable to this effort. Furs, cotton, piece goods and woollens may be imported into that country. The returns would be chiefly in gold and copper.

J. STUART.

CORPS.	OFFICERS PRESENT IN INDIA.												Qr. Mr. of Cavalry.	Serjeants present in India.	Drummers ditto.	Effective Rank and File.	WANTING TO COMPLETE.		
	COMMISSIONED.						STAFF.										Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank & File.
	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieuts.	Lieuts.	Ensigns or Cornets.	Pay-Masters.	Adjuts.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.							
Mysoor, 19th Light Dragoons	1	3	1	9	2	..	1	..	1	1	6	24	6	423	15
Ditto, 25th ditto	1	3	1	9	3	..	1	..	1	1	6	24	6	397	41
Cawnpore, 27th ditto	..	1	2	3	1	9	6	..	1	..	1	2	5	24	6	450
Dinapore, 29th ditto	..	1	2	5	1	8	3	..	1	..	1	1	6	24	6	371	67
Fort William, 10th Foot	..	1	2	6	1	18	4	..	1	1	1	2	..	52	22	979	10	..	221
Vellore & Mysoor, &c. 12th do	..	1	2	8	1	17	4	..	1	1	1	1	..	51	22	671	10	..	529
Colombo, 19th ditto	..	1	1	5	..	19	3	..	1	1	..	2	..	49	21	752	10	..	448
Manar & Mysoor, 33d ditto	..	1	1	4	1	18	6	..	1	1	1	2	..	51	21	676	10	..	524
Colombo, 51st ditto	..	2	1	7	..	17	6	1	1	1	1	1	..	33	22	453	29	..	747
Mysoor, 73d ditto	..	1	2	5	1	20	3	..	1	1	1	2	..	50	21	706	10	..	494
Madras, 74th ditto	..	2	1	5	1	16	1	..	1	1	1	1	..	52	23	681	10	..	519
Mysoor, 75th ditto	..	1	..	7	1	17	1	..	1	1	1	1	..	52	22	750	10	..	450
Allahabad, 76th ditto	..	1	1	5	1	16	3	1	1	1	1	1	..	52	22	740	10	..	460
Mysoor, 77th ditto	2	7	1	14	1	..	1	1	1	2	..	42	22	725	20	..	475
Cawnpore, 78th, ditto	..	3	1	5	1	14	7	..	1	1	1	1	..	52	22	864	10	..	336
Furbandi, 80th ditto	..	2	2	7	1	16	4	..	1	..	1	2	..	52	22	760	10	..	440
Goa, 84th ditto	..	2	2	6	1	21	1	..	1	1	1	2	..	52	22	865	10	..	335
Bombay, { 86th ditto	..	2	1	6	1	17	4	1	1	1	1	1	..	52	22	839	10	..	361
{ 88th ditto	..	2	1	8	..	17	2	1	1	1	1	2	..	36	22	484	26	..	716
Madras, Scotch Brigade	6	1	17	6	..	1	1	1	2	..	52	22	799	10	..	401
Ditto, Swiss Regiment	..	1	2	7	1	19	4	1	1	1	1	2	..	53	22	625	375
Total	1	26	28	118	18	328	74	5	20	16	19	32	23	929	395	14010	205	..	7954

N.B.—537 Invalids sent to Europe, included in the above effective rank and file.

WALTER CLIFFE, Adjutant General.

No. IV.

Chief Justice Sir John Anstruther's Observations on the Government of the British Possessions in India.

Calcutta, September 30, 1799.

Whoever has in the slightest degree considered the situation of the dominions of the East India Company, must be satisfied that the form of government, and the degree of pre-eminence and control which one settlement has over another, has arisen more from accidental circumstances than from any formed or settled plan of colonial or provincial policy. Indeed it is fortunate upon the whole that it has been so, because the events which have led to our present power, have been so various and wonderful that no plan of human policy, although framed with the greatest wisdom, or planned with the utmost foresight, could have either adapted itself or have been adapted to the varying scenes which have led to the present astonishing height of the British power in India.

In the more early period of our Indian history a manifest preference was given to the coasts of Malabar. The eyes of the nation were turned to the seat of the Portuguese power, and the possession of Bombay with its port and island in sovereignty gave us a footing upon that coast, which we had in no other part of India. The subsequent possession of Madras; its being the scene of the operations and the seat of the power of our enemies in war, and our rivals in peace, and the footing we there acquired, raised that settlement into public view. The wars of Dupleix and Lally; the victories of Laurence and his associates; the power and influence acquired in consequence of them; the wealth of the place; the decisive lead we assumed in the affairs of the Carnatic, soon gave to Madras a leading importance among the British settlements in the East. Nor was it till the solid and permanent effects which resulted from the victories of Clive, Adams and Munro, were felt and experienced, that the settlement at Calcutta assumed the pre-eminence it now enjoys, but which its power, its revenues and resources, will always enable it to maintain. Still however, although the different settlements at times assumed different degrees of importance in the public eye, they were independent upon each other; as they grew out of commercial establishments totally unconnected, so they continued when they became almost kingdoms.

The first attempt to remedy this disconnected state of the British settlements in India was in the year 1773. It was felt to be a strange thing that a Governor of Madras or Bombay, might involve the nation in a war, might entangle it in contradictory engagements with country powers, might involve it in negotiations conducted upon different principles without any power existing in India which could prevent the evil.

It was far from being even improbable, that at Bengal a treaty might have been negotiated of defensive alliance with a power against whom the Bombay government had contracted an offensive alliance with a hostile neighbour. This evil was remedied in some degree by the Act of 1773-4, commonly called the Regulating Act, by which the external relations of the Company's settlements were in some degree placed under the control of the Bengal government, by that Act it was provided, that the govern-

ments of Madras and Bombay should make no order for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war against any Indian Prince, or negotiate or conclude any treaty without the previous approbation of the Government-General, except in cases where danger arose from delay, or where the Court of Directors had given directions upon the subject under the penalty of being liable to be suspended from their offices.

It was not very difficult to foresee that so very limited a control could produce little effect, and although the different Presidencies were directed to transmit accounts of all their proceedings to the Government-General yet except in the points stated they had no right to interfere. The conduct of any particular settlement might be diametrically opposite to every view which the Government-General had of the public interest. It might either be such as would eventually involve the country in war; or render it incapable of defence if war was undertaken without any legal authority existing in India to prevent the evil. The whole settlement might be involved in domestic discord and almost intestine war, while the enemy was at the gates, and the Government-General a tame spectator of the confusion.

Those who have looked at the transactions which led to the first and second Mahratta war, who have viewed the dispute of Lord Pigot and Lord Macartney, with their councils and their Generals, will require no further proof of what I have stated. By the 24 Geo. III. the powers of control were carried somewhat further, and were declared to extend to all such points as related to any transactions with the country powers, to war or peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of the different settlements in time of war, and to such points as should be specially referred to them by the Court of Directors. This in truth, although from the terms in which it is worded might prevent some disputes, yet remedied few of the evils before existing, and gave very little unity or solidity to the powers of the different Presidencies.

The power of control of the Government-General were no otherways altered by the 26th Geo. III. c. 16. than by vesting the power in the Governor-General to act from himself without the concurrence of his Council, a measure declared to be for the purpose, and which certainly has had the effect of giving energy, vigour, and despatch to the measures of executive government.

The act of 1793 extended the power of control still farther by re-enacting the former power of control, and at the same time extending them to the collection as well as the application of the revenues, and extending the control both over the revenues and forces generally to all times, whereas by the former act it was confined to times of war. It further gave powers of control over all the civil and military governments of the respective Presidencies. It farther directed obedience in the first instance to all orders, whether any rule existed or not, whether they were within the powers of the Government-General or not.

This act farther provides that the Governor-General may visit the other Presidencies. That during his stay the powers of the governor of the place shall be suspended, and the governor placed in the situation of one of the council, and while the Governor-General remains, all the powers of

the government general are transferred to the Presidency where he is. It gives the power of appointing a Vice-President for the government of Bengal during his absence, but from an attentive consideration of the sections 50 and 53 of the Act of 1793, I am of opinion that such Vice-President has no power to act without the concurrence of his Council, although from some expressions in the Act I incline to think that the legislature intended he should have such power. Such being the powers of control and direction which have been extended as occasion required the question which now presents itself is :

In the present circumstances, after the unlooked for and wonderful extension of the British power in the Deccan, are these powers sufficient to give vigour, energy, and despatch to the executive government ?

Ought the three Presidencies to remain upon their present footing, or ought the British power to be concentrated and have more unity given to it than it at present possesses? Should Madras and Bombay maintain their relative situations as at present, or how is the distribution of power and territory to be made between them ?

I shall first consider the last of these propositions and then consider whether the present state of our power in India does not require some alteration in order to give it unity and vigour.

Our possessions upon the Malabar coast were small and unimportant till after the first Mysore war. The peace of Seringapatam gave us considerable possessions there, which were naturally placed under the Bombay government. It was the only one which could afford them aid and protection. It is true Bombay was at a distance, and for several months in the year all communication was cut off, but still it was nearer than Madras, and the force which the Bombay government had to dispose of was not only well disposed of upon the Malabar coast, but was so very consistently with the principles which had led the government at home to place so large a military force under a government whose territorial possessions were so unimportant.

The situation and power of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions gave him the ability to attack the narrow slip of coast which we and our ally the Nabob of the Carnatic possess upon the coast of Coromandel at his pleasure, but the situation of his dominions also rendered him liable to an attack upon the Malabar side. He could not pour his whole force into the Carnatic without exposing his own dominions to attack from Bombay, he could not resist such attack without dividing his force and rendering himself less able to cope with the Madras army.

The policy therefore of a large military force stationed somewhere upon the Malabar coast was obvious, Bombay was its natural position, both from its being a great seat of commerce, and its being a naval arsenal. When territory was acquired upon the Malabar coast, it was the natural theatre upon which the forces at Bombay were to act, and it was accordingly occupied by them.

The situation of Poonah and the Mahratta government, which could only be in case of necessity successfully attacked from Bombay or the upper provinces of Bengal, formed another strong reason for stationing

such a force at Bombay in order to keep the forces of the Mahratta empire in check.

Had it not been for these powerful military and political reasons, the measure of stationing a very large and expensive force in a settlement unable to support it was (considered in itself) a bad one. It operated as a great drain upon Bengal.

Large sums of money spent by an army in a country being mostly spent in articles of first necessity, quickly return into circulation and invigorate industry, but sent out of a country from which so much is already sent in the way of tribute is a real loss, it never returns into its circulation again.

Do these reasons now continue to operate with equal force, or does not the present situation of our power in the Deccan require that the distribution of our forces and the relative situation of the governments should be altered, and the whole possessions southward of Goa be placed under the Madras government? I think it does. The power of Tippoo is now removed out of our way, and instead of having an enemy the most powerful we ever had to contend with, lying with his whole force at the back of our narrow and extended possessions, the whole peninsula south of the fifteenth degree of north latitude may be said to be under our protection, and its solid defence rests upon our army.

Instead of having an enemy to attack upon the Malabar coast, we have that coast to defend; from an offensive position, we now in the Peninsula stand in a defensive one.* Instead of having a long line of coast to defend against an European enemy, and even a longer line to defend against a powerful native one behind, we are now liable to no attack from the quarter where it was most to be dreaded. In a military view, our dominions are consolidated; and the whole force in the Peninsula may in a very short time, and at any season when an attack can be made, be brought to bear upon any one point upon either coast. All idea of an attack by us upon any part of the coast is at an end, and every part of our army therefore formerly retained at Bombay for possible offensive purposes becomes useless. The object for which it was placed there does not exist. This material change in our position necessarily causes a change in our policy. But as we have a large country to defend, the application of our force is obvious, it ought to be concentrated in the country it has to defend.

By sea we can only be attacked by an European enemy, against such an attack, a force at Bombay is nearly useless, whereas if it was concentrated in some part of the Peninsula, let the attack come on what side it will, a very short time carries it to the scene of action.

It may, however, be said, that this reasoning is all true, but it does not form a ground for withdrawing the Malabar coast from the Bombay

* It will be observed that I look upon the defence and protection of Mysore in the same light I do that of the Carnatic, and the force in the pay of the Rajah as part of our positive strength, whether considered in an offensive or defensive point of view. *

Government, or placing its force under that of Madras. It will not be disputed, that the Madras Government alone ought to maintain all the relations of the British Government with that of Mysore. Nothing can be more mischievous than that it should have connections with two of our Governments. It would open an endless field of dispute and a fertile source of intrigue and venality. Yet this must be the case if the Malabar coast remains as it now does under the Bombay Government. It will be more so if Canara be added to the Government of Bombay, which it must be, if Malabar proper is continued to it, for it will not be contended that it is proper the Bombay Government should continue in the management of the coast at the greatest distance from it, and yet that it is improper that it should manage that which is nearest.

Possessing a slip of coast the whole length of the Mysore kingdom, in possession of every port by which access to it from sea can be had, furnishing the force to defend it on that side, it is impossible that much communication must not take place, add to this that many of the articles of the commerce of the Malabar coast are furnished from Mysore, and commercial intercourse must not only necessarily take place with individuals, but between the respective Governments. It is therefore in vain to attempt to prevent much intercourse between the Government of Bombay and that of Mysore, if the coast be continued under the former, and if much intercourse took place, it is impossible to prevent the Governments of Madras and Bombay from clashing, and much intrigue and mischief from taking place.

In a military point of view, and considering the geographical position of the Peninsula, which may be said to form one consolidated dominion, comprehending all the Decan, south of the 15th degree of north latitude, it seems preposterous to place part of the force to defend it, under a Government separated from it by hostile possessions, having no communication but by sea, and that interrupted for several months in the year, and at the same time withdraw it from that Government which commands the Peninsula to its centre, and from that General, who must have under his eye the possible defence of every point in the circumference. It is impossible to draw the line how much of the coast each Presidency is to defend, what is to be under the orders of General Harris, what of General Hartley. At one time it may be necessary and proper for the whole army upon the Malabar coast to be above the Ghauts, at another that the whole Mysore army should be under them. Is it possible this can be done, unless the whole be under one head and upon one footing.

Taking it for granted that Seringapatam is a most important post for the defence of the Peninsula, let the attack come from where it will, is it to be tolerated for a moment that the Commander in Chief above the Ghauts, charged with the whole defence of the Peninsula, is not to have the perfect disposition of, and command over, the forces which may be stationed in Canara, Mangalore, and Malabar.

Bad as it was, yet the immediate and direct communication with Bombay formed a reason among others for placing Malabar under that Presidency. This reason operates much more strongly at present against it. The com-

munication with the officer in command above the Ghauts is immediate, and the command there, from the importance of the position, must always be one of the first in the service. The communication with Madras is certain and safe at every season, and can never exceed a few days. I would just as soon think of placing the west coast of Scotland under the command of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, as placing the Malabar coast under the Bombay Government. The same reasoning will apply to the civil as to the military government, if government it can be called, which has yet been established there. I am not aware that any commercial reasons exist to interfere with this; it is equally and even more easy for the agents of the Madras Government to provide the investment from the Malabar coast, as for those from Bombay, and the ships would call upon the coast as at present. It is probable the commerce of the coast of Malabar will much extend itself, but even if it does, it is of much importance that the seat of Government be as near the commercial agent as possible.

Some difficulties of rank and patronage may probably occur in transferring part of the Bombay force to the Madras establishment, and probably some of the civil servants, but these are not worth considering in the view I take of the subject; partial and individual interests cannot merit much consideration.

It will still, however, be said, that, viewing the situation of the Mahratta power, it is necessary to keep a large force at Bombay, not only sufficient to preserve the settlement, but to be able to make a powerful diversion upon that side, if it should ever become necessary.

I readily admit that it is of great importance to maintain a respectable force at Bombay, as an excellent port, a convenient dock-yard, a naval arsenal, and a place of a great and useful commerce; and the force ought to be such as not only to place it and its dependencies in a state of security, but even to be able in case of hostilities to threaten offensive operations.

But if the large force placed under the controul of the Government was in any degree intended as a check to the Mahrattas, their relative situation towards us is so materially altered as to render it disputable whether it still is necessary to retain that force there for such purpose. It will be admitted that the great reason for stationing so large a force at Bombay, I mean the situation of the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun, is entirely at an end, and the question comes to be whether the same force is to remain there for what was originally the secondary reason for its being placed there.

It cannot escape observation that the wonderful events of the late war has materially changed the relative situation of the Mahrattas and the British power in the Deccan. In former times the Mahratta empire could not be assailed at all by the Madras army. The dominions of Tippoo, our certain enemy, lay between. In the event of war he was to them a powerful ally, and fully occupied the whole force of the Madras Government. The connections with the Nizam were till of late so uncertain and precarious, that at best he was but a doubtful friend and a weak and suspicious ally. Through the dominions of Tippoo a Mahratta army might have overrun the Carnatic without the possibility of that Presidency undertaking

a single offensive operation against that hostile power. How wonderfully is the scene changed? A powerful force stationed in the dominions of the Nizam has insured his fidelity and active aid, while at the same time it has given consistency and strength to his army, and confidence both to his troops and their generals. The strong forts under the Mysore Government are garrisoned by our troops without expense. A large force maintained in the same manner ready to break through the open and exposed Mahratta frontier at the first moment of hostilities; and this force is ready either to co-operate with the Nizam's detachment or to be supported by the whole force of the Madras Government.

Attack upon our dominions is become difficult nearly in the same proportion as offensive operations by our Government are become easy; and as our means have become powerful under these circumstances, the importance at least of a large force at Bombay is considerably diminished. Any attack from that quarter must commence with the ascent of a dangerous and difficult ghaut, instead of an open frontier, supported by a powerful army. It seems therefore of more importance to add strength to the army in Mysore and under the Madras Government, so as to enable it with ease at once to defend the Peninsula against an European enemy, and undertake offensive operations, if necessary, upon the Mahratta frontier. The Mahratta power is now assailable in every quarter. The dominions of the most powerful of its chiefs in Hindostan are at our mercy, and we have our choice of the point of attack, either from the Nizam's or the Mysore frontier. Is it therefore worth the expense of maintaining a large force at Bombay for the possibility of offensive operations in that quarter, which may be equally well or better carried on from another place, and where the force will be equally useful, whether it be necessary to employ it either in offensive or defensive operations.

Admitting that it were at any time advisable to undertake an offensive operation from Bombay, a reinforcement to its garrison might be at least as easily transported from Mangalore or Onore to Bombay, as it could be transported from the latter place to Cannanore or Calicut.

The result of all this reasoning would lead to placing the whole Peninsula south of latitude fifteen north under the Madras Government, transferring so much of the army of Bombay to the Madras establishment as is more than sufficient to form a powerful garrison for Bombay and its small dependencies, and to the transferring to the Madras Government so much of the civil establishment of Bombay as is necessarily employed in the territories acquired from Tippoo Sultaun at the peace of Seringapatam, or as are employed in the factories of Anjengo, Calicut, and the other places to the southward of the Mysore northern frontier.

It will not escape observation, that for civil purposes as well as military it is of importance that every part of our establishment have a ready communication with the Government General, and this is much more easily effected from every point of the Malabar coast through the Madras Government than through Bombay.

If this arrangement were to take place, a farther and subsequent consideration would arise, whether it would then be necessary to uphold the

Government of Bombay upon its present footing. It seems to me that when it becomes little more than a great garrison, a naval arsenal, and the seat of the Company's marine, with the provision of so much of the investment as is derived from Bombay and from the northward, that there would be little occasion for the whole establishment of Governor and Council, Secretary, Commander-in-Chief, Staff, Boards, &c. &c. The Government might be committed to one person, who if a military man would command the army, if a civilian the command of the army might be bestowed upon a Lieutenant-Governor, while the whole civil department might be conducted by the Governor without a council, with a commercial chief and the head of the marine under him. There seems no use for such an establishment as is necessary for the conduct of the extensive empire of Bengal or the important settlement of Madras: the whole to be immediately under the inspection of the Government-General. From the arrangements I propose, I imagine a very considerable saving would arise which in every view is of great importance. If the new acquisitions in Mysore with the Mysore subsidy would do no more than maintain the army for the defence of the Peninsula and the part transferred from Bombay, and the expense of that Government could be reduced as I have proposed, the saving to Bengal would be immense. And I need not point out the importance of such a sum applicable in Bengal either to the extinction of debt or the purposes of investment.

If such an arrangement were to take place, much power and importance would necessarily be added to the Madras Government; much has been added to it by the late conquests; it now touches upon the Mahratta frontier; it has the Mysore kingdom to defend, intricate and delicate relations with it to maintain and preserve, in short a powerful and extensive kingdom to govern in new and delicate circumstances, so situated that much good may be gained or much mischief done without the Government General having it even in its power to exercise either its powers of direction or controul. A Government of the extent and complication of that of Madras, newly arisen to its great power, is more difficult to manage than a regular and settled Government like that of Bengal, which although infinitely beyond it in resources and revenue, falls short of it perhaps in political importance. Circumstanced as Madras is and long has been, the race of men who are the instruments by which the Government must be carried on, are extremely unlike those of Bengal, where settled habits and regular and honest industry are the roads to fortune. The situation of the Nabob of the Carnatic and of Tanjore, the species of double government which the necessity of the case, aided however by the rapacity of individuals, has long established in that part of India where the real power is in one hand and the ostensible authority in another, has bred a race of men who look to fortune through transactions with natives in the Nabob's and Rajah's country, and not to the accumulation of regular allowances. The unfortunate idea which has long been inculcated into those Princes that their interest lies in cultivating English interest by money; the unlucky aid such notions received from their temporary success; the sending out Sir John Lindsay, a King's Representative, has led to all the shameful

scenes that followed ; to the misfortunes of Lord Pigot ; the disputes and distractions of every subsequent Government ; to the disgraceful trade of Nabob's bonds ; good and bad debts, and all the train of evils which have flowed from them ; and has in some degree corrupted the settlement. To correct those evils, to prevent their introduction into Mysore, to establish upon solid grounds our newly acquired power, requires no common hand, and can be the work of no subordinate person. And the question is whether this can be effectually done, and the whole power of both the Governments of Madras and Bengal brought to bear to one point, and be directed as it were under one soul, under the present system of controul and direction established by the Act of 1793.

The system of all the acts is one rather of prevention than of action ; they seem rather to give powers of preventing evil than doing good. It seems to me that to give unity of design and plan, to give consistency and vigour to the whole of the British power, very considerable advantage would accrue, if the settlement of Madras were placed more immediately (not under the control) but under the direction of the Government General. At present (and it will be more so as Madras becomes more important) the Governor of Madras feels himself independent on the Governor-General of Bengal ; when the latter interferes by checks and control, they are felt with impatience and obeyed with reluctance. If the authority were more direct and the subordination more distinct, all this would be done away, the orders of the Governor-General would be felt at Madras as they are at Benares, they would occasion no difference, they would convey no blame. At present they often must be felt as conveying implied censure.

The Governor-General may no doubt visit either of the Presidencies at his pleasure, but if he does without an important and public reason, his visit must be felt as misplaced, will be the object of blame, and certainly in the settlement to which he goes, will introduce ill-humour and dislike with all their consequent counteraction in a thousand ways. which it is not possible to lay hold of. It is true this effect has not followed from the two visits which have been made to Madras by Lords Cornwallis and Mornington, but in each of these cases the occasion was prominent and visible. In the first, what was so natural as a military commander of high rank and reputation, assuming the conduct of a war after the Madras army had been foiled in its attempt against its enemy. The purposes for which Lord Cornwallis was sent to India,—his own character, his being the first man of high rank and reputation at home who ever came to India, his military reputation, the union of every authority in his person, all tended to give him a weight personal to himself and rendered his visit neither the object of jealousy or ill humour. The character of Lord Mornington, his bold and manly conduct in taking responsibility from which most other men would have shrunk, his ready and prompt decision, and his attention to Lord Clive who was newly arrived in the country, where he found himself, unused as he is to public business, involved in a scene of trouble and danger, joined to the visible importance of the occasion, all tended to place his visit upon the same footing with that of Lord Cornwallis. But we must not expect that either the personal characters of individuals or the

existing circumstances of the moment, will at all times counteract defects in the system.

There may be many occasions where it is wise and expedient, and more probably will arise where it may be matter of necessity for a Governor-General to visit Madras, and yet where his reasons are so far from being visible that they must be industriously concealed, a visit to another Presidency, upon such occasions, necessarily produces ill humour and dissension, because the visit of the Governor-General is not the act of ordinary Government, but an extraordinary exertion, arising from something to blame in the Government to which he goes, or something important in its exterior relations which calls for his presence.

If the Governor of Madras be an ambitious man, and the event to be attained by the Governor-General be one of importance, he must feel his ambition disappointed, and be he of what description he may, he must feel his importance lessened and his consequence diminished; on the other hand, the Government of Bengal is placed in a very awkward situation; the occasion is probably one which requires the exertion of every Government in India, and yet at that moment the Government of Bengal is deprived of one of the principal powers, which, it was supposed, would give it vigour, energy, and effect; I mean that the Vice President has no power to act without the concurrence of his Council. The remedy to these defects is easy: I propose, that, instead of appointing a Governor-General of Bengal, to appoint a Governor-General of India, with the Councils of Bengal and Madras under him, at the head of which I would place either a Lieutenant-Governor, or a Vice President, who should act as the Governors now do in the absence of the Governor-General; that both Governments should be under his immediate direction, and that it should be equally competent to him to give directions whether he was or was not present at the settlement, in the same manner as Lord Cornwallis did when in the Mysore country, and for that purpose that part of his establishment be a Secretary for the affairs of each Government. That it be optional to him to reside where he pleased, and wherever he did reside the Lieutenant-Governor would take his directions immediately from him, but in other respects would continue as before, with the difference that while he was there he could not act independent of his Council. I think such a measure would tend to give unity to the British empire, and, of course, consistency and stability, which, in the present situation of things, is all that can be wished. Enemies to dread we now have none, and a further extension of territory is not to be wished.

The above observations are hastily thrown together, in consequence of a wish expressed to have my ideas upon this important subject; the topics are rather hinted at and opened than followed up and expanded. The views which may be taken of the subject are infinite almost, but in the fundamental position, the wisdom of consolidating the British power in India, but one opinion can be entertained.

I cannot conclude without remarking the importance the acquisition of the port of Goa would be to our possessions in India, and hinting at the

possibility of a negotiation being opened at home for the purpose, at a time when the British nation are making such exertions for the defence of Portugal.

J. ANSTATHER.

No. V.

J. Webbe, Esq. To N. B. Edmonstone Esq. respecting the College of Fort William.

DEAR EDMONSTONE,

Fort St. George, June 19, 1802.

I have been prevented from answering your letter by indisposition, which confined me to my bed; and I requested Malcolm to make my excuse to you on that account.

I think with Mr. Colebroke that it is indispensably necessary to prescribe a course of study for the students of the College: some of the young gentlemen will doubtless pursue with pleasure and perseverance the objects of their own choice; such it will always be practicable to distinguish and to indulge without infringing established rules; but in general it will be necessary to guard against the effects of caprice or idleness. At this Presidency, when everything depends on the choice or disposition of individuals, I have known too many instances, where pursuits of improvement have been taken up and abandoned, returned and changed, without the acquisition of useful knowledge.

Of the languages requisite to the students of this Presidency, I consider the Persian to be of the most importance: the body of our criminal jurisprudence, and a great part of our civil code being founded (like those of Bengal) on the Mahomedan law, the knowledge of the Persian language appears to be indispensably necessary to those who may be destined to the judicial department. It is not less necessary to those who may be ambitious of diplomatic stations; and being the proper foundation of the Hindostany dialect, must be essentially useful to students of every description.

Next in degree to the Persian, I consider the Shanscrit language to be important, both as it respects that part of our civil laws, which are derived from the principles of the Hindoo religion and manners; and as it contains the undoubted foundation of all the Hindoo dialects used in the Peninsula. Of the young gentlemen some will probably be found qualified to pursue the study of the Shanscrit language to the extent of opening sources of important information to the Indian Government; but the general utility of that language refers to the means of facilitating to any person moderately versed in it, the acquisition of any of the dialects spoken in the provinces under this Presidency. It contains the root of all those dialects; and I believe it to be impossible to express an abstract proposition, or to use a technical phrase in any of those dialects, without the aid of the Shanscrit language.

Of the four dialects used in these provinces, I think that the Tamul and

Telinga are the most useful, because they extend over a greater tract of territory; and because they are the vernacular languages of those territories. The Tamul is used from Cape Comorin to the northern boundary of the Company's Jagheer, and westward as far as the boundary of the Carnatic Payenghaut before the war of 1792: it also extends through* Travancore and the entire province of Malabar. Many of the people inhabiting this tract of country speak no other than the Tamul dialect; and use it, with few exceptions, for all purposes of account and record.

From the boundary of the Jagheer north to Ganjam, the Telinga dialect is alone used, as well in discourse as in writing; and I believe that it extends westward, along the southern bank of the river Kistna, through a large portion of the territory acquired from the Nizam.

In all this tract the Tamul and Telinga dialects come home to all the purposes of life; and must of course be used in the judicial proceedings in those districts respectively.

It has been stated to me by persons conversant with the Tamul dialect, that it is original and not dependent on the Shanscrit; but that two dialects exist, the higher and the lower, the former being used in poetry and religious compositions, the latter in conversation, and in the ordinary business of mankind. I am induced however to believe, as far as I am capable of forming a judgement, that this is an erroneous opinion. I doubt that any original compositions are to be found in the Tamul dialect, and think that I have reason for supposing that the religious tracts in that dialect are all translated from the Shanscrit.

The course of the early conquests made by the Mahrattas may be traced, by the existence of their language, through the northern and western parts of the Mysore country, and of the territories ceded by the Nizam, through the Bara Mahal and the Carnatic into Tanjour. In this tract entire colonies of Mahrattas are found; and there the dialect is familiar to those who do not use it as a national language. The Mahratta Mutseddies are proverbial throughout the territories subject to this Presidency: the office of Canoongoor was generally filled by Mahrattas; the cause it may be difficult, or useless, to ascertain; but the effect was to constitute the Mahratta dialect to be the vehicle of all revenue accounts, registers, and records. If that practice had been preserved under the British Government, the use of the Mahratta dialect would have been extensive in the Peninsula; but the office of Canoongoor having been abolished under the Company's administration, such of our revenue servants as have performed their official duties with success, have sought authentic information in the proper dialects of the different provinces. I believe that throughout the Mysore country, the north-western parts of the ceded country, a great part of the Bara Mahal, some parts of the Carnatic, and of Tanjour, the Mahratta dialect may be extensively used; but I doubt that it is sufficiently proper to any province to render it an acquisition necessary, or even useful, for judicial purposes.

As a diplomatic language, however, I think the Mahratta is entitled to

* It is used at the Durbar of the Ram Rajah

194. It is the vernacular idiom at Poonah, at Nagpoor, and at Tanjour. I am aware that in all formal proceedings and writings at the courts of Poonah and Nagpoor it has been usual to adopt the Persian language; but it is unnatural to suppose that either the Peishwa, or the Rajah of Berar, or their ministers should prefer a foreign language to their own in the transaction of ordinary business. Indeed I doubt, upon the information I have casually received, that those Princes possess a knowledge of any foreign language sufficient to enable them to hold a discussion on questions of political importance with ease and satisfaction to themselves. But whether this be true or not, I think it will not be difficult to believe that an accurate knowledge of the Mahratta dialect will furnish peculiar advantages to a Resident at Poonah* or at Nagpoor.

I believe that the Mahratta is more immediately derived from the Shanscrit language, and incorporates a greater number of original words than any other dialect used in the Peninsula: it is probable, therefore, that a slight acquaintance with the Shanscrit language would enable a student to acquire with little difficulty a competent knowledge of the Mahratta dialect. Studied in that manner it must possess powerful recommendations in the transaction of business with the Hindoos, from its copiousness, from its colloquial ease, and from its analogy to their sacred writings.

Next to the Mahratta I believe that the Canarese dialect approaches the Shanscrit and possesses in that respect a similar recommendation to notice. It is the only dialect used in the province of Canara, where it appears to be indispensably requisite to the officers of government employed in the departments of revenue and judicature. It is also the common dialect of Mysore, of the Bara Mahal, and of great part of the ceded country; in those provinces it is also the language of accounts, and may on that account be considered to be necessary to the officers of revenue; as well as to those who may hereafter be employed in the judicial department. Any person, possessing a competent knowledge of the Canarese dialect, would require no other in the Bara Mahal, throughout Mysore and Canara, and in the north-western parts of the districts ceded by the Nizam.

It is scarcely necessary for me to notice the Hindoostany dialect, the extent and force of which are sufficiently known to all persons, who have directed their attention either to the business or to the literature of India. A copious knowledge of that dialect is, in my judgement, alone sufficient for the transaction of ordinary affairs in any part of the territories under this government; but it will be obvious to you that the use of it will be found more extensive and more common in those parts, which have been more immediately, and for a longer period of time, subjected to the Mahomedan yoke. Throughout the territories of the Nabob of Arcot, and the Balaghaut dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun, the use of the Hindoostany dialect is familiar to all persons employed in the public offices of

* This observation, is applicable in a certain degree to all the chiefs of the Mahratta empire: and the state of India seems to indicate a more frequent communication with those chiefs than at any former period of time.

government, and to a great portion of the common people; but this observation is more extensively applicable to Mysore than to the Carnatic. All the officers of the Sultaun's government having been Mahomedans, who are generally too proud or too ignorant to understand any but their own language, the Hindostany necessarily became the general channel of communication in the departments of the army, the law and the revenue. It is long since the same causes have ceased to affect the general manners of the Carnatic under the Nabobs of Arcot. The armies maintained for its protection have been composed of natives of every description, and exclusively commanded by European officers; few traces of a judicial establishment are discoverable. The Nabobs of Arcot have taken into their service European ministers; and those ministers have necessarily employed interpreters or dúbashes; the effect of all which causes has tended to diminish the Mahomedan influence, and to revive the original manners of the Hindoo inhabitants of the different provinces. In the northern circars the traces of the Mahomedan conquest, in this respect, are more faint than in the Carnatic; and I believe that they are less perceptible in most of the southern provinces. In speaking therefore of the general utility of the Hindostany language it may be proper to qualify it by an exception with respect to the judicial department, particularly in the northern circars, and in the provinces south of the Coleroon; for I doubt that a person possessing a knowledge of the Hindostany dialect alone would be competent to discharge the duties of a judge in those districts.

From the number of dialects spoken, it must be considerably more difficult to educate a gentleman for the service of this Presidency than for that of Bengal; and it is impossible to suppose that many persons can be found of sufficient capacity and diligence to qualify themselves for the discharge of public duty in every part of these territories. The necessity therefore of prescribing a course of study, with regard to languages, appears to be more urgent in respect to the students of Fort St. George than to those of Fort William.

On the whole, the opinion which I should presume to offer to Mr. Colebroke, is, that the accomplishment of a student for the general purposes of the service under this Presidency, should be first an accurate knowledge of one of the provincial dialects; second a competent acquaintance with the Persian language; and third a fluent use of the common Hindostany. A person so qualified will be a most useful instrument in the hands of the government of Fort St. George; and will be fully equal (as far as language is concerned) to the discharge of the most important duties of the state.

This part of my opinion refers to the ordinary course of the public business. Some gentlemen will of course be found desirous of distinguishing themselves by a more profound knowledge of oriental literature, or by a more accurate acquaintance with those channels of knowledge, which may qualify them for diplomatic situations: to such persons all the assistance will of course be afforded which the College possesses. But with respect to students in general, I consider a competent knowledge of the

Persian language, and also of the Hindoo dialects to be an indispensable accomplishment for the gentlemen in the establishment of Fort St. George: without it I sincerely believe that it will be impracticable for any administration to employ a person, of the best talents, and of the best principles in the departments of judicature or revenue, without danger to his own reputation and to the public welfare.

Believe me, dear Edmonstone, with sincere regard,

yours truly,

J. WEBBE.*

* This able letter affords a strong proof of the talents and attainments of Mr. Josiah Webbe, Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, when that Presidency was the Seat of the Government-General in 1799. From the moment of the arrival of the Governor-General at Fort St. George, Mr. Webbe possessed his Lordship's entire confidence, and was a principal instrument in the execution of all his measures. Mr. Webbe was one of the greatest ornaments to the Company's Service in every respect. After his removal from Fort St. George, he was employed in the highest diplomatic stations, and died in the Service at Poonah.—[ED.]

DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

&c. &c. &c.

[SUPPLEMENT—MAHRATTA WAR.]

No. I.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee
of the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, April 12, 1804.

The despatches of the Governor-General and of the Governor-General in Council to the address of your honourable Committee of the dates noted in the margin,* contain a general statement of the events and transactions in the Mahratta Empire, which led to the conclusion of a treaty of defensive alliance between the British Government and the Peishwa, and which succeeded that event, together with a communication of the measures adopted by the British Government for the promotion and security of the public interests in every change of circumstances, and of the triumphant progress and glorious termination of the war in which the British Government was compelled to engage by the violence, injustice and ambition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

It was impracticable to furnish your honourable Committee with that detailed information with regard to those events and transactions, and to the proceedings of the British Go-

* From his Excellency the Governor-General—24th December, 1802; 10th February, 1803; 19th April, 1803; 20th June, 1803. From the Governor-General in Council—1st August, 1803; 25th September, 1803; 31st October, 1803; 28th December, 1803. See Vol. III.

vernment, (which it is the duty of the Governor-General in Council to convey to your honourable Committee by the earliest possible opportunity) until the close of the war; not only because the multiplicity and urgency of public affairs precluded the possibility of preparing and arranging the necessary documents, but because a knowledge of the result of many measures and transactions then in a course of operation was necessary, to enable us to appreciate their importance and to apply the explanation of them in a satisfactory manner to the purposes of affording full and clear information to your honourable Committee.

The Governor-General in Council now deems it to be his duty to combinè in one regular and connected narrative all the principal events and transactions which have passed in India, and all the measures and proceedings of the British administration, connected with the late glorious and successful war, and to furnish your honourable Committee at the same time with the details of them as recorded on the proceedings of government. For this purpose the Governor-General in Council has now the honour to transmit to your honourable Committee our broken set of proceedings in the Secret Department, from the 3rd of February 1803 to the 12th of April 1804, to the documents recorded in which reference will be made throughout the whole of the following narrative for the details of transactions noticed in this letter.

The conclusion of the treaty of defensive alliance between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa must be considered as connected with the primary causes of the late war with the confederated chieftains of the Mahratta Empire. The Governor-General in Council therefore deems it proper to commence the proposed narrative with a general statement of the negotiations and transactions which led to the conclusion of that treaty.

Your honourable Committee is apprized of the unremitted endeavours exerted by the Governor-General during a long period of time, under the sanction of your honourable Committee's approbation, to improve the connection subsisting between the honourable Company and the state of Poonah, by obtaining the consent of his Highness the Peishwa to conclude subsidiary and defensive engagements with the British Government. The negotiations of the Resident at Poonah for that purpose were repeatedly renewed and suspended as the exigencies of his Highness's affairs, and the jealousy of his disposition, influenced the weak and indecisive character of that Prince.

On the 30th of November, 1801, the Peishwa, who then exercised merely a limited and precarious nominal authority in his dominions, under the oppressive ascendancy of his subjects and servants, declared his consent to specific propositions founded on the basis of a general defensive alliance, but differing in several

material points from the propositions which the Governor-General had originally offered to his acceptance.

On that occasion the Peishwa agreed to subsidize six battalions of British troops, provided they should not be stationed within his Highness's dominions, but be prepared at all times to act on the requisition of the Peishwa. His Highness further proposed to assign territory in Hindostan for the payment of the subsidiary force, and his Highness's propositions with regard to the arbitration of differences between his Highness and the Court of Hyderabad, and to the exclusion of Frenchmen from his service, differed in some respects from those which the Governor-General had proposed.

The acceptance, rejection or modification of these propositions demanded the most mature deliberation, and appeared not to require an immediate decision; the Governor-General deemed it advisable therefore to await the progress of events in the Mahratta Empire, before he should form any final resolution upon the depending treaty of alliance with the Peishwa.

The Governor-General therefore suspended his instructions to the Resident at Poonah on the subject of the depending negotiation until the month of June 1802. The Governor-General in Council then communicated to the Resident his final determination with regard to the propositions of his Highness the Peishwa, and furnished the Resident with detailed instructions for the regulation of his conduct in pursuing the negotiation for the improvement of the connection between the British Government and the state of Poonah.

In those instructions the Governor-General in Council entered into a general review of the transactions which had passed between the British Government and the state of Poonah, and of the conduct and policy of the latter with respect to the British Government since the arrival of the present Governor-General in India, and inferred from the whole tenor of the Peishwa's proceedings that his Highness had not only been uniformly and progressively jealous of the power of the British nation in India, but actively hostile to its prosperity to the utmost practicable extent consistently with the security of his Highness's government and with the irresolution and timidity of his character, and that therefore until irresistibly compelled by the exigency of his affairs to have recourse to the assistance of the Company, the Peishwa would never be induced to conclude any engagements which in his apprehension would afford to the British Government the means of acquiring an ascendancy in the Mahratta empire. The Governor-General in Council therefore concluded, that if the Peishwa was sincere in his late propositions, he was influenced by the hope of obtaining the aid of the British power for the re-establishment and security of his authority, without hazarding the introduction of that degree of British influence which for the permanent defence of the Company and of our allies, and for the general tranquillity of India, as well as for the effectual exclusion of the influence of France, it was the interest of the British Government to establish in the Mahratta state.

The Governor-General in Council therefore deemed it necessary to consider his Highness's propositions with reference to that principle, and the result of a minute discussion of that subject was that in the judgment of his Excellency in Council an unqualified concurrence in the Peishwa's propositions would produce more injury than benefit to the British interests in India. The Governor-General in Council accordingly determined to reject the Peishwa's propositions in their actual form.*

* See Vol. III. p. 12.

Considerations, however, connected with the situation of affairs in Europe and in India disposed the Governor-General in Council to relax in the conditions which his Excellency had until then considered and declared to be indispensable in the conclusion of any engagements of a subsidiary and defensive nature with the Peishwa; and rather than abandon the hope of establishing a further connection with the state of Poonah, the Governor-General in Council therefore resolved to acquiesce in the limitation which the Peishwa had proposed with respect to the subsidiary force, provided the Peishwa would consent to an engagement for the discharge of the subsidy more favourable to our views and interests than an assignment of territory in Hindostan, which the Governor-General in Council considered at that time to be in every respect objectionable.

On the basis of the preceding observations the Resident at Poonah was instructed to renew the negotiation with his Highness the Peishwa for the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements, but the Resident was directed at the same time to endeavour to accomplish that object on the terms originally proposed by the Governor-General to his Highness, and not to accede to terms less favourable until every hope of obtaining the Peishwa's concurrence in the Governor-General's original propositions should be extinguished.

On his receipt of those instructions at the close of the month of July the Resident apprized the Peishwa of his being in possession of the Governor-General in Council's final determination with regard to his Highness's propositions, communicated to the British Government in the preceding month of November.

The Peishwa, however, received that information without manifesting any degree of solicitude to be apprized of the Governor-General's determination upon his Highness's propositions, and deferred the Resident's offered communication on that subject until a future time, although Jeswunt Rao Holkar, at the head of a large body of troops, then occupied a menacing position near Malligong, and had commenced a system of operations pregnant with immediate danger to the power of the Peishwa. No change appeared in the disposition of his Highness with respect to the improvement of his alliance with the British Government. This circumstance may in some degree be ascribed to the counsels of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, whose vakeels at that time earnestly dissuaded his Highness from a closer connection with the British Government, assuring his Highness of effectual support from the combined power of those chieftains after the close of the rains, until which time any material operations on the part of Holkar were stated to be impracticable.

On the 1st of August, however, Ruggoonaut Rao, one of the ministers of the Peishwa, waited on the Resident for the express purpose of receiving the communication with which the Resident was charged on the subject of improving the connection between the two states. The Resident opened the conference by expressing the surprize and disappointment of the Governor-General at the Peishwa's withholding his acquiescence in the terms of alliance originally proposed to his Highness's acceptance, notwithstanding the liberal tenor of those terms and the amicable nature of the motives which dictated the wish of the British Government to improve the connection subsisting between the two states. The Resident apprized the minister that the Governor-General had taken into mature consideration the propositions of his Highness on the subject of a defensive alliance, communicated to Colonel Palmer the late Resident in the month of November 1801, and had directed the Resident to explain to his Highness the Peishwa the ultimate sentiments of the Governor-General on those propositions.

The Resident then proceeded to state to the minister, that the Governor-General still continued to think that the principles on which the defensive alliance with

the state of Hyderabad had been concluded would form the most eligible basis of that which it was in the contemplation of the Governor-General to establish with his Highness the Peishwa. The Resident then specified the extent of the force which his Highness had agreed permanently to subsidize, as that which the Governor-General deemed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the objects of the defensive alliance.

The Resident next adverted to the mode of providing for the charges of the subsidiary force, observing that his Highness the Peishwa's offer of assigning territory in Hindostan, yielding a revenue of 25 lacs per annum, was absolutely inadmissible, and proposing that territory should be assigned for that purpose on the northern part of the Concan, or on the southern frontier adjoining the Tungbuddra.

The Resident observed that this proportion could not be waved, and that therefore it was absolutely necessary before he proceeded to communicate the Governor-General's determination with regard to the remaining articles of the Peishwa's propositions, that his Highness should signify his assent to this proposition. The minister however maintained the propriety of a previous disclosure of the Governor-General's sentiments and resolutions with regard to every branch of the proposed arrangement, and after some discussion of this point, the Resident acceded to the wishes of the minister, and proceeded to the next article by stating, that the Governor-General was disposed to relax in the demand which he had originally made for the absolute exclusion of all Europeans from the service of the Peishwa, and to limit it to the exclusion of the subjects of all European states at war with the British Government.

The Resident apprized the minister that the Governor-General was decidedly of opinion that the article which provided for the commutation of the Chout of Surat was equally convenient for both parties, and that accordingly that article should be retained; that with regard to the 6th article, by which an option was left to the Rajah of Berar of becoming a party to the defensive alliance, his Highness having manifested an aversion to that proposal, the Governor-General had agreed to withdraw it.

The minister himself in his reply to the Resident adverted to the two remaining articles relative to the permanent continuance of the subsidiary force within his Highness's dominions, and to the arbitration of the differences between his Highness the Peishwa and the Nizam, and after taking notes of the Resident's explanations on the subject of each article, withdrew.

These explanations were communicated to the Peishwa, who was subsequently reported to have held several conferences with his ministers, at which the subject of the proposed defensive alliance was fully discussed. But the information which the Resident received with regard to the Peishwa's real sentiments and resolutions, justified a belief that his Highness had resolved not to connect himself with the British Government until every hope of averting by other means, the danger with which his government was menaced by the proceedings of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, should have been extinguished.

In the meantime the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar continued on the northern bank of the Bheema river, in considerable force. His Highness the Peishwa depended almost entirely for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force upon the detachment of the troops of Scindiah, which occupied a position south of the river Taptee. The only force of the Peishwa which had at that time been assembled for his Highness's protection consisted of a detachment of 4,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, posted at Gardoon on the river Bheema, and his Highness's refusal or inability to advance the necessary funds precluded the augmentation of that

inefficient force. But the troops of Futteh Sing Maunia, an officer commanding a considerable portion of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's army, and occupying with his force a position north of the Bheema, having attacked the Peishwa's troops, and compelled them to retire, his Highness, under the influence of the general alarm occasioned by this event, subsequently made such advances of money to the several chiefs commanding corps in the service of the Peishwa as induced them to march with the standard of the empire, and to join the detachment which had retreated from Gardoon.

The object of the Peishwa was to effect a junction of this detachment with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah under the command of Suddasheo Rao, at that time stationed in the province of Candeish at an inconsiderable distance south of the Taptee, and his Highness trusted that these combined forces, joined by others which his Highness expected from the southward, would possess sufficient strength to repel the enemy.

On the 30th of August the Resident was invited to a conference with his Highness the Peishwa on the subject of the propositions communicated to his Highness by the Resident through his Highness's minister. From the result of that conference, it was manifest that the Peishwa was anxious to preserve the friendship of the British Government, but disinclined to the defensive alliance on the terms proposed by the Resident, and that it was the object of his Highness to protract the negotiation in such a manner as to retain the option either of accepting the aid of the British power in any emergency of his affairs, or of finally declining the proposed terms of alliance, when an improvement in the state of his Highness's affairs should appear to render the aid of the British power unnecessary.

While this negotiation was pending at Poonah, Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar were preparing for active operations at the approaching close of the season of the rains. In the beginning of the month of September, 1802, the troops of Scindiah under Suddasheo Rao occupied a position on the northern bank of the Godavery near Peyton, a town on the Nizam's frontier, and had begun to cross the river. Jeswunt Rao Holkar had made a movement towards the army of Suddasheo Rao from Chandore, and Meer Khaun and Shah Ahmed Khaun, who commanded considerable detachments of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's army, waited his approach between Ahmednugger and the Godavery. Futteh Sing Maunia continued to ravage the Peishwa's districts on the northern side of the Bheema, at a distance of not more than fifty miles from Poonah, yet no further measures were adopted by the Peishwa for reinforcing the detachment appointed for the immediate defence of the city.

Notwithstanding these hostile proceedings of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, his vakeels continued to attend at his Highness the Peishwa's durbar, and to urge, on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, demands with which his Highness was unable to comply.

Those demands were, that Khundeoh Rao, the son and heir of the late Mulhar Rao, second legitimate son of the late Tuckojee Holkar, who was in confinement with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, should be released, and be vested with the possession of the family territories, to the prejudice of Cashee Rao Holkar, the eldest legitimate son and successor of Tuckojee Holkar, and that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should be acknowledged as the guardian and dewan of Khundeoh Rao. It could not be expected that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would accede to terms so unjust and degrading excepting in the utmost exigency of his affairs; and the Peishwa, even if disposed to concur in those terms, did not possess sufficient authority over Dowlut Rao Scindiah to compel him to accept them. The troops of Scindiah under the command of Suddasheo Rao, on which the Peishwa principally depended for the

defence of his dominion against the violence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, did not appear in any degree adequate to the defeat of that enterprising chieftain, and the Peishwa possessed neither military force, energy, nor resource to enable him to afford any essential aid in repelling the dangers which appeared to menace the existence of his authority and dominion.

These dangers daily augmented. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, after sacking the town of Nassuk about the beginning of September, advanced to the southward of the Godavery in the direction of Poonah, Futteh Sing Maunia crossed the river Bheema, and was successful in levying contributions in the vicinity of Punderpore. At the same time the conduct of Amrut Rao, his Highness the Peishwa's brother, who resided at a short distance from Poonah, excited apprehensions in his Highness's mind of a design on the part of his brother, to take advantage of any crisis of affairs at Poonah which the progress of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's arms might produce favourable to his elevation. Suddasheo Rao, who commanded the troops of Scindiah, having prosecuted his march from Burhanpore, arrived at Ahmednuggur without molestation from the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. From that place Suddasheo Rao apprized the Peishwa that he had received orders from Scindiah to complete the arrangements requisite for the progress of his march at Ahmednuggur, and then to proceed to Poonah for the assistance of his Highness, that accordingly he should soon be able to commence his march, but that the pay of the troops was considerably in arrears, and that it was necessary that his Highness should prepare funds for the discharge of those demands. This state of affairs occasioned a great degree of alarm at Poonah. The inhabitants of which city justly apprehended that the arrival of the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar would be attended with every species of violence and outrage, and that the presence of Suddasheo Rao's detachment, without affording adequate protection, would add to the Peishwa's necessities in such a degree as to compel his Highness to levy oppressive contributions in the city; some of the opulent inhabitants therefore prepared to abandon the capital, and the Peishwa himself, aware of the magnitude of the difficulties and dangers which surrounded him, actually provided for his escape to the Concan by stationing relays of Palankeen bearers and detachments of horse on the road to the source of the Kistna in the vicinity of Nahar.

This arrangement was however subsequently abandoned by the advice of his ministers, who persuaded his Highness that funds might be provided for the payment of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's troops without the hazard of commotion, and his Highness resolving to remain at his capital, dispatched a message to Suddasheo Rao, requiring his advance to Poonah with the least possible delay.

Under the impression of these alarms, his Highness the Peishwa on the 20th of September, 1802, despatched his principal minister to the Resident, charged with a paper containing his Highness's propositions for a defensive arrangement with the British Government. These propositions differed from those which the Resident had offered to his Highness's acceptance in several important points. The Peishwa required that the subsidiary force should continue within the British territories, but be at all times prepared for any services on which his Highness might have occasion to employ it. That the British Government should be pledged never to form any connection or conduct any political transaction with Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, with Holkar or the family of the Guikowar, or with any Jaggeerdar of the Mahratta empire, and that the British Government should renounce all concern in the intercourse that might subsist between his Highness and any of those chieftains. That his Highness should be at liberty to employ Europeans of any description in his service, dismissing only

those who, during the existence of war between the British Government and any other power, should appear to have acted in a manner injurious to the interests of the Company or the Peishwa. That the British Government should be required to enforce any just claims which the Peishwa might have on any other power or state, and that the British Government should not interfere in any transactions between the Peishwa and the Nizam, nor be permitted to arbitrate any differences which might arise between those states. These terms, so inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the proposed defensive alliance and with the engagements actually subsisting between the British Government and other powers, were necessarily rejected by the Resident, who prepared a paper containing a reply to every article of the Peishwa's propositions, which the Resident delivered to the minister at his conference with him on the 27th of September.

The force under the command of Suddasheo Rao was expected to cross the river Bheema, and pursue its march to the neighbourhood of Poonah. On reaching Choomar-Goondah, however, that force changing its direction, proceeded along the northern bank of that river, and encountered the advance of Holkar's army, consisting of the detachments under the command of Meer Khaun and Shah Ahmed Khaun. On the 3d of October, 1802, an action took place, the result of which was ambiguously reported. Another detachment of Holkar's troops, under the command of Futteh Sing Maunia, occupied a position to the southward of Poonah, and a corps of his Highness the Peishwa's troops, commanded by Nana Poorundurreh, and attended by the Zurree Putkah, or standard of the empire, was disposed in such a manner as to prevent a junction of Futteh Sing Maunia with any other division of Holkar's force. The army under the personal command of that chieftain then occupied a position about 40 miles in the rear of his advanced troops.

The Peishwa in this crisis continued to augment his troops by requiring the attendance of the distant Jaggeerdars, and Suddasheo Rao expected soon to be reinforced by 5000 horse and 4 battalions of infantry from Boorhanpore under the command of Gopaul Bhow.

While the affairs of his Highness the Peishwa were in this critical state, the Resident continued his endeavours to impress upon his Highness's ministers the expediency of acceding to the liberal propositions offered to his acceptance by the British Government. The Resident took occasion to remark to his Highness's ministers that at the moment when a considerable progress had apparently been made in a negotiation with the British power, of which the object was the restoration of his Highness's authority, and the tranquillity of his dominions, his Highness had deliberately adopted measures calculated to impose additional burthens on the resources of his government, and to preclude every hope of relief from his present embarrassment. The Resident observed, that the contending armies dispersed over his Highness's territories, whether friends or enemies, were equally destructive to his resources, which were already utterly inadequate to the discharge of the extensive demands of the numerous corps which his Highness had invited from the northward. That his Highness's inability to pay those troops would convert them into enemies, and aggravate the dangers which these reinforcements were intended to avert. The minister replied by assurances of a speedy and successful conclusion of the negotiation depending between his Highness and the British Government, by representing in terms more favourable the situation of his Highness's affairs, and by expressing a confident expectation of the speedy reduction of Holkar's power, and a prospect of avoiding the dangers and embarrassments described by the Resident.

On the 8th of October an action took place at the distance of about forty miles from Poonah, between his Highness the Peishwa's troops, under the command of Nana Poorunddurreh, and those of Futteh Sing Maunia, in which the former were defeated, with the loss of the whole of their ordnance and baggage.

The receipt of this intelligence excited in the mind of the Peishwa considerable alarm for his personal safety. His Highness immediately directed that the corps of infantry stationed about his palace should be holden in readiness for marching, but his real design in issuing this order, was stated to be to secure the protection of those troops in the event of his being compelled to abandon his capital. His Highness actually despatched all his jewels to Sevagurh a strong hill fort, in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and in the night of the 9th of October his Highness conveyed to that fortress all the women of his family.

The Resident did not fail to take advantage of this disaster to impress upon the mind of his Highness's minister with additional urgency the dangers of his Highness's situation, and the expediency of his accepting the proposals of the British Government. The minister appeared to concur in the sentiments expressed by the Resident, and to admit that his Highness's affairs could only be retrieved by his acceptance of the proposals of the British Government for the conclusion of a defensive alliance with his Highness. The minister however added, that the Peishwa was then too much under the influence, control, and within the power of his own servants to possess the means of adopting measures to that effect without personal danger. The minister at the same time expressed a hope of the speedy removal of those embarrassments which immediately precluded the accomplishment of that desirable object.

The probability of such relief, however, was daily diminished by the increasing dangers of his Highness's situation. The troops of Holkar had now formed a junction with those under Futteh Sing Maunia, and occupied a position near Jejoory, a town situated within little more than the distance of one march from Poonah, in consequence of which the army under the command of Suddasheo Rao advanced and encamped by the Peishwa's desire at a short distance from the city on the road to that place.

The state of the city of Poonah, and the adjacent territory at this period of time, is described by the Resident in the following terms: "I cannot describe to your Highness the melancholy scenery which this place at present exhibits. The assessments on the city are carried on with so much rigour that the inhabitants fly towards the neighbouring hills in the hope of securing their property. On the road they are generally met by the Pindarries, who plunder and abuse them. These banditti carry their depredations to the very skirts of the city, and as the cultivation on the ground is unprotected, the Ryots are cutting it in an unripe state as the only means of saving something from the crop."

Amidst this general confusion, his Highness the Peishwa remained in his palace, guarded by about 2000 infantry, and a corps of cavalry. Saddled horses were at all times kept in readiness at the different gates, and every circumstance indicated his Highness's extreme alarm, and his intention to quit the city on the occurrence of any unfavourable event; and the distress of his Highness's situation was aggravated by his Highness's distrust of his own troops and adherents.

Suddasheo Rao, apprehensive that the Peishwa would suddenly abandon his capital and leave the troops destitute of supplies and pay, earnestly entreated his Highness either to repair to camp and accompany the army, or to permit two of Scindiah's battalions to be stationed at Poonah in the absence of the army for the protection of his Highness's person and of the city. The Peishwa however de-

clined both these proposals, and, in the genuine spirit of Mahratta policy, endeavoured to avert the impending danger by opening a negotiation with Holkar, through Holkar's vakeel, who still continued to frequent the Durbar at Poonah.

In this state of affairs the minister still continued to pursue the negotiation with the Resident for the conclusion of a defensive alliance with the Company, but under equivocations, delays, and evasions so manifest, that the Resident was at length compelled to declare to the minister in formal terms that he considered the negotiation to have ceased.

On the 23d of October, 1802, Jeswunt Rao Holkar marched and encamped within about eight miles of the camp of Suddasheo Rao. On the evening of the 24th, the Peishwa despatched messengers to Jeswunt Rao Holkar with distinct proposals for an accommodation, which that chieftain rejected, and on the morning of the 25th an action took place between the advanced armies, which terminated in the total defeat of the combined troops of the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The force of Holkar consisted of twenty-eight battalions, fourteen of which were commanded by European officers, 5000 Rohillas, 25000 cavalry, and 100 pieces of cannon. The force of Scindiah consisted only of four of the regular battalions raised and disciplined by M. De Boigne, with 20 guns attached to them, six battalions of Rajah Ambajee, and 10,000 horse. The number of the Peishwa's troops has not been ascertained.

The Peishwa, with a view to be prepared for every event, had moved out at the commencement of the action, attended by the Zurree Putka or standard of the empire, and all his remaining troops, and at the same time despatched his minister to the Resident, with an instrument under the Peishwa's seal, declaring his Highness's consent to subsidize the proposed number of British troops, and engaging to cede to the honourable Company for their subsistence territory in Guzerat, and in the southern quarter of his Highness's dominions or in either of those quarters, yielding an annual revenue of twenty-six lacs of rupees. The minister at the same time offered to the British Resident the fullest assurances of the Peishwa's intention and meaning, that a general defensive alliance should be concluded between his Highness and the honourable Company on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad.

In consequence of this transaction, the British Resident judged it to be expedient to suggest to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, and to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, the necessity of preparing a body of troops under the authority of those Presidencies respectively, for the eventual support of the Peishwa's government, and for the protection of his power.

The Resident at Poonah transmitted a similar application to the Resident at Hyderabad for the eventual services of a considerable detachment from the subsidiary force stationed with his Highness the Nizam.

At the close of the action between the armies of Holkar and Scindiah, the Peishwa retired with a small body of cavalry to a fortress in the vicinity of Poonah.

The city was left in charge of an officer of the Peishwa; no extreme violence was committed. His Highness's minister and the British Resident continued at Poonah, having settled a plan of communication with the Peishwa in the Concan, to which territory his Highness directed his retreat,

This crisis of affairs appeared to afford a most favourable opportunity for the complete establishment of the interests of the British power in the Mahratta empire. The Governor-General was justified in expecting the peaceable accom-

plishment of this important object, to which the attention of the British Government had so long been directed, and which was so manifestly necessary for the complete consolidation of the British Empire in the East.

The Governor-General therefore determined to confirm the engagements concluded between the Peishwa and the Resident at Poonah, and his Excellency accordingly instructed the Resident to signify to his Highness the Governor-General's ratification of the engagement, and the resolution of the Governor-General to employ every effort of the British power for the restoration of his authority. The British Resident was also instructed to direct his attention to the improvement of the terms of the proposed alliance by endeavouring to obtain the Peishwa's consent to those stipulations which his Highness had hitherto rejected, and to such additional concessions as appeared to be expedient for the better security and improvement of the British interests in that quarter of India; and the Resident was further directed to avail himself of the earliest opportunity of reducing the proposed conditions of alliance to the form of a definitive treaty.

Instructions were at the same time issued to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Resident at Hyderabad, confirming the requisition of the Resident at Poonah for assembling troops at the proposed stations, with a view to fulfil the engagements concluded with the Peishwa.

In authorizing the army at Fort St. George, Bombay, and Hyderabad, to assemble, the Governor-General was influenced by considerations independent of the single object of supporting the cause of his Highness the Peishwa.

Adverting to the actual state of the affairs of the Mahratta empire and to the position, numbers and description of the troops composing the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the desolated state of the Mahratta territories, it appeared to be nearly certain that the troops of Holkar or of Scindiah, or of both those chieftains, with all the horde of professional freebooters, must be compelled to seek subsistence in the countries of the Nizam, the Guikwar, the Rajah of Mysore, or of the honourable Company.

It was manifestly advisable therefore to adopt early measures of precaution to guard the frontiers of the Company and its allies from the inroads of these predatory armies.

The ultimate success and ascendancy of either of the contending parties, in the Mahratta empire, might suggest to the ambition, pride, or rapacity of its leader the policy of directing his successful army against the possessions of the Company or of its allies, and the hazard of this contingency equally required the immediate adoption of measures calculated to prevent or repel such an enterprise.

That such designs were entertained by Holkar with respect not only to the territories of our ally the Nizam, but to those of the Company in that quarter, the Governor-General possessed positive information; and it would have been imprudent to have omitted any precaution in such a case. The same precautionary measures were also indispensably necessary with reference to the general policy of being prepared to avert the dangers of contiguous anarchy; and the restoration of the Peishwa to his legitimate authority, under the protection of a powerful British force, was the measure best calculated to avert all the immediate dangers to which the British Government and its allies were exposed by the situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire, independently of the general or permanent policy of a more intimate connection with the Peishwa.

It appeared from the despatches of the Resident, that the primary object of Jeswunt Rao Holkar was to obtain possession of the Peishwa's person, and to

compel his Highness to establish such an administration as might secure Jeswunt Rao Holkar's ascendancy in the state, to the exclusion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's influence. If this plan should fail, the next project of Jeswunt Rao Holkar was to invite to Poonah Amrut Rao (son of the late Ruggoonaut Rao) to place the son of Amrut Rao on the Musnud, and to invest Amrut Rao with the office of prime minister, while Jeswunt Rao Holkar should assume the general command of the troops of the state.

The nature of the communication which the Governor-General received from the Resident at Poonah, on these and other points connected with the actual crisis of affairs, suggested to his Excellency the propriety of issuing the instructions to the Resident, with respect to the period of time at which it would be advisable to order the advance of the British troops, for the purpose of effecting the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the government of Poonah.

By the Resident's subsequent advices it appeared, that the Peishwa had effected his retreat to Mhar, a fort situated on the river of Bancoote in the Concan, and that Holkar despaired of the success of his endeavours either to obtain the Peishwa's voluntary return to Poonah, or to secure his Highness's power. That Holkar had detached a force to Jejoory, (a fort situated in the vicinity of Poonah, and being the actual residence of Amrut Rao) and had brought Amrut Rao to Poonah, with the intention of investing him with the general administration of affairs, and of placing the son of Amrut Rao on the Musnud, while Jeswunt Rao Holkar proposed to assume the general command of the army of the state. To this arrangement Amrut Rao was not disposed to accede, the authority of the government however was exercised by Holkar in the name of Amrut Rao. Both Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Amrut Rao appeared extremely apprehensive of the Peishwa's obtaining the protection and support of the British Government, and employed every endeavour to induce the Resident at Poonah to continue at that city, manifestly with the view to obtain the countenance of the British Government in sanctioning whatever arrangement might finally be adopted, under the exclusion of his Highness the Peishwa from the government of Poonah. The Resident however prudently rejected every advance of this nature, and persisted in his resolution to retire to Bombay, for which Presidency he with difficulty obtained permission from Amrut Rao and Holkar to depart on the 28th of November.

At the conferences holden by the Resident with Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar on the eve of the Resident's departure from Poonah, both those chieftains expressed their solicitude for the preservation of the friendship of the British Government, and directly and earnestly appealed to the Resident for his advice in the existing situation of affairs. Jeswunt Rao Holkar expressly intimated a wish for the mediation of the Resident for the express purpose of effecting an accommodation with the Peishwa. The Resident informed Jeswunt Rao Holkar that for this purpose it was indispensably necessary that both parties should consent to refer their differences to the mediation of the British Government; but that the Resident could not undertake such mediation without the orders of the Governor-General. The Resident at the same time, advised Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar to explain their views by a direct application to the Governor-General. At the Resident's final interview with Amrut Rao, that chieftain delivered three letters to the Governor-General's address, one from himself, the others from the persons then exercising the functions of ministers of the state. The purport of those letters was to solicit the countenance and support of the British Government, by the appointment of a Resident in the place of Colonel Close, whose departure from Poonah to Bombay was represented by Amrut Rao and his minis-

ters, to be an abdication of his station of representative of the British Government at the court of Poonah.

After the Peishwa's arrival at Mhar, his Highness despatched two vakeels to Bombay with a letter, expressing his Highness's desire of eventually seeking an asylum at Bombay, and his request that a ship might be prepared and sent to Bancoote, for the express purpose of conveying his Highness to Bombay or Bassein, if such a measure should appear to be necessary for the safety of his person. The honourable the Governor of Bombay complied with the latter application, by directing the ship *Herculean* to proceed to Bancoote, and to be prepared for the Peishwa's eventual accommodation.

The Resident at Poonah being apprized of these circumstances, suggested to the government of Bombay the expediency of discouraging the Peishwa from seeking an asylum within the British territories, until the sentiments and intentions of the Governor-General with respect to the affairs of the Peishwa should be made known, and the Resident recommended that the Peishwa should be advised to maintain his position at Mhar to the latest possible period of time, consistently with the safety of his Highness's person.

Under the determination which the Governor-General had adopted of employing every effort for the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, and in the actual situation of the Peishwa's affairs, it appeared to the Governor-General to be extremely desirable that the Peishwa should immediately place himself under the protection of the British power by retiring to Bombay.

His Highness the Peishwa being apprehensive for his safety at Mhar, proceeded to Sevendroog, a strong fortress on the coast of the Concan. His Highness subsequently embarked at that fortress under convoy of the ship *Herculean*, landed and continued some days at an intermediate port and thence re-embarked and, arrived in safety at Bassein on the 16th of December. The Resident at Poonah arrived at Bombay on the 3d of that month.

On the 6th of December 1802, the Resident at Poonah received the Governor-General's instructions of the 16th of November, and in consequence addressed a letter to Ragonaut Rao, his Highness's minister soliciting a conference with him, and recommending the removal of his Highness the Peishwa to Bombay.

On the 30th of December, the Governor-General directed a letter to be written to the Resident, expressing his Lordship's satisfaction at the appeal made to the British power by all the parties concerned in the commotions of the Mahratta states, and pointing it out as a favourable opportunity for pacific mediation.

Adverting to the possibility that the Peishwa might endeavour to evade the conclusion of a definitive treaty, and might prefer the assistance of Scindiah to that of the British Government, the Resident was directed to intimate to his Highness, that as the Governor-General had ratified the preliminary engagement, and proceeded to act in conformity to the obligations of it, his Highness's refusal to conclude a definitive treaty on the basis of that engagement, and to abide by its stipulations, would be deemed a violation of public faith; and that in such a case, his Lordship would adopt that course of policy which should tend to the security of the British Government and of its allies, and that a demand for re-imbusement of all charges incurred for the service of the Peishwa would form a part of any system of measures which might be adopted with that view.

On the 8th of December the Resident had an interview with Ragonaut Rao, when that minister stated his Highness's resolution to abide by his engagements, his intention to proceed from Choul* for Bassein, and his desire to remain at the latter

* The intermediate post mentioned above.

place under the protection of a British guard; Mr. Duncan signified to the minister his compliance with this request, and informed the minister that the force would consist of 100 European infantry, one company of European artillery, with its complement of gun lascars, and about 500 Native infantry. On the arrival of his Highness the Peishwa at Bassain the Resident proceeded to wait on his Highness, taking with him the draft of a treaty of defensive alliance to which his Highness after some discussion signified his consent. A difference of opinion however occurred between the Peishwa and the Resident, with respect to the territories to be selected for the payment of the subsidiary force, which occasioned some delay in the actual conclusion of the treaty of defensive alliance.

In the mean time the Resident transmitted to the Governor-General a copy of the proposed treaty. On the receipt of that document, the Governor-General transmitted instructions to the Resident containing his Excellency's remarks on the proposed treaty, and his Excellency's directions to press the conclusion of it, under certain modifications pointed out by his Lordship in those instructions.

On the 28th of January however, a despatch was received from the Resident, stating that, at an audience of the Peishwa on the 31st of December, his Highness had unexpectedly signified his consent to assign for the payment of the subsidiary force the territories which the Resident originally proposed, and the treaty was accordingly executed and exchanged at that conference.

The terms of the treaty being strictly conformable to the tenor of the Governor-General's original propositions to his Highness the Peishwa, and to the spirit of the Governor-General's subsequent instructions to the Resident at Poonah, the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the day on which it was received. Several copies of the treaty having already been transmitted to your honourable Committee,* the Governor-General in Council deems it unnecessary to state the detail of it in this place.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to advert to the measures pursued by the right honourable Lord Clive, the Governor of Fort St. George, in consequence of the suggestion conveyed to his Lordship by the Resident at Poonah, for the immediate preparation of a force of British troops in the Carnatic, for the support of his Highness the Peishwa, as noticed in the preceding paragraph.

The force which the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, in concert with Lieut.-General Stuart, resolved to assemble on the frontier of Mysore, consisted of five companies of artillery, two regiments of European, and five regiments of Native cavalry; three regiments and six companies of European infantry, and eight battalions of Native infantry, with an adequate proportion of field artillery. The reasons which induced his Lordship to equip a force of this extent, are stated in a despatch from his Lordship of the 10th of December, and appeared entirely satisfactory, and the measures pursued by the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, on that occasion appeared to the Governor-General to be highly judicious, and obtained the Governor-General's entire approbation.

Lord Clive properly considered, that any body of troops which might be required to advance into the Mahratta territory for the aid of the Peishwa, in the execution of our defensive engagements should be of sufficient strength to act independently, and to resist the single or united armies of Holkar and Scindiah. Lord Clive also judged it to be probable that the renewal of hostilities between those chieftains in the Deccan, would collect such a multitude of irregular troops as in the exhausted

* See Vol III. Appendix p. 627.

state of the Mahratta territories might be compelled to violate the frontiers of the Nizam's dominions, of the ceded countries, or of Mysore, in pursuit of the means of subsistence. In either event, the judgment of the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George deemed it necessary to prepare a force not inferior to that which his Lordship, in concert with Lieut.-General Stuart, had resolved to assemble. At the same time, the circumstances to which his Lordship adverted in his despatches upon this subject, and those stated in the instructions of the Governor-General to his Lordship of the 30th of December 1802, precluded all apprehension that hostilities would be precipitated by the appearance of so large a British force on the Mahratta frontier.

Every exertion therefore was employed by Lieut.-General Stuart, under the orders of the Right Honourable the Government of Fort St. George, to place the army in a condition to advance into the Mahratta territory whenever the state of the negotiations to be conducted by the Resident at Poonah for the conclusion of a treaty of defensive alliance with his Highness the Peishwa should appear to suggest the propriety of that measure. Lord Clive at the same time, according to the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions, directed the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, who commanded the subsidiary force stationed in Mysore, to afford every encouragement to the disposition which was manifested by his Highness the Peishwa's southern Jaggeerdars, to co-operate with the British Government for the support of his Highness's cause.

The Governor-General now deems it proper to attract the attention of your Honourable Committee to the affairs of Hyderabad as connected with the transactions and negotiations at Poonah.

The nature of the instructions issued to the Resident at Poonah under date the 23rd of June, 1803, rendered necessary corresponding instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad. For the reasons stated in the instructions to the former, the Governor-General deemed it expedient to authorize an eventual relaxation in the conditions prescribed by the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded on the 12th of October, 1800, for the admission of the Peishwa to the benefits of the defensive alliance. Those conditions were, that the Peishwa should acquiesce in the company's arbitration of differences between the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah on the basis of the treaty of Mhar,* and also that the Peishwa should consent to his Highness the Nizam's exemption from the payment of choute.

It was necessary to obtain his Highness the Nizam's consent to a relaxation of those conditions, and instructions were accordingly issued to the Resident at Hyderabad to employ his endeavours for that purpose.

The first conference upon this subject at Hyderabad was holden in the month of October following. The Resident, as he had foreseen, found the court of Hyderabad extremely averse to the concession required. The Resident, however, after much protracted discussion, succeeded in obtaining his Highness the Nizam's consent to a relaxation of the conditions of the Peishwa's admission to the benefits of the defensive alliance upon certain assurances from the British Government. Those assurances appeared to the Governor-General to be of a nature which could not be confirmed; but this difficulty was removed by the subsequent success of the Resident at Poonah in obtaining his Highness the Peishwa's assent to the prescribed conditions under the treaty of Hyderabad of his admission to the benefits of the defensive alliance.

On receiving from the Resident at Poonah the application for a force to be pre-

* A treaty pre-existing between the Peishwa and the Nizam.

pared on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, for the eventual support of the Peishwa's cause, the Resident at Hyderabad prudently suggested to his Highness the Nizam the expediency of reinforcing the detachments of his Highness's troops stationed on his Highness's western frontier, to which suggestion his Highness readily assented.

The Governor-General in his instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad of 16th November, confirmed the requisition of the Resident at Poonah for the speedy preparation of a British force; and in a subsequent letter of instructions, under date the 22nd of November, 1802, the Governor-General directed that the officer in command of the British force which might be detached from Hyderabad to the frontier, should obey the orders of the Resident at Poonah with regard to the advance of the detachment.

Previously to this period of time, the court of Hyderabad had frequently expressed an anxious desire for the junction of the two battalions of native infantry which by the treaty of October, 1800, were to be added to the subsidiary force. Various circumstances had occasioned and justified the delay which had occurred in furnishing this additional force.* The actual situation of affairs however rendered the speedy completion of the subsidiary force an object of considerable importance; at the same time it appeared to be extremely desirable on military principles, as well as with reference to various considerations of a local and incidental nature, that the subsidiary force should be augmented by the addition of a regiment of Europeans instead of two battalions of native infantry. The Resident at Hyderabad accordingly proposed to the court of Hyderabad the substitution of a regiment of Europeans for the additional battalions of native infantry stipulated by treaty, and with some difficulty obtained its consent to that arrangement. In expectation of the success of the Resident's endeavours for that purpose, instructions were issued by the Governor-General to the Right Honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, on the 31st of December, 1802, directing Lord Clive to be prepared to despatch to Hyderabad a regiment of Europeans, at the requisition of the Resident at Hyderabad.

Subsequently to the defeat of the combined forces of the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the latter chieftain and Amrut Rao addressed letters to his Highness the Nizam, and his minister Auzim Ool Omrah, soliciting the support and countenance of the court of Hyderabad to the projected revolution in the government of the Mahratta empire. The court of Hyderabad, in conformity to the spirit of its engagements communicated these overtures to the British Resident, and professed its intention to be guided in the reception of those overtures entirely by the advice of the British Government. The court of Hyderabad, however, regardless of those principles of equity and justice which formed the basis of the proceedings of the British Government, manifestly indicated a disposition to support the cause of the usurper. The object of that course of policy was to secure for his Highness the Nizam those advantages from the proposed administration of Poonah which the court of Hyderabad apprehended to be unattainable by the projected alliance with the Peishwa.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Amrut Rao subsequently notified their intention of despatching Babboo Furkia (son of the late Hurry Punt Furkia) to Hyderabad, charged with specific overtures. The question of receiving this emissary was referred by the court of Hyderabad to the decision of the Governor-General, who was of opinion that a refusal to receive that emissary would indicate a decided op-

* See Vol. II. Appendix, p. 714.

position to the views and interests of Jeswunt Rao Holkar on the part both of the British Government and of his Highness the Nizam, and would therefore be inconsistent with the Governor-General's solicitude to compose the existing distractions in the Mahratta empire by the means of amicable negotiation, and that with reference to the accomplishment of that object, all parties should be encouraged to appeal to the united counsels of the British Government and his Highness the Nizam. The Governor-General was therefore of opinion that the emissary despatched by Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Amrut Rao should be received at Hyderabad.

The Governor-General in Council here deems it proper to state the course of measures adopted in consequence of the conclusion and ratification of the treaty of defensive alliance with his Highness the Peishwa.

It had always been sufficiently manifest that the principal branches of the Mahratta state were averse to an alliance between the British Government and the sovereign power of the Mahratta empire. It was also evident that the Peishwa had been induced to conclude the treaty of defensive alliance with the British Government by his Highness's conviction that no other means existed of recovering any portion of his just authority, or of securing the tranquillity of his dominions. It was possible therefore that his Highness the Peishwa might be induced by a favourable change in the state of his affairs, and by the concurrent sentiments of the several branches of the Mahratta empire to desire the dissolution of the engagements which he had concluded with the British Government.

In such an event it was not the intention of the Governor-General to compel the Peishwa to adhere to the faith of his engagements at the hazard of involving the Company in a war with the combined Mahratta states. In pursuing his intention to exert the British influence and power for the restoration of the Peishwa to the Musnud of Poonah on the basis of the subsidiary treaty recently concluded with his Highness, the Governor-General deemed it absolutely necessary to attend to the leading principles by which his Excellency's conduct had been guided. These were the maintenance of peace with the Mahratta states, and the preservation of the internal tranquillity of the British possessions.

The stipulations of treaty on which his Excellency founded his intention to facilitate the restoration of the Peishwa, originated in a supposition that the majority of the Mahratta Jaggeerdars and the body of the Peishwa's subjects entertained a desire of co-operating in that measure. Justice and wisdom precluded any attempt to impose upon the Mahrattas a ruler whose restoration to authority was adverse to the wishes of every class of his subjects. The spirit of the engagements recently concluded with the Peishwa involved no obligation of such an extent. It was evident that whatever might be the success of our arms, the ultimate objects of those engagements would not be attained by a course of policy so violent and extreme. His Excellency the Governor-General accordingly resolved, in the event of a probable opposition to the restoration of the Peishwa from the majority of the Mahratta Jaggeerdars, and from the body of the Peishwa's subjects, to relinquish every attempt to restore the Peishwa to the Musnud of Poonah.

The Governor-General further considered, that even under an assurance of a decided support and co-operation from the Jaggeerdars, it would be advisable that a sufficient detachment of the British force should advance into the Mahratta territory. But that the advance of the whole of the British army, assembled at Hurryhaul, into the Mahratta territory would greatly diminish the internal security of the Company's possessions in that quarter of India. Such a movement would therefore have been inconsistent with a principal object of that armament.

With the view therefore of fulfilling our engagements with the Peishwa with-

out deviating from the leading principles above stated, the Governor-General was of opinion

1st. That the whole of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam should proceed to join the troops of the Nizam assembled on the Nizam's western frontier, and that the whole of that force should occupy within the Nizam's territory the most convenient station in the position nearest to Poonah, and should be prepared at a proper season to advance directly to that capital.

That as large a proportion of the British army assembled at Hurryhaul as could be detached, consistently with the internal security of the British territories should advance in concert and cooperation with such of the Mahratta chiefs and Jaggeerdars occupying the southern frontier of the Mahratta territory as should be attached to the Peishwa's cause, and that the remainder of the British army should maintain its position on the frontier of Mysore for the combined purpose of eventually supporting the advanced detachment, and of preserving the internal tranquillity of the Company's territory.

3rd. That the advanced detachment should proceed from Hurryhaul, together with such Mahratta forces as might unite with it, either to Merritch, or to any other station where the Peishwa might be enabled to join that force, or that the detachment from Hurryhaul should form a junction with the combined army of the Nizam, and with the British subsidiary troops on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions.

Copies of those instructions were forwarded to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad. The Resident at Poonah was directed to be guided in his future proceedings by the spirit of the resolutions and intentions described in those instructions, as far as they might be applicable to the situations in which he might be required to act. The Governor-General left it to the judgment of the Resident at Poonah to decide the proper period of time for the actual advance of the allied army from its position on the Nizam's frontier towards Poonah; and the Resident was informed that the commanding officer of the subsidiary force would be directed to conform to his suggestions both with regard to the time of commencing his march from the Nizam's frontier towards Poonah, and to any other points connected with the objects of the destination of that force.

Instructions were issued to the Resident at Hyderabad directing him to obtain the consent of his Highness the Nizam to the march of the whole of the subsidiary force to the frontier of his Highness's dominions, and to join his Highness the Nizam's forces stationed in that quarter in conformity to the plan of operations communicated to the Government of Fort St. George. The Resident at Hyderabad was further instructed to concert with the Resident at Poonah the position which it would be advisable for the combined army to occupy on the Nizam's frontier preparatory to its actual advance towards Poonah; and the Resident at Hyderabad was instructed to direct the commanding officer of the subsidiary force to conform to all orders and suggestions which he might receive from the Resident at Poonah.

The Governor-General now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the measures adopted by the right honourable Lord Clive, under the instructions of 2nd February, of which the substance is stated in the preceding and following paragraphs.

By those instructions the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George (aided by the judgment of Lieut.-General Stuart, and regulated by contingent events), was empowered to determine the actual period of time at which it might be proper for the British troops to advance into the Mahratta territory, and to the extent of the force to be detached from the main body of the army for that purpose.

Adverting to the expediency of securing the early arrival of the British troops at Poonah, and of confirming the favourable disposition which had been manifested by the Jaggeerdars in the southern territories of his Highness the Peishwa, as well as to the actual march of the subsidiary force towards the Nizam's western frontier, and to the necessity of terminating the depending negotiations at the earliest practicable period of time, Lord Clive was of opinion that the time was actually arrived at which it was necessary for the British troops to enter the Maharratta territory, and his Lordship accordingly, on the 27th February instructed his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart (then present with the army on the frontier of Mysore), to adopt the necessary measures for that purpose.

In consequence of the absence of Lieut.-General Stuart from the Residency of Fort St. George, Lord Clive deemed it to be necessary that the extent of the force to be detached from the main body of the army should be determined exclusively by Lieut.-General Stuart's discretion under an additional reference to the general spirit of the Governor-General's instructions of the 2nd February.

The extensive local knowledge and influence possessed by the honourable Major-General Wellesley, the personal intercourse long established between Major-General Wellesley and the Maharratta chieftains on the frontier of Mysore, and the confidence reposed by those chieftains in the approved talents, firmness, temper, and integrity of that officer, rendered him peculiarly qualified to discharge the complicated duties of the command of the detachment destined to proceed to Poonah. That important command required the united exertion of considerable military skill, and of great political experience and discretion. Lord Clive accordingly desired that Major-General Wellesley might be appointed to the command of the advancing detachment, and requested his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart to furnish Major-General Wellesley with instructions for the regulation of his conduct according to the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions.

In conformity to the foregoing directions, Lieut.-General Stuart appointed a detachment from the main body of the army assembled at Hurryhur for the purpose of advancing into the Maharratta territory. The detachment consisted of one regiment of European, and three regiments of native cavalry; two regiments of European, and six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery, amounting altogether to 1,500 cavalry, and 6,800 infantry; and to that force was added 2,500 of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore's horse. Lieut.-General Stuart appointed the honourable Major-General Wellesley to the command of that detachment in conformity to Lord Clive's suggestions.

Lieut.-General Stuart directed the honourable Major-General Wellesley

1st. To encourage the southern Jaggeerdars to declare in favour of the Peishwa's cause, to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness's government.

2ndly. To proceed to Merritch and form a junction with the Peishwa, or if the Peishwa's march to that station should be deemed unadvisable and impracticable, to unite with such of his Highness's chieftains and troops as might be there assembled.

3rdly. To open a communication and to form a junction with the subsidiary force advancing from Hyderabad, and with the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

4thly. To proceed eventually to Poonah, and to establish an order of things in that capital favourable to the return of the Peishwa, and to the accomplishment of the objects of the treaty lately concluded between his Highness and the British Government.

On the 4th of April the Governor-General in Council addressed a letter to the Governor of Fort St. George, signifying entire approbation of the measures adopted by his Lordship, and by his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, and of the selection of the honourable Major-General Wellesley for the command of the troops detached towards Poonah, and containing instructions relative to the government of Mysore connected with the arrangements which had been adopted under the immediate authority of the government of Fort St. George.

Your honourable Committee was informed by the Governor-General's address of the 10th of February, 1803, of the appointment of Mr. Webbe to be Resident at Nagpore, and of Major Malcolm to succeed that gentleman as Resident at Mysore. The reasons which suggested the expediency of that arrangement with reference to the state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, were stated in the instructions to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George upon that subject of the 3d of February. On the receipt of those instructions the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George proceeded to adopt the necessary measures for carrying them into effect, and his Lordship at the same time issued separate instructions to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart and to Major Malcolm, with respect to the means of cultivating an intercourse with the Jaggeerdars in the southern districts of the Peishwa's dominions.

In conformity to those instructions, Major Malcolm accompanied the honourable Major-General Wellesley on his march to Poonah, and assisted that officer in his negotiations with the Jaggeerdars and officers of the Mahratta government in the southern division of his Highness the Peishwa's dominions.

As connected with the plan of operations above described, it is necessary to state in this place the proceedings of the Resident at Hyderabad, in consequence of the instructions issued to him on the 3d of February.

The Resident at Hyderabad understanding the instructions of the Governor-General with regard to the advance of the whole of the subsidiary force in their literal sense, solicited and obtained the consent of his Highness the Nizam to the advance of the whole of that force, but communicated at the same time the objections of his Highness to this measure, by which his person and capital would be left without efficient protection. In reply to that communication, the Governor-General in his instructions to the Resident, under date the 6th of March, signified to the Resident, that although the terms of his Excellency's instructions admitted the Resident's construction, it was not his Excellency's intention to direct the adoption of an arrangement by which the station of Hyderabad would be left destitute of British troops. The Governor-General, however, not being aware of any hazard to the British interests at Hyderabad by the absence of their troops did not think proper to issue positive orders for the recall of two battalions to Hyderabad, for the purpose of continuing near his Highness the Nizam's person in conformity to the provisions of an article of the treaty of Hyderabad. The Governor-General left that point to the discretion of the Resident at Hyderabad under reference also to the Nizam's wishes. The Governor-General at the same time stated his opinion that the most eligible mode of supplying the deficiency of British troops at Hyderabad, would be by a detachment from the army assembled on the frontier of Mysore, and his Excellency accordingly apprized the Resident of his intention to issue provisional instructions to that effect to the government of Fort St. George.

In conformity to that intention the Governor-General addressed a letter under date 6th of March, 1803, to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, requesting his Highness to suggest to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart the expediency of ordering a detachment to Hyderabad of two battalions of native

infantry, provided that measure was consistent with other military arrangements.

His Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart having complied with that suggestion, two battalions proceeded from the main army stationed on the frontier of Mysore, and arrived at Hyderabad at the close of the month of April. On the 17th of February, the whole of the subsidiary force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson, marched from Hyderabad towards the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions for the purpose of forming a junction with the army of his Highness the Nizam, and of occupying a position preparatory to the advance of the Nizam's army into the Mahratta territory. On the 26th of March the British subsidiary troops with the Nizam's contingent, the whole force being under the command of Colonel Stevenson, encamped in the vicinity of Perinda, near the Nizam's western frontier, and on the 15th of April arrived at Akloos, where it was reinforced from Major-General Wellesley's army by his Majesty's Scotch brigade, and was subsequently joined by the main army, under the command of Major General Wellesley.

Previously to a statement of the proceedings of Major-General Wellesley, under the instructions of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, it may be proper to state to your honourable Committee in general terms the progress of transactions at the court of Hyderabad as connected with the affairs of the Mahratta empire until the return of the Peishwa to Poonah.

A preceding paragraph of this despatch states the intention of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Amrut Rao to despatch Baba Phurkeea on a mission to the court of Hyderabad; and the substance of the Governor-General's instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad on the subject of that emissary's reception. On the 24th of February, Baba Phurkeea arrived at Hyderabad. The primary object of Baba Phurkeea's mission appeared to be, to endeavour to detach his Highness the Nizam from his connection with the British Government, and to unite the Nizam with Jeswunt Rao Holkar in accomplishing the views which Jeswunt Rao Holkar had formed for the future administration of the Government of Poonah. His Highness the Nizam however distinctly declared to Baba Phurkeea his determination to co-operate with the British Government in restoring the Peishwa to the exercise of his legitimate authority. Baba Phurkeea being disappointed in obtaining the primary object of his mission, delivered to his Highness the Nizam a statement of the demands of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Amrut Rao. Those demands did not materially differ from those which Jeswunt Rao Holkar had repeatedly stated in writing to the Resident at Poonah. To Baba Phurkeea's statement of demands the court of Hyderabad replied that the intimate connection established between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad rendered it indispensably necessary to have the previous concurrence of the Governor-General in any adjustment of Baba Phurkeea's propositions; that the negotiation of all points of that nature had been exclusively entrusted by the Governor-General to the charge of the Resident at Poonah, but that the propositions and demands stated by the Mahratta envoy should be communicated to the Governor-General for his consideration.

The Governor-General's instructions to the Resident at Poonah of the 11th of February, on the subject of Holkar's demands, appearing to his Excellency to be equally applicable to the propositions of the Mahratta envoy to Hyderabad, the Governor-General deemed it unnecessary to issue any additional instructions on that subject.

The communications which the Governor-General at this period of time received from the Resident of Hyderabad, of intelligence transmitted by his High-

ness the Nizam's agent at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and obtained through other channels especially the information of the arrival of Jaddoo Rao Bhaskur, Scindiah's confidential minister at the Court of the Rajah of Berar, and of the active prosecution of military preparations within the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, afforded to the Governor-General reason to suspect the existence of the confederacy which was afterwards disclosed, between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for purposes hostile to the interests of the British Government and its allies. The Rajah of Berar had himself communicated in a letter to the Nizam a decided dissatisfaction at the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein; and the sentiments and intentions of the Rajah of Berar were further manifested by the recal of his vakeels from the court of Hyderabad.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the proceedings of Major-General Wellesley under the instructions of Lieut.-General Stuart.

Major-General Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur on the frontier of Mysore on the 9th of March, and crossed the Toombudra* river on the 12th. The march of the British troops through the southern division of the Peishwa's dominions induced the contending chieftains and Jaggeerdars to compromise their differences, and afforded confidence to the oppressed inhabitants of those distracted territories; while the concurrence of all ranks of people in a general sentiment of respect for the British name, and in a desire for the success of the cause in which the British Government was engaged, enabled the honourable Major-General Wellesley to derive abundant supplies for the army during the whole of its march. This favourable impression is to be ascribed principally to the personal confidence reposed in the honourable Major-General Wellesley by all the chieftains exercising authority in that country, and to the reliance which its inhabitants placed on that distinguished officer's ability, justice, and honour. Great merit is also to be ascribed to the judgment, temper, activity, and skill of Major-General Wellesley in directing the system of the supply and movement of the troops; in preventing plunder and every excess, and in conciliating the inhabitants of the districts through which his route was directed.

The British army was joined on its march by most of the chiefs and Jaggeerdars of those territories. No specific engagements however were concluded with them, but they received general assurances that they should be recommended to the particular favour of the Peishwa, if their conduct should continue to deserve it. Several of those chiefs who were under the Peishwa's displeasure, were induced to co-operate with the British troops, by a promise that the influence of the British Government should be exerted to restore them to the confidence of their sovereign.

On the 15th of April, Major-General Wellesley effected a junction with the subsidiary force and with the troops of his Highness the Nizam, under the command of Colonel Stevenson. The detachments from the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, under the command of Futteh Sing and Meer Khan, the former of which had proceeded to the southward as far as Merritch, and the latter had occupied a position on the Nizam's frontier, near Beejapoor, retreated gradually as Major-General Wellesley's army advanced. The approach of Major-General Wellesley also induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to retreat from Poonah to Chandoor, a town situated about 130 miles (north-east) from Poonah; and Amrut Rao alone remained at Poonah with about 1500 men:

* Sometimes written Tungbudra.

Under these circumstances it appeared to Major-General Wellesley unnecessary to advance to Poonah all the troops destined to effect the restoration of the Peishwa; and as the country was much exhausted, and a general deficiency of forage prevailed, General Wellesley determined to dispose of the troops in such situations that the whole might procure forage and subsistence, and might easily form a junction in case that measure should appear to be advisable. Accordingly Major-General Wellesley ordered Colonel Stevenson to march from his position near Akloos to Gardoon, to leave near that place within the Nizam's dominions all his Highness's troops, and to place himself with the British subsidiary troops in a position on the Beemah river towards Poonah, near its junction with the Mota-Mola river.

After having completed these arrangements, General Wellesley continued his march towards Poonah by the road of Baramooty. The General had received repeated intimations from Colonel Close, that Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poonah, intended to plunder and burn that city on the approach of the British troops, and Major-General Wellesley ultimately received an urgent request from the Peishwa, then at Bassein, to detach some of his Highness's troops, in order to provide for the safety of his Highness's family still remaining at Poonah. It was obvious that if General Wellesley could have prevailed on the officers of his Highness's troops to march to Poonah, the force was not of a description or of strength sufficient to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's design; and General Wellesley determined therefore to advance with the British Cavalry and the Mahratta troops belonging to the Peishwa, as soon as the British army should arrive within the distance of a forced march from Poonah. In the meantime intelligence was received that Amrut Rao was still in the neighbourhood of Poonah on the 18th of April, and that he had removed the Peishwa's family to the fortress of Saegur, a measure which was generally supposed to be preparatory to the destruction of the city. Major-General Wellesley therefore marched on the 19th of April, 1803, at night, over a most rugged country, and through a difficult pass (the little Bhoorghaut) about forty miles to Poonah, which city he reached at the head of the British cavalry, on the 20th of April, 1803, making the total distance marched by the cavalry, with Major-General Wellesley in person at their head, since the morning of the 19th (thirty-two hours) about sixty miles. Amrut Rao heard of the march of the British troops early on the morning of the 20th, and retired with precipitation, leaving the city in safety. Major-General Wellesley and the British troops were welcomed as the deliverers of the city by the few inhabitants who remained, and those who had deserted their habitations and had fled to the adjoining hills during the usurpation of Holkar, afforded a proof of their confidence in the British Government by immediately returning to their houses, and by resuming their different occupations. It is a circumstance equally honourable to the British character, and propitious to the British interests in that quarter of India, that the first effects of the British influence in the Mahratta dominions should have been displayed in rescuing the capital of the empire from impending ruin, and its inhabitants from violence and rapine.

It is proper in this place to advert to the military arrangements adopted at Fort St. George, after the march of Major-General Wellesley's army from Hurryhur towards Poonah on the 9th of March.

The main army continued to occupy its position on the southern bank of the Toombuddra, for the combined purposes of preserving the tranquillity of the British possessions, of protecting the ceded districts and the dominions of the Rajah of Mysore and those of the Nizam from foreign attack, operating as a check upon

the southern Jageerdars of the Mahratta empire, and of being prepared to support the troops in advance.

Lieut.-General Stuart being of opinion that the purposes above stated would be better effected by the advance of his army to a position beyond the frontier, and Lord Clive having concurred in opinion with that officer, the army crossed the Toombuddra in the month of May, and advanced to Moodgul, a position between the Kistna and Toombuddra, where it arrived at the close of that month.

The extent and variety of the communications contained in the despatches from the Resident at Poonah to the Governor-General from the date of the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein until his Highness the Peishwa's return to Poonah, preclude the possibility of comprizing within the compass of this despatch a particular narrative of that officer's proceedings, and of the various occurrences which took place during his Highness the Peishwa's residence at Bassein. Your honourable Committee has already been furnished by the Resident at Poonah with narratives of his proceedings and of transactions in that quarter during the period of time above mentioned.

The Governor-General in Council, however, deems it proper to notice the correspondence between the Resident at Poonah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar on the subject of an accommodation of differences between that chieftain and his Highness the Peishwa, and to refer especially to the documents containing the detail of that correspondence.

On the 1st of January, 1803, the Resident received a letter from Jeswunt Rao Holkar then at Poonah, expressing his desire of an accommodation with his Highness the Peishwa, and about the same time vakeels from Holkar arrived at the Peishwa's residence, and communicated to Colonel Close the propositions with which they were charged. These propositions were—1st. That the Peishwa should pay to Jeswunt Rao Holkar one crore of rupees to defray the expense of his army. 2nd. That his Highness should assign to Jeswunt Rao Holkar a fortress. 3rd. That his Highness should cause Scindiah to release Khunde Rao Holkar from confinement, and recognize Khunde Rao Holkar as the head and representative of the Holkar family. These propositions were deemed by the Peishwa to be in the highest degree extravagant.

The Resident transmitted to the Governor-General a copy of his reply to the letter of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in which Colonel Close apprized that chieftain of the treaty concluded at Bassein, and advised him to state to the Governor-General his wishes and sentiments on the subject of the differences between him and the Peishwa, signifying that his Excellency would be disposed to effect an accommodation of those differences on just and equitable principles.

In pursuance of the Governor-General's resolution to employ every practicable endeavour to effect the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa by the means of amicable negotiation, the Governor-General on the 11th of February, 1803, issued instructions to the Resident at Poonah on the subject of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's overtures.

His Excellency concurred with the Peishwa in deeming Holkar's propositions to be for the most part inadmissible. That Cashee Rao's right to succeed his father the late Tuckojee Holkar, was indisputable; that every demand, therefore, founded on a violation of that right, must be rejected. That terms of accommodation between the Peishwa and Holkar, as far as the Peishwa was authorized to grant, and policy could concede, should be offered to Holkar, that his Highness might even offer a sum of money to Holkar on condition of his immediate departure from Poonah, and that it would be advisable for his Highness to grant to Holkar

a fort with a jaggeer, if such a sacrifice could purchase the tranquillity of the Deccan.

The Resident was instructed to signify to Holkar that the British Government and the Peishwa would exert their influence to effect an accommodation between Scindiah and Holkar. The Resident was further directed to remonstrate on the injustice of Holkar's demands, and to demand in the name of the British Government and of the Peishwa, that Holkar should march from Poonah, and cease to oppose the restoration of the Peishwa, with an intimation that if Holkar should refuse to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation, the allied army would compel his submission to the legitimate authority of his Sovereign. Corresponding instructions were at the same time issued to the Resident at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Court, directing him to suggest to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the expediency of his consenting also to submit the adjustment of his differences with Jeswunt Rao Holkar to the arbitration of the British Government.

The detail of the correspondence of the Resident at Poonah with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of his communications with the Peishwa on the subject of an accommodation between his Highness and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will be found recorded on our proceedings. It is sufficient to state in this place that Holkar's refusal to relax in any material degree in his demands upon the Peishwa, and the indignation of his Highness at the unjustifiable conduct and exorbitant demands of his rebellious subject precluded the success of the Resident's endeavours to accomplish the objects of the Governor-General's instructions of the 11th of February.

In pursuance of the instructions which he had received from the Governor-General the Resident at Poonah opened a correspondence with Lieut.-General Stuart, and with the government of Bombay; the honourable Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.

During the approach of Major-General Wellesley to Poonah arrangements were made at Bombay for the return of his Highness the Peishwa to his capital. The detachment of British troops originally appointed for the immediate protection of his Highness the Peishwa at Bassein was augmented at the suggestion of the Resident at Poonah; and was placed under the command of Colonel Murray of his Majesty's 84th regiment.

His Highness reached Churchora on the 6th May, where he had an interview with the honourable Major-General Wellesley; and on the 13th of the same month his Highness, attended by his brother, Chimnaje Appa, and by a numerous train of the principal chiefs of the Mahratta empire, proceeded towards the city of Poonah, and having entered his palace, resumed his seat upon the musnud, when he received the presents of his principal servants.

With a view to preserve connection in the narrative of transactions and proceedings, it is necessary in this place to advert to the progress of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Deccan, and to the negotiations between that chieftain and the British Resident at his court after Dowlut Rao Scindiah's arrival at Burhanpore.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah was at Oujein, the capital of his dominions in the province of Malwa, when he received information of the defeat of his army under the command of Suddasheo Rao at Poonah by the forces of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; Dowlut Rao Scindiah immediately proceeded to collect and augment his forces with the intention of marching against Holkar.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah commenced his march from Oujein in the month of November, 1802, and was subsequently joined by Ambajee and the Bhyes or ladies of the family of the late Mahajee Scindiah, with their respective forces.

On the 13th of January Dowlut Rao Scindiah took possession of Mehysur, a principal city belonging to the family of Holkar. On the 23rd of January Dowlut Rao Scindiah arrived on the banks of the Nerbuddah, and crossed that river on the 4th of February. From the Nerbuddah Dowlut Rao Scindiah prosecuted his march towards Burhanpore, where he arrived on the 20th of February.

By the Governor-General's separate letter to your honourable Committee of the 24th of December, 1802, your honourable Committee was informed that the Governor-General had determined to combine with the measures to be adopted for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, the renewal of the propositions of the British Government to Dowlut Rao Scindiah for his admission to the benefits of the defensive alliance. In pursuance of this resolution the Resident at Scindiah's Court was instructed to proceed without delay from Futteghur to that chieftain's camp, for the purpose of concerting with Scindiah the means of restoring his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, and of proposing to Scindiah the terms under which that chieftain might be admitted to the general defensive engagements concluded with the Peishwa.

On the 13th of December, 1802, the Governor-General received a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, notifying his march from Oujein towards the Deccan for the declared purpose of restoring order and tranquillity in that quarter, and expressing his desire that in consideration of the friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Peishwa, and of the relation in which Dowlut Rao Scindiah stood towards both states as guarantee to the treaty of Salbey, the British Government would in "concert and concurrence with him, render the corroboration of the foundations of attachment and union, and the maintenance of the obligations of friendship and regard with respect to his Highness the Peishwa as heretofore and conformably to existing engagements, the objects of its attention."

Adverting to the reserve and ambiguity which uniformly distinguish the writings of the Mahrattas; to the critical situation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's affairs, and to the obvious dictates of his views and interests, the expressions above quoted were justly considered to contain a proposition on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the co-operation of the British power in the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah in terms as direct as are usually adopted by the Mahrattas in their political correspondence.

Every ground of doubt, however, on this subject was subsequently removed by the receipt of a copy of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's reply to the letter which the Resident at Poonah addressed to that chieftain on the 9th of January, 1803, apprizing Dowlut Rao Scindiah that engagements of a defensive nature had been concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, and that a British force would be stationed within the Peishwa's dominions agreeably to the tenor of those engagements, and expressing a hope on the part of the Governor-General that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would co-operate with the British Government in its endeavours to arrange the affairs of the Peishwa, and to restore his Highness to authority at Poonah. In his reply to that letter Dowlut Rao Scindiah addressed the Resident at Poonah in the following terms:—

"I have been favoured with your acceptable letter intimating that, as the relations of friendship had long subsisted between the Peishwa Saheb Bahaudur and the English Company Bahaudur, engagements of a defensive kind were concluded between the two states, and that accordingly, with a view to the occurrences that had taken place at Poonah, the Nabob Governor-General Bahaudur had determined to forward a British force to that quarter, to the end, that with my concurrence and co-operation the refractory may be brought to punishment. My friend, in truth the ancient relations of friendship and union which hold between the

different Sircars, required such a design and such a co-operation. My army which has also marched from Ougein towards the Deccan, with a view to lay the dust of commotion, and chastise the disrespectful, crossed the Nerbuddah under happy auspices on the 8th of February, and will shortly reach Boorhanpore. My friend Colonel Collins, who agreeably to the orders of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General has left Furruckabad for this quarter may be expected to join me in a few days. Inasmuch as the concerns of the different Sircars are one, and admit of no distinction, on the arrival of my forces at Boorhanpore, I shall without reserve make you acquainted with the measures which shall be resolved on for the arrangement and adjustment of affairs. God willing, under the divine favor and the co-operation of friends, the mischief of the evil-doers will be effectually removed."

It is manifest that these words convey not only Scindiah's entire concurrence in the conclusion of defensive engagements between the British Government and the Peishwa, and the march of a British force for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, but also an intention on the part of that chieftain to aid the accomplishment of that object, by combining the employment of his military force with the exertions of the British power.

The Governor-General in council therefore is satisfied, that at the period of time when Dowlut Rao Scindiah addressed the letter to the Governor-General, of which the substance is stated in a preceding paragraph, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was solicitous to obtain the co-operation of the British Government for the destruction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power, and for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa, to the musnud of Poonah; and that the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter to the Governor-General was to solicit that co-operation.

But it is now evident that the ultimate view of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was not to restore the Peishwa to his Highness's legitimate authority, but to regain the ascendancy of the undue influence of Scindiah's durbar in the Mahratta empire which had been lost by the success of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's arms, and by the entire subversion of the government of Poonah.

Under this application on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the co-operation of the British power, the Governor-General in council however, entertained a confident expectation of that chieftain's cordial concurrence in the measures which might be adopted by the British Government, for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, which step in every view appeared to be absolutely necessary to the recovery of Scindiah's affairs in the Mahratta empire.

In consequence of the Governor-General's instructions to the Resident at Poonah, of which the substance is stated in a preceding paragraph, Colonel Collins marched from Futtehgur about the 20th of December 1802, and on the 27th of February 1803, arrived in the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp near Burhanpore.

On the 4th of that month, Colonel Collins received a despatch from the Resident at Poonah, communicating to him the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and apprizing Colonel Collins that he had transmitted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah information of that event. Colonel Collins deemed it proper immediately to announce his knowledge of that event to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to inform that chieftain that he was authorised by the Governor-General to enter into engagements with him similar to those which had been concluded with his Highness the Peishwa. To this communication Colonel Collins received a reply from Dowlut Rao Scindiah referring the discussion of the important points of Colonel Collins's letter to a personal conference.

On the 1st of March 1803, Colonel Collins paid his first visit to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and was received with every proper mark of respect and attention.

The negotiations of Colonel Collins with Dowlut Rao Scindiah being of peculiar importance, as containing indisputable evidence of the unjust views and intentions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of the anxiety and earnest endeavours of the British Government to accomplish the just and moderate objects of its policy by amicable means, the Governor-General in council deems it necessary to state the progress of those negotiations in the body of this despatch, adverting to the instructions occasionally transmitted to the Resident in the order of their dates.

Although Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been apprized by a letter which the Governor-General had addressed to that chieftain on the subject of Colonel Collins's mission, as well as by the Resident's letter mentioned in a preceding paragraph, that he was charged with propositions of an important nature, Dowlut Rao Scindiah protracted the commencement of the negotiation by frivolous pretences and studied evasions until the 11th of March, when he afforded to Colonel Collins an opportunity of stating to him in general terms the propositions with which that officer was charged on the part of the British Government.

Colonel Collins stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that he was instructed to concert with Scindiah the most effectual means of restoring and securing tranquility in the Deccan. That he was also authorized to offer to Scindiah the mediation of the British Government, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and that the Governor-General having been uniformly solicitous to cement and improve the relations of amity and alliance which had so long subsisted between his Highness the Peishwa, Scindiah and the British Government, had further directed Colonel Collins to convey to Scindiah an offer of admitting him to the benefits of the general defensive alliance on terms similar to those recently concluded with his Highness the Peishwa.

In reply to that communication, one of the principal ministers of Scindiah stated on the part of his master, that the important nature of those propositions rendered it necessary to deliberate maturely on the answers to be returned to them, and desired that some time should be allowed for that purpose. The minister however, accompanied this reply with assurances of Scindiah's disposition to meet the wishes of the British Government.

On the 16th of March, one of the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah attended the Resident for the purpose of communicating to him the replies which he had been directed to return to the following effect. That with regard to the proposition of concerting with Dowlut Rao Scindiah the most effectual means of restoring and securing tranquillity in the Deccan, it was conformable to the relations of friendship subsisting between the two states.

That with respect to the proposed mediation of the British Government, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the minister had been directed to observe "that the affairs of the families of Scindiah and Holkar had been one and the same from father to son; that heretofore differences had arisen between them, but that those differences had always been adjusted by themselves."

To Colonel Collins's remark, that what the minister had delivered was not a direct answer to the first and second propositions, the minister replied, that Scindiah had not informed him whether it was his intention to accept or reject those propositions, and that he had already communicated to Colonel Collins all that he was authorized to state on those points.

With regard to the third proposition the minister observed, that Dowlut Rao

Scindiah being guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, had been surprized at the conclusion of the late defensive alliance between the Peishwa and the British Government without his previous knowledge. That after having had a personal conference with the Peishwa, Scindiah would be apprized of the real state of circumstances and should then act in such a manner as might be advisable and proper.

The argument founded on the relation in which Dowlut Rao Scindiah as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye stands to the British Government and the Peishwa, had been anticipated and provided for by the Governor-General's instructions to Colonel Collins of the 29th of November 1802, and 11th of February 1803; documents respectively adverted to in former paragraphs of this despatch.

On that subject the Governor-General observed in those instructions, that to render the Peishwa responsible to Scindiah for the acts of his administration, as the acknowledged executive head of the Mahratta state, would be to reverse the relation which subsists between them. That the Peishwa must be considered at liberty to contract whatever engagements he may think proper independently of the will of any of the inferior members of the Mahratta state. That in his capacity of guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, Scindiah was merely authorized to bring to a right understanding either of the parties to that treaty which should deviate from its stipulations. That in that capacity he could not be considered to possess an authority to prevent the contracting parties from concluding any additional engagements, or even abrogating the stipulations of the treaty of Salbye by mutual consent; and that at all events, his interests and his station as a member of the Mahratta state, were sufficiently considered by the offer of admitting him to be a party in the defensive treaty with the Peishwa, or of concluding separate engagements between him and the British Government on the basis of that treaty.

In answer therefore to Scindiah's unwarrantable pretension of being consulted in his capacity of guarantee to the treaty of Salbye previously to the conclusion of any engagements of the nature of those which had been contracted with the Peishwa, Colonel Collins adopted the arguments suggested by the Governor-General's instructions.

In reply to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intimation respecting the necessity of a personal conference with the Peishwa, previously to any determination on the subject of the third proposition, Colonel Collins observed, that it appeared either to imply a doubt respecting the actual conclusion of defensive engagements with the Peishwa, of which however Scindiah had been officially apprized both by himself and Colonel Close, or to indicate a design of attempting to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa; and Colonel Collins intimated that such an intention on the part of Scindiah would undoubtedly be considered by the British Government, to be a violation of the relations of friendship subsisting between the two states. To these observations the minister declared, that he was not authorized to offer any reply.

Minutes of this conference were taken down in writing by the minister of Scindiah, but the Resident did not receive any answer on the subject of them before the 24th of March, when he obtained a conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Colonel Collins opened the conference by expressing the gratification which he derived from having a personal interview with the Maharajah, and his expectation of obtaining a knowledge of the real sentiments and intentions of that chief. He proceeded to remark, that the Governor-General had supposed that the friendly propositions with which the Resident had been charged could not fail to be pleasing to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and he expressed his regret that the indecisive nature of the replies which the minister of Scindiah had delivered to those propositions, led

to a belief that Scindiah's court was dissatisfied with the conduct which the British Government had pursued in the late disturbances of the Mahratta empire.

Colonel Collins then observed that the reasonable interposition of the British Government, had not only preserved the acknowledged head of the Mahratta empire from destruction, and frustrated the ambitious designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar after the defeat of the united forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Peishwa by the arms of Holkar, but had also prevented the injury which the dignity, power and interests of Dowlut Rao Scindiah must have suffered by the elevation of his enemies to the supreme authority in the Mahratta empire, an event which was prevented solely by the exertions of the British Government.

The Resident concluded by earnestly requesting from Scindiah the disclosure of his real sentiments and intentions.

In reply to the observations of the Resident, Scindiah's ministers relinquished their former assumption respecting the right of Scindiah, to be consulted as a guarantee to the treaty of Salbye previously to the conclusion of any new engagements between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa, and they acknowledged that the measures of the British Government had been productive of great advantage to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but they contended that the Peishwa ought to have apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the terms of the treaty which he had concluded with the British Government.

Colonel Collins adverted to the uniform friendship manifested by the Peishwa towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and proceeded to require the communication of Scindiah's answer to the friendly propositions of the British Government, and further to insist upon a candid explanation of Scindiah's intentions, with regard to the treaty of Bassein.

In reply Dowlut Rao Scindiah said that he could not give a decided answer to the propositions of the British Government previously to the result of a conference which he proposed to hold with the agent deputed to his camp on the part of the Peishwa, whose arrival was shortly expected.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah then made an explicit declaration to the following effect: "That he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately concluded between the Peishwa and the British Government, but that on the contrary it was his wish to improve the friendship at present subsisting between the Peishwa, the British Government and his own state."

Within five days after this explicit declaration one of Scindiah's ministers waited upon the Resident and stated various objections on the part of Scindiah to the approach of the British troops to Poonah, accompanying those objections with a request that orders might be issued to stop their further progress. The advance of the British troops to Poonah, however, was the necessary consequence of the arrangements concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, which Scindiah by his declaration had promised not to obstruct. Before the conclusion of the conference the Resident convinced Scindiah's minister that it was not in his power to prevent the march of the British troops, and that no reference to the Supreme Government could be attended with the effect desired by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as the British troops would be at Poonah before any orders which might be issued to prevent their advance could be received.

On the 8th of April the Resident proceeded to the durbar for the purpose of delivering to Scindiah a letter which the Governor-General had addressed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in consequence of an unwarrantable demand preferred by one of Scindiah's officers on the Court of Hyderabad for the payment of Chout. In that

letter the Governor-General took occasion to offer the mediation of the British Government for the adjustment of differences between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

This letter was received with demonstrations of perfect respect, and satisfactory explanations were subsequently afforded on the subject of complaint, but neither at that time nor at any other did Scindiah or his ministers take any notice of that part of the Governor-General's letter which intimated that Colonel Collins was instructed to concert with Scindiah the means of effecting an amicable adjustment of the differences subsisting between him and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and all the efforts of the Resident to call the attention of Scindiah to that subject were ineffectual. It appeared to Colonel Collins at this meeting that the Court of Scindiah was both alarmed and displeased at the advance of the British army towards Poonah.

On the 18th of April, Eetul Punt, the person who subsequently negotiated at Serje-Anjengaum the treaty of peace concluded by Major-General Wellesley with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, waited upon the Resident accompanied by the minister who had before conducted the conferences with Colonel Collins. Eetul Punt commenced by asserting the right of Scindiah, as guarantee of the treaty of Salbye, to have been the mediator between the British Government and the Peishwa in the treaty of Bassein. The Resident referred him to the answer which had formerly been given to this pretension.

Scindiah's minister then observed, that the advance of the British troops had created doubts and suspicions in Scindiah's Durbar. In the course of this conference, which was marked by a great degree of intemperance and offensive violence on the part of Eetul Punt, that minister, with an extraordinary elevation and insulting tone of voice, demanded whether it was intended by the treaty of Bassein to take the turban from the head of Dowlut Rao Scindiah?

Colonel Collins in reply assured him of the amicable intentions of the British Government, and answered his objections to the advance of the British force to Poonah by arguments similar to those which he had used on a preceding occasion.

On the 4th of May Scindiah marched from the vicinity of Boorhanpore, and the British Resident, at Scindiah's express desire, followed on the 5th.

It is necessary in this place to observe, that as early as the 27th February, the day of the Resident's arrival in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, Colonel Collins received intelligence of the formation of a confederacy between Scindiah and other Mahratta Chiefs, for purposes hostile to the British Government and its Allies. Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's prime minister, had been deputed on the day preceding the arrival of the British Resident, to the Court of the Rajah of Berar. The nephew of that minister was shortly after despatched to the Peishwa for the purpose of remonstrating with him on his conduct in the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein: and about the same period of time vakeels arrived in Scindiah's camp from Holkar, with instructions to negotiate an adjustment of their differences. The subsequent information which the Resident collected, tended to corroborate his belief of the existence of an hostile confederacy. The Rajah of Berar had taken the field with a large army, at the instigation of the minister of Scindiah, and the declared object of Scindiah's march from Burhanpore was, to meet the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of consulting with him on the situation of affairs.

The existence of any such confederacy, however, appeared to the Governor-General to be a subject of considerable doubt. Adverting to the local situation, comparative power and resources of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it could not readily be believed that those chieftains entertained any design to attempt the

subversion of the Peishwa's government or the treaty of Bassein, at the desperate hazard of a war with the British power. It appeared to be probable, if such a combination had been actually formed, that its object was restricted to purposes of a defensive nature, without involving any views of hostility. At the same time the information which the Governor-General had received at the beginning of the month of May, both from the Resident at Scindiah's Court and from Hyderabad, of the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of his intended march with the whole body of his forces to Poonah, and the rumour of the confederacy between that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar, directed to the subversion of the treaty of Bassein, rendered it expedient to provide, by early measures of precaution, against every possible contingency. His Excellency therefore resolved to demand from Dowlut Rao Scindiah immediate and satisfactory demonstrations of his pacific intentions.

At that period of time, although his Highness the Peishwa had not actually returned to his capital, the information which the Governor-General had received of the retreat of Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Poonah, of the near approach of the British troops under the command of Major-General Wellesley to that city, and of the progress of other arrangements which had been adopted for the support of the Peishwa's cause, justified his Excellency in a conviction that the restoration of the Peishwa to his legitimate authority was at that moment either actually accomplished, or seemed beyond the hazard of failure, exclusively by the exertions of the British Government.

While Jeswunt Rao Holkar continued at the head of a powerful army in the vicinity of Poonah, and maintained in the Mahratta State the ascendancy which he had acquired by his successful rebellion against the authority of the Peishwa, and while the result of the measures adopted by the British Government at the solicitation of the Peishwa, for his Highness's restoration to the musnud of Poonah, continued in suspense, Dowlut Rao Scindiah would have discharged his duty as a feudatory chieftain of the Mahratta empire, in directing the exertion of his power to the extinction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's rebellion, and to the support of the supreme executive authority of the state; and the cooperation of his army with the British troops might have been eventually necessary for that purpose. But Scindiah having, in fact, made no adequate effort against the power of Holkar, and the approach of the British army towards Poonah having induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon his design of effecting a revolution in the Peishwa's Government, and to retire with his troops from that capital; and the promptitude and energy of our operations having secured the restoration of the Peishwa to his legitimate authority without the aid of Scindiah, the prosecution of that chieftain's march to Poonah for the purpose either of supporting the cause of the Peishwa, or of providing for the security of his own power and dominions against the ambitious projects of Jeswunt Rao Holkar had then become unnecessary; and under these circumstances the perseverance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in his intention of marching with his army to Poonah could have no other object than the subversion of the arrangements lately concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, and the reestablishment of his own usurped ascendancy in the state of Poonah. His Excellency the Governor-General therefore deemed it necessary to preclude the adoption of any designs on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of a nature hostile to the British interests, by requiring Scindiah either to return with his troops to the northward of the Nerbudda, or to afford some other unequivocal proof of his intention to refrain from any attempt to disturb the arrangement concluded between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa.

The Governor-General therefore issued instructions to the Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the subject of a remonstrance to be addressed to that chieftain, founded on the basis of the preceding observations.

The Resident was directed to communicate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the whole of the treaty of Bassein, to explain to him in the fullest manner the general principles on which it was founded, and the just and moderate views to which it was directed, and the Resident was particularly instructed to observe to that chieftain that the treaty of Bassein provided the most effectual security for the preservation of the respective interests and possessions of all the Mahratta chieftains, within the limits of their separate dominions and authorities, and that the treaty contained an explicit disavowal of any intention on the part either of the Peishwa or the British Government, to molest any of the Mahratta chieftains who should not place themselves in the condition of a public enemy by the adoption of measures hostile to the rights and interests of the British Government and its allies. That no right or power to interfere in the internal concerns of any of the Mahratta chiefs could be derived from the stipulations of the treaty beyond the limits of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, and that the objects of the Governor-General in concluding the treaty of Bassein, were to secure the British dominions, and those of our ally the Nizam, from the dangers of contiguous anarchy and confusion, to fulfil the duties of friendship towards our ally the Peishwa, and to provide at the same time for the safety of the several branches of the Mahratta empire, without disturbing the constitutional form of the state, and without affecting the legitimate independence of its feudatory chieftains, and that this course of policy must tend to strengthen the bonds of amity and alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as well as with every other branch of the Mahratta power.

Although Dowlut Rao Scindiah might be expected to admit the justice and moderation of our views, in concluding the recent alliance with the Peishwa, and to be satisfied that his rights and independence would not be endangered by the operation of the treaty of Bassein, it could not be expected that he would be immediately disposed to subscribe with cordiality to an arrangement by which the promotion of his known projects of ambition would be effectually controlled, and his ascendancy in the state of Poonah would be permanently excluded.

The Resident therefore was directed to observe to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his ascendancy at Poonah had in fact been already annihilated by the success of Holkar, which had also greatly endangered even the existence of Scindiah as a power in India; and that if after the restoration of the Peishwa to his Highness's legitimate authority due limitations were opposed to the usurpations of Scindiah, as well as to those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, upon the established power of the Mahratta empire, Scindiah should reflect, that by submitting to that sacrifice he would acquire additional security for his own legitimate power, and that he had already derived the preservation of a considerable part of his dominions from the check which had been opposed to the progress of Holkar's army.

The Resident was also particularly instructed to oppose any attempt on the part of Scindiah to contest the right of the Peishwa to conclude political engagements with any foreign power without the previous consent and concurrence of the feudatory chieftains. That right, the Governor-General observed, could not justly be contested by any arguments derived either from the original constitution of the Mahratta empire, or from the actual practice of the several chieftains composing the Mahratta confederacy. Upon this question his Excellency stated that the exclusive right of concluding treaties and engagements with foreign states, not of a nature to compromise the separate rights and interests of the feudatory chieftains of the empire must be considered to be inherent in the supreme executive autho-

city of the Mahratta state, and that it might even be a question whether the Peishwa, acting in the name and under the ostensible sanction of the nominal head of the empire, might not conclude treaties which should be obligatory upon the subordinate chiefs and feudatories without their concurrence. That even under a contrary supposition it would be absurd to regulate any political question by the standard of a constitution which time and events have entirely altered or dissolved. That the late Mahajee Scindiah, and his successor, Dowlut Rao, had uniformly exercised the powers of independent dominion by making war on the neighbouring states; by concluding engagements with them, and by regulating the whole system of their administration without the participation or previous consent of the Peishwa, whose supremacy however both Mahajee Scindiah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah have uniformly acknowledged. That Dowlut Rao Scindiah therefore could not, even on the supposed principles of the original constitution, deny the right of the Peishwa to conclude his late engagements with the British Government independently of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's concurrence without impeaching the validity of his own proceedings and those of his predecessor, nor could he, according to the more admissible rules derived from practice and prescription justly refuse to admit the exercise of those independent rights of dominion on the part of the Peishwa, which both Scindiah and his predecessor assumed in a condition of acknowledged subordination to his Highness's paramount authority.

With regard to the Rajah of Berar the Governor-General observed, that under the circumstances of his known pretensions to the authority of the Sahoo* Rajah, the Rajah of Berar's† acknowledgement of subordination to the paramount authority of the Peishwa might be doubted; but that in proportion as the Rajah of Berar disclaimed the supremacy of the Peishwa he had less right to interfere in any degree in the Peishwa's concerns. That the Peishwa must be considered by the Rajah of Berar either as the representative of the Rajah of Berar's paramount sovereign, or as an independent state in amity with the Rajah of Berar, or as a power acknowledged by every other state in India, but which it was the secret design of the Rajah of Berar to subvert with a view to supersede its authority for his own aggrandizement and that in any of those cases, and more especially in the last, the other powers of India could not admit the right of the Rajah of Berar to control the Peishwa's intercourse with other states, unless the Peishwa shall attempt to injure the independence of the Rajah of Berar.

The Governor-General further observed, that the arguments which disproved the validity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's pretensions to be consulted in the conclusion of any engagements of a political nature between the Peishwa and a foreign state were equally applicable to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's assumption of a right to interfere in any manner in the arrangement concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, or in the future administration of his Highness's affairs, and the Resident was accordingly directed to repel any arguments tending to justify such interference.

The Governor-General's instructions stated that the interposition of the British power for the restoration of the Peishwa, and the conclusion of the late alliance with the state of Poonah were acts not only warrantable upon every principle of justice and of the law of nations, but indispensably necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the Mahratta empire, and to the security of the legitimate

* The nominal head of the Mahratta empire, in whose name the Peishwa professed to exercise supreme dominion. Peishwa signifies leader, or prime minister.

† The Rajah of Berar was distantly related to the Sahoo Rajah.

rights and interests of its respective branches, and especially of Scindiah. That those rights and interests were effectually secured by the terms of the alliance, and consequently that any attempt on the part of any other state or chieftain to disturb the operation of the treaty of Bassein might justly be considered to be an act of hostility against the British Government.

That under all these circumstances therefore we possessed an undoubted right to require that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should afford the most unequivocal proofs of his resolution to abstain from the adoption of any measures calculated to impede the accomplishment of the late arrangements in the Mahratta state; and that the most satisfactory evidence of that intention would be the immediate return of Scindiah to his dominions north of the Nerbudda.

That his continuance in his actual position without any assignable motive connected with the security of his rights or the exigency of his affairs must be considered to indicate designs injurious to the combined interests of the British Government and its allies, and would render necessary the immediate adoption of the most active measures to compel his return within the limits of his northern dominions.

The Resident was also directed to inform Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his proceeding to Poonah at the head of his army under any pretext whatever excepting under the express permission of the Peishwa, approved by the British Government, would infallibly involve him in hostilities with the British power.

The Resident was further apprized that the information which his Excellency the Governor-General had received of a projected confederacy between Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, rendered it necessary in his Excellency's judgment that Scindiah should be required either to disavow such intended confederacy, or distinctly to declare the object of it, and in the event of Scindiah's avowing an intention to march for the purpose of meeting the Rajah of Berar without affording a satisfactory explanation with regard to the object of that proceeding, the Resident was directed to intimate to Scindiah, that in the actual situation of affairs the British Government would be justified in considering that proceeding to be directed to purposes hostile to its interests and to those of its allies, and would be compelled to adopt corresponding measures of precaution and defence. The Resident was further directed to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his intended interview with the Rajah of Berar would not be considered as a sufficient plea for postponing his return to Hindostan unless preceded by the most satisfactory proofs of the pacific designs of those chieftains. The Resident was also directed to inform Scindiah that his Excellency the Governor-General had addressed a representation in the spirit of these instructions to the Rajah of Berar, and had expressed to that chieftain the resolution of the British Government to anticipate any sinister project on the part of the Rajah of Berar with the utmost degree of promptitude and alacrity.

The Resident was further instructed to take that opportunity to renew the Governor-General's propositions to Scindiah for the conclusion of a defensive alliance with the Company, informing Scindiah that his Excellency was disposed either to admit Scindiah as a contracting party to the treaty of Bassein, or to conclude a separate subsidiary alliance with Scindiah, and stating to Scindiah the manifest advantages to the stability of his government and to the prosperity of his affairs which the proposed connection was calculated to secure.

The Resident was at the same time directed to apprise Scindiah of the determined resolution of the Governor-General to resist with the full force and energy of the British power any attempt on the part of Scindiah or on that of any other power or state to obstruct the operation of the treaty of Bassein, or to injure the interests of the British Government or of its allies, and that the formation of any

confederacy or the prosecution of any military operations on the part of Scindiah in opposition to the repeated remonstrances of the British Government would compel the British Government to resort to arms on every part of Scindiah's frontier.

The Resident was also directed to apprize Dowlut Rao Scindiah that any attack on the possessions of our ally the Nizam would be considered to be an hostile aggression against the British Government, and would be resented with the whole force of the British power.

The Resident was at the same time instructed in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's urging the necessity of his proceeding to Poonah for the adjustment of his claims on his Highness the Peishwa, to offer the mediation of the British Government for that purpose. The Resident was also directed to repeat the offer of arbitrating Scindiah's differences with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Resident was further directed to transmit to the honourable Major-General Wellesley the earliest intimation of the result of the prescribed remonstrance, for the regulation of that officer's conduct. These instructions were dated the 3rd of June.

With a view, however, to communicate to Colonel Collins the sentiments and intentions of the Governor-General with the least practicable delay, notes containing the substance of the preceding detail were transmitted to Colonel Collins for his guidance on the 5th of May. Corresponding instructions were at the same time issued to the honourable Major-General Wellesley and to the Resident at Poonah, which will be noticed in a subsequent part of this despatch.

With a view to support the representations of the Resident, the Governor-General deemed it proper to accompany his detailed instructions to the Resident of the 3rd of June, with a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. In that letter the Governor-General took occasion to advert to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's avowed concurrence in the expediency and wisdom of the measures undertaken by the British Government for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, and to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's explicit declaration of his intention to refrain from any measures calculated to obstruct the completion of the arrangements established under the treaty of Bassein; and expressed a disposition to discredit the reports which the Governor-General had received of the hostile design of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; observing, however, that the information which his Excellency had received of Scindiah's march towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and of the Rajah of Berar's having entered his tents for the express purpose of proceeding to meet Dowlut Rao Scindiah, compelled the Governor-General to direct his attention to those reports, and rendered necessary a candid declaration of his Excellency's sentiments and resolutions in the event of Scindiah's actually entertaining the design of interfering between the British Government and its allies, or of violating the rights of the honourable Company, or of any state in alliance with it. The Governor-General then proceeded to explain the general principles of the treaty of Bassein, the just and moderate views to which it was directed, and the security which it afforded to the just rights and legitimate authority of the feudatories of the Mahratta empire, and declared the resolution of the British Government to accomplish the provisions of the treaty concluded with his Highness the Peishwa against any meditated opposition, expressing at the same time the solicitude of the British Government to maintain the relations of amity and peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, unless the conduct of that chieftain should compel the British Government to adopt a contrary course. This letter contained substantially all that the Resident was directed to state to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The information of the projected confederacy rendered it equally expedient to address a remonstrance to the Rajah of Berar. Mr. Webbe, who had been appointed to the situation of Resident at the court of the Rajah of Berar, having

been detained for purposes connected with the public service at Fort St. George, no British representative then resided at that chieftain's court. His Excellency the Governor-General therefore conveyed his intended remonstrance to the Rajah of Berar exclusively by letter.

The Governor-General commenced his letter to the Rajah of Berar by adverting in general terms to the recent transactions at Poonah. His Excellency observed, that at the period when the Peishwa had been compelled by the violence and usurpation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon his capital and to retire into the Concan, his Highness solicited the aid of the British Government for his restoration to his just authority in the Mahratta state, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah, alarmed at the success of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, had solicited the co-operation of the British arms for the same important object; both his Highness the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah being convinced that the interposition of the British Government at that crisis was indispensably necessary for the preservation of the Mahratta empire from the impending evils of anarchy and confusion.

That the British Government, anxious to preserve the Mahratta empire from a condition of anarchy, which must have proved highly dangerous to all the contiguous states of India, readily consented to the united wishes of his Highness the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that his Highness accordingly proceeded under the protection of the British Government to Bassein, and subsequently concluded a treaty with the British Government calculated to secure the stability of his just authority, the rights of the subordinate chieftains, and the future tranquillity and prosperity of the Mahratta state.

That for the accomplishment of this arrangement a detachment of British troops had proceeded to Poonah, and that the British subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam's troops was assembled on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions for the same purpose.

That the measures adopted by the British Government for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to his legitimate authority had induced Holkar to retire with his troops from Poonah, and had removed every obstacle to the restoration of the Peishwa to his capital and to his rights. That the attention of the British Government therefore would be immediately directed to the complete accomplishment of all the provisions of the treaty of Bassein, of which a copy was enclosed for the Rajah's information.

That an examination of the articles of that treaty would demonstrate its justice, moderation and honourable policy, and that a review of the late transactions in the Mahratta empire would be sufficient to convince the Rajah that the interposition of the aid of the British Government for the restoration of the Peishwa to the government of Poonah far from having a tendency to subvert the order of the Mahratta state afforded the only means of averting confusion, and of providing for the future security and tranquillity of every branch of the Mahratta power.

The Governor-General directed the attention of the Rajah of Berar to the operation of the treaty of Bassein, in affording additional security to the just rights of the several feudatories of the Mahratta state. The Governor-General asserted the right of his Highness the Peishwa to contract with foreign powers all such engagements as should not affect the separate rights and interests of the feudatory chieftains. The Rajah of Berar was therefore apprized that any attempt on the part of any state or power to obstruct the operation of the treaty of Bassein would be deemed an act of hostility against the combined interests of the British Government and the Peishwa.

The Governor-General then proceeded to state the objects of the British Government in concluding the treaty of Bassein, in terms similar to those contained

in the Governor General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and described also in his Excellency's instructions to the Resident.

That the Governor-General was disposed to enter into engagements similar to the treaty of Bassein with the Rajah of Berar, but that the Rajah's rejection of that offer would produce no change in the amicable disposition of the British Government towards the state of Berar.

That the Governor General had been informed that the Rajah of Berar viewed the conduct of the British Government in the restoration of the Peishwa with jealousy and suspicion, and entertained a project of forming a confederacy for the purpose of frustrating the beneficial operation of the treaty of Bassein.

That although the character of the Rajah precluded implicit credit to this report, it was proper to declare distinctly that any military preparation on the part of the Rajah or any combination directed to the subversion of the arrangements lately concluded with the Peishwa would be followed by measures of precaution and security on the part of the British Government.

The Governor-General concluded by requesting a speedy and amicable reply to his Excellency's letter.

Under the expectation of the peaceable restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the Musnud of Poonah, the Governor-General deemed it highly expedient to furnish the honourable Major-General Wellesley and the Resident at Poonah without delay with specific instructions for the regulation of their conduct after the return of the Peishwa to his capital.

With these instructions were necessarily combined the Governor-General's directions (corresponding with those issued to the Resident at Scindiah's court on the 5th of May) for the regulation of the honourable Major-General Wellesley's conduct in the event of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar disregarding the earnest remonstrances of the Governor-General.

The Governor-General took that occasion to explain in general terms the principles on which the treaty of Bassein was founded, and the scope of his Excellency's views and intentions in concluding that important arrangement.

His Excellency observed that the destruction of the hostile power of Mysore, accompanied by the consolidation of our alliance with the court of Hyderabad, left no possible antagonist to the British Government among the natives states in India, excepting the Mahratta power.

That the Mahratta states, unconnected with any European ally, could not be considered formidable to the British Government, excepting in the event of an actual union of the feudal chiefs under an efficient sovereign power, or in the event of a revolution which should unite the command of the resources of a large portion of the Mahratta territory in the hands of an active and enterprising chief.

That although such events might have been encountered without apprehension by the British Government in the commanding posture of its foreign relations, and in the vigorous condition of its internal resources and concentrated strength, it was obviously prudent to employ every endeavour to effect such an arrangement as should preclude the union of the Mahrattah states under any circumstances which might menace the interruption to the tranquillity of our possessions or of those of our allies and dependants, especially of the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore.

That the most effectual arrangement with a view to this important object appeared to be, an intimate alliance with the acknowledged sovereign power of the Mahratta empire, founded upon principles which should render the British influence and military force the main support of that power. Such an arrangement appeared to afford the best security for preserving a due balance between the several states constituting the confederacy of the Mahratta empire, as well as for

preventing any dangerous union or diversion of the resources of that empire. The principal object therefore to be accomplished by the treaty of Bassein was the prevention of any hostile union of the Mahratta states under the sovereign power of that empire against the British Government or its allies.

The same policy required that the operation of the treaty should be so directed as to prevent the aggrandizement of any individual chief, or the combination of any number of chiefs, under circumstances adverse to the authority of the Peishwa or to the tranquillity of the territories of the Company, its dependents, and allies, but that it was neither consistent with the principle, nor necessary to the objects of the treaty, to exercise any influence in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's immediate government of a nature injurious to his dignity and independence, or offensive to his prejudices or pride. The Resident was directed to endeavour to satisfy his Highness, that his real and legitimate power was effectually secured by the alliance, and that he might confidently expect under the operation of his engagements with the British Government to enjoy that tranquillity and security, accompanied by respect and honour, which he has never experienced under the degrading influence of his own subjects, servants, or feudatory chieftains, and which he could never have attained under the protection of Scindiah, or of the Rajah of Berar, or under any pacification with Holkar or with Amrut Rao.

In demonstrating to the Peishwa the benefits of his new alliance, the Resident was directed to advert to the advantages which had been enjoyed by the Nizam, since the conclusion of similar engagements with the British power, and to describe the uniform disposition which the British Government had manifested to maintain, inviolate, the dignity and honour of the Nizam, and to abstain from any infringement of his Highness's just authority within his own dominions.

While the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein were calculated to protect the authority of the Peishwa from the encroachment of the feudatory chiefs, the most effectual security was also provided for the preservation of the respective interests and possessions of those chiefs within the just limits of their separate dominions and authorities.

That it was also a principal object of the treaty of Bassein to prevent the sovereign power of the Mahratta states, or the power of any great branch of the Mahratta empire from passing into the hands of France. To this object in all its relations, the constant and unremitting vigilance of the Resident was directed.

With these views and intentions, and under the actual circumstances of the Peishwa's government, the attention of the Resident and of the honourable Major-General Wellesley was particularly directed to the following objects: 1st. The restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the due exercise of his regular authority in the Mahratta empire. 2ndly. The effectual exercise of the right of mediation and guarantee acquired by the British Government under the treaty of Bassein, or originating in the measures adopted by the British Government for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the Musnud of Poonah, without exciting the jealousy or offending the pride of the Peishwa or other Mahratta chieftains. Under this head was classed the exertion of the Resident, and Major-General Wellesley's endeavours to mitigate the resentment of his Highness against Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to obtain from his Highness such concessions in favour of each of those chieftains as might be calculated to conciliate their submission to his Highness's authority.

3dly. To establish the subsidiary force in exact conformity to the treaty, and to provide for the return of the remainder of the forces employed in the restoration of the Peishwa to their respective stations, or for the disposal of such part of

those forces as it might be necessary to employ for the completion and security of the arrangement concluded with his Highness the Peishwa.

4thly. To provide for the security of his Highness the Nizam's dominions against any attack on the part of Scindiah, or of Holkar.

5thly. To provide for the complete occupation by the Company's officers of the districts ceded by his Highness the Peishwa.

The detail of the Governor-General's instructions for the accomplishment of these objects will be found in a letter to the Resident at Poonah recorded on our proceedings. The information however, which the Governor-General had at that time received with regard to the views and intentions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar rendered obviously necessary an eventual modification of those instructions, by providing for the possible occurrence of hostilities between those chieftains and the British Government.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley and the Resident at Poonah, were therefore furnished with a copy of the instructions, which the Governor-General had issued on that subject to the Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the honourable Major-General Wellesley was directed to regulate his proceedings with regard to the employment or separation of the army under his command, by the information which he might receive from the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with regard to the effect produced on Scindiah by the representations which Colonel Collins had been instructed to make to that chieftain; and Major-General Wellesley was authorized and directed to adopt hostile operations against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, if those representations should not have the effect of deterring that chieftain from pursuing his march with the whole body of his forces towards Poonah. The Governor-General also on that occasion adverted to the rumour of a confederacy between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, directed to the subversion of the alliance concluded between the Peishwa and the British Government, and authorized Major-General Wellesley to be prepared to employ the forces under his command in active operations against the united power of those chieftains, if that report should subsequently be confirmed.

The despatch containing the detail of these instructions was dated the 30th of May; but with a view to communicate to the honourable Major-General Wellesley and the Resident at Poonah, the sentiments and directions of the Governor-General on those important points with the least practicable delay, his Excellency directed notes containing the substance of the preceding instructions to be despatched to the Resident on the 7th of May.

On the occasion of the happy restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, the Governor-General deemed it expedient to address a letter to the Peishwa, explaining the nature of the connection established between his Highness and the British Government by the treaty of Bassein; and the expectations which the British Government entertained from his Highness under the operation of that treaty.

On that occasion the Governor-General after congratulating his Highness the Peishwa on his restoration to his government, under the protection of the British power, took a review of the amicable conduct uniformly manifested towards his Highness by the British Government, by adverting to the propositions for the conclusion of a defensive alliance which had been repeatedly offered to his Highness's acceptance, and observed that if the Peishwa had accepted those propositions at an earlier period of time his Highness would have avoided the disasters which had since befallen him. His Excellency then pointed out to the Peishwa that no other power than that of the British Government could have reinstated his Highness in his government without great difficulty, and that he could not have enjoyed under any other

protection the same security and independence which he derived from the engagements concluded at Bassein.

The Governor-General explained to his Highness the general principles of justice and moderation on which the treaty of Bassein was founded, and the beneficial objects to which it was directed; observing to his Highness that the nature of that treaty was purely defensive, and could not authorize his Highness's interference in the affairs of any Mahratta chief beyond the exercise of his Highness's legitimate authority. His Excellency at the same time afforded to his Highness the most explicit assurances of the intention of the British Government to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of his Highness's immediate government of a nature injurious to his dignity and independence.

His Excellency earnestly recommended to his Highness the Peishwa the policy of securing the attachment and confidence of the southern Jaggeerdars, and proposed the mediation of the British Government as the most likely mode of effecting that desirable object.

The Governor-General explained to his Highness the necessity of his refraining from all negotiations which were not sanctioned by the consent of the British Government.

The Governor-General directed the attention of his Highness to the great advantages which his Highness the Nizam had derived from the alliance of his state with the British power, and contrasted the former condition of the Peishwa under the control and usurpation of his own servants with the freedom and independence of the Nizam under the operation of his defensive engagements with the honourable Company.

The Governor-General concluded by declaring his determination to support the dignity and authority of his Highness the Peishwa as acknowledged and confirmed by the treaty of Bassein.

Subsequently to the despatch of the letter of the 9th of June to the Peishwa, the Governor-General received information from the Resident at Hyderabad that the Rajah of Berar, the whole of whose army was assembled in the vicinity of Nagpore, entered his tents on the 17th of April, preparatory to his proceeding to meet Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Governor-General therefore deemed it necessary to address another letter of remonstrance to the Rajah of Berar, calculated to deter him from the prosecution of that measure which appeared to confirm the rumour of an hostile confederacy between those chieftains. This letter was dated the 22nd of May.

With a view to enforce the remonstrances contained in that letter, the Governor-General deemed it to be necessary to direct the Resident at Hyderabad to proceed to the camp of the Rajah of Berar.

The information, however, which the Governor-General subsequently received of the dangerous state of his Highness the Nizam's health rendered it necessary to countermand those orders and to instruct the Resident to continue at Hyderabad, and to despatch his Secretary to the camp of the Rajah of Berar.

At the period of time, however, when those instructions reached the Resident at Hyderabad, the Resident had received intelligence that the Rajah of Berar had arrived within a short distance of the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. It became unnecessary therefore for either the Resident or his Secretary to proceed to the Rajah of Berar's camp.

The Governor-General in Council now deems it necessary to advert to the transactions at Poonah subsequently to the Peishwa's arrival at that capital.

Major-General Wellesley availed himself of an early opportunity of representing to his Highness the Peishwa, in strong terms, the claims of the southern Jaggeer-

dars, who had manifested their attachment to the Peishwa by co-operating with the British troops in his Highness's restoration to the musnud, and continued to employ his endeavours, which were aided by those of the Resident at Poonah, until the period of his departure from Poonah to induce the Peishwa to regard the claims, and to relieve the wants of those Jaggeedars, as well as to frame some general arrangement in favour of the several feudatory chieftains of the state of Poonah which might induce them to co-operate with the British troops, if the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should render necessary the adoption of extreme measures for the security of the combined rights and interests of the Peishwa and the British Government.

In the actual situation of affairs it appeared both to the honourable Major-General Wellesley and to the Resident at Poonah to be necessary that the army under the command of Major-General Wellesley should proceed to the northward of Poonah, and occupy a position which would enable it eventually to act in concert with the force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson.

That measure was manifestly necessary for the purpose either of defeating any operations of an hostile nature on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar against his Highness the Peishwa, or of frustrating the apparent design of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, to proceed with their respective armies to Poonah with a view to subvert the arrangements concluded between his Highness and the British Government.

Under these circumstances his Highness the Peishwa was bound by the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein to furnish a contingent of troops to co-operate with the British army. The endeavours of Major-General Wellesley and the Resident at Poonah were therefore employed to induce his Highness the Peishwa to adopt the measures necessary for equipping the force which he was required to furnish by the stipulations of the treaty. The efforts of Major-General Wellesley and of the Resident at Poonah to induce the Peishwa either to frame an arrangement with his feudatory chieftains and Jaggeedars, or to supply his contingent of troops, were equally unsuccessful; and Major-General Wellesley on the 4th of June marched from Poonah with the British troops, attended only by a small corps of Mahratta cavalry belonging to one of the Jaggeedars, who had joined the British detachment soon after its march from the frontier of Mysore.

During this interval of time no events of particular importance occurred at Hyderabad; the correspondence of the Resident during that interval related principally to an apprehended invasion of the territories of his Highness the Nizam on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the forced contributions levied by that chieftain from the city of Aurungabad. By the orders of Major-General Wellesley the subsidiary force under the command of Colonel Stevenson proceeded from its temporary situation at Gardoon towards Aurungabad for the relief of that city; previously however to the arrival of Colonel Stevenson at that city Jeswunt Rao Holkar had retreated with his whole force to a distance from the Nizam's frontier.

The Resident at Hyderabad maintained a constant correspondence with the honourable Major-General Wellesley and with Colonel Stevenson on the subject of the eventual operations of the troops under their command, or of the provision of supplies for the subsistence of the army. With reference to the state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, and to the danger to which the city of Hyderabad might eventually be exposed without the presence of a commanding force, the Resident suggested to the Court of Hyderabad the expediency of assembling a considerable army of his Highness the Nizam's troops in the vicinity of Hyderabad, to which his Highness the Nizam readily assented.

The precarious state of his Highness the Nizam's health at this period of time justified an apprehension of his Highness's speedy dissolution; the Governor-General therefore deemed it expedient to transmit instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad, confirming the resolution of the Governor-General in council which had formerly been communicated to the Resident at Hyderabad, on the subject of supporting the succession of his Highness's eldest son Sekunder Jah, but directing the Resident to obtain from Sekunder Jah, either previously to his accession to the musnud, or as the first act of his sovereignty, a formal acknowledgment and confirmation of all treaties and engagements subsisting between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad.

The Governor-General in council now resumes the narrative of Colonel Collins's negotiations at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Balajee Koonjur, the officer despatched by his Highness the Peishwa to Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of explaining to that chieftain the detail of the engagements concluded by the Peishwa with the British Government, arrived in Scindiah's camp on the 7th of May. The Resident had been led to expect that after the arrival of this officer the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would no longer delay their promised reply to the propositions which the Resident had stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the part of the British Government, but in this expectation Colonel Collins was disappointed.

On the 26th of May, Colonel Collins received the notes of instructions under date the 5th of May, which are mentioned in a preceding paragraph of this despatch. Colonel Collins immediately requested a conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the 28th of May was appointed for that purpose.

Colonel Collins commenced the conference by imparting to Scindiah the whole of the treaty of Bassein. The Resident having pointed out the pacific and amicable tendency of every article, requested Scindiah to declare whether the treaty of Bassein appeared to contain any stipulation injurious to his just rights. One of the ministers who assisted at the conference acknowledged that it did not, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah formally assented to that acknowledgment. The Resident then adverted to the reported negotiations between Scindiah, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, remarking that their recent proceedings justified a suspicion that they had confederated either for the purpose of invading the territories of our allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa, or of subverting the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein.

Colonel Collins observed, with regard to the avowed intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, to proceed with their united armies to Poonah, that this movement was rendered wholly unnecessary by the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, and that it might be productive of evil consequences.

Colonel Collins proceeded to require an unreserved explanation of the nature of their late negotiations, and concluded by affording the strongest assurances of the amicable disposition of the British Government towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its determination to refrain from any attempt to disturb the independence of Scindiah's state, unless that chieftain should provoke hostilities by acts of aggression.

One of the ministers replied that Scindiah had no intention whatever to invade either the territory of the Nizam or of the Peishwa, but when urged to disavow any intention on the part of that chieftain to obstruct the completion of the treaty of Bassein, the minister replied that "Scindiah could afford no satisfaction on that point until he had conferred with the Rajah of Berar."

Colonel Collins again endeavoured to obtain an explanation of the designs of

Dowlut Rao Scindiah but without effect. The Resident then distinctly apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his continued refusal to afford the required explanation combined with the prosecution of his military arrangements, would compel the British Government to adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of Scindiah's dominions, and that certain intelligence of the accession of Scindiah to any confederacy against the British power, would produce immediate hostility on all parts of his frontier. The Resident concluded by urging Scindiah, in the most conciliatory manner, to make a candid avowal of his intentions.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, however, terminated the conference by declaring his final determination to withhold the satisfaction which the Resident demanded until he had conferred with the Rajah of Berar, and Scindiah concluded by a formal and public declaration to the British Resident, in the following terms. "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed whether it will be peace or war."

This declaration constituted an unprovoked menace of hostility, and a public insult to the British Government, by a reference of the question of peace or war, to the result of a conference with the Rajah of Berar, who, at the head of a considerable army, had reached the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp. A sufficient indication was now afforded of the disposition of the confederate chieftains to prosecute the supposed objects of their confederacy; and the duty of the Governor-General now required without delay the most effectual measures for the vindication of the dignity, and for the security of the rights and interests of the British Government and of its allies, against any attempt on the part of the confederates to injure or invade them.

This menace of hostility cannot be justified by any pretence that language of a similar description had been previously applied by the British Government to Scindiah, and had provoked and warranted Scindiah's direct threat of war. The eventual hostilities announced by the British Resident were declared to depend exclusively on the conduct of Scindiah. The Resident apprized that chieftain, that if he should proceed to the extremity of engaging in a confederacy against the British power, such an act of aggression would occasion war. Scindiah's conduct had already indicated a disposition to accede to such a confederacy; it was therefore an act of justice and of necessity on the part of the British Government to apprise Scindiah of the consequences of his proceedings, under a declaration, which reserved to Scindiah the means of avoiding hostilities. Scindiah's reply contains a direct declaration, that at that time he contemplated the formation of an offensive confederacy against the Company; and that the ultimate question of peace or war was to depend not upon the pacific or hostile conduct of the British Government, but upon the will and pleasure of the confederate Mahratta chiefs.

The Governor-General in council now proceeds to communicate to your honourable Committee the detail of the measures and arrangements which were adopted by the Governor-General for the purposes stated at the close of the preceding paragraph. The Governor-General immediately issued private instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Cawnpore, to make the necessary arrangements for assembling the army on the north-west frontier of the Company's possessions, and the Governor-General at the same time directed the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the formation of a plan of operations of the British army in that quarter, and to the accomplishment of a system of political arrangement with the neighbouring states and chieftains, calculated to diminish the power and resources of the enemy, and to facilitate the success of the British arms, in the event of our being compelled to proceed to measures of hostility against the power and possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The course of measures which the Governor-General deemed it advisable to adopt for those purposes was described in a paper of notes, which on the 28th of June, 1803, was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief for his immediate information and guidance.

The plan of operations and arrangements described in those notes was subsequently communicated to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in detail, in the form of official instructions, the substance of which will be found fully stated in the subsequent paragraphs of this despatch. With a view to preserve regularity in the narrative of the proceedings of the Governor-General in this arduous crisis of affairs, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to communicate to your honourable Committee the instructions which were issued to the honourable Major-General Wellesley and to the Government of Bombay, at the time when those notes were transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Adverting to the actual state of affairs in the western side of India, and to the alarming aspect of the proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it appeared to the Governor-General to be indispensably necessary that a temporary authority should be constituted at the least possible distance from the scene of eventual negotiation or hostilities, with full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements might become necessary either for the final settlement of peace, or for the prosecution of war. The Governor-General considered that in such a crisis various questions might arise, of which the precise tenor could not be foreseen, and which might demand a prompt decision. That the issue of those questions might involve the result of war or peace, and in either alternative, the delay of reference to the Governor-General's authority might endanger the seasonable despatch, and the ultimate prosperity of the public service. That the success of the military operations placed under the direction of the honourable Major-General Wellesley by the Governor-General's instructions to the Resident at Poonah of the 30th of May, might depend on the timely decision of various political questions which might occur with relation to the interests and views of the several Mahratta chiefs and Jaggeerdars and of their Highness's the Peishwa and Nizam, and that on the other hand the issue of every political arrangement then under negotiation with the powers of Hindoostan and the Deccan; must be inseparably blended with the movements of the army under the command of Major-General Wellesley.

The Governor-General therefore deemed it necessary during that crisis to unite the general control of all political and military affairs in Hindoostan and the Deccan, connected with the depending negotiation and with the movement of the army, under a distinct local authority subject to the Governor-General in Council, and the Governor-General was decidedly of opinion that those powers could not be placed with advantage in any other hands than those of the general officer commanding the troops destined to restore the tranquillity of the Deccan; and the approved ability, zeal, temper, activity and judgment of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, combined with his extensive local experience, his established influence, and high reputation among the Mahratta chiefs and states, and Major-General Wellesley's intimate knowledge of the Governor-General's views and sentiments concerning the British interests in the Mahratta empire, determined the Governor-General to vest those important and arduous powers in that officer's hands. The same powers were also vested in Lieut.-General Stuart in the event of his assuming the immediate command of the forces in the Deccan.

Under these instructions the honourable Major-General Wellesley was autho-

vised and empowered to commence and conclude negotiations with any of the Mahratta chiefs and Jaggeerdars on the part of the British Government for the purpose of promoting the general objects of the alliance lately concluded with his Highness the Peishwa, or that subsisting with his Highness the Nizam.

This general authority especially empowered Major-General Wellesley either directly or through the representatives or officers of the British Government, to negotiate and conclude any engagements with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with the Rajah of Berar, or with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which might induce those chieftains to retire with their forces within the limits of their respective dominions, or to afford any other satisfactory pledge of their respective pacific intentions towards the British Government and its allies.

Major-General Wellesley was also authorized under this instruction to arbitrate on the part of the British Government the terms of any convention between his Highness the Peishwa and those chieftains respectively for the settlement of mutual differences or demands, or for the adjustment of relative pretensions, and to pledge the guarantee of the British Government for the observance of those terms by the contracting parties. Major-General Wellesley was also empowered to arbitrate and guarantee the terms of accommodation between Scindiah and Holkar if any points should yet remain unadjusted between those chieftains; and to frame, negotiate, and guarantee any terms between those chieftains jointly or separately and the Rajah of Berar.

It was the particular intention of the Governor-General by these instructions to enable Major-General Wellesley to conclude such arrangements with any of those chieftains, either separately or combined, as might preclude or frustrate any confederacy or other measures directed to the subversion of the treaty of Bassein, or to the injury of our own rights and interests, or those of our allies.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley was further instructed to hold the most unreserved and confidential intercourse with the Residents at Poonah, at Hyderabad, and at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and also with the Resident in the territory of the Guikwar, and to correspond with Lord Clive and with Mr. Duncan.

In the execution of these instructions Major-General Wellesley was authorised and directed to employ any additional military staff, and to require the services of any civil officers whose services Major-General Wellesley might deem necessary to the despatch of the arduous affairs connected with the subject of those orders.

The Governor-General at the same time notified to the honourable Major-General Wellesley his Excellency's views and intentions with regard to the operations of the army under Major-General Wellesley's command, and to such political proceedings as might be connected with a state of war between the British Government and those chiefs.

In the Governor-General's despatch upon that subject, which was dated the 27th of June, 1803, the honourable Major-General Wellesley was directed to desire Colonel Collins to demand an explicit declaration of the views of Scindiah and of the Rajah of Berar, within such a number of days as should appear to Major-General Wellesley to be reasonable, consistently with a due attention to the period of the season, and to the eventual prosecution of hostilities with every practicable degree of advantage; and if that explanation should not be satisfactory, Major-General Wellesley was directed to desire Colonel Collins to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In that event, or in any other state of circumstances which might appear to Major-General Wellesley to require hostilities, Major-General Wellesley was directed to employ the forces under his command in the most active operations

against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, or against both, according to his discretion, and in the event of hostilities, Major-General Wellesley was instructed to proceed to the utmost extremity which might appear to Major-General Wellesley to promise success, without admitting pacific negotiation until the power of the opposing chiefs should have been completely destroyed.

In any crisis Major-General Wellesley was empowered to conclude peace with Scindiah, or with the Rajah of Berar jointly or separately, on such terms as might appear to Major-General Wellesley most advisable.

The extensive powers vested in Major-General Wellesley rendered it necessary to combine with these instructions the notification of his Excellency's sentiments with regard to the terms of peace with the confederated chieftains. It is the intention of the Governor-General in Council, however, to address your honourable Committee separately on the subject of the peace actually concluded with those chieftains. The Governor-General in Council therefore deems it unnecessary at present to attract the notice of your honourable Committee to that part of the Governor-General's instructions to Major-General Wellesley of the 27th June, further than to observe that those instructions contained the general outlines of a plan of pacification with the confederates.

In these instructions Major-General Wellesley was directed to act towards Jeswunt Rao Holkar on the principles prescribed for the regulation of his conduct towards the confederated chieftains, in the event of that chieftain joining the confederacy.

The Governor-General stated it to be his opinion that it was not desirable to erect Holkar's accidental power into an established state of India, and that his reduction would be the most advisable policy; the Governor-General however deemed it proper to leave the conduct and modification of our relations with Holkar entirely to Major-General Wellesley's discretion, directing that officer at the same time not to prosecute hostilities against Holkar merely for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the plunder of Aurungabad, or for any other predatory incursion.

The attention of the honourable Major-General Wellesley was also directed to the important object of encouraging all European officers to withdraw from the service of the confederates in the event of hostilities.

The Governor-General also signified to Major-General Wellesley, that after the insolent and hostile declaration of Scindiah to Colonel Collins on the 28th of May, His Excellency would not consider Scindiah's retreat across the Nerbudda alone to be a sufficient proof of his pacific intentions. Unless therefore in the judgment of Major-General Wellesley Scindiah should have afforded full satisfaction and security, Major-General Wellesley was authorized to pursue Scindiah across the Nerbudda. The same principle was stated to be applicable to the Rajah of Berar, whose retreat within the limits of his dominions or elsewhere could not exclusively amount to a sufficient degree of satisfaction and security after the recent proofs which the confederacy had disclosed, of determined hostility and arrogant ambition. In all the movements of his army, and in all his proceedings under these instructions, Major-General Wellesley was directed to advert to the precarious state of the Nizam's health, and to the necessity of preserving our interests at Hyderabad in the event of his Highness's decease.

Copies of the instructions to Major-General Wellesley of the 26th and 27th of June were forwarded to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, with instructions to be prepared to employ the disposable military force at Bombay for the reduction of the fort and territory of Baroach, and of the possessions of Scindiah in Guzerat, and to the southward of the Nerbudda.

The honourable the Governor of Bombay was at the same time apprized that the British troops and those of our allies in Guzerat were to be considered to form a part of the army under Major-General Wellesley's command. The honourable the Governor of Bombay was further instructed to direct the Resident at Baroda to maintain a constant correspondence with Major-General Wellesley on all points connected with the public service, and the honourable the Governor of Bombay was requested to afford to Major-General Wellesley, and eventually to Lieut.-General Stuart every practicable degree of assistance in the exercise of the powers which the Governor-General had deemed it necessary to delegate to those officers respectively by his instructions of the 26th of June.

Copies of the instructions to the honourable Major-General Wellesley of the 26th and 27th of June were also transmitted to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, with directions to his Lordship to promote the objects of those instructions on all practicable occasions.

Subsequently to the despatch of the notes of instruction to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief noticed in the preceding paragraph, the Governor-General received through the Secretary in the secret department, some suggestions which Major Frith, an officer of cavalry on the establishment of Bengal, with a laudable zeal for the public service transmitted for the Governor-General's consideration relative to the means of withdrawing from the regular corps in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, British subjects holding commissions in the military service of that chieftain, and natives of the honourable Company's dominions employed in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army, in the event of a war with that chieftain. Those suggestions appearing to the Governor-General to be calculated to promote the object of destroying the efficiency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's regular troops, the Governor-General transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief a copy of Major Frith's communication with instructions, under date the 13th of July, for carrying into effect the measures suggested by Major Frith.

The Governor-General transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, together with those instructions, proclamations to be issued at such time as might appear to the Commander-in-Chief advisable, requiring all British subjects holding employment in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of any Mahratta Chieftain confederated with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to relinquish the service of those chieftains respectively within three months from the date of the proclamation, and to repair to the head quarters of the army, or to the officer who might be appointed to receive them, and promising to pay to such British subjects as should obey the proclamation, a pension equal to the annual pay or allowances which they might receive from Dowlut Rao Scindiah or any of his allies during the continuance of hostilities, or so long as such British subject might be employed by the honourable Company; and engaging that after quitting the service of the Company, they should receive every indulgence suitable to their situation, and consistent with the principles and regulations of the British Government. It was further declared that all British subjects who should bear arms against the British Government should be considered to have forfeited their right to the protection of the British Government, and should be treated accordingly. The benefits of the proclamation were declared to be extended to all subjects of France, or of any other foreign, European, or American state holding employment in the military service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or of his allies, who should comply with its terms; another proclamation was also transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, requiring all natives of the British territories in India holding employment in the military service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or his allies, to leave that service, and to repair to the station of the receiving officer, and promising service to all such persons in

the Company's army, or a provision equal to the amount of the pay and allowances which they had been accustomed to receive on their producing authentic proofs of their having quitted the Mahratta service in consequence of the proclamation. The last proclamation was afterwards extended to the subjects of the Nabob Vizier holding employment in the military service of the confederates.

The Governor-General at the same time suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the expediency of taking advantage of the increase of the native regiments to the war establishment, and of the augmentation of the army to provide for the employment of the native officers and Sepoys who might abandon the Mahratta service under the proclamation.

The Commander-in-Chief was authorized to assign to the European officers, British subjects, or foreigners, the pay of their respective ranks in the Mahratta service until they should receive employment in the service of the allies or tributaries of the British Government, or until such of them as were inclined to return to Europe should be furnished with the means of proceeding on the same terms as the French officers formerly in the service of the Nizam.

The Commander-in-Chief was authorized to appoint receiving officers at such places as he might deem proper for the purpose of receiving all European officers, and all native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and Sepoys who might relinquish the Mahratta service.

The Commander-in-Chief was further instructed to direct copies of the proclamations regarding natives of India to be distributed to the families (residing in the Company's territories) of the native officers and Sepoys in the Mahratta service, in order that the terms of the proclamation might be speedily promulgated. Copies of the proclamations were transmitted to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, Major-General Wellesley, to the Residents at Hyderabad, Poonah, and Lucknow, and to the Governor-General's agent in the ceded provinces for the purpose of being issued as soon as the proper period for their promulgation should arrive.

In conformity to the notes transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief on the 28th June, as stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, on the 27th July, the Governor-General, by an official despatch, communicated to the Commander-in-Chief in detail the sentiments and instructions of this Government with regard to the general plan of military operations and political arrangements to be adopted in Hindostan in the event of a war between the British Government and the confederated chieftains. The Governor-General subsequently transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief distinct instructions on various branches of the proposed plan of political arrangement.

The first of these despatches commences with a statement of the Governor-General's views and intentions with regard to the following important points:—

1st. The objects which appeared to be most desirable to be attained in the prosecution of hostilities against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar on the north-western frontier of Hindostan.

2dly. The general plan of military operations, by which these objects appeared to be attainable with the greatest degree of expedition and security.

3dly. The course of political arrangements and negotiations which the Governor-General proposed to pursue under the Commander-in-Chief's superintendance, for the purpose of facilitating the operations of the army, and of ensuring the stability of peace, under the most favourable conditions to the British interests.

The Governor-General commenced the discussion of those subjects by explaining the peculiar circumstances which rendered the north-western frontier of Oude the most vulnerable part of our extensive empire.

The Governor-General observed, that a sense of the dangers to which the interests and security of the British empire in India were exposed in that quarter, had concurred with other motives to produce those arrangements with the Nabob Vizier, which terminated in the treaty of Lucknow, concluded in the month of November, 1801. That those arrangements had certainly afforded a great accession of security to the British empire, but that the local position of Scindiah's territories, and the condition and nature of his military force, still constituted a source of serious danger to the British interests, by affording to Scindiah peculiar advantage in any attack upon the British dominions, which an accession of power, or an eventual connection with France, or with any enemy to the British interests, might induce Dowlut Rao Scindiah to undertake. That, formidable as the power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah might have become in the event of any accession to his strength, a danger more urgent and more direct in all its consequences, had grown out of the decline of Scindiah's local authority in Hindostan, by the establishment of a powerful and independent French state on the most vulnerable part of the Company's frontier, which French state held possession of the person and nominal authority of the Mogul, maintained the most efficient army of regular native infantry, and the most powerful artillery existing in India, with the exception of the Company's forces, and exercised a considerable influence over the neighbouring states, from the banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges.

The Governor-General then proceeded to describe the dangers to which the British empire was exposed by the strength and local position of that French force, adverting particularly to the encouragement and to the essential aid which such a force might afford to the attempts of France in the prosecution of war with the British power, and the Governor-General observed, that no instrument of destruction more skillfully adapted to wound the heart of the British empire in India could be presented to the vindictive hand of the chief Consul of France.

The Governor-General further remarked that in the supposition of the most intimate connection between Scindiah and the British Government, and even in the event of Scindiah's accession to the general defensive alliance with the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, it was impossible to suppose that this French state would co-operate with cordiality in support of the British interests, consequently that the aid of Scindiah's power even under a defensive alliance could be least expected in the case which would most essentially demand it, an attack from France upon the British possessions in India. The Governor-General proceeded to observe, that under the expected renewal of the war with France, and the consequent necessity of resorting to every practicable measure of precaution and security, the safety of the British dominions required the reduction of the French force established in the Doab, independently of any question which might exist between Scindiah and the British Government; and from this consideration his Excellency deduced a right on the part of the British Government in a state of profound peace and even of alliance with Scindiah to demand the removal of a danger so imminent from the frontier of our dominions. The Governor-General observed, that the refusal or inability of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to comply with that demand would authorize and require the British Government to assume the protection of its own territories, and to remove with its own hand the proximate cause of insecurity and alarm.

The Governor-General then proceeded to state the most desirable objects of the war on the north-western frontier of Hindostan to be the entire reduction of the regular corps under the command of M. Perron, the occupation of the whole tract

of country forming the Doab between the Jumna and Ganges to the mountains of Cumaon, and the occupation of Delhi and Agra, and of a chain of posts on the right bank of the Jumna from the mountains of Cumaon to the province of Bundelcund, observing at the same time that it was not his Excellency's desire to extend the actual possessions of the Company beyond the line of the Jumna, including Agra and Delhi, with a continued chain of posts for the purpose of securing the navigation of that river, and that whatever connections should be formed beyond the prescribed line to the southward and westward of the Jumna must be regulated on the principle of defensive alliance or tributary dependance, in such manner as to form between the actual possessions of the Company and the Mahrattas, a barrier of petty states exercising the internal government of their respective dominions in alliance with the Company and under the protection of our power.

His Excellency proceeded to advert to the importance of securing the person and nominal authority of the Mogul against the designs of France, and the increase of reputation to the British name, which would result from affording an honourable asylum to the person and family of that injured and unfortunate Monarch; and the Governor-General observed, that the reduction of the French force would afford us the means of forming alliances with all the inferior states beyond the Jumna, for the purpose of enabling us in the first instance to prosecute the war with the greatest advantage, and finally by forming a barrier composed of those states to exclude Scindiah and the Mahrattas altogether from the northern districts of Hindostan.

His Excellency also stated the ultimate annexation of the province of Bundelcund to the Company's dominions to be an object of peculiar advantage with reference to the province and city of Benares and to the general defence of that highly important and valuable portion of the British dominions. His Excellency then directed the attention of the Commander-in-Chief specifically to those several objects, and proceeded to communicate to the Commander-in-Chief his sentiments and instructions with regard to the general course of measures to be pursued for the successful accomplishment of those objects, observing that the first object of the Commander-in-Chief's movements must be the effectual destruction of the French state erected by M. Perron in the Doab, and directing the Commander-in-Chief to form such an arrangement and disposition of the army as should appear to afford the most absolute security for the accomplishment of that object previously to the conclusion of the rains.

The Governor-General stated the point of most urgent importance connected with the destruction of M. Perron's force to be the security of the person of the Mogul and of the heir apparent.

The next object of importance was stated by the Governor-General to be the reduction of the fortress of Agra, and his Excellency suggested to the Commander-in-Chief some observations with regard to the time and the mode of effecting that important operation, leaving however the determination of that question to the Commander-in-Chief's judgment.

The occupation of Bundelcund is stated by the Governor-General to be the next object of importance, and the Governor-General was of opinion that the detachment assembled at Allahabad for the purpose of covering Benares would suffice for the occupation of that province.

The Governor-General apprized the Commander-in-Chief of the plan of defensive measures which the Governor-General had adopted on the whole of the frontier from Mirzapore to Midnapore (of which a statement is contained in

subsequent paragraphs of this despatch), and directed the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the early occupation of the passes leading from the Deccan into Hindostan.

In the notes which accompanied these instructions, the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was especially directed to the occupation of Gwalior, which was garrisoned by the troops of Ambajee, and which covers the principal route from Oujein into Scindiah's former possessions in Hindostan.

The Rana of Gohud, although deprived by the usurpation of the late Mahajee Scindiah of his hereditary possessions, and destitute of power and resources, was believed to retain a considerable influence with the tribe of Jauts, and to be anxious to obtain the support of the British Government. It was supposed that with the support of the British Government, the Rana of Gohud would be enabled to raise a considerable force, which might assist in opposing the march of Scindiah into Hindostan, whilst the occupation of Gwalior by the British troops would enable us to maintain the Rana's authority in the country of Gohud, and would encourage the Jauts to assist their native chief in opposing the incursions of Scindiah's troops.

In prosecution of these objects the Commander-in-Chief was directed to open a negotiation with the Rana of Gohud. With regard however to the occupation of Gwalior, the Governor-General suggested the expediency of postponing a regular siege of that fortress until by the defeat of M. Perron's force, a sufficient detachment could be spared for that purpose. The Governor-General at the same time stated the probability of our being enabled to obtain possession of that important fortress by means of amicable negotiation with Ambajee, who had repeatedly manifested a disposition to connect his interests with those of the British Government.

The Governor-General also communicated to the Commander-in-Chief in general terms the orders which had been issued to the honourable Major-General Wellesley and the honourable the Governor of Bombay for the eventual prosecution of hostilities against the confederated chieftains in the Deccan and against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the western side of the Peninsula.

The attention of the Commander-in-Chief was also directed to the adoption of an arrangement calculated to secure tranquillity within the Nabob Vizier's possessions during the war.

The Governor-General signified to the Commander-in-Chief, that by a separate letter the Governor-General had vested the Commander-in-Chief with special powers for the conduct of all political negotiations and arrangements connected with the operation of the British army, and referred the Commander-in-Chief to that letter, and to instructions which the Governor-General had issued to Mr. Mercer, (and which are particularly noticed in subsequent paragraphs of this despatch), and to another separate letter from the Governor-General respecting the situation of his Majesty Shah Alum, (which letter is also particularly noticed in subsequent paragraphs of this despatch) for information with regard to the course of political measures to be pursued with a view of facilitating the Commander-in-Chief's military operations. The Governor-General, however, deemed it necessary to direct the attention of the Commander-in-Chief especially to the employment of his endeavours to detach M. Perron from Scindiah's service by pacific negotiation under proper precautions, and conveyed authority to the Commander-in-Chief for concluding an agreement for the security of M. Perron's personal interests and property, accompanied by any reasonable remuneration from the British Government which might induce him to deliver up the whole of

his military resources and power, together with his territorial possessions and the person of the Mogul, and of the heir apparent into the Commander-in-Chief's hands.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to state the substance of the Governor-General's instructions of the 22nd of July to Mr. Mercer, the Agent appointed by the Governor-General to assist the Commander-in-Chief in carrying into effect the Governor-General's instructions with regard to the occupation of the province of Bundelcund and to other branches of political arrangement, as described in the Governor-General's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the 27th of July, and in the notes which preceded and were annexed to that despatch.

The local knowledge, political experience, and approved zeal, ability and discretion which distinguished Mr. Mercer, and which that gentleman had eminently manifested in the situation of Secretary to the Lieut.-Governor of the ceded provinces, appeared to the Governor-General to qualify Mr. Mercer in a peculiar degree for the situation of Political Agent in Hindostan.

The Governor-General was further induced to employ Mr. Mercer on that occasion by the consideration that none of the Company's civil servants who by habits, knowledge or experience, were in any degree qualified for that situation, could have been removed from their actual employments in other important branches of the service without considerable interruption to the despatch of business, and without essential injury to the public interests.*

When the honourable Henry Wellesley, late Lieut.-Governor of the ceded provinces, was at Illahabad on his return from the ceded provinces, Himmut Bahauder, one of the Peishwa's officers employed in the province of Bundelcund, transmitted proposals to Mr. Wellesley for the transfer of that province to the authority of the honourable Company; at that period of time the proposals of Himmut Bahauder could not have been accepted without manifest injustice to the rights of his Highness the Peishwa; but under the expectation of an immediate war between the confederated chieftains and the British Government now allied with his Highness the Peishwa, the occupation for the Peishwa of that part of the province of Bundelcund which belonged to the Peishwa became a measure of justice with respect to the Peishwa, and of expediency with reference to the maintenance of the Peishwa's rights and interests, to the defence of the Company's possessions, and to the success of the Commander-in-Chief's operations on the north-western quarter of Hindostan.

The considerations which induced the Governor-General to authorize the adoption of measures for the occupation of Bundelcund by the British troops with the aid of his Highness the Peishwa's officer, Himmut Bahauder, are stated in his Excellency's instructions to Mr. Mercer, and for the accomplishment of that object, Mr. Mercer was directed by his instructions to proceed in the first instance with the utmost expedition to Illahabad. The proposals which Himmut Bahauder formerly transmitted to the honourable Henry Wellesley had been recently renewed and forwarded by that chieftain directly to the Governor-General through the Collector of Illahabad.

In conformity to the principles above stated, the Governor-General addressed a letter to Himmut Bahauder, stating in general terms his Excellency's views with respect to the province of Bundelcund, and desiring him to despatch to Illahabad a confidential Agent for the express purpose of conferring with Mr. Mercer on the details of the proposed arrangement. The objects of Himmut Bahauder were

* Mr. Mercer belonged to the medical branch of the Company's service.

stated to be the attainment of a jaggeer within the Company's provinces, and the release of his relation Omrao Geer, a subject of the Nabob Vizier, who had been convicted of participating in the revolt of Vizier Ally, and in consequence was in confinement at Lucknow. Mr. Mercer was authorized to accede to these conditions under a reservation with respect to the degree in which the exertions of Himmüt Bahaudur might be applied for the attainment of the desired object.

The imperfect knowledge possessed by this government with respect to the internal state of Bundelcund and of the relative situations of the several Bundelah chiefs possessing power or influence in that province precluded the practicability of determining at that time the specific arrangements which it might be advisable to enter into with them for the attainment of the object in view. Mr. Mercer was informed that those arrangements were to be regulated by the information which he might be enabled to acquire on those points after his arrival at Allahabad, and by the general spirit of his Excellency's views and intentions.

The Governor-General, however, added to that intimation some general instructions with regard to the nature of the engagements to be concluded with those chieftains.

Some general instructions were also communicated to Mr. Mercer with respect to the conclusion of engagements with Rajah Adjeet Sing, the hereditary chief of Bogheilcund or Rewah Muckundpoor, by which that chieftain should consent to oppose any attempt on the part of the enemy to penetrate into his country through the passes which are situated on the frontier of that province. This negotiation was subsequently transferred to the Magistrate of Mirzapore, and its progress and result will be stated in a subsequent part of this despatch.

In pursuing the instructions to Mr. Mercer, the Governor-General proceeded to state his Excellency's sentiments on the subject of concluding engagements with the Rana of Gohud and other chiefs of the tribe of Jauts, whose ancient territories had been subjected to the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and who were supposed to be anxious for an opportunity of obtaining their emancipation from the oppressive authority of the Mahrattas.

The Governor-General was decidedly of opinion, that in the event of a war, the security of the British possessions in the Doab required the entire extinction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's authority and influence in the north-western provinces of Hindostan, but that the extension of the British dominion on the west of the Jumna was not desirable beyond the province of Bundelcund, and the posts or territory necessary to secure the navigation of the river Jumna. On this principle therefore the Governor-General authorized the conclusion of engagements with the Rana of Gohud and other chieftains in the north-western provinces of Hindostan, securing to them the undisturbed possession of their hereditary tenures, on the condition of their zealous and ready co-operation with the British Government to the extent of their respective means in expelling the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from that quarter of Hindostan, and in preventing any future attempt on the part of that chieftain or of any other foreign power to establish an authority in those provinces.

With this view the Governor-General deemed it expedient to authorize an eventual advance of money to the Rana of Gohud (who was said to possess considerable influence with all the chiefs of the tribe of Jauts) to enable him to collect his adherents and to co-operate with the British forces.

The Governor-General also addressed a letter to the Rana of Gohud, inviting his co-operation, which Mr. Mercer was directed to convey to that chieftain, if his co-operation should subsequently be considered an object of importance.

The Governor-General next adverted to the importance of concluding defensive

engagements with the Rajpoot chieftains of Jyenagur and Jodepore with a view to the effectual exclusion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the north-western provinces of Hindostan.

Previously to the date of these instructions, the Governor-General had transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief letters addressed to those Rajahs, containing proposals on the part of the British Government for the conclusion of a defensive alliance.

Copies of those letters were enclosed in Mr. Mercer's instructions; and Mr. Mercer was referred to these documents for information with regard to the nature of the engagements proposed to be concluded with those chieftains.

The general tenor of the Governor-General's propositions was; that in the event of hostilities between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore should co-operate with the whole of their forces against the possessions of that chieftain and of his allies. That the actual possessions and the just rights and independence of those Rajahs should be guaranteed by the British Government against the attempts of any state or power to injure or invade them. That those Rajahs should engage to conclude a definitive treaty of perpetual defensive alliance with the British Government on such terms as should hereafter be adjusted between the contracting parties.

The Governor-General at the same time stated in his instructions to Mr. Mercer the expediency of obtaining the consent of the Jaut and Rajpoot chiefs to the establishment of a British subsidiary force within their dominions.

The Governor-General then proceeded to state his views and intentions with respect to Zeib-oo-Nissa Begum, commonly named Sumroo's Begum. The Begum's Jagheer being situated within the Doab, the Governor-General expressed his desire that in any engagements entered into on the part of the British Government, such conditions might be inserted as might facilitate the introduction of the British regulations into the Jagheer, in the event of the settlement of the adjoining parts of the Doab being formed upon the system of Government established in the British possessions.

The Governor-General had at different times received from Sumroo's Begum letters containing the expression of her desire to place herself under the protection of the British Government. Adverting to the relation in which the Begum stood towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it was impracticable even if it had been desirable to accede to her propositions during the existence of amity and peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, without a violation of good faith. The Governor-General therefore had uniformly declined those proposals, signifying however to the Begum that if an occasion should ever occur, the Governor-General would be happy to receive the proofs of her attachment to the British Government.

The late conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah however removed every objection to the acceptance of the Begum's proposals. The Governor-General therefore addressed a letter to the Begum, adverting to his Excellency's reply to her original propositions, and referring her to the Commander-in-Chief for a detail of the arrangements which it would be proper to adopt for the purpose of connecting her interests with those of the British Government; and the Begum was at the same time required to despatch a confidential agent to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, for the purpose of conferring with the Commander-in-Chief on that subject. That letter was subsequently transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with separate instructions on that subject from the Governor-General, of which the substance will be found stated in a subsequent part of this despatch.

The Governor-General deeming it to be of the utmost importance that the details of the measures directed by those instructions should be conducted under

the inspection of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Mercer was directed as soon as he might deem the negotiation with respect to Bundelcund to be in such a state of progress as to admit of his proceeding to join his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to entrust the further prosecution of the arrangement for the occupation of Bundelcund to the collector of Allahabad and to proceed to the head quarters of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, by whom Mr. Mercer would be furnished with such further instructions as might appear to be necessary.

By a separate letter to the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 27th of July, the Governor-General in Council vested the Commander-in-Chief with the powers necessary to enable the Commander-in-Chief to carry into effect the operations and political arrangements prescribed by the Governor-General's despatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the same date.

The letter to the Commander-in-Chief, which vests him with full powers to carry into effect those operations and arrangements, accords in principle with the instructions which were issued to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, under date the 26th June, 1803, vesting that officer with full powers to undertake all negotiations and arrangements connected either with the prosecution of war, or with the conclusion of peace.

The Commander-in-Chief was vested with full powers to decide upon any question which might arise in the prosecution of the measures prescribed by the Governor-General's orders with relation to any points connected with the affairs of the Mahratta states bordering the Jumna. His Excellency was however directed to refer to the Governor-General in all cases where immediate decision did not appear to be absolutely necessary. Under the same reservations the Commander-in-Chief was empowered to commence and to conclude negotiations with any of the Mahratta chiefs and Jageerdars, for the purpose of promoting the general objects of the alliance with the Peishwa or of the operations in the field.

The Commander-in-Chief was also especially empowered to conclude any engagements with M. Perron or any of Scindiah's European or native officers, with any of the chieftains or Rajahs of Bundelcund, with the Rajahs of Jyenagur or Jodepore, and other Rajpoot chiefs, and with the Rana of Gohud and other Jaut chieftains, with Sumroo's Begum, and with any other chiefs of the Seiks on the principles stated in the instructions to Mr. Mercer, the substance of which has been already submitted to your honourable Committee.

The Commander-in-Chief was also empowered to conclude engagements with his Majesty Shah Aulum, with reference however to a separate letter respecting his Majesty; and the Commander-in-Chief was further authorized to conclude such engagements with the subordinate Mahratta chieftains, situated on the north-western frontier of Oude, as might appear expedient for the purpose of securing their co-operation in the event of war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

The Governor-General intimated to the Commander-in-Chief that copies of those instructions would be sent to Lieut.-General Stuart, to Major-General Wellesley, to the Residents at the several courts, and to the Governor-General's agent in the ceded provinces, with directions to each of those authorities to co-operate with the Commander-in-Chief in all points connected with the exercise of the powers vested in the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commander-in-Chief was also requested to hold the most confidential and unreserved intercourse with Major-General Wellesley, copies of whose instructions were transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief for his Excellency's information.

In the execution of the preceding instructions, the Commander-in-Chief was

authorized to require the services of any civil officers, whose assistance might be deemed necessary to the despatch of affairs connected with the subject of the Governor-General's orders.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the substance of his Excellency's separate instructions to the Commander-in-Chief on distinct branches of the general plan of operations and political arrangements communicated to the Commander-in-Chief in the Governor-General's despatch to his Excellency of the 27th July.

By a separate letter of that date, the Commander-in-Chief was furnished with a detail of the measures to be pursued with respect to his Majesty Shah Aulum and the royal family, in the event of his Majesty and the royal family coming under the protection of the British Government.

Deeming it to be desirable that his Majesty Shah Aulum should be speedily apprized of the Governor-General's intentions in his Majesty's favour, the Governor-General addressed a letter to his Majesty, intimating that in the actual crisis of affairs, his Majesty would probably have an early opportunity of placing himself under the protection of the British Government; and assuring his Majesty that if he should be disposed to accept the asylum which the Commander-in-Chief had been directed to offer to him, every demonstration of respect and attention would be manifested towards his Majesty on the part of the British Government, and that an adequate provision would be made for the support of his Majesty and of his family and household, and referring his Majesty for further details to the communications of the Commander-in-Chief.

This letter was transmitted to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, with instructions respecting the mode of forwarding it to his Majesty.

With a view to provide against the probable attempt of the French officer in charge of the Mogul's person, to place his Majesty beyond the reach of our power in the event of any movement of the British troops against Delhi, the Commander-in-Chief was particularly instructed to regulate the operations of the army in such a manner as to frustrate the success of such a plan.

The Governor-General observed to the Commander-in-Chief, that the arrangement to be finally concluded with respect to his Majesty Shah Aulum, involved questions of great political and national importance which would form the subject of future deliberation. That for the present it was the intention of the Governor-General merely to secure for his Majesty the protection of the British Government, and to assign to his Majesty and to the royal family of Delhi, a provision for their immediate support, the extent of which must be regulated by future events. The Governor-General, however, expressed his opinion that the Emperor would not hesitate to place himself under British protection without any previous stipulation. The apparent impossibility of his Majesty effecting his escape from Delhi for the purpose of claiming the proffered protection of the British Government, rendered it unnecessary to contemplate that event.

The occupation of Delhi, appeared to the Governor-General to afford the only prospect of affording to his Majesty the protection of the British power. The Governor-General expressed to the Commander-in-Chief an anxious desire that when that event should take place, his Majesty and the royal family should immediately experience the benefit of the change, by receiving from the Commander-in-Chief and from all persons acting under the British authority, every demonstration of reverence and respectful care, and that every regard should be paid to the comfort and convenience of his Majesty and the royal family, consistent with the due security of their persons. The Governor-General directed that if his Majesty Shah Aulum should come under the protection of the British Government, the Commander-in-

Chief should immediately appoint a civil or military officer properly qualified to attend his Majesty in the capacity of representative of the British Government, with instructions to such officer for the regulation of his conduct towards his Majesty and the royal family, founded on the actual circumstances of their situation.

Under the Governor-General's resolution to postpone any final arrangement with respect to his Majesty and the royal family, the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to decline entering into any negotiation with his Majesty for that purpose. The Commander-in-Chief was also directed to refer to the Governor-General any propositions which might be received from his Majesty of a nature to admit the delay of a reference.

The nature of the instructions to Mr. Mercer, of which the substance is stated in former paragraphs of this despatch, rendered it necessary to transmit to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief directions which might enable the Commander-in-Chief to regulate and support Mr. Mercer's proceedings, and to carry into effect such of the measures described in Mr. Mercer's instructions as depended for their immediate execution on the exercise of the powers vested in the Commander-in-Chief. The Governor-General accordingly issued separate instructions to the Commander-in-Chief for that express purpose. The objects to which the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was particularly directed were—1st. To the support of the arrangements which Mr. Mercer might conclude with the chiefs of Bundelcund, by the application of a military force to such an extent as the Commander-in-Chief might deem sufficient to the exigencies of the public service in that quarter. 2ndly. The conclusion of arrangements with the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepoor calculated to secure their eventual co-operation with the British troops against the Mahratta power.

The Governor-General in Council has already stated to your honourable Committee the substance of the letters, which the Governor-General addressed to the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepoor, with a view to obtain the co-operation of those chieftains, and to induce them to conclude treaties of defensive alliance with the British Government. Those letters were privately despatched to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with instructions to forward them to their respective addresses, with every practicable degree of secrecy and expedition.

The Governor-General stated to the Commander-in-Chief that he had every reason to be satisfied of the disposition of the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepoor to connect themselves with the British Government, for the purpose of emancipating themselves from the oppressive control of the Mahrattas. The Governor-General at the same time observed, that the dread of M. Perron's resentment might deter those chieftains from an immediate manifestation of that disposition. That the immediate despatch of a commissioner to those chieftains for the purpose of negotiation might induce M. Perron to adopt measures to prevent their co-operation with the British forces, and that the danger of a disclosure would probably prevent those chieftains from despatching confidential agents to the Commander-in-Chief, agreeably to the suggestion contained in the Governor-General's letters to their address.

The Governor-General therefore suggested to the Commander-in-Chief, the expediency of communicating his sentiments on that subject in writing to the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepoor, if those chieftains in consequence of the Governor-General's propositions should signify to the Commander-in-Chief their desire to co-operate with the British forces.

The third object to which the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was directed, was the proposed arrangement with the Rana of Gohud. His Excellency was directed to regulate his proceedings with regard to that chieftain, and the Jauts

according to the information which his Excellency might receive from Mr. Mercer respecting the situation, power, and disposition of those chieftains.

The attention of the Commander-in-Chief was directed 4thly. to the arrangement which the Governor-General proposed to conclude with respect to the Jagheer of Sumroo's Begum. The Commander-in-Chief was furnished with copies of the letters from the Begum to the Governor-General, communicating her desire to place herself under the protection of the British Government, and of the Governor-General's reply.

The Governor-General also transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief the letter to the Begum, in which the Governor-General communicated to her his acceptance of her proposals.

The Governor-General requested that the Commander-in-Chief's negotiations with the Begum might be directed to the object of facilitating the future introduction of the British regulations into her Jagheer in the manner described in Mr. Mercer's instructions.

The Governor-General also signified to the Commander-in-Chief his desire, that the Begum's Jagheer should be ultimately commuted for a stipend proportioned to the profits of her territorial possessions, and to the services which the British Government might derive from the exertion of her aid and influence.

The Governor-General further suggested to the Commander-in-Chief, that the Begum should be required to recal her battalions serving in the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to employ her influence in the Doab; in supporting the cause of the British Government as the conditions of her admission to the benefit of our protection.

The Governor-General having already apprized the Commander-in-Chief of his Lordship's general views and intentions with respect to the campaign against Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the north-west of India, deemed it necessary to state to the Commander-in-Chief certain rules for the conduct of the army after it should have passed the frontier of the Company's provinces. These rules were calculated to facilitate the success of the British army, to conciliate the minds of the inhabitants of the country, and to enable the Commander-in-Chief to secure supplies in the field. For these purposes the Commander-in-Chief was directed to issue a proclamation in his own name, promising protection to the persons and properties of all such persons as should supply the army on reasonable terms with cattle, grain, &c. with further assurances that no person should be in any way molested excepting such as should appear in arms, or should impede the operations of the army by the removal of any supplies useful to its progress and subsistence.

Great attention to the orderly conduct of the army was recommended with a view to conciliate the inhabitants of the countries through which it might pass; and for the accomplishment of the same object, the Commander-in-Chief was directed to publish from time to time, such assurances as might be adapted to the occasion.

The Governor-General deeming it probable that other of the tributaries, and principal officers of Scindiah, besides those described in the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief and to Mr. Mercer, might be inclined to renounce their allegiance to Scindiah, and to place themselves under the protection of the Company, and being satisfied that the war in which the British Government expected to be involved by the aggression of Scindiah rendered it both just and expedient to take advantage of the discontent and disaffection of the subjects or officers of the enemy, His Excellency empowered the Commander-in-Chief to give to all tributaries and others who should renounce their allegiance to Scindiah, and should zealously endeavour to support the cause of the British Government and

its allies, the most positive assurances of effectual protection in the name of the honourable Company.

The Governor-General also deemed it to be advisable that the inhabitants of that part of the Doab which was subject to the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and M. Perron, should be apprized of the general security of persons and property afforded by the system of administration introduced by the British Government into the ceded provinces, with a view to induce the subjects of the Mahratta power in the Doab, to accept the protection of the Company. It appeared to the Governor-General that the Commander-in-Chief might find it practicable as the army under his command should advance into the enemy's country, to effect a settlement of the revenues of the conquered country for a term of one year with the persons who might be in actual possession. The benefits to be expected from such a measure were—1st. That it would afford an acceptable resource for the prosecution of the war, and 2ndly. That if it were effected on moderate terms, it might attach to our cause a body of men who would not only possess the means of affording essential assistance in the provision of supplies, but who would likewise oppose a formidable barrier against any incursions into our own territories, or into the reserved dominions of the Nabob Vizier.

With a view to secure to the Commander-in-Chief the aid of all the civil and military servants of the Company on every requisite occasion, a proclamation was issued by the Governor-General in Council commanding all the civil servants and military officers subject to the authority of this government, to pay prompt obedience to all such requisitions or orders as they might receive from the Commander-in-Chief.

By a reference to the notes which were transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the month of June 1803, your honourable Committee will observe, that the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief above-detailed were founded exclusively on the plan of operations and arrangements described in those notes. The information which the Governor-General received from the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, between the date on which those notes were despatched, and the date of his Excellency's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief abundantly confirmed the necessity of the measures which the Governor-General had resolved eventually to adopt for the vindication of the right and security of the interests of the British Government and its allies.

The narrative of Colonel Collins's proceedings at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the period of the last daté specified in a former paragraph of this despatch, will be regularly continued in a subsequent paragraph. It is proper however to state in this place, that in a letter from Colonel Collins dated the 14th June, and received on the 6th July, the Resident transmitted a paper of intelligence from his agent at Delhi, stating that messengers from Dowlut Rao Scindiah had lately come to the Rohillah chieftain Gholaum Mohummud Khaun who resided at Nadow; and letters had been received by that chieftain from General Perron inviting him to proceed with his followers towards the station of General Perron's army by the way of Saharunpore, for the purpose of exciting commotions in the Jagheer of Rampore in Rohilcund, and assuring Gholaum Mohummud of ample support both from Scindiah and General Perron, and that General Perron had clandestinely addressed letters to the principal persons residing in the Jagheer of Rampore in Rohilcund and other places, urging them to employ their exertions in disturbing the tranquillity of the Company's possessions.

This intelligence was corroborated by information repeatedly received and communicated to the Governor-General by the Resident at Lucknow and the agent of the Governor-General in the ceded provinces of Oude, of the preparations of Gho-

laum Mohummud Khaun for the avowed purpose of complying with the suggestions which he had received from Scindiah and General Perron, to excite disturbances in the district of Rampore, and to disturb the tranquillity of the Vizier's and the Company's dominions.

In consequence of this information, it became necessary that the conduct and motions of Gholaum Mohummud Khaun should be observed with vigilance, and that every practicable exertion should be made to frustrate the execution of his hostile designs, and to seize his person. Gholaum Mohummud Khaun had for some years resided at Nadown, under the protection of Rājah Sunsar Chund, the proprietor of that territory. Under a supposition that Rājah Sunsar Chund might be induced by motives of self interest to deliver Gholaum Mohummud Khaun into the hands of the British Government, or to detain that chieftain, and thereby prevent the prosecution of his hostile designs, instructions were issued to the Resident at Lucknow, directing him to despatch a confidential agent to Sunsar Chund, for the accomplishment of these objects. A copy of these instructions was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, with a discretionary power to enlarge or limit the powers of the agent to be employed on this occasion, and to alter or to modify the orders to the Resident at Lucknow, in such a manner as in the Commander-in-Chief's judgment might appear best calculated to maintain the peace and tranquillity of Oude and Rohilcund.

On the 26th of July, the Governor-General received from Mr. Leycester, the collector, of Moraudabad, copies of letters from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Gholaum-Mohummud Khaun and Bumboo Khaun (the son of the late Zabeta Khan, who occupied a territory in the vicinity of Saharunpore), declaring the intention of Scindiah to commence a war of aggression against the British power, and instigating those chieftains to co-operate with the forces of General Perron, against the British possessions.

These documents were transmitted to Mr. Leycester by Bumboo Khaun, accompanied by an offer of his services to the British Government.

It was manifest that the public service might be essentially promoted by securing the attachment and exertions of Bumboo Khaun in the actual crisis of affairs, the Governor-General therefore deemed it to be advisable to accept these overtures, and his Excellency accordingly addressed a letter to that chieftain, signifying a disposition to accept his services, and to extend to him in return for his exertions, the protection and power of the British Government.

This letter was transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, together with copies of the letter from the collector of Moraudabad and of its enclosures, and with general instructions for the regulation of the Commander-in-Chief's conduct with respect to Bumboo Khaun.

The Governor-General left to the determination of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the mode in which the influence and exertions of Bumboo Khaun could be most advantageously employed for the benefit of the public service, but at the same time suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the expediency of encouraging Bumboo Khaun to apprehend and to deliver the person of Gholaum Mohummud Khaun into the hands of the British power, or at least to prevent Gholaum Mohummud from proceeding with the force which he might have collected, either for the purpose of joining the army under General Perron, or of effecting disturbances in the territory of the Company, or of the Nabob Vizier.

The concessions to be offered to Bumboo Khaun were necessarily left to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, but the Commander-in-Chief was specially authorized to offer to Bumboo Khaun a pecuniary reward, if the Commander-in-

Chief should be of opinion that such an offer would stimulate the exertions of Bumboo Khaun.

Although the Governor-General entertained no doubt of the authenticity of the letters from Scindiah to Gholaum Mohummud Khaun and Bumboo Khaun, of which the documents transmitted by the latter to Mr. Leycester are said to be copies, his Excellency deemed it advisable to direct Mr. Leycester to endeavour to procure from Bumboo Khaun the originals of those letters, and for that purpose Mr. Leycester was directed to despatch a confidential agent to that chieftain with the necessary instructions; and Mr. Leycester was authorized eventually to offer a considerable sum of money for the attainment of those important documents.

In addition to the measures described in His Excellency's several despatches to the Commander-in-Chief, the substance of which has been already stated, the Governor-General deemed it to be necessary to issue special instructions on the subject of obtaining the co-operation of the principal chieftains of the tribe of Seiks, in the event of a contest with the Mahratta power, and of inducing the Rajah of Putteala to oppose the progress of Gholaum Mohummud Khaun towards the province of Rohilcund.

Deeming it expedient to place under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, persons who might be qualified to aid the Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of the important and extensive arrangements committed to his charge, the Governor-General directed Lieut.-Colonel Symes* (who with a laudable zeal for the public service had relinquished his intention of proceeding to Europe for the benefit of his health, and had offered his services in the existing crisis of affairs), to attend the Commander-in-Chief with the least practicable delay, for the purpose of undertaking such political duties, connected with the operations of the army, as the Commander-in-Chief might think proper to assign to him. The subsequent aggravation of Lieut.-Colonel Symes's severe illness utterly precluded the possibility of his proceeding to join the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, and compelled that highly meritorious and able officer to resume his intention of proceeding to Europe. The duties eventually assigned to Lieut.-Colonel Symes, were subsequently transferred to Captain J. Baillie, in the manner noticed in a subsequent part of this despatch.

The Governor-General in Council has now communicated to your honourable Committee the substance of the provisional instructions issued by the Governor-General to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with regard to the military operations and political arrangements committed to the immediate superintendence of the Commander-in-Chief, in the event of a war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

The instructions issued in conformity to the plan of operations and arrangements, stated in the Governor-General's despatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the 27th of July, for the defence of the line of frontier from Midnapore to Mirzapore, for securing the passes in Bhogaicund, for conducting negotiations with the feudatories and dependents of the Rajah of Berar, on the western confines of the British possessions, and for the occupation of the province of Cuttack, will be

* Formerly employed as ambassador from the British Government to the court of Ava; in the execution of the duties of which mission, Colonel Symes highly distinguished himself by his zeal, ability, and judgment. Colonel Symes published a narrative of his mission, containing also much important and interesting information of an historical, geographical, and statistical nature respecting the Burmese empire

found described in a subsequent part of this despatch, together with the mode in which those instructions were carried into effect.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the subject of Colonel Collins's negotiations, and of the proceedings at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The meeting of the two chiefs, Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, took place on the 4th of June at Mulkapoor, on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam's dominions.

On the 5th, Colonel Collins sent his native Secretary with a complimentary message to the Rajah of Berar. The Rajah received the native Secretary with great civility, and informed him that on the preceding night he had received a letter from the Governor-General, together with a copy of the treaty of Bassein.

The native Secretary was informed by the principal Minister of the Rajah, that the Governor-General's letter brought the first intelligence of the actual conclusion of a treaty between the British Government and the Peishwa; Jadoon Rao (the minister despatched to the Court of the Rajah of Berar by Dowlut Rao Scindiah), having merely stated that those powers were employed in negotiating a treaty.

Nothing passed between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar beyond the customary ceremonies, previously to the evening of the 8th of the month of June, when those chieftains held a long conference. Colonel Collins on the following day directed a confidential native in his employ to intimate to Scindiah, that as he had now had an interview with the Rajah of Berar, it was incumbent on him to give an immediate and explicit answer to the question urged by the Resident at the conference of the 28th of May.

The reply to this intimation was evasive; and as an attempt made by the same agent to procure from Jadoon Rao (who accompanied the Rajah of Berar to Mulkapoor, and had resumed his situation of Prime Minister at the Durbar of Scindiah), some explanation of his master's intentions, was equally unsatisfactory, the Resident on the 12th addressed a memorial to Scindiah, urging the necessity of his declaring his intentions; and stating, that in the event of a refusal to afford an immediate explanation, Colonel Collins would quit Scindiah's camp. The memorial was presented by the Resident's native Secretary, who was informed in reply, that it was necessary for Scindiah to have another interview with the Rajah of Berar, but that an answer should be given in the course of two or three days.

The Resident sent his native Secretary to the camp of the Rajah of Berar, in order to apprise him of the contents of the memorial which the Resident had addressed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to ascertain whether the Rajah of Berar had prepared any answer to the Governor-General's letter of the 13th of May.

The native Secretary explained to the Rajah of Berar the tenor of the conference between Colonel Collins and Scindiah, and the occasion and object of the Resident's memorial; and remarked that, as Scindiah had committed to the Rajah of Berar's wisdom, the alternative of peace or war with the Company, the preservation of friendship would redound highly to his honour, whilst the event of war would have a contrary effect.

To this the Rajah of Berar replied, that he would not give his consent to any measure whatever, until he should perfectly understand the situation of affairs, and ascertain the nature of the demands of the British Government upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah; he added that he would not quit his present position until some decided measure should have been adopted.

The native Secretary informed the Rajah of Berar that the British Government had required of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he should not obstruct the completion

of the arrangements concluded at Bassein, and that as a proof of the sincerity of his amicable professions, he should retire to the northward of the Nerbudda. He proceeded to observe that General Wellesley, at the head of the united forces of the honourable Company and of the Peishwa, had marched towards the frontier of the Peishwa's territories; and that the British army was waiting in expectation of an explicit answer on the question of peace or war from Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The native Secretary further remarked, that if an answer should be withheld, the British Government would consider that circumstance alone to be an indication of hostility.

The Rajah of Berar in reply, urged the necessity of the Resident's awaiting not only the result of another meeting between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, but also of an intended conference between both those chieftains and Holkar, whose name was now introduced as a third party necessary to be consulted in deciding the question of peace or war with the Company. Sereedhur Punt, the Rajah of Berar's minister, proposed that the British power and the Mahrattah chiefs should agree to abstain from hostilities, until a meeting of the three chiefs should have taken place. Holkar at this time was at a great distance from Mulkapoor.

The minister then proceeded to observe, that the Governor-General's letter to the Rajah of Berar contained an assertion that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had distinctly expressed his consent to the advance of the British troops to Poonah for the restoration of the Peishwa, whereas that chieftain had plainly refused his consent through Jadoon Rao.

The native Secretary acquainted Sereedhur Punt that Scindiah had signified his explicit consent to that measure in a letter to Colonel Close, received at Bassein on the 3d of March, 1803, a copy of which was in the possession of Colonel Collins and could be communicated for Sereedhur Punt's inspection.

The Rajah of Berar, at the close of the conference, promised to return an answer to the letter which he had received from the Governor-General, after a consultation with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Colonel Collins having received a verbal communication from Scindiah, intimating a wish that the Resident should pay a visit to the Rajah of Berar, the Resident on the 18th of June sent his native Secretary to the Rajah of Berar in order to procure the appointment of a certain day for that ceremony, but the Rajah appeared to be unwilling to receive the Resident, and not only declined to appoint any day, but even opposed obstacles to the intended visit.

As this behaviour appeared to the Resident to be the result of an agreement between the two chieftains, calculated for the double purpose of insult and delay, he addressed on the 19th of June a memorial to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, apprizing that chieftain of his resolution to march from Scindiah's camp on the 22nd.

The reply to this memorial, and the assurance of a satisfactory answer within the space of six days, induced the Resident to consent to remain until the expiration of that term.

On the 25th of June, Colonel Collins paid his first visit to the Rajah of Berar. On this occasion, the Rajah took occasion to advert to the Governor-General's letter of the 22nd of May, (the substance of which is stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, and a copy of which had been transmitted to the Rajah by the Resident,) but when Colonel Collins endeavoured to introduce a discussion of the subject of that letter, the Rajah avoided it by declining to enter upon any business whatever.

On the 28th, the period appointed for the delivery of Scindiah's final answer to the Resident's demands having expired, the Resident sent his native Secretary to Scindiah in order to remind him of his promise, when the native Secretary was

informed that the Resident would be invited to a conference with the confederate chieftains, at which they would jointly declare to him their final determination.

On that occasion the native secretary presented a duplicate of the Peishwa's letter to Scindiah, containing information of his Highness having entered into defensive engagements with the British Government. Scindiah and the ministers declared that the original had never been received, and Jadoon Rao observed, that no dependence could be placed on any such letters before Scindiah had obtained a personal interview with the Peishwa.

Subsequently to the promise made by Scindiah on the 28th of June, the Rajah of Berar moved his camp to a greater distance from that of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The urgent applications however of Colonel Collins procured an interview with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 1st of July.

The Resident remonstrated against the artful evasions which the ministers of Scindiah had practised in order to avoid the accomplishment of the written promise of their master.

He observed that ten days had elapsed without his receiving the explanation which he had been promised in six; and declared that he would no longer suffer himself to be deceived.

The replies of Scindiah and of Jadoon Rao were evasive and unsatisfactory, and all explanations with regard to the menacing position of the confederate armies, or to the intentions of the chiefs respecting the treaty of Bassein, or to the question of "peace or war," was referred to the result of another conference between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

Notwithstanding the insidious and insulting nature of these replies, the Resident with a most laudable degree of caution and prudence did not abandon all hopes of bringing the negotiation to an amicable conclusion; the Resident therefore consented to remain in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on receiving the promise of Jadoon Rao that the determination of the confederated chieftains should not be delayed beyond the period of four or five days: at the same time the Resident declared that he could not be responsible for the commencement of hostilities which might immediately take place in consequence of the menacing position of the confederate armies, and repeated delay of the communication of the resolution of the chieftains.

On the 4th of July the Resident attended a conference which was holden at the camp of the Rajah of Berar between that chieftain and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

On that occasion Colonel Collins repeated the arguments which he had formerly stated in proof of the friendly disposition of the British Government, and the amicable tendency of the treaty of Bassein; and he asserted the right of the Peishwa to conclude engagements independently of the interference of any subordinate chieftain.

In reply to the Resident's observations, Sereedhur Punt, the principal minister of the Rajah of Berar, asserted the impropriety of the Peishwa's conduct in concluding the treaty of Bassein without the concurrence or advice of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Colonel Collins reminded the minister that the delay of those chieftains in marching to the assistance of the Peishwa had compelled his Highness to seek the protection of the British Government.

Colonel Collins then repeated his demand of an explanation of the intention of the confederated chiefs, and after much intermediate discussion and evasion on the part of the ministers of the confederated chieftains, they distinctly declared to the Resident that they had no design whatever to oppose any engagements which the British Government might have contracted with the Peishwa; and they also pro-

promised that their armies should neither advance towards Poonah nor ascend the Adjuttee Ghaut. After these assurances they requested that the Resident would endeavour to prevent the nearer approach of the British troops. Colonel Collins replied, that in order to evince the sincerity of their profession it was indispensably requisite that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nerbudda, and that the Rajah of Berar should return to Nagpore, and that in the event of those chieftains complying with this proposition, he had no doubt that Major-General Wellesley would withdraw his troops also.

The Resident withdrew from the conference without having obtained any satisfactory assurances of the consent of the confederate chiefs to such an arrangement.

On the 9th of July, the Resident received letters addressed to the Governor-General from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

Both those letters contain an acknowledgement of the receipt of letters from the Governor-General on the subject of the treaty of Bassein.

The Rajah of Berar had at that time received the Governor-General's letters of the 13th and 22nd of May (of which the substance is stated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch), but his Excellency's letter of the 3rd of June to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the subject of the treaty of Bassein, was not delivered to that chieftain until the day after the date of his letter which refers to a despatch from the Governor-General on that subject. In these letters the confederate chiefs assert that the general consent and concurrence of the principal branches of the Mahratta Empire was necessary to the validity of any important political engagements between his Highness the Peishwa and a foreign state, but at the same time they declared that they had no intention to subvert the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, provided that the British Government and the Peishwa entertained no intention to subvert the engagements subsisting between the Peishwa and the Mahratta chieftains.

With a view to preserve connection in the narrative of Colonel Collins's negotiations at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it is necessary in this place to advert to intelligence which his Excellency the Governor-General received on the 17th of June from the collector of Allahabad, and to the instructions which the Governor-General in consequence issued to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

By that intelligence it appeared that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had addressed letters to Ghunnee Behaudur and Himmur Behaudur, (the officers exercising the chief authority on the part of his Highness the Peishwa in the province of Bundelcund,) requiring them to be prepared to co-operate with the confederate Mahratta armies in hostile measures against the British possessions, and that Dhurum Rao, the commanding officer of a considerable body of horse, which had been despatched by Scindiah in the month of April to Kalpee, a station on the right bank of the Jumna contiguous to the British territories, had received orders from Scindiah to the same effect.

On receipt of this information, the Governor-General (on the 18th of June), deemed it proper to direct the Resident to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah to acknowledge or to disavow those orders, and accordingly at a conference between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, holden on the 16th of July, the Resident stated the substance of that information to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and required him to declare whether he had actually issued orders of the nature described.

In reply Dowlut Rao Scindiah assured the Resident in the most solemn manner that he had never issued such orders either to the Peishwa's officers in Bundelcund, or to Dhurum Rao, and that the latter chieftain had been especially directed to respect the British territories.

The amicable tenor of the language and behaviour of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at this interview induced the Resident to renew the subject of Scindiah's return to Hindostan. In answer to the Resident's observations on that subject, Scindiah's principal minister replied, that as soon as Scindiah and the Rajah should receive favourable answers to the letters which they had addressed to the Governor-General, those chieftains would repair to their respective countries, and at the close of the conference that minister explicitly acknowledged that the treaty of Bassein not only contained no stipulation injurious to the general interests of the Mahratta territories, but afforded them additional security, and in this acknowledgment Dowlut Rao Scindiah expressed his entire concurrence; these declarations appeared to the Governor-General to afford a more satisfactory indication than Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had hitherto manifested of their disposition to comply with the demands of the British Government. The Governor-General also had reason to expect that in the apparent temper of those chieftains at that period of time, the firm and amicable remonstrances and declarations which Major-General Wellesley, in a letter to the Resident under date 18th July, written on the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th of June, directed the Resident to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar (a copy of which was received by the Governor-General on the 9th of August from the Resident at Poonah, and the substance of which letter is stated in a subsequent paragraph of this despatch), would induce those chieftains to comply with the just and moderate requisitions of the British Government; under this aspect of affairs the Governor-General deemed it expedient to issue instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief calculated to adapt the course of the Commander-in-Chief's proceedings to the eventual alternative either of peace or war.

The Governor General accordingly addressed instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 10th of August, authorising his Excellency to suspend the commencement of actual hostilities until his Excellency should have received advices either from the Governor-General, or from the public authorities in the Deccan of the actual commencement of hostilities in that quarter, or of Major-General Wellesley's determination to commence hostilities at the earliest practicable period of time. The Governor-General however authorized his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at the same time to proceed to operations of an hostile nature, if such should appear to his Excellency to be necessary either for the purpose of maintaining any advantages of circumstance or situation possessed by the army under his Excellency's command, or of preventing the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or of M. Perron, from accomplishing measures of any description which might tend to embarrass his Excellency's eventual operations, or to afford any advantage to the forces to be opposed to the British troops in the contingency of war.

With a view to preserve the order of transactions, the Governor-General in Council now deems it advisable to revert to the proceedings of the Resident at Hyderabad, and to the transactions at that court.

The Governor-General in Council has already stated to your honourable Committee in general terms the progress of proceedings and transactions at that court, connected with the affairs of the Mahratta empire to the middle of May. Between that time and the date of the despatch of the instructions above described, few transactions of particular importance occurred at Hyderabad. The attention of the Resident was principally engaged in making arrangements with the court of Hyderabad for supplying the subsidiary force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson with grain.

On the 29th of May, his highness the Nizam signified his consent to receive a

regiment of Europeans instead of the two battalions of native infantry which the British Government had engaged to furnish in addition to the actual strength of the subsidiary force. The measures adopted for the accomplishment of this arrangement have already been noticed in a preceding paragraph of this despatch.

The reports of the Resident with regard to the dangerous state of his Highness the Nizam's health, rendered it expedient to furnish the Resident with instructions for the regulation of his conduct in the event of his Highness the Nizam's decease; and the Resident was accordingly authorized, if necessary, to apply to Lieut.-General Stuart, Major-General Wellesley, or Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson, for the aid of a military force; and corresponding instructions were transmitted to those officers to be prepared to furnish such aid on the requisition of the Resident.

The despatches from the Resident contain a detail of the negotiations which were conducted on the part of the court of Hyderabad, for the purpose of detaching from the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Ameer Khaup, the chieftain mentioned in preceding paragraphs of this despatch, who commanded an irregular force, estimated to consist of near 40,000 men, and who had professed a disposition to enter into the service of his Highness the Nizam.

The Governor-General in Council concurring entirely in the opinion expressed by the honourable Major-General Wellesley in his letters to the Resident at Hyderabad (of which copies will be found recorded in the despatches to which the preceding paragraph refers), with regard to the expediency of accepting Ameer Khaun's proposals under certain modifications, addressed instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad on that subject on the 27th of July. That negotiation, however, proved wholly unsuccessful.

The feudatory obligations of the Nabob of Kurnool towards his Highness the Nizam having been transferred to the honourable Company by the treaty concluded at Hyderabad in October, 1800, the Governor-General deemed it proper under the existing probability of a war with the confederated chieftains, to require the Nabob of Kurnool to fulfil his feudatory obligations towards the British Government, by furnishing a proportion of troops to co-operate with the British forces in the event of a war. The instructions of the Governor-General to the Resident at Hyderabad, directing him to convey that requisition to the Nabob of Kurnool, were combined with those which are noticed in the preceding paragraph.

In consequence of advices received by the Resident at Hyderabad from Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson, commanding the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam, purporting that no dependence could be placed on his Highness's officers for the provision of supplies for the use of the British armies, the Resident applied to the court of Hyderabad for the delegation of full powers to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, authorizing that officer to command the application of the resources of his Highness's western provinces to the purposes of the public service.

The Governor-General deeming this measure to be highly proper, communicated his approbation of it in his instructions to the Resident of the 12th of August.

The Governor-General-in-Council deems it necessary in this place to revert to the proceedings of the army under the personal command of Lieut.-General Stuart.

That army continued to occupy the position which it had assumed at Moodgul as noticed in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, until towards the end of June, at which period of time, circumstances connected with the arrival of the

French squadron on the coast of Coromandel, induced Lord Clive to recommend the return of the army to the southward of the Toombuddra, and General Stuart accordingly re-crossed that river in the middle of July. The abrupt departure, however, of the French army from Pondicherry appearing to Lord Clive to diminish the urgency of the return of the whole of the main army within the frontier, and the aspect of affairs in the Mahratta empire appearing to his Lordship to render it advisable to strengthen the division under Major-General Wellesley, and to provide at the same time for the objects which had originally dictated the measure of maintaining a force between the Toombuddra and the Kistna, Lord Clive instructed Lieut.-General Stuart on the 28th of July to detach two battalions to reinforce Major-General Wellesley, and to station a force on the frontier for the purposes above described. Lord Clive at the same time instructed General Stuart to return with the remainder of his troops into the Carnatic. These instructions were carried into effect by Lieut.-General Stuart, who furnished Major-General Campbell, the officer left in command of the troops on the frontier, with proper instructions for the regulation of his conduct in that command; General Campbell in pursuance of his instructions, resumed the position at Moodgul. The Governor-General being impressed with a conviction of the importance of maintaining a respectable force beyond the frontier during the advance of General Wellesley's army, immediately on receiving intimation of the proposed return of General Stuart across the Toombuddra, issued orders under date the 30th of July to that officer to march back to Moodgul, or to some station possessing similar advantages, under any circumstances short of positive danger to our southern possessions. Those instructions did not reach General Stuart, until the final disposition of the troops concerted between that officer and Lord Clive had been carried into effect, and that arrangement, under all the circumstances of the case, received the approbation of the Governor-General.

In conformity to the orders of the Governor-General, communicated to the honourable Major-General Wellesley in the despatch to the Resident at Poonah of the 30th of May, the substance of which is stated in preceding paragraphs of this letter, Major-General Wellesley, on the 14th of July, addressed a letter to Scindiah, in which, after explaining the amicable tendency of the treaty of Bassein, and adverting to the hostile spirit of the measures adopted by the confederated chieftains since the conclusion of that treaty, Major General Wellesley required Dowlut Rao Scindiah to separate his army from that of the Rajah of Berar, and retire with his troops across the river Nurbuddra. In that letter, Major-General Wellesley declared his intention to direct the return of the British troops to their usual stations as soon as Dowlut Rao Scindiah should have complied with the Major-General's requisition. That letter was transmitted to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with corresponding instructions.

On the 18th of July, Major-General Wellesley received the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th of June, of which the substance is stated in preceding paragraphs. Immediately on the receipt of that despatch, Major-General Wellesley addressed a letter to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, directing that officer to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of the power vested in Major-General Wellesley by the Governor-General's letter of 26th of June, and directing the Resident again to require those chieftains to separate, and to return their armies to their usual stations. Colonel Collins was also directed to inform the confederates, that in the event of their refusal, he had been directed to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the following day.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to attract the particular attention of your honourable Committee to Major-General Wellesley,

ley's letter, under date the 18th of July, acknowledging the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th and 27th of June; as that letter contains an able and accurate description of the actual condition of the Peishwa's government, and of the probable views and disposition of the confederated chieftains.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of Colonel Collins's negotiations at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Resident having received Major-General Wellesley's letter of the 14th of July to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the substance of which is stated in a preceding paragraph, transmitted that letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with a message calculated to enforce the representations which it contained. Major-General Wellesley's letter and the representations which accompanied its delivery, appeared to produce a favourable impression on the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who immediately despatched his principal minister to the camp of the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of consulting that chieftain on the subject.

The Resident also despatched his native secretary to the Rajah of Berar, with a message similar to that which he had sent to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Rajah of Berar did not manifest any disposition to comply with Major-General Wellesley's requisition, and referred the decision of the question to the result of a conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which accordingly took place on the 21st of July; and on the ensuing day, the Resident addressed a note to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, demanding a reply to Major-General Wellesley's letter. To this note no answer was returned.

The Resident having subsequently received Major-General Wellesley's letter of the 18th of July, addressed memorials to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in the terms prescribed by Major-General Wellesley. In answer to those memorials, the Resident was informed by both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, that the reply to Major-General Wellesley's requisitions must still depend on a further conference between those chieftains. Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the same time invited the Resident to a separate conference on the 25th of July, in consequence of a previous application from the Resident, desiring an interview with Scindiah.

At this conference the Resident repeated, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah all the arguments and observations stated in Major-General Wellesley's instructions, and again urged Dowlut Rao Scindiah's compliance with Major-General Wellesley's requisitions.

In reply to this demand, the following observations were urged by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal ministers on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; that the forces of that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar were encamped in their own territories, that those chieftains had solemnly promised not to ascend the Adjunttee Pass, nor to march to Poonah, that they had already given to the Governor-General assurances in writing, that they never would attempt to subvert the treaty of Bassein, which assurances were unequivocal proofs of their amicable intentions.

In answer to those objections, the Resident referred to Major-General Wellesley's declaration, that it was impossible to confide in the promises and assurances of the confederated chieftains, while their armies occupied a position unnecessary to their security, and menacing the frontier of our ally the Nizam. The Resident further observed, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah derived any just advantage from his present position, or if the continuance of his army in that position was in any degree necessary for the defence of his own possessions, due allowance would be made for the exigency of the case; but it was manifest that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had no enemies in that quarter, and that far from deriving any advantage from his present position, he incurred an intolerable expence, and was exposed to the

greatest inconvenience in his actual situation; that his continuance therefore in that situation could only be ascribed to hostile designs against the British Government or its allies. The Resident further remarked, that Major-General Wellesley having been invested with full powers for the conduct of political and military affairs, the assurance afforded by Major-General Wellesley in his letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah was as valid and binding as if it had been given by the Governor-General himself, and the Resident concluded by insisting on an immediate and distinct reply to the requisition of Major-General Wellesley.

The minister appeared unable to answer the preceding arguments and observations of the Resident, and endeavoured to evade the further discussion of the subject, by promising to afford the satisfaction required in the course of a few days. The Resident replied, that Major-General Wellesley's letter having been delivered five days before, a sufficient time had been allowed for deliberation, and that under these circumstances the Resident could not submit to further procrastination on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This declaration produced a further discussion between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but that chieftain and his ministers having at length solemnly assured the Resident that he should receive a distinct and satisfactory reply on the 28th of July, in the presence of the Rajah of Berar, the Resident consented to wait until that day for their final decision.

In consequence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's solemn promise to the Resident to deliver a distinct and satisfactory reply on the 28th of July, the Resident sent a message on that day, desiring to be informed at what hour it would be convenient for Scindiah to grant the promised audience.

In reply to this message, the Resident was informed, that on that day a conference was to be holden between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; that it "was not proper for the Resident to attend at that conference," but that he should be apprized of the time which should be subsequently appointed for his attendance.

The Resident replied to this insolent message, by animadverting on Dowlut Rao Scindiah's direct violation of his promise, and by apprizing that chieftain that the Resident would wait until noon of the succeeding day for an explicit answer, and that in the event of his being disappointed, he would despatch his advanced tents on the road to Aurungabad, and proceed himself to quit Scindiah's camp on the following day.

In consequence of this declaration, the 29th of July was appointed for an interview between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Resident being desirous of making another effort to induce Scindiah to comply with the demands of the British Government, consented to postpone his departure, and to attend Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the time appointed.

The principal topics of this conference consisted in a repetition of the former discussions: the Minister declared that Dowlut Rao Scindiah must again consult the Rajah of Berar before he could return a decided answer to Major-General Wellesley's requisitions, and concluded by requesting the Resident to postpone his departure for two or three days more. The Resident then informed Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he was satisfied that the object of this evasive conduct on the part of that chieftain, was merely to gain time for the accomplishment of some particular purpose; that the Resident had been positively directed by Major-General Wellesley to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah when he should have reason to be convinced of the resolution of the confederated chieftains to maintain their position on the frontier of the Nizam's possessions, and that the Resident would accordingly commence his journey to Aurungabad on the 31st.

The Resident immediately addressed a memorial to the Rajah of Berar, stating to that chieftain the substance of his late communications with the Court of

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and apprizing the Rajah of Berar of his determination to quit Scindiah's camp on the 31st of July, unless he should previously receive a satisfactory reply to Major-General Wellesley's requisitions.

On the night of the 30th the Resident received a note from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, acknowledging the receipt of a copy of the Resident's memorial, addressed to the Rajah of Berar, and requesting that the Resident would meet him at the Tents of the Rajah of Berar on the following day, for the purpose of a further discussion of the depending questions. The Resident having been prevented by heavy rain from commencing his journey according to his intention on the 31st, and having received from the Rajah of Berar a request similar to that which had been conveyed to him by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Resident complied with their united solicitations, and met those chieftains on the evening of the (31st of July) at the tents of the Rajah of Berar.

At this conference the same discussions which had passed on the former interviews were renewed, but were followed by several successive propositions on the part of those chieftains.

Their first proposition was, that the united forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should retire to Burhanpore, and that the honourable Major-General Wellesley should withdraw the British troops to their usual stations; in other words, that the British army should abandon the means which it possessed in its embodied state of opposing a seasonable resistance to any hostile attempts on the part of the confederated chieftains, while those chieftains should retire with their united armies to a short distance from the frontier of our ally, prepared to take advantage of the approaching favourable season, and of the absence and dispersion of the British force. This unreasonable proposition being decidedly rejected by the Resident, the confederated chieftains proposed that the Resident should appoint a day for the march of the respective forces of those chieftains from the place of their encampment, and that the Resident should pledge the faith of the British Government for the retreat of the army under the command of Major-General Wellesley, on the day on which the confederates should commence their return to their usual stations. To this proposition, which afforded no security for the actual return of the armies of those chieftains to their usual stations, the Resident answered that he was not authorized to pledge the faith of the British Government to an arrangement inconsistent with the instructions which he had received from Major-General Wellesley.

Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar finally proposed that they should request Major-General Wellesley, by letter, to specify a day for withdrawing his army, and for the march of the confederated armies from their position on the Nizam's frontier; and that on the day so specified those chieftains would assuredly commence their march. Those chieftains further stated that they would in the same letter request Major-General Wellesley to specify the time when the forces under his command might be expected to reach their usual stations; and that the confederates would so regulate their marches as to arrive at their usual stations precisely at the same period of time.

After some discussion, the Resident consented to refer this last proposition to the consideration of Major-General Wellesley, and to remain in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp until an answer should be received, provided that letters from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to Major-General Wellesley, to the effect proposed, were sent to the Resident for transmission before noon on the following day. Notwithstanding the apparently amicable termination of this conference, in direct violation of the terms of their own proposition, the confederate chiefs transmitted letters to the Resident addressed to Major-General Wellesley, proposing to

continue their armies united, and to limit their retreat to the neighbouring station of Burhanpore, according to the tenor of the proposition which had been fully discussed and finally rejected by Colonel Collins.

On the receipt of the Rajah of Berar's letter, to the effect above described, the Resident made immediate arrangements for quitting the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and commenced his march towards Aurungabad on the 3d of August, and the departure of Colonel Collins necessarily placed the British Government in a state of war with the confederate chieftains.

The instructions issued by the Governor-General previously to the receipt of Colonel Collins's despatches communicating the final result of his negotiations, had already prescribed all the measures and arrangements to be adopted for the successful prosecution of the war, and no additional measures for that purpose remained to be adopted. The Governor-General, however, deemed it proper to confirm the requisitions and promises to British subjects and native inhabitants of the Company's dominions, in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and of his allies, which the Commander-in-Chief was required to promulgate (as stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch) by proclamations issuing immediately from the supreme British authority in India; and accordingly, on the 29th of August, similar proclamations were printed and published at Fort William, in the English language and in the language of the country, and were distributed to all the public officers by whose means they could be conveyed to the parties concerned.

On the 26th of September the Governor-General in Council issued another proclamation, adverting to the actual existence of hostilities between the British Government and the confederated Mahratta chieftains, and declaring that all British subjects holding commissions, or bearing arms in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, or their respective allies, during the existence of war between the British Government and those powers, or in any manner partaking in the counsels of those powers, or aiding or adhering to them during the war, incurred the guilt of high treason. The proclamation further declared that all such British subjects who should not claim the benefit of the proclamation of the 29th of August, before the 1st of November, should be liable to prosecution for high treason.

Your honourable Committee will duly appreciate the salutary consequences which resulted to the public interests from the arrangements adopted by the Governor-General for inducing the European officers and the regular sepoys to relinquish the service of the Mahratta chieftains, and to avail themselves of the liberal offers of the British Government. The greater part of the European officers in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah immediately quitted the army of that chieftain, and those that remained were (with a very few exceptions) placed under restraint by the troops under their respective commands. It is now certain that many of the officers who relinquished the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and who were attached to the interests of their country, would have been compelled, for the purposes of subsistence, to have supported the cause of our enemies, had they not found a resource in the liberal provision offered to them by the British Government. In addition to this circumstance, the loss of the European officers at so critical a moment has excited in the minds of the Mahratta chieftains, and of all the native powers, a distrust of the fidelity of all European adventurers, and it is not probable that any of the native powers will at any future period resort to the employment of European adventurers for the discipline and improvement of its army.

Adverting to the hardship of the situation of the European officers in the Mahratta service, many of whom had been encouraged to enter that service by the British Government, and were reduced to the alternative of being exposed to the

most severe distress, or of supporting the interests of the enemies of the British power, it will be apparent to the justice and wisdom of your honourable Committee, that the proclamations issued under the authority of the Governor-General were equally just and politic; the public service also derived advantage from the zeal, activity, and local information of the European officers lately in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, many of whom were employed with success by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief during the late campaign in Hindostan.

Great number of the sepoy composing the regular infantry of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had formerly been in the service of the honourable Company, and had entered the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when a considerable reduction took place in the military establishment of the honourable Company, at the conclusion of the late peace with France. The greater part of the families of these sepoys were settled in the territories of the honourable Company, and as soon as employment was offered for their services, the sepoys readily abandoned the service of Scindiah for that of the Company. By this arrangement, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief was enabled, within a short period of time, not only to diminish the positive strength of the most formidable part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's military establishment, but to acquire an efficient body of recruits who had been regularly disciplined by the Company's officers, and who were attached to the Company's service.

The Governor-General in Council will hereafter communicate to your honourable Committee the arrangements adopted by this Government with respect to the European officers who quitted the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, according to the tenor of the proclamations to the benefit of which they became entitled.

Although a considerable portion of the detail of the preceding transactions and events has already been communicated to your honourable Committee in the letters which the Governor-General and the Governor-General in Council have at various times despatched to your honourable Committee, the Governor-General in Council has deemed it to be proper to submit to your honourable Committee this connected narrative, with regular references* to the official and recorded documents for the purpose of furnishing your honourable Committee with the most ample means of exercising your judgment upon every part of those important events and transactions which ultimately placed the British Government in a state of war with the combined power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

The operations of the war, however, both in Hindostan and the Deccan, have already been detailed in an accurate and connected form in the despatches from the Governor-General in Council of the 25th of September and 31st of October, 1803, as well as in the printed notes transmitted to the honourable Court of Directors on the 24th of December, 1803.

The Governor-General in Council therefore deems it to be unnecessary to repeat in this despatch, the narrative of the operations of the army during the war, and considers it to be sufficient to refer your honourable Committee, for the detail of those operations, to such of the despatches from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Wellesley, as relate to the proceedings of the army.

The Governor-General in Council however deems it proper to state to your honourable Committee such parts of the proceedings of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Wellesley, as are not of a military nature,

* These being marginal references to the specific consultations on which the documents alluded to are recorded, it has not been thought necessary to insert them. For the same reason, all similar references have been omitted throughout this despatch.

and have not been described either in the despatches of this Government to your honourable Committee, or in the printed notes referred to in a preceding paragraph.

The Governor-General in Council further deems it proper to observe to your honourable Committee, that the detailed discussion on the subject of the justice and necessity of the war in which the British-Government has been engaged with the Mahratta power, contained in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 25th of September, and the statement which that letter contains of the sentiments of the Governor-General in Council with regard to the general tenour and to the special conduct of Colonel Collins's negotiations at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, combined with the narrative of proceedings now submitted to your honourable Committee, appear to preclude the necessity of any further observations upon those subjects.

In conformity to the intention now stated, the Governor-General has the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee the proceedings of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of the negotiations, and in the accomplishment of the political arrangements prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions to his Excellency of the 27th of July, and by the Governor-General's subsequent despatches to the Commander-in-Chief.

The earliest attention of the Commander-in-Chief having been directed by those instructions to a negotiation with M. Perron, the Governor-General in Council will first communicate to your honourable Committee the commencement, progress and result of the Commander-in-Chief's correspondence and communications with that officer, together with all the circumstances connected with the surrender of M. Perron to the British power.

It is proper to state to your honourable Committee that M. Perron had, some time before the commencement of the campaign, preferred an application to the British Government for permission to enter the British territories, in prosecution of his intention to retire from the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; with which application the Governor-General immediately complied. This application was communicated to the Governor-General in a private letter from the Commander-in-Chief, and the reply to it was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief in the same form. Subsequent events prevented M. Perron from availing himself of that permission.

On the 20th of August the Commander-in-Chief received a letter from M. Perron, expressing his surprize at the advance of the British army, and requesting to be informed whether the British Government was actually in a state of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The tenor of this letter appeared to indicate a desire on the part of M. Perron to effect some arrangement which might preclude a contest between the British forces and those under the command of M. Perron. The Commander-in-Chief replied to M. Perron, by stating generally the cause of the advance of his army, and requesting him to depute a confidential officer for the purpose of conversing with his Excellency on the subject of M. Perron's letter. It was the expectation of the Commander-in-Chief, that M. Perron would accede to the propositions which his Excellency was authorized to offer to his acceptance by the instructions of the Governor-General as above stated.

On the 27th of August the Commander-in-Chief received another letter from M. Perron, stating his anxious wish that some means might be adopted for avoiding the extremity of war. M. Perron, however, declined sending an officer to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, on the plea of an apprehension that such a measure would excite the jealousy of the Durbar of Scindiah. M. Perron, however, requested that the Commander-in-Chief would despatch a confidential officer to confer with M. Perron. The Commander-in-Chief did not think it proper to

comply with this request. His Excellency, in his reply to M. Perron's letter, explained to him in general terms, that the object of the conference which he sought with M. Perron, did not relate to the public affairs of the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but were connected with the private interests of M. Perron, and with the object of affording him the means of carrying into effect, with ease and safety, his design of retiring from the service of Scindiah. His Excellency repeated his readiness to receive an officer from M. Perron, apprizing him however, that it was not his Excellency's intention to renew his correspondence with M. Perron, unless M. Perron should avail himself of the permission granted to him to depute an officer to the British camp; and that the situation of the British army with respect to M. Perron's was such as to require an immediate decision on the part of M. Perron.

M. Perron, in a letter which the Commander-in-Chief received in answer to his Excellency's letter, of which the substance is stated in the preceding paragraph, declared his intention of adhering to Scindiah's service during the present crisis, and the impossibility of his retiring until a person should be nominated to succeed him. M. Perron also declared his wish to depute his Aide-de-camp, Mr. Beckett, to the British camp for the purpose of affording further explanation. This letter was delayed several hours, in the hope of inducing the Commander-in-Chief (who was now within one march of M. Perron's position at Coel) to defer his attack for another day.

Although the Commander-in-Chief did not perceive the necessity of Mr. Beckett's mission, after the explicit declaration of M. Perron, of his determination not to relinquish the service of Scindiah, his Excellency intimated to M. Perron a disposition to receive Mr. Beckett; Mr. Beckett accordingly attended the Commander-in-Chief on the morning of the 29th of August, while the army was on its march towards M. Perron's encampment at Coel in the Doab. Mr. Beckett repeated the determination of M. Perron not to retire from the Mahratta service until he should be relieved by his successor. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out to Mr. Beckett the terms on which M. Perron might avoid hostilities with advantage to his interests. After some vague conversation on the part of Mr. Beckett he departed.

The defeat of M. Perron's forces at Coel, and his precipitate flight, suspended any further correspondence between M. Perron and the Commander-in-Chief at that time.

On the 6th of September, however, the Commander-in-Chief received a letter from M. Perron, renewing his application for permission to retire to Lucknow through the Company's territories. M. Perron stated as the causes of his application, the information which he had received of the appointment and approach of his successor, and the treachery of his European officers. M. Perron requested that he might be attended to Lucknow by his own body-guard, or that he might be furnished with an escort from the Company's troops. The Commander-in-Chief judiciously complied with M. Perron's request, to proceed through the territories of the Company to Lucknow, and authorized M. Perron to retain his body-guard as an escort. The Commander-in-Chief required that M. Perron should commence his march on the second day after the receipt of the permission to enter the Company's territories, and enjoined him to restrain his escort from all acts of plunder. The Governor-General in Council considered M. Perron's defection at that moment to be an event highly favourable to the success of the British arms, and to the interests of the British Government in India. That event relieved the surrounding states and chieftains from the dread which they entertained of M. Perron's power, and encouraged them to manifest the desire which they were believed to entertain of emancipating themselves from the control of the Mahrattas,

by co-operating with the British forces. It also greatly tended to diminish the confidence which the native powers had been accustomed to repose in the fidelity of their French officers. Conformably to the permission of the Commander-in-Chief, M. Perron, attended by his Secretary, Mr. Beckett, and by Monsieur Fleury, passed into the Company's territory, and on the 1st of October arrived at Lucknow.

On receiving information of the application of M. Perron for permission to proceed to Lucknow, the Governor-General in Council deemed it advisable to furnish the Resident at Lucknow with instructions for his guidance respecting M. Perron and the persons who accompanied him.

Although M. Perron, under the terms of the letter from the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 6th of September, 1803, was only entitled to claim, as a matter of right, the protection of the British Government for the security of his own person and property, and of those of his family and suite, yet the Governor-General in Council deemed it proper to direct that M. Perron should be treated, during his residence at Lucknow, with the distinction due to the rank which he held in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that the officers who accompanied him should be received with the usual marks of civility and attention.

Mr. Beckett being a British subject, and having continued in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah after the commencement of hostilities, the Resident was directed to intimate to him that it would be necessary, for his own safety, that he should claim the benefit of the proclamation issued by the Governor-General in Council, under date the 16th of September, 1803.

The Resident was directed to hasten as much as possible the departure of M. Perron and his suite from Lucknow, and to select an officer to accompany M. Perron on his journey to Calcutta. The Resident was also directed to intimate to the principal civil and military officers of the districts through which M. Perron was to pass, the desire of the Governor-General in Council, that M. Perron and his suite should be treated with due attention, and their journey facilitated as much as possible. The Resident was instructed to acquaint M. Perron that the Governor-General in Council would acquiesce in any proper arrangement for his return to Europe, or for his continuance, under proper regulations, within the British territories in India.

M. Perron's residence at Lucknow having been protracted beyond the period which appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be necessary, Colonel Scott was again directed to urge his speedy departure.

Soon after his arrival at Lucknow, M. Perron addressed a letter to the Governor-General, stating, that at the period of his quitting the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, he had left in the hands of a native agent, besides public property to a large amount, a sum of money amounting to twenty-two lacs of rupees, his private property. M. Perron added, that he had demanded this sum from his agent, who had evaded a compliance with his demand and had stated that the money was deposited in the fortress of Agra. M. Perron solicited the Governor-General to issue instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, to compel the native agent to restore such of his private property as was in that agent's possession, and to reserve for M. Perron all property belonging to him which might be found in Agra or elsewhere. M. Perron founded his claim to the interference of the British Government for the preservation of his property on the permission which he had received from the Commander-in-Chief, under the authority of the Governor-General, to retire into the Company's territories, with his family, the officers of his suite, and his property.

The Governor-General in Council thought it proper to suspend his reply to M.

Perron's letter until he should receive the report of the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, accompanied by copies of the correspondence which had passed between the Commander-in-Chief and M. Perron, previously and subsequently to M. Perron's arrival within the Company's territories. The substance of that correspondence has been stated to your honourable Committee in preceding paragraphs.

The permission granted to M. Perron to retire within the Company's territories with his family, the officers of his suite, his property and effects, did not appear to the Governor-General in Council to involve any other obligation on the part of the British Government, with respect to M. Perron's private property than to protect, for his use, such parts of that property as he might convey within the Company's territory, and could not justify any claim to the interposition of the British Government, for the protection of any property which he might leave within the enemy's country.

M. Perron was assured that he would continue to receive the protection of the British Government for the security of all his property deposited or invested within the limits of the Company's frontier, according to the boundaries established previously to the war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, but that the Governor-General in Council could not consider the British Government to be in any degree responsible for any property which M. Perron might have left within the territory of powers at war with the British Government; for these reasons the Governor-General in Council declined to comply with M. Perron's application.

The proceedings of the Governor-General in Council with respect to the disposal of the money found in the fortress of Agra will be communicated from the Military Department; but the Governor-General in Council thinks it proper in this place to solicit the attention of your honourable Committee to the despatch from the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 22nd of October, from which it appears that the money deposited in Agra was considered by Mr. Hessian, who commanded the fort at the commencement of the war, and by all the European officers in the fort, to be public property, and that a part of it had been actually disbursed for the payment of the troops.

M. Perron, together with Messrs. Beckett and Fleury, proceeded from Lucknow towards the Presidency on the 8th of November, accompanied by an European officer. M. Perron has since resided in the vicinity of the French settlement of Chandernagore.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to communicate to your honourable Committee the proceedings of the Commander-in-Chief, in concluding the prescribed defensive arrangements with the chieftains of Hindostan.

The first chief to whom the benefit of the British alliance was extended was the Rajah of Bhurtpore, one of the principal chieftains of the tribe of Jauts, who possesses a considerable territory and some strong forts in the vicinity of Agra and Muttra, on the south-west bank of the Jumna.

Your honourable Committee was informed, in our despatch of the 31st of October, 1803, that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief concluded a treaty of defence and guarantee with that chieftain on the 9th of October, 1803, and a copy of the treaty as approved and ratified by the Governor-General in Council, was enclosed in that despatch.

The Rajah of Bhurtpore sent a body of horse to join the army of the Commander-in-Chief, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty.

On the 14th of November, a treaty of alliance was concluded by the Commander-in-Chief with the Rajah of Macherry, or the Rao Rajah, whose possessions

are bounded on the south and west by the territory of the Rajah of Jyenagur, and on the east by that of the Rajah of Bhurtpore. The local situation and resources of the territory of Macherry enable the Rajah of that country materially to impede or assist any future incursions of the Mahrattas into the northern parts of Hindostan; a connection with that petty state, therefore, appeared to be highly desirable, and the terms of the treaty which was concluded by the Commander-in-Chief with that chieftain, appearing to the Governor-General to be very judicious and proper, and conformable to the general principles prescribed by the Governor-General in his instructions, the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in Council.

The Governor-General attached peculiar importance to the formation of an alliance with the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore, and with the Rana of Gohud. The local situation of the territories of Jyenagur, Jodepore and Gohud, which are interposed between the northern provinces of Hindostan and the Mahratta possessions in Malwa and Berar, and the adjoining provinces, rendered a connection with those chieftains of great importance in securing the principal object of the proposed system of alliance, the exclusion of the Mahratta power from the northern part of Hindostan.

The chiefs of Jyenagur and Jodepore had long maintained a vigorous resistance to the encroachments of the Mahrattas, but had at length been compelled to yield to the superior power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and at the period of the commencement of the late war, exclusively of the regular tribute which those chieftains had agreed to pay, they were subject to frequent exactions, and their dominions were continually exposed to predatory incursions of the armies both of Scindiah and of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Those states, however, still possessed considerable internal resources, which it was reasonable to expect would enable them, when relieved from the oppressive yoke of the Mahrattas, and supported by the power of the British Government, to become useful allies both in the prosecution of the war and in the future exclusion of the Mahrattas from the northern provinces of Hindostan.

During a considerable time, the dread of the Mahrattas, and the death of the Rajah of Jyenagur, which happened on the 1st of August, 1803, and the dissensions which ensued at that Durbar, prevented the state of Jyenagur from entering into the negotiation with a spirit of sincerity and decision. The same causes withheld the Court of Jodepore (the Rajah of which state also died in the month of October, 1803), from concluding engagements with the British Government.

Immediately, however, after the glorious and decisive victory of Laswaree, the Rajah of Jyenagur despatched vakeels to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty of defensive alliance.

Those vakeels arrived in the British camp on the 25th of November, and a treaty of defensive alliance between the British Government and the Rajah of Jyenagur, was concluded on the 12th of December, 1803.

The example of the Rajah of Jyenagur was speedily followed by the Rajah of Jodepore, whose views and interests are inseparably connected with those of the state of Jyenagur; and a treaty was concluded on the 22nd of December, 1803, with the vakeel of the Rajah of Jodepore, in terms similar to the treaty of Jyenagur.

It was the original intention of the Governor-General in Council to provide additional security to the frontier of the territories of Jyenagur and Jodepore, by the introduction into those countries of a subsidiary force of British troops. That measure, however, was not considered by the Governor-General in Council to be indispensable. Those chieftains appearing to entertain considerable objec-

tions to that arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief was induced to concede he point. The Governor-General in Council entirely approved the motives which influenced the determination of the Commander-in-Chief on this occasion. The treaties being in all respects conformable to the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions and intentions were duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council.

Vakeels from the Rana of Oudypore one of the principal Rajpoot chieftains, and from the Raja of Kotah, who possesses a territory to the southward of Jyenagur, were received in the British camp. The former of those chieftains had been deterred from declaring his desire to contract an alliance with the British Government by the vicinity of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who with a large force had been engaged in plundering the Rana's territories. The Commander-in-Chief being uncertain whether engagements with these chieftains would accord with the general views of the Governor-General in Council, referred the question to our consideration. The Governor-General in Council being of opinion, that unless those chieftains were included in the general alliance, the future extension of the authority of Scindiah or Holkar or Ambajee over them might weaken our barrier in that quarter, directed the Commander-in-Chief to conclude with the Rana of Oudypore and the Raja of Kotah, engagements similar to those which he had formed with the northern Rajpoot chiefs. The establishment of peace with Dowlt Rao Scindiah, however, previously to the conclusion of any engagements with those chiefs, suspended the negotiation.

The Governor-General in Council is not inclined (under the change of circumstances which has taken place,) to apprehend any injury to our interests from the exclusion of those chiefs from the alliance. The danger to be expected from the extension of the power of Dowlt Rao Scindiah, has been in a great degree, if not altogether removed by the conclusion of a treaty of defensive alliance with that chieftain, which must also operate as a material check to the aggrandizement of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or of any other chief or state in that quarter of India.

Agreeably to the instructions of the Governor-General to Mr. Mercer, of which the substance is stated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch, that gentleman soon after his arrival at Illahabad, opened a communication with the Rana of Gohud, under the immediate directions of the Commander in Chief, for the co-operation of that chieftain with the British troops, in expelling the Mahratta troops from the province of Gohud. The Rana of Gohud assented with the utmost readiness to the proposition of the British Government, and having raised a body of troops by the aid of a sum of money which the Commander-in-Chief was authorized to advance for that purpose, the Rana of Gohud was actively and successfully employed during the whole course of the war, in opposing the troops of the enemy, and in performing the duties of a faithful ally of the British Government.

The country of Gohud, having been placed entirely at the disposal of the British Government, by the treaty with Rajah Ambajee, (of which the details will be stated to your honourable Committee in a subsequent part of this despatch,) a treaty was concluded on the 29th January 1804, between the British Government and the Rana of Gohud, by which the British Government guaranteed to the Rana the independent possession of the countries assigned to him; and the Rana agreed to subsidize a British force of three battalions of native infantry, and to pay a subsidy of 9 lacks of rupees per annum. The fort and town of Gwalior were ceded by that treaty to the British Government in perpetuity; the remaining stipulations of the treaty are similar to those contained in the treaties concluded with the Jaut and Rajpoot chieftains.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable

Committee, the negotiations with Rajah Ambajee Inglia, which led to the conclusion of the treaty with that chieftain.

A considerable portion of Scindiah's territories in Hindostan, including the ancient possessions of the Rana of Gohud, were placed under the exclusive management of Ambajee.

In the month of October 1803, a communication was received through a respectable channel by the Persian Secretary to Government, of Ambajee's views and intentions in the existing state of affairs between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This communication contained a direct proposal from Ambajee to withdraw from his allegiance to Scindiah, and to place himself under the protection of the British Government, and to become tributary under certain conditions to that Government.

A memorandum of this communication, together with the sentiments and instructions of the Governor-General on the subject of a connection with Ambajee, was transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who had received through an agent of Ambajee, propositions of a similar tendency. Accredited Vakeels from Ambajee reached the camp of the Commander-in-Chief at the end of October.

Your honourable Committee will observe that the proposal of Ambajee to become tributary to the British Government for the whole of the country under his management, was incompatible with the instructions of the Governor-General with respect to the Rana of Gohud, the possessions of whose ancestors, or the greater part of them were included in the districts under Ambajee. The Governor-General, therefore, proposed to compensate to Ambajee for the loss of that portion of the territory under his management, which the Governor-General intended to assign to the Rana of Gohud, by guaranteeing to Ambajee the independent possession of the remainder, and by admitting Ambajee to the benefits of an alliance founded on the principles of the engagements to be concluded with the Rajpoot and Jaut States.

The Commander-in-Chief accordingly opened a negotiation with Ambajee, on the principle above stated, and after considerable delays and systematic evasions on the part of Ambajee, a treaty was concluded by the Commander-in-Chief with that chieftain, on the 16th of December 1803, by which all the territory in his possession situated to the northward of Gwalior, inclusive of that fort was ceded to the British Government, and the British Government guaranteed to Ambajee the independent possession of the remainder of the territory, which had been under his management.

For the detail of that treaty, which was entirely approved and ratified by the Governor-General in Council, and of the explanatory letter of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to copies of those documents recorded on our proceedings of the 2nd March.

Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty with Ambajee, the Commander-in-Chief detached a force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel White, to receive possession of Gwalior, for the surrender of which fort to the British detachment; an order was received from Ambajee.

For the purpose of securing the strict performance of the stipulations of the treaty by Ambajee, and of settling the arrangements in contemplation with the Rana of Gohud, Mr. Mercer was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany the detachment to Gwalior.

The Governor-General, however, was subsequently apprized, by private advices from Mr. Mercer, that the Commandant of the fortress of Gwalior had

refused to surrender it in conformity to the treaty of alliance concluded between the British Government and Rajah Ambajee. The Governor-General therefore deemed it necessary to issue immediate instructions to Mr. Mercer for the regulation of his conduct upon that occasion, with a view to preclude the delay which would be occasioned by a reference to the Commander-in-Chief.

It appeared to be so manifestly the interest of Rajah Ambajee to adhere to the faith of his engagements with the British Government, that the Governor-General was disposed to acquit that chieftain of any concern in the refusal of the Commandant of Gwalior to surrender that fortress. The Governor-General however observed, that the stipulation in the treaty for the surrender of Gwalior, necessarily implied the power as well as the disposition to effect the peaceable transfer of that fortress to the authority of the British Government; that in the confidence of the immediate and undisputed surrender of the fortress of Gwalior, we had acceded to the stipulations of the treaty in favour of Rajah Ambajee; that unless that stipulation therefore should be strictly fulfilled, the obligation of the treaty ceased on the part of the British Government.

The Governor-General directed Mr. Mercer, in the event of the fortress of Gwalior not having surrendered on the receipt of that despatch, to communicate to Rajah Ambajee the preceding observation, and to apprize Ambajee, that by the failure on his part in the execution of this fundamental article of the engagements lately concluded with him, those engagements were rendered null and void, and that the British Government was left at liberty to pursue such measures as might appear most conducive to the public interests, without regard to the obligations of the treaty.

The same instructions were also stated to be applicable to the event of our being ultimately reduced to the necessity of occupying Gwalior by force of arms.

Corresponding instructions were at the same time issued by the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief, in which the Governor-General stated it to be his opinion, that although the alliance actually concluded with Rajah Ambajee should be dissolved, an arrangement should be ultimately concluded with Ambajee, by which that chieftain might be guaranteed in the independent possession of a part of the territory under his authority; and the Governor-General accordingly authorized the Commander-in-Chief if necessary, to renew the negotiation with Ambajee for that purpose, unless the Commander-in-Chief should have reason to be satisfied that the conduct of the Commandant of Gwalior had been clandestinely instigated by Ambajee; such a proof of treachery, being considered by the Governor-General, to be of a nature, to preclude all confidence in any arrangement with Ambajee.

The Governor-General proceeded to observe, that in the event of the dissolution of the engagements lately contracted with Ambajee, the British Government would be justified in proposing to his acceptance, terms less favourable than those which formed the basis of the late arrangements; and the Governor-General suggested to the Commander-in-Chief, the expediency of taking advantage of a renewed negotiation with Ambajee, to obtain indemnification for the injury sustained by the British Government, in consequence of Ambajee's violation of his engagements, or of his inability to fulfil their stipulations. The Governor-General also suggested to the Commander-in-Chief, the policy of applying the limitation of the extent of territory to be guaranteed to Ambajee, under the stipulations of any new engagements, to the augmentation of the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the conclusion of peace with that chieftain.

On the refusal of the Commandant of Gwalior to surrender that fortress to the British troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel White, that officer immediately proceeded to take possession of the town of Gwalior, with a view to intimidate the garrison, as well as to prevent communication between the town and fort.

On receiving information of the refusal of the garrison to surrender, the Commander-in-Chief detached a considerable reinforcement of European and native infantry, with battering guns, to join Lieut.-Colonel White, who had also been authorized to call for a reinforcement from the detachment serving in Bundelcund. On the junction of the reinforcements, Colonel White opened batteries against the fort, and on the 4th of February, a practicable breach having been effected, the garrison offered to surrender on the condition of receiving a donation of 50,000 rupees. This proposal was rejected by Mr. Mercer and Colonel White, but an arrangement having been subsequently effected, by which the garrison was to receive the value of certain articles of provision in the fort, the British troops were put in possession of all the gates on the night of the 4th, and on the 5th of February the fort was evacuated.

The possession of this important fortress, which commands the passes into Hindostan in that quarter, and secures the frontier of Gohud, completely accomplished the views of the Governor-General in Council, in that important branch of the general plan of operations.

On the 11th of February, Mr. Mercer communicated to Ambajee the sentiments and resolutions of the Governor-General in Council, as expressed in the instructions to which a preceding paragraph refers. In his reply Ambajee expressed no surprise at the measures pursued by the order of the Governor-General in Council, or any disposition to palliate his conduct, nor to establish the validity of his engagements with the British Government.

Although neither the Governor-General in Council, nor the Commander-in-Chief at first ascribed to the treachery of Ambajee the conduct of the Commandant of Gwalior, yet circumstances subsequently transpired, which amounted to full proof of treachery on the part of Ambajee, and which were corroborated by the conduct of Ambajee, after that chieftain had received intelligence of the conclusion of peace with Scindiah.

Your honourable Committee will have observed, that information was received by the Commander-in-Chief and by Mr. Mercer, of the conclusion of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, previously to the surrender of Gwalior, and that the same information had reached the Governor-General in Council, previously to his knowledge of the latter event.

The Governor-General in Council being decidedly of opinion, that the rights acquired by the British Government under the treaties with Ambajee and the Rana of Gohud, were acknowledged and confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, and that no fair construction of that article could impose upon the British Government the necessity of foregoing the advantages which it derived from the treaty with Ambajee, or could exonerate the British Government from the obligations of the engagements which it had contracted with the Rana of Gohud, under the conviction of Ambajee's adherence to good faith, His Lordship in Council issued immediate instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, to prosecute the siege of Gwalior without interruption, and to proceed in the occupation of the territories which had been assigned to the Rana of Gohud by the treaty with that chieftain.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having expressed doubts with regard to the true intent and meaning of the 2nd and 9th articles of the treaty of peace,

the Governor-General stated to the Commander-in-Chief in a separate letter, under date the 20th of February, the just construction of those articles.

The Governor-General in Council solicits the attention of your honourable Committee to the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief and to Mr. Mercer above referred to, for a statement of the principles which have governed his decision on this important question.

The discussions which have arisen with the Durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the subject of Gohud and Gwalior, and the sentiments and final resolution of the Governor-General in Council on the whole of that intricate question, will more properly come under consideration in the separate despatch, which it is the intention of the Governor-General in Council to address to your honourable Committee exclusively on the subject of the pacification with the confederated chieftains.

The instructions of the Governor-General with respect to Zeib-oo-Nissa Begum, commonly called Sumroo's Begum, who possessed a considerable Jagheer under the Mahratta government in the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges, and in the centre of the territory formerly possessed by M. Perron, and the instructions of the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief with respect to the Begum, have already been fully stated to your honourable Committee in a former part of this despatch.

In those instructions, the Governor-General signified to the Commander-in-Chief his desire, that the Begum's Jagheer should ultimately be commuted for a stipend: The entire transfer of her Jagheer to the Company being an object of great importance to the British Government, with reference to the tranquillity of the Doab, and to the complete introduction into that country of the system of British laws and regulations.

The territory which was placed at the disposal of the British Government by the glorious success of our arms in the battle of Delhi, afforded us the means of assigning to the Begum, territory on the western side of the Jumna, instead of the Jagheer which she possessed within the Doab; and accordingly in a letter of instructions which the Governor-General issued to Mr. Mercer on various points of detail connected with the duties of his mission, the Governor-General conveyed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief authority to propose to the Begum the transfer of her establishment to the opposite side of the Jumna.

On the 5th of December, the Governor-General in Council received a despatch from the Commander-in-Chief, containing information of the Begum's unconditional consent to the proposed transfer of her establishment, and enclosing orders from the Begum for the recal of her battalions serving with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Begum at the same time assured his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, through the officer left at Delhi to attend on his Majesty Shah Aulum, that she had issued orders for the recal of her troops immediately on the requisition which was conveyed to her by the Commander-in-Chief, at the period of time when his Excellency transmitted to her the Governor-General's letter. The Commander-in-Chief's despatch also enclosed a letter from the Begum to the Governor-General, communicating her consent to the proposed arrangement.

The Governor-General in Council being of opinion that the conduct of the Begum on this occasion merited the approbation of the British Government, adopted the suggestion contained in the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief, to guarantee to her the independent possession of the territory to be assigned to her in lieu of her Jagheer on the usual condition of military service; and directed the Commander-in-Chief to take the necessary measures for the assignment of territory to the Begum on the western side of the Jumna. His Excellency was at the

same time instructed to adopt immediate measures for introducing the British authority into her former Jagheer, and to urge the Begum to resign it without awaiting the actual assignment of territory on the western side of the Jumna; an arrangement to which the Begum has consented. Various circumstances, however, have hitherto prevented the selection and assignment of territory in lieu of her Jagheer. But it is the intention of the Governor-General in Council to account to the Begum for the revenue of her Jagheer, during the period of time which may elapse from her surrender of it to the British Government, until her occupation of a territorial equivalent on the western side of the Jumna. The troops of the Begum joined the Commander-in-Chief in the month of December, after a long and difficult march from the Deccan.

Preceding paragraphs of this despatch advert to the instructions issued by the Governor-General to his Excellency the *Commander-in-Chief*, on the subject of conciliating the good will of the principal Seik chiefs, and of the engagements to be concluded with them. The course of the *Commander-in-Chief's* operations did not afford opportunities for carrying these instructions into effect to the extent proposed. In fact, a principal object was accomplished by the neutrality of the Seik chieftains during the war, and which may in a great degree be ascribed to the rapid progress and glorious triumphs of the British arms.

The *Commander-in-Chief*, however, (as has been already stated to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 25th of September, 1803) received proposals from Rajah Runjeet Sing, the Rajah of Lahore, for transferring to the authority of the British Government the territory in the possession of chiefs of the tribe of Seik, situated to the southward of the river Sutledge, on the condition of mutual defence against the respective enemies of that chieftain, and of the British Nation.

The possession of territory in that quarter, however, was by no means desirable to the British Government, although the power of disposing of it might have facilitated future arrangements. But the Governor-General entertained considerable doubts with regard to the right of Rajah Runjeet Sing to transfer that territory; and at all events the Governor-General apprehended that any disposition of that territory, excepting such as should confirm the chieftains actually occupying it in their respective possessions, would render it necessary to employ force for the accomplishment of the proposed arrangement, and place in the condition of enemies those whom it was a principal object of the Governor-General to conciliate. His Excellency, therefore, deemed it sufficient, that the amicable disposition of Runjeet Sing manifested by his proposals, should be encouraged without concluding any specific engagements with that chieftain. The Governor-General also received a letter from Rajah Sahib Sing, the chief of Putteealah, expressive of his friendly disposition towards the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the circumstances attending the deliverance of the Emperor Shah Aulum from his grievous subjection to the power and authority of the Mahrattas and the French; and of the restoration of that aged and venerable monarch, under the protection of the British Government, to a state of dignity, competency, and comfort.

The letter addressed by the Governor-General to his Majesty Shah Aulum, of which the substance was stated in a preceding paragraph of this letter, was secretly transmitted by the *Commander-in-Chief* to Syud Rezza Khaun, the agent of the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah at Delhi, for the purpose of being delivered to his Majesty. It was accompanied by a letter from the *Commander-in-Chief*, expressive of his anxiety to afford every demonstration of respect and at-

tachment to his Majesty. The strictest secrecy was enjoined to Syud Rezza Khaun in the delivery of these letters.

On the 29th of August, the Commander-in-Chief received through Syud Rezza Khaun the answer of Shah Aulum to the Governor-General's letter, expressing the anxious wish of his Majesty to avail himself of the protection of the British Government.

On the 1st of September, the Commander-in-Chief received from Syud Rezza Khaun a letter, under the seal of his Majesty to the Governor-General, declaring that his Majesty had entrusted the management of all his affairs to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to M. Perron as the deputy of Scindiah, and announcing his Majesty's intention of taking the field in person, and requiring the Governor-General to prohibit the further prosecution of military operations.

It is proper to apprise your honourable Committee that the transmission of letters on the part of his Majesty was at all times subject to the control of the officers who were stationed at Delhi on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and who acted under the immediate authority of M. Perron. His Majesty was never permitted to despatch any letters which had not been either dictated or approved by those Officers. The reply which the Governor-General received to his letter to the King was clandestinely prepared and forwarded, added to which, the actual state of misery and distress in which that unfortunate monarch had long been involved, and the known solicitude of his Majesty to be relieved from the oppressive control and inhumanity of the Mahratta power, precluded any supposition that the letter described in the preceding paragraph was prepared and transmitted by his Majesty's voluntary command, or that the declarations and injunctions contained in it accorded with the real wishes and designs of his Majesty. These considerations, added to information which the Commander-in-Chief received from Syud Rezza Khaun, that the letter in question was actually dictated by the French officers at Delhi, afford unquestionable proof of that fact.

A letter in the same spirit, addressed by his Majesty to the Nawaub Vizier, had been delivered by the Vizier to the Resident at Lucknow, and Syud Rezza Khaun reported to the Commander-in-Chief that his Majesty had publicly declared his intention to address similar letters to several of the chiefs of Hindostan. The whole of these proceedings evidently originated with the French officers at Delhi, and subsequent events have proved the correctness of the opinion which was formed of his Majesty's anxious solicitude to place himself under the protection of the British power.

Syud Rezza Khaun having been compelled to quit Delhi by the violence of the French officers, proceeded to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, and rendered a favourable account of the disposition of his Majesty and of his court towards the British Government.

All the attempts of the French and others in the interest of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to deter his Majesty from accepting the protection of the British Government, were however frustrated by the signal and decisive success of our arms in the memorable battle of Delhi, on the 11th of September, 1803. Immediately after that event, the Commander-in-Chief was apprized of the Emperor's earnest desire to place himself under the immediate protection of the British army.

On the 16th of September, the Commander-in-Chief, attended by the principal officers of the army, waited on the Emperor Shah Aulum at the royal palace in the fort of Delhi. On that occasion his Majesty's eldest son, Mirza Akber Shah, the heir apparent, proceeded to the British camp, and conducted his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the presence of his Majesty, who received his Excellency seated on his throne. His Majesty and the whole court testified the utmost

joy at the events which had placed his Majesty and the royal family under the protection of the British Government.

Soon after the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief at Delhi, his Excellency received information that a sum of money, amounting to six lacs of rupees, the property of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had been lodged in the hands of M. Dugeon, the Commandant of Delhi, for the payment of the troops; of that sum M. Dugeon had disbursed 60,000 rupees for the payment of his troops, and on the approach of the British army, he had deposited the remainder with Shah Nowauz Khan, the treasurer of his Majesty, with a view to prevent it from falling into the possession of the Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency being satisfied that the money in question was the public property of the enemy, and that the transfer of it to the hands of an officer of his Majesty's treasury had no other object than to deprive the British Government of the benefit of the capture, deemed it to be his duty to claim the property, as belonging to the British power. This application was made in the most respectful manner, and with every degree of attention to his Majesty's dignity. After some consideration, the Emperor sent the money to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by a message to his Excellency, requesting his acceptance of the money as a donation to the brave army, whose gallant conduct had released his Majesty from a miserable subjection to the Mahratta and French power, and placed him under the long-desired protection and liberality of the British Government.

The Commander-in-Chief received the money, and referred the question of its disposal to the consideration and orders of the Governor-General.

The Emperor addressed a letter to the Governor-General, at the same time stating the circumstance of his having bestowed this donation on the British army.

The Governor-General communicated to the Commander-in-Chief without delay his sentiments and instructions relative to the transaction above described.

In those instructions the Governor-General stated his decided opinion to be, that the original sum of six lacs of rupees, as well as the residue of that sum, after deduction of the disbursement made to the troops of the enemy, was certainly the public property of the enemy; and that any part of that property captured in the hands of M. Dugeon, or of any officer, soldier, or subject of the enemy, would unquestionably have been adjudged lawful prize to the British Government.

The Governor-General observed, that the fraudulent transfer of the enemy's property to the hands of the officers of his Majesty Shah Aulum, at the time of the approach of the British army, could not change the nature of that property, or exempt it from the right of the captors, who had defeated the enemy's troops in the battle of Delhi, and in consequence of that glorious victory had captured the city and fortress of Delhi, occupied at that time by a division of the enemy's army; that no circumstance appeared to warrant a suggestion, that this deposit could have been intended for the service of his Majesty, although placed in the hands of the chief officer of his Majesty's treasury; that the state of indigence and misery to which his Majesty, his royal family, and household had long been reduced by the Mahratta power; the degraded and destitute condition to which the imperial house of Timur had been subjected under the officers of Scindiah; and the deplorable situation in which the Commander-in-Chief found the Emperor upon his entrance into Delhi, excluded the possibility of a supposition that M. Dugeon intended to contribute so large a sum to relieve the sufferings of Shah Aulum, and of his impoverished court; that the object of the deposit was evi-

dently to elude the rights of the conquerors, and to cover the property of the enemy in the hands of his Majesty's officers and under the royal name, without the authority or knowledge of the Emperor, and without any intention of relieving his Majesty's urgent distress, That under the conclusion, therefore, that the residue of the original sum of six lacs of rupees deposited by M. Dugeon in the hands of Shah Nowauz Khaun, continued to be really the public property of the enemy, the right to that property appeared to the Governor-General to have been vested in the British Government by the conquest of Delhi.

Under these circumstances the Governor General expressed his entire approbation of the Commander-in-Chief's conduct in having claimed the sum of money in question, and in having observed in his mode of preferring a claim to it, the respect and attention which the Commander-in-Chief had uniformly manifested towards the unfortunate Emperor.

The Governor-General proceeded to observe, that his Majesty Shah Aulum having been pleased to offer to the army as a donation the sum of money claimed by his Excellency in right of conquest, the Commander-in-Chief could not have declined to accept that offer without injury to his Majesty's dignity, unless at the same time the Commander-in-Chief could have relinquished altogether the claim on the part of the British Government to that part of the property of the enemy, and that in the judgment of the Governor-General the Commander-in-Chief would not have been justified in relinquishing that claim without the express authority of the Governor-General in Council.

The Governor-General further stated to the Commander-in-Chief, that the treasure in question being lawful prize, the Governor-General could not have deemed himself warranted in any stage of the transaction (under the circumstances stated by the Commander-in-Chief) to have authorized his Excellency to withhold the assertion of the claim of the British Government to obtain the enemy's property from the hands in which it had been concealed; adding, that the limited amount of the sum, combined with the memorable events which attended the conquest, would have rendered the Governor-General peculiarly anxious to secure, for the purpose of granting to the army, a reward earned by a degree of exertion and merit which had never been surpassed.

The Governor-General, therefore, by those instructions, authorized and directed the Commander-in-Chief to consider the treasure, amounting to five lacs and 40,000 rupees, received as a donation from his Majesty, but being really the property of the enemy, to be prize-money granted by the authority of the Governor-General in Council to the army, in testimony of the high sense entertained by the Governor-General in Council of the discipline, perseverance, fortitude, and zeal displayed by that gallant army.

The Governor-General, however, thought it advisable to take an early opportunity of paying an equal sum to the use of the Emperor in such a manner as should be most acceptable to his Majesty, and as should secure its due application to his Majesty's service.

Accordingly the Governor-General addressed a letter to the Emperor, in which his Lordship stated to his Majesty the circumstances which appeared to render the money claimed by the Commander-in-Chief, the undoubted right of the British Government acquired by the conquest of Delhi, from the Mahrattas and French. After establishing this fact, the Governor-General proceeded to state, that agreeably to the pleasure of his Majesty, he had issued orders to the Commander-in-Chief for the distribution of the property among the troops. The Governor-General then intimated to his Majesty, that his Excellency's attention was directed to the formation of a permanent arrangement, calculated to provide security for the hap-

piness, dignity, and tranquillity of his Majesty and of the royal family, and that his Excellency had issued instructions to the Commander-in-Chief to pay into the royal treasury the sum of six lacs of rupees, with a view to provide for the immediate exigencies of his Majesty's household; and the Governor-General issued orders accordingly, which have since been carried into execution, and the money applied to his Majesty's use.

Previously to the march of the army from Delhi, the Commander-in-Chief appointed Lieut.-Colonel Ochterlony, the Deputy Adjutant-General, to reside with his Majesty on the part of the British Government. Every possible degree of attention and respect has been manifested towards the unfortunate Emperor and his family and household, and his Majesty appears to be fully impressed with a sense of the benefits which he has already derived from the protection of the British Government.

After the battle of Laswāree, his Majesty deputed a special mission for the purpose of congratulating the Commander-in-Chief on that brilliant victory, and conferring on his Excellency an honorary dress agreeably to the customs of India.

The arrangements which the Governor-General in Council proposes ultimately to adopt for the support of his Majesty and of the royal family will hereafter be stated to your honourable Committee. The Governor-General in Council, however, deems it to be advisable to apprise your honourable Committee in this place, that it is not his Excellency's intention to require any concession whatever from his Majesty, nor to proceed in any immediate arrangement beyond the limits of establishing a liberal allowance for his Majesty's support, and for the comfort of his royal family and nobility, under the protection of the British power, with such arrangements at Delhi as may render his Majesty's residence in that city tranquil, secure, and dignified; may improve the condition of the inhabitants of the city, and of the contiguous provinces; and may combine with these desirable objects additional augmentation and strength to the military resources and defences of the Company's possessions in that quarter.

The Governor-General in Council cannot conclude this branch of the subject of the present despatch without offering to your honourable Committee his most cordial congratulations on the complete accomplishment of the plan of political arrangement in the north-western provinces of Hindostan, which was formed by the Governor-General for the exclusion of the Mahratta power from that quarter of India, and for the establishment of the influence of the British Government in the north of Hindostan on the most solid and durable foundations. The conclusion of defensive alliances with the chiefs of the Rajpoot and Jaut tribes must secure the ascendancy of the British Government in those states, and must prove an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of the influence of the Mahrattas in those states; a particular article of those treaties also provides effectual security against the introduction of the power or influence of the French, or of any other European state into the counsels or armies of our new allies. The stipulation of mutual aid in case of war ensures to us the use of a powerful body of native troops, which may prove essentially useful in a variety of services, while the obligation which the treaties impose on our allies of submitting all their disputes to the British Government, and of abiding in all cases by the arbitration of that government, precludes the danger of our becoming involved in any unjust or unnecessary wars, and affords us powerful means of preserving, to the utmost possible extent, the future tranquillity of the northern provinces of Hindostan.

In conformity to his instructions, Mr. Mercer having proceeded to Illahabad, was met by the agent appointed by Himmüt Bahauder to conduct the proposed

negotiation with that chieftain; and on the 4th of September, 1803, Mr. Mercer concluded an agreement with Rajah Himmüt Bahauder.

The terms of that engagement were, that the British Government should solicit from the Nabob Vizier the release of Amrao Geer, the relation of Himmüt Bahauder, on proper security for his future conduct; that a jagheer in the Doab, suitable to his rank and station, should be conferred on Himmüt Bahauder, after he should have rendered to the Company the services which he had engaged to perform. That a territory, yielding an annual revenue of twenty lacs of rupees in Bundelcund, should be assigned for the support of his troops, on condition that they should at all times be prepared to obey the orders of the British Government; the British Government agreeing to provide for the pay of any number of troops, which the Rajah might be required to furnish beyond the force for which that territory was assigned, and that a similar provision should be secured to Rajah Himmüt Bahauder, in the event of the province of Bundelcund being relinquished by the Company.

A clause was inserted in the agreement, by which the British Government engaged to treat Himmüt Bahauder with the distinction to which his rank and situation entitled him; and he received an assurance of the strict observance by the British Government of all agreements which might be concluded with persons who might offer obedience through the agency of the Rajah.

After the conclusion of the agreement with Himmüt Bahauder, Mr. Mercer proceeded to the head quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of entering on the remaining objects of his mission, having entrusted the completion of the arrangements in Bundelcund to Mr. Ahmuty, the Collector of Allahabad, who had been the channel for the transmission of the detailed proposals of Himmüt Bahauder to the British Government.

The British detachment which had been formed near Allahabad for the purpose of acting in Bundelcund, entered that country about the 12th of September, and was joined by the troops of Rajah Himmüt Bahauder at Teroa, about three days march from the Jumna. The united detachments arrived on the bank of the river Cane on the 23rd of September, and found that the army of Shumsheer Bahauder, (the son of the late ally Bahauder,) who had lately entered Bundelcund with a considerable force for the purpose of assuming the government of that province under the alleged orders of the Peishya, was encamped on the bank of the river opposite to the position of the allied troops. Shumsheer Bahauder having despatched vakeels to Mr. Ahmuty, who accompanied the detachment into Bundelcund with proposals of submission to the British Government, a negotiation was commenced with that chieftain.

Mr. Ahmuty having been compelled by ill health to return to Allahabad, the conduct of the negotiation devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Powell. On the 10th of October Colonel Powell crossed the river Cane, and finding that Shumsheer Bahauder was not disposed to evacuate the province of Bundelcund with his troops, attacked and defeated the army of that chieftain on the 13th of October. Shumsheer Bahauder immediately retired with his army towards Calpee. The loss of the British detachment on this occasion was inconsiderable.

Previously to the receipt by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, of any information of the actual rupture between the British Government and Shumsheer Bahauder, his Excellency deeming it to be of importance to secure the submission of that chieftain to the British Government, had issued instructions to Mr. Ahmuty to endeavour, by every measure of conciliation, to effect that desirable object. The change of circumstances occasioned by the expulsion of Shumsheer

Bahauder by force from Bundelcund, did not induce his Excellency to withhold from him the offer of the British protection, and Colonel Powell was accordingly directed to resume the negotiation with Shumsheer Bahauder, which had been suspended in consequence of the events which had occurred previously to the receipt of the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to Mr. Ahmuty.

In a preceding paragraph of this despatch the Governor-General in Council has apprized your honourable Committee that Captain J. Baillie, professor of Arabic and Persian and of Mahomedan law in the College of Fort William, had been appointed to act in the capacity of a political agent of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in the room of Colonel Symes, who was compelled by indisposition to embark for Europe.

Captain Baillie proceeded to the army of the Commander-in-Chief in the beginning of October.

In consequence of the indisposition of Mr. Ahmuty, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief selected Captain Baillie for the conduct of all political arrangements in Bundelcund; Captain Baillie was accordingly furnished with general instructions for his guidance, and proceeded to join the detachment in Bundelcund.

Captain Baillie was met, previously to his arrival in Bundelcund, by vakeels from Shumsheer Bahauder, with proposals of accommodation on the part of that chief. The Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to Captain Baillie's despatch of the 9th of November, for a statement of the communications which passed between Captain Baillie and the vakeels.

In reply to a letter which Captain Baillie despatched to Shumsheer Bahauder by his vakeels, that officer received one from Shumsheer Bahauder, expressive of his friendly disposition, and of his inclination to connect his interests with those of the British Government, and stating that he despatched vakeels to Captain Baillie for the purpose of concerting an arrangement between himself and the British Government.

Notwithstanding these favourable appearances, the negotiation was protracted for a period of two months by the indecision and weakness of Shumsheer Bahauder, who, after having actually fixed a time for his arrival in the British camp, suddenly broke off the negotiation, and retired to some distance from the position occupied by Colonel Powell's detachment.

The continued success, however, of the British arms in the district of Calpee, and in the countries on the north-western frontier of Bundelcund, together with the frequent desertion of his troops, and the defection of many of his officers, speedily reduced Shumsheer Bahauder to a state of such distress as to leave him no hope of the restoration of his affairs otherwise than by the generosity of the British Government.

Captain Baillie finding that the submission of Shumsheer Bahauder would be more speedily effected by making known to him the intentions of the British Government in his favour, addressed a letter to him, in which he promised that the British Government would, in concert with the Peishwa, settle on him and his family a provision to the annual amount of four lacs of rupees; and conveyed to Shumsheer Bahauder other assurances calculated to inspire him with confidence in the justice and liberality of the British Government.

On the 18th of January, Shumsheer Bahauder arrived in the British camp, where he was received by Colonel Powell and Captain Baillie with every suitable mark of respect and attention.

The Governor-General in Council entirely approved the conduct of Captain Baillie in the course of this negotiation, and being convinced of the sincerity of

Shumsheer Bahauder's submission, and of his determination to adhere to his recent engagements with the British Government, confirmed the agreement entered into by that officer with Shumsheer Bahauder. The Governor-General in Council has also instructed the Resident at Poonah to endeavour to prevail on the Peishwa to commit to Shumsheer Bahauder the management of the districts in Bundelcund, which will remain under his Highness's authority; and entertains a confident hope that the success of the proposed measure will add considerably to the permanence and security of the final arrangements which will be concluded in that province.

The submission of Shumsheer Bahauder was followed by the surrender of all the forts in Bundelcund possessed by his adherents; Shumsheer Bahauder has continued since to reside in the British camp.

Soon after Captain Baillie's arrival in Bundelcund, he received proposals from the Soubadar of Jansee, who holds the fort of that name and its dependent districts under the nominal authority of the Peishwa, to connect his interests with those of the British Government, to which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief authorized Captain Baillie to accede.

On the 4th of January the Soubadar of Jansee arrived in the British camp. Regular engagements have been concluded with that chief by Captain Baillie, and have received the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Governor-General in Council.

The troops of the Soubadar of Jansee have since been employed in co-operating in the defence of Bundelcund and the adjoining districts in the neighbourhood of Jansee. The example of the Soubadar has induced several other chiefs in that quarter to place themselves under the protection of the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the progress of the troops under the command of Colonel Powell, the narrative of which has been interrupted for the purpose of giving a connected account of the negotiation with Shumsheer Bahauder.

Immediately after the flight of Shumsheer Bahauder from Bundelcund, Colonel Powell having detached a part of his force to the banks of the river Betwa, for the purpose of protecting the frontier, and of securing the tranquillity of the districts in that direction, which had been reduced to the British authority, marched towards the strong fort of Calinger, which he intended to attack without delay. A communication had been previously opened with the commandant of that fortress, and hopes were entertained that possession of it might be obtained by means of negotiation.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, however, justly conceiving that the defence of Bundelcund, and of the contiguous possessions of the Company from hostile incursion, was an object of greater importance than the immediate possession of Calinger, directed Colonel Powell to proceed with his whole force to the north-western frontier of Bundelcund, and to occupy such a position as might enable him to repel any invasion of the enemy, and to enforce the submission of the neighbouring chiefs to the authority of the British Government and that of the Peishwa. Colonel Powell arrived at Sorahpore, on the banks of the Betwa, on the 1st of November.

Several strong forts surrendered to Colonel Powell's detachment, and to the troops of Himmut Bahauder, during their march through the country; and progress was made in establishing the authority of the British Government throughout the districts of Bundelcund; some disturbances which had broken out in the southern parts of the province were speedily quelled by a part of the troops of Himmut Bahauder, which were detached to that quarter by Colonel Powell.

The Jagheerदार of Calpee having manifested a disposition to hostility, and hav-

ing refused to accept reasonable terms of accommodation, Colonel Powell marched to the capital of that district which surrendered on the 4th of December, shortly after batteries were opened against it. The possession of the fort of Calpee has always been considered by the Governor-General in Council to be indispensably necessary to maintain the complete command of the right bank of the Jumna, and it is accordingly the intention of the Governor-General in Council permanently to occupy that position, with a British garrison, under an arrangement to be concluded with his Highness the Peishwa, to whose nominal authority the district of Calpee is subject.

The Jagheerdar of Calpee has since surrendered and come into the British camp. A permanent settlement of his affairs, however, has not yet been accomplished.

The reduction of Calpee was followed by the surrender of several other strong forts in that quarter, and by the submission of all the Chiefs and Zemindars possessing territory between the Betwa and the district of Bind to the north of the river Sind. A temporary arrangement has been made by Captain Baillie for the management of the districts of Calpee and the other districts to the north of the Betwa, which have been surrendered to the British Government, and a proportion of their revenue has been already realized.

On the 12th of December, Colonel Powell was joined by a brigade of infantry, officered by Europeans, and commanded by a native of Great Britain, of the name of Shephard, which had come over from the service of Ambajee, under the proclamation of the Governor-General in Council of the 29th of August, 1803. This brigade has been taken into the pay of the British Government, and has been usefully employed by Colonel Powell on various services. Two other corps under the command of native commandants have also come over from Ambajee's service, and have been taken into pay and employed by Colonel Powell in establishing and maintaining tranquillity in the interior districts of Bundelcund, to which British troops could not conveniently be despatched.

On the 28th of December, Colonel Powell detached two battalions of native infantry to reinforce the detachment serving before the fortress of Gwalior.

Early in the month of February, Ameer Khaun, a freebooter, who had retained a large body of predatory marauders, and had offered his services on various occasions to the different belligerent powers in the course of the war, approached the frontier of Bundelcund. Ameer Khaun was now supposed to be retained in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar for the purpose of invading Bundelcund and the countries north of the Betwa. Colonel Powell, therefore, detached Colonel Shephard's brigade and a considerable body of the Soubadar of Jansee's troops to a position in the vicinity of Jansee, where they were to be joined by a large force belonging to the Rajah of Oondcha, one of the chiefs who had lately submitted to the British Government. This detachment was considered to be fully equal to resist any force which Ameer Khaun could bring against it, and Colonel Powell having collected his force at Kotra to the north of the Betwa, and having received a reinforcement of European and Native troops, was preparing to support it if necessary.

A negotiation had been commenced by Captain Baillie a short time before with Ameer Khaun, who was supposed to be desirous of leaving the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

On the 20th of February, Colonel Powell having received intelligence of the intention of Ameer Khaun to proceed by Jansee and Narwar to join Jeswunt Rao Holkar, marched in the direction of Jansee for the purpose of intercepting him. Ameer Khaun, who had entered the territory of Jansee, retreated on hearing of the advance of Colonel Powell, but suddenly returned into that district with a body

of plundering horse and engaged in a slight skirmish with a part of the Soubadar of Jansee's troops. Colonel Powell, however, continuing to advance, Ameer Khaun withdrew his troops, reascended the Ghauts, and retired to Seronge. The retreat of Ameer Khaun appearing to relieve the province of Bundelcund and the possessions of the neighbouring chiefs from all apprehension of invasion, Colonel Powell found himself at liberty to proceed into the interior of Bundelcund, for the purpose of taking possession of the fortress of Calinger, and of the few other strong holds which had not submitted to the British Government, and commenced his march towards Calinger on the 9th of March.

The strong fort of Booraghur had surrendered to a part of the troops of Himmud Behadur, while Colonel Powell's detachment was to the northward of the Betwa.

A preceding paragraph of this despatch refers to arrangements adopted by the Governor-General under an expectation of war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, for the defence of the line of frontier extending from Midnapore to Mirzapore on the banks of the Ganges against predatory incursions of irregular bodies of troops from the Mahratta territory.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to communicate to your honourable Committee the detail of those arrangements. With a view to that important object, the officers commanding the principal military stations on the frontier, were furnished with instructions (adapted to the local circumstances of the districts within the limits of their respective commands), directing them to adopt measures in concert with the civil magistrates, for the establishment of a regular and efficient system of defence against any incursions of the nature above described.

The officers to whom this important duty was entrusted, were Major-General Deare and Colonel Fenwick, respectively commanding at Chunar and Midnapore, and to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, Commandant of the Ramgur battalion.

The charge of the frontier from the northern bank of the Soane to Mirzapore, was entrusted to Major-General Deare. That of the province of Midnapore to Colonel Fenwick, and the line extending from the southern extremity of Pachete, to the southern bank of the Soane was placed under the charge of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton.

It appearing to the Governor-General in Council to be an object of great importance to the efficiency and discipline of the regular troops, and more particularly urgent in the present crisis that they should be kept collected, the commanding officers were directed to recall all the detachment of their troops stationed at out posts as soon as that measure could be adopted with safety; and the magistrates of districts on the frontier, were directed to entertain Burkundazes or armed Peons, for the purpose of performing the duties heretofore executed by the regular troops.

The expediency of keeping the regular troops collected as much as possible, and of employing in the internal administration of the country as small a number of the regular troops as might be adequate to the service, suggested to the Governor-General in Council the propriety of encouraging the Zemindars of the districts situated on the frontier of the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Benares to assist in repelling any attempts which might be made to enter the Company's provinces through the passes situated in their respective estates. The officers commanding on the frontier were therefore directed to afford every possible encouragement to those Zemindars, and to authorize them in the event of any appearance of a design on the part of the enemy to enter the Company's territories, to entertain armed Peons at the expense of Government, and to urge them

to adopt every measure which their means would afford of effectually guarding the passes.

The commanding officers were ordered to employ a sufficient number of trusty emissaries for the purpose of obtaining intelligence of any troops assembled within the Mahratta territory, or of any other proceedings which might indicate a design to enter the British territory.

The commanding officers were directed to consult the civil magistrates of the several districts, with the defence of which they were entrusted, on all matters connected with the subject of their instructions; and the magistrates were directed to afford to the commanding officers every information in their power, which could conduce to the accomplishment of the objects in view. Similar orders were issued to the Governor-General's agent at Benares with respect to the defence of the line of frontier under the charge of Major-General Deare.

The same general instructions appeared to apply to the circumstances under which the commanding officers at the different frontier stations would be required to act; but the greater extent of that part of the frontier which was entrusted to the charge of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, the probability that the force of the enemy would be directed against some part of that line, together with circumstances connected with the state of the adjoining Mahratta provinces, and some of the districts immediately within the Company's frontier, appeared to render specific instructions to that officer necessary.

Those instructions however were communicated to Major-General Deare and to Colonel Fenwick, who were directed to adopt such parts of them as were applicable to their respective commands; and those officers were further directed to submit such suggestions as occurred to them with respect to any additional precautions which they might consider to be necessary or proper.

In order to place the Ramgur battalion in a state of efficiency, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was authorized to complete that corps to 10 companies of 95 men each company, and he was afterwards authorized to raise two additional companies of the same strength. Two companies of regular Sepoys were detached from the station of Dinapore, and placed under Lieut.-Colonel Broughton's command in order to enable him to collect the whole of the Ramgur battalion, with a view to the future operations which it might become advisable for Colonel Broughton to undertake. The officer commanding at Dinapore received orders to furnish Lieut.-Colonel Broughton with every assistance in his power.

In conformity to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton's suggestions, that officer was authorized to establish depots of provisions at proper places for the use of his detachment and of the Burkundazes who might be employed in guarding the passes. Purwannabs were issued by the Governor-General to the different Zemeendars, who were stated by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton to possess the means of promoting the public service, enjoining them to co-operate with Colonel Broughton to the utmost extent of their power.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was also authorized to promise a free pardon to such Zemeendars in possession of passes leading into the Company's provinces, who by their former offences had forfeited the protection of the British Government, as should establish by their zeal and services in the defence of the frontier, pretensions to the favourable notice of the Governor-General in Council.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was also authorized to stipulate with such persons possessing the command of passes as he might think proper, for the payment of a just and equitable compensation for the services which they might render to the public on this occasion. The assistance of the proprietor of the district of

Bellounjah, situated on the southern bank of the Soane, being considered to be of importance to the complete success of the system of defensive measures committed to the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, and the efficient employment of his exertions being checked by the disturbed state of his country, the Governor-General in Council issued instructions to the collector of Behar to endeavour to mediate an accommodation between the proprietor of Bellounjah and the discontented Ryots.

The instructions above stated comprized the substance of the arrangements formed by the Governor-General in Council, for the defence of the frontier from Midnapore to Mirzapore. The orders of the Governor-General in Council were carried into effect by the officers who were entrusted with their execution, with the greatest alacrity and zeal; and the Governor-General in Council is happy to assure your honourable Committee, that no attempt was made by the enemy during the whole course of the war, to violate the line of frontier extending from the southern extremity of Midnapore to Illahabad. The entire exemption of the Company's possession in this quarter from the evils of a state of war, is however to be ascribed principally to the active operations of the army on every point of the enemy's resources and power, and to the alacrity, vigour, and success with which the attack upon the enemy was conducted in different quarters at the same period of time.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to submit to your honourable Committee, a view of the operations of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, and of the negotiations conducted by that meritorious officer with the tributaries and Zemeendars of the Rajah of Berar, in the eastern provinces of that chieftain's dominions.

The Governor-General in Council being of opinion that the plan for the defence of that part of the frontier under the charge of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, might be materially promoted, and that at the same time a considerable reduction of the power and resources of the Rajah of Berar might be effected, by commencing negotiations (to be eventually supported by the advance of a detachment of troops) with the disaffected subjects of the Rajah of Berar, in the countries bordering on the possessions of the honourable Company in Bengal, calculated to excite their resistance to the authority of the Mahratta government, and to attach them to the interests of the British Government, instructed Colonel Broughton under date the 25th of August, to open an immediate intercourse with those persons; and in separate instructions of the same date, stated the principles on which such negotiations were to be conducted.

By those instructions Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was in the first instance directed to procure the most accurate intelligence of the present state of Sumbulpore, (the most eastern province of Berar, and the chiefs and Zemeendars of which were known to be disaffected to the Mahratta Government,) of the force employed by the Mahrattas in that province, and of the means which the disaffected landholders possessed, of affording assistance to an invading enemy.

The measures which were adopted for placing the corps under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton in a condition to act with promptitude and effect, and for enabling him to collect the principal part of his force, with a view to offensive operations without abandoning the defence of the Company's possessions against hostile incursions, have been stated to your honourable Committee in that part of this despatch which relates to the plan of defence adopted by the Governor-General in Council, for the security of the frontier

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state the substance of the

instructions under which Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was directed to conduct the political negotiations, which might become necessary for the attainment of the objects of his expedition into the eastern provinces of Berar.

During the residence of Mr. Colebrooke at Nagpore, that gentleman received secret overtures from Vincajee Bhooslah the brother of the Rajah of Berar, for the countenance and support of the British Government in the establishment of his independence. It appears from the correspondence of Mr. Colebrooke, and from other sources of information, that the province of Chutteesghur, consisting of Ryepore and Ruttunpore and their respective dependencies, was under the exclusive authority of Vincajee Bhooslah; that the Rajah of Berar did not interfere in the affairs of Chutteesghur, nor exercise any authority over the hill chieftains tributary to the province of Ruttunpore, and that the military force stationed in Chutteesghur, was exclusively in the service of Vincajee Bhooslah, and all the public officers of the province, were appointed by Vincajee, and under his exclusive control.

The Governor-General in Council had no reason to suppose that Vincajee Bhooslah had abandoned his views of independence; but Vincajee Bhooslah having attended the Rajah of Berar in his march to join the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, any direct communication with Vincajee Bhooslah became difficult, and might have proved extremely hazardous to that chieftain.

The advantages however which the British Government might be expected to derive in the existing crisis of affairs, by the establishment of the authority of Vincajee Bhooslah in the province of Chutteesghur, independently of the Rajah of Berar, and under the protection of the British Government, determined the Governor-General in Council to endeavour to effect that object by negotiation with the Soubadars of Ruttunpore and Ryepore, the principal officers of Vincajee Bhooslah in Chutteesghur. It was not known to the Governor-General in Council, that those officers were apprized of the desire of their master, to establish his independence, or that they were prepared to act in conformity to his supposed views. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was therefore instructed to commence his negotiation, by addressing letters to the Soubadars of Ryepore and Ruttunpore, informing them, that hostilities between the Rajah of Berar and the British Government, would not be considered to involve Vincajee Bhooslah, provided that no aggressions were committed by them or their dependants, and that they would allow no passage to freebooters through their districts towards the Company's provinces. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was at the same time directed to despatch to Ruttunpore a confidential agent with instructions to endeavour to ascertain the real views and disposition of the Soubadar. If the Soubadars of Ryepore and Ruttunpore should appear to be acquainted with the supposed views of their immediate superior, and be disposed to promote their success, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was directed to state to those officers, the inclination of the British Government to guarantee the future independence of the territories of Vincajee Bhooslah.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, was also instructed to impress on the minds of the officers of Vincajee Bhooslah, the necessity of secrecy and circumspection. The terms of the proposed guarantee were reserved for future discussion.

In framing these instructions, it appeared to the Governor-General in Council, to be necessary to take into consideration the existing state of the province of Chutteesghur. It appeared that many of the Zemeendars of that province, were disaffected to the authority under which they were immediately placed, and disposed to co-operate with the British Government against the Mahratta power. Our support of those Zemeendars, however, being manifestly inconsistent with

the course of policy described in the preceding paragraphs, it became necessary to determine on the comparative expediency of those distinct modes of proceeding. In every view of the question, it appeared to the Governor-General in Council, that the objects of the British Government would be better effected by the establishment of the authority of Vincajee Bhooslah in Chutteesghur, on the principles above described, than by encouraging and supporting the disaffected Zemeendars of the province against his power. The establishment of such an authority was better calculated to afford security and tranquility to the Company's contiguous possessions, and by the reduction of the power and resources of the Rajah of Berar, proportionately to encrease our own. The encouragement of the disaffected landholders, did not promise to afford the same political advantages to the British Government, while it was obvious that the adjustment of their several claims and privileges might be productive of embarrassment and difficulty far exceeding the benefit to be derived from their alliance.

The Governor-General in Council, therefore, determined to adopt the latter plan only, in the event of the failure of the negotiation with the officers of Vincajee Bhooslah in Ryepore and Ruttunpore.

The same objection did not, however, appear to exist under similar circumstances to the measure of encouraging and assisting the hill chiefs tributary to Ruttunpore, whose possessions are situated between Chutteesghur and the Company's frontier, in throwing off the Mahratta yoke.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, was further directed to endeavour to restore to its former authority, the family which originally possessed the district of Sumbulpore, provided that measure should meet the concurrence of the chiefs and Zemeendars in that district.

The family of Sumbulpore had been expelled by the Mahrattas, who maintained complete possession of the province. The Ranee, who represented the family of Sumbulpore, was known to be anxious for the assistance of the British Government, and had made the most unequivocal applications to Colonel Broughton for that purpose. The possibility of annexing Sumbulpore to the possessions of Vincajee Bhooslah, was also suggested to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, who was apprized however as a general rule for his guidance, that it was not then the intention of the British Government, in the event of a successful war with the Rajah of Berar, to extend the British regulations in that quarter, beyond the western borders of Ramgur, Palamow, Pachete, and Midnapore.

In pursuance of those instructions, Colonel Broughton immediately after his arrival on the frontier, despatched a confidential agent to Kishoo Govind, the Soubadar of Ruttunpore, and the principal officer of Vincajee Bhooslah in that district, with suitable instructions, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the Soubadar, and of concerting with him in the event of his being favourably disposed towards the British Government, the means of promoting the mutual interests of his master and of the British Government. Your honourable Committee will observe from the letters from Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, the failure of this negotiation and the causes to which that officer is inclined to ascribe it.

In conformity to his instructions, Colonel Broughton also opened a communication with the Ranee of Sumbulpore and with other disaffected Zemeendars in that quarter who had on former occasions expressed a desire to connect their interests with the British Government.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton being of opinion from all the information which he had received, that the possession of the fort of Sumbulpore, which was occupied by a garrison of the troops of the Rajah of Berar, was the first object to which his views should be directed, and having received intelligence from Sumbulpore

of the most encouraging nature, determined to advance in that direction without delay, and having provided for the protection of that part of the frontier which could not be covered by the advance of his detachment, began his march from the position which he had occupied at the beginning of the month of December. Colonel Broughton had been joined while he remained within the frontier of the Company's possessions by two parties of irregular troops, commanded respectively by Rajah Futteh Narraia Sing, the proprietor of a Zemeendary in the district of Behar, and by an adventurer of the name of Bhoop Sing, who was for many years in the service of the Rajah of Berar, and from whose local knowledge Colonel Broughton expected to derive considerable advantage. These two leaders accompanied Lieut.-Colonel Broughton with their troops on his march to Sumbulpore.

Finding that the route by which he intended to proceed to Sumbulpore, was from the difficulty of the passes impracticable for artillery, Colonel Broughton was obliged to change the direction of his march, and to cut a road for his guns through a forrest of considerable extent.

On the 26th of December, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton received a letter from the Rajah of Ryeghur, the proprietor of a very considerable Zemeendary, dependent on Sumbulpore, containing assurances of the friendly disposition of the chiefs and inhabitants of that quarter, towards the British Government.

On the evening of the 28th December, Colonel Broughton detached a party of his troops under the command of Lieutenant Higgot, to destroy a body of Mahrattas which was in possession of a small post in his front; owing to the mistakes of his guides, Lieutenant Higgot did not arrive at the Mahratta post till some hours after day light on the 29th. He immediately attacked the enemy and put them to flight with some loss on their part.

On the 31st December, after a most difficult and harrassing march through a country which presented numerous obstacles to the progress of troops, Colonel Broughton arrived before the fort of Sumbulpore, and immediately summoned the garrison to surrender. After a short negotiation, the troops composing the garrison, agreed to evacuate the fort on condition that they should retain their arms and private property, and should receive the protection of the British detachment for themselves and their families against the inhabitants of the country, from whose vengeance they apprehended the greatest danger. The garrison also engaged not to fight against the British troops during the war. These terms were accepted, and the fort was evacuated on the evening of the 2nd January; and agreeably to his promise Colonel Broughton detached a party of his troops to protect the garrison during its march through the province of Sumbulpore.

For a detail of the circumstances attending the surrender of Sumbulpore, the Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to the despatches from Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, under dates the 3rd and 9th of January.

The Governor-General in Council directed his entire approbation of the zeal and perseverance which was manifested by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton and his detachment on their march to Sumbulpore, and of the terms on which Colonel Broughton permitted the Mahratta garrison of Sumbulpore to evacuate the fort, to be communicated to that officer.

On the 8th of January, Colonel Broughton detached a company of Sepoys and 1000 irregulars, under the command of Lieutenant Fountaine, to disperse a body of Mahratta troops, which was plundering the country in the direction of Sonapore. His detachment completely succeeded in its object, and with the assistance of the troops of the Rajahs of the country, dispersed and destroyed the only Mahratta

force which remained between the frontier of Cuttack and the province of Ruttunpore.

Within a short period after the fall of Sumbulpore, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton received assurances from all the Zemeendars of that province and of the neighbouring district of Patna, either in person or by their representatives, of their joy at their deliverance from the oppression of the former government, and of their readiness to agree to any arrangement which the British Government chose to adopt for the administration of those provinces.

On the 25th of January, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton received from Fort William the first intimation of the conclusion of peace with the Rajah of Berar, together with the orders of the Governor-General in Council, to abstain from all further hostile measures against that chief.

Your honourable Committee will observe, on a reference to the despatches from Colonel Broughton, that distinct propositions of submission to the British Government, and of a desire to transfer to the British Government that allegiance which they had so long reluctantly professed to the Rajah of Berar, were made by the several chiefs and landholders enumerated in the schedule enclosed in Colonel Broughton's despatch of the 29th of January, and that Colonel Broughton, previously to his knowledge of the conclusion of peace, had given them a positive and unequivocal assurance that they should be delivered from the authority of the Mahratta Government, and received under the British protection. The important question which has arisen respecting the validity of these engagements under the terms of the treaty of Deogaum, and the decision of the Governor-General in Council on that question will be stated to your honourable Committee in our separate despatch on the subject of the peace.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton had been instructed in the meanwhile to maintain his position at Sumbulpore, until the further orders of the Governor-General in Council.

Your honourable Committee will observe from the instructions to Mr. Mercer, under date the 22d of July, 1803, that the Governor-General deemed it to be desirable to conciliate to the interests of the British Government, Ajeet Sing, the chief of Boghaikund or Rewah Mukundpore, as a measure of precaution connected with the defence of the Company's frontier, and with the course of proceeding which the Governor-General had resolved to pursue with respect to the province of Bundelcund. In pursuance of the plan for the defence of the frontier of the Company against hostile incursions, a detachment of British troops was assembled on the northern frontier of Rewah, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to penetrate through that district into the province of Benares. The passes to the southward of Rewah, between that country and the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, being more defensible than those on the immediate frontier of the British possessions, the Commander-in-Chief under the general powers vested in his Excellency by the Governor-General, instructed the agent of the Governor-General at Benares, to endeavour to prevail on the Rajah of Rewah to allow a British force to enter his territory for the purpose of occupying those passes.

The Commander-in-Chief having received information, which induced him to believe that the Rajah of Rewah was inclined to connect his interests with those of the Company, afterwards transmitted to the magistrate of Mirzapore for the purpose of being proposed to Rajah Ajeet Sing, the draft of a treaty of alliance with the British Government on terms favourable to the interests of the Rajah, and calculated to secure the attainment of the objects of the Governor-General in Council in the district of Rewah,

Those propositions were transmitted to the Rajah by the magistrate of Mirzapore on the 23d of October.

In the month of November, some subjects of Ajeet Sing having joined a party of freebooters, who were committing depredations in the district of Khyragur, in the ceded provinces, and having seized the fort of Choukundee situated on the borders of that district, a detachment of British troops was sent against them, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief instructed Major-General Deare, who commanded on the frontier of Mirzapore, to prepare to enter the territory of Ajeet Sing with the force under his command, if it should appear that the Rajah was concerned in the violent and unjustifiable proceedings of his subjects and their accomplices.

After a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to carry the fort of Choukundee by assault, that fort was evacuated by the garrison on the night of the 24th of November, and the district of Khyragur was restored to tranquillity.

The leaders of the party of marauders having taken refuge in Rewah, Mr. Burges, the magistrate of Mirzapore, addressed a letter to Ajeet Sing, demanding as a proof of his attachment to the British Government, that he would seize and deliver up the persons of those offenders. In reply to the several communications of Mr. Burges, Rajah Ajeet Sing repeated his professions of friendship towards the British Government, but gave no decided answer to the propositions which had been offered to his acceptance.

No progress has been made in the conclusion of the intended treaty with Ajeet Sing, but the Governor-General in Council has no reason to suppose that Rajah Ajeet Sing is inimical to the British Government. The age and incapacity of the Rajah, and the weak and distracted state of his Government and country, sufficiently account for his indecisive conduct.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to submit to your honourable Committee a view of the measures which he adopted for the occupation of the province of Cuttack, and to state the substance of the instructions which were issued to the several officers employed on that important service. The command of the principal division of troops for hostile operations against Cuttack, was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, of his Majesty's 74th regiment, commanding the northern division of the Army of fort St. George.

Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was instructed to assemble at Ganjam, a force of not less than 1500 native troops, and to increase that force to the utmost extent consistent with the tranquillity of the northern Sirkars. A force, consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 22d regiment of foot, and 600 of the 20th Bengal regiment, with artillery, was despatched from Bengal by sea to Ganjam, to reinforce Colonel Campbell; Captain Blunt, an engineer officer of experience, who had surveyed the province of Cuttack, and possessed much local knowledge, accompanied the detachment from Bengal. The united force assembled at Ganjam, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, consisted of 565 Europeans of his Majesty's, and the honourable Company's troops 2200 Sepoys, and a party of native cavalry, consisting of 50 men.

With this force, Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was instructed to enter the province of Cuttack, and to proceed to Juggernaut.

Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was instructed, on passing the frontier, to use every possible means to conciliate the inhabitants; and a proclamation was transmitted to him, which he was directed to promulgate, promising every degree of protection and indulgence to those persons who should not appear in arms against the British troops, and exhorting the inhabitants to proceed in their respective occupations, and to rely on the enjoyment of perfect security. The attention of Colonel Camp-

bell was directed in a particular manner to the situation of the pilgrims passing to and from Juggernaut, to whom he was instructed to afford the most ample protection, and to manifest every mark of conciliation and kindness. He was directed on his arrival at Juggernaut, to adopt every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the Pagodas, to the religious prejudices of the Bramins and pilgrims, and to supply the Bramins with guards, and with every other means of protection and security which they might require. Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was further instructed to abstain from all interference in the established system of management at the temple of Juggernaut; and to give the Bramins an assurance, that they would not be required to pay any tribute or revenue, beyond that which they had been in the habit of paying to the Mahratta Government. Colonel Campbell was, however, directed to avoid entering into any engagements which should preclude such future arrangements as might be found necessary for the purpose of reforming abuses and vexations.

Colonel Campbell was particularly enjoined to observe, that no part of the property contained in the Pagoda, nor that of the priests or officers of the religious institutions, was to be considered as prize to the army; that no account was to be taken by the British officers of such property, and that no person was to be suffered to enter the sacred building, without the express desire of the Bramins.

Lieut. Colonel Campbell was directed, after leaving a sufficient force at Juggernaut, under an officer on whom he could rely for a due discharge of the duties of his situation, to advance to Cuttack, and to effect the reduction of the town and fort.

The immediate objects to which Lieut.-Colonel Campbell's attention was directed after the reduction of Cuttack, were to open a communication with Midnapore and Jellasore; to secure the safe and free passage of the public mails between Ganjam and Calcutta, and to guard against any surprize from the side of Nagpore.

Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was apprized that it was the intention of the Governor-General in Council to despatch a force by sea to Balasore, for the purpose of occupying that place as soon as information should be received of Colonel Campbell's arrival before Cuttack; and that a battalion of Sepoys would be directed to advance from Jellasore as soon as the season would permit, to join his army.

The Governor-General in Council also deemed it proper to furnish Lieut.-Colonel Campbell with instructions for his guidance, in the communications which he might have with the chiefs and Zemeendars of Cuttack and the adjacent country. Many of the powerful Zemeendars of Cuttack were supposed to have rendered themselves independent of the Mahratta power, or to yield to it a partial obedience. The chieftains residing in the contiguous districts were either independent of the Mahratta authority or tributaries to that state. Colonel Campbell was directed to require the submission to the British Government of the revolted Zemeendars, and to enter into engagements with the independent and tributary chieftains who might possess the means of embarrassing his operations, favourable to their interests without requiring their absolute submission to the British authority.

A civil commissioner was appointed to attend the army for the purpose of settling the province, and of aiding the commanding officer of the troops in his negotiations with the officers and subjects of the Rajah of Berar, and was furnished with separate instructions for his guidance. The primary duty assigned to Mr. Melvill, the gentleman who was appointed to be civil commissioner, was the progressive settlement of the revenues of Cuttack, as the advance of the

British troops should place the province under our authority. The commissioner was instructed to effect the settlement of the conquered country with the persons whom he should find in actual charge of it. The Governor-General in Council having resolved to introduce into Cuttack at the earliest practicable period of time the British system of laws and regulations, the commissioner was directed to form all his arrangements with a view to this intention, and he was instructed to explain to the inhabitants the intention of the British Government to admit them to the benefits of its laws, and to point out to them the various advantages which they would derive from the introduction of so just and lenient a system of Government. The settlement of the revenue was to be concluded in the first instance for the term of one year. The precise nature of the settlement could not be prescribed, but Mr. Melvill was directed to make the assessment so moderate as to conciliate the parties with whom the engagements should be made, and to interest the Rajahs and chiefs in the security of the new arrangement. Mr. Melvill was instructed to obtain every information in his power with respect to the temple of Juggernaut, the nature and extent of the duties levied there, and the amount of the revenue which the Mahratta Government derived from that source, and to make the necessary arrangements for securing the regular payment of that revenue. The instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell on this subject were communicated to Mr. Melvill. Mr. Melvill was also apprized of the instructions which had been issued to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell respecting the negotiation with the officers and subjects of the Mahratta government; and received corresponding instructions respecting that branch of his duties. Finally, Mr. Melvill was directed after the reduction of Cuttack to remain in charge of the collections, and two gentlemen of the civil service of Bengal were appointed to attend Mr. Melvill for the purpose of assisting him in that duty.

Adverting to the extent and efficiency of the military equipments and arrangements directed against Cuttack, and the little expectation which the officers of the Berar government could entertain of a successful resistance to the British arms, and to the character of those officers and of the Mahratta Government, the Governor-General in Council deemed it proper to authorize Lieut.-Colonel Campbell and Mr. Melvill to open a negotiation with the managers of Cuttack on the part of the Mahratta government, for the peaceable surrender of the province to the British authority, on the condition of receiving a permanent provision or a donation of money from the British Government. His Excellency the Governor-General therefore addressed letters to the two persons exercising the chief authority in Cuttack, and instructed Lieut.-Colonel Campbell and Mr. Melvill to transmit those letters, and to open a negotiation with the persons to whom they were addressed for the purpose above described, and they were authorized to offer a donation to each of the two principal Mahratta officers, not exceeding two lacs of rupees. Negotiations of a similar nature were to be opened with any other persons whose situation and influence might afford them the means of facilitating the peaceable occupation of the province of Cuttack by the British force. Duplicates and triplicates of the letters to the managers of Cuttack were transmitted to the officers commanding the expedition against Balasore, and the force to advance from Jellasore respectively, with instructions to endeavour to forward them, and to transmit the answers to the officer commanding the division proceeding from Ganjam.

With a similar view the Governor-General in Council obtained a letter from the most eminent of the Pundits of Bengal, addressed to the principal Bramins at Juggernaut, encouraging them to place themselves and the temple under the British protection. That letter was transmitted to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell and

Mr. Melvill with discretionary instructions with respect to the time and mode of delivering it.

In consequence of the severe and dangerous illness which menaced the life of Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, and prevented that zealous and able officer from proceeding with the army into Cuttack, the Governor-General despatched Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, of his Majesty's 12th regiment of foot his Lordship's military secretary, to Ganjam, for the purpose of taking the command of the expedition. Colonel Harcourt arrived at Ganjam on the 11th September, and assumed the command of the troops, Lieut.-Colonel Campbell continuing in a state of health which rendered him unable to accompany the expedition.

On the first of September, the Governor-General having received information from Ganjam, which appeared to render it expedient to enable Lieut.-Colonel Campbell to strengthen his force, despatched from Fort William to Ganjam by sea 500 Bengal volunteers with a supply of battering guns and ammunition for the use of Colonel Campbell's division under the command of Captain Dick, which had been held in readiness for the occupation of Balasore. Colonel Campbell was authorized either to detain that corps or to direct it to proceed to its original destination. Captain Dick arrived on the coast at too late a period in the season to effect a junction with the army in Cuttack, and was afterwards instructed by Colonel Harcourt to proceed to Fort St. George, from whence he was despatched to Trincomallee for the purpose of reinforcing the British troops on the Island of Ceylon.

The destination of Captain Dick's corps being changed, another detachment of 500 volunteers and 21 artillery men with four 6 pounders was prepared to proceed to Balasore, under the command of Captain Morgan, of the 7th Bengal regiment. This detachment was furnished with an ample supply of stores and provisions.

Captain Morgan's detachment was directed to proceed with all practicable despatch on the transports which were prepared for its accommodation to Balasore. With a view to overcome as far as might be practicable the delay which the difficult navigation of the Balasore river might oppose to Captain Morgan's passage up to the town of Balasore, an experienced pilot was directed to attend Captain Morgan, and he was furnished with every information which could be procured respecting the navigation of the river.

Captain Morgan was directed to endeavour to proceed up the river to the town of Balasore, and there to effect his landing. He was authorized to effect his passage up the river, and the disembarkation of his detachment by force if necessary, but every possible care was to be taken to avoid hostilities, and to obtain peaceable possession of the town. After obtaining possession of Balasore and securing his post by every means in his power, Captain Morgan was directed to use his utmost endeavours to preserve the free passage of the mails, and if his interference should be necessary, to assist the officers in charge of the posts with guards, and by such other means of security as might be necessary and consistent with the safety of his detachment.

Captain Morgan was directed to promise protection and security to all the inhabitants of Balasore and its vicinity, and to prevent any excess on the part of his troops, and to avoid every act of violence. The importance, however, of maintaining his position at Balasore was particularly pointed out to Captain Morgan, and he was ordered to be prepared to resist by every means in his power any attempt to dislodge him.

Captain Morgan was directed to lose no time in opening a communication with the detachment advancing from Jellalore, and to accelerate its march by detach-

ing parties of troops in that direction as far as he might find it to be safe and practicable. The officers commanding these parties were to receive particular instructions for the exercise of every degree of conciliation and kindness towards the people of the country. He was likewise directed to use every endeavour to open a communication with the officer commanding the division advancing from Ganjam as soon as he should hear of the arrival of that division before Cuttack, and to exert every means of preserving the communication with Balasore in both directions. The safety of the pilgrims passing to and from Jaggernaut was particularly recommended to Captain Morgan's attention, and he was directed to afford every assistance in his power to that description of persons.

Guns, stores, and camp equipage for the eventual use of the detachment advancing from Jellasore were despatched to Balasore with Captain Morgan. The Governor-General thought proper to address letters to the officers of the Mahratta Government at Balasore, calculated to obtain their co-operation with the British Government, and to transmit them to Captain Morgan, with instructions to deliver them when he might think expedient. Letters under the signature of the Governor-General were also entrusted to Captain Morgan, to be addressed and transmitted to any other officers of the Mahratta Government, on whom he might think them calculated to produce a favourable impression.

The Governor-General in Council having received information that a considerable number of Patan adventurers, natives of the dominions of the honourable Company and of the Nabob Vizier, were employed in Cuttack by the Mahratta Government, and being of opinion that a corps formed of persons of that description might be rendered useful in the protection of the country against marauders, and in other services of a similar nature, while it was desirable to deprive the enemy of a serviceable body of troops, authorized Captain Morgan to entertain a corps of irregular cavalry not exceeding 500 men, to be composed of persons born in the dominions of the Company, or of the Nabob Vizier. The conditions of their services were to be the same as the conditions on which Major Frith was authorized to raise a body of irregular cavalry in the upper provinces, which have been communicated to your honourable Committee from the Military Department.

The Governor-General in Council being of opinion that the services of Captain P. Grant, of the Bengal Establishment, 2nd battalion 22nd Native regiment, might be rendered useful in Cuttack, directed that officer to accompany Captain Morgan to Balasore, for the purpose of affording to Captain Morgan the aid of his local knowledge of the province of Cuttack, and particularly of the town and environs of Balasore, in carrying into effect the orders of the Governor-General. Captain Grant was also entrusted, under the superintendence of Captain Morgan, with the duty of forming and disciplining the corps of irregular cavalry which Captain Morgan was instructed to entertain.

Captain Morgan was directed, as soon as his presence at Balasore could be dispensed with, to join the detachment advancing from Jellasore, for the purpose of affording his assistance in facilitating the advance of that detachment, the commanding officer of which was directed to pay every attention to Captain Grant's suggestions.

The officer commanding the station of Midnapore had been directed to reinforce the frontier station of Jellasore to the extent of three companies of Sepoys; and afterwards instructed to order a complete battalion of Sepoys with guns to proceed to Jellasore for the purpose of advancing into Cuttack as soon as the state of the season and of the country should admit of such a movement. This battalion was joined by a detachment of the Governor-General's body-guard with two galloper

guns. Special instructions were issued under the immediate authority of the Governor-General to Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson, the officer commanding the battalion ordered to Jellalore for the guidance of his conduct after he should enter the province of Cuttack. He was ordered to enter Cuttack as soon as he should receive intelligence that the state of the country between Jellalore and Balasore was such as to admit of his advancing without danger to his detachment, and to proceed with the utmost practicable expedition to Balasore. The state of the roads rendering it probable that it might not be practicable to advance with guns, Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson was authorized, in the event of his finding it utterly impracticable to carry on his guns, to leave them behind; he was also authorized to leave behind whatever proportion of his camp equipage he might find it impracticable to carry on. Guns and camp equipage had been already sent to Balasore for the eventual use of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson's detachment.

Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson received the same orders with respect to the conciliatory conduct to be observed towards the people of the country, as had been issued to the other officers employed in the reduction of Cuttack. The Governor-General's instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson were communicated to Colonel Fenwick commanding the station of Midnapore; and that officer was instructed to furnish Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson with every assistance in his power, to enable him to carry the orders of the Governor-General into effect. Colonel Fenwick was also directed to hold his own corps in a state of readiness to move at the shortest notice, in case it should become necessary for that corps to advance for the support of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson's detachment, or for the defence of the frontier of Midnapore, which was entrusted to Colonel Fenwick's charge. The Governor-General had previously notified to Colonel Fenwick his intention gradually to strengthen the post of Midnapore from Fort William.

Under the supposition that Captain Morgan might obtain possession of Balasore previously to the arrival of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson at Jellalore, the Governor-General authorized Captain Morgan to call for the services of two of the three companies stationed at Jellalore (exclusively of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson's battalion) for the purpose of occupying the passes between Jellalore and Balasore. This arrangement was in no respect to interfere with the advance of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson, whose march to Balasore was not to be suspended on account of the previous occupation of the passes between Balasore and Jellalore, under these instructions to Captain Morgan. Colonel Fenwick was directed to issue the necessary orders to the officer commanding the three companies at Jellalore, to comply with Captain Morgan's requisition. Colonel Fenwick was further directed to order the officer commanding at Jellalore to obey any orders to advance into Cuttack which he might receive from the officer commanding the division proceeding from Ganjam, who received authority to call for the services of two of the three companies stationed at Jellalore.

The force assembled at Midnapore under the command of Colonel Fenwick, was destined, as soon as hostilities should commence, to occupy the Mahratta districts to the north-east of the Sooburnreeka river and the Mahratta territory, intermixed with the British possessions in Midnapore.

The combined system of operations above described appeared to the Governor-General in Council to provide in the most ample manner for the speedy and effectual reduction of the valuable province of Cuttack to the authority of the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council has already had the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee the successful operations of the British army in Cuttack, in conformity to the arrangements above described for the occupation of

that province. For the various details of those operations, the Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to the correspondence with Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt and the officers commanding the different detachments of British troops employed in the invasion of the province of Cuttack.

After the capture of the fort of Barrabutt, as communicated in our letter of the 30th of October, Colonel Harcourt directed his attention to destroy the remnant of the Mahratta force in Cuttack, which was hastily retreating from the province, and to secure the frontier of Cuttack on the side of Berar; and with this view, Colonel Harcourt immediately despatched a force consisting of a small party of Native cavalry, a company of the Madras European regiment, and one battalion of Madras Native infantry, with a detachment of artillerymen and two 6-pounders under the command of Major Forbes of the Madras Establishment, to the Pass of Bermule, which forms the only entrance into Cuttack through the range of hills which divides that province from the dominions of the Rajah of Berar. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to Colonel Harcourt's despatch of the 26th of October, for the instructions with which he furnished Major Forbes for the guidance of his conduct on this service.

Major Forbes arrived at the Pass of Bermule on the 2nd of November, and disposed of his troops in such a manner as to give him the complete command of the Pass. The detachment was received on its march by the Zemindars and inhabitants of the country through which it passed with every demonstration of attachment to the British Government, and was amply supplied with provisions and necessaries of every description for the use of the troops. The retreating enemy had escaped through the hills previously to the arrival of the detachment under Major Forbes. It is probable that they suffered severely on their flight from the inhabitants of the different countries through which they were obliged to pass, all of whom were highly exasperated against the Mahratta Government.

Soon after Major Forbes's arrival at the Bermule Pass he was met by vakeels from the Rajah of Boud and the Ranees of Sonepore, with proposals of submission to the British Government, and solicitations to be taken under its protection, which were referred by Major Forbes to the authority of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt; an account of the progress and result of these negotiations will be communicated to your honourable Committee in a subsequent part of this despatch.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley having formed a plan for the invasion of the remaining dominions of the Rajah of Berar in the event of the continuance of the war with that chieftain, the Governor-General resolved that a detachment of considerable strength should march from Cuttack through the Bermule Pass into the Eastern possessions of the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of co-operating with the force to be detached into Berar by the honourable Major-General Wellesley. The detachment at Cuttack was equipped with great promptitude and activity by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, and was in a state of readiness to proceed on its march when the conclusion of the treaty of Deogaum terminated all hostile operations against the Rajah of Berar.

Your honourable Committee was apprized in our letter of the 31st of October, 1803, of the march of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson from Balasore, for the purpose of joining Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt. That detachment arrived in the vicinity of Cuttack on the 28th of October; Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson was every where well received on his march from Balasore to Cuttack, and met with every degree of assistance from the inhabitants of the country.

After the advance of Colonel Ferguson towards Cuttack, Captain Morgan, who remained in command of the British detachment at Balasore, successfully exerted

himself in preserving good order, and supporting the newly acquired authority of the British Government in the adjacent country. Captain Morgan was afterwards usefully employed in providing cattle and grain for the use of the force intended to proceed from Cuttack under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, for the purpose of co-operating in the invasion of Berar.

Your honourable Committee was apprized in our letter of the 25th of December that the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson, which advanced into Cuttack from Jellasore, was supported by a force assembled at Midnapore under the command of Colonel Fenwick, the officer entrusted with the defence of the frontier of Midnapore against predatory incursions from the Mahratta territory.

Immediately after the commencement of hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, Colonel Fenwick in concert with Mr. Ernst, the Acting Magistrate of Midnapore, took possession of the districts under the authority of the Mahratta government, situated to the north-east of the Sooburnreeka, and intermixed with the possessions of the Company in Midnapore. Engagements were formed by Mr. Ernst with the proprietors of those districts, by which their allegiance was transferred to the Company; Colonel Fenwick's post at Midnapore was gradually reinforced from the Presidency, by which precaution means were afforded of strengthening the force at Cuttack.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the progress of the negotiations prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell and Mr. Melvill, with a view to facilitate the objects of the war in that quarter of the Rajah of Berar's possessions.

The execution of these instructions devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt and Mr. Melvill, who endeavoured to obtain possession of the province of Cuttack by negotiation with the officers exercising authority in that province under the Rajah of Berar. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to the letters from Mr. Melvill, for a detail of the measures which were unsuccessfully adopted by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt and Mr. Melvill for that purpose.

The speedy reduction of the fort of Barrabutty, and the facility with which the entire province of Cuttack submitted to the authority of the British Government, rendered unnecessary any further attempt to negotiate with the officers of the Mahratta government.

After the reduction of the fort of Cuttack, the Governor-General in Council deemed it proper to constitute a commission for the settlement of the province of Cuttack composed of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt and Mr. Melvill. Mr. Ernst, who had officiated as magistrate of Midnapore for a short period previous to the commencement of the war, was afterwards joined in the commission.

The immediate attention of the Commissioners was directed to the establishment of a connection with the Rajahs in the province of Cuttack and in its vicinity, who had been tributary to the government of the Rajah of Berar, whose speedy acknowledgement of the authority of the British Government was desirable with a view to the tranquillity of our newly acquired dominions.

The Rajah of Koorda, one of the most powerful of those chiefs in the southern parts of Cuttack, had received proposals of a conciliatory nature from Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt and Mr. Melvill previously to the reduction of Cuttack; and engagements were concluded with him and carried into effect early in the month of November. Engagements were also concluded with the tributary Rajahs of Duspulea, Angole, Hindole and Dekanul, whose lands, as well as those of the Rajah of Koorda, are situated within the limits of the province of Cuttack. The

substance of the engagements concluded with those persons (for the details of which the Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to the proceedings of the Commissioners under date the 21st of November, 1803,) is an acknowledgement on their part of the authority of the honourable Company, and a promise to pay to the British Government the stipulated tribute, and to assist the Company when required with their troops. Other stipulations were inserted, having for their object the security of the police and revenue of the Company's contiguous possessions. The British Government on its part engaged never to demand an increase of tribute, nor to make any further pecuniary demand whatever.

It is stated in a preceding paragraph of this letter that overtures of an amicable nature were received from the chiefs of Boad and Sonapore early in the month of November; similar overtures were also received from the Rajah of Ramgurh. Colonel Harcourt replied to the propositions of those chiefs in terms conformable to the general instructions which he had received, and expressive of the approbation with which the British Government would receive their offers of submission, and of its readiness to extend its protection to them. In order to facilitate the negotiation, Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt despatched vakeels to Boad, Ramgurh and Sonapore. The Commissioners also opened a negotiation with the Rajah of Koonjur, who possesses a territory contiguous to the province of Cuttack.

The engagements ultimately concluded with those chieftains involving questions intimately connected with the terms of the peace, will be submitted to your honourable Committee's notice in our separate despatch on that subject.

A preceding paragraph of this despatch refers to the occupation of several pergunnahs belonging to the Mahratta government, situated within the province of Midnapore, by the British Government. Since the conquest of Cuttack, engagements have been concluded with the Zemindars of those Pergunnahs, by which their allegiance was transferred to the government of the honourable Company. The district of Morebunge, situated on the south-west frontier of the province of Midnapore, together with its dependent Zemindaries, was also subject to the authority of the government of the Rajah of Berar. Proposals of submission to the British Government were made at an early period of time by the Zemindar of Morebunge, with whom engagements have since been concluded.

The correspondence of Mr. Ernst, to which the Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee, contains the most ample information on the subject of Morebunge and of the Mahratta Pergunnahs situated within the district of Midnapore. Both the Zemindary of Morebunge and the Mahratta Pergunnahs situated in Midnapore remain permanent possessions of the honourable Company, under the stipulations of the treaty of Deogaum; and it is unnecessary to state to your honourable Committee the advantage which must be derived from the complete exclusion of the influence of the Mahratta Government from Midnapore and the adjacent districts.

Your honourable Committee will observe on a reference to the proceedings of Mr. Melvill and of the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, that their attention was directed at an early period to the settlement and collection of the revenues of the province. They deemed it advisable, for reasons which appeared satisfactory to the Governor-General in Council, to abstain from making any material alteration in the mode of collection during the current year; and they accordingly, with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, continued with little variation the system which they found in force, and appointed the necessary officers to carry it into effect, establishing at the same time such rules as appeared necessary

to prevent abuses. The Commissioners have already realized a considerable proportion of the revenues of Cuttack under this temporary arrangement.

They have been directed to use every exertion in their power to ascertain the real resources of the country, and to obtain such other information as is necessary to enable the Governor-General in Council to establish a regular and permanent system of revenue in the province of Cuttack.

It was thought advisable also that no immediate change should be introduced in the existing establishment at the Temple of Juggernaut. At the recommendation of the commissioners, the Governor-General in Council confirmed in his situation, the principal officer of the Mahratta Government at Juggernaut. The commissioners were directed to furnish a detailed statement of the system which heretofore prevailed in the Temple of Juggernaut, in order to enable the Governor-General in Council to form a final arrangement for the regulation of the affairs of that temple.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of transactions at Hyderabad.

In a preceding paragraph of this despatch it is stated that the Resident at Hyderabad obtained from his Highness the Nizam, a letter to Major-General Wellesley investing him with full powers to controul his Highness's military Commanders and Amildars on the western frontier of his dominions. Those powers were confirmed by his Highness Secunder Jah, after his accession to the Government of Hyderabad. Those powers, however, being rendered entirely nugatory by the contumacy and disobedience of the officers of his Highness's Government, the immediate exercise of them was transferred by Major-General Wellesley's express desire to Rajah Mohiput Ram, one of the principal officers of his Highness's contingent serving with the subsidiary force. Rajah Mohiput Ram was ordered to comply with all Major-General Wellesley's requisitions, and was held responsible for the due execution of General Wellesley's orders.

The principal object of solicitude at Hyderabad at this period of time was the demise of his Highness the Nizam. That event took place on the 6th of August 1803. Your honourable Committee has been apprized in a preceding paragraph of this letter of the instructions which were issued to the Resident at Hyderabad, under the expectation of the death of the Nizam. Every precaution was adopted by the Resident in concert with Azim ool Omrah for the preservation of the tranquility of the city. A battalion of British troops was ordered by the Resident at the express desire of Azim ool Omrah to march into the city, and guards were posted in such situations as were considered to afford the best means of preserving tranquility.

On the 7th of August, Mirza Secunder Jah, eldest son of the late Nizam, formally ascended the Musnud, to which he was conducted by the Resident at Hyderabad, and by Rajah Ragotim Rao, the deputy of Azim ool Omrah, and received the congratulatory presents of all the principal officers of his Government at Hyderabad. On that occasion the Resident was received by his Highness with the most distinguished honours as the representative of the British Government in India; and his Highness publicly delivered to the Resident an instrument under his Highness's seal, acknowledging the obligation of the treaties subsisting between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad. Your honourable Committee is apprized that the Governor-General had previously directed the Resident to require from Secunder Jah the delivery of an instrument to that effect, as the first public act of his government, and his Highness assented to that requisition with the utmost readiness.

Rajah Ragotim Rao on that occasion suggested the demand of a corresponding engagement on the part of the British Government, which suggestion the Resident properly rejected. The Governor-General in Council, however, being of opinion that a voluntary act of recognition on our part would tend to conciliate the confidence of Secunder Jah, and would produce an impression on the minds of his subjects and of the several princes and chieftains of India, and particularly on the mind of his Highness the Peishwa, highly favourable to the credit of our justice, moderation and public faith, deemed it expedient to execute an engagement in terms corresponding with the instrument delivered by Secunder Jah, and an instrument to that effect was accordingly executed by the Governor-General in Council under the seal of the honourable Company, and transmitted to the Resident with directions to deliver it to his Highness the Soubahdar in the most public and formal manner. The instrument was delivered to his Highness by the Resident in a full Durbar on the 24th of September, and was received by the Soubahdar with every demonstration of satisfaction and of the sense which his Highness entertained of the liberality manifested by the British Government on this occasion.

The Resident at Hyderabad despatched immediate intelligence of the death of the Nizam and the succession of Secunder Jah, to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, to the Government of Fort St. George and Bombay, to his Excellency General Stuart, to Major-General Campbell, and to the Residents at Poonah, and with Dowlat Rao Scindiah; and those events were publicly proclaimed at Hyderabad, at the principal places in the Soubahdar's dominions, and at the stations of his Highness's army on the frontier.

The Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in stating to your honourable Committee, that the event of his Highness's death did not occasion any interruption of the public tranquillity, and that the accession of Mirza Secunder Jah was generally and cheerfully acknowledged by the younger sons of his late Highness, and by all the officers and subjects of his Highness's government.

Intelligence of the commencement of hostilities between the British Government and its allies, and the confederate Mahratta chieftains was received at Hyderabad, on the 10th of August.

The Resident, in conformity to the provisional instructions of the Governor-General issued on the 19th of August, immediately suggested to the Government of Hyderabad the propriety of dismissing the vakeels and agents of the confederate chiefs, and the recall from their respective courts of the Minister of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. This suggestion was adopted without hesitation by the Government of the Soubahdar.

Previously to the actual commencement of hostilities, the Resident at Hyderabad had been instructed by Major-General Wellesley, under the possible occurrence of that event, to call upon the Soubahdar of the Deccan to issue orders for the repair of the forts throughout the northern parts of his dominions, and to place garrisons of peons both in the forts and in the walled towns and villages, for the purpose of checking the depredations of the enemy's cavalry. General Wellesley also instructed the Resident to endeavour to prevail on his Highness the Soubahdar, to assemble a body of troops at Hyderabad for the protection of that city.

The necessary measures were immediately adopted for that purpose, and in the month of December the force assembled at Hyderabad amounted to 11,000 horse and 6,000 foot. His Highness the Soubahdar declared his intention of placing himself at the head of this force; and his Highness actually entered his tents, and resided in the camp during several weeks. The requisitions of the Resident on the other points recommended to his attention by Major-General Wellesley were not attended with the same success. Orders were indeed issued by the Minister

to the several Kelladars and other officers of the Soubahdar's government, but those orders were disregarded, and no exertions were made by his Highness's servants either for the defence of his country against the predatory incursions of the enemy, or for the success of the common cause. In some instances acts of positive hostility were committed against the British troops by the officers of the Soubahdar.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley, therefore, found it absolutely necessary to direct the Resident at Hyderabad to remonstrate in the strongest terms against the unjustifiable and hostile conduct of the servants of his Highness's government. The principal subjects of complaint were—the refusal of the Kelladar of Dowlutabad to receive into the fort under his command the sick of General Wellesley's army, and the officers and men wounded in the battle of Assaye;

The conduct of the Kelladar of Budnapore, who fired upon a detachment of British troops on its march to join Major-General Wellesley with a convoy;

The refusal of the Kelladar of Dharore to give protection under the guns of his fort to a convoy proceeding to join General Wellesley's army, and the Kelladar's declaration of his intention to compel the British troops to retire from the vicinity of his fort, into which he declared that he could not admit them without express orders from Hyderabad;

The refusal of Rajah Sookroodur (the principal officer of his Highness the Soubahdar in the northern parts of his dominions) to permit the sale of grain in the districts under his charge for the use of the troops, and various acts of disobedience and disaffection on the part of that officer.

The Resident at Hyderabad addressed remonstrances to the Minister on the different subjects of complaint above stated. Azim-ul-Omrah assured the Resident, that the conduct of his Highness's officers was not to be ascribed to the government of his Highness the Soubahdar; that positive orders had been issued and should be repeated; and that the officers whose names were specified by the Resident, should be immediately dismissed from their respective employments. In the course of the correspondence of Major-General Wellesley and the Resident at Hyderabad on these subjects, some circumstances were stated by the Resident materially affecting the fundamental principles of the connection subsisting between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad, which appeared to require the immediate notice of the Governor-General in Council.

The Resident in a letter to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, dated the 8th of October, 1803, ascribed the conduct of the Soubahdar's officers in a considerable degree to the jealousy distrust and aversion with which the connection with the British Government was viewed by almost all descriptions of persons in the Soubahdar's dominions. The Resident also stated that the Soubahdar himself was not free from the contagion: that his Highness in a private conference with his Minister, had charged the British Government with an unauthorized interference in the internal concerns of his administration, and denied the right of the British Government to remonstrate against the conduct of his Highness's Kelladars and officers; adding, that the admission of the troops and officers of the British Government into his Highness's fortresses, or their exclusion from those forts in time of joint war, was a matter of indifference.

The Governor-General in Council deemed it necessary to state without delay to the Resident at Hyderabad, his sentiments on this extraordinary and alarming intelligence, combined with the recent conduct of the officers of the Soubahdar, which had formed the subject of General Wellesley's complaints, and to furnish the Resident with proper instructions for his guidance on that occasion.

Although the Governor-General in Council was satisfied with the notice which

had been taken by the government of Hyderabad, of the misconduct of his Highness's officers. His Excellency in Council was of opinion, that if his Highness the Soubahdar really entertained the sentiments which had been ascribed to his Highness, and if a general sentiment of jealousy and aversion with respect to the connection subsisting between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad actually prevailed throughout his Highness's dominions; such a state of circumstances affected the fundamental principles of the alliance, and required a remedy beyond the immediate redress of particular causes of complaint.

With a view to bring to a decided issue this doubtful state of affairs, the Governor-General in Council directed the Resident at Hyderabad to address to the Soubahdar, in public Durbar, a remonstrance founded on the following topics—

1st. The general principles of the alliance and the reciprocal obligations imposed by its stipulations on the contracting parties. The numerous advantages which had been derived by the late Nizam, and by the present Soubahdar, from the alliance with the Company, and the repeated dangers from which the state of Hyderabad had been preserved by that alliance. The liberal and equitable conduct of the British Government in the unconditional establishment of the succession of Secunder Jah, notwithstanding the many just claims which the British Government possessed against his Highness.

2ndly. The delicacy and public faith manifested by the British Government in avoiding all interference in the internal affairs of his Highness or of his predecessor.

3rdly. The strict attention paid to his Highness's rights in the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein.

4thly. The defence of his Highness's possessions in the present war.

5thly. The failure of his Highness to perform the conditions of the alliance in the present war; and lastly, the unjustifiable and treasonable conduct of his Highness's officers.

The Resident was further directed to observe to his Highness, that the maintenance of the principles ascribed to Secunder Jah (as stated in a preceding paragraph of this letter) would place that Prince in the situation of a public enemy to the British Government.

The Resident was desired to demand the execution of an additional article to the treaty of Hyderabad, stipulating that the forts of the contracting parties in time of joint war should be open to the troops of each state respectively; and that the officers of both governments should employ all the resources at their command in facilitating the operations of the troops of their respective governments.

His Excellency the Governor-General further signified to the Resident, that if in the course of the existing war the Soubahdar should not correct the treachery of the commanders of his forts, the Resident should demand the surrender of all forts necessary for the protection of supplies into the hands of Major-General Wellesley; observing that his Highness's defence of his officers who acted hostilely towards the British Government, was inconsistent with the spirit of the alliance, and that to remonstrate against the conduct of officers guilty of such acts was no encroachment on his Highness's rights or independence.

The Resident was directed to require from the Soubahdar the most solemn and distinct recognition of the principles of the alliance. To give his remonstrance the fullest effect, the Resident was directed to abstain from the discussion of all subjects of inferior importance, and to direct his whole attention to the objects of impressing on the mind of the Soubahdar a just sense of the real nature of the alliance, and of convincing his Highness that his true interest and the obligation

of his public faith, his honour and reputation, required his Highness's cordial co-operation in the common cause; of ascertaining the real views and character of Secunder Jah, and of providing seasonable precautions against the defection of that Prince, particularly during the existing war. With reference to the supposed existence of a general sentiment of jealousy and aversion with respect to the connection established between the two states, the Resident was desired to concert with Major-General Wellesley proper measures of precaution against the effects of that general spirit of disaffection. Major-General Wellesley was also authorized to proceed against any of the Soubahdar's officers who might hereafter be guilty of acts of the nature described in preceding paragraphs of this despatch, as against officers of a state at war with the British Government, without further reference to the Soubahdar or the Governor-General in Council.

The Resident having demanded an audience of the Soubahdar, read and presented to his Highness in public Durbar, a memorial founded on the instructions of which the substance is stated in the two preceding paragraphs. This remonstrance produced the desired effect. The Soubahdar, in a letter which he addressed to the Governor-General, declared his perfect readiness to execute the additional article, to which the Resident at Hyderabad had been instructed to require his consent, and on the 9th of January that article was formally executed and exchanged at Hyderabad. The alleged temper of his Highness's subjects did not appear to the Resident to be such as to endanger the public tranquillity. Any augmentation of the force of Hyderabad, therefore, with reference to that circumstance, was considered by the Resident to be unnecessary.

In the course of the communications of the Resident at Hyderabad with the Durbar, on the various subjects which at this period were agitated, it appeared that a difference of a very serious nature had arisen between the Soubahdar and his Prime Minister, Azim-ool-Omrah.

The causes of mutual dissatisfaction are stated to have arisen at a period antecedent to the accession of Secunder Jah to the Soubadaree of the Deccan, and Azim-ool-Omrah was suspected and accused of a design to oppose the succession of Secunder Jah in favour of one of the younger sons of the late Nizam. On being apprized of this change previously to the death of the late Nizam, the Resident deemed it necessary to adopt immediate measures for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of this allegation, and, if requisite, of restraining the Ministers from any opposition to the succession of Secunder Jah.

The Minister did not hesitate to give to the Resident the most solemn assurances of his innocence of the design imputed to him, and of his resolution to secure and support the succession of Secunder Jah by every means in his power.

At an early period of time after the accession of Secunder Jah to the musnud of Hyderabad, the displeasure of that Prince against his Minister became apparent, and finally augmented to such a degree as to render probable the Minister's disgrace and removal from power, and even to justify an apprehension for the safety of his person.

The continuance of Azim-ool-Omrah's influence in the Councils of the Soubahdar of the Deccan being an object of considerable importance to the interests of the British Government, the Governor-General approved the resolution which the Resident at Hyderabad had adopted of interposing his influence and exertions for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between his Highness and the Minister. It is unnecessary to state to your honourable Committee in detail the means which were adopted by the Resident for the attainment of that desirable object. The Resident completely succeeded in restoring Azim-ool-Omrah to the favour and confidence of Secunder Jah, who, at the suggestion of the Resident, conferred upon

his Minister the same full powers and unlimited control over the public affairs of his government as were exercised by Azim-sol-Omrah during the life of the late Nizam.

A preceding paragraph of this despatch refers to the instructions which were issued to the Resident at Hyderabad, directing him to require the Nabob of Kurnool to furnish the quota of troops which in his tributary relation to the British Government he was pledged to supply.

That chieftain complied with the requisition of the Resident without hesitation; and his contingent of troops, consisting of 500 horse and 500 foot, arrived at Hyderabad early in the month of October, 1803, and then proceeded to join the division of the army under the command of Major-General Campbell. The Nabob of Kurnool has expressed a wish to receive a written instrument, defining the extent of his obligations with respect to the payment of tribute and to military service, with which it is the intention of the Governor-General in Council to comply.

Towards the close of the month of August the Resident at Hyderabad received from a person named Lucca Ram Pundit, a communication on the part of Serjajee Ghautka, the father-in-law, and at one period the Minister of Dowlat Rao Scindiah, then residing within the territory of the Rajah of Colapore. The purport of this communication, which was expressed in vague and obscure terms, appeared to be a proposition on the part of Serjajee Ghautka, in concert with the British Government, to exert the influence which he still possessed at the Durbar, and in the army of Scindiah, for the restoration of general tranquillity and good order. The Resident referred Serjajee Ghautka's Agent to Major-General Wellesley, to whom the Resident transmitted the proposition which he had received. The possibility of the restoration of Serjajee Ghautka to power in Scindiah's government, and his connection with a powerful Zemindar on the bank of the Kishna, through whose possessions General Wellesley's convoys were obliged to pass, induced General Wellesley, without authorizing the Resident to accede to Serjajee's proposition, to maintain an amicable intercourse with that chief. The removal of Serjajee Ghautka to Poonah precluded the Resident at Hyderabad from any further communication with him.

During the course of the war the Resident repeatedly urged the government of the Soubahdar to increase, as far as might be practicable, the strength of the contingent of his Highness's troops serving in the field in conformity to the provisions of the treaty of 1800. While an expectation was entertained of securing the services of Meer Khan, the Resident did not think it advisable to urge the measure of increasing the contingent, on the ground of the expense to which the Soubahdar's government would be subjected by such an augmentation of the troops of the state, combined with the employment of Meer Khan, and a part of that chieftain's army. After the failure of the negotiation with Meer Khan, the Resident repeatedly pressed the Minister to issue orders for the increase of the contingent. After a great delay and evasion on the part of the Durbar, the Resident received a positive assurance that orders had been issued to Mohiput Ram, directing him to raise additional forces. These orders, however, were either entirely disregarded or clandestinely suppressed. No other transactions of any importance occurred at Hyderabad during the remainder of the war.

The Resident continued to maintain a regular correspondence with the honourable Major-General Wellesley on all subjects connected with the movement and supply of the army under Major-General Wellesley's immediate command, and of the subsidiary force. The Resident exerted his endeavours with considerable zeal,

activity and success in procuring and forwarding large supplies of money, grain, and bullocks for the use of the troops in the field.

Your honourable Committee will have been apprized by the honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, of the proceedings of that government, in the prosecution of such branches of the general system of arrangements and operations connected with the war as that government was required to conduct. The exertions of the government of Bombay were principally directed to the objects, of supplying the army under the personal command of the honourable Major-General Wellesley with provisions; of forming and equipping the detachment employed in the occupation of Broach, and in facilitating the operations of the troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, who was employed under the immediate authority of Major-General Wellesley in occupying the territory in Guzerat belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; in providing for the defence of that province, and ultimately in preparing an expedition against Scindiah's capital of Ougein, the prosecution of which was however prevented by the conclusion of peace with that chieftain.

The detail of Lieut.-Colonel Murray's proceedings will also have been communicated to your honourable Committee by the government of Bombay.

As connected however with the general system of arrangements for the vigorous and successful prosecution of the war, it may be proper to advert to the correspondence which passed between the honourable the Governor of Bombay and the honourable Major-General Wellesley subsequently to Major-General Wellesley's receipt of the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th and 27th of June, 1803, on the subject of providing for the defence of the province of Guzerat, and of the application of the troops employed in that province, to the general objects of the war.

On that occasion the honourable the Governor of Bombay appeared to the Governor-General in Council to have formed an erroneous judgment of the extent of the powers vested in Major-General Wellesley, and to have impeded the effect of that officer's proposed arrangements, by admitting the operation of counteracting principles founded on the supposed necessity of maintaining the local and subordinate authority of the Resident at Baroda over the troops stationed in Guzerat. It appeared to the Governor-General in Council that the proceedings of the government of Bombay on that occasion, however dictated by laudable public spirit and zeal, were so framed as to endanger the success of the Governor-General's plan for the conduct of the campaign in the Deccan, by precluding that combination of an efficient and vigorous system of operations on the west of India, which it was the object of the honourable Major-General Wellesley to establish, with a view not only to the defence of our western possessions, but to the prosecution of active hostilities against the enemy. In the actual crisis of affairs it was obviously necessary that all local considerations and inferior details should yield to the important object of securing the accomplishment of a general system of defensive arrangements and active military operations under the exclusive direction of the general officer commanding the main army in the Deccan, subject to the direct authority of the Governor-General in Council. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, positively directed that in conformity to the plan proposed by Major-General Wellesley, Colonel Murray should be invested with the chief local military authority in the province of Guzerat, subject to the control of the honourable Major-General Wellesley or of the general officer commanding in the Deccan, and exempt from the control of any other local authority whatever.

The Governor-General in Council further directed the Government of Bombay

to employ the utmost despatch in preparing the whole body of the forces under the command of Colonel Murray for active operations in the field, and expressed his confidence in the zeal, diligence, and ability of the Governor in Council of Bombay, that every endeavour to forward that important service would be employed by direct orders from Bombay, and by the united efforts of every department under the immediate inspection of the Governor in Council of Bombay. The Governor-General in Council further expressed his expectation of witnessing in the Government of Bombay the same spirit of cordial co-operation which accelerated the conclusion of the war in Mysore, and which could not fail to promote the speedy attainment of a secure and honourable peace with the Mahratta chiefs.

His Excellency in Council at the same time observed, that to obtain this object, all local and temporary considerations must be submitted to the paramount exigency of prosecuting the war with vigour, and of carrying our arms into the centre of the enemy's resources and power.

Under the injunctions contained in the instructions to the Government of Bombay, of which the substance is above stated, the Governor in Council of Bombay deemed it necessary to adopt measures for the augmentation of the force under the command of Colonel Murray, and for that purpose, concurred in the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief of that presidency to convert the corps of fencibles into a regiment on the regular establishment of Bombay.

The reasons assigned for this arrangement, appearing to the Governor-General in Council to be entirely satisfactory, his Excellency in Council acquiesced in the proposed addition to the regular military establishment at Bombay, during the continuance of the war with the Mahrattas, but directed that it should be notified in general orders at Bombay, that the newly formed regiment would be reduced immediately after the conclusion of peace with Scindiah.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to submit to your honourable Committee, a general view of the transactions which occurred at Poona after the march of the honourable Major-General Wellesley from that capital, on the 4th of June 1803.

The time and exertions of the Resident were principally occupied in endeavouring to prevail upon the Peishwa to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of Bassin applicable to the existing state of affairs, by furnishing the proportion of troops which by the treaty his Highness was engaged to provide in the season of joint war. To enable his Highness to perform this essential part of his engagements, the measure of the greatest urgency was, to induce his Highness to conciliate the good will of the southern Jageerdars, who had accompanied Major-General Wellesley from the Kistna to Poona, and from whom alone the Peishwa could expect the aid which was necessary to enable his Highness to discharge the obligation of his engagements.

Major-General Wellesley had been obliged to march from Poona, unaccompanied by any of the Peishwa's troops. After urgent and repeated remonstrances, however, the Resident prevailed on the Peishwa to frame an arrangement with two of the chiefs, who marched from Poona and joined the army under the command of Major-General Wellesley near Ahmednuggur. The combined force of these two chiefs did not amount to more than 3,000 horse. Those troops, however, continued to serve with the British army during the campaign, and their conduct received the approbation of Major-General Wellesley.

On the actual commencement of hostilities the Peishwa was again urged to complete the contingent of troops which his Highness was required by his engagements to furnish, but without success. The mutual distrust and apprehen-

sion founded on a sense of reciprocal injuries which subsisted between his Highness and his chiefs, presented insuperable obstacles to a sincere reconciliation; and all the chiefs who accompanied General Wellesley to Poona with the exception of Goklah and Appa Desaye the two chieftains who with their respective troops joined the British army after its march from Poona, as is stated in the preceding paragraph, returned to their Jaggeers.

It appeared to Major-General Wellesley and to Lieut.-Colonel Close to be an object of the greatest importance at this time to effect a reconciliation between the Peishwa and his brother Amrut Rao. Amrut Rao had apparently separated his interests from those of the enemies of the Peishwa, and had manifested a disposition to conclude terms of accommodation with the Peishwa, under the guarantee of the British Government. At the desire of General Wellesley, the Resident at Poona addressed a memorial to the Peishwa, containing propositions calculated to combine with a suitable provision for the maintenance of Amrut Rao sufficient security for the fidelity of Amrut Rao to the cause of his Highness.

The propositions contained in the Resident's memorial were received by the Peishwa with expressions of decided disapprobation. His Highness's ministers declared, that their master would never consent to terms so favourable to Amrut Rao; whom he considered as a rebel and a traitor, on whose professions no reliance could be placed, and against whom the Peishwa had vowed eternal enmity. The Peishwa subsequently delivered to the Resident a paper containing the terms on which his Highness was willing to grant a provision to Amrut Rao. These terms would have imposed the most degrading restrictions on Amrut Rao, and were of a nature to confirm Amrut Rao in his distrust of the Peishwa, and to urge him to the most desperate extremities against his Highness's person and government. The Resident at Poona finding that all arguments founded on the urgency of a reconciliation with Amrut Rao, both with reference to the necessity of the Peishwa's affairs, and to the obligations of his alliance with the British Government, produced no effect, addressed to his Highness a firm and decided remonstrance, in which the Resident recapitulated all the arguments which had been already urged in favour of an accommodation with Amrut Rao, and pressed on the Peishwa's consideration the absolute necessity of conducting his Government on principles consistent with his own interests and with those of the alliance which he had concluded with the British Government.

His Highness for a considerable period of time adhered to his former declarations of vengeance against Amrut Rao. The urgency, however, of the Resident's applications finally drew from his Highness his consent to leave the adjustment of his differences with Amrut Rao to the British Government under a conviction that every degree of attention would be paid to his own interests under any arrangement which the British Government might deem it expedient to conclude with Amrut Rao.

During the negotiations of the honourable Major-General Wellesley and the Resident at Poona for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between the Peishwa and Amrut Rao, Major-General Wellesley continued to correspond with Amrut Rao urging him to abandon the cause of the Peishwa's enemies, and to unite his interests with those of his Highness. The failure however of every attempt to prevail upon his Highness the Peishwa to consent to the conclusion of an arrangement calculated to secure the fidelity of Amrut Rao, suggested to Major-General Wellesley the necessity of endeavouring to conclude engagements with Amrut Rao independently of the previous consent and concurrence of the Peishwa and accordingly on the 16th of July, Major-General Wellesley addressed a letter to Amrut Rao in which he promised in general terms to secure to Amrut

Rao a suitable provision, on the condition of his continuing to conduct himself to the satisfaction of the British Government, and on the 24th of August, Major-General Wellesley concluded an arrangement with Amrut Rao's Vakeel, by which he engaged to secure to that chieftain a permanent provision of seven lacs of rupees per annum on the conditions that he should cordially unite with the British Government and the Peishwa, and should immediately join Major-General Wellesley with his troops. Major-General Wellesley also engaged to provide for the friends and adherents of Amrut Rao.

Major-General Wellesley did not receive Amrut Rao's confirmation of the engagements concluded by his Vakeel until the month of October, when the Vakeel preferred a new demand for the payment of a body of 10,000 men, who were stated to be with Amrut Rao. General Wellesley having successfully combated this unreasonable demand, agreed to take into the pay of the British Government, such troops only as should actually join his army with Amrut Rao, intending that those troops should form part of a force of 5,000 men, the charges of which by the terms of a modification of the treaty of Bassein, noticed in a subsequent part of this despatch, the British Government had engaged to defray. Amrut Rao joined General Wellesley on the 12th of November, and continued to act with the British troops during the remainder of the war, and to conduct himself entirely to that officer's satisfaction.

Immediately after the receipt at Poona of intelligence of the commencement of hostilities, the Resident required his Highness the Peishwa to recall his Vakeel from the camps of the confederates. To this measure after some hesitation his Highness assented. The Peishwa also declared his intention of adopting immediate measures for raising a force to assist in the defence of his capital.

Your honourable Committee has been informed in a former part of this despatch of the intentions of the Governor-General in Council with respect to the province of Bundelcund. The views of the Governor-General in Council with respect to that province, were essentially promoted, and the means of effecting a speedy and amicable settlement of affairs in that quarter, were materially facilitated by a proposition which was made by the Peishwa to the Resident at Poona, in the month of August 1803. In a conference which the Resident held with the ministers of the Peishwa early in that month, the ministers having repeated their assertions on the subject of the distressed state of his Highness's pecuniary affairs, and the inability of his Highness to perform his engagement, by furnishing a force of cavalry, to co-operate with the British troops in the war, Colonel Close pointed out to them a mode by which the Peishwa might assist the resources of the British Government, without inconvenience to his own. The Resident observed that by the cession of Bundelcund from which the state of Poona had not for several years realized any revenue, or of a part of that province, to the British Government, his Highness might retain the districts situated in the southern part of his dominions, which had been ceded by the treaty of Bassein, and at the same time obtain the desirable addition of a regiment of cavalry to the subsidiary force. The ministers expressed their opinion that his Highness would readily consent to the cession of a part of Bundelcund on conditions which they stated to the Resident, and they promised to communicate the Peishwa's determination on the subject without delay.

On the 13th of August, the Resident received from the minister of the Peishwa, a proposition founded on the suggestion of the Resident above described. The proposition of his Highness comprized the following articles.

1st. That the cessions of territory in the southern part of his Highness's do-

minions, amounting to 16 lacks of rupees per annum, should revert to his Highness's Government.

2ndly. That the district of Oolpar near Surat, estimated at the annual value of \$16,000 rupees should revert to his Highness's Government, in order to be restored to its former possessor Vittul Sook Deo, an old and faithful adherent of the Peishwa, to whom it was his Highness's intention to entrust the command of the forces to be raised for the purpose of co-operating in the protection of the city of Poona.

3dly. That a regiment of native cavalry of the same strength as the cavalry regiments attached to the subsidiary force at Hyderabad should be added to the subsidiary force at Poonah.

4thly. That the military force to be furnished by the Peishwa in time of war should be reduced to 5000 horse and 3000 foot. That his Highness's Government, however, would furnish as large a body of infantry and cavalry, besides that force as his Highness might possess the means of supplying.

5thly. That the British Government should maintain a corps of 5000 Mahratta horse during the war, exclusive of the corps serving with General Wellesley under Gokla and Appa Desseye, which would continue to be subsisted at the charge of the Peishwa.

6thly. That the Peishwa should cede in perpetuity to the honourable Company's territory in Bundelcund, yielding an estimated annual revenue of \$6,16,000 rupees, agreeably to the following detail.

1st. In lieu of the cession to the southward of the Peishwa's dominions, mentioned in article 1st, territory equal to an estimated annual revenue of 16 lacs of rupees.

2ndly. In lieu of the district of Oolpar, mentioned in article 2nd, territory equal to an estimated annual revenue of 3,66,000 rupees.

3dly. To bear the entire expense of a regiment of cavalry, mentioned in article 3d, territory yielding an estimated annual revenue of 7,50,000 rupees.

4thly. To serve as an equivalent for the expense to be incurred by the British Government, in paying and maintaining during the present war, the 5000 Mahratta horse mentioned in article 4th, territory equal to an annual revenue of five lacks of rupees.

5thly. To meet the extraordinary expense to which the British Government must be exposed in establishing and preserving its authority in Bundelcund, territory equal to an estimated annual revenue of four lacs of rupees. The whole of the territory to be ceded in Bundelcund, to be taken from those parts of the province most contiguous to the British possessions, and in every sense most convenient to the British Government.

The Peishwa's minister stated, that his Highness's motives for offering this proposition, was to attend to the wishes of the Governor-General, to demonstrate his sincere adherence to his engagements, and to acquire the means of conciliating Vittul Sook Deo, the most faithful of his adherents.

The Resident stated, that he should consider the proposition in its present stage to be so far binding on the Poonah state, as to entitle the Governor-General to act upon it in the event of his Excellency's acceptance of it without the delay of awaiting a formal adjustment. This proposal was accepted by the Peishwa's minister in his Highness's name.

The Governor-General in Council was of opinion that the terms of this proposition with the exception of that which stipulated for the retrocession of Oolpar, which it was desirable to retain in consequence of its contiguity to the city of Surat, were extremely advantageous to the British Government.

The proposition from the Peishwa also appeared to afford satisfactory proofs of the disposition of his Highness to adhere with sincerity to the principles and spirit of his engagements with the honourable Company.

The Governor-General accordingly intimated to Colonel Close his Excellency's assent to the terms of the proposition, and his resolution to act upon them immediately as far as related to the province of Bundelcund. The Resident was directed to endeavour to prevail on the Peishwa to recede from his proposition for the retrocession of Oolpar; but as the possession of that district by the Company was considered by the Governor-General to be of very inferior importance when placed in competition with the general advantages of the proposed arrangement, the Resident was authorized, in the event of his finding that the Peishwa and Vittul Sook Deo were inflexibly solicitous for the retrocession of Oolpar, to refrain from urging that point, and to conclude, without further reference to the Governor-General, supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein, on the basis of the propositions of the Peishwa.

The Resident was shortly after instructed to urge the Peishwa to issue orders to his officers in Bundelcund, for placing under the British authority those districts which his Highness had ceded to the Company, and to require Shumsheer Bahauder to abstain from any opposition to the measures pursued by the British Government, for establishing the authority of the Company in the districts of Bundelcund ceded by the Peishwa. On the 5th of October the Resident at Poonah received from the Peishwa an order addressed to the manager of the late Allee Bahauder in Bundelcund, directing the surrender to the British Government of districts yielding an annual revenue of 36,16,000 rupees. The original order was immediately transmitted to the Agent of the Commander-in-Chief in Bundelcund.

The Resident at Poonah, finding all his endeavours to prevail on Vittul Sook Deo to accept an indemnity for the loss of the district of Oolpar to be unsuccessful, proceeded to frame the supplemental articles of the treaty of Bassein on the basis of the Peishwa's original proposition. Those articles were executed at Poonah on the 7th of December without any essential variation from the Peishwa's propositions, and were formally ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the 7th of January.

The Governor-General in Council has now concluded in this despatch all the transactions connected with the origin and conduct of the late war, excepting the operations of the army, of which a detailed statement has regularly been transmitted to your honourable Committee from the commencement of hostilities to the conclusion of peace.

The Governor-General in Council has also purposely excluded from this despatch the detail of the arrangements connected with the treaties of peace concluded with Dowlat Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; the Governor-General in Council deeming it to be proper to address to your honourable Committee a separate despatch upon that important subject.

We have the honour to be,

honourable Sirs,

your most faithful humble servants,

WELLESLEY,
G. H. BARLOW,
G. UDNY.

No. II.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, March 24, 1805.

[The greater part of this despatch was given in Vol. IV. p. 323 to 487, the remainder being omitted for want of space, as it was not then intended to publish a fifth volume of this work: the conclusion of the despatch is now therefore inserted.—Ed.]

In a preceding part of this despatch the Governor-General in Council has stated the intelligence received from the Resident at Nagpore of a project entertained by the Rajah of Khoordah, (one of the principal tributary Rajahs, whose territory is comprized within the limits of the province of Cuttack) in concert with the Rajah of Berar, for the subversion of the British authority in the province of Cuttack; and the Governor-General in Council has adverted in that place to the instructions issued to the officer commanding the British troops in Cuttack for the purpose of counteracting those hostile designs. The Governor-General now deems it proper to state to your honourable Committee the detail of occurrences and transactions in the province of Cuttack, connected with the subject of that intelligence.

At an early period of time, subsequent to the establishment of the British authority in the province of Cuttack, the conduct of the Rajah of Khoordah excited considerable doubts of the sincerity of his professed allegiance to the British Government. Shortly after the conquest of Cuttack, the Rajah of Khoordah demanded the restoration of four Pergunnahs, in one of which was included the pagodah and city of Jaggermout, on the ground of their having belonged to some of his ancestors; intimating at the same time to the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, his determination never to recede from this demand. With the hope of intimidating the British authorities in the province of Cuttack, the Rajah of Khoordah considerably augmented his establishment of troops, and published his intention of seizing those Pergunnahs at a convenient period of time.

In the month of June, the Commissioners at Cuttack received authentic intelligence, that the Rajah of Khoordah had employed every endeavour to induce the remaining tributary Rajahs in the province of Cuttack to unite in a common effort against the British authority, and this information was corroborated by the intelligence to which a preceding paragraph refers. Numerous reports also, conveyed to the Commissioners through various and distinct channels, concurred in stating that the Rajah of Khoordah continued diligently to increase his military establishment. At the same time, the exertions of the Rajah of Khoordah were actively employed in repairing and improving the internal defences of his country.

These indications of a spirit of revolt in the Rajah of Khoordah would have rendered it the duty of the British Government under any circumstances, to employ the most active measures for the reduction of that chieftain's power within the limits necessary for the preservation of tranquillity and security within the province of Cuttack, but the importance of this object was obviously augmented in the degree in which the conduct of the Rajah of Khoordah might be connected with any project of combined hostility against the British power.

Under this impression, and with a knowledge of the facts above stated, the Governor-General in Council issued the instructions of the 4th of October to Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, the officer commanding the British forces in Cuttack, to which a preceding paragraph adverts. By those instructions, Colonel Harcourt

was directed to place the force under his command in such a state of preparation as might enable it to move against the possessions of the Rajah of Khoordah without any delay. Colonel Harcourt was at the same time instructed, at a proper season, to apprise the Rajah of Khoordah of the information which he had received with respect to his hostile designs; and to signify to him that any indication of a resolution to carry those designs into effect, would be instantly followed by the march of a British force into his territory, and by his expulsion from his Zemindary; assuring the Rajah at the same time that he might rely with confidence on the favour and protection of the British Government, while he should continue to act according to the obligations of his tributary relation to the honourable Company.

It was expected that these measures would have deterred the Rajah of Khoordah from the prosecution of any designs of the nature of those imputed to him. With the view however of enabling Colonel Harcourt to act with vigour and effect under any circumstances, the officer commanding in the northern Circars received orders to be prepared to co-operate with him if necessary; in the reduction of the Rajah Khoordah's territory, and to comply with all requisitions from Colonel Harcourt connected with that eventual service.

In consequence of these instructions, Colonel Harcourt resolved to despatch Captain Blunt to the Rajah of Khoordah for the purpose of conveying to him the representations prescribed by the Governor-General's orders, and of effecting such an arrangement as might afford sufficient security against the prosecution of the Rajah's inimical designs. Colonel Harcourt however deemed it expedient previously to despatch a native agent to the Rajah of Khoordah, to apprise the Rajah of his intention to despatch Captain Blunt for the purpose of communicating with him on subjects of considerable importance to the Rajah's welfare and interests.

Colonel Harcourt's agent having proceeded to Khoordah, with difficulty obtained an interview with the Rajah; he was surrounded night and day by armed men, and after the expiration of fourteen days from the day of his arrival, he was informed that his longer continuance would be attended with personal danger, and he was accordingly advised to depart.

The Rajah of Khoordah likewise thought proper to preclude the freedom of intercourse with the authority to which he was immediately subject, by closing the entrances into his territory; and the messengers whom Colonel Harcourt had occasion to despatch to Khoordah, or who were sent by his agent with letters to that officer, were arrested and confined.

Various other indications of a spirit of hostility were manifested by the Rajah of Khoordah of a nature to preclude all doubt of his intention to revolt, and of the exertion of his utmost endeavours to excite the same disposition in the minds of the other tributaries of the British Government, dependent upon the province of Cuttack.

Under these circumstances it became indispensably necessary to acquire the means of imposing a due degree of restraint upon the hostile proceedings of the Rajah of Khoordah, by measures of coercion. Colonel Harcourt was accordingly authorized to employ the force under his command, in active operations against the power and resources of the Rajah of Khoordah; but he was at the same time informed that it was not the intention of the Governor-General to sanction the prosecution of measures of severity towards the Rajah of Khoordah, beyond the extent necessary for the purpose of depriving him of the means of prosecuting designs of the nature of those which required the active interposition of the British power.

In pursuance of these instructions, the forces under authority of Colonel Harcourt, were disposed in such a manner as appeared to that officer to be calculated to afford protection to the persons and property of the loyal inhabitants of the province of Cuttack, and to enable Colonel Harcourt to make an early and effectual impression on the territory of Khoordah.

On the 19th of November 1804, a party of the Rajah's troops, amounting to 250 horsemen, and 900 Burkundazes, stationed in the village and fort of Dulgong near Peeply, was attacked and dispersed with severe loss by a detachment of 120 Sepoys under the command of Captain Hickland of the 5th regiment of Bengal Native infantry.

On the 22d of the same month, the stockade erected at the boundary of Khoordah was carried by Colonel Harcourt, with the casualty of four men only slightly wounded.

The principal barrier on the road leading from Peeply to the Fort of Khoordah, was carried on the night of the 2d of December, without resistance, by Captain Story of the 19th Sepoy regiment, on the establishment of Fort St. George.

The Fort of Khoordah being surrounded by a wood and bound hedge of bamboos, which rendered it impracticable to reconnoitre, and the enemy being in possession of some heavy pieces of artillery, Colonel Harcourt considered it to be prudent with the view of preventing the unnecessary sacrifice of the lives of his men, to postpone any attempt on the place until a practicable breach could be effected in the walls. Batteries were accordingly erected for that purpose, and opened at day-break on the 5th of December.

At ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, a practicable breach having been effected near the principal entrance of the outer fort, the outer fort and the Pettah (or town) were carried by assault by a detachment under the orders of Major Fletcher of the Madras European regiment; the inner fort appeared to be of considerable strength; the detachment however being provided with scaling ladders, Major Fletcher advanced with promptitude and vigour under a heavy fire from the enemy, and gained complete possession of the place.

The Rajah accompanied by his dewan, and other principal servants, escaped at the moment when the British troops entered the outworks, but the Rajah has since been made prisoner by Colonel Harcourt.

The loss on this occasion was not considerable with reference to the nature of the place, and to the determined resistance opposed to the British troops, by the enemy. The only officer who fell, was Lieutenant Bryant, of the Madras European regiment, who accompanied the detachment employed in the assault as a volunteer, and who is represented to have conducted himself with distinguished gallantry.

The able and judicious disposition made by Colonel Harcourt of the forces under his command, and the meritorious and exemplary conduct of the troops employed in the reduction of the fort and territory of the Khoordah Rajah, obtained the entire approbation of the Governor-General in Council.

The success of Colonel Harcourt's operations enabled him in a great measure to concentrate the various detachments dispersed at different stations on the borders of the Khoordah territory, in a position calculated to secure the tranquillity of the province, and to defend the frontier of the southern division of Cuttack.

With reference to these objects it appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be of considerable importance, that all forts of whatever construction, and all barriers or places of defence established by the Rajah of Khoordah for the purpose of enabling him to resist the authority of the Mahratta government, or for other purposes, should be levelled and destroyed. The necessary orders for this purpose

were accordingly issued to Colonel Harcourt, who was at the same time authorized to preserve all such fortifications as might appear to him to be useful to the British Government.

Colonel Harcourt was further instructed to proceed without delay to open roads through the territory of Khoordah, to establish such temporary provisions, for the administration of justice and of the revenue, as might appear to him to be expedient, and generally to adopt such measures as should effectually exclude the revival of the Rajah's power, and facilitate the establishment of that of the British Government.

The depredations committed by the Rajah of Khoordah before the march of Colonel Harcourt's detachment from Cuttack, afforded public evidence of his hostile disposition, and his expulsion was universally considered by the inhabitants of the province to be the just punishment of his rebellion. With the view of confirming this sentiment, Colonel Harcourt was instructed to publish a declaration in the name of the Commissioners of Cuttack, explaining to the inhabitants and tributaries the motives of his proceedings against that chieftain, and assuring all persons of the protection of the British Government who should refrain from violating its laws, and from aiding its enemies. On the 13th of January 1805, Colonel Harcourt reported that he had concluded the most pressing arrangements in the district of Khoordah, and had taken every precaution to secure its tranquillity.

With the exception of the late Rajah of Khoordah, the only subject of the British Government in the province of Cuttack by whom any hostile disposition has been manifested, is the Rajah or Zemindar of Kunkha, who possesses several islands at the entrance of the Keddera or Kunkha river, and a portion of the sea coast, adjacent to Balasore.

This person has been long attached to the late Rajah of Khoordah, by whose advice and example he was induced to disclaim the authority of the Commissioners in Cuttack. The tribute he had engaged to pay to the British Government was withheld. The officers of government employed on the public service within his possessions, were imprisoned, plundered and treated with severity and insult; unwarranted restraints were imposed on all vessels navigating the Kunkha river, and one vessel under British colours (the *Borneo* cutter) was forcibly prevented from proceeding to the place of her destination. A large body of armed men was also assembled by the Rajah, and placed under the orders of a Mahratta Sirdar, publicly known to be an enemy of the British Government. These troops were dispersed on his frontier, where by their menaces of hostility they compelled the peaceable inhabitants to desert their houses, and destroyed the crops on the ground.

The refractory conduct and the piratical practices of the Rajah of Kunkha, induced the Governor-General to authorize Colonel Harcourt to commence such operations against that chieftain, as might appear to be practicable and necessary for his reduction; and for the suppression of the system of piracy and plunder which prevailed under the Mahratta government from the mouth of the Soobenricka river along the coast of Cuttack to Ganjam.

With the view of checking every hostile attempt of the Rajah of Kunkha in the northern division of Cuttack, a force was detached by Colonel Harcourt to occupy a position on his frontier, calculated to render every predatory incursion of the Rajah's armed Peons extremely hazardous to their master.

About the period of time when this force arrived at the place of its destination, the Kunkha Rajah received intelligence of the success of Colonel Harcourt at Khoordah, and the exemplary punishment of the rebellious Rajah of Khoordah produced an immediate indication of a disposition to submit to the authority of the British Government on the part of the Rajah of Kunkha. The *Borneo* cutter

was released from restraint; many of the armed Peons entertained in the service of the Rajah were discharged, and vakeels were despatched to Colonel Harcourt, with offers from the Rajah to give up his principal Sirdars, whom he now described as disturbers of the public peace.

No apprehension is now entertained of any interruption to the tranquillity of the province of Cuttack; it will be necessary, however, to make such arrangements as shall effectually preclude any further attempts on the part of the Kunkha Rajah to oppose the British Government, and to introduce a system of subordination and obedience to the laws amongst the petty chiefs on the sea coast, who have long been habituated to acts of piracy and plunder.

In the prosecution of these objects, Colonel Harcourt marched from Khoordah on the 14th of January, 1805, proposing to make the tour of the sea coast from its southern extremity at Goop to the territory of Kunkha in the vicinity of Balasore.

The measures which it may become expedient to adopt under the information to be obtained by Colonel Harcourt in the course of his progress will be submitted to your honourable Committee by a future opportunity; it is expected by that officer, that he will experience neither opposition nor difficulty in the conclusion of such arrangements as shall be found to be necessary for the establishment of a system of perfect order and subordination in every part of the sea coast within the province of Cuttack.

The Governor-General in Council is not enabled by any positive evidence to establish the existence of a connection between the hostile proceedings of these chieftains, and the operations or intrigues of our external enemies. The probability of such a connection, however, is strongly supported by various circumstances and considerations. At the same time it is possible that these chieftains may have been actuated exclusively by the same spirit of turbulence and disobedience which induced them to disregard and often to resist the authority of the Mahratta Government, and they may have expected to pursue a similar course of conduct under the British administration with equal success and impunity.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of proceedings at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which have been described up to the 31st of November.

After that date, Dowlut Rao Scindiah continued to march in an easterly direction along the southern bank of the Nurbudda. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army being in the utmost distress for want of pay, Dowlut Rao Scindiah renewed his solicitation to the Acting Resident for the immediate discharge of another portion of the stipends payable under the 7th article of the treaty of Serje Anjungaum. But this application was rejected by the Acting Resident on the grounds of his former replies to similar solicitations.

On the 6th of December, the Acting Resident received the intelligence of the glorious victory obtained by the British troops under the command of the late Major-General Fraser over the enemy at the memorable battle of Deig, which he immediately communicated in writing to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who was at that moment indisposed. No answer, however, was returned to that communication.

A few days after his receipt of that intelligence, the Acting Resident received the Governor-General's instructions of the 5th of November, on the subject of granting pecuniary aid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the substance of which is stated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch. The Acting Resident judged that the period of the receipt of the intelligence of Holkar's defeat, when the motives of our liberality could not be misunderstood, was the most favourable for the execution of the Governor-General's instructions. The Acting Resident therefore

resolved to commence that duty without delay, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah being indisposed, the Acting Resident despatched to him a written message, stating the general nature of the liberal intentions of the British Government towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and suggesting to his Highness the expediency of appointing a person of rank to attend the Acting Resident for the purpose of negotiating the details of the proposed arrangement, which (the Acting Resident observed) involved some questions of peculiar delicacy and importance. In reply to this message, Dowlut Rao Scindiah signified his intention of despatching a confidential agent to the Acting Resident with powers to enter into a discussion of all unadjusted points. A person, named Ramchunder Basker, accordingly attended the Acting Resident on the 11th of December.

The Acting Resident after some introductory remarks, intimated to the agent the general supposition with regard to the hostile object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march, and contrasted the hostile spirit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's counsels with the just and honourable policy which had regulated the conduct of the British Government towards his Highness. In reply to the Acting Resident's remarks, the agent maintained the sincerity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's disposition to adhere to the faith of his engagements, and admitted that the existence of his Highness's Government depended upon the friendship and protection of the British power. The agent then proceeded to state the various causes of interminable enmity which precluded the possibility of a connection such as was supposed between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and adverted to the hostile proceedings of Meer Khan against Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fort and territory of Bhelsa as a proof that no such connection could exist with that partizan of the common enemy. To these observations the Acting Resident replied, by appealing to the evidence of facts, observing that the vakeel of Jeswunt Rao Holkar still continued in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, that the intercourse between that vakeel and his Highness's father-in-law, Serjee Rao Ghautka, had lately been more frequent, and was become more notorious than ever. That the defection of Bappoojee Scindiah and Suddasheo Bukshee corroborated the suspicion which the Acting Resident had expressed; that the actual direction of his Highness's march; his orders for the junction of all his officers and forces stationed in Malwa, and the actual despatch of an agent from his Highness's camp to Meer Khan (of which fact the Acting Resident asserted his positive knowledge) constituted additional proofs of the hostile designs imputed to those by whose counsels the affairs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government were regulated. The Acting Resident stated some arguments tending to invalidate the justice of the inference deduced by the agent from the depredations and exactions of Meer Khan within the limits of his Highness's possessions, and concluded by observing, that although convinced of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's disposition to maintain the alliance with the British Government, it was notorious that the counsels by which he had lately been actuated, were utterly repugnant to that disposition.

The agent admitted the justice of the Acting Resident's remarks, but added, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was entirely dependent upon the British Government, which possessed the power either to destroy or to elevate his Highness's dominion. The Acting Resident observed in reply, that the late orders of the Governor-General constituted a proof of the amicable disposition of the British Government towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of its solicitude for the prosperity and honour of his Highness's government. The Acting Resident then proceeded to explain the nature of the Governor-General's determination with regard to his Highness's Government, and apprized the agent that he had been directed to provide funds for the payment of the amount of the net revenue collected from the

districts of Dholepoor, Baree, and Rajah-Kerra since the conclusion of the treaty of Serje Anjengaum.

The Acting Resident, however, apprized the agent that no further pecuniary aid could be granted until Dowlut Rao Scindiah's arrival at Ougein; and at the same time observed, that the arrangement proposed by the Governor-General for the support of his Highness's government, must appear to his Highness to be preferable to his actual mode of subsistence, and that it was more consistent with the dignity of a Prince to fix his residence at the capital of his dominions, and to cultivate the resources of his country than to depend upon the precarious sources of compulsory contribution.

The Acting Resident then adverted to the subject of Serjee Rao Ghautka, and after some introductory observations (in the course of which the Acting Resident adverted to the notorious disposition and recent intrigues of that pernicious minister), distinctly stated to the Agent, that the dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka was essential to the preservation of the alliance, and to the restoration of that confidence between the two states which his iniquitous proceedings had disturbed.

The acting Resident also on this occasion expressed to the Agent his expectation that Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel who attended the camp should be dismissed. In his report of this conference the acting Resident stated that the Agent had been instructed to convey to him a private message from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, purporting that it had never been his Highness's intention to remove the late minister Bappoo Wittul from his counsels, and that if Bappoo Wittul had recovered, he would have continued to enjoy his Highness's confidence, and to maintain his control over the general administration of affairs. The conference closed with a repetition of the assurance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's sincere determination to observe the faith of his engagements.

In reporting the detail of this conference, the Acting Resident took occasion to explain, that in suggesting to the agent the necessity of Serjee Rao Ghautka's dismissal, it was his intention to render that measure an indispensable condition of the proposed pecuniary aid. The Acting Resident at the same time stated intelligence which he had received of a disagreement between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Serjee Rao Ghautka, founded on Dowlut Rao Scindiah's disapprobation of the nature and tendency of Ghautka's intrigues, and on the disappointment of those visionary prospects of improvement in the condition of his interests, which that minister had presented to his view. This intelligence, if authentic, was manifestly favourable to the success of the acting Resident's attempt to effect the dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka.

The instructions of the Governor-General, under date 5th of November, did not specially authorize the Resident to declare the dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka to be the condition of the proposed pecuniary aid. Under the change in the state of affairs, however, which had been produced at the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the death of the late minister Bappoo Wittul, and by other circumstances, at the time when the acting Resident received the Governor-General's instructions of the 5th of November, the Governor-General approved the conduct of the Acting Resident. The motives which influenced him on that occasion are detailed in the Acting Resident's despatch of the 13th of December, containing his report of the conference, of which the substance is stated in the preceding paragraphs; and the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to annex to this letter a copy of that document. The Resident reported in that despatch that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had crossed the Nerbudda, and had signified to the acting Resident his intention of proceeding to his capital by the route of Bhelsa.

On the 14th of December the acting Resident waited on Dowlut Rao Scindiah by appointment, and at his Highness's desire stated the substance of his communication to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's agent, on the subject of the liberal intentions of the British Government towards his Highness. The acting Resident apprized his Highness, that the disposition of the British Government to relieve his Highness's pecuniary distresses, was founded on a conviction of his Highness's inability to perform his engagements without such pecuniary assistance; and concluded by referring in general terms to the sentiments which he had expressed in his conference with his Highness's agent relative to the conduct of his Highness's durbar.

That agent (who assisted at the conference) with a view (as the Resident supposed) of inducing him to state with more precision and detail, those topics of discussion to which motives of delicacy had induced the Resident to advert by a general reference to the agent's report, then expatiated upon the expenses which, (as he averred) at the desire of the late Resident, his Highness had incurred in equipping his army for the express purpose of co-operating with the British troops in the prosecution of hostilities against the common enemy, and expressed a desire to be apprized of the arrangements proposed by the British Government for the liquidation of that expense. The acting Resident, in his report of his conference, states, that in reply to this demand, he expressed a just indignation at the indecency of such a proposition, under the notoriety of the objects of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march in the direction of his recent progress; and the acting Resident was proceeding to state to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the various indications of the hostility of his designs, which the acting Resident had described in his conference with the agent. Dowlut Rao Scindiah however interrupted him by acknowledging that he was apprized of the whole tenor of that conference, and by desiring the acting Resident to state the conditions which were to be annexed to the grant of pecuniary aid.

Accordingly the acting Resident, after some introductory observations relative to the notorious depravity of Ghautka's character, the hostile nature of his designs, and the dangerous tendency of his counsels, stated the dismissal of that minister to be an indispensable condition of the proposed pecuniary aid. In the course of the discussion which ensued upon this subject, Dowlut Rao Scindiah repeatedly expressed a resolution to adhere to his engagements with the British Government, assuring the Resident that no evil counsels could produce a change in that resolution; and this topic of discussion was closed by an intimation on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he would take into his most serious consideration the subject of dismissing Serjee Rao Ghautka, and communicate the result to the Resident in the course of a few days.

The route by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah should proceed to Ougein having become a subject of discourse, his Highness adverted to an unliquidated assignment upon Saugur in his favor, which he held from the Peishwa, and expressed his intention of marching to that place for the purpose of realizing the amount. The acting Resident remonstrated in the strongest terms against the march of his Highness in the direction of Saugur, which the acting Resident observed was calculated to revive doubts of the sincerity of his Highness's amicable professions; and the acting Resident added, that if his Highness persisted in his declared resolution, the subject of pecuniary aid must be abandoned. The agent asserted, that the measure of proceeding to Saugur for the purpose of realizing the Peishwa's assignment, was adopted with the authority of the Peishwa's vakeel. The acting Resident replied, that even that circumstance would not justify the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but having received no intimation on the subject from the

Resident at Poonah, the acting Resident must conclude that the Peishwa's *vaikēel* was not vested with power to authorize the realization of his Highness's demand upon Saugur, by force of arms.

The subject was then suspended, and the conference was terminated by an enquiry with regard to the extent of the pecuniary aid to be granted by the British Government after the arrival of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at his capital, which the acting Resident answered by stating that the amount would considerably depend upon the future conduct of his Highness's Government.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah halted several days at a place called Deolee, a short distance south of Saugur. In that interval of time the acting Resident having solicited a reply to the points which he had stated at his last interview, Dowlut Rao Scindiah invited him to a conference on the 21st of December.

The acting Resident having previously received and communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the intelligence of the brilliant victory obtained by the British cavalry under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the 17th of November, the conference commenced by the interchange of congratulations on that memorable success.

The Acting Resident then stated to his Highness that he understood that his attendance had been desired for the purpose of communicating to him his Highness's reply to the points under discussion, and requested to be informed of the result of his Highness's deliberation. Ram Chunder Pundit, the agent before mentioned, who on this occasion spoke on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, instead of returning a reply in any degree connected with the object of the Acting Resident's visit, entered into a discussion of the conduct of the British Government under the obligations of the treaty of defensive alliance, alledging that the British Government had disregarded the provisions of that treaty, by neglecting to protect his Highness's territory in Malwa from the depredations of the enemy. The Acting Resident therefore refused to proceed in the discussion of that subject, and stated the object of his visit to be, to receive an answer relative to the dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka. The agent however still continued to avoid a direct reply, and proceeded to observe that the amount of the pensions due to the chieftains of his Highness's Government, under the 7th article of the treaty of Serjee Anjengaum, and the amount of the revenue collected from the districts of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajah-Kerra, since the conclusion of the peace, might be demanded on the ground of right, and could not justly be considered to form a part of the proposed pecuniary aid; to which observation the Acting Resident assented, stating at the same time that he had not received authority for the payment of either of those demands. The Acting Resident however observed, that in his opinion the hostile purposes of his Highness's march in the direction of Saugur, and even the continuance of Serjee Rao Ghautka near the person of his Highness would justify a suspension of those payments.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah then proceeded to state, that at the desire of the Acting Resident he had relinquished his intention of proceeding to Saugur, and had halted at Deolee, with a design to proceed by whatever route the Acting Resident might prescribe. But that funds were necessary to enable his Highness to march, and even to disband his troops, a measure which he professed his disposition to adopt, provided the Acting Resident would furnish his Highness with funds for that purpose.

The Acting Resident replied by explaining to his Highness that it was the object of the British Government not to destroy his military force, but on his arrival at Ougein to aid his Highness with the funds necessary for its improvement and efficiency. The Acting Resident then proceeded to describe to Dowlut Rao Scin-

diah the advantages which he would command by the liberality of the British Government, and by the aid of its alliance, in the restoration of order and prosperity within the limits of his dominion, in the event of his Highness's immediate return to his capital.

The Acting Resident observed, that a considerable period of time had elapsed since the communication to his Highness of the intentions of the British Government in his favour, and that he had not yet been enabled to state any circumstances calculated to satisfy the British Government of his Highness's resolution to abandon the hostile designs which, by the instigation of Serjee Rao Ghautka, he had been induced to entertain, that person being still permitted to retain his influence in the administration of his Highness's affairs. The acting Resident concluded by stating that if within the period of two days his Highness should not comply with his requisition, the Acting Resident would not, after the expiration of that period, resume the subject of pecuniary aid. But that in the event of his Highness's compliance, the Acting Resident would consent to pay the amount of the pensions due to the officers of his Highness's government, and also two lacs of rupees in part of the revenues of Dholepore, Barea, and Rajah-Kerra.

On the 23rd. of December, Ramchunder Pundit attended the Resident by his Highness's direction, and stated that his Highness having seriously reflected upon what had passed in communication with the Resident, was convinced of the justice of the considerations which the Acting Resident had urged relative to the dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka, and had resolved to dismiss him, and to act in all respects according to the Acting Resident's advice. The communication was accompanied by a statement of the oppressive and violent measures which had been adopted by Serjee Rao Ghautka, for the purpose of providing funds for the charges of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government. The agent stated that those funds had been provided by forcibly exacting contributions from the officers of government and from the bankers, or by loans of money from individuals who were compelled to advance it upon the credit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's security. That the few persons who would, under other circumstances undertake the arduous duties of prime minister, were deterred by the degree of responsibility which on the expulsion of Serjee Rao Ghautka would be imposed on his successor for the discharge of the demands which his dismissal would produce. The agent proceeded to remark, that Serjee Rao Ghautka's oppressive exactions had contributed to ruin many of the opulent class of his Highness's subjects, and that the fortunes of the rest depended entirely upon the security granted in his Highness's name. The agent added, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had requested the Acting Resident's special attention to this part of the subject, which involved the impediment to the instant dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka, and concluded by expressing a hope that the Acting Resident would suggest some expedient to remedy the inconvenience which the agent had explained.

The Acting Resident, in his report to the Governor-General in Council, of this conference, communicated the substance of his reply in the following terms: "Under my knowledge of the falsehood of this statement, which appeared to me to be urged for the purpose of gaining time; I replied, that I would not consent to make the smallest advance of money to this state until the departure of Ghautka, who was himself the cause of every embarrassment, and that I was convinced no difficulty would occur in finding a proper person to assume the administration immediately upon his dismissal.

The Acting Resident concluded his report by stating, that he had received secret communications from Dowlut Rao Scindiah through his Highness's vakeel, residing in the Acting Resident's camp, conveying the most solemn assurances of his

Highness's determination to regulate his conduct according to the desire of the British Government, and intimating that Ghautka should be dismissed in the course of a few days.

The Acting Resident however deemed it proper to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah that the position of his army relatively to the armies of Baptiste (one of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's commanders), of Ambajee and Meer Khaun, required that his Highness should afford immediate proof of the amicable nature of his designs; and the Acting Resident signified that unless Ghautka should quit his Highness's camp within the space of two days, he had resolved to be silent till his receipt of orders from the British Government.

A despatch from the Acting Resident, under date the 29th of December, contains the following intimation :—

"The preparations for active measures, which are still in train in this army, notwithstanding the assurances I have received of the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to proceed to his capital, appear to me to manifest an unequivocal spirit of hostility. My demand for the dismissal of Ghautka has not been complied with, while the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah is daily recruited with fresh levies, and the situation of the armies of Baptiste at Bopaul, of Meer Khan at Bhilaa, and of other chiefs in Malwa, combined with the notoriety of the inimical counsels still in agitation at this court, indicate, in my judgment, a decided intention on the part of Scindiah to commence hostilities at an early period.

"I have therefore signified to the Durbar my resolution of quitting camp should arrangements not be immediately adopted to convince me of a contrary spirit, and I shall deem it to be my duty to carry my design into execution, unless the conduct to be instantly pursued by Scindiah shall be perfectly satisfactory to my mind."

The Acting Resident having subsequently received information that it was the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to march from Deolee in the direction of Saugur, the Acting Resident repeated his resolution to quit the camp.

On the 30th of December, Ram Chunder Bhasker visited the Acting Resident. He ascribed the delay which had occurred in his Highness's compliance with the Acting Resident's demands to the characteristic procrastination of a Mahratta court. He renewed the assurances of his Highness's amicable and pacific intentions, adding, that in the course of a few days, every point would be satisfactorily adjusted; that the object of the march of the army from Deolee was merely to provide a more convenient place of encampment; and that he had been despatched by his Highness for the purpose of assuring the Acting Resident of his Highness's resolution to act in every respect in conformity to his desire. This representation induced the Acting Resident to consent to suspend his departure.

Subsequently, however, to this conference, the progressive march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army towards the city of Saugur, and the depredations committed by his Highness's Pindarries within the territory of Saugur, appear to have induced the Acting Resident to renew his demand for passports to enable him to quit the camp, in consequence of which, Ramchunder Bhasker was again despatched to the Resident on the evening of the 3rd of January.

The object of the visit was to persuade the Resident to abandon his intention of quitting the court. Ramchunder stated that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was proceeding to his own dominions by the way of Saugur (on which district his Highness possessed an assignment), and that the disappointment of his Highness's expectation of receiving from the Acting Resident the amount of his just demands, had produced the necessity of proceeding to Saugur for the realization of his assignment.

The Acting Resident stated, in reply, that the entrance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's

army into the territory of the Peishwa, and the plunder of the country by his Highness's Pindarries, constituted an act of direct hostility against an ally of the British Government. The Acting Resident recapitulated the grounds of his repeated remonstrances, and observed, that instead of proceeding to Ougein, his Highness's army had continued to advance in an opposite direction, and that the number of his Highness's troops continued to augment, although the want of funds for the payment of the actual establishment was a constant object of complaint. The Acting Resident concluded his discourse, of which the principal topics are above stated, by signifying to the agent that if his Highness would immediately proceed in the direction of Ougein, and would in other respects also regulate his conduct by the spirit of his professions, the Acting Resident would continue his attendance at his Highness's court.

On the 6th of January Dowlut Rao Scindiah advanced to Saugur, where he was joined by nine battalions of infantry and sixty-five guns, under the command of Baptiste.

The Acting Resident having received on the 7th of January the instructions of the Governor-General, dated the 4th of December, 1804, notifying the appointment of Colonel Close to the temporary charge of the office of Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, considered it to be his duty on that occasion to state in detail the motives and considerations by which his conduct had been actuated; and the Governor-General in Council deems it expedient to insert in this place an extract from the Acting Resident's report upon that subject, and at the same time to communicate to your honourable Committee the sentiments of the Governor-General in Council relative to the conduct of the Acting Resident in resolving to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the grounds which have already been described in this narrative, and which are succinctly stated in the following extract:

" My despatch of the 13th ultimo has fully detailed the principles upon which I commenced the execution of his Excellency's commands to the late Resident of the 5th November, and the considerations which rendered it in my judgment expedient to modify those instructions in such a manner as to make the agitation of the subject of pecuniary aid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, conditional upon the expulsion of Serjee Rao Ghautka. The principles upon which I deemed it to be my duty to annex the same condition to the payment of the pensions, and of the revenues of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah-Kerra, will likewise be obvious to his Excellency's judgment. His Excellency will have observed the artful duplicity with which that negotiation was conducted on the part of the Durbar; it evidently never was the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to dismiss Ghautka, it never was his intention to proceed to Ougein; and, in short, the sole object by which he was induced to manifest an apparent acquiescence with my demands was that of inducing me to advance a sum of money in order to assist him with the means of prosecuting hostilities against the British Government. During the course of this fraudulent proceeding Serjee Rao Ghautka continued to raise new levies, the Pindarries joined this army, and exercised their predatory destruction upon the territories of his Highness the Peishwa, the orders were repeated to the different officers in Malwa to proceed to Saugur, the authentic accounts which I communicated of the victories achieved by the British arms against Holkar were received with the utmost indifference by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, while forged intelligence of a nature inimical to the British interests was acknowledged with the most public demonstrations of exultation and applause.

" To my repeated remonstrances against the depredations of the Pindarries I received the most plausible assurances of their instant dismissal, while every intelli-

gence which I could obtain warranted a belief that a plan was in agitation to send the Pindarries to the southward to ravage the territories of the Rajah of Berar and the Soubah of the Deccan. His Excellency will also perceive that my interviews with Dowlut Rao Scindiah were checked and controlled by the presence of one of Ghautka's creatures, while every communication which I received through other channels was a prostitution of the Maharajah's name and authority, to the attainment of his infamous designs.²²

The Governor-General in Council has already stated our opinion that Mr. Jenkins acted with judgment and propriety in rendering the dismissal of Serjee Rao Ghautka, as well as the return of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his capital, the condition of the pecuniary aid to be eventually afforded to him on the part of the British Government. Any well founded doubts of the amicable nature of that chieftain's counsels with reference to the British Government, or of the just application of the funds which the British Government might provide for the relief of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's exigencies, would equally in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council have justified and required a suspension of the proposed pecuniary aid; these observations, however, are not equally applicable to the net revenue of Dholepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerra, collected since the conclusion of the peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who possesses a decided right to the amount of that revenue. The absolute certainty of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's inimical intentions, established by overt acts, was necessary in the judgment of his Excellency in Council, to justify a refusal to discharge the sums due both on that account and on account of the pensions granted by treaty.

The Acting Resident's mind was impressed with a conviction of the hostility of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's designs, and he considered Dowlut Rao Scindiah to have proceeded to an act of direct hostility by the violation of his Highness the Peishwa's territory of Saugur. The Governor-General in Council, however, entertained different sentiments with regard to the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and to the nature of this alleged act of aggression.

The Governor-General in Council was satisfied that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was personally disposed to maintain with the British Government the relations of amity and peace; but the weakness, the indolence, and the exigencies of that chieftain, placed him under the control of his abandoned relation, Serjee Rao Ghautka. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah, however, as the head of the state, must be referred all the acts of his minister.

The Governor-General in Council was convinced of the disposition of Serjee Rao Ghautka to take advantage of any situation of affairs which might appear to him to be favourable to the successful prosecution of hostilities against the British Government, and his Excellency in Council was of opinion that the eventual prosecution of hostilities constituted one of the objects of that Minister's contemplation, in assembling all the troops of the state in the vicinity of Saugur, and in augmenting their number.

The Governor-General in Council, however, was unwilling to believe that even Serjee Rao Ghautka could discern in the actual condition of affairs a prospect of deriving advantage from the prosecution of hostilities against the British power, or that his influence was sufficient to overcome the general sentiment of reluctance to a renewal of war, which was stated to prevail in the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and in the minds of his chiefs and followers.

With regard to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's invasion of the district of Saugur, it is proper to observe, that the Peishwa possesses no real authority over that district, and derives from it no revenue; that his Highness is perfectly indifferent with regard to the invasion of that distant territory, and certainly does not consider

that measure to be an act of hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah against his Highness's government. Dowlut Rao Scindiah has urged that he possessed an assignment upon Saugur which he obtained from the Peishwa. That assignment (if any existed) was supposed to be of ancient date and obsolete, but according to the loose habits of Mahratta states, the realization of such assignment by the arms of the chieftain, in whose favour it was granted, would have been deemed admissible. For these reasons it is manifest that the invasion of Saugur was not designed as an act of hostility against the Peishwa, and that under actual circumstances, the British Government was not pledged to resent it. In the judgment of his Excellency in Council, therefore, none of the acts and proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, described in the extract from the Acting Resident's despatches of the 7th of January, could justly be referred to a systematic course of hostile operations directed against the British power or against any of its allies.

The Acting Resident erroneously supposed that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was placed precisely in the same condition relatively to the British Government and its allies as at the commencement of the war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains; but there is, in fact, no similarity in the principal points of that relation at those two periods of time, and the Acting Resident was not authorized either by instructions from this government or by the circumstances of the case, to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and, as far as depended upon that measure, to renew the war between the two states.

It was the duty of the Acting Resident (especially under the knowledge of the appointment of Colonel Close to the charge of the Residency at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's court) to have protested against the proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, as far as they appeared to him to be inconsistent with the obligation of his engagements, and to have left to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the positive violation of the peace, in the sense in which, with reference to actual circumstances, it ought to be considered, namely, an aggression against the British Government or any of its allies, evidently proceeding from a determined spirit of hostility, and constituting a part of a systematic plan of hostile operations. In that sense and in that degree Dowlut Rao Scindiah had not, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, violated the peace.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to communicate the sequel of the Acting Resident's negotiations at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The conviction which the Acting Resident entertained of the infamous designs of Serjee Rao Ghautka was corroborated in the Acting Resident's judgment by an occurrence in his camp on the night of the 27th of December. On that night the guard stationed at the tent which contained the public baggage of the Residency was attacked and overpowered by a large body of plunderers, who murdered or wounded every person near the tent, and plundered money and other property to the value of about 12,000 rupees. The most valuable part of the public property however was preserved by the activity of the Resident's escort, which compelled the plunderers to retreat with precipitation. The Acting Resident was induced to suspect that this outrage was instigated by Serjee Rao Ghautka, but of this fact no evidence appears. Dowlut Rao Scindiah expressed the utmost degree of regret upon this occasion, and promised to afford the Resident every practicable satisfaction. The Acting Resident did not suspect that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had any concern in this outrage. That chieftain had previously expressed an earnest desire that the Acting Resident should encamp on the same ground with his army on account of the Pindaries, whom his Highness acknowledged his inability to control. Although the suspicions of the Acting Resident with regard to the designs

of Serjee Rao Ghautka were confirmed by this occurrence, the Acting Resident very properly determined not to render it an exclusive cause for quitting the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Between the 7th and the 9th of January the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah invested the fort of Saugur for the purpose of realizing the amount of his demand; in consequence of which, the Acting Resident despatched a message to his Highness, intimating that he had resolved to march the following morning, and desiring passports. To this message the Acting Resident received an answer purporting that Ramchunder Bhasker (the Agent before mentioned) should be despatched to the Acting Resident in the course of the morning, and that all points should be satisfactorily adjusted.

The Acting Resident, however, having repeated his demand for passports, he received a message from Dowlut Rao Scindiah signifying that Ambajee Ingla was expected to arrive in the space of eight days, and that on his arrival, it would be determined whether his Highness should proceed to Ougein, or the Acting Resident should receive his dismissal.

This insulting message confirmed the Acting Resident in his resolution to march the succeeding morning unless Dowlut Rao Scindiah should consent to proceed immediately in the direction of Ougein. This resolution, however, the Acting Resident was subsequently induced to change, after having made preparations for marching by striking all the tents of the British camp and loading the baggage, on receiving from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, through the agency of Ramchunder Pundit, the most solemn assurances of his Highness's determination to march in the direction of Ougein on the 16th of January, and to act in every respect according to the Acting Resident's advice. The delay of six days was required in consequence of the decease of a female of distinction in the family of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

It is proper to observe in this place that the information which the Acting Resident received with regard to the object of Ambajee's expected visit, was calculated to palliate the hostile and insulting tendency of the message which was conveyed to the Acting Resident upon that subject, as described in a preceding paragraph.

The Acting Resident was informed that repeated and earnest invitations had been transmitted to Ambajee, to proceed to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the hope and expectation that his influence would effect the expulsion of Ghautka. The Acting Resident also stated that in the general opinion Ambajee was decidedly adverse to the renewal of war with the British Government. The arrival of Ambajee therefore was calculated to maintain peace and amity between the two states, although the expectation of it was announced to the Acting Resident in an apparent spirit of hostility and insult.

On the evening of the 15th of January the Acting Resident received a message from Dowlut Rao Scindiah stating, that his Highness's march on the following morning agreeably to his engagement would be attended with considerable inconvenience, and requesting that the Acting Resident would consent to a further delay of two days promising in the most positive terms to prosecute his march at the expiration of that time, without a halt to Ougein. To this proposal the Acting Resident after some opposition assented, and on the 11th of January Dowlut Rao Scindiah actually commenced his march; but only a small portion of the army accompanied his Highness. The battalions and guns, together with the greater portion of the army, continued to occupy their position in the vicinity of Saugur, and the extent of his Highness's march did not exceed three miles. The Acting Resident was also informed that it was the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to halt four days where he had pitched his tents.

The Acting Resident having despatched a message remonstrating on his

breach of promise, his Highness replied, that in compliance with the Acting Resident's desire, his Highness had considered it to be incumbent upon him to march on the 18th. That his resolution of proceeding to Ougein remained unchanged, but that within the period of thirteen days after the decease of a member of his family, it was inconsistent with established custom to quit the spot where such an event had happened; adding however, that he would positively proceed on the march to Ougein after the four days which the prescribed period of mourning compelled. The Acting Resident considered the whole of this proceeding to be the result of collusion and deceit, but his solicitude to abstain from a measure which in his apprehension would revive the war between the two states, induced him to attend to the promises and professions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In the mean time the Acting Resident received the Governor-General's instructions of the 12th of December, on the subject of the conduct of Rajah Ambajee (the substance of which instructions is contained in preceding paragraphs of this despatch) and addressed a memorial to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the terms prescribed by the orders of the Governor-General, and by a verbal message the Acting Resident suggested that a letter should be immediately addressed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Rajah Ambajee, disavowing any participation in his unwarrantable proceedings, and any designs of the nature ascribed by him to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and prohibiting Ambajee's attendance at his Highness's court, and the Acting Resident desired to be furnished with a copy of that letter for transmission to the Governor-General. The Acting Resident further recommended that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should address a letter to the Governor-General in terms conformable to the tenor of the proposed letter to Ambajee, and to the resolution which his Highness had expressed of proceeding to his capital and of adhering to the obligations of his alliance. Several days having elapsed without obtaining a satisfactory reply from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the memorial and the message which the Acting Resident had addressed to his Highness, the Acting Resident deemed it proper to repeat his demand of an answer, and to combine with that demand a repetition of his remonstrances on the late conduct of his Highness. The Acting Resident accordingly transmitted a message to his Highness recapitulating all the grounds of complaint against his Highness's conduct, and intimating that the delay which had occurred in affording to the Acting Resident a reply to his communication and demand on the subject of Ambajee's hostile incursion, tended to confirm the Acting Resident's belief of his Highness's participation in the aggression of that chieftain. The Acting Resident further signified to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that in the event of his Highness's marching on the following morning in the direction of Ougein, he might be induced to remain in his Highness's camp awaiting the orders of the Governor-General; expressing at the same time a doubt whether any submission would avert the just resentment of the British Government "under the complicated acts" of hostility and treachery already committed in disregard of every principle of public faith and honour.

To this message the Acting Resident received an answer expressing his Highness's extreme concern at the just cause of resentment which his conduct had afforded to the British Government and his confidence in the clemency and moderation of the British Government. The person charged with this reply, then described the embarrassment of Dowlut Rao Scindiah under the impracticability of providing for the due conduct of the administration, and intimated a hope that his Highness's personal disposition to maintain the relations of amity with the British Government, might be opposed to the measures which in his Highness's name and under his supposed authority were pursued, by Serjee Rao Ghautka. The Acting Resident refused to admit the justice of this expectation and desired the messenger

to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that his Highness must now be considered to be responsible for the acts of his minister. The Acting Resident having desired to be informed what answer his Highness had returned to his representation on the subject of Ambajee, the messenger replied, that his Highness had assented to all that the Acting Resident had proposed on that subject. After adverting to the evil consequences of procrastination, the Acting Resident proceeded to demand when Dowlut Rao Scindiah had resolved to commence his march towards his capital. The messenger replied, that his Highness would positively commence his march at the expiration of three days which would complete the period of mourning. This intimation was accompanied by an acknowledgement on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that his Highness had forfeited all claim to further indulgence, and by an assurance that if the Acting Resident would consent to remain that additional period of time, he would experience no further cause of dissatisfaction; on the ground of this acknowledgement and assurance the Acting Resident consented to await the expiration of the prescribed term.

The Acting Resident concluded his report of these proceedings with the following observations; "Dowlut Rao Scindiah still appears to be actuated by a delusive hope that every act of his government will be attributed to Serjee Rao Ghautka, and although I believe the Maharajah to be sincere in his wish to preserve peace and to settle quietly at his capital, his weak and capricious mind continually fluctuates between the prudent counsels of all the old adherents of his family; and the insinuating allusions presented to his imagination by his father-in-law. In short, nothing but the prospect of immediate danger from the British arms can in my judgement thoroughly awake him to a sense of his real situation."

The Acting Resident's report of his proceedings at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah is interrupted by the miscarriage of a despatch to that officer under date the 22nd of January. It appears however, by a despatch from the Acting Resident of a subsequent date, that he had received an insulting message from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Durbar in answer to his demand for passports, and that the Acting Resident actually marched from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp on the 23d of January to the distance of about fourteen miles. Previously to his departure, the Acting Resident received a visit from two of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's officers, the object of which was to persuade the Acting Resident to remain, but those persons not being authorized to vouch for Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march on that day, the Acting Resident resisted their entreaties and commenced his journey towards the camp of the British forces.

On receiving information of the Acting Resident's departure, Dowlut Rao Scindiah despatched an officer of high rank together with Ramchunder Bhaaker the agent before-mentioned to the Acting Resident's camp, for the purpose of persuading the Acting Resident to return. They arrived at his camp on the evening of the 23d, and on being received by the Acting Resident, solemnly pledged themselves that if he would return to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp on the morning of the 24th, Dowlut Rao Scindiah would commence his march towards his capital on the following day. The Acting Resident however refused to accept this assurance, but being informed by those persons that they were authorized to pledge Dowlut Rao Scindiah's name for the performance of any conditions which could induce the Acting Resident to return; the Acting Resident proposed the following:—

1st. That on the day following the Acting Resident's return to camp, Dowlut Rao Scindiah should commence his march to Ougein, to which place he should proceed without any further halt than the usual and necessary intervals.

2ndly. That Scindiah should act in conformity to the Acting Resident's advice respecting Ambajee without any further delay.

3dly. That Scindiah should comply with the Acting Resident's advice to disavow in a letter to the Governor-General, the conduct of Ambajee and of the vakeel at Hyderabad, and that letters of recall to the latter persons should be delivered to the Acting Resident in order that they might be transmitted through the Resident at that court. The messengers having agreed in the most solemn manner to these conditions, the Acting Resident consented to return to camp, and he accordingly returned on the 24th of January.

On the evening of that day the Acting Resident received information that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had resolved to halt the following day. This resolution being a direct violation of one of the conditions on which the Acting Resident had consented to return to camp, the Acting Resident recommenced his march, but after proceeding a short distance was informed that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had expressed a desire to receive a visit from the Acting Resident, who in consequence of this intimation directed that his baggage should remain at a grove in the vicinity of the encampment of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's regular brigades, and proceeded with Lieutenant Stuart, the officer commanding the escort to the tents of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. After some endeavour on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to excuse his conduct, he signified his determination to comply that day with all the Acting Resident's demands respecting Ambajee, and to commence his march towards Ougein on the following morning.

The Acting Resident refused to be satisfied unless the letters which he had demanded should be prepared and despatched in his presence. To this his Highness after much discussion consented, and the Acting Resident was requested to retire with some of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's public officers to a separate tent, that the letters might there be prepared in the terms which the Acting Resident should prescribe. The Acting Resident accordingly retired with Lieutenant Stuart while Dowlut Rao Scindiah continued to hold his court. The letters were in a state of preparation, when the Acting Resident was informed that Dowlut Rao Scindiah desired to retire for the purpose of performing his devotions, which had been interrupted by the Acting Resident's visit, and the letters when completed should be carried to him, and if the terms of them should not entirely accord with the Acting Resident's wishes, he might return to his Highness's tents in the evening for the purpose of suggesting the necessary alterations.

The Resident accordingly returned to take leave of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and immediately despatched orders, recalling the baggage of the Residency. In the mean time, however, the British camp was surrounded and overpowered by the whole body of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Pindarries who plundered the whole of the baggage, Lieutenant Greene, who commanded the escort, and Dr. Wise the surgeon of the Residency, were severely wounded, and many of the Sepoys and other persons attached to the Residency were also wounded.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah expressed the utmost horror and regret at this occurrence, and promised to restore the whole of the plundered property. In the mean time the gentlemen of the residency being deprived by this atrocious violence of all the means of accommodation, were reduced to a situation of extreme distress.

With whatever degree of regret and indignation the Governor-General in Council contemplated this unparalleled outrage, justice requires the expression of our decided opinion, that it was perpetrated without the participation or knowledge of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Governor-General in Council even doubts whether that outrage was instigated or abetted by Serjee Rao Ghantka, and deems it most probable that the plunder of the baggage was the exclusive object of this act of violence on the part of some of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's irregular horse and other

licentious troops. This occurrence therefore produced no alteration in the sentiments of the Governor-General in Council with regard to the views and dispositions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah as described in preceding paragraphs.

The Governor-General, however, deemed it indispensably necessary to demand from Dowlut Rao Scindiah a full explanation of that extraordinary act of violence and ample reparation and atonement for it, and the Governor-General considered it to be proper to address a letter to that chieftain, stating in general terms the sentiments of the British Government with regard to the whole tenor of his conduct, adverting however in an especial manner to the outrage committed upon the British Representative at his Highness's court, and containing also a demand of reparation and atonement. A copy of that letter is annexed to this despatch for your honourable Committee's information.

Under the view of the acts and proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government which has been above transcribed, the Governor-General in Council resolved to pursue the same pacific system of measures towards that chieftain which is described in the Governor-General's instructions to the late Resident of the 5th of November, and to the Acting Resident of the 22d of December, the substance of which is stated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch, and instructions were accordingly issued to Colonel Close, who arrived at Nagpore on the 8th of February, 1805, on his way to Scindiah's camp, but in consequence of the receipt of the intelligence of the outrage committed upon the Resident's camp, had determined to await at Nagpore further information with regard to the course of events at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Those instructions which were dated the 23rd of February, contained a general statement of the sentiments of the Governor-General with regard to the views and disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and to the conduct of the Acting Resident described in preceding parts of this despatch, and conveyed the Governor-General's orders to Colonel Close, directing him to pursue his journey to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with the least practicable delay, unless at the period of his receipt of those instructions he should be apprised of the existence of a state of affairs entirely different from that which the Governor-General supposed to exist.

Colonel Close was further directed after his arrival at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to regulate his proceedings according to the spirit and intent of the instructions of the 5th of November and 22d of December, as being entirely applicable in the Governor-General's judgment to the supposed condition of affairs at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's court. Colonel Close was at the same time instructed to endeavour to impress upon that chieftain's mind a due sense of the amicable and pacific nature of the designs of the British Government, and a confident belief of our solicitude for the restoration of efficiency and prosperity to his declining dominion, and of the continuance of our disposition to assist his efforts for that purpose, provided that he would adopt a course of proceeding consistent with the accomplishment of that object, and with the interests and obligations of the alliance subsisting between the two states; Colonel Close was at the same time directed to urge the demand of explanation and atonement for the outrage committed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Pindarries in the spirit of the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

No alteration had taken place in the condition of the Residency on the 15th of February, the date of our latest advice from the Acting Resident. Some of the elephants belonging to the residency had been restored. Dowlut Rao Scindiah continued occasionally to repeat with great earnestness the expressions of regret

and concern at the outrage committed by his Pindarries, but does not appear to have employed any endeavours to supply to the Acting Resident and the gentlemen of his family the accommodations and comforts of which they had been deprived by the plunder of the British camp. No restraint, however, was imposed upon the Resident, nor has the transit of letters and despatches to and from the Acting Resident been interrupted.

To the characteristic levity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, may in some degree be ascribed the indifference with which he apparently contemplates the outrage which has been committed by persons in his service against the British Representative and the distressed condition of the gentlemen of the Residency; but his conduct in this respect is probably controlled by Serjee Rao Ghautka, who may be supposed to view with malignant and vindictive satisfaction the distress of the British Resident.

On the 24th of February, Dowlut Rao Scindiah with the main body of his army, marched from Saugur in a south-western direction, leaving the battalions under the command of Baptiste for the purpose of realizing the balance of the contribution which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had exacted from that place. This person is said to be of French extraction, but born in India of a native woman, and to have been brought up in the military service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in whose service he now commands a considerable force of regular infantry, with a large train of artillery.

On the morning of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's departure, the Acting Resident despatched a message to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, stating the extreme inconvenience to which he would be exposed by proceeding with the army, and desiring permission to retire to a place of safety. Dowlut Rao Scindiah replied to this message, by repeating in the strongest terms the deep sense of regret which his Highness entertained at the outrage which had been committed, and earnestly requesting the Resident to continue with the army.

Subsequently to the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from Saugur, the Acting Resident received repeated intimations from Dowlut Rao Scindiah of his desire to visit him, and to introduce Serjee Rao Ghautka, and the Acting Resident having with some reluctance consented to receive Dowlut Rao Scindiah's visit, that chieftain, accompanied by Ghautka and the principal officers of his court, visited the Acting Resident on the evening of the 2d instant. On that occasion, Dowlut Rao Scindiah endeavoured to justify the conduct of his government, and to remove from the Acting Resident's mind a supposition that his government had any concern in the late outrage, asserting that the Pindarries by whom it was committed were not under the control of the government. His Highness also upon this occasion expressed his hope that the late misfortune would not interrupt the friendship which had so long been established between the two states. The Acting Resident replied by observing, that what had happened could not be repaired, and that he was entirely in the power of his Highness.

It appears that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was at that time greatly perplexed by the refusal of Ambajee to join his Highness and to aid him with his councils and his resources, and the Acting Resident appears to ascribe to that cause, combined with a belief of the continued successes of our arms, and with an apprehension of the resentment of the British Government, the apparent solicitude of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to conciliate the Acting Resident. It seems evident, therefore, that at that time the views of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were directed to purposes unconnected with any sentiment of hostility against the British Government, excepting such as might arise from the necessity of eventual defence against the appre-

hended effects of its resentment. Dowlut Rao Scindiah then occupied a position about twenty-four miles north-west of Saugur, with the supposed intention of proceeding towards Narwar.

The Governor-General in Council is not enabled to state with any degree of confidence an opinion with regard to the ultimate views of Dowlut Rao Scindiah under the guidance of his profligate and unprincipled minister Sirjee Rao Ghautka. The immediate object of that chieftain appears to be, to provide funds by any means for the support of a numerous army, which he has been engaged in collecting, and which may probably be employed as at Saugur, in enforcing the payment of pecuniary demands from other chieftains, who without such an accession of force on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, might have possessed the means of successful resistance.

Our latest advices from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp are dated the 7th instant, at which time Dowlut Rao Scindiah continued in the same position as that which he occupied on the 3d instant.

As connected with the general subject of the war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the Governor-General in Council deems it necessary in this place to state in general terms the progress of transactions in the province of Bundelcund, and the movements of the British force employed for the protection of that province.

In our despatch of the 15th of June, the Governor-General in Council communicated to your honourable Committee the unfortunate circumstances which attended the incursion of a body of predatory horse into the district of Kooch in Bundelcund, in the month of May, and of the subsequent retreat of those plunderers. With reference to that incursion, the Governor-General in Council also apprized your honourable Committee, that the Governor-General had deemed it necessary to adopt an arrangement for the complete establishment of the British authority throughout the district of Bundelcund, ceded to the honourable Company by his Highness the Peishwa, and for the consolidation of the civil and military authorities in that province, and for its future security against any irruption of predatory horse.

The detail of the arrangement proposed by the Governor-General for the accomplishment of these objects will be stated to your honourable Committee in a future despatch. It appears to the Governor-General in Council to be sufficient at this time, to apprise your honourable Committee that obstacles of a local and a military nature opposed the adoption of the proposed arrangement at that period of time, and that the urgency of its adoption having subsequently abated in a considerable degree, the Governor-General was of opinion that in the actual situation of affairs every object of security and tranquillity might be accomplished by the British troops stationed within the province of Bundelcund.

The army of Bundelcund, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Martindell, who was appointed to succeed Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett on his suspension from that command, continued to occupy a position near Calpee, in conformity to the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Tranquillity being restored in the territory in the vicinity of Calpee, the principal part of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment was ordered into the interior of Bundelcund for the purpose of suppressing the turbulence of the refractory chieftains of Bundelcund, who had taken advantage of the incursion of the predatory horse and of the absence of the regular troops, to renew their depredations. The remainder of the detachment continued at Calpee.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell having received information that a party of refractory Boondelaha had been joined by a body of plunderers of a tribe denominated Na-

gals, and had entered the district of Mahoba and excited disturbance, he directed his march into that district for the purpose of dispersing or destroying this predatory body.

On the 2nd of July Lieut.-Colonel Martindell overtook them near the town of Mahoba, and immediately attacked them with great gallantry and spirit, and completely defeated them with considerable slaughter, and the loss of almost the whole of their baggage and bazars. The loss of the British detachment was very inconsiderable. The banditti dispersed in every direction, and were attacked by the inhabitants of the towns and villages near which they passed in the progress of their flight.

It appeared from the depositions of some of the prisoners taken at Mahoba, that the banditti which had been defeated at that place, acted under the orders of a confederacy of petty Boondela chieftains who had resisted the authority of the British Government, and who had despatched agents to Meer Khan soliciting his assistance for the subversion of the established authority of the British Government in Bundelcund; Meer Khan however was at that period of time engaged in hostile operations against the Nabob of Bopaul.

Soon after the defeat of the freebooters at Mahoba, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell, in prosecution of the plan of operations for the re-establishment of the authority of Government in those districts, proceeded to assault the Fort of Jeyhpore, which was occupied by a garrison in the pay of Rajah Kessary Sing, one of the confederated chieftains mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Measures were in the mean while adopted by Captain Baillie for the preservation of tranquillity in those parts of Bundelcund which were not occupied by regular troops, by judicious dispositions of the irregular force in the service of the successor of Rajah Hinmut Behadur.

The necessary preparations being made for assaulting the Fort of Jeyhpore, the storming party advanced to the gate of the Fort at daybreak on the 28th of July, but the gate being defended by a breastwork of earth, the time occupied in the removal of this impediment enabled the enemy to bring guns to bear, in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of advancing. After sustaining considerable loss, and finding every attempt to force the gate impracticable, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell ordered the party to be withdrawn. Another party which was ordered to scale the wall in a different part of the Fort, was also under the necessity of abandoning the attempt, several of the scaling ladders being found to be too short, and the remainder being broken. The troops manifested the utmost gallantry and perseverance on this occasion, and their conduct is mentioned by Lieut.-Colonel Martindell in terms of high approbation.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's report of this event, together with a return of the killed and wounded, is enclosed for the information of your Honourable Committee.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell deemed it necessary to suspend a renewal of the attack on the Fort until furnished with ordnance better adapted to the nature of the undertaking than that which accompanied his detachment. On the 17th of August, having received from Baurda some 12-pounder guns, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell determined immediately to renew the attack, and on the 30th of August succeeded in taking possession of the Fort.

Other forts in the different districts of Bundelcund were captured, either by the regular troops, or by the irregular battalions which had been entertained and employed for the preservation of tranquillity and good order in Bundelcund.

No fort of any considerable strength remains in the hands of those who have resisted the authority of the British Government, with the exception of Callinger and Ajsrghur. The Governor-General entertains no doubt that when the ser-

rices of the British troops can be spared to undertake the reduction of these forts, they will speedily be surrendered to the British Government, or that such an accommodation may be effected with the chieftains who possess them, as will secure the establishment of the authority of the Company, or of his Highness the Peishwa, throughout the districts in Bundelcund in which their respective authorities are to be maintained.

Soon after the capture of Jeypore, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, directing him to advance with the detachment under his command, to a position on the northern frontier of Bundelcund. The object of these instructions was to secure the province of Bundelcund and the neighbouring districts from the danger of an hostile incursion, directed to the purposes either of plundering the territory of Bundelcund, or of penetrating through that province into the doab of the Jumna and the Ganges, during the advance of the main army under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The prescribed position of Colonel Martindell's detachment on the frontier of Bundelcund, was also calculated to enable that detachment to undertake any operation which the state of affairs or the movements of any hostile troops might render necessary.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell, with the detachment under his command, advanced from Jeypore on the 7th of September, and proceeded by the route of Calpee, intending to march from Calpee to the position which he had been directed to occupy. The troops had suffered so severely from sickness during the preceding months, that on the arrival of the detachment at Calpee, the number of sick was such as to reduce it to an extreme degree of weakness, and to render it absolutely necessary to postpone the march of the detachment to the frontier.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell accordingly, with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, encamped near Calpee, with the intention of remaining in that situation until the detachment should be in a condition to advance.

At Calpee, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell was joined by a detachment of the Governor-General's body guard, under the command of Captain Daniel, amounting to 240 rank and file, with two gallopers, which had been placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

Towards the end of November, the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell advanced from Calpee, and took up a position near Kooch, a district situated on the northern frontier of Bundelcund.

Meer Khan, after the conclusion of his operations against Bhelsa, in the month of September, marched with the main body of his force towards Saugur, a possession of the Jaggeerdar of Calpee. Having remained some time in the vicinity of that place, he advanced in a northerly direction with the principal part of his force, and arrived about the end of December at Calapahaur, a position on the right bank of the Sind, from whence he could prosecute his march either to Narwa to form a junction with the troops of Ambajee, or towards Jhanses for the invasion of that territory.

On receiving intelligence of the approach of Meer Khan to the frontier of Bundelcund, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell prepared to occupy a more advanced position than Kooch, but the information which at that time Lieut.-Colonel Martindell received of the hostile conduct of Rajah Ambajee (as described in a preceding paragraph of this despatch) induced him to suspend this movement until the views of Ambajee should be ascertained. On the receipt of that information by the Commander-in-Chief, his Excellency issued instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Martindell, directing him to advance immediately into Gohud, and endeavour to attack and defeat the enemy's force which had entered that country. The Commander-

in-Chief left it to the discretion of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell to suspend the execution of these orders, if the advance of his force in that direction should leave the province of Bundelcund and its vicinity open to an incursion from the southward.

The subsequent receipt of intelligence of the retreat of Ambajee's troops from Gohud, rendered any immediate movement of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment unnecessary, and that officer determined therefore to remain near Kooch ready to act as circumstances might require. Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's determination was also influenced by the information which he received at the time of the arrival of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at Saugur with a large army, and of Scindiah's hostile proceedings against that place.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell being unacquainted with the object and designs of Scindiah, and being doubtful whether the hostile proceedings of Scindiah against a possession of our ally the Peishwa, might not be the commencement of a systematic plan of hostile operations against the British power, or might not be considered by the British Government to be a violation of the peace, deemed it necessary to be prepared for an eventual attempt on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to invade the province of Bundelcund, which Lieut.-Colonel Martindell concluded would be the first object of his attack, in the event of a rupture between the two Governments.

On the 5th of January, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell received accounts of Meer Khan's arrival at Calapahaur, as related in a preceding paragraph, and prepared to move from Kooch the instant he should ascertain the intended route of Meer Khan.

The cavalry of Meer Khan, commanded by that chieftain in person, having suddenly advanced to the northward, arrived within a few miles of Gwalior on the 8th of January, and proceeded to the northward on the following day; and having crossed the Chumbul near Dolepore, joined the force of Jeswunt Rao Holkar near Bhurtpore on the 17th of January.

Lieut.-Colonel Martindell had advanced to a position on the bank of the Sind (where he arrived on the 12th of January) which was calculated to enable him both to oppose with effect an attempted invasion and to advance with facility to the northward, if that movement should be necessary.

The infantry and guns of Meer Khan not having advanced with his cavalry, and being still in a position which might enable them to enter Bundelcund unless opposed by a force on the frontier, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell proposed to maintain his position on the Sind until the views of this body of troops should be ascertained.

On the 13th, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell received from Mr. Jenkins the notification of his determination to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah without delay. This information confirmed Lieut.-Colonel Martindell in his determination to maintain his position on the Sind until he should receive further information. Lieut.-Colonel Martindell stated to the Commander-in-Chief his intention to refrain from any offensive operations against Dowlut Rao Scindiah without orders, but to repel by force any attempt of that chieftain to invade the province under his protection.

The Commander-in-Chief, on receiving intelligence of the advance of Meer Khan, directed Colonel Martindell to advance immediately to Dolepore with his whole force. It appears that the information received by the Commander-in-Chief induced his Excellency to suppose that the whole of Meer Khan's force was advancing towards Bhurtpore, and by this movement of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment, with the expected advance of the army under the command of Major:

General Jones from Shahabad, his Excellency entertained the hope of effectually preventing the escape of the enemy from one or other of those distinct forces. Lieut.-Colonel Martindell, in compliance with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, advanced from the Sind, and arrived at Gwalior on the 21st of January.

At Gwalior, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell received information from Mr. Jenkins of the further advance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and being at the time in possession of instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, which authorized him eventually to suspend his advance to Dolepore, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell determined to return to his former position on the Sind, and there to wait the progress of events, and to be prepared for any emergency which might require the services of his detachment.

By our latest advices, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment continued to occupy that position, which is equally calculated to secure the internal tranquillity of Bundelcund, and to protect that province and the territory of Gohud from external invasion.

The Governor-General-in-Council now resumes the narrative of the proceedings of the army under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commander-in-Chief having completed the necessary arrangements at Deig and having left a proper garrison in the fort, proceeded against Bhurtpore another strong fort belonging to Rajah Runjeet Sing and his usual place of residence.

The Commander-in-Chief directed his march near Muttra for the purpose of favouring his junction with his Majesty's 75th regiment and a large convoy of provisions. His Majesty's 75th regiment and the convoy having joined the main army on the 29th of December, the Commander-in-Chief pursued his march towards Bhurtpore where the army arrived on the 3rd of January.

The Commander-in-Chief commenced operations against the town of Bhurtpore, and a battery of six 18 pounders was opened against the wall on the 7th of January. On the 9th, the breach being reported practicable, preparations were made to storm it, and Lieut.-Colonel Maitland of his Majesty's 75th regiment was appointed to the command of the storming party.

Extraordinary and unexpected obstacles however opposed the progress of the storming party and occasioned its detention during a considerable period of time in a situation where it was exposed to a heavy fire from the walls of the town and on reaching the breach, it was unfortunately found to be impracticable. The party was therefore compelled to retire after repeated attempts to ascend the breach with the loss of many officers and men, and of Lieut.-Colonel Maitland whose courage and exertions were eminently conspicuous on this unfortunate occasion. A flanking party, however, which was directed against the enemy's battery at the same time succeeded in gaining the battery, spiked the guns which were found in it and killed a considerable number of the enemy.

The party which endeavoured to storm, retreated in good order to the batteries of the British army. Although this attempt to storm the breach terminated unsuccessfully, the British troops have on no occasion displayed a greater spirit of gallantry and firmness than in this attack. The failure of this attack must be exclusively ascribed to the insurmountable nature of the obstacles which opposed the progress of the troops.

On the following night a new battery was commenced for the purpose of breaching the wall in a different place and was opened on the 14th with great effect.

On the 21st of January, the breach which had been effected by the fire from the batteries which had been erected after the assault of the town on the 9th

appearing to be practicable, the Commander-in-Chief determined upon another attempt to carry the place by storm. On the evening of that day the storming party which was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Macrae of his Majesty's 76th regiment moved out of the trenches. The ditch however which surrounds the town was found to be so broad and deep that every attempt of the storming party to cross it proved unsuccessful and the party was compelled to return to the trenches. The Commander-in-Chief represents the conduct of the troops on this occasion to have been distinguished by their accustomed steadiness, activity, and valour.

The Governor-General-in-Council is concerned to add that the heavy fire to which the troops were unavoidably exposed during a considerable time in endeavouring to effect their passage across the ditch and during their return to the batteries occasioned a severe loss.

The failure of these attempts determined the Commander-in-Chief to carry the approaches close to the surrounding ditch, by which means it was his Excellency's expectation that the obstacles which had hitherto prevented our success would be effectually overcome.

His Excellency accordingly stationed the army in a new position on the southern side of the town and recommenced the operations of the siege.

Shortly after the failure of the second assault an action took place between a detachment of the British troops and the whole force of the enemy's cavalry supported by a body of infantry with guns, which afforded additional proof of the superiority of the British arms when opposed to the enemy in the field.

A large supply of provisions having been collected at Muttra for the use of the army before Bhurtpore, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief detached a party of the 1st regiment of native cavalry and one battalion of native infantry under the command of Captain Welsh of the native cavalry, for the purpose of protecting the convoy on its march to his Excellency's camp. On the morning of the 23rd of January, the convoy was attacked on its march at the distance of about eight miles from the British camp by a considerable body of infantry with guns and by the whole of the united force of cavalry belonging to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Meer Khan and Bappojee Scindiah. The British troops took post in a village where they resisted with success the attack of the whole of the enemy's cavalry.

The fire of the contending troops being heard in the British camp, the Commander-in-Chief ordered a party of cavalry, consisting of his Majesty's 27th light dragoons and the 2d regiment of native cavalry under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Need to advance to the support of the Convoy, and his Excellency followed in person with the whole of the cavalry in camp. As soon as Lieut.-Colonel Need's detachment appeared, the party of British troops in the village charged the enemy and routed them with great slaughter, taking four guns with their tumbrils and nearly forty stand of colours. The party commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Need also subsequently charged the enemy's troops and completed their defeat, Meer Khan who commanded the infantry in person with difficulty escaped in disguise.

The loss of the British detachment consisted of two officers wounded and only two privates killed and twenty wounded.

The Commander-in-Chief has expressed his high approbation of the gallantry judgement, and activity manifested by Captain Welsh on the occasion.

On the 29th of January the Commander-in-Chief again moved out with the whole of the cavalry and two corps of infantry, for the purpose of protecting a large convoy which was on its march from Agra to join his Excellency's camp

under an escort of several battalions of native infantry, which had been detached from the army for that purpose.

This convoy chiefly consisted of a large supply of provisions, treasure, ammunition and military stores of every description requisite for the prosecution of the siege of Bhurtpore, and its arrival was an object of great importance and of proportionate anxiety to the mind of the Commander-in-Chief.

The enemy aware of the importance of this convoy and of the inconvenience which would be occasioned to the British army by its loss, determined to assault it on its approach. With this view the whole of the enemy's united cavalry had occupied a position near the road from Agra awaiting the approach of the convoy. The design of the enemy, however, was completely frustrated by the vigilance and activity of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief who arrived near the enemy's position a few hours before the British convoy.

The arrival of the British detachment under his Excellency's command, induced the enemy to retreat with precipitation. The Commander-in-Chief attempted to charge the enemy's troops, but the rapidity of their flight rendered impracticable every effort to overtake them. The convoy arrived in camp in perfect safety on the evening of the 30th of January.

On the 8th of February, the Commander-in-Chief received information that Meer Khan had marched with a force of between ten and fifteen thousand cavalry towards the Jumna with the intention of crossing that river and plundering the British provinces in that quarter. His Excellency immediately detached a force consisting of three regiments of European light dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry and the horse artillery under the command of Major-General Smith in pursuit of the enemy. General Smith marched on the 8th for Muttra, at which place he crossed the Jumna by a bridge of boats on the 9th of February, and proceeded with the greatest expedition in pursuit of the enemy who had crossed at a ford a little below Muttra on the 7th. The enemy pursued a north-easterly course up the Doab towards the Ganges and endeavoured to cross that river at different places, but for some time without success.

On the 14th of February, Meer Khan effected his passage across the Ganges and entered Rohilcund with his whole force directing his march to Moradabad. The principal station in the district of that name and the seat of the court of justice and the treasury.

Meer Khan arrived at Moradabad on the 16th of February. Measures of precaution had been adopted by the civil officers of government at Moradabad for the preservation of the treasure, of the records of the court, and those of the collector's office, and for their own security, and that of their families and the other European inhabitants of the place; they retired into a house belonging to Mr. Leycester the Acting Collector of the district, which had been rendered capable of defence by the construction of a wall and a ditch.

The only troops at the station consisted of about 350 sepoy of the provincial battalion who were commanded by Lieutenant Wilkinson. These troops received the enemy on the parade of their corps, but after some skirmishing with the enemy, were compelled to retire before the enemy's superior numbers, and effected their retreat with great regularity to the house to which the civil officers had retired. A few sepoy of this party were killed and wounded, during the day. Meer Khan's troops burned the cantonments of the provincial corps and the public stations of most of the European inhabitants of the place, and also took possession of the town of Moradabad. On the 17th they surrounded and attacked Mr. Leycester's house. A party of irregular troops which had been raised for the purpose of assisting in the defence of the place deserted to the enemy with the

sepoys of the provincial corps above-mentioned and three small pieces of cannon. The party in the house maintained a successful defence against various attempts on the part of the enemy to carry the place by assault, and the enemy was repulsed with considerable loss. The enemy prepared for another assault on the evening of the same day, but the information which reached Meer Khan of the approach of Major-General Smith, induced him to abandon his design and after remaining under arms during the night, the enemy decamped at 3 o'clock in the morning. General Smith who had crossed the Ganges on the 15th at a ford parallel to Moradabad, arrived on the ground which the enemy had occupied on the 18th. The enemy plundered some houses in the town of Moradabad and committed various outrages.

The conduct of Mr. Leicester and of the other officers of government at Moradabad in the defence of the post which they occupied, has merited the expression of the high approbation of the Governor-General-in-Council.

Meer Khan proceeded towards Casheepore, a place situated to the north-east of Moradabad near the hills and was pursued by Major-General Smith, who passed Rampore the capital of the Jaggeer of the descendants and followers of the late Rohilla Chief Fyz Oollah Khan, when General Smith had an interview with the Nabob Nusser Oollah Khan, the Regent of Rampore. Meer Khan having fled under the hills into a country of difficult access into which General Smith could not pursue him, General Smith deemed it advisable to halt in a position by which he should be able to cover the cities of Bareilly, Moradabad, and Pillebeat, from any attempt of the enemy to pursue him as soon as he should again enter the open country.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to interrupt the narrative of transactions in Rohilcund for the purpose of communicating the operations of the army before Bhurtpore.

On the 11th of February the main body of the army under the command of Major-General Jones, which had advanced from Guzerat, formed a junction with the army of the Commander-in-Chief, and encamped in a position in the vicinity of the ground occupied by the army of Bengal.

The remainder of the force from Guzerat under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Holmes, was advancing with a convoy of treasure and stores by a different route, and at the period of the latest advices was arrived at Rampora.

On the 20th of February the advanced state of the operations against the town of Bhurtpore appeared to the Commander-in-Chief to render it advisable to assault the place without further delay. On that day his Excellency made preparations for the attack. The party destined to storm the breach was formed of the greater part of the European infantry belonging to the Bengal army and three battalions of Sepoys under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Don. Another party consisting of 200 men, his Majesty's 86th regiment, and one battalion of Bengal native infantry under the command of Captain Grant of the former corps, was ordered to attack the enemy's trenches and guns on the outside of the town, while a third column composed of 300 men from his Majesty's 65th regiment and two battalions of Bombay native infantry was destined to attack one of the gates of the place which was understood to be accessible. The attack conducted by Captain Grant entirely succeeded, and the British troops obtained possession of the enemy's guns which were brought into camp. The Governor-General is concerned to state that neither of the other attacks succeeded. The ditch was found to be so deep as to render the approach of the storming party under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Don to the breach impracticable. The troops then attempted to ascend one of the bastions of the town but without success, and after repeated

endeavours to ascend, was finally compelled to desist. The column under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Taylor which was intended to attack the gate was detained a considerable time on its march, and was early exposed to a most heavy and destructive fire from the town which destroyed the ladders and rendered every attempt to succeed by assaulting the gate impracticable. Lieut.-Colonel Taylor, therefore, was compelled to withdraw his men until he received orders to return to camp. The Commander-in-Chief has expressed his opinion of the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Don and of Captain Grant and the troops under their command in terms of the greatest approbation.

The failure of this attempt to carry the town by assault having been occasioned in a great degree by the occurrence of unexpected accidents and delays, and the Commander-in-Chief having reason to suppose that a few hours more battering would render perfectly practicable the bastion which our troops had attempted to escalade, his Excellency determined to renew the attack on the following day.

The storming party consisted of the whole of the European force and two battalions of Native infantry from the army of Bengal and the greater part of his Majesty's 65th and 86th regiments, the Grenadier battalion and the flank companies, and another battalion of Native infantry from the army of Bombay. The whole was commanded by the honourable Colonel Monson, and moved out to the attack at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 21st of February.

The troops engaged in the attack with the most determined zeal and bravery, but their utmost exertions to gain the top of the breach were unsuccessful, and after successive attempts, which were continued with unabating ardour during two hours, were compelled to retire with a severe loss of officers and men. It is with the deepest concern that the Governor-General in Council announces to your honourable Committee this further failure in the attempt to carry Bhurtpore by assault, and his Excellency in Council extremely laments the loss of the many brave officers and men who have fallen on this occasion; although the exertions of the troops have not been attended with success, they have not on any occasion displayed a greater degree of gallantry and steadiness, and the Commander-in-Chief has expressed the highest approbation of the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Monson and of all the troops engaged in the assault.

The causes of the repeated failures in the attempts upon Bhurtpore have not yet been fully stated to the Governor-General in Council, and will require further investigation.

On the 24th of February the Commander-in-Chief took up a new position on the north-east side of Bhurtpore, and his Excellency is prepared to re-commence operations against that place as soon as he shall have received supplies of stores and ammunition which are advancing towards the army from the stations within the Company's provinces at which they had been collected. The Commander-in-Chief expresses a confident hope of obtaining possession of Bhurtpore before the conclusion of the season for active military operations in that quarter of India.

The Rajah of Bhurtpore however, aware that the exertions of the British forces must ultimately be successful and that the utter destruction of his power must be the consequence of our success, despatched on the 25th of February a letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, proposing an accommodation with the British Government.

In that letter the Rajah of Bhurtpore indirectly acknowledged the treachery of his conduct, expressed an earnest desire to be restored to the friendship of the British Government, and offered, under proper encouragement, to proceed to the British camp; in his reply to that letter the Commander-in-Chief apprized the the Rajah of Bhurtpore that if the Rajah was sincerely disposed to maintain in fu-

ture his fidelity to the British Government, and would consent to reimburse the expenses to which the British Government had been exposed by the consequences of his conduct, the Rajah might repair to the British camp, and would be admitted to a personal communication with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. In his reply to that letter, however, the Rajah signified that he had directed a person in his confidence to attend his Excellency. The Commander-in-Chief therefore replied, by advverting to the Rajah's deviation from the tenor of his own proposition, and by intimating that the insincerity of the Rajah would preclude all confidence in the representations of his agents.

In his replies to the Rajah of Bhurtpore's letters, the Commander-in-Chief purposely avoided any explicit declaration of the terms on which the Rajah might be permitted to retain any portion of his former power and resources, and required as a preliminary condition his consent to afford to the British Government compensation for the expenses which he had occasioned.

The terms of accommodation which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief deems it advisable at a proper season to propose to the Rajah of Bhurtpore are, 1st. That he shall be confirmed in the possession of territory, yielding an annual revenue of from ten to twelve lacs of rupees. 2ndly. That he shall surrender the fortress of Deig, and its dependent territory, &c. 3rdly. That he shall reimburse to the extent of his means, the expenses which his conduct has occasioned.

The Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that under actual circumstances these terms were proportionably advantageous both to the Rajah of Bhurtpore and the British Government. To the Rajah, by enabling him to avoid the extremity of ruin, and to the British Government, by depriving Holkar at an early period of time, of the only remaining bulwark of his power.

The Governor-General had previously transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief a communication of his sentiments with regard to the expediency of detaching the Rajah of Bhurtpore from the interests of Holkar, and to the most desirable terms of accommodation with the Rajah.

On the receipt of the plan proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General transmitted further instructions for the conduct of the negotiation in the event of its renewal. It appeared to his Excellency the Governor-General to be necessary to state the conditions which his Excellency considers to be indispensable under any engagement which might be concluded with that chieftain.

Those conditions have been by the Governor-General stated to be—

1st. That the Rajah of Bhurtpore should furnish such security as the Commander-in-Chief should deem satisfactory for the exact fulfilment of the engagement which he might conclude with the British power.

2ndly. That the Rajah of Bhurtpore should completely abandon the cause of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; that he should withhold from Jeswunt Rao Holkar every species of resource within his power to controul, and that he should unite with the British Government in endeavouring to expel Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his troops from the limits of his possessions.

3dly. That the Rajah of Bhurtpore should indemnify the British Government to a certain extent, for the expenses to which we have been exposed in the prosecution of hostilities against the Rajah of Bhurtpore and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has been requested to exercise his judgment, in determining the extent of the compensation to be demanded. With a view however to afford to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, an additional inducement to adhere to the faith of his engagements, the Governor-General suggested to his Excellency the expediency of intimating to the Rajah that the British Government would be disposed to consent that the payments should be gradual, and should

admit of a future reduction in the stipulated amount of compensation in proportion to the zeal and fidelity which the Rajah should manifest in fulfilling the conditions of his engagements.

4thly. That the fortress of Deig and the territory dependant upon it, should continue in the possession of the British Government until peace should have been completely established in India.

The permanent possession of that fortress and territory did not appear to the Governor-General to be an object of sufficient importance to hazard for the sake of its attainment, the advantage of detaching the Rajah of Bhurtpore from the interests of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

On these conditions the Governor-General signified to the Commander-in-Chief his disposition to confirm the Rajah of Bhurtpore in the possession of all the territory which he occupied at the commencement of the present war, with the exception of the districts granted to him by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief after the last war, as (stated in a former paragraph of this despatch) and lately resumed by the British Government.

The Governor-General further signified to the Commander-in-Chief, that in the opinion of the Governor-General it was extremely important to stipulate with the Rajah of Bhurtpore for the payment of an annual tribute, but that the exigency of the stipulation was not such as to require that it should be rendered an indispensable condition of the proposed arrangement.

The Governor-General in Council is disposed to credit the actual disposition of the Rajah of Bhurtpore to effect an accommodation with the British power, and deems it highly probable that when the British army shall have received fresh supplies for the renewal of the siege of Bhurtpore, the Rajah will submit to the proposed conditions.

The Governor-General in Council has stated that Meer Khan had been driven under the hills in Rohilcund, and that Major-General Smith was prepared to renew his pursuit as soon as the enemy should quit his position.

Meer Khan having after a few days quitted his position under the hills and proceeded towards the Ganges, Major-General Smith marched again on the 24th of February in the direction of Moradabad.

Meer Khan marched for some days in a north-westerly direction, and appeared to entertain the intention of recrossing the Ganges at some ford near Hurdwar, but suddenly changed his route and returned to the south-west in the direction of the hills, when the intelligence which he received of the approach of General Smith's detachment induced him again to move to the north-west, and on the 1st of March he encamped between Shaircote and Ufsulgurh.

On the morning of the 2nd, Major-General Smith having left his camp and baggage at Shaircote under charge of the rear guard of his detachment, and of the 3rd regiment native cavalry, made a forced march with the remainder of the detachment, and on the afternoon of that day overtook the force of the enemy, consisting of a large body of cavalry and a corps of infantry.

Meer Khan having received information of the approach of Major-General Smith at ten o'clock in the morning, despatched the baggage of his troops and remained with the principal part of his force, with the view to cover the retreat of the baggage. Major-General Smith immediately attacked the enemy; a body of infantry attempted to charge the British cavalry but was completely destroyed; the cavalry of the enemy also charged and attempted to penetrate our line, but were repulsed with loss. After the destruction of the infantry the cavalry fled, pursued to some distance by the British troops. The loss sustained by the enemy was very con-

siderable, and many of the principal officers were killed and wounded. Of the British force, only four officers and forty-three men were wounded, and nine men killed.

Meer Khan, having collected his cavalry after the action, appears to have proceeded towards Casheepore, and from thence to Moradabad. He next proceeded to Chandowsy, a considerable town situated in a direction south-west from Moradabad. Meer Khan is stated to have levied an inconsiderable contribution on Chandowsy, and to have entertained a design of proceeding from thence to Bareilly. A considerable detachment of native infantry, however, under the command of Colonel Grueber, which had entered Rohilcund shortly after Meer Khan's attempt on Moradabad, having marched to Bareilly, effectually secured that important city from any danger from the enemy.

Major-General Smith continued to pursue the enemy, who on hearing of the approach of the British detachment changed his route, after having advanced a short distance on the road to Bareilly, and returned in a north-westerly direction, and on the 10th of March encamped near Amrooah.

On that day a party of 900 irregular horse and 400 Rohillabs, which had been detached to Moradabad by Colonel Burn, who commanded a detachment stationed on the right bank of the Ganges for the defence of the fords on that river, was surrounded at a village near Amrooah by the whole of Meer Khan's force. The party in the village repulsed several attempts of the enemy to dislodge it with considerable loss, and maintained its ground during the whole of the 10th. Colonel Burn, who had received information on the morning of the 10th of the situation of the detachment, crossed the Ganges and marched to its relief, and arrived at the village where our party had taken post after a march of twenty-eight miles. On the arrival of Colonel Burn's force, the troops of the enemy fled. On the following day, Colonel Burn having received intelligence that a large party of horse and foot had been left in the rear with the baggage of the enemy, detached the irregular cavalry under his command for the purpose of attacking that force. The cavalry completely succeeded in defeating the troops of the enemy, destroying 500 of their number, and captured the whole of their baggage, and bazars.

After this defeat, Meer Khan pursued his route to the Ganges, and on the 13th of March recrossed that river at the ford by which he had entered Rohilcund with the whole of his force, pursued by Major-General Smith. No doubt can be entertained of Meer Khan's intention to continue his flight across the Jumna.

The Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in stating to your honourable Committee that the hopes which Meer Khan may have entertained of exciting a general insurrection in Rohilcund have been completely disappointed. No person of family, reputation, or influence, even among those of his own tribe has joined his standard. Rohilcund abounds with needy adventurers, who possessing no regular and established means of subsistence, are disposed to join the standard of any rebel or invader. Few, if any, even of that description of persons have been induced to follow the fortune of Meer Khan. It appears that by persons of respectability and rank among the Rohillas, Meer Khan is not held in any degree of estimation, his force is of the most contemptible kind, scarcely better than a mere banditti, and no permanent mischief can be effected by it.

The General body of the inhabitants of Rohilcund entertain sentiments of the highest respect for the British Government, and a just sense of the power and stability of the British empire in India, and are attached to the interests of the British Government by an experience of the benefits resulting from the mild and equitable system of its administration.

To the operation of these sentiments may be ascribed the failure of the unremitted exertions of the agents of Meer Khan to excite among the tribe of Rohillas a spirit of insurrection, and to induce any persons of rank and character to join his standard.

The conduct of the Nawaub Nusser Oollah Khan, the regent of Rampore, has been eminently distinguished during the late occurrences in Rohilkund by a firm and zealous attachment to the interests of the British Government. Attempts were made by Meer Khan to shake the allegiance of Nusser Oollah Khan, the Nawaub however invariably communicated to Mr. Seton, the agent of the Governor-General in the ceded provinces, the letters which he received from Meer Khan and accompanied these communications with assurances of his fidelity and attachment.

The Governor-General in Council has deemed it proper to address a letter of approbation and encouragement to Nusser Oollah Khan, and to testify in the most public and honourable manner the sentiments entertained by the British Government of the merits of his conduct.

The reports received from Mr. Seton of the general disposition manifested by the inhabitants of Bareilly during the late transactions in Rohilkund, have satisfied the Governor-General in Council that whatever may be the sentiments and conduct of a few individuals, the body of the inhabitants including all those who are eminent for rank, respectability of character, and influence in the province, unite in a sense of the benefits which they derive from the protection of the British Government. No evil therefore has resulted from this irruption into the province of Rohilkund, except a temporary loss of revenue, the necessary consequence of the depredations which uniformly mark the progress of such lawless banditti; and experience of the little advantage or honour to be derived from such attempts to disturb our possessions, will probably discourage future enterprizes of a similar nature. But in any event all such attempts will be effectually frustrated as soon as our troops can be disposed at their proper stations.

On a consideration of all the transactions which have been recorded in the preceding narrative, combined with the actual condition of our internal and external relations, the Governor-General in Council has no reason to doubt the accomplishment of the expectations, which in our despatch of the 13th of July the Governor-General in Council has expressed with regard to the benefits to be derived from the general arrangements of the peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. The fundamental principles of that policy which regulated the measures of the British Government in framing those arrangements which must constitute the basis of the power and security of the British Empire in India, cannot be considered to be affected by the circumstances of the existing contest with Holkar and his partizans. The immediate effect of that extended system of political connection which is indisputably requisite for the permanent establishment of general peace and tranquillity throughout India, must necessarily be to deprive of employment that numerous class of military adventurers, who have hitherto derived subsistence from the wars and contests of the various discordant and unconnected powers of India. To the operation of this cause must be ascribed the facility with which Holkar and his partizans have been enabled without any pecuniary or territorial resources to assemble and maintain a numerous horde of freebooters. But the gradual and certain operation of those principles on which is founded the existing system of our political relations, must ultimately tend to subdue the characteristic habits and dispositions of those rude and predatory classes, and to encourage the cultivation of the arts of peace, and industry throughout every state in India.

The power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar is destitute of any solid foundation, and of every element of an established Government; and although under actual circumstances the British Government is still under the necessity of maintaining our armies in the field during an unexpected period of time, no conclusions can be deduced from the present situation of affairs, of a nature to justify a doubt of the ultimate establishment of that system of general peace and security throughout India, to which the views and measures of this government have been uniformly directed.

We have the honour to be,
honourable Sirs,

your most faithful humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

No. III.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, May 13, 1805.

1. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee by a despatch overland, a narrative of occurrences connected with the progress of operations against the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, continued from the latest advices which had been received by the Governor-General in Council on the 24th of March, the date of our last despatch to your honourable Committee.

2. Meer Khan after re-crossing the Ganges, as stated in our letter of the 24th of March, moved down the Doab and was pursued by Major-General Smith with the British cavalry. In his flight Meer Khan attempted to plunder the town of Hauper in the Doab, but was repulsed by the spirited exertions of the Aumil of the district. During his progress through the Doab he does not appear to have effected any serious injury to the country through which he passed.

3. On the 20th of March, Meer Khan crossed the Jumna at a ford to the southward of Muttra, and proceeded to the vicinity of Bhurtpore. During the flight of Meer Khan through the Doab, his followers deserted him in

great numbers, and it is stated that after he had crossed the Jumna, his force did not exceed a few hundred horse.

4. Major-General Smith having effected the expulsion of Meer Khan from the British territories, proceeded to Bhurt-pore and joined the army on the 23d of March.

5. During this period the cavalry of Jeswunt Rao Holkar was encamped in the neighbourhood of Bhurt-pore in separate divisions of small force. The absence of the British cavalry in pursuit of Meer Khan deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the means of dislodging or destroying any of these parties. On the junction of the cavalry, however, with the main army, his Excellency determined to endeavour to surprise the cavalry of Holkar.

6. Accordingly on the 29th of March, the Commander-in-Chief marched with a column of cavalry and a column of infantry with the view of surprising two of the principal divisions of Holkar's cavalry. The infantry and cavalry proceeded respectively by different routes towards the encampment of the enemy, but the enemy having received information of the approach of the British troops, was prepared for flight. The troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar suffered some loss from the fire of the infantry and a charge was effected by the cavalry, by which about 300 of the enemy were destroyed, and a considerable quantity of baggage and cattle fell into the hands of the British troops. After this attack the British detachment returned to camp.

7. On the 1st of April, the Commander-in-Chief having received intelligence that Holkar had assembled the greater part of his infantry and cavalry at a position distant about sixteen miles from Bhurt-pore, his Excellency determined to make another attempt to surprise his camp. With this view his Excellency marched at one o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of April with the whole of the cavalry, the horse artillery and the reserve of the army towards the enemy's position.

8. The Commander-in-Chief arrived in the neighbourhood of the enemy before day-break, and immediately made his dispositions for the attack.

9. The enemy had received intelligence of the approach of the British troops about two hours before, and was posted round a high village in a strong position. On the

approach of the British troops the enemy endeavoured to escape, but was charged by the British troops in every direction with success and suffered severe loss. The British cavalry continued the pursuit until the enemy was entirely dispersed. The enemy is said to have lost more than 1000 men on this occasion.

10. On the return of the Commander-in-Chief towards his camp, a body of the enemy's infantry which was observed moving in the woods which surround the town of Bhurt-pore was overtaken and charged by a squadron of his Majesty's 8th light dragoons. After sustaining some loss, the enemy's troops threw down their arms and were made prisoners. The colours of this corps were captured and it proved to be a party which had quitted Meer Khan and was proceeding to offer its services to Runjeet Sing the Rajah of Bhurt-pore.

11. The Commander-in-Chief reached the British camp at one o'clock, after having performed a march including the pursuit of the enemy of fifty miles.

12. Hernaut Sing the Chailah* of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the person who commanded Holkar's infantry in the memorable battle of Deig, having taken up a position near Dolepore with the remains of Holkar's infantry and guns, and with a party of that chieftain's cavalry under the command of Bappojee Scindiah, a detachment composed of sixteen companies of newly raised Sepoys, a battalion of irregular infantry and a party of irregular horse under the command of Captain Royle was detached from Agra to dislodge him. On the 30th of March Captain Royle's detachment came up with the cavalry of the enemy under Bappoojee Scindiah and completely defeated it.

13. On the 8th of April, Captain Royle received information that the principal body of Hernaut's force, consisting of between 3 and 4000 men, infantry and cavalry, with three guns, occupied a strong position under the walls of the fortified town of Adaulutnagbur having the town in its rear, and its front and flanks covered by deep ravines occupied by troops. Captain Royle with great spirit and judgement

* A species of domestic bondsman, often of elevated station.

immediately formed his detachment, and advancing against a heavy and well directed fire from the enemy's artillery and infantry, compelled the enemy to abandon his guns, and to retreat with the loss of all his artillery and baggage. The irregular horse pursued the enemy and killed great numbers of the fugitives. On this occasion more than twenty stands of colours and a great number of musquets of European manufacture, matchlocks, guns, spikes, &c. &c. were captured. The conduct of the troops on this occasion was highly exemplary.

14. On the 10th of April, the detachment of the army of Bombay under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Holmes which was advancing from Guzerat and had arrived at Ram-poorah as stated in our despatch of the 24th of March, marched into the British camp before Bhurtpore. Colonel Holmes's detachment escorted a large and valuable convoy of provisions and stores, and treasure to a large amount for the use of the army of Bombay under the command of Major-General Jones. Lieut.-Colonel Holmes did not experience any material interruption on his march and did not meet any part of the enemy's force after he left Kota.

15. In our despatch of the 24th of March, the Governor-General in Council had the honour to apprise your honourable Committee that the Rajah of Bhurtpore had made overtures of accommodation to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Governor-General in Council also stated to your honourable Committee in that despatch, the substance of the instructions with which the Commander-in-Chief had been furnished on the subject of the terms which the Governor-General in Council was disposed to grant to the Rajah of Bhurtpore. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having been induced by the entreaties of Rajah Runjeet Sing to consent to receive vakeels to be despatched by that chieftain for the express purpose of adjusting the terms of accommodation, vakeels were despatched and arrived in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief on the 28th of March. The detail of the negotiations which ensued will be communicated to your honourable Committee by a letter from the Governor-General in Council, which will be forwarded on the *Teignmouth* Company's armed cruizer now under despatch.

By the present despatch which proceeds overland, the Governor-General deems it sufficient in addition to this summary statement, to transmit to your honourable Committee a copy of the treaty which was finally concluded with Rajah Runjeet Sing on the 17th of April. Your honourable Committee will observe that the terms of that engagement are in conformity to the spirit of those which were prescribed by the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the 19th of March, a copy of which accompanied our despatch of the 24th of the same month.

16. The Governor-General in Council deeming the conditions of the treaty to be in every respect honourable and advantageous to the British Government, has ratified that engagement.

17. The son of the Rajah of Bhurtpore arrived in the British camp on the 11th of April as an hostage, and continues to attend his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

18. On the 8th of April, (all the military stores requisite for the resumption of the siege of Bhurtpore having previously arrived) the British army moved to the position from which the Commander-in-Chief had resolved to recommence the operations of the siege of Bhurtpore, but the necessity of renewing the siege having been precluded by the submission of Rajah Runjeet Sing, the battering train and all the unnecessary stores were subsequently despatched to Agra.

19. By the repeated defeats which the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar have sustained, the military power of that chieftain, appears to be completely reduced. His force of Infantry has been entirely destroyed, and all the artillery which he possessed according to the most authentic accounts has been captured, and in consequence of the engagement concluded by Rajah Runjeet Sing with the British Government, Jeswunt Rao Holkar has been compelled to quit Bhurtpore and to retire with the remnant of his force, which is said not to exceed 3 or 4000 men. For further details of these transactions and occurrences, the Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to the annexed copy of an extraordinary Gazette published on the 23rd of April.

20. On the 21st of April, the British army under the personal command of his Excellency the right honourable Lord Lake marched from Bhurtpore and joined the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell. The object of this movement was to observe the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which had advanced to Subbulgurh on the Chumbul, for the ostensible purpose of mediating a peace between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar. By our latest advices it appears that Dowlut Rao Scindiah without attempting any act of hostility, had retreated from Subbulgurh and the Governor-General in Council expects that the British troops composing the army in Hindostan will soon retire into cantonments. Your honourable Committee will be apprized by a separate letter of this date that the suspicious and unwarrantable conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah will form the subject of a despatch now under preparation to be transmitted to your honourable Committee by the *Teignmouth* Cruizer.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

No. IV.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 31st May, 1805.

The Governor-General in Council's despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th March, contained a detailed narrative of the transactions and occurrences at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, up to the 7th of that month, the date of our latest advices from that court.

The Governor-General in Council has now the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee a statement of transactions at that court, in continuation, and of the proceedings of this government with reference to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

At the date above mentioned, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was encamped in a position about twenty-four miles north-west of Seronge, where he was detained by the nuptials of the heir apparent, the son of the late Mahajee Scindiah's daughter. On the 14th of March, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had resumed his march in the direction of Narwar. On the 12th of that month, the Acting Resident received a copy of the Governor-General's instructions to Colonel Close of the 23rd February, to which our despatch of the 24th of March refers; and of which a copy was annexed to that despatch. The Acting Resident at the same time received the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to which that despatch refers, and of which a copy was also transmitted to your honourable Committee.

In conformity to the spirit of those instructions, the Acting Resident very properly resumed the exercise of his ministerial functions which he had suspended in consequence of the act of violence committed against the Residency on the 25th of January, and immediately proceeded to deliver the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who received it in presence of his assembled court. The Acting Resident then proceeded to visit the minister Sirjee Rao Ghautka and the heir apparent, and was received by all with the respect and attention due to his official station.

Previously to a communication of the substance of the instructions which on receipt of the preceding information the Governor-General in Council transmitted to the Acting Resident, the Governor-General in Council deems it necessary to advert to a letter addressed to the Governor-General under the seal of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, containing a variety of most extraordinary and unfounded allegations, tending to implicate the justice and good faith of the British Government in its conduct towards that chieftain, and also to a despatch from Colonel Close, containing that officer's report of a communication which he received from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's vakeel at the court of Nagpore, corresponding in some material points with the tenor of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter. In that letter Dowlut Rao Scindiah not only renewed his claim to the fort and district of Gwalior and Gohud, which had been formally and solemnly abandoned

(as is noticed in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th March, 1805), but on the ground of the unavoidable alienation of that fort and territory from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possessions by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, founded a complaint of a violation of that treaty on the part of the British Government. The other complaints stated in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter against the British Government are substantially these, that the British Government had neglected to afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah pecuniary supplies for the equipment and support of his armies to be employed in co-operating with the British forces in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah actually endeavoured to justify the conduct of Bappojee Scindiah, and Suddasheo Rao, (the officers who commanded that portion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army which was destined to co-operate against Holkar, and whose defection to the enemy was stated in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th of March) by asserting that Colonel Monson and the Commander-in-Chief had refused to supply funds for the payment of the troops under the command of those officers. That the name of the Rajah of Jodepore was improperly inserted in the list of tributaries declared independent of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government by the 9th article of the treaty of peace; that the British Government had not afforded protection to his dominions against the incursions of the enemy's troops. That the pensions payable to certain officers of Scindiah's government by the terms of the treaty of peace had not been regularly paid, and that certain Jaggeers which were to be restored under that treaty still continued in the hands of the British officers. That the districts of Dolepore and Barea, and Rajah-Kerrah, which by the terms of the treaty of peace were to revert to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had not been restored, and the revenue of them had not been paid. That Dowlut Rao Scindiah being prohibited by treaty from stationing troops in the districts in the vicinity of Ahmednagar restored to him by treaty, the officers of the British Government had neglected to afford protection to those districts from internal disorders and from predatory incursions, and that the revenue collected from those districts by British

officers from the date of the treaty of peace until their restitution, had not been discharged by the British Government.

This letter was dated the 18th of October, at which time Scindiah had not crossed the Nerbuddah on his route to Saugur. It was forwarded by two messengers on foot to a person residing at Benares, who during many years has held the nominal appointment of vakeel, originally on the part of the late Mahajee Scindiah, and subsequently on that of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that vakeel received directions to proceed with the letter to Calcutta for the purpose of delivering it in person. The vakeel did not report his arrival at Calcutta until the 18th of February, four months after the date of the letter. Although there is considerable reason to doubt Dowlut Rao Scindiah's knowledge of the contents of that extraordinary letter, it must have been prepared under the authority of the chief executive officer of his government, and the object of its preparation appears to have been, to provide some pretext on which to found proceedings of a nature utterly inconsistent with the obligations of treaty, which (as is now ascertained) Dowlut Rao Scindiah under the influence of pernicious counsels, had resolved to adopt antecedently to the date of his letter. This supposition is confirmed by the dilatory mode adopted by Scindiah's ministers for the transmission of the letter, and by their omitting to state to the Resident even at the moment when he imputed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government a violation of his engagements, any one of the articles of complaints which were thus circuitously transmitted to the British Government, without any attempt to communicate through the ordinary and regular channel of the British Resident actually at that time in the camp of Scindiah. It must have been evident to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ministers that the British Government would readily take into consideration and would be disposed to adjust on principles of equity and justice, whatever claims might be preferred on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, excepting such as were obviously extravagant and unjust. The speedy communication of these complaints therefore to the British Government would have produced an adjustment of every depending question at a period of time earlier than was consistent with the insidious

views of the court. Your honourable Committee, however, will observe from the narrative of the conferences and negotiations between the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the British Resident, contained in our despatch of the 24th of March, that the complaints and allegations stated in that chiefain's letter were never preferred to the British Resident at his court. A copy of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter is annexed to this despatch. Notwithstanding the manifest object and intention of this letter, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to meet these unfounded complaints and unjustifiable allegations, not only by demonstrating their injustice, but by stating in detail Dowlut Rao Scindiah's numerous violations both of the treaty of peace and of defensive alliance.

The Governor-General specially adverted to the dilatory and circuitous mode adopted for the transmission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter, observing that it was a subject of surprise and concern that his Highness should not have adopted the most expeditious mode of conveying to the Governor-General a letter involving such important considerations. That the mode of conveyance which his Highness had adopted, appeared to be inconsistent with a desire of receiving the Governor-General's early reply to the several points stated in that letter, and that a conscious sense of the justice and equity of the statements and demands contained in his Highness's letter, would probably have been manifested by a more direct and expeditious communication of his Highness's sentiments.

With reference to the revival of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's claim to the fort and territory of Gwalior and Gohud, the Governor-General observed, that his Highness had stated that claim not only without any reference to the repeated discussions of that question between his Highness and his ministers, and Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm, but after that question had been completely and finally adjusted by a formal act of his Highness's government, and by his own personal acceptance in public Durbar of the list of treaties confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace. The Governor-General reminded his Highness that at a conference holden on the 20th of May, 1804, between his Highness's chief minister the late Bajpoo Wittul and other principal officers of

his government and the British Resident Mr. Webbe, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm, Bappoo Wittul declared in the most solemn manner on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that the claim to Gohud and Gwalior had been entirely abandoned, and that the British Resident having expressed a desire to be enabled to report to the Governor-General the final adjustment of that question, Bappoo Wittul had authorized the Resident in the most unequivocal manner to assure the Governor-General that the claim had been completely relinquished by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that Bappoo Wittul having reported to his Highness that declaration, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had not only verbally assented to it, but had ratified it in the most public, formal, and solemn manner, by receiving from the hands of the British Resident in his public Durbar, the list of treaties confirmed by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

The Governor-General proceeded to observe that under such circumstances, it became the duty of the Governor-General to require that his Highness should distinctly confirm by a written instrument, the declaration made to the British Resident in his Highness's name relative to his claim to the possession of Gohud and Gwalior, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should distinctly declare that his Highness considered his acceptance of the list of engagements delivered into his hands by the British Resident on the 20th of May, 1804, to constitute a formal recognition of those engagements, and the Governor-General further requested that his Highness's reply to that requisition might be immediately communicated to his Excellency Lord Lake, at the head quarters of the British army in Hindostan, and that his Highness would declare under a written instrument transmitted to Lord Lake, whether his Highness still proposed to dispute the validity of any of the treaties which he had already solemnly recognized, and particularly whether he proposed to dispute the validity of the treaty between the British Government and the Rana of Gohud.

The Governor-General further declared, that after the ample discussions upon the subjects of Gwalior and Gohud, between Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm and his Highness's ministers, and after his Highness's solemn and public renunciation of his claim to those districts, confirmed by his formal and

public acknowledgment of the validity of the treaty subsisting between the Company and the Rana of Gohud, the Governor-General could not consent to receive from his Highness any application on the subject of those districts resting on the ground of his alledged right to the possession of them.

The Governor-General, however, deemed it proper to state in detail all the circumstances of the question respecting Gohud and Gwalior, and to demonstrate the fallacy of the statement upon that subject contained in his Highness's letter.

The Governor-General entered into a refutation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's extraordinary complaint of a disregard of the obligations of treaty on the part of the British Government, by neglecting to afford pecuniary aid to his Highness for the support of his troops to be employed in concert with those of the British Government against the common enemy. The Governor-General reminded Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the obligations of the treaty of defensive alliance by which his Highness was pledged to employ his utmost exertions in conjunction with the British power in the prosecution of joint war. The Governor-General observed, that by the terms of that engagement, the British Government was entitled to expect from his Highness that degree of assistance in the prosecution of the war, which the state of his Government might enable him to afford; but that the grant of pecuniary aid to his Highness was entirely optional on the part of the British Government. The Governor-General further observed, that it was unnecessary to examine whether his Highness was really prevented by the embarrassed condition of his affairs from affording any aid in the prosecution of the war against Holkar. That if the resources of his Highness's government were exhausted to such a degree as to be inadequate to the supply of the ordinary expences of the state, it was not reasonable to expect that the British Government should provide from its own funds for so enormous a deficiency in his Highness's resources, or in other words, that the charges of the troops in his Highness's service to be employed in the prosecution of the war should be borne by the Company; and his Highness possessed no right, founded either upon the stipulation of any treaty, or upon any prin-

principle of justice, to warrant an expectation that the British Government should replace at its own expense all the loss which his Highness had sustained in the war which he had waged against the British power. The Governor-General then stated the substance of the discussions which had taken place between his Highness and his ministers and the British Resident on the subject of affording to his Highness pecuniary aid, for the purpose of demonstrating both the extravagance of his Highness's expectation with regard to the extent of pecuniary aid to be afforded by the British Government, and the liberal disposition manifested by the British Government to relieve the immediate exigencies of his Highness's Government.

With reference to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's assertion that the defection of his officers was occasioned by the refusal of the Commander-in-Chief and Colonel Monson to supply them with funds for the payment of their troops, it is proper to state in this place that advances of money were actually made to these officers by Colonel Monson and the Commander-in-Chief to the extent of 1,25,000 rupees. This fact did not occur to the recollection of the Governor-General when preparing the reply to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter. The circumstances of it are detailed in a letter from the Governor-General's political agent at the head quarters of the British army, to the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under date the 19th of April.

In reply to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's complaint, that the name of the Rajah of Jodepore was improperly inserted in the list of tributaries, deemed independent of his Highness's Government by the 9th article of the treaty of peace, the Governor-General stated, that the name of the Rajah of Jodepore was inserted in the list of treaties, because previously to the termination of the war, an engagement had been concluded with that chieftain by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and by the 9th article of the treaty of peace all engagements concluded by the British Government with Rajahs and others, feudatories of his Highness, were acknowledged and confirmed. That the Rajah of Jodepore, however, having subsequently refused to receive that engagement, ratified by the British Government, the alliance

became dissolved. The Governor-General further stated that this circumstance had been communicated to the late Mr. Webbe, but that by some error, or by the miscarriage of the letter to Mr. Webbe, the name of the Rajah of Jodepore had not been expunged from the list of tributaries. That the British Government had no intention to interfere in any manner between his Highness and the Rajah of Jodepore, and that the name of the Rajah of Jodepore might therefore be expunged from the list of tributaries.

In answer to the complaint that the British Government had not afforded protection to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's dominions against the incursions and ravages of the enemy's troops, according to the stipulations of the treaty of defensive alliance, which expressly provided for the protection of his Highness's dominions, the Governor-General admitted that the treaty of defensive alliance contained the stipulation to which his Highness referred; observing, however, at the same time, that the stipulation in question was reciprocal; that the permanent security and tranquillity of both states was the basis and object of the alliance; that when the security and tranquillity of either state were menaced by the violence and aggression of an external enemy, it became the duty of both to combine their efforts for the destruction of the enemy; and that each state would have fulfilled the obligation of the defensive alliance, in the degree in which its exertions should have contributed to that end. That in the prosecution of war, it must be expected that the enemy would occasionally gain opportunities of ravaging the territories of the allied states; that the obligations of the defensive alliance being reciprocal, the British Government might with equal justice ascribe to his Highness a violation of the treaty of defensive alliance, because his Highness afforded no protection to the British territories against the incursions of the enemy. That an appeal to the evidence of facts, however, would manifest the degree in which either state had fulfilled the obligations of the defensive alliance; that by the valour, activity and skill of the British armies, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been deprived of nearly all his territorial possessions, a part of which, including the capital city of Indore, had actually been delivered over to his Highness's officers; that the

whole of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force had been repeatedly defeated, and nearly destroyed with the loss of his artillery, and that he had been deprived of every resource but that which he derived from the feeble and precarious aid of the Rajah of Bhurtpore. That his Highness, according to the provisions of treaty, had not contributed in any degree to these victories; that on the contrary, the conduct of his Highness and of his officers had aided the cause of the enemy against the power by which those victories had been achieved, and with which his Highness was pledged to cooperate; that the British Government, however, had adopted every practicable measure for the protection of his Highness's territory, and that his capital of Oujein had actually been protected from plunder by the advance of the British troops at his Highness's desire, under the command of Colonel Murray. That if his Highness's officers at Oujein had joined Colonel Murray with their troops, and had employed their exertions in supplying the equipments of the British force, it might have been practicable to have prevented the ravages of which his Highness complained. But that far from obtaining any aid from his Highness's officers, Colonel Murray had experienced every species of counter-action.

In reply to the complaint stated in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter that the pensions payable to certain officers of his Highness's government by the tenor of the treaty of peace, had not been regularly paid, the Governor-General demonstrated by a detailed statement of indisputable facts, that not only no hesitation had been manifested on the part of the British Government in the payment of the pensions, but that every instalment of those pensions had actually been discharged in advance, and that at the date of his Highness's letter (namely the 18th October, 1804), no part of them was due.

With regard to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's further complaint, that certain Jaggeers which were to be restored under the treaty of peace, still continued in the hands of the British officers, the Governor-General observed that on application to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the civil officers of the British Government, within whose jurisdiction those

Jaggeers were situated, would be vested with authority to surrender them, either to the grantees, or to such persons as should produce the sunnuds which were granted to the several Jaggeerdars by Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm, together with a sufficient authority for receiving charge of the Jaggeers on the part of the proprietors, but that the Governor-General had not heard that any application had been made to the British officers on the part of these Jaggeerdars, adding that the Jaggeerdars would of course be entitled to receive from the British Government whatever had been received by that government from the Jaggeer lands since the date of the treaty of peace.

It is proper, however, to state in this place that the Governor-General in Council was subsequently informed by a letter from the Governor-General's Agent, stationed with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 16th of April, that orders to the civil officers, in whose jurisdiction the Jaggeers were respectively situated, for the release of the Jaggeers, were issued by the Commander-in-Chief immediately on the sunnuds granted for that purpose by Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm being presented by the Agents of the Jaggeerdars.

That such trifling obstacles as occurred to the immediate release of the Jaggeers were removed with as little delay as possible, and that no complaints upon the subject reached the Commander-in-Chief subsequently to the march of his Excellency from Cawnpore.

That some villages, however, forming part of one of the Jaggeers, being held by a son of his Majesty, Shah Allum, and the Resident deeming it improper to dispossess the Prince, an equivalent was offered to the Jaggeerdar; an alternative, for which Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm in his discussions with Scindiah's ministers had actually provided, and that this was the only instance within the Commander-in-Chief's recollection of the occurrence of any durable obstacle to the surrender of the Jaggeers.

With regard to the complaint that the districts of Dolepore, Barree, and Rajah-Kerrah, (which by the terms of the treaty of peace were to revert to Dowlut Rao Scindiah,) had not been restored, and the revenue of them had not been paid, the Governor-General observed, that his Highness had

never despatched any person properly authorized to receive charge of those Pergunnahs; that his Highness could not therefore consider their continuance in the occupation of the Company to be a just ground of complaint. That with reference to the operations of the war against Holkar, the surrender of those pergunnahs at the present time would be extremely inconvenient, but that at the termination of hostilities they should be delivered over to the person whom his Highness might appoint, or if his Highness should prefer it, that the British Government would accept the farm of those pergunnahs at an equitable rent, which should be regularly paid into his Highness's treasury. That the extraordinary and suspicious occurrences at his Highness's Court had retarded the payments on account of the net collections from those pergunnahs; but that orders had been issued to the British Representative for the payment of the amount due on an inspection of accounts, and that an arrangement should be adopted for the regular payment of the collections to his Highness, until the districts in question should have been delivered over to his Highness's officers, if he should not ultimately prefer to let them in farm to the Company.

In reply to the complaint that Dowlut Rao Scindiah being prohibited from stationing troops in the districts in the vicinity of Ahmednagar restored to him by treaty, the officers of the British Government had neglected to give protection to those districts from internal disorder and from predatory incursions, and that the revenue collected from those districts by British officers from the date of the treaty of peace, until their restitution, had not been discharged by the British Government; the Governor-General stated to his Highness that the British Government was not required by the treaty of peace to suppress disturbances in those pergunnahs or to protect them from the incursions of robbers, but that with a view to manifest a disposition to conform to his Highness's wishes, the British officers should be directed to pay particular attention to the preservation of good order within those districts. With regard to the revenues of those districts, the Governor-General apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah that this claim was totally unknown to the British Government, but

that whatever collections might have been realized from those places within the specified period of time, would of course, when ascertained, be paid to his Highness.

After having replied in detail to every article of complaint contained in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter, the Governor-General proceeded to enumerate the several acts and proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, which constituted distinct violations not only of the treaty of defensive alliance, but even of the treaty of peace; concluding however with a declaration of the solicitude of the British Government to maintain the relations of amity with his Highness, and to continue to preserve the provisions of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance, provided his Highness should adopt a course of proceeding suitable to the spirit of those engagements.

The communication from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's vakeel at the Court of Nagpore to which a preceding paragraph refers, was received by Colonel Close on the 14th of March. The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to transmit enclosed a copy of Colonel Close's despatch, containing the substance of his conference with the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on that occasion. That communication evidently proceeded from the same authority as that which dictated the letter of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Governor-General, and was directed to the same purposes as that letter. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah was sincerely anxious to obtain satisfaction on those points which formed the subjects of his ostensible complaints against the British Government, and to remove by amicable negotiation every ground of difference between the two states, it may reasonably be concluded that he would either have endeavoured to effect an adjustment of all such depending questions through the channel of the British Representative actually at his Highness's court, or that he would favour the speedy arrival of Colonel Close in his camp, by despatching a proper officer to escort him, and by moving in the direction of his capital, or at least by ceasing to march in a direction which increased the distance between his camp and Colonel Close's position. But while professing through the agency of his vakeel at Nagpore a solicitude for the early arrival of Colonel Close at his High-

ness's camp, for the express purpose of effecting an amicable and satisfactory adjustment of those points which his Highness had thought proper to constitute subjects of complaint against the British Government, he adopted every measure which could retard, and neglected every measure which could expedite the adjustment of those points. The communication therefore made by Scindiah's vakeel to Colonel Close, far from tending to establish the reality of his Highness's solicitude for the adjustment of the several assumed subjects of complaint, corroborated and confirmed the justice of the opinion which has already been stated with regard to the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's court, both in preferring those complaints and in adopting such circuitous and dilatory modes of conveying them to the notice of the British Government, and of obtaining a satisfactory adjustment of them.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the substance of the instructions which the Governor-General deemed it expedient to issue to the Acting Resident at Scindiah's court, on the receipt of that officer's report of his proceedings under the orders of government of the 23rd of February, as described in a preceding paragraph.

In the actual situation of affairs, the Governor-General deemed it of the utmost importance to provide the means of speedy and unembarrassed communication with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to come to a distinct understanding with Scindiah on the principal points affecting our actual and future situation relatively to that chieftain. Colonel Close having expressed his intention of awaiting at Nagpore the orders of the Governor-General on the subject of the prosecution of his journey to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in consequence of the communication which he had received from that chieftain's vakeel at Nagpore, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to vest the Acting Resident with special authority for the conduct of the negotiations which were to have been entrusted to Colonel Close. The Acting Resident was therefore directed in the first instance to adopt every practicable measure for the purpose of restoring the Residency to its former condition by supplying the losses occa-

sioned by the plunder of the British camp, and by resuming the usual state and functions of the British Representative at a foreign court. Previously, however, to the discussion of any other question at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah the Governor-General deemed it indispensably necessary that the Acting Resident should require from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a public and formal atonement for the violence committed by his predatory horse upon the British camp on the 27th of December, 1804, and on the 25th of January, 1805. The Acting Resident was accordingly instructed to demand an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for that express purpose, and on that occasion to express to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the concern and indignation with which the Governor-General received the information of the outrages committed by predatory horse and others in his Highness's service against the accredited minister of the British state, and to signify to his Highness, that although the Governor-General was disposed to believe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had not personally participated in those outrages, the government of his Highness must be considered to be responsible for them, and to be pledged to afford every practicable degree of compensation; that the Governor-General expected that his Highness would in public durbar declare that the outrages committed by his predatory horse were unauthorized by his Highness, and that his Highness was concerned for the outrages which they had committed; that his Highness would address a letter to the Governor-General expressing his disavowal and disapprobation of the acts of his Pindarries, and his hope that those irregularities would not be ascribed to the orders or inclination of his government. That his Highness would employ every endeavour to discover the perpetrators of those outrages, and would punish them when discovered, and that his Highness would either adopt measures for the recovery of the property plundered by his people, or become responsible for its value. The Resident was at the same time apprized that the Governor-General would not consider the actual discovery of the perpetrators of the outrage and the recovery of the plundered property, or the payment of its value, to constitute indispensable branches of the required atonement; but that the Governor-General

would be satisfied by the prescribed public declaration and by the delivery of the prescribed letter, combined with a manifest solicitude to discover and punish the offenders.

It being necessary to provide for the possible case of Dowlut Rao Scindiah refusing or neglecting to afford the prescribed atonement, the Acting Resident was directed in either of those cases to signify to that chieftain the resolution of the British Government to abandon all connection with a rude and barbarous state, which, disregarding the acknowledged principles of universal justice and of public law, withheld a just and moderate atonement for an outrage committed against the accredited representative of a great independent power, in a state of perfect amity and peace; and the Acting Resident was further instructed to intimate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that he had received the positive orders of the Governor-General, directing him to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, delivering at the same time to the Maharajah a letter which had been prepared and transmitted for that purpose. The Acting Resident was however directed to state to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his departure from Scindiah's court was totally unconnected with any hostile designs on the part of the British Government against the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with which the British Government would continue disposed to maintain the relations of peace, while Dowlut Rao Scindiah should abstain from any acts of direct aggression against the British Government or any of its allies; but that after having sustained such an outrage on the part of his Highness's government in the person of its representative, and after having failed in its endeavours to obtain from Dowlut Rao Scindiah a just and moderate atonement, the British Government would no longer preserve any connection with his Highness's government, nor maintain any intercourse with his Highness, through the channel of a British Resident at his Highness's court. The Acting Resident was instructed to add, that he was from that moment precluded from entering into the discussion of any public questions, and to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that whatever claims he might possess upon the British Government under the treaty of peace, must be adjusted through the channel of his Highness's agents despatched for that purpose to the right honourable

Lord Lake, at the head quarters of the British army, who was vested with full powers to adjust such claims, and who possessed in all respects in Hindostan, the same powers which Sir Arthur Wellesley possessed in the Deccan during the last war. After having made that declaration in the most formal and public manner, the Acting Resident was desired to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the earliest practicable period of time.

The Governor-General however, entertained a confident expectation that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would readily afford the just and moderate atonement to be demanded of him, and in that event, the Governor-General deemed it proper to instruct the Acting Resident to adopt immediate measures for carrying into effect those arrangements connected with the treaty of peace, which had been suspended by the state of affairs in Hindostan and at Scindiah's durbar, and to proceed to the adjustment of such points of inferior importance, as might appear to constitute sources of discontent and complaint at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Under the former description the following points could alone be justly stated.

1st. The payment of the net revenue of the districts of Dolepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerrah, which had been collected by the officers of the British Government since the conclusion of peace.

2ndly. The discharge of the arrears of the pensions which by the 7th article of the treaty of peace are payable to certain persons named in that article, of which however only one instalment was due.

3dly. The relinquishment of the Jagheers situated within the limits of the British territories, which by the 7th article of the treaty of peace were assigned to Bala Baye Sahib and others.

4thly. The restitution of Dolepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerrah, to the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government.

The Governor-General at the same time communicated to the Acting Resident various remarks upon those several points, and furnished him with detailed instructions relative to the mode of adjusting them. The Acting Resident was further

instructed to satisfy Dowlut Rao Scindiah on some other points which might be supposed to constitute subjects of vexation or solicitude to the mind of that chieftain.

After having thus removed every plausible ground of complaint on the part of Scindiah against the British Government, the Acting Resident was directed to notify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General's receipt of the letter under his Highness's seal of the 18th of October 1804, and to require from Dowlut Rao Scindiah an avowal or disavowal of that letter. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah in consequence either of his real ignorance of its contents, or of a desire to avoid the discussion of the various unwarrantable and extraordinary pretensions and demands stated in that document, should disavow the letter, the Acting Resident was instructed merely to suggest to his Highness the expediency of resenting the presumption of his servants in this extraordinary abuse of his Highness's name and authority. If, however, Dowlut Rao Scindiah should avow the letter, the Resident was directed to deliver to his Highness the Governor-General's reply, which was subsequently transmitted to the Acting Resident for that purpose, and to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that any further discussion of the subjects of his Highness's letter, must be conducted with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at the head quarters of the British army, who had been vested with authority to adjust all points remaining to be adjusted between the two governments.

The object of this course of proceeding was, to provide the means of removing from the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah every possible ground of complaint against the British Government, and of depriving him of every pretext for the prosecution of measures, incompatible with the obligations of amity and alliance, and at the same time of precluding the success of any treacherous and insidious views, which that chieftain might have intended to pursue, under the mask of his complaints against the conduct of the British Government, and under the facilities to be afforded by a negotiation industriously protracted by evasion and delay, the habitual instruments of Mahratta policy; and with a view to facilitate and expedite the adjustment of all depending questions, the Governor-General deemed it advisable to authorize his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to despatch Mr. Groome

Mercer, the Governor-General's political agent, who was in attendance upon the Commander-in-Chief, to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of conducting all negotiations in concert with the Acting Resident at his Highness's court, and in the instructions to the Acting Resident, of which the substance has been stated, that officer was directed to apprize Dowlut Rao Scindiah of Mr. Mercer's mission. On that occasion the Governor-General further signified to the Acting Resident, that although the removal of Serjee Rao Ghautka, as an enemy to peace and to the British power, from the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was highly desirable, the Governor-General did not consider that measure to be indispensable to the maintenance of peace. His Excellency further observed, that the British Government was not authorized to interfere, if Scindiah should persist in submitting to Ghautka's influence. The Governor-General at the same time stated it to be a desirable object to assist Dowlut Rao Scindiah in emancipating himself from the ascendancy of that minister, and to aid the friends of peace and of the British power at Scindiah's durbar. In the event of war appearing to be inevitable, the Acting Resident was directed to endeavour to convey to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's chiefs an encouragement to abandon his cause, and particularly to promise to all pensioners and Jaggeerdars under the treaty of peace, the continuance of their respective jaggeers and pensions provided they should quit Scindiah and join the British armies.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to intimate to your honourable Committee in this place, that the Governor-General being desirous of receiving personally from Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm the Resident at Mysore, information on various points connected with the political interests of the British Government, which that officer's employment in the field with Major-General the honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, and subsequently at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had enabled him to acquire, had directed Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm in the month of March to proceed to Fort William with the least practicable delay; and that in consequence of Colonel Close's detention at Nagpore, and the probability that circumstances might occur to prevent the prosecution of his journey to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scin-

diah, the Governor-General had determined to supply the eventual defect of Colonel Close's able agency at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by despatching Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm to his Highness's camp. The instructions of the 2d of April, of which the substance has been stated, were calculated to provide for the exigencies of the public interests at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, until the arrival of Colonel Close, or of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm.

To provide for the temporary absence of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm from his station in Mysore, the Governor-General in Council with the concurrence of the right honourable the Governor of Fort of St. George, appointed Major Wilks of the establishment of that Presidency to act in the capacity of Resident at Mysore, until Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm's return.

Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm arrived at the Presidency at Fort William, on the 16th of April, and the Governor-General having judged it proper previously to that date, to invest Colonel Close with the general control of military and political affairs in the Deccan, (as noticed in a subsequent part of this despatch), Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm was directed to proceed to the head quarters of the British army, eventually to be despatched to the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of conducting such negotiations as might be prescribed directly by the orders of the Governor-General, or by the instruction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief under the Governor-General's authority. Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm accordingly proceeded on his journey to head quarters on the 29th of April.

On the 4th of April the Governor-General received a copy of a letter addressed by the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief under date the 22d of March, containing the information that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had officially announced to the Acting Resident his resolution of marching to Bhurtpore for the purpose of interposing his mediation for the settlement of peace. The receipt of this intelligence rendered it necessary in the Governor-General's judgment immediately to issue instructions to the Commander-in-Chief applicable to any course of proceeding which Scindiah might be supposed to adopt.

Scindiah had undoubtedly violated the treaty of peace as

well as of defensive alliance, and the declaration of his intention instead of co-operating against the common enemy in the manner prescribed by the treaty, to proceed at the head of an army to the seat of hostilities, for the purpose of interposing his unsolicited mediation, was an act not only inconsistent with the nature of his engagements, but insulting to the honour and highly dangerous to the interests of the British Government. The Governor-General however was anxious to avoid the extremity of a renewal of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and the general principle of the instructions issued to the Commander-in-Chief on this occasion, was to abstain from hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, excepting in the case of actual aggression on his part, and to endeavour to effect a permanent settlement with his Highness's government on the basis of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance; and the Commander-in-Chief was accordingly instructed to reject all demands on the part of Scindiah which might in any degree differ from the terms of the treaty of peace. The Governor-General at the same time stated to the Commander-in-Chief, what acts and measures on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be considered by the British Government to constitute aggressions, and to render necessary the prosecution of hostilities against that chieftain. The Governor-General further signified to the Commander-in-Chief that even in the event of war, if the success of our arms should be such as to place us in a condition to dictate the terms of pacification with Scindiah, the British Government had no desire to depart from the basis of the subsisting treaties of peace and defensive alliance, with this difference, that in the event supposed, it would be necessary to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah's consent to the establishment of the British subsidiary force within his dominions. The Governor-General further deemed it necessary to prescribe in the same event, a demand for the removal of Serjee Rao Ghautka from the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Under a supposition that in the event of the defeat of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's force, Jeswunt Rao Holkar might be disposed to accede to reasonable terms of accommodation, the Governor-General communicated his sentiments to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of the terms to be in such case granted to Holkar. On this occasion the Governor-

General suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the employment of Mr. Groome Mercer, according to the arrangement described in the instructions to the acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 2nd of April, of which the substance has already been stated.

The Governor-General further intimated to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah must not be permitted to negotiate for Holkar, nor Holkar for Scindiah. A copy of these instructions, which were dated the 4th of April, together with a copy of notes, dated the 29th of March, to which those instructions refer, and which had been transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in a private form, is enclosed for your honourable Committee's information.

In conformity to the tenor of those instructions, it became necessary to provide, with the least practicable delay, the most effectual means of attacking the possessions of Scindiah if that chieftain's aggression should render hostilities unavoidable.

The experience of the late war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, having demonstrated the indispensable necessity of the measure adopted by the Governor-General, of vesting general and extensive powers for the regulation and control of military and political affairs in the Deccan, in the hands of a constituted local authority during the existence of a state of war in that quarter, the Governor-General deemed it proper, with a view to secure the efficient and prompt application of our resources in the Deccan to the exigencies and emergencies of the public service; to invest Colonel Close with the same political powers as those which were vested in Major-General the honourable Sir A. Wellesley by the Governor-General's instruction of the 26th of June, 1803, with the exception of the military command in the province of Guzerat. The Governor-General accordingly, by instructions dated the 5th of April, authorised and directed Colonel Close to exercise those powers, to the extent and in the manner applicable to the actual state of circumstances in the Deccan. The Governor-General, at the same time directed Colonel Close to proceed with the least practicable delay from Nagpore (at which station Colonel Close awaited the orders of government on the subject of proceeding to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of returning to

Poonah), for the purpose of assuming the personal command of the main army of the Deccan, and in the mean time Colonel Close was instructed to issue orders to Colonel Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force of Poonah, and to Colonel Haliburton, commanding the subsidiary force of Hyderabad, directing those officers respectively to occupy with their troops the positions most favourable for the seizure of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's territories, south of the Nerbuddah. Colonel Close was however instructed to prohibit Colonel Wallace and Colonel Haliburton from commencing operations against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah until they should receive express orders for that purpose, or until certain intelligence should reach them of the actual commencement of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Hindostan.

The Governor-General at the same time issued orders to Colonels Wallace and Haliburton to the effect described in the preceding paragraph. The necessary intimation of this arrangement was at the same time communicated to the governments of Bombay and Fort St. George, and to the Resident at Hyderabad, and to the officiating Resident at Poonah.

With reference to a state of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it became necessary to provide the means of reinforcing the troops in Guzerat; the force originally stationed in that province having been considerably reduced by the march of the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray, which first proceeded to Oujein, and subsequently under the command of Major-General Jones joined the army in Hindostan, as has been stated to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 24th of March.

The object of assembling a considerable force in Guzerat was both to guard that province against foreign invasion, and to attack the forts and possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Guzerat and its vicinity, in the event of Scindiah's commencing hostilities against the British power.

The obvious necessity of preserving the utmost degree of secrecy with regard to the motive and object of this arrangement suggested to the Governor-General the expediency of addressing the instructions upon the subject of reinforcing Guzerat, separately to the honourable the Governor of Bombay. Instructions were accordingly issued by the Governor-General to the honourable the Governor of Bombay,

prescribing the precise mode of effecting the proposed augmentation of the British force in Guzerat. The Governor-General at the same time intimated to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, that although his Excellency was desirous that the force of Guzerat should be completely equipped and placed in a state of the most efficient preparation for active war, as well as in the most favourable position for the reduction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possessions, it was not the Governor-General's intention to authorise the commencement of hostilities against the possessions of Scindiah until the honourable the Governor should receive further orders from this Government, excepting in the single event of an attack on the province of Guzerat by the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

These arrangements were at the same time communicated to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, with instructions directing the suspension, until a more favourable opportunity, of the orders of the Governor-General relative to the return from the Deccan of the extra Madras corps serving under Colonel Haliburton, and to the reduction of the extra Madras battalions, and of the Mysore cavalry, which was engaged to serve with the British army in the Deccan (to which orders our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th of March refers). The attention of the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George was also directed to the necessity of being prepared to frustrate any attempt which might be made by any of the southern Jaggeerdars of the Mahratta empire in favour of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the event of hostilities with that chieftain, and to other points connected with that event. His Lordship was desired to communicate a copy of the Governor-General's instructions on these subjects to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, and to concert with his Excellency the means of giving effect to such part of those instructions as related to the employment and disposition of the military force of Fort St. George. The Governor-General deemed it proper at the same time to transmit corresponding instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of Fort St. George, referring to his Excellency for a more detailed communication of the sentiments and orders of this government to the right honourable the Governor.

These arrangements and instructions were framed upon principles calculated to provide for every purpose of internal defence and of active and successful operations against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the event of a rupture with that chieftain. The whole of the proposed measures were also communicated to his Excellency the right honourable Lord Lake.

The course of proceeding stated in the instructions to which the preceding paragraph refers, was founded on the simple official notification on the part of Scindiah of his Highness's resolution to proceed to Bhurtpore for the purpose of interposing his mediation for the settlement of peace between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar. On the 7th of April, however, the Governor-General received the Acting Resident's detailed report of all the circumstances of the case, and of his conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his minister upon that subject, and the tenor of that report appeared to the Governor-General in Council to require the adoption of more decided measures with respect to that chieftain.

The Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to that report for information relative to the details of this extraordinary transaction, and to request your honourable Committee's particular attention to that important document.

Your honourable Committee will not fail to remark the distinct avowal of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's minister, that until that period of time, the intentions of Sirjee Rao Ghautka the chief executive minister of his Highness's government, had been hostile to the British power. It must be obvious to your honourable Committee that this avowal (as far as it can be considered to constitute evidence of the fact which is avowed), demonstrates the existence of a systematic course of deceit, treachery, and determined hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government since the time when Serjee Rao Ghautka assumed the administration of his Highness's affairs until the period of the alleged change in the sentiments of that minister.

Your honourable Committee will also remark the minister's avowal of the existence of an amicable and secret intercourse between the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the

enemy, and the outrage offered to every principle of good faith by the declaration under such circumstances, of an intention to advance to the vicinity of the British camp, for the declared purpose of mediating an accommodation between the British Government and its enemies, Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Rajah Runjeet Sing.

The impression produced upon the Governor-General's mind by the treacherous and insulting nature of that proposition, under a knowledge of the details connected with it, suggested to the Governor-General in Council the expediency of stating to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in a more decided manner the resolution adopted by the Governor-General in Council with respect to the measures to be pursued towards Scindiah in the actual situation of affairs. The Governor-General accordingly addressed additional instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief under date the 7th of April. In those instructions the Governor-General adverted to the resolution declared in his Excellency's despatch of the 4th April, not to suffer Dowlut Rao Scindiah to negotiate for Holkar, and intimated to the Commander-in-Chief that the circumstances since conveyed to the knowledge of Government required the distinct expression of the Governor-General's desire not only that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's most unwarrantable assumption of the privilege of a mediating power should be resisted in the most peremptory terms, but that in the event of that chieftain's continuing to advance with his army towards Bhurtpore, either through the territory of our ally the Rana of Gohud, or by any other route in which he should pass the line of demarcation prescribed by the treaty of peace, or should take up any position upon that line of a nature dangerous to our security, the Commander-in-Chief would instantly adopt the most active measures for the entire destruction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's force. The Governor-General, however, at the same time signified to the Commander-in-Chief that notwithstanding the unwarrantable and hostile conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, if that chieftain (not violating the line of demarcation, or taking up any position of the nature above described), should despatch an agent to his Excellency's camp, his Excellency was at liberty to treat with Dowlut Rao Scindiah according to the tenor of the Governor-General's former

instructions ; but that even in that case it would be necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should approach Dowlut Rao Scindiah with a commanding force, and should require his retreat to the distance of at least 100 miles from the frontier before his Excellency should admit any negotiation with that chieftain.

On the 9th of April, however, the Governor-General received a despatch from Colonel Close, dated the 23d of March, containing a report of another conversation holden by that officer and the Resident at Nagpore, with the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah stationed at that capital, tending to confirm and augment the impressions which we had already received with regard to the treachery and hostility of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government.

Your honourable Committee will observe that the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah stated, upon that occasion, most of the articles of complaint against the conduct of the British Government, which are contained in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter to the Governor-General, to which a preceding paragraph refers.

Your honourable Committee will further remark the distinct and irrefragable proof of the duplicity and hostility of Scindiah's conduct, afforded by the vakeel's distinct declaration under authority from his principal, that the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the northward was occasioned by that chieftain's resentment against the British Government, and that under the impression of that resentment, it was the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to form a junction with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, since Dowlut Rao Scindiah, both before and after his advance to the northward, withheld from the British Resident all complaint of a violation of treaty on the part of the British Government, and met the remonstrances of the British Resident against the suspicious measures of his government, not by any endeavour to justify them by recriminating upon the British Government, but by delusive attempts to conceal the real nature of those measures, and to reconcile them to the obligations of his duty as an ally ; and at the time when, according to the official declaration of his accredited vakeel, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was proceeding to the northward for the express purpose of forming a junction with the common enemy, that chieftain made the most

solemn protestations of the amicable nature of his designs, and of his resolution to fulfil the obligations of his alliance, in the mode so earnestly recommended by the Resident, that of returning to his capital for the purpose of settling his government with the aid of the British power, and of occupying part of the possessions wrested from the dominion of Holkar by the exertions of the British arms. Under the influence of these sentiments with regard to the conduct and the views of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government, the Governor-General in Council deemed it necessary to furnish his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with additional instructions, calculated to meet every case which under the information recently obtained of the disposition and designs of Scindiah's Court, could reasonably be supposed to occur. A copy of these instructions (which were dated the 10th of April), is annexed to this despatch. The Governor-General in Council however deems it proper to state to your honourable Committee the substance of the several supposed cases, and of the measures which the Governor-General suggested, under the occurrence of each case respectively.

It was suggested that Dowlut Rao Scindiah might afford the satisfaction required for the insult offered to the British Presidency, and might retire from our frontier without advancing any of his troops, or making any claims upon us or our allies. In that case, the Governor-General observed that it would be unnecessary for the Commander-in-Chief to act against Scindiah in any manner, or to hold any intercourse with that chieftain: that in such case, the Commander-in-Chief should employ every effort to close the war with Holkar; and that as soon as the Residency with Scindiah should be restored, all depending questions with Scindiah might probably be brought to an amicable conclusion.

The 2nd supposed case was, that Scindiah might refuse or withhold the satisfaction required, and might still retain the person of the British Resident, although he might remain within his own frontier. In this case the Governor-General directed the Commander-in-Chief to approach Scindiah's position, and to demand the safe conduct to his army, of the British Resident, his suite and escort; and if this demand should not be complied with within a limited number of hours, the Commander-in-Chief was directed to attack Scin-

diah's army, employing also all practicable means for the safety of the persons of the British Residency and escort; and if Scindiah in this case should even retire from our frontier, carrying the British Resident with him under such disgraceful circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to use every effort to pursue and destroy Scindiah's army, and to rescue the British Resident.

3d. It was suggested that Scindiah might refuse the atonement demanded, but might enable the British Representative to arrive in safety at one of our posts, or at head quarters, after the Commander-in-Chief should have demanded his release. That Scindiah might then retire and place his army in a position not positively indicative of hostility against the British Government or any of its allies. The necessary consequence of this state of circumstances had already been declared by the Governor-General, in his instructions to the Acting Resident, to which preceding paragraphs refer, that all intercourse with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, through the channel of a British representative at his Court, must cease. With reference to this supposed case, the Governor-General observed, that although neither the treaty of peace, nor the treaty of defensive alliance was necessarily dissolved by such a course of proceeding on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and although the Governor-General had intimated that even in the case supposed, the British Government would be inclined to maintain peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, yet the British Government was at liberty under such circumstances to consider both the treaties of peace and alliance to be dissolved, and even to declare war.

The Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to the enclosed copy of the Governor-General's instructions of the 10th of April to the Commander-in-Chief, for information relative to the grounds of that conclusion, and of the resolution of Government to proceed to hostilities against Scindiah, if the public satisfaction required, should be withheld or refused.*

4th. It was suggested that Scindiah, for the purpose of deceit, might make the proposed atonement, but might

* See enclosure following this despatch.—[ED.]

menace our frontier, or that of our allies, or might proceed to pass the line of demarcation, or might make demands for himself or for others. In any of these cases, the Commander-in-Chief was directed instantly to attack Dowlut Rao Scindiah's force, making the best practicable arrangement for the security of the Residency.

The Governor-General further expressed his expectation that if Scindiah should advance to Bhurtpore according to the terms of his declaration to the Acting Resident, the Commander-in-Chief would endeavour to place the force of Dowlut Rao Scindiah between the British army under his Excellency's personal command, and that of Colonel Martindell (who commanded the army of Bundelcund, and whose movements and proceedings will be found stated in a subsequent part of this despatch), and would attack Dowlut Rao Scindiah's force on both sides, without a moment of delay; refusing to receive any vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and thus frustrating all his artifices. The Governor-General observed that the mere circumstance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's advance to Bhurtpore, under all the circumstances of the case, constituted not only a declaration of war, but a violent act of hostility. In the event therefore of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's advancing, the Governor-General signified his desire that the Commander-in-Chief would direct his whole attention to an immediate attack upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with every corps that could be brought into action against him.

The Governor-General in Council further deemed it necessary to combine with these instructions, the declaration of his sentiments with regard to the terms which should be granted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the event of his being so reduced by our arms as to be compelled to sue for peace on any terms. The Governor-General observed, that on this subject his sentiments had been materially changed since the date of the instructions of the 7th of April; the various circumstances relative to the conduct and views of Scindiah's Government which had subsequently come to the knowledge of Government, having rendered indispensably necessary in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council the reduction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's power to the lowest scale, in the event of a successful war against him. In determining

this question, it was necessary to establish some fundamental principles as the basis of pacification.

The fundamental principle of the pacification with Scindiah in December, 1803, was, compensation for Dowlut Rao Scindiah's aggression, and for the injury which the British Government and its allies had sustained by the war, without depriving Dowlut Rao Scindiah of any of the rights and privileges of an independent state. The Governor-General observed that this principle of pacification had proved inadequate to the purposes of our security, and that the restraints imposed by the provisions of the treaty of peace upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah's means of mischief, were insufficient. That another principle of pacification therefore must be assumed; that Scindiah must not be permitted to retain the rights and privileges of an independent state, nor any privileges to an extent that might at a future time enable him to injure us or our allies; and that we must secure the arrangement by establishing a direct controul over the acts of his Government; experience having sufficiently manifested that it was vain to place any reliance on the faith, justice, sincerity, gratitude or honour of that chieftain.

In conformity to these sentiments, a paper of notes containing the basis of the treaty to be concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the event supposed, was annexed to the Governor-General's instructions, and a draft of the proposed treaty was subsequently transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief.

Some cases not specifically provided for by the Governor-General's instructions of the 10th of April, having occurred to his Excellency in Council subsequently to the despatch of those instructions, the Governor-General in Council deemed it necessary to state those cases in a supplementary note of instructions. It occurred to the Governor-General in Council that Scindiah might receive into his camp Jeswunt Rao Holkar or Meer Khan, or both, with or without their troops, and might then desire to open a negotiation with the Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of obtaining terms of accommodation for either or both of those chieftains; or without making any demand, or proposing any negotiation, might either continue in his actual position or retire. The Governor-General in Council expressed his decided opinion that

under any of these circumstances Scindiah should be instantly attacked; stating at the same time the grounds of that opinion, and adding, that the instant surrender of the persons of Meer Khan or Holkar, or of both, (if both should be protected by Dowlut Rao Scindiah) should constitute an indispensable condition of our forbearance from the immediate prosecution of hostilities against the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Governor-General further observed, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah should actually surrender the persons of those chieftains, a confident hope might be entertained of his submission to the indispensable demand of satisfaction for the outrages committed against the British Residency (if that should not previously have been afforded), and to such other demands as might be requisite for the security of the British Government against any hostile attempts on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

It may be proper in this place to state, that in reply to the letter from the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, of the 22nd of March, notifying his Highness's intention of proceeding to the vicinity of Bhurtpore for the purpose of mediation, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief instructed the Acting Resident to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that the avowed purpose of his Highness's proposed advance to Bhurtpore could not be considered to be a satisfactory reason for the prosecution of that measure. That under actual circumstances, Scindiah's mediation was wholly unnecessary, and must be considered to be undertaken for purposes unfriendly to the British Government. That the Commander-in-Chief was disposed to attend to any propositions on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah as the friend and ally of the British Government regarding Jeswunt Rao Holkar; but that the advance of Scindiah's army towards Bhurtpore in the actual situation of affairs, would be considered by his Excellency to be a measure calculated to subvert the amicable relations subsisting between the two governments.

The acceptance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's propositions as an ally and friend of the British Government, on any point relating to the enemy, would have been entirely conformable to the views of the Governor-General in Council, and to the spirit of the subsisting treaties; but your honourable Com-

mittee will not fail to remark that this principle cannot be justly extended to the admission of the unsolicited mediation of Scindiah at the head of an army in favour of the enemy, or to the admission of Scindiah to treat for the enemy; more especially in the case of Scindiah manifesting any decisive symptom of an attachment to the cause of the enemy, or of general hostility to the British Government.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah continued his march to the northward, and on the 29th of March had advanced with all his cavalry and pindarries to Subbulgurh, on the river Chumbul, leaving his battalions and guns in the rear. The force of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at that time was stated to consist of 8 or 9000 cavalry, independently of the pindarries, which amounted to 20,000. The infantry, including several of Meer Khan's battalions, which joined the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on its march from Seronge, was stated to consist nominally of 18 battalions with 140 guns, in a very defective state of equipment and discipline; this nominal force, including 10 battalions and 64 guns under the command of a person named John Baptiste, a native of India (of whom mention is made in our despatch of the 24th of March), which 10 battalions remained at Seronge. Between the 29th and 31st of March, Dowlut Rao Scindiah marched from Subbulgurh to the distance of eighteen miles in a northeasterly direction. In that position Dowlut Rao Scindiah was joined by Ambajee. The Acting Resident understanding it to be the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to proceed to cross the Chumbul with all his cavalry and the pindarries, leaving the bazars and heavy baggage of the army under the protection of Ambajee, deemed it necessary to endeavour to dissuade Dowlut Rao Scindiah from crossing the Chumbul, and to induce him to await the arrival of Colonel Close.

The Acting Resident being admitted to an audience which he solicited for the purpose above stated, was requested, after the usual civilities, to retire with the ministers to a separate place of conference. A letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Governor-General, in reply to the Governor-General's letter of the 23rd of February demanding atonement for the outrages committed against the British Residency, was then read to the Acting Resident, and being approved by him, was delivered for transmission to the Gover-

nor-General. After having heard the contents of the letter, the Acting Resident proceeded to state the immediate object of his visit. The minister Serjee Rao Ghautka replied by the most amicable professions, and intimated, that the position which Dowlut Rao Scindiah proposed to occupy in the vicinity of Bhurtpore, was entirely calculated to facilitate the object in view, that of mediating a peace between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The minister then proceeded to request the Acting Resident to address a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, while Dowlut Rao Scindiah should also address a letter to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, proposing an armistice. The Acting Resident declined compliance with this proposition; intimating that he did not possess any authority to suggest to the Commander-in-Chief the measures to be pursued, and referring to the sentiments which he had formerly expressed, relative to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's proffered mediation. This point was urged no further. The Acting Resident then desired to be informed in what manner the Governor-General's demand respecting the restoration of the property plundered by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's servants from the British Residency and the punishment of the plunderers, was to be satisfied. Upon these points the minister returned replies which appeared to the Acting Resident to be perfectly satisfactory. The Acting Resident then expressed a desire to be enabled to satisfy the Governor-General on the remaining topic of the Governor-General's letter; the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act in conformity to the relations subsisting between the two governments: to which the minister replied, that there was no cause for any doubts upon that subject; that the sole object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march to the Chumbul, was to mediate a peace. That when that object should have been accomplished Dowlut Rao Scindiah would return to settle his country, which in the actual embarrassed condition of his finances was impracticable; and the minister added, that if the Resident would make any arrangement for the relief of the distresses of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government, Dowlut Rao Scindiah would act in every respect according to the wishes of the British Government. The Acting Resident signified to the minister that the Governor-General was still disposed to afford relief to the distresses of the state,

provided the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be consistent with the spirit of his engagements, but referred the decision of the question to the arrival of Colonel Close who possessed authority for that purpose, and the conference terminated by a declaration on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, (which was subsequently confirmed by that chieftain) that his Highness would halt on the Chumbul and await the arrival of Colonel Close.

The Acting Resident in his report of this conference stated his intention under the orders of the Governor-General of the 23rd of February, of discharging a third instalment of the pensions payable by the treaty of peace.

The tenor of the Acting Resident's communication, combined with the terms of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter, appeared to the Governor-General in Council to indicate a material change in the counsels of that chieftain. The Governor-General in Council deemed it probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or rather Serjee Rao Ghautka, had at length been undeceived with regard to the actual power and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the condition of his affairs, and that despairing of the accomplishment of any views which Dowlut Rao Scindiah or his minister might have been induced to entertain by a fallacious dependance upon the supposed prosperity of Holkar's cause and the strength of his power, Dowlut Rao Scindiah might have become sincerely disposed to maintain peace with the British Government. Although the previous proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had not only constituted a direct violation on his part, of every subsisting engagement, but had been decidedly hostile to the British power; the Governor-General in Council was not of opinion that either the security or the dignity of the British Government required the rejection of that chieftain's pacific overtures; since under actual circumstances, those overtures, if sincere, constituted a submissive acknowledgment of the superiority of our power; and a due sense of that superiority in the minds of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his minister, afforded a rational security for the continuance of peace.

Under this view of the subject the Governor-General in Council resolved to accept the letter of Dowlut Rao Scindiah combined with the declaration of that chieftain and his

ministers as reported in the Acting Resident's despatch of the 3rd of April, as a satisfactory atonement for the insults which had been offered to the British Resident at his Highness's court, and to pursue the system of pacific measures for the permanent adjustment of all depending questions, which had been prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions to the Acting Resident of the 2nd of April (the substance of which is contained in former paragraphs of this despatch) provided that the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be consistent with the amicable professions of his letter, and with the verbal declarations which the Acting Resident had received from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his minister.

In adopting this resolution, however, it was not the intention of the Governor-General in Council to admit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's proposed mediation for the settlement of peace, or to authorize a deviation from the instructions issued to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the 10th and 12th of April; the Commander-in-Chief being directed by those instructions to adopt measures of coercion or hostility against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, only in the event of his pursuing a system of conduct inconsistent with the obligations of amity towards the British Government.

On the basis of these resolutions, additional instructions were issued to the Acting Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah under date the 20th of April, apprizing him of the course of conduct which the Governor-General had resolved to adopt towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and authorising him under the stated provisions, to proceed to satisfy Dowlut Rao Scindiah on all the points specified in the Governor-General's instructions of the 2nd of April, without awaiting the arrival of Colonel Close. The Acting Resident was directed to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah that the Governor-General had consented to receive his Highness's letter, combined with the verbal declarations of his Highness and his minister, as a satisfactory atonement for the outrages committed by his servants upon the British Residency, and to communicate to his Highness the orders which he had received for the satisfactory adjustment of all depending questions; stating to Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the same time, the causes which would probably prevent the arrival of

Colonel Close at his Highness's camp. The Acting Resident was further directed distinctly to declare to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his mediation for the settlement of peace could not be admitted, and to signify to him, that as the ally of the British Government, it was his duty under the obligations of treaty, to act in concert with the British forces against Jeswunt Rao Holkar either until his power should have been completely destroyed, or until the British Government should deem it expedient to grant terms of peace to the enemy; that the only mode in which his Highness's co-operation could be useful or desirable was, by his returning to the southward and proceeding to occupy the remaining possessions of Holkar in the province of Malwa. That his Highness's return to his capital would enable him to occupy those possessions and would place him in a condition to adopt the measures necessary for the settlement of his Government; and that in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's consenting to return to his capital with those views and intentions, the Acting Resident was vested with full powers to relieve the immediate distresses of his Highness's government, by pecuniary aid.

By these instructions also, the Acting Resident was apprized that excepting under the actual occurrence or immediate prospect of the renewal of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it was the intention of his Excellency the Governor-General to despatch at the earliest practicable period of time to the camp of that chieftain, Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm the Resident at Mysore, who had lately arrived at Fort William, for the purpose of aiding Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the settlement of his government and of delivering over to that chieftain a part of the territories conquered from Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Acting Resident, however, was prohibited from suspending the execution of any part of the Governor-General's instructions in the expectation of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm's arrival, and was especially directed to neglect no opportunity of urging Dowlut Rao Scindiah's return to the southward.

The Acting Resident was further informed that the resolution to despatch Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm to the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, was not intended to supersede the eventual mission of Mr. Mercer in the manner prescribed by

the Governor-General's instruction to the Commander-in-Chief.

On the 2nd of April Dowlut Rao Scindiah marched about eight miles in a retrograde direction towards Subbulgurh, leaving the whole of his baggage and bazars under the charge of Ambajee, and it was said to be the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to cross the Chumbul at a ford about thirty miles distant from that place.

On the 3rd of April the Acting Resident was visited by Atmaram, the Vakeel residing on the part of the Durbar in the British camp. The object of this visit was to induce the Acting Resident to adopt some arrangement for the relief of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's pecuniary distresses. The Acting Resident having ascertained from the Vakeel that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intention was to cross the Chumbul and proceed to Kerowly, availed himself of the opportunity afforded by the Vakeel's visit, to state such arguments and considerations as might induce Dowlut Rao Scindiah to halt in his actual position until the arrival of Colonel Close. The Vakeel having reported the substance of the Acting Resident's representations to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Acting Resident was visited by Annah Bhasker one of the principal officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government. The discussions which ensued on the subject of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's continuance in his actual position, awaiting the arrival of Colonel Close, and of the adoption of an arrangement for the relief of the pecuniary distresses of his Highness's government being reported to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that chieftain consented to return to Subbulgurh, and continue at that place until the time when Colonel Close might be expected to arrive, on the implied condition, that the Acting Resident should immediately discharge the third instalment of the pensions payable under the treaty of peace.

On the 7th of April Meer Khaun left Bhurtpore with the avowed intention of joining Dowlut Rao Scindiah. On the same day, Serjee Rao Ghautka with a large body of Pindarries and a considerable part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's cavalry, marched towards Bhurtpore. Previously, however, to Serjee Rao Ghautka's departure, Annah Bhasker (the minister above-mentioned visited the Resident for the express purpose of communicating Ghautka's intended departure and

the object of it, which he stated to be, to enter upon the proposed mediation between the Commander-in-Chief and Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Acting Resident however deemed it proper to demand from Dowlut Rao Scindiah himself an explanation of the movement of Serjee Rao Ghautka. The Acting Resident being admitted to an audience, received from Dowlut Rao Scindiah the same explanation as that which was afforded by Annah Bhasker, accompanied by professions of the most amicable nature, and by a repetition of his Highness's request that the Acting Resident would address a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, desiring the suspension of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

Your honourable Committee will not fail to remark the disgraceful evasion and deceit which distinguished the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on this occasion. After having repeatedly remonstrated with the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah against the measure of that chieftain's proceeding to the vicinity of Bhurtpore, the Acting Resident obtained his Highness's consent to remain at Subbulgurh until the time when Colonel Close's arrival might be expected; yet Dowlut Rao Scindiah immediately after the conclusion of that arrangement, despatched Serjee Rao Gautka to Bhurtpore avowedly for the accomplishment of the alleged object of his Highness's march to that place.

It is necessary to interrupt the narrative of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's proceedings for the purpose of adverting to the negotiations with the Rajah of Bhurtpore, the commencement of which was noticed in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th of March and which have terminated in the settlement of peace with that chieftain.

The terms to which the Rajah of Bhurtpore has ultimately assented are, that the Rajah shall pay to the honourable Company the sum of twenty lacks of rupees by instalments, the whole to be discharged within the space of four years.

The last instalment however to be remitted, if the intermediate conduct of the Rajah shall be satisfactory to the British Government.

That the Rajah shall assist to the utmost of his power in repelling any attack upon the British possessions and that

the Rajah shall never hold any correspondence with the enemies of the British power, or be in any way connected with them.

That the Rajah will never entertain in his service any subject of Great Britain or France, or any European without the sanction of the British Government.

That as a security for the performance of the articles of the treaty, one of the Rajah's sons shall constantly remain with the officer commanding the British forces in the Soubahs of Delhi or Agra, and that the fortress of Deig shall continue in the occupation of a British garrison, until the British Government shall be perfectly satisfied of the Rajah's fidelity and attachment.

On the other hand, the British Government engages permanently to guarantee Rajah Runjeet Sing in the possession of his antient territory: the Rajah consenting, as the condition of his right eventually to claim the aid of the British power, and to submit to the arbitration of the British Government any difference which may occur between him and any other state or chieftain,

The terms of this treaty do not differ materially from those which were prescribed in the Governor-General's instructions of the 19th of March; and being considered by the Governor-General in Council to be in every respect advantageous and honourable to the British Government, the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General, in Council on the 2d of May.

Although the treaty with Rajah Runjeet Sing was not finally executed until the 17th of April, all the stipulations of it were adjusted on the 11th of that month; and on the evening of that day, the Rajah's son arrived in the British camp as an hostage. On the same evening Jeswunt Rao Holkar was compelled by the Rajah to leave Bhurtpore.

On the same day his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief received a letter from Serjee Rao Ghautka who had proceeded to Weir, a town situated about fifteen miles S. W. of Bhurtpore, intimating that at the request of the Acting British Resident, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had consented to wait ten days at Subbulgurh in the expectation of Colonel Close's arrival; "*That the Acting British Resident had at the same time expressed a desire that Dowlut Rao Scindiah*

should interpose his mediation for the settlement of peace, and that his Highness had accordingly despatched Serjee Rao Ghautka to Bhurtpore for the purpose of concluding certain negotiations relative to peace." Serjee Rao Ghautka further expressed his intention of halting one day at Weir and of proceeding on the following day lightly attended to Bhurtpore; after his arrival at which place, whatever negotiations might be concluded, should be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief.

In reply to this letter his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief intimated to Serjee Rao Ghautka that terms of peace having been granted to Rajah Runjeet Sing, Serjee Rao Ghautka's proceeding to Bhurtpore was unnecessary, and might subvert the relations of amity between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and recommended his immediate return to the camp of that chieftain.

On the 12th of April, however, Serjee Rao Ghautka advanced with a small party of horse within a short distance of Bhurtpore, and transmitted a message to Rajah Runjeet Sing soliciting a personal conference. The Rajah intimated to Ghautka in reply, that he had concluded peace with the British power, and that Serjee Rao's advance to Bhurtpore was therefore improper. On receipt of this reply Serjee Rao Ghautka retreated to his camp at Weir, where he was subsequently joined by Holkar with three or four thousand horse in a very reduced condition, constituting nearly the whole of that chieftain's remaining force, and both proceeded towards the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at Subbulgurh.

Your honourable Committee will observe the gross falsehood of the assertion contained in Serjee Rao Ghautka's letter, that the Acting Resident had expressed a desire that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should interpose his mediation for the settlement of peace, the Acting Resident having distinctly declared in his conferences with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ministers that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's mediation was inadmissible and that it was not within the limit of the Acting Resident's authority to suggest to the Commander-in-Chief an armistice for the purpose of negotiating the settlement of peace, which the Commander-in-Chief alone possessed the power to conclude.

With regard to the object of Serjee Rao Ghautka's advance

to Bhurtpore no doubt exists that the immediate purpose of that movement was to prevent the conclusion of peace with Rajah Runjeet Sing.

The facts of the preceding narrative and the detail of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's proceedings, as described in our despatch of the 24th of March, appear to the Governor-General in Council to contain satisfactory proof that in advancing to the northward it was not the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, either to act against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or to effect a pacification, excepting only in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's being enabled, by a combination of his force with that of the enemy, to dictate the terms of peace in favour of Holkar, and of an arrangement in favour of himself.

But whatever might be the specific object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's advance to the northward, it may justly be presumed that such object coincided with the views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; it is manifest also that these views, whatever they might be, were to be accomplished by an union of the forces of those chieftains; and it was obviously the interest of Dowlut Rao Scindiah as well as of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, under such circumstances, to frustrate the depending negotiation between the British Government and Rajah Runjeet Sing.

The negotiation with Runjeet Sing was a matter of public notoriety, and its progress could not be unknown to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ministers; adverting therefore to the state of the negotiation at the period of Serjee Rao Ghautka's departure from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that minister's advance to Bhurtpore, and his solicitude to confer with Rajah Runjeet Sing, can only be ascribed to a design of preventing the conclusion of peace between the British Government and Rajah Runjeet Sing, and the Commander-in-Chief actually received intelligence from the accredited vakeels of Rajah Runjeet Sing, that Serjee Rao Ghautka, both by letters and by messages, had earnestly dissuaded Runjeet Sing from concluding any engagements with the British power, intimating at the same time that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was proceeding to his relief.

According to the expectation afforded by the Acting Resident to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Acting Resident granted

bills for the third instalment of the pensions payable under the treaty of Serjee Anjengaum. On receipt of this information, however, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief deemed it necessary to issue instructions to the Acting Resident, under date the 14th of April, suggesting the inexpediency of furnishing Dowlut Rao Scindiah with further pecuniary supplies under the equivocal circumstances of his recent conduct, until the Acting Resident should receive orders for that purpose from the Governor-General in Council, or until he should be satisfied that such advances of money would induce Dowlut Rao Scindiah to return to the southward.

In a subsequent part of our despatch of the 24th of March the Governor-General in Council stated to your honourable Committee that the force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell was encamped in a position on the bank of the Sind, which enabled him equally to secure the internal tranquillity of Bundelcund, and to protect that province and the territory of Gohud from external invasion. Lieut.-Colonel Martindell continued for some time to occupy the same position; no movement of an enemy's force, nor any appearance of internal commotion, having rendered a change of position necessary. Lieut.-Colonel Martindell having subsequently received information of the arrival of a part of Scindiah's army at Narwa, and of his intention to advance to Subbulgurh, deemed it necessary to refer to the authority of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for instructions with respect to the conduct which he should pursue in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's attempting to cross the Chumbul.

Previously to the receipt of instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, however, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell having obtained information from Mr. Jenkins of the positive intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to advance with his army to the vicinity of Bhurtpore, resolved to proceed to a more advanced position, and subsequently, until the receipt of further orders, to regulate the movements of his force by those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in conformity to the general instructions which he had formerly received from the Commander-in-Chief.

In consequence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's advance to the northward, Lieut.-Colonel Martindell, who had now received orders from the Commander-in-Chief applicable to that event,

continued to advance in the same direction, carefully abstaining from any violation of the possessions of Scindiah, or his dependants; and on the 6th of April reached a position on the southern bank of the Chumbul, at a short distance from Dholepore.

The vicinity of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's camp to that of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's appeared to excite a considerable degree of alarm in the minds of that chieftain and his ministers; and on the 11th of April Dowlut Rao Scindiah requested the attendance of the Acting Resident for the express purpose of stating the apprehension which he entertained upon that subject. The Acting Resident having accordingly attended the durbar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah stated the apprehension which had been excited in his mind by the advance of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment towards the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and requested the Acting Resident to prevent the approach of that detachment within the distance of twenty coss from Scindiah's camp. After some discussion upon this subject, in the course of which the Acting Resident explained the necessity of the presence of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment in its actual position, and assured his Highness that a previous aggression on his part could alone produce hostility on the part of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell's detachment, the Acting Resident succeeded in dispelling Dowlut Rao Scindiah's apprehensions. Dowlut Rao Scindiah then proceeded to apprise the Acting Resident of the arrival of Bappojee Scindiah in the vicinity of his camp, declaring his intention of visiting that chieftain, and requesting the opinion of the Acting Resident upon that subject.

It will occur to the recollection of the honourable Committee that Bappojee commanded Dowlut Rao Scindiah's contingent of troops at the commencement of hostilities with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and after joining the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, deserted with his troops to the enemy.

In reply to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's reference to the Acting Resident on the subject of Bappojee Scindiah, the Acting Resident adverted to the treachery of that chieftain, and submitted to his Highness's judgment the impropriety of visiting an officer who had placed himself in the condition of

an open enemy to the British Government. Dowlut Rao Scindiah however, notwithstanding this declaration on the part of the Acting Resident, proceeded in the evening of the same day to visit Bappjee Scindiah.

On the 14th the Resident received a visit from Annah Bhasker, who apprized him on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that Meer Khan was arrived in the vicinity of his Highness's camp; that his Highness had received no communication relative to the object of Meer Khan's arrival, but that his Highness supposed Meer Khan to have been despatched by Holkar with views corresponding with those which had dictated the mission of Serjee Rao Ghautka to Bhurtpore. It is superfluous to remark that this statement was calculated to afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a plausible pretext for receiving Meer Khan.

On the 15th of April the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah received another visit from Annah Bhasker, who conveyed a message on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, purporting that his Highness had already apprized the Acting Resident of the object of Serjee Rao Ghautka's mission to Bhurtpore; that Ghautka, before his arrival at that place, had received with great satisfaction the intelligence of the conclusion of peace with Rajah Runjeet Sing; that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had directed Annah Bhasker to congratulate the Acting Resident on this event in his Highness's name; that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had resolved to renew his attack upon the Company's territories, but that the minister's persuasions had induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon that resolution; that Holkar had consented to accept the mediation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that Serjee Rao Ghautka was accordingly on his way to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp with Holkar, who was expected to arrive in the course of the day. To this communication the Acting Resident replied, by stating that the Commander-in-Chief had already declared his disposition to attend to any representation which Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as the friend and ally of the British Government, might think proper to state with regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that accordingly it was the duty of the Acting Resident to report to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Governor-General any communication upon that subject which he might receive from his Highness. Annah Bhasker

then signified to the Acting Resident that it was the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to invite him to a conference, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was anxiously desirous of securing the permanent tranquillity of India, by mediating a peace between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and by improving the relations of amity and alliance with the British Government.

On the 15th of April, Jeswunt Rao Holkar with all his remaining force, arrived in the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, and was visited by his Highness and all the principal officers of his court. Before Dowlut Rao Scindiah proceeded to the camp of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the Acting Resident received a message from his Highness, purporting that he was surprized by the sudden arrival of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. That his Highness had despatched a message to Holkar, desiring him not to cross the Chumbul, but that Jeswunt Rao Holkar having disregarded his request, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was compelled to visit him. That his Highness particularly wished the Acting Resident to be present at the interview, and that the vakeels of the Peishwa and the Rajah of Berar had also been desired to attend. The Acting Resident replied to this message by adverting to the extreme impropriety of the request respecting his attendance, and by observing that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intended visit to Jeswunt Rao Holkar was utterly inconsistent with the relations subsisting between his Highness and the British Government.

On the 17th of April the Acting Resident attended the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by appointment. The object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in desiring the attendance of the Acting Resident was to satisfy the mind of the Acting Resident with regard to the pacific motives of the junction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar with the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which his Highness's ministers endeavoured to justify upon the grounds already stated.

It is proper to state that in consequence of the instructions of the Governor-General to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the 4th of April (of which the substance is contained in a former part of this despatch), the Commander-in-Chief in a letter addressed to the Acting Resident by his Excellency's command, under date the 16th of April, signi-

fied that Dowlut Rao Scindiah could not be admitted to treat for Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The Governor-General in Council also deems it proper that your honourable Committee should be apprized of the instructions which, under the general powers vested in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief by the authority of the Governor-General in Council, combined with the instructions occasionally transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, his Excellency issued to the Acting Resident for the regulation of his conduct, according to the reports which his Excellency successively received from the Acting Resident of the progress of transactions and events at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Copies of those documents are accordingly enclosed.

Your honourable Committee will observe from the tenor of those instructions that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief directed the Acting Resident to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his consent to retire with his army to a considerable distance from its actual position and his separation from Holkar, must be considered by his Highness to be the conditions upon which alone his Excellency could enter into an amicable discussion of all points connected with the interests of the two states. Your honourable Committee will further remark, that the Commander-in-Chief repeated his injunctions to the Acting Resident, directing him to reject any proposal on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to negotiate for Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

These instructions corresponded with the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the 4th and 7th of April, which Lord Lake had at that time received, and of which the substance is stated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch.

Your honourable Committee will also observe from the tenor of the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to the Acting Resident, that his Excellency took occasion to direct the Acting Resident to oppose Dowlut Rao Scindiah's unfounded pretensions to the merit of having induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon his project of invading the honourable Company's territories, by adverting to the total failure of the former enterprizes of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khan against the British possessions even at a time when their troops were numerous and efficient, and to the manifest im-

practicability of the renewal of such attempts, in the disabled and miserable condition to which the force of those chieftains was actually reduced.

Previously to a resumption of the narrative of transactions and proceedings at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council deems it expedient to state to your honourable Committee the grounds on which the Governor-General in Council considers the advance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the northward for the declared purpose of interposing his mediation for the settlement of peace, and his junction with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, although for the same professed purpose, to constitute a violation of the treaty of peace as well as of defensive alliance, and to justify the prosecution of hostilities against that chieftain.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah did not announce to the British Resident his resolution of proceeding to Bhurtpore and the ostensible object of that measure, until the 21st of March, at which time Dowlut Rao Scindiah had reached the vicinity of Narwa. In his letter to the Governor-General received on the 19th of April, and referred to in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared that he was proceeding to Oujein, but that the information of the state of affairs in Hindostan had induced him to change his route, and to proceed to the northward for the purpose of "allaying the dust of disturbance."

This written communication is manifestly intended to correspond with the above mentioned intimation to the Resident. At what stage of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's progress from the banks of the Nerbuddah, his Highness changed his route in the manner described, cannot easily be determined. The presumption is, that his Highness never entertained the design of proceeding to his capital. But assuming his Highness's own verbal and written declarations as a standard by which to judge of his conduct in this instance, it may justly be asserted, that after his Highness's march from Seronge before the close of the month of February, he did not change his route; and that on the contrary, his Highness proceeded from that station with a resolution to approach the scene of hostilities. During one month therefore Dowlut Rao Scindiah continued to move with an army towards the position of the contending forces, contrary to the most solemn asseverations

of his intention to proceed to Oujein without revoking his promises to that effect, and without affording to the British Government directly or through the channel of its representative at his Highness's Court any explanation whatever of the object of his Highness's march in that direction.

Scindiah has declared, that in assembling a force and in proceeding at the head of it to the scene of hostilities, his intention was to interpose his mediation for the settlement of peace between the British Government and its enemies.

If Dowlut Rao Scindiah can be supposed to possess a right to adopt the measure of an armed mediation for the settlement of peace between the British Government and its enemies, that right must be founded either on the general principles of the law of nations, or on the provisions of treaty. The only cases in which such an interference can be deemed justifiable upon the principles of the law of nations, are those in which the security of the interfering party is manifestly and directly endangered by the success of one of the belligerent powers. A general reference to facts will be sufficient to demonstrate that Dowlut Rao Scindiah could not found upon the basis of this position any right to interpose his unsolicited mediation.

It is superfluous to consider the supposed case of the success of Holkar's arms over those of the British power; since Dowlut Rao Scindiah could not have acted on the ground of the danger to which his government would be exposed by the consequent aggrandizement of Holkar's power, without acting in conformity to the obligation of the defensive alliance subsisting between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the British Government. This ground of interference however evidently did not exist, nor was it in fact assumed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. A reference to the narrative of facts and transactions is sufficient to demonstrate that Dowlut Rao Scindiah could apprehend no danger from any success of Holkar over the British arms, and that the interference of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was directed exclusively to the benefit of Holkar's cause.

The right of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to interpose an armed mediation for the settlement of peace, could not be founded on any danger to be apprehended from the aggrandizement of the British power, by the destruction of that of Holkar;

the security of Scindiah could not be considered to be more endangered by whatever degree of ascendancy the British power could be supposed to acquire, than it was at the moment when the peace of Sirjee Anjengaum was concluded; since, subsequently to the pacification, the security of Dowlut Rao Scindiah has not depended in any degree upon his ability to resist the British arms, or upon the existence of Holkar's power. Scindiah therefore would have been equally justified upon the principle of self-defence, in violating the peace immediately after its conclusion, as in interposing upon the same principle, an armed mediation for the settlement of peace between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

It remains to consider whether the engagements subsisting between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the British Government, can be considered to convey to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a right to interfere by an armed mediation for the settlement of peace between the British Government and its enemies.

The treaty of peace contains no stipulations in any manner applicable to this question, which must therefore be considered solely with reference to the treaty of defensive alliance. By that treaty Dowlut Rao Scindiah was bound to co-operate to the extent of his power with the British Government in the reduction of the enemy's force. The conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah under that engagement having been fully stated in the course of the narrative contained in this despatch, and in our despatch of the 24th of March, it is sufficient to observe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has not discharged any obligation of the defensive alliance. Dowlut Rao Scindiah has himself admitted this fact, and has pleaded as an excuse, his inability to co-operate with the British arms against the common enemy. Whatever rights or pretensions therefore Dowlut Rao Scindiah might have derived under the treaty of alliance, have been justly forfeited; since he cannot reasonably claim the benefit of a reciprocal engagement, his part of which he has either neglected or has been unable to fulfil. But under any circumstances it cannot be concluded, that from the obligations of the defensive alliance Dowlut Rao Scindiah derives a right to interpose a forced mediation for the settlement of peace between the British Government and its ene-

mies, although Dowlut Rao Scindiah be himself an ally in the war.

As an ally of the British Government the obligation imposed upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah is of an opposite nature. It is his duty to aid the British Government in the reduction of the enemy's power, until the object of the war shall have been accomplished. Whereas Dowlut Rao Scindiah's mediation under actual circumstances, was directed to the benefit of the enemy opposed to that of the British Government, before those objects had been accomplished.

Supposing the power of the enemy to have been reduced to a condition which precluded all apprehension of future danger from it, the object of the war might be considered to have been so far accomplished, as to admit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's withdrawing his co-operation without a violation of the spirit and intent of the defensive alliance: under a contrary supposition Scindiah is pledged to continue his co-operation. Combining therefore these arguments with the fact (which must necessarily be supposed, and which unquestionably existed in the present case) that the measure of an armed mediation on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, was not necessary to that chieftain's security, it is evident that the adoption of that measure was a positive violation of the treaty of defensive alliance, an invasion of the rights of the British Government as an independent state, and inconsistent with the relations established between the two states by the treaty of peace, and would consequently have justified on the part of the British Government an immediate declaration of war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The subsequent junction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with the enemy, although professedly connected with the purposes of peace, was manifestly an aggravation of the hostile conduct of that chieftain. The proposed mediation therefore could not have been accepted by the British Government without a degree of humiliation utterly inconsistent with the establishment of the real sources of durable tranquillity and security, and a pacification effected under such circumstances must have been founded on the disgraceful and precarious basis of unlimited concession.

On the 21st of April his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief

with the whole of the British army under his personal command, marched from Bhurtpore in the direction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp. This movement was manifestly necessary with reference either to a state of war, or to an amicable termination of all depending questions with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and was necessary also for the purpose of carrying into effect the instructions of the Governor-General in Council.

On the 18th of April, Rajah Ambajee was seized by order of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The object of this act of violence was to extort from Ambajee a supply of money, and by subsequent reports it appears that Ambajee was compelled to promise payment of fifty lacs of rupees.

Your honourable Committee will have observed from the preceding narrative, that before the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah could have received the Governor-General in Council's instructions of the 2d of April, the substance of which is stated in former paragraphs of this despatch, the state of affairs at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had altered materially from that which was contemplated by the Governor-General in Council at the date of those instructions; part of those instructions had been anticipated by the Acting Resident and the change of circumstances rendered other points of those instructions inapplicable to the situation of affairs. Previously to the Acting Resident's receipt of those orders, he had consented to pay the third instalment of pensions payable by treaty, as stated in a former paragraph; and also two lacs of rupees on account of the revenues of the districts of Dholepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerra. The payment of the instalment of pensions had been actually effected, before the Acting Resident's receipt of the Governor-General in Council's instructions of the 2d of April; but the Acting Resident had not at that time granted bills for the two lacs of rupees, which he had consented to pay on account of the revenues of Dholepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerra.

Subsequently to the Acting Resident's receipt of the Governor-General in Council's instructions of the 2d of April, he received those of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, suggesting the inexpediency of making further payments to Dowlut Rao Scindiah under the circumstances of that chief-

tain's conduct; combining however the manifest spirit and intention of those several orders, the Acting Resident deemed it to be his duty to fulfil the promise which he had already given relative to the payment of the two lacs of rupees above-mentioned. The Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to the Acting Resident's letter of the 19th of April to the Secretary to Government in the Secret Department, and to the copy of his address to the Commander-in-Chief of the same date, for the motives and considerations which regulated his conduct on that occasion.

In reply to the Acting Resident's letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the 19th of April however, his Excellency expressed his decided opinion, that under the actual state of circumstances, the Acting Resident would have been justified in suspending the payment of the sum which he had promised on account of the revenues of Dholepore, Barea and Rajah-Kerra, until his receipt of instructions from Government applicable to that state of circumstances; and his Excellency repeated his orders to the Acting Resident prohibiting any further advances to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Commander-in-Chief further intimated to the Acting Resident, that as the seizure of Ambajee by Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, without whose concurrence and participation it could not have been effected, constituted a proof of the combination of the interests and views of those chieftains, his Excellency deemed it absolutely necessary that the Acting Resident should take the earliest opportunity of quitting Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp. His Excellency at the same time desired the Acting Resident to suggest to the Commander-in-Chief any mode by which his Excellency might facilitate the Acting Resident's safe arrival at the head quarters of the British army, or at any other British station. His Excellency also offered to address a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, if in the judgment of the Acting Resident, such a letter would facilitate his departure.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to advert to additional instructions which under a knowledge of all the circumstances already stated in this narrative, the Governor-General in Council judged it expedient to issue to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of a pacification with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The Governor-General in Council having now under his view all the circumstances of the conduct and state of Scindiah's government, with reference as well to its general course of policy, as to its connection with Holkar, his Excellency in Council deemed it to be proper to transmit to the Commander-in-Chief in a detailed manner; the grounds of the orders for rejecting the profered mediation of Scindiah for the settlement of peace with Holkar, and to state the actual condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah relatively to the British Government, in a point of view contrasted with the circumstances of his situation in the month of June 1804, when the Governor-General in Council proposed to effect a settlement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar through the interposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to apprise the Commander-in-Chief that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah were again placed in the same condition relatively to the British Government, as that in which he stood at the period above-mentioned, the Governor-General in Council would not object to the interposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the conclusion of peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

A copy of these instructions is annexed to this despatch for your honourable Committee's more detailed information.

On the 20th of April the Commander-in-Chief received through the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a letter under the seal of that chieftain purporting, that since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, the friendship of the two states had been uniformly progressive, that the object of that treaty was to promote peace and tranquillity throughout India; that peace had accordingly been concluded between the British Government and the Mahratta states with the exception of Holkar; that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had marched from Boorhanpore for the express purpose of effecting an accommodation between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; that with a view to negotiate the terms of pacification, both with the Rajah of Bhurtpore and with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had despatched Serjee Rao Ghautka to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, but that before his arrival at Bhurtpore, a treaty had been concluded with Rajah Runjeet Sing, in consequence of which Jeswunt Rao Holkar had left Bhurtpore, and had intended to cross the Ganges and to attack the Company's

possessions, but had been withheld from the prosecution of that design by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and had therefore proceeded to his Highness's camp; and that for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, a person named Junardun was now despatched by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Commander-in-Chief. The letter concluded by an intimation, that until the question of peace should be determined, Holkar should refrain from ravaging the Company's territory, and by a request that the Commander-in-Chief would prohibit the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Martindell from prosecuting any hostile operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

Your honourable Committee will not fail to observe the declaration contained in that letter, of the express object of Scindiah's march from Burhanpore, and the utter inconsistency of that declaration with the professions and assurances by which the ministers of that chieftain during the whole course of his progress from Burhanpore to Narwa, endeavoured to deceive the British representative at his court. Your honourable Committee will also observe the groundless pretensions of Scindiah to the merit of withholding Jeswunt Rao Holkar from an attack upon the British territories, and you will remark the extraordinary disregard of every principle of the subsisting alliance, manifested by the demand of a treaty of peace between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, after every obligation of honour and public faith had been violated by the junction of Scindiah with Holkar. In the instructions which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief issued to the Acting Resident after the receipt of that letter, the Commander-in-Chief confirmed his former orders prohibiting the agitation of the several points stated in the Governor-General's instructions of the 2nd of April, which his Excellency properly considered to be entirely inapplicable to the actual situation of affairs. The Commander-in-Chief, however, directed the Acting Resident to deliver the Governor-General's answer to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter of the 18th of October if he should have received it, but at the same time to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that the circumstances which had occurred subsequently to the date of the Governor-General's letter, and the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, must preclude the Acting

Resident from any discussions upon the subject of that letter. The Commander-in-Chief further observed, that the Acting Resident having already apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah that his mediation was inadmissible, Scindiah must have anticipated the purport of the Commander-in-Chief's reply, but that his Excellency deemed it proper to suspend the transmission of a reply until the arrival of the British army on the banks of the Chumbul. The Commander-in-Chief expressed his hope, that the Acting Resident had objected to the mission of a vakeel on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of negotiating a peace with the enemy, and directed the Acting Resident in the event of his receiving any further propositions upon that subject, to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the most positive terms, that a vakeel despatched for such a purpose could not be received.

In conformity to orders contained in a private despatch to the Acting Resident from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 24th of April, the Acting Resident on the 27th solicited an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of requiring in the name of the Commander-in-Chief the return of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from his actual position, and his separation from Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Dowlut Rao Scindiah appointed the evening of that day for the visit of the Acting Resident. The Acting Resident, however, deeming it proper to afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a previous intimation relative to the nature of the intended communication, transmitted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a memorial upon that subject.

In that memorial the Acting Resident, after remonstrating on the junction of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with those of the enemy against whom he was pledged to cooperate, distinctly stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that under such circumstances his mediation for the settlement of peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar could not be accepted by the Commander-in-Chief, and communicated on the part of his Excellency the prescribed requisition for the retreat of his Highness's force to a distance of at least 100 miles from the frontier of Gohud, and for the separation of that chieftain from Holkar; intimating at the same time, that his Highness's refusal to comply with those just and reasonable requisitions would tend to convince the Commander-in-Chief of his High-

ness's resolution to support the cause of the enemy, and to prosecute hostilities against the British power in conjunction with^o Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his adherents; and that in that event the Acting Resident had received the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to quit his Highness's camp whenever his Highness should furnish him with the requisite safeguard to a British station. The Acting Resident took this opportunity of executing his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's directions on the subject of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's assumption of the merit of having prevented Jeswunt Rao Holkar from renewing his invasion of the British territories.

On the arrival of the British army at the banks of the Chumbul on the 29th of April, the Commander-in-Chief despatched his reply to the letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of which the substance is stated in a former paragraph. That reply contained a concise statement of those points of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's conduct since the commencement of hostilities with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in which Scindiah had manifested an utter disregard of the obligations of the treaties subsisting between the two states. The Commander-in-Chief concluded with a declaration, that the junction of his Highness's army with the remnant of Holkar's forces having demonstrated a combination of interests between his Highness and the enemies of the British Government, against whom his Highness was pledged by treaty to co-operate, the Commander-in-Chief had judged it proper to direct the Acting Resident at his Highness's court to proceed with the gentlemen attached to the Residency to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, and that the British Government would consider his Highness to be responsible in his own person, and in the persons of his family, ministers and servants, for the safe and unmolested journey of the Acting Resident and of the gentlemen attached to the Residency with their property to the nearest British camp. This letter was transmitted to the Acting Resident for the purpose of being delivered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, together with the corresponding instructions for the regulation of his conduct.

On the 1st of May, Bhowanny Shunker, an officer of the highest rank attached to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and greatly in the confidence of that chieftain, and Moorteza Khan, one of the principal chiefs of the tribe of Patans, in the service

of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, arrived in the British camp with a body of horse for the purpose of entering into the service of the British Government. These chiefs were induced to quit the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar by the total failure of Holkar's resources for the payment of his troops.

It has been stated in a former paragraph, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had appointed the evening of the 27th of April for the Acting Resident's visit. His Highness, however, did not think proper either to desire the Acting Resident's attendance or to return any satisfactory reply to the Acting Resident's memorial. During the whole of that day and the succeeding night, the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was in a state of extreme confusion and alarm, in consequence of a report that the British troops had advanced to a position in the vicinity of the camp; and on the morning of the 28th Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with their respective forces, retreated with the utmost precipitation in the direction of Sheopore, a town situated at a short distance south of the Chumbul, in the route to Kota, and about fifty miles north-east of that place. Their armies marched on that day twenty miles, and on the following fourteen. Their route lay along the banks of the Chumbul, over deep ravines, and the want of water and excessive heat added to the difficulty and fatigue of the march, occasioned the destruction of vast numbers of the troops of those chieftains. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar continued their march along the banks of the Chumbul until their arrival at Sheopore, where they halted some days.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to state in this place the general operation of the orders of the 5th of April, on the subject of adopting the necessary preparations for the eventual renewal of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah according to the information at present in our possession.

The Governor-General's instructions to Colonel Close of the 5th of April (of which the substance is stated in a former paragraph of this despatch) were received by that officer at Nagpore on the 19th of the same month. Colonel Close immediately issued instructions to Colonel Haliburton, commanding the Hyderabad subsidiary force (who had withdrawn the force under his command towards the Godavery,

agreeably to the orders of the 24th of January, as stated in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th of March) to advance without delay to his former position at Mulkapore, where it was Colonel Close's intention that he should be joined by the main body of the Poonah subsidiary force under the command of Colonel Wallace. Colonel Haliburton's force was equipped with battering guns, and every requisite for undertaking the siege of Asseergurh, and was joined by the contingent of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan. Colonel Close at the same time signified to Colonel Wallace his desire, that Colonel Wallace should immediately advance with that part of the subsidiary force under his command, which would remain after providing for the protection of Poonah, and for the eventual occupation of the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the vicinity of Ahmednagar, for the purpose of joining Colonel Haliburton at Mulkapore, and of assuming the command of the troops in the Deccan until the receipt of further orders.

The force to be left at Poonah, was to consist of two battalions of native infantry, and an equal force was to remain at Ahmednagar for the purpose of occupying Scindiah's possessions in that quarter in the event of war. The latter force, after performing the prescribed service, was to advance and join the main body of the combined subsidiary forces.

Colonel Close commenced his march from Nagpore on the 22d of April, and proceeded in the direction of Mulkapore for the purpose of joining Colonel Haliburton's detachment.

On the receipt of Colonel Close's instructions, Colonel Haliburton commenced his march on his return to Mulkapore. In conformity to Colonel Close's directions, measures were immediately adopted by Colonel Wallace in concert with Captain T. Sydenham, officiating Resident at the court of his Highness the Peishwa, for preparing for field service the part of the subsidiary force which was destined for active operations in the event of war with Scindiah, and that corps consisting of his Majesty's 74th regiment, three battalions of native infantry, and two regiments of native cavalry, exclusive of the two battalions intended to be left at Ahmednagar, was to have been ready to advance towards Mulkapore by the 20th of the present month in a state of efficient equip-

ment for field service. The necessary arrangements were also made for securing regular and ample supplies of treasure and provisions for this detachment.

Your honourable Committee will have observed by the Governor-General's instructions to the right honourable Lord William Bentinck of the 5th of April (of which the substance is stated in a former paragraph of this despatch) that the Government of Fort St. George was instructed to adopt measures of precaution against any attempt which might be made by the southern Mahratta chiefs to excite disturbance or to violate the neighbouring possessions of the Company or its allies. With a view to guard against any such attempt, as well as to provide for other contingencies which might arise, the right honourable Lord William Bentinck and his Excellency Sir John Craddock deemed it to be advisable to prepare a considerable force to be assembled at an advanced position in the ceded districts. Orders were accordingly issued by those authorities for assembling at Belharry a force composed of his Majesty's 33d regiment of foot, four battalions of native infantry, his Majesty's 22d regiment of light dragoons, and two regiments of native cavalry, with a considerable field equipment. The government of Fort St. George also issued orders for the return from Malabar of the two remaining battalions of the establishment of Bombay serving in that province, resolving to supply their place by withdrawing a part of the British forces from the province of Travancore. The right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George further deemed it to be advisable that the Dewan of Mysore should take the field with a body of the Rajah's troops, and occupy a position on the frontier of Mysore, and also that a body of the Sillahdar horse in the service of the Rajah should join the British troops to be assembled at Belharry.

Your honourable Committee will observe with satisfaction the alacrity with which the Dewan of Mysore assented to the proposition of the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, and the promptitude and efficiency of the arrangements adopted by the Dewan for the complete attainment of the objects suggested to his attention.

Your honourable Committee will derive considerable satisfaction from observing the effects of the system of Government established in Mysore, which enables that government

at so short a notice to assemble a force capable both of affording complete protection to that valuable country against the attacks of a foreign enemy, without the hazard of internal disorder, and of affording essential aid to the British Government in the operations and arrangements of war. Your honourable Committee will observe that the Dewan had engaged within the space of a fortnight from the date of the Acting Resident's communication, to assemble a force at Hinesghur on the frontier of Mysore, consisting of 3500 cavalry and 2500 regular infantry, with a proportion of artillery, and to be prepared with an additional body of light troops and guns to reinforce the army in advance or to proceed in any other direction whenever the services of that additional force might be required.

The honourable the Governor of Bombay on the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions of the 5th of April, adopted measures for reinforcing the troops in Guzerat, to the extent immediately practicable; having issued orders for the march of five companies of European infantry and a company of artillery to join the force under Colonel Woodington, the officer commanding in Guzerat; and the necessary measures were also adopted for reinforcing the troops in Guzerat in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions of the 5th of April.

The state of affairs, however, which appeared to exist at the period of time when the Governor-General in Council received the information of the retreat of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from Subbulgurh, rendered it expedient in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council to modify the instructions of the 5th of April in such a manner as to combine with all the advantages of a state of preparation for active operations against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the principles of a permanent system of military arrangement and a material reduction of military expence.

The conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had unquestionably justified the most active measures of war against him, and if that chieftain, in conjunction with the enemy, had maintained his position at Subbulgurh, the Governor-General in Council would have considered that contingency to constitute one of those cases in which by the Governor-General's instructions of the 4th, 7th, 10th, and 12th of April, the Commander-in-

Chief was authorized to employ the British troops in the destruction of the force of Dowlut Rao Scindiah: but the nature of that chieftain's retreat on the reported advance of the British troops, combined with other circumstances, appeared to demonstrate, that whatever might be the ultimate intentions of his Highness, or rather of those infatuated persons, by whose mischievous counsels he was misguided, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was not prepared for hostilities, and on the part of the British Government it was manifestly desirable to avoid the necessity of war. The Governor-General in Council also entertained an expectation that the measures adopted for effecting a favourable impression upon Scindiah's counsels, combined with the distress in which the progress of his present counsels must involve Dowlut Rao Scindiah, would ultimately incline that chieftain to revert to his alliance with the Company. Under all these circumstances the Governor-General in Council judged it to be expedient to adopt the necessary measures for cantoning the army at its several fixed stations. In the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, this measure properly arranged, might be expected to afford sufficient protection to our possessions even in the event of war, and the best security for the preservation of peace would be, such a distribution of our armies, as should enable them to act against the enemy with vigour and celerity if Scindiah should commence hostilities, or Holkar again attempt to disturb the tranquillity of our territories. At the same time this arrangement would afford the means of effecting a material reduction of the heavy charges incident to a state of war.

Instructions were accordingly issued by the Governor-General to his Excellency the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief, to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, and to the other authorities on which the execution of the proposed plan of arrangement in any degree depended.

The Commander-in-Chief was instructed not to pursue the retreating forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, but to direct his attention to the necessary arrangements for cantoning the British troops. In every arrangement, however, which might be adopted, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was especially requested to advert to

the possibility of our being hereafter compelled to employ our arms against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to the necessity of securing our valuable possessions against the predatory attempts of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or of any other free-booter; and with this view the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was directed to the indispensable object of maintaining the several corps in such a state of equipment as might enable them if necessary to take the field, when the violence of the monsoon should have ceased.

In cantoning the troops, the following objects were recommended to the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, as calculated for the accomplishment of the proposed system of military arrangement in the north-west quarter of Hindostan, 1st. The establishment of the subsidiary force with the Rana of Gohud, to be stationed either at Gohud or in some favourable position in that district. 2nd. The establishment of a force in the province of Bundelcund, sufficient to cover that province, and to enable the revenue officers to complete the settlement of the revenues. 3rd. To station a force at Agra and Muttra, or in some part between those cities. 4th. To station a force at Delhi and in the northern part of the Doab.

The expediency of cantoning the main strength of his army on the right bank of the Jumna, or in the vicinity of that river, was recommended to Lord Lake's consideration, provided the health of the Europeans should not be exposed to risk by that measure. The Commander-in-Chief was further instructed to send the Bombay army under the command of Major-General Jones towards Rampoorah, there to be cantoned until the season should admit of its proceeding to Guzerat, and the Governor-General expressed his hope that the army of Bombay might march through Malwa before the violence of the rains should commence. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was requested to take particular care that in proceeding through the province of Malwa the Bombay army should be of sufficient strength, especially in cavalry, to be superior to the Mahrattas, and to be enabled not only to defeat the main body of the Mahratta armies, but at the same time to protect its supplies against any plunderers who might attempt to intercept them; and with these views the Governor-General suggested to his Excellency the

Commander-in-Chief the expediency of reinforcing the army of Bombay with two regiments of native cavalry. The Governor-General also suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the importance of rendering the equipments of the Bombay army as complete as possible, and of placing it in a state fit for active field service previously to the commencement of its march towards Guzerat.

The Governor-General further suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the expediency of directing Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm (whose mission is noticed in a preceding paragraph) to accompany the Bombay army for the purpose of facilitating his arrival at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and, (with reference to the general tenor of the Governor-General's recent instructions to the Commander-in-Chief), of empowering Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm to employ the army of Bombay in its march to Guzerat, for the purpose of carrying into effect any arrangements which might be adopted in concert with Scindiah, for securing the person of Holkar, or for prosecuting the objects of the instructions with which the Commander-in-Chief might furnish Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm.

The Governor-General then proceeded to state the expediency of reducing all the corps of irregular troops in the service of the British Government, as a measure which, adverting to the actual condition of our military power and resources, and to the state of the Mahratta armies, might be adopted without hazard, and which would afford material relief to the public finances. The Governor-General at the same time suggested various modes of providing for the corps of irregular troops which should be dismissed, with a view to preclude the necessity to which those corps might otherwise be reduced, of entering into the service of our enemies.

The Governor-General further signified to the Commander-in-Chief the necessity of employing every effort for the reduction of all other extra charges of every description without delay, and for the settlement of our conquests and the security of their revenue.

The Governor-General requested from the Commander-in-Chief a detailed report on all the points stated in these instructions, together with a return of all the irregular cavalry and infantry in the service of the British Government, including a statement of the monthly expense of those corps,

and a plan for the reduction of them by transferring them to our allies, and by posting the British officers lately in the Mahratta service to those corps; also a detailed plan for the distribution of the troops on the right bank of the Jumna; for the establishment of cantonments near Agra, Delhi, Bundelcund, or other stations; and for the distribution of the troops in the Doab and Rohilcund, including the Vizier's territory; shewing the number of troops proposed to be stationed at the several cantonments, garrisons, and posts, and comprising a general return of the number of men composing the army under his Excellency's personal command.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the substance of the instructions issued to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, for the accomplishment of that part of the proposed plan of arrangement which related to that Presidency.

After stating in general terms the grounds on which the Governor-General in Council founded an expectation of preserving the relations of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and after adverting to the considerations which suggested the expediency of a system of military arrangement, such as has been already described, the Governor-General stated his opinion, that under actual circumstances, the army of Fort St. George might safely be placed on the scale of its ordinary establishment, and that all extra charges of every description might be immediately reduced.

The Governor-General observed that it was scarcely possible, even if Scindiah should be disposed to commence hostilities, that in the present season the Deccan would become the theatre of the war, and that even if Scindiah should enter the Deccan, the subsidiary forces serving with the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, were fully equal to defeat the Mahratta armies. The Governor-General therefore directed the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George to suspend the execution of the arrangements described in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, and to distribute the army of Fort St. George at its usual stations, and to proceed immediately to withdraw from the Deccan all corps and establishments which might be extra to the field establishment of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peishwa and the

Soubahdar of the Deccan respectively. As the absence of the army of Bombay under the command of Major-General Jones, however, and the necessity of reinforcing Guzerat, precluded the practicability of completing the subsidiary force of Poonah with troops of the establishment of Bombay, the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George was apprized, that until the return to Guzerat of the army under Major-General Jones, the deficiency of the subsidiary force of Poonah must be supplied from the Presidency of Fort St. George.

The Government of Fort St. George was also directed to proceed to reduce the extra battalions on the establishment of that Presidency, and to make every other reduction of military expense compatible with the interests of the public service.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the substance of the instructions issued on this occasion to Colonel Close, who in pursuance of the orders of the 4th of April, had commenced his return to Mulcapore for the purpose of assuming the command of the army of the Deccan, as stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch.

Copies of the Governor-General's instructions to the right honourable Lord Lake and Lord William Bentinck, of which the substance is above stated, were transmitted to Colonel Close, and that officer was directed to carry into execution such parts of those instructions as might depend upon the exercise of his authority. Colonel Close was further instructed to make such a distribution of the two subsidiary forces serving with the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan respectively, as should provide for the formation of a field corps consisting of two regiments of cavalry, one regiment of European infantry, and six battalions of sepoys, with a due proportion of artillery, pioneers, &c., and to dispose of the remainder of the subsidiary forces in the manner which might appear to Colonel Close to be most advantageous for the security of our interests in the Deccan. At the same time it was intimated to Colonel Close, that the field corps should occupy an advanced position near Mulcapore, and should be cantoned or covered until it should be practicable for the subsidiary forces to occupy the respective positions

on the Godavery river, which had been appointed for their permanent stations.

The Governor-General in Council being of opinion that the actual position of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Hindostan, and the mission of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm to the Court of that chieftain, precluded the necessity of continuing the military and political powers vested in Colonel Close, by the Governor-General's orders of the 5th of April (as stated in a preceding paragraph), the Governor-General in Council resolved to withdraw those powers, and to direct Colonel Close to return to Poonah for the purpose of resuming his situation of Resident at the Court of his Highness the Peishwa, authorizing that officer, however, to continue for the present to exercise the same control over the field corps in advance, as was exercised by the Resident at Poonah over the Peishwa's subsidiary force. The communication of this arrangement accordingly formed a part of the instructions to Colonel Close, to which the preceding paragraphs refer.

Copies of the Governor-General's instructions to the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief, to the Government of Fort St. George and to Colonel Close, of which the substance is above stated, were transmitted to the Governor of Bombay with corresponding instructions for the execution of those branches of the general arrangement, the completion of which depended in any degree upon the authority of the Government of Bombay. The objects to which the attention of the Governor of Bombay was immediately directed, were to secure the province of Guzerat, and to make every reduction of extra expense which might be compatible with that object, and with a state of efficient preparation in that quarter, in the event (which the Governor-General stated to be improbable), of Scindiah's proceeding to hostilities, or of Holkar's attempting any incursion into Guzerat. With a view to economy, the Governor-General suggested to the special consideration of the Governor of Bombay, the expediency of cantoning the corps in Guzerat, but at the same time to canton them in such a manner as to admit of assembling them with the greatest expedition, observing that it would be extremely desirable to avoid the expense of field allowances, if the troops could be so stationed as to secure in an effectual manner the province of Guzerat; and the Governor of Bombay

was accordingly desired to refrain from incurring any field expenses without the previous sanction of this Government, unless circumstances should occur to render that measure indispensably necessary, and to preclude the delay of awaiting the result of a reference to the Supreme Government in India, without hazard of injury to the public service.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of the proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of transactions connected with the conduct of that chieftain.

A former paragraph adverts to the seizure of Ambajee, who was in consequence compelled to consent to the payment of fifty lacs of rupees. On the 4th of May Serjee Rao Ghautka, with about 3000 horse, marched towards Kota for the purpose of realizing the amount to be paid by Ambajee, who had before been despatched to that place under the charge of Bappojee Scindiah, Ambajee having promised to effect the payment at Kota. In his despatch of the 4th of May to the Commander-in-Chief, the Acting Resident intimated that by intelligence which he deemed authentic he was disposed to believe that he should be permitted to depart with every necessary protection both from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and from Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Under this impression, the Acting Resident despatched a message to Dowlut Rao Scindiah requesting a reply to his memorial of the 27th of April, but received no communication upon the subject from Dowlut Rao Scindiah before the Acting Resident's receipt of the Commander-in-Chief's instructions of the 29th of April, conveying his Excellency's letter of that date to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the substance of which is stated in a preceding paragraph. On the receipt of those instructions, the Acting Resident immediately transmitted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the Commander-in-Chief's letter to his Highness's address; intimating at the same time that he had received corresponding orders from the Commander-in-Chief, directing him to quit his Highness's camp with the least practicable delay, and requesting to be apprized of the arrangements which his Highness might be pleased to adopt, for the purpose of facilitating the Acting Resident's execution of his Excellency's commands. To this communication his Highness replied, that the minister Serjee Rao Ghautka being absent at Kota, he could not immediately return a decided answer,

and that in the course of two or three days a reply to the Commander-in-Chief's letter might be prepared.

On the 7th of May, the Acting Resident again signified to the Durbar his uneasiness at being prevented from executing the orders of the Commander-in-Chief; intimating at the same time that his Excellency did not expect any answer to his letter, but would be surprized to learn that the British Representative at his Highness's Court was not permitted to obey the orders of his own government. That his Highness must be aware of the impracticability of the Acting Resident's departure without the full protection of his Highness; and that the usages of the world and the principles of justice and public faith required that a person in the situation of the Acting Resident should be entirely free from restraint, and that the Acting Resident merely desired to be informed of his Highness's intentions to enable him to exculpate himself from the charge of a voluntary deviation from the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. In his report upon this subject, the Acting Resident suggested to the Commander-in-Chief, with reference to the systematic evasion and delay which characterize the proceedings of a Mahratta Court, that his Excellency should address a separate letter to his Highness, the purport of which should be limited to the demand of safe conduct for the Acting Resident and the gentlemen of the Residency to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the 9th of May the Acting Resident had not received any satisfactory reply from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his several messages on the subject of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. On the preceding evening, however, his Highness signified to the Acting Resident that a copy of the Commander-in-Chief's letter, together with the substance of the Acting Resident's several messages, has been communicated to the minister Serjee Rao Ghautka. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's officers endeavoured to counteract the Acting Resident's solicitude to depart, by expatiating on the dangers to which he would be exposed from the numerous troops stated to be assembled by the people of the country in the vicinity of the camp, and in the road to the head quarters of the British army. The Acting Resident having obviated this supposed difficulty, by informing his Highness that whenever a day might be fixed for his departure, the Commander-

in-Chief would despatch a force to meet the Acting Resident, and that he should merely require a convoy of his Highness's cavalry rather for the purpose of shewing that he had the protection of Dowlut Rao Scindiah than of repelling any danger, the Acting Resident received another message to this effect:—that the Commander-in-Chief's letter, together with the substance of his Excellency's communications, had been submitted to the minister, and that the advance of a British force was unnecessary, because whenever the Acting Resident might depart, exclusively of about 500 of his Highness's horse, and the same number of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's cavalry, the Acting Resident should receive the protection of any force of infantry and guns he might desire; and that his Highness would in every respect be responsible for the safe conduct of the Acting Resident to the head quarters of the British army.

In his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, containing a relation of the circumstances above described, the Acting Resident stated that he had understood from some authority, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had some intention of despatching a person of rank to the Commander-in-Chief, together with some chief on the part of Holkar. The Acting Resident added that he had secretly insinuated that such a mission could not be received by the Commander-in-Chief so long as the Acting Resident should be forcibly detained in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In reply to this communication, a letter was addressed to the Acting Resident by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, purporting that it appeared to his Excellency to be the wish of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to detain the Acting Resident in his Highness's camp, and that this supposed disposition of his Highness's mind, combined with the information of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intention to despatch a person of rank to the Commander-in-Chief, suggested a conjecture, that if a free and unsuspected channel could be opened for the communication of his Highness's personal sentiments, they might be found to differ essentially from the profligate and unprincipled maxims which guided the conduct of his minister and his confederate Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Under this impression, the Commander-in-Chief suggested to the Acting Resident that advantage might be derived from the mission of some

person of rank on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to accompany the Acting Resident to the head quarters of the British army, who might either himself be the channel of communication, or whose mission might afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah an opportunity for despatching in his suite a person in his confidence charged with the communication of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's sentiments and wishes on the subject of his affairs to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The Acting Resident was therefore directed by his Excellency to take advantage of any proposition for the despatch of a person of rank to the British camp, by intimating to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that although the Commander-in-Chief had positively refused to receive any person avowedly despatched by Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of negotiating for Jeswunt Rao Holkar, no objection opposed the despatch of a person of rank on the part of his Highness, to accompany the Acting Resident for the purpose of communicating to the Commander-in-Chief his Highness's own sentiments and views. These instructions were dated the 15th of May.

On the 9th of May the Acting Resident received the Governor-General's instructions of the 20th of April (the substance of which is comprized in preceding paragraphs of this despatch), in which the Governor-General stated his acceptance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's letter of apology, combined with his verbal declarations and those of his minister, as a satisfactory atonement for the outrages committed by his Highness's servants against the British Residency; the Acting Resident at the same time received the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon that subject. In the actual situation of affairs at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Acting Resident judged it expedient to withhold the communication of the Governor-General's sentiments and the delivery of the Governor-General's letter upon that subject until his arrival in the British camp.

Your honourable Committee will observe that on the 10th of May Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar recommenced their march towards Kotah, and that at the date above mentioned the Acting Resident had not been able to obtain any satisfactory reply from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his application for permission to quit his Highness's camp.

By the whole tenor of the transactions at the Court of

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, your honourable Committee will have observed that the weakness and indolence of Scindiah's personal character combined with his habits of levity and debauchery, have gradually subjected him to the uncontrolled influence of his minister Serjee Rao Ghautka, a person of the most profligate principles, and whose cruelty, violence, and abandoned conduct have rendered him odious to whatever remains of respectable character among the chiefs attached to Scindiah. Ghautka's personal views, and irregular and disorderly disposition, are adverse to the establishment of Scindiah's government upon any settled basis of peace and order, Ghautka is therefore an enemy to the treaty of alliance subsisting between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the honourable Company. Your honourable Committee will observe, that under the guidance of such perverse counsels, the interests of Dowlut Rao Scindiah have actually been sacrificed by Ghautka to those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and it appears by the Report of the Acting Resident, that in the absence of Serjee Rao Ghautka, the functions of the administration are actually discharged by Jeswunt Rao Holkar. So long as these persons shall continue to maintain the entire ascendancy in the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, no hope can reasonably be entertained of the just operation of the relations established between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the provisions of subsisting treaties.

Adverting to the turbulent disposition and the predatory habits of Holkar, it is not probable that he will sincerely consent to any system of arrangement which shall deprive him of the means of ranging the territories of Hindostan at the head of a body of plunderers, excepting only in the last extremity of ruined fortune. From that condition Jeswunt Rao Holkar may be considered to have been relieved in the degree in which the reduced powers and resources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah may have fallen under his control by his junction with Ghautka.

Whatever might be the expediency under other circumstances of offering to Jeswunt Rao Holkar terms of accommodation without previous submission and solicitation on his part, in the present situation of affairs the offer of terms such as Jeswunt Rao Holkar might be expected to accept, would be manifestly injurious to the reputation, and ultimately

hazardous to the security of the British Government. It is doubtful however whether the haughtiness, ferocity and turbulence of Holkar's disposition could under any circumstances whatever be reconciled to a condition of dependence and control. This disinclination on the part of Holkar to consent to terms of accommodation, unquestionably exists in the mind of that chieftain, independently of any hope of retrieving the disgrace which he has suffered, and of recovering the power and resources of which he has been deprived in the late contest. It is manifestly inconsistent with that regard to the reputation of the British Government, the preservation of which is an essential bulwark of our power, or with the principles of public faith and honour to offer concessions to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. His rejection or acceptance of concessions offered under the circumstances of the present moment, would equally tend to shake the foundations of our power; no terms of settlement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar can safely be granted, which shall not have been previously solicited by that chieftain, and which shall not be calculated to deprive him of the means of invading the rights and disturbing the possessions of the British Government and its allies.

The proposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to mediate a peace between the British Government and Holkar, affords no ground of confidence in the disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to consent to any terms which could be granted to him, consistently with the principles of honour, security, or public faith. There is every reason indeed to believe, that the proposed mediation was merely a pretext to cover a predetermined resolution on the part of Serjee Rao Ghautka, in the unlimited exercise of his ascendancy over the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to effect a junction of the forces of that chieftain and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and if the British Government had submitted to accept the proposed mediation, such concessions would have been demanded as could only have been yielded in the last extremity of defeat and distress.

No principles of permanency exist in the present extraordinary combination of the interests of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which has been effected through the agency and ascendancy of Serjee Rao Ghautka. It is

not probable that the chiefs and the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah will long submit to be the instruments of the wild and profligate designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Serjee Rao Ghautka, or patiently endure the difficulties and distresses to which they are at present exposed. It may be expected that Dowlut Rao Scindiah himself may soon become sensible of the disgrace and degradation of his actual condition, and may be induced by a just sentiment of pride and indignation to make an effectual effort for his emancipation from the control of those chieftains who have abused his confidence and usurped his power. The Governor-General in Council therefore anticipates the speedy dissolution of this confederacy, but the British Government will be prepared to take advantage of any circumstances favourable to the restoration of permanent tranquillity, and of our relations with the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the basis of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance.

It is the intention of the Governor-General in Council, even under present circumstances, to adhere to the principles of the peace established by the treaty of Serjee Anjengaum, while Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall continue to abstain from active measures of hostility against the British Government and its allies.

The necessity of adopting a new basis of pacification with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as stated by the Governor-General in his instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the 10th of April (the substance of which is contained in preceding paragraphs of this despatch), was stated with reference to the supposed previous necessity of prosecuting hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. While any ground of expectation remains that Scindiah may be induced to regulate his conduct in conformity to the spirit of subsisting engagements, the immediate urgency of a change in the fundamental principles of our connection with the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah is precluded. The unavoidable occurrence of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah would constitute a proof of the indispensable necessity of such a change; and without being actually placed in a condition of war relatively to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the British Government would not be justified in demanding the concessions necessary for the accomplishment

of the proposed alteration in the system of our political connection with the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Governor-General in Council confidently expects that the course of policy described in the foregoing paragraphs combined with a due sense of the advantages of the treaty of peace and defensive alliance, will constitute an additional inducement with that chieftain to effect his early emancipation from his present distressed and degraded situation.

In the mean time the Governor-General in Council has the satisfaction to assure your honourable Committee that no danger can be apprehended from any exertion of the combined forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to impair the foundations of our security.

Even should no opportunity occur for a permanent and advantageous settlement of our relations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, previously to the return of the season for military operations, the arrangements which have been adopted for the disposal of the British forces as described in preceding paragraphs of this despatch, and which will be completely accomplished before the commencement of that season, will secure the tranquillity of our possessions and those of our allies from any hostile attempt on the part of the confederated forces of those chieftains.

In concluding this despatch, the Governor-General in Council deems it expedient to submit to your honourable Committee the following observations respecting the effect of the war with Holkar upon the principles of the general system of our defensive alliances, in Hindostan and the Deccan.

The different states of India included in the general system of defensive alliance are, the Peishwa; Soubahdar of the Deccan; Rajah of Mysore; Guikwar; Rajah of Jeypbre; Rajah of Bhurtpore; Rajah of Matcherry; Rana of Gohud; Scindiah.

In the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, we have derived considerable assistance from the Peishwa, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Rajah of Mysore and the Guikwar, under the operation of our engagements with those states. That assistance could not have been expected under any other state of circumstances. The troops of these states have actually joined our armies while the re-

sources of their respective territories have been at our disposal and have been applied with advantage to the use of our troops in the field.

At this moment the troops of the Peishwa and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan form an useful addition to the army in the Deccan. The troops of the Rajah of Mysore are already prepared for active operations. The troops of the Guikwar have rendered considerable services with the army under the command of Major-General Jones and have furnished convoy for the extensive supplies, which have been drawn as well from the Guikwar's territories as from the Company's resources for the use of the army.

These advantages could not have been obtained without the operation of the system of alliances established with those states respectively, and it may justly be apprehended that in a different state of circumstances, the resources by which our military operations have been so materially facilitated might have been applied against us. The causes which have precluded the operation of the alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah have been fully detailed in the narrative of transactions and events at that chieftain's court, and your honourable Committee will observe that those causes are wholly unconnected with any considerations affecting the general policy of the alliance.

The Rajah of Jeypore has not fulfilled the duties of the alliance against the common enemy. With regard to active exertions, he has observed a strict neutrality. But this conduct on the part of the Rajah must be attributed to the internal state of the politics of that court. The Rajah of Jeypore however has been useful in a certain degree, by assembling his troops and by publicly manifesting a design to co-operate with the British forces. Had the Rajah of Jeypore been unconnected with us, the difficulties of the war in Hindostan would have been increased by the necessity of adopting measures of precaution to guard against the possible effect of intrigues at that court, which we should not then have had the means of controlling.

The Rajah of Matcherry has performed all the duties of defensive alliance with fidelity and zeal.

The Rana of Gohud has been equally faithful and his troops have been actively employed against the enemy.

With regard to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, it may be observed that a sufficient period of time had not elapsed to give full effect to the alliance, before the advance of Holkar compelled the British power to direct its immediate attention to the prosecution of hostilities against that chieftain. The retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment, followed by the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, favoured the success of Holkar's intrigues at the durbar of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and the characteristic treachery of the Asiatic durbars combined with an exaggerated impression of Holkar's power, induced the Rajah of Bhurtpore to violate his engagements and to join the cause of the enemy. The experience of the difficulty, danger and distress which have attended his connection with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, has induced the Rajah of Bhurtpore to abandon the cause of that chieftain, and to seek the sources of security and prosperity in the renewal of his alliance with the British power.

It is evident therefore that the war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar has not only not affected the general system of our political relations, but has demonstrated the utility of those relations in their application to the increase of our resources and power against our enemies. Under every possible advantage derived from the exertions of intrigue, from the unsettled state of our conquests, from the internal commotion naturally occasioned by a state of active war on the frontier, from the exaggerated impression of Holkar's power, resources, skill and reputation, the disturbances excited by Holkar have not shaken the great foundations of the alliances established in Hindostan and the Deccan, and it may be reasonably expected that the ultimate consequence of the war with Holkar will tend to confirm the stability of all our alliances, and to secure the tranquillity of all our dominions.

We have the honour to be,
honourable Sirs,
your most faithful humble Servants,

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

[Enclosure.]

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency the Right Honourable Lord Lake.

MY LORD,

Fort William 4th April, 1805.

I have received through Lieut.-Colonel Martindell a copy of Mr. Jenkins's address to your Lordship under date the 22nd ult., and I deem it necessary to communicate to your Lordship without delay, in general terms, my sentiments on the measures to be pursued with regard to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under any course of proceeding which that chieftain may be supposed to adopt.

It is possible that Scindiah may halt at a considerable distance from Bhurtpore, and may there open a negotiation with your Excellency by despatching a vakeel to your Excellency's camp. In that event your Excellency will be pleased to reject all demands which may in any degree differ from the terms of the treaty of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 30th of December 1803, and your Excellency will be regulated in your negotiations by the tenor of the instructions which have been issued to Mr. Jenkins under date the 2nd instant, and of which a copy has been transmitted for your Excellency's information, and of my notes to your Excellency of the 29th ult.,* as far as they may be applicable to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. While Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall abstain from actual aggression, I shall be disposed to accede to an adjustment of all depending points in the manner prescribed in those documents, and to maintain our intercourse and connection with Dowlut Rao Scindiah as before, on the basis of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance.

In the event of war, your Excellency will take every practicable measure for the safety of Mr. Jenkins, and of the British Residency. If Scindiah should violate the territory of our ally the Rana of Gohud, or should advance within a short distance of any part of our territories or those of our allies, or of your Excellency's camp, or of that of any of our detachments evidently with hostile intentions, or in a menacing manner, your Excellency will of course employ the most active exertions for attacking and destroying his force. And in this case the atrocious treachery of Scindiah has been so flagrant, that your Excellency cannot render a more essential service to your country, than by the total reduction of Scindiah's force opposed to you.

If the success of your Excellency's force should be such as to place your Excellency in a condition to dictate the terms of pacification with Scindiah, I have no desire to depart from the basis of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance now subsisting, with this difference, that in the supposed event, I should deem it necessary to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah's consent to the establishment of the British subsidiary force, within his dominions, and your Excellency will accordingly proceed to the adjustment of every point under those treaties, in the manner prescribed by the instructions to Mr. Jenkins, above referred to, requiring at the same time

* See Enclosure following this letter.

of the proposed alteration in the system of our political connection with the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Governor-General in Council confidently expects that the course of policy described in the foregoing paragraphs combined with a due sense of the advantages of the treaty of peace and defensive alliance, will constitute an additional inducement with that chieftain to effect his early emancipation from his present distressed and degraded situation.

In the mean time the Governor-General in Council has the satisfaction to assure your honourable Committee that no danger can be apprehended from any exertion of the combined forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to impair the foundations of our security.

Even should no opportunity occur for a permanent and advantageous settlement of our relations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, previously to the return of the season for military operations, the arrangements which have been adopted for the disposal of the British forces as described in preceding paragraphs of this despatch, and which will be completely accomplished before the commencement of that season, will secure the tranquillity of our possessions and those of our allies from any hostile attempt on the part of the confederated forces of those chieftains.

In concluding this despatch, the Governor-General in Council deems it expedient to submit to your honourable Committee the following observations respecting the effect of the war with Holkar upon the principles of the general system of our defensive alliances, in Hindostan and the Deccan.

The different states of India included in the general system of defensive alliance are, the Peishwa; Soubahdar of the Deccan; Rajah of Mysore; Guikwar; Rajah of Jeypbre; Rajah of Bhurtpore; Rajah of Matcherry; Rana of Gohud; Scindiah.

In the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, we have derived considerable assistance from the Peishwa, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Rajah of Mysore and the Guikwar, under the operation of our engagements with those states. That assistance could not have been expected under any other state of circumstances. The troops of these states have actually joined our armies while the re-

sources of their respective territories have been at our disposal and have been applied with advantage to the use of our troops in the field.

At this moment the troops of the Peishwa and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan form an useful addition to the army in the Deccan. The troops of the Rajah of Mysore are already prepared for active operations. The troops of the Guikwar have rendered considerable services with the army under the command of Major-General Jones and have furnished convoy for the extensive supplies, which have been drawn as well from the Guikwar's territories as from the Company's resources for the use of the army.

These advantages could not have been obtained without the operation of the system of alliances established with those states respectively, and it may justly be apprehended that in a different state of circumstances, the resources by which our military operations have been so materially facilitated might have been applied against us. The causes which have precluded the operation of the alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah have been fully detailed in the narrative of transactions and events at that chieftain's court, and your honourable Committee will observe that those causes are wholly unconnected with any considerations affecting the general policy of the alliance.

The Rajah of Jeypore has not fulfilled the duties of the alliance against the common enemy. With regard to active exertions, he has observed a strict neutrality. But this conduct on the part of the Rajah must be attributed to the internal state of the politics of that court. The Rajah of Jeypore however has been useful in a certain degree, by assembling his troops and by publicly manifesting a design to co-operate with the British forces. Had the Rajah of Jeypore been unconnected with us, the difficulties of the war in Hindostan would have been increased by the necessity of adopting measures of precaution to guard against the possible effect of intrigues at that court, which we should not then have had the means of controlling.

The Rajah of Matcherry has performed all the duties of defensive alliance with fidelity and zeal.

The Rana of Gohud has been equally faithful and his troops have been actively employed against the enemy.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah's reception of the subsidiary force within his territories.

After any success against Scindiah, your Excellency will also require as a preliminary of all negotiation on the subject of peace with Scindiah, the removal of Serjee Rao Ghautka from Scindiah's counsels.

In the event of the defeat of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's force by the British troops, it is probable that Jeswunt Rao Holkar may be disposed to accede to terms of accommodation. The terms which I should be disposed to grant to Jeswunt Rao Holkar are, a settlement in part of the territory of the Holkar family which it was intended to assign to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the condition of Holkar's abstaining from all demands or exactions from any of the allies of the British power.

No territory should be granted to Holkar to the southward of the Nerbuddah, in the event of any treaty with him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

P. S. In any negotiation, your Lordship will not permit Scindiah to treat for Holkar, or Holkar for Scindiah. It may also be necessary to observe that if after due notification, any of the present pensioners of the British Government shall serve in Scindiah's army against the British power, their pensions must be struck off at the peace. The pensions were granted to the individuals, and not to Scindiah's government. The pensions of Bappojee Scindiah and of Suddasheo Bhow must never be renewed. All such reductions are to be considered as absolute, and not to be replaced by pensions of equal amount to other parties.

[Enclosure.]

Marquess Wellesley's Notes respecting Scindiah, referred to at p. 237.

Fort William, 29th March, 1805.

1. Scindiah is probably before this time at Narwar with an army.
2. His views are not yet declared to me, but they are probably hostile, or at least intended to be regulated by events.
3. He asserts several claims under the treaty of peace, and perhaps he may take up a position on the frontier, and require satisfaction of those claims, or he may invade Gohud, or other parts of our territory, or that of the allies, and justify this invasion under pretence of these claims; he may attempt to seize Gwalior, Gohud, and Dholepore, &c. &c.
4. It is absolutely necessary to have a force superior to Scindiah, in a position calculated to intimidate him, but not so close as to render hostilities inevitable. I trust that steps have already been taken for reinforcing Colonel Martindell, and that he will be ordered immediately to take up a commanding position against Scindiah.
5. In addition to this measure, it would be desirable that Lord Lake should approach Scindiah. The co-operation of these two bodies must destroy him, if he should attempt hostilities.
6. When the several corps are in their proper positions, Scindiah should be brought to a full explanation upon all points of difference, by amicable

representation. Mr. Mercer should be sent to Scindiah, after having received a proper safeguard, with a letter from the Commander-in-Chief.

7. In the mean while Mr. Jenkins will be empowered to act, to correspond with the Commander-in-Chief, and to take his Excellency's orders until Colonel Close shall arrive, who will also be placed under Lord Lake's orders.

8. It is doubtful whether Colonel Close will reach Scindiah in time, or indeed at all. It is intended to relieve Colonel Close at Scindiah's Durbar, by Colonel Malcolm, who is expected soon at Calcutta, and who will proceed directly from the Governor-General to Scindiah's camp. But this arrangement cannot take place for a time. The Commander-in-Chief might immediately send an ordinary letter of compliment to Scindiah.

9. It is very desirable to avoid war with Scindiah, but if he should attack any part of our territories, or those of the allies, a vigorous movement against him would probably induce most of his people to quit him, and I suppose his guns must fall; but war must be avoided, if possible.

10. If he should demand Gwalior or Gohud, or make any hostile demand, your Lordship will move an adequate force against him without delay.

11. If he should express a desire to be aided against Ghautka, he must be aided, but care must be taken to preclude the effects of treachery in such a case.

12. Ambajee cannot be received by us without a violation both of the treaties of peace and alliance. If Scindiah does not intend war, the punishment of Ambajee may be considered advantageous. Ambajee cannot be received while any hope of peace shall remain. In the event of war, or if war should appear to be certain, your Lordship will receive Ambajee or not, as your Lordship may judge most useful for the prosecution of war.

13. If Scindiah should not advance himself but send his Pindarries into the country of Gohud or elsewhere, your Lordship will order the troops to destroy these robbers without reserve. You will then write to Scindiah, and desire him either to retreat, and call off his Pindarries, or to restrain them. If he does neither, you will advance a sufficient corps and drive him to the southward at such a distance as shall prevent his depredations.

14. Most of Scindiah's respectable Sirdars and officers will quit him if properly encouraged, in the event of war; your Lordship will publish proper encouragement to them in such an event, particularly you will not fail to promise to all the pensioners and Jagheerdars under the treaty of peace, full and regular payment for life of all their claims under the treaty of peace, provided they quit Scindiah, and join the British armies. This plan will leave Scindiah without an officer of any rank or character. Baptiste would certainly come over, and must be encouraged. The great advantage of the pensions is the influence which they afford us in the event of war with Scindiah. It must also be proclaimed that every man who remains with Scindiah, will lose his pension or jagheer.

15. Scindiah may attempt to send his aumils to Dholepore, Rajakerra and Baree; that measure cannot now be permitted until peace be restored, but the amount of the revenue of those districts must be paid to Scindiah, unless he should violate the peace:

16. In the event of war with Scindiah, the allies must be plainly told that if they prevaricate they will be treated as enemies, or delivered over to Scindiah whenever peace shall be restored.

WELLESLEY.

N. B. The Resident with Scindiah will be informed that your Lordship's powers are the same as General Wellesley's, and, if occasion should require it, he will inform Scindiah accordingly.

W.

[Enclosure.]

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Lake, Commander-in-Chief.

MY LORD,

Fort William, April 10, 1805.

I transmit to your Lordship Notes of Instruction for your guidance in the present crisis. You will consider them to be completely official, although forwarded in the present form to accelerate their despatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

Notes of Instruction, enclosed in "most Secret and Official, No. 5, to his Excellency Lord Lake.

10th April, 1805.

1. Dowlut Rao Scindiah may offer the satisfaction required for the insult to the British Residency, and may retire from our frontier without advancing any of his troops, or making any claims upon us or our allies; in this case it would be unnecessary for the Commander-in-Chief to act against Scindiah in any manner, or to hold any intercourse with that chieftain. The Commander-in-Chief will use in this case every effort to close the war with Holkar, and as soon as the residency with Scindiah can be restored by the arrival of Colonel Malcolm, or of another Resident, all depending questions with Scindiah might probably be brought to an amicable conclusion.

2. Scindiah may refuse or withhold the satisfaction required, and may still retain the person of the British Resident, although he may remain within his own frontier. In this case the Commander-in-Chief must approach Scindiah's position, and demand the safe conduct to his army, of the British Resident, his suite and escort; and if this demand should not be

complied with within a limited number of hours, the Commander-in-Chief must attack Scindiah's army, and use every effort to destroy it, and to seize the persons of Scindiah and Ghautka, employing also all practicable means for the safety of the persons of the British Residency and escort. If Scindiah in this case should even retire from our frontier, carrying the British Resident with him under such disgraceful circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief must use every effort to pursue and destroy Scindiah's army, and to rescue the British Resident.

3. Scindiah may refuse the atonement demanded, but may furnish the passports and safeguard which the British Representative will in that event require of Scindiah, and Mr. Jenkins may arrive in safety at one of our posts, or at head quarters, after the Commander-in-Chief shall have made the demand; Scindiah may then retire and place his army in a position which does not positively amount to hostility against the British Government, or any of its allies. The necessary consequence of this will be as already declared by the Governor-General in his letter to Scindiah of the 22d of April, that all intercourse with Dowlut Rao Scindiah through the channel of a British Representative at his court must cease. Neither the treaty of peace, nor the treaty of defensive alliance, is therefore necessarily dissolved, but the British Government is at liberty under such circumstances to consider both to be dissolved, and even to declare war. For, the Governor-General's declaration in his letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah "that even after Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall have refused atonement, the British Government will be disposed to maintain the ties of amity and peace," is not conditional with reference to any thing demanded of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the British Government. That declaration will be made only after Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall have refused the atonement, and can only be considered to mean that merely on account of Scindiah's refusal to make that atonement the British Government is not disposed to resort to arms. But it cannot preclude the British Government from making war upon Scindiah on the ground of his violation of the treaty of peace, and of his hostile proceedings, among which, combined with other circumstances, his refusal of atonement may properly be classed. However desirable it may be to preserve peace, if the satisfaction required for the insult offered to the British Residency be referred or withheld, war appears to be inevitable, adverting to all the circumstances of Scindiah's conduct and actual power. In any of these cases, therefore, whatever may be the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards Mr. Jenkins, if the public satisfaction required, be deferred or withheld, the Commander-in-Chief will immediately proceed to attack Scindiah's army. If any violence should be offered to the person of the British Resident in any of the supposed cases,* the Commander-in-Chief will attack Scindiah's army without delay.

* With a view to protect the Residency, it might be proper to menace Scindiah's person and family, all his vakeels within our reach in India, and every prisoner taken with retaliation, in the event of any violence to the persons of the Residency, or of the escort. This menace might be conveyed in a letter from the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Scindiah, for the purpose of deceit, may make the proposed atonement, but may menace our frontier, or that of our allies, or may proceed to pass the line of demarcation, or may make demands for himself or for others. In any of these cases the Commander-in-Chief will instantly attack him, making the best practicable arrangement for the security of the Residency. In no case is any demand of any description to be conceded to Scindiah at the head of his army, on our frontier. In every such case the demand must be answered by an instantaneous attack. In no case must Scindiah be permitted to remain upon our frontier, although his immediate position should be within his own. He must be driven from our frontier, and if possible reduced, and every effort must be made for this purpose, notwithstanding the advanced period of the season.

5. If the corps of Colonel Martindell and the Commander-in-Chief's army, could be brought to operate in a general engagement with Scindiah's whole army, the result would probably be a more brilliant triumph than any we have yet obtained in the whole history of India. It appears to be nearly certain in such an event that all Scindiah's artillery must fall into our hands, that few if any of his infantry could escape, and that any part of his cavalry which should attempt resistance must be destroyed. It is even highly probable that the person of Scindiah and Ghautka would fall into our hands. Upon the whole, it might be expected that such a victory would establish the tranquillity of India for many years. Never was such an example more requisite to settle the opinions of the native powers, and the character of the British arms in India would derive additional lustre from so decisive a victory in such a cause. A general engagement therefore between the whole of Scindiah's force, particularly if he should be joined by Holkar and Meer Khan, appears to be highly desirable after all that has passed, provided your Lordship can bring to act against the whole of Scindiah's army, not only your Lordship's personal army, but the corps under Colonel Martindell, and if Scindiah should advance to Bhurtpore, according to the terms of his insolent and profligate declaration to Mr. Jenkins, I hope your Lordship will place him between your army and that of Colonel Martindell, attack him on both sides without a moment of delay, refusing to receive any vakeels from him, and thus frustrating all his artifices. The mere circumstance of his advance constitutes not only a declaration of war, but a violent act of hostility. If therefore he should advance, I trust your Lordship will direct your whole attention to an immediate attack upon him with every corps that can be brought into action.

6. In the event of war with Scindiah, if your Lordship should prove successful in your operations, you will not offer terms of peace to Scindiah until he shall sue for peace after having been defeated in action. In such a case you will not refuse to receive his vakeels, taking care at the same time to guard against the treachery of that faithless race, and not for a moment relaxing the operations of your army on account of any negotiation. You will also in no case whatever grant any armistice, but even while negotiating pursue the enemy to extremity, and if possible, seize the persons of the authors of this mischief.

7. It remains to consider what terms should be granted to Dowlut Rao

Scindiah in the event of his being so reduced by our arms as to be compelled to sue for peace on any terms.* On this subject my sentiments have been materially changed since I wrote to your Lordship, signifying my disposition in the event of war with Scindiah, and of his defeat, to admit him to the benefits of the subsisting treaties of peace and defensive alliance. Various circumstances relative to the conduct and views of Scindiah's Government have come to my knowledge since that time, which have decided me to reduce his power to the lowest scale in the event of a successful war against him. In determining this question it is necessary to establish some fundamental principles as the basis of pacification. The fundamental principle of the pacification with Scindiah in December 1803, was compensation for Dowlut Rao Scindiah's aggression, and for the injury which the British Government and its allies sustained by the war, without depriving Dowlut Rao Scindiah of any of the rights and privileges of an independent state. It is evident that this principle of pacification has proved inadequate to the purposes of our security, and that the restraints imposed by the provisions of that treaty of peace upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah's means of mischief were insufficient. Another principle of pacification therefore must be assumed. Scindiah must not be permitted to retain the rights and privileges of an independent state, nor any privileges to an extent which may hereafter enable him to injure us or our allies, and we must secure the arrangement by establishing a direct control over the acts of his Government, experience having sufficiently manifested that it was in vain to place any reliance upon the faith, justice, sincerity, gratitude, or honour of that chieftain. With these sentiments I annex the following Notes, containing the basis of the treaty to be concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the event supposed. I shall forward a draft of the treaty regularly drawn, to your Lordship as soon as possible. In the mean while, if the supposed exigency should have occurred, an event which appears to me highly probable, your Lordship, if Scindiah should sue for peace, will proceed with confidence to conclude it on the terms herein stated.

WELLESLEY.

* In this event the Commander-in-Chief will not despatch any British agent to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of negotiating the peace. The peace must be negotiated with vakeels despatched to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the treaty must be concluded in the Commander-in-Chief's camp. Immediately upon the conclusion of peace, the Commander-in-Chief will send the subsidiary force, according to the treaty, to join Scindiah, and to conduct him, with all practicable expedition to Oujein, the Commander-in-Chief will name a discreet officer to the command.

Supplement to his Excellency the Governor-General's Notes of Instruction to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief (of the 10th April, 1805), dated 12th April, 1805.

Some cases may possibly occur which are not specifically provided for by the notes of the 10th of April. Scindiah may possibly receive into his camp Rao Holkar or Meer Khan, or both, with or without their troops, and may then desire to open a negotiation with the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of obtaining terms of accommodation for either or both of those chieftains, or without making any demands, or proposing any negotiation, may either continue in his actual position or retire. Under any of these circumstances Scindiah should be instantly attacked. To afford protection to the enemy is an act of hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as positive and direct as that of combining his forces with those of the enemy for the purpose of acting against the British power, and it cannot be doubted that such a step on the part of Scindiah must be intended for the purpose of concerting hostilities against the British power. But Scindiah may intimate that his object in receiving either or both of those chieftains is to restrain them from the further prosecution of hostilities. No dependence whatever can be placed upon such a declaration, and even admitting its sincerity, the reception of either of those chieftains is a violation of the spirit of the treaty of peace; and under any circumstances, the British Government could not, consistently with its dignity, acquiesce in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's assumption of a right to dispose of the persons of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khan. In such case therefore the instant surrender of the persons of Meer Khan or Holkar, or of both, if both should be protected by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, should constitute an indispensable condition of our forbearance from the immediate prosecution of hostilities against the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah should actually surrender the persons of those chieftains, a confident hope might be entertained of his submission to the indispensable demand of satisfaction for the outrages committed against the British Residency (if that should not previously have been afforded), and to such other demands as might be requisite for the security of the British Government against any hostile attempts on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

WELLESLEY.

No. V.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 30th July, 1805.

Our despatch of the 15th of June to your honourable Committee contained a communication of our latest advices from the confederated armies of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and

Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Governor-General in Council also transmitted with that despatch a copy of his Excellency the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to Mr. Jenkins the Acting Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in reply to Mr. Jenkins's communication of an expected change in the administration of that chieftain, and a copy of the Commander-in-Chief's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated the 4th of June, requiring the dismissal and safe conduct of Mr. Jenkins and the gentlemen and escort attached to the Residency within the period of ten days after Scindiah's receipt of that letter. The Governor-General-in-Council now deems it proper to transmit to your honourable Committee a copy of a letter from Mr. Mercer the Governor-General's agent at head quarters, dated the 5th of June, stating the considerations which suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the expediency of the measures adopted by his Excellency for effecting the release of the British Residency at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Governor-General in Council has already signified to your honourable Committee his entire approbation of the tenor of the letter which the Commander-in-Chief addressed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. After the receipt of those despatches, the Governor-General in Council directed his deliberate attention to the important object of determining the course of policy to be pursued by the British Government, not only in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah refusing or evading a compliance with the Commander-in-Chief's demand for the liberation of the Residency within the prescribed period of time, but also under the occurrence of any events which could at that time be foreseen or reasonably supposed.

The measure of withdrawing the British Residency did not necessarily place the British Government in a state of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Commander-in-Chief having very properly avoided a direct menace of war, even in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's refusing or evading a compliance with his Excellency's demand, the course of measures pursued by the Commander-in-Chief appeared to the Governor-General in Council to leave the British Government at liberty in the actual state of circumstances to adopt

either a pacific or an hostile system of policy with respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

With a view to determine this important question,* the Governor-General in Council deemed it proper to advert to the general principles which had regulated the conduct of this government towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to apply those principles to the actual situation of affairs and to any state of circumstances which might be expected to arise. Those principles were, 1st. to avoid the renewal of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, excepting only under the occurrence of such acts of overt hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah involving the honour and security of the British Government and possessions as must necessarily place us in a state of war with that chieftain. 2ndly. To maintain the relations of amity and peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah according to the provisions of the treaty of Sirjee Anjengaum without demanding from Dowlut Rao Scindiah or granting to him any concessions beyond the limits prescribed by that engagement.

The operation of these general principles, however, was necessarily rendered in some degree subordinate to the obligation of obtaining from Dowlut Rao Scindiah a satisfactory atonement for the outrages committed by his servants against the person of the British Resident on the 27th of December, 1804, and 25th of January, 1805. Dowlut Rao Scindiah having complied with the demand of atonement in a degree which appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be satisfactory, it became unnecessary to regulate the conduct of the Governor-General in Council towards him by any reference to the outrages committed by that chieftain's servants against the British Resident.

Exclusively of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's refusing the required atonement, the cases which were considered as constituting acts which would justify and require the measure of an immediate attack upon that chieftain's forces were—

1st. His proceeding with his army to Bhurtpore according to his declared intention, or in any manner passing the line of demarcation prescribed by the treaty of peace.

2ndly. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's placing his army in a position evidently menacing to the British Government or its allies.

3dly. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's receiving Jeswunt Rao Holkar or Meer Khan into his camp, and under such circumstances, either continuing in his actual position or retiring.

The cases stated under the second and third heads may be considered to have occurred; Dowlut Rao Scindiah having placed his army in a position, evidently menacing to the British Government and its allies, and having subsequently received both Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khan and retired with those chieftains, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief acted in strict conformity to the instructions of this government in advancing with the troops under his Excellency's personal command towards the position occupied by Scindiah, near the frontier of our ally the Ranah of Gohud. If Scindiah had awaited in that position the approach of the British army, and had refused to comply with the demands which the Commander-in-Chief was authorized to make, an immediate attack upon the united forces of that chieftain and Holkar would have been indispensably necessary for the vindication of the honour and rights of the British Government. Or if circumstances had admitted of the pursuit of the retreating armies with the prospect of forcing them to action, the Commander-in-Chief's demands having been rejected, that measure would have been highly expedient and in strict conformity to the intentions of the Governor-General in Council.

In the event of an attack, the British Government would have been placed in a condition of actual war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the result of the action would have determined the necessity of prosecuting further measures of hostility against him.

The immediate operations of the British army, however, being precluded by the precipitation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's retreat, and by the state of the season, it became a subject of deliberation whether under all the circumstances of the case it was necessary to consider the British Government to be in a state of actual war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The circumstances of precipitation, alarm, and disgrace, under which the united forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar retreated from their position at Subbulgurh, the distressed and inefficient condition of their armies and the deficiency of their resources appeared to the Governor-Ge-

neral in Council to preclude that necessity on any grounds connected with the honour or security of the British Government.

In conformity, therefore, to the general principles stated in the fourth paragraph of this despatch, the Governor-General in Council resolved to suspend the prosecution of hostilities against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah unless that chieftain should proceed to such acts of direct hostility as would necessarily place us in a state of war with him.

At the same time, under the circumstances of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's conduct in uniting his forces with those of the enemy, and of the state of restraint and distress of the British Residency at his Highness's court, it appeared to be indispensably necessary for the preservation of the credit and dignity of the British Government to demand the release of the Residency, and to maintain that demand even at the hazard of war. The Governor-General in Council, however, actuated by an anxious desire to avoid that extremity, deemed it advisable to adopt intermediate measures which might induce Dowlut Rao Scindiah to comply with that demand. In the event, therefore, of the detention of the Residency beyond the time limited by the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General in Council resolved in the first instance to adopt a measure of retaliation by publicly prohibiting Dowlut Rao Scindiah's vakeel at Calcutta from quitting that city, and by communicating this prohibition to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and by promulgating it in the most public manner at every court in India. If this measure should not induce Dowlut Rao Scindiah to release the British Residency, the Governor-General in Council resolved to declare the suspension of the payment of the stipends, and of the revenues of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah-Kerrah, payable under the treaty of peace, and if this measure also, after a sufficient latitude of trial should prove ineffectual, the Governor-General in Council was decidedly of opinion that it would be expedient to adopt the coercive measures, of resuming all the Jagheers granted by the treaty of peace, of seizing Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possessions in Amednagur, and of attacking Asseerghur and Burhanpore, and Scindiah's several posts near the frontier of Guzerat, declaring at the same time to Scindiah that those possessions should be restored when Mr.

Jenkins with the gentlemen and escort of the Residency should have been released, and should have arrived in safety at a British station.

With regard to the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah considered without reference to the detention of the Residency, the resolution of the Governor-General in Council was regulated as before, by the general principles stated in the fourth paragraph.

The Governor-General in Council was decidedly of opinion that notwithstanding the indisputable justice of considering Dowlut Rao Scindiah's actual connection with Jeswunt Rao Holkar to be a legitimate ground of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that connection was attended with circumstances which precluded the necessity on grounds either of security or honour, of rendering it a cause of war with Scindiah; and the Governor-General in Council accordingly resolved to refrain from the prosecution of hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the grounds of his connection with Holkar, uncombined with acts of positive aggression on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah against the British Government, or any of its allies. This determination appeared to the Governor-General in Council to preclude the abrogation, and even the suspension of any of the obligations of the treaty of peace.

The abrogation of any of the provisions of that treaty without the mutual consent of the contracting parties obviously constitutes a virtual dissolution of that engagement, and both parties consequently revert to the condition in which they relatively stood before the conclusion of the peace. In that event therefore, the British Government would be placed in a state of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although we should refrain from the actual prosecution of military operations against that chieftain. Under the operation of the same principles it was evident that the measure of declaring the suspension of any of the provisions of the treaty of peace, until Dowlut Rao Scindiah should abandon his connection with Holkar, would involve the necessity of war in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's inability or disinclination to comply with that demand.

For these reasons the Governor-General in Council was decidedly of opinion, that after the British Residency should have been released, no alternative was left to the British

Government but either to adhere to all the obligations of the treaty of peace, or to be prepared for the immediate prosecution of hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

It appeared to the Governor-General in Council, that while the British Government should continue to adhere to the obligations of the treaty of peace, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had an interest in refraining from such a participation in the hostile proceedings of Holkar, as must necessarily place him in a state of war with the British power; and that although Dowlut Rao Scindiah might not immediately possess the means of emancipating himself from his connection with Holkar, he probably had the power of abstaining from a participation of in the war. These considerations influenced the deliberate resolutions of the Governor-General in Council to adhere to the obligations of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, notwithstanding the continuance of that chieftain's connection with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, provided Dowlut Rao Scindiah should ultimately surrender the person of Mr. Jenkins, with the gentlemen and escort attached to the Residency, and should refrain from the prosecution of measures of war against the British Government and its allies.

On the basis of these sentiments and resolutions the Governor-General in Council transmitted to the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief instructions for the regulation of his conduct under the occurrence of any events which it was necessary to contemplate.

The Governor-General in Council, deeming it to be sufficient to state in the body of this despatch the general principles of policy which have regulated his conduct with regard to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, refers your honourable Committee to the inclosed copy of his instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, which were dated the 25th of June, for information relative to the application of those principles to eventual occurrences. Your honourable Committee will observe, that those instructions also comprehend the declaration of the sentiments and orders of the Governor-General in Council on the subject of a pacification with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. With a view to remedy the error in Mr. Jenkins's conduct in withholding the Governor-General's letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 4th and 22nd of April, (to which our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 31st of May refers) the

Governor-General in Council further deemed it expedient to transmit duplicates of those letters to the Commander-in-Chief directing his Excellency to forward them, with positive instructions to Mr. Jenkins for the immediate delivery of them to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, explaining at the same time to his Highness the causes which prevented the delivery of the originals of those letters.

The Governor-General in Council now adverts to the proceedings of the confederate chieftains according to the advice from Mr. Jenkins since the date of the latest intelligence which had reached the Governor-General in Council at the date of our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 15th of June.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar continued to move in a westerly direction towards Ajmere. With reference to the observations contained in Mr. Jenkins's despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, of the 7th of June, on the subject of the disposition of the petty chiefs of Hindostan and of the Rajpoot states, it may be proper to state some observations for the notice of your honourable Committee. Their conduct must necessarily be regulated by the progress of events. None of these chiefs possesses singly the power of resisting the forces of the confederates, and any effectual combination among those chiefs is rendered impracticable by the nature of their tenures, by their respective views and prejudices, and by the insuperable operation of immemorial usages and customs; they are therefore compelled to submit to exactions enforced by the vicinity of a superior force, and their preservation and their interests are concerned in supporting the cause of that power, which engaged in a contest with another state, appears to be successful, and in abstaining from any opposition to either of the belligerent powers which possesses the means of punishing their resistance.

In contracting alliances with the petty states of Hindostan, the British Government has never entertained the vain expectation of deriving from them the benefits of an active opposition to the power of the Mahratta chieftains, or even of an absolute neutrality, excepting under circumstances which should enable us to protect them against the power of the enemy; at the same time the actual or expected superiority and success of the confederates, can alone induce those states

to unite their exertions with those of the enemy in active operations against the British power.

In the present reduced condition of the power of the Confederates, and in the actual situation of the Rajpoot states of Jodepore and Jyenagur, no probability exists of the success of any endeavours on the part of the confederates to obtain the co-operation of those states, notwithstanding the influence which Jeswunt Rao Holkar appears to have established in their counsels by means of his agents.

The justice of these observations with respect to the state of Jyenagur is demonstrated by the actual conduct of that state. Your honourable Committee will observe that the evasive and temporising policy of the court of Jyenagur is the necessary result of the operation of those principles which are described in the preceeding paragraphs of this despatch.

The opinion which is entertained among the states of Hindostan with regard to the reduced condition of the enemy and the consequent improbability of success on the part of the confederates in their endeavours to effect a combination of the states of Hindostan against the British power, may be inferred from the overtures which the Commander-in-Chief has lately received from the Rana of Odeypore (one of the principal Rajpoot states) soliciting the aid of the British power against the confederates. The course of policy which the Governor-General in Council has adopted with regard to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having necessarily precluded our compliance with the solicitations of the Rana of Odeypore, the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to communicate to that chieftain's vakeel, the indispensable necessity under actual circumstances of declining the proposals of the Rana.

The Governor-General in Council is satisfied that the confederates have never entertained the desperate project of attacking the army under the command of Major-General Jones, as described in the despatch from Mr. Jenkins of the 7th of June. The complete destruction of the remnant of their military force would unquestionably be the result of such an attempt. But the prevailing report of that project industriously propagated by Holkar and his partizans, may be considered to afford a proof of the sense which the confederates entertain of the impracticability of effecting any efficient combination of the states of Hindostan against us

without previously restoring the credit of their arms by some decided and important success.

In our despatch of the 15th of June, the Governor-General in Council communicated to your honourable Committee the probability of a material change in the administration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Having since received from Mr. Jenkins a despatch, dated the 16th of June, containing a detailed statement of the circumstances connected with that event, together with an able discussion on the subject of the views and disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to transmit enclosed a copy of that despatch for your honourable Committee's information.

The Governor-General in Council also deems it proper to annex to this despatch a copy of a letter from Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm, dated the 23rd of June, containing the observations of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the despatch from Mr. Jenkins, to which the preceding paragraph refers.

The Governor-General in Council concurs in many points with the sentiments of the Commander-in-Chief, as expressed in that letter, at the same time the Governor-General in Council is not disposed to abandon the expectation which he has been led to entertain respecting the dissolution of the confederacy in the event of Serjee Rao Ghautka's removal from the office of Prime Minister at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and of the appointment of Ambajee, the inclination of whose interest must necessarily dispose him to effect the emancipation of Scindiah from the control of Holkar, and to suggest a course of policy directed to the preservation of amity with the British Government, and compatible with the efficient operation of the alliance concluded between the two states.

That degree of ascendancy which Jeswunt Rao Holkar at present possesses in the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and which enables him to control the measures of Scindiah's administration, has been established and hitherto maintained by the aid of Serjee Rao Ghautka, whose views and disposition have uniformly coincided with those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Any support and assistance which Holkar may derive from the agency of Ambajee, in the prosecution of designs against the British Government and its allies, in-

to unite their exertions with those of the enemy in active operations against the British power.

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The Governor-General in Council concurs in many points with the sentiments of the Commander-in-Chief, as expressed in that letter, at the same time the Governor-General in Council is not disposed to abandon the expectation which he has been led to entertain respecting the dissolution of the confederacy in the event of Serjee Rao Ghautka's removal from the office of Prime Minister at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and of the appointment of Ambajee, the inclination of whose interest must necessarily dispose him to effect the emancipation of Scindiah from the control of Holkar, and to suggest a course of policy directed to the preservation of amity with the British Government, and compatible with the efficient operation of the alliance concluded between the two states.

That degree of ascendancy which Jeswunt Rao Holkar at present possesses in the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and which enables him to control the measures of Scindiah's administration, has been established and hitherto maintained by the aid of Serjee Rao Ghautka, whose views and disposition have uniformly coincided with those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Any support and assistance which Holkar may derive from the agency of Ambajee, in the prosecution of designs against the British Government and its allies, in-

volved the co-operation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, may be considered to be compulsive, and may be expected to cease when the ascendancy of Holkar in the councils of Scindiah shall have been diminished by the success of Ambajee's endeavours to restore the independence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, and to provide for his own security against a repetition of the extortion and cruelty which Ambajee has suffered at the hands of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Admitting therefore the appointment of Ambajee to the executive administration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government to be an arrangement adopted through the ascendancy of Holkar, the Governor-General in Council is yet decidedly of opinion that, under the operation of that arrangement, the control of Jeswunt Rao Holkar over the measures of Scindiah's administration and his means of directing the power and resources of Scindiah to the prosecution of designs hostile to the British Government will gradually diminish, and that this expected change in the counsels of Scindiah will tend to revive the influence of that class of chieftains in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah who are adverse to the wild and profligate views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and are disposed to measures of a pacific nature, calculated to restore the efficiency and independence of the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These expectations tend to preclude the necessity of departing from the course of policy prescribed by our instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the 25th of June.

With a view to explain to your honourable Committee the reference, contained in the 5th paragraph of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm's letter, to the flight of Moonshee Kavel Nyne and to the treatment of Baptiste, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to state to your honourable Committee the following circumstances:—Moonshee Kavel Nyne had enjoyed, during a long course of years, the entire confidence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and of his predecessor, and was considered to be one of the most respectable of the officers of his Highness's government. His detestation of the profligate character of Serjee Rao Ghautka, and his sense of the disgrace and impending ruin to which the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the control of Ghautka and Holkar, had exposed the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, added to the apprehension which he entertained of the violence and cruelty

of Ghautka and Holkar, induced Moonshee Kavel Nyné to abandon the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and to retire to Delhi.

The experience, character and situation of Kavel Nyné warrant an entire confidence in the justice of his sentiments and opinions upon that subject.

Jean Baptiste has been frequently mentioned in our despatches to your honourable Committee as an officer in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, commanding a corps of regular infantry, with a train of artillery. This officer joined the confederate armies, and being suspected of a design to seize the person of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Jean Baptiste was apprehended by order of Holkar, his eyes were put out, and his death, which shortly after ensued, was the consequence of that outrage.

On the 16th of June Mr. Jenkins received the Commander-in-Chief's instructions of the 4th of that month and his Excellency's letter of that date to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These documents are referred to in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 15th of June.

Mr. Jenkins delivered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the Commander-in-Chief's letter at the audience appointed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 17th, agreeably to Mr. Jenkins's request. Upon that occasion, Dowlut Rao Scindiah signified to Mr. Jenkins that a satisfactory reply should be returned within two days. Being disappointed however in his expectation of receiving a satisfactory communication from the Durbar, Mr. Jenkins deemed it proper to transmit a written message to the Durbar, adverting to the delay which had already occurred in replying to the demand of the Commander-in-Chief and intimating that if he should not be permitted to withdraw before the expiration of the term limited by the Commander-in-Chief, his Excellency would conclude that Mr. Jenkins was forcibly detained, and would consider the British Government to be absolved from the obligations of subsisting treaties. In reply to that message Dowlut Rao Scindiah stated, "that the letters of his Excellency the Governor-General had informed him that Mr. Jenkins was vested with powers to transact all matters which related to the interests of the two states, that his Highness had also received letters to the same effect from Colonel Close, and that his Highness

could by no means reconcile the tenor of those letters with the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, announcing the cessation of Mr. Jenkins's functions and requiring his dismissal; that therefore his Highness would send vakeels to the Commander-in-Chief in order to ascertain the nature of the case: that with regard to Mr. Jenkins's communication, that if he were not permitted to quit the camp in ten days the relations subsisting between the two states would be no longer binding upon the British Government, such an event would by no means attach to Mr. Jenkins's character, nor would it be attributed to Mr. Jenkins, and that if hostilities should occur, Mr. Jenkins need not be under any apprehension for his own safety, as the persons of vakeels were sacred in all situations either of war or peace."

The Governor-General in Council has now the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee his sentiments upon the state of affairs as described in Mr. Jenkins's despatch of the 20th of June, and the measures and resolutions adopted in consequence by the Governor-General in Council.

The argument by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah endeavoured to justify his evident determination to avoid a compliance with the Commander-in-Chief's demand for the release of Mr. Jenkins, is destitute of any real force, and Scindiah himself was probably sensible of its fallacy. The Governor-General in Council, however, deemed it advisable to deprive Scindiah of the advantage of any pretext for the detention of Mr. Jenkins, by a distinct confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief's demand, under the seal and signature of the Governor-General-in-Council. It appeared to the Governor-General in Council that if such a requisition, authenticated by the seal and signature of the Governor-General should also prove unsuccessful, it must be inferred that Scindiah was either disposed, or was in a state to be compelled to hazard the alternative of war. Whatever latitude of action Scindiah might possess, or might be allowed with regard to this particular point, it seemed evident from the general tenor of the advices received since the despatch of our instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the 25th of June, that the power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was absorbed in that of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that a speedy dissolution of the connection between those chieftains could not reasonably be expected by

the exclusive operation of those causes on which at the date of those instructions the Governor-General in Council had been induced to found that expectation. It appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be evident that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah was disposed or would be compelled to hazard the renewal of war, rather than comply with the dismissal of the Residency, the speedy prosecution of hostilities on the part of the British Government was advisable upon every principle of dignity, security, and even of economy. It could not be supposed either that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would refuse or evade a compliance with the Governor-General's demand without previously resolving to detain Mr. Jenkins at the hazard of war, or that after the receipt of the Governor-General's letter Scindiah could expect to deceive us by any further subterfuges. Under actual circumstances, therefore, it appears to the Governor-General in Council that great danger must inevitably be produced by our abstaining from the prosecution of hostilities at the earliest practicable period of time, if Scindiah should refuse or evade a compliance with the Governor-General's demand.

In conformity to those sentiments, the Governor-General in Council issued instructions to the Commander-in-Chief authorizing and directing his Excellency to be prepared to commence active operations against the confederated forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as soon as the season should admit, and to transmit with the least practicable delay a plan of operations for the eventual prosecution of hostilities in every quarter of Hindostan and the Deccan.

The Governor-General in Council, however, signified to the Commander-in-Chief that no act of hostility must be committed against Scindiah without further instructions from the Governor-General. At the same time the Governor-General in Council judged it proper to authorize the Commander-in-Chief at whatever time his Excellency might deem expedient, to make any forward movement of the troops in Hindostan either with a view to the protection of our possessions, or to the attainment of a final settlement of affairs with Scindiah and Holkar in that quarter.

The Governor-General in his letter to Dowlut Rao Scin-
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diah, to which these instructions referred, after adverting to the argument by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah endeavoured to evade a compliance with the Commander-in-Chief's demand for the release of Mr. Jenkins, and exposing the fallacy of that argument, confirmed in express terms the Commander-in-Chief's demand, and signified his expectation that within the space of fourteen days after Dowlut Rao Scindiah's receipt of the Governor-General's letter, his Highness would permit Mr. Jenkins, the gentlemen, and escort of the Residency, to depart from his Highness's camp, and would afford them safe conduct to the nearest British station.

The Governor-General further intimated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he would never recede from that demand, and that after the expiration of the term limited for the dismissal of Mr. Jenkins, neither his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, nor the Governor-General, could receive from his Highness any communication which he might desire to make through Mr. Jenkins, nor could Mr. Jenkins be authorized to transact any official business with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or with his ministers. The Governor-General at the same time observed that his Highness's responsibility for the safety of Mr. Jenkins and of every person attached to the Residency from injury or insult, would not be diminished by the suspension of Mr. Jenkins's functions as the representative of the British Government at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's court.

The Governor-General further observed, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's detention of Mr. Jenkins after his Highness's receipt of the Governor-General's letter, far from tending to the accomplishment of any object connected with the interests of his Highness, was an act calculated to preclude every advantage derivable from the preservation of amity and concord between the two states. The Governor-General also adverted to the intimation which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had received from the Commander-in-Chief, that after the arrival of Mr. Jenkins and the gentlemen and escort attached to the Residency, under safe conduct at a British station, the Commander-in-Chief would be prepared to receive any confidential agent whom his Highness might think proper to despatch for the purpose of communicating on points connected with the welfare and amity of both states, and that at a proper

season an officer of rank would be despatched to his Highness's court in the capacity of representative of the British Government. In this letter also the Governor-General distinctly explained to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the extent of the powers vested in the Commander-in-Chief. The Governor-General then proceeded to advert to the letters which his Excellency had addressed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under dates the 4th and 22d of April, observing that the extraordinary and unfavourable state of affairs at his Highness's court had necessarily prevented the delivery of those letters, and intimating that those letters would now be delivered; that the perusal of them would remove all error and misconception with regard to the intentions of the British Government, but that if any point should appear to his Highness to require explanation, his Highness must refer to Lord Lake, who had full authority to state the Governor-General's sentiments to his Highness. The Governor-General concluded by declaring his determination to maintain the treaty of peace without alteration, and neither to advance any demand nor to grant any concession inconsistent with that engagement, and by expressing a hope that his Highness was disposed to respect the allies and territories of the Company, and not only to afford no assistance to our enemies, but to co-operate with Lord Lake against them.

Copies of our instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the 25th of June, and of the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah are annexed to this despatch for your honourable Committee's more detailed information.

By a letter from Mr. Jenkins to the Governor-General's agent at head quarters, dated the 19th of June, it appears that Cashee Rao Holkar, who had arrived in the vicinity of the camp of the confederates had an interview of reconciliation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The number of troops with Cashee Rao Holkar was stated to be inconsiderable.

On the 22nd of June, Rajah Ambajee was liberated from confinement and was subsequently received by Dowlut Rao Scindiah with every degree of respect and attention; the ceremony of his reception was considered to be preparatory to his appointment to the charge of the executive authority

of his Highness's government in the room of Serjee Rao Ghautka. Until the expiration of the term limited by the Commander-in-Chief for the release of the Residency, Mr. Jenkins continued to employ every endeavour to obtain an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the subject of the Commander-in-Chief's letter of the 4th of June, but without success. On the evening of the 27th of June, the last day of the prescribed term, Mr. Jenkins was visited by Anna Bhasker on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the express purpose of inducing Mr. Jenkins to wave his demand of dismissal. The detail of the conference holden on that occasion is described in the annexed copy of Mr. Jenkins's despatch of the 1st instant to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Your honourable Committee will observe from the contents of that despatch, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah professes the most amicable intentions with regard to the British Government, but appears resolved to withhold his consent to the departure of Mr. Jenkins on the pretext that his dismissal would constitute the appearance of enmity between the two states, and your honourable Committee will observe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah refuses to admit that the detention of Mr. Jenkins can be considered a ground of war.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to annex to this despatch a copy of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm's letter of the 10th instant, stating the sentiments of the Commander-in-Chief upon the communication contained in Mr. Jenkins's despatch of the 1st, together with a copy of the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to Mr. Jenkins in reply to that communication. The course of proceeding adopted by the Commander-in-Chief leaves the British Government at liberty to pursue such measures as may appear to be advisable with reference either to the prosecution of war or to a state of peace.

The instructions of the Governor-General in Council addressed to the Commander-in-Chief under date the 25th of June, and the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the same date, of which the substance has been stated in this despatch, have superceded the necessity of any further directions. No information of a later date than the

1st instant has been received from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

With a view to apprise your honourable Committee of the extent of the forces of the confederates, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to annex to this despatch a copy of a circular letter, which has been transmitted to the chief British authorities in Hindostan and the Deccan, containing a statement of the nature and extent of the forces of those chieftains according to the most authentic information that it has been practicable to procure.

The Governor-General in Council also deems it proper to transmit for your honourable Committee's information, the enclosed copy of a letter addressed to the Governor-General by his Excellency's military secretary, shewing the disposition and actual positions of the British troops both in Hindostan and the Deccan, under the orders upon that subject communicated to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 31st of May.

No event has occurred to any of the other durbars of India, of sufficient importance to the interests of the honourable Company to require notice in this despatch. The conduct of the Peishwa, the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Rajah of Nagpore has continued to be conformable to the obligations of subsisting engagements.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

[Enclosure.]

The Governor-General in Council to his Excellency the Right Honourable Lord Lake, &c. &c.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 25th June, 1805.

1. The Governor-General in Council has been apprized by Mr. Mercer's letters of the 4th and 5th instant to the Secretary to Government in the Secret Department of the course of measures adopted by your Excellency for effecting the liberation of Mr. Jenkins from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to state to your Excellency his entire approbation of the measure adopted by your Excellency on this occasion and of the tenor of your address to Dowlut Rao

Scindiah of the 4th instant, demanding the release of Mr. Jenkins within the limited period of ten days.

3. In the actual condition of affairs it appears to the Governor-General in Council to be necessary to determine the course of measures to be pursued with respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah under such events as can now be foreseen or reasonably supposed. This determination will necessarily involve a reply to your Lordship's reference on the subject of the measures to be adopted in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's refusal to comply with your ultimate requisition for the release of Mr. Jenkins.

4. The instructions which have been occasionally issued for the regulation of your Excellency's conduct with respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah have necessarily varied according to the information which was received of the views and proceedings of that chieftain, but those instructions have resulted from the same uniform principles of policy.

5. The general principles upon which the Governor-General's instructions have been founded were—1st. To avoid the renewal of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah excepting only under the occurrence of such acts of overt hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, involving the honour and security of the British Government and possessions as must necessarily place us in a state of war with that chieftain. 2ndly. To maintain the relations of amity and peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah according to the provisions of the treaty of Serjeeanjengaum without demanding from Dowlut Rao Scindiah or granting to him any concessions beyond the limits prescribed by that engagement.

6. The operation of these general principles, however, was necessarily rendered in some degree subordinate to the obligation of obtaining from Dowlut Rao Scindiah a satisfactory atonement for the outrages committed by his servants against the person of the British Resident on the 27th of December, 1804, and 25th of January, 1805. Dowlut Rao Scindiah having complied with the demand of atonement in a degree which appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be satisfactory, it became unnecessary to regulate the conduct of the Governor-General in Council towards him by any reference to the outrages committed by that chieftain's servants against the British Resident.

7. Exclusively of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's refusing the required atonement, the cases which were considered as constituting acts which would justify and require on the part of your Excellency the measure of an immediate attack upon that chieftain's forces were:—

1st. His proceeding with his army to Bhurtpore according to his declared intention, or in any manner passing the line of demarcation prescribed by the treaty of peace.

2ndly. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's placing his army in a position evidently menacing to the British Government or its allies.

3rdly. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's receiving Jeswunt Rao Holkar or Meer Khan into his camp, and under such circumstances, either continuing in his actual position or retiring.

8. The Governor-General's orders to Mr. Jenkins of the 20th of April,

authorizing him on the ground of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's compliance with the demand of atonement, to proceed to the adjustment of all depending questions with that chieftain on the basis of the treaty of peace, although issued subsequently to the Governor-General's instructions to your Excellency, which authorized your Excellency to attack the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the cases above described, were not of a nature to supercede those instructions; and the same observation is applicable to the Governor-General's subsequent instructions of the 4th of May, describing the circumstances under which the British Government would be disposed to admit the agency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in effecting an accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, since those several orders and instructions referred exclusively to a state of circumstances which could not be considered to involve the indispensable necessity of prosecuting hostilities against the power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although the conduct of that chieftain had amply justified an unqualified declaration of war.

9. The cases above stated under the 2nd and 3rd heads may be considered to have occurred, Dowlut Rao Scindiah having placed his army in a position evidently menacing to the British Government and its allies, and having subsequently received both Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khan, and retired with those chieftains; and your Excellency acted in strict conformity to the intentions of this government in advancing with the troops under your Excellency's personal command towards the position occupied by Scindiah, near the frontier of our ally the Rana of Gohud. If Scindiah had awaited in that position the approach of your Excellency's army, and had refused to comply with the demands which your Excellency was authorized to make, an immediate attack upon the united forces of that chieftain and Holkar would have been indispensably necessary for the vindication of the honour and rights of the British Government: or if circumstances had admitted of your Excellency's pursuit of the retreating armies with a prospect of forcing them to action, your Excellency's demand having been rejected, that measure would have been highly expedient, and in strict conformity to the intentions of the Governor-General in Council. In the event of an attack the British Government would have been placed in a condition of actual war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the result of the action would have determined the necessity of prosecuting further measures of hostility against him.

10. The immediate operations of your Excellency's army, however, being precluded by the precipitation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's retreat and by the state of the season, it became a subject of deliberation whether the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was such as to render it necessary to consider the British Government to be in a state of actual war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The circumstances of precipitation, alarm and disgrace under which the united forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar retreated from their position at Subbulgurh, the distressed and inefficient condition of their armies and the deficiency of their resources, appeared to the Governor-General in Council to preclude that necessity on any grounds connected with the honour or security of the British Government.

11. In conformity, therefore, to the general principles stated in the 5th paragraph of this despatch, the Governor-General in Council resolved to suspend the prosecution of hostilities against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, unless that chief should proceed to such acts of direct hostility as would necessarily place us in a state of war with him.

12. At the same time, under the circumstances of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's conduct in uniting his forces with those of the enemy, and of the state of restraint and distress of the British Residency at his Highness's Court, your Excellency's resolution to demand from Dowlut Rao Scindiah the release of Mr. Jenkins, and his safe conduct with the gentlemen of the Residency and the escort to a British station was perfectly proper, and the terms in which your Excellency conveyed that demand are entirely approved by the Governor-General in Council. Neither the measures of withdrawing the British Residency, nor the tenor of your Excellency's letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah constitute a declaration of war with that chieftain, and your Excellency has very properly avoided a direct menace of war even in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ultimately refusing to comply with your Excellency's demand for the release of the British Residency. The course of proceeding, therefore, which your Excellency has judiciously pursued leaves the British Government at liberty in the actual situation of affairs to adopt either a pacific or an hostile system of policy with respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

13. After the maturest deliberation, upon the measures which it is most expedient to pursue in the present condition of affairs, the Governor-General in Council has finally resolved to adhere to the general principles which have hitherto regulated our conduct towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah as described in the 5th paragraph of this despatch; and the Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your Excellency the application of those principles to every case which it is at present necessary to contemplate.

14. First. Dowlut Rao Scindiah may comply with your Excellency's requisition for the release and safe conduct of Mr. Jenkins and the gentleman of the Residency and the escort, and although united with Holkar, may refrain from any positive acts of hostility against the troops or possessions of the British Government or its allies.

15. In this case, according to the principles already stated, the Governor-General in Council is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and accordingly, when your Excellency shall have received intelligence of the safe arrival of Mr. Jenkins and the gentlemen and escort of the Residency in safety at a British station, your Excellency will be pleased to signify this resolution to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Your Excellency will at the same time intimate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that your Excellency is disposed to receive at the head quarters of the British army, any person duly authorized and empowered to negotiate on the part of his Highness, and to adjust with the person so authorized and empowered, all questions depending between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the basis of the treaty of peace. Your Excellency will further signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that if his High-

nés should prefer the measure of a convention of deputies, your Excellency will despatch a person of rank to Ramporah, or to any other convenient station which his Highness may indicate, for the purpose of meeting an agent on the part of his Highness, and of adjusting with that agent all depending questions on the basis of the treaty of peace; or finally, that under proper assurances from Dowlut Rao Scindiah of his disposition to receive a British Resident at his Court in a manner suitable to the dignity of his station, your Excellency will despatch to his Highness's camp an officer of rank, who in that event will be vested with the power and authority of that station by credentials from the British Government, and will assume the functions of British Resident, and reside in that capacity at his Highness's Court.

16. The Governor-General's instructions to Mr. Jenkins of the 2nd of April, combined with the Governor-General's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 4th of that month, appear to the Governor-General in Council to preclude the necessity of any additional instructions relative to the adjustment of any questions depending between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

17. Your Excellency will be pleased to consider it to be the fundamental principle of any negotiation for the adjustment of depending questions on the basis of the treaty of peace, neither to demand from Dowlut Rao Scindiah nor to concede to that chieftain any point whatever beyond the limits of the provisions of that treaty.

18. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah should express a desire to renew the provisions of the defensive alliance, your Excellency will refer for instructions upon that subject to the authority of the Governor-General in Council; at the same time your Excellency will be pleased to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that the British Government is disposed to renew the defensive engagements which his conduct had necessarily suspended, and even to assign to him the portion of the territories conquered from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which the British Government originally engaged to assign to him, provided the conduct of his Highness shall be consistent with the obligation of the defensive alliance.

19. Your Excellency will of course understand it to be the wish of the Governor-General in Council that Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm should be the officer despatched either to meet the agent of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or to proceed to that chieftain's court in the capacity of Resident.

20. Secondly, Dowlut Rao Scindiah may refuse to comply with your Excellency's demand for the release of Mr. Jenkins, abstaining however from the commission of any violence or the imposition of any restraint upon him, and merely detaining him in the manner in which he has hitherto been detained; or in the expectation of inducing the British Government to acquiesce in Mr. Jenkins's continuance, or to suspend coercive measures, Scindiah may manifest towards the British Residency an unusual degree of respect and attention, and may enable the Residency to maintain a due degree of respectability and credit within the limits of his camp.

21. The Governor-General in Council concurs entirely in opinion with

your Excellency that Mr. Jenkins must not be suffered to continue in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah under any circumstances whatever. The British Government, therefore, must not be induced by any proceeding on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the British Residency to withdraw the demand for the release of Mr. Jenkins, with the gentlemen and escort of the Residency. In the case supposed, however, the Governor-General in Council will deem it sufficient in the first instance to adopt a measure of retaliation by publicly prohibiting Dowlut Rao Scindiah's vakeels at Calcutta from quitting that city, and by communicating this prohibition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and by promulgating it in the most public manner at every Court in India. If this measure should not induce Dowlut Rao Scindiah to release the British Residency, the Governor-General in Council will deem it necessary to declare the suspension of the payment of the stipends and of the revenues of Dholepore and Barree and Rajah-Kerrah, payable under the treaty of peace. If this measure also after a sufficient latitude of trial should prove ineffectual, it will be expedient in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, to proceed to the coercive measures, of resuming all the jaggeers granted by the treaty of peace, of seizing Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possessions in Ahmednagur, and of attacking Asseergurh and Burhanpore and Scindiah's several forts near the frontier of Guzerat, declaring at the same time to Scindiah that these possessions shall be restored when Mr. Jenkins with the gentlemen and escort of the Residency shall have been released and shall have arrived in safety at a British station.

22. In conformity to these resolutions, when your Excellency shall receive information of the detention of Mr. Jenkins in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah beyond the period of time limited by your Excellency's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 4th instant, your Excellency will be pleased to communicate by letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the measure of retaliation which the British Government has determined to adopt with respect to his vakeels at Calcutta, intimating at the same time the intended formal promulgation of that measure at every Court in India. It will be proper also to signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the resolution of the British Government to proceed to the suspension of the stipends and territorial revenue payable under the treaty of peace if he should continue to detain the British Residency beyond a specified period of time. If at the expiration of that prescribed term the British Residency shall still be detained, your Excellency will be pleased by a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to declare the stipends and the revenues of Dholepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerrah to be suspended. If this measure also should prove ineffectual, your Excellency will be pleased to report that result to the Governor-General in Council, and to abstain from the adoption of any additional measure until your Excellency shall have received instructions upon that subject from the Governor-General in Council.

23. Thirdly. Dowlut Rao Scindiah may not only refuse to comply with your Excellency's demand for the release of the British Residency, but may detain Mr. Jenkins in actual confinement or proceed to other acts of violence against his person.

24. In this case the Governor-General in Council will probably deem it indispensably necessary to resume the Jagheers, to abrogate the pensions, and to seize Dholepore, Barree and Rajah-Kerra, together with the lands belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the province of Ahmudnugger, and to authorize the most prompt and vigorous measures of hostility against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; the Governor-General in Council deems it proper however that information should previously be communicated to Government of the nature and extent of the violence offered to the person of Mr. Jenkins, and that these measures should not be adopted without the express direction of the Governor-General in Council.

25. Your Excellency will observe from the tenor of these instructions that notwithstanding the indisputable justice of considering Dowlut Rao Scindiah's actual connection with Jeswunt Rao Holkar to be a legitimate ground of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it is not the intention of the Governor-General in Council to render that connection a cause of war with Scindiah, or even a cause for suspending any of the provisions of the treaty of peace, and the Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your Excellency some observations calculated to elucidate the grounds of this determination.

26. An adherence to all the obligations of the treaty of peace, appears to the Governor-General in Council to be necessarily connected with a determination to refrain from the prosecution of war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The abrogation of any of the provisions of that treaty without the mutual consent of the contracting parties, constitutes a virtual dissolution of that engagement, and both parties consequently revert to the condition in which they relatively stood before the conclusion of the treaty of peace. In that event therefore the British Government would be placed in a state of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although we should refrain from the actual prosecution of military operations against that chieftain. Your Excellency will observe a distinction between the suspension of some of the provisions of the treaty of peace, and the absolute abrogation of them. The former measure has been prescribed in these instructions in the event Mr. Jenkins's detention, as a measure preliminary to the actual prosecution of hostilities; the abrogation of them is stated to be a measure exclusively connected with the operations of war.

27. The Governor-General in Council deems it indispensably necessary to effect the release of the British Residency, and ultimately to proceed to the extremity of war for the purpose of accomplishing that object. Our solicitude to avoid that extremity, however, has suggested the expediency of the intermediate measures which have been prescribed with a view to effect the release of the British Residency.

28. The Governor-General in Council has stated in the 26th paragraph the grounds on which the abrogation of the provisions of the treaty of peace are considered to place the British Government in a state of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The measure of declaring the provisions of the treaty of peace suspended until Dowlut Rao Scindiah should abandon his connection with Holkar, would manifestly involve the necessity of war in the event of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's inability or disinclination to comply

with that demand. Your Excellency will probably concur in opinion with the Governor-General in Council, that the measure of suspending those provisions would not be attended with success. In the actual condition of Scindiah's affairs, he is probably unable to effect his emancipation from the control of Ghautka and of his associate Jeawunt Rao Holkar. Both Holkar and Ghautka are unquestionably desirous of involving Dowlut Rao Scindiah in a war with the British Government; and their influence in the counsels and their ascendancy in the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would enable them to prevent his compliance with our demand. The effect therefore of the proposed measure of suspending the provisions of the treaty of peace in the manner described, would be to precipitate a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and consequently to cement the confederacy which it is our object to dissolve.

29. It is obvious that the same influence and ascendancy may preclude the release of the British Residency, but the Governor-General in Council deems the honour and reputation of the British character in India, and consequently the security of the British empire to be involved in supporting our demand for the release of the Residency at the hazard of war, without reference to the causes which may preclude Dowlut Rao Scindiah's compliance with that demand. The Governor-General in Council does not consider the junction of Holkar and Scindiah unconnected with their joint prosecution of measures of actual war against the British Government or its allies to involve similar considerations of honour and security; the Governor-General in Council therefore has not judged it expedient, by demanding the separation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to permit the question of war or peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to depend upon his ability as well as his inclination to overcome the ascendancy and influence of the chieftains who at present control his Councils, and who are interested in preventing his compliance with the demands of the British Government.

30. For these reasons the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion that when the British Residency shall have been released, no alternative is left to the British Government but either to adhere to the obligations of the treaty of peace, or to be prepared for the immediate prosecution of hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

31. While the British Government shall continue to adhere to the obligations of the treaty of peace, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has an obvious interest in refraining from such a participation in the hostile proceedings of Holkar as must necessarily place him in a state of war with the British power, and although Dowlut Rao Scindiah may not immediately possess the means of emancipating himself from the connection with Holkar, he probably has the power of abstaining from a participation in the war.

32. No principles of permanency exist in the present extraordinary combination of the interest of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeawunt Rao Holkar, which has been effected through the agency and ascendancy of Serjee Rao Ghautka. It is not probable that the adherents of Dowlut Rao Scindiah will long submit to be the instruments of the wild and pro-

fligate designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Serjee Rao Ghautka, or patiently endure the difficulties and distresses to which they are at present exposed. It may be expected that Dowlut Rao Scindiah himself may soon become sensible of the disgrace and degradation of his actual condition; and if he should retain any latitude of action, may be induced by a just sentiment of pride and indignation to make an effectual effort for his own emancipation from the control of those chieftains who have abused his confidence and usurped his power. The pacific course of policy which the Governor-General in Council has now resolved to adopt is calculated to accelerate the dissolution of the connection between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

33. If Scindiah should commit hostilities against the troops or possessions of the British Government either singly or in concert with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the British Government will of course be compelled to adopt the most vigorous measures of war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, that necessity is not involved in the continuance of Scindiah's present connection with Holkar, unaccompanied by acts of positive hostility against the British Government or its allies. In any event, however, no military operations should be undertaken against the forces or possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, but any actual attack upon the British forces or possessions or those of our allies, must of course be repelled with the utmost promptitude and vigour.

34. These are the considerations which have influenced the deliberate resolution of the Governor-General in Council to adhere to the obligations of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, notwithstanding the continuance of that chieftain's connection with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, provided Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall ultimately surrender the person of Mr. Jenkins, with the gentlemen and escort attached to the Residency, and shall refrain from the prosecution of measures of war against the British Government and its allies.

35. The Governor-General in Council now deems it proper to state to your Excellency his sentiments with regard to the practicability of effecting a satisfactory pacification with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

36. The Governor-General has already stated to your Excellency the general principle of a settlement with Holkar which the Governor-General in Council would consider to be a sufficient security against the turbulence and ambition of that chieftain. Adverting however to the restless disposition and predatory habits of Holkar, it is not probable that he will be induced to consent to any system of arrangement which shall deprive him of the means of ranging the territories of Hindostan at the head of a body of plunderers, excepting only in the last extremity of ruined fortune. Whatever might be the expediency under other circumstances than those which at present exist of offering to Jeswunt Rao Holkar terms of accommodation without previous submission and solicitation on his part, in the present situation of affairs the offer of terms such as Jeswunt Rao Holkar might be expected to accept would be mani-

festly injurious to the reputation and ultimately hazardous to the security of the British Government. It is doubtful, however, whether the haughtiness, ferocity and turbulence of Holkar's disposition could under any circumstances whatever be reconciled to a condition of dependence and control. It is manifestly inconsistent with a due regard to the reputation of the British Government, and with the principles of public faith and honour, to offer concessions to Holkar; and his rejection or acceptance of concessions offered under the circumstances of the present moment, would equally tend to shake the foundations of our power. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, does not entertain any immediate expectation of effecting a settlement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. If, however, at any future period of time, Jeswunt Rao Holkar should manifest a disposition to accede to terms of peace with the British Government, the Governor-General in Council will deem it expedient to take into consideration whatever propositions may be made for that purpose on the part of Holkar, and while the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall be such as to enable us to maintain with him the relations of amity and peace on the basis of the treaty of Serjee Anjengaum, the Governor-General in Council will consider it to be consistent with those relations to admit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's agency in the settlement of the terms of pacification with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. If therefore under the circumstances described, Dowlut Rao Scindiah should convey to your Excellency any propositions for a settlement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, your Excellency will be pleased to receive such propositions, and to communicate them to the Governor-General in Council for the consideration of Government. Until such propositions shall have been communicated to the Governor-General in Council, it is impracticable to determine the specified terms of accommodation with Holkar, to which the Governor-General in Council might deem it expedient to accede. The general principle of such a settlement should be to combine with a suitable provision for Jeswunt Rao Holkar, an arrangement which should deprive him of the means of invading the rights and disturbing the possessions of the British Government and its allies; any accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar should also comprize a suitable provision for Cashee Rao Holkar; and eventually the assignment of a proportion of the territory of the Holkar family to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, according to the original intention of the British Government in that chieftain's favour.

37. Your Excellency will infer from the general tenor of these instructions, that it is not the intention of the Governor-General in Council to authorize the further prosecution of military operations against Holkar beyond the extent necessary for the defence of our possessions and those of our allies, against any attempt on the part of Holkar again to disturb them. The arrangements prescribed by the instructions of the Governor-General in Council of the 17th of May, supersede the necessity of any further suggestions upon that subject at present.

38. Your Excellency will have observed that Mr. Jenkins has deemed it proper to withhold the Governor-General's letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 4th of April, containing a detailed reply to that chieftain's

letter of the 18th of October, 1804, and of the 23d of April, 1805, communicating to Scindiah the Governor-General's acceptance of his letter of apology for the outrages committed by his servants against the person of the British Representative at his Highness's Court, combined with his verbal declaration and those of his minister, as a satisfactory atonement for those outrages. Mr. Jenkins has been induced to withhold those letters by the consideration that they were respectively prepared under the supposition of a state of circumstances which did not exist at the time when Mr. Jenkins received those letters. The same considerations appear to have induced Mr. Jenkins to withhold your Excellency's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 12th of May. The Governor-General in Council cannot approve the conduct of Mr. Jenkins in suspending the delivery of those letters.

39. The Governor-General in Council is especially desirous that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should receive the Governor-General's reply to his Highness's letter of the 18th of October; and the Governor-General in Council also deems it of importance that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be apprized of the Governor-General's acceptance of the atonement which he offered. The Governor-General has therefore directed duplicates of those letters to be transmitted to your Excellency; and the Governor-General in Council requests that your Excellency will be pleased to forward them to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with a letter from your Excellency, containing an explanation of the causes which prevented the delivery of the originals of those letters.

40. If Mr. Jenkins should still be in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council is not aware of any objection to his agency in the delivery of the letters, notwithstanding the suspension of his functions as the representative of the British Government at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Court, since the delivery of the letters may be considered as an official act exclusively referable to a period of time antecedent to the suspension of his functions. In the event supposed, therefore, your Excellency will be pleased to issue the necessary instructions to Mr. Jenkins for the delivery of the Governor-General's letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

Humble Servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

[These letters are inserted as exhibiting General Lake's view of the Mahratta campaign.]—ED.

Lieut.-General Lake to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief.

Head Quarters of the British Army, Camp Agra,
October 20, 1803.

SIR,

In my despatch under date the 16th of August, I acquainted Colonel Clinton for the information of your Royal Highness, that I marched from Cawnpore on the 7th of that month, towards the north-west frontier of the honourable Company's dominions.

I have now the honour to inform your Royal Highness, that soon after that period a rupture actually took place between the British Government and its allies on the one side, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar on the other.

From the date of my last despatch, I moved on without meeting with any interruption till the morning of the 29th of August, when after entering the Mahratta territories, I encountered a large force of cavalry, commanded by M. Perron, a French officer.

This man had been entrusted with the government of a large extent of country in the immediate vicinity of the British territory: and, with many of his countrymen, who have at different times entered the service of Dowlut Rao Scindia, had for many years past been employed in organizing a strong army of both infantry and cavalry.

They had succeeded to a very alarming degree in the accomplishment of this object, and had now at their disposal, a force which was at once large, well armed, and effective, and for the support of which, ample means were afforded by the revenues arising from the country under their control.

It became therefore to the government of this country an object of the utmost importance to destroy a power whose views were avowedly hostile to British interests, whose situation was contiguous and menacing, and whose strength and solidity, already formidable, were every day increasing.

I found M. Perron with his army, posted in a very strong position in the neighbourhood of Coel, a town of considerable consequence within the Mahratta frontier, and from this I completely drove him after some resistance, and dispersed the strong force he had collected.

I beg leave for particulars on this subject, to refer your Royal Highness to my despatch to his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, a copy of which, No. 1,* I have the honour to enclose.

* See Vol. III. p. 283.

After this affair, I encamped with my army before the fort of Ally Ghur, which from the breadth and depth of the water in its ditch is a place of great strength, and to be assailed with the utmost difficulty.

After mature deliberation on the different ways in which it might be attacked, and the certainty that whatever mode was adopted, our loss must necessarily be considerable, I determined to gain possession of it, if possible, by a *coup de main* on the morning of the 4th of September.

The party destined for this service, consisted of a part of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and about fifteen companies of sepoy, the whole commanded by the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson.

This party met with a most vigorous resistance; but owing to the unexampled bravery of both officers and men, they succeeded in forcing the gates, and gained complete possession of every part of the fort. Colonel Monson, whose services were most meritorious, was very severely wounded, and many valuable officers and men were killed and wounded.

I beg leave to recommend Colonel Monson particularly to his Majesty's favour, and to assure your Royal Highness, that I cannot find words to express the high sense I entertain of the conduct of that officer.

Captain Macleod, Brevet-Major, who succeeded to the command of the corps after Colonel Monson was wounded, is equally entitled to my warmest praise, and I should be wanting in justice did I not inform your Royal Highness, that every officer and man employed behaved in a style of the most heroic gallantry and determined perseverance.

It is necessary to add, for the information of your Royal Highness, and to enable you to judge of the difficulties that were to be surmounted, that from the great breadth of the ditch and its depth of water, the attack was only practicable on the gates, three of which it was necessary to burst open before the fort could be entered. These gates were uncommonly strong, and the road to them was completely covered by batteries and other strong works within the fort, from which the enemy did much execution.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of my despatch on this occasion to his Excellency the Governor-General, together with a return of our loss, No. 2.*

After halting two days in my original position at the town of Coel, I moved with my army towards Delhi, with the exception of a garrison left in the fort of Ally Ghur, and a brigade of cavalry, which I found it necessary to send towards our own territories, to repel an irruption which had been made by a part of the enemy's cavalry.

This brigade consisted of his Majesty's 29th regiment of light dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry.

My advance from Coel was not interrupted until the 11th of that month, when I encountered a very large force both of cavalry and infantry, with a numerous artillery, under the command of M. Bourquain, one of the French officers already alluded to.

My army had made a very long march in the morning, and were hardly

* See Vol. III. p. 291.

arrived on their ground, when I learnt that the enemy were preparing to attack us.

I immediately moved out the whole line of cavalry and infantry, and advanced on the enemy's line, who opposed to us a very severe fire from their numerous artillery, which did much execution.

I am happy to say, that we succeeded in completely defeating the enemy, killing great numbers of them, and gaining possession of the whole of their artillery.

I have the honour to enclose copies of my letters to the Governor-General on this occasion, Nos. 3, 4, and 5,* and I cannot omit expressing to your Royal Highness how infinitely I feel indebted to the officers and men employed on this glorious day.

His Majesty's 76th regiment, which has on all occasions been conspicuous for its good conduct, afforded in the present instance an example of distinguished gallantry to the rest of the army, which led to complete success.

The honourable Major-General St. John, who commanded my left wing, displayed eminent courage and ability, and by his steady and collected conduct defeated the designs, and threw into confusion the right wing of the enemy to which he was opposed. I humbly hope your Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to make known to his Majesty his meritorious conduct on this occasion.

I am no less indebted to the skill, ability, and courage of Colonel St. Leger, who commanded the cavalry, to whose prompt and vigorous charge of the enemy, the final dispersion of their force is to be ascribed.

After this affair, I encamped my army on the banks of the river Jumna, opposite to the city of Delhi, and early next morning a message arrived from his Majesty Shah Aulum, with information, that the town and two forts which defend it had been evacuated by the party of the enemy left for their defence, on hearing that their army on the other side of the river had been totally defeated.

Shah Aulum, the unfortunate representative of the house of Timur, whose whole life has been a miserable series of calamity and misfortune, has for a number of years past been totally under the power and control of the French faction which has governed this country.

The oppressive and degrading manner in which they had exerted their authority; their insulting conduct to the royal family; the state of rigorous confinement in which it had been detained; and the extreme indigence to which it was reduced by French rapacity, were all circumstances which rendered this monarch eager to receive the British protection, and made him view its approach with joy and exultation.

Every effort which the liberty he had obtained by the defeat of his oppressors gave him the power of exerting, was employed in affording my army the means of crossing the river, and in testifying the extreme satisfaction felt by himself and every one of his dependents at the distinguished success of the British arms.

* See Vol. III. p. 307, &c.

In testimony of the sentiments he entertained on this occasion, he conferred on me a title, the second in the empire in rank and importance, and would have conferred the first, had it not been previously bestowed on Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

On my part, I paid every deference, respect, and honour, consistent with my situation, to the royal dignity, and encouraged every hope of future comfort and independence from the generous conduct and acknowledged liberality of the British Government.

Soon after the fall of the fort of Ally Ghur, M. Perron, who opposed me on the 29th of August, and who was at the head of the French faction, and commanded the whole military force of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Hindostan, threw himself on my protection,* and entreated permission to resign the service of his Prince, and to pass through the Company's territories on his way to Europe.

For reasons specified in my letter to the Governor-General, a copy of which, No. 6,* I have the honour to transmit for the information of your Royal Highness, I complied with M. Perron's wishes, and he is now at Lucknow, on his way to Calcutta.

Soon after my arrival at Delhi, M. Louis Bourquain, who commanded the army opposed to me on the 11th of September, and a number of French officers of inferior rank also threw themselves on my protection. This measure they were compelled to adopt for their personal safety, the whole country irritated by their extortions and oppressions, being desirous, now that they found them divested of power, to avenge by their destruction the sufferings they had occasioned.

These I have sent under guards within the British provinces, and I have now reason to think that as the French influence and authority in India are thus completely dissolved, the ambition and hostile designs of France will find no room hereafter to endanger the British possessions.

Having completed every arrangement respecting the royal person, that I judged necessary in the present situation of affairs, and left such a force as I deemed sufficient for the defence and protection of Delhi and its neighbourhood, I marched towards Agra on the 24th of September.

The weather, which at this season of the year has been beyond example favourable to military operations, permitted us to march with little interruption, and I arrived at Muttra, a town of considerable importance on the Jumna, on the 2d of October.

At this place Colonel Vandeleur, with his Majesty's 8th regiment of light dragoons, and the brigade which I had sent from Ally Ghur to repel an incursion which the enemy had made into the British provinces in my rear joined me.

Colonel Vandeleur, who was proceeding up the country to join my army, effected a junction with this Brigade, and by his judicious movements compelled the enemy to make a precipitate retreat from the British territories.

* See Vol. III. p. 313.

From Muttra I proceeded towards Agra, where I arrived on the 4th instant.

The town of Agra, situated on the banks of the Jumna, is large and populous, and defended by a strong wall; on its south-west side it has a fort, regularly constructed, with a deep ditch and high walls, deemed amongst the natives of this country of extraordinary strength.

Immediately after my arrival, I took up such a position as circumstances seemed to require.

On the 10th of the month, I drove the enemy with great loss, both of their men and artillery from the town, and from some deep ravines on the south-west side of the fort where they were strongly posted, and which it was necessary for me to occupy, in order to carry on my approaches.

The particulars of this affair are detailed in my letter to the Governor-General, of which I have the honour to forward a copy, No. 7,* for your royal Highness's information.

From this period, my engineer and artillery officers were employed in the construction of batteries for the purpose of effecting a breach in the wall.

I had the satisfaction to see these completed, at the distance of 350 yards on the morning of the 17th, and in the course of that day they did so much execution that the garrison were compelled to send to me proposals of capitulation.

The nature of these was such as to meet my entire concurrence, and the whole garrison amounting to upwards of 5000 men were on the 18th allowed to march out. I immediately occupied the fort with my troops, and I had great reason to rejoice that possession of it had been obtained on such terms, as I afterwards perceived, that the obstacles to have been surmounted must have occasioned us very heavy loss if the enemy had persisted in opposition.

A copy of my despatch to his Excellency the Governor-General, No. 8,† will inform your Royal Highness of all particulars.

This finishes a plan of operations which I had laid down for the purpose of effecting different objects contained in instructions, which I received from his Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

These instructions pointed out the expediency of destroying the French power and authority in Hindostan; of seizing their arsenals, military stores, and strong places; of taking possession, on account of the British Government, of that extent of country which is situated between the Ganges and Jumna, called the Doab; of securing a line of posts on the north-western banks of the Jumna to protect the navigation of that river; of taking under the protection of the British Government his Majesty Shah Aulum; and of forming such connections with the independent Rajahs and petty Princes to the north-westward of Hindostan as would secure their friendship, and form a barrier against the power of the Mah-ratta states.

The fall of the fort of Ally Ghur was attended with the acquisition of

* See Vol. III. p. 393.

† See Vol. III. p. 407.

most of the military stores belonging to the French party. This was the place of residence of their principal officer M. Perron, and it was the grand dépôt of their military stores.

This event also, with the decisive consequences of the action of the 11th of September, at the same time that they destroyed the French influence and authority, put into our possession the whole of the tract of country above alluded to.

The French officers stript of their authority, and finding themselves the objects of just indignation to the country they had governed, were compelled to solicit my protection. I disposed of them in the manner I have already pointed out, and I have now reason to believe, that there does not remain in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; or of any other native Prince, an individual that has either power or inclination to espouse the interests of France.

The conquered country seems to rejoice in its change of masters, and will, I can have no doubt, submit with the utmost tranquillity and satisfaction to the introduction of those forms and regulations by which the British possessions in India are governed.

This must be attributed in a great measure to the mild treatment and security, which they could not help being informed, the British Government affords to all its subjects; but I cannot in justice to the army I have the honour to command, conceal from your Royal Highness, that the good opinion and favourable disposition of the natives has been in a great measure obtained by the humane treatment and orderly behaviour of my troops.

It has hitherto been unknown in Hindostan, that a victorious army has moved without every where committing plunder and devastation. During our progress, on the contrary, the utmost attention has been paid to the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants, and this has led them to regard us more in the light of friends and deliverers than enemies and oppressors.

The possession of Delhi, Muttra, Agra, and other places, secures the navigation of the river Jumna, and gives us possession of a considerable tract of country on its north-western banks. I therefore look upon this object of government as completely obtained.

The unfortunate Shah Aulum has been rescued from the power of his oppressors, by which means the purposes of humanity are accomplished, and so far as this object is to be regarded in a political point of view, his being under the protection of the British Government, will effectually prevent any other power from availing itself of the weight and influence which his name must ever possess amongst the Mussulman inhabitants of Hindostan.

The native chieftains and independent Rajahs who possess territory to the north-westward of Hindostan, are for the most part eager to embrace our friendship, and with several of the most powerful I have already entered into treaties, conformable to my instructions, by which their alliance is secured.

Every object therefore contained in the instructions with which I was

furnished by his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, appears to be fully accomplished.

The prosecution of the war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, will require that I should still further extend my operations; and I shall have the honour, in my next despatch, to inform your Royal Highness what measures I may find necessary to adopt for that purpose.

The success of my army hitherto, has in point of extent, surpassed even my most sanguine hopes, and no example is to be found in this country which equals it in point of rapidity.

This I most willingly ascribe in a great degree to the high discipline, persevering courage, and eminent gallantry of the officers and men who compose my army, many instances of which have already been pointed out to the notice of your Royal Highness.

I find also a most important cause of my success in the unrestrained powers with which I have been invested by his Excellency the Governor-General, and in the very ample means with which I have been supplied for the prosecution of the various objects of this campaign.

The effect of these has been so great, that whilst I feel towards the Marquess Wellesley the highest sense of private obligation, I conceive it a public duty to express to your Royal Highness the beneficial consequences my public measures have derived from his zealous assistance, his unlimited support, and his complete confidence in my various exertions.

Permit me to add, that I derive the most sincere satisfaction from the success which has attended my endeavours to carry into effect the comprehensive plans of his Excellency, and that I feel in the highest degree gratified by the praise and approbation with which he has been pleased to honour my conduct, and signalize the services of the army.

A well grounded confidence may now be entertained that his Lordship's views will soon be successfully accomplished; and that whilst his political wisdom, energy, and decision are fully evinced, an increase of power, resources, and stability will be obtained to our Indian possessions, and ultimate advantages secured to Great Britain, the extent and importance of which cannot easily be calculated.

I cannot close this despatch without recommending to the notice of your Royal Highness my two Aides-de-Camp, Majors Nicolson and Lake, to whose zeal and activity upon all occasions since they have been attached to me, I feel most particularly obliged.

The former, with whose merits your Royal Highness is well acquainted, I have made the bearer of this despatch, that he may have the honour of communicating any particulars respecting the campaign, with which your Royal Highness may be desirous of being made acquainted.

I feel it incumbent upon me from my situation (although a parent) to assure your Royal Highness that Major Lake has in every action displayed so much energy, zeal, and ability, as to convince me that he is one of the first officers of his standing I ever saw, and will, I am quite certain, become a very distinguished character in his profession.

I have long forborne mentioning this young man on account of his near connection with me, but I feel it a duty I owe to him, both as a father

and an officer, to inform your Royal Highness of his merits, in the hope that he may reap the benefit of your Royal Highness's patronage and protection, and that you will be graciously pleased to recommend him to the notice of his Majesty.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

your Royal Highness's most faithful
and most humble servant,

G. LAKE.

Lieut.-General Lake to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief.

Head Quarters of the British army, Camp, Laswarree,

SIR,

November 6th, 1803.

I concluded the despatch which I had the honour to address to your Royal Highness on the 20th ultimo, with the surrender of the important fortress of Agra to the British arms.

I derive the most sincere pleasure from having it again in my power at so early a period to report a continuation of the success, which has throughout the present campaign attended my efforts to promote the interests, and support the honour of my country in this quarter of the globe.

Whilst I remained encamped before Agra, the enemy in great force took up a position about thirty miles in my rear, where they appeared to menace an attack, though they made no movements, which made it necessary for me in any degree to interrupt the operations of the siege.

This army of the enemy was composed of the whole force of infantry which remained to them in Hindostan, and of a considerable body of cavalry. It had been sent by Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of recovering those possessions of which he had been deprived by the success of the British arms, and its strength had been augmented by the fugitives from the different engagements in which his armies have been defeated.

After I had obtained possession of Agra, repaired the breach which our batteries had effected, and placed in it a garrison which I deemed sufficient for its defence, I found myself at liberty to act on the offensive against this army; and I had many reasons for thinking that no time should be lost in bringing it to an engagement.

I formerly mentioned to your Royal Highness that the British Government in this country, in order to establish their power on a solid foundation, and to create a barrier against the hostile attempts, which must at every future period be expected from the restless nature, and ambitious views of the Mahratta princes, had judged it expedient to enter into treaties of alliance with the independent Rajahs to the north-westward of Hindostan.

In the negotiations which I was carrying on for this purpose, I perceived myself in some degree counteracted by the fears this army occasioned in the minds of those whose dispositions were friendly, and by the confidence it inspired in those who were adverse to the British interests.

I perceived also, that without destroying this army my operations during the remaining part of the campaign, would necessarily be confined to watching its motions. It would have required my whole force to have kept it in awe; and the possessions recently acquired, became insecure the moment it was freed from my immediate presence.

All these considerations therefore when duly weighed, determined me to proceed with the utmost expedition towards the enemy, and to exert every effort to bring them to an engagement the result of which would be decisive.

With this intention I marched with my whole army from Agra on the 27th of October, and directed my course in pursuit of the enemy, who had taken the road, and appeared proceeding towards Delhi.

On the 28th, a severe fall of rain made it necessary for me to halt, and although on the day following the weather cleared up and allowed me to proceed, I found it impossible from the depth and badness of the road to convey my heavy artillery and baggage with celerity sufficient to afford me any hope of coming up with an enemy, who was amply provided with every necessary that could enable him to march with expedition.

On the 30th of October therefore, I left my heavy guns and a great portion of my baggage at Futtypore a town about thirty miles distant from Agra, and having placed over them a force which I deemed sufficient for their protection, I proceeded by forced marches after the army of the enemy.

Although the climate of this country is extremely unfavourable to rapid movements, particularly by European troops, on the mornings of the 30th and 31st I marched a distance of upwards of forty miles.

Receiving certain intelligence that the enemy were encamped about twenty-five miles in my front, and intended next day by a very long march to frustrate my intention of bringing them to action, I proceeded forward with the whole of my cavalry at twelve o'clock on the night of the 31st, and left orders for my infantry to follow at three next morning with the utmost expedition.

My design was to surprize the enemy before they quitted their ground next morning and disappoint their hopes of escaping me.

I had the satisfaction to come up with the enemy as I expected, just as they were moving from their ground at day-light; having thus in the short space of forty-eight hours accomplished a march of upwards of sixty-five miles. I determined instantly to attack them, and if possible to avail myself of the confusion into which they were likely to be thrown, to take possession of their artillery and baggage.

Some unforeseen impediments which I met with, and some intimation which the enemy received of my approach, enabled them to take up an advantageous position, and to form in order of battle; which prevented me from carrying my intentions into effect so completely as would otherwise have been in my power.

The charge of the cavalry however, which was performed with the utmost steadiness and gallantry, besides destroying great numbers of the enemy, had the effect of driving them from several of their batteries, and

reduced them to the necessity of remaining on the field of action until the infantry came up.

I took up a position with the cavalry about twelve hundred yards in front of the enemy, which obliged them to remain on the defensive.

The infantry arrived a little before twelve o'clock, when I adopted such measures as I deemed proper for a general attack, and had the satisfaction of seeing these carried into effect with such resolution, gallantry and decision, that in spite of the most stubborn opposition on the part of the enemy, the consequences soon were a most brilliant and decisive victory.

The particulars of this affair are so fully detailed in my despatch on this occasion to his Excellency the Governor-General, that I have deemed it proper to transmit a copy of it for the information of your Royal Highness.

A return of the ordnance taken on the field of battle consisting of seventy-one pieces of cannon is also transmitted; which at the same time that it evinces the great power of the enemy, will give your Royal Highness some idea of the complete defeat which they have sustained. I also got possession of all their stores, camp equipage, colours, camels, elephants, musquetry, &c.

I most sincerely lament that the number of gallant officers and men who have fallen, is so great: but when I consider the superiority of force with which I had to contend, the very numerous artillery to which I was opposed, and the disadvantage of situation in which it was necessary to attack the enemy, I could not reasonably have expected to have accomplished with a smaller loss the object I had in view.

I mention with sincere sorrow the loss of Lieutenant Duval, my Aide-de-Camp; he fell in affording me the most zealous assistance, and in him the service has lost a young officer of the most promising activity and ability.

I feel it a duty incumbent upon me to bear testimony to the good conduct, steady valour, and undaunted gallantry of the whole of the officers and soldiers composing the army, which under my command has achieved such brilliant success.

Notwithstanding the extreme fatigue of marching sixty-five miles in the short space of forty-eight hours, the army moved on to the attack with unexampled alacrity, and by exertions of the utmost firmness and intrepidity, succeeded in obtaining a most important and glorious victory.

His Majesty's 27th regiment of light dragoons under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Need, supported in a high degree the reputation it has so justly obtained for high discipline and eminent courage, and every officer and man of which it is composed has merited my warmest praises and approbation.

I feel particular pleasure in having it also in my power, to point out to your Royal Highness the gallant services performed by his Majesty's 29th regiment of light dragoons. In its repeated charges of the enemy which it performed under the command of Captain Wade with the utmost rapidity and success, it preserved an order, regularity and steadiness which could

not be surpassed, and which have given it the strongest claims to my highest approbation and acknowledgments.

I have already so often had occasion to particularize to your Royal Highness the gallant and meritorious services of his Majesty's 76th regiment of infantry, that the highest praise now left me to bestow is to inform your Royal Highness, that it behaved with its accustomed good conduct. It is the only regiment of European infantry in the army under my immediate command, and has in the many distinguished services which it has performed since the commencement of the present war, been reduced to a very small number. Notwithstanding this, and the want of that support which British troops can alone afford, it advanced with the most resolute determination against batteries discharging grape and chain shot, and at the point of the bayonet by its almost single efforts drove the enemy from every position.

Brevet Major Macleod, Captain Robertson, and every officer of this distinguished corps conducted themselves in the most heroic manner, and deserve to be reported to your Royal Highness as having in a high degree merited your most favourable notice.

The consequences of this brilliant success, are the acquisition of a powerful artillery, the total destruction of the whole regular infantry of the enemy, and the removal of all those apprehensions which were justly to be entertained from the presence of so large and powerful a force in the immediate vicinity of the British territories.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar will no longer find in Hindostan the support which he will find necessary to second his enterprising and ambitious designs, and the native princes whose friendship we are desirous to obtain, will by the removal of their fears, or overawed by our power, step forward to court our alliance.

The enemy will I have reason to hope, from the destruction of their most powerful armies, and from the loss of their most valuable possessions, be convinced of their inability to oppose the British power; and be reduced to the necessity of acquiescing in those measures which the wisdom of the British Government has thought necessary for the stability of its power in India.

Before closing this despatch, I beg leave to inform your Royal Highness that I received from all my staff the most useful and active assistance, a circumstance of which the list of killed and wounded bears a most honourable testimony, although one which I most sincerely regret.

The zealous and important services of Lieut.-Colonel Clinton, my Adjutant-General, and of Lieut.-Colonel Nightingale, my Quarter-Master-General, are particularly entitled to my warmest approbation and applause.

Major Lake unfortunately received a severe wound in his knee, when exerting himself in a most critical moment, under the most heavy fire I ever in my life experienced. He did on this occasion as well as on every other in which he has been engaged, acquit himself in so exemplary a manner, as to deserve my warmest praise and admiration; and I beg leave once

more to mention his merits to your Royal Highness, and to express a hope that you will be graciously pleased to recommend him to his Majesty's protection.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Royal Highness's
Most faithful and humble servant,
G. LAKE.

[The following letters from Lieut.-General (afterwards Lord) Lake to the Governor-General explain the honourable Colonel Monson's disaster.]—ED.

Lieut-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Head Quarters, Muttra, July 1st, 1805.

Soon after the conclusion of the late war with the Mahratta confederates, the attention of Government was directed to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The armies of that chief occupied a position highly dangerous to our security, and he openly avowed an intention to invade our possessions. He was likewise committing the most destructive depredations on the territories of our allies, and employing the most active means to excite revolt and insurrection in those provinces which had recently been subjected to our dominion.

A consideration of these circumstances induced your Lordship in Council to authorize me to enter into a negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and in conformity to the instructions with which I was furnished on this occasion, I employed such means as were deemed consistent with the dignity, honour and interests of government to avert the hostile designs of that chief, and to adjust his various insolent and groundless pretensions.

During the progress of this negotiation, I judged it expedient to move forward with the army which as your Lordship knows, had remained in the field since the conclusion of the former war. This movement was dictated by the desire of giving weight to the means employed for the purpose of accommodation; by the necessity of protecting from the ravages of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, those states with whom we were in alliance, and by the advantage of placing my army in a situation from whence it might act with effect and celerity in the event of failure in our pacific measures.

In the course of my communications with Holkar, it gradually became manifest that the relations of peace and friendship could not be established with that chief. His language was arrogant and unconciliating, his demands were extravagant and inadmissible, and his conduct continued menacing and hostile. Under these circumstances I continued slowly to advance forward until your Lordship's final decision should authorize

what appeared no longer avoidable, the commencement of military operations.

Holkar's force had occupied a position in the country of Ajmger, contiguous to the frontier of the Jyepoor possessions from whence it had extended its depredations to all the surrounding countries. On my arrival at Doussa, I was informed that it had moved into the territories of Jyepoor and advanced so far as to threaten the capital of that state. It became of importance to avert a plan which would be destructive to our ally the Rajah of Jyepoor, and add in a great degree to the resources of a chief whose hostile intentions in regard to the British Government were no longer doubtful. I therefore determined to advance a force for the protection of Jyepoor, which my vicinity to that place would have enabled me to support with the rest of my army if necessary.

The force destined for this service marched from my camp at Doussa, on the 18th of April 1804, and consisted of three battalions of Native infantry, with suitable equipments of artillery, military stores, &c. It was commanded by the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson of his Majesty's 76th regiment, whom I instructed, unless compelled for the safety of Jyepoor, to avoid engaging any part of the enemy's force, and to remain within such a distance of my army as might enable me to give him whatever degree of support circumstances might require.

The advance of this detachment, and the situation of my army compelled Holkar to abandon his designs against Jyepoor. He moved slowly off in a southerly direction, destroying the villages and laying waste the country in his neighbourhood.

My proceedings in the course of the negotiation I carried on with Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been transmitted to your Lordship, and produced a conviction of the impossibility of avoiding hostilities with that chief. Your Lordship in consequence was pleased to transmit me instructions to commence military operations with every practicable degree of haste and vigour. The despatch on this occasion under date 16th of April 1804, was received whilst the army was encamped at Doussa, and I commenced without delay to carry into effect the orders it contained.

The enemy having halted in the Jyepoor territories an opportunity seemed to offer of bringing him to a general action, and I accordingly proceeded from Doussa with the greatest expedition towards the position he occupied. My approach however induced him to retreat, and he pursued his course with such celerity in a southerly direction as left no probability that I could compel him to engage my army.

The flight of Holkar, and the inexpediency of pursuing him on account of the advanced period of the season and other causes, induced me to halt the army at Nuahee, a position near the frontier of the Jyepoor country, and at an inconsiderable distance from Tonk and Rampoora, places which with an extensive country connected to them belonged at this time to the enemy, and of which it was of importance that we should obtain possession.

Tonk, which is a walled town of considerable extent and population, was about this time very gallantly attacked and carried by a body of irre-

gular horse, which I had sent in advance under the command of Lieutenant Lucan of his Majesty's 74th regiment, for the purpose of giving every possible annoyance to the rear of the retreating enemy.

Kamoorah is a fortress deemed by the natives of great strength, I therefore judged it necessary to detach a force from the army properly equipped for taking possession of it. The party intended for this service accordingly, consisted of two battalions of Native infantry, the necessary artillery, and a regiment of Native cavalry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Don of the honourable Company's service.

Lieutenant-Colonel Don and his detachment executed this duty with the utmost spirit and success. Having in vain endeavoured to induce the enemy to surrender the place, Colonel Don concerted the necessary measures for attempting to carry it by assault on the 16th of May. This was contrived with so much wisdom, and executed with such spirit and energy that the attempt completely succeeded. The greatest part of the garrison was destroyed, whilst the loss on our part was extremely inconsiderable.

These rapid and important successes, with the situation of my army, and the advancement of the detachment under the honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Monson appeared to impress the enemy with a great degree of consternation. They fled rapidly across the Chumbul river, and returned towards Malwa, laying waste the country in their progress in that direction.

At this period I was informed from all quarters, that Holkar's pecuniary resources were reduced to the lowest ebb, that his army was filled with terror and dismay, and that his troops who before had been mutinous and discontented were now deserting from him in great numbers. These representations were rendered more probable from the consideration that a successful war is necessary to retain together an army and to support the confidence of troops whose chief band of union is plunder. I therefore gave them considerable credit, although I found it impossible to obtain accurate information, and was aware of the exaggeration which the natives of this country give to all their relations.

This reduced state of the enemy's power and resources, and the great distance to which he had prosecuted his flight appearing to me in a great measure to have released those states with which we were in alliance from all hazard of future depredation, and to have deprived Jeswunt Rao Holkar of all hopes of success in any future attempt to invade the British territories in Hindostan, I determined without further delay to withdraw the main army to their respective cantonments within the Company's provinces.

Other considerations at the same time concurred to render this measure highly expedient. No advantage could have resulted from remaining in the position I then occupied, and a further pursuit of the enemy was rendered impossible from the nature of those countries in advance, in regard to water and provisions. It was highly desirable too to place my European troops under cover before the approach of the rainy season, which could not fail to be destructive to them in the field.

Before I commenced my march to cantonments, it was of importance to take every precaution in regard to our future security, and it appeared

to me that this object would be completely attained by securing the passes of Boondee and Lakery in that chain of mountains to the southward of Rampoor. I accordingly directed Lieut.-Colonel Monson with the force under his command, to occupy and maintain a position in their vicinity. Lieut.-Colonel Don was at the same instructed to place himself under the command of Colonel Monson, with the whole force that had captured Rampoor, with the exception of a regiment of native cavalry which I ordered to rejoin my army.

Having formed this arrangement, and furnished the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson with such instructions as appeared necessary for the guidance of his future conduct, I commenced my march with the main army towards Agra on the 18th of May, and I arrived at that place on the 5th of June 1804.

Though this march was in some degree hastened by unexpected occurrences, which at this time happened in the province of Bundelcund, yet my movements were adapted as much as possible to the extreme heat of the season. Notwithstanding however every precaution that could be taken, I lost a number of Europeans, and my whole army suffered severely from the excessive heat.

I stationed the principal part of my native force at Agra and at Muttra, as well for the purpose of securing tranquillity in the districts contiguous to these places, as with the view of ensuring the fidelity of the neighbouring petty states, and of being in readiness to proceed again to the southward, should circumstances at a future period require their presence in that quarter.

No cantonments for European troops had been constructed on the banks of the Jumna, and I therefore proceeded towards Cawnpore with my European force, which consisted of his Majesty's 8th, 27th, and 29th regiments of light dragoons; two companies of his Majesty's 22d and the whole of the 76th regiment of foot, with two companies of the honourable Company's European regiment. These arrived at Cawnpore about the end of June a few days previous to the commencement of the rainy season.

The detachment which I had left under the command of the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson consisted of five complete battalions of native infantry, a suitable proportion of artillery, and about 4,000 irregular cavalry, who, under the command of Lieutenant Lucan had been ordered to join Colonel Monson's detachment soon after its arrival at Jyepoor. These troops were in a high state of discipline and had been accustomed to victory, and their equipment and efficiency were rendered perfect by an ample supply of treasure and all kinds of military stores.

The passes near which this detachment was stationed afford the only entrance through the mountains above-mentioned from Malwa into Hindostan. Through these the enemy had retreated, and whilst they were defended by our troops, his return appeared to be rendered impossible. The situation of Colonel Monson's corps therefore appeared to secure all the advantages which had been obtained, and to obviate every danger that could accrue to ourselves or to our allies, from the absence of the main army.

It was my intention that the detachment should have remained in this position until the termination of the rainy season, where either alone or

strengthened by reinforcements from Hindostan as circumstances might have rendered necessary, it could have advanced into Malwa for the purpose of carrying on offensive operations against the enemy. Unfortunately my views were defeated by Colonel Monson's departure from the plan which I intended him to pursue.

The irregular cavalry belonging to Colonel Monson's detachment were sent in advance to distress as much as possible the rear of the retreating enemy, and their exertions in this service were attended with considerable success. Several small parties of the enemy were cut off. On the 29th of May, Lieutenant Lucan, assisted by Captain Gardener, who likewise commanded a small body of irregular horse, surrounded three battalions and eleven guns belonging to Tantia, a partizan of Holkar, and after a short engagement in which these officers displayed great activity and courage, compelled them to surrender.

Unfortunately it appeared to Colonel Monson about this time, that advantage would likewise result from the advance of his main force. It appeared to him that the presence of his detachment would animate to resistance the chiefs of those countries in which Holkar was committing depredations. Such resistance in the present reduced and dismayed state of the enemy might be thought to be attended with important effects, and the promises of support and of supply held out to him by the Rajah of Kotah seemed to obviate every risk of an advanced movement.

As soon as I understood that Colonel Monson had formed the resolution of advancing beyond the position I had assigned to him, I expressed in the strongest terms my disapprobation of such a measure, and my apprehension of the mischiefs that might follow. Before however, he could receive my communications on this subject, he had actually crossed the Chumbul near Kotah, and was proceeding towards Mokundra, (a pass in a more distant range of hills) which appeared to Colonel Monson as defensible and as well calculated to command the future operations of the enemy as those at which he had been originally stationed.

Though the reasons which Colonel Monson assigned for this forward movement did not appear to me satisfactory, yet I was disposed to allow considerable latitude to the judgment of this officer, as well from his being best able to obtain a knowledge of such circumstances as immediately regarded his situation, as from the confidence in his zeal, courage and abilities with which his whole conduct during the former war had inspired me.

Finding therefore that the detachment had occupied the advanced position at Mokundra, it appeared to me that the most desirable measure I could pursue, was to form such arrangements as were calculated to support it in that situation, and point out to Colonel Monson such precautions as were likely to obviate the evils to be apprehended.

All my communications to Colonel Monson at this period had in view to impress him strongly with the danger of advancing; with the importance of being in a situation where his supplies would be liable to no uncertainty; with the advantages to be derived from his conciliating the chiefs of those countries in his neighbourhood, and with the necessity of

extreme vigilance in regard to whatever concerned the movements and designs of the enemy.

I likewise directed Colonel Monson to correspond frequently with Colonel Murray, and to keep that officer regularly informed of the nature of his situation and intentions, and of his opinions on such objects as he thought ought to engage their mutual attention and exertions.

Colonel Murray at the commencement of the war had been directed by Major-General Wellesley to move forward from Guzerat into Malwa. The force under his command was of sufficient strength to engage the main body of the enemy, and he had been instructed to use every exertion to accomplish that object. At the present period he was advancing to Oujein where his presence appeared necessary for the defence of that capital against an attack with which it was threatened by the enemy's force.

My communications to Colonel Murray informed him of the situation of the detachment under the command of Colonel Monson, and instructed him to correspond and co-operate with that officer in the fullest confidence that two bodies of troops of such strength and efficiency could not only have supported each other, but by availing themselves with judgment of such favourable circumstances as offered, might have had it in their power to accomplish the total overthrow of the enemy.

For reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained to me, Colonel Murray after he had advanced within a short distance of Oujein, formed the extraordinary resolution of retreating behind the Myhee river, and actually fell back for that purpose. This movement gave the enemy confidence, relieved him from any apprehension of an attack on the side of Malwa, and left him at liberty to direct his whole attention to the honourable Colonel Monson's detachment. Colonel Murray after several retrograde marches, again altered his intentions and advanced to Oujein. He was however, either too late to give the necessary support to Colonel Monson, or he declined affording that degree of assistance and co-operation which seemed to me so much in his power, and which the situation of the latter so much required.

Colonel Monson was at this time unfortunately induced to quit his secure situation at Mokundra. It had appeared to him that the Fort of Hinglaisghur, situated at some distance in advance of that Pass, might greatly tend to strengthen his position, and he resolved to make an effort to gain possession of it. With that view therefore he proceeded forwards, and by an attack concerted with skill and executed with vigour, he carried it by assault on the 2d of July 1804. On this occasion the activity of Colonel Monson, and the gallantry and good conduct of his troops appeared to merit such an expression of my approbation as I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship.

After the capture of Hinglaisghur, the detachment remained encamped several days in its vicinity, at a place nearly fifty miles in advance of the Mokundra Pass, and whilst they were in this situation, intelligence was received that the main body of the enemy's force was advancing for the purpose of attacking them.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar had occupied a position in Malwa and was now advanced to the vicinity of Rampoorah on the left bank of the Chumbul. During the short period that had elapsed since his retreat, he had been exerting himself to collect his scattered forces; to renew their confidence and their attachment to his cause; and to equip himself in such a manner as would enable him to make a vigorous exertion against the British detachment. How he succeeded in so great a degree as to be enabled to make those exertions which afterwards marked his conduct, my deficiency of information prevents me from explaining.

Colonel Monson's farther progress would have deprived the enemy of his most valuable possessions; and been entirely destructive of whatever confidence or spirit his followers yet retained. These considerations therefore, in the very exposed situation of the British detachment at the present period, formed a sufficient inducement to the enemy to hazard a decisive engagement.

The Chumbul which at that season is a considerable river was interposed between our troops and Holkar's army; and whilst the enemy were crossing it, with their numerous artillery an opportunity offered to Colonel Monson of attacking him, which appeared to promise success. Success at this period would have secured to Colonel Monson his advanced position; procured him supplies from the neighbouring country, and enabled him afterwards to prosecute whatever plan of operations circumstances might have required. Colonel Monson was aware of these circumstances and wrote to me that he intended to attack the enemy. Unfortunately, however, he altered these intentions and permitted Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force to cross the river unmolested and to advance upon his detachment.

As another occasion equally favourable for an attack could not occur to Colonel Monson; perhaps the omission should have been repaired by an attack under the most favourable circumstances that could afterwards be obtained. His numbers were certainly inferior to those of the enemy, but he had on his side discipline, approved valour, and the choice of position. A bold effort was likewise evidently necessary to extricate him from his situation, and to avoid the disgrace and misfortunes inseparable from a rapid retreat.

Instead of adopting this plan, Colonel Monson formed the resolution of retreating to the Mokundrah Pass, with the intention as he informed me of making a stand in that situation; and he accordingly moved from his position on the 8th of July, leaving the whole of his irregular cavalry on the ground of his encampment, for the purpose of protecting the rear of the detachment in the event of an attack from the enemy.

Colonel Monson's infantry effected their retreat without suffering any loss; but his cavalry having as he informed me, remained longer behind than he intended, were attacked, and, after an obstinate contest, nearly cut to pieces. The number of these had lately been increased by a body of horse belonging Bapojee Scindiah, and in this affair amounted to four thousand. Lieutenant Lucan who commanded them signalized himself to an extraordinary degree, till being severely wounded he was made

prisoner. He afterwards fell a sacrifice to the inhuman treatment he met with from the enemy.

After the detachment had arrived at the Mokundrah Pass, its out-posts were attacked by bodies of the enemy's horse which had followed in its rear. These were repulsed with very severe loss, but the supposed approach of the enemy's infantry, and the apprehensions entertained by Lieut.-Colonel Monson in regard to his future supplies, determined him after a short halt to prosecute his retreat to Kotah. This he effected on the 12th of July with more precipitation than was necessary; having on his departure from Mokundrah left his camp standing in order to deceive the enemy in regard to his intentions.

At Kotah Colonel Monson's difficulties did not appear to him to be diminished. He stated that he was unable to obtain the necessary supply of provisions; and a misunderstanding with the Rajah having at the same time created some distrust in regard to the disposition and views of the latter, the Colonel determined to re-cross the Chumbul and retire on the fortress of Rampoorah.

On its march from Kotah to Rampoorah, the detachment sustained considerable loss, and was exposed to great inconvenience from the severity of the rains and the want of provisions. Colonel Monson reported to me that the obstacles produced by the very broken state of the roads and the swelling of the rivers, were surmounted with the utmost difficulty, and compelled him to leave behind the whole of his artillery and military stores. These in consequence fell into the hands of the enemy, where they remained until retaken by my army at Deig and Bhurtpore.

Colonel Monson was detained a considerable time at the Chumbulee rivulet which was much swelled by the rains; and at length found such difficulty in crossing it, that several of his men were drowned. He states, likewise, that he was attacked in this situation by a body of the enemy's horse, which he repulsed with some loss. The detachment arrived at Rampoorah about the 27th of July.

As soon as I was apprized that Colonel Monson had commenced his retreat, I urged him in the most pressing manner to occupy some position in which he could make a stand against the enemy; and I at the same time ordered two fresh battalions with ample supplies of ammunition, provisions and treasure to march from Agra with all possible expedition to his support. These battalions under Colonel M'Culloch and a thousand irregular horse under Major Frith reached Rampoorah a few days after Colonel Monson's arrival at that place.

When I was informed that the detachment joined by this reinforcement was at Rampoorah, I transmitted instructions to Colonel Monson to make a stand at that place, if such a measure appeared to him practicable; but if the enemy could not be opposed with considerable prospect of success, to throw a sufficient garrison with the necessary quantity of provisions and stores into the Fort of Rampoorah, and fall back in a slow and regular manner on the frontier of the British possessions, before the enemy were in a situation to press his retreat.

The honourable Colonel deemed it most advisable to retreat; and he accordingly marched from Rampoorah on the 21st of August, after having garrisoned that place as I had directed. He had, however, waited till the enemy were close upon his rear. On the 22nd of August the detachment arrived at the Bannas river, which was so swelled in consequence of the late rains as to be impassable. This occasioned a halt until the river might subside, during which the whole force of the enemy had assembled in the neighbourhood of the detachment.

The river having become fordable, the detachment was ordered to cross it on the 24th of August, notwithstanding the presence of the enemy; and the precautions taken by Colonel Monson on this occasion were not sufficient to prevent the enemy from availing himself successfully of the opportunity which was offered to him of attacking our troops.

When four battalions of the detachment had crossed the river, the enemy commenced a sharp attack upon the pickets which had not yet been withdrawn. Colonel Monson immediately advanced to their support with a battalion of the second regiment of the native infantry, now the only corps remaining on that side of the river. This party was in consequence exposed to the whole force of the enemy's attack.

The utmost steadiness and intrepidity was displayed in this unequal contest. The battalion above mentioned, not only withstood the utmost efforts of the enemy, but charged and drove them from several of their guns. The great numbers however which had fallen, and the great loss of officers it had sustained, rendered it unable to maintain the advantages it had obtained. It was compelled after an arduous struggle to fall back upon the river; and the obstacles it there met with in crossing exposed it so much to the enemy's attack, that great numbers were destroyed.

Colonel Monson continued his retreat to Khooshalghur, where he arrived on the night of the 25th of August, and joined a party consisting of six companies of sepoy, which he had sent forward under Captain Nicholl with the treasure of the detachment, the day preceding the action at the Bannas river.

A body of troops belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah were at this time encamped at the neighbourhood of Khooshalghur, and had resolved to attack the town for the purpose of levying a contribution. The hopes of obtaining possession of the treasure induced them at the same time to commence an attack on Captain Nicholl's party. They were however repulsed with some loss, and afterwards joined the enemy.

A great part of the corps of irregular cavalry, commanded by Major Frith, deserted during the retreat from Rampoorah; and at Khooshalghur some sepoy of the 14th regiment went over with their arms to the enemy. The defection amongst the latter was however more the consequence of extreme fatigue than of disaffection, and never took place to any very alarming extent.

On his route from Khooshalghur, Colonel Monson formed his Detachment into an oblong square, which resisted with great steadiness repeated attacks of the enemy, who continued to harass its march. On the 28th of August, in the neighbourhood of Hindown, the detachment repulsed

with severe loss a very vigorous charge made upon it by the whole of the enemy's cavalry.

As the detachment approached our own territories, however, it lost in a considerable degree that regularity which it had hitherto preserved. In this situation several were destroyed; and others, exhausted and dispirited by hunger and fatigue, allowed themselves to fall into the hands of the enemy. The remainder, greatly harrassed and nearly worn out, arrived in a scattered and irregular manner at Agra about the 31st of August.

It is painful to me to reflect on these distressing particulars. It affords however some satisfaction to be assured of the steadiness and attachment of our native troops, even under circumstances of the severest misfortune. The same corps which constituted Colonel Monson's detachment, have served under my immediate command during the whole of this campaign, and they have on every occasion displayed the utmost patience, activity, steadiness and discipline.

The impression made on the public mind by the misfortunes of the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, was much increased by the ferocious cruelty exercised on those who fell into the hands of the enemy. Europeans of all descriptions were immediately put to death; and such natives as refused to engage in the service of the enemy, were mutilated in a most shocking and inhuman manner. Fortunately, a very small number of the former have suffered; and the latter, as a means of preservation, embraced a cause which they soon afterwards found an opportunity of deserting.

The enemy's cavalry followed close in the rear of the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment; and his infantry and artillery arrived in a few days afterwards, and took up a position in the neighbourhood of Bhurtpore. This rendered necessary the adoption of that system of measures which I shall have the honour of detailing to your Lordship in my next despatch.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

LAKE.

*His Excellency Lieutenant-General Lord Lake to the Marquess Wellesley,
Governor-General, &c. &c. &c.*

MY LORD,

Head Quarters, Muttra, July 1st; 1805.

The misfortunes which had befallen so large a body of our troops as that commanded by the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson, and the presence of a very numerous enemy in the immediate vicinity of our dominions, were circumstances which, in the month of September, 1804, demanded the most prompt and vigorous exertion of our power.

Other considerations of great importance concurred at the same period

in requiring our utmost energy. The conduct of some neighbouring states with whom we were in alliance, afforded just grounds to distrust their fidelity; a spirit of disaffection and revolt had begun to manifest itself, among some of the most powerful of our new subjects; and there existed a probability that our former enemies, though humbled and reduced by the unexampled success of the former campaign, might conceive this an opportunity of making an effort to regain their power and importance.

According to the most accurate accounts I have received, the enemy's force at this period consisted of twenty-four battalions of regular infantry, about ten thousand irregular cavalry, and upwards of one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon.

The discipline of this army was in no great degree respectable, nor could much be apprehended from the plan of operations it would probably pursue. The exertions however it had made in marching so great a distance with such celerity, and its having brought forward so formidable a train of artillery at a season when the fall of rain had broken the roads and rendered the river difficult to be passed, afforded proofs of a greater degree of efficiency and enterprize than could have been expected, and rendered it difficult to estimate what they might venture to undertake or be able to accomplish.

I had commenced making the necessary preparations for taking the field from the moment I was informed of the unfavourable situation of affairs with the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, and the urgent and menacing appearances that now presented themselves, induced me to hasten these with the utmost possible degree of vigor.

The objects I had to accomplish, as they appeared to me at this period, were the defeat of the enemy's main force, the pursuit of that force to extremity, and the restoration of tranquillity and confidence in our own provinces. Any hostile designs entertained by our allies, I concluded would cease as soon as our success deprived them of the support necessary for carrying them into execution.

For the purpose of attacking and defeating the enemy's main force, I judged it expedient to assemble my army in the neighbourhood of Agra with the utmost expedition. To subdue the spirit of revolt and insurrection which existed in our own provinces, I proposed to detach bodies of troops to such situations as appeared necessary. I had it likewise in contemplation to make such a division of my army, after the enemy had been defeated, as would at the same time follow up their broken forces, and afford sufficient protection to the frontier of our own territories.

The execution of these measures was retarded by circumstances which I had considerable difficulty to overcome. The health of my European troops had suffered very severely from exposure to the excessive heats of April, May and June, and they had enjoyed but a short period of repose and refreshment. The horses and cattle of my army had been greatly weakened and reduced, and were not yet refitted for very active exertions. A severe fall of rain too had so deluged the country, that my immediate movement was impossible after every preparation had been completed.

Notwithstanding those impediments, I was enabled to move from Cawnpore with my whole European force on the 2nd of September. My orders had previously been issued to the different native corps intended to compose my army, and they were already on their march to Agra from their respective stations.

A very considerable degree of sickness took place amongst my European troops on their march to Agra. This was the effect of their previous weakness, and of the wet and unhealthy country over which they moved. I found, however, throughout all ranks, both of officers and men, the utmost zeal and alacrity; and I arrived at Agra on the 20th of September in a much better state of efficiency than the circumstances above mentioned, relating to the men and cattle, had given me just reason to expect.

The force which accompanied me from Cawnpore consisted of his Majesty's 8th, 27th and 29th regiments of light dragoons; the horse artillery, his Majesty's 76th regiment, and two companies of the 22nd regiment of foot, and a proportion of artillery. My native force had been already assembled under Colonel Macan in the neighbourhood of Agra, and consisted of five regiments of native cavalry and ten battalions of native infantry. Some of the latter corps had composed part of Colonel Monson's detachment, and consequently were much reduced in point of numbers.

From the position which the enemy originally occupied in the neighbourhood of Bhurtpore, they had advanced in the direction of Muttra. The inexpediency of allowing the force at that station, which consisted of one regiment of native cavalry and four battalions of native infantry, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Brown, to risk a general engagement with the enemy's force, had induced me to order it to repair to Agra, where the army was assembling. By that means the enemy had obtained undisputed possession of Muttra, and had already been encamped for a considerable time in its vicinity.

Several days were necessarily occupied in crossing the river with the troops, stores, &c. which had accompanied me from Cawnpore; and this delay with that occasioned by several impediments which were experienced in the Commissary's department, rendered it impossible for me to make a forward movement before the 2nd of October.

During this period the enemy's infantry and artillery had moved from Muttra in the direction of Delhi; his cavalry however still retained their position, with the apparent intention of disputing my progress. Whilst at Muttra he had used his utmost endeavours to induce our more powerful subjects in the Doab to connect themselves with his cause and interests, and his efforts with that view, had been to a considerable degree successful.

The disorders which the enemy's agents had excited in several parts of our lately conquered territories, were the occasion of great difficulties in obtaining supplies for my army, and in consequence threw considerable obstacles in the way of my operations during the early part of the campaign. The transportation of grain to the different depots on the Jumna,

was for a time either entirely prevented, or rendered extremely difficult and hazardous.

To obviate this important mischief, therefore, and to repel a small body of the enemy's troops who had crossed the Jumna into the Doab at Muttra, I detached two battalions of native infantry under the command of Captain Worseley from Agra on the 26th of September. The activity of this officer very soon drove the enemy entirely out of the Doab; and much was in a short time likewise effected in regard to the restoration of internal tranquillity, an object which Captain Worseley had my orders to prosecute with every practicable exertion.

On the 3d of October, in the course of my second march from Agra, at a short distance from the village of Furrah, the enemy's cavalry appeared in large bodies in my front and on my left flank, and at first seemed determined to wait my attack. The advance of my cavalry, however, and a brisk fire from my horse artillery had the effect of dispersing them in the manner related in the despatch which I had the honour on this occasion of forwarding to your Lordship.

On the day following I arrived at Muttra, of which place I obtained immediate possession. On my march I met with no farther opposition from the enemy than what arose from attempts made on my baggage by detached parties which hung on my line of march for the purpose of depredation.

It was my intention to have moved immediately from Muttra in pursuit of the enemy's infantry and artillery, which had proceeded as above mentioned in the direction of Delhi. Here again, however, the difficulties experienced in the supply department occasioned great delay, and it was the 12th of October before I found it practicable to make an advanced movement from Muttra.

During this interval I withdrew Captain Worseley from the Doab, where he had in a great measure effected all the objects for which he had been detached. The party of the enemy which had crossed the Jumna had been expelled, and tranquillity had been in a great degree restored at Coel, Jellasseer, and the other places where insurrection had principally prevailed. I therefore stationed Captain Worseley and the force under his command in the town of Muttra, and directed him to remain there for its future security and protection.

Whilst the army halted at Muttra, I made several attempts to surprize the enemy's cavalry, who had taken post at the village of Arowkie in my vicinity, and were active in their endeavours to cut off the supplies for which I waited. My several despatches have informed your Lordship with what success these attempts were executed. In every instance the early flight of the enemy prevented the blow from being so decisive as I might have wished. My attacks however had the effect of destroying their confidence in their own strength, and of exposing to those who might otherwise have espoused their cause, how unable they were to withstand our troops.

On my march to Delhi, scattered bodies of the enemy hung upon my rear. The utmost object of their views, however, appeared to be plunder,

and the vigilance and activity of my troops, together with the measures which had been adopted for the protection of my provisions and baggage, totally defeated their predatory attempts. Considerable numbers of them were on different occasions destroyed, and their efforts were at all times rendered so completely unsuccessful, that they ultimately abandoned this mode of warfare.

It now appeared that the designs of the enemy's infantry and artillery were to obtain possession of Delhi, and to secure the person of his Majesty Shah Allum, which they conceived might be the consequence of the fall of that capital. A few days after my departure from Muttra I received information that operations had already been commenced against the town of Delhi, and were carried on with all the vigour and activity which the enemy could employ.

Lieut.-Col. Ochterlony, the Acting Resident with his Majesty, displayed in the defence of this capital great prudence, judgment and activity. Foreseeing the designs of the enemy as they approached, he wrote to Col. Burn, who was stationed in the upper part of the Doab, to request his support and assistance. Col. Burn with the troops under his command reached Delhi by forced marches previous to the arrival of the enemy, and with Col. Ochterlony made such a disposition of his force, and of the force already stationed in the town of Delhi, as appeared best calculated to defeat the enemy's operations.

The enemy appeared before the town on the morning of the 8th of October, and soon afterwards commenced their attack, which they prosecuted with considerable activity. The judicious arrangements however that had been made, and the great gallantry of the troops in Delhi, notwithstanding the great extent of the place, its unfitness for defence, the prodigious superiority of the enemy's numbers, and the many circumstances that aided their exertions, completely succeeded in retarding the operations, and in defeating every attempt to carry the place by assault, which the enemy had been induced to undertake.

The approach of my army, and the very spirited resistance the enemy had met with, induced them to raise the siege of Delhi, and retreat with great precipitation on the 15th of October. My army arrived and encamped in that neighbourhood on the morning of the 17th of October. The enemy's infantry and guns proceeded in the direction of the country of Rewanie, and were at first followed by their cavalry, which had continued to hover round my army on its march from Muttra.

The slow rate at which the enemy were enabled to move from the very large train of artillery with which they were encumbered, and the short distance to which they had proceeded in advance of my army, presented at this time the fairest prospect that it would be in my power to overtake them, and at once strike a blow sufficiently decisive to terminate the war.

I immediately disencumbered my army of all its heavy artillery, and of such baggage as was not indispensably necessary, and was completely prepared to advance forward on the morning of the 18th of October, and by the most rapid movements avail myself of the very favourable opportunity that offered for the completion of so desirable an object.

I can easily express to your Lordship the degree of vexation, disappointment and sorrow, which I experienced on this occasion. An error in the statement I received from the commissariat department had led me to believe that the quantity of provisions in store was sufficient to enable me to accomplish the enterprize in contemplation. This error was not detected till I had actually commenced my march from Delhi in pursuit of the enemy. It then however appeared that my supplies were far from being adequate to the intended object, and I was compelled to abandon my flattering hopes and prospects, and re-occupy the position I had just quitted in the neighbourhood of Delhi. The enemy's infantry and artillery were enabled to make good their retreat to the southward long before the arrival of those convoys of provisions that were expected. Their cavalry returned to the bank of the Jumna and proceeded up that river to Panniput, where they had leisure to concert plans of aggression which, but for the unforeseen impediments my army experienced, would in all probability never have entered into their contemplation.

The Begum Sumroo and several Seikh chieftains, some of them our subjects in the upper part of the Doab, and others inhabiting countries contiguous to our dominions, were at this time engaged in a correspondence with Jeswunt Rao Holkar which was hostile to the British Government; and considering the presence of that chief in their immediate vicinity as affording a favourable opportunity for throwing off their allegiance, they invited him to cross the Jumna, with such promises of support and co-operation as could not fail being regarded by him as extremely favourable to his cause and interests.

Several communications from these chiefs to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which were intercepted, fully apprized me of their disposition and designs; and some commotions at the same time taking place in the neighbourhood of Seharunpore, I deemed it expedient to order Colonel Burn, with the force under his command, to return to his station in the upper part of the Doab with the greatest degree of expedition in his power. From this, as has been already mentioned, he had been withdrawn to reinforce the troops in Delhi during the attack made by the enemy on that city; and in compliance with the orders with which he was now furnished, he recrossed the Jumna to return to Seharunpore on the 26th of October.

A double object now offered to induce Jeswunt Rao Holkar to cross the Jumna and advance into the Doab. The detachment under Colonel Burn did not appear of sufficient strength to be able to resist his attack, and his presence would give confidence and support to those chiefs who were disposed to espouse his interests. With a view therefore to effect the destruction of the former, and to afford assistance to the latter he crossed the Jumna on the 29th of October at a ford in the neighbourhood of Panniput with the whole of his artillery.

The situation of affairs which now existed rendered necessary a complete change in my plan of operations. The most prompt and decisive measures were necessary to expel the enemy from the Doab, and to repress the spirit of disaffection and rebellion which had begun to display itself. On the other hand the defeat of the enemy's infantry and guns became a

measure no less urgent. These had proceeded by a circuitous route to Cassawly, and gave indications of returning by Deig or Bhurtpore to the frontier of the British possessions.

To meet both these exigencies at the same time, I formed my army into divisions, one consisting principally of cavalry, I destined to pursue Holkar in the Doab; the other composed of my main body of infantry, I intended to follow, and, if possible, to engage the enemy's infantry and artillery.

The consequences likely to arise from the state of affairs in the Doab appearing to me of the greatest moment, I determined to proceed with the division of the army intended to act in that quarter. This consisted of three regiments of British, and three of native cavalry. My whole cavalry amounted to about 1900 men. The horse artillery and the reserve of the army, the division intended to pursue the enemy's infantry and guns, consisted of two regiments of native cavalry, his Majesty's 76th regiment, and six battalions of native infantry, with the park of artillery. To this was afterwards added the honourable Company's European regiment, which joined it in the neighbourhood of Muttra. This division I placed under the command of Major-General Frazer, an officer in whose zeal, ability and courage I reposed the utmost confidence, and instructed him to pursue the enemy, and, if possible, to bring them to action.

I crossed the Jumna with the division under my immediate command at Delhi on the 31st of October. I was at this time informed that Jeswant Rao Holkar had come up with and attacked the small detachment above mentioned under Colonel Burn. My fears for the safety of this detachment induced me to move towards it with the utmost expedition, and I came up to their relief on the 2nd of November.

The conduct of Colonel Burn's detachment was in the highest degree meritorious. It repeatedly repulsed the enemy's cavalry, who attacked it on the plain, and it afterwards occupied a small fort contiguous to the town of Samlee, where, though totally destitute of every article of provisions, it defended itself for several days not only against the enemy's cavalry, but likewise against the attacks of the inhabitants of Samlee.

At my approach the enemy, who had already been joined by several Seik chieftains, proceeded in the direction of Sardhana, where I understood he expected the Begum Sumroo would embrace his cause. My close pursuit, however, disconcerted all his measures. The Begum was overawed into obedience, and those chiefs who had engaged themselves in his interests, soon forsook a cause which appeared to them hopeless.

Lieut.-Colonel Burn with three battalions of native infantry and a considerable body of irregular cavalry was left in this neighbourhood to restore order and preserve tranquillity, and his exertions on this service have been highly meritorious and successful. Several Seik chiefs who were committing depredations have been expelled, and the whole country restored to submission, tranquillity and peace.

Having defeated Holkar's intentions in regard to the Begum Sumroo, that chief altered his direction and proceeded to the eastward. My army hung so close on his rear that all his attempts to excite insurrection were unsuccessful. His several efforts to plunder the towns near which he

passed were resisted with success; and my presence in his immediate vicinity restrained his depredations on the surrounding country.

My pursuit of the enemy was prosecuted for the space of seventeen days without interruption; my cavalry daily marched a distance of twenty-three or twenty-four miles during the whole of that period. The enemy continued in general twenty or thirty miles in my front, but their utmost efforts did not enable them to increase that distance.

On the 16th of November I received information that the enemy in the morning of that day had made an attack on the cantonments of Futtyghur, but had been repulsed by the troops at that station. I learnt also that he had afterwards encamped under the walls of the town of Furruckabad, and was obtaining money and supplies from the Patan inhabitants of that place, who were not unfriendly to his cause. I immediately formed the resolution to leave my infantry and baggage on the ground I then occupied in the neighbourhood of Balygunge, and endeavour to surprize the enemy on the morning of the 17th by making a forced march with my cavalry during the night.

In this object I succeeded to the utmost of my hopes. Though my cavalry had marched upwards of thirty miles on the forenoon of the 16th, they proceeded nearly a similar distance in the course of that night, and surprized the enemy at day-break the following morning.

The fires in the enemy's camp, and the accurate information of my guides, conducted me immediately to the place which the enemy occupied. My horse artillery whom I had placed in front advanced upon their camp with a quick pace, and opened a most destructive fire. The different regiments of cavalry instantly formed in the order I had directed, and charged with the utmost impetuosity. The enemy were quickly thrown into the utmost confusion. Most of their horses were still at picket, and those mounted were unable to oppose the least resistance. Great numbers were immediately killed, and the rest were dispersed and pursued over the adjoining country with signal destruction.

My despatches to your Lordship in Council on this occasion have already conveyed the particulars of this affair. I have now only to repeat the high sense I must ever entertain of the unrivalled patience, activity and gallantry of those corps under my immediate command, who followed up the enemy with such steady perseverance, and ultimately achieved a success so brilliant and important.

The occurrences of this day were peculiarly fortunate and satisfactory. I had scarcely withdrawn my troops from the pursuit of the enemy when I received the happy intelligence of a glorious victory obtained by the division of the army under the command of Major-General Frazer over the infantry and artillery of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Deig.

That officer in pursuance of my orders had marched from Delhi on the 5th of November, and had come within sight of the enemy on the 12th of that month. It appeared to him evident that no time should be lost in attacking them, and he accordingly made the necessary arrangements to effect that important object on the following morning.

The enemy had occupied a strong position with their left upon the fortress of Deig, and their right upon a walled village about four miles distant. The greatest part of their front was protected by a morass, which was not passable, and their immense artillery was so stationed as to bear with its whole force on that point where they were alone accessible. A large expanse of water covered the whole of their rear.*

Major-General Frazer resolved to storm the village on their right flank at an early hour next morning, and to follow up his attack from that quarter upon the enemy's line. His measures for this purpose were so wisely concerted and executed with such promptitude, decision and courage that at day-break the village was stormed, and completely in his possession.

From the village the Major-General advanced upon the main body of the enemy, his army formed in two lines, with his reserve and cavalry so posted as effectually to protect his rear and cover his baggage. The enemy were soon thrown into great confusion, and successively driven from every position where they attempted to make a stand. At length many were forced into the lake, which extended along their rear, and there perished, whilst the remainder sought refuge under the walls of Deig, leaving their artillery on the field of battle.

The British army prosecuted its advantage close under the walls of the fort. Whilst they were in this situation the garrison, which consisted of the troops of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, opened a heavy fire from the ramparts, and this act of treacherous aggression, by covering the flight of the enemy, preserved the remains of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's army from that destruction which otherwise they could not have escaped. It was afterwards found that the Bhurtpore troops had, during the whole of the action, been engaged on the side of the enemy.

After the action Major-General Frazer took up his position at the village which he had stormed at the commencement of the day, and brought into his park all the enemy's artillery which the heavy fire from the fort had allowed him to carry off the field. This consisted of eighty-seven pieces of ordnance, tumbrils, ammunition, &c. Besides these, he got possession of the greatest part of the enemy's baggage.

My despatches to your Lordship in Council relating to this event have fully expressed the admiration excited in my mind by the wise and heroic conduct of Major-General Frazer, and by the gallant exertions of the officers and men under his command. To these your Lordship's attention will, I doubt not, revert with the highest satisfaction.

My mind must ever associate with this victory sentiments of deep regret for the fate of the brave Major-General Frazer. Sorrow for the early loss of so distinguished an officer can never cease to mix itself with the admiration his brilliant career cannot fail to excite. Your Lordship knows that he died of his wounds twelve days after the victory he had achieved. He has left impressed on the minds of this army a conduct to be admired and an example to be imitated.

* See Vol. IV. and lithograph plate accompanying the Volume.

After Major-General Frazer had received his wound the command of the army devolved on the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson, whose personal exertions were on this occasion highly meritorious, and contributed in a great degree to complete the achievements of that memorable day.

The victory at Deig and the victory at Furruckabad achieved so nearly at the same time produced a total alteration in the state of affairs in India. Our enemy's power was at once nearly annihilated. Instead of exciting the wonder of Hindostan and spreading terror and devastation with a numerous army, Jeswunt Rao Holkar became at once the reduced leader of a miserable multitude, without power, without spirit, and without resource.

The wretched fugitives from the battle of the 17th of November were pursued by me from Furruckabad to the Jumna, which they crossed at a ford in the neighbourhood of Muttra on the 23rd of November, and fled to join their companions in disaster, who had obtained refuge within the walls of Deig.

I rejoined the division of the army, which had been commanded by Major-General Frazer on the 28th of November at Muttra, where it had returned to deposit its wounded men, and to disencumber itself of the prodigious train of ordnance which it had captured in the memorable battle of the 13th of November.

As it appeared probable at this period that the remains of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force would attempt to escape in the direction of Malwa, I transmitted orders to Colonel Murray, who commanded at Onjein the force already stated to have advanced from Guzerat to proceed in the direction of Kotah, and endeavour to intercept the remains of the enemy's force in their flight to that quarter.

On the 1st of December I left Muttra with my whole army, and proceeded in the direction of Deig, determined to commence operations against that fortress; and at the same time to pursue to extremity the broken forces of the enemy in whatever direction they might be disposed to prosecute their flight.

The only support which remained to Jeswunt Rao Holkar in Hindostan was the Rajah of Bhurtpore, whose desertion of the alliance of the British Government is marked by such atrocious treachery and ingratitude that his early punishment became a necessary act of exemplary justice.

My details on this subject will form the substance of a separate despatch to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.

LAKE.

A true Copy.

J. LUMSDEN,

Chief Sec. to the Government.

No. VI.

Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control; to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, March 4th, 1804.

The Bombay letters of the 28th July, announcing the probability of a rupture with the Mahrattas, induced me to read over carefully our negotiations with the Court of Poonah, for a series of years, which from a variety of other important subjects pressing upon my attention, I had till then omitted to do.

The outline of the opinion I have been led to form upon this subject will be conveyed to your Lordship in a despatch through the Secret Committee, but I should not feel satisfied in differing from your Lordship on some points of policy, as connected with the late treaty, if I did not put you in possession of the grounds upon which my opinions are founded; I am induced therefore without attempting to throw the substance into the form of a letter, to send you without reserve, my sentiments in the precise form in which they were first thrown together, trusting to their being not less acceptable to your Lordship so conveyed, than if transmitted in a more formal shape.

I have the honour to be,
My dear Lord, with great regard,
Your faithful and obedient servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

[*Enclosure in Lord Castlereagh's letter to the Marquess Wellesley of the 4th of March, 1804.*]

The question now depending between the British power and the Mahrattas is one of great difficulty and importance.

What directions it may be expedient ultimately to give from home must depend on the precise issue of the present discussions, whatever might have been originally wise as a rule of conduct may now require modification, with reference to *events*, to *engagements*, and to the *collateral effects* to be apprehended from any particular course we may take.

The next advices from India will probably ascertain whether the discussions have ended in actual war; in a jealous truce, still requiring the presence of a British army; or, in that apparent acquiescence on the part

of the Mahrattas, which may lead the Governor-General to consider that the professed objects of the treaty have been accomplished, and induce him to return the troops (with the exception of the subsidizing force) to their respective cantonments.

It may be expedient in the meantime to examine—1st. The abstract policy of what has been aimed at. 2ndly. How far it has been judiciously pursued; and 3dly. Whether the Governor-General has exceeded his legal authority, or gone beyond the instructions, under which, if his own authority were inadequate, his powers were derived.

1st. As to the policy of a connexion with the Mahrattas:

In considering this question it is material to *ascertain precisely* what the *nature* of the connection is, at which we have aimed. The professed end in view is, a *defensive alliance* and *guarantee* connecting the Mahrattas with the Nizam and the Company, and through that *league preserving the peace of India*.

Although the apprehension of remote danger from French influence, acting through the Mahratta confederacy, is stated as a collateral object to be thus provided against, yet the main policy of the system, as relied upon, is, its *pacific tendency*.

On this ground it must principally be tried, the British power in India is too firmly consolidated at this moment, and the prospect of attack from any quarter too remote to justify us in prudence in risking a war, with a view of providing against a danger merely speculative.

The British empire in India may be considered (including allies and dependents) as comprehending nearly every thing in Hindostan (the Mahratta possessions excepted.) In addition to our old possessions in Bengal, and on the coast, recently strengthened by the treaties which have placed the whole of the Carnatic, and a large proportion of Oude under our immediate administration, we have by two wars, equally just and successful, bound up the entire of Mysore in our dominions, and by a negotiation conducted with great ability and wisely undertaken, expelled French influence from Hyderabad, and connected the Nizam indissolubly with our interests.

Whatever questions may have been hitherto raised *on the justice* of our conduct towards certain dependent states, upon the *policy* of our measures (always assuming them to be founded in justice) so far as concerns the consolidation of our authority in the Carnatic, in Tanjore, and in Oude, the reduction of the power of Tippoo, and the intimate connexion established with the Nizam, no well founded doubt can be entertained.

Considering this as the well established sphere at this day of the British power in India, the next step towards a close connexion with another power, and that power necessarily involved in the complicated relations of the Mahratta confederacy, is a question of critical and delicate policy.

The idea upon which the treaty of Bassein was concluded, seems originally to have arisen out of, and to have been founded upon the connexion subsisting, previously to the conquest of Mysore, between the Company, the Mahrattas and the Nizam, by the treaty concluded 1790, at Poonah.

The object of this league was to watch and guard against the power of

Tippoo. The treaty was defective, inasmuch as it did not specify, except with respect to the war then existing, the amount of force which the allies were bound to furnish to each other; nor did it *in terms* bind their heirs and successors, which led to cavils on the part of the Peishwa.

It gave us however, in Lord Cornwallis's war ending in 1792, the advantage of considerable succours both from the Nizam and the Peishwa against Tippoo.

Upon the peace of Seringapatam, Hurry Punt pressed Lord Cornwallis to let the Peishwa subsidize in future a corps of British troops in like manner as the Nizam then did. Whether he was so authorized by the Peishwa is not known.

Lord Cornwallis, although the Mahratta General urged it strongly (stating that to refuse was acting towards them with less friendship than towards the Nizam) declined the proposal; thinking it hazardous to mix ourselves in the unsettled policy of the Mahratta states, and that the principles, upon which it had been thought wise to connect ourselves with the Nizam (regard being had to the resources and position of his dominions, and also to the hazard of his being thrown into the hands of Tippoo, if not connected with the Company) did not apply to the state of Poonah; neither did he at that time think it essential to our general security, having materially reduced the power of Tippoo, to aim at establishing a commanding influence at Poonah.

Whether an acquiescence in Hurry Punt's proposal would have guarded against the decay of the Peishwa's power, which afterwards happened, it is difficult now to determine; but we find that, previously to the war of 1798-9 against Tippoo, both the Peishwa and the Nizam were so reduced in authority, the former by the ascendancy of Scindiah; the latter by a strong French faction in his army, as to render it very little probable, that the Company, in the event of a rupture with Tippoo, could hope to derive any efficient aid from the alliance.

The object of the Company was then to strengthen its allies, in order that they might be in a situation to fulfil their engagements; Scindiah's purpose was to weaken the Peishwa, and to get the power at Poonah into his own hands. Hence arose a jealousy between Scindiah and the Company, which produced a proportionate union of interest between him and Tippoo. The number of French officers in the armies of Scindiah, of Tippoo, and of the Nizam, rendered the danger very serious of a formidable combination of the native powers against us supported by France.

In this state of things, Lord Wellesley wisely determined to use every expedient to revive our influence and authority both at the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad. A British force was offered the Peishwa to protect his person and re-establish his government, and an augmentation of the subsidiary force was proposed to the Nizam.

Under a variety of pretences, evidently resulting from a jealousy of our power, as well as that of Scindiah, our offer was declined by the Peishwa. What then occurred is noticed here principally to mark *the jealousy* which even then disinclined the Peishwa to place himself in our hands, as well as to point out the strong defensive policy, which warranted us to risk

much for the purpose of giving vigour and consistency to the only alliance, on which we could reckon, against the hostile confederacy with which we were threatened.

The result was, that we derived no support from the Mahrattas in the last Mysore war; our connection with the Nizam was improved, the French force in his Highness's service finally destroyed, and a commanding British corps established in its room.

The termination of the war in the conquest of Mysore, and the absolute extinction of French influence in that quarter of India, as well as at Hyderabad, placed the Mahratta question entirely on new grounds.

Hitherto, a connection with the Mahrattas had been sought as a defence against Tippoo and the French influence generally. The fall of Tippoo and the extinction of the French party in Mysore and Hyderabad, leaving only what was to be found in Scindiah's army, as any object of jealousy, put an end to the importance as a means of necessary and immediate security of a connection with the Mahrattas.

From this time it could not be argued to be of *pressing necessity*. The most that could be contended for was, its being desirable on grounds of general expediency, and as tending to guard against remote and contingent dangers, we were certainly justified in risking less to accomplish it.

It was reasonable also to suppose, that in proportion as our power had been increased and consolidated, and as that of Tippoo was absolutely extinguished, the Mahrattas would entertain additional jealousy of any subsidiary connection with us.

We find accordingly, after the peace, that upon the Peishwa being invited to accede to the treaty of Hyderabad, upon which condition we should have deemed him entitled to a certain share in the conquered territories, he declined the proposal, evidently from indisposition to receive a British force within his dominions.

Between that period and the treaty of Bassein, several attempts were made by us to induce him to enter into subsidiary engagements with us. The same was proposed to the Rajah of Berar, and an opening left in the treaty of Hyderabad of 1800, for Scindiah to accede on certain terms; but the connection was declined by all.

The Peishwa, when most oppressed and in danger from Scindiah, proceeded considerable lengths in entertaining the proposition of a subsidiary alliance, but always resisted the idea of the subsidiary force being stationed *within his dominions*. Even with this qualification, our connection was an alternative which the Peishwa never latterly shewed any disposition to adopt, but under the pressure of extreme embarrassment, and it is even doubtful whether he was ever really sincere in the propositions he made, as his system invariably was to play off Scindiah and us against each other, and his overtures were generally accompanied by some stipulation which he had reason to suppose would not be acceded to by the Governor-General.

If the connection, after the fall of Tippoo, became of less pressing necessity, doubts may be entertained of the policy of appearing to pursue

the object with such unremitting anxiety. It will be necessary hereafter to examine under what circumstances a Mahratta alliance would or would not be desirable; but if the early conclusion of it was not of urgent importance to our immediate security, it might perhaps have been more successfully accomplished under a system of *more reserve* on our part.

The eagerness with which we appeared to press our connection upon all the leading states in succession, might naturally lead them to apprehend that we meant more than we avowed, that our object was ultimately to be masters instead of allies, and that, having obtained either possession of, or absolute influence over every state, except the Mahrattas, with whom we had been in connection, our object was to obtain a similar influence over *their* councils.

Under whatever estimate of our views it may have been formed, the fact is indisputable, that a general repugnance to the British connection on the terms proposed universally prevailed amongst the great Mahratta powers. It was avoided by all as long as they had any choice. It was only embraced by the Peishwa, when an exile from his dominions and the jealousy of it such as to have since led Holkar and Scindiah to forget their animosities, and to appear disposed to league with the Rajah of Berar against the Company and the Peishwa. How long the Peishwa will continue faithful to engagements which were contracted from necessity and not from choice, in opposition to the other Mahratta states is yet to be seen.

The practical question to be considered is, whether an alliance formed under such circumstances can rest upon any other foundation than mere force, and if not, whether the means by which it is to be upheld, are not destructive of its professed advantages.

Supposing Holkar, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar adverse, and the Peishwa acquiescent, but in his heart not cordially satisfied, can we expect that the subsidiary force alone will enable us to maintain our influence at Poonah?

If such be the *unqualified feeling* of the Mahratta states to a connection with us upon the principles on which the present has been formed, unless we are prepared to establish ourselves by conquest in that quarter of India, it seems necessary either to abandon the connection (if it can be abandoned consistent with a due regard to our engagements), or to modify it (should such be practicable) so as to reconcile at least a proportion of the Mahratta states.

It appears hopeless to attempt to govern the Mahratta empire through a feeble and perhaps disaffected Peishwa. The military power of the state of Poonah is at present inconsiderable.

It may be said the military power of the Peishwa under our protection may be consolidated and restored, and other states may be gradually reconciled to the alliance. Both these results may be possible; but the true question is, whether they are probable in such a degree, and whether they are likely to occur within such a reasonable period of time, and to be accomplished with so little hazard of expence as to make it politic to persevere against present opposing difficulties? Is the future effect likely to

add so much to our prospects in point of security and tranquillity as to counterbalance the immediate inconveniences of war with the several Mahratta powers ?

In examining this, the motive to alliance must be reverted to, whatever may be the disposition amongst the Mahratta states to plunder each other, they have hitherto respected our territory. They have seldom even levied contributions on the Nizam, notwithstanding the disputed claims for Choute, &c. since his close connection with us.

The Mahrattas have never in any instance commenced hostilities against us. When, by taking part in their internal disputes we have been at war with any of the Mahratta states, they have always availed themselves of the first opening for peace, and have shewn forbearance and humanity to a British army, more than once, when in difficulty. So far then as past experience goes, there seems no special ground to apprehend future danger from the Mahrattas. The French officers in Scindiah's army are just objects of jealousy, and their mixing themselves in the affairs of the native powers must be watched, and be matter of alarm in proportion to the degree in which it takes place, and as those states are *near* to, or *remote* from our possessions ; but this alone cannot render the alliance prudent, nor is this danger at present of a magnitude to call for the adoption of a system, otherwise of dubious policy.

As far as the Mahratta interests are concerned, what motive can they have in acquiescing in the ostensible head of their empire being placed in our hands ?

Whatever we may hold out to reconcile the Peishwa to the alliance, and however we may profess to respect his independence in the management of his own internal affairs, we cannot deny that in fact as well as in appearance, whilst a British army is at Poonah, he can be considered in no other light than as *politically dependent on us*.

The Mahratta contentions between the leading states have been chiefly for influence at Poonah. To obtain this, Holkar attacked Scindiah. Having been deprived of this, Scindiah abandoned the Peishwa, and seems prepared to join his greatest enemy. The same motives which before opposed them to each other now oppose them both to us, and the Berar Rajah, perhaps with views to supplant the Peishwa, and with common feelings of jealousy joins the confederacy.

What will reconcile them to a different course ? To talk to them of the advantage of our guarantee for preserving the peace of Hindostan, assumes that the genius of their government is *industrious and pacific*, instead of being *predatory and warlike* ; nor is it to be expected that independent states, especially of the description in question, can feel any disposition to make us, or any other great power, an arbiter of their destiny.

We not only place the Peishwa as a prey out of their reach, but we declare our purpose is to prevent them from plundering each other. They wish to be unrestrained in carrying their arms wherever they can derive advantage. Temporary distress may make them in their turn accept our support. Were it given as a temporary assistance it would

frequently *be sought* for, and, as far as their means would go, *paid for*; but when it is to be given *permanently*, or not at all, it will only be accepted when no other resource remains. It will be avoided by each state exempt by the pressure, when the danger is gone by it will be *disrelished* by the state which has submitted to it, and ultimately we must either alter the genius of the various states, or rely upon our arms alone for the preservation of our authority.

To aim at a connection with the Mahratta powers on these grounds is, to say the least, extremely hazardous. It is evidently against the grain. It may be difficult and expensive to be established, not less so to be maintained, and as it must, when accomplished, rest on our *authority and arms*, rather than the disposition of our allies, it must practically operate as an extension of our own dominions.

Such a result we disavow as our object. In principle, as well as in policy, we are bound by the laws of the land to abstain from it, and it certainly would be a hazardous project to embark in the management of this half-civilized people, in addition to the widely-extended empire of which we are now possessed. If we are not prepared to contemplate such a purpose, we should avoid being gradually led into a course of measures, the tendency of which leads to such a result as their natural consequence.

Is there then no connection with any of the Mahratta states, at which in policy we should aim?

It does not follow because an alliance, which places a British force in immediate contact with a weak Mahratta power, and that power the supreme head of the empire, in opposition to the will of all the stronger states, is unwise and dangerous, that no relation can be established between the British power and certain states of that empire, which may have a tendency to protect our interests against such dangers as might otherwise arise *from*, or operate *through*, that confederacy.

It may, however, be asserted, that to be either safe or useful, it must be formed on a broader basis than the present, and as the British power, from its magnitude, must now have become a more natural object of jealousy to the Mahratta states than any other, it is not probable that any considerable portion of the Mahratta confederacy will be disposed to connect themselves with us, unless we can present to them that connection in a shape less inconsistent with their natural propensities and independence than the late treaty.

When jealousy is once strongly aroused, any arrangement is become of more difficulty. Whether it might have been feasible, must remain matter of speculation, but I can conceive, if Holkar and Scindiah had been suffered to reduce each other, before a treaty had been proposed to the Peishwa, that a broader connection might have been formed; especially if the introduction of the British force to be subsidized *into the dominions* of our allies had not been made a *sine quâ non*.

It may be said, if the treaty had not been pushed with the Peishwa when at Bassein, he might have refused it afterwards, possibly so; but it may be doubted whether the treaty so obtained was a benefit.

The benefit as well as the necessity of a Mahratta connection has for

the last four years been in my conception always overrated. The importance of not taking the whole of the burthen upon ourselves of restoring the Peishwa, appears to have been strongly felt by Lord Wellesley, and he accordingly after the conclusion of the treaty wished to hold back, and leave Holkar and Scindiah to weaken and reduce each other; but as the treaty could not be concealed from Scindiah and the other powers, the success of this course depended upon their sentiments with respect to the treaty itself. Our troops, however, were moved forward by Lord Clive's orders, before the result could be distinctly ascertained.

Perhaps our safest line would have been to have received the Peishwa hospitably, to have professed a disposition to assist the other Mahratta powers in repressing Holkar's rebellion, and restoring the Peishwa to the Musnud, provided we found his Highness and his allies were disposed to connect themselves in interest with us.

Had we remained with our army on the frontiers, pledged to neither party, and in a position to assist either, our aid must have been an object of competition to both.

Neither had any claim upon us, and consequently neither (whatever might be our opinion of the merits of their cause) had any right to expect our assistance without an equivalent. In postponing any negotiation with the Peishwa, till he could treat in conjunction with Scindiah, we should have been able more correctly to estimate the grounds upon which we were proceeding.

It is probable the Peishwa and Scindiah united, could not have dislodged Holkar from Poonah without our aid. If so, it lay upon them to offer terms to us. But then, in treating with the Peishwa and Scindiah conjointly, we left the Peishwa in Scindiah's hands as before. And why not? Our motive for interference was not any principle of attachment to the Peishwa or any claim he had upon us. It was with a view of establishing an influence in the Mahratta empire, calculated to improve our general security and preserve the tranquillity of India. This could alone be effectually accomplished by a substantial and not a nominal connection, which Scindiah and the Peishwa united might amount to, but not the Peishwa singly.

The mistake appears to have been, the following up too strictly the policy acted upon before the fall of Tippoo. Then we were obliged to endeavour to take the Peishwa out of Scindiah's hands, inasmuch as the latter, with a view of strengthening himself at Poonah, leant to Tippoo and against us. Had we on the present occasion not manifested any particular jealousy of Scindiah, but expressed a willingness to *receive proposals for connecting ourselves with both*, and limited our views to what would *strengthen us*, without either in *appearance or in fact* making them instruments in our hands, I see no reason (if practicable at all) why a treaty with both might not have been made.

The main advantage of the treaty of Bassein I take to be, the increased footing it gives us in the Guzerat. Our position at Poonah, abstractedly considered, appears to me more calculated to weaken our influence over the other states than to strengthen us by the power to be found there, and

I should (as at present informed) much prefer having the subsidiary force stationed at certain positions within our own territories than stationed in those of our ally.

Had we concluded subsidiary engagements with both the Peishwa and Scindiah, obtaining the Iaidad as now in the quarter of Guzerat, the troops never to be moved into the territories of either state, except upon requisition, we should have obtained an increase of force and territory in our weakest quarter. The right to call for this force would have raised these states in the scale of the Mahratta powers, without exposing them to our unsolicited interference, and as all our subsidiary engagements have been made with a reserve as to the application of the troops against certain powers named, we should have possessed a salutary influence in the councils of our allies not incompatible with their independence.

The history of our own connections in India affords instances of both descriptions of alliances. By the treaty of 1763 with the Nizam, explained by Lord Cornwallis's letter in 1789, we were bound to furnish to his Highness two battalions of Sepoys, and six pieces of cannon, when called upon so to do, but not otherwise. The treaty of 1793 increased the subsidiary force to six battalions, and that of 1800 to eight battalions, to be stationed within the Nizam's dominions.

The former principle of connexion appears most suited to *remote and independent* states. The latter to a power which circumstances have nearly incorporated in policy and interest with our own.

The former appears to me to be alone applicable to any portion of the Mahratta empire, consideration being had to its composition and nature, and also to *our position* with respect to it. The latter under the circumstances was wisely applied to the Nizam, substituting British in the room of French influence, and throwing the shield of our authority over that state, incapable in itself of preserving its territories against the continual incursions of the Mahrattas.

It may be said, had the Peishwa and Scindiah met, they would have declined all permanent connection with us. Supposing this to have been the case, there were other courses open to us, without supporting an usurper in opposition to the Peishwa. We might either in conjunction with the Rajah of Berar have offered a *disinterested mediation*, and thereby dispelled much of the alarm that had grown up, as to *our views*, or, if we preferred co-operating with Scindiah in the restoration of the Peishwa without any permanent alliance we might have obtained, I have no doubt, an ample territorial indemnity in the quarter of Guzerat for our *services*, as well as our *expences*. At all events, in preserving an army of observation on the frontier, and not mixing ourselves in Mahratta politics, except upon sure grounds, if we gained no more than securing our own territory, as well as that of our ally the Nizam from insult, we escaped war, whilst the Mahratta powers wasted their strength.

I cannot but doubt the policy of our making from the outset the Peishwa our only, or even our main object. The determination to take him out of the hands of Scindiah was, from the first apparent, if not avowed, and from that moment, if Scindiah could save himself by negotiation with

his opponents, he had every inducement to throw himself into the scale against us.

His doing so, rendered our success without a war extremely doubtful, and more than any other circumstance rendered the Peishwa's fidelity to our alliance precarious.

It remains to be considered whether, as has been suggested, the Governor-General has exceeded his powers, and lastly, what instructions should now be given from hence for the future regulation of his conduct.

The first question depends on his powers.—1st. Under the 42d section of the act of 1793. 2ndly. Under his instructions from home of the 10th of September 1800, and 4th of December of the same year.*

The law clearly gives him no authority to conclude any treaty binding the Company to guarantee the territories of any state, except that state shall at the same time bind itself to support the Company in a war then actually existing, or in the case of preparations then making for war against the Company. It has not been alledged that Holkar, when this treaty was made, had either committed, or meditated hostilities against us or our allies; the treaty of Bassein was therefore clearly not within the scope of the 42d clause.

The next question is under his instructions. The instructions were necessarily general. The precise course pursued in acting upon them may in policy be questioned, but I think the Governor-General, as far as powers go is clearly borne out in what he has done, regard being had to the tenor of those instructions, coupled with the recorded proceedings of his negotiations at the court of Poonah, of which the Government at home were from time to time put in possession, and which when acquiesced in might be fairly considered by him as approved of, and consequently illustrative of those orders.

The orders specifically approved of a subsidiary treaty with the Peishwa similar to that of the Nizam.

They enjoined a large subsidiary force as indispensable, and assumed that the Peishwa must *tacitly renounce his independence.*

In the letter of the 4th of December it is stated, that if by any arrangement *not likely to lead to hostilities*, the Peishwa could be relieved from the influence of Scindiah, it would be highly desirable, &c. &c.

In that of the 10th of September, the Governor-General's plan for establishing a subsidiary force at Poonah is approved of. *Caution* is recommended in *renewing the negotiation*, except at the instance of the court of Poonah, or at a *crisis*, when there can be no doubt of the proposition being accepted.

Now, although the alliance under a *reasonable apprehension of hostilities* is not authorized, yet it would be too much to suppose that it could be concluded without *any risk* being incurred, particularly as it was declared, and clearly understood, that nothing but the *last necessity* would induce the Peishwa to sign such a treaty, and the object being to dispossess Scindiah of his influence at Poonah, his opposition could not but be expected.

* See Appendix.

In July 1800, the Peishwa fearing that his person might be seized by Scindiah, vested certain persons with the power of signing a treaty for him.

In this event of the flight or seizure of the Peishwa, Lord Wellesley ordered the Resident to conclude a subsidiary treaty with him, or those authorized on his part, also the British troops to occupy the Mahratta districts south of the Kistna.

This was a stronger case of risk than the present, as Scindiah then must have been forcibly driven from Poonah, whereas the state of his own affairs lately afforded some prospect of his co-operation, and the chance of a rupture was more with Holkar an adventurer than with the established feudatories of the Mahratta empire.

Early in May of the same year, Lord Wellesley authorized the Resident at Poonah to conclude a secret treaty with the Peishwa, in which the Company were to engage to *compel Scindiah* to remove from the Deccan, and also to bind themselves to maintain the Peishwa *in his just rights and authority* over that chief, and over the other acknowledged feudatories of the empire, the Nizam and Rajah of Berar, to be at liberty to accede.

The latter is even a stronger proceeding. In both these cases Scindiah was to be necessarily opposed. In the latter absolutely forced. Whereas previously to the treaty of Bassein our interference was solicited by all parties.

It is not here the question whether the negotiation was judiciously conducted, or whether the treaty in itself was the most advisable one that could have been framed under the circumstances. It is only meant in this part of the argument to state, that in the position wherein the Mahratta states then were placed with relation to each other, no *crisis* could have been found more propitious to the formation of a connexion if under any circumstances it were attainable.

It is also contended, that under the words of his instructions and the mode in which he had acted under them on the above occasions with the acquiescence of the Government at home Lord Wellesley might reasonably consider himself as authorized to pursue the course he took.

Whatever therefore there may be to criticize in respect to the policy aimed at, or the management of the negotiations, it cannot well be contended that Lord Wellesley's conduct should be called in question, as having acted in breach of the instructions sent him.

Before we proceed to apply the principles heretofore laid down to the existing case, or to consider what orders it may be advisable to send from hence, it is material to mark, that the objections above-stated are not against any and every description of Mahratta connexion but against that which gives us the Peishwa alone, whilst it commits us in hostility with the three greatest military powers of the empire.

It is also considered that no alliance which does not give us a majority of the preponderating chiefs of the confederacy in cordial connexion with us can in the long run prove of advantage, inasmuch as such an alliance will occasion frequent recurrence to arms, and place the discontented states more in a situation to be tampered with by France.

That there is no reason, certainly none from experience, to suppose an alliance can ever be formed with the Mahrattas by a European power on principles destructive of the independence of any leading state; but more especially of the ostensible head of the Mahratta confederacy without making all the other powers enemies, and even occasioning the fidelity of the allied state to be precarious.

That the Mahratta confederacy, though the power of the Peishwa is imperfectly defined, and feebly maintained, is yet so far a body politic as to make the acts of each member a matter of common concern to all.

That Lord Wellesley when he looked to treat secretly for the expulsion of Scindiah from Poonah in terms recognized a paramount power to reside in the Peishwa over Scindiah and the other Mahratta chieftains. This paramount authority as head of the empire, and not his individual strength, could never have suggested the policy of looking principally to the Peishwa's connexion.

If that be the case, it is impossible to contend that the Peishwa can treat and act as a separate and independent state; and whilst he retains and asserts his authority over the Mahratta feudatories, submit himself in the management of his external concerns in a great degree to a foreign power. If he does so act, he must do it at his peril, and the other states will naturally consider how those acts are likely to affect their security or independence.

An alliance with the Peishwa and Scindiah jointly under the circumstances which took place subsequent to the defeat of the confederate forces before Poonah, perhaps might have been formed upon the basis of stationing the subsidiary force within our own territories, liable to be called on under certain conditions by each power in proportion as it contributed the funds towards its maintenance and support, not restricting either to a communication with us, before he concluded any treaty; for such stipulation where it is not reciprocal, is upon the face of it an abrogation of independence; but trusting that and every other question which might touch our interests to the legitimate influence gradually arising out of a connexion framed with a view to support and not extinguish the authority of the other contracting party, and also to the known and acknowledged power of the British arms, which it could never be their wish or their interest to provoke.

If an alliance framed on principles compatible with the feelings of a large proportion of that empire could not be formed under the circumstances which then prevailed, when so many parties had the strongest motives for cultivating our support, it may be doubted whether a Mahratta connexion is to be accomplished on any grounds short of subjugation. To subdue the Mahratta empire would be (if at all practicable) to charge ourselves with an incumbrance, and to bring ourselves in contact with neighbours much more troublesome, it would be sacrificing a tolerable barrier for one infinitely more precarious; and it must never be forgot, that were our object accomplished, of placing a subsidiary force of equal strength with that which the Peishwa is to receive under the treaty of Basscin, in the dominions of each of the four great military chieftains of

the confederacy, we should be only permanently extending our native force to the amount of 24,000 men, without any assurance that the empire at home can spare us, *that additional proportion of European force, which, whether actually making a part of the subsidiary corps or not, ought always invariably to accompany every encrease of our Indian army.*

Success therefore whether in war, or in negotiation, so long as we are *forcing*, and not *inviting this alliance*, however, for the time it may give a lustre to our authority, can only embark us in difficulties, from which it may be embarrassing to recede.

The British empire in India contains above fifty millions of inhabitants, it produces a revenue of above thirteen millions sterling a year, increasing with the general prosperity of the country at this moment rapidly advancing under the mild and beneficent administration of the Company. Our regular army native and European, on its peace establishment amounts to 115,000 men, a force capable of immediate extension in time of war. With such an empire a Mahratta connexion may be a very good thing, if it can be had without mixing us too deeply in their internal disturbances, or leading to an extension of dominion beyond our purpose, but we are too strong *to require it.* Our wisest policy is to place our dependence in that quarter, on the consolidation and improvement of what we already possess. On the steady application of our resources to the reduction of our debt, and approaching every native power possessed of and valuing its independence, with offers of alliance and connexion (when any such are to be made) on grounds really compatible with that independence, trust to the friends which such a course of conduct will make for us in the hour of trial, it being little probable that any competitor for eastern dominion can deprive us of our share of alliances when the danger is at hand, unless we ourselves by a mistaken course of policy lay the grounds before he approaches.

It has not been a matter of choice, but of necessity, that our existence in India should pass from that of traders to that of sovereigns. If we had not, the French would long since have taken the lead in India to our exclusion.

In the various contentions for power, in which our security was at the same time really involved, we have risen to an extent of possession and authority which can no longer be safely permitted to rest on any other foundation than our own intrinsic strength, events have latterly accelerated our progress so much as in itself (the rather as most political transactions will admit of question) to give an impression, with respect to our policy, which, *if heightened*, may be productive of serious embarrassment to our interests both at home and abroad, without being disposed to admit, or in truth feeling, that the tenor of our administration in India has been otherwise than highly honourable to the national character, I think, it is material, having already accomplished so much in point of *power and glory*, that we should now be studious to give to our councils a complexion of moderation and forbearance, trusting, as we may safely do, the preservation of our Indian possessions to the resources abundantly contained within our present limits.

In determining what it may be advisable to do, under present circumstances, it is necessary to decide to what extent we are bound and prepared to support the treaty of Bassein.

Lord Wellesley from the outset declared his determination not to persevere in the connection if the Peishwa's conduct was such as to prove him averse and faithless to the alliance.

His Lordship also resolved not to force the restoration of the Peishwa contrary to the feelings and inclinations of the majority of the immediate jaggeerdars and feudatories of the Poonah state.

Should the conduct of the Peishwa have become such as to induce the Governor-General to consider the alliance dissolved under the treaty of Bassein, the British Government will have an undoubted claim to retain the territories ceded by his Highness till he shall have fully discharged the extraordinary expense incurred in replacing him on the musnud.

In case the Peishwa shall have performed his part of the treaty, he is entitled to our support, and having guaranteed his dominions in good faith and character, we are bound to defend and maintain him on the musnud.

The treaty itself may be considered as consisting of two parts, the first affecting the immediate interests of the Peishwa, the second principally affecting our own; the former, unless modified with his Highness's concurrence, we are bound to adhere to; the relaxation of the latter depends principally on ourselves, and can meet with little difficulty on his part.

The 3rd and 17th articles* are obvious points of jealousy to all the Mahratta states, and from former experience of the Peishwa's reluctance to the receiving a subsidiary force within his dominions, the third article is not likely to be in truth more acceptable to him.

The 12th article also deserves consideration which binds the Peishwa to accept our arbitration in all disputes with the other powers. If the reasoning contained in the former part of these notes is right, doubts may be entertained of the policy of a connection with the Poonah state, which is necessarily calculated to mix the British Government so intimately in Mahratta politics, and must in appearance render the Peishwa absolutely dependent on us.

As far as relates to arbitrating the differences between the Nizam and the Peishwa as allies of the Company, we were bound to contend for it under the treaty of Hyderabad of 1800, but beyond this, having provided that our troops were not to be employed against any of the principal branches of the Mahratta empire, it would perhaps be better not to stipulate for a right, which being general, may alarm other states, and cannot be very acceptable even to the Peishwa himself, but rather to rely for the means of regulating his conduct upon pacific principles on the grounds we shall have to withhold the subsidiary force in cases where the Peishwa may be deemed the aggressor, than upon a positive right of arbitration in all cases binding upon him.

* See vol. iii. Appendix, page 627.

Without therefore failing in the spirit of our obligations to the Peishwa, we have the means of altering so far the character of the treaty as to restore his Highness to a state of more *ostensible independence*, and to give to the alliance less the aspect of aiming at an interference in Mahratta affairs.

Much of my doubt upon the policy of any Mahratta connection, however modified, arises from an apprehension of its tendency to involve us too much in the endless and complicated distractions of that turbulent empire. Much of my difficulty would be removed by our connection being so far simplified as to confine it to a mere support upon requisition, and that claim of support necessarily qualified by the principles which strictly belong to every *defensive* alliance. We should then always have a good plea for keeping out of discussion, which appeared to us foreign to the principles of our alliance, we should equally derive all the advantages connected with the late cessions, and being less pledged to interference, we should perhaps be in a situation to exercise a more beneficial influence than we can do by making ourselves *absolute parties*, in which light we must be considered so long as the subsidiary force is at Poonah and the Peishwa actually in our hands.

The object of the late treaty has been to obtain a complete and commanding influence, to render this at all secure from interruption and contest, our authority must be introduced upon similar principles into other leading Mahratta states. The accomplishment of this seems little probable if desirable, and the reasons for not thinking it desirable have been already stated.

The objections to forming a subsidiary connection with the Mahratta states upon the modified plan herein proposed appear less serious, as it throws less weight of management and interference upon us, whilst in its nature it is less calculated to excite the resentment and jealousy of powers not included in the alliance; the stipulations may be fulfilled without so large an extension of our native force, but even upon this principle it ought not to be carried beyond what appears *absolutely requisite* to unite some proportion of the confederacy in interest with us, as I am satisfied the limited number of men that can be obtained in Europe for general service in the present state of our manufactures and commerce, and the extended scale on which it will be thought necessary hereafter to provide for our home defence, renders it hopeless to aim at obtaining for India a larger establishment of King's troops.

In any modification of the treaty of Bassein upon the principles above suggested, it is of great importance to guard against any impression calculated to make the Nizam discontented with the treaty of Hyderabad of 1800.

This cannot be difficult to manage. The Nizam has a direct interest in the subsidiary force being so stationed as effectually to cover his dominions from Mahratta incursions; it will be easy to make him feel the policy of modifying our connection with the Court of Poonah, the head of the Mahratta confederacy, so as to occasion less jealousy in the other states, and as war always augments his expenses; as our ally, he will

have the same interest in the adoption of measures tending to allay the uneasiness of the other Mahratta powers which we ourselves have.

The object to be aimed at should be, to place the alliance with the Court of Poonah, as nearly as may be, on the footing of our connection with the Nizam previous to 1793,* retaining however the assigned lands as a permanent provision for a permanent force to be held always disposable for the protection of the Peishwa, although not stationed within his dominions, and it appears to me that so far from encouraging or wishing the Peishwa to order this force frequently and without adequate necessity to enter his territory, that the object of the Resident at Poonah should be to discourage as much as possible his applying for it, when its services can be dispensed with, and whenever the service is performed on which it is required, that it should be *our endeavour* to have it returned to its station with the least possible delay.

Such is the course of management which appears to me best calculated to strengthen our influence not only at Poonah, but in the other Mahratta Courts between this, and a system of authority founded on force, and not likely to be effected without continual struggles; I apprehend there is no safe medium.

Whether this alteration of our engagements with the Peishwa had better be made a matter of general negotiation at the peace with the Mahratta states, or at once settled between the Peishwa and the Company, must be judged of on the spot; in the former case, it may lead to some equivalent arrangements on the part of our enemies; in the latter, it would bear less the complexion of a concession, whilst it would probably narrow materially the points at issue with the other powers.

Our first object then seems to be, to fulfil our engagements to the Peishwa; our second, to alter to a certain degree the nature of our connection with that state. A third consideration is, what steps we are called upon to take in consequence of the part which the other Mahratta powers have acted on the present occasion, particularly Scindiah and the Berar Rajah, Holkar by the last accounts not having as yet joined the confederacy.

Whatever might have been their natural motives of jealousy, their conduct has throughout been marked by the utmost duplicity. They appear to have taken their measures for war whilst they were professing friendship.

They did not remonstrate against the treaty of Bassein; on the contrary, Scindiah disclaimed any purpose of disturbing it, and declared he did not consider it to contain any stipulation inconsistent with his interest; the evidence we had of orders given by Scindiah to his chiefs on the Bengal frontier clearly marks that his interview with the Berar Rajah, and the menacing posture taken by their united forces immediately on the Nizam's territories, was a prelude to hostilities.

* The rise and progress of an alarming French force at Hyderabad, annihilated by the Governor-General in 1798; shews the imperfection of such an arrangement.—[Ed. June, 1837.]

Not having demanded *explanation*, nor made any attempt to settle the question by amicable negotiation, but having on the contrary pursued a course of equivocation and deceit, we are warranted in considering them as aggressors.

In this case we are entitled to demand from them (subject to prudential considerations) indemnity for the expenses incurred by us and our allies in the war; in the application however of this right, it would be highly unadvisable to protract the war in the hope of obtaining such retribution.

Pecuniary compensation is very much out of the question with such states; they have little treasure and less credit, and any security given on lands is only keeping alive a question of litigation between them and us if our successes are such as to place within our reach any concession on their part without protracting the contest. Better take it in some absolute and unqualified surrender than any thing connected with a protracted settlement; and if the surrender is of a territorial description, it is desirable that it should be some point of value rather as a means of security to our existing possessions than selected with a view to their extension.

The expelling the French now in the service of Scindiah is certainly a considerable object, and one to which the Governor-General's attention appears already earnestly directed. As far as my means of information go I should conceive Baroach in the Guzerat belonging to Scindiah, and Cuttack to the Rajah of Berar, would be the points of most importance to insist on, as tending to deny to European intrigue their best channels of intercourse with the native powers.

The object however of *most importance* will be, to bring the war to an end as early as is consistent with our good honour and good faith. Extension of territory not being our purpose, we have nothing to gain from the contest, whilst it suspends all our views to the reduction of debt, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

Major-General Wellesley's Observations on the preceding Document.

As the author of observations* on Mahratta affairs does not appear to me to have viewed the policy of the treaty of Bassein in the light in which I have viewed it, and as I conceive that much of his reasoning upon the subject is to be attributed to his erroneous view in my opinion of the political state of India at the time the treaty was made, I deem it necessary to advert shortly to the political situation of the great powers in India at different periods in which any important change has taken place since the

* The "Observations" of Lord Castlereagh were sent by the Governor-General to different persons in India for their opinion thereon; and in order that the subject might more freely be discussed, the name of the writer was not disclosed.—[ED.]

peace of Seringapatam, before I proceed to consider the amendments to the treaty of Bassein which have been proposed.

In the consideration of all questions of Indian policy, it is necessary to extend our views beyond those powers immediately possessing territory. It is well known that the French have never ceased to look to the re-establishment of their power in India; and although they possess no territory themselves on the continent, they have at all times had some influence in the councils of the different native powers, and sometimes great power by means of the European adventurers introduced into native armies. There can be no doubt but that the French government would avail themselves of an instrument, such as the influence or the power of these adventurers would give them, to prosecute their favourite plan in India; and it is equally certain, that whether at peace or at war with Great Britain, the object of every French statesman must be to diminish the influence, the power, and the prosperity of the British Government in India. I therefore conclude, that in the consideration of every question of Indian policy, or in an inquiry into the expediency of any political measure, it is absolutely necessary to view it, not only as it will affect Indian powers, but as it will affect the French.

When I establish this principle, I don't mean that the assertion "that the French interest has been affected," is to be admitted in justification of every political measure of the government. It is necessary only that it should be recollected by those who are to judge of political affairs in India, that French power and French influence are important parts of every political discussion by the governments abroad; and it will appear by the view which I shall take of the political situation of the great powers in India at different periods, that French influence was powerful, that to have omitted to guard against the French would have been ruinous to the Company, and that the necessity of guarding against French influence was one of the principal causes of the treaty of Bassein.

In order thoroughly to understand the relations in which the different powers of India stood to each other at the period at which the treaty of Bassein was concluded, and to be able to comprehend the objects and benefits of that treaty, it is necessary to advert to the situation in which they stood at the peace of Seringapatam in 1792, and to trace their progress from that period.

The three great powers, the English, the Peishwa, and the Nizam, having each received injuries from Tippoo Sultaun, joined in the war, the result of which was that peace; and the object of the British Government was if possible to preserve the power of each in the situation in which it was left by the pacification. Lord Cornwallis, who foresaw the difficulties and dangers to which the alliance would be exposed from the claims of the Mahrattas upon the Nizam, endeavoured to establish the alliance upon a more firm basis, by interposing the arbitration of the British Government in their disputes; but the Mahrattas who knew that their claims were without foundation, that they depended entirely upon their superior strength, and that the result of an arbitration by the British

Government must be unfavourable to them, declined to accept the offer made by Lord Cornwallis.

I conceive this to be the real history of the refusal of Lord Cornwallis to allow the Mahrattas to subsidize two British battalions as mentioned by the anonymous observer, if such a proposal was ever made to him. His Lordship found that without giving the British Government any additional strength or security, the Peishwa's general wished to have the assistance of the British troops in the support of the Peishwa's internal government; and his Lordship was not desirous of being involved in the internal disputes of the Mahrattas, without having some corresponding political advantage.

The result of the refusal of the Mahrattas to allow the arbitration of the British Government was exactly what his Lordship had foreseen. In the course of very few years the Mahrattas attacked the Nizam for the purpose of enforcing their unjust claims. The British Government of that day did not interfere, and the Nizam was obliged, in a treaty signed at Kurdlah, on the _____ to cede half his territories, to pay a great sum of money, and to give up to the Mahrattas his prime minister Mushier-ool Mulk, and to appoint another minister, recommended by the enemies who had reduced his power to that low state. His Highness was also obliged to consent to send out of his territories the two British battalions which had continued with him since the peace of Seringapatam,

In the contest which had just taken place between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, the troops principally employed, and whose gallantry had been most conspicuous, were the corps of infantry in the service of Scindiah on the one side, and those in the service of the Nizam on the other. Both these corps were commanded, and in general officered by Frenchmen and other foreigners. The corps in the service of the Nizam in particular, commanded by M. Raymond, had distinguished itself in an extraordinary manner, although unsuccessful.

After the experience of the war, which had just terminated, the Nizam, seeing that he could not rely upon the assistance of the British Government against the Mahrattas, determined to increase the corps of infantry, officered by Frenchmen and other foreigners, to the greatest extent that his finances would admit, and to render it as efficient as was possible. With this view, a large territory was granted in Jagheer to M. Raymond, from the revenues of which he was to pay the troops under his command; and the number of troops and French officers to command them was vastly increased.

In a short time after the peace of Kurdlah, the Peishwa Madoo Rao Narrain died, and a scene of intrigue and confusion ensued at Poonah, the object of which was the succession to the Musnud of the Peishwa, and the possession of the power of the Poonah state.

It is useless to the consideration of the question under discussion to endeavour, and would be impossible to succeed in detailing the events which occurred upon that occasion; the result was the establishment, in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of all the power of the Peishwa

The predecessor of this chief had conquered the territories in the Doab

of the Jumna and Ganges, and those on the right of the Jumna; he was in possession of the person of the King, and of his power, by virtue of his office of *Vakeel ul Muluck*; and thus was established in the hand of one *Mahratta*, all the territory and all the power on the west side of India, extending from *Hurdwar* to the *Toombuddra*, along the frontiers of the Company, the *Nabob Vizier*, the *Nizam*, *Tippoo Suldaun*, &c. I have already observed that *Scindiah* had in his service a corps of infantry, commanded and generally officered by Frenchmen. This corps had conquered the territories in *Hindostan*, had rendered essential service in the war which preceded the peace of *Kurdlah*, and had been the principal instrument in the establishment of *Scindiah's* power at *Poonah*. This corps, therefore, commanded and officered by Frenchmen, may be fairly stated to have been the principal instrument and support of the enormous power thus established in the western side of India.

On the other hand a similar corps, officered in a similar manner, was the principal, indeed the only support of the state of the *Nizam*. The difference between the two was, that that of *Raymond* was the most powerful; and *Raymond* had the most influence in the councils of the Prince whom he was serving, owing to the destruction of the power and authority of the *Nizam* in his own territories, occasioned by the disgrace suffered at *Kurdlah*.

In this situation, the Governor-General, *Lord Wellesley*, found political affairs when he assumed the government in the year 1798.

As *Lord Cornwallis* had foreseen, the state of the *Nizam* was nearly destroyed by the *Mahrattas*; the policy of the British Government had obliged the *Nizam* to support his tottering authority by the service of a body of troops commanded by French officers, in whose hands was the only power in the state.

The *Peishwa's* power was lodged by another train of events in the hands of *Scindiah*, who possessed besides all the power of the north and west of India, and whose principal support and instrument was a corps of a similar description, likewise commanded by Frenchmen.

It is useless to detail the measures adopted by *Lord Wellesley* to remedy the evils which resulted from this state of the governments of the allies of the Company in the war with *Tippoo Suldaun*; of which he saw the probability in the year 1798. It is sufficient here to observe, that his Lordship relieved the *Nizam* from the state of dependence in which he was held by the commanding officer of the French corps in his service: The French officers were dismissed; British troops were subsidized in lieu of the corps which the French officers had commanded; and the British Government enjoyed the advantage of the assistance of the *Nizam* in the war which ensued with *Tippoo Suldaun*.

The measures by which the Governor-General proposed to relieve the government of the *Peishwa* from the state in which it was held by *Scindiah* failed to produce their effect. His Highness's Government was in *Scindiah's* hands; and the British Government derived no assistance from this branch of the alliance.

After the destruction of the power of *Tippoo Suldaun*, on the 4th of

May, 1799, a new combination of politics appeared in India. The native power, against whose enmity it had been necessary to provide, by an alliance with the Peishwa and the Nizam was no more, and the Governor-General was to determine the relation in which the British Government should stand in respect to the powers which remained. These were that of the Nizam, and that of the Mahrattas.

It was obviously the interest of the British Government that the power of the Nizam should continue to exist in a state of independence. If there had been any reasonable ground for hope that his Highness's state could continue in independence, there might possibly have been no occasion for an alteration of the treaty by which the Company was then allied with his Highness. But it could not exist in that state, unless the Peishwa should consent to admit the mediation and arbitration of the British Government in the questions or claims which his Highness had upon the Nizam. The Governor-General therefore offered to allow the Peishwa to participate in the acquisitions made by the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, provided his Highness would admit the arbitration of the British Government in his disputes with the Nizam, and would receive a subsidiary force. The Peishwa declined to accept this offer; and the acquisitions made in the war were divided between the parties concerned in carrying it on.

The state of the Nizam's government however, after this refusal of the Peishwa, must still have pressed upon the consideration of the Governor-General.

By the treaty of 1798, his Highness was precluded from the employment of the British subsidiary troops against the Mahrattas, or against certain tributaries of his, likewise tributaries of the Peishwa; and it was obvious that however advantageous the treaty of 1798 had been to his government in many respects, his Highness was still in the situation in respect to the Mahrattas, in which he had been in the year 1797, with this difference, however, that he had no longer the support and service of the corps commanded by the French officers. It became necessary therefore for the Governor-General to decide respecting the Nizam's government, whether he would allow it to fall into the hands of the Mahrattas; whether he would allow it to revert into the hands of the French adventurers from whom he had relieved the Nizam in the year of 1798; or whether he would by an alteration of the treaty of 1798 extend the objects of the alliance, and render it defensive against all powers whatever, and in this manner undertake the defence of the Nizam against the vexatious claims which it was certain that the Mahrattas would make upon him.

It is scarcely necessary that I should advert to the consequences which would have resulted from the first. The Mahrattas would shortly have exercised the power of the Nizam's government, whose territory at that time extended to the southward of the Kistna and Toombuddra, along the frontier of the newly established government of Mysore. They would soon have found the means of making claims in his name, or in that of the Peishwa, on the Rajah of Mysore, or the Nabob of the Carnatic, or even the Company, and the consequence would have been a war with that restless power,

of which the seat would have been the territories of the Company or their allies, and the sources from which the means to carry on the war were to be drawn.

The second mode would have been in direct contradiction to the opinion of parliament and the nation, and of every man who had given an opinion on the Governor-General's conduct in his transactions with the Nizam's government in the year 1798. It would have introduced Frenchmen, French influence, interests and power into the heart of India, after they had been expelled by the Governor-General.

There remained then only to take the Nizam under the protection of the Company; and this measure was adopted by the general defensive treaty of 1800, although every man who knew any thing of the politics of India foresaw that the consequence of this measure might be sooner or later a war with the Mahrattas.

The probability of such a war was foreseen by the former Governor-General Sir John Shore, in a minute in which he discussed the question regarding a closer alliance with the Nizam; and it is supposed that Lord Wellesley saw clearly that the only mode of avoiding that war, was to induce the Peishwa to become a party to the alliance, and to submit his claims to the arbitration of the British Government. Consistently with this opinion, it was the duty of the Governor-General to repeat his offers of alliance as frequently as opportunities might occur; and accordingly they were repeated upon different occasions.

I cannot agree in opinion with the anonymous observer, that the offers to admit the Peishwa as a party to the general defensive alliance were not accepted, because the Governor-General insisted that a body of British troops should be posted in his Highness's territories.

In the first place it does not appear that the Governor-General insisted upon that object as a *sine quâ non*. He may, for reasons into which I will enter hereafter, have thought it desirable that a body of British troops should be at Poonah; but he did not insist upon it. However, I shall consider this point upon the facts stated by the anonymous observer.

Till the end of the year 1800, Scindiah was at Poonah with an army; it was obvious that he would not willingly consent to the defensive treaty because it would put an end to all his projects of ambition in the Deccan; and the Peishwa could not consent to it, because he would have been exposed to the tyranny of Scindiah from the time at which he would sign the treaty to that at which the British troops would arrive at Poonah.

When circumstances obliged Scindiah to quit Poonah with his army, he appointed the Peishwa's ministers, who still continued to negotiate with the British Resident; and it is a fact well known that the Peishwa did not know even of the existence of a negotiation, much less the nature of the objects offered to his acceptance, and refused by his servants.

The result of this statement and reasoning is, that the policy of a connection with the Mahrattas did not "arise from the connection subsisting previously to the conquest of Mysore, between the Company, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam, by the treaty concluded in 1790 at Poonah;" but subsequently to the conquest of Mysore; it originated, 1st, In the neces-

sity of preserving the state of the Nizam in independence. 2ndly. In the unjust claims of the Mahratta nation on the Nizam. 3rdly. In the certainty that those claims would be asserted in arms, and that the Nizam must submit unless he should protect himself by raising an army to be officered by European adventurers, particularly Frenchmen. 4thly. In the necessity of preventing the Nizam from entertaining those adventurers, and of affording him protection at least equal to that which he would have procured for himself by those means, even at the risk of a war with the whole Mahratta nation.

In this view of the question I have entirely omitted the enlarged considerations which must be obvious to every statesman who discusses it. I have likewise omitted to advert to the peculiar situation of the British power in India, which requires that the funds applicable to the defence of the country should be applied to commercial purposes, and therefore renders it necessary that the local government should derive means of supporting armies different from those usually resorted to; I have considered nothing but that which was absolutely necessary for security in the first instance, and for peace in the second.

There can be no question about the Mahratta claims, or that they would have been enforced with arms, or that the Nizam must have yielded unless supported by the French, or by the Company. The question is, whether the best mode of preventing the war was to prevail upon the Peishwa to become a party to the defensive alliance.

It is not necessary that I should consider the particular circumstances of the times at the different periods at which proposals were made to the Peishwa to become a party to the defensive alliance. It will be sufficient for the purpose under consideration to state, that the consequence of the conclusion of the defensive arrangements with the Peishwa at any period since the year 1799, must have been to join against Scindiah a great proportion of the Mahratta nation. It is possible that under these circumstances Scindiah might have acquiesced in the arrangement, but supposing that he should have gone to war to oppose it, the war would have been one of far less extent and difficulty than that in which the Company must sooner or later have been involved with the whole Mahratta nation, by the necessity of supporting the Nizam. The seat of it would have been the territories of our enemies instead of our own, and the sources from which we were to draw the means of carrying it on.

But the question is not properly referable to the admission of the Peishwa to the defensive alliance, at any period antecedent to the treaty of Bassein, but to that treaty itself.

In order to be able to form a judgment whether the circumstances under which it was negotiated afforded the best chance of preserving the peace of India, it is necessary to advert to the situation of Mahratta affairs from the years 1798-9.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah appears to have possessed the power to which I have referred in the former part of this memorandum, from the time at which he placed the Peishwa Bajee Rao on the musnud. He was involved however in a contest in Malwa with the females of the family of his pre-

decessor Madhaje Scindiah; and after the death of Tuckojee Holkar, he was desirous of influencing the disposal of the succession of that chief, in such a manner as to forward his own political objects. In pursuance of these views, he murdered Mulhar Rao (the son of Tuckojee Holkar) at Poonah. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the natural son of Tuckojee Holkar, fled upon that occasion, and after a variety of adventures in the territories of the Nizam and of the Rajah of Berar, he first joined the Bhyes, and then plundered them. He afterwards, in the year 1800, attacked and defeated a detachment of Scindiah's army at Oujein.

These events obliged Scindiah to quit Poonah. Towards the end of that year, he defeated Holkar in a pitched battle fought at Indore; and in 1801 and 1802, drove him out of Malwa into the Deccan. Holkar then attacked the Peishwa, and having a large body of troops defeated the united armies of Scindiah and the Peishwa at Poonah. In the month of October 1802, the Peishwa fled, and took refuge under the Company's protection at Bassein, having previous to the battle at Poonah signed an agreement, which contained all the principal objects of the treaty of Bassein.

In this crisis, all the Mahratta powers pressed the Governor-General to interfere in their affairs. Scindiah repeatedly urged the Governor-General to settle the Peishwa's affairs; and begged that his Highness and himself might enjoy the benefit of the Company's friendship.

I believe it might be proved that Scindiah was fully informed of every point in the negotiation of the treaty of Bassein. His vakeel Ballajee Koonjee was the Peishwa's dewan at the time, and he knew every thing.

Holkar's declared intention and apparent object was to establish a new government at Poonah under one of the sons of Amrut Rao as Peishwa.

The government at Poonah would under this arrangement have been administered in its military branch by Holkar; and in its civil, by Amrut Rao. These persons both repeatedly requested the Company's countenance for themselves; and in fact the arrangement failed because Amrut Rao saw that the British Government was determined to oppose it, and to support Bajee Rao. At all events, Holkar and Amrut Rao requested the Company's mediation of their disputes with the Peishwa, and urged the Governor-General to interfere to settle the affairs at Poonah.

Although it cannot be asserted that the Peishwa is a powerful prince, there is a large party in the empire attached to his person, all of whom were anxious in the expression of their wishes that the British Government should interfere in his affairs. The Peishwa's right to the *musnud* is universally acknowledged, although his authority is from circumstances imperfect, and his orders but ill obeyed; and his cause supported by the British Government was certainly popular in the southern parts of the empire.

The southern chiefs who are the principal support of the government of Poonah had not submitted to Holkar; they were in arms waiting for the arrival of the British troops, as the instruments of the interference of the British Government in the Peishwa's affairs; and they joined the British

army when it arrived in their neighbourhood. There was no probability that Holkar would make any serious opposition to the march of the British troops to Poonah. He had not made his peace with Scindiah, indeed neither party thought of it, and he would have opposed himself singly in an unpopular cause, to all the great powers in India.

Under all these circumstances, and allowing for the treachery of the Mahratta character, there was every reason to believe, that the close of the year 1802 was the most favourable period that had ever occurred, or that would occur, for the admission of the Peishwā as a party to the defensive alliance without a war.

I have already stated my reasons for thinking that this measure was the only one that could be devised to avoid a war which sooner or later must have occurred with all the Mahratta powers, in the support and defence of the Nizam; and the anonymous observer has pointed out with great truth and accuracy, the sentiments of the Court of Directors, and of the Government at home, on the subject of the admission of the Peishwa to the defensive alliance. It is true that the Court of Directors do not appear to have had a very distinct knowledge of the objects of the defensive alliance; and like the anonymous observer, supposed that it was founded upon the triple alliance of the year 1790, to defend the allies against Tippoo, who was no more. However, whatever may have been the reasons of the approbation of the Court of Directors, and of the authorities at home, they approved the measure, and ordered the Governor-General, according to the anonymous observer, to carry it into execution. Surely it will not be denied that if the Governor-General had passed over the opportunity which offered at the end of the year 1802, he would have been guilty of the most flagrant disobedience of orders, and dereliction of his own principles and measures repeatedly reviewed by himself and by the first authorities in India and in England.

If the Governor-General had omitted to take advantage of the opportunity which presented itself at the close of the year 1802, I think the most probable result would have been a war with the Poonah state under the government of Holkar and Amrut Rao, and it is not improbable but that the war might have extended to the whole of the Mahratta states.

The British Government might on this plan of proceeding have collected their armies, and have remained upon the frontier to watch the course of proceedings as recommended by the anonymous observer, or they might have passed over, as unworthy of notice, every thing that was doing at Poonah; and have delayed to take any steps till the moment when they or their allies should be attacked. I cannot exactly discern the object in assembling the army upon the frontier, if it was to do nothing. The most expensive article in India is an army in the field; and the most useless is one destined to act upon the defensive. An army in a state of preparation to act offensively when opportunity will offer is indeed useful, and I believe no army ever seized so favourable an opportunity as that which marched to Poonah in March and April, 1803.

But the anonymous observer says, that we ought to have concerted our arrangements with Scindiah; that we ought to have offered a disinter-

ested mediation, and to have acted in concert with Scindiah at one time, and at another with the Rajah of Berar,

I have already shewn, and the anonymous observer acknowledges that the British Government were encouraged, nay, strongly urged, by all the principal Mahratta powers, amongst others by Holkar himself, to interfere in the settlement of the Peishwa's affairs. In respect to a concert, the anonymous observer forgets the difficulty and length of every communication with the chief who was to be party to the concert. Supposing that it had been possible to bring Scindiah into our measures, the direct object of which was to take the Nizam out of his reach, and to deprive him of all objects of ambition in the Deccan, it would still have taken six months before the Commander-in-Chief in the army could receive the orders of the Governor-General to advance to Poonah, even if the diplomatic agent charged with the negotiations with Scindiah should have had occasion to make but two references to the Governor-General. But in this case the objects of the British Government, of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar would have been entirely different. That of the British Government would have been to restore the Peishwa to the exercise of his authority, independently of any of the feudatory Mahratta chiefs, in order that his Highness might perform his treaty with the Company, in favour of the Nizam. That of Scindiah would have been to restore the government of the Peishwa, in order that he might usurp and exercise its authority, and revive the old claims and objects of ambition in the Deccan. As far as it is possible to form a judgment of the course of politics of any Mahratta, the Rajah of Berar favoured Holkar's usurpation at Poonah, and the establishment of the new government to be founded upon it.

Supposing that it had been possible, by placing the treaty of Bassein upon a broader basis, as proposed by the anonymous observer, to induce Scindiah to agree to its only important stipulation, viz., that of the mediation and arbitration of the Mahratta claims in the Peishwa's name made upon the Nizam, it would have become a question of considerable importance to the British Government to decide whether that chief should be allowed to resume his situation at Poonah, and to usurp all the power and authority of the Peishwa's government.

It must be recollected that Scindiah's resumption of his power must have been preceded by the defeat of Holkar's army in the Deccan. Scindiah's power was already established in the whole of Hindostan and Malwa. The reduction of Holkar's force, and the re-establishment at Poonah of Scindiah's power would have replaced Mahratta affairs in the situation in which they had been since the death of Madhoo-Rao-Narrain, from which they had been relieved by a variety of unforeseen events. One powerful Mahratta chief, with a French force as his principal support, would have possessed all the territory, influence and power, from the sources of the Ganges to the Toombuddra; the situation which all Indian politicians have deprecated since the British nation have had any thing to do with Indian politics,

It is therefore very probable that the British Government and Scindiah

would not have agreed in a detailed concert for the settlement of the Peishwa's government; and it is certain that they would not have agreed with the Rajah of Berar.

In this diversity of opinions and objects the negotiations would have been protracted possibly more than a year.

In all military operations, but particularly in India, time is every thing; and I am decidedly of opinion, that if we had not seized the opportunity which was taken, the march to Poonah would never have been effected.

If the British Government had hesitated in the measures which it should adopt, Amrut Rao would have consented to the arrangement proposed for his son. This boy would have been placed upon the musnud with the title of Peishwa. The southern chiefs would soon have submitted to Holkar. They are generally connected with Amrut Rao, and that party in the state which favours his pretensions, and Holkar had already detached troops and adopted other measures to reduce them; and would have extended his authority to the frontiers of Mysore.

We should then have seen at Poonah the Peishwa's government administered by the ablest Mahratta in the civil affairs of the empire, and served by a formidable army commanded by the most enterprising chief. This army, however, would have had no means of support; for the revenues of the Peishwa's country are already assigned to the Jagheerdary chiefs in the southern districts, who, if they had not been certain of British assistance, would have submitted to Holkar, and would have joined his army with their troops. Holkar would have been under the necessity of keeping his army together; and after the southern chiefs would have submitted, he must have attacked the Nizam or the Company, in order to support his troops.

It is well known that when he was at Poonah, he was collecting documents to enforce the claims of the Poonah state upon the Nizam; and that every discontented pretender of every description from the territories of the Company or the Company's allies was received with distinction, and encouraged to hope for the assistance of Holkar's armies in enforcing his pretensions to portions of these territories.

While the British Government would have been wasting its time and resources, according to the plan of the anonymous observer, with an army upon the frontier, and in a vain attempt to frame a concert with Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, Holkar would have attained the greatest degree of strength.

We have seen that the Rajah of Berar favoured Holkar's usurpation at Poonah. Scindiah certainly was adverse to it, but I doubt much whether Scindiah would have done any thing against Holkar.

Scindiah certainly could have done nothing excepting he could bring his brigades to Poonah: the country had been already destroyed in a great measure by Holkar, and the destruction would have been completed if Scindiah had attempted to move. It may be said that he moved his brigades afterwards into the Deccan, for the purpose of opposing the British Government, and that he might equally have moved them to Poonah to destroy the power established by Holkar's usurpation; but in

answer I observe that an operation of this description is very different when opposed by British troops, and when opposed by such an army as Holkar's. The former don't, and indeed have not the means of destroying the country; to destroy the country is the only mode of warfare of the latter, and it is certain that this mode would have been adopted by Holkar to prevent Scindiah from entering the Deccan.

If it be true, as I have supposed, that the concert proposed by the anonymous observer could not have been formed, if the Rajah of Berar favoured Holkar's usurpation at Poonah, and if Scindiah could not have advanced his troops into the Deccan, it is my opinion that the result of the negotiations would have been a combination of all the Mahratta states to attack the Company and the Nizam.

In the negotiations for the proposed concert the British Government must have kept aloof from the new government at Poonah. Neither our principles or our practice permit us to encourage by marks of favour or kindness an usurpation, while we are negotiating with other powers the means of destroying it. But in this instance the state of our negotiations must have been known to those against whom they were to be directed. There is no secret in a Mahratta Durbar; and it may be depended upon that this secret above all others would have transpired.

Then would have commenced a counterplot conducted by certainly the ablest Mahratta in the empire; I mean Amrut Rao.

In considering a question of this kind, respecting the remote consequences of any particular line of policy which never was adopted, it is not possible to do more than to state the general principles and opinions of the parties concerned, their conduct upon other occasions, and to draw from these premises a conclusion respecting their conduct in the supposed case.

There can be no doubt whatever that the great object of every Mahratta statesman has been to combine their force to attack the British Government; and if they had ever been free from disputes among themselves, they would have carried that plan into execution.

The person who I believe of all the Mahrattas to have been the most determined enemy of the British Government, and who was the soul of this plan, was the Rajah of Berar. This person would have been the centre of the negotiations for the concert, supposing that the Governor-General had adopted the plan of the anonymous observer; and on the other hand, he would have been the instrument of Amrut Rao's counterplot to support his own usurped authority.

We have seen the Rajah of Berar, under circumstances very unfavourable, negotiate a peace between Scindiah and Holkar for the purposes of a combination against the Company. The question is whether, supposing the British Government had not brought back the Peishwa to Poonah, and had followed the plan of the anonymous observer, he would not have had in his hands materials which would have enabled him to effect that pacification with greater ease than he effected that under which the combination was formed in the summer of 1803.

The loss which Scindiah sustained by the subversion of the Peishwa's

government was power and influence. He lost no territory in consequence of Holkar's victories. Those which he had in the Deccan remained with him till he went to war with the Company.

On the other hand, Holkar had claims to the possessions of his family in Malwa, and to certain portions of the territories which Madhaje Scindiah had conquered in Hindostan. In the pacification which was effected through the mediation of the Rajah of Berar in the summer of 1803, with the view to the combination against the Company, all these territories and claims were ceded by Scindiah to Holkar.

We have already seen that Scindiah would have found himself unable to do any thing against Holkar in the Deccan singly; and on the other hand, the British Government, according to the plan of the anonymous observer, would do nothing excepting in concert with Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar. We have seen Scindiah's object in restoring the Peishwa's government would have been to usurp its authority again, and to assert its claims and revive the old plans of ambition in the Deccan. Ours would have been to make the Peishwa so independent of all the Mahratta powers as that he would have been able to perform his treaty with the Company in favour of the Nizam. That of the Rajah of Berar would have been to support the new government, established by Holkar's and Amrut Rao's usurpation. These discordant views were to be reconciled by negotiation before the British Government could have taken any step to overcome Holkar; and these negotiations must have been attended by all the tediousness which is the usual consequence of references to Calcutta, on account of the distance.

Amrut Rao and the Rajah of Berar would in the meantime have endeavoured to bring about a peace on the basis of Holkar's cession of his territories and claims in Malwa, &c., and of Scindiah's acknowledgment of the new Peishwa and the state of affairs established at Poonah, and of a combination of the whole Mahratta nation to enforce their claims upon the Nizam, the Nabob Vizier, and the Company.

We have seen that the negotiations for the concert with Scindiah would have turned upon the degree of power which Scindiah was to have at Poonah after the Peishwa's government should be restored; the object of the British Government would have been, that the Peishwa should be independent; that of Scindiah to have the whole power of the state in his hands; and he would have been aware that the British Government would never consent to that arrangement.

In this state of affairs he would have had to choose whether he would co-operate with the British Government in restoring the Peishwa's government, in rendering it independent of himself, and in renouncing all its vexatious claims upon the Nizam; or whether he would leave the power at Poonah in the hands of Holkar and Amrut Rao, keeping peaceable possession of what he had in Malwa, Hindostan, and the Deccan.

In either case the power at Poonah would have been lost to him, and he would have derived no advantage from the arrangement with the British Government, excepting the gratification of his enmity against Holkar. On the other hand, by the pacification with Holkar and the combination

against the British Government, he would have adopted a favourite and popular plan of policy among the Mahrattas, in the execution of which he would have played the principal part; and if it had been successful, he would have been the greatest gainer.

I have no doubt respecting the choice which Scindiah would have made, and I declare that I conceive that peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and a combination upon the basis supposed, would have included more interests, and would have been more practicable than that which was formed in the summer of 1803.

If the British Government had remained unarmed, and a tacit spectator of events in the Mahratta empire, the result would possibly have been the same. Holkar would certainly have been obliged to spread his armies into the Nizam's country for subsistence, and we must eventually have been at war. But as we should not have been actively employed in negotiations for a concert against the new government at Poonah, it is possible that Amrut Rao might not have thought it necessary to commence his administration by combining all the Mahrattas against us. Nothing however would have been able to destroy the new government; and whenever the peace between Scindiah and Holkar would have been effected, the British Government and its allies would have been attacked.

In the consideration of this part of the question I have omitted purposely to introduce any reference to the French. It must not be forgotten however, that at the time that the Governor-General decided on the part which he would take in the Mahratta affairs at the end of the year 1802, he had every reason to expect the French in India;* and I leave those who will peruse this memorandum to judge how much this event would have increased the difficulties of a protracted and complicated negotiation, against which one of the parties would have been plotting with Amrut Rao and Holkar.

I may therefore conclude that the treaty of Bassein and the measures adopted in consequence of it, not only afforded the best prospect of preserving the peace of India, but that to have adopted any other measures would have rendered war with Holkar nearly certain, and war with the whole Mahratta nation more probable than it could be under any other course of events.

Having now considered the general policy of admitting the Peishwa as a party to the treaty of general defensive alliance, and the policy of concluding the treaty of Bassein, at the time at which it was concluded, and of the measures which were adopted in consequence of that treaty, I come to consider the particular articles of that treaty to which the anonymous observer objects, and the nature of his objections to them.

I have already pointed out that the object of the Company in concluding any arrangement with the Peishwa was to secure the Nizam against the vexatious claims which might be made upon him either by the Peishwa or by one of the great chiefs acting in his name, and under the authority of

* They were then in Egypt.—[Ed.]

the government of Poonah. It is obvious that the Company's object could not have been gained unless the Peishwa should agree either to give up the claims upon the Nizam entirely, or to admit the mediation and arbitration of the Company in deciding on the justice of those claims.

To have insisted on the Peishwa's relinquishing his claims entirely, would have been an unjust an arbitrary proceeding, and would probably have occasioned the loss of the whole treaty. The only mode, therefore, which remained was to insist upon establishing the mediation and arbitration of the Company, as the mode of deciding all questions, disputes, and claims between the two powers.

The Company were bound to the Nizam to settle the questions and claims existing on the part of the Peishwa, or his Highness's government.

It does not appear practicable for the Company to be bound in a defensive alliance with both governments without stipulating to arbitrate their disputes; and this will appear more clearly when the events are recollected which have occurred since the year 1792.

In respect to the article by which it is required that a body of troops should be stationed within the territories of the Peishwa, this will appear the more necessary when the situation of the Peishwa's government in relation to the other great Máhratta powers is considered.

The object of these powers, as stated by the anonymous observer, was to get possession of the power of the Peishwa's government at Poonah. The attainment of this object, it is very evident, must have defeated the great view which the British Government must have had in admitting the Peishwa at all to become a party to the general defensive alliance.

As soon as Scindiah or Holkar would have established themselves at Poonah they would immediately have revived the old claims upon the Nizam; and the Peishwa without power would have been unable to execute his own treaty.

The question then upon this part of the subject comes to be whether the Peishwa is more likely to be able to maintain his independence in relation to the other great chiefs of the empire by having the British troops stationed in his territories, or by having the force subsidized by himself stationed in the territories of the Company.

Upon this point I have to observe, that as in order to defend the Peishwa, against the attempts of either of those chiefs to establish an influence at his Durbár by means of an armed force, it would be necessary to bring the troops from a great distance; and they would have to arrive and operate in a country in which no magazines or establishment would have been formed for them. I can have no doubt respecting the expediency, as a military question, of establishing the subsidiary force within the Peishwa's territories.

As a political question, I consider that inasmuch as the subsidiary troops being on the spot, would provide a force ready at all times to support the Peishwa's power, to have them in that situation would be more likely to prevent attempts to influence his Durbár by force of arms which must occasion war, than to station them in the Company's territories.

In respect to the notion of the anonymous observer, that by extending

the basis of the treaty of Bassein, it might be hoped to include some of the other great Mahratta powers, I have to observe that the object is to make the Peishwa powerful in his own government so that he may be able to keep his treaty with us.

I have already shewn that there was no ground for hope that any of the great chiefs would consent to any arrangement which would place the power at Poonah out of their reach, and nothing short of such an arrangement would answer our purpose.

It would not be desirable that any of them should become parties to the defensive alliance if the great object of our policy should be defeated by that measure.

In this view of the question, it is scarcely necessary to advert to the assertion of the anonymous observer, that a subsidiary alliance, such as that formed in the year 1768 with the Nizam, is most applicable to the situation of the Peishwa and of his territories. The independence of the Peishwa's power is an object, and that we must effect by whatever means we may have in our hands; but if it were necessary to the argument, I could point out to the anonymous observer that the Peishwa is a power much nearer to us, and who touches us upon many more important points, than the Nizam does.

When considering this objection to the 4th article of the treaty of Bassein, it is necessary that I should advert to the objection of the anonymous observer, that by placing the troops in the territories of the Peishwa it is necessary to increase the number of European troops in India; and that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the number of European troops required for the service in India.

The 4th article does not specify that European troops shall be stationed in the Peishwa's territories, and therefore the objection does not apply to the treaty of Bassein.

It is perfectly true that in the important services in which the Company's troops may be engaged on the part of the Peishwa, European troops may be necessary; but as those services must equally have been performed, if the troops had been stationed in the Company's territories, European troops would equally be necessary.

But the anonymous observer has not supposed that an increase of European troops would be required on the ground that their services might be necessary in the Peishwa's territories, but on a general calculation of certain proportions of European to native troops in India in general.

In the first place the increase of European troops would be necessary on this ground also, whether the subsidiary force were stationed in the territories of the Peishwa or not; the native army must still have been increased (unless indeed it should be proposed to take the Peishwa's subsidy and not furnish him with any troops) and the number of European troops must likewise have been increased in order to keep up the due proportion; but in the second place, this calculation of proportions of European to native troops is certainly erroneous, and does not exist in the mind of any man who has ever conducted or considered the details of the

service in India. If the proportion does exist, on what calculation is it founded? In what part of India is it practically carried into execution?

In almost all services in India it is certainly necessary that there should be some European troops; but the number in proportion to the native troops employed on the same services must vary according to the nature of the service required, and the description of the enemy against whom it is directed.

For instance, in the wars against Tippoo Sultan, the proportions of European to native troops were about one-third in the first, and one-fourth in the second. In the late war against the Mahrattas the number of Europeans employed in proportion to natives, was not more than one-tenth or one-eleventh.

I certainly agree with the idea of the anonymous observer so far, that a body of 8 or 10,000 native troops ought never to be assembled without some Europeans, for very obvious reasons; but as there are few such collections of troops in India, I should conceive that I founded my calculations upon very erroneous principles, and deceived those to whom I should communicate them, if I should upon this opinion state that the European troops ought to be in the proportion of one-eighth or one-tenth to the native troops throughout the Indian establishments. Thousands of native troops must necessarily be employed in garrisons in the interior and on various duties, in which it would be very inconvenient to employ Europeans; and on the other hand Europeans are absolutely necessary in certain garrisons and stations and services, in some cases in equal proportions, in others one-third of the number of natives.

The only safe mode therefore of forming an opinion respecting the number of European troops required in India is to call for and examine details; and if this mode should be adopted, it will be found that the treaty of Bassein does not add, and does not render it necessary to add one European infantry soldier to the establishments in India.

In respect to the increase of the European troops in general, it is my opinion that it will be found that they are not more numerous at this moment than they were in the years 1790, 91, and 92. According to the detailed distributions which I have seen, the number of regiments of European infantry now required for the continent of India is twenty, including three of the Company's regiments, viz. six for Bengal, ten for Madras, including one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and four for Bombay, including one for Goa. This is the peace establishment.

In the years 1790, 91, and 92, there were of King's infantry in India nine regiments, two regiments of Hanoverians, six Company's regiments in Bengal, four at Madras, and two at Bombay; making altogether twenty-three regiments. The artillery at the different Presidencies were nearly of the same strength with the artillery at present.

At all events if an increase of European troops is necessary, which in my opinion it is not, beyond twenty regiments complete to 1000 rank and file, the necessity of this measure must not be attributed to the treaty of Bassein.

In respect to the proposal that the treaty of Bassein should be altered in this article, viz. that the troops should be removed from the Peishwa's territories, I have reason to know that his Highness would be exceedingly alarmed if the proposal were made to him; and that it is more than probable he would move with the troops.

I have now to consider the objection of the anonymous observer to the 12th and 17th articles of the treaty of Bassein, by the former of which, the Peishwa is bound to abide by the Company's mediation and arbitration in all cases, and by the latter not to commence any negotiation with any power without giving previous notice to the Company's government.

In order to understand clearly the object of these articles, it is necessary to consider the nature and constitution of the contracting parties; to examine their political objects and systems, to see by what rules or systems of policy they are respectively bound, and in what manner affected by their respective connections with other sovereign authorities. European governments were till very lately guided by certain rules and systems of policy, so accurately defined and generally known, that it was scarcely possible to suppose a political event in which the interests and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the corps diplomatique in general as to the statesman of each particular state.

The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge, and hardly know of such rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary, the objects of their policy are always shifting, they have no regular established system, the effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong; on the contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance they should, by a sense of common danger be induced for a season to combine their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only as long as it is attended by success; the first reverse dissolves it; and at all events it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the apprehension of which originally caused it.

There cannot be a stronger proof of this defect of policy in the Asiatic governments than the dissolution of the combination of the year 1790, between the English, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam, by the attack of the Mahrattas on the Nizam in the year 1795.

These observations apply to the government of the Mahrattas more than to any other of the Asiatic governments. Their schemes and systems of policy are the wildest of any: they undertake expeditions not only without viewing their remote consequences upon other states or upon their own; but without considering more than the chance of success of the immediate expedition in contemplation.

The Company's government in India, the other contracting party to this alliance, is one bound by all the rules and systems of European policy.

The Company's power in India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation; and although I do not admit that it depends upon its reputation as distinguished from its real force, as appears to be contended by

some, I may say that it is particularly desirable for a government so constituted as the Company's, never to enter upon any political object, the probable result of which should not be greatly in favour of success. Besides this, the Company's government in India is bound by acts of Parliament not to undertake wars of aggression; not to make any but defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the Company actually threatened with hostilities.

The Company's government in India is also connected with his Majesty's Government; and as an Asiatic power is liable to be involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever his Majesty shall be at war with those powers.

The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers proves, that no permanent system can be adopted which will preserve the weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in their relative situations, and the whole, in peace; excepting there should be one power, which, either by the superiority of its strength, its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate, and be able to protect all. This is proved by the history of the last fourteen years.

The Company has been the preponderating power, and by the 2nd article of the treaty of Bassein has in so many words taken the Peishwa under its protection.

I might contend that the stipulations of the 12th and 17th articles are only consequences of the protection promised, and really offered. But in my opinion these stipulations are the necessary consequence of the alliance between a power such as the Peishwa's, and one such as the Company's, bound by rules of policy, acts of Parliament, and by the acts of his Majesty's Government.

It would be impossible to define the various claims, and grounds for war, existing not only between the Peishwa and the Nizam, but between the Peishwa and all the other powers of India.

The Mahrattas claim the choute of all India; and all the claims of this description centre in the Peishwa's authority. Besides this general claim, there are others of various descriptions and denominations upon every power, of all which there are records at Poonah; and it is a mistake to suppose that the Peishwa, however weak in point of troops and resources, will not find persons in the Mahratta empire ready and willing to enforce these claims in his name.

All the warfare which would be the consequence of bringing forward these claims will be prevented by the stipulation that the Company shall mediate and arbitrate in every case.

But the anonymous observer says, that the benefit to be derived from the 12th article ought to have been left to the operation of the British influence in the Peishwa's councils, and ought not to have been the subject of a treaty. To this objection to the article in question, the best answer is to state the fact, viz. that notwithstanding the right which we have acquired by treaty to mediate between the Peishwa and other powers, and the influence which we have in his councils, by that stipulation and a variety of

events which have occurred since the treaty of Bassein was concluded, it is not so easy as the anonymous observer imagines, at all times to prevent the evils which must result from the Peishwa's enforcing these claims.

The anonymous observer says, that if the Peishwa should contrary to our advice and opinion, commence an unjust war, he ought not to be supported by the British Government. This is perfectly true; but the object of the 12th article is to prevent the possibility of unjust wars, and to preserve the Peishwa's government from the destruction which must be the consequence of his entering into any war without the Company's assistance.

This article is the bond of peace to India. It is this which renders the treaty really defensive, and makes the Governor-General really responsible for every war in which the British Government may be engaged. If this article were not in the treaty, the Peishwa would be the responsible person.

If the general mediation on the part of the Company be necessary to ensure peace, there is certainly no occasion that the Peishwa should be in communication with other independent powers. All his foreign affairs must be transacted and eventually settled by the Company; and any other communication must be intended only for sinister purposes.

The stipulation of the 17th article is necessary in order to enable the British Government to have a knowledge of, and stop at once any intrigues which have a tendency to war. Those who have seen the course of proceedings of a Mahratta Durbar will not be at a loss to find reasons for this stipulation; and in fact even this stipulation cannot entirely check the intrigues which are its constant operation.

But the mode in which it will operate most beneficially will be by checking intrigues with European powers; and surely this cannot be deemed an inconsiderable object by the anonymous observer.

The principle and foundation of the treaty of Bassein, which is protection from the Company's government to that of the Peishwa, would prevent the stipulation of the 17th article from being reciprocal. The Company's government must have communication with some powers with which the Peishwa never had any; and it would be very inconvenient to be obliged to lay these communications before the Peishwa's Durbar.

But it must be recollected that the Company are constantly liable by the acts of his Majesty's prerogative, to be at war, or hold communications with European nations having territories in India; and it would be a curious proceeding to lay these communications before the Peishwa's Durbar. This measure would be necessary, if the stipulations of the 17th article were made reciprocal.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[There is no other date for this paper but the year 1804, and it would appear to have been written at Calcutta in the month of November, 1804.—ED.]

No. VII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

(Separate.)

HONOURABLE SIRs,

Fort William, July 25, 1805.

1. The Governor-General in Council had the honour to state to your honourable Court in the general letter to your honourable Court in the military department, dated the 20th of September 1801, that the separate letter from your honourable Court of the 11th of February 1801,* on the subject of the military establishments of the Presidencies of Fort William, Fort St. George, and Bombay, would be replied to, as soon as the necessary documents and information could be obtained to enable him to furnish your honourable Court with a complete view of all the important considerations connected with that letter.

2. The sentiments of the Governor-General in Council on the orders contained in the separate letter from your honourable Court of February 1801, above adverted to, for new modelling the corps of native cavalry of this establishment, were submitted in detail to your honourable Court, in the separate letter in the military department, dated the 7th of October 1802, by the *Telegraph* packet, a duplicate of which was then also transmitted to your honourable Court by an overland despatch. His Excellency in Council in his separate despatch of the 7th October 1802, after submitting in detail his sentiments, and those of the Commander-in-Chief respecting the new formation of the corps of native cavalry, stated to your honourable Court, that he deemed it to be his duty to suspend the orders of your honourable Court for new modelling that corps; and to submit the whole subject for the further consideration of your honourable Court.

3. The Governor-General in Council at the same time took the liberty of submitting his further opinion to your honourable Court, that it would be expedient to postpone any proceed-

* This is a long detail of the military establishment.—[Ed.]

ings on this important subject, until he should be enabled after a full consideration of the general condition of your military establishments, with reference to the probable state of our political relations in India, to explain with accuracy his detailed sentiments upon the extent and constitution of the force necessary for the defence of the honourable Company's possessions in India.

4. The subsequent orders however, of your honourable Court of the 20th of April 1803, for new modelling the corps of native cavalry, (which were carried into effect by the Governor-General in Council,) render it unnecessary for the Governor-General in Council to advert further to the formation and constitution of the corps of native cavalry.

5. Your honourable Court is fully apprised of the state of affairs in India since the date of the despatch from the Governor-General in Council of the 30th of September 1801, adverted to in the 1st paragraph of this letter; and consequently your honourable Court has anticipated the impossibility of furnishing your honourable Court from this Government, with a complete view of all the important considerations connected with the subject of your separate letter of the 11th of February 1801. The Governor-General in Council, however, has for some time past been desirous of reviewing the principles on which the military establishments of India have been increased since the date of the advice from your honourable Court of the 11th of February 1801, and of submitting the result to the consideration of your honourable Court; but his Excellency in Council has hitherto been prevented from carrying this intention into effect by the state of public affairs in India.

6. Your honourable Court is aware of the difficulty which still exists of stating with accuracy, a comparative view of the permanent resources and charges arising from the late war. The Governor-General in Council however, is desirous of explaining the motives which have compelled him from time to time to increase the army at the Presidencies of Fort William, Fort St. George and Bombay.

7. Your honourable Court will be pleased to observe, that this despatch is exclusively directed to the consideration of the native military force required for this country. It is the in-

tention of the Governor-General in Council, to submit to your honourable Court in a separate address, the sentiments of this government with regard to the amount of European troops which the Governor-General in Council deems to be indispensable for the service of India.

8. The orders of your honourable Court under date the 11th of February 1801, respecting the native cavalry having been replied to in the general letter from the Governor-General in Council of the 30th of April 1804, it only remains to consider the operation of those orders with regard to the native infantry at your different Presidencies.

9. The orders of the 11th of February 1801, do, not prescribe any precise number of regiments of native infantry for the Presidency of Bengal; but your honourable Court has observed, that "engagements recently contracted with the Nabob Vizier would doubtless prove highly advantageous to the security and prosperity of your Bengal provinces," and "that of course whatever addition, it might have become necessary to make to your native infantry establishment, for the purpose of fulfilling these engagements, would be cheerfully acquiesced in."

10. With respect to the establishment of Fort St. George and Bombay, your honourable Court was pleased in your letter of the 11th of February 1801, to direct that the native infantry at Fort St. George should consist of fourteen regiments. Your honourable Court was also of opinion that four regiments of native infantry, with the marine battalion would be sufficient for the service of the Presidency of Bombay, as well as to provide the troops required under our subsidiary engagements with the Rajah of Travancore, and the Nabob of Surat. But your honourable Court's orders on this branch of the subject, were not positive; and you expressed an intention of awaiting the receipt from India of more accurate information, before you passed a final judgment with regard to the establishment of native infantry for Bombay, with reference to our engagements with the Nabob of Surat, and the Rajah of Travancore.

11. Before the Governor-General in Council proceeds to submit to your honourable court the principles on which the execution of your orders of the 11th of February, 1801, were

suspended, as well as the extent of the augmentations which have since been made in your native infantry establishments, it appears to be necessary to advert to that part of your honourable court's letter which relates to the extinction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, and to the immediate practicability of reducing our military establishments, exclusively with reference to that important event.

12. No doubt can be entertained that the reduction of the hostile power of Mysore relieved the government of India from the constant danger to which it was exposed from the hatred and ambition of that powerful state. But in considering the amount of force required for the establishment of Fort St. George, it will be expedient to examine the effects derived from the change of affairs in a military point of view since the death of Tippoo Sultaun, and from the comparative security occasioned by that event to the British possessions in the Peninsula.

13. A reference to the strength of our army in the Carnatic during the war of 1780, will demonstrate that the military establishment of Fort St. George was not fixed on a scale equal to the defence of its territories against the house of Hyder Ally; making every allowance for the circumstances of that period of time, no doubt can exist that our actual force was insufficient to oppose the progress of Hyder Ally. With the assistance of a very large detachment from the Bengal army at a later period of that war, Sir Eyre Coote himself was unable to maintain an equal contest with Hyder Ally.

14. The experience obtained in that war, and the general notice which the affairs of India began to attract in England about that period of time, produced a revision of our military establishments on the coast of Coromandel; and it has been received as a general opinion, that the army of Fort St. George was restored during the administration of Sir A. Campbell, in the years 1786 and 1787, to a state of much greater comparative efficiency, and of a consequent security against the power of Tippoo Sultaun.

15. Subsequent events soon produced the test of those opinions; our mode of warfare was changed, and it was found that the only effectual system of defence consisted in a direct attack on the dominions of the Sultaun; an attempt was

made to carry the war of 1790 into the enemy's country, with troops from the establishment of Fort St. George alone.

16. But the events of that campaign, and a better consideration of the question, terminated in the indispensable necessity of a very extensive co-operation from the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, in order to carry into effect the plan of the war conducted by Lord Cornwallis.

17. In the year 1796, the establishment of the army under the government of Fort St. George was again revised; and it was fixed on a scale computed from the actual state of our affairs in the Peninsula at that period of time, in relation to the power of our external enemies, as well as to the means of supporting internal tranquillity.

18. From the great interest which the affairs of India had excited in England, it may be presumed, that the establishment of 1796 was fixed on the basis of a full and comprehensive consideration of the question; but when the implacable enmity of Tippoo Suldaun, provoked the British Government to war in the year 1799, the military establishment of Fort St. George, fixed with the caution already stated, was alone found to be totally inadequate to the prosecution of a successful war against the power of Tippoo Suldaun, diminished as his resources were by the successful termination of the war of 1792, and it became necessary again to apply a powerful co-operation from the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay for the purpose of reducing and finally of subverting the dangerous power of the Suldaun.

19. From this statement it appears, that the unsuccessful war of 1780, as well as the successful war of 1790, produced the necessity of an augmentation of the military establishment of Fort St. George at those different periods of time. It is unnecessary to observe, that the considerations which gave rise to that measure, under circumstances so entirely dissimilar, could not be derived from the same cause; but it is evident that if the military establishment of Fort St. George, under that variety of circumstances, occasioned by the improvement of our administration, by the increase of our resources and strength, and by the diminution of the power of Tippoo Suldaun, was never equal to contend with that Prince, without powerful assistance from Bengal and Bombay; the extent of the establishment of Fort St. George has

been governed less by considerations applicable to the power of the house of Hyder Ally than by causes inseparable from the internal administration and resources of that Presidency.

20. It is unreasonable to suppose, and indeed might be proved if necessary, that at the important periods of 1780, 1790, and 1799, all the resources of the Government of Fort St. George were brought into action, and it is sufficiently known that the result of those exertions invariably produced the most inconvenient diminution of the force allotted for the internal protection of the provinces.

21. During the war of 1780, the Polygars of Tinivelly refused obedience to the British Government; the Zemindars of Calastry and Bomrauzepollam joined the standard of Hyder Ally, and in the northern Circars we maintained our Government less by the power of the Company than by the sufferance of its tributaries.

22. After the war of 1780, it became necessary to equip two armies against the southern Polygars commanded by Colonels Fullarton and Stuart, and the control of the British Government was nominally restored after a very heavy loss of men on both occasions. With respect to the northern Circars we were compelled to accept such a revenue, as the Zemindars were willing to pay, without admitting any control over their military establishments.

23. The conduct of the southern Polygars during the war of 1790, rendered it necessary to equip a large army immediately after the conclusion of peace in 1792, under the command of Colonel Maxwell, while the insolence and independence assumed during the same period by the Zemindars of the northern Circars, terminated in the death of Vizeram Rauze at the head of a considerable force in open rebellion.

24. After the conclusion of peace in 1799, the same events occurred and the extent of rebellions in our ancient possessions, manifested that the success of our final contest with Tippoo Sultan had produced no immediate effect on our turbulent tributaries, different from that produced by the events of former wars.

25. From this recital of facts, it will appear that the same consequences have followed invariably every exertion which we have made to meet the house of Hyder Ally in the field,

by withdrawing the force appointed for the protection of the provinces; if therefore, notwithstanding the assistance derived from Bengal and Bombay, the establishment of Fort St. George has always been unequal to contend with the house of Hyder Ally without recourse to the destructive measure of weakening the provinces, and if the tributaries of the Company in the distant provinces have not been more encouraged to rebellion by the events of unsuccessful war, than deterred by those of prosperous contest from availing themselves of the temporary absence of the British troops; it is manifest not only that the establishment of Fort St. George had not been fixed on considerations exclusively relative to the power of Tippoo Sultaun, but that it had always been regulated by causes intimately connected with the preservation of internal tranquillity.

26. If it had been safe to connect the diminution of the military establishment of Fort St. George with the diminution of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, no period would have afforded a more favourable opportunity of effecting that economical measure than that of the war in 1792.

27. During that war the power of Great Britain in India and of Tippoo Sultaun had been compared and completely ascertained in their relation to each other. It was proved that the Sultaun was incapable of resisting the concentrated force of the Company, and the result of the contest was the actual diminution of one half of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, while the Company derived a proportionate augmentation of resources from its share of the conquered countries. It is manifest therefore, that a revival of the contest which had already been proved to have been unequal could not reasonably have been expected under a change of circumstances, so injurious to the power of Tippoo Sultaun, while on the other hand the positive augmentation of strength derived to the Company from the events of that contest, justified an expectation of the stability of its power, with respect to Tippoo Sultaun, as well as of the internal tranquillity of its territorial possessions.

28. No doubt can exist that in determining the future extent of the military establishment of Fort St. George, the Government was not biassed by an apprehension of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, connected with the extent of his former

resources, or by a jealousy of that prince's hostile dispositions, under the generous and indulgent conditions of peace granted to him at Seringapatam.

29. This then was the period of time most favourable to a secure reduction of the military establishment of Fort St. George, if that establishment or any part of it, had been fixed on grounds exclusively applicable to the power of Tippoo Suldaun; but it was not deemed advisable to reduce the military establishment of Fort St. George in consequence of that event; and if on the contrary it was judged expedient to augment the establishment at that very period of time, it is reasonable to conclude that the grounds of policy must have been distinct from considerations of danger to be apprehended from the power of Tippoo Suldaun; an augmentation of the military establishment of Fort St. George was authorized under all the advantageous circumstances immediately flowing from the issue of the war of 1790; we must therefore trace the policy of the British Government in India to a different source, and under the circumstances now described, it is obvious that our attention must be directed to the internal government of the territories immediately dependent on the Presidency of Fort St. George.

30. It is manifest from the facts already related, that neither the Polygars of the Carnatic, nor the Zemindars of the northern Circars, had been sufficiently subjected to the British Government at the period of the conquest of Mysore, and that they exercised an independent power totally incompatible with the establishment of a regular civil government in that part of the Company's possessions. That the spirit of disobedience and affectation of independence continued long after the reduction of Seringapatam in 1799, to animate the breast of those turbulent tributaries, and the extent of the rebellions which existed in the territories, subject to the government of Fort St. George, at a considerable distance of time from the death of Tippoo Suldaun, incontestably proves that the evil was neither exclusively derivable from the power of Tippoo Suldaun (although always increased by the operation of that cause,) nor immediately controlable by the augmented power of the Company in the peninsula.

31. If these were the true and efficient causes of the state of affairs under the government of Fort St. George after the

conquest of Mysore, it will be necessary to consider how far the operation of those causes was increased or diminished by the extension of our territories in the peninsula, effected by the conquest of Mysore, and by the treaty of Hyderabad concluded in October, 1800, with the Nizam.

32. The dominions of Tippoo Sultaun, like those of the Nabob of Arcot, were composed of the possessions of tributary but independent chieftains, gradually subdued by Hyder Ally, and added to his government; the chieftains of Malabar continued to oppose a resistance to the arms of Hyder Ally and of Tippoo Sultaun, no less obstinate than that opposed to the government of the Nabob of Arcot, and of the Company, by the Polygars of Tinivelly. The chieftains who inhabit the province of Gorramcondah are a continuation of the same tribes as are settled in the districts of Chittoor, and extend their power along the eastern side of the hills which divide the Carnatic: some of those polygars were never effectually subjugated to the government of Mysore; while the existence of the descendants of all of them, as well as of the Hindoo Rajahs, whose ancient possessions lie in the north-western parts of the Peninsula, rendered it necessary for Tippoo Sultaun to maintain a large disposable force for the suppression of commotions, and at the same time to exercise the promptest exertions of a despotic government for the support of his authority.

33. In the districts ceded to the allies by Tippoo Sultaun, in conformity to the treaty of 1792, pretensions founded on these claims were revived. The succession of events in Malabar supersedes the necessity of describing the effects of those causes in that province; and the government of the Nizam's officers, equally weak and corrupt in the provinces ceded to his Highness, permitted many of the chieftains expelled by Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sultaun to re-establish themselves in the territories of their ancestors. In establishing therefore a government upon the ruins of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, the Presidency of Fort St. George succeeded to the government of a people held in subjection by the despotic exercise of military power, ignorant of the milder influence of a government founded on a system of laws, and habituated under the exactions of unfeeling tyranny to withhold at whatever risk the revenue of the state.

34. In succeeding to the government of the Nizam in the provinces ceded by his Highness to the Company under the treaty of Hydrabad in 1800, the government of Fort St. George had to contend with all the evils accumulated under the arbitrary despotism of Tippoo Sultaun, and the subsequent relaxation of military power introduced by the Nizam. In both cases the progress of all human institutions required that a considerable interval of time should intervene between the acknowledgment of the British power in the newly acquired countries, and the establishment of a moderate government of system and law.

35. In the subversion of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, the necessity of maintaining a military power was unquestionably involved to the extent requisite for preserving the energies of Government from relaxation; and in the substitution of the British Government for that of the Nizam and of Tippoo Sultaun, the extent of that necessity was intimately connected with the augmentation of those causes, which had previously rendered indispensable a large military establishment for the purpose of supporting and enforcing the Company's authority in the Carnatic and in the northern Circars.

36. An immediate reduction of the military establishment of Fort St. George founded solely on the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, would not only have deprived that government of the means of administering the affairs of the ceded and conquered countries, but would have curtailed those very means which experience had shewn were indispensably requisite to the preservation of the internal tranquillity of our ancient possessions under the Presidency of Fort St. George, the death of Tippoo and the destruction of his power unquestionably removed a pregnant and constant source of danger to the British Government, but the same events did not immediately suppress the causes which menaced the internal tranquillity of that Prince's dominions, as well as that of the British possessions. If therefore the actual state of the British Government at the conclusion of the treaty of 1792 required that the military establishment of Fort St. George should be augmented upon the grounds of internal security, absolutely unconnected with any increased apprehension of danger from the power of Tippoo Sultaun, it is demonstrable that the operation of the same causes ne-

cessarily required an augmentation of force proportionate to the difference between the territories ceded at that period of time, and those which had been acquired since the conquest of Mysore.

37. This statement explains the causes which rendered it necessary to adopt (at least until the civil government should be completely established, within the new territories subject to the government of Fort St. George), a different basis from that stated in the first part of your honourable Court's letter of the 11th of February, 1801, for the regulation of your military establishment in the Peninsula of India, which appears to form the principal object of your consideration in the despatch of the 11th of February, 1801.

38. In considering the application of the orders of the 11th of February, 1801, to the Presidency of Bengal, your honourable Court will be pleased to observe, that on the 29th of May, 1800, the arrangements of this Government, then in progress with the Nabob Vizier (of which your honourable Court is fully apprized), rendered it indispensably necessary to augment the army of this establishment, by an addition of two regiments of native infantry (viz. the 18th and 19th), in consequence of the intended reduction of the Nabob Vizier's military force, and with a view to the protection and internal tranquillity of the provinces ceded to the honourable Company by the Vizier—your honourable Court was duly informed by the Governor-General in Council, in the general letter from this department of the 31st of July, 1800, of the augmentation to the army to which this paragraph refers. His Excellency in Council had also the honour to state to your honourable Court, in the general letter from the Governor-General in Council of the 30th of September, 1802, that the marine battalion had been formed into a regiment, and denominated the marine or 20th regiment of native infantry.

39. Your honourable Court was informed in the general letter from this department of the 30th September, 1802, that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had been requested to favour the Governor-General in Council with his sentiments and opinion respecting the strength of the army to be maintained during the continuation of peace for the protection and internal duties of the honourable Company's

possessions immediately dependent on this Presidency, (including the provinces ceded by the Vizier, and the reserved provinces of the Vizier) and also for affording occasional relief to the troops at Fort Marlborough and Prince of Wales's Island.

40. In the general letter of the 30th of September, 1802, the Governor-General in Council had the honour to state to your honourable Court, that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that six regiments of native cavalry, thirty companies of gun Lascars, and forty battalions of native infantry, would be barely adequate to the above purposes. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to transmit a number in the present packet, a copy of the Adjutant-General's letter, dated the 6th of August, 1802, and of the statement referred to in that letter, containing the distribution of the force above referred to; and to solicit the attention of your honourable Court to the sentiments and opinion of the Commander-in-Chief expressed in that letter. Your honourable Court will observe, that the force then proposed by the Commander-in-Chief as a peace establishment would be scarcely adequate to the due performance of the common ordinary duties; and that the troops allotted for the principal stations of the Presidency, Burhanpore, Dinapore, and Benares, would not be more than sufficient to furnish one relief of guards, escorts, and detachments.

41. With regard to the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, the Governor-General in Council has the honour to inform your honourable Court that at the period of time at which the commands of your honourable Court of the 11th of February, 1801, were received by the Governor-General in Council, the commotion which existed in the southern districts of the Carnatic and northern Circars, the demands of military force for the service in Egypt, for the occupation of the territories ceded by his Highness the Nizam, and for the preservation of tranquillity in Mysore, required the application of the entire military resources of the Presidency of Fort St. George, with the addition of the aid derived from the establishment of Bombay. Even these resources, with such additional aid, proved insufficient to meet the immediate exigencies of the public service; and it was necessary to de-

tach a force from Bengal for the purpose of quelling the disturbances in the northern Circars.

42. Although the terms of the letter from your honourable Court of the 11th of February, 1801, appear to indicate an expectation on the part of your honourable Court, that the orders which that letter contained would be carried into immediate effect, the Governor-General could not reconcile with his sense of respect for the wisdom and experience of your honourable Court, the supposition that it could be the intention of your honourable Court by these orders to supersede the exercise of his discretion under his legal responsibility to the Company and to his sovereign, in the eventual modification, or total suspension of the proposed reduction of the military force in India.

43. The known prudence of your honourable Court must certainly preclude the possibility of any order being issued to be carried into effect in these distant possessions, without reference to the existing crisis of affairs on the spot, or to any local considerations, involving not only the general tranquillity and security of the Company's possessions in India, but even the means of executing other orders of your honourable Court (communicated through the Secret Committee) for the vigorous prosecution of the war against the common enemy. A compliance with the injunctions of your honourable Court for the reduction of the military establishment of Fort St. George, at the period of time when the letter of the 11th of February was received, would have compelled the British Government to have abandoned the southern districts of the Carnatic without defence to the rebellious Polygars; to have evacuated the territories ceded by his Highness the Nizam, and to have withdrawn a considerable portion of the troops stationed in Mysore, while it would have deprived the British Government in India of every resource for the prosecution of the war in Egypt, or for eventual resistance to any attempt which the French might have meditated either against our possessions or against those of our allies.

44. In this view of the subject, the Governor-General in Council did not deem it to be necessary or advisable to make any immediate reference to the governments of the subordinate Presidencies on the subject of the orders of your

honourable Court of the 11th of February, 1801, for the reduction of the army in India, considering himself to be bound by every obligation of the Governor-General's arduous charge, by his duty towards your honourable Court and the honourable Company, as well as towards his sovereign and his country, to suspend altogether the execution of an order, which in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, could not have been carried into effect, without the instantaneous ruin of many of the most valuable possessions of the honourable Company, and without the immediate hazard of all the British interests in the Peninsula of India.

45. Shortly after the receipt of your honourable Court's commands of the 11th of February, 1801, the successful termination of the contest with the southern Polygars at that period of time considerably alleviated the exigencies of the public service; but the orders received about the same time from for the occupation of the Portuguese settlements in China and the East Indies, the recent transfer of the civil and military administration of the Carnatic to the authority of the Company, the absence (likely then to be long protracted) of the troops employed on service in Egypt, and the general posture of affairs in this quarter of the globe, appeared at that period of time to the Governor-General in Council to render the further suspension of the orders of your honourable Court of the 11th of February, 1801, for the reduction of the military establishments in India, indispensably necessary to the preservation of the British possessions in India.

46. The Governor-General stated the sentiments expressed in the preceding paragraphs of this despatch to the right honourable Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George, in a despatch from Allahabad, dated the 19th of December, 1801, recorded on the proceedings in the secret department of the 7th of January following. The Governor-General at the same time informed Lord Clive, that considerations of a similar nature applicable to the internal condition of the Government of Bombay, and connected with the near relation which its military establishments bear to the security of the British Empire in the Peninsula of India, and to the means of prosecuting the war in Egypt, rendered the suspension of the orders of your honourable Court of February, 1801, with

reference to the military establishment of that Presidency equally necessary. The reduction of the military establishments of either of the Presidencies of Fort St. George or Bombay, is so intimately connected with the security of the possessions subject to the authority of the other, that the questions could not be separated.

47. The effect of those sentiments upon the Governor-General would have induced his Excellency to have withheld any reference to Lord Clive on the subject of the reduction of the army, until a more tranquil aspect should have warranted an expectation that the forces at Fort St. George and Bombay might have been reduced without danger to the general security. But the intention which Lord Clive had then announced to the Governor-General, then absent from Fort William, of returning to Europe that season, rendered the Governor-General anxious to bring the whole question distinctly under his Lordship's view, previously to his departure for Europe.

48. The Governor-General at the same time intimated to Lord Clive that his Lordship in Council at that period of time possessed the advantage of availing himself of the opinion of Lieut.-General Stuart on the general question in addition to the general knowledge of the military affairs of Fort St. George and Bombay, possessed by that able and distinguished officer. Lieut.-General Stuart had then occupied the situation of Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George a sufficient length of time to consider the subject under all its various relations.

49. Under these considerations the Governor-General communicated his desire to be furnished at as early a period of time as might be practicable with the opinion of the right honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, aided by the experience, judgment, and local knowledge of Lieut.-General Stuart upon the subject of reducing the military establishments of both the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay to the scale prescribed by the orders of your honourable court of the 11th of February, 1801, with reference not only to the actual posture of the British interests in the peninsula of India under the existing crisis of affairs, but also to the consideration of the situation in which those interests would be placed under the consequences likely

to ensue immediately after the conclusion of a general pacification in Europe.

50. In pursuance of the orders contained in the Governor-General's despatch of the 19th of December, 1801, above adverted to, the right honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George in a despatch from the Secret Department dated the 18th of June, 1802, to the Governor-General in Council, submitted for the consideration of this government the sentiments and opinions of the government of Fort St. George, with respect to the extent of the military force requisite for the security and defence of the honourable Company's possessions immediately dependent on the Presidency of Fort St. George, founded on the detailed considerations stated in the despatch of the 18th of June, 1802, and in the enclosures of that despatch. With a view to place the whole of this important subject immediately before your honourable Court, the Governor-General in Council has the honour to transmit a number in the present packet, a copy of the letter from the government of Fort St. George of the 18th of June, 1802, above adverted to, and copies of the enclosures referred to in that letter, including three separate minutes from his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, dated the 22nd of January, 9th and 16th of March, 1802, containing his Excellency's detailed sentiments on this important subject.

51. Your honourable Court will observe that the Government of Fort St. George on the 18th of June, 1802, entered into a deliberate consideration of this important subject, and examined the principles upon which Lord Clive in his Lordship's separate despatch to the Governor-General, dated the 18th of September, 1800, had proposed fifty-eight battalions of native infantry for the service of the Presidency of Fort St. George.

52. Lieutenant-General Stuart assumed the ground of the general principles stated in Lord Clive's despatch of the 18th of September, 1800, above adverted to, and recorded his Excellency's sentiments in the separate minutes of the 22d of January, 9th and 16th of March, 1802. The Governor-General in Council is persuaded that your honourable Court will afford the most attentive and deliberate consideration to the reasonings and observations of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart on this highly important subject.

53. On the 7th of February, 1802, the Governor-General received at Lucknow the intelligence of the ratification of the preliminaries of peace between his Majesty and the French Government, and immediately issued orders to effect a considerable reduction of the military expences and establishments of the different Presidencies. Your honourable Court was duly apprized in the general letter to your honourable Court, dated 30th September, 1802, of the measures which were adopted on this occasion by the Governor-General, and you were also informed of the effect of those orders in the diminution of the military expences, and that the reduction effected in the military charges at the different Presidencies under the special instructions of the Governor-General amounted to £.783,733. 13s. 2½d.

54. At no period of time since the receipt of your honourable Court's orders of February, 1801, was it practicable for the Governor-General in Council to attempt any reductions of the military establishments of India, excepting those above adverted to, which however were limited, and proved to be of a temporary nature, in consequence of the renewal of hostilities with France. The renewal of hostilities with France, combined with the previously existing state of affairs in India relatively to the Mahratta state, rendered it necessary to make every exertion to counteract any hostile attempt of the French upon the possessions of the Company, and to prosecute the war in Hindostan and the Deccan, and consequently to make considerable augmentations to its military establishments in India.

55. It may merit the attention of your honourable Court, that every augmentation which the Governor-General in Council has made to the native force in India, has been considerably inferior to that recommended by the most respectable military authorities on the spot; and that every reduction which his Excellency has effected has exceeded the limits prescribed by the same authorities.

56. An inconsiderable period of time had elapsed after the system of military reduction prescribed by the Governor-General's orders of the 8th of February, 1802, had been commenced, when that able and experienced officer, Lieut.-General Stuart, recorded his opinion at Fort St. George, that the reduced establishment of the Presidency of Fort St.

George was inadequate to the exigencies of the public service during a season of peace; and the sentiments of his Excellency General Lake (whose distinguished character and transcendent services demand the highest respect) with regard to the actual insufficiency of the military establishment of Fort William, corresponded with those of Lieut.-General Stuart.

57. Under these circumstances, the Governor-General in Council could not venture to expose the British interests in India during a season of war to the imperfect protection of a military force, declared by the Commanders-in-Chief to be inadequate to the security of the Company's possessions in a season of peace with France, even if our relations with the native powers of India had at that time removed all danger of a combination with our European enemies.

58. The Governor-General in Council is now of opinion, that upon the last peace with France, his solicitude to carry into effect the plan of your honourable Court for the reduction of debt and for the diminution of the military charges, led his Excellency to adopt a more speedy and extensive reduction of the native corps than was strictly compatible with the permanent safety of the honourable Company's possessions.

59. Your honourable Court is aware that in carrying that plan into execution, the Governor-General in Council differed in opinion with the most respectable military authorities in India.

60. Experience has proved that the native corps, even in Bengal, cannot be recruited with the facility and despatch generally supposed; while any sudden reduction of these corps furnishes a dangerous source of supply to the armies of the native states.

61. The Governor-General in Council therefore deems it to be his duty to submit to your honourable Court his conscientious opinion that great danger may be expected to result to your interests in India by any attempt to reduce any branch of our military establishments, even in time of peace, to a scale inadequate to the ordinary exigencies of war.

62. The Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion that substantial security for durable peace in India is to be derived from a constant state of preparation for war; and

the judgment and experience of your honourable Court will anticipate the peculiar necessity of applying this principle to our native establishments.

63. The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to submit to your honourable Court a statement of the augmentation of the military establishments which were made in consequence of the renewal of war with France, and of the commencement of the Mahratta war, together with the augmentations and arrangement which became necessary in consequence of the treaties of peace, partition, subsidy, and alliance.

64. Your honourable Court is apprized that in the month of June, 1803, the Governor-General in Council deemed it to be necessary, that an army should be immediately formed in the upper provinces, under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief, with the view to oppose the hostile designs of the Mahratta confederates, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was accordingly directed to draw from the lower provinces, without waiting the result of a previous reference to the Governor-General in Council, whatever European or native troops his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief might think proper, either for the purpose of directly joining and forming a part of the force to be assembled in the upper provinces, or for the purpose of co-operating with that force in such manner as the Commander-in-Chief might judge to be most advisable.

65. In consequence of these arrangements, and of the march of the army from Cawnpore against the enemy, it became indispensably necessary to raise the 21st regiment of native infantry. Your honourable Court was duly apprized of this increase to the native troops of this establishment in the general letter from the Governor-General in Council of the 11th of August, 1803.

66. The territories added to the possessions of the honourable Company under this Presidency by the victorious progress of the army under the immediate command of his Excellency General Lake, the large detachments sent to Ganjam, Cuttack, Ceylon, and the islands to the eastward; the necessity of making early and effectual provision for the vigorous prosecution of the war, for securing internal tranquillity in the conquered countries, and for supplying the

troops which might be required to fulfil the several subsidiary engagements then concluded with various native powers, rendered it absolutely necessary to augment the military establishment of this Presidency by an addition of two regiments. The 22nd and 23rd regiments were accordingly ordered to be raised. This augmentation was communicated to your honourable Court by the Governor-General in Council in the general letter from this department of the 1st of February, 1804.

67. The treaties of peace with the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah, were concluded on the 17th and 30th December, 1803, but before any conclusive arrangements could be effected for placing the troops in quarters and cantonments, the hostile designs of Holkar (of which your honourable Court is already apprized) against the interests of the honourable Company and of the British Government in India, compelled the Governor-General in Council to transmit orders to the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief in the month of April, 1804, to act against that chieftain.

68. The successful operations of the British army under the personal command of the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief, have been stated in detail to the honourable the Secret Committee of your honourable Court.

69. The increased demands for troops with a view to the completion of the subsidiary forces for Scindiah and the Ranah of Gohud, for the prosecution of the war and the protection of new territories in the upper part of the Doab, of the Ganges, and Jumna, on the right bank of the Jumna, and in Bundelcund, rendered a further increase of the native army of this establishment indispensably necessary. Orders were accordingly issued in the months of September and October last for raising the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th regiments of native infantry. The Governor-General in Council had the honour to inform your honourable Court of the raising of these additional regiments in the general letter from this department of the 1st of November, 1804. An augmentation has recently been made to the corps of native cavalry of this establishment by an addition of two regiments (the 7th and 8th). The Governor-General in Council in consideration of the subsidiary engagements with the native powers, and being convinced of the important advantages to

be derived in securing the safety and tranquillity of these provinces, by a large and well disciplined force of cavalry, deemed it to be indispensably necessary to augment the corps of native cavalry as mentioned above.

70. Your honourable Court on considering this branch of the military establishments of Bengal, will not fail to advert to the great services which were rendered to your Government by the Bengal cavalry in repelling the incursions of Holkar, and of Meer Khan into the company's territories, and in frustrating the attempts of those chieftains to disturb the tranquillity of your possessions, and to injure your military resources and reputation.

71. The actual condition of the Mahratta power, consisting chiefly of predatory horse, will in the event of future hostilities, compel the Mahrattas to confine their operations to incursions into the Company's territories; it may be expected, however, from the experience of the last campaign in Hindostan, that the knowledge of our possessing a large and efficient body of cavalry, will deter all predatory chieftains from such attempts; on the other hand your honourable Court will appreciate the actual security which your government must derive from the maintenance of such a body of cavalry as should ensure the means of frustrating the designs of any predatory force which may again attempt to enter your territories.

72. It may also be observed, that although we are not bound by treaty to furnish any cavalry to Scindiah, it will always be desirable to attach a proportion of cavalry to the subsidiary force serving with that chieftain, whenever the subsidiary force may be employed in active operations.

73. Your honourable Court will also advert to the necessity of our being prepared to maintain the tranquillity of your territories in the northern parts of the Doab against the predatory attempts of the tribes of Seiks occupying the territory to the north-west of the Jumna river above Delhi. The force of the Seiks is of that description which will be best repelled by a body of cavalry.

74. Although it is necessary to be prepared to meet these contingencies, no danger exists in any quarter as long as we shall retain the certain means of checking the progress of these predatory chieftains, or of compelling them by the ra-

pidity of our movements to seek their safety in a precipitate and disgraceful flight; but unless we shall possess an efficient body of cavalry, the enemy will always be tempted to make incursions into our territories, and it will be difficult to secure our valuable resources, and to protect our subjects. An active and well disciplined body of cavalry can alone enable us to repress all predatory incursions, in such a manner as may be calculated to give confidence to the inhabitants of the Company's territories, and to deter all freebooters from attempting to desolate our possessions.

75. From the information submitted to your honourable Court in the preceding paragraphs of this despatch, your honourable Court will observe, that the establishment of native cavalry and of regular native infantry under this Presidency, amounts at this present period of time to eight regiments of cavalry and twenty-seven regiments of infantry.

76. The demands of a permanent nature for an increase of troops to the establishment of Bengal since the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, are generally as follows, viz.—

1st. A sufficient body of troops for the protection of the conquered and ceded provinces in Hindostan, and for the purpose of occupying the various forts and military posts acquired during the war.

2nd. Six battalions of native infantry for Scindiah's subsidiary force, of which the expence is to be defrayed by the produce of the territories, ceded under the treaty of peace.

3rd. Three battalions for the Ranah of Gohud, for which payment is provided by the treaty with that chief.

4thly. A sufficient force for the protection of Delhi, the person of the King, and the Company's new possessions in that quarter.

5thly. A sufficient force for the protection of the new territory acquired by the Company in Bundelcund.

6thly. A force for the protection of the province of Cuttack.

77. The right honourable the Commander-in-Chief having furnished the Governor-General in Council with a statement and distribution of the regular corps of native infantry, which in the Commander-in-Chief's judgment would be necessary for the defence and protection of the extensive provinces immediately dependent on Fort William, the Governor-Ge-

neral in Council has the honour to transmit a number in the present packet for the information of your honourable Court, a copy of that statement, from which your honourable Court will perceive, that the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief considers thirty regiments of native infantry and eight regiments of native cavalry to be necessary for the peace establishment of this Presidency. That statement was transmitted by the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General on the 21st of September, 1804, when the Commander-in-Chief was employed in assembling the army under his command, and could not collect for that purpose more than seven battalions of native infantry (exclusive of the remainder of the detachment lately under the command of Colonel Monson.)

78. Your honourable Court will observe that the statement of the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief does not provide for the subsidiary force serving with Scindiah or for the fort of Rampoorah, nor for the districts belonging to it, which from their situation and distance from the rest of the British territories will require a considerable military force, until those territories shall be otherwise disposed of at the period of a general peace in India. Your honourable Court will also observe that the Commander-in-Chief considers the force appropriated for the defence and protection of Bundelcund to be inadequate.

79. It is the indispensable duty of the Governor-General in Council to consult the Commander-in-Chief, and to obtain his opinion and advice with respect to the military force to be maintained under this Presidency. The local knowledge and experience of the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief on this important subject, obtained since his arrival at Fort William in the month of March, 1801, upwards of three years of which period of time his Lordship has been in the field on active and arduous service, enables Lord Lake to give a correct and just opinion regarding the extent of the force necessary to be maintained under the Presidency of Fort William. The Governor-General in Council has the firmest reliance on the correctness of the opinion of the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief, founded on his Lordship's experience, and on his intimate and extensive knowledge of the subject.

80. The Governor-General in Council is satisfied that it will not be safe for some time to attempt any material reduction of the actual military establishment at this Presidency.

81. In the letter of the 11th of February, 1801, your honourable Court stated an opinion that the military establishment of Fort St. George should consist of fourteen regiments of native infantry, including three regiments of native infantry for the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

82. Your honourable Court at the same time ordered eight regiments of native infantry for the establishment of Bombay under an opinion that all above four of those regiments of native infantry could be paid for by the subsidies from the Rajah of Travancore and the Nabob of Surat.

83. It does not appear that any detailed statements of the deficiencies and demands of troops for the defence and protection of the extensive possessions of the honourable Company, dependent on the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay were then before your honourable Court.

84. By the orders of your honourable Court of the 11th of February, 1801, the establishment of native regiments under the Presidency of Fort St. George was not increased beyond that ordered in the year 1796, excepting to supply the subsidiary force for the Nizam. The establishment ordered in 1796 was eleven regiments, and one for the Nizam, if he should require one. The establishment ordered in 1801 was eleven regiments, and three for the Nizam; notwithstanding that in the year 1799 an addition was made to the Company's territories, dependent on the Presidency of Fort St. George, of Coimbatore, of the districts bordering on the Ghauts, which divide the Carnatic (besides Kanara and Soonda, for which provision was supposed to be made from the Bombay establishment) and the Company engaged in consequence of a subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas from the Rajah of Mysore, to defend his territories and support his government.

85. It is doubtful whether your honourable Court adverted to the necessity of a force for the defence of Mysore. It is however evident that three regiments were necessary for the services of Mysore and Coimbatore in addition to the old establishment, which was necessary for the Carnatic and the Nizam's subsidiary force.

86. Previously to the date of the letter of the 11th of February, 1801, from your honourable Court, the treaty of 1800 was concluded with the Soubah of the Deccan, by which a large territory was ceded in perpetuity to the honourable Company, in commutation of subsidy. According to the principle on which this territory was ceded, the Company were to receive nearly double the amount of the sum paid as subsidy in order to defray the expense of defending and governing the territory ceded. This measure could only be accomplished by additional troops, and an addition was also made by treaty to the force subsidized by the Nizam to the extent of two battalions of sepoy and one regiment of cavalry, with their proportion of guns and artillery men.

87. Subsequently to the despatch of the letter from your honourable Court of the 11th of February, 1801, the civil government of the Carnatic was transferred to the Company. The Nabob's troops were disbanded, and the duty which they had performed devolved upon the Company's troops, which consequently occasioned a demand for new levies for the payment of which the advantage gained provided the means.

88. These two last demands for additional troops may be considered to have required two regiments, and in this manner the establishment of Fort St. George was augmented to nineteen regiments of native infantry, exclusive of two extra battalions, at which the native infantry of the Presidency of Fort St. George stood in the year 1802. On the renewal of war with France, and the commencement of hostilities with the Mahrattas, the number of extra battalions was increased to eight, making the number of battalions (exclusive of the native troops belonging to the establishment of Bombay serving in Malabar and Canara) under the Presidency of Fort St. George, in the month of August, 1804, amount to forty-six of which thirty-eight were regular, and eight extra battalions.

89. With respect to the native cavalry of Fort St. George, the establishment of 1796 was four regiments, since that time, the Nizam has paid for two regiments, and the Peishwa for one regiment of native cavalry. There are at present eight regiments of native cavalry, making the actual increase of native cavalry to be paid by the Company, one regiment

since the year 1796. This additional regiment is perhaps the only increase of the military establishment of Fort St. George, the payment of which is not provided for by subsidies from the native powers; but for the payment of which, the revenues of Coimbatore will amply provide. The principal increase of the actual military expenses of the Presidency of Fort St. George may be attributed to the circumstance of Fort St. George having now to defray the expense of defending Malabar, which formerly was defrayed by the Presidency of Bombay.

90. The preceding statement will have apprized your honourable Court, that in the month of August, 1804, the native establishment of Fort St. George amounted to eight regiments of native cavalry, nineteen regiments of infantry, and eight extra battalions of sepoy, exclusive of eleven battalions of Bombay infantry doing duty in the provinces of Malabar and Canara. The evils attending the employment of the troops of the Bombay establishment in Malabar and Canara had been a source of solicitude to your government for a length of time; the distance of those troops from their own Presidency, the difficulty of recruiting them, and the impracticability of relieving them, had reduced them to a state of weakness and inefficiency, to which the ill success of the military operations in Malabar was in some cases to be ascribed. It appeared, therefore, to be equally conducive to the efficiency of the Bombay army, and to the good of the service under the government of Fort St. George, to withdraw the Bombay troops from Malabar and Canara, and to relieve them by corps of the Madras establishment.

91. The comparative facility of recruiting, of relieving, and superintending the latter corps, would exempt them from the operation of these causes, which had proved so destructive to the discipline and efficiency of the Bombay troops serving in Malabar and Canara.

92. With a view to provide for this arrangement, and to determine the permanent arrangement of the army of Fort St. George, with reference to the change which had taken place in our political relations, and in the disposition of our military strength, produced by the treaty of Bassein, and by the important consequences which had resulted from that event, the Governor-General required from Lieut-General

Stuart, and from the honourable Major-General Wellesley, the information necessary to enable his Excellency in Council to consider the extent and respective proportion of such augmentation of the military establishment of Fort St. George as might appear to General Stuart, and to Major-General Wellesley to be expedient, for the purpose of furnishing the several subsidiary forces, and of protecting the acquisitions dependent on the Presidency of Fort St. George, derived from our actual situation under the recent treaties. The Governor-General also required from Lieut.-General Stuart such observations as might tend to illustrate the system of distribution of the army within the territories, dependencies, or connections of the Presidency of Fort St. George.

93. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to transmit a number in the present packet, for the information of your honourable Court, a copy of the plan proposed by Lieut.-General Stuart respecting the extent of the military force requisite for the defence of the territories to be permanently occupied by the army of the Presidency of Fort St. George, and the distribution of that force; together with the opinion of the honourable Major-General Wellesley with relation to the effect of the proposed plan in its operation upon the military establishment of Fort St. George.

94. Your honourable Court will observe, that Lieut.-General Stuart proposed eight regiments of native cavalry and fifty-four battalions of native infantry for the establishment of Fort St. George, "under the limitations that are imposed by a consideration of the actual condition of the finances of that Presidency."

95. The Governor-General in Council is satisfied of the accuracy of the statements of Lieut.-General Stuart, and entirely concurs in the general principles and opinions stated by Lieut.-General Stuart, and by the honourable Major-General Wellesley, in the documents now transmitted to your honourable Court. His Excellency in Council therefore begs leave to solicit the particular attention of your honourable Court to the general principles and opinions of Lieut.-General Stuart, and of Major-General Wellesley on this important subject.

96. On the receipt of the despatch from Lieut.-General Stuart, noted in the 93d paragraph of this letter, the Go-

vernor-General in Council, on the 21st. of September, 1804, proceeded to consider the operation of the engagements contracted by the British Government in India, under the recent treaties of peace, partition, subsidy, and defensive alliance with the augmentation of the honourable Company's territory, and the various changes in the system of our political relations towards the several native states which have resulted from the late war with the Mahratta confederates, and from these treaties; his Excellency in Council accordingly determined the principles by which the general distribution of the military forces of the Presidencies of Bengal, Fort St. George, and Bombay respectively, should be regulated, with a view to maintain our former possessions and recent acquisitions in security, tranquillity, and good order; and to fulfil the conditions of our several public obligations to our tributaries, dependents, and allies.

97. For these important purposes, the Governor-General in Council resolved that the military establishment of Bengal, in addition to the service to which it has hitherto been applicable, should supply the force to be stationed in the province of Cuttack; the force which may be required for our recent acquisitions and engagements to the northward of Benares, and also the subsidiary force granted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the defensive alliance concluded with that chieftain under the treaty of Burhanpore.

98. That the military establishment of Fort St. George should furnish the force requisite for the service of the territories immediately subject to the authority of that Presidency, including Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, Cochin, and all the conquests retained from the Dutch and French on either coast, together with the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and one regiment of native cavalry for the service of the Peishwa at Poonah.

99. That the military establishment of Bombay, consisting of nine regiments of native infantry, (as will be stated to your honourable Court in a subsequent part of this despatch) in addition to the force requisite for the service of the territories immediately subject to that Presidency, should furnish the garrison of Goa, the troops for Surat, and the subsidiary forces for Poonah and for the Guickwar.

100. In order to carry the proposed distribution of the

armies of the three Prèsidencies into effect, it was necessary to recall within the limits of the territories, subject to Fort St. George and of Mysore, all troops belonging to the establishment of Fort St. George, then serving on the continent of India without those limits, excepting the subsidiary force serving at Hyderabad, and one regiment of native cavalry at Poonah.

101. It was also necessary that the troops belonging to the military establishment of Bombay, serving on the coast of Malabar and Canara, under the orders of the government of Fort St. George, should be recalled within the limits of the authority of the government of Bombay, in order to complete the proposed plan of distribution.

102. Your honourable Court will observe, that the force required by Lieut.-General Stuart's statement, in addition to the existing regular establishment of Fort St. George, amounted to sixteen battalions of native infantry; but that calculation provided for the garrison of Goa, which was to be provided from Bombay, according to the Governor-General's plan of the 21st of September, 1801, a deduction should therefore be made from Lieutenant-General Stuart's requisition of two battalions. After the deduction, the force required by Lieut.-General Stuart in addition to the regular establishment of Fort St. George amounted to fourteen battalions.

103. In the course of the war, the government of Fort St. George had raised several extra battalions of native infantry, with a view to meet the temporary exigencies of the service. At this period of time eight extra battalions of native infantry were stationed in the territories subject to Fort St. George.

104. As it might be expected, that the final termination of hostilities in Europe and in India, together with the progressive introduction of a system of civil order and regular administration of justice within the territories subject to the Government of Fort St. George, might *gradually* admit of a reduction in the amount of the military establishment required by the statement of Lieut.-General Stuart; it was desirable, that the augmentation of the force required for Fort St. George, in consequence of the recall of the Bombay troops, should be formed with a view to eventual reduction,

and consequently that the greatest practicable proportion of the proposed augmentation should consist of that description of force which might hereafter be reduced with the greatest facility. With this view, it appeared to be expedient, that the addition of regular regiments to the establishment of native infantry at fort St. George should be confined to the most limited number, compatible with the exigency of the service, and with the efficiency of the corps.

105. On the other hand, the Governor-General in Council in considering the nature of the augmentation required at Fort St. George, was apprized of the circumstances which render the extra battalions in many respects inapplicable to the services which regular regiments are calculated to perform; and his Excellency in Council was of opinion that great inconvenience, and even hazard, might be incurred, by maintaining any number of extra battalions, greatly disproportionate to the number of the regular corps. The Governor-General in Council also adverted to the difficulty which the government of Fort St. George would experience in furnishing the requisite number of European officers for any considerable augmentation of the regular corps.

106. Combining these various considerations, the Governor-General in Council authorized and directed the government of Fort St. George to raise with all practicable despatch, for the purposes stated in the Governor-General's plan of the 21st of September, 1804; *four* regular regiments of native infantry, in addition to the actual establishment, together with *six* extra battalions to be employed on the services to which the actual extra battalions were applicable, until the amount of the establishment of Fort St. George could be finally determined.

107. The extra battalions already raised, enabled the Government of Fort St. George to form the new regiments without delay; and the remaining proportion of the force ordered to be raised and maintained in the form of extra battalions, did not equal that which the actual amount of the extra battalions bore to the actual regular establishment; by these means the establishment of Fort St. George was increased to twenty-three regiments of native infantry, and six extra battalions, making a force of fifty-two battalions, ex-

clusive of two Bombay battalions, stationed in Goa, and furnished from the establishment of Bombay; your honourable Court will not fail to notice the remarks of Lieut.-General Stuart on this subject, that respectable and experienced officer observes, that "the military establishment which he has recommended, is confined within the narrowest limits than can be observed, without abandoning all ideas of security and necessary defence. It will accordingly be remarked, that that establishment is considerably lower than any that has been proposed for the service of this Presidency since the annexation of Mysore, the ceded districts, and the coast of Malabar and Canara. Lieutenant-General Stuart proposed fifty-four battalions of native infantry. Lord Clive, in his despatch to the Governor-General of the 18th of September, 1800, proposed fifty-eight battalions; Major-General Brathwaite, in his report on this subject, dated the 15th of August, 1800, recommended that sixty-two battalions should be maintained, and the Adjutant-General, Lieut.-Colonel Agnew, in his report of the 20th August, 1800, recommended that sixty battalions should be maintained for the duties of the Government of Fort St. George. The establishment of troops which Lieut.-General Stuart proposed, is even below the amount of force employed under this Presidency at the conclusion of the last war with France, a fact which will be shewn by the accompanying statement* of the number of troops serving at that period of time in the territories dependent upon Fort St. George. This circumstance affords a strong evidence of the necessity and the practicability of supporting the establishment that Lieut.-General Stuart has detailed."

108. Although the Governor-General in Council concurs

* Memorandum of native infantry serving under the Government of Fort St. George in December, 1801, including Bengal, Bombay, Travancore, Nair, Mopola, Sebundy, and local corps.—Madras troops, 19 native regular regiments; 2 Madras battalions native infantry; 1 volunteer battalion do.; 4 revenue battalions do.—Bengal troops, 1 regiment (6th) native infantry; 1 battalion (the marine) ditto; Bombay, &c. troops, 11 battalions Bombay native infantry; 3 battalions Travancore, ditto; 3 corps of Tiers Nairs and Mapilas, in Malabar.—Total battalions, Madras 45; Bengal, 3; Bombay, &c. 17.—Total battalions, 65.

in the sentiments expressed by Lieut.-General Stuart, respecting the extent of native force required for Fort St. George. His Excellency in Council at the same time entertained an expectation that the gradual introduction of a more regular system of government, and of an efficient police within the territories subject to the government of Fort St. George, combined with the restoration of tranquillity in the Deccan, the flourishing condition of the government of Mysore, the prosperous state of our alliance with the Peishwa, and the improvement of the government of Poonah under the influence of the British power, might admit of a reduction of the extra corps, recommended by Lieut.-General Stuart. His Excellency in Council was also extremely anxious to relieve the finances in India from the heavy burden of a larger military establishment than appeared to be indispensably requisite; and the state of affairs in the Deccan, together with the powerful addition made to the strength of the British empire in India by a large augmentation of the naval force in India directed by the activity, talents, and knowledge of Rear Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, appeared to present a favourable opportunity of effecting the proposed reduction. The Governor-General in Council accordingly on the 4th of April last, directed the government of Fort St. George to reduce the six extra battalions, and the establishment of native infantry at Fort St. George will therefore amount (when these orders are completely carried into execution) to twenty-three regiments of native infantry, exclusive of two Bombay battalions in garrison at Goa, making the total native infantry under the government of Fort St. George amount to forty-eight battalions.

109. With respect to the establishment of Bombay, your honourable Court in your advices of February, 1801, is pleased to consider two battalions for Malabar, and two battalions for Canara, to be sufficient for these purposes. Experience has shewn that so limited a force would be altogether inadequate for the protection and maintenance of the tranquillity of those countries; for the Commander-in-Chief, with the whole of the Bombay army, including his Majesty's 77th regiment, and the honourable Company's European regiment, was not able to subdue the Pyche Rajah; the govern-

ment of Bombay in consequence was under the necessity of purchasing a peace with the Rajah.

110. Your honourable Court has allowed eight regiments of native infantry for the establishment of Bombay, and fortunately it has been practicable to post a large proportion of the force in Malabar.

111. Since the date of the orders of your honourable Court of February, 1801, the following additional demands have been made upon the establishment of Bombay, viz. two battalions for Goa, and four battalions, if they should be of 700 men each, if of 1000 men, then three battalions for the Guikowar state. Only one regiment has been raised to make up this deficiency, leaving a deficiency of three battalions.

112. The government of Bombay apprized your honourable Court at an early period of time, that the fencible corps at Bombay had been converted into a regular regiment, denominated the 9th regiment, towards the latter end of 1803. This increase (which is the only augmentation that has taken place in the regular native force at Bombay, now amounting to nine regiments of native infantry, was subsequently approved and confirmed by the Governor-General in Council, after having received from Lieut.-General Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and from the honourable Major-General Wellesley, representations of the absolute necessity of continuing that regiment as a part of the permanent establishment of the Presidency of Bombay.

113. The Guikowar subsidiary force must be 3000 men, or three battalions of Bombay troops; there must be two battalions of Bombay troops at Surat, and one battalion of Bombay troops at Broach, six battalions of Bombay troops at Poonah, four at Bombay, and two at Goa, making the total number of Bombay native troops required to supply the necessary demands under that Presidency, eighteen battalions or nine regiments.

114. From the preceding details, your honourable Court will perceive, that the native military establishments of India amount at the present period of time to the following force:—

ESTABLISHMENT.

In 1805.		In 1801-2.		Increased since 1801-2.	
N. Cav.	N. I.	Cav.	N. I.	Cav.	N. I.
Bengal	8 27	6 20	2 7	2 7	7
Fort St. George	8 23	7 19	1 4	1 4	4
Bombay	" 9	" 8	" 1	" 1	1
	<u>16</u> <u>59</u>	<u>13</u> <u>47</u>	<u>3</u> <u>12</u>		

115. The increase to the military establishments of the Presidencies of Fort William, Fort St. George, and Bombay, since the year 1801-2 is three regiments of native cavalry, and twelve regiments of infantry. But with regard to Fort St. George, your honourable Court will observe, that no actual increase has taken place in the strength of the army of that establishment since the 30th of April, 1802, when it amounted to nineteen regiments of native infantry, two extra battalions, and eleven battalions of Bombay infantry, serving in Malabar and Canara, making the total number of battalions fifty-one, which is three battalions more than the present establishment, when the six extra battalions shall have been reduced.

116. The Governor-General in Council has not noticed in this despatch, either the gun Lascars or native artillery. The former depend on the strength of the European artillery, and the latter have generally been raised in time of war or of difficulty as a temporary expedient to supply the deficiency of European artillery; neither has the Governor-General in Council deemed it to be necessary to enter into any discussion respecting the native pioneers, the number of which must always be regulated by the demands of the public service for detachments, &c. and which can always easily be reduced in time of tranquillity to the scale which may be deemed necessary for the performance of the ordinary duties of a peace establishment.

117. No doubt can be entertained that the resources acquired by our subsidiary engagements, and by our conquests in Hindostan, Cuttack, and the Deccan, will amply repay

the expense of the augmentation made to your armies, without imposing any additional charge in the revenue as they stood in the year of account, 1802-3.

118. The Governor-General in Council is unable at the present moment of time to afford to your honourable Court a correct and detailed statement of the probable amount of the revenues of the conquered and ceded territories in time of peace and good order. The only criterion excepting the schedules which the Governor-General at present possesses for forming any idea of the value of our conquests, is the amount of collections made in Fusily 1211, ending in September, 1804, an estimate of the charges and revenues of the conquests, &c. has been formed on this principle, and is enclosed for the information of your honourable Court. But this cannot be deemed a correct basis of calculation. It is to be recollected that the conquests were only made towards the close of the year, 1803, and that the intelligence of the peace with the confederates did not reach Lord Lake until the month of February, 1804, and the army did not return to cantonments until June, 1804. The war with Holkar, and the advance of that chieftain to Hindostan afterwards, compelled Lord Lake to take the field again in September, 1804, and as the Fusily 1211 ends in September, 1804, the revenues of 1211 cannot certainly be considered to afford any correct data by which an accurate estimate may be formed of the probable revenues of the conquests in time of peace and good order: in the time of M. Perron, the territories in the Doab of the Jumna, and Ganges, yielded a revenue of seventy-five lacs of rupees, and a confident expectation may be entertained, that when tranquillity shall have been maintained for a sufficient period of time, the Doab will yield a revenue greatly exceeding the amount of the Fusily 1211, and affording a surplus after the payment of all charges.

119. The cessions in Bundelcund made by the Peishwab, amount to thirty-six lacs of rupees, but in the enclosed estimate the revenue from Bundelcund is only estimated at fifteen lacs, which is the amount already settled by the Commissioners.

120. This deficiency is to be ascribed to the confused state of the province of Bundelcund for some years past, to-

gether with the necessity of employing the troops stationed in it in active operations against the enemy; the amount of revenue collected in 1211 is only fifteen lacs of rupees. In course of time, however, the revenues will increase with the establishment of order and regularity, admitting therefore that no improvement shall take place in the revenues of Broach, Cuttack, and the territories in Guzerat, an event highly improbable, no doubt can be entertained that the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges, and the province of Bundelcund will in a short period of time afford a revenue greatly exceeding that stated in the enclosed estimate; on the other hand, the charges have been taken at the highest scale, and appear to include every probable contingency; a confident expectation may therefore be entertained that the acquisitions obtained by the recent success of our councils and arms will prove as beneficial to our pecuniary resources as they are calculated to confirm the security of every interest of the Company, and of the nation in this great and powerful empire.

121. The Governor-General in Council does not deem it to be proper to enter in this place into any discussion of the innumerable advantages which our recent acquisitions offer to many other important branches of your interests; and although the enclosed estimate is formed under every possible disadvantage with regard to the future amount of the revenues of our conquests, &c., his Excellency in Council is satisfied that this estimate, even in its present state, will afford the most substantial proof of the great benefits which may ultimately be expected to result to your affairs by the great change which has been effected in the state of India since the receipt of your orders of the 11th of February, 1801.

122. In concluding this despatch, the Governor-General in Council recommends to your honourable Court to take into your early and most serious consideration, the necessity of raising a body of regular cavalry for the service of the province of Guzerat; great inconvenience has been recently experienced from the want of regular cavalry in that quarter, and as your honourable Court is fully impressed with the value of our possessions in the province of Guzerat, the

Governor-General in Council is satisfied that this important question will receive the early and deliberate judgment of your honourable Court.

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

No. VIII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

(Separate.)

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, July 25, 1805.

1. The Governor-General in Council has now the honour to reply to such parts of your honourable Court's separate letter of the 11th February 1801, as relate to the European military establishment of India.

2. This branch of your establishments is fixed in your letter of the 11th of February 1801, as follows:

	Battalions. Artillery.	Regiment. Cavalry.	King's Infantry.	Company's Infantry.	Total Infantry.
Bengal	3	2	5	1	6
Fort St. George	2	2	6	1	7
Bombay	1	..	2	1	3
Grand Total	6	4	13	3	16

3. It does not appear upon what principle your honourable Court has been pleased to fix this establishment. The Governor-General in Council, however, is of opinion that the only safe mode of estimating the strength of European force in India is to exhibit a detailed statement of the distribution of every corps with reference to our wants and to the different stations which it is indispensably necessary to occupy by European troops. Great errors would arise from fixing the European military establishment by any given proportion which may be supposed to exist generally between our European and native establishments. It would be impracticable,

under the real state of the case, to devise any accurate principle by which such general proportion between our European and native troops should be regulated,

4. In almost every service in India it is certainly necessary that a proportion of European troops should be employed, but the number in proportion to the native troops employed on the same services will necessarily vary according to the nature of the service required and the description of the enemy against whom our arms are to be directed.

5. In the wars with Tippoo Sultaun the proportion of European to native troops appears to have been about one-third in the first, and one-fourth in the second war. In the late war against the Mahratta chieftains the number of Europeans employed in proportion to natives was not more than one-tenth or one-eleventh.

6. No considerable body of native troops to the amount of 10,000 men can be prudently assembled without some intermixture of Europeans, but such bodies of troops are seldom assembled in India, and it would certainly be erroneous upon this opinion to state that the European troops ought to be maintained in the exact proportion of one-eighth or one-tenth to the native troops throughout the Indian establishments. Numbers of native troops must necessarily be employed in garrisons in the interior and on various duties, in which it would be very inconvenient and even injurious to employ Europeans, and on the other hand Europeans are absolutely necessary in certain garrisons and stations, and on certain services, in some cases in equal proportions, in others in the proportion of one-third of the number of natives. Experience has demonstrated, that it has frequently been necessary to augment our native establishments whenever there has been any great deficiency of European troops, it is evident that were the European infantry now serving under the Presidency of Fort William to be suddenly diminished to any material extent, it would be indispensably necessary to make an immediate augmentation to the corps of native infantry, and although the corps of native infantry would not be so efficient as those of European infantry, yet such additions of native infantry might be made without apprehension to a great extent.

7. The most safe principle of calculation which can be used for determining the strength of our European military establishments must be derived from a detailed examination of the question, determining the number of European troops by a consideration of our detailed wants at every station of your armies.

8. The Governor-General in Council concurs in opinion with your honourable Court, that four regiments of dragoons, viz., two for the establishment of Bengal, and two to be stationed under the Presidency of Fort St. George, is sufficient for the service of the continent of India in time of peace with France: this opinion, however, rests upon the supposition that each regiment of dragoons will be maintained at the full establishment of 640 men.

9. With respect to the Company's European artillery the number of battalions fixed by your honourable Court would be sufficient if kept complete, and the artillery has always proved an useful and valuable corps in the field; it would however be desirable to increase the number of companies to each battalion at Fort St. George. The total number of companies of artillery at Fort St. George now amounts only to fourteen, and the disposable force of artillery at that Presidency has been much lessened by the return to its own establishment of the detachment of Bombay artillery serving in Malabar and Canara.

10. Your honourable Court will observe by the memorandum of Lieut.-General Stuart, (a copy of which was transmitted to your honourable Court in the letter from the Governor-General in Council of this date, respecting the native military establishments) that the number of companies of artillery required by that officer is nineteen, and that he strongly recommends the addition to each battalion of three companies of the present strength of each company, which will increase the artillery of Fort St. George from fourteen to twenty companies. The Governor-General in Council concurs in opinion with Lieut.-General Stuart on the subject of the European artillery at Fort St. George, and recommends your honourable Court to order the proposed addition to be made to the artillery of that Presidency.

11. It would also be extremely desirable to add to the

corps of artillery at each Presidency one or two troops of mounted European artillery of the strength of eighty men to each troop.

12. Your honourable Court has allowed sixteen regiments of European infantry, including three of the Company for the service in India exclusive of Ceylon, of this number your honourable Court has appropriated six to the Presidency of Bengal, seven to Fort St. George, and three to Bombay.

13. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that nineteen regiments of European infantry, including three of the Company's at 1000 rank and file each, are indispensably necessary in time of peace with France for the service in India.

The distribution of this force would be as follows:

14. Six regiments, including one of the Company's, would be stationed in the territories immediately subject to the Presidency of Bengal. This force is the same in point of strength as that allowed by your honourable Court for the service of this Presidency, and is the least which ought to remain in the provinces immediately subject to Bengal.

15. Of this force three regiments would be stationed in the upper provinces and on the frontier of Oude, two between Allahabad and Fort William, and one for the garrison of Fort William. Your honourable Court will observe that, without leaving the whole line of country between Allahabad and the Presidency, with a smaller proportion of Europeans than can be deemed prudent in the inefficient state of the Company's European regiment, this establishment furnishes only one regiment of European infantry for the garrison of Fort William.

16. It would certainly be highly desirable that the garrison of Fort William should at all times consist of two regiments of European infantry, upon the establishment proposed, of 1000 rank and file to each regiment, and unless your honourable Court possesses the certain means of maintaining the Company's European regiments to the fixed strength, it would unquestionably prove a most advantageous measure to reduce the Company's European regiments altogether, and to furnish King's regiments in their place.

In Oude and Upper Provinces, 3 regiments, 3,000 men; Between Allahabad and Fort William, 1 do., 1,000 do.; Fort William, 2 do., 2,000 do.;

Total men, 6,000. Of which five Companies might be stationed in Cuttack, if necessary.

17. This arrangement by substituting one of his Majesty's regiments of the strength of 1000 men for the Company's European regiment, would leave a sufficient European force between Allahabad and the Presidency, and would furnish two of his Majesty's regiments for the garrison of Fort William.

18. The Company's European regiments are principally serviceable in furnishing non-commissioned officers for the native corps. The supply however of non-commissioned officers for the native corps might be furnished with greater advantage from his Majesty's regiments than from the Company's European force, and for this purpose a certain number of supernumeraries might constantly be maintained; or if this arrangement should appear objectionable, the Company's European artillery might furnish non-commissioned officers for the native corps.

19. The Governor-General in Council considers nine regiments of European infantry, including one Company's regiment of 1000 rank and file each, to be necessary for the service of the government of Fort St. George. The distribution of this force is noted in the margin, and the force is certainly the least which can be appropriated for the service of the extensive territories which are now subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George.

Mysore,* including Seringapatam, 1; Canara and Malabar, 1; Ceded Districts, 1; Northern Division, 1; Carnatic, including Fort St. George, Vellore, and the French Possessions, 3; Southern Division, 1; Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, 1; Total, 9.

20. Your honourable Court in your letter of the 11th of February, 1801, has appropriated seven regiments of European infantry for the service of Fort St. George, but since the date of your orders of the 11th of February, 1801, the services of one regiment of European infantry has been granted to the Nizam, for which he makes provision, and one regiment is required for the duties of the ceded districts, the revenues of which will amply defray the expense of the additional troops required for the protection of those valuable and

* General Stuart considers two regiments to be necessary for Mysore.

important cessions. These increased demands equal the difference between the establishment allowed by your honourable Court, and that deemed to be necessary by the Governor-General in Council. Your honourable Court has not stated the principles on which you have fixed the European establishments of Fort St. George. It is evident, however, from the date and terms of your letter of the 11th of February, 1801, that you could not have had in contemplation the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in October, 1800; and the Governor-General in Council therefore entertains a confident persuasion that your honourable Court will be of opinion that the increased demand of two regiments of European infantry is amply compensated by the advantages which we have derived from the improvement of our connection with the Nizam, effected by the treaty of Hyderabad in 1800.

21. The Governor-General in Council solicits the particular attention of your honourable Court to the memorandum of Lieut.-General Stuart transmitted with the other separate letter from the military department of this date.

22. In considering the extent of the European force required for the Presidency of Fort St. George, your honourable Court will observe that Lieut.-General Stuart recommends eleven regiments of European infantry, including one for Goa. The difference between the plan of the Governor-General in Council and that of Lieut.-General Stuart arises from the regiment to be stationed at Goa, and from General Stuart considering two regiments of European infantry as being necessary for Mysore. The Governor-General in Council is satisfied that your honourable Court will give due weight to the opinions of Lieut.-General Stuart, whose experience, and military knowledge, are entitled to the highest respect and consideration.

23. Your honourable Court has allowed three regiments (including one Company's) of European infantry for the service of Bombay, including Goa. Since the receipt of your letter of the 11th of February, 1801 defensive engagements have been concluded with the Guikowar, and considerable acquisitions of territory have been made in Guzerat. Your honourable Court is fully apprized of the importance of these acquisitions, and will not certainly consider one regiment of

Europeans to be too large a force for the protection of our interests in that quarter.

The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that four regiments of European infantry, of 1000 rank and file each, are necessary for the service of the Presidency of Bombay, and should be stationed; two at Bombay, one at Goa, and one in Guzerat.

24. Your honourable Court will observe, that upon the preceding statement in time of peace with France, the establishment of European infantry, which the Governor-General in Council proposes, exceeds the plan of your honourable Court by *three* regiments only; and when your honourable Court shall have taken into consideration that the plan of the Governor-General in Council embraces the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the districts ceded by the Nizam, the cessions in Guzerat, and eventually the subsidiary force at Poonah, his Excellency in Council trusts that the difference between the opinion of your honourable Court, and that of the Governor-General in Council upon this subject, will not be deemed essential.

25. It certainly, however, would be advantageous to consider the two regiments of European infantry applicable to the service of Hyderabad and Poonah, to be *exclusive* of the establishment, and great additional strength would be derived from fixing the establishment conformably to this view of the subject. We are bound by treaty to furnish a regiment of Europeans to the Nizam, and it certainly will be desirable to attach a regiment of Europeans to the Poonah subsidiary force, whenever that force may be employed on service.

26. Great advantage would be derived from fixing the establishment of the Poonah subsidiary force at the same strength as that of Hyderabad. In this case, and supposing that your honourable Court should approve of the suggestion that the European regiments to be attached to the subsidiary force at Poonah and Hyderabad shall be *exclusive* of the ordinary establishments, the number of regiments of European infantry which will then be required for India will be twenty-one; of which six will be stationed in Bengal; nine in the territories subject to Fort St. George, four under

Bombay, and two to the subsidiary forces at Hyderabad and Poonah.*

27. Your honourable Court however, will be pleased to observe, that the calculation of the Governor-General in Council proceeds entirely upon a supposition that each of the regiments of European infantry in India, will at all times be maintained at the strength of 1,000 men.

28. In this case the Governor-General in Council is of opinion, that the proposed establishment of European infantry will meet every possible contingency of war with any native power and every probable contingency of war with France, or with any other European power. If any European power should form extensive schemes of attack against our possessions in India, and should prepare great armaments by land or sea, for that purpose, it is to be presumed that the Government at home would always be sufficiently apprized of any such design, to frustrate it by seasonable reinforcements in India.

29. Although the Governor-General in Council has recommended to your honourable Court the reduction of the Company's European regiments, founded on their state of inefficiency from want of numbers, and from the apparent impossibility of recruiting them to the establishment, fixed by your honourable Court; and although the Governor-General in Council has recommended that the European corps to be furnished to Hyderabad and eventually to Poonah, should be considered to be exclusive of the ordinary establishment of European troops, his Excellency in Council does not consider these arrangements to be indispensable to the security of the British empire in India; his Excellency in Council proposes this arrangement as a considerable, but not absolutely necessary improvement in our military strength, and the Governor-General will not continue to be alarmed for the security of this empire, if the European establishments

* *Bengal*.—Oude, 3; between Allahabad and Fort William, 1; Fort William and Cuttack (if necessary), 2; total 6.—6,000. *Fort St. George*. Mysore, 2; Canara and Malabar, 1; Northern Division, 1; Carnatic (including Fort St. George, &c.) 3; Southern Division, 1; Ceded Districts, 1; total 9.—9,000. *Bombay*.—Presidency, 2; Goa, 1; Guzerat, 1; total 4.—4,000. *Poonah*, 1; *Hyderabad*, 1; total 2.—2,000. Total 21 Regts.—21,000 Men.

shall be completed to the extent which his Excellency in Council has proposed for the continent of India, of sixteen regiments of his Majesty's infantry of 1,000 men each, three regiments of the Company's infantry of the same strength, with four regiments of dragoons, at 640 men each, and a due proportion of European artillery.

30. Whatever may be the determination of your honourable Court, and of his Majesty's ministers, with regard to this important subject, it is indispensably requisite that the European establishment in India should be kept complete to the strength at which it may be fixed by the Government in England; the Governor-General in Council cannot too strongly recommend this point to the serious attention of your honourable Court, and he is satisfied that your honourable Court will be equally impressed with the urgent importance of giving to this country an efficient establishment of European troops, which will be fixed not only with reference to the considerations stated to you in this letter, but also to the means which the Government in England may possess of keeping it complete to the strength at which it may be fixed.

We have the honour to be,
honourable Sirs,
your most faithful humble Servants,

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

No. IX.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD,

East Sheen, 25th August 1804.

Having in my letter most secret (No. 25) adverted to the defective supply of recruits at home for general service, I think it may be satisfactory to your Lordship to receive a detailed statement of our present military force at home and abroad.

The statement inclosed is for the month of May last; but as that for July does not exceed it in amount more than 2,000 men, it will answer equally well for all the purposes of general information.

The line and militia at present amount at home and abroad, to 241,217 effective rank and file. The deficiencies on our establishment (almost entirely confined to the line) are not less than 40,000 men; the additional force proposed to be raised under Mr. Pitt's last bill, exclusive of the gradual conversion of the supplementary militia as vacancies happen, into army of reserve may be taken at 20,000, making a gross deficiency upon our proposed military establishment of about 60,000 men.

Your Lordship will perceive that independent of volunteers, which in the accompanying returns, are stated from the effectives at the monthly inspections, and not from their nominal establishment, the regular force for home defence is in Great Britain (including Jersey and Guernsey) 138,000, in Ireland 50,000 rank and file. It will require full 20,000 men more to place us at home as we wish to stand, and this before we can consider ourselves as having a force disposable for foreign service, without starving the main object of home security.

The demands for disposable force are at the same time very pressing, and it is impossible for us to look upon ourselves as in a situation to do justice to the interests of the country in the war in which we are engaged, unless we can command the services of a corps of not less than 20,000 men for offensive operations, preserving at the same time our internal defences on that high scale which the preparations of the enemy have rendered indispensable.

Your Lordship will be able to estimate from the above sketch of our military situation, the difficulties I have to contend with, in attempting to procure for India the reinforcements of European force which I deem to be essential to our interests in that quarter, so that your Lordship must be satisfied to receive at present limited supplies; being assured that I shall seize the first moment which more exposed interests will admit of placing the British army in India on the most respectable footing; and I shall not cease to importune the Duke of York to allot a number of recruits beyond the very inadequate proportion the Company have lately derived from the recruiting depôt, to restore the artillery corps to its proper strength. In the meantime I trust you will avail yourself of whatever resource can be derived for the support of

this most important feature of our army, either from the men volunteering from the King's regiments ordered home, or from the Company's European regiments which are at present wholly inefficient; notwithstanding which evident truth, and the little prospect of completing them by recruits from Europe; I find either their reduction or their conversion into Native battalions much disrelished by the Court of Directors. Such of the men however as are fit for the artillery, will I am sure be much more usefully employed in that service.

Having apprized your Lordship that his Majesty's ministers are not yet satisfied with the amount of our force at home, which exceeds both in quality of troops and in numbers, what the country has possessed at any former period; I think it necessary to state in explanation, that the preparations of the enemy continue with unabated vigour along the whole line of their coast. Great exertions have been used in equipping and even augmenting their regular navy, and they have now including eight Dutch, about forty-five sail of the line from Toulon to the Texel in a state to put to sea; though certainly in many respects little qualified to contend with our ships; but their efforts have been principally directed to the construction, equipment, and discipline as far as that can be accomplished in their own harbours, and under the protection of their batteries, of a lesser marine, which consists of four or five different classes of vessels, descending from prames which are square rigged, and carry each about thirty heavy guns, to row-boats carrying one gun, and capable of receiving about fifty men—the former are good batteries, sail reasonably well with a fair wind, and from drawing very little water, are well calculated to cover the landing of troops.

From the best information we are in possession of, they have accumulated not less than 2000 vessels of all sorts, for the purposes of descent; of these about 300 are of the class of stout gun brigs, and armed vessels of a higher description; the remainder in transports fitted for the reception of horses and artillery; Dutch schutz, Greenland boats, and craft of various descriptions; they are now assembled in the ports of Boulogne, Ostend, and Flushing; the former station, with several dependent basons, having been enlarged for the reception of this flotilla, on board of which a large proportion of the army is constantly embarked, partly for the purpose of

training and accustoming them to the management of the boats, partly as affording them more convenient accommodation than huts on shore, making due allowance for the portion of tonnage which must be employed in transporting artillery, stores, provisions, and horses. The above fleet may be calculated as capable of transporting on an average about sixty men each, or upon the whole, 120,000 men, to which is to be added whatever may be embarked from Brest and Rochfort on the one flank, or from the Texel on the other, either on board or under the protection of their fleets. It has been generally understood that Buonaparte's purpose has been not to attempt the descent with less than 200,000 men. Your Lordship will make your own calculation what proportion of this force is likely to penetrate the succession of defences we happily possess before the enemy can bring the contest to an issue upon land. There are still sceptics upon the attempt being finally made. Whatever may be the result, we must clearly act as if it was inevitable; and after all that has passed, the nature of the man, and the object in view compared with the risk being considered, I cannot bring myself to doubt its being hazarded, the rather as there is nothing in the state of the Continent which is likely, at least for the present year, to give him any alarm for his own security at home whilst he is employed on the expedition.

During the last three months the progress the volunteers have made in discipline is highly satisfactory, and there prevails amongst that valuable and improving force the best possible spirit. Since encouragement was given by Parliament to their coming out upon permanent duty, there have been in Great Britain alone not less than 180,000 men who have passed from a fortnight to three weeks, at a distance from their own homes, in an uninterrupted improvement of themselves in the use of arms, during which time they have been subject to the mutiny act, and been superintended and instructed by regular officers.

In addition to our preparations in point of numbers, the whole being now brigaded under general officers, a plan is in considerable forwardness for moving with rapidity to the point of attack whatever proportion of the volunteer force it may be expedient to bring forward in aid of the regular army; and it is hoped that it may be so arranged as to admit of the

entire force (if necessary) of England being concentrated for the security of the metropolis on the 9th day, supplying a daily reinforcement of about 25,000 men to the main army advanced in front of London.

I have already said enough to justify myself, I trust, to your Lordship, for not having obtained for India in the course of the past season, a larger proportion of king's troops; the same considerations must also reconcile your Lordship to a disappointment with respect to the naval succours, which upon consultation with Lord Melville, I felt myself warranted in holding out to your Lordship in my letter of May last. His Lordship desires me to express his regret that the pressing demands at home preclude him at this moment from detaching from hence the two ships then promised; and he is also unable to supply by the fleet now under despatch, any number of seamen for the ships which may have been taken up in India in pursuance of the late orders from the Board of Admiralty to Admiral Rainier, there being above thirty light armed ships, peculiarly adapted for service in the narrow seas, at this moment in the river completely equipped, and only waiting for hands. It will however be an early object of his Lordship's solicitude to furnish you with the means of completing the naval armament ordered in India with the least possible delay.

I cannot close this despatch without offering to your Lordship my congratulations on the truly gallant and distinguished conduct of the China fleet. The Court of Directors have liberally distributed about £50,000 amongst the officers and men, which in addition to the notice the King has taken of their services by conferring on Captain Dance, as Commodore, the honour of knighthood, cannot fail I trust to infuse into the Company's marine a confidence in their own strength, and a determination hereafter to redeem their character, which had suffered in one or two instances towards the close of the last war. Few events have given greater satisfaction to the nation than Linois' defeat. It is a novel description of glory, and as such has produced a more lively impression on the public mind than a repetition of triumphs to which our navy is so well accustomed.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with great truth and respect most faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE FRENCH INTRIGUES AGAINST
THE BRITISH POWER IN INDIA.*

Du Fayel, Capitaine d'Infanterie, au Général de Caen Général de tous les établissements Français dans l'Inde.

Général,

Tranquebar ce 7 Brumaire an 12 de la République.

L'Adjudant Commandant Binot avant de capituler, m'ayant commissionné agent Français à Tranquebar près le gouvernement Danois, je suis arrivé en cette ville le 18 fructidor. Ce Commandant a pensé que dans les circonstances actuelles de la guerre des Anglais contre la nation Maratte, il ne pouvait vous être indifférent d'avoir dans une ville neutre à cette côte une personne chargée de vous faire parvenir la situation des deux armées belligérantes ; c'est Adjudant Commandant, au terme de sa capitulation, ayant fait la demande d'un passeport au gouvernement Anglais pour l'officier qu'il desirait vous expédier en avoit d'abord éprouvé un refus, et en conséquence j'avois reçu l'ordre de m'embarquer pour me rendre auprès de vous, et j'avois pris toutes les mesures nécessaire à mon voyage, quand le 29 Vindemiaire au matin est arrivé le citoyen St. Delhor munis d'un ordre du gouvernement de Madras, et d'après les désirs de l'Adjudant Binot je lui ai remis les paquets qui vous étoient destinés. Cet officier s'embarque demain sur la *Louisa Augusta* qui doit mettre aussitôt à la voile pour suivre sa destination. Le brick *La Betsy* est mouillé en cette rade le 27 Vindemiaire au matin. Entre autres passagers étoit le Capitaine St. Mihiel, porteur de vos dépêches pour l'Adjudant Commandant Binot. Cet officier vu les circonstances, se trouvant dans l'impossibilité de faire parvenir sûrement les paquets dont il étoit chargé, d'après la communication que je lui ai donné de mes instructions, m'a remis vos lettres sur reçue. Je les ai acheminé de suite, et j'ai le plaisir, général, de vous annoncer, qu'ils sont arrivées dans dix huit heures, malgré les entraves, que, depuis la guerre, le gouvernement Anglais a mis à ce qu'il puisse parvenir aucune lettre que par leur Tapats ; les routes sont couvertes de leurs satellites, les voyageurs sont fouillés, à des postes établis à cet effet, et la malheureuse ville de Pondicherry est entourée d'une chaîne d'espions, des Chelinqes aux ordres du Capitaine de port, Pernon, parcourent dans la nuit la côte pour y surveiller les embarquations mouillées au large. Ces précautions dont j'ai prévenu l'Adjudant me font craindre qu'il ne puisse me faire parvenir les paquets, qu'il m'a fait annoncer ce matin, ou du moins qu'ils n'arrivent trop tard pour que je puisse vous les acheminer par Delhort, le vaisseau qui le porte devant mettre à la voile dans la matinée de demain.

J'ignore ce qu'annonce les craintes des Anglais, mais les précautions qu'ils prennent tiennent même du minutieux. Les Chelinqes, sur les deux côtes ont été mises hors d'état d'aller à la mer, excepté dans les villes où ils ont des postes établis. Les marchands de Nesly dans toute la province, ont eu l'ordre de livrer tout leur grain aux collecteurs de la compagnie qui les font transporter dans les places fortes, qu'ils ont conservé dans cette Nabobie, les autres fortins ayant été rasés Cochin se démantèle en ce moment, et tous les Français qui faisoient leur résidence dans cette place, ont reçu l'ordre de se tenir prêts à partir pour l'Europe. Une bataille opiniâtre a eu lieu entre les armées des Marates et celle des Anglais. Ces derniers ont perdu la presque totalité du regiment 74 et près de 60 officiers. La perte des Marates selon les papiers Anglais se montoit fort haut, mais des détails reçus ici par des lettres particulières du camp même, la porte à près de trois mille combattants. Ils ont à la vérité abandonnés beaucoup des bouches à feu, mais l'on assure que les bœufs en avoient été tués, car il est certain, que l'infanterie

* These letters are given as a specimen of the intrigues and correspondence which the foreign European settlements in India enabled the French to carry on against England.—Ed.

Maratte a opéré sa retraite dans le meilleur ordre possible de l'aveu même des Anglais. Ce combat a eu lieu le 23 Septembre.

La Raja du Tanjour est gardé à vue dans sa capitale, et aux premières nouvelles d'une invasion des Marattes, dans la province, il doit être conduit à Madras. • Ce prince est soupçonné d'avoir des intelligences avec les chefs de la nation en guerre, étant de la même caste, et voulant éviter le sort de tous les malheureux princes tributaires des Anglais, attendait des forces Marattes pour fuir, espérant à la paix d'obtenir des conditions plus avantageuses que celles où l'on lui permet encore de vivre.

La communication du Bengal par terre est absolument interceptée. Le Catek est inondé de la cavalerie Maratte qui dit on n'attendent que la fin des pluies à cette côte pour la ravager. Il se fait en consequence un armement au Bengal qu'on répand être pour le Pegou, mais dont les troupes sont certainement destinés à mettre le nord de Madras à l'abri du pillage.

L'on croit ici l'escadre de l'Admiral Regnier à la côte de Malabar, mais il circuloit, il y a quelques jours, qu'on la supposoit partie pour Batavie pour y attaquer les vaisseaux Hollandais, et les forcer de se jeter à la côte. Les Chingulais à Ceylon ont portés leurs ravages jusqu'aux portes des villes de la côte. Les Anglais viennent d'y faire encore parvenir quatre cents soldats Européens

Si vous êtes destiné, Général, à être le liberateur des malheureux peuples de cette contrée, jamais circonstance ne sera plus favorable pour y attaquer les oppresseurs de ce pays, occupés à une guerre terrible à plus de deux cents cinquante lieues dans l'intérieur de la presqu'isle, n'ayant point à cette côte plus de deux mille quelques cents hommes de troupes blanches et encore disséminés sur une très grande étendue. Il n'y a aucun point de cette presqu'isle qui puisse être en état d'opposer la moindre résistance. Madras, dont le fort quoiqu'impasant par sa régularité et ses bouches à feu ne pourrait tenir longtems par le peu de solidité de ses bastions, dont les crevâsses journalières dégelent qu'ils travaillent continuellement, et d'ailleurs, un coup de canon heureux serait à n'en pas douter, le signal d'une levée générale des boucliers contre les tyrans abhorrés que vous auriez à combattre. Les Anglais mettent de nouveau en usage une ressource qui selon le tableau que j'ai vu leur a procuré dans la dernière guerre des sommes assez conséquentes, ils concèdent les Aldés depuis le nord de Madras jusqu'aux Kercars. Chaque concessionnaire comptant une somme finie devient propriétaire. La vanité des Malabars résiste guère à cet appas, aussi comptent ils sans réflexions les sommes qu'on exige d'eux à cet effet.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir, Général, que je suis ici absolument à mes frais, que journallement je fais des avances pour pouvoir correspondre avec sûreté avec l'Adjudant Commandant Binot et j'espère que vous voudrez bien me fixer un traitement qui puisse me permettre de servir mon pays, de la manière dont je le désire. Je pense général, qu'une somme quelconque pour mes frais suffira ne voulant point être à charge. Je trouverai dans la délicate jouissance de servir mon pays la récompense que tout bon Français doit ambitionner.

Cy joint copie des ordres et lettres qui me concernent.

Salut et respect,

Du FAYEL, Capitaine d'Infanterie.

Le Capitaine Descombe passe à bord de la Louisa; il vient d'être victime de la voracité Anglaise. Il a été pris en quittant le Tanjaoure, où il a fait un très long séjour. Il vous donnera, Général, les détails qui vous intéresseront sur ce pays, ayant vécu dans l'intimité avec le roy et les ministres de ce précieux royaume, pendant tout le tems qu'il a passé à la côte Malabar.

Copie de la Lettre du Nid^a Rajapu à un Préfet.

Citoyen Préfet,

Pondicherry, le 28 Août, 1803.

Je prends la liberté de vous adresser la présente, fermement persuadé que vous recevrez de mes nouvelles avec plaisir d'après la bonté que vous m'avez toujours témoigné pendant votre résidence dans ce pays, et dont je vous prie de m'accorder la continuation.

Vous trouverez, Citoyen Préfet, ci-jointe la suite des gazettes du gouvernement depuis votre départ. J'ai cru devoir vous en faire l'envoi, pour votre satisfaction, quoique ces feuilles ne contiennent rien d'important, pas même un mot à l'égard des opérations de l'armée Anglaise contre les Marattes. Permettez moi, Citoyen Préfet, de supplier à ce silence par le récit des informations qui me sont parvenues par diverses voyes.

Holcar, après avoir établi à Poonah un nouveau Pesheway de son choix, se retira un peu loin de cette capitale. La marche de l'armée Anglaise vers Poonah le détermina ensuite à se rendre près de Scindia alors aux environs de Delhy. Il fut ouvert des negociations entre les deux chefs pour une pacification générale entre toutes les puissances Marattes, au moyen de la mediation d'une d'entre elles. Les Anglais jaloux d'un tel événement se hatèrent de ramener à Poonah l'ancien Peshway, qui étoit réfugié dans le pays de Concan aux environs de Bombay, et l'établirent sur le trône à leur tour. Bientôt ils exigèrent de ce prince à faire avec eux un nouveau traité, à fin de faire échouer celui, qui étoit entamé entre Holcar et Scindia. Ce dernier justement allarmé de l'ambition des Anglais, conclût une suspension d'armes avec Holcar, et dans la suite institua par le nouveau Peshway des demandes et des intentions des Anglais lui écrivit à avoir aucune negociation et à ne faire aucun traité avec eux, au contraire à les renvoyer de ses domaines sous quelque prétexte, et dans le cas où il ne pourroit le faire, à se retirer de Poonah avec toute sa famille pour aller le joindre. Les Anglais institua des intentions de Scindia tiennent le Peshway à vue et lui réclame une somme immense pour les frais de la guerre qu'ils ont été obligés de faire pour lui, moyennant qu'ils lui offrent la continuation de leur alliance.

Le rendez-vous des ambassadeurs Marattes pour traiter la paix est, dit-on, dans un endroit proche de Delhy. Déjà les divers ambassadeurs y sont réunis et travaillent à une pacification générale durable et solide. Le résultat n'en est pas encore connu. L'on ajoute que toutes les puissances réunies traiteront ensuite collectivement avec les Anglais soit pour la guerre ou la paix.

Une partie de l'armée Anglaise, commandée par le Général Stuart est déjà de retour pour entrer dans la province d'Arcot. Un détachement reste encore près de Ballan au bord de la rivière de Toungabadra, et une autre commandée par le Général Wellesley est près de Poonah.

Le Nabobe du Dekan Nizam Aly Khan est mort à Hyderabad, le 7 du courant. Ses deux ou trois fils sont en discussion relativement à la succession de leur père. Le Divan Machir Moulouk fort lié aux Anglais, s'efforce de procurer la Nabobie à son gendre, second fils du défunt. Les Marattes, chez qui se trouve réfugié l'aîné, veulent le faire succéder à son père.

Depuis votre départ les Anglais font démolir le fort de Gondelour, et dit-on, généralement tous les forts du Carnatick, excepté les places fortes comme Madias, Velore, Masulipatam, &c. &c.

Divers Vakils des Rajahs du Nord et du Sud qui me connoissent, étant dans l'intention de venir résider à Pondicherry, les uns incognito, les autres publiquement, aussitôt le rétablissement, m'ont fait diverses propositions, particulièrement

le vakil des Marattes. J'ai cru devoir les entretenir dans leurs espérances sans néanmoins me compromettre en rien.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec profond respect,
Citoyen Prefet,

Votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur.

P. S. du 3 Septembre, 1803.

Signé NID^a RAJAPAT, etc.

L'armée du Général Stuart qui arrive à Madras reçut ordre de retourner vers la grande armée qui se trouve au bord de la rivière de Toungabadra.

Le bruit court qu'il y a une bataille entre l'armée du Général Wellesley et celle des Marattes.

La cause des derniers troubles parmi les Marattes.

Après la mort du Peshwa les Barabays sont assemblés de faire un conseil pour établir un nouveau Peshwa. Raguba a laissé deux enfans males dont l'un adoptif et l'autre legitime. Les opinions de Barabays ont été divisées en deux parties. Enfin Scindia, comme il étoit plus puissant que les autres, vu le fils legitime à son bas age, il a placé malgré les autres le fils adoptif en sa place de Peshwa. Essavault Kan Holcar a paru mécontent de cette opération, et chercha le moyen de le déplacer pour remettre à la place le fils légitime. Scindia et Peshwa voyant la conduite d'Holcar voudroient diminuer sa force, et exigerent de lui une somme considerable sous le nom de Redevance. Dans ce tems la, comme le frère d'Holcar se trouva à Poonah, on a mis sur lui un corps de garde et on l'a sommé, s'il ne versoit pas au tresor de Sircar la somme qu'ils lui ont exigé, qu'il seroit vexé sans aucune consideration, en effet, dit-on, que l'on a fait périr Holcar. Ayant appris cette nouvelle si severe et voulant se venger il a commencé à former une armée formidable dans le mois d'Août dernier. Dans cette intervalle Scindia a eu la necessité d'aller à coté de Delhy. Il a laissé à son départ un détachement pour soutenir le Peshwa. Holcar profita de cette absence, et attaqua contre Peshwa et Scindia. Il a presenté plusieurs batailles, aux quelles Holcar a toujours remporté la victoire. Son ambition a parvenue jusqu'à s'emparer de Poonah, piller et ravager, et a fait lever une forte contribution sur tous les Saracars de Poonah. Peshwa n'ayant pu resister à la force d'Holcar, étoit obligé de se retirer dans le pays de Concane. C'est alors que Scindia et Peshwa écrivirent aux Anglais avec quelques conditions secretes pour leur faire envoyer du secours. Les Anglais profitant de cette occasion se presserent à marcher contre Holcar. Leur armée s'est divisée en 4 partie, et la sieme étoit une armée de 12 à 15 milles troupes tant en cavalerie qu'en infanterie commandées par Pournaya (Strimautte Pandith Pradune) afin d'avoir la facilité de fournir la provision de bouche, et Holcar voulant lui seul être gouverneur de toute l'étendue des Marattes, il a placé à Poonah à son choix Peshwa, le fils de Couddouran Mullar. Il s'avançoit avec son armée pour conquerir d'autre pays. Dans cette intervalle le détachement des Anglais de Bombay, ainsi que celui de Scindia et Peshwa, et les autres allies tous réunis ensemble ont ramené l'ancien Peshwa Bagirau qui étoit réfugié dans le pays de Concane et l'ont posé à Poonah et l'ont mis sur le trône. Le Général Perron qui commande environ 25 à 30 mille troupes tant en cavalerie qu'en infanterie au service de Scindia est très consideré. Son influence regne dans tout le royaume de Delhy. Toutes les expeditions, qu'on lui a ordonné, ont remporté la victoire. Par consequent Scindia a une grande confiance en lui. Mais on parle entre les officiers Anglais de distinction depuis peu, que le Général Perron parut mécontent de son maître à cause de leur alliance avec Scindia et Peshwa, Holcar voyant qu'il ne peut resister à cette force si considerable il est éloigné pour le moment du coté du Nord afin d'augmenter plus en plus ses forces et ses trésors. Se desiroit ardemment, s'il pouvoit tirer pour lui les parties du Général Perron. On parle aujourd'hui que les Anglais ont fait le traité avec cette puissance.

Pondicherry, le 29 Juin, 1803.

Traduction d'une lettre du Général Binot à Maharaja Savay Davaletrave Scindiah Bahader.

(Après les Compliments.)

L'officier porteur de la presente le Citoyen Delohr est un homme distingué par son experience et sa bravoure et son intrepidité dans les Batailles aux quelles il a assisté dans les plus belliqueuses campagnes sous les ordres de Buonaparte et Moreau.

Suivant ses desirs permettez que je recommande à votre Altesse cet officier, qui s'est déterminé à aller cueillir des nouveaux lauriers dans vos armées par des actions éclatantes contre vos fiers ennemis. En consequence, je desire que votre Altesse lui accorde avec la confiance une place digne de son grade et de sa sagacité. J'ose vous assurer qu'il ne manquera pas de donner à votre Altesse des preuves journalières de son attachement pour la confiance dont vous voudrez l'honorer, et dont vous n'aurez point à vous repentir, au contraire vous en serez satisfait, puisque vous favorisez tous ceux des bons Français qui se rendent auprès de votre Altesse. Le gouvernement Français a toujours des vues de se joindre au jour à votre Altesse, afin de contribuer à l'augmentation de votre puissance et à la destruction de vos ennemis, qui seront alors humilié à vos pieds. Et moi, je m'intéresse particulièrement à votre prospérité, et souhaite ardemment que vous vous reunissiez à tous vos confreres Marattes afin de punir les trahisons de notre ambitieux ennemi commun, qui n'est parvenu que par ce moyen à détruire toutes les puissances de l'Inde. Que pourrois-je écrire d'avantage pour ce moment, si non faire des vœux au ciel pour la conservation de votre santé et prospérité.

*Noms des principaux Princes de l'Indostan, de leurs capitales et de leurs forces.**

Sha Kalem Empereur Mogul, capitale Delhy, sous la dépendance des Anglais et des Marattes.

Shayan Oskan, Divan, 100,000 hommes cavalerie; 100,000 h. infanterie.

Scindiah, un des chefs des Marattes, a le titre de premier ministre qu'il a forcé l'Empereur de lui donner.

MARATTES.

1. Savay Davoulat Raou Scindiah Bahauder, Outcheny, sa capitale, il a 50,000 h. cav.; 30,000 h. inf.
2. Ragotchi Gossela ou Bouncela, Rajah du Berar, Nagpour, sa capitale, 30,000 h. cav.; 30,000 h. inf.
3. Jessevanterare Holkar, Cap. Indoure, il a, 50,000 h. cav.; 50,000 h. inf.
4. Mollarun, fils de Parserau Baur, Missery, N. b. c'est le seul chef Maratta réuni aux Anglais, 15,000 h. cav.; 10,000 h. inf.
5. Aripant Padika, 15,000 h. cav.; 10,000 h. inf.
6. Manoutchi Nimbalkar, Ischaudi, 10,000 h. cav.; 5,000 h. inf.
7. Sinckrazi, Badrikau, 10,000 h. cav.; 5,000 h. inf.
8. Gerozi Zado, Vagali, 10,000 h. cav.; 5,000 h. inf.
9. Ally Bahauder. Il est a present à Delhy comme ministre, 10,000 h. cav.; 5,000 h. inf.

* These documents are given from the original papers, that the views entertained by the French may the more clearly be seen.—[Ed.]

10. Triham Bakaran Mama, Nassika, 15,000 h. cav. ; 10,000 h. inf.

11. Dondryioun, 5,000 h. cav. ; 3,000 h. inf.

12. Managi Bagdé, 10,000 h. cav. ; 5,000 h. inf.

Strimaut Batchirau Predana Paudie Peshwa, Poonah, 20,000 h. cav. ; 15,000 h. inf.

C'est lui, que les Anglais ont placé dernièrement sur le trône de cette capitale ; nais il se tiennent sous leur garde. Les frères Amontouran et Simatchl apah, ainsi que ses forces ont été joindre l'Armée de Scindiah.

SEIKES.

Raja Bay Sing, 30,000 h. de cav. ; 10,000 h. d'inf.

Taté Sing Maniar, 10,000 h. de cav. ; 5,000 h. d'inf.

Chermad Kan, 10,000 h. de cav. ; 5,000 d'inf.

Princes tributaires des Anglais à l'Est de Masulipatam.

Narayna Deaon, Kimdi, Tributaire des Anglais et sous leur garde.

Narayna Babou ou Gazapatti Deaon, fils de Vizayaram Raja à Vigiaya Nagaram.

Dissaratima Razom, Seddaporam ; Raon Vareon, Sitapouram ; Apparaon, Nougedou ; Mungapadi Deaon, Sotaram. Tous ces Princes sont tributaires des Anglais et n'ont plus de soldats. Les Anglais occupent le pays pour en retirer des subsides. Il s'est revolté contre les Anglais, 10,000 hommes.

CARCARS DE GOUNTOOR.

Quatre Zemidar.—Vassy Reddy Vintakadri Nayadon, Grand Zemindar Sintapally 3,000 hommes ; Matrazon Goundaran, Viniconda, 1,000 h. ; Manika ran Babuya, Repallé, 300 h. ; Marour Narsannaron, Sillacalourpadou, 300 h.

POLYAGARS DU NORD.

Baugary Jassama Naydou, Ventaguiry, 5,000 h. ; Damarla Venkata Naidon, Calastry, 5,000 ; Bominarazon, Bominarazoupalem, 3,000 ; Matclevaron, Tchitevely, 3,000.

Ces Polygars avoient envoyé ici à Saudrihuy lors de l'arrivée de la frégate la Belle Poule dans le dessein de faire des offres, si les Français vouloient faire la guerre aux Anglais. Dans le cas d'un débarquement dans les Circars du nord ce Polygars nous seront extremement utiles, parceque habitant une partie de la côte au nord de Madras jusqu'à Masulipatam, ils seront à même de nous fournir en abondance des vivres et même des Chevaux. Mais ils n'oseront point se déclarer ouvertement à moins qu'ils ne soient protegés par les Français. Les Anglais les traitent assez durement. Ils ont établi un cordon sur leurs frontières pour empêcher qu'il n'y entre ni fer ni étain, ni plomb enfin tout ce qui pourra leur fournir des moyens de revolte. La guerre avec les Marattes les a empêché de leur faire subir le même sort qu'aux Poliagars du Sud. Ainsi les peuplades s'y attendent sitôt la guerre des Marattes finit, et ne desirent rien tant que l'arrivée des Français.

CARNATIC.

Azimud Daowla, petit fils de Mahomed Aly. Les Anglais se sont emparés de ses domaines, gouvernement en son nom, et lui payent annuellement le cinquième des revenues. Le Nabob demeure dans une maison de campagne près de Madras à Tirpleking. Sa garde est composée de 50 cavaliers.

TANJAUR.

Raja Charpozy. 2000 hommes de cavalerie que d'infanterie. Les Anglais prennent les revenus de son pays, et ne lui en laissent que le cinquième. Les Anglais ont voulu dernièrement abattre la forteresse de Tanjore. Il s'y est opposé formellement et a déclaré qu'il mourroit plutôt sous les ruines de sa capitale que d'accéder aux demandes des Anglais. Il est parent du Rajah de Ragpour et espère du secours des Marattes. Il nous a fait connoître sa ferme résolution de briser le joug des Anglais, si les Français veulent débarquer dans son pays, et le prendre sous leur protection. Le point le plus favorable pour un débarquement seroit ou à Carical sur la côte Coromandel, ou dans le Cochin sur la côte Malabar. Qu'on choisisse l'un ou l'autre de ces points, on sera à même de se réunir sitôt le débarquement opéré au Rajahs de Tanjore, de Travancore, Madura et Morara ainsi qu'aux Polygars du Sud, dont beaucoup se sont cachés dans les forêts et les montagnes, et qui n'aspirent qu'après le moment de l'arrivée des Français pour se réunir à eux et se venger des cruautés commises envers eux par les Anglais. Tous ces différens peuples passent pour très braves, et ce n'est qu'après des pertes très considérables que les Anglais sont parvenus à les soumettre en apparence. Je choisirois pour point de débarquement le Cochin voisin de Travancore qui abonde en bestiaux.

POLYAGARS DU SUD.

Les Polygars de Oudcarpalua, Arialour, Toccour et autres petits Polygars reçoivent une petite subsistance annuelle des Anglais qui occupent leur pays. Le plus puissant Polygar le Rajah Setoupadi de Ramanad fut dépouillé, il y a trois ans dans son Royaume par les Anglais, qui l'ont fait mourir en le retenant en prison, les fers aux pieds. Une femme de sa famille gouverne aujourd'hui ce pays avec l'agrément des Anglais, qui lui payent une subsistance.

L'année dernière le Rajah de Marara s'étant revolté contre les Anglais, il a été pris après des prodiges de valeur. Il a été étranglé, après avoir tué lui-même plusieurs officiers Anglais, par son ennemi victorieux.

TRAVANCOR.

Ramaraja est le seul qui existe dans le sud de l'Indostan avec ses forces et ses domaines. Les Anglais ne négligent rien pour le soumettre à leur puissance, mais il s'en défend fermement jusqu'aujourd'hui. Ses forces militaires peuvent à peu près monter à 25,000 hommes tant cavalerie qu'infanterie. Il reçoit les Français à bras ouvert dans son pays. Il est très riche, son pays très fertile et beaucoup de bestiaux.

MAYSSOUR.

Nichena Raja Oudcar se trouve placé sur le trône de Tippoo Sultaun depuis la mort de ce prince. Poornaja, ancien Ministre de Tippoo est actuellement son premier Ministre. Les Anglais lui ont donné une partie de son pays et le font entretenir 10,000 hommes de troupes.

DECKAN.

Nizam el Mouluck. Capitale Hyderabad. Mort le 5 Août 1803. L'ainé de ses fils s'étoit réfugié chez les Marattes des avant la mort de son père. Les Marattes veulent les placer sur le trône de son père, mais les Anglais y ont mis le 7 Août dernier le prince Tricarderjah par l'entremise de Machir Moulouck son beau père et leur creature.

Rajarugotam Raon, brave Maratte et son Divan. On n'a pas des renseignements sur s'il est bien avec les Anglais ou non.

LES FILS DE TIPOO SULTAN.

Deux fils de Tipoo; Tate Ayder l'ainé et Mahinadin Sacha ainsi que la famille de ce prince se trouvent prisonniers à Velore avec une subsistance journalière de 1000 rupies. Un autre fils de Tipoo a trouvé moyen de s'enfuir de Velore déguisé en porteur d'eau, et de parvenir jusqu'à Scindia, qui lui donna une subsistance et le fait commander un petit corps de cavalerie. Ce Prince avoit envoyé ici un homme de confiance, qui est arrivé quelque jours après notre capitulation pour s'informer des détails sur l'arrivée des Français. Je lui ai parlé lui même, et il m'a donné des renseignements positifs sur les intentions du Roi de Tanjore en faveur des Français. Il est retourné dans le Tanjore pour faire part à ses commettants des espérances prochaines que je lui ai données.

Pendant l'assaut de Seringapatram Doondia, de caste Maratte, fils adoptif de Tipoo, et que ce dernier retenoit dans les prisons pour révolte, a trouvé moyen de s'échapper. Il étoit parvenu à ramasser les troupes dispersées de Tipoo, et à tenir la campagne pendant quelque tems contre les Anglais; mais enfin il a succombé sous des forces majeures. Les Anglais le croyoient jusqu'à présent tué dans la bataille, mais ce même homme qui est venu me donner les nouvelles du Tanjore m'a assuré que ce chef a échappé et qu'il s'est retiré chez les Marattes où il reste tranquille pour le moment.

[MISCELLANEOUS LETTERS.]

No. I.

*The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable H. Addington, Speaker
to the House of Commons.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER, Fort St. George, 18th May, 1799.

I have the satisfaction to transmit to you a series of the *Madrâs Gazettes* extraordinary, containing the details of our short and brilliant campaign with Tippoo Sulṭaun, which commenced on the 5th of March, and terminated on the 4th of May in the capture of Seringapatam, the death of Tippoo Sulṭaun and the possession of all his treasure, of the persons of his family, and of those of the families of all his principal officers and chieftains.

I am upon the point of proceeding to Seringapatam, where I have little doubt of being able to effect a satisfactory arrangement with the principal omrahs of the late Sulṭaun's Court and army. The immediate result of this unequalled and happy success will be a large accession of revenue to the Company with a more contracted and stronger frontier, and the total ruin of the French interests in India.

In Tippoo's palace have been discovered papers containing his correspondence with Messrs. Malartic, Sercey, Margallon and other Frenchmen, together with copies of the Sulṭaun's proposals to the Islands of France and Bourbon, and to the Executive Directory of France.

We cannot sufficiently bless Providence for having enabled us to defeat a combination, which if it had been suffered to proceed without interruption to its intended object, might have overthrown the foundations of our empire in India.

You will be glad to hear that I am very well, and not in

any degree fatigued by the exertions which I have been obliged to make on this important occasion.

It appears by all accounts from the army, that Tippoo Sultaan's troops had been much improved in discipline since the last war, and their number was little if at all reduced since that period. Of our army it is impossible to speak in terms of sufficient praise. You may consider peace to be restored in India, as all Tippoo Sultaan's principal officers have already submitted to General Harris, and little remains to be settled further than to make an arrangement for their future condition.

We have felt throughout this contest the great benefit of the subsidiary treaty which I concluded in September last with the Nizam. In addition to the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, the Nizam has afforded us the most cordial and effective assistance during the war, and he has entrusted me with full powers to adjust his interests in the conclusion of peace.

The distracted state of the Mahratta empire has rendered the Peishwa unable to fulfil his engagements with us against Tippoo; and the equivocal and versatile politics of the Court of Poonah render his disposition suspicious; but at present his interest must be to preserve a good understanding with us in order to recommend himself to our consideration in the distribution of the conquered territory of Mysore, and I therefore entertain no apprehension of any danger from the Mahrattas of Poonah; nor will the disturbed state of Scindiah's affairs admit of his attempting any hostile step, whatever may be his inclination or views, which, in the mind of every Mahratta, are always directed to the interest of the hour, without any consideration of justice, faith, or even of comprehensive and enlarged policy.

Ever, dear Mr. Speaker,

yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

P. S. I have dictated this letter in place of writing it with my own hand; a practice which I find very convenient during the severity of the hot season.

No. II.

Thomas Coutts, Esq. to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Strand, London, 9th Oct. 1799.

I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship to state the case of Mr. Archibald Seton, a gentleman in the Company's service at Patna; but though to endeavour to do him a service I am free to confess is the object of my letter, yet I wish first to indulge myself by expressing my sincere congratulations on the splendid success of your Government, which seems to have placed the India Company in a state of security beyond example:—it must give great pleasure to every Englishman as a public event, and to your Lordship's family and friends must be a subject of great joy and satisfaction.

Mr. Seton was born the second son of a very ancient family in Scotland, and luckily was educated with a view to some civil profession, and very early had formed in his mind a desire to go to India, which when his elder brother died, his father still encouraged, secretly conscious I believe that he had injured his fortune, which independent of the old family estate had always by the world been supposed very considerable.

The family estate came by his mother who was the heiress of Touch, and his father very unjustifiably contrived to make him join in securities for large sums of money (previous to his bankruptcy). The young man being in India and little suspecting the possibility that he was, besides inheriting nothing from his father's supposed riches, to be thereby deprived of the ancient family possession of his mother, which however he finds he has involved in debts far beyond its value.

The object of his life will be to redeem this estate, and he has already by his exertions done something towards so desirable a purpose.

I flatter myself your Lordship will think it is an amiable and laudable ambition, and that his case is a very hard one. The calamity in which he has been involved being through no fault of his own, but on the contrary from a dutiful obedience and compliance with the desire of his father.

Notwithstanding the circumstances I have mentioned, which

must in some degree interest every man not devoid of the sentiments of humanity, I would not have ventured to write in Mr. Seton's favour if I had not the greatest reason to believe he is a young man of considerable abilities and of the most admirable character.

I imagine he must be known very well by Sir John Anstruther, and as he has been some time resident at Patna, perhaps not unknown to your Lordship. He is hereditary Armour Bearer for Scotland, to the King, and if through any attentions in your Lordship's power, with propriety in your public situation, to show him, he may, in time, recover his natural inheritance, I am persuaded to see him at home in the enjoyment of it will be among the pleasing reflections of the good you was able to do during your very extended and important government.

That your Lordship may return home with health and every other enjoyment your conduct and success can deserve is my sincere and earnest wish.

I am, my Lord, with sincere respect,
 your Lordship's most obedient
 faithful humble servant,
 THOMAS COURTS.*

No. III.

The Duchess of Gordon to the Earl of Mornington.

Gordon Castle, 23d Oct. 1799.

At this moment, my dear Lord, you are the admiration of all Europe, may you long enjoy the glorious laurels you have gained in health, happiness, and every domestic blessing. There is a particular friend of the Duke's and mine in India; I knew him early in life, and know him to possess honour, integrity, and a high military spirit; his name is Mackay, and I am afraid his success has not been equal to his merit; pray protect him and grant him some situation which I know he will do honour to. I have to congratulate you upon your

* Mr. Seton was a gentleman of the highest merit, and was employed by the Governor-General in a distinguished station in the north-western provinces.—[ED.]

dear sister Lady Ann's marriage; she has made a choice all her friends approved of; I don't know a more amiable man. Lady Mornington was so good as to let your lovely boys come and see me when in town. I left your friend and mine Le Premier* in better health and spirits than I have seen him for years. I spent some days at *Wimbledon* with the gang† and left with regret. I hear Lord Cornwallis talks with rapture and surprise of your noble administration of India, and he is a good judge. Huntly has had a most tedious and dangerous wound in that fatal crusade to Holland, but is now recovering; himself and his regiment gained immortal honour,

And have the honour to be,
my dear Lord,

yours most truly,

J. GORDON.

No. IV.

Hugh Inglis, Esq. to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

East India House, 31st Oct. 1799.

This serves to cover duplicate of my letter to your Lordship of the 27th September, which went by the overland despatch.

Mr. Dundas has communicated to me, in confidence, your plan of an arrangement for the Mysore dominions, which your Lordship will observe, accords, in the prominent features, with the ideas mentioned in the above letter. The only objection that occurs to me to this arrangement (and I confess I do not see how it could with justice have been obviated) is, that the Mahrattas may be jealous of the Nizam's acquiring so large an accession of territory from Tippoo's dominions, whilst they have obtained, comparatively, so little; though considering the part they took in the contest, that

* Mr. Pitt.

† By this appellation (the Wimbledon Gang) the Duchess of Gordon used to designate Mr. Pitt's friends, who usually accompanied him on horseback every Saturday to Mr. Dundas's villa at Wimbledon.—[ED.]

little is more than, in equity, they are entitled to:—but I have that confidence in your Lordship's wisdom and prudence, that I doubt not you have foreseen, and have obviated the objection.

I am, my Lord, with great esteem
 your Lordship's very faithful
 and obedient servant,
 HUGH INGLIS.

No. V.

Lord De Dunstanville to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bath, November 25th, 1799.

Permit me to add my congratulations to the general exultation in the success which the British arms under your Lordship's auspices have attained in India; the general joy has been mixed with no little astonishment, that you have been able in so short a time to destroy so formidable an enemy as Tippoo. I will not trouble you on European politics, as you have correspondents so much better able to inform you on that subject; the return of Buonaparte to France, and his subsequent assumption of the government of that country, occasion, of course, a variety of speculations.

I most heartily wish you, my dear Lord, every blessing this life can afford; and that when you return from the country, which you govern with so much honour to yourself, and advantage to the state, you may receive here every honour and advantage which your Sovereign and a grateful people can bestow.

I am, with great truth and esteem,
 my dear Lord,
 your most sincere friend,
 and much obliged servant,
 DE DUNSTANVILLE.

No. VI.

The Marquess of Downshire to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR MARQUESS,

December 20th, 1799.

Give me leave to congratulate you, as I do most sincerely, upon the honours that his Majesty has lately conferred upon you; when I make comparisons, I hardly think his Majesty has been advised to do all that you are entitled to; the East India Company intend to make some more solid acknowledgment of your merits. I hope you have received my former letter which I wrote on seeing your achievements in the Gazette, which very faintly expressed what I felt upon the news of your victorious success, which I attribute as much to your excellent government and management as to the bravery of our troops. Lady Downshire joins me in all congratulations and hourly wishes for your happiness; give my affectionate compliments to General Wellesley and Henry, and believe me to be your very sincere and affectionate friend,

DOWNSHIRE.

No. VII.

The Earl of Westmeath to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Stephen's Green, Dublin, Jan. 23, 1800.

I am convinced that our long friendship will make any apology unnecessary for the trouble you will have in reading this letter. The young gentleman who carries it with him to India, Ensign Irwin of the 88th Regiment, is my near relation, which I would I flatter myself be of itself a strong inducement to your protection, but I have reason to hope that Mr. Irwin's conduct as an officer and a gentleman, will most powerfully recommend him to your favour, for any marks of which I shall feel particularly thankful. He served a considerable time in Lord Euston's Regiment, with his entire approbation, and has received from him the strongest and most flattering testimony of good conduct, and of his Lordship's wishes for his future success in life. He is going with his regiment to Madras, and as I have not the honour of knowing Lord Clive I am induced to trespass so far on your friendship, as to

entreat that you may be so kind as to write to him in Mr. Irwin's favour, if his regiment is to remain stationed at Madras. In the event of his serving within your own immediate government I entertain no doubt that he will, should opportunity offer, receive, for my sake, any kind offices which you can shew him. I am happy my dear Lord, in this opportunity of offering you my most hearty congratulations on the brilliant success which has attended your spirited efforts in India. Believe me, amongst the many friends you have left behind you, there is not one who more sincerely rejoices in every circumstance that contributes to your reputation and your happiness, than

Your faithful and affectionate friend,
WESTMEATH.

No. VIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

Fort William, January 20, 1800.

This letter will be delivered to you by Major Davis, who has been an Aid-de-camp in my family during the whole period of my government, and who accompanied me to the coast, and returned with me to Fort William. He is charged with a variety of articles from Seringapatam, which I thought would be acceptable in England as memorials of the great events of the past year. A list of these articles is enclosed, with the suggestions which I take the liberty of offering relative to their disposal; I am satisfied that the Court will readily accede to my wishes in this respect. The articles designed for his Majesty, the Prince of Wales, and the Duke of York, will, I know, be peculiarly acceptable to them. Notwithstanding my deep sense of His Majesty's uniformly gracious acceptance of my services, and of his personal favor towards me, I am sensible that the articles destined for His Majesty ought certainly to be presented to him by the Court, and not in my name. The particular kindness which I have experienced from their Royal Highnesses the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York induces me to request, that the

presents to them may be made in my name. The golden tiger's head* (which formed the footstool of Tippoo Sultaun's throne) I hope, will be placed in St. George's Hall in Windsor Castle, as a noble trophy of the triumph of the British arms in the East. It would have given me pleasure to have been able to send the whole throne entire to England; but the indiscreet zeal of the prize agents of the army had broken that proud monument of the Sultaun's arrogance into fragments, before I had been apprized even of the existence of any such trophy; I have the honour to refer you to the enclosed memoranda for a particular account of the several articles in Major Davis's charge, and I beg leave to recommend him to your favourable notice, and to the countenance and protection of the Court, as a valuable and respectable officer, to whom I am much attached.

As connected with the subject of this letter, I take the liberty of expressing my desire, that full length portraits of the Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen who presided during the period of our preparations for the late war in Mysore and of its continuance, should be sent to Fort William to be placed in the Government House; these portraits would be of Mr. Bosanquet, of Sir Stephen Lushington, and of Mr. Inglis; I also wish for the portrait of Lord Teignmouth, of Mr. Dundas, and of Mr. Pitt for the same purpose; I have already applied to Lord Clive, Generals Harris, Stuart, and Baird for their respective portraits.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and esteem, Sir,
your faithful servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. IX.

The Earl of Inchiquin to the Marquess Wellesley.

London, Feb. 10, 1800.

I thank you my dear Lord for the papers you were so good to order me, your kind remembrance has given additional satisfaction and heartfelt gratification in reading the

* The tiger's head and the bird of royalty (Husna) which stood on the top of Tippoo's throne, are now preserved in the Castle of Windsor, and were frequently placed on the royal table on occasions of state during the reign of his late Majesty King William the Fourth.—[Ed.]

never to be forgotten accounts of your most glorious, great and manly exertions, in your conquests in India, executed in a manner, to make all your predecessors hide their diminished heads; your achievements have silenced the blackest and most determined oppositions; the Governor, in the soldier, has more than answered the wishes and expectations of the nation, and almost of your noble friend Pitt, the first, greatest, and best of men, he has been the protector and saviour not only of this country, but of Europe; and to whom I hope he will ever be the restorer of liberty and peace, if not obstructed by the crooked, jealous, and obstinate politics of Germany.

As I suppose your friends here, send you the state of politics of this country, I shall say nothing about them.

I remain, my dear Lord,
 your Lordship's obliged
 and faithful friend and humble servant,
 INCHQUIN.

No. X.

Mr. Strachey, to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Hill Street, 8th March, 1800.

I had so often heard from Lord Clive of your Lordship's kindness to my son Richard, that my heart was sufficiently full of gratitude before I received the additional proof of your condescension, in your letter of the 12th August last by the Cornwallis. The young man himself has never failed to express the high obligations he feels himself under, for attentions which could proceed only from your Lordship's goodness, as no reasonable expectation of them could be formed, either from his juvenile merits or from his father's connection with your Lordship.

I have since learnt that your Lordship, with the concurrence of Lord Clive, has consented to indulge him in a laudable desire of knowledge and improvement, by his making one in Captain Malcolm's suite to Persia. The anxiety which I know he will undergo if he does not hear of his family in England, (the Lord and Lady Clive have undertaken to relieve him as often as they can) induces me to take the liberty of inclosing such a small letter as I judge it may not be

inconvenient for you to forward with some despatch of your own to the ambassador.

I am happy in the kind testimony which your Lordship bears to the conduct and character of my two eldest sons, who being now under your more immediate view at the Presidency, will, I flatter myself, appear to continue deserving of your protection and favour.

I have had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Wellesley, and I have read, with great avidity and extreme satisfaction, all the printed papers from Madras, forming a complete history of the justifiable rise and prosperous termination of the war in Mysore.

The entire expulsion of the French—the overthrow of Tippoo Sultaun—the discovery of the absolute proofs of his duplicity and negotiations with our enemies, and the judicious settlement of the conquered country,—these are events which have filled your cup of renown, and must ever rank you amongst the greatest men who have governed India. Lord Clive, in a letter to me of the 10th of August, says, “a more politic, wise, and advantageous settlement of the Mysore country than that which has actually been made by the Commissioners, under the direction of the Governor-General, could not have been devised, or more happily and expeditiously concluded.”

I hope to have an opportunity of showing Mr. Wellesley several other paragraphs in Lord Clive’s letters to me, expressive of the opinion he has all along entertained of your Lordship’s conduct, and the cordiality of his co-operation with you, which amply justify your kind sentiment towards him in your letter of the 12th August.

I will detain your Lordship no longer than to add, that I have the honour to be with the most perfect esteem,

My Lord,

Your Lordship’s most obliged and faithful servant,

H. STRACHEY.

No. XI.

Colonel Palmer to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Poonah, 27th June, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship’s letter of the 1st instant; I am perfectly sensible my Lord, that the

cares and fatigues of an arduous public station, may require powers of mind and strength of constitution which in my precarious state of health, and advanced time of life, it cannot be expected that I should possess. And no person would feel greater regret than myself, that your Lordship should suffer any apprehension or anxiety for the success of your important objects at this Court, from my inability to promote it.

Impressed with this sentiment and conviction, I receive your Lordship's command to deliver over the charge of this residency to Mr. Webbe, with equal cheerfulness and submission.

I request your Lordship to accept my grateful acknowledgements for your generous intention to provide for my future comfort, and for the favourable opinion which you are pleased to express of my conduct and character,

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, my Lord,
your faithful and obedient humble servant,
W. PALMER.

No. XII.

Sir Hercules Langrishe to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Dublin, September 6, 1800.

After offering you my sincere congratulations on the glorious and important events of your Lordship's administration, will you allow me, as one whom you formerly honoured with your friendship, to yield to the solicitations of my nephew, Mr. Robert Green, in writing you a few lines in his favour; he has been some years in India, and I cannot now state his situation, further than, that when his friends last heard of him, he was a lieutenant in the Company's service at Calcutta; but his last letter thus expresses the place he wrote from, "Zillah Sircar Sawrun." If, in your high situation, an opportunity should occur to you of doing him any service, consistent with the many superior claims that must solicit your attention, your goodness to him would be remembered by me with gratitude; and though I have not seen him for some years, yet as the several letters I receive from him contain much good sense, just sentiment, and interesting inform-

ation, I am led to think he would not prove unworthy of your favour. At all events, let me beg your Lordship will be good enough to pardon the liberty I take in making this application, into which I have been betrayed by the very high respect and esteem I feel towards you.

The affairs of Europe are so uncertain and changing every day, that if I were to attempt saying any thing to you as to their situation, I should probably describe it very different from what it will be when you receive this letter. At all events the public papers and your confidential communications would anticipate any thing I could tell you; I shall therefore only say, that in this tremendous conflict, the resources of England have proved miraculous, and the minister enjoys that fulness of power and public confidence to which his wisdom and high qualities entitle him. On the 1st of August the Royal assent was given here to the Bill for the Parliamentary Union of Great Britain and Ireland, a similar law having passed in the British Parliament. This measure passed through our Parliament, certainly not without much opposition, but, being finally decided, is received by the nation with perfect tranquillity.

I shall conclude with expressing my ardent wishes for your health and success in the important situation in which you are placed; and I beg to assure you that I am, with great respect and esteem,

Your Lordship's faithful
and most obedient servant,

HERCULES LANGRISHE.

P. S. I sent another copy of this letter by another conveyance, which I thought might miscarry.

No. XIII.

Colonel Palmer to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Poonah, 21st October, 1800.

Feeling an interest in the happy termination of the negotiations at Hyderabad, which the forms of official business do not permit me fully to express, I hope for your Lordship's pardon in offering under a private address, my sincere and cordial congratulations, on the conclusion of the treaty of

general defensive alliance between the Company and the Nizam. An alliance which places the security of the British Government in India, on a solid and durable basis, and which affords the fairest prospect of permanent tranquillity throughout the Peninsula. I ardently wish that all your Lordship's plans for promoting the honour and prosperity of your government in its external and internal relations may prove equally successful.

While congratulating your Lordship on the success of their negotiation, I cannot but be impressed with a sense of severe mortification, at the failure of those which you have committed to my charge; though I have reason to believe from the peculiar character and dependent situation of the Peishwa, that those negotiations would have failed in much abler hands than mine.

I have the honor to be,
with the highest respect and unfeigned attachment,
my Lord,
your faithful and most obedient humble servant,
W. PALMER.

No. XIV.

Chief Justice Sir J. Anstruther to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Calcutta, 26th October, 1800.

I have very great pleasure in offering you my warmest congratulations upon the event* yesterday announced to the public. The success of every measure of yours always gives me much pleasure, but the magnitude and importance of this swallows up all personal considerations; its political importance rivals the most splendid conquests which ever you have achieved, it gives solidity and permanency to what the sword had gained.

You found the British influence in the Deccan gone. You have planted its power in the very centre of the mountains which hold India together.

Your late measure gives security to every part of our pos-

* The Hyderabad Treaty, see Vol. II. App. page 709.

sessions from Hurdwar to Cape Comorin. Nor is its influence less upon what may properly be called our domestic than it is on our foreign politics, upon those who are properly called dependent princes. Its relations externally and internally can hardly be calculated even by those accustomed to take the most comprehensive views of the state of India, most sincerely do I congratulate my country in having such a Governor-General at such a juncture.

Yours very sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

P. S. I should have done myself the honour to have personally offered you my congratulations but I believe I shall be to-day detained in court till too late an hour.

No. XV.

General Cradock (now Lord Howden) to the Marquess Wellesley.

La Vallette, Island of Malta,
Dec. 20, 1800.

MY DEAR LORD,

I feel the presumption of the step I now hazard, but anxiety to assist a very near relation impels me to the liberty of presenting to your notice my nephew, Sir Frederic Hamilton, I will not say more upon the subject, than if he is a deserving young man, and worthy of your Lordship's protection, I shall feel myself under the highest obligation at some mark of favour being extended to him. Were my poor brother alive this application would come from him, as a still nearer relation, and perhaps the more entitled to make a request, but allow me to express our joint intercession that at some convenient moment this young man's situation may be improved, and that he may be placed in such a road, as that it will be his own fault, if he loses his way.

I cannot avoid any opportunity of adding my voice to the acclamation that has followed all your Lordship's career in the East Indies, and I trust, that your health and every other circumstance tends to make you as satisfied with your situation in the East, as it gives universal satisfaction.

I am so far on our way to Egypt, with the army under Sir Ralph Abercromby, to expel the French; we are all in high spirits, and full of bright prospects. If they have not re-

ceived re-inforcements, which is doubtful, the enterprise, as a military one, may not prove arduous.

With every possible respect,
my dear Lord,

I am ever, your's most obliged and faithfully,
H. CRADOCK.

P. S. I trust that my friend Wellesley is well, I will write a line to him also upon this point.

No. XVI.

Sir Robert Smyth to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Bere Church Hall, Jan. 16, 1801.

After an interval of so many years I hope your Lordship will not think it presumptuous in me, in some measure, to renew my acquaintance, but recollecting the time we passed in the same society at Paris, and afterwards continued, during our Parliamentary career in England, and being persuaded of the excellence of your Lordship's disposition, I take the liberty of addressing a few lines to you by the hands of Mr. Canning, who will have the honour of presenting this to you: he is a near neighbour of mine, in Essex, of very respectable landed property, and a branch of the family of Canynges of Gloucestershire, one of the oldest and most respectable families in England: owing to the imprudence of his ancestors, finding his family estate something impaired, he has had the singular merit to renounce the ease and enjoyment of private life, in order to restore his family to their ancient and respectable situation: but, notwithstanding his acknowledged merit, his endeavours have not been crowned with due success; during the corrupt administration of former governors of India, the needy adventurer under the patronage of Leadenhall Street, frequently supplanted persons of the first merit, but under the honourable and distinguished government of Mr. Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, and your Lordship, talents and approved merit were sure of being protected and at length rewarded; but diffidence, which dreads being obtrusive, frequently kept their claim and pretensions from being known: Mr. Canning not wishing to be classed with the common set of needy adventurers who run

over to India to make their fortune by any means that present themselves, is very ambitious of being known to your Lordship, hoping that his long service, and the interesting history of himself and family, may find a powerful advocate in your natural disposition and goodness of heart; I believe he does not mean to point out any specific object of his wishes, but only to obtain your Lordship's countenance and protection, and to be considered, perhaps recommended, as not coming within the common class of Indian adventurers.

And now, my Lord, permit me to say a word with respect to myself, which is to congratulate you and our country on your brilliant success and happy administration in India; if during a long Parliamentary attendance, we were frequently disgusted with the enormities committed in that country, still we must feel a secret pride and satisfaction in reflecting that the national character has been in some measure retrieved by the virtuous government of Mr. Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, and the Marquess Wellesley.

I have the honour to be,
 your Lordship's most devoted
 and obedient humble servant,
 ROBERT SMYTH.

No. XVII.

C. T. Greville, Esq. to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

19th February, 1801.

I cannot let Colonel Symes depart without availing myself of the opportunity to pay my respects to you, and express the satisfaction with which I see every valuable person embark for India, as you thereby receive fresh instruments to be employed in the great objects entrusted to your talents. The merit of Colonel Symes is too well known to you to require fresh testimony, and yet I cannot avoid throwing in my mite of information, because I know his modesty in commending himself, and in the communication of the intercourse which he has had with the Board of Controul and the Directors, I have a certain knowledge that he preferred the decision as to the future exercise of his services, being left to your Lordship's option, to that of an appointment accom-

panied with a recommendation from Mr. Dundas, or from the Directors. It is from similar conduct that the good sense and independence of a man's mind may be well estimated, and Colonel Symes has embarked for India, to assume his duty with his regiment, and should your Lordship think of him as he is thought of by all at home, his gratification by your nomination will be proportioned to the importance of the object, and his mind will be suited to the most difficult object, from the confidence of the support and good opinion of the Governor-General. The unexpected change of the administration has not varied Colonel Symes's plans, and, it may happen that he will sail before a new minister for India is appointed, though I shall hope to send him the complete extent of the changes before he is out of the Channel. I trust you will excuse my writing for the precise object of stating these points relative to Colonel Symes, which cannot fail to add to your opinion, and confidence in him.

It will at all times make me happy to be informed of the prosperity of India, from your Lordship's government. I have ventured to state at large, my idea of the true basis of a financial system, on which will depend the prosperity of the natives, and the preparation for the storms which gather round us. I will therefore only subscribe myself, with great regard,

your Lordship's most obedient
and humble servant,
C. F. GREVILLE.

No. XVIII.

Warren Hastings, Esq. to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Daylesford House, April 12th, 1801.

From the same motive which impelled me the last year to address your Lordship, with a letter of introduction for my young friend and godson, Hastings Impey, I now venture to take the same liberty in favour of his younger brother, Edward Impey, newly appointed a writer on the Bengal establishment; and to request for him, in like manner as I did for the former, that your Lordship will honour him with such

a degree of personal notice as may excite and animate his endeavours to obtain by his own merit that title to your future favour, which on any other ground I have no pretensions to solicit, nor if I had, should I solicit it on his behalf. I add this with the greater confidence, because I have not known many young men begin life with equal, none with fairer promises of good conduct through it, than both the brothers. Your Lordship will have already known, at the time when this letter shall be delivered, how far I am justified in my opinion of one brother, and on that experience I place my best reliance for your favourable reception of the other.

Although no man has ever exercised in a more conspicuous manner the best prerogative of power, that of rewarding merit, and encouraging it, than your Lordship; and this letter, as well as my former, is written in perfect conformity to the disposition manifested by that practice; I still feel a consciousness of having assumed a freedom which I have not even the most distant acquaintance to warrant: but it will not have imposed much trouble on your Lordship to read them, whatever their effect may be; and I think it but fair to add the assurance that I will not again repeat the trespass.

I have the honour to be,
with sentiments of the most perfect esteem
and respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,
WARREN HASTINGS.

No. XIX.

Doctor Burton to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Christchurch, June 29, 1801.

I remember, with very particular gratitude to your Lordship and pleasure to myself, the instances of regard which I received from you in the early part of your life, and I am persuaded you will have the goodness to make great allowance for my presumption in troubling you with a letter respecting one of my own family. I have therefore ventured to become the introducer of a beloved son, humbly hoping that he will be

honoured with your notice, on account of the favourable opinion you were pleased to entertain of his father. I must be silent as to his merit, lest I should be led by a natural partiality to speak of him in higher terms than he deserves, and will mention only the good character which he brings from the colonel of the third regiment of East India Volunteers, under whose command he has been for some considerable time an ensign.

I am now almost constantly resident in that society, where we are justly proud of saying that your Lordship received your education, and I shall heartily rejoice in an opportunity of being serviceable to any young friend of yours who may become a member of it. I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful and most
obliged humble servant,

JAMES BURTON.

No. XX.

The Earl of Dartmouth to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Blackheath, 2nd Oct. 1801.

As I understand that one of Lord Elgin's messengers is to be despatched to-night I have only time to inform you that the preliminaries of Peace between this country and France were signed last night by Lord Hawke's envoy and M. Otto, and indeed if I had had more time, this is all that I know officially upon the subject, though I have been informed from good authority that we are to keep the Island of Ceylon, and the Cape of Good Hope is to be a free port; I have also been informed that the integrity of the Turkish empire is to be maintained, and that of our conquests in the West Indies the Island of Trinidad is to remain to us, but perhaps it is hardly necessary that I should trouble your Lordship more with this scanty information, as it is probable that the same conveyance by which this is carried out will transmit to you much more information upon the subject than I am possessed of. I have just received overland despatches from your Lordship addressed to Mr. Dundas, those which were

marked official I have retained, but have not yet had time to peruse; those which were private and confidential I have ordered to be sent to Mr. Dundas who is now in Scotland. The Court of Directors have (I am informed) been some time occupied upon the subject of the College at Calcutta, what the result of their deliberations may be, I do not yet know, I understand that some modifications have been proposed; and the subject of the conveyance of the private trade to this country, in India built shipping has so much irritated their minds, that I rather expect some trouble upon this subject, of this however you may be assured that I feel every disposition to support your Lordship in this measure. I have had several conferences with Mr. Macintosh upon the subject which has led me to approve very much of the choice you have made of him for the situation, it is proposed he should hold in that establishment. I hope to be able to confer with your Lordship more fully upon this and other subjects by the next despatch; and in the mean time remain,

with the greatest truth and regard,

my dear Lord,

your faithful and obedient servant,

DARTMOUTH.

No. XXI.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, 4th. January 1803.

The cordiality which has distinguished the connected system of measures pursued by your Lordship and myself, the kindness of your private communications, and the consciousness of being embarked in the same cause with your Lordship, having for its object to secure to the Government of India, the means of an efficient and prosperous administration of affairs on the basis of just responsibility and individual authority in their chiefs, render it in me not less a matter of inclination than it is of duty to suggest the expediency of your Lordship's repairing to this side of India at the present crisis.

Although our encrease of strength and augmented means of resource, will enable us eventually to enter upon a new contest with advantages superior to what we have possessed at any other period, and although a consideration of these advantages must necessarily make a strong impression on the minds of the Mahratta Chiefs, yet I am of opinion that it is necessary to be prepared to bring into action the whole of the force of British India at this time; in the double view of preventing war if possible by effectual preparation, or of ensuring success, should the appeal to the sword become unavoidable.

Your Lordship is fully acquainted with my sentiments upon a similar occasion, of the incalculable advantage derivable from the exercise of the supreme power of the Governor-General, in application of resources which he alone can command, near the scene of contest: and my reflections upon the wars of 92 and of 1799 particularly upon the latter, when by your Lordship's presence upon the coast, and the decisive system of your measures, the object of the war was atchieved in a shorter time than has been often absorbed in preparation for other wars, induce me to recommend to your Lordship the adoption of a measure which without having recourse to the unerring test of experience to which I have alluded, the obstacles which the Court of Directors have opposed to the efficiency of my Government, would render most satisfactory to me, and of the highest importance to the public interests.

Your Lordship must be aware from various documents and proceedings of the council, transmitted from hence for your perusal, that in addition to the impediment to an efficient administration to which I have been subjected, I shall by the departure of General Stuart have to conduct the business of my Government with a dissentient Council, and probably under the frequent necessity in my decision, of having recourse to my personal responsibility. This situation of things will I trust not only add weight to the suggestion I have had the honour to make, but will also in the event of your Lordship's departure from Fort William being rendered impracticable by causes which I have not the means of appreciating, apprise your Lordship of the difficulty of executing with precision, and in their spirit, the tenor of your important commands, more especially when points may be

expected to occur requiring the prompt and zealous discharge of those confidential duties of which I can encourage no expectation from the instruments imposed on this Government by the Court of Directors.

The eventual arrival of a successor to the Government of Fort St. George, not possessing the personal and local information necessary to the best employment of the means and instruments at the disposal of this Presidency, for the attainment of the objects in your Lordship's contemplation, will also probably obtain your serious consideration.

Being unable to form a just estimate of the obstacles that may stand opposed to your Lordship's leaving Bengal at this crisis, I shall no farther allude to that part of the subject than to assure your Lordship that should you resolve to proceed to Fort St. George, I shall derive the same personal gratification which I have already felt from the union of our labours, and that should the reasons for your remaining at Fort William, countervail those which I have had the honor to adduce for your presence on the Peninsula, you may rely upon a zealous, and faithful endeavour to execute your Lordship's commands to the extent of the means I possess,

I am always my dear Lord,

with the greatest esteem and regard,

most faithfully yours,

CLIVE.

No. XXII.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

[Private]

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, February 27th, 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your Lordship's private letter of the 7th instant, with enclosures of your correspondence with his Majesty's Ministers and the Court of Directors respecting the succession to our respective Governments, and the important points connected therewith.

The precision with which, in your Lordship's former communications you had stated the motives of your resignation of the supreme Government, the explanation of the eventual period of that resignation, which you had condescended to impart; and the uniform manner in which your Lordship

has advised, shared in, and approved the measures of my Government had left no doubt on my mind of the extent to which they had received the sanction of your approbation in your despatches to Europe. The decided and generous support therefore evinced in these papers, has only indelibly confirmed those sentiments of obligation and gratitude, which I have always felt to be due from me to your Lordship.

From the nature of your Lordship's despatches and of mine to his Majesty's Ministers and to the Court of Directors, it was to have been expected, that they would have proceeded at an earlier period than September last, to provide a successor for this Government, and I am gratified to find it is your Lordship's opinion that no notification having been communicated to me upon that point is solely to be attributed to the persuasion, that I must have taken my departure from India previous to the arrival of any information which could have been transmitted to me. I most sensibly feel the kind manner in which your Lordship has considered the question of my continuance in India, and the delicacy with which you have conveyed the assurance of your support in whatever decision I may ultimately form. The opinion of your Lordship as far as regards the public service, not being equivocal, my judgement on the present crisis of public affairs as well as the disagreeable predicament in which I am situated, have determined me to combine the preservation of the vigour of this Government, as far as it may be practicable with the attention due to the dignity of personal character and of public situation. In the expectation therefore of the early arrival of my successor, or of further intelligence of the means provided by the Court of Directors, and by his Majesty's Ministers for administering the affairs of this Presidency, I have resolved to protract my departure to the latest period consistently with those considerations. It is accordingly my intencion to secure to myself accommodations for my passage to England on the United Kingdom; and I shall endeavour to regulate the period of my departure in such a manner as to reduce the interval between that event and the arrival of my successor, to the shortest possible period of time.

I am always with the greatest attachment and esteem,

My dear Lord,

most faithfully yours.

CLIVE.

No. XXIII.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

[Private and Secret.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, 24th April, 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your Lordship's private despatch of the 4th instant. The important consideration which induced your Lordship to urge with such irresistible force the farther protraction of my stay in India, had left no doubt on my mind of the line of conduct which it was my duty to pursue; and I had accordingly resolved in deference to your Lordship's judgement, and in conformity with your wishes, which it has ever been my desire to promote, to await the arrival of my successor; when the receipt last night of a despatch of the 17th December, from the Court of Directors, of which I enclose a copy, renewed with increased interest the consideration of the subject. The tenor of this despatch is of the most mortifying nature, and the perseverance of the Court of Directors, acquiesced in by his Majesty's Ministers, in those measures which have degraded my authority cannot be otherwise considered by me, than as a formal subversion of the principles uniformly avowed by me, and as a proclamation of the triumph, which the Court of Directors, has been permitted to grant to the faction disaffected to my administration.

But as the grounds of your Lordship's opinion cannot be affected by these considerations, but are referable to the present political crisis of affairs, and to the characters of those individuals whom my departure would place in temporary power, I submit to make this farther sacrifice of my personal feelings, in the view of securing the State from the evils your Lordship apprehends from my immediate relinquishment of the Government; but in the hope, that if any alteration of circumstances shall enable your Lordship to relieve me at an earlier period of time than the arrival of Lord William Bentinck, your Lordship will have regard to the augmented degree of embarrassment, disappointment, and disgust, which must be consequent upon the operation of this last despatch.

I am always with the greatest attachment and regard,
my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

CLIVE.

No. XXIV.

Marquess Wellesley to Lord Clive.

[Private and Secret.]—Extract.

MY DEAR LORD, Fort William, August 4th, 1803.

The fluctuating state of affairs in India, and in Europe has not yet afforded any opportunity of returning a definite answer to your Lordship's private and secret despatch of the 24th April.* The delay of Lord William Bentinck's departure from England has also admitted a further consideration of the important question stated in that despatch, while every circumstance on the spot has concurred to strengthen the reasons which originally induced me to solicit your Lordship's continuance in India until the actual arrival of a successor from Europe.

I should desert every sentiment of my heart, if I were insensible to the justice of those emotions of indignation which your Lordship has expressed in adverting to the recent conduct and correspondence of the Court of Directors. The whole tenor of the late letter to Fort St. George is most exceptionable: injustice and ingratitude towards your Lordship; encouragement to faction and intrigue; together with injury to the executive powers of the whole frame of the Government in India, form the marked features of the system of policy which that extraordinary document inculcates.†

* See page 417.

† The conduct of the Court of Directors of the day in superseding the appointments made by their governments in India in 1803-4 and 5 had been before exercised as shewn in the following extracts of letters from Mr. Hastings and Lord Cornwallis.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings to the Honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company dated the 28th of November 1783.

“It is hard to be loaded with weighty responsibility without power; to be compelled to work with instruments imposed upon me which I cannot trust; and to see the terrors of high authority held over the heads of such as I myself employ in the discharge of my public duties.”

Extract of a letter from Lord Cornwallis dated the 17th April 1796, in reference to an application made to him to use his influence to prevent the supercession of a friend of the writer by a direct appointment by the Court of Directors.

“I have always protested in the strongest terms against the practice of making any nominations at home to the offices in India, which is to

With the same public spirit which has distinguished every part of your Lordship's conduct; under the accumulated pressure of ingratitude at home, and of faction abroad; surrounded by the disorder, audacity, and clamour, which ever attend the dissolution of just authority; in this painful scene of humiliation and insult; your Lordship has nobly determined to continue in your arduous and vexatious station, for the benefit of those whose influence has been employed to detract from the substantial merit of your high public services, and to frustrate their salutary operation. Whatever may be the temporary sufferings of your generous mind under such a sacrifice, I anticipate the early victory, and permanent triumph of your Lordship's honorable and worthy course, and the disgrace and defeat of the base and despicable arts, by which you have been counteracted, and traduced. To the last hour of my existence your Lordship may rely on my indefatigable endeavours to aid you in the vindication of your honor, and in the maintenance of those great public principles, which involve not only your Lordship's character and mine, but the safety of the arduous charge entrusted to us by our country.

In the present moment it is my sincere conviction, that I cannot offer to your Lordship any counsel, so salutary to the public interests, or so advantageous to your own honor and fame, as that you should remain at Fort St. George until the actual arrival of your successor from England. The apprehension of a revival of war with France, the state of affairs in the Mahratta Empire, the prospect of those important questions of internal and external policy which must claim the early attention of the Government of Fort St. George even in the event of established peace, appear to me to constitute a crisis, which may justly demand this sacrifice of your Lordship's personal sufferings to the exigencies of the public service.

Previously to your departure, I wish to be furnished with an opportunity of passing my public and solemn judgement in council upon the merits of your Lordship's administration;

take the power out of the hands of those who are responsible for carrying on the government; and I declared that I should consider the arrival of such an appointment in Bengal, as an order for my resignation."

and I wish to know from your Lordship the mode, in which I can proceed to that last act of justice and gratitude with the greatest degree of satisfaction to your Lordship's mind.

I still entertain a hope that you may not leave India without visiting Bengal; it is unnecessary to add any expression of the pleasure, with which I should witness the gratification of that hope. I trust and believe, that Lord William Bentinck will arrive in India, with sentiments and views entirely conformable to your Lordship's opinions, and to the exigencies of his arduous public trust.

I have the honor to be,
with the most sincere attachment, esteem, and affection,

My dear Lord,
Your most faithful and obliged servant
WELLESLEY.

No. XXV.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

Fort St. George, 3d September, 1803.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 25th September.]

The generous and affectionate expressions conveyed to me in your Lordship's private letter of the 4th ultimo,* upon subjects intimately connected with my reputation, and nearly touching the feelings of my mind, have penetrated me with sentiments of the sincerest regard, gratitude and respect.

Had not your Lordship's former communications, the consideration of the important crisis of affairs, both in India and in Europe, and my own judgment confirmed by the whole course of my observation upon events and proceedings at this place, anticipated in my mind the indispensable necessity of my continuing in the exercise of the authority of the government of Fort St. George, under any circumstances that might have occurred, until the arrival of Lord William Bentinck should enable me to relieve myself from that arduous and important charge. The decided expression of your Lordship's judgment and wishes contained in your des-

* See Page 418.

patch of the fourth ultimo, could have left no doubt of the determination which it would have become me to adopt and pursue; I feel, therefore, great satisfaction in having afforded this last proof of my obedience to your Lordship's commands, and I congratulate your Lordship with sincere pleasure on the opportunities at length afforded to me of transferring the charge of this government to the honourable hands appointed to receive that trust.

Your Lordship's intention of passing your solemn and public judgment in council upon the subject of my administration, is matter of much consolation to the feelings of my mind; and I am truly grateful for the great kindness of your Lordship in desiring me to point out the mode of fulfilling that intention which may be most satisfactory to me; the circumstances in which I have been placed by the extraordinary procedure of the Court of Directors have compelled me to discussions relative to the administration of the internal affairs of this Presidency, which have completely laid open to that honourable Court, and to your Excellency, the motives, progress, execution, and result of all the principal acts of my government. These details are minutely described in my several despatches to the honourable Court; and, feeling a well grounded confidence that the judgments recently pronounced by that body, under the impression of a passionate view of my administration, will yield to the evidence of my success in the improvement of the affairs of the East India Company on the Peninsula; my anxiety on this subject is entirely relieved by a just assurance that your Lordship, in passing a formal judgment on my government, will pursue that course which, under a more general view of this important question than I am competent to form, may be best calculated to secure the stability, prosperity, and honour of the empire in India on principles of enlarged and national policy. On your Lordship's superior judgment, therefore, on your intimate knowledge of the acts of my government, and of the principles which have guided the conduct of my administration, and on the dignified and fervent friendship of your Lordship, the result of our cordial union and co-operation, for the attainment of the most important public objects, I entirely wish to rely, not only for the fairest and most enlightened decision on the merits and character of my

administration, which it may be capable of receiving, but also for the mode which may render that decision most impressive and convincing. In order to complete the documents in your Lordship's possession respecting my administration, I do myself the honour to inclose the concluding minute by which I formally resigned the Government of Fort St. George into the hands of Lord William Bentinck, and I trust that the points which I have endeavoured to impress on the attention of my successor will be deemed by your Excellency to be conformable to the system of your Lordship's policy for this presidency in the actual situation of its affairs.

I have the satisfaction to add that I think it of importance to state, that the public accounts completed since the date of my minute, exhibit a material improvement of the public revenue beyond the amount at which it has been stated and estimated in the documents officially submitted to your Excellency in council, in the past as well as in the current revenue.

I am extremely sensible to the kindness of your Lordship's invitation to Bengal. The contemplation of the personal satisfaction and advantage which I should derive from the society of your Lordship, and from the communication of your sentiments upon the important objects which have so long engaged our joint attention, as well as the peculiar interest with which the scenes and improvements in Bengal could not fail to affect my mind, would hold out inducements not to be resisted, did not the extraordinary circumstances in which I have been placed, and the length of time during which I have deferred my departure for the avowed and sole purpose, now accomplished, of resigning into the hands of my successor the government of Fort St. George, render it most consistent and necessary that I should embrace the earliest means after the accomplishment of that event, of repairing to England. It is accordingly my intention to embark the moment the ships are ready for sea, which cannot, I believe, now exceed four or five days.

It is impossible for me to contemplate my approaching separation from your Lordship's labours without reviving in my mind all those sentiments of gratitude and attachment which have been excited by your Lordship's uniform friendship, support, and advice; nor without renewing to your

Lordship the assurance of my most fervent esteem, respect, and affection.

I look not without anxiety, but with a confident expectation of success, to the termination of your Lordship's present contest with the Mahratta chieftains; and when your Lordship shall have added that trophy to the brilliant career of your achievements, I trust that the national policy will have been sufficiently matured to call upon your Lordship for the only means of preserving by the wisdom and firmness of your councils at home, the great empire which has been extended and consolidated by the vigour and success of your Lordship's administration abroad.

I have the honour to be,
with the most sincere respect and attachment,
my dear Lord,
Your most obliged and faithful servant,

CLIVE.

No. XXVI.

Major (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

United Kingdom at Sea, Feb. 9th, 1803.

Before I left Calcutta I attempted personally to express to your Excellency the feelings of my heart, but I had not the power, and if I was to endeavour to state them in a letter, I should be equally unsuccessful: acknowledgments of obligations, and professions of gratitude, the current payment of common favours, shall never be offered to your Lordship, in discharge of a debt so serious as mine; an unshaken adherence to the principles of honour, a firm and onward tread in the path of virtue, and an unwearied exertion of talents which your Lordship's approbation has persuaded me are not contemptible, will I trust combine to guide me in a course of action, which shall convince your Lordship I have not thrown away the extraordinary advantages I have enjoyed in holding so long a confidential station near your Excellency's person, and I entertain the proud hope that no one action of my life (to whatever period it may please Providence to extend

that blessing) shall ever give your Lordship cause to regret the partial kindness with which I have been treated, or the marks of honourable favour with which I have been distinguished.

Among the various feelings which at this moment occupy my breast, I recognize with exultation that of a personal attachment to your Lordship to be predominant, and I shall glory in every opportunity I may have of shewing the nature of the zeal which that attachment inspires, and how far it places me above the common motives which influence men who are busy in the self-interested pursuit of fortune.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient and
most humble servant,
JOHN MALCOLM.

No. XXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Henry Addington.

SIR;

Fort William, Feb. 27th, 1803.

The object of this letter is to call your particular attention to the services, claims and views of Mr. Barlow, a member of the Supreme Council, who held the government for near nine months during my absence in the Upper Provinces, and who by my particular desire was appointed to succeed me provisionally in this arduous charge.

Lord Cornwallis has probably already informed you of the eminent services which Mr. Barlow rendered to the British interests here during his Lordship's administration by framing the whole code of regulations and the whole system of government of these extensive provinces; a greater benefit has seldom been conferred on any people than that which Mr. Barlow was the main instrument of conferring on our native subjects in India; to that code are principally to be ascribed the prosperity and tranquillity of these possessions and the stability of our power.

Mr. Barlow also rendered considerable service in the office of Chief Secretary during Lord Teignmouth's government, and in the same office from the time of my arrival until the

month of October 1801. I received the most useful assistance from his ability, discretion, fortitude, integrity and industry, during a most critical and difficult state of affairs.

In October, 1801, he was promoted to a seat in Council in consequence of my particular desire, and immediately was entrusted with the charge of the government of the Presidency. With what credit he acquitted himself of that charge will appear by my recorded opinion upon my return to Fort William; a copy of my minute on that occasion was sent to England by the *Telegraph*, and another by the *Swallow*, and I beg leave to refer you to that document.

In addition to these public documents Mr. Barlow's honourable attachment, amiable qualities and virtues, and his ardent spirit of integrity and zeal for the glory of his country in India, and for the lustre of my administration, have bound me to him by the strongest ties of affectionate friendship. I have never met a man of more pure honour, or of more elevated sentiment, combined with the most unaffected simplicity of manners and with the most calm judgment and sound prudence.

His ambition is to receive from his Majesty a mark of his royal approbation, which shall descend to his posterity; his fortune is moderate, but respectable, and the vigour and purity of his mind rise above the desire of emolument. If a reference to these considerations, strengthened by what you may learn from Lord Cornwallis, should induce you to attend to Mr. Barlow's just views, the dignity of a baronet of the United Kingdom would at present be acceptable to him. To this object I think Mr. Barlow's services and station entitle him to look with confidence, and you will confer a particular favour on me by giving your early attention to it.

I must add, in justice to Mr. Barlow, that any honour conferred on him will operate as a powerful encouragement to integrity, diligence, and public spirit in this service; he affords a bright example of the success of these qualities in defiance of interest, intrigue, and low subserviency; and it would reflect great credit on the Crown to distinguish a man of so admirable a character. My opinion of Mr. Barlow is such, that I know no person to whom the charge of this government (at least for some time) could be entrusted at my

departure with equal prospect of advantage to the public service.

In such an event, I imagine that it would have been deemed advisable to have conferred some hereditary dignity upon him, but he would rather receive such an honour as a testimony of his Majesty's notice of his long and approved public services, and of his exemplary character in the administration of this empire.

WELLESLEY.

No. XXVIII.

W. Wilberforce, Esq. to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, April 6th, 1803.

In addressing your Lordship, so many different matters rush into my mind, that if I were to attempt to express them I should encroach far too much on the time of the Governor-General. You will hear from others that we are not going on satisfactorily; but we live in times in which, as I think, (and I hope when you return to England you will concur with me and act in the persuasion) measures out of the common road should be taken in order to excite that public spirit which is so apt to languish. If we were all in earnest, laying aside all false delicacy, and zealously cordial in our disposition to adopt and inspire such principles as the state of our affairs requires, humanly speaking, we might bid defiance to the power of France; and lest I should be misunderstood when I say humanly speaking, let me add, that I who believe in a Providence which ordains and directs all human events should regard these requisite dispositions as at once the omen of a happy issue and the instrument of producing it.

With every wish for your Lordship's public usefulness and private happiness here and hereafter,

I remain ever,
 my dear Lord,
 your Lordship's faithful servant,
 W. WILBERFORCE.

No. XXIX.

The Right Honourable N. Vansittart to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Extract.)

MY LORD,

Treasury, April 25, 1804.

I am happy to have an opportunity of congratulating your Lordship on the splendid triumphs of the British councils and the British arms in India, of which we have lately received accounts, and particularly to day by the *Belle*.

I have the honour to be,
your Lordship's faithful humble servant,

N. VANSITTART.

No. XXX.

The Earl of Dartmouth to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD.

Berkeley Square, June 21, 1804.

I have desired Mr. Gerald Wellesley to inform you that I took the earliest opportunity the King's illness would allow me of presenting to his Majesty the Calcutta Gazettes, in obedience to your commands. Allow me to take this opportunity of returning you my best thanks for the history of the Mahratta war, the transactions of which would have been alone sufficient to give the stamp of immortality to the most brilliant and successful administration of government which the pages of history have ever recorded, and I am persuaded you will give me credit when I assure you that this is the language of truth and sincerity, and not of adulation. We are at present engaged in a political contest which has brought almost all our Generals to power who have voices in Parliament, and has superseded all thoughts of invasion, and of every public concern except that of what party shall govern. The trial of strength in the House of Lords is expected to take place on Monday upon the second reading of Mr. Pitt's Defence Bill. A minister of less resolution would shrink from the opposition he meets with at starting. I think

Mr. Pitt, in spite of all obstacles (including the decided opposition of the Heir Apparent) will finally triumph.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with the highest regard and every good wish,
most sincerely and truly,
your Excellency's servant,
DARTMOUTH.

No. XXXI.

Sir John Newport to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Extract.)

MY DEAR LORD,

London, July 1, 1804.

Many years have elapsed since we have met, still more since we have corresponded, yet believe me no man has more warmly participated in your triumphs or done more ample homage to the ability which effected them. I have often gloried in the exertions of the friend of my early youth in defence of our common country.

And believe me ever, My dear Lord,
with the truest sentiments of esteem
and regard, yours,

JOHN NEWPORT.

No. XXXII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, July 31, 1804.

1. On the 15th instant, the Governor-General in Council had the honour to receive by a despatch overland, the instructions of your honourable Committee under date the 6th of March, 1804,* and on the 24th instant the duplicate of those instructions was received by his Majesty's sloop of war the *Sea Flower*.

2. It is the intention of the Governor-General in Council to transmit a detailed reply to your honourable Committee's instructions by an early opportunity. Since the date of your

* See Vol. IV. p. 227.

honourable Committee's instructions of the 6th of March, 1804, you must have received the despatches from this government, communicating the termination of hostilities, the terms of pacification concluded with the confederated Marhatta chieftains, the treaty of partition between the allies and the defensive and subsidiary treaty concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The receipt of those despatches will probably have induced your honourable Committee to consider your instructions of the 6th of March, 1804, to be inapplicable to the actual situation of affairs in India, and the Governor-General in Council accordingly expects that orders of a different tendency may in consequence have been despatched.

3. The Governor-General in Council therefore has not considered the immediate despatch of a detailed reply to your honourable Committee's instructions of the 6th of March to be an object of sufficient urgency to require the detention of the extra ship *Hope*, or of the packet overland for the special purpose of conveying that reply.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

No. XXXIII.

From Lord William Bentinck, when Governor of Madras, to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private and Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, October, 25, 1804.

Major-General Dowdeswell informed me some time ago that your Lordship had expressed a wish to see the opinion which I had written to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject of the college. The view which I had taken of the question was so very confined in all respects, so unworthy of being read by your Lordship, that I had determined not to send it. General Dowdeswell having recently repeated the same request, I have now the honour of forwarding a copy of that paper for your Lordship's perusal. The only circumstance which gives me confidence upon the occasion arises in the result of my opinion, being conformable to those sentiments

which I am ashamed to see have been so ably and eloquently described with so little effect.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect,
my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient servant,
W. BENTINCK.

No. XXXIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Hobart.

MY LORD,

Fort William, Dec. 30, 1804.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, and to return your Lordship my sincere acknowledgements for the highly satisfactory terms in which your Lordship has been pleased to express your approbation of the military operations which it became my duty to direct against the confederate Mahratta chieftains. It is extremely grateful to my mind to receive the notification of your Lordship's entire concurrence in the sentiments which I had submitted to your Lordship respecting the honourable and glorious conduct of the troops under the respective personal commands of General Lake, and of the honourable Major-General Wellesley; and I assure your Lordship that the expression of your approbation on this occasion forms a most acceptable addition to the satisfaction which I have derived from the honour conferred upon me by the House of Lords.

I have the honour to be, &c.
WELLESLEY.

No. XXXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Colonel Haliburton.

(Most Secret.)

SIR,

Fort William, Jan. 24, 1805.

1. With a view to prevent any unnecessary delay in the execution of the orders which I have issued for the distribution of the troops now serving in the Deccan, I deem it

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