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GREAT PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD

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INTRODUCTION

IN the following pages I have endeavoured to give a brief outline of some famous systems of philosophy. As it is clearly impossible within the limits of a book of this size even to indicate all the views which philosophers have entertained, I have selected those which, besides possessing a title to inclusion on their own account, lend themselves more or less readily to the purposes of popular exposition.

Philosophy is a difficult subject, and, to those who are not familiar with the twists and turns of the speculative reason, somewhat bewildering. It rejoices, moreover, in technical terms. These latter I have endeavoured scrupulously to avoid, and, for the rest, I hope that there is nothing in these pages which will prove unintelligible to those who are tackling the subject for the first time.

A word may be added with regard to the general character of the philosophies outlined. As the reader proceeds, it will be borne in upon him not only that the conclusions reached by different philosophies are hopelessly at variance, but that there seems to be no sort of agreement even as to the subjects which should be discussed. If philosophers do not know what they are looking for, how, he may be tempted to ask, are they to be expected to find it, at which point he will call to mind some time-honoured gibe about a philosopher being like a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat that isn't there.

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For all this, let him not be tempted lightly to dismiss philosophy. The philosopher seeks to comprehend the universe as a whole; not, like physics or biology, a special department of it, but the whole mass of data to which the moral intuitions of the ordinary man, the religious consciousness of the saint, the æsthetic enjoyment of the artist, and the history of the human race, no less than the discoveries of the physicist and the biologist, contribute. To look for certain fixed and definite knowledge in regard to a subject-matter of so all-embracing a character is unreasonable.

In the first place, the subject-matter is itself in a state of continual flux. It is not philosophy alone that is changing and self-contradictory; the record of science is strewn with the débris of discarded theories, and the scientific laws and formulæ of one age are superseded in the next. At the moment the physicists are presenting us with new theories about the constitution of the material universe at about the rate of one every ten years, while biology is in a state of perpetual controversy about the cause and character of the evolution of life. But more important than differences in the data about which the philosopher speculates are the differences in the minds of philosophers. Philosophy is not content to catalogue the facts; it inquires into their meaning. Pooling the experiences of the scientist, the saint, the artist, and the common man it asks what must be the nature of the universe in which such experiences are possible. It is interested, in other words, not so much in the facts as in their significance. Thus it establishes principles of selection and rejection whereby some of the facts are shown to be important, while others are rejected as trivial or condemned as illusory; it assigns values, too, and assesses the universe in respect of its beauty or its goodness.

Now, this search for meaning and significance, this task of assessment and valuation, involves considerations of a highly personal character. We shall select

according to what we think important; we shall group and arrange according to likenesses which we think significant; we shall assign values to what we recognise as beautiful or good. What we think important or significant or beautiful will depend very largely upon the sort of minds we possess, and not only upon our minds, but also upon our characters and temperaments. One man will detect common elements where another observes only a chaos of differences; some will recognise the hand of God in what others insist to be a haphazard collection of fortuitous events. Thus, while the facts are the same for all, the conclusions which we base upon them will be different. Nor need this difference be deplored: just as it takes all sorts of men to make a world, so does it take all sorts of minds to make the truth about the world, and philosophy is no more to be dismissed because each philosopher has a different system, than morality is to be invalidated by the fact of differing moral judgments, or religion proclaimed to be nonsense because there are innumerable variations of religious belief.

But for all that, philosophy, which is not to be lightly attempted by any, should be eschewed altogether by some. There are those who feel an imperative need to believe, for whom the value of a belief is proportionate not to its truth, but to its definiteness. Incapable either of admitting the existence of contrary judgments or of suspending their own, they supply the place of knowledge by turning other men's conjectures into dogmas. To such the uncertainties of philosophy will bring nothing but irritation and contempt, and they should not, therefore, read this book.

There are, however, others, and, if it should prove to be the means of introducing these to the original works of the great philosophers, it will not have been written in vain.

CHAPTER I

PLATO

MANY people consider Plato (427-347 B.C.) to have been the greatest of the philosophers. He lived in Athens in the fourth century B.C., and began to teach and write some fifteen years after the defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. This defeat, which terminated the military greatness of Athens, has been ascribed by some to the extreme form of democracy which constituted the city's Government, a form of democracy under which every citizen was a member of the governing assembly, wherein he exercised a direct influence on the policy of the city. Plato himself was inclined to take this view, and his writings are characterised throughout by a hostility to democracy. This hostility was intensified by the treatment which the Athenian populace had accorded to the philosopher Socrates (470-399 B.C.). The philosophy of Socrates consisted less in the profession of his own wisdom than in the demonstration of others' ignorance. It was his habit to ask the Athenians questions with a view to ascertaining the grounds upon which they based their beliefs. What, he wanted to know, did they consider to be goodness, and why? What was courage? If, as is clearly the case, the brave man is afraid of certain things, as, for example, of doing what is shameful, of running away or of betraying his friends, how is his fear to be distinguished from the fear of the coward?

Anyone who is compelled to consider why it is that he believes what he does believe will usually find, either that he can give no reasons at all for his beliefs, or that they are not presentable in public. Socrates was continually forcing this discovery upon the Athenians, who, being naturally irritated by the man's incessant curiosity as to their beliefs and motives,

accused him of corrupting the youth and discrediting the gods, and had him poisoned. Plato was one of Socrates' disciples; the precise nature of the relationship between the two men is a matter of controversy, but there is no doubt that some part at least of Plato's philosophy is derived from Socrates, who is the chief figure in Plato's *Dialogues*. Plato's view seems to have been that a people who were capable of putting their wisest man to death simply because he was the wisest, were not, and never would be, fit to govern themselves; hence his antagonism to democracy.

Plato's philosophy is contained in a number of *Dialogues* (twenty-seven are extant, although it is not certain that all of them were, in fact, written by Plato). The *Dialogues* are conversations between a group of people, and usually centre round a particular topic. The "Republic," for example, is concerned to discover the nature of justice; the "Symposium" is a series of dissertations on the character of Love; in another dialogue courage is discussed, in another temperance or self-control. The *Dialogues* vary enormously in point of dramatic interest and philosophic profundity. Some are little more than dialectical skirmishes, in which Socrates discomfits his opponents as much by good-humoured pleasantry, as by philosophic argument; people make jokes; there are personal allusions and nobody goes very deep. Others are disquisitions upon metaphysics or logic, in which the atmosphere of the dinner-table is replaced by that of the lecture-room; the element of dramatic interest is reduced to a minimum, and the characters are little more than mouthpieces for the expression of various points of view.

In general, however, the *Dialogues* proceed somewhat as follows: Somebody, generally a typical representative of the man-in-the-street, gives utterance to a platitudinous reflection about politics or religion, in which some word like "just" or "true" or "beautiful" appears. Socrates asks him what he

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means by the word; he endeavours to explain, and involves himself in difficulties. Other speakers come to the rescue with different suggestions as to what he may have meant; Socrates disposes of them one by one, and is then challenged to give his own meaning of the term in dispute. This he presently undertakes to do, and the rest of the dialogue is in effect a long disquisition by Socrates interspersed by objections or requests for restatement in the interests of clarity by the other speakers.

The "Republic," the most famous of the *Dialogues*, follows this course. A discussion arises as to the nature of justice. Various definitions of justice are suggested, which Socrates has little difficulty in showing to be inadequate. Two of Socrates' own followers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, then proceed to elaborate a carefully thought-out and well-substantiated line of argument with regard to the nature of justice, which they challenge Socrates to refute. What they set out to maintain is that men have no natural or innate preference for justice as compared with injustice, but they extend the scope of the argument in such a way that what they are presently found to be denying is that there is any essential or intrinsic difference between morality and immorality. Their case falls into two parts: First, men are by nature lawless and non-moral, bundles of imperious desires, whose activity is prompted by no other motive than the gratification of their desires; this, at least, is true of man in the state of nature. In course of time, however, it was borne in upon him that the measures necessary for the gratification of his desires were impeded by similar measures on the part of others. The acquisition of the necessities of life—food, for example, or shelter, or a wife—was attended with serious disabilities in the face of the greater physical strength of neighbours who coveted the same desirable objects, and the consequent insecurity of life became intolerable. Accordingly, man decided to forego his right to gratify his desires

as and when he pleased, provided that his neighbours made a similar concession, and to indulge only those of his desires which were not incompatible with the indulgence of the desires of others, which were not, that is to say, socially injurious; he decided, in other words, to live in society.

Man in society proceeds to make laws the object of which is to restrain the citizens from purely self-regarding conduct designed to satisfy the self irrespective of the wishes of others. As a member of society the citizen behaves respectably and obeys the laws; but he does this not from choice, but from fear; not, that is to say, because he naturally prefers to do what is right, but, lest a worse thing befall him, if he transgress the ordinances of society. Morality, then, which we may identify with law-abiding conduct, is not natural to human nature, but is conventional. It is the product, not of a natural preference for doing right as compared with doing wrong, but of the consequences which society has taken care to impose upon socially injurious conduct. Remove the fear of these consequences, as, for example, by endowing a man with the power to become invisible at will, and he would at once lapse into the natural, lawless state of his pre-society days, satisfying his desires as and when he pleased without let or hindrance from moral considerations. Man, then, is by nature not just, but unjust: not moral, but non-moral.

The second part of the case is devoted to showing that man's apparent regard for justice is not really disinterested, is not, that is to say, a regard for justice in itself, but is generated by and proceeds from a consideration of the respective consequences of so-called just and unjust actions.

Human society, to commit an anachronism and quote Schopenhauer, is like a collection of hedgehogs driven together for the sake of warmth. Spikes in close proximity would prick unless they were well felt. Hence those kinds of behaviour are encouraged

by society which felt the spikes and so render social intercourse possible. Society's encouragement takes, in the first place, the form of moral approval; it defines as virtuous those actions which benefit it. Courage, for example, is regarded as morally good because the habit of facing the enemy is more advantageous to an army than the contrary habit of giving way to one's natural reaction to belching cannon and running away; temperance, because the excessive indulgence of unbridled desire is apt to be a nuisance to others; truth-telling, because if we all told lies, nobody would believe anybody else, and there would be no point in telling lies. The advantage to others of the virtue of unselfishness is obvious, and selfishness is therefore reprobated because society loses by it. Thus, virtuous conduct is simply the habit of acting in ways of which society approves, and society takes care to secure its performance by punishing, either by the ostracism of public opinion or by the penalties of the law, those who have the temerity to outrage its moral code. Men act morally, therefore, not because they are by nature virtuous, but to avoid the censure of society.

But the rewards which society offers to the good—that is, to those who do what benefits it—are not confined to the intangible benefits of moral approval. By a hundred maxims of the "Honesty is the best policy" type, we strive to convince a man that to act "rightly" is the way to prosperity and happiness. Nor are the results of "right conduct" confined to this world. Most social systems have emphasised the pleasure which the gods take in an honest man, being careful at the same time to paint the results of displeasing the gods in the liveliest colours. Thus, every man is bidden to choose between two different types of life; the first involves taking out a short term insurance policy, the benefits of which are drawn in terms of earthly pleasures to be enjoyed here and now, pleasures both dubious—or so say the moralists—and short lived; the second is a long term policy involving the payment of premiums

in the form of self-restraint and law-abiding conduct in the present, for which the holder is compensated with the prospect of an eternity of divine bliss in the hereafter. It is not surprising that most men choose the second, and, suppressing their natural, primitive desires, conform to the requirements of society by maintaining a decent level of moral behaviour. This does not mean that they reverence morality and hate immorality, but simply that they prefer the consequences which attend the former to those with which society has taken care to discourage the latter. Thus, morality is honoured not for itself, but for its rewards.

Compare justice and injustice as they are in themselves, stripped, that is to say, of their consequences; nay, more, visit the just man with the consequences which usually attend upon injustice, and give him the reputation of being unjust into the bargain, and who would wish to be just?

Is it, in the face of these arguments, possible to prove that justice is intrinsically superior to injustice, that morality, in other words, is *in itself* better than immorality? "If it is possible," say Glaucon and Adeimantus, "will you please, Socrates, to prove it?"

The remainder of the "Republic" is Socrates' answer to the challenge. Faced with the necessity of defining justice and proving its intrinsic superiority, he points out that the best way of discovering its nature is to look for it where it is writ large—that is to say, in the principles regulating the intercourse of men in society; in other words, in the State. It will be manifested, moreover, most clearly in the best of all possible States. What is the best of all possible States? Socrates' answer to this question is to construct an ideal State, the arrangements of which are regulated exclusively by a rational consideration of what is good.

The ideal State is an aristocracy, ruled by a guardian class who receive an intensive education, and are chosen in virtue of their ability to comprehend and fitness to maintain the principles on the basis of which

the city is founded. The guardians live communally, owning no private property in order that they may not be tempted by considerations of self-interest to admit any incentive to conduct other than the welfare of the State. The remainder of the population is divided into two classes, the soldiers and the workers, the former being entrusted with the duty of protecting and the latter of producing for the State. Justice is found in the contented performance by each class of citizens of the functions and duties appertaining to that class, and the resolute refusal of the members of one class to interfere in the business of the other two. Hence Plato's State is founded on a specialisation of function, which springs from the principle that every man should do that only for which he is best fitted. This is the negation of democracy, in which everybody is considered to be an expert at everything, and the man-in-the-street presumes to understand the conduct of affairs.

✓ The division of the State into three different classes corresponds to and is based upon a threefold division of the human soul. The soul for Plato has three parts (as we should put it to-day, a man's psychology exhibits three main aspects or trends), the rational part, the emotional or spirited part, and the desiring part. Wisdom is the virtue of the first, courage of the second, and temperance of the third. (Temperance consists more strictly in a relationship of harmony between the third part and the other two, in virtue of which desire is subjected to reason and schooled by the more generous emotions.) To each part of the soul there corresponds a particular type of man. The guardian of the State, who is also a philosopher, exemplifies the reasoning man, since in him the reasoning part of the soul is most strongly developed; the soldier is the emotional or spirited type of man; the ordinary worker, who is represented as more or less subject to the sway of a variety of different desires, corresponds to the desiring man. Now, just as

justice in the State was found to consist in the proper performance by the members of the different classes of the duties and functions appropriate to the class, the guardian governing, the soldier protecting, and the workers producing, so does justice in the soul consist in a right performance of their appropriate functions by the different parts of the soul. Each part of the soul must, that is to say, perform the function proper to itself; the reason must rule the passions, deciding, in the interest of the good of the whole, exactly how much rope each individual passion is to be allowed, and the spirited part must assist reason in her task by enlisting the nobler emotions, such as indignation at what is base and the sense of shame, in her support. Social justice is simply the external expression of this just condition of the soul.

The notion that justice in particular and morality in general involve the subjection of the passions to the reason has a somewhat unexpected consequence in the denial of what we are accustomed to regard as moral consciousness to the third class, that is to say, to the mass of ordinary citizens. As we shall see when we come to discuss Plato's theory of Forms, what we may call self-conscious morality, which is usually taken to include the knowledge of what is good, the perception of the nature of the difference between right and wrong and the recognition of the obligation to do what is right, is ascribed only to those who have known reality—that is to say, to philosophers.

When he is asked how his State may be realised in practice, Socrates says that this is impossible unless philosophers become kings. Now, this somewhat surprising statement follows directly from Socrates' definition of a philosopher as a person who knows reality. The question of what is meant by reality can only be answered by an account of Plato's metaphysics, which cannot be undertaken in this chapter. I shall return to the subject in the next chapter, when I shall briefly describe Plato's theory of reality and trace its line of

descent through medieval to modern philosophy. For the present it will be sufficient to say that reality includes a conception known as the Form of the Good, from which all good things derive their goodness.

Accepting Plato's definition of a philosopher as a person who knows reality, and knows, therefore, among other things, what good is in itself, assuming also that philosophers are kings, that they compose, in other words, the guardian class in Plato's State, it will follow that the laws which they prescribe for its governance will embody their knowledge of what is good. These laws, that is to say, will be drawn up upon the model of the ideal laws which the philosophers have discerned in the world of reality, and they will be, therefore, the best possible laws. These laws will constitute a framework such that, by ordering their lives in accordance with it, the citizens will be automatically constrained to do what is good. Not being philosophers, they will be ignorant of what virtue is and of why they should pursue it; they will lack, that is to say, a spontaneous and self-conscious morality, but by the mere process of living in accordance with the laws they will attain to such virtue as lies within their capacity. Thus, in Plato's State the morality of the ordinary citizen will spring, not from an insight into what is good, nor from a conviction that good ought to be pursued and evil eschewed, but simply from his obedience to public opinion and the laws, an obedience which, as a result of his social training and education, has become second nature.

This is, in effect, to concede to Glaucon and Adeimantus a large part of their case. It is a way of saying that the morality of the ordinary man is and must always be conventional, and it constitutes Plato's fundamental argument against democracy. The ordinary man is too busy or too stupid to discover his duty or solve his moral problems for himself; yet it is essential for him to believe something, and he is constrained, therefore, to buy his morals at the social

shop. His sense of right and wrong is formed for him, that is to say, by his social environment as it expresses itself in law and public opinion. At Plato's social shop he will obtain the best suit of morals which he is capable of wearing, by living in obedience to laws which, being framed on the model of those that exist in the real world, enjoin upon him as his duty the best conduct of which he is capable.

Hence, in morality, as in politics, Plato's social system involves a denial of the fundamental tenet of democracy. The democrat is inclined to say that the man who makes laws should be the man who has to obey them, on the ground that it is only the wearer who knows where the shoe pinches; if the laws are imperfect—as is to be expected, since they are made by the imperfect—it is, after all, the imperfect who will have to fit into them. It is better to have imperfect laws that prescribe the conduct that suits you and express your sense of social morality, short-sighted as it may be, than the best possible laws which only perfect beings could be expected to understand. Plato's answer is simply to deny that the ordinary individual can be trusted to decide what is best for him as an individual, or to prescribe what is good for the society to which he belongs. This is the task of the expert—in other words, of the philosopher—and the only chance for the State is to entrust such men with its legislature. This done, the duty of the ordinary man, the only good of which, as Plato would say, he is capable, will be found in living according to the way of life which the philosopher prescribes.

This Plato contrives that he shall do by living in obedience to the city's laws and carrying into effect the principles with which the city has imbued him in childhood. Thus, that the best should rule and that the rest should be educated in the primary duty of obeying the best, are the two main features of Plato's political philosophy.

CHAPTER II

*PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS: ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS*

PLATO's celebrated theory of ideas may be regarded as an attempt to mediate between two contradictory metaphysical systems, which he had inherited from his predecessors, the philosophers Heracleitus (540-475 B.C.) and Parmenides (about 500 B.C.).

Heracleitus held that everything is in a state of change or flux and that nothing is stable; Parmenides maintained, on the contrary, that change is an illusion, and that reality is changeless. Into the reasons for Heracleitus' view I cannot here enter; I hope to consider them in some little detail when we come to the philosophy of Bergson.* The notion that everything is continually changing is, moreover, one which, so far as the material world is concerned, science has made sufficiently familiar to-day, and it need not be elaborated here.

Parmenides' arguments were chiefly directed to proving that reality as a whole cannot change. If we consider everything that is, it is clear that it cannot become more than it is, except by the addition of something else; but, if we start with literally everything, there is nothing left that can be added to it. Similarly, everything that is can only become less than itself by reason of some part of it becoming separated and departing somewhere else; but once again, if you start with everything that is, there is no place whither the separated part can proceed that has not already been comprehended in the whole reality with which you started. Similar arguments can be applied to demonstrate the impossibility of the growth or diminution of any particular element in the universe

* See Chapter VI.

—that is to say, of apparent changes in the quality as opposed to the quantity of everything that is. It follows that the whole cannot change, and that any apparent change in the parts is, therefore, an illusion.

Greek philosophers were particularly fond of maintaining this position, and invented a number of paradoxes to prove the unreality of change. Of these the most famous is that of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. Consider, he said, any apparent example of change or motion, an arrow, let us say, in its flight. At any given moment of its flight it either is where it is or it is where it isn't; if it is where it is, it cannot be moving, since, if it were, it would not be there; and it cannot be where it isn't. Therefore, at that particular moment it is not moving. Similar arguments apply to any other point or moment in the flight of the arrow; therefore at no point or moment does it move; therefore its movement is an illusion.

Faced by these two opposing positions in philosophy Plato found himself unable entirely to reject either. What he did was to limit their application: each, he held, applied to a certain section or aspect of the universe, but neither to the whole of it. Let us consider first our knowledge of sensible things—that is to say, of the objects of which we are made aware by means of the senses. Plato is continually pointing out how fallible and relative this knowledge is. If I put my hand, which has been half frozen in a blizzard, into lukewarm water, I shall pronounce the water hot; but a man coming out of a hot bath will find it cold. In other words, so far as our knowledge of it goes, it is both hot and cold at the same time. An elephant will regard a rabbit as a small animal, but to a cheesemite the rabbit will appear gigantic; hence the rabbit seems to be both small and large at the same time according to the nature of the creature viewing it. Similarly, with regard to æsthetic and moral qualities, one man will find a picture beautiful which another

considers ugly, and an action which seems admirable to one will seem base to another. It is clear, then, that, as Plato put it, objects of sense have no more right to be credited with certain qualities than they have to be credited with the contrary qualities. Whatever grounds there may be for saying that X has the quality A apply equally well to the statement that X has the quality B, B being the opposite of A; in other words, X has both the qualities of A and B at the same time, or, rather, it has neither of them, but fluctuates about, as Plato says, between both. X, therefore, is of such a character that no quality can be truly ascribed to it; hence, X is not quite real. Since X is not a fixed and definite thing with unalterable characteristics, we cannot have definite knowledge of it, but only what Plato calls opinion. It is for this reason that we are enabled to pass contradictory judgments about the same thing, asserting, for example, in the case of the picture, that it is both beautiful and ugly. Opinions, that is to say, may contradict each other, since none are true, but knowledge cannot be self-contradictory. A thing which is real either has or has not certain definite characteristics, and the only relation which knowledge can have to these characteristics is to be aware of or to recognise them. We cannot, then, have knowledge of the sensible world; yet, as science and mathematics show, we do most certainly have knowledge. Of what, then, is this knowledge? Plato's answer is, of the world of Forms or ideas.

In order to understand what is meant by a Form, let us consider a conception such as whiteness. Whiteness is obviously not the same thing as a white object, such as cream or snow, nor is it the sum total of such objects, since, if all the objects which are called white were collected together, their sum total would not be whiteness. What then is whiteness? To this question some might reply that what we mean by whiteness is an idea or concept in our minds, but this reply is not Plato's. If we were to take this view, it is clear that

things would cease to be white when we ceased to regard them; that, in short, if all minds were abolished, no such thing as whiteness would remain. Yet in ceasing to contemplate a white object, you do not effect any alteration in the qualities of that object. Whiteness, therefore, is not something which is mental, nor, though it attaches to objects, is it itself an object, nor is it any number of objects. What, then, is it? Plato's answer is that it is a Form or idea, neither mental nor material, changeless, perfect, and eternal, an inhabitant of the real world.

To the real world belong all the Forms whose manifestations we discover and imperfectly apprehend in sensible objects. It is the Forms which bestow upon sensible objects whatever qualities they are found to exhibit, and so endow them with such semi-reality as they possess. It is of the Forms that we have knowledge as opposed to mere opinion, and the object of philosophy is to elevate the soul from the realm of opinion in which her objects are the fleeting, changing things of sense, into the realm of knowledge, where she may come face to face with the Forms to which the things of sense owe their being.

It is on these lines that Plato effects a reconciliation between Heracleitus and Parmenides; Heracleitus is right to affirm that everything changes, so far as the world of sense is concerned; Parmenides' view is correct in so far as it relates to a world which, being wholly real, is also changeless. Thus, when Plato says that his ideal State can only be realised when philosophers become kings, he means by a philosopher one who has apprehended the Form of the State as opposed to the imperfect representations of it in the sensible world; one, that is to say, who has *knowledge* of what the State is in reality, as opposed to mere opinion.

Plato's distinction between the world of thought and the world of sense, between universal concepts such as whiteness, and particular instances of them such as one white object, runs through the whole of

philosophy. In the Middle Ages it appears in the form of a controversy between two schools named respectively the Realists and the Nominalists. In order that the issues in this controversy may be understood, it is necessary that I should say something of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of Forms.

Aristotle (384-323 B.C.) is the most important of the Greek philosophers after Plato. Although strongly influenced by Plato, he was, nevertheless, a severe critic of the theory of Forms. Plato, as we have seen, regarded the Forms as principles of substance, which existed apart from the physical objects upon which they conferred qualities, and apart also from the mind which apprehended them. Thus, in addition to all the individual horses that there are in the physical universe, there is a Form or idea of a horse, in virtue of which the individual horses possess the common characteristic of "horsiness," which causes us to recognise them as horses, but which is, nevertheless, independent of and other than any of the individual horses which belong to the sensible world.

There are two main criticisms of this doctrine, both of which are found in Aristotle. First, what is the relation between the individual horses and the Form of the horse? Plato uses two rather different words to describe this relation. He says that the physical horses "imitate" or are "modelled on" the Form, and also that they "participate" in it. If they participate in it and owe their qualities to this participation, we are committed to the difficult view that the real and changeless—namely, the Form—is the immanent cause or essence of the being of the half real and changing—that is, the physical horses. If the relation is one of imitation only, it seems impossible to maintain, as Plato does, that the real world is the cause of the being of and the characteristics exhibited by the sensible world; it will be merely an accident that the qualities of physical objects mirror or reflect the Forms, and there is, therefore, no reason to postulate

the manifestation of the Forms at all, in order to explain the qualities of the sensible world.

Thus Aristotle's second criticism consists of charging Plato with the simple mistake of attributing independent, substantive existence to our general notions and ideas. Aristotle does not wish to deny that we have such general ideas, but the fact that we have them is, he says, no reason for projecting them, as it were, outside our minds, and asserting that they are independent factors of the external universe, or even that there are such independent factors to correspond with our general ideas. Thus Aristotle denied the independent existence of Forms, affirming that Plato had been misled into attributing independent, substantive existence to the common qualities we discerned in individual things and to our general ideas of those qualities.

The philosophy of the Middle Ages, known as Scholasticism, is a blend of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, a blend which, in the three centuries during which it flourished (from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, A.D.) exhibits progressively more of the influence of Aristotle and progressively less of that of Plato. Although, however, the doctrines of Plato steadily declined in importance through the Middle Ages the influence of the Forms remains apparent throughout the whole history of Scholasticism. Scholastic philosophy abounds in entities conceived more or less after the likeness of the Forms such as essences, potentialities, principles, causes, which are conceived not as ways of representing facts or as the properties of things, but as independent agencies, which are responsible for the occurrence of the phenomena they were invoked to explain. Because a stone fell to the earth when dropped, medieval philosophers were inclined to say that it possessed a "principle of gravity" which caused it to seek the earth's centre; the fact that quinine prevents a cold would be explained as due to its possession of a "cold-for-

bidding essence," which would be thought of as a Form with which the material of quinine had combined. In this way the influence of the Platonic Forms still made itself felt.

One school of medieval philosophers, the Realists, continued to maintain the Platonic doctrine in all its completeness, affirming that the Forms were principles of substance existing apart from objects and minds. In addition to the Forms, there were also, they held, the general ideas we have of them; there is, for example, a Form of whiteness, and there is also our general idea of whiteness, and, since it is not necessary, on the Realist view, for a Form to manifest itself in or to combine with matter in order that it may exist, there are Forms which have no material manifestation. Thus, for the Realist, chimerical entities, like unicorns, existed in the world of Forms.

The Nominalists, the opponents of the Realists, did not deny that we can form general notions of things, nor that there are factors in the external world from which these notions are derived. But they refused to assign to these factors independent existence, asserting that they are merely the common qualities observed in groups of physical objects, whiteness being the common quality possessed by both snow and cream, but not being something over and above the snow and the cream which are white. Hence our general notions are derived from an inspection of physical objects and do not precede such inspection.

William of Champeaux (1070-1121) was one of the leading Realists, Roscellinus (1050-1122), the teacher of Abelard, the protagonist of the Nominalists. Abelard (1079-1142) attacked both Realists and Nominalists; but his own views, which are inclined more to Nominalism than to Realism, are not as clear as could be wished, and are chiefly concerned with theological problems.

Both Realism and Nominalism were ultimately superseded by the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274), which may be regarded as the most

mature expression of the thought of the Middle Ages. St. Thomas Aquinas' account of substance and of the relation of substance to the qualities which substance exhibits, is a typical scholastic doctrine, and I propose, therefore, to describe it in some little detail. St. Thomas Aquinas is more or less directly under the influence of Aristotle, with the result that in his philosophy the Forms, though still retained in name, are mere semblances of their Platonic originals, a Form being regarded not as an entity distinct from the material world, but as that which subsists in, and only in, the matter to which it gives its shape and qualities. For St. Thomas Aquinas the universe is composed of a union between matter and forms.* The matter (*materia prima*) is in itself without form, but it is united with forms of various kinds which have been fixed by the Creator. The result of the combination is a particular kind of substance endowed with qualities, and it is this particular kind of substance which we call a material object. Matter may combine with a number of forms either successively or together, but the forms cannot themselves be transmuted one into another, except by divine agency. Thus, change in a piece of matter is due to the withdrawal of one form which previously combined with it, and its being replaced by another; the green leaf in spring is the same as the yellow leaf in autumn so far as its matter is concerned, but the form of greenness with which it was combined has given way to the form of yellowness.

Among the forms which a material object may exhibit, there is one that St. Thomas Aquinas called "the substantial form." The substantial form is that which makes the object what it is; in the case of a leaf

* I shall henceforward drop the capital F, the smaller letter being more appropriate to the diminished dignity of the forms in St. Thomas's philosophy.

it would be "leafiness," in the case of a jug, "jugginess," and so forth. A thing's substance is the union of its *materia prima* with its substantial form. Any other qualities which it may possess, those, for example, in virtue of which we call the jug white or black, tall or squat, are termed accidents, since they are not essential to the jug's being a jug, and are due to the accidental union of the jug with the forms of whiteness or blackness, or tallness or squatness.

The ability of matter to change—that is, to take on a new form—arises from what is called its potentiality. This potentiality is latent until it is brought into play by an external act. Thus St. Thomas' account of what happens when water is boiled and turns into steam would be that the potentiality of the matter of which the water is composed to take on the substantial form of "steaminess," is transformed into actuality, or, as we should say, brought into play by the action of subjecting the water to the heat of the fire.

It is interesting to notice in connection with this doctrine how the full-blooded Forms of Plato, the inhabitants of a perfect and changeless world, which alone possess the full title to be called real, have been watered down until they become nothing more than the shaping agencies of the *materia prima*. That they cannot exist without the matter to which they give shape is clear from St. Thomas' doctrine of the soul. Man is a combination of soul and body, the body being the substance, which owes its qualities to the imposition of various forms upon the *materia prima*, and the soul the form, and St. Thomas goes out of his way to insist upon the necessity of the body to the soul, in order that there may be a soul at all. Hence, the soul could not survive the death of the mortal body unless it were provided with a new and glorified body, which is, in fact, what happens at death.

The questions discussed in this chapter have never been satisfactorily settled. They persist to-day in the

form of a controversy as to the precise relationship between universals and particulars. "Are universals* like whiteness," we ask, "something over and above the sum total of their particular instances, or are they merely the common qualities of different things?" The problems here involved, if treated in isolation, are incapable of solution, for the reason that they raise far-reaching issues which affect our general attitude to the universe as a whole and to the position and status of mind within the universe. Since, therefore, our views with regard to the existence and nature of universals will be determined by our philosophy as a whole, it is not desirable to discuss further as a separate question the issues raised in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

RATIONALISM—DESCARTES AND LEIBNIZ

THE word Rationalism has in philosophy a different significance from that which it possesses in ordinary life. A rationalist according to common usage is a person who insists on applying his reason to theological questions and ethical problems, instead of trusting to faith or insight or allowing himself to be guided by tradition. As the application of reason to theological and ethical questions has usually had a disastrous effect upon orthodox beliefs, a rationalist is generally found to be an agnostic, if not a sceptic.

In philosophy the significance of the word Rationalism is almost precisely the reverse. One of the great

* The modern term for forms.

questions with which philosophy has been historically concerned is: How do we obtain our knowledge, and what is its validity? There are, broadly speaking, two answers to this question in the history of philosophy, the first of which is the rationalist answer. It is roughly to the effect that the mind is provided with a number of ready-made principles or faculties, and that it only needs to reason in accordance with these principles and to use these faculties to discover the whole truth about everything. Just as a mathematician in his study could, provided he reasoned well enough, deduce by sheer process of reasoning the whole of mathematics from one or two fundamental axioms, so, it was thought, the philosopher, provided he was a good enough philosopher, could discover the truth about the universe by the same methods. Hence a rationalist philosopher was one who took the view that reason itself, unaided by observation, can provide us with philosophical knowledge, which is also true knowledge. Now, if the universe were like a mathematical problem, the claim put forward by the philosophical rationalist on behalf of reason could be sustained. But unfortunately the universe is not like mathematics; it exhibits necessity, and, in so far as it does so, may legitimately be tackled by reason; but it exhibits contingency as well. An example of a necessary fact is that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This fact is necessary because it follows necessarily from the definition of a Euclidean triangle; because a triangle is what it is, this is necessarily a fact about it. Facts of this kind can be discovered by process of reasoning. Contingent facts do not follow from anything; they just are, whether we like it or not, and there is no sort of necessity about them. For example, the fact that a substance with the specific gravity of gold should be yellow is a fact which no amount of reasoning will enable us to discover, because there is nothing reasonable about it; hence, in opposition to the rationalist

philosophers there grew up a school of thought which insisted that, if you wanted to know what the universe was like, the only way was to go and look, which is, broadly speaking, the method of science. To put the point in another way, we may say that although reasoning will tell you what will follow from the fact that x exists, reasoning cannot tell you whether x does exist. Observation alone can inform us of the nature of what exists. Those who have insisted that observation or experience of fact is the basis of knowledge are known as Empirical philosophers, from the Greek word *ἐμπειρία*, which means experience. Empiricists who have emphasised the actual brute facts of the world have tended to arrive at sceptical conclusions with regard to such questions as the existence of design or purpose in the universe, or the ability of mind to act freely. That the universe is ultimately spiritual in character, or that God exists, are facts, if facts they are, which are certainly not given in sensation, and, in denying that anything could be known except through the medium of sense experience, empiricists have usually found themselves unable to admit the existence and efficacy of spiritual agencies. Thus their philosophies have been practical rather than idealistic in tendency, and their effect has been to confirm the outlook of the scientist and the man of hard common sense. There are exceptions to this generalisation, but it is true in the main. Rationalist philosophers who have relied upon the operations of the reasoning faculty for knowledge about the universe have tended to arrive at conclusions which are more conformable with our aspirations, affirming that the universe is fundamentally spiritual and is, therefore, such as we should wish to inhabit. The existence of God, for example, can be proved in a number of different ways by reasoning. Hence, when the brute facts of experience have seemed to contradict the spiritual character of the reality which reason has affirmed, it has been easy to show that the world revealed to us by our sense experience is in some

sense illusory, presenting an appearance which belies the reality to which philosophical reasoning points. Thus Rationalism in philosophy has issued in beliefs which are directly opposed to those of the rationalists of ordinary terminology.

Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716), and Spinoza (1632-1677) are rationalists in the philosophical sense just indicated; the English philosophers, Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753), and Hume (1711-1776) are the founders of the empirical school. With the views of Berkeley we shall deal in the next chapter; in this one we shall be concerned with the philosophies of Descartes and Leibniz.

We pointed out above that, if the universe were fundamentally of the same nature as a problem in mathematics, then it would be possible to discover the truth about it by the process of reasoning from self-evident premises. Descartes and Leibniz were both eminent mathematicians, and their philosophies are accordingly markedly mathematical in character. Affirming, that is to say, that we possess certain knowledge independently of experience, they proceeded to use their reason to deduce what the universe must be like in order to account for our having such knowledge. The question whether we do in fact have knowledge independently of experience (such knowledge is known as *a priori* knowledge) is exceedingly controversial. The most apparently convincing examples of it belong to the realms of logic and mathematics. In order that we may realise how the existence of *a priori* knowledge is possible, let us take as an example our knowledge of the fact that two and two make four. How do we come to know this fact? It is, no doubt, necessary in the first place that we should have some actual experience of concrete objects such as counters. The child learning arithmetic actually handles such objects, and is made to realise that any pair of them, when combined with any other pair of them, makes four. The next stage

is the realisation of the truth, that this fact in no way depends upon the nature of the objects counted in order that it may be a fact; that it is, in short, a fact not only with regard to those objects which have been actually counted, but with regard to all objects of whatever kind, both those which have been counted and those which have not. No additional number of instances is, therefore, required to establish the truth of the general proposition that two and two make four, which is seen to be independent of any of the instances by which it happens to have been verified.

When we grasp the truth of a general mathematical proposition of this kind, our minds make a jump from the actual instances in which the truth of the proposition has been verified to the realisation of the truth of all instances of it, both verified and unverified—that is to say, to the apprehension of the general proposition itself. Now, since the general proposition embraces instances which have not been experienced, our knowledge of it cannot be based entirely upon experience. Experience of instances, though necessary to draw our attention to this piece of general knowledge, does not itself constitute its sole ground, nor does our knowledge of the general proposition, once it has been obtained, depend upon the instances we have examined. One way of putting this is to say that although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not all spring from it, and the knowledge which does not spring from experience is what is called *a priori*. It is knowledge which we have had, in a sense, all the time, but to the existence of which the instances actually experienced have been necessary to draw our attention.

In asserting that there is knowledge of this kind the rationalists were right, and the empiricists, in so far as they denied it, were wrong. Although, therefore, we usually find it impossible to agree with Descartes that we do, in fact, know *a priori* many of the things which he thought we did, we may agree

with him that this sort of knowledge is at least possible. If we assume that there is *a priori* knowledge, then it will follow that we know many things that we shall be unable to prove; that they should be self-evident to the intellect will be a sufficient guarantee of their truth. Thus we find Descartes saying that knowledge is given by the clear vision of the intellect; that I should clearly and distinctly conceive something in my mind is, in other words, for him a sufficient reason for regarding what I clearly and distinctly conceive as true. It is, therefore, unfortunate that we should be unable to agree with regard to many of the things which Descartes clearly and distinctly conceived that they are true. For example, Descartes set himself to doubt everything that he reasonably could, and came to the conclusion that the only thing that he could not doubt by any possibility was the fact that he was doubting; if he was doubting, he was thinking, a process which implied that he was a self-conscious reflective being. From this he deduced the famous proposition which is the foundation of his metaphysics, "I think, therefore I am."

In this apparently incontrovertible statement there are two serious difficulties. The first is the inference from the fact of consciousness to the existence of a personal, continuing ego underlying consciousness. Because there is consciousness Descartes assumed that there must be an "I" to be conscious, and that the "I" who is conscious at one moment is identical with the "I" who is conscious at the next. There is no ground for this assumption; the unity of the self depends upon memory, which links together a string of different psychical events, each of which, taken separately, is more certain than the string of events as a whole. When Descartes speaks of "I" he is postulating a mythical, continuing entity, the self, to which the successive psychical states happen, but which is nevertheless other than the states through which it passes, when we have empirical evidence only for a

succession of states. There is, in other words, no *a priori* knowledge of the self; there is only experience of a given psychical state.

The remark "I think, therefore I am" is in the second place unfortunate, because it suggests that mind knows itself more easily than it knows its objects, a suggestion which is presently found to lead to the assertion that mind only knows its own states. The belief that the objects of our knowledge are mental, a belief which was supported by very convincing arguments by the philosopher Berkeley, has given to philosophy an unfortunate subjectivist bias from which it is only now beginning to recover.

Following out the implications of his initial proposition, Descartes was led to maintain a sharp distinction between mind and what was not mind, a distinction which involved in its turn a complete separation of mind from body. The science of dynamics was rapidly developing in Descartes' time, and seemed to show that, given certain data, the motions of matter could be calculated mathematically; if this were true, the motions of matter were mechanical and determined. Now, the body was a collection of material particles; therefore the motions of the body were mechanical and determined, and, if the mind were part of or continuous with the body, this conclusion would be true also of the mind. This result was distasteful to philosophers who wanted to believe that mind was free, and taken in connection with Descartes' original remark "I think, therefore I am," which implies, as I pointed out above, that the primary objects of mind's knowledge are its own states and not objects external to itself, led him to maintain that the mind was completely independent of bodily influences.

The Supreme Substance, namely God, had, he held, created two substances, mind and matter; the essence of the mind is thought, and of matter extension or occupancy of space. So different are these two substances that they cannot possibly interact, and the

followers of Descartes were led, therefore, to maintain that there is no effect of mind upon body or of body upon mind. Mind and body, according to this view, proceed on two parallel lines, but matters are so arranged that an event in the one is always accompanied by an event in the other. Thus, the fact that my body assumes a horizontal position when I will to lie down, does not mean that there is any causal connection between my willing and the movements of my body, any more than the fact of two perfectly accurate clocks ticking at the same moment implies that there is a connection between them. What it does point to is the active benevolence of God, who has provided for a continuous and miraculous synchronisation between mental and bodily events, without which human beings would be unable to survive. The knowledge of God's benevolent intervention in the affairs of the world is, it must be presumed, given *a priori*. The gulf which Descartes established between mind and body has had disastrous results for psychology, which has been engaged ever since in a more or less unsuccessful attempt to put together the pieces of the unity which Descartes destroyed. The difficulties of bringing together the two substances which Descartes so sharply divided are, indeed, almost insurmountable. If mind be really as different from matter as Descartes represented it to be, if mind and matter have no single attribute in common, it is impossible to conceive how they can ever establish contact much less interact with each other. The attributes of matter are shape, size, texture, weight, occupancy of space, and so forth; those of mind are wishes, volitions, thoughts, and ideas. Now, one piece of matter can affect another in virtue of the fact that each possesses qualities in common; a roller, for example, can crush a daisy since both have size, shape, and weight. But how can a roller crush a thought or be affected by a wish? If, therefore, we regard mind and matter as distinct substances, it seems impossible to explain their interaction

except on the assumption of an indefinitely repeated series of divine miracles.

The resort to the benevolent intervention of God by philosophers in a difficulty was a feature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the operations of divine goodness in earthly affairs are invoked even more frequently in Leibniz's philosophy than in that of Descartes. Leibniz (1646-1716) rejected Descartes' dualism between mind and matter, but accepted his view of the impossibility of interaction between different substances. Of these different substances, which he called "spiritual monads,"* he held that there was an infinite number. Since no monad could interact with any other monad, there could be no causal connection between anything that happens in one monad and anything that happens elsewhere in the universe. Nevertheless, Leibniz believed that there was a point-to-point correspondence between the development of one monad and that of the others, so that any event in one is accompanied by corresponding events in all the others. Since each monad registers all the events which occur in all the other monads that there are, we may say that each monad reflects or is a mirror of the universe. We cannot, however, suppose that one monad knows another one, since, if it did, it would be causally affected by the monad known, and we are explicitly told that the connection between it and the other monads is not a casual one. For this reason Leibniz called the monads "windowless," the word being intended to signify that each monad is completely shut up within the world of its own experience. The fact that the monads, although they do not know each other and are not affected by each other, nevertheless keep step, is to be explained by the conception of the pre-established harmony of the universe, a

* The word monad is usually employed to denote an ultimate spiritual unit, just as the word atom means an ultimate material unit.

harmony which is the work of the Creator, who ordered everything in the universe in the best possible manner. Our knowledge of the existence of this harmony must again be presumed to be *a priori*, since, as Voltaire showed in *Candide*, attempts to demonstrate it by experience are not as successful as could be wished. Leibniz's system, fantastic as it may seem, is important, not only on its own account, but also because it laid one of the foundations of the philosophy of Idealism, another line of approach to which will be pursued in the next chapter. According to Idealism, matter is an illusion and everything in the world is mental. The way for this conception had, as we have seen, already been prepared by Descartes' view that the mind has direct knowledge only of its own mental states. Leibniz's philosophy reinforces the same conclusion in two ways.

In the first place, let us ask what is our chief reason for believing in the existence of matter? The answer of the plain man would be that we are made directly aware of it by the experience of the outside world which we have through our senses. We seem, that is to say, when we perceive an object, to be brought into contact with something which is other than our own minds, but which produces an effect upon our minds, the effect being that which makes us say that we are seeing the object. To accept this common-sense account of perception would be, for Leibniz, tantamount to admitting that one monad could influence or affect another, since, as there are only monads in the universe, the apparently lifeless external object is really a collection of monads. Therefore, Leibniz regarded perception not as a process in which an object perceived affects a perceiving monad, but as an event in the perceiving monad which runs parallel with a similar event in the perceived monad.

From this it follows that we are never aware of any happening which is not a happening in ourselves; hence, we never experience an external world at all.

Since the happenings in ourselves, of which we are aware, are mental events, like thoughts, feelings, volitions, and so forth, the inference is that the world is composed of such events. It is not very clear why, if Leibniz had really, as his theory required him to maintain, developed a complete independence of everybody and everything else, he should have believed in the existence of anything except himself. If the answer is that his knowledge of other monads was *a priori* knowledge, and, as such, not derived from experience but given to him by God to begin with, it is necessary to inquire how he came to know that there was a God to endow him with *a priori* knowledge. He could only know of God's existence *a priori*, yet, unless there is a God, *a priori* knowledge is robbed of its validity and its certainty.

In apparent contradiction to the conclusion that we never perceive anything outside ourselves, Leibniz held that our belief in matter was the result of our confused way of perceiving the world. The monads vary in levels of mental development. A man's body, for example, is a group of innumerable monads, but his mind or soul, which is the central or guiding monad of the group, consists of one monad only. The monads have views of the world which vary in clearness according to their level of development, inferior monads mirroring the world, in the manner already explained, more obscurely than superior ones. The vision of even such a superior kind of monad as the human mind is infected with some degree of confusion, as a result of which we see the world as matter extended in space, instead of as a collection of mental monads. Only to God, who is the supreme monad, does the world appear as it really is, as a collection of self-contained monads.

There is thus introduced a distinction between reality and appearance, between the world as it really is and the world as it falsely appears to the partial vision of limited beings, the consequences of which

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are highly important in later philosophy. Some of these consequences we shall consider in connection with the philosophy of Hegel in Chapter V. For the present, it is sufficient to point out that some distinction of this kind is clearly necessary for any idealist philosophy, for any theory, that is to say, which regards the universe as fundamentally mental, since the universe as it appears is obviously nothing of the sort.

Thus Leibniz's conception of the partial, and therefore erroneous, view of the universe which is taken by the monads, provides the second foundation upon which subsequent idealist structures were based. It is important, however, to point out that, while most idealist thinkers who have maintained the distinction between appearance and reality have argued also that plurality (the existence of many different things in the universe) is an illusion and that reality is an all-embracing unity, Leibniz believed that plurality was ultimate, holding that reality was constituted by infinite numbers of diverse monads. These monads were not in any sense included in or absorbed by the supreme monad who is God.

CHAPTER IV

IDEALISM—I. BERKELEY

PERHAPS the most important movement in the history of philosophy is that known as Idealism. Idealism has historically assumed a number of different forms, but all idealists concur in regarding matter as being in some sense unreal. The term was originally used to describe the view that the objects of our knowledge are our own ideas, but this by no means exhausts its usage. For example, philosophers who hold that there is only one thing in the universe and that the apparent differ-

ences between things are unreal, are also called "idealists." We shall give some of the grounds for this latter belief in our next chapter; in the present chapter we shall be concerned solely with that form of Idealism which asserts that, whether there are or are not entities in the universe which are not mental, it is true at least of everything that we know or can know that it is mental. If this assertion can be satisfactorily established, it affords considerable ground for the presumption that the universe, as a whole, is mental, since we have no reason for assuming that the parts of the universe that we do not know are of an entirely different character from those that we do.

The theory, then, which we propose to outline holds that the objects of our knowledge are mental entities, that they are, that is to say, sensations and ideas. This view was advocated early in the eighteenth century by Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753), and the arguments which I am going to give are, in the main, derived from his writings.

It will be desirable to preface these arguments with a few remarks designed to place Berkeley's philosophy in its proper historical perspective. In the last chapter I endeavoured to give an account of the difference between Rationalism and Empiricism, a difference which consists chiefly in the rationalist's assertion of the existence of *a priori* knowledge, and in the empiricist's denial of that assertion.

Descartes, it will be remembered, held that the mind is equipped initially with certain general ideas, in virtue of which it knows a number of truths *a priori*. Although experience may be necessary to elicit this knowledge, to bring it, as it were, into consciousness, the knowledge is not itself derived from experience: The principles of mathematics and the laws of logic were thought to be known in this way, and the rationalists' contention was that by reasoning in accordance with these laws and conformably with certain other general principles also known *a priori*,

it was possible to arrive at true conclusions about the universe. We have seen how the conclusions at which Leibniz arrived by *a priori* methods were idealistic in character, in the sense that they purported to show that the universe was composed of experiencing units called "monads," and Descartes' philosophy, though he admitted the existence of matter which he thought was revealed to us *a priori*, tended to show that matter could not be known by sense experience.

Berkeley's immediate predecessor, Locke (1632-1704), the first of the empiricists, had severely criticised the assumptions and methods of the rationalists. In particular, he endeavoured to show that we have no innate ideas in virtue of which we possess knowledge which has been derived otherwise than from experience, and that all our knowledge is, therefore, derived from experience. This amounts to a denial of the existence of *a priori* knowledge. Berkeley accepted this part of Locke's philosophy, and devoted considerable space to proving that there are no such things as abstract, general ideas. The rationalists, for example, had maintained that the mind possesses a general idea of such an entity as a triangle, which constitutes an example of *a priori* knowledge. When, they said, you think of a triangle you are obviously not thinking of any particular triangle, but of a general concept of a triangle, which you possess *a priori*. It is because you have this general concept, as it were, to begin with, that, when you come across particular triangles, you recognise them as special examples of your general concept. Otherwise, unless you somehow knew what a triangle was to begin with, you would never recognise an actual triangle, when you met it in everyday experience. As Plato put it, we can never have new knowledge, for either we know what we want to know already, in which case our knowledge will not be new, or we do not, in which case, when we come across what we want to know, we shall not be able to recognise it as the thing we were looking for. The

rationalists' answer to this difficulty was to deny that our knowledge of the first particular triangle met with in experience is new, the denial being based on the ground that we know, and always have known, a triangle *a priori*. We have, that is to say, an abstract general idea of a triangle, and in virtue of this general idea, when we meet a particular triangle for the first time we recognise it as belonging to the type exemplified by the general idea.

Now, Berkeley was at pains to deny this conclusion. To admit that we have a general idea of a triangle, which is other than our experience of individual triangles, would be to admit the existence of *a priori* knowledge, since, as nobody has ever experienced a triangle which was not an individual triangle, the general idea of a triangle, if there were such an idea, could not have been reached through experience. Therefore, we find Berkeley roundly asserting that, when we think of a triangle, what is a fact in front of our minds is not a general, abstract, idea, but the idea of a particular individual triangle that we happen to have experienced.

But Locke, in Berkeley's view, had not pushed his denial of *a priori* knowledge far enough. He had, for example, maintained that there is a thing called "substance," which is, as it were, the raw material of the universe to which are attached all the qualities in virtue of which we distinguish one thing from another. Now, Berkeley's philosophy, as we shall see in a moment, is devoted to proving that we never have experience of this substance, but only of the qualities which substance, if it existed, might be expected to exhibit. If, then, we never experience substance, we can only know it *a priori* in virtue of the fact that we have a general idea of it. But, if we are consistent in our denial of the existence of *a priori* knowledge, it is clear that we cannot know substance *a priori*; therefore we have no general idea of it, therefore we cannot know it at all, therefore there is no reason to suppose

that it exists. If there is no substance in the universe, there is no matter in the universe either; therefore all that exist are mind and the qualities which mind knows. Thus, through his denial of the existence of *a priori* knowledge Berkeley arrives at an idealistic view of the universe, which is not very far removed, so far at least as its picture of the outside world is concerned, from that of Leibniz.

We are now in a position to consider the positive arguments which Berkeley uses to establish his view that the only things we experience are mental entities.

Let us suppose that I press my tongue against my teeth and ask the question: "What is it that I experience or am aware of?" At first sight the answer would appear to be: "I am aware of my teeth." But is this answer really correct? Is not what I really experience a feeling in my tongue—a feeling caused by the contact between my tongue and my teeth, but a feeling, nevertheless, and, being a feeling, something that is mental? Suppose now that I press my fingers against the table, is what I experience the table? Again the obvious answer proves on examination to be incorrect. The immediate object of my experience, that of which I am aware, is a sensation in my fingers, a sensation in this case of hardness, smoothness, and coolness. Let us take a further example. If I stand two feet away from the fire, I experience heat, and say that the heat is a property of the fire. If, however, I move nearer to the fire, the heat increases in intensity until it becomes a pain. Now, the pain is clearly in me and not in the fire; since, then, the pain is only a more intense degree of the heat, the inference is that the heat also was a sensation of mine, and not a property of the fire. The leg of a cheese-mite is so small that, except with the aid of a microscope, I cannot see it. Are we, then, to suppose that the cheese-mite cannot see its own leg? This seems unlikely. We must infer, then, that the size of the cheese-mite's leg varies according to the

nature of the mind perceiving it, that the leg has, in other words, one size for the cheese-mite and another for ourselves. But the leg cannot have two different sizes at the same time; hence the size turns out to be a property of our seeing, and not of the object seen; it is, in other words, not an intrinsic property of the object seen, but relative to and dependent upon the nature of the perceiver's mind.

By similar arguments it can be shown that all the qualities apparently possessed by material objects in their own right turn out on examination to be feelings or sensations or ideas on the part of the perceiver. This conclusion is reinforced by the scientific account of perception. What precisely is it that, according to the scientist, occurs when we see something? Taking first the case of visual sensations, we find that their causation is roughly described in the following terms: A physical object sends out rays of light which, after travelling through the ether, impinge upon the optical nerves; the resulting disturbance in the optical nerves is conveyed along neural chords to the brain, where it causes a further disturbance in the cerebral cortex. It is our consciousness of this disturbance in the cerebral cortex which constitutes our seeing of the object. Similarly with regard to hearing; a sound is a vibration in the atmosphere; this vibration impinges upon our ear-drums; the effect produced upon the ear-drums is conveyed by the nerves to the brain; here it causes a disturbance of which we become conscious, and our consciousness of the cerebral disturbance is called hearing the sound.

Describing this process in metaphorical language, we may say that the brain is like a dark cabinet containing a brightly lit screen which is illuminated by consciousness. The objects* in the external world

* This conception, as will appear in a moment, does not represent Berkeley's view, because it retains the notion of the external object. It coincides more

which we experience stimulate our senses; the stimulus is conveyed by the sense organs and nerves into the dark cabinet, with the result that images or reflections of the objects causing the stimulus are cast upon the lighted screen. Hence, we may say that what is called knowing an object consists in the appearance of an image or reflection of the object which, as we say, we know, on the screen in the brain which is lit up by our consciousness. Knowledge, therefore, is a process in which three distinct entities are involved: the knowing mind (*a*), the external object (*b*), and the representations or images of the object in the brain (*c*): (*a*) always knows (*c*) but never does and never can know (*b*), since, whenever it tries to do so, the images or reflections of (*b*)—that is to say, (*c*)—insist on intervening and being known instead. Having proceeded so far, we may now put the question: Is it really necessary to retain (*b*) at all? If it be a fact that we never know (*b*), we cannot know anything about it; we cannot, therefore, know that it exists or even that it has the property of being able to cause (*c*).

But, it may be urged, there must be something to cause the sensations and ideas which, according to the preceding analysis, are the objects of our knowledge; there must, in short, be a world of objects external to and independent of ourselves, even if these objects are very unlike the representations of them in consciousness which we already know. This, indeed, is the position of Locke, who, as I pointed out earlier in the chapter, retained a belief in the existence of substance. Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Secondary qualities, such as colour, temperature, taste, he showed by arguments similar to those employed above to be sensations or ideas in the mind of the perceiver; but primary

nearly with that of Locke, whose view is sometimes called Representationalism, because it suggests that we know the images or *representations* of external objects.

qualities such as shape, weight, position in space, number, and so forth, he regarded as independent of the perceiver, and as existing, therefore, in the external world in their own right. And as they could not exist *in vacuo*, he postulated an entity called "substance" to act as a kind of foundation or substratum for the primary qualities, a something in which they could inhere.

For Locke, therefore, there was an external world independent of perception, which was composed of substance and of the primary qualities inhering in substance. Berkeley departs from Locke in two particulars; he abolishes the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and, as we have seen, he eliminates substance.

Let us take each point separately. So far as the qualities are concerned, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is clearly arbitrary. Any arguments which show that a secondary quality, heat, for example, is an idea in the mind of the perceiver apply also to size or hardness. When we were engaged in showing how the qualities of the alleged external object turned out to be not properties of the object, but characteristics of our perception of the object, we did not find it necessary to make any exceptions. The hardness of the table and the size of the cheese-mite's leg were revealed on analysis as properties relative to and dependent upon the nature of the perceiver, and, therefore, in the last resort, as ideas in the perceiver's mind, just as evidently as the heat of the fire.

This brings us to the second point. Let us suppose that you take an object and one by one strip away all its qualities. What is left? Consider, for example, a chocolate. A chocolate is brown, soft, sticky, and sweet to the taste. Let us abstract these qualities one by one and consider what remains. What is it that had the qualities, but now has them no longer? We may say, of course, that what is left is the chocolate

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minus its colour, consistency and taste, but is this residue anything at all? If it is, it is only so in virtue of such qualities as we may have left remaining in it; if these qualities, too, were taken away, there would be literally nothing left. There is, that is to say, no substratum or foundation in which the qualities inhere, which is itself without qualities and other than they. Locke's substance is, in other words, a pure myth. If, therefore, the qualities turn out to be ideas in the mind of the perceiver, and if there is no substance or material foundation besides the qualities, there is nothing left except mind. Matter, therefore, is an illusion. This is not to say that the tables and chairs which we know in everyday life do not exist, but merely that they turn out on analysis to be ideas in the mind of the perceiver. Hence, their existence consists in their being perceived or known. According to Bishop Berkeley the ideas we know do, in fact, exist independently of *our* knowledge, since they continue to exist as ideas in the mind of God. The whole of what we call the external world, therefore, continues to exist, in Berkeley's theory, even when we cease to perceive it, because God's perception sustains it. It is, however, clear that, unless we are prepared to follow Berkeley in introducing God to give independent reality to a world whose existence, apart from knowledge, has been destroyed, we are reduced to the position that the only things which exist are our mental states and our knowledge of them.

CHAPTER V

IDEALISM—II. KANT AND HEGEL

IN the last chapter I described the philosophy sometimes known as Subjective Idealism, which asserts that the objects of my knowledge are my own sensations and ideas. This assertion is tantamount to the belief that the succession of ideas and sensations which constitute my experience are the sole entities in the universe; at any rate, if anything else does exist, I cannot know it. Philosophy could not long rest in this position, which is known as Solipsism, and later forms of Idealism consist, therefore, very largely of a series of attempts to escape from the conclusions to which Berkeley's arguments, when logically pressed, as they were by Hume, seemed to lead. Of these attempts the most famous are those of Kant and Hegel. Their philosophies are unfortunately exceedingly difficult, and I cannot do more than indicate in the briefest outline some of the positions which they maintained.

Kant (1724-1804) held that there were two distinct realms inhabited by two distinct classes of entities: there was the realm of things as they are, and the realm of things as they appear to the knowing mind. Because of this distinction we can never know anything as it really is. What is the reason for this assertion?

According to Kant the mind is furnished initially with a number of general ideas or concepts, which he called "principles of understanding," which form a sort of framework into which everything that we know is fitted, and with which it must conform. In being made to fit into and conform with this framework it is insensibly altered. Putting the point in another way, we may say that, in order that a thing may be known, it must satisfy certain conditions; these con-

ditions are imposed upon it by the knowing mind, so that, as known, it is literally a different thing from what it was before it was known. An example will serve to make the point plainer. Let us suppose that I am born with a pair of blue spectacles permanently affixed to my nose; everything that I see will be blue, and I shall affirm, therefore, that blueness is a universal quality of objects. In this I shall be mistaken; blueness, in the case in question, will be not a property which belongs to things in their own right, but a quality imposed upon them by the peculiar conditions of my seeing; that things should appear to me to be blue is, in other words, a condition of my seeing them at all. Now, according to Kant, the mind is fitted with a number of different sets of mental spectacles which insensibly transform everything that the mind knows, just as, in the instance given, the blue spectacles altered what my eyes saw. In point of fact, Kant held that there are two different kinds of mental spectacles. The first, which are called "forms of intuition," are time and space. All our sense impressions are subject to time, and all those which come to us from outside to space. As a consequence, time and space pervade everything that we know of the external world.

When we experience this external world, what is actually given to us is a crude, formless stuff, which Kant calls "matter." This stuff is apprehended under the forms of intuition, as a result of which the things we perceive appear to us to be related together in time and in space, so that everything we know is here or there, and then or now. As the result, therefore, of the operations of the first set of mental spectacles, the world appears to us to be in time and in space.

The second set of mental spectacles, which Kant called "categories" or "principles of understanding," now comes into play. Examples of these are quality, quantity, substance, and causality. The categories endow what we perceive with those universal attributes which everything that we know is found

to possess. When we come to reflect on the nature of the things we know, we realise that each has substance, is of a certain quantity, exhibits certain qualities, and is at once the cause and the effect of something else. When, therefore, Kant says we apprehend the given material of experience under the forms of the categories, he means that the mind combines what comes to it from without with a number of mental constituents, of which quantity, quality, and the rest are examples. Hence, the object we know is a composite object; it consists of a non-mental ingredient, a sort of raw stuff or material which has been worked up by the forms of intuition and the categories into something we can not only know, but recognise. It is by means of the categories, that is to say, that we can recognise the black patch surmounted by a pink blob that we see in the street as a man.

The above by no means exhausts Kant's account of the mental functions which we perform upon the raw material which is given to us in sensation, but it will serve to indicate the kind of unceasing mental activity which he believes to be going on all the time as an accompaniment, or rather as an integral part of experience. The world as we know it, the world, that is to say, that our minds have insensibly transformed in the process of knowing, is called by Kant the world of *phenomena*. Of this world Berkeley's conclusions are true; its existence, that is to say, consists in being known, and, if it were to cease to be known, it would cease to exist. But to the world as it is, the world that is independent of our knowledge, called by Kant "the world of *noumena*" (*noumena* means things in themselves), Berkeley's conclusions do not apply.

Kant's system seeks to provide an answer to another of the fundamental questions of philosophy, the question, namely, of why it is that the laws of our thinking should apply to the behaviour of things. The laws of logic and the formulæ of mathematics are mental products; they are, that is to say, *prima facie*

statements about the way in which the mind works. We think that three and two make five, that every effect must have a cause, and that a tree cannot both be and not be a beech, because our minds are made like that. It is conceivable that creatures with minds differently constituted—Martians, for example, or white ants—might hold different views. Certainly there is no necessary reason why the universe should be of such a kind as to conform to the way in which our minds happen to work, why, in other words, the truth that three and two make five, a truth reached by purely mental processes, should apply to the behaviour of things.

This question is raised in an acute form by the possibility and the success of science. The procedure of the scientist occupies a position midway between the process of reasoning and that of sense experience. Like mathematics or logic, it involves reasoning; but unlike them, it checks the results of reasoning by the appeal to sense experience; scientific conclusions, in short, are verified. The existence and validity of mathematics provide no problem, for here reason operates entirely within her own sphere, and the results at which she arrives have not to be checked by experience. Again, there is no problem in the fact that sense experience should be possible, since we have five senses through which this experience comes. The puzzle is why the conclusions of the former should apply to the raw material provided by the latter? That they do, in fact, apply, the success of science demonstrates, the method of science being to employ formulæ arrived at by reasoning process, and apply them to the behaviour of things. Science arrives, for example, at a general law like the law of gravitation, and predicts that the behaviour of things which have never been experienced will conform to it. And, when the experiment is made, they do, in fact, conform. A scientific law is, in other words, the result of the application of mathematical and logical reasoning to actual experience, and

the problem is, why should things behave according to the expectations which reasoning leads us to form of them?

Now, Kant's answer to this problem brings us back to the controversy between the rationalists and the empiricists, at which we have already glanced in Chapter III. That there is a distinction between the things we experience through our senses and the things we know by means of our understanding, between the pairs of objects which the child adds together to make four and the general proposition that two and two make four, is obvious. Since, then, our general ideas are other than the individual particular things we immediately experience through our senses, the question arises: Why should our general ideas, which are *a priori*, be true of or apply to the things we immediately experience; why, to take a concrete example, should the general law that the attraction between bodies varies inversely with the square of the distance that separates them, apply to the things we know by means of our senses?

It was this problem which more than any other had led to the controversy between rationalists and empiricists. The rationalists had tended to reason away the actual stuff of our sense experience; they were concerned with the world as it ought to be, not in the moral sense of the word "ought," but in the sense in which ought implies necessity. In mathematics, for example, everything follows necessarily from everything else, and there is no place for anything which just is, in the sense that it could not have been deduced from something else. Hence, the rationalists, when faced with facts like the specific gravity of gold and its yellow colour, a combination which just is, but which could not have been deduced, tended to ignore it. They left out, that is to say, the observation of actual fact. The empiricists, realising that no amount of reasoning will inform you of the nature of what actually exists, and that if, therefore,

you want to know what is, you must go and see, relied entirely upon sense experience for knowledge, affirming that there was nothing in knowledge which had not previously been sense experience. Just as the rationalists made no provision for our observation of actual fact, so the empiricists made no provision for the general principles governing our observation, the principles, for example, in virtue of which we arrange, compare, group together, or select from what we observe in order to form general ideas. They denied, in fact, the existence of general principles altogether. Thus, if the empiricists were right, reasoned knowledge was impossible; if the rationalists were right, it would be impossible to explain how there were things to know. Nevertheless, it was perfectly clear that we did reason about and arrange our sense impressions, and that conclusions reached by mental processes did, in fact, apply to the world around us. The problem was, therefore, to find a *modus vivendi* between the rationalists and the empiricists, a *modus vivendi* which would reconcile the empiricists' insistence upon the observation of actual fact as the raw material of our experience, with the general principles of reasoning which, as the rationalists had shown, were used in working up this raw material into knowledge.

It is to the solution of this difficulty that Kant applied himself. Given the problem that experience provides us only with the raw stuff of perception, but that we, nevertheless, form general principles to which Nature is found to conform, Kant's solution consists in effect in denying that the stuff of perception really is raw. In point of fact, he says, we never do have experience of things as they are. What we do know is not raw material coming to us direct from the outer world and therefore revealing the outer world as it is, but a composite object, which has already been worked up and modelled by our understandings in the process of being known. This being so, it is only to

be expected that it should conform to the general laws which our understanding prescribes. The rationalists' principles of reason apply, therefore, to the empiricists' raw material of experience because the material is not raw after all, but, if I may be forgiven the metaphor, has already been cooked in the process of reaching the understanding. Thus, the laws of thought apply to the world that we know—that is to say, to the world of phenomena—simply because that is a world which thought itself, in accordance with the principles of the understanding, has constructed. Whether they apply to things in themselves, we do not know; but this is of no importance since we never know things in themselves.

Kant's great contribution to philosophy is, therefore, to stress the activity of the experiencing subject. The mind in perception is not passive, but active. It acts as a lawgiver to Nature, prescribing to the world we know the forms and conditions under which it shall appear to us. Thus, when we come to ask how it is that we already have knowledge *a priori* about the world which appears to us, Kant answers that it is because this same knowledge has been at work in constructing what appears. The law of cause and effect is admittedly a piece of mental apparatus, but it is valid for all that in the world we know, since the world we know is also a product of the same mental apparatus. Thus, we know *a priori* of things only what we have ourselves put into them.

Kant's system is exposed to a number of serious objections, into which we cannot here enter. It should, however, be stated that nobody now maintains Kant's distinction between the world of phenomena and the world of noumena, at any rate, in the form in which Kant himself advanced it. Kant himself was, indeed, forced to abandon it when he proceeded to consider the problems of ethics. His ethical theory is peculiar, and, as it springs directly from his metaphysical view, I propose very briefly to outline it here. Kant divided

our mental faculties into three groups: the senses, the intellect, and the will. The senses and the intellect, as we have seen, are employed in manipulating, schematising, and generally working up into a form suitable for our knowledge the material which comes to us from the outside world. But, when we will something, we have, according to Kant, knowledge that is neither sensuous nor intellectual. There is no outside world here between which and us the intellect and the senses intervene; there are no forms of space and time through which our perceptions reach us. The exercise of the will brings with it a capacity for free activity, in virtue of which we can use our sensuous and intellectual knowledge as we please; it brings also a sense of emancipation both from the law of cause and effect which dominates the world of phenomena, and from the necessity by which the operations of reason are constrained.

Now, in so far as we act according to desire, Kant held that we are not free. The origin of our desires may be explained in one or other of two ways: they are either the result of events occurring in our body (for example, food is desired because of a deficiency of chemical substances in the body, sexual desires are bound up with the changes in the body which take place at puberty), or else they spring from and are conditioned by our dispositions and temperaments. In so far as you can say of a man, "He will fly into a rage, because he has a passionate disposition," you are predicting his actions in virtue of your knowledge of his temperament, and in so far as your prediction is correct, his desire and action are dictated by his temperament, and are not, therefore, free.

As creatures of desire we belong, for Kant, to the phenomenal world, and our feelings and the actions which spring from them are as much determined as the movements of matter in the physical world; they are, that is to say, subject to the law of cause and effect and are not, therefore, free. But, when we act

in accordance with the law which our will prescribes, we are lifted out of the phenomenal world and are in direct touch with the world of reality; and, in so far as man wills freely in accordance with the laws of his nature, he is himself *noumenal*.

Man as a creature of desire is subject to the law of cause and effect which governs the phenomenal world; but when he prescribes to himself, irrespective of circumstances and desires, the law of self-government and duty from which springs morality, he is free. What is more he is moral, for, since the will prescribes the moral law, to act freely—that is to say, in accordance with the will—is to act rightly. “There is nothing in the world—nay, even beyond the world,” said Kant, “. . . which can be regarded as good without qualification, saving alone a good will.” If we ask in what acting rightly consists, Kant’s answer is unfortunately not very helpful. What the will prescribes is that we should act in every case upon general principles which are intuitively recognised as morally binding. These general principles are of the kind which everybody acknowledges irrespective of their needs and circumstances, for example, that we should not tell lies, that kindness is better than cruelty, honesty better than deceit, and so forth. Nor are they in any way opposed to reason. On the contrary, if we investigate the deliverances of our will by means of the reason, which Kant called in this connection “the practical reason,” we realise that the general principles which the will prescribes are the only ones which are not self-contradictory. There is, for example, no contradiction inherent in the precept that everybody should tell the truth; but if, to return to an example we have already used, everybody were to lie, nobody would believe anybody else, and there would be no point, therefore, in lying. This is what Kant means by saying that wrong conduct is self-contradictory; it cannot be universalised without stultifying itself. Hence, Kant’s famous precept: “Act only according

to that maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law."

As an account of the nature and authority of our general moral principles, this doctrine, which depends upon Kant's metaphysical position, may command respect, but it gives us no guidance in the actual circumstances of daily life. Kant affirms, for example, that the will prescribes truth telling as a categorically binding general principle; as such it admits of no exceptions. But there are occasions in which the telling of a lie may be justified in actual life on the ground that the consequences of truth telling would be harmful. Ought we, for example, to tell the truth to a potential murderer, who asks where an innocent person whom he proposes to kill is hiding? Most people would say that we ought not, but, whatever view we take of the matter, Kant's universally binding principle affords us little assistance. It seems difficult in practice to decide between alternative courses of actions except by reference to their consequences, and this alternative criterion of right conduct, which the Utilitarians stressed,* is implicitly excluded by Kant's moral system.

Hegel (1770-1831) followed Kant in maintaining a distinction between the world of appearance and the world of reality, but in his philosophy the world of reality is differently conceived. Instead of containing the many noumena of Kant's system, it is or contains one thing only—namely, the Absolute, and this Absolute is not only reality itself, but the world of appearance also. The universe, in fact, is one all-embracing unity such that all distinctions are illusory, and plurality (the appearance, that is to say, of there being many things) unreal; the universe is also mental. How is this conclusion reached? Let me try to summarise the sort of considerations that Hegel stressed.

If we consider the nature of any object, we find

* See Chapter VIII.

that, in order that it may be completely understood, it involves a necessary reference to other objects; taken by itself it is not self-sufficient and not, therefore, intelligible. A hen's egg, for example, is less round than a ball, more brittle than leather, larger than a sparrow's egg, smaller than an ostrich's, and so forth. If these facts were not facts about the hen's egg, it would be a different object from what it is; hence, we may say that these facts contribute to its being what it is. Now, each fact implies a relationship on the part of the egg to some other object; hence, its relationships to other objects are constitutive of the nature or being of the egg, since, as we have seen, without them it would be a different egg. But the egg is related—*e.g.*, by relations of likeness or unlikeness—to everything in the universe; therefore everything that is must be taken into account and understood before we can completely know the egg, simply because everything that is is implied in the egg being what it is. Hence, reality is a single indivisible whole or unity, the parts of which are related by relations which constitute the parts, and are constituted in their turn by them. The differences between things are, therefore, unreal.

A similar conclusion applies to the processes of thought. Any so-called truth we like to assert involves the existence of the contrary untruth; this is the case not only with regard to isolated propositions, as, for example, that snow is white, but also with regard to theories which purport to be of universal application. The belief in free will, for example, is opposed by the contrary belief in determinism; each belief is irrefutable in relation to the facts with which it deals, yet, from the very circumstance of there being a contrary belief, neither taken by itself can be quite true. There must, then, be some wider truth which embraces both the partial truths asserted by the theories in question, by comprehending both theories within itself, and the mind, unable to rest in the incomplete truth, which

can be contradicted, will be driven onward to embrace the wider truth. This wider truth, in its turn, will be confronted with its contrary, together with which it will be subsumed and embraced within the scope of a still wider truth. This process of comprehending partial and opposing truths under wider formulations, which transcend them both, continues indefinitely until we reach the final truth under which all partial truths and contraries are subsumed, and in which they are reconciled. This final truth will be the whole truth about everything; to it, therefore, there will be no contrary. It is, moreover, related to the whole about which it is the truth, since it applies to it and is true of it; it must, therefore, according to the preceding argument about relations, be continuous with it, forming with it a single, indivisible unity.

Now, a truth is mental; it is a characteristic of thoughts and presupposes a mind; therefore the whole with which the final truth is one is also mental. We thus arrive at the Absolute, the most striking conception of Hegel's philosophy, which is the name he gives to reality; this reality is a single unified whole, comprehending within itself all distinctions, including the distinction between mind and its objects, and embracing all differences. Our minds being but partial aspects of the Absolute take a partial and, therefore, partially false view of the universe which they contemplate, seeing it as a bundle of isolated things; it is only to the Absolute's view of itself, to an inkling of which we are enabled to reach through philosophy, that the universe is revealed as a single, indivisible unity. From this doctrine there follows an important theory as to the nature of truth.

The problem of truth and error is one of the most difficult in philosophy, and we cannot discuss it at any length here. If, however, I briefly indicate what may be regarded as the common-sense view of truth, it will be easier to see in what respect the Hegelian philosophy departs from it.

We should normally say that truth is a property of ideas or judgments. Facts are real and judgments are true. If, for example, a train leaves King's Cross for Edinburgh at 10 a.m., then the departure of the train at this time is a fact. If I judge or assert that it does, then we should say that my judgment or assertion is true, and it would be regarded as true because there is a fact, which is other than my judgment, with which the judgment corresponds. Truth, then, consists in correspondence between the idea or judgment which is true and a fact. It is a property of judgments, but whether a judgment has or has not the property will depend upon something other than the judgment—namely, a fact. Now, in order that we may hold this view, it is clear that such things as facts must exist. There must, in other words, be an isolated fact, which is self-sufficient in itself, which can, that is to say, be understood apart from its relations to other facts, in order that the judgment which purports to be true may correspond with it. Now this, as we have seen, is just what Hegel's philosophy denies. According to Hegel, there is only one real fact in the universe—namely, the Absolute, and anything which is less than the Absolute is not entirely and completely a fact. It is linked on to other facts, by relations which are not distinct from the facts they relate, and no single idea can therefore correspond to it. The only idea which could correspond to the whole complex of facts, of which the fact with which we began forms a fragmentary or unreal part, is a universal idea about everything, that is to say, about the Absolute. And a universal idea about everything is part of and continuous with that which is its object, since, as we have seen, the distinction between thought and object of thought is an unreal distinction. Now, the notion of correspondence postulates two entities between which there may be correspondence; if, therefore, our analysis shows that, when we think about something, there are not two entities involved—namely, thought and

its object—but that thought and its object constitute an indissoluble unity, it is clear that the notion of correspondence as the meaning of truth must be given up. What is substituted is the notion of coherence or consistency. Truth consists, therefore, for Hegel, in the coherence of ideas one with another. Now, we have already seen that any single idea taken by itself involves the opposition of another contrary idea. The two ideas being contrary fail to cohere and are not, therefore, true. We are thus drawn forward to a wider idea which embraces them both within its scope, and so resolves the contradiction, in virtue of which they failed to cohere. This wider idea will, therefore, be truer than either of the partial ideas which are subsumed under it. The wider idea is opposed by its contrary, with which it also fails to cohere, and the two ideas are thus subsumed under a still wider idea, for which a still greater degree of truth may be claimed. But the truth of any single idea, however wide, must still be partial. For a single idea, when taken in isolation as one idea, is bereft of all the aspects and relations which link it on to other ideas and constitute it part of a whole, and it is thus different from what it would be when considered as a part of the whole. Now, if account were taken of all the relations of the partial idea to other partial ideas, we should be brought to the whole system of ideas for which alone absolute truth may be claimed. In other words, it is only in the Absolute that all the partial ideas are embraced and made to cohere, and only of the Absolute, therefore, that complete truth may be predicated. It follows that any partial truth is only partially true, a conclusion which applies both to the truth of Hegel's philosophy in general, and to his statement about the partial character of truth in particular.

CHAPTER VI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE

I MENTIONED in the second chapter the view of the philosopher Heraclitus that everything is in a state of flux or change, and described the use made by Plato of this conception in his theory of ideas. We have now to consider a development of Heraclitus' position which has figured prominently in modern philosophy.

The notion that everything is changing has derived considerable support from the scientific doctrine of evolution. Evolution shows that the history of life, from its earliest manifestations in the jelly-fish and the amoeba through the mesozoic reptiles and the vertebrate mammals to its latest representatives in the human race, is a process of continuous change and development. Attempts were made by the scientists of the last century to represent this process as a series of reactions to material influences, or of responses to physical stimuli. The evolution of life, they urged, is wholly explicable in terms of the adaptation of living creatures to their external environment, while, within the living creature itself, what is called the mind is a mere reflection or register of the events which occur in the body. Thus, the living is determined by the non-living, and within the living the mind is in all respects determined by the body.

This type of explanation is called mechanistic, since it conceives of the universe as a whole and of every living creature within the universe after the model of a machine. No part of the machine functions spontaneously, but every part is entirely determined by the activities of every other part to which it reacts. The universe, in short, is like the works of a gigantic clock. Someone, at some time or other, wound the clock up; thereafter it proceeds to function indefinitely through the mere automatic interaction of its parts. This is the

conception of the universe which the philosopher Bergson, the leading modern exponent of the philosophy of change, set himself to challenge.

The materialists maintain that life, itself an offshoot of matter, is entirely determined in respect of all its activities by the matter from which it sprang. Bergson urges, on the contrary, that matter is a creation of life and is relative to the needs of living organisms. He begins, therefore, by marshalling a number of considerations both biological and psychological against the materialist view of the living creature as a machine determined by its external environment, and of the mind as a mere reflection or register of bodily events. Into these considerations we cannot here enter; all that we can do is to state the conclusion to which, in the light of them, Bergson is led, which is that the facts of biology and psychology are only explicable on the assumption that there is an ever-changing, ever-developing force behind the movement of evolution which expresses itself in all the manifold forms of life. This force is not material, but is the very stuff of which our consciousness is made, and in order to understand its nature, it is necessary to reflect upon what the fact of consciousness, of our own consciousness, that is to say, involves. It is this inquiry which Bergson undertakes at the beginning of his best-known work, *Creative Evolution*.

At first sight consciousness appears to consist of a succession of psychical states, each of which is a single and independent entity, these states being strung together along something which is called the "ego," like beads on a necklace. But—as we saw when discussing Descartes' axiom, "I think, therefore I am"—reflection shows this conception to be erroneous; and the error consists more particularly in the fact that, when we admit that one state changes and gives way to another, we overlook the fact that it changes even while it persists. "Take," says Bergson, "the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a

motionless object. The object may remain the same; I may look at it from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light: nevertheless, the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had, even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration it accumulates." If this is the case with regard to our perception of external objects, it is even more true as a description of our internal states, our desires, our emotions, our willings, and so forth. The conclusion is, in Bergson's words, that "we change without ceasing, and the state itself is nothing but change." "There is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change at every moment: if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow."

It follows that there is no real difference between passing from one state to another and continuing in what is called the same state. We imagine such a difference because it is only when the continual change in any one state has become sufficiently marked to arrest our attention that we do, in fact, notice it, with the result that we assert that one state has given way to another. Thus, we postulate a series of successive mental states, because our attention is forced upon them in a series of successive mental acts. It is for the same reason that we tend to regard ourselves as beings in whom something endures, in spite of change. Just as we say that there exist separate states which change, so we speak of a self which experiences changing psychic states, and this self, we say, endures. But we have no more experience of an unchanging ego than we have of an unchanging psychic state: however far we push our analysis, we never reach such an unchanging ego. There is, in fact, nothing which endures through change, because there is nothing which does not change.

Hence Bergson arrives at the truth that we ourselves are beings who endure not through change, but by change. Our life, as actually experienced, as the reality of which we are most directly assured, is change itself. "If," says Bergson, "our existence were composed of separate states with an impassive ego to unite them, for us there would be no duration. For an ego which does not change does not endure, and a psychic state which remains the same so long as it is not replaced by the following state, does not endure either."

There is thus no self which changes: there is, indeed, nothing which changes, for in asserting the existence of that which changes, we are asserting the existence of something which, from the mere fact that it is subject to change, is not itself change; there is simply change.

The truth that we are beings whose reality consists in continuous change is for Bergson the clue to the understanding of the universe itself. For the universe is shown by him to belong to the same stream of change or "becoming," as Bergson calls it (since it never actually is any one thing, but is always on the way to becoming something else), as we do ourselves. Just as we are unable to penetrate through the continuous changes of our consciousness to something stable that underlies them, so, when we consider the nature of the world around us, do we find it impossible to discover anything which passes through changes, but is itself something other than the changes which occur to it. The universe, in other words, is itself a stream of perpetual change. How comes it, then, that it appears to us as a collection of solid static objects extended in space? The answer to this question is to be found in Bergson's theory of the intellect.

Life in a world of ceaseless flow and change would present difficulties from the point of view of action, which the intellect is designed to overcome. The intellect, then, is a purely practical faculty, which has

been evolved for the purposes of action: What it does is to take the ceaseless, living flow of which the universe is composed and to make cuts across it, inserting artificial stops or gaps in what is really a continuous and indivisible process. The effect of these stops or gaps is to produce the impression of a world of apparently solid objects. These have no existence as separate objects in reality; they are, as it were, the design or pattern which our intellects have impressed on reality to serve our purposes.

The world of material objects occupying space results, therefore, from the peculiar view that the intellect takes of reality. But it is not to be supposed that in inserting stops and gaps into the living flow of reality, and so presenting it as a collection of material objects, the intellect is acting quite arbitrarily, that there is literally *nothing* in reality to justify the view of it that intellect gives. Reality is, as we have seen, a creative impulse of endless duration; but its continual movement does not proceed without interruption. At a certain point the flow of reality is interrupted, and, as a result of this interruption, part of it falls back. This backward or inverse movement of the flow is matter. Matter is not solid and motionless as the intellect represents it, but it does not, therefore, follow that it is part of the same forward movement as life itself. It *was* part of that movement, but, having been turned back, is now moving in a direction contrary to that of life itself. In one of his famous similes Bergson likens the flow of reality to a fountain which, expanding as it rises, partially arrests the drops which fall back. The jet of the fountain is vital activity in its highest form; the spent drops which fall back are the creative movement as it dissipates itself—that is to say, they are matter. It is upon this backward movement of life that the intellect focusses our attention, representing it to the forward movement, which is consciousness, as the inorganic, material world, something distinct from life and existing, as it were, in

opposition to life. But, when we conceive of reality after the model which the intellect presents to us, then we fall into error. The way to grasp the true nature of reality, to realise it, in fact, as Bergson's philosophy represents it in theory, is through Intuition. It is through Intuition that, by attending sufficiently closely to the nature of our own experience, we may become conscious of our oneness with reality as a whole, may realise, that is to say, the pulsing within us of the stream of universal life of which reality consists. It is Intuition which enables us to grasp the nature of that constant change, that Duration, as Bergson calls it, which is, as we have seen, the stuff of reality. Intuition is instinct conscious of itself, conscious, that is to say, of its own real nature as perpetual change. This view of the instinctive side of our natures, as opposed to the intellect, it provides the clue to the understanding of the universe, constitutes the most original feature of Bergson's philosophy.

CHAPTER VII

MODERN REALISM

THE appearance which the physical universe presents to the ordinary man is that of a number of separate, solid, material objects occupying space. The different philosophies, which have been described in the preceding chapters, have this characteristic in common, that they issue in a picture of the universe which completely belies this appearance. For Subjective Idealism reality is a collection of ideas or sensations; reality, that is to say, is non-material: for Hegel there is only

one thing in the universe, namely, the Absolute, the apparent multiplicity and separateness of things being, therefore, illusory; while Bergson attacks the common-sense view for attributing permanence and solidity to what is, in reality, a changing flux. Thus, all these philosophies concur in holding that the reality of the universe is very different from its appearance.

The fact that a philosophy is at variance with the deliverances of common sense does not constitute an argument against it. In recent years, however, there has grown up a school of philosophers who, without deliberately seeking to uphold the common-sense view of the universe as composed of a number of independent, material entities have, nevertheless, succeeded in presenting us with a philosophy which, so far at least as its theory of perception is concerned, is more akin both in spirit and conclusions to the instinctive attitude of the man-in-the-street than the great idealist philosophies of the past. Philosophers who belong to this school are known more or less loosely as "realists," because they affirm the reality, a reality which is independent of knowledge, of the objects which we perceive. Mr. Bertrand Russell, Professor G. E. Moore, and Professor Alexander are prominent modern realists. Although, however, they rescue the external world from its dependence upon the knowing mind, it cannot be said that their picture of it resembles very closely that of the ordinary man.* I propose to give an outline of some of the arguments which these philosophers have advanced against the view that the universe is mental.

It will be remembered that one of the chief considerations brought forward by the subjective idealist in favour of his position was the fact that two people

* This is not true of Professor Moore's account of the external world, which approximates more or less closely to the ordinary view.

have different perceptions of the same thing. I see a carnation green which a colour-blind man sees blue; the carnation cannot be both blue and green at the same time; it follows, therefore, said Locke, that what I see is dependent upon the peculiarities of my vision, being, in fact, not the external object at all, but only a representation or image of it in my mind. From this position the complete abolition of the external object, which is independent of mind, follows in Berkeley's philosophy by logical steps which we have already traced. In face of these arguments, it is clear that any attempt to preserve the existence of an external world which is independent of the perceiver must account for the fact of different perceptions of the same object. It is to this problem, then, that modern realists begin by addressing themselves. Various methods of dealing with it have been suggested; the argument which I am going to give follows, in the main, the position adopted by Mr. Russell and certain American philosophers known as "neo-realists."

Their solution of the problem with which we are concerned begins with the assertion that, whatever it is that we immediately experience when we perceive the external world, it is not the chairs and tables which are the physical objects of everyday experience. Let us suppose that we place a shilling upon the table and look at it from the edge of the table. What we shall see is a shining elliptical something. Furthermore, from whatever position we look at the shilling (excepting only from the one position, which is perpendicularly above the shilling) the shape of this something will continue to be elliptical, the ellipses varying in degrees of fatness and thinness. Now, a shilling is supposed to be circular; it follows, therefore, that, since what we see is elliptical, what we see is certainly not the same as the surface of the shilling. Now, let us suppose that I look at the shilling from a distance of a yard and you look at it from a distance of ten yards. What I see will certainly be larger than what

you see. From this it seems to follow, first, that each of us is seeing something different; and, secondly, since the shilling has a constant size, that neither of us is seeing the shilling. Let us further suppose that a florin is placed on the same table as the shilling, and that I look at the two coins from a position which is considerably nearer to the place where the shilling is than it is to the place where the florin is. The thing, whatever it may be, which I see in the place where the shilling is, will then be larger than the thing which I see in the place where the florin is. But the florin is larger than the shilling. The same conclusion appears, therefore, to hold—namely, that whatever the things are that I am seeing, they are certainly not a shilling and a florin. What, then, are they? To this question the answer of the modern realist is that they are sense data. The term "sense data" means "things given to the senses," and by it philosophers wish to denote whatever we immediately experience by means of our senses when we see and touch what we call an object.

Now, everyone would admit that when I look at what is called a table, I do not see the whole table. What I see at most is two of its legs, the surface, or rather a part of the surface of its top, the edge of the top, and, possibly, the corners at each end of the edge. The rest of the table, the greater part of which I do not see, is supplied, as it were, by an act of mental addition to the part I do see. Suppose I try through my other senses to make further acquaintance with the table, I shall feel something that is cool, smooth, and hard if I press my hand against the top, and hear a sharp, rapping noise if I strike it with my knuckles. What, then, I *actually* experience when, as I say, I know or perceive a table is a series of distinct isolated things, a patch of colour, in this case brown, an angle, a rap of sound, a cold something, a smooth something, and so on. Now, it is to these *things* that we give the name of "sense data"; and the important

point to notice is that it is collections of sense data, and not chairs and tables, that we actually meet with when we try to experience the outside world. The chairs and tables are not experienced; they are constructed by our minds on the basis of the sense data, which are experienced.

Now, since we never meet with physical objects but only with sense data, there is no reason to suppose that physical objects exist. We may say, of course, that they are behind the sense data forming, as it were, a foundation for them and constituting their underlying cause. But, since there is no more reason why the physical universe should consist of common-sense objects than of sense data, there is no ground for inventing a hypothetical physical object, which we never experience, to be the cause of the sense data, which we do. How is it, then, that we all believe in physical objects, and behave as if the universe were composed of them?

It is clear that if, after having made my observation of the alleged table, I slightly change my position and again observe it, the collection of sense data which I shall experience will be quite different from the former collection; and if twenty other people are observing the table from twenty different points of view, it is also clear that each will experience a set of sense data which is different from the sets of sense data experienced by me and by the other nineteen. In other words, the "table" (which I put in inverted commas to indicate its mythical character) will appear different at each place from which it is looked at. Now, each of these sets of sense data—that is to say, each different appearance of the table—has as good a right to be regarded as being *the* table as the set or series which I originally experienced as, that is to say, the appearance which was presented at my first point of observation. The table, then, is *each and all* of the twenty sets of sense data which are experienced at each of the twenty points of observation; and since,

from whatever point of view the table is looked at, a different appearance will be presented, we may define the table as the complete system of appearances, or sets of sense data, which the table, if it existed, would present to all possible points of observation. These sets of sense data are collected together in accordance with the laws of perspective and in virtue of their resemblance to each other, and the result is what is called a table.

The answer to the question with which we started—How is it that two people have different perceptions of the same thing?—is, therefore, that they never do perceive the same thing; what they respectively perceive are two different sets of sense data, varying according to the position of the observer and the conditions of his observation, these conditions including the state of his nervous system, visual organs and so forth.

Now, the fact that everybody who looks at a table sees something different—not different aspects of the same thing, but literally different things—is no reason for asserting that the things he sees are ideas in his, the observer's, mind, or are even dependent upon his mind for their existence. The act of observing is, indeed, mental, but the act is not to be identified with the object of the act which, as we have seen, is a series of non-mental sense data. Thus, the independent reality of the external world is preserved at the cost of being resolved into sets of sense data.

It will be observed that this theory of perception reduces the function of the mind in perception to an act of bare awareness. Mind does not construct, it does not even distort or add to what is there; it simply reveals it. A similar interpretation may be given to the activity of mind, which is called "thinking." If perceiving a chair is being aware of a set of sense data which exist independently of the act of perceiving, so thinking of the relationship between two and four, or of the late Tsar of Russia, is being aware of something

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which exists independently of the act of thought. The something in question may be said to be a concept,* or rather a set of concepts, and the relations between them, the existence of which may be established on lines similar to those indicated in our second chapter in the course of our discussion of Plato's theory of Forms.

CHAPTER VIII

ETHICAL PHILOSOPHIES

I PROPOSE in this chapter to describe in brief outline some of the conclusions at which philosophers have arrived with regard to ethical questions. It is necessary first to say a few words about the nature of the problems with which Ethics deals.

It used to be thought that the object of Ethics was to discover the good. This belief rested upon the assumption that there was one thing, and one thing only, that was good—namely, The Good, and that everything else which was thought to be good was only good in so far as it tended to promote or was a means to The Good. This view has now been generally abandoned. Many philosophers, however, consider that there are a number of different things each of which is good in itself. By saying that a thing is good in itself, they mean that it is desired for its own sake, and not as a means to some other thing. It seems clear that, if there are any things of this nature in the universe, we cannot give any reasons for desiring them or thinking them to be good, since to give a reason for holding that a thing is good is in effect to show why it ought to be desired, that is to

* Called also "universal." (See Chapter II.)

say, to indicate *some other thing* for the sake of which it ought to be desired.

But, if it ought to be desired for the sake of some other thing, then it is not good in itself, but only good as a means to something else. Thus, to say that quinine is good for a cold means that it helps us to get rid of a cold. Why, it may be asked, should we wish to get rid of a cold? Because, we may say, a cold is uncomfortable and distressing. Why should we not be put to discomfort and be distressed? Because discomfort is bad, from which it follows that comfort is good, and comfort is good because it is pleasant. Thus, quinine is found to be good because it promotes pleasure. If we ask why pleasure is good, the answer is either that we intuitively recognise it to be so, recognise it as good, that is to say, without being able to give reasons for so doing, or that it promotes something else and that something else is good, in which event the something else must be intuitively recognised as a good in itself. Push our questions as far as we may, we shall always come to something which we judge to be good without being able to give any reason for our judgment.

Hence, another of the questions which Ethics considers is: What is the nature and authority of the faculty by means of which we judge certain things to be good or ethically desirable in themselves, and what are those things? Another closely related question is: What do we mean by a right action, and how is it to be distinguished from a wrong one? Another: How are we to discover what actions are right? We may answer the second of these questions by saying that we mean by a right action one that tends to promote one or other of those things which are good in themselves, and the third by saying that such actions are intuitively recognised to be right by some faculty within ourselves, whose deliverances are final. If we give this answer to the third question, a further question will arise as to the nature and

authority of this faculty which discovers what is right and distinguishes it from what is wrong, and as to whether it is the same as the faculty which recognises what is good in itself. I cannot in the space of this chapter even indicate all the ways in which ethical writers have attempted to deal with these questions. I propose, however, briefly to describe two main types of ethical theory, each of which endeavours to provide an answer to some, if not to all the questions I have mentioned.

1. The first of these theories is known as Utilitarianism, which originated with the English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and was subsequently maintained in a somewhat different form by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).

Bentham and Mill both held that the criterion of a right action, in virtue of which it was to be distinguished from a wrong one, was to be found in the consequences of the action. A right action was the one which had the best consequences on the whole. When, as may often happen, the expected consequences of an action are different from its actual consequences, then it is the actual consequences, and not the expected ones which determine its rightness or wrongness; it is, nevertheless, our duty always to do the action which we *think* will have the best consequences. Two corollaries follow: first, it may sometimes be our duty to do a wrong action. Thus, if I see a man drowning it will be my duty to try and save him seeing that, apart altogether from the demoralising effect of cowardice upon myself, since life is assumed to be a good thing on the whole, the consequences of his being saved may be expected to be better than the consequences of his dying. If, however, he subsequently goes mad or drinks, beats his wife, and murders his children, the actual consequences of my act of rescue will have been bad. Therefore, I shall have done a wrong action, which it was, nevertheless, my duty to do.

In the second place, as it is impossible to know *all* the actual consequences of any action, we can never tell for certain whether our action is right or wrong. Thus, although the Utilitarian criterion provides a rough-and-ready test which serves the purposes of practical life, it is one which cannot, in practice, be applied with absolute certainty. This consideration does not, however, invalidate the *meaning* which the Utilitarians give to the term "right action." It is obvious that we may know what is *meant* by the phrase "the temperature of the room," without knowing what its temperature is.

But what is meant by "the best consequences"? To this question the Utilitarian theory replies by making a pronouncement upon the nature of good, which is to the effect that pleasure or happiness alone is good or The Good, and that, therefore, the "best consequences" are those which involve the greatest amount of pleasure. "Pleasure and freedom from pain," said Mill, "are the only things desirable as ends." To the question whose pleasure is meant, when we say that the best action is that which promotes the greatest quantity of pleasure, the answer is, the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Hence, we arrive at a conception of duty, which is that we ought so to act as to promote the greatest pleasure of the greatest number.

Two rather different doctrines are involved here: the first, which is known as psychological hedonism, and was held by Bentham, is to the effect that man is so constituted that he is incapable of desiring anything but his own pleasure. This doctrine has a long and interesting philosophical history; it is very plausible and exceedingly difficult to refute.

It is surprising how easy it is to show that all our actions are dictated solely by the desire to obtain pleasure for ourselves. Let us take as an example the case of the martyr who goes to the stake for his convictions. Why does he take a step involving so much

apparent discomfort? We may say that he prefers to purchase eternal bliss in the hereafter at the cost of being burned for ten minutes in the present, to the shame of renouncing his most cherished convictions combined with the prospect of being burned for ever in hell. Even if he does not believe in heaven or hell—though it is notorious that most martyrs have been sustained by strong convictions on the subject—we may point to the fact that martyrs are obstinate and determined men, who are constitutionally averse from humbling their pride by yielding to their enemies, and unwilling to outrage their consciences by doing what they conceive to be wrong. It is possible, too, that a well-developed histrionic sense may not be without its effect. For all these reasons the martyr decides to be burned, choosing the course which, in his view, will bring him the greatest quantity of happiness, or enable him to avoid the greatest quantity of pain in the long run. If he did not prefer to be burned now to going to hell for eternity, he would decide the other way.

The man who undergoes hardship and suffering, or faces danger for the sake of a cause, is animated by hopes of public esteem, if he succeeds, and by fear of disgrace, if he betrays his trust or his convictions. The soldier who goes over the top in wartime is impelled by the fear of court-martial, if he shows the white feather; the life-saver by the desire for the approval of his fellows expressed in the form of the Royal Humane Society's medal. The unselfish man, who denies himself in order to benefit others, takes a pleasure in self-denial, or, if this interpretation be thought too cynical, may be classed as a kind-hearted person who, by definition, gets more pleasure out of giving pleasure to others than by directly pleasing himself.

Whatever action you choose to take, it is always possible to show that the agent was prompted by the desire to obtain pleasure for himself. Now, Bentham

believed that, as a matter of fact, the way to secure the greatest pleasure for oneself was to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, arguing that society has so arranged matters that it is only by doing what benefits the community to which one belongs that one can achieve happiness. Honesty, for example, is a social virtue, since society is benefited by it. Hence, maxims of the "honesty is the best policy" type have been coined to show that the honest man is rewarded by public consideration and esteem, while, by the infliction of penalties upon the dishonest, society seeks to make it more profitable and therefore more pleasurable for the individual to act honestly than to act dishonestly. Thus, according to Bentham, there is no contradiction for a properly trained and educated citizen between pursuing his own greatest pleasure on the one hand and promoting social good—that is to say, the greatest happiness of the greatest number—on the other.

J. S. Mill, although educated under Bentham's influence, introduced important modifications into his doctrine. Of these, the first is the admission of a distinction between the pursuit of one's own greatest pleasure and the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number—that is to say, of social good. It is our duty, said Mill, always to promote social good, although the actions involved in doing so may on occasion be prejudicial to our own greatest pleasure. This admission commits us to the position that it is possible to desire something other than our own pleasure—namely, social good. In the second place, Mill made a distinction between different kinds of pleasure. If pleasure is the only good, pleasure is the only standard of value, and quantity of pleasure is therefore the only factor to which attention need be paid in assessing the comparative values of the effects of different actions. This conclusion was accepted by Bentham, who crystallised it in his famous phrase "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pen is as good

as poetry." Mill, however, held that we ought always to prefer a "higher" pleasure to a "lower," even if the quantity of higher pleasure is smaller. "It is better," he said, "to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied."

This admission involves the complete abandonment of the view that pleasure is the only good. It is clear in the first place that higher pleasure does not mean simply more pleasure of the same kind. If, therefore, in a whole— x , y is the quantity of pleasure and z the quantity of something other than pleasure, which Mill wishes to indicate by the word "higher," then, if pleasure is the only good, the value of x will be entirely proportional to the quantity of y ; it will, that is to say, be unaffected by the presence or absence of z . But we are expressly told that the value of x is increased by the inclusion of z , and that it may be so increased, even if the quantity of y be diminished. It follows that z has value in its own right, and, since x is not just pleasure, we arrive at the conclusion that there is something in the universe which Mill denotes by the adjective "higher," which is other than pleasure and which is nevertheless a good in itself. This conclusion is one which most ethical writers would now accept.

2. Before we proceed to indicate what this something is, or at least what various philosophers have held it to be, it will be necessary briefly to indicate the other main type of ethical theories with which we proposed to deal. Theories of this second type are chiefly concerned with the question of the moral criterion and of the nature of the faculty which establishes this criterion. An action for the Utilitarians was right when it had the best possible consequences; the criterion of rightness and wrongness consisted, therefore, for them in an actual objective fact or set of facts. For the type of theory with which we are now concerned, the criterion is to be found in the existence of a certain kind of feeling. We all, it is asserted,

possess a faculty in virtue of which we pronounce upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, just as we have a faculty, the sense of smell, whereby we pronounce upon the goodness and badness of smells. If an action wins the approval of this faculty, it is right; if it arouses its disapproval, it is wrong. This faculty is called "conscience," or "the moral sense."

Moral sense theories differ in the view which they take as to the nature and authority of the moral sense. There is also controversy with regard to the question, of whose moral sense is to be accepted as the arbiter of the rightness and wrongness of actions, whether, for example, that of the individual himself or of the society to which he belongs? We may say, however, in general, that for theories of the second type, the rightness of an action is established not by its consequences, but by the existence in some person or body of persons of a certain feeling or set of feelings with regard to the action in question.

We have already considered one form of this theory in connection with Kant's ethical doctrine of the freedom of the will. The injunction to act in accordance always with the moral law is tantamount to the assertion that those actions are right which proceed from the free will and of which the free will approves. Other writers who have held the moral sense view in some form or other are Bishop Butler (1692-1752), Richard Price (1723-1791), and James Martineau (1805-1900). Writers of this school have pointed out that we do, as a matter of fact, decide that actions are right or wrong without any reflection upon their consequences. Children and uneducated persons, for example, unconsciously condemn lying as wrong without knowing why they do so; at any rate, they are innocent of any reflection upon the deleterious effects of dishonesty upon society. Furthermore, in spite of the obvious differences in the deliverances of the moral sense in different peoples, in spite of the fact that these differing moral deliverances can be shown to be re-

lated to and in part dictated by the needs and circumstances of society (the Old Testament, for example, advocates the morality appropriate to a semi-nomadic desert tribe, while the New Testament enshrines the more developed moral notions of a comparatively settled society, which is partly based on slavery and subject to a stronger political power), nevertheless, the deliverances of people's moral senses in all times and places have been more or less unanimous with regard to the ethical status of certain *classes* of actions. Again everybody recognises instinctively that there is a distinction between good and bad, although they may not be able to assign any very definite meaning to the terms they use or to say in what precisely the distinction exists; everybody, moreover, other things being equal, naturally prefers good to bad, so that, while they require some particular inducement to make them do what is wrong, no excuse or inducement is needed for doing what is right; from which it is inferred that people only act wrongly for the sake of some particular end they desire to achieve. They desire evil, not for its own sake, but as a means; it is only good that they pursue as an end.

What these theories assert, then, is that there is something at once ultimate and unanalysable about our moral intuitions. We may not be able either to defend them or to explain them; nevertheless they do enable us to distinguish right from wrong, and in such matters they are the only guides that we have.

A recent development of ethical theory, for which Professor G. E. Moore is chiefly responsible, seeks to effect a reconciliation between the two views we have been considering. The ultimate, unanalysable character of our intuitions is accepted by Dr. Moore, but he regards them as applying to questions of value rather than to questions of morality, as intuitions—that is to say, about what things are good rather than about what actions are right or wrong. If the moral sense is a feeling, it is a purely personal and private affair, as

personal as, for example, a toothache, and it possesses no authority except for the person who has the feeling. Unless the moral sense is grounded in reason, we cannot be expected to respect its deliverances. Now a rational moral sense cannot but take account of the consequences of the actions upon whose rightness and wrongness it pronounces. Divest an action of its consequences and it ceases to be a subject for ethical judgment. If, for example, drunkenness did not make a man thick in speech, shambling in gait, fuddled in mind, violent in action, and physically repulsive, in what way would it be blameworthy?

The Utilitarians, therefore, are right, Professor Moore holds, in insisting that the morality of actions can only be assessed by reference to their consequences, and that a right action is one which has the best consequences on the whole. But when we come to decide which consequences are best, there is a legitimate field for the deliverances of the moral sense. Questions of ultimate ends, as we have already seen, cannot be determined by rational considerations. We cannot say why what is desired for its own sake should be desired; we cannot, in other words, give reasons for thinking it desirable; we can only say that we find it so. Therefore, in deciding what things are good—good, that is to say, in themselves and not as a means to something else—we can only fall back upon our intuitions. Taking the intuitions of mankind as a whole, they seem to be more or less unanimous in favour of the view that pleasure is not the only good, but that other things such as virtue, knowledge, and beauty are also good in themselves. Right actions are, therefore, those which tend to promote things that are good in themselves. In deciding what these things are we must trust not to reason but to the deliverances of our own intuitions.

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


THE RELIGIONS OF
THE WORLD

By the Rev. C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J.



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THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION

THE method of any science is: To collect and register relevant facts; to group them; to seek to generalise and to assign "laws," or constants, that hold good within the given area of research. But what facts *are* "relevant"? At first you can only guess. You take a rough "working-definition" of your subject. A man might begin by observing "all that shines in the night sky," and end by laying down exact laws about comets. Again, on what principle will you group your facts? On that of cause and effect? But you are seeking to find out which facts *are* causally connected. You may then start with facts "rather like one another," guarding carefully against the assumption that similar facts *are* causally connected facts. Meanwhile you will be constructing, testing, correcting *hypotheses*, no less careful lest an attractive hypothesis be exalted into the realm of demonstration; lest what probably may be, slip into the realm of what *is*.

In this tiny book, even the facts concerning its vast topic—The Religions of the World—cannot be properly exhibited. Only primary, organic ones can be offered. Yet no mere heap of bones, so to say, is demanded, but at least a skeleton! Facts must be interconnected. Yet neither would a museum of religious skeletons suffice. Religions must be appreciated for what they were and are—living things, provoking human reactions. This demands "sympathy" in the writer; *we* are religious; fail to "sympathise" with men, and you write nonsense about their religions. But is not "sympathy" alien to

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"cold" science? When the subject is abstract, like mathematics, or material, like chemistry, it may be; as the subject-matter tends manward, like music, or military tactics, it is necessary. Hence while the present writer does not disguise, but affirms, that he is a Christian in obedience to the See of Rome, he insists that he is wholly able to "sympathise" with religions—that is, with religious men; and no less able impartially to collect, examine, and exhibit facts. That an artist cannot study and write of art with scientific impartiality and objective serenity, is untrue as a fact, and out of date as a surmise. We propose, then, having briefly stated how men have addressed themselves to the study of "religions," to set forth some account of the main religions that have as a matter of fact existed, without philosophising on these religions, or on religion, or defending the special value or nature of a special religion, which would belong to a different sort of book altogether.

* * * * *

Had you asked the men of whom we have our first historical records: "What is religion?" they might have answered: "Ways of worshipping the gods." By "gods," roughly, they would have meant the unseen powers that manage the world or interfere with it; by "religion," the whole attitude to be taken towards them. But one family, one tribe, took one attitude; their neighbours, different ones. One group ousted another, and brought its gods and its religion. Hence, comparisons; adjustments; even theories. A conquered god subsided into the rank of hero, or survived as "father" of the invader, or was identified with him—names were hyphenated. A self-satisfied group could say: "Our neighbours call our god So-and-so"; modest men might confess: "We learnt our gods from So-and-so." No group wanted quite to abandon its traditional assets, nor quite to disregard new facts. Hence juxtaposition meant observation: observation provoked theory, especially where minds rationalised, like Greek minds; elsewhere,

less desire to account for differences was felt. Gods could be worshipped "parallel."

Thus Greek poets (Homer, Hesiod) developed genealogies of gods: inquisitive travellers (Herodotus) used similarities of names, traditions of conquests and racial interminglings to prove that Greek gods were derived from Egyptian ones: philosophers, anxious to find one physical principle for the universe, decided that the gods were personifications of natural phenomena or elements: others, more "moral" in intent, allegorised myths to render them, and with them the gods and their worship, respectable. The great metaphysical systems (Plato, Aristotle) produced various schools: commerce, war, travel, for enquiry's sake, provided these with an infinity of new facts, and thus genuine theories based on observation and comparison came to exist—a Euhemerus (c. 310), helped by the deification of Alexander the Great, argued that gods were ancient kings: the Roman Scævola (c. 100 B.C.) concluded that there was one religion—pious stories—for the poets; another—rationalist—for philosophers; a third, composed of traditional rites, for "keeping the people in control." A laborious scholar like Varro (b. 116 B.C.) piled up facts till he decided that even the Jewish Jahweh was but Jove under another name. The system of "fusion"—syncretism—showed itself best a couple of centuries later, when educated men agreed that there was one force, identical in essence, behind the universe, expressed in various ways—religions—according to temperament, place, and time. The practical man objected to no form of cult, if it did not object to his own, nor interfere with the State.

Christianity cut across this. It said it was the only fully true religion. Differentiated, first, from the Jews, then from the flood of Oriental cults pouring into the West, its seemingly anti-social as well as anti-religious solation brought down persecution. Apologists therefore stepped forth to point the contrast between their faith and contemporary pagan cult, which they said was materialist, immoral, and foolish. Pagan religious oppo-

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sition, when not just persecution, took the shape of a fuller working out of the syncretist idea: all special myths or cults, Christianity included, might quite well be treated as more, or less, satisfactory expressions of the one eternal thing. Rationalism was less and less invoked: with Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism the world went towards mysticism: the sheer fact of the Empire helped: in the sky, no better symbol of the one ultimate life-giving fact, than the Sun: none better upon earth, than the Emperor.

Christians retorted that religions and their symbols were not equivalents: similarities were due to the natural knowledge of God common to all men but easily deformed by circumstances: to the "Seed-Word," or partial knowledge of God infused by Him into all that is: to imitations of true religion by fallen angels: to plagiarism of Moses and the prophets by philosophers: to the "condescension" of God who educated the childhood of the race by notions and rites, tolerated, but not lastingly sanctioned. When Origen (b. 185) argued that what was apparently similar (e.g., pagan and Christian prayer) yet bore such different results as to prove a difference in nature, few if any themes remained to elaborate. But just when the pagan synthesis seemed due to triumph, when the Empire seemed ready to bask beneath the bland imperial smile of the Sun-God in his pantheistic haze, the old order passed; barbarians made an end of Rome; Christianity survived with only heresies to distract it till Islam came.

The early Middle Ages renewed the clash of ideas as between Mohammedans, Jews, and Catholics. Roughly, Aristotle stood behind the Arabs, Augustine's Platonism behind Catholics. Ibn Rochd (Averroes, 1126-1198) captained the former. Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides, 1135-1204) must represent Hebrew thought. Each granted to his religion a *relative* superiority; each regarded its details as symbolic, and relied on their pragmatic value. Catholics parried by working out the doctrine that our knowledge of God is analogical—*i.e.*, we

know, *truly*, yet in our human way, what is in God even more truly and in *His* way; and their doctrine of the Sacraments. Aquinas (d. 1274), towering above the rest, yet like the rest preferred to obtain metaphysical principles and apply them to special instances. A few, spurred by vast new material supplied by explorers (Marco Polo) and missionaries (especially the Franciscans), began to compare these data with one another and with Christianity. The reaction against scholasticism was foreshadowed, and a certain despair of the rationalising intellect prepared the way for subjectivism.

The Renaissance refilled the imagination with ancient myths, brought back Plato, and soon enough compared Christianity with pagan cults, often to its discredit. Scholasticism began to seem barbaric; with the Reformation, individualism triumphed. But the Protestant polemic against papistry, which it wished to prove pagan, provoked new comparisons; the very thesis that Rome had deformed the early faith, involved the study of antiquity; so did the substitution of the Bible for the Pope as central authority. But Catholic and Protestant alike still assumed that the Hebrew and the Christian religions were divine in origin: hence theories of idolatry are re-formed: plagiarism of Moses by the "Greeks" is re-suggested; linguistic knowledge advances and the notion that divine *names* gave rise to divine personalities becomes popular—*nomina = numina*. Eyes turned hesitatingly to India, China, Japan, even Mexico, for analogies. Francis Bacon had tried to explain myths as fictions with an ethical sense; scholars, like Voss, Grotius, regarded paganism as containing fragments of original Revelation half-drowned in the sea of the inventions of sin-weakened human reason. The theory, that God used rites and ideas tolerable in themselves to prepare for better things, was set forth anew—e.g., by J. Spencer, in his *De legibus Hebræorum Ritualibus* (1630-1695), which Robertson Smith says laid, such was its erudition, "the foundations for the science of Comparative Religion." Cudworth at Cambridge (1678) argued, in his *True Intel-*

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lectual System of the Universe, that men were never atheists; that idols were purely symbolic; that Plato's "trinity" was derived from Hebraism and barely differed from the Christian one. Thus the Renaissance had provided, it has been said, "Summas" of myths; the Reformation, "Summas" of cults: the Jesuit missions, especially in India, also Africa and America, by their original work on Sanskrit, their translations of Eastern texts, offered a mass of new material, and serene scholars like Calmet (d. 1757) were meditating on the best *methods* for using all this, and on what inferences might legitimately be drawn.

Alongside sentimental subjectivism, rationalism was growing. When a Catholic rite or formula was not visible in antiquity, it was called an "accretion": when it was like something found among pagans, it was regarded as "borrowed." Only a step was needed to reduce Christianity to "natural" proportions. Thus Blount (1630) edited the "life" of Apollonius of Tyana; miracles were found there; *therefore* Christian miracles became incredible. Latitudinarianism became just theism; and to the "natural" man, continually discovered by missionaries and merchants, a "natural" religion must surely correspond. The theory was developed by Herbert of Cherbury, Tindal, Locke; then by a Voltaire and the Encyclopædists; by a Wolf, Lessing, Eichhorn in Germany. Names are innumerable; the aim, identical—to prove Christianity "reasonable"—*i.e.*, to de-supernaturalise it. Lack of documentation still left room for rash generalisation: most unscientific methods were used to extract "fact" from "myth": the effort to find one substratum for all religions issued into books like Dupuis' *Origine de tous les Cultes*; he (using the earlier work of Abbé Pluche) reduced everything, even the person of Christ, to solar myth (and prepared the recent astrological school): Rousseau, with his "natural man," stimulated and even governed research among "savages": C. de Brosses (1757) argued that "fetishism" was the primitive, universal, source of wor-

ship and belief; and Abbé Bergier (1767), accepting the postulate that "primitive" man is best studied in the person of "savages," reduced this astrology and this fetishism to what is simply modern "animism" (p. 10). In a word, during the end of the rationalist and the dawn of the romantic periods, "savage" cults were studied at the expense of historical ones; a flood of "facts" was used by theorists in search of one explanation for everything, and mostly anxious for an arsenal whence to bombard Christianity. This opened the road to scientific work, but was seldom scientific.

But a new era of discovery re-enthroned History. Anquetil-Duperron and then Burnouf (1771, 1833-1835) translated the Avesta and based Persian studies anew. The Asiatic Society, Bopp (1816), Hodgson (1824), and again Burnouf, regenerated Indian research. The Rosetta Stone was found in 1799, and Champollion interpreted Egyptian hieroglyphics. Lepsius in 1842 edited the Book of the Dead. But now philosophy, no more rationalist, began to talk of categorical imperatives, of the religious sense, and applauded religions even when their historical foundations appeared ruined: Hegel's influence facilitated the application of Darwinian evolutionist theories to the whole realm of fact: he regarded religions as necessary "moments" in the evolution of the Idea. You could not then sneer at the "gods," without sneering at man, who mysteriously and inevitably created them; nor at him, without deriding the whole cosmic impulse. Reaction against the subjective method (with its haphazard illustrations drawn from maltreated evidence, as in Creuzer's *Symbolik*, published at Leipzig from 1810 onwards) was soon felt: still, Comte having established that metaphysics was an outpassed stage of human evolution, and H. Spencer having proclaimed the Unknowable, how easily modern pragmatism is reached! A vital urge drives us to richer experience: if it helps you to externalise this in creeds and rites, do so, *because* it does so help you.

The last half of the optimist nineteenth century, and

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the first decade of our own disheartened one, not only provided still more material (Oriental texts, especially for India and Japan, Max Müller; for India, Barth; China, Julien, etc.; Assyria and Babylonia, Layard, Taylor, Smith, Oppert; Egypt, Mariette, Maspero; Semitic religions, Robertson Smith; Palestine itself, the Catacombs themselves, classical areas, too, and Crete, were exploited anew), but tempted critics back into the immense antiquity that biology suggested, to seek for the origin of religion itself, and to picture a pre-religious world, even as they did the pre-historic world. Impossible to catalogue the "schools of thought" thus formed. The "philological" school (Max Müller) taught that language sufficed to make a genealogy of gods: you came to an aboriginal "intuition" to which names were attached, whence gods arose, and once more *nomina=numina*. The "anthropological" school again reached by way of "folk of lower culture" and their "lore" to the pre-religious states of mind of "primitive" men: E. B. Tylor's "animism" taught that they regarded all things as "animated": whence spirits; whence gods. This theory was contested. Andrew Lang ended by deciding that the pre-animist world was theist—everywhere he found an aboriginal "All-Father." Others derived everything from just a sense of "awe" in presence of the extraordinary—a quality called *mana* attached to it; how, was and is disputed. Tribes, bearing the name of, considering themselves in close union with, some vegetable or animal (totem) which they surrounded with taboos, caused J. F. McLennan, S. Reinach, and at first J. G. Frazer, to see in this a universal origin for religion. Magic, or the power to coerce natural phenomena unmanageable by average men, founded another theory. Individual or social psychology offered other clues: ecstasies and hysterical persons were studied: the collective effect on the mind of some tribal dance. . . . Astrology revived in the Pan-Babylonian school, which announced the world-wide influence of Mesopotamia. All these theories are

weakened by their assumptions, if not that "primitive" men can be seen in the person of contemporary "savages," at least that human history has developed equably upwards, and that less spiritual notions must have preceded and given rise to more spiritual ones. Above all, one key has been sought for the opening of every lock. Not only strict historians like Wissowa, Toutain, Cumont, chastened rash speculation, but a much more "total" system, like that of Gräbner and Ankermann (1904), followed up by W. Schmidt since 1908, which combined historical method with anthropological material, and called itself the "historico-cultural" school, will probably appeal to minds tired of specialist theorising. These scholars arrive at defining "culture-types"; and if they can be trusted, it looks as if the whole history of human evolution might have to be rewritten.

The success of the science of "hierology" has been retarded by the use of any one of these or other methods in isolation. The incompleteness of the record of facts must be remembered. If hypotheses be framed, they must never be allowed to fill lacunæ with non-existent evidence. Introspection and observation of contemporary psychology must recognise the extreme improbability of the minds of races other than that of the student (in time, origin or culture) acting as his does, save in what can be proved to be fundamental in human nature. When this is found, the probability of similar parallel consequences always takes precedence over the theory of loans between one cult and another, when these cannot historically be proved. Above all, experience has warned us against any assumption that a grosser form necessarily precedes a more refined one: humanity moves by zigzags, in cycles, by way of complication, and indeed degeneration quite as often as, if not more often than, by advance. Nowhere has the shoddy, the flimsy, reigned so triumphantly as among speculators as to the origin and development of religions. We cannot omit this warning to those who would fain draw conclusions from the few facts we can select to write down in the following pages.

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We propose, then, after a few lines on the religions of "primitives," to write of the religions of the further East, beginning with India, because the "Hindu heresy," Buddhism, affected so deeply the religions of China and Japan, which follow; then, of Persia, between which and the ancient Aryan worship the links are so close; then of Babylonia, Assyria, and Syria; then of Egypt, because though Mesopotamia may have affected the West no earlier than Egypt did, yet Egypt affected it much longer. We then interpose sections on those northern religions which have transmitted little to ourselves; then on Greece and on Rome, which have transmitted much. Finally, we speak of Hebrew religion and of Christianity, because the latter is organically connected with the former, and last of all of Islam, which was a modification of Arabic belief by means of a drastic infusion of Jewish and Christian elements.

THE RELIGION OF THE "UNCIVILISED"

THE name "Primitives" begs the question and indeed is false, but is at least not uncomplimentary. All tribes known to us have elaborate cultures, and are indescribably far from primitive. Indeed, they are often degenerate. Moreover, the assumption that they are "primitive" suggests that their religion (if any) will reveal some element to be judged as at the back of, and the origin of, all religion. To pass any judgment on such peoples is all but impossible: what is sacred to them, is usually secret: they would not yield it up to aliens even if they could, which deficiencies in their language and our intelligence render anyhow unlikely. Very briefly, then, and without theorising, we write a few lines descriptive primarily of the Bantu race, widespread in many tribes throughout Central Africa, as it appears racially intact, and uncomplicated by invasion of Mohammedan or Christian ideas. We then allude even more briefly to one or two other racial groupings.

The Bantu visible world is wool to a warp of spirits:

every action in the former involves a spirit-ward act. Religion therefore is not departmental, but consists of innumerable "customs" of kinds as many as there are sorts of things. He who "knows" these "virtues" and the right "address" to them is "mganga." Some such spiritual qualities are so strong as to persist after the decay of the material vehicle, so to say: then, according to their nature, they must be pursued with suitable homage, fear, hate, and be given a domicile—the dead like to maintain their old sort of life: they are given the red-painted skull of their old body; or, some statuette, duly surrounded with gifts. Other spirits are quite discarnate; but can be controlled by magic ceremonies or incarcerated in almost anything. Such fetishism is a consequence, not an origin. Spiritual entities then fall into the classes of *mi-ximu*, human ghosts; *pepo*, spirits, never human, but controllable by wise men; and *Mu-lungu*, a word without plural. This being has no image; sorcery gets no grip on him: his names are from "life," "power," "action." The notion is as certain as it is undefined. In quality it surpasses all the rest: in mass, the rest far outweighs it. Without doubt "ownership" enters into the notion of the Bantu God: hence offerings, abstentions, taboos. Parallel, and quite disconnected, exists the behaviour proper to "magic," "brutally utilitarian," as it has been called. It is the obverse of religion, and while here and there it may contain a degenerate form of religion, it shows no sign, and indeed contains no possibility, of an evolution into religion. Totemism appears as a social arrangement, issuing at times into magical rites, but neither becoming, nor growing out of, religion. It is a method of consolidating a family or clan by strengthening the bonds that unite it with some object which chance, maybe, has associated with that clan, and is specially impregnated (if you will) with the spirit that is that of the total group.

Unnecessary to dwell on the other African peoples. God, spirits, family, are everywhere interconnected and form the stuff of life. The Hottentot prays to the

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"Father of Fathers": the name for God, En-Ngai, is ever on Massai lips, little as his nature or whereabouts can be stated. The quite special race of Pygmies deserves a special study; yet it would yield similar results. The rapidly vanishing peoples of Australia cannot any more be said to be without a notion of an all-powerful being behind the many pieces of ritual behaviour which have quite different objectives. The extremely complicated and often precipitately applied evidence afforded by this area needs new and intensive study (since it will not for long be accessible), probably on the lines of Gräbner-Ankermann-Schmidt.

The religions of the American aborigines can be briefly summed up. Their world was more than "animistic"—the presence of "spirit" or "soul" in things gave them their more "real reality." Everything was as "personal" as man, if not more so. Hence the "religious" attitude of the native was taken toward spiritual agencies which he required to appease or win to his side: hence while his every action seems involved in dramatic prayer of a part-magical sort, so too he relies upon and is the victim of the "wizard" who knows how properly to perform these rites. There was no special solar worship, as the sun, though powerful and important, had no unique character, but was simply the abode of solar spirits. So far as the spirit-world was differentiated, this was due first to the parts of the country where the tribe in question lived, and important animals entered into what little myth existed. Thus the fish, the deer, the raven. The cults were, moreover, regulated according to the group or clan to which a man belonged: hence the laws of "totemism." Human sacrifice existed, and among the Aztecs reached astounding dimensions: but although the Aztecs and other Mexican tribes have much more of a religion than other groups, including a notion of a supreme, invisible, non-representable creator, yet (to our mind) the origins of Mexican relics are so entangled that it is impossible to say what was produced simply by natural instinct, what by Buddhist influence, and what

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by Christian (Icelandic or Norse). Generalising so far as possible, the uncivilised races deal with a world interpenetrated with invisible beings, capable of knowledge and of good or evil will. These may have been, and be, totally discarnate, but others have been incarnate, and may possess, or "haunt," or act through almost anything. They may be so vague as merely to seem a kind of aroma of *unusualness* floating round an object: or, again, a special being is acknowledged as so unique as to be indescribable, unnameable, superior to worship. And this Ultimate, "vague" not because of its emptiness, but because of its transcendence, is to be discerned as existing, or as having existed, in the minds of morally all such peoples.

INDIA

In this vast peninsula "Aryan" immigrants found two sorts of people—Kolarians, in, or driven into, the Centre; the Dravidians, still predominating in the South. Imperfect fusions were made. Speculation alone can carry us behind the Vedas, or Sacred Books, of which the oldest part is the Rig-Veda. Yet even this seems to mark a certain development, if (as we think) personifications of natural forces (Dyauspita, god of the shining sky; Varuna, god of the darker sky; Mitra, god of light; Agni, fire; Vishnu, a sun-god, and many others) have specified themselves between man and the vague deity behind and pervading everything. It would seem that in this earlier period caste, child-marriage, food-restrictions, transmigration, were unknown. Material prosperity was the ideal; yet sanction existed for the moral life; and a happy future state was conceived. Perhaps the Rig-Veda belongs to 1500-1000 a.c. Between (roughly) 1000 and 800 the three remaining Vedas will have been composed ("composition" allows for a great antiquity of idea and probably material): also, the commentaries called Brahmanas; the Aranyakas, to be read by Brahmins (*infra*) in their ascetical probation; the Upanishads, "guesses at truth," and the beginning of a philosophico-theological

system; none of which yet stereotyped the caste system, food-taboos, or the degradation of womanhood. The "rationalist" period (800-500) followed with its Sutras, treatises of ritual, law, theology. The previous period was already highly artificialised: this period is often atheistic and monist, and contains six Shastras, or systems of philosophy, of which the Vedānta is the most famous, in its undiluted form (there is but *One*: the world is pure delusion), or the "qualified" form, in which world and souls have reality, but are yet forms only of the One. Leaving to one side Buddhism as such, we recall that Brahmanism revived (c. A.D. 500), and by modifying itself profoundly modified the Buddhism that had practically eclipsed it, and finally ousted Buddhism from India proper almost altogether. This new "Puranic" Brahmanism consisted of an amalgam of the most elaborate Hindu cults and some of the old doctrines, and despite the exuberant crop of myths and rites, this latter, stronger element imparted a unity of principle and aspiration which enables us to speak of "modern Hinduism" as a whole.

This synthesis was the work of Brahman influence: usually it is put down to calculated diplomacy and desire to maintain their absolute supremacy. Granted; if it be granted, too, that they believed in the validity of their philosophy, the relative value of inferior modes of belief and worship, and the genuineness of their class-superiority. We attempt to indicate (in barest outline) that philosophy below. Enough now to say that it taught, in some sense, that all things were but more or less illusory forms or aspects of the One; so, there was nothing that could not be tolerated provided it was not considered to be *more* than that. Hence admission of every non-exclusive form of "religion," and condescension towards popular movements, such as those which exalted into the loftiest positions both Vishnu and Siva, and the at first quite inferior figure of Krishna. Vishnu came into prominence in the fourteenth century A.D., a cheerful god, coming down to men by way of "avatars"

(descents), by means of which the god is manifested (rather than incarnated) wholly, fractionally, or barely at all, in all manner of beasts and men and gods, including Krishna and the Buddha. Such notions tend to "devotion" rather than to effort, asceticism; to affection, even licentiousness; to polytheism and even fetishism (the tortoise, the fish, were recipients of Vishnu's avatars), rather than pure theism. Siva, on the other hand, was "preached" into eminence in the eighth century A.D., was aloof, needing to be reached by ascetic works, and gave birth thus to penitential and fanatical sects or individuals who reach, by self-torture, that emancipation which allows their absorption into the All. Limited things imply no "avatar," but are manifestations of Siva's power: the most adequate is the generative power of man. These two cults threatened to divide the Hindu world. The Brahmans by a masterful declaration united them in theory and in fact. They set forth the Hindu Trimurthi—Brahmā, Vishnu, Siva—the Ultimate One God, and His aspects or energies, Creative, and Destructive. He, the Unconditioned, was all but unsusceptible of so much as worship: let the main cult go to what of Him was manifested and thus accessible. However, in Hindu mythologies, there had always been female counterparts to the gods, a notion explained by divine productivity: divine power, as it were combining with matter, produced innumerable forms. In the concrete, the goddesses assumed separate values, especially by the twelfth century A.D., when Saktism, called also after its books Tantrism, prevailed widely. This was canonised licence of an appalling sort. Hindus were "right-handed," who based themselves on the relatively sound notions and worship of the Puranic Veda, or, left-handed, who worshipped the goddesses by means of sexual aberrations and magic, and used the Tantras as authority. Reforming sects arose, led by men sometimes of the loftiest intellect and ethical mysticism; at present, the lingam in Siva-worship cannot possibly be called licentious: such sanctified license as exists is connected with

Vishnuism, especially in relation with the lustful myths of Krishna. Thousands of picturesque details could illustrate the popular version of religion, due to the Puranas, called the "Veda of the common folk." All the "idol"-worship, the pilgrimages to famous shrines, washings in sacred rivers conveying the absolution from all sins, all this dates in its widest sense from these. A smear of red paint (standing presumably for blood) upon a stone, puts that stone "into relation" with a god. Naturally, the masses have no philosophy by which to explain that relation—whether the stone is the god; whether the god is in, or near, the stone, and so forth. Heredity is the great power that preserves "Hinduism": a new notion is an immediate solvent. The doctrine of transmigration has been in itself valuable, and can (but need not) issue into much hospitality and tenderness towards others, even to animals: female child-life seems hopelessly discounted, since perhaps sex-experience is the only ideal for vast numbers. Yet even in the use of hideous symbols there is the more or less conscious acknowledgment that all these things *are* symbols—even the figure of the limbless, featureless god, who has lost these human attributes through disgraceful diseases is explained as *meaning* the suffering endured by the divine for the love of man, on whose account he laboured.

A powerful factor in the formation of old "Hindu" religion must have been (1) the care to preserve racial integrity, (2) the conviction of family continuity. This strongly assisted development of caste, and again, of Brahman superiority, and the doctrine of transmigration. "Assisted," not "created": causes are manifold. Thus, in the earlier strata, existed the conviction that the dead yet so lived that their well-being depended on the rites duly done for them by their descendants—hence the duty of marrying for your ancestors' sakes. Yet the notion that the dead could pass into bliss along with Varuna and the first man, Yama, co-existed with this. The solidarity of the family, in all its generations, may have originated the idea that a discarnate being (an ancestral soul) desired

reincarnation; the idea may have spread till it included other discarnate entities besides direct ancestors; and again, have thus been moralised so as to account for this need of new life by the presence of imperfections not yet got rid of; and finally, treated metaphysically as we shall see in a moment. Even if the notion of this god or that sprang up from the personification of a material object, like the house-fire, minds like those of Hindus were not slow to invert the process and see in the fire a manifestation of the divine Fire, and then, even the various gods as manifestations of That which was behind even gods. Hence the austere idea of Brahmā, the absolutely Undifferentiated, whereof all "things" were *in some sense* at least illusory aspects, or real, though fleeting manifestations. The first way in which Brahmā could be "*thought*," was, as sufficiently "masculinised" (Brahmā) to be a "god," supreme, yet to that extent specified. He could then be thought of in a whole series of ways, right down to the inanimate stone. But "who" thus thinks of Him? He can, in the long run, but be said to think of Himself: but then, how can He do so limitedly? A double theory: He "unfolds" Himself into the multiplex forms of the Universe—the eternal Lotus blossoms—only to reabsorb these manifestations into that Super-One which transcends all notional unity. A doctrine of emanations of *power*—a sort of less and less impregnation of undifferentiated matter—seems co-existent with this, and even harmonised with it. A comparison may serve: I have been assured that it is no illegitimate one. We speak of *eddies* in streams. They exist, therefore. But how? Their individuality is a negation. Let them flatten out, as the stream flows forward—the hollow disappears—there is no more eddy: yet there is just so much water and force. Even so, the "individuality" of each thing will disappear, yet none of its reality (in the case of the "soul," none of its "personality") will be lost. The All therefore could be thought—*i.e.*, limited by a mind, in a thousand ways: there are in It no real limitations: but in whatever nega-

tive way a limited mind could exist, in that way it could also think, and thus conceive limitedly of the All. This All, therefore, is "aware" of its own richness; and thereby, of those negations which minds would be, and of their negative conceptions of Itself. Hence It transcends our notion even of Being: as true to say it "is" not, in our sense, as that it "is." Similarly, it does not "act" in any of the ways we know as "action." In this system, Not-Being is not Nothingness; nor Inaction, Inertia. After all, an Aristotelian or a Platonist alike can grasp this notion. From this follows the doctrine of Nirvāna—*i.e.*, that the limited and active will in the end achieve that perfect Peace which is Brahmā; and, since the series of forms is unbroken, the Law of Action bears constantly its own fruit: Karma reigns absolute: what I have done issues into what I do, and what I do, into the subsequent action. Why any particular process begins, and why a downgrade series reaches none the less an identical End with an upgrade one, perhaps no Western can see, nor Eastern explain, nor why this is not fatalism (it mostly acts as such), nor how the developed practice of meditation and of asceticism, both intended to rid the soul of its ignorances as to its true being, or anything else can be *chosen*.

Across this struck Buddhism. Its origin is so disputed that we will but say we think it ascertained that a young prince of the Gotama family of the Sākya clan became, as he claimed, "Enlightened"; "the Buddha" means The Enlightened One. We think that he (1) was certainly wearied by the mass of mere ceremony that surrounded the Brahman doctrines; and (2) found life so painful that this made the starting-point of his purely practical doctrine. Life is painful; it is so, because of men's Desires: surmount Desire, and you enter into Bliss. Almost at the same time was founded the parallel "order" of the Jainists, for, not only did such men move the masses, but grouped disciples more definitely round themselves. Leaving these, however, aside, the Buddha taught the all-importance of that Action, which is

Thought: he went then all but to extremes in deprecating those sacrifices which the Brahmans held essential, especially that of the Soma-juice. The latter, too, though regarding the "gods" as destined themselves to absorption in Brahmā, did not degrade them to the Buddhist level, where these imperfect beings are seen as far lower than a Buddha, having yet to escape their wheel of existences which he has already done. Buddhism naturally praised celibacy, and even weakened the caste-notion, since it tried to open out the Brahman notions to the world at large. The Buddhist monk, however—though there was also the "forester" sort of extreme ascetic—led a measured life of "neither too much nor too little," the Buddha apparently holding that violent asceticism can involve just as much self-will and illusion as sensuality can. Here is one point of opposition to the Jainists, who may practically starve themselves to death from *desire* to be free from "this" life. From such a desire, Buddhism would also free a man: suicide is the extreme of "will"-action. I think that Sākya-muni, having an entirely practical aim, appeared to deny "god," and to be atheist, to deny "soul" in the sense of surviving personality, and to deny existence in Nirvana (as well as non-existence) to this extent—he refused to assert anything at all about them, because he did not know the unknowable, and proposed to teach only a "way" to emancipation from "lives" (all of them painful)—a *Middle Way*, intellectually, between assertion and denial, and morally—i.e., between indulgence and contradiction, each of them implying desire. When he ridicules the Brahman god, he ridicules only the things that can be said, and are said, of Him, simply because, being sayable, they are untrue. But the Brahmans would have said the same: I hold that in the long run, both Brahmans and Buddhists meant exactly the same thing.

I cannot even outline the various Buddhist schools of thought and sects. Enough to say that one great current was set by those who taught that Buddhas could renounce even their own entry into bliss and remain to

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instruct the unenlightened how to reach enlightenment. These were "Buddhas of Compassion," Amitabha, for instance, who had a great success in China and Japan. Definitely, however, just in so far as Buddhist compassion involves the *sentiment* of compassion, it is false to the essential notion of Buddhism, for such sentiment connotes desire, and creates suffering. So, too, a cult of the Buddha, such as everywhere grew up, is false to the true notion that in Nirvana there is no one left to pay a cult to. Let us say that among humans, both for the true Brahman and the true Buddhist, the loftiest state short of the perfect one is a sort of immobile contemplation: below this would be the pure thought of metaphysics: next to this, the wilful, even emotion-tolerating, method of religion. Later Buddhism was propagated by King Asoka (third century B.C.).

CHINA

CHINESE "history" begins about 2700 B.C. Ancient fragments subsisting in the books of Odes (Shih-Ching) and of Annals (Shu-Ching), edited by Confucius (p. 24), and tradition (which students personally acquainted with China value more than academic foreigners do) show that early China was monotheist: its supreme Being was called Supreme Heaven, Supreme Ruler, and was certainly not the material sky-vault. From him came existence, human relationships, reward, and punishment: he had no idols. Victims, especially oxen, were immolated to him; events made known to him by fires upon the mountains, whose smoke carried the information. Hence importance attached to atmospheric conditions; hence too divination, especially by means of tortoises—their arched shell represented heaven; their flat nether plate, the earth; their flesh, mankind. But alone the Emperor, Heaven's predestined and long-prepared-for representative, dealt with this Ultimate. "Spirits" of nature (wind; thunder; rivers; regions) were what important persons worshipped each in his own district, nar-

rower and narrower in scope, down to those of door and stove (*cf.*, p. 56). Across this cut the notion of ancestor-cult: regional "spirits" were those of important predecessors in office: family-cult went to physical ancestors, and had enduring invaluable social effects. Indeed, though the Supreme Heaven would punish wrong, right and wrong meant, what pleased parents or the authorities. Actual cult consisted chiefly in setting forth food and clothes for the ancestors, whose presence was invoked. Even a living representative would "dramatically" be fed, and clothed and done homage to. Under the Chou dynasty (from 1122 B.C. for over eight centuries), germs of decay developed—infiltrations from India especially complicated the earlier simplicity; the names given to the Supreme Ruler, representing his Unity, his heavenliness, his governorship, tended to suggest polytheism. But the Chinese were never metaphysicians, despite certain simple notions, such as Yin and Yang, repose and action, which alternated in and constructed the universe. The other world was ever more crassly pictured: hunger therein was the great fear. In 535 for the first time, it is said, Izu-ch'an stated a psychology which has survived in practice till our day—man's soul is double: the inferior soul is generated with the body, and soon after physical death dwindles to extinction: the higher soul survives, with qualities dependent on its level of education and nourishment: if ritually attended to, it will keep quiet; else it is mischievous.

Early, perhaps sixth century B.C., Lao-tzu propounded notions afterwards united into a philosophy. His word "Tao," "Way," came to be regarded as the Prime Principle, which progresses and retrogresses by way of *ch'i*, breath, which underlies all phenomena. This swept aside even the Supreme Heaven, itself but a manifestation. We are, then, exhaled into brief illusory being, only to be reinhaled. Wise who dispenses, then, with the senses; even with ideas; above all, with action. Hence war is fiercely denounced; nay, all laws that shackle "nature"—*i.e.*, instinct. Put no finger into the

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mysterious machinery! Abstain; wait. Easiest remembered was its instruction to "empty the head and fill the belly of the people." For educated people ruined the State. It soon borrowed all that was most crass and exterior from Buddhism: no system so negative could survive. It is now a sort of atheist ritual, and never was really a religion. Somewhat after Lao-tzu, Confucius (Kung-fu-tse), born probably about 550 B.C., took exactly the opposite course. Each was disgusted by the degeneration of the times: Lao-tzu preached the perfect abstinence; Confucius, the practical life of each day. Lao-tzu wished to destroy the whole of the past: Confucius, to go back to it in every detail. No speculation as to gods, or soul, or other world. No abstract morality. He compiled the Odes and the Annals, that immemorial lore might be re-learned and preserved; he wished for a practical governing class, worshipping the ubiquitous spirits and using a sober divination; cult must be respectful, not tender; the intellect, not the heart, was to regulate it. The governed class was to be taught proverbs—day-to-day duties were to be inculcated by sheer authority and none but this official teaching must exist. Absolute loyalty throughout the social mass was to exist, but constructed from the molecular family upwards entirely by kindness. Violence, whether to embrace or to repel, must be quite eschewed: the middle way between extremes alone was right, and must be taken without preconceived plan from moment to moment. This strengthened considerably whatever was traditional and temperamental in Chinese social life, but created only an incredibly conservative cabal of the *litterati*, who, absorbing all authority, and alone vocal, have for centuries stood, for us, as "China," masking many things. Rival philosophers had but small influence: a crash occurred in 213 B.C., when the Emperor Shih-Huang, destroyer of the Chou dynasty, was so angry at the censures constantly passed by the Confucians on his "innovations" that he had the Sacred Books burnt and went over to the Taoists, descendants of Lao-tzu.

The only real change, however, came in A.D. 65, when under Ming-Ti Buddhism was officially introduced, and a long series of invasions at last achieved its material success first in North, then in South China. Its psychological success was due to the insufficiency of Taoism (held to be revolutionary) and of Confucianism, hopelessly and inhumanly dry. The Mahayana, or Greater Vehicle, the inclusive, later Buddhism, was what triumphed in China, with its ever-increasing mythology and ritual, satisfying the imagination and affections.

In 960 the fateful Sung dynasty began. To the Emperor T'ai-tsung, in 984, a Japanese bonze expounded Japanese Shinto (p. 26). Its divine Mikado fascinated him. In 1015 his son declared that his aboriginal ancestor was simply the Supreme Ruler: Buddhists, Taoists, were embosomed in the new State Church: the Court consisted entirely of reincarnate spirits of either sex. But in mid-twelfth century, the Sung were expelled southwards, and the religious system survived only as "Heroic Taoism," or Chinese Shinto. In the south, Confucianism revived, but split into reactionaries and progressists. The latter wished to put into the purely practical Chinese tradition a philosophy like that of the Indian books. Condemned by the Emperor Hsiao-tsung in 1178, as "abandoning the text of the classics" and occupied wholly with "abstract philosophy," and with disputing about "intangible notions in unintelligible terms," their leader Chu-hsi died in disgrace, A.D. 1200, but in 1227 was granted the diploma of Grand Master, Authentic Exegete, and Ideal Classic. He denied absolutely the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. All was *li* (Norm, Law), *t'ai-chi* (Great Axle, because it moves everything), *wu-chi* (imperceptible), or *ch'i* (matter). *Li* is one, eternal, immutable, unconscious, fatal. Matter is no less eternal, but serves only to limit, give a term to, *Li*. Both "souls" are material—they ripen, over-ripen, decay. A man who has lived right, dies when ripe; his soul forthwith decomposes: souls of the "unripe" (as of bonzes, who meditate too much)

are tough and stringy. Decomposition takes time. Hence ghosts. Worship of ancestors marks merely *our* gratitude for that act whereby they transmitted life to us. Existence is like a sea—waves differ, yet they are the *same* water driven by the same force. *Li* is unconscious; matter, unintelligent: the special combination of *Li* and matter that makes man, strikes out intelligence like spark from flint: the consequent "vibration" is emotion. Emotions and their subsequent acts are "right" when, erring neither by excess nor deficit, they are in keeping with nature. Chu-hsi's system, has been well compared to Haeckel's "all is Force and Matter"; rather as the imperial regulation of religion has been compared with the ideas of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. The *litterati* made this their religion; from 1416, despite the Buddhists, it was taught in all schools, and examinations gave the entry to everything till 1905, when after the Boxer rebellion the examination system was abolished. None the less, officialdom lived in sympathy with Confucius interpreted by Chu-hsi, but henceforward shot with not a little of the spirit of, say, Herbert Spencer.

Our personal opinion, derived entirely from men who have lived very long in China, in intimate association with all classes, is that the people at large are quiet and lovable, living an admirable family life, mainly due to Chinese tradition, and having an excellent ethic, mainly due to Buddhism. The divinisation of Confucius was slow and artificial: his system of practical behaviour has been very useful in its sphere. Neo-Confucianism is irreconcilable with everything that most Europeans value. The tragedy of China has been neither its people, nor Confucius, nor even its Emperors, but its closed caste of *litterati*.

JAPAN

THE original religion of Japan was colourless. It had no name till, Buddhism having been introduced from China by Korea in 522, the Chinese word "Shinto" (Way of

the Gods) was used to designate the traditional forms, Butsudo, the Buddhist system. The two systems are now inextricably intertwined. The (eighth century?) scriptures, Kojiki and Nihongi, relate that the first divine couple, Izanagi and Izanami, peopled the earth with divine offspring, of whom the most important was Amaterasu, sun-goddess. She was the grandmother of the first Mikado. With vague nature-worship went ritual traditions of purification and some ancestor worship. There was no clear distinction between gods and men, nor other-world sanctions for behaviour. After death, souls, from their "world of darkness," can bring comfort or annoyance to their survivors, and so are propitiated. Buddhism brought colour and variety into worship: a combination of the two systems, Ryobu-Shinto) was devised. Shinto gods were called reincarnations of the Buddha, who climbed to the highest rank at the side of Amaterasu's son. Not until nearly A.D. 1700 was a badly needed reformation made. Mabuchi, Motoori, and Hirata (died 1769, 1801, 1841 respectively), devoted their lives to dethroning Buddha, "Confucius" (i.e., Neo-Confucianism), and Taoism: all dogmas, moral laws, and foreign ritual were to be eliminated: little save the Mikado, and the duty to follow instinct, was left. The extreme poverty of this residuum was approved on the grounds that the innate perfection of the Japanese nature needed neither saint nor sage to help it. Shinto gods are called "Kami": they are nature-gods, and god-men, deified scholars, warriors, and ancestors, who encroach on the court of Amaterasu, composed of nature-deities. The gods have no ethical qualities. The very simple Shinto temples contain no image, but only symbols, like a mirror, symbolic of the shining of the sun-goddess: worship is practically the *entertainment* of the deities by means of food and theatrical performances. Most purification-ceremonies are concerned with physical or ritual impurities: but the "Prayer of Great Purification" alludes to the expiation of various crimes, such as profanation of corpses, homicide, disturbance of the rice-

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harvest, or incest. Shinto has waned with the waning of the divine Mikado.

Buddhism, however, brought the full civilisation and art of China to Japan, along with the personality of Shaka (Sakyamuni) and the Mahayana literature (p. 25). Nirvana (in Japanese "Nehan") was a definite Paradise-heaven, obtained by victories over six successive worlds. Combined with this, Confucius ("Koshi" in Japanese) lessoned Japan in ethics, especially in family respect and loyalty to the Mikado, a notion most acceptable to the soldier-Samurai, who still powerfully affect minds owing to their terrific ideal of self-control. It is impossible to relate the gods and goddesses that peopled the Japanese Buddhist heaven. Amaterasu herself became a Buddha (Japanese Buddhas have female faces); Kwannon, "the Gracious Goddess of a Thousand Hands," is very popular, as special granter of prayers, whether said or written. Amida-Buddha (Amitabha, p. 22) is highest among gods. Japanese Buddhism soon split into many schools of thought and practice. They fall into two main categories, Shodo-mon (Holy Way), and Jodo-mon (Land of Purity). The former teaches self-reliance if you would reach Nirvana, and the practice of the "three wisdoms": thus its Hosso sect is a sort of subjective idealism in practice, but is to-day unimportant. The Kegon sect, likewise unimportant, teaches a pantheist realism. The Tendai sect, Chinese in origin, is a sort of monism in which the nature of Buddha is the One: meditation is to teach you to realise this identity of all that is "you" with Buddha. All nature can in the long run become him who indeed it already is. Shingon tends by asceticism and repetitions to achieve Buddhahood even in this life and thus re-enter the Absolute. Zen rejects reading almost wholly, and relies on meditation to teach you that in your heart is "the true heart of Buddha": there is then for you no more good nor evil, but perfect quiet. The sects, Jodo, Shin, and Nichiren, are, however, of pure Japanese origin, unlike these Indian or Chinese ones. Jodo transferred everything to faith in Amida, who

put off his own Buddhahood out of compassion for men, and taught them to reach the Land of Purity, which he created for them. Their life is therefore to be spent in repeating, "I put my trust in Amida-Buddha," on a sort of rosary. Shin, though gorgeously ritualist, rejects all "works," even prayer. You simply trust in the saving promise of Amida, with whom you can be united even here. Prayer is but a cry of gratitude, an expression of faith from the redeemed. Asceticism is abolished: the priesthood is but a lay-ministry of teaching. Nichiren, the other most popular sect, teaches the exact opposite. It claims to pay unique homage to the Book of the original revelation of Buddha. It repeats for hours at a time: "Worship be to the Sutra of the marvellous Law of the Lotus." It declares that worshippers of Amida will go to hell, and that the disciples of Zen are devils. Personal effort is everything, and even stones can make it. Unfortunately, the level of these sects is low. The Tripitaka has not even been translated out of Chinese. If you twirl the sacred bookcases, you gain the same merit as if you read the 6,711 books therein contained.

PERSIA

IN view of the enormous importance of the Persian Empire in history, its religion is of vast importance, too. But, as that most impartial scholar, the late Dr. Casartelli confessed, there is yet no way of properly correlating the view of it obtained from the Inscriptions of the kings of the Achaemenid dynasty (549-330 B.C.) and that offered by the sacred books called the Avesta. The former is a contemporary record in Old Persian: the latter in a later form of the language in its earlier parts, in Pahlavi in its later; its general date is fiercely disputed even now. The Avesta sets forth the Zarathustrian reform—Zarathustra or Zoroaster was a philosopher-prophet to be dated probably between 650 and 580 B.C. However, the only part of the Avesta safely to be attributed even to the time of Zarathustra is the set of hymns, etc., called the

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Gāthā (below, p. 31). Even so, while the Avesta never mentions the great Achaemenid kings, it speaks of many other dynasties and lands of ancient "Iran"; the inscriptions do not once mention Zarathustra, as though Asoka (p. 22), should never mention the Buddha; nor do they hint at the essential dualism of the Avesta, as though Asoka were found ignorant of deliverance from the wheel of existences in Nirvana. Is, then, the royal religion a simplification of an ancient Avestan one? Is the Avestan system an elaboration of a previous system? Is one proper to the north, one to the south? Impossible to answer. At least, *both* "religions" are close akin to the old Vedic religion of India (p. 15). Possibly Zarathustrian religion was introduced, with simplifications, by Darius (522-485) into Persia proper; nature-worship certainly lay at the back even of the simple royal cult. Possibly the domination of Assyrians and Medes had corrupted Persian worship and creed, and the kings cut away original elements, thinking them to be accretions. It is best to offer first a view of the simpler royal system; then, of the Avestic religion.

The religion of the Great Kings testifies to belief in one supreme God, the great God, Auramazda (in the Avesta the parts of the name are always separate—Ahura Mazda, and even inverted, or separated by other words): He is all-powerful: by His grace, kings are allowed to reign, receive their power, govern or defeat the nations. "Everything that I have done, I have done without exception by the will of Auramazda." He is, too, omniscient. Along with him are "other gods"—those of subject clans: they are anonymous. But also, Mithra, originally a god of light, and Anāhata, a goddess of water, are associated with the supreme god, significantly in view of the profound respect given by the Persians to fire and to rivers. Auramazda is Creator of heavens, earth, man, and man's happiness: men pray to, worship, and intercede with him. The existence of temples is uncertain: the sculptured frames of the inscriptions, however, seem to show fire-altars: perhaps

Assyria originated art-forms like their winged half-men, or winged discs; Herodotus says that Persians admitted no images of the gods into their worship.* The moral life sprang from the command of Auramazda: incomparably the worst sin was a lie.

Avestic religion itself falls into two parts, that expressed in the Gāthās, and the rest. The Avesta is a tiny fragment of an immense literature called Avistak va Zand: Avesta and its Commentary. Anquetil-Duperron (p. 9) thought that the last word was the language in which it was written: hence "Zend" to-day is misused in that sense. We isolate, first, those "metrical sermons" called the Gāthās, older than the rest, and professing to be Zarathustra's own. We hold that Zarathustra was a real person, living about 600 B.C., that these older portions of the Avesta go back to him in substance at least, that the entire Avesta did *not* perish in the times of Alexander, and that the Sassanid king Ardashir, aided by his high-priest, did *not* rewrite the entire Avesta from memories of traditions. We conceive, in fact, of the old Indo-Persian religion, so to call it, as a simple nature-religion, developing quite differently in India and in Persia owing to the quite different temperaments of the peoples, meditative and practical respectively. We conceive, then, of a "school" rather than reform shaping itself among a group of Magi of whom Zarathustra may well have been a leader, acting so as to elaborate popular notions even while it purified them: it can be called "philosophical" provided this be not conceived as rationalising in the Greek sense (p. 52). Possibly Darius attempted a parallel reform, of a much more practical and thoroughgoing sort. After a period of chaos, due to Alexander's invasions and his desire to Hellenise his conquests, the Zarathustrian reforms, persisting among

* On this part, see especially: King and Thompson, *The Sculptures and Inscription of Darius the Great on the Rock of Behistun* (published by the British Museum trustees, 1904).

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the educated Magi, may have rejoined popular religion and thus formed the Avestic amalgam. The royal reform will have lapsed. We consider, then, the Gāthās as the oldest stratum available.

The Gāthās clearly are attacking some hostile system : interestingly, they eliminate both Mithra and Anāhata, and disesteem the *haōma* sacrifice. But they definitely teach Dualism. Twin spirits of Good and Evil create the Universe, itself divided into the world of Asha, good, and Drug, evil. The latter includes Angro-Mainyav, the evil spirit, with his court of dēvas, devils, and all wicked men, who ceaselessly persecute and seduce the good. The former includes Ahura Mazda, surrounded by many semi-personal beings—divine Attributes, we may almost say—*Asha*, Moral Law; *Vohu-Manah*, Good Will; *Khshathra*, Royalty; and several others, six of whom later made a pre-eminent group. Through these God communicates with man, and man with God. The reward in the next world is promised usually in terms of riches or material well-being. It depends, however, definitely on the state of a man's mind or soul. Man's spirit must, in fact, be that of Ahura Mazda. Thus animated, a man must resist Ignorance and Falsehood, their spirits, and their works; must conform himself to the spirit of knowledge and of good; live as a peaceable agriculturist, respecting especially the ox, and thus tread the path to the Kingdom whose recompense begins to be possessed in this life, being perfected after a Judgment in the next.

The remaining mass of literature (itself but the relics of many books destroyed) contains all manner of prayers, ritual regulations, etc. In it, the two creative principles, good and evil, are seen so definitely opposed (though the latter is to be totally abolished in the end) that theories were worked out to reduce their Origin to a Unity—Limitless Time, *Zrvan akarana*, progenitor of both, was one solution. Ahura Mazda, with six Attributes now fully personified, forms a group of seven Ameshas-Spentas, Immortal Holy Ones. *Vohu-Manah* is the Good Mind, or Thought, yet is special protector of domestic

animals. Asha is the Moral Law, yet guardian of fire. Khshathra Vairya is the Good Reign (personification of Mazda's kindly power), and patron of metals, and so forth. Beneath these are the Yazatas, apparently ancient gods reduced to the rank of "angels": one is Atar, Fire, son of Mazda, showing itself especially in the hvarenah, or the glory that enhaloed kings. Anahita is now goddess or genius of waters. Mithra is all but personification of Contracts, of military honour—hence of soldiers (p. 62); the sun is his eye—he sees all. He, with Sraosha and Rashnu, Justice and Obedience, presides at the judgment of souls. Under these were the Fravashis, almost "guardian angels" or the genius of each man and his benefactor: even, there is the Soul of the Ox—the primeval ox that lived with the first man and symbolised all good things of the earth. Opposed in all points to these is Anglo-Mainyav and his devils, of whom six are pre-eminent. During the first 3,000 years of creation, Ahura Mazda made only a spiritual world: but Anglo-Mainyav awoke, and declared war (though Ahura offered him peace) for 9,000 years. Mazda then stuns him with an omnipotent prayer. During the next 3,000 years material things, whose spiritual prototypes had been existing, are made. The world is the scene of conflict till the last 3,000 years open with the revelation to Zarathustra, whom a series of prophets follows, ending with a supreme prophet, the general resurrection, and the triumph of Mazda over his foe; then a new period of Unlimited Time begins. Man has to fight his own battle by venerating fire, by honesty and truth, scrupulous purity, charity, hospitality. The loftiest virtues are, however confused by puerile details—also, by the unfortunate permission of brother-and-sister marriage (*cf.*, p. 34). Severe penances were enjoined on sin—sins against nature and burning a corpse were unforgivable. Worship centred round the cult of fire, the purest and divinest thing imaginable. Hence a corpse must defile neither earth by being buried nor fire by being burnt. Impure birds devour it on the Tower of Silence. After three

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days the soul is judged: if its good and bad actions balance, it is in "equilibrium": else it crosses a bridge to Paradise, or is thrust from it into an appalling hell. The final cataclysm shall destroy the world, and though its rain of molten lead shall hurt the wicked souls indescribably, yet apparently they emerge purified and the new cycle begins. Note, a singular absence of myth, and an overwhelming insistence on moral virtues in this "revelation," as it professed to be—in this definite "doctrine," as it certainly was. It was cruel to Christianity; the Arabs were crueller still to it. Alone Parsis in India—said to be 70,000 at most—are its true survivors. In the names of demonology alone did Jewish literature accept somewhat from it: Asmodeus in *Tobit* is the Aeshma dæva of the Avesta. The Jewish notions of the Kingdom, and of the Resurrection, developed independently. Indeed, it is likely the exiled Jews affected Mazdeism at least as a stimulus to develop itself, though Persia need not have borrowed anything from them directly.

EGYPT

THE religion of the Egyptians was simple and complex—simple, because it reflected the divine power perceived in sky and land and river: complex, because its forms were very localised, and subsisted in combination even when the land was unified. The sky provided above all its incomparable Sun: the earth meant the land as fertilised by the Nile. Presumably, after the unification (shall we say, about 4000 B.C.?), the tribes, each with its own worship, so amalgamated as to retain their own names for gods recognised as identical beneath the many titles, or at least, offspring of one supreme deity best recognised in the Sun. It may be that Egypt was a totemist land, and that each tribe had its sacred animal, which it used as "crest" and symbol of its god, and later represented its special god, or presentation of god, hawk-headed, ibis-headed, and so forth. Marriages of

kings with their sisters aimed at preserving the divine blood inherited from the ancestral deity.

Heliopolis in the north remained the religious and intellectual centre of the land. It taught that from primeval chaos or dark, Nû, emerged as from his own substance and like a sun (Râ) the first God, Atûm. (He is hawk-, human-, or scarab-headed according to his rôle: the scarab was, apparently, self-generated, or at least indestructible.) From himself Atûm-Râ generates pairs of gods and goddesses; the latter are sometimes colourless figures existing more for parallelism than for practical purposes. Thus a pale Tafnut stands beside Shû, the air, who, insinuated between Qeb (earth) and Nût (sky)—the second pair—lives in the heaven high above the earth. A third pair are Osiris and Isis, enormously important later on, though at first secondary. They are Nile and Land: united, they produce all the fertility of Egypt. Set (with the vague Nephthys) would be the arid desert, enemy of these powers. Early hymns to Atûm-Râ are of exalted beauty. At Memphis, the supreme god was the mysterious Ptah, or at least the power or spirit of that god—his creative force, operative even in the "Hidden Land" of the "dead." His spirit resided in the Bull Apis and passed from one such bull into another. At Hermopolis in Middle Egypt, Tahuti had been creator-god: but this ibis-headed figure sank into myth, and became secretary of the gods and assimilated or transmitted many of the duties of the Greek Hermes. He was god, too, of crafts, writing, and invention generally. At Thebes in Upper Egypt, Amon, or Amon-Râ, held the rank of Atûm-Râ, but associated with himself Mut, the mother-goddess, and Khons, their child. Regarded as a unity, this group attached to itself the eight Atûm-born gods of Heliopolis, and inaugurated thus the groups of nine into which the Egyptian gods kept fitting themselves. Amon-Râ, owing to the triumph, maybe, of Thebes, became by far the most important divine figure in matured Egypt. Of other gods we may quote Har (Horus), a solar god: Hat-Hor, not dissimilar to Nût,

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owning the cow, and goddess of women especially. Neith, especially at Saïs, was regarded as the first mother. The Egyptians, instinctive and not rationalist philosophers, never issued declarations as to the precise nature of their supreme God: but he was unique: to him the others owed their existence: the only co-eternal along with him is Chaos (*cf.* pp. 39, 49).

In the realm of myth, Osiris and Isis had an incomparable success. Osiris, who married his sister Isis, reigned on earth as king after Râ. His brother Set attacked, slew, and dismembered him. Isis, after long search, re-formed the scattered limbs and embalmed them. Thereupon Osiris became king among the dead, and his son Horus (conceived before either Isis or Osiris was born, and himself born after his father's death) ultimately ousted Set and became king. The ritual opportunities provided by this myth were enormous: so, too, the possibility of allegorising it. Also, the desperate importance attached by the Egyptians to their well-being after death, rendered Osiris as Judge and King in Hades all but supremely important, too. Finally, when Greek philosophy laid hands upon it, along with the syncretist theologians (see pp. 5, 66), the myth became sublime and beautiful. No doubt the figure of Isis, with its human pathos, was the more popular: Apuleius, in his strange book, the *Metamorphoses*, shows what could be made of it, even by an author who was plagiarist, superstitious, frivolous, and obscene. He is thrilled to the soul by the thoughts inspired by the goddess.

The after-world was clearly recognised from very early times as, first, most certainly existing; and as depending for its conditions wholly on the moral behaviour of the man while still on earth. He was body, and also soul (as for the puzzling Kâ, of Genius, p. 56). It was a sort of spiritual replica attending on the man. Almost, the subsistent *idea* of the man). On bodily death the soul was tried by Osiris: the Heart was weighed against Truth. Here the "Negative Confession" was made, a singularly exacting one, in which simple and practical misdoings

have to be disavowed (such as cutting off Nile-water from a channel), but also what the loftiest codes of ethics everywhere recognise as wrong. Each action incurred its sanction in the other world. The absolutely evil man was condemned to torture, or perhaps reincarnation as a hog; the righteous, after anxious wanderings and purifications (to pass through which with success rendered the possession and knowledge of the Book of the Dead so important), entered Paradise, conceived either as a happy reproduction of earthly life, in other worldly states, or, as a mystical union with Osiris, so that the blessed soul was actually called Osiris.

The brief attempt to impose a cult of the Solar Disc, quasi-monotheist and philosophical, by Akhn Aton (about 1300), has been made familiar by recent research. It did not succeed, and need not delay us. Nor need the progressive degeneration of the Egyptian religion, in Græco-Roman days. Its solitary popular contribution was the god Serapis, whose vogue was due more to royal patronage than to genuine interest in this originally local worship (he came from Sinope in Asia Minor). Superstition connected with animals became quite mad: magical practices, especially connected with the after-life, increased, such as the putting into graves of those little earthenware figures symbolically "responding" to the dead man's name when he should be called upon to work in the next world or otherwise have a less agreeable sojourn there. We hold that earlier Egyptian religion was purer and nobler than it is sometimes allowed to have been; but we do not admit that it exerted that vast influence, nor contained that sublime philosophy, with which modern romance credits it.

BABYLON AND ASSYRIA

SINCE 1842 an enormous amount of material concerning the religion of these empires has been excavated. Not nearly all of it has been translated. Much of what has been translated remains doubtful. Hence here, as else-

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where, tentative results, for the most part, can alone be set down. Moreover, without entering into vexed questions such as the relation of Semitic elements to "Sumerian" in the mass of evidence before us, we face the fact that each little city-state under its "patesi" or ruler had its "religion," even though certain shrines rose into general repute; and the "god" of each such state was pictured as the patesi "writ large," and had his divine court and, indeed, bureaucracy according to the earthly model. However, the importance of a city or its king led to a proportionate importance of its god: gods, moreover, could be fused, if sufficiently like one another; hierarchies could be fashioned. On the whole, Anu, sky-god, stands naturally at the head of the worship of dwellers in those enormous plains: En-Lil is god of Earth; Ea, of Ocean. Neither the Euphrates nor the Tigris playing so definite a rôle as the Nile, no god of theirs rose to the importance of, say, Osiris in Egypt. However, the Great Lady, Ishtar, specially worshipped at Uruk, rose to be a fourth along with these three great gods: she was the goddess of fecundity, and absorbed other such goddesses; but also a militant deity, and, again, a goddess of love, or, rather, passion. The moon-god was Sin, especially famous at Ur and at Haran; Shamash was sun-god; Ninib, war-god; Adad (Assyrian Rammân, *cf.* p. 41), storm-god. Nabu, god of Borsippa, yet sank in the scale, like Tahuti (p. 35), and became scribe-god, and "son" of Marduk, when under Hammurabi (about 2000 B.C.) Babylon rose to a central position, and with it its god ascended to the apex of worship. Dumuzi (Tammuz: *cf.* p. 64), a quite secondary god of vegetation, yet, like Osiris (p. 36), achieved, owing to the human element in his myth, no little importance even internationally. He is the Adonis of Phœnicia and even the Attis of Asia—he is slain yearly by the fierce sun, and Ishtar, his paramour, goes into the lower world to rescue him. This is the subject of the famous poem, "The Descent of Ishtar." To the end of its 3,000 years of evolution a "monarchical polytheism" obtained in Baby-

lonia: floating tendencies to see a varied action of one god in the different spheres of existence may be discerned: but the idea of "God" does not seem to have properly dawned: divine names like "Ilu-abi" are considered to mean not "God," but "a god is my father." The attractive theory that the name Yahweh has been discovered in ancient Babylonian records seems unsupported.

Babylonian cosmogony is interesting chiefly because of the problems it sets regarding the book of Genesis. The aboriginal Ocean, Apsu, and Tiâmât, the watery abyss or chaos, mingle and produce the gods. These disturb Apsu, who with Tiâmât resolves to destroy them. She produces therefor dragons and other monsters and attacks the gods. Anu, sent to fight her, flies at her aspect; Marduk offers to fight her if he may be exalted among the gods. The gods feast, get drunk, and promise Marduk what he asks. He arms himself, and, when Tiâmât opens her mouth against him, hurls a wind between her jaws, divides her body, heaves half of it aloft over the heaven, and in this sets sun, moon, and stars. He forms man out of blood (his own?), and is finally glorified. The poem seems to date from the rise of Babylon to pre-eminence, and aims at the exaltation of Marduk. Ea, in other creation-myths, formed the universe. The Babylonian story of the Flood offers other interesting points, but does not enter into "religion" save as exhibiting the popular notions concerning the gods, who are afraid of the flood, fly to heaven, hide there like dogs with drooping ears, and then descend like flies over the sweet-scented sacrifice. Alongside of worship was magic. The Babylonian world was full of witchcraft, which drew down disasters, especially sickness. The all but omnipotence of wizards, and especially witches, originated a mass of counter-spells, nor is it easy to overstate the influence of this upon ordinary Babylonian life. Alongside of exorcist-priests stood the diviner-priests, and very many records of astrological consultations of a most elaborate sort survive. A quaint Ishtar-oracle shows how, if the first oracle was

displeasing to the king, a second could be sought which should satisfy him.

The religion which (as personal and temple names reveal) simply drenched popular life showed, above all, the sentiments of helplessness, distress, and penitence. If, however, sin is repented, it seems because it has brought disaster, and this disaster is material, and nearly always illness. A long incantation exists, intended to discover what sin has provoked the evil. What in the Egyptian Negative Confession (p. 36) is denied here appears in the form of questions. "I am not one who cuts short the field's measure," is here: "Has he traced false boundaries?" It has been definitely stated that "forgiveness of sins" *means*, for the Babylonian, liberation from disease. Exalted moral sentiments are also to be found: but never, it is said, genuine love for one's neighbour. Moreover, the punishments allotted in the code of Hammurabi, not only cruel but sometimes severe for most trivial matters and relatively light for grave ones, and the approbation of immoral practices—*e.g.*, ritual prostitution—show a very imperfectly developed moral sense.

The doctrine of the "Vast Land," or after-death world, is far less developed than the Egyptian one, and appears extremely gloomy. The shades lie in darkness, and eat dust and mire. There is a hint that kings at least may join the gods. Despite the magnificence of the Mesopotamian empires, the lot of the people seems to have been appalling, and their outlook melancholy.

SYRIA

WE have to use this name very roughly, for the land and the peoples lying between the Mediterranean and the Euphrates, and the Taurus range and the Sinaitic peninsula. We exclude temporarily the Hebrew immigrants. Babylon, Egypt, the Hittites, Persia, Greece, Rome, poured into and out of the land and confused worship and traditions. However, the general worship went to "Lords," or Owners, Masters—Ba'alim, in Hebrew. So

vague was this name that the Hebrews themselves could use it without offence till quite late. These Ba'als were lords of field, of water, of tree: also, of sun and heavens. They had also regularly the title Melek, king: the more familiar word "Molech" is due to the Hebrews inserting the vowels of the word *bosheth*, a thing of shame. Adoni, the same as the Hebrew Adonai, my Lord, was no less regular as a title, and, accumulating qualities proper to Tammuz (p. 38), and perhaps to the Egyptian Osiris (p. 36), ended as the Adonis who, Hellenized, became famous later on, and, as vegetation-deity, died yearly and was restored to life. Dagon, a fish-formed deity, adopted specially by the Philistines, was a god of fertility like most of the others. At his side was a fish-goddess, Atargatis, a name compounded of the Babylonian Ishtar and the Syrian Hati. But while Ishtar certainly superimposed herself on the anonymous female Ba'als, or Belith, bringing with her the general characteristic of fertile nature, and adding to herself the horns of the Egyptian Isis, and being taken consequently for a moon-goddess, she, too, was felt to be goddess of various places and unspecified on the whole in any other way, and the Hebrews, again adding the vowels of *bosheth* to her Syrian name Ashtart (Greek, Astartê), obtained the familiar word Ashtoreth. Most of these names or titles could be hyphenated, either as representing a pair of deities, male and female, or equivalent deities. Thus, Hadad-Rimmon (Syrian sun-god Hadad, and Assyrian thunderer Rammânu: Ashtar-Chemosh—*i.e.*, Syrian Ashtart and Moabite Kemosh). The constant symbol of divine presence, or interposition, was a stone pillar, with or at first without an altar, and indeed itself acting as a libation-altar: along with these, a wooden pole received homage, called the *asherah*; it seems likely that the pillar represented the Ba'al; the pole, his female counterpart; nor is there serious ground for regarding the former as *phallic* in origin. Later on, shaped images became common, the Baals often aureoled with sun-rays; the goddess of fecundity pressing her hands to her breasts or carrying a dove. (This profoundly

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coloured the Greek notion of Aphrodite, p. 50.) The worship of Syria and of her colonies (Carthage) was violent in the extreme. It became, indeed, just the cult of sensation. Ferocious ecstasy, including self-mutilation, and canonised profligacy, including unnatural vice, none of which we have the slightest right to allegorise or sublimate, became quite normal, and the sacrifice of children in the fire was quite common. The future life was conceived vaguely—a place of ghosts is mentioned; and the world, as time went on, was thought to have been begotten of Chaos and of Spirit. While, then, it is hopeless to try to disentangle all the interwoven threads in the Syrian religious web, we can at least say that Syrian religion began with nature-worship, and expressed itself in the most degenerate forms of cultus to be found among people claiming to be civilised.

CELTIC RELIGION

We assume that Celtic civilisation spread from the middle of Europe, rich in forests and iron. The Celts went north and eastwards, and south over the Alps, and gradually all over Gaul and most of Spain. In 390 B.C. they actually took Rome, and a century later overran the Balkan peninsula and established themselves even in Asia Minor (the Galatians). It may have been the conquests of Julius Cæsar that checked their migrations. But these migrations, together with trade which from remote ages had existed between the Continent, Britain, and Ireland, had much confused traditions, especially where men of Celtic stock submitted to the forceful influence of Rome. In Gaul, Roman names for the gods prevailed, even when the original one was as it were hyphenated to them. It is easiest to observe Celtic religion in Ireland, though even there you see it through the eyes of Christian writers, who, while they enjoyed telling the traditional stories, modified them, lest they should appear to believe them. In any case, we find clear traces of polytheism, but not of image or temple; perhaps the

priest was the father of each family—sacrifice was not rarely human. Natural phenomena (springs, trees) not only had their divine inhabitants, but could be directly worshipped, like the Winds. The gods were regarded as "ancestors rather than creators," and if elsewhere kings were thought to have become gods, here the gods have been effectively reduced to kings, or at least the fathers of kings. Every man, medieval genealogists assure us, who is outstanding in beauty, strength, or art, is a descendant from the Tuatha De Danann—"the people of the goddess Dana"; and the Gaulish god whom the Romans described as *Dis Pater*, is thought to be the Irish *Dagde* (*Davos-devos*, the good god), who is also *Oll-athair*, "universal father." When the gods did not become kings, they became sprites or fairies. *Sidhi*, the hill-dwellers, an ancient Irish name for "gods," are now *Sidheoga*, a diminutive, "fairies." *Lugh-chorpan*, "leprechaun" or "luprachan," a word re-familiarised to us by W. B. Yeats and other moderns, "little Lugh-body," a fairy craftsman, is the relic of the fire and crafts god *Lugh*, whence *Lyons*, *Lugdunum*, is said to get its name.

The gods dwelt in "the Land of the Young, of the Living Heart, of Heart's Delight," in the "Land beneath the Wave," which was held to be, if not interwoven with, at least superimposed upon our earth-world. Our air is to the dwellers there not unlike the sea, so that the celestial boatmen in the story of the *Ship of Cluain* "drown" in it. A mortal could enter this world, while still alive, yet so that should his foot again touch earth (which he could visit without treading it), time, which had had no effect upon him "yonder," now took its full toll: he became aged on the spot, or even fell to dust. The home of the dead has no similar mythology: it existed, however, probably in or beyond the northern sea, the place of the *Fomorians*, enemies of the gods and of the living. Feasts and games, the origin of fairs, were used for solemnly commemorating the dead in their great fields of tumuli. The ethics of the Celts had little if any

association with their religion. They were sound, and the ancient laws are said to be based on the customs of the free agricultural population, the Feni. Writers, however, insist on the efficacy of "geis" (plural gesa), which Prof. J. McNeill tells us is "a law of conduct which required an individual or a class of persons to do or to refrain from doing some action or class of actions." Hence it is by no means the same as "taboo," even though disaster follow on its violation, prosperity on observance. Nor is it the same as karma (p. 20) even though men are born with it, or clans have their hereditary gesa; for one man may "put" a geis upon another, though whence he derives the power to do so, none knows. Conaire Mor, for example, was subject to a group of gesa, and precisely in pursuance of his will to do right, he is led to break his gesa one by one and end in ruin. The persistence of this notion of "luck," good or bad, and of the power of curses, along with and in spite of its modification by Christianity, is interestingly visible in the Ireland even of to-day. Ancient authority assigned the origin of gesa to the pre-Celt Picts. Already in what we have said traces of possible survivals from older days, either really, or by contrast, gloomier than the Celtic contribution, may be surmised. Druidism, too, has been assigned to this earlier source, though quite probably it is a very late development.

Druidism has not been properly studied yet, for it continued in Ireland long after it died out elsewhere, and much tradition is still uncollected. It is convincingly argued that it reached the coast of Britain from Ireland, and crossing the Channel established its Continental headquarters near Chartres, and thence spread even across the Alps. "Druid" is a word meaning, possibly, one who "knows well." Druidism was an order of instructed men who taught. On this intellectual aspect of the Druids, Greek records insist: on their political influence, the Roman. Their prominence in worship was simply part of the "lead" they took in everything. They were the universal experts. No wonder, then, that they

acted as "magicians," nor that this "sorcerer" aspect of them is what revived as the lands became Christianised. It may well be that they started as "medicine-men" in the magic sense, used this embryonic "science" to such good effect as really to become leaders even in thought, and then, when monks themselves began to philosophise, reverted in esteem to their earlier character. It is partly because magic does not stand high in traditional Irish tales, that the origin of Druids is held by some to be Pictish. Since they taught "immortality," and probably explained the ancient belief that some souls at least "transmigrated," even into animals, we cannot but be reminded by the Druids of Indian conceptions and even practice (education of a chela, disciple). When Diogenes Laertius says they delivered their philosophy "enigmatically," and when an early Irish Druidic poet makes the "first Druid" sing: "I am the wind over the ocean—the wave of the sea against the land—the sound of the sea: I am the hawk on the cliff—the salmon in the pool—the lake on the plain—I am the spear—I am the god that forms fire in the head . . ." we cannot but recall the pantheistic philosophy of India. Prof. McNeill rejects this, and says the poet identifies himself with all this because he "knows" it: indeed the comparison may be one of those that strike only the amateur. It remains that while the Druids have been foolishly enhaloed with romance, no romance can be more poignant than that of the ancient traditions of the Celts.

TEUTONIC PEOPLES

THESE are at least the "Germans," Danes, English, Norwegian, Swedish, and Icelandic peoples. But pre-Christian evidence is practically nil: indeed, only Iceland offers much, and then Norway, because of their Sagas and the older Edda literature, of which the first MSS. are thirteenth century. The older stories are constantly so Christianised as to be hard of interpretation. It is clear,

however, that there were certain "Pan-Teutonic" gods: Odin (Wotan), god of the dead and of wind, who evicted Thor (Donner) from the primacy in Norway and Iceland; Ziu-Tyr, war-god, and Frigg, wife of Odin. The interrelation of all these is obscure: they survive in some of the names of our week-days. Frey was the special god of the fertile plains of Sweden. Thence, from Upsala, he went northwards: his name simply means Lord (*cf.* Ba'al, p. 40). With him went Freya, goddess of fecundity. There are many other names that can be cited, but they gave rise to tumultuous myth rather than to "theology." The double system of gods, Asas and Vans, marks the gradual victory of Wotan. We can here add but Balder, son of Odin, a Norse god of light, who, slain by the mistletoe, was avenged by a brother born for that purpose. Loki was definitely treated as a god; of "Satanic" disposition—that is, trickily resisting the others; but his character was "elfish" rather than divine; and the rôle played by Giants, Dwarfs, and Elves must have been quite as important for these peoples as that of the gods. Many intermediate beings existed—*e.g.*, the Valkyries, who transport to Valhalla men slain in battle. Most of these secondary beings appear to rank as personifications of natural forces, usually violent like the storm, or are ex-gods. It seems certain that kings were deified, and even inanimate objects like swords and, of course, trees and waters were treated with divine homage. But we must, as ever, avoid attributing clean-cut notions to these Northerners on such subjects, then, and perhaps now. Save in England, priests do not seem to have been a class, but to have combined sacerdotal functions with civil ones. Feasts occurred principally at the crises of the year, and Yule and the midsummer festival leave their traces in country customs even now. There were certainly temples and images; and groves or trees were specially attended to: near each house, apparently, grew a "protector-tree," usually over a well. Possibly the world-ash Yggdrasil developed from the tree of the royal enclosure, or was reflected even into

the world of the gods: the worlds of Hades, of the Giants, and of the gods were involved in its roots, and on it Odin hung for nine days, offering himself to himself, in which we can see a combination of ancient tree-offerings with Christian themes. After a cycle of time the gods were to perish by fire, the earth in the sea, and a new better era was to begin.

GREECE

THE last two generations have proved that the history of the "Greek" peninsula, far from going back, hesitatingly, to some mere 700 years B.C., can be traced securely to quite double that distance. Here, however, we cannot enter into details concerning those peoples or that race, which preceded the Greeks in the peninsula and the islands. Enough to say that in the enormous palaces discovered in Crete especially, at Troy, and at Tiryns or Mycenæ, or at least within that civilisation, a goddess at whose sides lions ramped, a power figured by a double-headed axe, and a pillar tapering towards its base (a wooden pillar, that is, somewhat whittled away for fixing it in earth or stone), were venerated. The dead were reverently buried and surrounded by gift or sacrifice. Into the civilisation of the conquering groups ancient influences crept. Stones, perhaps aerolites, had a cult, and stood for the first representation of this divinity or that—thus the exquisite Aphrodite was, at Paphos, just a conical stone: animals, too, became attached to certain gods, whence some manner of earlier cult may be guessed—thus, Athene's owl; Aphrodite's dove; Zeus's eagle. Perhaps the habits of snakes, living in cave or tomb, connected them without more ado with buried heroes or with the pre-Greek cults associated with Earth or driven literally under earth by the invaders. Clearly, too, the cult of trees was prehistoric. On vase-paintings you can see, e.g., the worship of the tree; of the tree human-headed and clothed; and of the full-formed god. The Dead, too, had their cult, but chiefly as Undesir-

ables, to be got rid of. The ancient Anthesteria feast presupposes periodical marauding excursions of the ghosts: they could be kept in order during the year if, on one day, food was set for them at the house-door: they came no further, and finally could be told to leave (*cf.* p. 57). As for the gods and their origin, they are best treated in their developed form: enough to say that as time went on it was less the official gods than the kindly local "hero" who filled imagination and evoked affection.

In Homer's poems (to which, in common, we think, with most modern students, we attribute far more unity, antiquity, and authenticity than was once the fashion, and in which we see substantial tradition with but accidental modernisations, and which can be thought of as belonging in the mass to about 1000 B.C.) religion is so complex already as to be degenerate. The ancient nature-worship is sometimes evident, sometimes already "anthropomorphised." Let us say, once and for all, that the moment the Greeks could express a "force" or phenomenon in human form, they did so, just as the Romans did not (*cf.* p. 55). The tales about the gods have that artistic ribaldry which comes at the end of a period: no doubt in their present shape these are relatively late: but the tales took time to form. Olympus, the home of the gods, is at least connected with the actual mountain; there the gods live under Zeus their monarch; thence they descend to indulge in every kind of intrigue and even crime. But most of what can be said about them has an historical interest rather than a religious one, save in what concerns Zeus himself and Fate. Homer's humans have so perfect a humanity as to be more god-like than his gods. What goes to the root of things is this: the Greeks saw well that there was and must be a supreme God: this was Zeus (Sanskrit, Dyaus: *cf.* p. 15). Also, they were possessed from the outset by that sense of "limit" which is visible in their art, as in their philosophy. The back of the Greek mind was fatalist and pessimist. Reconciliation between Fate and the

Almighty was never achieved by them. Homer is on the rack of this mystery. In Homer, the Dead exist in a shadowy way in the Unseen: the "man himself" lies on the battlefield: his ghost, "a phantom merely," has no sense and no wit, nor will till it has drunk human blood. Vague anticipations of Elysian fields and Tartarus exist, at least for favoured or specially sinful souls. Between 800 and 700, Hesiod, in Bœotia and no more, like Homer, in Asia Minor or the islands, fixes a genealogy of gods. Again the Greek instinct for order reveals itself: but in the dull lists of names at least the inclusion at the outset (along with Chaos, Earth, and Tartaros) of Eros, Love, is striking. The notion of Force, Attraction, is deep in Greek surmise. The battles between dynasties or sets of gods are important, and the recognition that Zeus was by no means the first comer to the now Greek-peopled lands.

Greece then went forward, not with a doctrine of God, but with stories about the gods. Provided ancestral rites were performed, little enough conservatism was needed. Immemorial feasts—things "done" rather than things offered and not at all things "taught"—testified, not necessarily, we hold, to pre-Greek customs, but to immemorial preoccupations of mankind—field and home. Seed-time and harvest; flowering-time and (at last) vintage—these had their feasts, prefaced by these logical primitives by fasting and eating purgative herbs—thus evil was expelled—and then by carrying in procession symbols of that fertility which was desired, or eating in specimen, as it were, those fruits or grains that were hoped for. Sometimes a maiden would be enclosed in a vault, and thence reappear; the whole myth of Demeter (Earth-Mother) and Kore, the maiden (nameless at first), was evolved. Ravished by the god of Death, she was sought and found by her sorrowing mother, and restored to life for a space of each year. Even the fruit-god Dionysos (*cf.* p. 56) died yearly, and women, waving cradles, called him back to life. Connected with these notions are the Mysteries (*infra*, p. 64). Above this

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the great gods were enthroned, yet even they were susceptible of as many myths as their minimum of original character admitted.

Zeus, god of heaven, father of gods and men, master of the sky and its marvels, patron of family and guesthood and of the helpless, lord of oracle, president of homes and towns and people, came by violence to his lofty seat. He slew his Father; the earth-born Titans assailed him and were conquered. Heré, his wife, goddess of marriage, may possibly be pre-Greek, though the ritual of her "sacred marriage" need not by any means be a symbol of a mating of two cults. Sufficient to see in it the magical representation of the prototype of marriage, which should ensure success to human bridals. Artemis, on the other hand, did derive many of her features from a distance. At first the Greek divinities were very vague—perhaps nameless. The sense of vigorous life in wild birds, beasts, and even fish, struck forth from Greek minds the figure of a goddess who befriended or inhabited them. Wherever such a goddess was found—especially the great Nature-Goddesses of Asia—the Greeks recognised Artemis, and incorporated all they could of the foreign elements. Thus "Artemis of the Ephesians" is but the immemorial Asiatic goddess equipped with a Greek name. Aphrodité, too, is profoundly affected by oriental cults; indeed, the Aphrodités of Cyprus and Cythera were but Semitic Astartes. Quite possibly the sensual eastern goddesses supplied the whole figure of the goddess of soft love, to be set beside the chaster northern Artemis. Ares was the savage god of warfare; Hermes, a guide for the dead; Poseidon, certainly, we hold, pre-Greek, was associated with the bulls and horses of the Thessalian plain, and (we think from sheer events like local earthquakes, floods, and such phenomena) became god both of earth and its catastrophes, and of tumultuous sea. But with Zeus, Athené and Apollo are the most interesting gods. Athené was but the Maiden of Athenai, the local name for the ancient female deity found all over Greece.

Warrior in so far as she is patroness of a city ever at war, she is primarily a civic power: things of craftsmanship and politics are hers, and her colossal statue on the Acropolis dominated the seas as she herself controlled the imagination of her citizens. Apollo began, one would think, as a wolf-god: by a sheer mistake in the meaning of a cult-title he became connected with the sun. He, too, accumulated almost every quality with which a grateful people could endow him: above all, the cave of Delphi, whence his cult had ousted an earlier earth-worship, became the source of an influence that really did give some actual unity to the chaos of little "states" that made up Hellas. There were many other oracles, but Delphi stands alone. Mephitic vapours rising from a cleft in the rocks reduced the woman elected to be the vehicle of his behests to a state of ecstasy; she gave forth cries which the staff of the temple put into verses that contained the god's advice. Without any doubt, this international shrine was well-informed, and had definite policies, which for centuries it could impose on statesman and general, as well as on private inquirer.

That Apollo put the cries of the "pythoness" into verse, was symptomatic. The old generalisation is not false, that he and his cult were "orderly." But the Greeks were at times restive under their limits and their fate. Human nature always needs a percentage of mystery and ecstasy. Dionysos gave these to them. Invading the peninsula from the north, recognised at first as god of "moist" fruits rather than of grain, and then definitely of the vine, he ended by sharing the very cave of Delphi with Apollo, and invaded the ancient rites of Eleusis. In that town the worship of Demeter and Koré was immemorial. We cannot describe it here (*cf.* p. 64). Enough to say that candidates for "initiation" were, after fasting and other purifications, taken to Eleusis, given to eat from sacred grain- and vegetable-foods, made to participate in a symbolical miracle-play showing the history of the two goddesses and perhaps of Dionysos, and, at first, ensured thus prosperity for their

fields, families and town during this life, and, later on, owing to admixtures of Oriental ideas, gained safety from other-world perils after death. The "enthusiastic" cult of Dionysos, and the doctrines of the mystical schools of Orpheus and Pythagoras—the former taught a kind of heaven, hell, and purgatory; the latter, reincarnation; and both provided magical means of avoiding disaster and accelerating salvation therein—did not officially enter into the Eleusinian rites, but provided easy ways of allegorising and sublimating them. Yet the ecstatic element was antagonistic to Greek instinct.

Reason, or rather rationalism, or both, had always worked in the awakened "Greek" mind. We put inverted commas; for we cannot constantly remind readers that "Greece" was very much of a geographical expression, save in so far as Greek-speakers felt the rest of the world to be alien—barbarian. "Greece" was as truly the coast of Asia Minor as the European peninsula; and within that peninsula, the tiny state of Attica and, indeed, a minority in its capital, Athens, are too often spoken of as "Greece," a most illegitimate generalisation, particularly when philosophy is being spoken of. Alongside of mythology and cult, men tried to find one explanation of, one formula for the development of, the universe. This began in Ionia, the Asiatic coastland, 500 years before Christ. Usually the "gods" were treated with sufficient reverence to permit of their names being retained provided their notion was allegorised or interpreted in terms of natural forces: quite early, however, the idea of God as the ultimate one source of things went not unperceived. But this chapter cannot deal properly with philosophy, nor should religion ever be identified with it. Philosophy can be the map of religion, but is not the land itself. Therefore an orthodox Greek like Aristophanes, nothing of a philosopher, could yet mock at the stories about the gods: a profoundly religious man like Æschylus could eliminate a few discreditable myths; serene souls like Sophocles could contemplate the eternal Laws, God's action in the world,

and use the myths poetically; a tortured spirit like Euripides could rail with deep bitterness against the popular immoral notions, as he felt them, of the gods. But the "Sophists" of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in Athens were the often quite sincere purveyors of general knowledge, able to argue "for and against" and to teach others to do so. The dissipating effect of this upon the minds of younger men in Athens can be imagined. Religion had nothing at all save traditional rites and myths, both often absurd enough, if not disgraceful, to support itself upon. Hence the Sophists grew into worse favour, among the conservative, than they often deserved. Into this society came the extraordinary personality of Socrates (b. 468 B.C.), who, while loathing the Sophists for their disregard of Truth and prostitution of knowledge involved (he held) in their taking fees for teaching it, was quite as solvent in his method as they were. True, his aim was to find a basis for the moral, practical life; he had the deepest reverence for divine things and no intention even of disregarding traditional behaviour: none the less, his disciples, at least, by their constant airy criticism of established notions or formulas, drove their elders to desperation, and Socrates was executed. Plato, his adoring junior, a puritan-poet-mystic, who, however much he might have repudiated any one of the three names, rejected almost passionately the religious myth-world of his contemporaries, yet not only strained his own philosophy to the utmost in order to reach an idea of God that should not actually dislocate his metaphysics, but tended frankly, when he left Athens in disgust, towards the Pythagorean doctrines and, indeed, accepted transmigration. Perhaps he never achieved his ideal, which (to speak with extreme crudity; for who could crush Plato into a line or two?) was to identify the Super-Idea, "God," with the Good—Good in itself and *our* good. We move towards the Immutable God, by loving ever more purely the Beautiful, Good, True, and Real. As for Aristotle (384-322), my personal opinion has always been that there is a break in his mental pro-

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cess. Thus he certainly establishes to his satisfaction the existence of God, First Cause, Unchangeable, Infinite Intelligence, infinitely happy in its Self-Contemplation. And this Unchanging God does change us, because we can love it and thereby "move" towards it, though it love us not in return. (And of course this aristocrat of the intelligence, and therefore in all other departments of life, admits that the "lesser breeds" should have their gods, their worship, and indeed insists on reverent dealing with all such religious elements.) But suddenly, in the Nichomachean Ethics, he seems to me to pass into the notion of an individual immortality of happiness with God and in his contemplation, destined for man's soul. This, however, I cannot work out here. Nor is it possible to describe the degeneration of Greek religious life. It was the result of the conflict between a sceptical philosophy, the invincible rush of the human soul towards the worship of a God that can be loved, and superstitions. All this operated on a physique rapidly deteriorating, and a brain no more apt to sustain a creative intelligence. Neurotic activity alternated with inertia. The vision of beauty became complacency in national good taste. Oriental cults began to have their way: astrology ran riot: king-worship degraded human independence even of thought. Already we have overlapped the Roman period. Enough to add that a Neo-Pythagoreanism and a Neo-Platonism, gathering up all the manifold experience and even erudition that had become accessible since Plato's day, all the knowledge of religions throughout the new world, attempted a synthesis and also an asceticism—even as philosophy transcended the life of the senses, so direct intuition of God was to outswamp philosophy, and could be gained by souls detached enough from earth and its impurities. It was this synthesis that might be set over against third-century Christianity.

ROMAN RELIGION

I

THE earliest evidence concerning the Italian peninsula, as we know it, shows that its inhabitants had awe for the phenomena and forces of nature, an awe fastening itself on to tree or stone or sky, nor can you find the time when the ancient Aryan god of the bright sky, Dyauspiter, Jupiter, was not worshipped. But the unimaginative Roman, at any rate, surrounded his gods with neither art nor myth: his personifications were of the vaguest (*cf.* p. 48). He attended to "powers," *numina*: they were so dim as to be sexless, even nameless save for those adjectival names that expressed their *action*, an action concerned chiefly with scenes of ancient human interest—nursery, house, field. Statana was invoked to make a baby stand: Levana, to lift it: Carna saw to your digestion: Cloacina to the drains. Innumerable such Powers attended to every stage in the growth of crops: the Semones were a collectivity of powers that saw to sowing; Fauni were the voices of which the countryside was full. Circumstances created feasts—domestic, pastoral, agricultural, social, civic, as the Roman life developed. These names, too, are vague (*cf.* p. 48), neuter plurals—Robigalia, the day when you went in procession to invoke Divus Robigus against red crop-rust (*robigo*); Fordicidia (April 15—April, from *aperire*, to open, was the second month of the ancient Roman year, which began in March. Notice that September, October, and November still recall the times when in the calendar they were seventh, eighth, and ninth months) was kept by sacrificing unborn calves, "sympathetic magic" to provoke the growth of grain still in the womb of earth: Cerealia, April 19, a ceremony in honour of the Creative Power Ceres or Cerus (the sex was uncertain), derived from the root of *create*, to create. April 23 was the Vinalia, to obtain a good wine-year: the Ambarvalia was a procession round the fields on three successive days to invoke

fertility for them. The year had actually opened with the quaint ceremony of the dancing priests of Mars: his priests, leaping and beating shield with spear, scared away evil and (according to a most ancient notion) by their blows incited the earth to activity. There was also the rite of expelling the Old Mars, the decayed vegetation of the previous year (*cf.* p. 49). The Christian Church preserved the processions of the Robigalia (April 25) and of the Ambarvalia: the latter became fixed to the "Rogation days" before the Feast of the Ascension. But in a house the important points are the Door (*Ianua*) and the Hearth (Greek, *Hestia*; Latin, *Vesta*). The former, as the god Janus, Opener and Shutter, had a very special cult: he was the god of all beginnings, and his month, January, became the first of the year. Now, in a primitive community fire is precious. It must never go out. The ancient Roman kings kept the communal fire: their daughters kept its spark ever glowing: hence the Vestal Virgins and their undying flame. Even when the very name "king" had come to be hated, the Pontifex Maximus, or religious head of the State who had at first been also the political one, was still called "rex sacrorum," "king of divine worship," and his house, the Regia. Even tiny domestic details were stereotyped in cult: the Vestals had their great feast from June 7-15: Roman matrons came in procession to the State hearth: millers' and bakers' donkeys were decorated: and, when the rubbish had been solemnly carried down from the Vestals' convent to the Tiber, "the festival," say the Calendars, "is over." The special gods of each house, Lares and Penates, had careful worship; but the Lares were village-spirits too, and State-spirits. Add to these the strange Roman conception of the "Genius," originally man's power, apparently, of begetting his like: as it were his vital reality, his spiritual equivalent (not that the Romans had abstract notions like this). The Genius of an individual, of a place, of the People, of the City Rome, finally of the Emperor were evolved. Feasts like the Paganalia (village-community feasts), of the Fornacalia

(the common district-ovens) show the spirit of this very early worship. A feast in April on the Alban Mount, when milk was offered as in sacrifices of pre-wine days, and a heifer was sacrificed and eaten among all the participants, who were, in fact, representatives of the Latin communities, typified and intensified the social bond uniting them. The Lupercalia, February 15, set young men running round the city-walls, striking them, and women, with goat-hide thongs. Here, too, the blows communicated vigour and fertility. The thongs were called *februa*, purificatory-things, and this whole month of February was full of such purifications. The Dead were treated both with alarm, as when on May 9, 11, and 13 they came out of their graves and had to be kept off by a meal of beans (*cf.* p. 48), and with affection, February 13-21, the All Souls week of Rome. They were then felt not only as still members of a family (and as such they were feasted on their anniversaries), but also of the State. Everyone trooped out to the City of the Dead—Necropolis, as it came to be called—and placed milk, honey and oil, roses and violets upon the tombs: on the 22nd, the *Cara Cognatio*—feast of our dear Kinsfolk, or *Caristia*, of our Dear Ones, the whole family met at home; feuds were laid aside; places were set for the dead at a meal over which the household gods presided; during the week no secular business could be transacted.

Save Jupiter, the great official gods are less interesting. Jupiter was the bright-sky god, with titles from lightning, rain, thunder: all lightning-stricken spots are sacred to him, all full-moon days. Above all, he became the State's god: we find Jupiter of the Latins, of the Capitol, Giver of Victory, Stayer of Rout: he was god of Oaths. Juno, the women's supreme Genius, followed a parallel course. Mars, originally god of vegetation as much as or more than of war, became definitely "martial" as the spirit of the people changed. Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, god of the Colline-Hill community, made a triad till Juno and the Etruscan Minerva, who became assimilated to the Greek Athene, eclipsed the last

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two. The worship of these gods was held to have been regulated by the ancient king Numa. Its spirit was the extension of family life to the gods. You showed them *due* reverence—*pietas*—from which affection was not excluded, though awe predominated. To do more than this, especially if you had a "contract" with the god, was *superstitio*, stepping beyond the mark. The father of a family was priest for his household; magistrates for the State. Ritual was a thing to be accurately performed: all was as concrete and became as legalistic as possible.

When Greek culture reached Rome, the conservative, stereotyping habit was not checked, yet a strain of frivolity and scepticism appeared. Ritual became gorgeous; images, elaborate; myths were written; old Roman gods were remodelled on Greek types. Traditional Latin notions, as of genial benefaction, poured into the mould of the Greek Herakles (Hercules); and abstractions were canonised—Good Faith, Honour, Awe. This continued till and after 200 B.C. However, religion decayed. The very altars were cobwebbed; central temples unroofed and deserted. One reason was that religious rites were performed by magistrates, and these for long had been nobles only: when "democratic" laws were proposed, these patricians found religious motives for opposing them: when the "middle classes" gained entry to the priesthoods, they were men of no tradition. Greek drama and philosophy sapped the intellectual basis (such as it was) and the emotional approaches of religion. The department of auguries and auspices (signs given by lightning, etc., and by birds), founded on the notion that the will of God must at all costs be discovered before any important enterprise, became a matter for ridicule and a mere weapon for obstruction. About 140 B.C. a most academic effort to revive religion was made by politicians anxious to keep the people in control, and by scholars like Varro who tried by antiquarian lore to stimulate interest in dead rites. Cicero, with whom Republican Rome really ends, shows that in the law-courts he kept to traditional formulas: when philosophising, he

tried to acclimatise Greek ideas in Latin dress; in his letters he is seen to be just sceptical. Alone the cult of the Dead retained vitality. Anyhow, the old family life and country life were weakening: it had been the sober, honourable, dignified ordering of these that the old religion provided. Once the Roman heard of new ideas or practices or even peoples and modified *himself*, his ancient worship became useless: where it had supported, now it cramped; where it had met with scruple, it now found indifference.

II

The old Roman world ended in appalling civil wars, popular superstition, and educated scepticism. Octavianus, adopted son of Julius Cæsar, saw that the chaos must be reformed—the old name should be kept, but in fact it must be an empire, and he, untitled emperor. Religion is the most powerful of all cohesive, unifying forces: therefore it must be revived. One title he did forthwith take: "Augustus," which means Consecrated: Sacred. He not only rebuilt temples—in Rome alone, in one year, 82—but caused nobles to repair their family chapels, and revived many feasts and honoured religious confraternities of priests, and the Vestals, sometimes changing the character of feasts from sombre to brilliant. He popularised cults that threw glory on his own family, and soon himself became an object of religious awe. He was made every sort of priest and president, and Pontifex Maximus in 13 a.c. Gradually every event in the Emperors' lives becomes "sacred" and matter for a feast. Emperor-worship has a strange background. We have seen divine kings in China, Japan, Egypt (pp. 22, 27, 34). Alexander the Great introduced the notion into the Greek world after his conquest of Egypt. The Greeks were at least accustomed to heroes who shared altars with gods. After his death the worship became quite open: and a successor of his, Demetrius, son of Antigonus, when in 307 he conquered Greece, received blatantly divine honours as an oracle and god. "Saviour" (from disaster)

was a favourite title of such gods. In Egypt, the reigning Ptolemy and his sister (whom according to Egyptian tradition he would marry, *cf.* p. 34) became even in their lifetimes "brethren-gods." Arsinoë, sister of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus, deified by him along with himself, was "identified" in cult with Aphrodite and also with Isis (pp. 50, 36) and became associate goddess in all the Egyptian temples, with good financial results, since she now could appropriate the tax of one-sixth on vines and wine hitherto given to those temples. When in 168 B.C. Antiochus IV. Epiphanes took Jerusalem, he set up the "abomination of desolation" in the Temple, a statue (we regard it as certain) of the Roman Jupiter under the features of Antiochus, identified, too, with the Hebrew Jahweh. This was definitely in accord with his wish to unite his possessions and perhaps the world in one civilisation, which involved one Lord and one God, and, best of all, the two combined in one. At Hierapolis, he actually claimed the temple-treasures, sacred to "Juno," as his, he being Jove, and Juno, therefore, his wife. It would be idle to catalogue this insane yet calculated cultus, which triumphed in the East nearly two centuries before Christ. The East, so far as Rome was concerned, began by worshipping Rome herself, and her magistrates in the provinces: Julius Cæsar, hysterical (it seems to us) before the end, was accepting, then refusing, and again welcoming divine honours. Augustus maintained these, but admitted them very slowly in his own case. The fifth and sixth months became July and August: the Virtues, or qualities of the Augustus, and his Genius were worshipped even in Rome. Little by little the temples to the Divine Augustus crept from the provinces into Italy: the army swore by his divinity; a middle class began to exist and be powerful, and new religious posts and functions were invented for it, all involving Emperor-worship. But when provinces, trade, and army are penetrated with, convinced of, held together by, one notion and practice, that notion and practice have conquered. In this case it was the Divine Destiny of Rome, displayed in the Empire,

concentrated in the City, incarnate in the Emperor. Yet, as has been well indicated, the tendency led to the scornful alienation of the Northerners, the loathing of the Jews, the segregation to martyrdom-point of the Christians. Both Emperor-worship and persecution reached their climax under Diocletian, even while he sought to model much that was pagan upon Christian types, concerned especially with priesthood. Constantine, at his conversion, was far from totally dispensing with this tradition, secularised to a great extent as the imperial ceremonies were. Still, the instinct that had created the God-Emperor operated enduringly at Constantinople.* I have dwelt on this phenomenon because of its vast and lasting importance. The real crisis came when the Absolute State was pitted against Conscience, Cæsar against Jahweh, and against Christ.

This calculated revival of religion coincided with new spiritual stirrings in the human heart: literature helped the practical measures with its emotion: the Empire itself brought soldiers, slaves, merchants, magistrates home from the East where they had absorbed much experience. The centre of religious gravity found itself shifted from earthly prosperity and ethics to an other-world happiness obtained by purity of conscience and, indeed, by purification lasting well into the "next" life. To such notions a special class of men—religious priests—ministered: of such ideals religious philosophers made themselves the patrons. Mysticism for the Educated, and for the Average Man, domiciled itself within the unpromising Roman world. Rome had disliked Oriental cults: now they poured into her. The rich and adaptable cult of Isis from Egypt: the black-robed priests of a Cappadocian goddess, Ma—they careered through the streets with drums and

* We have suggested above that hero-worship made up more, almost, of popular religion than that of the official gods. The bridge from hero-worship to other cults of men, pagan and Christian, is obvious. No less obvious is the difference between hero-cultus and saint-cultus.

trumpets, gashing their limbs with knives and drinking their blood and sprinkling therewith the passer-by: the Syrian Goddess, with her companion Adonis: the Phrygian Sabazius with his fictitious connection with Yahweh Sabaoth, the Most High: the Asiatic Cybele, along with Attis, and her mutilated flagellant priests, and orgies where sin was confessed and done penance for; and the allied rite of the Taurobolium, when blood of slaughtered bulls rained on devotees till they emerged "reborn for eternity." It is worth pausing a moment on the cult of the Persian god Mithra, if only because it had recently a notoriety that we hold exaggerated, despite its intrinsic interest.

Mitra, a light-god, appears in the Veda (p. 15); appears, too, as Mithra in the Avesta (p. 33) as god of heavenly light: he becomes god of truth and oaths; champion of Ahura Mazda against Dark, and friend of man. His cult developed independently of the Zarathustrian reform, and from 550-330 he is especially the god of the Kings. Having been carried to Mesopotamia, the cult was overlaid with astrological elements, and, after the conquests of Alexander, it took on its final shape and colour in Asia Minor, under pressure of Greek art and philosophy. The adaptable god went with slaves, armies and commerce to the very outposts of the Empire: by A.D. 100 his inscriptions begin to be found. We recall that there is hardly any written evidence: opinion must be formed from sculptured symbolic slabs, from shreds of allusion, from comparison with other cults based on an assumption that by now they all involved much the same notions. Matured Mazdeism evolved the idea of Infinite Time, parent of Good and Ill. This *may* be represented by the lion-headed figure found in some Mithraic centres, but anyhow stands outside the cult proper, and can here be neglected. Mithra, god of "diffused light," halfway between heaven and earth, was an "intermediate" god, but acquired many qualities of the sun-god, and eclipsed Ahura in imagination. The sun's birth over mountains or in the vault of the sky, suggested Mithra's birth from a

rock, a birth later on placed on December 25, the winter solstice, when the *Natalis Solis Invicti* was feasted and when, in the West, Christmas was to be kept. The central episode of Mithra's career is the slaying of a bull, from whose tail wheat-ears sprout, while serpent and scorpion seek to poison his vitality. Among various sculptured incidents, too problematical to need allusion here, one represents the upward flight of Mithra along with the Sun, and his place beside Ahura (?) over the slaughtered bull. At the end of time, Mithra was to reappear, sacrifice another bull, give its fat mixed with haôma-juice to men who now left their tombs; and, fire devouring earth and all evil, blissful eternity begins. Worshippers were initiated through seven grades called Crow, Veiled, Soldier, Lion, Persian, Sun-Runner, Father. The first three grades contained "Servants"; the rest, "Participants." Admission to the Servants (children could be these) was called *Acceptio*; to the rest, *Traditio*. Women were quite excluded. The Patres directed worship, headed by a Pater Patrum with life-office. The ritual involved a purificatory bath; the taking of a sword and rejection of a garland by the Soldier; the placing of honey (an Egyptian preservative) on hands and tongue of Lion and Persian; and a sacred feast of bread and water, unless wine replaced the original Persian intoxicant, haôma. The worship occurred in crypts, with raised masonry platforms down the two sides for worshippers to lie on, and a sanctuary at the end, with its altar and sculptured slab. The confraternities (rather than congregations) were rigidly organised: slaves and free were on equal footing. The extreme difficulty of knowing for certain anything special about Mithraism causes us to include it among those "mystery cults" of which we will speak collectively in a moment. Enough to say that the ideas proper to the Avesta in its later form (p. 32) cannot safely be read into it. We have no knowledge of any ethic proper to it; its association with neurotic Oriental cults like Cybele's, and its connection with the army, argue against any special purity in it. Possibly the sturdy

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virtues of ancient Persia survived under the layers of Babylonian, Asiatic, and Hellenist material, but none can be sure. Its association with much nature-worship, again like that of Attis, assimilated it fatally to obscene and cruel cults; its affinity with solar worship caused it easily to be absorbed in the general pantheist sun-cult and philosophy in which the Empire ended (*infra*, p. 66, and *cf.* p. 5).

The mystery-religions form a group of cults without doubt Oriental in character and alien to Greek feeling, which was objective and naturalistic in its expression. They aimed at a social union with, rather than service of, the god concerned. A philosophy, quite possibly Indian in remote origin, elevated this union into sheer absorption into the divinity. Yet the mysteries, too, were nature-cult in origin. In various lands the god of vegetation, or earth-life generally, was felt to die, and to reappear next year. Often this was dramatically represented, and then a myth explained the drama. Such gods were Tammuz in Babylonia, Osiris in Egypt, Attis in Asia Minor, Adon in Syria, Koré (the "Maiden") at Eleusis in Greece, etc. The death was shown as violent; the return to life was no less violently celebrated. But besides this, the ancient rite of a feeding on what represented or was sacred to or was inhabited by the god, was "socially" observed. A union was thus formed between worshippers and god and one another. Thus the tribe or clan was consolidated and revived. Into this came the idea that after death the soul was saved from the many dangers of the unexplored other-world: its purification was hastened or un-needed. Thus two disparate ideas were combined—social prosperity in this life, the earlier one, and well-being in the next. The method of the mysteries was to create an impression on the imagination, indeed, the nerves, by dramatic shocks administered to the initiate: their system was also magical—the result was due wholly to the proper performance of a ritual and, indeed, pronunciation of formulas: as such they taught neither philosophy nor ethic; indeed, their sexual element needed

vigorous allegorisation quite inaccessible to the average mind. The Roman, at last excitable and a-hunt for religious thrills, began to indulge in them, but even Neoplatonist ideals failed to make them last. A generation ago the theory was broached that St. Paul introduced their notions into Christianity. I hold firmly that neither his personal history and psychology, nor his diction, nor his doctrine support this; indeed, they contradict it. Moreover, the theory is losing caste. Enough to say that the mysteries testified to the most exalted and the most degraded tendencies of contemporary religious souls.

Together with this invasion of emotional religion came a Romanised version of Greek philosophy, especially Stoic. Only principles of Pleasure or of Renunciation suited the appalling conditions in which men had to live under a Caligula, a Nero, or a Domitian. Philosophy then ceased primarily to speculate and became a school of life: in the last resort, it was pessimist and fatalist: superficially it was emotional too, religious, and charitable. As a matter of fact, it branched into chill scepticism or superstition. Yet there was a popular apostolate, unlike Seneca's, for example, who was a "society" philosopher. An Apollonius of Tyana was a "revivalist," as we say, and worked miracles and preached from temple steps: a Musonius discoursed on chastity and on peace, to soldiers engaged in civil war at the gates of Rome: Dion Chrysostom, in beggar's dress, denounced wealth and vice in his genuine horror of the misery of nearly all mankind. Troops of sheer charlatans went about, like caricatures of mendicant friars, especially the Cynics, though some, like Demonax, were noble and beloved. Aristides (born 117), an Asiatic, became the protagonist of miracle-working shrines: Artemidorus of Daldis (died about 200) wrote five astounding books on dreams and their interpretation. This Freud-before-his-time differs from our contemporary chiefly in this: the worst things that the psycho-analyst takes our dreams to symbolise were then, apparently, along with the usual absurdities, the undisguised material of dreams. What, then, were

men's waking thoughts? The clever ventriloquist Alexander of Abonoteichos had an army of spies throughout Europe, and confounded the Empire. A senator married his daughter "by the Moon." Country places remained conservative: and under the Antonines the Court grew pious, if not virtuous; but from 194-235 the Severi ruled and Syrian gods triumphed. It was now that the Sun and the Emperor, alike "Un-Conquered," filled men's eyes, givers of life, each Absolute. All the gods melted into this golden haze: the Ultimate *One* shone vaguely upon the world dedicated "To Eternity," under whose social surface crawled the obscene witches who cut the throats of babies to make their love-charms.

THE RELIGION OF THE HEBREWS

THE Hebrews, Semite in origin, emigrated first from Babylonian Ur, then from Haran in Aram, led by Abram and his family group. They settled on both sides of the Jordan, about 2000 B.C. (he is most probably contemporary with Hammurabi, p. 40). Famine drove his descendants to settle on the east of the Egyptian delta; they left when (probably) reaction against Akhn-Aton (p. 37) left no tolerance for foreigners. They may have departed under Mer-n-Ptah, successor of Rameses II., by way of the Sinaitic peninsula. Moses, who led this exodus, welded the tribal groups into a true "people" by means of a Law imposed on them under divine sanction. After long fighting they established themselves in Canaan, and after a period of group-governors (Judges) they became one kingdom under Saul, David, Solomon (about 1000 B.C.). The kingdom then split into two, and a series of disasters, including wholesale deportations, befell them, under Babylonian, Persian, Græco-Asiatic attacks upon this folk which was placed astride the great communication line between north and south. Finally Jerusalem and its temple were destroyed, and the people dispersed, under Hadrian, A.D. 70.

The religious history of the Hebrews is one of con-

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stant upward development against psychological tendencies and environmental pressures such as is nowhere else diagnosed. On the theological considerations involved in this, a descriptive book neither need, nor must, nor can dwell. Hebrew tradition insists that the forefathers of Abram were idolatrous: that is, polytheist, and lacking none of the magical or fetishist tendencies of their stock. Even after the Exodus we see Joshua offering the people the choice between the religions of Canaan to which they had come, of Egypt which they had left, or of their historical leaders, to which he and his family meant to adhere. The Hebrews in fact constantly hark back to Egyptian elements (the golden calf in the desert, imaging Yahweh, *cf.* p. 35); "go whoring after" the gods of their neighbours, Ba'alim and the Asherah (p. 41) with their accompaniments of human sacrifice and ritual prostitution; even quite late the Temple is profaned by cults like that of Tammuz (p. 41). None the less, their literature makes it critically clear that the people, proverbially difficult to persuade, were consistently led to recognise in God, worshipped under the name Yahweh, not only the one whom they were to adore, but the only one who was adorable and as possessing not only a monarchy above gods, but as so *one* that the other gods were "nothingness," and again, so spiritual that no image of any sort must be made of Him. He was, moreover, seen not only as Creator of absolutely all things, including the heavenly bodies, and of man in a quite special way, so that man with one part of himself was affine to the rest of creation, and with another, was affine to God, and His "son," possessed by His "Spirit," but, as Lord of the whole world and destined to achieve therein His total and lasting triumph. This triumph was, too, conceived always, yet ever more clearly, in terms of righteousness: the contents of this term became more and more spiritually thought of, but, the moral life was always under a divine sanction, and "evil" held always the notion of "sin" behind or within it. Hence the ideas of the Nation, and of the World, do not

exclude one another. However much Yahweh be seen as universal in His reach, yet the nation remains specially His Chosen: however much the Nation was His "son," the "Day of the Gentiles" was ever foreseen, whether interpreted as their destruction, subjugation, or conversion. Thus the Hebrews, never metaphysicians, achieved none the less a notion of God, as it were, in practical terms, wholly disentangled from nature-myth and from dualism, and still more from polytheism and its affinities. More slowly was He conceived as the God of the individual and more slowly still as God of tender love, though never was this notion lacking. Yet towards the end of Jewish history a certain ossification of the religion was taking place.

The sources of human authority among the Hebrews were Lawgivers, Kings, Priests and Prophets. These were often in conflict among themselves: constantly the prophet had to resist the king, and often the priest. The king, by marriages or personal taste, would tolerate pagan infiltrations; the priest might become a time-server or a legalist. Slowly an adjustment between the ancient Law and its representatives, and the soaring spirit of individuals, would be found, lost, and refound. This expressed itself not least in cult. Along with their Semite relatives, the Hebrews loved sacrifice. Sacrifice was not invented, but regulated and purified in meaning by Moses and his followers. The tendency always was to see that Yahweh took more "pleasure" in interior dispositions of the soul than in the external gift, and to look forward to the arrival of an "Anointed" who should offer the perfectly acceptable sacrifice to God. Thus the Hebrew always looked forward, and did so under stress of a conviction of Vocation, based on "promises" made by Yahweh. The indestructibility of the race, under unparalleled disasters, never dissipated the forward vision, while it constantly purified it at least among a few. Thus a race whose antiquity shone with no triumphs in science or philosophy or art or politics or sociology is none the less to-day still setting the gravest problems to the world.

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Most slowly of all, ideas concerning survival developed. The Hebrew Sheol was apparently a place of gloom like the Vast Land of the Assyrian: reward belonged to this world—prosperity, or grateful memory. Towards the end, it was clear that the just, at any rate, survived, and should rise again to share in the triumph of the Messiah, whose figure had entered into a unique relationship with Yahweh, apparently pre-existing his earthly career, and certainly outlasting it. The final generations of Jewish history show an element of Alexandrian-Greek influence, and a new birth of eschatological apocalypsis: the history of the race, and of the world, were seen to interpenetrate, and the disasters of the people and its triumph became all but symbols of the cosmic cycle. At the birth of Christ, the elements most worth noticing are this apocalyptic, ecstatic one; the Hellenising one (Sadducees); the reactionary one (Pharisees); and the obscure, devout element, quiet and hopeful, called "the poor in heart."

CHRISTIANITY

DURING the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate in Judea, Jesus from Nazareth preached, enraging the Pharisees especially against his doctrine, which they considered blasphemous, inasmuch as He called Himself Son of God and Messiah, and injurious to their position as sole true observers of the Law. Causing Him to be regarded as defying the Roman rule, they obtained His condemnation from the procurator and He was crucified. After a short space, His followers began to proclaim Him not only Messiah, but as sealed so by God, who had raised Him from the dead. The Sadducees, disdaining this doctrine of resurrection, sought to have them suppressed; but not until they publicly insisted that the promises of God were for the world, nor only for the Jews, and, indeed, that the Jews had been notoriously unfaithful to them, did persecution break out and Stephen, a Greek-named convert, was killed. A leader in the subsequent persecu-

tion was Saul from Tarsus, a genius of mingled Hebrew, Greek, and Asiatic education and experience, and a Roman citizen. At the height of the persecution, he was himself converted. Already the Christians, as they were soon nicknamed, had spread beyond Jerusalem; now persecution, and the amazing energy and organising power of Paul, scattered them afar, or created distant groups throughout the Empire. The Christians were from the outset a "society," governed by the twelve apostles and their delegates; their faith was, too, a Doctrine, homogeneously taught by men of very varied mentalities. It can, taking the teaching of Peter, Paul, and John as a whole, which is legitimate, for they were conscious that there was no contradiction among them, be summarised as follows:

God created all that is, destining mankind to immortal happiness. He endowed man with a supernatural gift, Grace, freely re-destining him to supernatural vision of, love for, union with, and happiness in Himself. In the person of the first man, the race which was incorporate with him was deprived of this Grace owing to sin, and, supernaturally speaking, died. By incorporation with a second Adam, or head of the human race, man could regain this gift. God took up human nature, so uniting it with His own as to appear among men truly God, and truly man. Born of a virgin, Mary, He lived and taught and was crucified. In His person, therefore, and in His life culminating in life's last act, which is to die, He offered to God a worship truly human, since He was man, and adequate, since He was God. With Him, men are progressively incorporated, forming thus His Body which is the Church. This incorporation takes place by means of Baptism, and is nourished by the Eucharist, wherein at the Christian altar men receive His body and blood—that is, Himself really present there. Those who die thus incorporate with Christ, are destined to eternal bliss; those who die "out of" Christ are lost. But in God exists not only the Father, who thus sent His Son into the world, but the Spirit of God, who is neither

Son nor Father. Yet there is but one God. There were subsidiary doctrines, but these suffice. I add, that unless the radical one of Grace be understood, nothing in early or later Christianity will be understood. Enough then to recall that the first age of Christianity was dogmatic, hierarchic, and sacramental.

It developed partly by Christian thought playing on its own data; partly under pressure from without. As a doctrine, it found itself confronted with philosophies; and again, with Gnostic illuminism: as a society, with the Empire. Without delay, through Justin and Irenæus to Origen, and again through the Latin thinkers from Tertullian, the Christian religion elucidated itself. Greek writers utilised and adapted the category of Logos especially, to explain their doctrine of Christ to Stoicised thinkers: Latin ones, the notions of Law and of Army. In consequence, the Church, as containing a doctrine that could be thought, and a discipline that should be imposed, and a structure that must be preserved, became manifest. So much so, that the Empire saw it as an independent Society, a super-people, refusing to assimilate or to be assimilated. Hence the persecutions culminating in Diocletian's. But the second phase of the Church's development occurred after its liberation by Constantine. Then began that era of the "Fathers" or Doctors which endured (speaking roughly) till Augustine. Greek-trained intelligence mused, naturally, on the "mysteries" of the Trinity and the Incarnation by preference: Latin minds dealt more willingly with those of Sin, Will, Grace, and hierarchic government. Briefly, we must say that without the intellectual work now done, Alexandrian (Athanasius: Cyril) and Asiatic (the two Gregorys: Basil), neither clearness of thought nor accuracy of language would have survived, nor would Europe have so been trained as to enable her to resist Islam. As for Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, they gave that Latin to the northern invaders, which also formed their minds and shaped their societies when else they would have brought but chaos. Thus by the time of the

sack of Rome, "freezing intellect, fiery emotion, and melting mysticism"—rationalist Arians, tumultuous Montanists, ecstatic Neoplatonists, and their followers—had alike to be coped with by the historically Catholic Church. The removal of Constantine from Italy to the East caused seeds of future schism to flow together. In the dispute between East and West, theology counted for but little, political ambition and the ancient reciprocal contempt of effeminate Greek and boorish Roman, for almost everything—add, the difficulty of translating Greek terms into Latin. Yet from Clement through Victor to the Popes who dominated those great Councils that set firm boundaries for Christian thought, the unique place and function of the Bishop of Rome, affirmed itself, and it was long before the definite break came.

In the chaos of barbarian invasions, social and intellectual centres were the Benedictine monasteries, the cathedral schools, and the See of Rome. Benedict in the West, Basil in the East, had organised the monastic tendency according to temperaments: no firmer bond of unity, no more stabilising force could be imagined. So soon as possible, from these centres rose the Latin Renaissance, long anticipating the Greek one. It was so powerful that despite the appalling social conflicts of those centuries which we quite refuse to call "dark," the best of the old kept filtering into and vivifying the new. By Abælard, in fact, intellectual energy had become rationalist, and the sacramental theology of the period almost ran riot into fantastic symbolism. But the thirteenth century dawned, and with it the most astounding explosion of creative religious genius, operating in all fields without, we think, exception: social (guilds, etc.: hospitals; asylums); intellectual (universities and Aristotelianism "baptised"; art of all sorts); applied science (surgery); pure religion (Francis of Assisi and Dominic); philosophy and theology (Bonaventure and Aquinas). The theory, however, of the "dual control," Pope and Emperor, could not withstand developed nationalisms.

When upon this came Greek Renaissance (*cf.* p. 7) and Reformation German and French (the English political one contributed nothing original), the world fell into Catholic and Protestant, and since separate books are to be written upon this, we need go no further. Enough to say here that Christianity is seen to collect and co-ordinate the elements of other historical religions which made for their endurance: in its universal sweep it includes all possibilities. It proclaims that monotheism which by its invasions, or approximations, alone, in history, sent religions on an upward grade; while its doctrine of the absolute spirituality, eternity, immutability, infinity of God, of His all-perfection, save it from all illegitimate anthropomorphism whatsoever. Its doctrine of the Incarnation brings God so close as possible to man without sullyng His purity; and it deliberately turns the full force of reason upon these doctrines as upon all the rest of its gifts. It thus, moreover, does away with all dualistic notion of matter as evil, albeit its assertion of the freedom of will admits the possibility, even as its observation and experience admit the fact, of sin. Its doctrine of the Atonement, by way of incorporation with Christ, living, dying, risen, mates Justice with that Love which none else so fully recognises in God Himself. Its social and sacramental systems cater fully for humanity, which is not mere soul, nor individualist: its authoritative element responds no less to needs proper to humanity, emphatically not self-sufficient, materially or intellectually or morally; its very ritual recognises that man creates ritual, in his life, when he does not find it. Even, since humanity has thriven on books, it provides a Book, or collection of writings, albeit these are not its source. Above all, its doctrine of supernatural Grace, without an understanding of which no part of historical Christianity even begins to be intelligible, and its transcendent mysteries, taught to an intellect always tending to assert that it is ultimate in the line of "knowing," carry a man from the never-denied bodily and mental level, not only to the perfection of these accord-

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ing to their nature, but still higher towards supernatural bliss in God, yet without danger of monisms, pantheist, or other. Hence, disciplined asceticism: hence, governed mysticism. Christianity therefore reckons with art, emotion, science, philosophy, social life, theology, mysticism, and co-ordinates these, and, historically, is alone among religions in so doing. Personally, we dare not omit to recall that even so, the focus of the Christian is Christ.

ISLAM

THE background of Mohammedanism is complicated but easily analysed. In Arabia pagan belief and cult expressed itself in innumerable local divinities worshipped "in" or at blocks of stone, or stumps of wood, near a tree (for votive offerings) and a spring (for ritual purposes). Around these was an enclosure full of sacred animals. Worship included sacrifice and processions going (usually seven times) round the sanctuary, but, above all, the feast held at (probably) the autumn equinox near Mecca. Three months' religious peace was observed, during which fairs were also held—at these marketing took place, proclamations, recitations; wars were prepared; and, since Mecca thus became a religious centre for all Arabia, belief in a common god, in fact, monotheism, was suggested. Every kind of demonology coexisted with worship of the gods. But in the south religion was higher, and monotheism is certain for the end of the fourth century. Prayer, a sense and confession of sin, and fasting prevailed there; temples and images existed, and a clearer notion of survival. Jewish colonies were powerful, especially in Medina and not far from Mecca: in 520 a Jew was king of Saba, in the south. Byzantium and Persia, northwards and eastwards; Syrian merchants, and hermits even in Central Arabia; and convert Abyssinians in the south, had infused many Christian notions of varying worth: and Hanifs from Mecca, Medina, and Taif, seeking for "the pure religion of Abraham," accepted Jewish and Christian notions, were rigid monotheists, believers in a future life with eternal sanctions, ascetics,

and total abstainers from alcohol. With at least two of these Mohammed was in close contact.

Mohammed, born about 520 in Mecca, rescued from orphaned poverty by his uncle, the head of the clan, learnt much in his work as caravan-servant, going thus to Syria and South Arabia. Marriage with a rich widow gave him time for meditation, and at about forty he had his first revelation, that God was one, and that Mohammed was His prophet. He believed, too, in a future life and in the duties of alms and prayer. Denouncing his idolatrous fellow-townsmen, he and his followers were fiercely persecuted and evicted from their clans, an excommunication of fatal import for an Arabian. They expatriated themselves (615) to Abyssinia, returned, and preached their faith at the Mecca pilgrimage. The Medina pilgrims easily assimilated the new preaching (which, in fact, contained nothing new save the personal position of Mohammed), and invited the prophet and his companions to Medina, whither they went in 622, the "second Hegira" or emigration, whence the Mohammedan calendar is reckoned. At Medina he learned more from Christian and Jewish sources, set one party against another so as better to unite them under himself, and finally created a religious brotherhood that transcended tribal unity. Revelation informed him that the heathen temple at Mecca was the first temple ever built to God, founded by Abraham and Ishmael, ancestors of the Arab race. This, then, he made his centre, uniting what looked and was so disparate, foreseeing Arabia wholly beneath his religious and civil sway, and preaching thenceforward the Holy War. Wars, in fact, followed to such effect that by 632, when he died at Medina, Arabia was practically his, though amid his plans for subduing Greeks and Persians he made no arrangements for the future of his movement.

The religion of Islam (resignation) is drawn from the Al-Koran—now the collection of Mohammed's revelations made posthumously, and the Hadith, containing the sayings of Mohammed himself—(the Koran is God's word), and the Sunna, or traditions of customs, partly

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Jewish or Christian, partly invented as need required. By the ninth century they had to be much expurgated. Orthodox Mohammedans call themselves, hence, *Sunni*. Islam is based on four "pillars"—Faith ("There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is His Prophet"—this profession of faith has to be made publicly by each Mohammedan at least once: it binds to the whole law: apostasy means death): Prayer (each Mahommedan must pray five times daily: he is "called" to prayer; prefaces it with ablution—in the desert, sand is symbolically used for water; turns towards Mecca—when Mohammed broke with the Jews and the Christians, Mecca was substituted for Jerusalem; takes various ritual postures and recites, at least mentally, due formulas. Mosques must have a minaret [for the Call to be given], a mihrab or Mecca-wards niche, and a pulpit for the Friday sermon); Alms (the word for this means "purification," which shows that the duty was not at first purely social, though inspired partly by the prevalent injustices at Mecca. Later, alms were to be private and official—the latter being sheer taxes assessed according to property, and applied to the community and especially war): Fasting (first, one day only a year, apparently derived from the Jewish Day of Atonement; then for a whole month, Ramadan, derived from the Eastern Lent, when Christians fasted for thirty-six days till after sunset. During that month, from before dawn to sunset, neither food nor drink nor perfume nor tobacco may be taken—the very saliva must not be swallowed deliberately): and Pilgrimage. Each Moslem who can, must make the Hajj, or Mecca-pilgrimage, once. It would be impossible here to give the details of the great festival, with its pelting of the devil, its slaughter of victims, its sevenfold procession round the Kaaba, or Holy House, with its black acrolite embedded in the eastern corner; the drinking of the bitter Zamzam well, the race between two hills, once sanctuaries. Mohammedan-Hebrew legends give reasons for each ceremony. Mohammedans can also be ordered by legitimate authority to take part in war. At Medina they were commanded to "slay the unbeliever wherever they found him," and

to "make neighbouring nations feel their strength." It must be firmly asserted that not religious zeal for conversion, but will to propagate empire, originated these wars. Indeed, it fostered hate, and turned cruelty into a virtue, and implied no martyrdom, since if faced by the option of death or apostasy, the Mohammedan was advised by the Koran to deny with the lips but to believe in heart. Details like abstinence from alcohol, swine's flesh, pictures of the human form, and so forth, need not detain us: as to women, the limitation of the number of legal wives to four improved their position, though divorce was easy (on the husband's side: the wife had no such rights, and could be starved to death for infidelity attested by four witnesses), and while female slaves were at the disposal of their masters, their children could be given a regular status. Mohammed by special revelation was dispensed from thus limiting the number of his wives and from marrying outside fixed kinship degrees alone.

Mohammed changed considerably within his own dogmas. At first, God, Almighty and *therefore* One, was "limited" by the "Throne," which created the world, and the "Book," according to which He acts (Talmudic notions). Later, God is thought of as more merciful, yet as creating many men and spirits entirely for hell—those, e.g., whom Mohammed found intractable. Also, He becomes more spiritual: the Book becomes His Will: His Throne is heaven and earth: the "Trinity," practically admitted at first, is rejected and the Holy Spirit defined as the angel Gabriel. Mohammed's fiery angels (Mazdean in origin, p. 32) are good, and immortal. One, Iblis (diabolus), refused homage to Adam, was evicted from Paradise, and spends his time till the Judgment trying to pervert mankind. Heathen deities and Arabic Jinn (malicious spirits of whom, however, Mohammed found some to be good and to accept the Koran) form the companions of Iblis. They seek to scale heaven, and are pelted down with stars by sentinel angels. Hence meteors: the explanation was useful as discrediting divination: the identification of heathen gods with the satel-

lites of Satan discredited them in their turn. Man, tending to evil, cannot work out his salvation alone. Hence divine messengers. Among these were Hebrew patriarchs and kings, but first among them was Jesus, born of an immaculate virgin, and worthy of every attribute save godhead. Another 'man was substituted for him at the crucifixion, and he is throned in heaven on attesting that he never did claim divine prerogatives. Anything to conflict with this in the Scriptures (often praised by Mohammed as descendants of the Divine archetypal Book) is due to misinterpretation by Jews or Christians, and must be corrected by the Koran. After death, souls sleep till an appalling Judgment Day awakes them; then the wicked go to a hell, and the good to a heaven, described by Mohammed in terms of 'extreme sensuality which he never hints is to be taken allegorically. Indeed, he insists that the celestial wine gives no headaches; that souls are dressed in green satin; and he dwells on the physical charms of both youths and maidens who feed the blessed on dates, grapes, or bananas, as they please.

After Mohammed's death an orthodox party maintained that whoever won the approbation of the Islamic world was rightful ruler of Islam. Hence the Sultan. Another party accepted only the pious and freely elected governor. The Shiahs, or sectaries, decided wholly for the descendants of Mohammed's daughter Fatima and her husband Ali. One of these, the Imam Mahdi, was to appear at the end of time: whence all manner of claimants and sects. Mohammed's disconnected dogmas and the intrinsic contradictions of the Koran demanded rationalistic treatment. The Motazelites (seceders) inaugurated this about 750, but not till the eleventh century did Al-Ghazali establish the full Mohammedan Aquinas-like synthesis. In spite of Mohammed's own confession, he had to admit the popular view of the prophet's sinlessness and infallibility from birth onwards: he had, till reaction triumphed, to deny the Motazelite attack on the uncreated nature of the Koran. An absolute worship of the very letters of the Koran was thus re-established,

though it afterwards faded. Al-Ghazali restored the popular predestinationism, so that Fate, as we say, anyhow that antecedent absolute will of God that provokes the cry of "Kismet," came to rule Mohammedan imagination and caused much inertia in the faithful. Three doctrines, not in the Koran, won universal acceptance in varying degrees. Mohammedan saints and their tombs obtained a cultus, though an eighteenth-century sect of "Puritans"—the Wahhabis—inaugurated a violent and destructive reform. The coming of a Messiah was felt more and more to be certain; even divinity was held to be incarnate in the descendants of Ali, though this view was unorthodox. Above all, Sufism—*sufa* is a rough cloak—had a profound influence. The Sufis were the monks and ascetics of Islam, though Mohammed had said that war was to be its monasticism. Sufism became penetrated with Neoplatonism (p. 54) and Indian Pantheism, Vedic or Buddhist (p. 19), and led, on the one hand, to a mystical endeavour after union with God, and, on the other, to dervish excesses. At its best it has produced some of the world's sublimest poetry. Since the downfall of the Sultan it seems to an onlooker that Islam is tending to "modernism," where its adherents are not abandoning it for positivism or rationalism; its war-cry serves well for political purposes: it may be asked how far its many converts absorb that passion for prayer, based on an incredibly vivid perception of the one God, interpreted by one man, which was its enormous strength.

CONCLUSION

NONE, then, need be surprised that students are ceasing to lay down laws for the evolution of religions, or assign the origins of religions, let alone religion, and are timorous of adding even one more to the rubbish-heap of theories, or of exhibiting the old irresponsible readiness to succumb to fascinating visions, pulling evidence into shapes that suit them, as artists adapt a landscape till it "makes a picture," or librettists a novel till it fits the cinema. Theisms, animisms, magic, these and much more

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coexist, cannot be put into a time-series, need not generate one another. The mind moves in astonishing spirals, and in no direct advance. Little more can be said than that all men experience the need to recognise some Ultimate and confess an obligation towards it, the power to enter into some relation to it, and the tendency to express this outwardly in "prayer" and in gifts. Man seems able to do this almost at once, by a pure and rapid jet of his intelligent, sensitive nature. What further he does depends on many things: as to the validity of his reasonings, decisions as to true and false, right and wrong, these concern philosophy, and not this book nor its topic.

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
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ISLÁM

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE Arabic word *Islám*, which means "submission to the will of God," is employed to denote both the Muhammadan religion and the Muhammadan world. It is as if in English we only had one word to denote Christianity and Christendom. One who professes Islám is called a Muslim. The present sketch is concerned with the history of the Muhammadan world, and only incidentally with Islám as a religion; its object being to give a brief survey of the rise of the Arabian religion in the seventh century; of the conquests of the outer world by the newly converted Arabs; of the foundation of the Arab Caliphate, and of the subsequent establishment of non-Arab Islámic states.

In view of the limitations of space imposed, the narrative is devoted to the great conquerors who founded Islámic dynasties rather than to the detailed history of their kingdoms. In the case of existing Islámic states like Persia, Turkey, Morocco, and Afghanistan no attempt has been made to bring events down to modern times, seeing that such matters belong rather to the special history of these countries than to the story of Islám as a whole.

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ISLÁM

CHAPTER I

MUHAMMAD AND HIS MISSION

THE map of Arabia offers few salient features, for it has no rivers and no high mountains and very few towns of importance, and so much of it is desert. Roughly speaking, it stretches in the north from the Gulf of Akaba to the Euphrates in the north-east. Three-fourths of its frontier is seaboard, its shores being washed by the Red Sea on the west, the Gulf of Aden on the south, and the Persian Gulf on the east.

At the beginning of the seventh century, Yemen and part of the Hadhramaut were in the possession of the Persians, while the Syrian frontier was ruled over by the Gassanids under the suzerainty of the Byzantine Emperor. The whole Peninsula was inhabited by Arabs, but the Hejaz contained large Jewish colonies which had been driven out of Palestine. The majority of the Arabs of Arabia were heathen, and believed in a supreme God called Allah, who had created and who ruled the world. He had no temples in his honour, and no priests to serve him. Next to Allah came the *jinn*s (or spirits), who had fixed habitations in stones, trees, or statues. Each Arab tribe had its special *jinn* or *jinn*s. Mekka was the principal religious centre of West Central Arabia, and possessed an old temple called the Ka'ba (or Cube), round which the tribe of Quraysh had built a city in the fifth century of our era. The Ka'ba did not belong to the Quraysh, but was the common pantheon of many tribes, and contained 360 idols. The most sacred object it con-

tained was the Black Stone, which is still venerated by the Muslims. Hence the importance of the city of Mekka and of the tribe of Quraysh, which had the guardianship of the Ka'ba.

At the beginning of the seventh century, when the religion of the Arabs was little more than a degraded fetishism, there suddenly appeared an Arab of the tribe of Quraysh named Muhammad, inspired with the idea of reducing the number of Arabian gods to one, and of compelling his fellow-countrymen to recognise his mission as divine. The new Prophet, being a townsman and a merchant whose business had taken him into foreign countries, had often had opportunities of meeting Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians. Islám owed much of its success to the fact that so large a part of its doctrines were derived from these three great religions. The Prophet is instructed by God to say: "I am no apostle of new doctrines, and I do not know what will happen to me or to you. I follow naught, save what has been revealed to me. For I am only a public admonisher" (Qorán xlvi., 8).

Muhammad, the son of 'Abdalláh, the son of 'Abd-al-Muttalib, the son of Háshim, the son of 'Abd Manáf, is said to have been born in A.D. 571. Of his early life down to the age of forty we know very little. At the age of twenty-four he married Khadija, widow of a rich merchant, in whose service he had made caravan journeys into Syria and South Arabia. By this marriage Muhammad had six children, of whom we need only mention the youngest daughter Fátima. After the death of Khadija he married a young girl called 'Ayesha, the daughter of Abu Bakr.

About the year A.D. 610 Muhammad, who was given to solitary wanderings, one day had a dream, in which it seemed to him that someone said to him: "Recite in the name of thy Lord, who created man—and teaches man by the pen what he does not know." Muhammad was deeply impressed by this dream, which may be regarded as the beginning of his

MUHAMMAD AND HIS MISSION 7

mission. Thereafter he began to receive these dream messages with recurring frequency, and they were recorded or remembered by Muhammad as the Word of God delivered to him by the Angel Gabriel. Thus was created what came to be known as the Qorán, or "the reading," which was only brought together after the Prophet's death.

The whole of his own family, including his adopted sons 'Alí and Zayd, and many of his intimate friends immediately believed that Muhammad had received a divine mission. The most important of these friends was Abu Bakr, a wealthy merchant, who belonged to the tribe of Taym. The complete faith which this honourable man placed in Muhammad and his mission was not only an invaluable source of encouragement to Muhammad, but is a most important testimony to the genuineness of the Prophet's mission.

In all, the first band of the Faithful are said to have numbered forty-three persons. Among these were several slaves, and mention may be made of an Ethiopian named Bilál, who, by reason of his loud voice, became the first *Muezzin* to call to prayer in Islám. The whole Muslim Confession of Faith is contained in the words: "*There is no Deity but Allah, and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah.*"

The public feeling against the new religion often took an active form, and the Muslims were mocked and persecuted. Indeed, they were soon obliged to hold their meetings in a private house. But the turning-point in these first years of the mission was the conversion of 'Omar, the son of Khattáb, who had hitherto been one of the strongest opponents of Islám. This young man of twenty-six already commanded so much respect among his townsmen for his bravery and decision of character that from the day of his acceptance of Islám the Faithful were able to perform their prayers in public. The importance of the rôle played by 'Omar in the history of Islám cannot be overrated. It was he who spurred the Prophet on to action, and

encouraged him to undertake the conversion of all Arabia; and to resort to force of arms where peaceful methods failed. It was 'Omar, moreover, who initiated the invasion and conquest of the outer world by the Arabs.

Towards the end of A.D. 619 two great misfortunes befell the Prophet. Within a few weeks he lost first his faithful Khadija, to whom he had been married for twenty-four years, and then his uncle and staunch defender Abu Tálib, who enjoyed such respect in Mekka that no one dared to attack his nephew. On the death of Abu Tálib, however, Muhammad's position in Mekka became one of such grave danger that he was, we are told, afraid to leave his own house. He was peremptorily ordered to give up his public preaching, and to cease from attacking the idolatry of his compatriots. In the meantime, however, during the annual pilgrimage which brought Arabs from far and near to Mekka, he had succeeded in converting a number of pilgrims to the New Faith, and notably some inhabitants of the town of Yathrib (afterwards called al-Medína, or The Town). With them he formed a secret alliance in A.D. 620; but no sooner was it noised abroad that he had thus betrayed his own home and his tribe, than further residence in Mekka became impossible for him. He, therefore, resolved to migrate to Yathrib and seek the protection of its inhabitants; but the number of converts he had succeeded in making during the pilgrimage was not sufficient to guarantee the support of the whole tribe. In A.D. 622 a secret meeting was held during the last days of the pilgrimage between the Muslims of Mekka and the envoys from Yathrib; as a result of which the former migrated to the latter city, where they were received with open arms by the local converts. It is from this event—known as the *Hijra*, *i.e.*, the Migration or Flight of the Prophet—that the Muhammadan era dates.

The Muslim year is lunar, and thus their months

and festivals occur at constantly shifting periods; according to the solar year. It is useful to remember that the Hijra year A.D. 700 corresponds to the Christian year A.D. 1300. The companions of the Flight were known as the Muhájirín; the Muslims of Yathrib as the Ansár or Helpers.

Space will not permit of our entering into the details of the years of constant warfare in which the Prophet was engaged during the remaining ten years of his life. He himself is reported to have said: "All the cities and towns which are conquered were taken by force. Medína alone was conquered by the Qorán."

The outstanding battles were those of Badr (January, 624) and of Ohod (January, 625). The resort to arms for the fulfilling of his mission was forced on Muhammad from the moment that he was compelled to flee with his slender following from his native town: and thus the reforming religion was given at the outset a militant character, which it retained so long as there were countries too weak to withstand the arms and prestige of Islám. The national weapon of the Arabs was the sword, used either on horseback or on foot. The lance had been imported from India and enjoyed a secondary popularity to the sword. Arabia was famous for its bows and arrows, but the early Arabs rather despised these long-range weapons just as to-day they dislike the rifle. During the ten years of life that remained to him after the flight to Medína, he took part in no less than twenty-seven battles and organised forty-seven expeditions.

When, in A.D. 632, Muhammad died, practically all the Arabs had been compelled to accept Islám; but there were many backsliders, and even some rivals who at once seized the opportunity offered to rebel; and it took the famous General Khálid ibn Walíd and others many months to quell these disturbances; and fierce battles were fought, in which many leading Muslims perished, notably at Yamáma (in A.D. 633). Within a year of the Prophet's death, however, Islám

was finally established amongst all the Arabs of the Peninsula.

It was a collision of the Muslims with the Arab tribes on the northern border that ultimately led to conflict with the Byzantines and the Persians. Both these powers were in a state which rendered them ill-fitted to cope with a new enemy. The Emperor Heraclius, who had just gained a victory over the Persians after an exhausting struggle, had many troubles to deal with at home and in the north of the shrunken Eastern Empire; whilst the Persian Empire of the Sásánians was in a state of disruption.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST FOUR CALIPHS

It will be seen from what precedes that Muhammad the Prophet had, by the time of his death, become the uncrowned King of Arabia. To what extent Muhammad himself realised that he had founded a secular state which required governing, and not merely a religion which required a pontiff, it is difficult to judge. However this may be, he left no instructions regarding a successor, and on his death in A.D. 632 the Faithful found themselves in an awkward predicament. After much discussion Muhammad's old and faithful friend Abu Bakr was chosen as the first Caliph—*i.e.*, *Khalifa*, or successor to the Prophet of God.

During Abu Bakr's reign of two years the organised invasion of the neighbouring lands was initiated, a policy which did more to consolidate Islám among the Arabs than all the internal wars; for not only did it provide occupation for a restless congeries of men experienced in warfare, with the prospect of limitless

booty, but also added to the prestige of the new religion.

On the death of Abu Bakr, 'Omar succeeded to the Caliphate without opposition, and to his ten years at the head of Islám belong most of the great early conquests. He seems to have realised that the consolidation of the Arabs as a national unity was essential to their success in this far-flung adventure, and used a restraining hand when he felt that the Arabian armies were progressing too rapidly. The invading troops might secure and divide loot to their hearts' content, but they were forbidden to acquire landed property. The conquered were given the choice of embracing Islám or of paying a poll-tax called *jizia*. All land was either made state property or was restored to the old owners, subject to a perpetual tribute which provided pay for the army.

The outstanding general in these days was Khálid, the son of Walíd, who became known as "the Sword of Allah," and was sent first against the Persians and then against the Romans. The earliest triumphs were the battle of the Chains, which opened the road to Persia, and the battle of the Yarmuk (Hieromax River), which caused Heraclius finally to abandon Syria (636). At the end of a.d. 637 was fought the great battle of Qádisiya, in which the Persians were so completely defeated that they abandoned all their western possessions, and withdrew to Persia proper, and the Muslims became masters of Iráq, including the Persian capital of Ctesiphon on the Tigris.

Already in a.d. 635 Damascus had fallen, and 'Omar now established two new cities of Basra and Kúfa, which, peopled with Arab immigrants, were destined to play such an important part in the early history of the Caliphate, becoming the centres both of revolution and of learning. Medina remained the capital of the Islámic state, and into the city poured the incalculable wealth derived from the *jizia* and the taxation of newly conquered lands.

Arabia was, however, rapidly beginning to lose its importance in the new Islámic state, and the need for some new administrative centre was clearly indicated, from which the expeditions eastwards and westwards could be controlled, though Mekka, of course, remained the unchallenged religious centre of Islám. The incursions into the Roman Empire were brought to a temporary end by the conquest of Syria; but the victory of Qádisiya was only the beginning of the Persian Campaign, and hostilities continued between the Muslim armies and those of the Chosroes until A.D. 641, when in the great battle of Nihávand the Persians, after a most stubborn resistance, were finally crushed, and the last Sásánian king, Yezdijerd III., fled from the field—only to perish miserably in a remote corner of his realm after ten years spent in hiding.

The Muslims were now undisputed masters of Syria and Persia, including Mesopotamia and Iráq. The population they had thus subdued were either Christians or Zoroastrians; and as soon as a town or district succumbed, the choice lay with the inhabitants either to accept Islám or to retain their old religion and pay the *jizia* or poll-tax.

Towards the end of the year A.D. 639 an army of some four thousand men, under the command of 'Amr ibn al-'Asi, was sent against Egypt, which was conquered from the Romans with comparative ease in less than two years; and 'Amr was appointed the first Muslim governor of this new province.

The debt of Islám to 'Omar cannot be over-estimated. He had precisely the qualities which were needed at this critical stage: great administrative abilities, a powerful personality, and a strong will. He met his death at the hand of a Persian workman in A.D. 644, and was succeeded in the Caliphate by another of the Prophet's sons-in-law, 'Othman, who belonged to the tribe of Quraysh and the family of Omayya. He was nearly seventy years of age when he assumed this

office, for which, even by temperament, he was quite unfitted.

The armies of Islám continued, indeed, in their progress eastwards and westwards, notwithstanding many disasters, and in North Africa Tripoli was reached. In A.D. 649 the Muslims won their first naval victory by the capture of Cyprus. Basra and Kúfa, which had rapidly grown into large cities, were a constant source of trouble to the Caliph, for—as one governor reported—“Noble birth passed for nothing; and the Bedouins were altogether out of hand.” In Medína and Mekka things fared badly, owing to ‘Othman’s policy of reserving all posts and emoluments for the Omayyads, which gave offence to all those other Mekkans who had helped the Prophet in the early days—notably the Háshimite family.

‘Othman was powerless to resist the opposition that their men now offered, and was finally besieged and killed in his own house, after a reign of twelve years, in A.D. 656.

The revolutionaries now set up as Caliph, ‘Alí, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, who—unlike his predecessors—did not command general allegiance. Many leading Mekkans were opposed to his appointment, including ‘Ayesha, the Prophet’s widow, who, with others, fled to Basra, and there raised the standard of revolt. This revolt he quelled without much difficulty, but more serious trouble was awaiting ‘Alí in Syria, where Mu‘áwiya, the Omayyad governor appointed by ‘Othman, had made himself practically independent on the death of that Caliph. ‘Alí tried to depose this powerful governor, but received only a haughty reply; and his authority was ignored throughout Syria. An open conflict was now inevitable; and ‘Alí, for political motives, transferred the seat of his government to Kúfa; and shortly after began to collect an army with which to attack Syria. The fateful field of Siffin, south-east of Aleppo, witnessed a series of inconclusive battles, which continued for two months,

and were brought to an end by a deed of arbitration on the basis of the Qorán, for which an umpire was chosen from each side, one of them being 'Amr, the conqueror of Egypt. The two umpires arrived at a decision which left matters very much as they were before, and though the rival claimants had withdrawn their troops, further hostilities were inevitable.

'Alí's reign was one long series of troubles and disasters; and so broken was his spirit that he again came to terms with Mu'áwiya, and each agreed to respect the territories of the other. This state of affairs naturally troubled the minds of many Muslims, more especially amongst the so-called Khárijites, a body of ultra-theocratic republicans who maintained that the best man possible should always be chosen—even if he were a negro.

In A.D. 661 three men of the Khárijite party formed a resolution to rid Islám of the three men who were mainly responsible for the existing situation—namely, 'Alí, Mu'áwiya, and 'Amr, who had been so unfair an umpire, and was a likely claimant to the Caliphate. On a given Friday each of the three conspirators was respectively to strike down his man, in the mosques of Kúfa, Damascus, and Fostat (old Cairo). 'Alí was mortally wounded; Mu'áwiya recovered from his wounds; and 'Amr escaped only because indisposition prevented his attending prayers that day.

'Alí, by his wife Fátima, the Prophet's daughter, had two sons: Hasan and Husayn. On his father's death Hasan, the elder, was at once proclaimed Caliph by the people of Kúfa. Hasan, who does not appear to have inherited any of the qualities of his father or grandfather, at the end of six months withdrew from Kúfa to Medína; and the commander he left in charge of his army, having no one to fight for, laid down his arms and paid homage to Mu'áwiya.

CHAPTER III

THE OMAYYAD CALIPHS

MU'ÁWIYA, on the death of 'Othman in 656, had, as we have seen, become independent ruler of the West, and on the abdication of Hasan, in 661, he became undisputed Caliph of all Islám, and was called the Commander of the Faithful. His dynasty is so called after his great-grandfather Omayya, who was grandson of 'Abd-Menáf, and, consequently, a cousin of 'Abd al-Muttalib, the grandfather of the Prophet.

During this reign the Muslims gained absolute sway over all the countries between the Oxus, the Indus, and the Persian Gulf, while in Northern Africa they made rapid progress under the leadership of Okba, who, in A.D. 670, founded the settlement of Kairowán in Southern Tunisia, and fortified it strongly against the Berbers. He was, however, driven out of the new city a few years later by a combined Roman and Berber army.

In this same year, A.D. 670, the first expedition was sent against Constantinople, without achieving any tangible results; and further vain attempts on the Byzantine capital were made almost yearly.

After a prosperous reign of nineteen years Mu'áwiya died, and from his death-bed sent final recommendations to his son Yezíd, warning him that the chief rivals he had to fear were 'Abdulláh ibn Zobayr and Husayn, the son of the Caliph 'Alí. Both these men were at the time in Mekka, and both, no doubt, aspired to the Caliphate. On the death of Mu'áwiya, Husayn was at once invited to Kúfa, whose inhabitants promised him their support, and he, in spite of the warnings of the Meckans, accepted, and set out together with his family for that city. On his way he learned that his cousin Muslim, who had been sent in

advance, had been put to death by Yezíd's orders. It was too late for him to turn back, and being met at Kerbela with orders to retire, he there pitched his camp, having with him less than one hundred and fifty men. And now followed the tragedy which to this day on every 10th of Muharram stirs the hearts of all good Muslims, and forms the subject of that heart-rending Passion Play, which is performed with ever-fresh exaltation and even self-inflicted violence wherever there is a Shi'a community. The little band, comprising nearly all those in whose veins the blood of the Prophet flowed, fought on till there was not a man left alive. Husayn, felled by an arrow, was trampled to death by the cavalry, and his head, together with seventy other heads, was thrown at the feet of the governor who had been responsible for the tragedy. Two sons and two daughters of Husayn who had escaped the carnage were afterwards kindly received by Yezíd, who, in a moment fatal for his house and later for the house of 'Abbás, sent them to Medína.

The Shi'a Movement, the claim of 'Alí's family to rule over Islám, thanks to the tragedy of Kerbela and the return to Medína of Husayn's children, now became a living reality, and has ever since split the Muslim world into two irreconcilable factions—the Sunni and the Shi'a.

Originally the Shi'a Movement was purely a political one in favour of 'Alí and his descendants (the name being a contraction of *Shi'at 'Alí*, or the Party of 'Alí); but its adherents soon began to formulate theories and beliefs which had nothing to do with the succession and very little to do with orthodox Islám. An allegorical interpretation was given to the Qorán. One of the most important features of their teaching was the belief in the "coming" of a promised Mahdí, or Messiah, who would one day appear on earth in order to establish the reign of justice and equity, and to take vengeance on the oppressors of the family of 'Alí. The

first three Caliphs are regarded as usurpers and duly cursed by good Shi'as, while no execrations are bad enough for Yezíd.

The most important sects which grew out of Shi'ism were the Isma'ilis, or "Seveners," who recognised in Isma'il, seventh in descent from 'Alí, their last Pontiff, or Imám, and looked to the ultimate coming of his son Muhammad as the promised Mahdí. Another sect of Shi'as, called the "Twelvers," believe that there have been twelve Imáms of the house of 'Alí, of whom the last, also called Muhammad, is said to have disappeared under mysterious circumstances. The religion of the "Twelvers" is to-day the state religion of Persia, each occupant of the throne being the *locum tenens* pending the reappearance of the hidden Imám.

In Africa the armies, during the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, met with many reverses, but in A.D. 693 the largest force yet despatched to Africa was sent under the command of Hasan ibn Nu'mán, who marched from Kairowán to Carthage. In the neighbourhood of Constantine he was for five years held in check by a woman known as *Káhina*, or "the Priestess," who took command of the Berbers. Ultimately *Káhina* was slain, and her sons, with their army, accepted Islám, a course their mother had herself recommended to them. The opposition of the Berbers was now finally broken (A.D. 703). The important part played by the Berbers in the history of Islám should not be forgotten. It was they who won the first battle in Spain under Tárik; it was they who upheld Islám in Spain and in North Africa, and, finally, it was they who won Egypt for the Fátimids.

The arms of Islám had meanwhile taken a new direction to the south-east, under command of Muhammad ibn Qásim, who, crossing the Indus, marched through Sind, and took the rich city of Multan, which yielded untold treasure to the Muslims (A.D. 711). It is unlikely that at this juncture further invasion into India was feasible, and this first adventure ended with the recall

of Muhammad ibn Qásim, owing to the death of the Caliph al-Walíd.

'Abd al-Malik died in A.D. 705 after a reign of twenty-one years. He was, on the whole, a successful ruler. He had continually three large expeditions in the field, constant revolts in Iráq, and an administration to establish or reform. It was he who first established a national mint, the Muslims having hitherto been content to use Persian or Roman coinage.

'Abd al-Malik was succeeded by al-Walíd (one of four sons, who all succeeded to the Caliphate in turn). During the ten years of al-Walíd's reign Islám reached its farthest limits in the West, and almost its farthest limits of conquest in the East. His reign also saw the beginning of the Abbásid Movement, which, within a few years of his death, was to bring the house of Omayya to an end.

In Africa the victorious Muslims, having extended their conquests as far as Fez, Tangier, and Ceuta, were already beginning to cast covetous eyes on Spain.

An opportunity offered when, in the year A.D. 709, the son of the Gothic King of Spain invited the aid of the Arabs in the recovery of his father's throne, which had been usurped by Roderick. This invitation was sent through a certain Count Julian, a Greek who, as governor of Tangier, had submitted to the Muslims, and was now in command of Ceuta. The Embassy was sent to Tárik, the new Muslim Governor of Tangier, who, in turn, sent it on to Musa ibn Nusayr at Kairowán, who then obtained the permission of the Caliph Walíd to send an expedition into Spain. These details are significant as illustrating the organisation that already existed in the Islámic State. In 710 a party of five hundred Berbers was sent to reconnoitre the country, and in the following year Tárik and Count Julian landed at Gibraltar, which name is a corruption of Jebel Tárik, or Tárik's Hill. Tárik's progress was so rapid—Malaga, Granada, Cordova, and Toledo all in turn submitted to his arms—that in 712 Musa be-

came either jealous or apprehensive, and himself set out for the Spanish mainland at the head of a large force, including many Arabs. His progress was not quite so rapid as that of his lieutenant. He took Seville, and on reaching Salamanca ordered Tárík to join him, and shortly after, Roderick being killed, Musa entered Toledo in triumph and proclaimed the Caliph of Damascus sole ruler of the Peninsula. In A.D. 714, being recalled by the Caliph, he returned to Damascus, leaving his son 'Abd ul-'Azíz as Governor, with Seville as his headquarters. But ere he reached Damascus Walíd had died, and his brother Sulayman reigned in his stead.

We must now look again to the East, where the remarkable progress begun under 'Abd al-Malik had been steadily continued. The appointment of Qutayba ibn Muslim in A.D. 704 marks, however, a new epoch; for though the Arabs had now been for many years masters of Khurásán, with Merv as the capital, their hold on the country beyond the Oxus was but slight. It was Qutayba who first brought the country lying between the Oxus and the Jaxartes under the rule of the Caliph. Adding to his Arab troops thousands of the local inhabitants whom he invited to join in the Holy War, he set out on a triumphant career of conquest, and in the course of a few years had conquered Bukhára, Samarqand, Khwárazm (Khiva), Farghána, and Tashkent as far as the mountains which separate Russian from Chinese Turkestan.

The outstanding event of the Caliph Sulayman's reign was his great attack on Constantinople by land and by sea, the second effort of the Muslims to win this coveted prize. The siege continued for three years, and was repelled mainly owing to the use of "Greek fire," which was employed with equal effect by sea and land, in battles or in sieges. The importance of the failure of the Muslims to take Constantinople cannot be over-estimated. It was the Byzantine Emperors who made it impossible for the Arabs to

sweep over Europe as they had swept over Syria and Egypt. Many centuries later it was again the Emperors of Constantinople who saved Europe from the Seljuqs. Professor Bury has well said that "if the Eastern Empire had not been mortally wounded and reduced to the dimensions of a petty state by the greed and brutality of the Western brigands who called themselves Crusaders, it is possible that the Turks might never have gained a footing in Europe." During the siege the Caliph Sulayman died, presumably from over-eating, and was succeeded by Walid's grandson, 'Omar II., who, after an equally brief reign, was succeeded by another of 'Abd al-Malik's sons, Yazid II.. In A.D. 724 the fourth son, Hishám, came to the throne of the Omayyads. He was the last distinguished ruler of his house. He reigned for nineteen years (A.D. 724-743), and it was while he held his high office in Damascus that the Muslim armies came within an ace of making themselves masters of France.

In A.D. 720 the governor appointed over Spain by 'Omar II. crossed the Pyrenees and took possession of Narbonne: but at Toulouse he was defeated and killed; and the attention of the Muslims in Spain was now turned to avenging this defeat. The Pyrenees were again crossed, and Carcassonne, Nîmes, and Autun were taken. The main body of the Muslim forces was composed of Berbers, to whom the Arabs owed their initial successes in Spain. These men were, however, treated as inferiors by the proud Arabs, and one of their chiefs, resenting this, made an alliance with Odo, King of Aquitaine. A veteran warrior, 'Abdur-Rahmán, was thereupon despatched with an enormous force and overran the land as far as Poitiers, having penetrated into Gascony by the Valley of Roncevalles: his detachments overspread the Kingdom of Burgundy as far as Lyons and Besançon.

On the possibilities involved by this invasion of France, I cannot do better than quote from the pages of Gibbon: "A victorious line of march had been pro-

longed above a thousand miles from the Rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland: the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Qorán would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and true revelation of Mahomet. From such calamities was Christendom delivered by the genius and fortune of one man."

In October, A.D. 732, Charles Martel, the illegitimate son of King Pepin of Burgundy, collecting his forces, sought and found the enemy in the midst of France between Tours and Poitiers. The battle was hotly contested, but at last the invaders were driven back, leaving 'Abdur-Rahmán dead on the field. So hasty was the retreat of the Muslim forces that on the following day every man of them had disappeared. Though this battle really decided the fate of France, the attack was twice renewed by the Muslims under Okba, the son of Hajjáj, but each was in turn repelled. Hishám died A.D. 743, and with him ended the glory of the Omayyads.

Meanwhile events were passing in Khurásán, which, within seven years of Hishám's death, were to bring about the downfall of his house.

In the reign of Hishám, Muhammad, the great-grandson of the Prophet's uncle 'Abbás, who was living in retreat in the south of Palestine, began to advance his claims to the Caliphate and to direct Shi'a propaganda. This Muhammad, whose two sons became the first two Abbásid Caliphs, devoted his attention primarily to Khurásán, where his missionaries were instructed to undermine the authority of the Omayyads by abusing their misrule and by holding out promises of a Saviour from the house of the

Prophet who would restore Islám to its original purity. In the year A.D. 743 he purchased a young slave, aged twenty, named Abu Muslim, who should act as his confidential agent in Khurásán. And so successful were he and his assistants that in A.D. 747 Ibráhím, son of Muhammad the Abbásid pretender, determined to raise the black banner in Khurásán without further delay. They chose black as their colour in contradistinction to the white banner of the Omayyads.

The Shi'ites were induced to make common cause with the pretender on the plea that the only object of the movement was to secure the Caliphate for a member of the Prophet's own family, while the Khárijites were only too glad to give expression to their disapproval of Omayyad misrule. Nasr, ibn Sayyár, who had governed Khurásán loyally for the past ten years, being unable to cope with this menacing situation, implored the Caliph to send reinforcements; and since no such help was forthcoming he deemed the struggle useless, and retired from Merv to Nishapur with such troops as remained faithful to him, only to be pursued and defeated by Qahtaba, the famous general, under Abu Muslim. The Omayyad Caliph at last awoke to the gravity of the situation and sent a large Syrian army against Qahtaba, but it was too late, and after a series of victories the Abbásid troops entered Kúfa, where the head of the house, Abu'l-'Abbás, was brought from seclusion as the promised Mahdí. The last of the Omayyads of Damascus fled to Egypt, where he was captured and slain, A.D. 750.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABBÁSID CALIPHS

THE first measure of Abu'l-'Abbás was to exterminate every member of the house of Omayya. From this terrible slaughter there escaped one grandson of the Caliph Hishám named 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, who fled eventually to Spain, where he founded the Omayyad Dynasty in that country. (See below, p. 29.)

The reign of Abu'l-'Abbás lasted less than five years, during which risings took place in every quarter of the Empire, except in Khurásán where Abu Muslim wielded unlimited power.

On the death of Abu'l-'Abbás in A.D. 754 his brother, al-Mansúr became Caliph, and one of his first acts was the murder of Abu Muslim, who had really been the main cause of the rise to power of the new dynasty, but was feared on account of his prestige in Khurásán; and it was only by bribery that Abu Muslim's officers were kept from rising in revenge for their master's cruel death.

Al-Mansúr now turned his attention to the building of his new capital, and we may take the completion of Baghdad in A.D. 766 as the beginning of a new era in Islám. For with the advent of the Abbásids and the transfer of the Court to Iráq a totally new influence came into operation. The Abbásids owed their rise to power to the support of the Persians of Khurásán, and everything Persian now became the fashion, and the Caliphs aspired to emulate the magnificence and luxury of the old kings of Irán. The Court even adopted Persian dress.

The ten years' reign of al-Mahdí, who assumed the Caliphate on the death of his father, al-Mansúr, in A.D. 775, was singularly free from battle or murder in comparison with the reigns of those who preceded him. This Caliph had two sons, both of whom suc-

ceeded him; the elder, al-Hádí, only survived his father by one year, and in A.D. 786, Hárún al-Rashíd, the most famous though not the greatest of the Caliphs of Baghdad, came to the throne.

Allusion must also be made to a rising in Medína in favour of a descendent of 'Alí, who was proclaimed Caliph. The pretender was killed while rashly making the pilgrimage to Mekka: a cousin of his, named Idrís, fled into Africa, and it was this Idrís who in A.D. 788 founded the Idrísid Dynasty in Morocco, which lasted nearly two hundred years.

Hárún holds a quite unique place among Muslim heroes, especially among English-speaking peoples: this we owe to the *Arabian Nights* in the first instance, and to our own literature in the second. The two phrases "The Great Hárún al-Rashíd" and "Bar-micide Feast" have a fixed place in our literary education; and Hárún's only rivals in the field of English letters are possibly Saladin and Tamerlane.

The real history of Hárún is not especially rich in incident. His reign of twenty-three years (A.D. 786-809) was comparatively uneventful, thanks mainly to the wisdom and good counsel of his Chief Ministers the Barmecides (Barmakids).

Yahya, who became Hárún's Prime Minister, was the son of Khálid, who had been Chief of the Exchequer to the first Abbásid Caliph: his two sons, Fadl and Ja'far, held important posts, and all were on terms of great intimacy with Hárún the Just. Although the name of this Caliph is so closely associated with that of Baghdad, Hárún actually spent very little time in this town. He spent much of his time in travel, and paid several visits to Khurásán and to Egypt: he performed the pilgrimage to Mekka nine times—for he was a very strict Muslim and observed minutely all the ordinances regarding prayer and fasting—and invaded the Roman territories in Asia Minor on no less than eight occasions.

It is during this reign that we first hear of the

employment of Turks in military command; and from this time on the Turks begin to play an increasingly important part in the Muslim Army.

Hárún is brought nearer to the West in our thoughts by the fact that he exchanged embassies with Charlemagne, and the elephants he included in his gifts to the great emperor were probably the first to be brought into Europe.

The story of the fall of the Barmecides must be mentioned, even in this brief summary, because of its proverbial place in our language. Curiously enough, the actual cause which led Hárún to turn against this family with such suddenness, to murder his most intimate friend Ja'far, to imprison his father and his brother and to confiscate all their property, has never been established, though, naturally enough, many stories have been woven round this tragedy which has cast so black a stain on the memory of Hárún the Just.

The expression "Barmecide Feast" has nothing to do with Hárún, but is merely taken from an *Arabian Night*, in which one of the Barmecides serves up a series of empty dishes to a hungry man to test his sense of humor.

To Hárún must also be given much of the credit for that liberal encouragement of letters, arts, and science which made the Court of the Abbásids the centre of the highest culture, to which the learned and the gifted flocked from East and West.

The manufacture of paper, the secret of which the Muslims had learnt from the Chinese in Turkestan, was in this reign established in Baghdad. Hitherto either parchment or papyrus had been employed for writing.

Hárún had three sons, and his intention was that while Amín, the elder, should succeed to the Caliphate, Ma'mún, the second son, should have absolute charge of Khurásán, and should be next in succession to his brother. It was while Hárún was leading an expedition into Khurásán, where a serious revolt had taken

place, that he succumbed to a malady at Tús. Ma'mún had been sent in advance to occupy Mery. Amín, on the news of his father's death, recalled the army to Baghdad, and struck Ma'mún's name from the succession. Ma'mún retaliated by stopping all postal communication between Baghdad and Khurásán, and assumed the title of Caliph over the Muslim territories of the East. Amín next sent a force of fifty thousand men to attack Ma'mún, which was defeated by Ma'mún's capable Persian General, Táhir, who followed up this victory by marching on Baghdad, to which he laid siege and which he took by storm in A.D. 813 after a twelve months' investment. Amín, in a vain attempt to escape, was finally slain by a party of Persian soldiers.

Ma'mún, now undisputed Caliph, instead of removing to Baghdad made Merv his capital, a step which naturally gave great offence to the people of the West.

Not till A.D. 817 did Ma'mún set out for Baghdad. Táhir was appointed to the Viceroyalty of the East in A.D. 820, and although he died two years later, seeing that his descendants succeeded him in this governorship during a period of fifty-six years, he may be fitly regarded as the founder of a dynasty in Khurásán, the first Persian dynasty to govern since the fall of the Sásánids in A.D. 641. The rise of this dynasty will be dealt with in Chapter VI. on the Eastern provinces.

The next Caliph, Mu'tasim, was also a son of Hárún. He was chiefly famous for having instituted a personal bodyguard of three thousand Turks, and for having built the royal residence of Sámarrá, a few miles above Baghdad, where he established himself, leaving his son Wáthiq in charge of Baghdad (A.D. 836). From this time on the Caliphs became mere puppets in the hands of their Turkish pretorians.

The last years of the Caliph Muqtadir, who was twice deposed and finally killed by one of his own

generals (A.D. 908-932), saw the rise of a Persian family named Buwayh, or Búya, belonging to the country of Daylam on the south-west of the Caspian, who, though Shi'as, gained such influence over the Caliph that they practically usurped his functions. Further reference to the Buwayhids will be found in Chapter VI.

Under the next Caliph, Rádf (934-940), the Empire was practically reduced to the province of Baghdad, and the worldly power of the Caliphate was a mere shadow, although his nominal authority was recognised by all orthodox Muslim rulers. Khurásán and Transoxiana, Southern Persia, Kirman, Media, Mesopotamia, Azarbaiján, Egypt, Arabia, Africa, and Spain were all in the hands of various independent sovereigns.

The Caliphate of Baghdad came altogether to an end with the defeat and death of Mosta'sim at the hands of Hulagu, the grandson of Chingiz Khan the Mongol, in A.D. 1256.

One member of the Abbásid family escaped to Egypt, which was in the hands of the Mamlúk Sultans, and made an abortive attempt to regain Baghdad, but was defeated and killed ere he reached that city. His descendants of a collateral line for two hundred and fifty years were more or less prisoners in Cairo of the Mamlúk Sultans, but enjoyed the title of Caliph and were paraded on State occasions. The last of the line of pseudo-Caliphs was carried off to Constantinople by Salim the Turk, after his conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1517. (See p. 76.)

CHAPTER V

THE DYNASTIES OF SPAIN, NORTH
AFRICA, AND EGYPT

SPAIN at the time of the Mussulman conquest was Christian rather in name than in fact. This country was the last country within the Roman Empire to cling to paganism; and, under the Visigoths, little trouble seems to have been taken to convert the people. Slavery and serfdom existed on an extensive scale, and the lower classes were downtrodden and ignorant. It is easy to understand that in these circumstances the call to Islám fell on willing ears; for the creed was simple, there was no priesthood, and every Muslim slave had a chance of becoming a freedman. In any case the Spaniards were only exchanging one alien rule for another.

From 478 down to the Arab invasion, Spain had been ruled by the Visigoths, who held their Court at Toulouse and had their Spanish headquarters in Toledo. Not till the sixth century was their rule firmly established there. The throne was elective, and after the establishment of the Catholic belief the power seems to have been shared between the king and the bishops.

A very noticeable feature was the persecution of the Jews, who in spite of this continued to thrive and to hold their own, and because of this contributed largely to the rapid successes of the Arabs, who, as we have seen elsewhere, practised toleration towards all who would pay the *jizia*. The Spanish Christians living under Arab rule received the name of Muzarabes—*i.e.*, *Must'aribin*, or the Arabicised.

On the departure of Musa ibn Nusayr in A.D. 714 (see above, p. 19) the newly acquired province fell into a state of hopeless disorder due to the rivalry among the Arab tribal representatives and the absence of a

really capable leader, and the constant quarrels between the Arabs and the Berbers. Governors were regularly appointed by the Dasmascus Caliphs, but their authority was more or less ignored. Civil war and the decline of the Omayyad Caliphate were reflected in all the outlying lands of Islám.

The situation for the Muslims in Spain was suddenly saved, twenty-three years after they had been driven back over the Pyrenees, by the arrival of one of the only Omayyad princes to escape from the general slaughter of his house, by name 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, the son of the Caliph, Mu'áwiya.

After five years' adventurous life in North Africa, during which he in vain attempted to win over the Berbers, he found himself in A.D. 755 in Ceuta, in the direst straits, accompanied only by his faithful freedman Badr. He now sent Badr over the sea to Spain to discover whether the local Arab chiefs would welcome the arrival of the grandson of the Caliph Hishám. Badr's mission met with such success that the young prince, then aged twenty-four, was able to land near Malaga, where he was greeted as their king by the assembled chiefs. In the following year he received the homage of nearly all the Muslims in Spain, and thus, within six years of the fall of the Omayyads of Damascus, was founded the Omayyad Dynasty of Cordova, which endured for over two hundred and fifty years.

'Abdur-Rahmán I. took the titles of Amír and Sultan, but the title of Caliph was only assumed two centuries later by 'Abdur-Rahmán III., the greatest monarch of his line. Only once did the Abbásid Caliphs make an attempt to wrest Spain from its new masters, when, in A.D. 763, 'Alá ibn Mughith was sent to raise a rebellion which was quickly and ruthlessly suppressed by 'Abdur-Rahmán. We are told that the heads of 'Alá and his chief companions were cut off, embalmed, and put in a bag, each head being labelled with the name and rank of the victim: to this parcel

were added the black flag of the Abbásids, the diploma appointing 'Alá Viceroy of Spain, and a document containing a short account of his defeat. This ghastly gift for the Caliph was carried by a merchant from Cordova to Baghdad, and on opening it Mansúr, who was not noted for his squeamishness, was moved to say: "I thank God for setting a sea between me and such an enemy!"

In A.D. 778, 'Abdur-Rahmán was faced by the most serious crisis of his thirty years' reign. Three Arab chiefs in the north, bent on the downfall of the Omayyad Amír, had gone to meet the Emperor Charlemagne in Paderborn and had concluded with him an alliance against the Muslim ruler of Spain. All was ready for the invasion of Spain by the Franks, but while the Emperor was still on the other side of the Pyrenees, a new rebellion in Saxony demanded his immediate return to Germany, and the Amír of Cordova had only to deal with the revolting Arabs and Berbers. The Frankish troops, which under the romantic Roland of Brittany had crossed the Pyrenees, were in their withdrawal all but annihilated by the Bask mountaineers in the famous valley of Roncesvalles.

It was during the reign of 'Abdur-Rahmán I. that there arose in the north of Spain the little Christian state of the Asturias with its capital at Oviedo, which by the middle of the ninth century seems to have been firmly established, and this was the thin edge of the wedge which gradually worked its way into the heart of Moorish Spain, and by the thirteenth century had reduced the limits of this proud state to the kingdom of Granada.

By the middle of the tenth century this little state had become the kingdom of Leon: a separate kingdom of Navarre was next established, and later both these principalities were merged into the two great states of Castile and Aragon respectively. A glance at the map of Spain will show that one-third of the

Peninsula had already been recovered by the Christians during the rule of the Omayyads of Cordova. From Coimbra to Barcelona an irregular line may be drawn to show the northern frontier of this outlying province of Islám, which included the Emirates of Seville, Granada, Cordova, Badajos, including more than half of modern Portugal, Toledo, Valencia, and Saragossa. Only two other names need be mentioned in connection with this one great Muslim dynasty that ever ruled in Spain—namely, 'Abdur-Rahmán III. and the great vezir al-Mansúr. It was during the long reign of 'Abdur-Rahmán III. (A.D. 912-961) that this house reached the apogee of its glory. "In spite of innumerable obstacles he had saved Andalusia both from itself and from foreign rule. He had given to it internal order and prosperity and the consideration and respect of foreigners. A numerous and well-disciplined army, perhaps the best in the world, gave him a preponderance over the Christians of the north. The most haughty sovereigns were eager for his alliance. Ambassadors were sent to him by the Emperor of Constantinople and by the sovereigns of Germany, Italy, and France."

The other name we have to mention is that of al-Mansúr (Almansor) the great minister who was destined to play a more important part in the history of Spain than any of the Caliphs. An administrator by inheritance and training, and a learned doctor of the law, he determined also to master the art of war, and became a great general. He is said to have conducted no less than fifty campaigns against the Christians, and the three important towns of Leon, Pamplona, and Barcelona were each captured by him in turn. His position was far greater than that of the two Caliphs whom he served, and he could no doubt have, had he chosen, usurped the supreme power; but he seems to have been contented with the enjoyment of public esteem and hero-worship.

With the death of al-Mansúr the power of the

Omayyads began rapidly to decline; and at the beginning of the eleventh century Moorish Spain again became a prey to factions and adventurers, and a number of petty dynasties arose in the various Emirates, the most important of which was that of the Abbadids of Seville. In the meantime, the Christian states of Aragon and Castile were rapidly growing in power; and so threatening did they appear to the Muslims that the Abbadid Prince of Granada appealed for aid to the Almorávid ruler of Morocco.

To this period belongs the Cid Campeador, Don Ruy Diaz, or Rodrigo, who, as an historical personage, played a part which entitled him to small fame and no honour, but as a hero of romance is the centre of a vast literature. He was, indeed, a free-lance who in accordance with the chances of booty fought alternately for the Moors and the Spaniards; and, as is so often the case with popular heroes, it would have been happier for all lovers of romance if his real life had been less accessible to the historian.

We must now leave Spain and take a rapid survey of what had been passing in North Africa since the recall of Musa ibn Nusayr to Damascus in A.D. 714.

NORTH AFRICA.—When in A.D. 754 the Caliph Mansúr ascended the throne he wrote to 'Abdur-Rahmán, the Viceroy in Kairowán, demanding him to take the oath of allegiance. This he refused, and issued a circular letter commanding all Muslims in the west to refuse obedience to the Abbásid Caliph. Such was the beginning of the independence of the *Maghrib* (or West), and several years elapsed before the Abbásid general al-Aghlab was able to enter Kairowán and re-establish the authority of the Caliph.

In A.D. 788 an independent 'Alid Dynasty known as the Idrísids had been founded in Morocco. In A.D. 787, the Governor-General of Africa (*i.e.*, Tunisia) died and was succeeded by Ibráhím, the son of Aghlab. In A.D. 800 the Caliph Hárún made him Governor of the whole of the African province, from the frontiers of

Egypt up to Morocco, where the authority of the Idrísids was not challenged.

The Aghlabid domination of one hundred years in Africa was a period of naval triumphs for Islám. They continually harried the coasts of Italy, France, Corsica, Malta, and Sardinia, and in A.D. 827 conquered Sicily. Their piratical sailors, known as the Corsairs, were the terror of the Mediterranean, and they even sailed up the Tiber within a few miles of Rome.

FÁTIMIDS. — The establishment of the Fátimid Dynasty, first in Africa and afterwards in Egypt, was the outcome of a very important sectarian movement which, originating in the reign of the 11th Abbásid Caliph (892-902), laid waste the Muslim Empire for two centuries.

In the second half of the ninth century a certain Persian named 'Abdulláh began to preach the Isma'ílí doctrine, and to institute a sort of secret society into which one could only enter after the strictest initiation, and from which one could never again withdraw owing to solemn oaths taken. 'Abdulláh soon had a great number of members, and missionaries were sent all over the Muslim world.

From the Isma'íls sprang a branch which, from its founder Qarmat, became known as the Qarámita, or Carmathians, who, rapidly spreading in Iráq, Syria, and Eastern Arabia, kept in check all the armies which were sent against them.

Finally, at the end of the ninth century, there arose a man named 'Ubaydullah, who, though actually descended from 'Abdulláh, the Persian Isma'ílí mentioned above, gave himself out as a direct descendant of 'Alí through his wife Fátima. One of this man's missionaries it was who, after gaining a numerous following among the susceptible Berbers, had wrested Tunisia from the Aghlabids. This was in A.D. 909.

'Ubaydullah took the title of al-Mahdí and claimed

to be Caliph and Amír of the Faithful. He soon made himself master of all North Africa excepting Idrísid Morocco. He founded the city of Mahdíya on the coast of Tunisia and made it the Fátimid capital, and fifty years later his great-grandson al-Mu'izz became master of Egypt and founded Cairo.

EGYPT.—The advent of the Fátimids to the kingdom of Egypt and Syria finally deprived the Caliphs of Baghdad of those two rich provinces, and cut them off from all connection with the west. Khurásán had long passed from their hands, and their possessions now were small in comparison with the empire of the Fátimids, which stretched from the Orontes to the borders of Morocco.

Although the Fátimids reigned in Cairo down to the time of their overthrow by the great Saladin in A.D. 1171, they did not manage to retain their hold over their western provinces.

Politically, the influence of the Fátimids extended far beyond the confines of their empire, for it was Fátimid propaganda which led to the establishment of the Isma'ilís in Persia and Syria, who were destined to play such a terrifying rôle during the three succeeding centuries under the leadership of their chief, who was known as the Old Man of the Mountain (*Shaykh ul-Jabal*).

It is not easy to account for the untiring efforts which were expended in spreading the cause of the Fátimids, which was obviously prompted by the desire to hold what they had gained, which, after all, required money and arms rather than religious adherents.

THE ALMORÁVIDS.—As a result of the removal of the Fátimids to Cairo, two of their African lieutenants set up local dynasties and a number of Berber chiefs made themselves independent. And, finally, in the middle of the eleventh century a new teacher appeared, in the person of a Berber named 'Abdullah ibn Yásín, who founded the dynasty of the Almorávids (a corruption of *al-murábitin* or monks of the *ribát* or frontier

monastery). He conquered practically the whole of Morocco, and it was his cousin Yúsuf, the son of Tashfin, who built the city of Marrákush, from which Morocco has its name.

It was this Yúsuf who in A.D. 1086 was invited by the Muslims in Spain, notably the Abbadids of Seville, to come and help them against the Christian princes: in response to their appeals he made two expeditions into Spain. He not only helped his co-religionists, but took the opportunity of annexing Spain to his African Empire. The Almorávids were probably the first Berbers to be really converted to Islám, and so fanatical were they that during the sixty years that they ruled over Spain the Christian inhabitants, who under all other Muslim rulers before and after were treated with tolerance, became the objects of persecution.

THE ALMOHADES.—At the beginning of the twelfth century another Berber preacher arose named Ibn Túmart, who founded a sect which in A.D. 1130 became a dynasty called the Almohades, a corruption of *Muwahhidin*, or Unitarians.

The first chief of the Almohades, in the course of fifteen years, conquered Morocco and finally put an end to the Almorávids, and at the same time gained possession of all Moorish Spain. He ultimately extended his conquests as far as the frontiers of Egypt. His successors were mainly occupied in repelling the attacks of the Christians in Spain, and in A.D. 1212 the Almohades suffered a disastrous defeat at Las Navas, and were driven out of the Peninsula.

THE NASRIDS OF GRANADA.—A number of petty kingdoms had sprung up during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Valencia, Saragossa, etc., but the last dynasty worthy of mention is that of the Nasrids in Granada, which lasted from the middle of the thirteenth century down to the final expulsion of the Moors by Ferdinand and Isabella in A.D. 1492, when their last king, Abu 'Abdulláh Muhammad, better

known as Boabdil (*el rey chico*), fled from the city he loved so well. We are told that as he cast a last long-ing glance on the Alhambra, on a spot still known as "The Moor's last sigh," he burst into tears, and his mother upbraided him, saying: "Do not weep like a woman just because you have not the courage to defend yourself like a man!"

Travellers in Morocco have all heard how, in many households, there are preserved to this day the keys which the Moorish refugees brought away with them from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century; and Arabic works, written as late as the seventeenth century, in speaking of Spain utter pious prayers for a speedy return.

THE ARABS IN SPAIN (*Retrospect*).—For nearly eight hundred years the religion of the Arabian Prophet had exercised its influence in Spain, during which it had given her all that was best in Muhammadan culture. A hundred glorious monuments still stand to bear witness to the artistic genius and architectural skill of the Arabs, but the greatest service they rendered was not to Spain only but to the whole world; for it was they who by their Universities and their encouragement of letters and learning kept alive Greek philosophy and science, and thus paved the way during Europe's Dark Ages for the Great Renaissance.

One has only to recall the names of such scholars as Averroes, Maimonides the Jew, Abu Meron the Christian, and Ibn Jubayr of Valencia, one of the greatest travellers and geographers.

NORTH AFRICA—MOROCCO (*the Marinids*).—Morocco alone of the North African Muslim states has always preserved her independence, until comparatively recent times when she became a bone of contention among the European powers; but even now she has her own dynasty and her own capital.

From the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century she was governed by the Marínids, and for a further period of eighty years by the Wat'asids. In

1544 began the rule of the *Sharifs*, who claimed descent from Hasan the son of 'Alī. In 1664 another branch of the Sharifs began to rule over Morocco, and with certain interruptions have continued down to the present day.

TUNIS.—From 1228 to 1534 Tunis was governed by a dynasty known as the Hafsids, whose founder was appointed Viceroy of Tunis by the Almohades. This was a period of peace and prosperity, during which active commercial relations were maintained with the Italian maritime republics.

In 1534 the famous Barbary Corsair Khayr ud-Din Barbarossa conquered Tunis on behalf of the Sultan of Turkey, Sulayman I. (see p. 76 below). In the following year the Emperor Charles V. restored the Hafsids King and placed a Spanish garrison at La Goletta, between Carthage and the town of Tunis, which was finally driven out again in 1574. From this last date down to 1881 Tunis was a province of the Ottoman Empire, under a *Dey*, but in 1705 the Turkish soldiery elected their own Bey. In 1881 the French occupied Tunis, and have ever since exercised suzerainty over that country, which is still nominally ruled over by a Bey.

ALGIERS.—In 1516 Algiers was captured by Uruj Barbarossa, an adventurer from Lesbos, who three years later appointed his brother Khayrud-Dīn, Beglerbeg, or Governor-General, of the province on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan. In 1551 Tripoli, conquered from the Knights of St. John by another Corsair named Dragut, was also added to the Ottoman Empire.

Algiers was governed by a series of Pashas appointed from Constantinople down to 1671, when, as in Tunis, the Turkish soldiery elected a Dey from their own number, whose power rivalled that of the Pasha. In 1710 the two offices were united in that of the Dey, and this was the form of government when Algiers was conquered by the French in 1830.

EGYPT AND SYRIA (*the Fátimids*).—We have seen that by the removal of the seat of the Government from Tunisia to Egypt in A.D. 972 the Fátimids lost their provinces in the Maghrib. They, however, received the allegiance of Syria and the Hejaz, and thus the *Khutba* of a Shi'a Caliph came to be read in the mosques of Mekka and Medína.

The Carmathians still continued to give trouble, and in 973, having captured Damascus from the Fátimid Governor, invaded Egypt. Here they were utterly routed by the Caliph al-Mu'izz, and their power was finally broken.

The next Caliph, Nizár, who assumed the title of al-'Azíz billáh, deserves mention on account of his strenuous activities in the direction of Fátimid propaganda, which led to the establishment of the Isma'ílí Assassins in Persia (see below, p. 51). His son *'al-Hákim bi amr Illáh*, who reigned from A.D. 996 to 1021, was a still more remarkable man. He was subject to fits of madness which sometimes took the form of homicidal mania, but in his lucid moments he was a liberal patron of art and science. He, moreover, founded a new cult in which he occupied the central place as an emanation of the Deity. This led to his being adopted by the Druses of the Lebanon, who still revere and worship him.

He both erected and destroyed public buildings; and he is credited with the restoration of the Dome of the Rock and with the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The history of the Fátimids from this point is uninspiring. In 1031 the great Seljuqs had appeared on the scene, and after Tughril's triumphant entry into Baghdad in 1055 the nominal supremacy of the Abbásid Caliphs was re-established in Western Asia, and the jurisdiction of the Fátimids was limited to Egypt; and fifty years later that strange storm of wild fanaticism called the Crusades burst with all its fury over the Near East; and, finally, in 1171, Saláh

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ud-Dín (Saladin), having made himself master of Egypt, caused the *Khutba* to be read in the name of the Abbásid Caliph of Baghdad, and Egypt once more became Sunni instead of Shi'a.

CHAPTER VI

THE EASTERN PROVINCES AND THE RISE OF THE TURKS

THE TÁHIRIDS.—Under the last Omayyads and the first great Abbásids the Eastern Provinces comprised Khurásán, Transoxiana, Seistan, and Tabaristán, including Daylam and Mázandarán on the south of the Caspian Sea.

We have seen above (p. 26) that when the Caliph Ma'mún moved from his new capital Merv to the old capital Baghdad, he gave the management of the Eastern Provinces of the Caliphate to Táhir, the Persian: and from this date the history of the Caliphate tends to become a series of incidents in the history of Persia or of Central Asia.

Táhir only lived to hold his appointment for two years (820-822), and on his death was succeeded by his son Talha, who ruled over the countries, while his brother 'Abdulláh fought the Caliph's battles in Mesopotamia and Egypt. In Transoxiana a family now came into prominence which was destined to lay the foundations of independent Persian rule in the Eastern Provinces—namely, the Sámánids. Various members of this family, who claimed to be of old and noble Persian stock, were placed in charge of subdivisions of the Oxus country, and the subordinate posts were handed on from father to son in the Sámánid, just as the governorship of the Eastern Provinces passed from father to son in the Táhirid

family. These countries now enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity lasting over fifty years. The nominal authority of the Caliph was recognised, and these Persian governors being more addicted to the arts of administration than to those of war, devoted themselves to the material and spiritual advancement of the inhabitants.

THE SAFFÁRIDS.—In the meantime a revolt of the Khárijites broke out in Seistan: and among the local "volunteers" who joined them was a certain Ya'qúb, the son of Layth, who was by trade a coppersmith, whence the name of Saffárids by which he and his two successors are known.

His career is one of the most remarkable in the annals of Islám.

Beginning as a common soldier in a land of outlaws, he first drove the Táhirids out of Seistan and Khurásán and extended his power over practically the whole of modern Persia, and even threatened the Caliph in Baghdad in A.D. 879.

It was Ya'qúb who first brought Islám to Kabul, which hitherto had remained Buddhist.

His brother 'Amr, who succeeded him, made terms with the Caliph and was confirmed in the Governments of Khurásán, Fars, Kurdistan, and Seistan, which he continued to enjoy for twelve years, when he was attacked by the Sámánid ruler of Transoxiana and made prisoner. His grandson succeeded him in Seistan only, and the rest of Ya'qúb's conquests fell to the Sámánids.

THE SÁMÁNIDS.—We have seen that the family of Sámán held important posts under the Táhirids already in the reign of the Caliph Ma'mún. During the revolt and supremacy of the Saffárids Transoxiana, which had not submitted to them, was practically cut off from Baghdad, and the Sámánid Isma'il made himself virtual ruler of this country (A.D. 892).

It was Isma'il who, at the instigation of the Caliph, in A.D. 903, drove the Saffárids out of Khurásán and

became ruler of all the Persian provinces gained by Ya'qúb ibn Layth.

Under this prince and his successors, Samarqand and Bukhárá became the centres of civilisation, learning, art, and scholarship for a large part of the Muhammadan world.

It was at the Court of the Sámánids that modern Persian poetry came into being and the first of their great poets, the blind Rúdákí, flourished under the Sámánid Nasr ibn Ahmad, who reigned from A.D. 913 to 942.

During the first two centuries of Arab supremacy over Persia the language of the country was relegated to the background, very much as Anglo-Saxon was ousted by French during the rule of the Norman kings. Islám had been very extensively accepted by the Persians, and with it the language of the Qorán : and although Persian, no doubt, continued to be spoken by the people, Arabic was adopted by the intelligentsia of Persia both for religious and secular writings. Many of the most notable poets belonging to the Arabic Parnassus were Persian bred and born.

This Persian dynasty was eventually brought to an end by the Turks, who, in the second half of the tenth century, suddenly attained a new prominence. We have already seen that the Caliphs had made use of the prisoners taken in their wars on the frontiers of Turkestan by forming a Pretorian guard, and high military commands had been given to many of these men who, as prisoners, began by being bought and sold as slaves. In the Eastern Provinces, the Persian and Arab governors had also learnt to appreciate the military qualities of the Turks, and the Sámánids had employed them as provincial governors. The first of these Turks to rise to great eminence was a commander-in-chief in Khurásán named Alptegin, who, having been deprived of his command, withdrew to Ghazna, and there founded a small independent kingdom. He was eventually succeeded by a slave in

his service named Sebuktegin, who had risen to high rank and married his master's daughter. Sebuktegin accepted the position of vassal to the Sámánids, though he had received a formal recognition from the Caliph of Bagdad as King of Ghazna: such was the rise of the first Turk who became a ruler in Islám.

Meanwhile, a new enemy had appeared on the eastern frontier in the shape of the Ilek Kháns of Turkestan. Hitherto the Turks had only been on the defensive against the forces of Islám. The westward movement of the Ilek Kháns into Transoxiana represents the first appearance of the Turks as invaders of Islámic territory. To save himself from the attacks of the Ilek Kháns the Sámánid king was obliged to call upon his vassal for assistance, and, finally, as a reward for these services, Sebuktegin was made governor of Khurásán, and a few years later, by a treaty concluded between Sebuktegin and the Ilek Khán, the former became master of all the provinces south of the Oxus, while the latter was allowed to occupy the basin of the Jaxartes. The helpless representative of the Sámánids had no say in the matter, and found his kingdom reduced to Transoxiana and Khwárazm (Khiva).

In the year A.D. 999 two events of outstanding importance in the history of Islám occurred. Sebuktegin died and was succeeded by his famous son Mahmúd, and the Ilek Khán captured and occupied Bukhárá. This latter event involved the final extinction of the Sámánids.

Mahmúd at once proceeded to a division of the spoil with the Ilek Khán, the larger share falling to himself, after which he set about that career of conquest in the south and the west, which has made his name one of the most famous in Oriental history.

Mahmúd, the son of Sebuktegin, during a reign of thirty years, was incessantly engaged in military campaigns, north and west and south: in 1008 he totally defeated the Ilek Khán, who had invaded Khurásán; in 1017 he marched into Khwárazm and set up his

own nominee as local governor; he made many successful expeditions into the northern and southern provinces of Persia, and in 1026 he received diplomas from the Abbásid Caliph, in which he was recognised as Supreme Ruler of the East, and the legitimate successor of the Sámánids.

But it was always on India that his heart was set, and he is said to have invaded that country no less than twelve times. He actually led an army across the deserts of Rajputana and penetrated as far as Somnath in the southern corner of the Kathiawar Peninsula and destroyed the local Hindu temple. Mahmúd was thus the first Turkish general to reach the sea. His marvellous energy and physical endurance fill one with wonder: he seems to have indulged in conquest almost as a hobby, and although he was able to bequeath to his successor a vast empire extending from the Punjab frontier to Khiva in the north and Isfahan and Rayy in the west, he did not give himself time to consolidate his conquests in India or to prevent the Turkomans from settling in the rich provinces of the Oxus. It must be remembered that his raids into India, unlike his other expeditions, were carried out against "infidels and idol worshippers," and therefore had the character of a Holy War: and prepared the ground for subsequent Muslim invaders. His destruction of Hindu temples won him the title of the "Idol-breaker."

Almost as remarkable as his soldierly activity was his patronage of learning and letters. Although by origin a Turk and the son of a slave, he displayed such interest in the Persian literary revival and gathered round him so many distinguished poets that the glory of Turkish Ghazna quite eclipsed the fame of Persian Bukhárá. It was for Mahmúd that the great Persian epic, the *Shahnáma*, or Book of Kings, containing the story of the pre-Islámic kings and heroes of Irán, was written by the poet Firdawsí.

Mahmúd died in A.D. 1030, and his son Mas'úd,

during a reign of ten years, was confronted with the threefold problem of holding his possessions in India, keeping in order the minor states which had arisen in Persia and staving off the encroachments of the Ghuzz Turks, who were overrunning the whole of Transoxiana and Khurásán.

In the middle of the tenth century it looked as if the Persian renaissance were about to have far-reaching effects throughout the eastern and central provinces of Islám. For apart from the establishment of the national Sámánid Dynasty in the East, the Caliphs, as we have seen, had become mere puppets in the hands of the Persian Buwayhids, who were masters of many provinces of Persia, but it was precisely at this juncture that the Turks suddenly appeared in the rôle of invaders.

THE SELJUQS.—We have seen that the first counter-attack on the Arabs came from an adventurer in Seistan, the second from a Turk in Ghazna, the third from the IleK Kháns, of Turkestan. The attack of the Seljuqs, of which we are about to speak, was on a very much larger scale, and its results were far-reaching and lasting, for it involved not merely a conquest, but also a world migration.

Among the numerous bands of Turks which had, during the Sámánid period, filtered into Transoxiana, the majority belonged to the horde of the Ghuzz. Among these Ghuzz was a petty chieftain named Seljuq. His famous grandsons, Tughril Beg and Chaghri Beg, are first heard of as helping the Sámánids against the IleK Khán. During the reign of Sultan Mahmúd many other groups of Ghuzz crossed the Oxus into Khurásán: and only towards the close of his reign did the Ghaznavid Sultan, suddenly alive to the danger of their growing power, send an army against them, the result of which was to scatter these hordes over northern Persia.

The Ghuzz continued, however, to flow into Khurásán, and in A.D. 1035, while Mas'úd was in

Tabaristan, the Seljuq brothers also crossed the Oxus with their army, and in A.D. 1037, while Mas'úd was away in India, they made themselves masters of the principal cities of Khurásán: and it was now that Tughril Beg, leaving his brother in charge of Khurásán, set out on his unchecked career of conquest in the west. For nowhere did he meet with organised opposition. The petty kingdoms in northern Persia had no bond of union; the Buwayhids, though still controlling the Caliph of Baghdad, had been exhausted by their wars with Sultan Mahmúd and were constantly quarrelling with each other, and thus in A.D. 1054 Tughril was able to march against Baghdad, which he entered in the following year. The Caliph (al-Qaym) received him with every honour and seated him on his throne. No doubt the Caliph was delighted to be rescued by a good Sunni from the hands of the Shi'a Buwayhids: and it was Tughril who revived this dying state and enabled it to last for another two hundred years.

Tughril was now an old man of nearly seventy, and having spent twenty consecutive years campaigning in Persia, he now cried a halt to his military exploits and settled down in his capital of Rayy. In spite of his age and of his phenomenal successes, his ambition was still unsatisfied, for though he had given his niece in marriage to the Caliph, he had set his heart on receiving the Caliph's daughter in marriage as a final culmination of his glorious career. In spite of his invidious position, the proposal of an alliance with this uncouth Turk was repugnant to this aristocratic Arab, and the negotiations for the marriage dragged on over several years. Finally, in A.D. 1063, when all had been settled, the reluctant princess learnt—presumably to her great relief—while on the road to Rayy that Tughril had died.

Though the Turks were past masters in the art of war, and had their traditional methods of tribal organisation, they were confronted with an entirely

new problem when they found themselves responsible for the good government of the western Islámic provinces, which had settled populations in town and country and distinct classes of administrators, land-owners, and soldiers. Like the conquering Arabs before them they had the wisdom to call in the Persians and to appoint them to the highest administrative offices in the state. For letters and learning and the arts the Turks cared not at all, but thanks to the great influence of their Persian ministers the disaster to Islámic culture, which the Turkish invasion seemed bound to bring in its train, was happily averted, and under the immediate successes of Tughril Beg, both Persian and Arab letters flourished.

The greatest service, however, which the Seljuqs rendered to Islám was the reuniting of Middle Asia from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean under one sovereign, which made it possible for the Muslims to check the progress first of the Byzantine Emperors and later of the Crusaders.

The Great Seljuqs—that is to say, the Seljuq Sultans who ruled over and at times extended the Empire conquered by Tughril Beg—in the course of their hundred years' rule, produced no less than four sovereigns of great talent. After Tughril came his nephew Alp Arslán, the son of Chaghri Beg, who began his career as a highly successful Governor of Khurásán. During his reign of ten years (1063-1073) he was mainly occupied with the consolidation of the Empire; and his most notable feat of arms was his victory at Manzikert over the Emperor Diogenes Romanus in A.D. 1071, which led to the subsequent foundation of a Seljuq Dynasty in Rúm, or Asia Minor. He also recovered Aleppo and the Holy Cities from the Fátimids of Egypt. He was succeeded by his son Malik Sháh, who was, in some respects, the most eminent ruler of his line.

But the fame of both these kings pales before that of the great minister who served them so faithfully

and so ably, Nizám ul-Mulk. This man stands out as one of the finest figures in Muslim history. Himself a distinguished man of letters and the author of an invaluable and delightful *Book of Government*, he founded colleges, known after him as *Nizámiyya*, in Baghdad, Nishapur, and elsewhere. He was a liberal patron of literature and science, and he appointed a committee of astronomers to revise the calendar. His connection with 'Omar Khayyám is well known to all readers of FitzGerald's translation of *Rubá'íyyát*, where we are also told that the great vezir ultimately perished at the hand of an emissary of Hasán-i-Sabbáh, the head of the Isma'ílí Assassins.

Sultan Sinjar, the last of the Great Seljuqs, was also a man of rare distinction. After governing Khurásán with firmness and justice for twenty years, he was called to the throne in Baghdad in A.D. 1119, which he occupied for forty years, during which he gained many victories and suffered severe reverses. He was finally defeated by Turkish rebels in Khurásán—that is, in that province where his great ancestors had begun their world-conquest exactly one hundred years after the triumphant entry of Tughril into Baghdad: and with him perished the Empire.

In the meantime, however, four semi-independent Seljuq dynasties had come into being in Rúm, Kerman, Syria, and Iráq, which survived the main dynasty for varying periods, the Seljuqs of Rúm lasting down to the end of the thirteenth century.

In addition to these a number of petty kingdoms had sprung up in Syria and Asia Minor, which were destined to play an important rôle in the wars of the Crusaders.

THE SELJUQS OF RÚM.—The dynasty of Seljuqs of Rúm, or Asia Minor, was founded by a Seljuq who was not descended, like the other dynasties bearing this name, from Chaghri Beg, but from another son of the original Seljuq. His name was Sulayman ibn Qutulmish, and after Alp Arslán's successful campaign

against Diogenes Romanus (see p. 46 above), he had remained in Asia Minor with a large army. In A.D. 1081, Alexius Comnenus, who had meanwhile succeeded to the Byzantine throne, found himself in such dire straits that he appealed to Sulayman for aid, which the latter gave: and in 1081 established himself in Nicæa as independent Sultan.

It was Sulayman's son, Qilij Arslán (1092-1106), who first came into conflict with the Crusaders.

Space will not permit me to describe the struggles of the Crusaders against the various Seljuq princes and commanders. From the point of view of Islám the Crusades are of slight importance: the story resolves itself into the loss and recapture of Jerusalem. The Crusades, indeed, had very little direct influence on the system of the Islámic state, and hardly any at all, on her religion or culture.

CHAPTER VII

THE KHWÁRAZM-SHÁHS—THE MONGOLS —THE IL-KHÁNIDS

THE province of Khwárazm (Khorazmia), the modern Khiva, bordered on the south by Khurásán, on the east by the Oxus, and on the west by the Caspian, had already under the Sámánids had governors who bore the title of Khwárazm-Sháh. One of the first acts of Sultan Mahmúd's reign was his appointment to this governorship of his own nominee. In the reign of Malik-Sháh, another man from Ghazna, a slave, named Anushtegin, who had been cup-bearer to the Seljuq Sultan, was appointed to govern Khwárazm: and it was either he or his son Atsiz who founded the independent dynasty of Khwárazm-Sháhs, which was destined for one hundred years to play the leading rôle in the history of Middle Asia.

The last years of Sultan Sinjar's reign were almost entirely taken up with troubles on his eastern frontiers and in Khurásán. Apart from the rebellions of the Ghuzz in Khurásán, and the repeated revolts of Atsiz, there now arrived on the frontiers of Transoxiana a new enemy, in the shape of the Qara-Khitái Turks, who had been driven westwards out of Central Asia by the pressure of the Chinese and the Mongols.

These Turks were strangers to Islám, and their progress through the Muslim Transoxiana and their defeat of Sultan Sinjar in A.D. 1141 represent the first serious reverses which Islám had suffered in the east at the hands of Unbelievers. Their chief who was called *Gúr-Khán*, or Universal Lord, had among his followers members of Turkish tribes which professed Christianity, and it was this victory over the Seljuqs which gave rise in Europe to the rumour that the enemies of the Crusaders in the west had been defeated by Christians in the east under Prester John.

This victory had far-reaching effects: it not only brought about the ultimate fall of Sinjar and with him of his dynasty, it also opened the road to power to the Khwárazm-Sháh, and to the Ghúrid princes in the mountains between Herat and Ghazna, who stood in the same relation to the Ghaznavids as the Khwárazm-Sháhs to Sinjar (see below, p. 60), and while the Ghúrids were taking possession of Khurásán, defeating the last Ghaznavid and establishing a kingdom of Delhi, the Khwárazm-Sháhs were capturing all the lands east and west which had been in the hands of the last Great Seljuq.

The greatest of these Sháhs was 'Alá ud-Dín Muhammad (1199-1220), who drove the Ghúrids out of Khurásán, completed the conquest of Persia, recaptured Bukhárá and Samarqand, driving the Gúr-Khán of the Qara-Khitáis back on to his own country. In 1214 he invaded Afghanistan and captured Ghazna.

We have observed that previous conquerors like Sultan Mahmúd and Tughril had been recognised by

the Abbásid Caliphs of Baghdad. The Caliph Násir, however, who had been a partisan of the Ghúrids, refused to allow 'Alá ud-Dín to have his name read with his own in the *Khutba*, and by this foolish act, led the Khwárazm-Sháh to adopt the Shi'a heresy and to nominate for the Caliphate a descendant of 'Alí, who was in Transoxiana. His first march on Baghdad was frustrated by the severity of the winter, and his further progress was brought suddenly to an end by the appearance on his northern frontier of Chingiz Khán.

The Khwárazm-Sháh, after defeating the Qara-Khitáis (in 1206), had committed the fatal error of handing over all lands beyond the Jaxartes to a Turkish chieftain of the tribe of Naiman.

This Naiman chieftain had, in 1207, been driven westwards by the Mongols, under Chingiz Khán, and had taken refuge with the Gúr-Khán. During the next ten years Chingiz Khán was occupied with subduing China, and it was not till 1217 that he began his great westward migration.

The invincible Mongol, having himself besieged and captured Bukhárá and Samarcand, now divided his forces into three huge armies under the princes, which swept over Khwárazm, Khurásán, Afghanistan, Azarbaiján, Georgia, and Southern Russia, and still had men enough to carry on the further reduction of China.

Though space compels us to pass immediately to the capture of Baghdad by Hulagu, the grandson of Chingiz, in 1258, it is, nevertheless, impossible to omit all reference to the character of this terrible invasion by the Mongols, which threw the whole of the known world into a panic, and with reason.

In comparing the behaviour of the Mongols with that of the Ghuzz, we must remember that the latter had already been converted to Islám, and were therefore invading the country of their co-religionists, whereas the Mongols had no respect for any religion

at all, and, having achieved their initial successes, carried all before them by what for want of a better or a worse word can only be called *Schrecklichkeit*.

The accounts of their cruelty and wholesale destruction, which have come down to us from contemporary sources, strain our powers of belief. Town after town which had been famous for its great buildings, its mosques, its colleges and its pleasure-gardens, was levelled to the ground, never again to revive. As they moved forward they left only desert wastes behind them.

In A.D. 1224 Chingiz Khán again withdrew to Mongolia, and not till thirty years later was Middle Asia again to suffer the horrors of a Mongol invasion. Chingiz had died in 1227, and his son and successor, Ogotai, in 1241. It was the death of this second Mongol Emperor that unexpectedly saved Europe from being entirely overrun by the Mongolian hordes, who had penetrated as far as East Prussia and now suddenly withdrew. During this thirty years' respite the eastern Muslim provinces remained in a state of complete disorder and anarchy. The only redeeming figure is that of 'Alá ud-Dín's brave son, Jalál ud-Dín Mangubirni, who led a life of amazing adventures, during which he spent two years in India trying to establish himself there. For a time he held Azarbaiján, but, deserted by most of his following, he finally perished in Kurdestan in 1231.

It was Mangu Khán, a grandson of Chingiz, who, in A.D. 1253, sent Hulagu with a vast army to complete the conquest of the Islámic West. No sooner had Hulagu crossed the Oxus than he was met and welcomed by a number of princes and governors from all sides, including the Christian King of Georgia. One of Hulagu's first undertakings was the extermination of the Isma'ílí Assassins, whose almost impregnable mountain fortress of Alamut, founded by Hasán-i-Sabbáh, he captured and destroyed. His road through Persia was no doubt made easier by the fact

that the Khwárazm-Sháh had so recently subdued the country, which fell after a siege of forty days.

He now advanced on Baghdad, and on January 18, 1258, a date full of fateful memories for Islám, Hulagu Khán was able to pitch his tent within the residence of the Abbásids, and on February 10, the Caliph Musta'sim gave himself up to the Mongolian Khán. The next day orders were issued for the sack of the city and the massacre of its inhabitants. Thus ended the rule of the Abbásid Caliphs of Baghdad. Thirty-seven in number, they had nominally reigned for five hundred years.

The great difference between the Arab conquests and other world conquests is the fact that the dismemberment of their empire did not mean the collapse of their system. With the solitary exception of Spain and the islands of the Mediterranean, all the countries conquered in the name of the Caliph have remained ever since the home of Islám. The living results of the Islámic invasions are still to be seen in the Mosques of Fez, Constantinople, Kashghar, and Delhi, not to mention the lands like Malaya, China, and Central Africa, where the Faith has penetrated by peaceful propaganda.

Having thus completed one of the most terrible deeds recorded in the history of the world, Hulagu continued his Western march in the hope of subduing the remaining Muhammadan states. Crossing the Euphrates he carried havoc and slaughter into Mesopotamia and Syria. In Aleppo alone he put fifty thousand people to the sword. But even the Mongol resources in men were nearing an end, for at the same time they were fighting in China and invading Southern Europe, and Hulagu now at last met an enemy who was prepared to stand up against him in the person of the Mamlúk Sultan Baybars of Egypt. On the field of Ayn Jálût, near Nazareth (A.D. 1260), the Mongols met with their first defeat, and thus Egypt, Arabia, and Asia Minor were saved from sharing the fate of Baghdad.

In 1259 Mangu Khán was succeeded by his brother, the famous Kubilai Khán (of Xanadu fame), who shortly after conferred on Hulagu the title of Il-Khán, or Provincial Khán of Persia, a name by which the dynasty of Hulagu and his successors is known.

Hulagu, dying in 1265, was succeeded by his son Abáqá, who also suffered a defeat at the hands of Sultan Baybars in 1277.

The Mongols had hitherto shown themselves either indifferent or tolerant towards all religions. They themselves professed a kind of half-hearted Buddhism. They had, however, like the Seljuqs, been quick to appreciate the administrative genius of the Persians, and gathered round them men of science, poets, and historians: and the sixty years of Il-Khánid rule in Persia was rich in literary achievement. The wonder is that those cultivated Persians like Juwayní and Rashíd ud-Dín, the historians, could bring themselves to serve the men who had laid waste their country and destroyed so many libraries.

During the rule of the Il-Khánids Persia enjoyed something more nearly approaching peace and quiet than she had known for centuries.

The accession of Gházán (1295-1304), the Seventh Il-Khánid, who adopted Muhammadanism with strong Shi'ite proclivities, marks the definite triumph of Islám over Mongol heathenism, and the beginning of the reconstruction of Persian independence. His conversion was regarded with disfavour by many of the Mongols, and led to rebellions, which Gházán suppressed with a ruthless hand. He was constantly engaged in war with the Mamlúks of Egypt with varying success, but finally, in 1303, his forces were entirely defeated by the Egyptians, and one can picture the exultation of the inhabitants of Cairo when they beheld, being led through the city as prisoners, one thousand six hundred of these terrible Mongols each bearing, slung round his neck, the head of one of his dead comrades. Gházán

never recovered from the vexation and shame of this defeat, and died in the following year.

It is, indeed, curious to realise that less than fifty years after the merciless destruction of all that Islámic culture stood for by Hulagu, his great-grandson should, as a devout Muslim, devote so much time and money to precisely the contrary object, though Gházán could not, of course, bring back the dead to life!

Gházán was succeeded in 1305 by his brother Uljaytu, who had been baptized into the Christian Church as a child, but was afterwards converted to Islám by his wife. He corresponded with various European Courts, and some of the letters on both sides are extant, but he seems to have hidden from Pope Clement V., Philip le Bel, and Edward II. the fact that he had renounced Christianity.

The power of Il-Khánids may be said to have ended with the death of Abu Sa'íd, the son and successor of Uljaytu, in 1335. Between this date and the first invasion of Khurásán by Tamerlane in 1380, Middle Asia was ruled over by a number of petty chiefs and provincial governors, of whom the most powerful were the Jalayrs of Iráq. Space will not permit us to follow the varying fortunes of all these petty dynasties and tribes, such as the Muzaffarids of Fars and Kirman (1313-1393), the Sarbadárids of Khurásán (1337-1381), the Kurts of Herat (1245-1389), and the Turkomans of the Black Sheep and of the White Sheep in Azarbaijan.

Transoxiana from 1227 to 1358 had been ruled over by Chaghatay Khán, son of Chingiz Khán, and his descendants. Although this dynasty does not loom very large in the picture of Mongol domination, the name Chaghatay is perhaps more famous to-day than that of any other son of Chingiz Khán, as it has given its name not only to the dialect of Turkish, which is spoken and written in Turkestan, but also to the Great Mughals of Delhi as an alternative appellation.

This is a period of perpetual anarchy, and although

politically it is unedifying, it happens to have been very remarkable for the quantity and quality of the poets and writers which it produced. The famous Persian lyricist, Háfiz, for example, belonged to the court of the Muzaffarids.

CHAPTER VIII

TAMERLANE—THE SAFAVIDS

AFTER a respite of only one hundred and fifty years the Middle East was again destined to be overrun by a ruthless conqueror carrying hordes of strangers with him. In natural savagery there was not probably much to choose between Tughril, Hulagu, and Tamerlane, but the fact that the first and the third were Muslims certainly put some check on their behaviour in Muslim countries, if only in regard to sacred buildings and holy men.

Tamerlane (Tímúr-i-Lang, or The Lame Tímúr), who claimed relationship with the family of Chingiz Khán, was born in 1336. As a young man he was given the government of a district in Transoxiana, and eventually became vezir to two successive Chaghatay Kháns, whose authority he completely usurped, and in 1380, at the age of forty-four, he set out on his amazing career of conquest. Already by 1360 he had so greatly distinguished himself that he received the title of *Sáhib-Qirán*, or Lord of the Happy Conjunction, by which he is generally referred to in Persian histories.

For the next twenty years he spent his summers in raids into Persia or Afghanistan, carrying all before him, usually putting all his prisoners to the sword and making pyramids of their bodies or minarets of their heads, and returning to his beloved capital, Samarcand, for the winter. One after the other the princes

of Persia and the neighbouring countries were subdued, and they and their people treated with the utmost barbarity by this glorified highway robber, who, in the winter, would devote his attention to the beautifying of his capital and its environs by the labours of engineers and architects "gathered from every clime and country from East to West." To follow in detail these expeditions is not our business in this place, but it may be mentioned that the materials at the disposal of the historian are ample, and the fullest biography of Tamerlane, called the *Zafar Náma*, or "Book of Victory," has been accessible, if in a somewhat abridged form, both in French and in English since the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The two campaigns which concern us most here are his expedition into India (1398) and his so-called Seven Years' War with the Ottoman Sultan Báyzid, which actually only lasted five years (1399-1404).

Crossing the Indus in September, 1398, he marched on Delhi, taking a south-easterly route in order to join his grandson, who had captured Multan in the previous year. His biographer tells us that on his victorious progress through the Panjab he became so burdened with prisoners that on nearing Delhi he caused one hundred thousand of them to be put to death in cold blood. Gibbon, who for some reason or other tries to whitewash Tamerlane, totally ignores this act of sheer barbarity, and dismisses the horrors enacted a few days later in Delhi with the remark that "the order or licence of a general pillage or massacre polluted the festival of his victory."

It is strange to think that such a glorified marauding expedition, which had no other motive but loot and led to nothing but death and destruction, should have been carried out by the ancestor of those very men who were to raise Hindustan to a height of prosperity and power which surpassed that reached under any of her previous Muslim rulers.

In the meanwhile Tamerlane became embroiled

with the Mamlúk Sultan of Egypt, Násir, who had unlawfully detained Tamerlane's ambassador in Cairo, and this addition to his potential foes was probably a matter of congratulation for such an omnivorous campaigner as this. After subduing the principal towns of Syria, he turned his attention to Baghdad.

This unfortunate city after a short siege was again sacked, and turned into "a smoking charnel-house."

A heated correspondence was meanwhile passing between Sultan Báyazid and the conqueror, in which each accused the other of violating his territory: and the opening of hostilities was merely a question of time. It is interesting to note that Tamerlane refrained from attacking Báyazid in the first instance because the latter was still engaged in the blockade of Constantinople, and as a good Muslim he could not be justified in interfering with his Holy War against the Christians; a precisely similar reluctance was shown by Humáyun in regard to Sultan Bahádur (see below, p. 66). However, at the beginning of 1402 he could brook delay no longer, and in July of that year was fought the memorable battle of Angora, in which the Ottomans were utterly defeated and Báyazid was taken prisoner. The legend perpetuated by Marlowe of the Ottoman Sultan being confined in a cage and carried about with the conqueror wherever he went is most probably apocryphal. One cannot help wondering whether Marshal Ney had this legend in his mind when he undertook to bring back Napoleon in a cage in March, 1815.

Tamerlane in 1404 turned his eyes on China, where he hoped to spread the true faith and enrich himself and his army, but on reaching Otrar fell ill, and in February, 1404, died at the age of seventy-one.

His conquests at this time extended from the Ganges to the Bosphorus, and from the Persian Gulf to the Jaxartes, but Egypt and Arabia eluded his grasp as they had previously eluded that of the Seljuqs and the Mongols.

As soon as the Great Conqueror was dead, Ottomans, Jalayrs, and Turkomans began to recover their lost provinces in the west.

His son Sháh Rukh managed for a while (1404-1447) to maintain the power and dignity of the Empire, but after his death the dominions were split up into petty principalities, which made way for the Safavids in Persia and the Shaybanids in Transoxiana.

SHAYBANÍDS (1500-1599).—It was Muhammad Shaybaní, a Mongol by descent, who founded the Uzbek kingdom in Transoxiana, which was ruled by several successive dynasties. These Uzbeks were a constant source of annoyance and danger to the Safavid kings on their eastern frontiers.

SARAVIDS (1502-1736).—We cannot here follow the fluctuating successes of the various princes who ruled over Persia during the century following Tamerlane's death, but must pass immediately to the rise of the Great Safavid Dynasty, which revived the ancient glories of Persia and gave her an independent and national status which she had never really enjoyed since the overthrow of the Sásánian Chosroes in the seventh century.

There was a certain Shi'a family who had, during the fourteenth century, acquired a reputation for sanctity, and the most celebrated among them was a certain Shaykh, Safi ud-Dín of Ardabíl. From this saint was descended, in the fifth generation, Sháh Isma'il who, first entering on a career of conquest at the age of thirteen in 1499, three years later defeated the Turkomans and set himself up as king in Tabriz. Within the next few years he made himself master of Khurásán, including Herat. On the west his frontier marched with that of the Ottomans, and his Shi'a propaganda embittered the religious antagonism between the Shi'a Persians and the Sunni Turks, which continued down to the beginning of the seventeenth century. They were also engaged in continual wars against the Uzbeks on the north-eastern frontier.

Sháh Isma'il, in spite of a signal defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1514 (see below, p. 74), during a reign of twenty-two years managed to introduce a sort of national unity into Persia and to establish the Shi'ite belief, which had always been so dear to its native inhabitants. It is for this reason that he came to be regarded as both hero and saint.

Tahmasp, who succeeded his father in 1524, reigned for fifty-two years, and in spite of many losses to the Ottomans—including Baghdad and the holy places of the Shi'ites, Nejed, and Kerbela—he managed to maintain the honour of his kingdom. It was this king who received the Indian Emperor Humáyun during his exile from India (see p. 67).

The greatest of the Safavids, however, was Sháh 'Abbás I. (1587-1629), whose reign was celebrated for the revival of arts and literature, the development of public works, and an enlightened foreign policy, which brought him into relations with his three equally renowned contemporaries Queen Elizabeth, the Emperor Akbar, and Sulayman the Magnificent.

The chief ambition of his life was to recover from the Ottomans those provinces which had been lost to them by his predecessors, especially Azarbaiján and Georgia. In order to effect this he desired to ally himself with the Christian princes of Europe, who for their part were only too thankful to find someone who would share with them the task of suppressing the powerful Turk.

CHAPTER IX

THE DYNASTIES OF INDIA

AFTER the recall of Muhammad ibn Qásim (see above, p. 17) the Muslims retained some foothold on the west bank of the Indus. but they were in such small

numbers compared with the Hindus that they were gradually merged into the native population and entirely lost touch with the Caliph of Baghdad. In Mansúra they openly adopted Hinduism. Sultan Mahmúd had, therefore, the twofold object in his repeated invasions of India of winning back the former conquests of the Arabs and of extending the realms of Islám.

It should be remembered that the Muslim kingdoms of India never at any time stretched southwards beyond Golkonda on the east and Mysore on the west. The English were the first people to attempt the rule of the whole of the Indian Peninsula from Cape Cormorin to Peshawar; and, apart from this, there is no record in Indian history prior to the rule of the British Raj of any period of as much as ten years without internal warfare. Since 1858 very few shots have been fired in anger in the whole length and breadth of India.

THE GHÚRIDS.—The dynasty founded by Sultan Mahmúd (see p. 42) was in A.D. 1155 driven out of Ghazna by one of these Ghúrid kings who had risen to power in Eastern Afghanistan between Herat and Ghazna, and for a while the Ghaznavids settled in Lahore. The last king of this house was defeated and killed by the brother of the Ghúrid king, who conquered many important cities, including Kanauj and Delhi, between the years A.D. 1175 and 1194, whereby the Ghúrids became virtual masters of Hindustan. In A.D. 1202 this Ghúrid king died and was succeeded by his brother Muhammad who had carried out these conquests. In A.D. 1206, Muhammad the Ghúrid was murdered and his throne passed to his slave, Qutb ud-Dín Aï-bek (or Moon-Lord), who became the first of the so-called "Slave kings" of Delhi.

The real history of Islám in India begins with his accession to the throne, although already in 1195, while Muhammad the Ghúrid was conquering upper India, a certain Muhammad, ibn Bakhkúyar, entering Bihar, had conquered Bengal, where he established

himself as independent king with Gaur (Lakhnawt) as his capital. This conqueror and first Muslim Governor of Bengal belonged to the Afghan-Turkish tribe of Khalj, of which we shall hear again.

The Slave kings of Delhi ruled from 1206 to 1287. The most distinguished of them was Altamish (more correctly Il-tutmish or World-Grasper) who, during his reign of twenty-five years, conquered Sind, made Bengal subordinate to Delhi, and drove off the redoubtable Jalál ud-Dín, the son of Muhammad Khwárazm-Sháh, who aimed at establishing himself in Hindustan after being driven across the Hindu Kush by the Mongols. The authority of Il-tutmish extended over the whole of India north of the Vindhya Mountains; and he was the first Muslim ruler in India to be recognised as such by the Caliph of Baghdad. He died in A.D. 1235.

After a year of dispute regarding his successor among his sons and grandsons, the choice fell on his daughter Razía, who, as S. Lane-Poole says, "was the only woman who ever sat on the throne of Delhi until Queen Victoria figuratively took her seat there in 1858." After a short and disturbed reign she was taken prisoner and killed by the Hindus. We shall see below that Núr Jahán, the famous wife of the Mughal Emperor Jahánjir, was *de facto* ruler during most of her husband's reign (see p. 70).

In A.D. 1290 the Slave Dynasty was ousted by Jalál ad-Dín Fíruz who belonged to the tribe of Khaljis, from which this dynasty received its name. The most remarkable man of this house, which only ruled over Hindustan for thirty years, was the nephew of the founder, 'Alá ud-Dín (1295-1315), who distinguished himself not only as a general in the field, but also as an administrative and a religious reformer.

It is interesting to note that after the defeat and death of the Caliph of Baghdad in 1258 (see p. 52) the sovereigns of Delhi had continued to write the name of this Caliph on their coins down to the accession of

'Alā ud-Dīn, who was the first Muslim ruler in India to style himself Caliph on his coins. His conquests included the Dekkan and the strong Rajput fortress of Chitor. There was constant rivalry at Delhi among the representatives of the various Turkish and Afghan tribes, which persisted and was accountable for the various changes of dynasty down to the time of the Mughals.

The Khaljis were succeeded by another Turkish dynasty known as the Tughluqids, which was founded by a slave named Tughluq. The second ruler of this line, Muhammad ibn Tughluq, was one of the most remarkable men that ever ruled in Muslim India. Though full of original ideas he seems to have been totally lacking in reasoning power, and thus, with the best of intentions, he attempted drastic reforms which were from the first doomed to failure. He took the whole administration into his own hands, and though he was much given to discussion of spiritual and material problems he never listened to the counsels or warnings of the wise. He found, for example, that in spite of the immense wealth that had flowed into the coffers of Delhi from the rich provinces of Northern India, the finances of the state had been seriously depleted by vast military undertakings and the greed of the Turkish and Afghan nobility: he, therefore, one fine day issued an order that in future gold coins should be struck in copper, and that this new currency should be accepted at the gold standard by all his subjects on pain of death. This ridiculous innovation naturally led to endless troubles both with the army, who had to accept their salaries at the old rate, and with the cultivators, who had to sell their produce at the new rate and pay taxes at the old. The troubles thus caused at the capital, and the notion that the recently acquired Dekkan provinces could not be efficiently ruled from far-away Delhi, suggested to this thick-headed genius the absurd plan of removing the seat of the government to Deogir, one hundred and fifty

miles south of the Vindhya Mountains, and transplanting there by force all the inhabitants of Delhi, high and low. He hoped thereby not only to distract the minds of his dissatisfied subjects, but also to be able to replenish his treasury with loot from Southern India. Deogir now received the name of Daulatábád. The plan was, of course, a failure, and half these unfortunate people perished either on the way thither or on the return journey. Muhammad ibn Tughluq died in A.D. 1351, and although his house continued to reign in Delhi for a further period of sixty years, the kingdom gradually lost all its outlying provinces, notably Bengal and the Dekkan, where independent dynasties arose, while the Rajputs recovered most of the strong places that had been taken from them.

It seemed, however, that the glory of the Delhi Empire was to be revived under Firúz Sháh, the son and successor, who tried to heal the wounds made by his father, and devoted himself to building canals and bridges, and to restoring the buildings which had been neglected during the previous reign.

But the misfortunes of Delhi were not at an end, for in 1398 the redoubtable Tamerlane made his fateful raid on Northern India and turned that city into a shambles.

The Sayyids, who were Shi'as, superseded the Tughluqids in A.D. 1414 and reigned in Delhi for forty years, but did nothing to increase or revive their decadent kingdom.

The Sayyids were followed by the Afghan house of Lodi; and at last the Afghans had an opportunity of showing their worth, for all the other rulers with the exception of the Shi'a Sayyids had been Turks. Bahlul Lodi, his son Sikandar, and his grandson Ibráhím ruled from 1451 to 1526, when the arrival of the victorious Bábur from Kabul brought about an entire change in the affairs of Muslim India.

Before speaking of the advent of the Mughals, a brief reference should be made to the various king-

doms which had arisen in India before and during the disastrous reign of Muhammad ibn Tughluq.

Bengal holds a unique place in the annals of Muslim India, for from A.D. 1202 down to A.D. 1576 she always had her own rulers, either governors or kings, who, thanks to her remoteness from Delhi, were more often than not totally independent.

In A.D. 1347 a certain Hasan Gangu, presumably an Afghan with a Hindu name, taking advantage of the troubles in the Dekkan which Muhammad ibn Tughluq had brought upon himself, placed himself at the head of a party of insurgents and set himself on the throne at Kulbarga, and founded the dynasty of the Bahmanids, who for nearly two centuries held sway over the greater part of the Dekkan. At the end of the fifteenth century local governors with the Bahmanid kingdom began to throw off their allegiance, and thus out of one state there arose five independent dynasties in Berar, Ahmadnagar, Bidar, Bijapur, and Golkonda.

The most important of the kingdoms which were established south of Hindustan was that of Gujarat. This rich country, with its extensive sea border and its important harbours, though long coveted by the Muslims, was not actually conquered till the end of the thirteenth century. It remained subordinate to the Delhi Sultan until a certain Zafar Khán, the son of a Rajput convert, who had been appointed its Governor in A.D. 1396, assumed independence and founded a dynasty which ruled over that country down to A.D. 1572, when it was invaded by the Emperor Akbar and again became an appanage of Delhi.

During the ascendancy of this dynasty several remarkable men ruled over Gujarat, the most famous of whom were Ahmad (1411-1443), who founded the beautiful city of Ahmadábád, which he made his capital; (1458-1511) Mahmud Begarha, who distinguished himself by his successful campaigns against his Mussulman and Rajput neighbours, and his mari-

time exploits against the Portuguese who first sailed into the northern ports in 1507, when they were defeated in the port of Chiul, but gained a victory over the Indians two years later in Diu. It was reserved for Sultan Bahádúr (1526-1536) to give the Portuguese their first foothold in Gujarat, for, being hard pressed by the Emperor Humáyun, who had driven him back to the coast, he gave the Portuguese the right to build a factory in Diu in return for assistance in men and arms, which were, however, never forthcoming. When Humáyun suddenly again withdrew (see below, p. 66), Bahádúr regretted his promises to the Portuguese, and it was in the course of an interview which he held with the Portuguese Governor on a Portuguese ship, with a view to arriving at a settlement of their differences, that Bahádúr met his death in 1536.

From this time down to the arrival of the Emperor Akbar in 1572, Gujarat had no king worthy of the name: its history during these years offers a strange picture of rival nobles continually at war with one another, and during which the nominal king passed from the custody of one successful noble to that of another.

Such being the state of the country, it was small wonder that the Portuguese were able to establish themselves securely in the ports of Gujarat. Separate kingdoms were also established in Malwa (1401-1530) and in Khandesh (1399-1599), which held out against the Mughals longer than any other Dekkan state.

THE GREAT MUGHALS.—We now come to the greatest and the last of the Muslim dynasties in India—namely, that of the Great Mughal.

The adventurous career of the young Prince Bábur, who was seventh in descent from the great Tamerlane, is one of the most romantic in the pages of Eastern history, and thanks to his personal memoirs which have been preserved to us, his deeds and his thoughts are both alike known to posterity. These

memoirs, which were originally written in Bábur's native language, Turki, have been more than once translated into English, and are readily accessible to the curious.

Bábur, who had succeeded an uncle as ruler of Kabul, had long cherished the ambition of becoming King of Hindustan, and conducted many raids into the Panjab, which served the double purpose of encouraging his troops with loot and of giving him an opportunity of spying out the land. He also made himself master of Candahar and the surrounding country in order to leave open a road of retreat should this prove necessary.

The Lodi Sultan Ibráhím (see p. 63) in 1524 was faced with many dangers, especially from rival claimants to the Lodi throne. Bábur knew how to take full advantage of these family quarrels. Nevertheless, it required almost unexampled courage on his part to lead into this densely populated country an army of not more than thirty thousand men. The decisive battle was fought on the historic plain of Pániapat, ten miles north of Delhi, and on April 21, 1526, Ibráhím, with his hundred thousand men, suffered a crushing and final defeat. Three days later Bábur entered Delhi, and thus established the Mughal Empire of India, which at the time of his death in 1530 only extended from the Indus to the borders of Bengal.

He was succeeded by his son Humáyun who, though only nineteen years of age, had already distinguished himself as a soldier: he did not, however, inherit his father's gifts as an administrator and politician. During his reign of ten years he endeavoured, but without success, to complete his father's work. He came very near to conquering the rich province of Gujarat from Sultan Bahádur, but at the critical moment, alarmed by reports of trouble in Agra, withdrew. When he began his march into Gujarat, Bahádur was engaged in attacking the Hindu fort of Chitor, and as in the case of Tamerlane and

Báyazid (see p. 57), Humáyun was reluctant to interrupt a fellow Muslim in his Holy War against the infidel. The simile may be carried yet further, for it was the acrimonious correspondence between Humáyun and the King of Gujarat that hastened the opening of hostilities.

Meanwhile, the Afghans had found a new leader in Shír Khán, a man of genius who had usurped the throne of Bihar and made himself master of Bengal, and now aspired to recover all Hindustan for the Afghans and himself. Humáyun in vain tried to call him to order, and improvidently entered Bengal where, having spent six months of inaction, he found his retreat cut off and was allowed to retain Bengal. Finally, in 1540, the rebellious Afghan, marching on Agra, totally defeated the opposing forces under Humáyun at Qanauj on the Ganges. Taking the title of Shír Sháh, he quickly made himself master of all Hindustan, while Humáyun fled first to Sind and finally to Persia, where he was kindly and honourably received by the Safavid Sháh Tahmasp (see p. 59).

For fifteen years Shír Sháh and his family ruled over Hindustan—and Shír Sháh's six years' reign was marked by great administrative reforms and good government—only to become disunited by family quarrels as the Lodi Afghans before them. It was this disunion that rendered possible in 1555 the return of Humáyun to Delhi. But he only enjoyed his throne for six months, for at the beginning of the following year, while descending the steps of his observatory, suddenly hearing the Muezzin call to pray, he slipped, and falling, injured himself fatally. As Lane-Poole says: "He tumbled through life and he tumbled out of it."

AKBAR.—Of the Emperor Akbar, who succeeded his father Humáyun at the age of thirteen and retained the throne for nearly fifty years, it is impossible to speak here at suitable length. Of all the Muslim rulers mentioned in these pages he was in many

respects the greatest : others have governed wider kingdoms, and many had engaged in greater and more far-flung campaigns, but none had known how to hold and to keep and to leave a united empire to their successors. The whole of Akbar's attention was devoted to Hindustan and the neighbouring lands on the Indian side. World conquest never engaged his thoughts. When he came to the throne his kingdom did not extend beyond Delhi and the Panjab. The Afghans still held Bengal and the Ganges valley, and were not finally conquered till 1567. Gujarat, though conquered in 1572 (see p. 65), had to be retaken in 1584. Only a small portion of the Dekkan was annexed in Akbar's lifetime. As Lane-Poole says : "In spite of wise statesmanship, matured experience, and a clemency and toleration which grew with advancing years, to the day of his death Akbar seldom knew what it was to enjoy a year's freedom from war."

Nothing was more notable in Akbar's reign than his conciliation and assimilation of the Hindu chiefs. In 1562, as a result of his alliance with a Rajput princess, he abolished the *jizya*, or poll-tax, which had never before been remitted by any Muslim ruler. It may be imagined how popular this act made Akbar with the Hindus.

But the Emperor's tolerance towards men of other creeds than his own sprang from an intense sympathy and curiosity in regard to all religions, which culminated in his devising a new one, to which he gave the name of *Dín-i-Iláhi*, or The Divine Faith—a kind of eclectic pantheism containing elements taken from all the faiths of which he had any knowledge. His acquaintance with Christianity was derived from Portuguese Jesuits whom he invited to reside at his Court. Even after promulgating this new religion, the spirit of toleration did not desert him, and thus we find that the band of the so-called elect was quite a small one, and we hear of nothing in the shape of propaganda or forcible acceptance.

Among the elect was his great friend and counsellor Abul-Fazl, who in 1597 published his famous life of Akbar called the *Akbar Nama*.

Akbar's old age was clouded with many disappointments and sorrows. Two of his sons had become hopeless drunkards, and Prince Salím, who eventually succeeded him, displayed the most flagrant insubordination, and went so far as to cause the murder of the faithful Abul-Fazl in 1602. Akbar never recovered from the blow, and he died in 1605, the greatest Muslim king that ever ruled in India, and one of the most remarkable sovereigns that the world has ever seen.

It is fortunate that of such a man's deeds we have the fullest and most reliable records, thanks to the pen of Abul-Fazl: to his artistic taste and his love of beautiful buildings, the peerless architecture of Fathpur Sikri and many other noble structures bear ample silent witness.

Prince Salím on his accession took the title of Jahángír, "World-Grasper," being the Persian equivalent of the Turkish *Il-tutmish*, a title held by a king of the Slave Dynasty (see p. 61).

Like his brothers he was given to drink, and even had the effrontery to strike coins depicting himself holding a wine-cup. Though he did not carry on the *Dín-i-Iláhi*, but reverted to orthodox Islám, he practised the same policy as his father of toleration towards Hindus and Christians.

In 1597 the Dutch had begun to compete with the Portuguese for the trade with the Indies, and on December 31, 1600, was incorporated the first English East India Company; and shortly afterwards the trade of the Portuguese began to decline.

In 1615, Sir Thomas Roe was sent to India as the Ambassador of King James, and by tact and courage won important diplomatic successes and paved the way for the official recognition of the English factory in Surat.

Jahángír's reign, down to the outbreak of the civil war of succession in 1624, was singularly peaceful, thanks mainly to the wise counsels of his wife Núr Jahán, whom he adored. This remarkable woman, with the help of her astute brother Asaf Khán, to all intents and purposes ruled India during the greater part of her husband's reign, and her name appears on his coins side by side with his own, "a conjunction unparalleled in the history of Muhammadan money."

His son Khurram, who succeeded him in 1628 with the title of Sháh-Jahán (or King of the World) was a man of very different stamp to his weak wine-bibbing father. He was temperate in his habits, and though fond of public display was affable and gracious to all who came into contact with him. He owed his ultimate accession to the throne, after suffering utter defeat at the hands of his father in the civil war of 1624, mainly to the fact that he had married the daughter of Asaf Khán, who, after his sister Núr Jahán, was the most influential person in the kingdom. Though an orthodox Sunni, he was on the whole tolerant towards those professing other religions. He employed many Hindu generals, and welcomed the Jesuit missionaries to Agra. It must be remembered that his mother was a Rajput princess, as was also his grandmother, and thus he had more Indian than Turkish blood in his veins.

Only three years after his accession his adored wife died when giving birth to their fourteenth child. To her memory he built the famous mausoleum known as the Táj Mahal, which took eighteen years to complete.

The lady's real name was Arjumand Banu, and she came to be known as "Mumtáz-i-Mahal" ("the elect of the palace"). By some curious confusion the exquisite monument raised in her name at Agra came to be known by her name, and finally as "the Táj," as if one were to speak of the Albert Memorial as "the Albert."

Sháh Jahán's reign of thirty years was on the whole one of peace and prosperity; and the splendour of his Court, both at Agra and after the completion of Shah-jahanábád at Delhi in 1648, is spoken of in the most glowing terms by a number of European eyewitnesses.

Towards the end of his life, however, he began to grow self-indulgent and lazy, and his four sons who had been appointed to various viceroalties began to usurp the status of independent sovereigns.

In 1657, when Sháh Jáhan was believed to be dying, his four sons prepared to fight for the throne, and a civil war of succession began, which ultimately ended in the victory of Aurangzib.

Sháh Jahán, meanwhile, recovered from his illness, and thus Aurangzib found in his own father his only serious rival. By employing a ruse he now entered the fort of Agra and made his father a prisoner in the castle, which he never left again during the seven remaining years of his life. He was, however, provided with every comfort and luxury, and indulged alternately in satisfying his senile appetites and his religious proclivities. Aurangzib constantly sought his father's advice, but the two never met again.

To-day visitors are shown the tower where Sháh Jahán spent so many years accompanied by a devoted daughter, and whence he was wont to gaze on the wonderful view of the Táj from the river side.

An Indian historian (Kháfi Khán) says that for order and arrangement of his territory and finances, and the good administration of every department of the state, no prince ever reigned in India who could be compared to Sháh Jahán.

The whole annals of Islám can show no king more wholeheartedly devoted to the religion of the Arabian Prophet than Aurangzib, who was descended from a line of kings noted for their religious toleration, and whose grandmother and great-grandmother were Rajputs. He intrigued and struggled for the throne, as his father had done before him, with a total dis-

regard for his brothers; he was cunning and hypocritical, and had no scruples regarding means to an end; and yet his desire for the throne was not prompted by the usual lust for power and wealth, but was the outcome of a firm conviction that he had a great mission to perform as King of Hindustan in upholding Islám.

He led a life of the strictest austerity, and though he maintained the outward pomp of Court ceremonial, he indulged in none of the extravagancies and luxuries hitherto associated with the private life of the Mughal emperors.

During the first twenty years of his reign there was neither serious persecution nor religious disabilities, although he ordered the destruction of one or two Hindu temples. He did, however, reimpose the *jizia* which had been abolished by Akbar, which raised a storm of popular feeling against him, especially among the Rajput princes. There were risings which were put down by punitive expeditions. But now a new enemy appeared, in the shape of the Marathas, who dwelt between the Indian Ocean and the River Warda. Their strength lay in the inaccessible fastnesses of the Western Ghats. We never hear of them before the reign of Sháh Jahán, and it was the kings of Bijapur and Golkonda who first made use of them in their armies. The actual founder of their power was a man named Sivaji, whose father had been Governor of Poona. He became the inveterate enemy of Aurangzib, and it was the Maratha Wars, which continued after the death of Sivaji in 1680, which finally brought about the ruin of the aged Aurangzib and led to the collapse of the Mughal Empire.

Aurangzib died in 1707, at the age of eighty-nine, after a reign of fifty years.

I must now pass rapidly over the remaining period of Mughal rule in India. In 1738, Nádir Sháh, and in 1748, Ahmad Sháh Durrani, invaded Hindustan. In 1757, was fought the Battle of Plassey, as a result of

which Bengal came under the rule of the East India Company. Exactly one hundred years later the Indian Mutiny brought the nominal rule of the Mughals to an end in India.

Of the six great Mughals who ruled from 1526 to 1707, four were certainly men of remarkable personality and gifts, and even Humáyun and Jahángír, though less eminent than the others as rulers, possessed qualities which entitle them to our admiration.

CHAPTER X

THE ATÁBEGS—THE MAMLÚKS—THE OTTOMAN TURKS—AFGHANISTAN

DURING the twelfth century, when the power of the Seljuqs was beginning to weaken, it became the practice of their princes in Syria and Mesopotamia to appoint Atábegs, or Guardians, to train their youthful heirs, and to fight their battles for them. Of the many Atábegs who, taking advantage of their position, themselves assumed sovereign rights, only the Zangids of Mesopotamia and Syria need be mentioned here. Their founder, Zangí (1127-1146), especially distinguished himself as champion of the Muslims against the Crusaders, as did also his son Núr ud-Dín (1046-1073), who made himself King of Syria. It was in the service of this prince that the Great Saladin first won his spurs.

THE MAMLÚKS.—From 1260 to 1517 Egypt was ruled over by two separate dynasties of Mamlúks (or Slaves): the Bahrís (1260-1382) and the Burjís (1382-1517). The real founder of the Bahrî Mamlúks was Baybars, who, in 1260, two years after the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols (see p. 52), established himself on the throne in Cairo.

The last of the Mamlúks of Egypt, Qansuh Ghaurî,

was sixty years of age when he came to the throne in 1501. Like almost all his predecessors, he had been a slave. It was his reign that saw the Red Sea trade with India, so valuable to the Egyptian Exchequer, suddenly ruined by the discovery of the Cape route to the East. Hitherto the Indian spices sold in Europe had to be brought across Egypt, and high *ad valorem* duties were demanded, first in Jedda, then in Cairo, and, finally, in Alexandria. The carrying as far as Suez was done entirely by Muslim sailors. The direct trade with India, which at once followed on Vasco da Gama's first journey round the Cape in 1498, was disastrous both for the Egyptian Government and for the Arab merchantmen. Qansauh, noticing this, actually appealed to the Pope to put a stop to these Portuguese interlopers, threatening in case of refusal to destroy the sacred places of the Christians in Palestine and on Mount Sinai. The threat was idle, and the Pope, of course, did nothing, but Qansauh at length, in 1507, fitted out a fleet in Suez and sent it to the aid of the Muslims of Gujarat: but it was too late now to recover the lost Red Sea trade.

When Sultan Salím had disposed of Sháh Isma'il on the Persian frontier, he marched on Egypt, and Qansauh, though an old man of seventy-five, bravely set out to meet the enemy halfway. On August 24, 1516, the opposing forces met near Aleppo, and, owing partly to treachery and partly to the superior artillery of the Ottomans, Qansauh's troops were defeated, and he himself was slain on the field. His son Tuman, who had been left in charge of Cairo, was unable to offer resistance to the victorious forces, and, with the entry of Salím into Cairo in January, 1517, the Mamlúks of Egypt came to an end, after ruling over that country for nearly two hundred and fifty years.

THE OTTOMANS.—The Ottoman Turks (so called after their eponymous founder 'Othman, the Turkish adjective being 'Othmanlí) do not seem to have been Seljuqs, but probably belonged to another branch of

the Ghuzz, who were driven out of Khurásán by the pressure of the Mongols, and arrived in Asia Minor in the thirteenth century, where in return for military services the Seljuqs allowed them to pasture their flocks. 'Othman was born, according to tradition, in 1258, and exactly one hundred years later the 'Othmanlis crossed the Hellespont and established a garrison in Gallipoli. This was the first step in the conquest of the Byzantine Empire in Europe: by the end of the fourteenth century these Turks were in possession of the whole Balkan peninsula except Constantinople and its neighbourhood. That the capture of the capital of Rúm was postponed for a further fifty years was solely due to the arrival on the scenes of Tamerlane, for, as we have seen (p. 66), Sultan Bayázid was actually blockading Constantinople when he was called away to meet Tamerlane and defeat on the fateful field of Angora (1402).

Had the Arabs been inspired to effect a foothold on the peninsula before attacking the city itself, it is quite possible that the Byzantine Empire might have fallen prey to them in the days of the Caliph Sulayman. It was Muhammad I. (1402-1413) who recovered in Asia Minor all that the Ottomans had lost in the Tímúrid Convulsion. He also transferred the capital from Brusa on the Asiatic coast of the Marmora to Adrianople in Europe.

During the reign of his son Murad II. (1421-1451) a terrible foe made his appearance in the person of Hunyady, the Hungarian national hero who inflicted grievous losses on the Ottomans, especially at the battle of Hermannstadt in 1442.

The attacks of Europeans on Turkey in Europe were brought to an end by Murad's victory at Varna in 1444, against Frankish crusaders under Cardinal Julian.

It was Murad's son, Muhammad II., who, in 1453, at last brought Constantinople within the Muslim fold. But the greatest expansion was given to the

Ottoman Empire by Salím I., who took Kurdistan and Diyar-Bákr from the Safavid King Isma'il of Persia by the battle of Chaldaran in 1514, and captured Egypt, Syria, and Arabia by his defeat of the last Mamlúk in 1517.

There has long been a popular belief—due to the Swedish historian of the Mongols, d'Ohsson—that Sultan Salím, after the capture of Cairo, received from the hands of the last Abbásid "Caliph" the dignity of Caliph by a formal act of transfer. It has been clearly shown by Sir Thomas Arnold that although Salím eventually carried the Caliph with him to Constantinople, no steps to assume the Caliphate were taken either by him or by his successor Sulayman the Great, and that not till the nineteenth century did Ottoman Sultans begin to lay stress on their claims to be regarded as the inheritors of the Abbásids.

Sulayman I., the Magnificent, succeeded his father, the conqueror of Egypt, in 1520, and his reign of forty-six years forms the most glorious period of Ottoman history. As a soldier and as a ruler he yielded to no prince in Europe, even in an age which produced Charles V., Francis I., Elizabeth, and Leo X. None of these could boast a more resplendent Court or a more efficient army. By the Turks he is known as *Kánúni*, or the founder of the canon of domestic law.

In 1522 he turned the Knights of St. John out of Rhodes. The attack on Malta in 1565, however, was successfully resisted by the Knights. In 1521 he took Belgrade, then a Hungarian frontier port, and in 1526 he utterly defeated the Hungarians on the famous field of Mohacs, slaying their king, Louis II., and twenty thousand of his followers, as a result of which Hungary became a province of Turkey for one hundred and fifty years. In 1529 he laid siege to Vienna, which made such gallant defence that he abandoned the enterprise after eighteen days. To his other exploits by sea, reference has been made above (see p. 27).

From the death of Sulayman II. in 1566, the power and prestige of the Turks in Europe began to decline.

AFGHANISTAN.—From the foundation of the Slave Dynasty in India in 1206 down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, Afghanistan had no dynasty of its own—with the exception of the local dynasty of Kurts in Herat (1245-1389). It was a province of Persia, under the Il-Khánids and the Tímúrids. During the rule of the Delhi Mughals, Kabul and Candahar were generally included in their empire, while Herat belonged to Persia.

After the death of Aurangzib (1707), Kabul and Candahar again passed into the hands of Persia, and an organised revolt of the Afghans in 1713 laid the foundations of Afghan power, and Afghanistan as a distinct kingdom first came into being. In 1720 the Afghans, crossing the deserts of Seistan, attacked Kerman.

Two years later they marched against Isfahan, and on March 8, 1722, they gained a decisive victory over the Persians at Gulnabad, which decided the fate of the Safavi Dynasty as surely as did the battle of Qádisiya in 635 that of the Sásánians, or the battle outside Baghdad in 1258 that of the Abbásids. The actual domination of the Afghans over Persia endured less than ten years, although their invasion led to seventy-three years of anarchy (1722-1795), illuminated by the meteoric career of that Napoleon of Persia, Nádir Sháh, and ending in the establishment of the Qajar Dynasty.

At the end of 1722 Sháh Husayn, the Safavid king, abdicated, and his son Tahmasp Mirza, who now caused himself to be proclaimed king, was reduced to the miserable expedient of invoking the help of Russia and Turkey. In September, 1723, a treaty was signed whereby in return for the expulsion of the Afghans and the restoration of his authority, Tahmasp undertook to cede to Russia the South Caspian Provinces, including the town of Baku. In the following year

Russia and Turkey signed an agreement for the partition of Persia!

The Ottoman Turks meanwhile were pressing forward against the Afghans, and in 1725 captured Tabriz—but in 1727 the Afghans concluded a treaty of peace with Ottoman Sultan. It was at this juncture that there appeared upon the scene the last great conqueror in Islámic history, in the person of Nádír Sháh. We know little of this military genius prior to 1727, when he was about forty years of age. Having set himself the task of expelling the Afghans, he began by capturing Nishapur, and then, taking Tahmasp under his care, he proceeded to occupy other important towns, and in 1730 had finally dispersed the Afghan armies.

I cannot here follow the amazing career of this adventurer, who controlled the destinies of Persia for nearly twenty years, and not merely won back almost all that had been lost to Turkey and Russia by battle or by treaty, but in 1737, after taking Candahar, Kabul, and Peshawar, crossed the Indus and entered Delhi without striking a blow. His visit to Delhi bears a fatal resemblance to that of Tamerlane in 1398. For on account of a riot, in which some of his soldiers were killed, he ordered a general massacre of the inhabitants from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m., in which one hundred and ten thousand persons perished. Like Tamerlane, Nádír Sháh had only come for loot, and had no intention of holding India. Nádír's loot included the famous jewelled Peacock Throne, which was valued by a French traveller at six millions sterling. Nádír Sháh, during his reign of eleven years—he only assumed the royal title in 1736—had made himself thoroughly detested by the Persians, mainly on account of his attempt to impose on them the Sunni doctrine. He was, moreover, cruel, avaricious, and extortionate. The Persians, as a whole, were probably not aware of the fact that Nádír had saved their country from being split up between the Russians and the Turks!

From 1750 to 1794 most of Persia was ruled over by

an undistinguished dynasty known as the Zand. In 1779 Aga Muhammad the Qajar gained supreme control over all Persia, and founded a dynasty which lasted till after the Great European War.

On the assassination of Nádír Sháh in 1747, the Afghans selected as their head a certain Ahmad Khán Durrani, and ever since Afghanistan has remained an independent kingdom. The Durranis ruled till 1842, when their last king was routed by Dost Muhammad, who founded the reigning dynasty of Barakzais.

NOTE

IN the course of this brief survey of Islámic history, I have been compelled to omit even the names of many dynasties. The most notable of such omissions are :

1. The various lines established by the sons of Chingiz Khán and their descendants, of which I have only mentioned the Il-Khánids and the line of Chaghatay. These seemed to belong rather to the history of the Mongols than to the history of Islám.

2. The various dynasties which ruled over the Yaman either in Zabíd, Sana'a, or Aden.

3. The local dynasties in North Persia during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries.

4. The local dynasties in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, whose conversion to Islám under the influence of Arab and Persian traders, began towards the close of the thirteenth century.

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


THE ISLAMIC FAITH

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THE ISLAMIC FAITH

THE CREED OF ISLAM

THE faith of Islam is professed by about 239 millions of persons, distributed mainly throughout the continents of Asia and Africa, but found also in smaller groups in many other parts of the world. Their creed is expressed in the brief sentence: "There is no god save God; Muhammad is the Apostle of God." Around these two central dogmas of the Unity of God and the prophetic mission of Muhammad, the whole of Muslim theology has been built up, and whatever may have been the variations in the exposition of religious doctrine and the diversities of ecclesiastical organization, all the sects (and they have been many) agree in the acceptance of these fundamental articles of the faith and repeat the creed in the same words. It is whispered in the ear of the new-born babe; it is one of the first sentences the growing child is taught to utter; on all possible occasions, the pious Muslim loves to repeat it, and these should be the last words on the lips of the dying.

The two parts of which this creed are made up, nowhere occur together in the Qur'ân, but are taken from separate chapters—viz., xlvii., 21, and xlviii., 29. The implications of the first clause are that God is One and Unique in His essence; the qualities of the divine nature are, indeed, enumerated at great length in the Qur'ân, but throughout the whole of Muslim theological literature the heresy most dreaded is that of *Shirk*, or giving to God a partner, and the exposi-

tion of the Being of God is set forth in such a way as always to emphasize His absolute Unity. A large part of the dogmatic theology of the Muslim world is taken up with the problem of the relation between the essence of God's nature and His qualities, such as His power, knowledge, and goodness, etc., as will be shown later on.

The second article of this creed implies a doctrine of God's relation to His creation, according to which God, having first instructed Adam in divine truth and explained to him his duties, in succeeding ages, as the knowledge of this truth became obscured, and men lapsed into unbelief, sent a succession of prophets—Noah, Abraham, Moses, etc.—to proclaim anew the primitive revelation. This series of prophets comprises many of the familiar names of the Old Testament, and leads through St. John the Baptist and Jesus to Muhammad, "the seal of the prophets," after whom no further inspired teacher is held to be needed. According to this theory of God's revelation to men through prophets, Muhammad was not the founder of any new religion, and he constantly emphasized the fact that he was an apostle of no new doctrine (Qur'ān, xlvii., 8), and described his own teaching as being the religion of Abraham. It is, therefore, misleading to call the Muslim faith Muhammadanism, as though the adherents of it considered Muhammad to be the founder of it, and the name which the Muhammadan world gives to its own faith is Islam—that is, resignation to the will of God. Thus, by theory, there is nothing new in Muhammad's teaching, and in the Qur'ān he represents himself as bidden by God to say: "We believe in God and in what hath been sent down to us and what hath been sent down to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and in what was given to Moses and to Jesus and to the prophets from their Lord. We make no difference between them; and to Him we are resigned; and

whoso desireth any other religion than Islam, it shall by no means be accepted from him, and in the next world he will be among the lost " (Qur'ān, iii., 78, 79). But despite this self-depreciatory attitude, the person of Muhammad fills a large place in the religious consciousness of his followers, and his name is constantly on their lips. As no biography of him appears to have been written by any of his contemporaries, the details of his life became early wrapped around with miraculous narrations; and the earliest biography that has survived to us, compiled in the second century of the Muhammadan era, is already filled with narrations which historical criticism is unable to accept as authentic. All such details of his life as are in harmony with the text of the Qur'ān, which all authorities are agreed in accepting as the utterance of Muhammad himself, may be accepted as historically correct, but these details are few in number compared with those which his numerous biographers relate of him. Born in the city of Mecca some time in the second half of the sixth century, he came forward as a religious teacher among his fellow-townsmen; but they rejected his message and his warnings of the impending Day of Judgment and the wrath of God upon idolaters, and the number of his adherents appears to have grown very slowly, and he and they were exposed to much contumely and rough treatment. Historical research into this earlier period of the Prophet's career, the years spent in Mecca, has left little that can be accepted with any degree of certainty; but the historian reaches firmer ground when Muhammad determines to leave his native city and migrate to Medina, about eight days' journey from Mecca.

This event, from which the Muhammadan era commences, took place in the year 622, and for the following ten years, up to the death of the Prophet in June, 632, there are more reliable details of his career and activity. Soon after his arrival his followers came into

armed conflict with the people of Mecca. The first Muslim success was gained in the Battle of Badr (624), which is attributed in the Qur'an (iii., 119) to the direct intervention of God, Who sent His angels to succour the faithful. The devotion with which his followers had by this time come to regard the Prophet may be gauged from the fact that their defeat in the Battle of Uhud, in which Muhammad himself was wounded (625), did not shake their confidence in him; and the indecision of the army of the Meccans, as shown in their failure to consummate their success by assaulting the city of Medina both after the Battle of Uhud and two years later, when they brought a much larger force up to the confines of the city, enabled Muhammad to fortify his position and so to extend his influence in the neighbouring territories that in the year 629 he was able to enter his native city at the head of a large force of his followers, and Mecca, which had so long rejected his mission, submitted without striking a blow. The Ka'bah, which had been the sanctuary of an earlier cult, was purified of its idolatrous associations, and became the focus of the new religion.

But more important for a study of the faith of Islam than the actual events of the life of Muhammad is an appreciation of the attitude of his followers towards him and the place which he has filled in the minds of the Muslims in succeeding ages. Whether historical criticism is willing to accept their account of the Prophet's life or not, the biographies of Muhammad current in the Muslim world are supremely important for an understanding of the faith of Islam. Though the Prophet repeatedly repudiated any claim to miraculous powers, maintaining, "I am but a man as ye are," later generations produced innumerable recitals of his miracles. In these it is possible to recognize the influence of the Gospels, and particularly of the Apocryphal Gospels, and a desire that the

founder of the new religion should not in any way fall behind the founder of the rival faith. Accordingly, the birth and childhood of Muhammad are heralded by prophecies and accompanied by marvellous events. He performs miracles of healing and miraculously feeds his followers. Particularly detailed and marvellous are recitals of his ascension to heaven, where he interviews the prophets who had preceded him, and is finally admitted into the presence of God himself. Muhammad also becomes the pattern for the devout life and the exemplar of all virtues, and innumerable anecdotes of his speech and behaviour on all possible occasions were recorded, and the faithful in all generations have aimed at modelling their lives upon that of the founder of their faith. One great Muslim legislator is said to have always refused to eat a water-melon because he was unable to discover what had been the practice of the Prophet in regard to melons, and therefore decided to abstain altogether.

THE QUR'ĀN

THE sacred scriptures of the faith of Islam are known as the Qur'ān (the recitation)—*i.e.*, the divine revelation which Muhammad was bidden to publicly recite to his heathen fellow-townsmen in Mecca, and later to the growing body of his believing followers. In the form in which it has come down to us, it represents the recension of the text which was issued in the reign of 'Uthmān, about twenty years after Muhammad's death. There is a general agreement by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars that the text of this recension substantially corresponds to the actual utterances of Muhammad himself.

But the arrangement of the text, divided as it is into

armed conflict with the people of Mecca. The first Muslim success was gained in the Battle of Badr (624), which is attributed in the Qur'an (iii., 119) to the direct intervention of God, Who sent His angels to succour the faithful. The devotion with which his followers had by this time come to regard the Prophet may be gauged from the fact that their defeat in the Battle of Uhud, in which Muhammad himself was wounded (625), did not shake their confidence in him; and the indecision of the army of the Meccans, as shown in their failure to consummate their success by assaulting the city of Medina both after the Battle of Uhud and two years later, when they brought a much larger force up to the confines of the city, enabled Muhammad to fortify his position and so to extend his influence in the neighbouring territories that in the year 629 he was able to enter his native city at the head of a large force of his followers, and Mecca, which had so long rejected his mission, submitted without striking a blow. The Ka'bah, which had been the sanctuary of an earlier cult, was purified of its idolatrous associations, and became the focus of the new religion.

But more important for a study of the faith of Islam than the actual events of the life of Muhammad is an appreciation of the attitude of his followers towards him and the place which he has filled in the minds of the Muslims in succeeding ages. Whether historical criticism is willing to accept their account of the Prophet's life or not, the biographies of Muhammad current in the Muslim world are supremely important for an understanding of the faith of Islam. Though the Prophet repeatedly repudiated any claim to miraculous powers, maintaining, "I am but a man as ye are," later generations produced innumerable recitals of his miracles. In these it is possible to recognize the influence of the Gospels, and particularly of the Apocryphal Gospels, and a desire that the

founder of the new religion should not in any way fall behind the founder of the rival faith. Accordingly, the birth and childhood of Muhammad are heralded by prophecies and accompanied by marvellous events. He performs miracles of healing and miraculously feeds his followers. Particularly detailed and marvellous are recitals of his ascension to heaven, where he interviews the prophets who had preceded him, and is finally admitted into the presence of God himself. Muhammad also becomes the pattern for the devout life and the exemplar of all virtues, and innumerable anecdotes of his speech and behaviour on all possible occasions were recorded, and the faithful in all generations have aimed at modelling their lives upon that of the founder of their faith. One great Muslim legist is said to have always refused to eat a water-melon because he was unable to discover what had been the practice of the Prophet in regard to melons, and therefore decided to abstain altogether.

THE QUR'ĀN

THE sacred scriptures of the faith of Islam are known as the Qur'ān (the recitation)—*i.e.*, the divine revelation which Muhammad was bidden to publicly recite to his heathen fellow-townsmen in Mecca, and later to the growing body of his believing followers. In the form in which it has come down to us, it represents the recension of the text which was issued in the reign of 'Uthmān, about twenty years after Muhammad's death. There is a general agreement by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars that the text of this recension substantially corresponds to the actual utterances of Muhammad himself.

But the arrangement of the text, divided as it is into

chapters of unequal length, does not correspond to the chronological order in which the various parts were said to have been revealed. For the principle generally adopted appears to have been to place the longest chapters first, and let the rest follow in a diminishing scale with the shortest at the end. This principle is disregarded in the case of the first chapter, the Fâtiha (*i.e.*, the opening chapter). This is generally believed to have been one of the oldest portions of the Qur'ân, and to have been already commonly used as a prayer by the little group of believers in Mecca before Muhammad migrated from his native city to Medina. It has ever since formed an integral part of the daily devotions of the Muslim world, and is repeated on all kinds of solemn occasions—*e.g.*, at the shrines of the Saints, by the bedside of the sick and dying, and before undertaking any important enterprise. It runs thus:

“ Praise be to God, the Lord of the Worlds,
 The Compassionate, the Merciful.
 The King of the Day of Judgment.
 Thee do we worship, and to Thee do we cry for
 help.
 Guide us to the straight path,
 The path of those to whom Thou art gracious;
 Not of those with whom Thou art angered, nor
 of those who go astray.”

The Qur'ân, as revealed to the Prophet, is represented as being the counterpart of the original Scripture in heaven, and as being in agreement with the earlier revelations given to Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, all of which were derived from the same divine source; but the Jews and the Christians are declared to have corrupted the original text of the Scriptures in their possession.

Much ingenuity has been exercised, both on the part

of Muslim theologians and European scholars, in the attempt to ascertain the correct historical order of the chapters of the Qur'ân. The shortest ones, placed at the end of the volume, are certainly among the earliest, and a general agreement has been arrived at as to which of the chapters were revealed in Mecca and which in Medina; but the longer and later chapters present numerous difficulties, since it is not certain that some of them have not been made up of revelations given at quite different periods in the Prophet's career.

A large part of the earlier chapters is taken up with descriptions of the Day of Judgment, when the trumpet will blow, the dead will arise and will stand before the throne of God; and into the hands of each individual will be placed a book containing a record of his or her deeds. A few verses will suffice to illustrate the vivid character of these descriptions.

"On that day shall every soul find present whatever it has wrought of good; and as to what it hath wrought of evil, it will wish that wide were the space between itself and it" (iii., 28). "Each shall have his book put into his hand, and thou shalt see the wicked in alarm at that which is therein, and they shall say, 'Oh, woe to us, what meaneth this book, it leaveth neither small nor great unnoted down?'" (xviii., 47). "We will set up just balances for the day of the resurrection, and no soul will be defrauded in aught; and even though (a deed) be but the weight of a grain of mustard-seed, we will bring it" (xxxi., 48).

The rewards of the blessed in Paradise and the torments of the wicked in hell are described with a lavish use of picturesque imagery. The righteous, clad in green silk, will recline on couches, under the shade of flowering trees, with clusters of grapes hanging over them, in gardens through which flow streams of water, milk, wine, and honey; here they will enjoy the company of dark-eyed, ever-virgin Houris, while im-

mortal youths will go about among them, pouring out drink from vessels of silver and glass. The damned, on the other hand, will be tortured in the fire of hell, amid scorching winds and scalding water; bound in fetters they will have no respite from the torment, and will be fed with choking food and boiling water, and their mutual wranglings will add to the woe of their distressful state.

Such descriptions are frequently repeated, for the people of Mecca, to whom Muhammad delivered his message, expressed great scepticism as to the possibility of the resurrection of the body. He insists, therefore, again and again on the power of God to bring the dead to life, after their bodies have become mere dust and bones, even as He created life in the first instance out of nothing.

It is impossible here to give an account of all the varied contents of the Qur'an. They comprise theological dogmas as to the nature of God's existence, His attributes, His creative activity, His relation to mankind, especially in connection with His sending of prophets from time to time to reveal to men the truth as to the proper object of their worship and their duties towards God and one another; regulations as to the waging of war against unbelievers, the division of the spoil, and the disposal of captives; a certain number of legal enactments, such as those prescribing the punishments for criminal offences—*e.g.*, murder, theft, adultery, etc.; ordinances of civil law, dealing with marriage and divorce, and inheritance, which is dealt with in some detail. Insistence is laid upon right faith, repentance of sin, and the performance of good works, and special emphasis is laid on the fulfilment of the specific obligations of Islam, of which a separate account will be given below.

The ethical teaching of the Qur'an is closely bound up with its theology, and the principles of morals are enunciated as commands of God. In the following

passage right conduct receives the same emphasis as right belief :

"There is no piety in turning your faces towards the East or the West, but he is pious who believeth in God and the Last Day, and the angels, and the Scriptures, and for the love of God disburseth his wealth to his kindred and to the orphans and the needy, and the wayfarer, and those who ask, and for ransoming; who observeth prayer, and payeth the legal alms; who is of those who are faithful to their engagements when they have engaged them, and are patient under ills and hardships and in time of trouble. These are they who are just, and these are they who fear the Lord" (ii., 172).

Here the virtues of charity, patience, and the fulfilment of promises are given as important a place as loyalty to the true faith. Among the other ethical duties upon which emphasis is laid in the Qur'ān are kindness and gratitude towards parents, and one of the Traditions of the Prophet declares that Paradise lies at the feet of mothers; the care of the orphan; the reconciliation of contending groups of believers; the payment of debts; the forgiveness of offenders. Several rules are laid down for behaviour in society—e.g., no house should be entered without first asking permission and saluting the inmates (xxiv., 27); a greeting should receive a courteous response (iv., 88); in social intercourse rules of politeness should be observed (xvii., 55, and ii., 77); and modesty of demeanour is commended (xxiv., 30, and xxv., 64).

Certain injunctions in the Qur'ān have had a lasting influence upon the general character of Muhammadan society; such has been the prohibition of the drinking of wine, which is described as "an abomination of Satan's work" (v., 92). Though there have been flagrant breaches of this commandment in most periods of Muhammadan history, yet its widespread observance has given to Muslim society a general

stamp of sobriety and austerity, and there have been times when Muhammadan governments have taken stern measures in insisting that the prohibition was observed. The eating of pork was also forbidden (v., 4; xvi., 116); this command has been more rigidly observed than the other, and thus an obstacle has been put in the way of social intercourse with Christians and other non-Muslims, which has emphasized the separate character of the Muslim community.

The prohibition of usury (ii., 276) has also exercised a profound influence on the commercial life of Muhammadan countries, and has, on the whole, been very strictly observed, in spite of its obvious disadvantages; even among such fanatical Muslims as the people of Afghanistan, toleration has been extended to the infidel Hindus who practise usury in that country, for otherwise any resource to the moneylender would be impossible, since none of the faithful could follow such a calling.

The marriage law of the Qur'ān admits of the marrying of four wives, and, consequently, from the earliest days of Islam, polygamy has been a characteristic institution of Muhammadan society, though among certain converts, whose former social usages did not include it, the practice has always been rare—*e.g.*, the Islamized Hindus of Northern India and the Muhammadans of Albania. The prevalence of polygamy in Muhammadan society has tended to lower the status of women, in spite of the fact that the Qur'ān allows them to hold property of their own and to share in the inheritance of their husbands, and commands that wives shall be treated with love and tenderness and with strict impartiality. But the possibility of frequent divorce has militated against a high ideal of family life, though the Sacred Law limits the number of wives at any one time to four, for even a reformer such as 'Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn, in the eleventh century, who was horrified at the disregard of the

prescriptions of the Sacred Law in this respect on the part of the Berbers, whom he was endeavouring to lead into the strict path of the faith, used to marry four new wives every month, carefully, however, avoiding having more than four at one time. Similarly, Ibn Sa'ūd, the present king of the Hijaz and Najd, is said to have already married as many as one hundred.

A very common error in European writings on Islam maintains that Muhammadans believe that women have no souls. That this is entirely incorrect is shown by the verse in the Qur'ān, which promises the joys of heaven to women equally with men: "The men who resign themselves (to God) and the women who resign themselves, and the believing men and the believing women, and the devout men and the devout women, and the truthful men and the truthful women, and the patient men and the patient women, and the humble men and the humble women, and the men who give alms and the women who give alms, and the men who fast and the women who fast, and the chaste men and the chaste women, and the men who remember God oft and the women who remember Him, for them hath God prepared forgiveness and an abundant reward" (xxxiii., 35).

The religious duties imposed upon the faithful must be fulfilled by women as well as by men, and they even undertake the arduous and at many times very dangerous burden of the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Muslim Church women saints have filled an important place from the earliest period in the Muhammadan era to modern times, and there have been men saints who have sat at the feet of women saints and have humbly accepted them as their guides in the devout life. Similarly there have been separate convents for women who devote themselves entirely to the religious life, and most of the religious orders of Islam to which lay folk are affiliated enrol

women among their number. These women are initiated into the order by women instructors, and take part in its special religious exercises, such as frequent repetitions of the name of God, or some religious formula. Naturally, women take an active part in the devotions during the festival of Sayyidah Zaynab, the daughter of 'Ali, and granddaughter of the Prophet, whose tomb is one of the most revered shrines in the city of Cairo, and frequent the tombs of other women saints in other parts of the Muhammadan world.

ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

THE Qur'ān is far from being a systematic manual of theology; even the two phrases of the creed occur in separate chapters, and not in any single continuous sentence. The task of drawing up the articles of faith and of arranging the doctrines of Islam, scattered throughout the pages of the Qur'ān, according to some logical method, was left to succeeding generations. The first impulse to such theological activity was probably given by contact with Christian controversialists, who, by their attacks upon the teachers of the new faith, forced upon Muslim thinkers the need of an exposition of their own faith in an orderly and logical presentation.

In the course of the performance of this task, it was found that the text of the Qur'ān did not provide all the material necessary for a complete statement of certain fundamental dogmas of the faith, or of the duties of religion; for example, in the Qur'ān there is no clear mention of the five times of daily worship, though these appear to have been of primitive institu-

tion; in many other details, both of faith and practice, reference to the revealed Word of God failed to discover a solution to the difficulty. Hence, in the formative period of the development of systematic Muslim theology, during the first two or three centuries of the Muhammadan era, resource was had to the Traditions of Muhammad, which claimed to report his utterances and actions on various occasions. Of these Traditions various compilations were made, and the authority assigned to them caused them to assume an importance in the theological thought of the Muslim world equal to that of the text of the Qur'an itself. The authenticity of these Traditions has been much disputed, even in the Muhammadan world itself, and Muslim historical criticism began with the elaboration of principles for testing the genuineness of the utterances that claimed to come from the mouth of the Prophet. Rival theologians, as early as the second century, often criticized the Traditions when brought forward as evidence by the defenders of doctrines which they themselves condemned, and the unreliable character of many of these Traditions becomes obvious when they uphold the claims of rival political parties which did not come into existence until after the death of Muhammad. Others are manifestly borrowed from the Gospel narrative, with the object of assimilating the character of Muhammad to that of Jesus. Indeed, modern European critics tend to reject this whole accumulated mass of thousands of Traditions as having no historical value whatsoever, but the fact that they are accepted as genuine by the theologians of Islam gives them an importance in the formation of Islamic doctrine and observance which cannot be exaggerated.

On the basis, therefore, of the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet, the theologians of Islam erected the fabric of the dogmas of their creed, and they are practically all agreed in including among the

articles of the faith which every true Muslim must accept, the following: (1) Belief in God; (2) in His angels; (3) in His revealed books; (4) in His apostles; (5) in the Resurrection and the Day of Judgment; and (6) in His predestination of good and evil. To each of these articles of belief some separate consideration may be devoted.

1. One of the first problems with which the early theologians were faced was that of determining the relation between the essence of God's nature and His attributes. Throughout the Qur'ān reference is constantly made to God as merciful, eternal, wise, self-sufficing, loving, etc., and in order to preserve the absolute Unity of the divine nature, which is a cardinal principle of Muslim teaching, it was necessary to make clear the exact relation of these qualities to the divine essence, so as to avoid any hypostatizing of these attributes such as would cause them to be in any degree approximated to the Persons of the Christian Trinity. One of the earliest solutions offered for this problem was that given by the Mu'tazilah school of thinkers, who held that the attributes of God are not *in* His essence, but *are* His essence—that is, God is Omnipotent, not through power as one of His attributes, but His power is His essence and likewise His omniscience is His essence, etc. The aim of these thinkers was to maintain the absolute Unity of God, and accordingly they held that there is no distinction between knowledge, power, and life in God. They are all one, and they *are* His essence.

This explanation was rejected by later theologians, who fixed what was destined to be the orthodox doctrine for succeeding generations, by declaring that the eternal qualities of God exist *in* His essence; they are not He, nor are they any other than He; they are not to be explained by reference to anything upon earth or in the nature of man, for there is nothing whatsoever which resembles God. By such an exposi-

tion they attempted to remove the difficulties raised by the anthropomorphic language of the Qur'an, when God is described as seating Himself upon His throne, and as speaking with a voice, commanding and prohibiting, etc.

Other problems which called for discussion were those connected with the nature of the vision of God, promised to the faithful in Paradise; but it is impossible here to enter into so vast a subject, which has given birth to an enormous mass of theological literature in all the learned languages of the Muhammadan world.

However, before leaving the consideration of this primal article of the faith of Islam, reference must be made to the abiding place that the thought of God occupies in the mind of the devout Muslim. The mere mention of any proposed activity or even of the recurring phenomena of Nature is accompanied with the phrase, "If God will"; and pious phrases such as, "God is great," are frequently upon the lips of the devout, and are used to fill up pauses in ordinary conversation. For the same reason the use of the rosary is common from one end of the Muhammadan world to the other; it is made up of a hundred beads, and while these are passed through the fingers, the ninety-nine attributes of God are recited, ending with the name of Allāh.

2. The second article of the faith concerns the angels of God, who receive frequent mention in the Qur'an; they bear up the throne of God, they are guardians of the fire of hell, they come to the assistance of the believer on occasions of danger and perplexity, even as they succoured Muhammad and his companions at the Battle of Badr (Qur., iii., 120). The promise of their assistance is given to the faithful in the following verses: "As to those who say 'Our Lord is God,' and who walk uprightly, the angels shall descend to them saying, 'Fear ye not,

neither be ye grieved, but rejoice in the Paradise which ye have been promised; we are your guardians in this life and in the next; yours therein shall be your soul's desire, and yours therein whatsoever ye shall ask for, the hospitality of a Gracious and Merciful One" (Qur., xli., 30-32).

The angels are also sent to receive the soul of the believer at the hour of death (Qur., vi., 61). Popular belief also holds that two angels visit the dead, after the corpse has been laid in the grave, to interrogate him as to his faith; if his answers are satisfactory, he is left to sleep peacefully until the Day of Resurrection; if he has to acknowledge that he is an unbeliever, he is tortured there continuously until the Last Day.

Some theologians explain that the salutations "The peace and mercy of God be upon you," with which the divine service ends, as the worshipper turns his face first to the right and then to the left, are addressed to the guardian angels who watch over every believer and note down all his actions. Certain of the angels hold a higher rank than others, such as Gabriel, who announced to the Virgin Mary the birth of Jesus, and brought the revelations of God to Muhammad; Isrāfil, the angel who will sound the trumpet on the Last Day, and 'Azrā'il, the Angel of Death.

3. The Scriptures of God are those that have been revealed to various prophets from Adam onwards, including the Torah given to Moses, the Psalms of David, and the Gospel of Jesus; but according to Muslim doctrine the text of all these earlier Scriptures has been corrupted by the followers of the prophets to whom they were given, and they have all been superseded by the final revelation of the Qur'ān.

4. By the Apostles of God are meant the prophets of God, unto whom He has granted His revelation. The series begins with Adam, and as men fell into error and sin and the knowledge of divine truth

became obscured or forgotten, successive messengers were sent by God to lead men again into the right way. Of these prophets, twenty-eight are mentioned by name in the Qur'ān, and they include several of the famous personages of the Old Testament, and Zacharias, John the Baptist, and Jesus in the New. Added to these are certain obscure teachers—e.g., Dhu'l-kifl, "he with the double portion," whom some have identified with Job; Luqmān, commonly supposed to be Æsop; and Dhu'l-Qarnayn, "he with the two horns," whom the majority of Muslim commentators explained to be Alexander. Of the two first of these no biographical details are given, but the exploits of Dhu'l-Qarnayn, as recorded in the Qur'ān (chap. xviii.), correspond to some of those found in the Alexander romance, which was current in a Syriac version before the birth of Muhammad.

Three prophets are mentioned as having been sent to the Arabs: Hūd, Sālih, and Shu'ayb; but besides these, it is stated that an apostle had been sent to every nation (Qur., x., 48), and accordingly one Tradition gives the total number of the prophets of God as having been 124,000.

5. The doctrine of God's predestination of good and evil is distinctly set forth in the Qur'ān, but the exact definition of it was the subject of discussion by Muslim theologians for many centuries. Though the Mu'tazilah school, already mentioned, claimed for men freedom of choice between good and evil and freedom of action after having made that choice, the prevailing doctrine as formulated by the theologians of the tenth and following centuries left to men no personal freedom whatsoever. In the creed of al-Ash'ari (ob. A.D. 935), who did more than any other thinker of his time to fix the articles of Muslim belief for succeeding generations, the doctrine of predestination is stated as follows:

"We believe that there is nothing on earth either

good or evil that happens except by the will of God; everything comes about by His will; no one can perform any action except as God does it. . . . There is no Creator except God, and all human actions are created by Him and are predestined by Him, according to His words: 'God has created you and your actions' (xxxvii., 94). . . . God guides the true believers, but leads astray unbelievers. . . . God has power to save the unbelievers. . . . But He wills that they remain infidels in accordance with His foreknowledge; . . . consequently good and evil depend upon His decree." This uncompromising statement was somewhat modified by a later theologian in order to make it clear that though God predestined evil, He did not order it. "Faith in predestination is believing in the heart and confessing with the tongue that God has predestined all things and the circumstances of things, so that everything that happens in the world—good and evil, obedience and disobedience, faith and unbelief, health and disease, riches and poverty, life and death—exist by the predestination of God, by His creation, by His will, and by His decision. Good and obedience and faith exist by the predestination of God, by His creation, His will, His decision, His guidance, His good pleasure, His command; but evil and disobedience and unbelief exist by His predestination, His creation, His will, and His decision, but not by His guidance, His good pleasure, and His command; but, on the contrary, by His leading astray, by His wrath, and His forbidding."

This doctrine is based upon the clear statement in the Qur'ān of the all-embracing power and knowledge of God as follows: "Unto God belongeth all sovereignty of the heavens and of the earth, and over all things doth His decree extend" (v., 1, 20). "Say: Nought can befall us save what God has written for us" (ix., 51). Similarly, the almighty power of God extends over the volitions of men. "They wish for

nothing except what God wishes" (lxxvi., 30). Consequently righteousness and wickedness, faith and unbelief, are in accordance with God's decree. "God leadeth astray whom He will and whom He will He guideth" (xiv., 4). "If thy Lord had pleased, all men on the earth would have believed together . . . no soul can believe but by the permission of God" (x., 99-100). "We will set hell on that day close before the unbelievers, whose eyes were veiled from my warning, and who had no power to hear" (xviii., 100-101).

But, at the same time, there are many verses in the Qur'ân which imply the moral responsibility of men, whom God has reasoned with and has invited to the good and warned of the consequences of evil, just as if their choice of right or wrong depended on themselves alone—e.g., "Whatever good happens to thee is from God, and whatever evil happens to thee is from thyself" (iv., 81). "God hath promised to those who believe and do the things that are right, that for them is pardon and a great reward" (v., 12). Of the unbelievers who were punished in former days, it is said, "God was not unjust" (xvi., 35). "A man has a succession of angels, before him and behind, who guard him by God's command. . . . God does not change the condition of a people until they change their own condition; and when God willeth evil to a people, there is none can turn it away" (xiii., 12). "Those who believe and do what is right and pray and give alms, they shall have their reward with their Lord" (ii., 277).

We thus find in the Qur'ân, as in the Bible, opposite truths enunciated with equal distinctness and seeming unconcern about their reconciliation. Consequently, while Islam has been throughout its history an ethical religion, and stress has been persistently laid upon due performance of moral duties, there has been in the Muslim consciousness an abiding realization of the unceasing manifestation of God's creative activity in each

and every one of the actions of His servants, and the thought that every righteous deed is an embodiment of the will and command of God Himself has lent to the life of the believer a dignity and a sense of self-respect, which has found corresponding expression in outward behaviour and bearing. Likewise, in times of trial and suffering, this creed has produced that uncomplaining and dignified attitude of resignation which has often been noted as one of the most characteristic features of Muslim life. Human misery and suffering have become more endurable when they are recognized to come from the hands of the Merciful and Compassionate. The doctrine of Predestination, therefore, in Islam, is not a doctrine of fatalism, as though the affairs of the world were the result of a fortuitous concomitation of atoms, but a recognition of the all-embracing activity of the wise and loving Creator. Accordingly, the devout Muslim is taught to cultivate an attitude of confidence in the divine governance of the world and a ready acceptance of whatever fate is apportioned to him. He must accept with patience and resignation the course of human events, as being the results of the operation of divine wisdom, even though the workings of it may be to him obscure. This lesson is constantly re-iterated in the works of later theologians, particularly in the writings of the mystics, and is set forth in the Qur'ān in the well-known story of Moses, when he asked permission of one of the servants of God (whose name is not mentioned in the sacred text) to accompany him on his travels. Common opinion has identified this unknown personage with the mysterious being Khidr, who is revered throughout the whole Muhammadan world as a deliverer in all occasions of peril. In the Qur'ān he is only described as one to whom God vouchsafed mercy, and to whom He had communicated His knowledge. He is represented as being at first unwilling to allow Moses to travel with him on the ground that

Moses would be guilty of impatience with him, as he could not be expected to show patience in matters that he did not fully understand. However, they set out together and embarked upon a ship, in which the servant of God proceeded to stave a hole. Moses protested, saying: "Hast thou staved it in so as to drown the crew? a strange thing, indeed, it is that thou hast done!" The other answered: "Did I not tell thee that thou wouldst not be able to have patience with me?" They went on farther until they came upon a boy, whom the mysterious stranger put to death; Moses exclaimed in horror: "Hast thou slain one who is free from the guilt of blood? Surely thou hast done an evil thing!" Again comes the protest: "Did I not tell thee that thou couldst not have patience with me?" Moses begs to be excused, and agrees that if he again asks such questions, he shall no longer be allowed to remain in his company. They come next to a city, the inhabitants of which refuse their request for food and will not receive them as guests. The travellers find a wall, which is on the point of falling, and the companion of Moses proceeds to put it into a state of good repair; whereupon Moses again criticizes his action, saying: "If you had wished you might surely have received a reward for this." The servant of God can bear this interference no longer, but exclaims: "Now it is time for thee and me to part; but I will first tell thee the meaning of those matters in regard to which thou couldst not have patience with me. The ship belonged to some poor men who toiled upon the sea, and I wished to damage it, because coming after them was a king who took every sound ship by force. As to the boy, his parents were true believers, and we feared lest he should cause them distress through his perversity and unbelief when he grew up, wherefore we desired that God should give them in his place a more virtuous and affectionate child. As to the wall, beneath it was hidden a treasure

belonging to two orphans, the children of a righteous man, and I built it up so that the treasure should remain concealed until the orphans were fully grown, and not of my own will did I do this, but by God's direction. Such is the interpretation of that which thou couldst not endure with patience" (xviii., 64-82).

A further ground for confidence and resignation is presented by the widespread belief—not, indeed, authorized by orthodox theologians—that the profession of Islam by itself is sufficient to obtain for the believer ultimate admission into Paradise, however long he may have to endure the torments of hell, in punishment of his offences. Support for such a hope is given by such verses as xix., 96, which declares that on the Day of Judgment, "God will vouchsafe love to those who believe and work righteousness." Another common belief is that Muhammad's intercession will obtain for all his followers entrance into heaven.

GOOD WORKS

FAITH includes works, and in addition to the fundamental articles of belief, there are certain practices, the performance of which is incumbent on the believer. These are five in number:

1. Bearing witness that there is but one God.
2. The performance of divine worship* at the five appointed canonical times.

* The Arabic word (*salat*, lit., "bowing") is incorrectly translated "prayer," for which another Arabic word is commonly used, since this service contains but a modicum of prayer or petition.

3. The payment of the legal alms.
4. The keeping of the fast in the month of Ramadân.
5. The making of the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime.

1. The creed is whispered into the ear of the new-born babe, and the repetition of it marks the admittance into the body of the faithful of the convert who, in adult life, enters the fold of Islam from any other religious body. The theologians demand that not only should there be audible repetition by the lips, but that the believer should fully understand the meaning, recite it correctly, and believe it completely in his heart. It should be also the last utterance on the lips of the dying.

2. Five times a day should worship be paid to God.

- (1) In the early dawn before the sun has risen above the horizon.
- (2) In the early afternoon when the sun has begun to decline.
- (3) Later, when the sun is about midway in its course towards setting.
- (4) Immediately after sunset.
- (5) In the evening between the disappearance of the red glow in the west and bedtime.

The ritual observances laid down in connection with these services are minute and detailed. They must be preceded by an ablution, which includes the washing of the hands in water, the cleansing of the mouth and the nose, the washing of the face, and of the right and then the left arm up to the elbow; the head is wiped over with the wet hands and the feet are washed up to the ankles, first the right foot and then the left. If socks or boots are worn, and such an ablution had

been performed before they were put on, then it is not necessary to remove them, but the wet hands are merely passed over them. Under certain conditions the ritual ablution must include the washing of the whole body. It is held to be more meritorious to perform these acts of worship in a mosque in company with a congregation; but it is equally permissible in a house or at any other place where the worshipper may happen to be, provided that the place itself is not unclean, such as a slaughter-house, etc. The worshipper begins by standing with his face turned towards Mecca, and after declaring his intention of offering his worship to God, he raises his two hands up to his ears and repeats the words: "God is great." The ritual positions that must be assumed are as follows: First, the worshipper stands erect, placing his hands one above the other in front of the body, or otherwise according to the particular sect to which the worshipper belongs; then he bends his head till the palms of the hands rest upon the knees; standing erect again, he lets his hands hang down on either side; then dropping on his knees he touches the ground, first with his nose, then with his forehead; lastly, raising his head and body, he sinks backwards upon his heels and again repeats, "God is great," followed by a second prostration. This series of devotional exercises, with the repetition of appropriate versicles and passages from the Qur'ān makes up what is called one bowing; and for each separate period in the day, a certain number (from two to four) of these bowings is prescribed. The whole ends with the ascription of glory to God and a prayer for the blessing of God on the Prophet and on the faithful, the recitation of the creed, and, finally, the turning of the head, first to the right and then to the left, with the words: "The peace and mercy of God be upon you." For specially devout persons there are similar services prescribed to be performed during the night, and there are special

directions for services on a journey or at the burial of the dead.

This ordered service of divine worship is one of the most characteristic features of the religious life of Muslim society, and its impressive character has frequently been noted by travellers and others in the East. The late Bishop Lefroy thus commented upon it: "No one who comes in contact for the first time with Mohammadans can fail to be struck by this aspect of their faith. . . . Wherever one may be, in open street, in railway station, in the field, it is the most ordinary thing to see a man, without the slightest touch of phariseicism or parade, quietly and humbly leave whatever pursuit he may be at the moment engaged in, in order to say his prayers at the appointed hour. On a larger scale, no one who has ever seen the court of the great mosque at Delhi on the last Friday in the Fast Month (Ramazān) filled to overflowing with, perhaps, fifteen thousand worshippers all wholly absorbed in prayer and manifesting the profoundest reverence and humility in every gesture, can fail to be deeply impressed by the sight or to get a glimpse of the power which underlies such a system; while the very regularity of the daily call to prayer, as it rings out at earliest dawn before light commences or amid all the noise and bustle of business hours or again as evening closes in, is fraught with the same majesty." Again, Renan said that he never entered a mosque without a lively emotion, or even without a certain regret at not being a Muslim. Such a sight has, indeed, been one of the contributing motives to conversion, as an Alexandrian Jew who embraced Islam in the year 1298 wrote of his own experience. During a severe illness he had had a vision in which a voice bade him declare himself a Muslim: "And when I entered the mosque," he goes on, "and saw the Muslims standing in rows like angels, I heard a voice speaking within me, 'This is the community whose

coming was announced by the prophets (on whom be blessings and peace),’ and when the preacher came forth clad in his black robe, a deep feeling of awe fell upon me . . . and when he closed his sermon with the words, ‘Verily God enjoineth justice and kindness and the giving of gifts to kinsfolk, and He forbiddeth wickedness and wrong and oppression; He warneth you; haply ye will be mindful.’ And when the prayer began, I was mightily uplifted, for the rows of the Muslims appeared to me like rows of angels, to whose prostrations and genuflections God Almighty was revealing himself, and I heard a voice within me saying, ‘If God spake twice unto the people of Israel throughout the ages, verily He speaketh to this community in every time of prayer,’ and I was convinced in my mind that I was created to be a Muslim.”*

The public services in the mosque are characterized by an austerity and solemnity which do not ordinarily admit of any external exhibition of religious emotion, and to the observer they appear to lack that unction and emotive quality which are characteristic features of the devotional practices of other faiths. But there are certain occasions on which this apparent coldness takes on a character of public rejoicing. This is notably the case in the two great festivals of the Muhammadan year: (1) The Feast of Sacrifice, which commemorates Abraham’s intended sacrifice of his son; and (2) the festival of the breaking of the fast at the end of the month Ramadān. Both these festivals are observed as times of rejoicing in all parts of the Muhammadan world. Prayers are generally celebrated outside the city in spacious enclosures, specially set aside for these occasions, in order that the whole Muslim population may be able to join together in one public act of worship, and at the close of the service the members of the congregation salute and

* *Revue des études juives*, xxx. (1895), pp. 17-18.

embrace one another and spend the rest of the day in feasting and merriment. On these two great occasions, most persons dress themselves out in new clothes, and friends visit one another's houses, and the streets of a Muhammadan city present a gay appearance, and various forms of amusement are provided for the crowd.

But such scenes of rejoicing are rather the social accompaniments of the festival than actual characteristics of the religious service itself. Examples of more emotional forms of religious worship are found in the devotional exercises known as *Dhikr*, and on the occasion of the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, known as *Mawlid*. The latter festival is celebrated with great fervour and enthusiasm, especially in Africa, India, and Turkey, and many hymns have been written for the occasion. One of the most famous of these is the poem written in praise of Muhammad by Sulaymān Chelebi, one of the earliest of Ottoman poets, who died about the middle of the fifteenth century; it has been sung on such festivals in Turkey for centuries, and the recitation of it moves the audience to tears. A portion of it is quoted here, as indicating the rapturous devotion that Muslims often express towards the founder of their faith:

“ Hail to thee! O Sun of fulgent splendour! Hail!
 Hail to thee! O Soul of Souls most tender! Hail!
 All the world is drunken for thy love indeed!
 Hail to thee! O Loved One of the Lord of Power!
 Hail to thee! O Mercy to the Worlds—to all!
 Hail to thee! O Pleader for the folk who fall!
 Hail to thee! to God most near and dear art thou!
 Hail to thee! O thou of Either World the King!
 Yea, for thee this universe to life did spring!
 Even as thy Light hath all the world illumed,
 Through thy rose-face hath the world a garden
 bloomed!

Lo, thou art the Sovereign of the Prophet-host!
Light of eye to all the saints and all the just!"*

Religious fervour is also excited in connection with the form of devotion known as a *Dhikr* (lit., "mention" of the name of God). Such special forms of religious exercise are common throughout the whole Muhammadan world, and are generally held in connection with one of the religious orders, to one or other of which most devout Muslims are affiliated. The prevailing feature of these religious gatherings is the repetition, many hundreds of times, of the name of God, or the creed, or some other pious utterance; and in the ecstatic condition induced by such a devotional exercise, the worshipper is believed to attain communion with the divine. There is a considerable variety in the ritual of such services according to the particular religious order which organizes them. They generally take place, not in a mosque, but in a room connected with the convent of the order, in the presence of a Shaykh or spiritual director occupying a position of authority in the order, and the worshippers follow his guidance in their proceedings.

He opens the service with a few simple prayers, and then begins to repeat the particular religious formula which is in favour with his order, the worshippers either sitting on the ground or swaying backwards and forwards; as the rate at which they repeat the formula grows faster and faster, so their movements become more rapid, until a state of religious excitement is produced.

In the case of the Mevlevis, an order founded by the great mystic and poet, Jalāl ud-Dīn Rūmī, the members of the order accompany their devotions with a solemn dance to the sound of flutes and drums. The

* E. J. W. Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry*, vol. i., pp. 246-247.

ritual they observe is as follows: After the dervishes have collected in a hall, the Shaykh enters and seats himself in front of the prayer niche, and opens the proceedings with the recitation of the opening chapter of the Qur'ân and a few special prayers. Then rising, he bows to the right and to the left, which is said to indicate an invitation for the founder of the order to be spiritually present. The dervishes then rise one after the other and slowly pace round the hall three times, bowing to the Shaykh as each one passes him. They then go in single file to the Shaykh, kiss his hand, and, after making an obeisance, commence turning slowly round on the left foot, using the right foot to produce the circular motion, but keeping both feet close together. The pace is at first very slow, but gradually increases in speed, and the dervish gradually raises his arms, which at the outset he held crossed over his breast, until they are stretched out on either side, the left palm being turned down and the right upwards towards heaven; the head is held slightly bent over one shoulder, and the eyes are closed. As the speed increases their long skirts, which, when in repose, reach the ankles, gradually unfold and spread out in a circle around them. On such occasions the dervishes are described as "passing into a trance," and in such a condition are believed to obtain knowledge of divine mysteries. After an interval, the dervishes again march three times round the room, and resume this dance as many times as the Shaykh may direct.

Other religious orders condemn both the use of music and the practice of dancing, and in their case the Dhikr consists merely of the repetition of some prescribed formula. Characteristic of the Shiah sect are the violent expressions of grief excited by the lamentations for the martyrdom of Husayn. Tears stream down the cheeks of the mourners as they listen to the recital of the sad story of the murder on the field of Karbala, and they give way to extravagant

exhibitions of grief; some beat their breasts or even slash themselves with knives.

But such emotional forms of devotion are peculiar to special occasions only, and are in striking contrast to the austere and sober solemnity that characterizes the ordinary public services in the mosque.

3. The payment of the legal alms is one of the primitive institutions of Islam, and the technical term for such alms—*zakāt* (lit., "purification")—implies that the dedication of a portion of the believer's property to pious purposes constitutes a sanctification of the remainder to its owner. This annual payment also impresses upon the believer a sense of corporate unity and the duty of sharing in the common burdens. Such contributions were, in primitive times, collected by officials of the State and devoted to the ransoming of slaves, the relief of the necessities of the poor, of travellers and of debtors, and the payment of those who were fighting in the way of God for the extension of the domination of Islam. The amount to be paid varied according to the character of the property possessed—whether animals, gold or silver, articles of merchandise or fruits of the earth; but the regulations connected with it are too complicated to be set down in detail here. Under an independent and regularly constituted Muhammadan government, *zakāt* was collected by government officials and formed an important part of the revenues of the State, and such an arrangement still survives under a government organized in accordance with the primitive law of Islam, such as that of the Wahhabis in Najd, where it is still the custom to collect the *zakāt* in kind on the basis of one camel or sheep out of ten. In some sects, such as those of the Khojahs and Bohoras in India, this yearly contribution may amount to as much as one-fifth of the total annual income of each member to the head of the community. But under Muhammadan governments of a more modern type, other

systems of taxation have taken its place, and the payment of the legal alms has fallen into disuse, as, of course, is also the case under the European governments which control a Muhammadan population. In such cases the fulfilment of this religious obligation is left to the conscience of the individual believer. In addition to this payment of a proportion of their property, the faithful are enjoined to show charity on all occasions. "Those who expend their substance in alms, by night and day, in private and in public, shall have their reward with their Lord" (ii., 275). "If ye give your alms openly, it is well with you; and if, ye conceal them and give them to the poor this will be better for you and will expiate your sins" (ii., 273). A wide interpretation is given to this voluntary form of alms-giving, and a tradition ascribed to the Prophet says that "a camel lent out for milk is alms, good words are alms, and your smiling in your brother's face is alms."

4. A characteristic part of the religious ordinances of Islam is the fast during the month of Ramadān. This is an obligation binding on men and women alike, with the exception of children and aged persons, travellers, and sick persons. During the whole of this month of thirty days, no particle of food and no drop of water or any other drink can be taken from day-break until sunset, and if, through any impediment, this obligation is not fulfilled, the fast has to be kept as soon as the impediment is removed, for as many days as have been omitted. As the Muhammadan calendar is a lunar one, the month of Ramadān may occur in various seasons of the year, and if it comes in the summer, the ordeal is very severe, and especially the prohibition of any form of liquid refreshment imposes a severe strain on the endurance of the believer, for the fast is broken even by the swallowing of the spittle.

One of the most characteristic features of Muham-

madan society is the conscientious devotion shown in the rigid observance of this religious obligation, and many devout persons spend much of this month in the mosque or in the reading of the Qur'ān, and special religious services are performed during the night.

A remarkable instance of the strict observance of this ordinance of the Muslim faith occurred during the Murman expedition in 1918. A British vessel, having a number of Muhammadan lascars on board, was sent so far north into the Arctic circle that the sun did not set. It was unfortunately the month of Ramadān, and these unfortunate Muhammadans waited in vain for the coming of night in order that they might break their fast; in spite of all efforts to persuade them to take food, some of them starved themselves to death rather than fail to fulfil what they considered to be a religious obligation, and the lives of the rest were only saved by hurrying them back to England at the earliest opportunity.

5. Muhammad carried over into his own religion the practices which he found observed by his fellow-countrymen in connection with the Ka'bah, or cubical erection in the central shrine of Mecca, in a corner of which is situated the famous Black Stone. Towards this building in Mecca every Muslim turns his face when engaged in religious worship, and, if circumstances permit, the performance of the pilgrimage to Mecca during the month of pilgrimage is incumbent upon every believer at least once in his lifetime. This pilgrimage is not so strictly obligatory as the fast in Ramadān, because those persons are held to be excused who are in ill-health or do not possess sufficient money for the expenses of the journey and for the support of their families during their absence from home. The obligation also ceases in time of war or during any political disturbance which renders travelling unsafe. Many regulations are laid down for the performance of this pilgrimage. A special dress is to be assumed

as soon as the pilgrim reaches the last stage outside the sacred city, when he has to put on a garment consisting of two seamless wrappers, one wrapped round the waist and the other thrown over the shoulder. Immediately on his arrival in Mecca, he visits the great Mosque and kisses the Black Stone, and then perambulates the Ka'bah seven times, three times at a quick pace and four times slowly, kissing the Black Stone each time he passes it. A number of other ceremonies have to be performed during the ten days over which the rites of pilgrimage extend, ending up with the Feast of Sacrifice, which is commonly held by Muslims to have been instituted in commemoration of Abraham's willingness to offer his son as a sacrifice. The animal sacrificed may be either a goat, a sheep, a cow, or a camel.

This great international gathering, attended by thousands of pilgrims every year, not only from adjacent countries, but from such distant places as China, Senegal, or Cape Town is an impressive manifestation of the unity of the Muslim world, and serves to keep alive the feeling of brotherhood in Islam. The same thought is impressed upon those Muslims who have been unable themselves to make the pilgrimage, in that on the very same day in which the sacrifices are being performed outside the city of Mecca, the faithful in every other part of the world celebrate the Feast of Sacrifice in a similar fashion, and are thus linked by bonds of sympathy with their more fortunate brethren in the sacred city.

CHURCH AND STATE

No correct conception of Islam is possible if it is regarded merely as a body of religious doctrine to which intellectual assent is given by the believer, for the circumstances of its origin made it not merely a religion, but also an organized political society. In Medina Muhammad was accepted not merely as the teacher of a creed, but also as the founder of a state; he was the sole head of the civil administration, supreme judge, and commander-in-chief of the army. The revealed Word of God, which promulgated the dogmas of the faith and the religious duties of the true believer, likewise laid down such principles of statescraft and such political obligations as the infant Muslim community required, and they may be summed up in a doctrine of the divine origin of the civil government and the duty of unquestioning obedience to the Prophet as the messenger of God's will: "O believers, obey God and obey the Apostle and those who have authority among you; and if ye have a dispute on any matter, refer it to God and the Apostle, if ye believe in God and the Last Day" (iv., 62).

After the death of Muhammad, his successor, the Caliph, was considered to have assumed all the functions previously exercised by the founder of the faith, with the exception of the prophetic office, for this was held to have ceased with the death of the "Seal of the Prophets," and no further divine revelation was felt to be needed to take the place of the Qur'ān. Thus, the Caliph was at once the head of the military, civil, and judicial administration; he was the protector of Islam and the guardian of religion and of the sacred law; as the successor of the Prophet, he led the faithful in prayer, and used his power for the

extirpation of heresy and the preservation of the purity of the faith. Church and State were thus inextricably bound up with one another, and the Muslim State became established as a religious organization, in which the only bond of citizenship was the acceptance of a common faith—the faith of Islam. The impressive character of the Arab conquests, the vast extent of the Muslim empire, extending at one period from the shores of the Atlantic, in Morocco, to the River Indus and the borders of China, and the enormous wealth and influence which consequently came into the hands of the Caliph, tended enormously to magnify his office. Moreover, the rapid success of the victorious armies of the first two generations of the faithful and the divine command in the Qur'ān (viii., 39; ix., 29) to wage war against the unbelievers until they acknowledged the superiority of the Muslims and the religion of God prevailed, bequeathed to later generations the aggressive ambition of making Islam the dominant power in the world and of creating a worldwide empire.

So long as there was unity of government in the Muslim community, whether the capital was Medina, Damascus, or Baghdad, such an ambition could be cherished; but Spain made itself independent of the central power as early as 756, and the break up of the rest of the empire proceeded rapidly after the death of the Caliph Hārūn in 809, and the last Caliph of Baghdad, Musta'sim, in 1258, perished miserably at the hands of the heathen Mongols in the city where his ancestors had ruled for nearly five centuries.

By this date the political theory of Islam as elaborated by the Muslim legists and theologians had caused the institution of the Caliphate to be regarded as an integral and essential part of the organization of the community, for the Caliph was held to be the source of all authority, and all judicial procedure was considered to be legitimized by the assumption that

all officers of the law ultimately derived their appointment from him. So the fiction was maintained that the Caliph was the head of the whole Muslim community throughout the world, even after the holder of this ancient office had ceased to be able to exercise any effective authority whatsoever. The Caliphate recovered some small measure of its former glory when the title was arrogated to himself by the Ottoman Sultan, and in the days of the decline of Turkish power, Sultan Abdul Hamid II. (1876-1909) endeavoured to add to his prestige by a revival of the old theory of the Caliphate, and claimed that all the Muslims scattered throughout the world, whatever might be the government to which they owed political obedience, should recognize him as their spiritual leader. But it was Abdul Hamid who ultimately brought about the ruin of the institution whose past glories he had endeavoured to restore, for his despotic rule and his ruthless tyranny created in the minds of his subjects feelings of antagonism and distrust towards a political theory which could be made the instrument of such tyranny, and the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Republic, in 1924, was the logical consequence of the deposition of Abdul Hamid in 1909.

But however despotic the government of a Muslim ruler might be, in theory at least, he was not above the law, for the law of any Muslim state was held to be fundamentally derived from the Qur'ān—the same revealed Word of God as laid down the dogmas of the faith—and was, therefore, as much binding upon the Caliph or Sultan as upon any other believer, the meanest of his subjects. For a proper understanding of the faith of Islam, therefore, it is important to recognize the place of law in the Islamic system. In this religion, law has not the restricted application which it has in Christian Europe, where the Christian faith has been superimposed upon a pre-existent body of civil law and an organized system of administra-

tion, which the religion made no attempt to displace. For in Islam, from the same sources as provided the dogmas of the faith and the principles of morality and the rules for divine worship—namely, the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet—were derived the equivalents of the civil and criminal codes in a non-Muslim state. The Shari'ah, or Sacred Law of Islam, claimed to be all-embracing, and concerned itself with every department of the life of the believer—religious, political, social, domestic, and private; accordingly, the science of law was defined as the knowledge of rights and duties, whereby a man might guide his life fittingly in this world and prepare himself for the world to come. It deals, therefore, not only with the punishments assigned to various offences against the welfare of society, but with the fundamental articles of the faith and the proper observance of religious ritual; it governs the relations between husband and wife, enters minutely into the problems connected with the division of inheritances, and regulates contracts of sale; a large part of it is taken up with rules for the division of the booty after a successful conflict with the armies of the infidels, and for the imposition of the tax (*jizyah*) to be paid by the non-Muslim inhabitants of a Muhammadan country, who accept the rule of the faithful but elect to retain their original, ancestral religion; it lays down rules for eating and dress and the proper use of toothpicks, and prescribes limits for the activity of the painter and the musician.

The elaboration of this Sacred Law was the work of the legists of the first century and a half of the Muslim era, and by the middle of the ninth century A.D. the four orthodox schools of law which are recognized throughout the greater part of the Muhammadan world, were fairly established—the Hanafi, Sha'fi, Maliki, and Hanbali. Later legists, until modern times, contented themselves with commenting on and elaborating the works of the great exponents of one

or other of these four schools of law. The followers of them must not be regarded as forming separate sects, for the differences between them are mainly trivial, and their relations with one another have, for the most part, been friendly. Among the problems they discussed are details of ritual observance—e.g., should the believer while in the standing position during divine worship hold his hands above or below the navel? Under what circumstances is water to be considered to be sufficiently clean to be used for purposes of ritual purification? Can the worshipper content himself with rubbing his boots before taking part in the service in the mosque, on occasions when it is not convenient for him to remove them and wash his feet? Again, must infidel prisoners captured during a holy war be either put to death or enslaved, or can they regain their freedom by paying a ransom? Is a foundling to be assumed to be a Muslim, or not? What constitutes apostasy? Is a change of intellectual attitude enough, or must there also be verbal expression of the loss of faith? Though a dog is an unclean beast and cannot therefore be regarded as property, is it lawful to make a shepherd dog or a hunting dog a part of an inheritance?

Absorbed in the discussion of problems such as these, the legists of Islam elaborated a body of law, largely divorced from everyday life and inapplicable to the most pressing needs of human society; accordingly, the Shari'ah tended to become more and more academic in character, and contemplated an ideal order of society in which the Sacred Law was credited with being more successful in its operations than the unrighteousness of the rulers and the degeneracy of the world actually allowed it to be. But enough of this law was really operative, and it was so closely concerned with the family and social life of the faithful, particularly in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, that it appeared to be intimately bound up

with the lives of the faithful, apart from the fact that it was cherished as embodying the ideal of Muslim society. Any attempt at change was regarded as disloyalty to the Word of God, and even the reforming efforts of the Sultans of Turkey in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were resisted with the cry: "The Shari'ah in danger." The framers of the liberal Constitution, proclaimed by Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1876, were careful to state that one of the chief causes of the disastrous condition of the country was the neglect of a strict observance of the Shari'ah, and that whatever new regulations were to be passed would be in accordance with it.

The guardians of the Shari'ah were the 'Ulamā (i.e., the learned), the only equivalent to a priesthood in the Muslim world. But they were laymen only, and could claim no status or functions apart from those of the general body of the faithful; the only authority they exercised was that which was conferred upon them by the knowledge which they had derived from their assiduous study of the Qur'an, the Traditions of the Prophet, and the system of law based thereon. As expounders of this body of divine truth, they claimed to be "the heirs of the Prophets," and they enjoyed the respect and confidence of their co-religionists for their devotion to learning and the guidance they could afford in the straight path. The majority of them were poor and came from the lower classes, and their influence over the general mass of the believers has always been enormous, however much they may have failed to persuade the government to their way of thinking.

As a separate class, the 'Ulamā may be considered to have come into existence in Medina after the Umayyads had moved the capital of the Muslim empire to Damascus; as guardians and interpreters of the Word of God, they laid the foundations of the great systems of Islamic law, while they regarded with

suspicion and dislike the civil authority that had fallen into the hands of the descendants of the Meccan aristocracy, which had been hostile to the mission of Muhammad during the greater part of his life. The Abbasids came into power in the middle of the eighth century as the defenders of religion, and they extended their patronage to the men of learning, and endeavoured to induce them to accept offices of state. The study of the Sacred Law received a great impulse, and tended more and more to receive recognition in the practical affairs of the life of the community—though not, indeed, to the extent that the 'Ulamā would have desired. Still, the Abbasids claimed at least to foster the cause of religion, and it was possible for Abū Yūsuf, the Chief Justice of the Caliph Hārūn (786-809) to exhort his master to take the following view of his office as Commander of the Faithful: "God (to Whom be praise) has invested thee with immense power, which entails either the most abundant reward or the most grievous punishment, in that He has entrusted thee with the government of this community, making thee their shepherd and committing them to thy care; hereby He puts thee to the test and makes thee ruler over them. Now, a building that hath any other foundation save piety, God soon strikes at the base of it and brings it down in ruin on the builder of it and his helpers. When one of two alternatives concerns the next world and the other this present world, then choose the former, for the next world abideth and this world passes away. Be on thy guard, as God warns thee to be, for He hath not created thee in jest nor hast thou been left uncared-for. God will question thee concerning thy state and thy deeds, then see to it what answer thou wilt render Him. Forget not to take care of those over whom God has set thee in authority; then thou thyself wilt not be forgotten. Neglect not aught that may be for their advantage, and thou thyself wilt not

be neglected. The frequent movements of thy lips in making mention of God, confessing His unity, extolling His might and giving Him thanks, and in invoking blessings on His Apostle, the prophet of mercy and the Imām of right guidance, will cause no diminution in thy good fortune upon earth through all those days and nights. God in His bounty and mercy and forbearance has made the temporal rulers Caliphs upon His earth, and has bestowed upon them a light, whereby to illuminate all that in their daily life is dark, and make clear to them all that in their duties is obscure. The rulers cause this light to shine by imposing the penalties that God has laid down, and assigning to each his duty, with firmness and a clear command. Of the highest importance is it to keep alive the Sunna (the use and wont of the Prophet), such as the righteous have followed, for this is one of the good deeds that live and perish not. Tyranny on the part of the shepherd implies the ruin of the flock, and if he seeks the help of any save reliable and righteous persons, the community must perish."*

Such a conception of the ideal leader of the community, devoting himself to the welfare of his subjects and co-religionists, in accordance with the ordinances of the Sacred Law, and following the advice of the 'Ulamā in the details of their application, and having ever before his mind the thought of the coming Judgment before the throne of God, has been continuously present to the minds of Muslim theologians. It serves to explain the hopes, entertained even up to the present day in certain quarters, of a revival of the Caliphate.

After the death of Hārūn, the Muslim empire began rapidly to fall to pieces, and the 'Ulamā had to accommodate themselves to new conditions of life under the

* *Kitāb al-Khardj*, pp. 2-3.

rule of the Turkish and other sultans, who built up kingdoms for themselves on the ruins of the Caliphate. At the hands of the Mongol conquerors they suffered cruel persecution; but at times they succeeded in enjoying the favour of a prince belonging to one of the newly converted tribes that rose to power by right of conquest. Under the Ottomans, especially after the conquest of Constantinople by Muhammad II. in 1453, the 'Ulamā were taken into government service, and received regular salaries and exercised judicial functions according to the particular grade of their appointment, and the head of the whole body of the 'Ulamā, the Mufti of Constantinople, on whom Muhammad II. conferred the title of Shaykh ul-Islam; became one of the most powerful officers of the State; on three historic occasions, he even declared the deposition of a sultan. As administrators of the religious endowments, which at one time are said to have comprised one-third of the landed property in the Ottoman empire, and as controlling the whole of the educational system, both in schools and colleges, they exercised enormous influence throughout the Turkish dominions. This immense power, in recent years, brought about their ruin in Turkey, for they were regarded as being the supporters of the tyrannical rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. and as obstacles to all reform and progress. The new Turkish Republic, therefore, looked upon them as reactionaries, and deprived them of all power under the new constitution.

In other parts of the world in which vast Muhammadan populations had passed under the domination of the Christian powers of Europe—England, France, Holland, and Russia—the influence of the 'Ulamā was seriously diminished, as they were no longer associated with the government, and the sphere of Muslim law was restricted within narrow limits.

But the ideal of a self-governing Muslim community, under a single head, the Caliph, continued to

be cherished; it was embodied in the theological training which the 'Ulamā imparted to their pupils, and among the ignorant masses was believed to correspond with reality to a greater degree than the hard facts of actual history warranted. If the Sacred Law was inoperative, the fault lay in the evil state of the times, and all would be set right after the coming of the Mahdī (the rightly guided one), whom God would send to subject the whole world to Islam. This Messianic hope has served to counteract the depressing influence of the realization of the declining influence of Muslim power in the world, and at different times in the course of Muslim history has stirred up political movements in opposition to the powers hostile to Islam or to Muslim rulers, held to be faithless to the claims of religion. The same theory of Islamic society explains the devotion to the Caliphate, which has expressed itself so forcibly in recent years at the cost of immense sacrifice, and has resulted in much bitter disillusionment in consequence of the disregard of actual facts.

But however little encouragement realities may give to such a doctrine, every Muslim may consider himself to be a member of an ideal society, which is bound ultimately to overcome all hostile forces and make the law of God prevail in the world. The memory of the glories of the Caliphate in the past is a constant stimulus to such a hope, and meanwhile all believers are brethren (Qur., xlix., 10), and this ideal of brotherhood in the faith succeeds in breaking down the barriers of race and country, and (except in the case of the Europeanized sections of the educated classes) this distinctiveness finds expression for itself in some characteristic form of dress or appearance—e.g., the clipping of the front of the moustache, in the avoidance of certain articles of diet such as pork and wine, and in regulations regarding the methods of eating, in special forms of greeting—e.g., "Salām 'alaykum,"

which only Muslims should use to one another, etc. Up to the nineteenth century it was generally possible to recognize Muhammadans by their external appearance. They felt that they were heirs of a culture which was bound up with their creed, and they wished to preserve the characteristic marks of their own civilization. So persistent has been the influence of this distinctive Muslim culture that a strong sense of corporate unity may often survive the disappearance of intellectual assent to the dogmas of the faith, and may serve as a social bond long after faith is dead.

An integral part of the theory of the Muslim community is concerned with its relations to the outside world, and the foundations of this were already laid in the Qur'an in connection with the doctrine of Jihād. This word literally means "striving," and is used of the struggle of the faithful against their enemies. The faith of Islam early became a militant one, for the activities of the Prophet after his migration to Medina were largely taken up with warfare against the enemies of the growing community, and the successful period of conquest in which the next generation overran the empire of Persia and a great part of that of Rome, tended to emphasize this aspect of the life of the believer. Conflict with the infidels was raised to the level of a religious duty, and was included in the definition of true faith. "The believers are only those who believe in God and His Apostle, then doubt not, and strive with their property and their persons in the way of God" (xlix., 15). "Say to the unbelievers: If they desist, that which is past shall be forgiven them; but if they return, there has already preceded them the doom of the ancients. Fight, then, against them till there be no more strife and the religion be all of it God's" (viii., 39-40). "March forth, both the light and the heavy (armed), and strive with your property and your persons in the way of God" (ix., 41).

Though such warfare was to be waged in defence

of the faith and for the extension of the ascendancy of Islam, yet acceptance of this religion was not to be forced upon either Christians or Jews, to whom a previous revelation had been vouchsafed by God; if they submitted and consented to pay the tax (called *jizyah*) which was levied on non-Muslim subjects of the Muslim State, in recognition of the protection accorded to them and of their exemption from military service, then they were allowed to retain their ancestral faith. The command to fight against them is thus given in the Qur'an: "Fight against such of those to whom the Book has been given as do not believe in Allah or the Last Day, and do not forbid what God and His Apostle have forbidden, and do not follow the religion of truth, until they pay *jizyah* in acknowledgment of (your) superiority and be humbled" (ix., 29)—and the granting of toleration to them thus: "Say to those who have been given the Book and to the illiterate, 'Do ye accept Islam?' Then if they accept Islam they are guided aright, but if they turn away, then thy duty is only preaching" (iii., 19).

The doctrine of *Jihād* was elaborated into a system by the later legists, who laid it down that the waging of *Jihād* was not a universal obligation, but the duty was sufficiently performed if the required number of free, male, adult Muslims joined the army in order to carry it out. But if the infidels invaded Muslim territory and the *Imām* called upon all believers to go forth and fight, then it was an obligation upon all, even upon women, and a wife might go forth without the permission of her husband, and a slave without the permission of his master. The decision as to the proper time and locality for the campaign rests with the *Imām*, and he ought to proclaim a *Jihād* at least once a year—as, indeed, was the practise of most of the early Caliphs; but modern theologians, in view of the altered circumstances of the Muslim world, have decided that this obligation is sufficiently fulfilled if

the Imām keeps an army ready armed and makes other preparations for waging Jihād whenever a suitable opportunity may present itself.

In harmony with this theory, the legists divided the whole world into two parts—one, the territory of Islam, which is governed according to the Sacred Law; and the other, the land of war, in the possession of infidels who have not yet submitted to Muslim rule. The possibility of Muslims having to live under an alien rule was never contemplated by these theorists.

ISLAM AS A MISSIONARY RELIGION

ISLAM was from the very outset a missionary religion. When Muhammad began to convert his fellow-citizens in Mecca from their heathen practices he had neither power nor wealth, but only the spoken word as an instrument of his propaganda; he could only emphasize the doctrine of the unity of God by repeated warnings of the penalties of idolatry, and by reminders of the teaching of his predecessors, the prophets, who had been sent by God in successive ages to other peoples. When in Medina he found himself at the head of a body of devoted followers ready to fight on his behalf, and forming the nucleus of an independent state, his position was entirely altered; but methods of persuasion were still adopted for the conversion of individuals after his death.

During the first two generations of the Muhamadan era the attention of the Arab conquerors was too closely concentrated on the acquisition of territory and wealth for them to pay much heed to the more devout precepts of the founder of their faith. In regard

to the propaganda of Islam, the inhabitants of the countries which they overran are said to have been always invited to accept the new faith in accordance with the instructions clearly laid down in the Qur'ān. But evidence of any marked missionary zeal appears in this earlier period to be lacking; nevertheless Christians, both in the conquered provinces of the Roman Empire and of the Persian Empire, as well as Zoroastrians in Persia, appear to have gone over to Islam in large numbers, in spite of the toleration extended to the adherents of Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, provided they submitted to the authority of the conquerors and paid the tax imposed upon the tolerated creeds.

The history of the expansion of Islam as a religion, voluntarily adopted by fresh converts, during this earlier period is obscure. The Caliphs of the Umayyad dynasty seem to have paid little regard to this matter, with the exception of the devout 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (717-720), who was a zealous propagandist, and endeavoured to win converts in various parts of the vast empire over which he ruled, from North Africa to Transoxania and Sind. The Caliphs of the Abbasid dynasty were more ready to use the authority of the State in the support of the cause of religion, and it was in this period that Islam first began to spread among the Turks, who, in later centuries, were destined to become one of the strongest bulwarks of the faith.

Islam was faced with a formidable task after the Mongols had overrun a large part of Muhammadan territory in Asia, and had brought the vast Muhammadan populations under their dominion. It had then to enter into competition with two other missionary religions, Buddhism and Christianity, for the conversion of these heathen conquerors. But at last, towards the close of the thirteenth century, the Ilkhans, who had established a Mongol dynasty in Persia, were won

over to Islam, and other Mongol tribes further east, at a later period. The Mongols, by the creation of one vast empire, stretching from China in the east to Russia and Syria in the west, facilitated communications from one end of Asia to another, and gave opportunities for the activity of Muslim propagandists in China, and their efforts resulted in the growth of scattered communities of Chinese Muhammadans.

The terror of the Mongol invasions had also caused a number of learned men and members of religious orders to take refuge in India, and their influence led to the farther spread of Islam in that country, in which it had already gained a footing in the province of Sind and on the Malabar coast as early as the eighth century. The growth of Muhammadan political power in India naturally promoted an increase in the number of the adherents of Islam, but there is also abundant evidence of the individual efforts of religious propagandists.

Further south another great centre of missionary activity is found in the various islands of the Malay Archipelago. The process of conversion was slow, but it has been carried on even up to recent times.

Another great field for the successful activity of the Muslim missionary has been the continent of Africa. The Arab conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries extended Muslim rule over Egypt and North Africa, and had been followed by extensive conversions. The penetration of Islam towards the south at first proceeded slowly, but the most rapid advance took place in the nineteenth century, especially after the partition of a great part of the continent between the Christian powers of Europe had provided easier means of communication by the making of roads and railways and the consequent stimulus given to trade. For it is the Muhammadan trader who has been most active as a propagandist, especially when he has brought with him his religion into districts inhabited

by tribes on a lower level of culture. The agents in this propaganda have generally been private individuals, and the missionary history of Islam is characterized by a lack of organized and continuous effort. Even the part played by the religious orders, who have done much for the conversion of heathen tribes in India and Africa, has remained unrecorded in consequence of its individualistic character. The formation of missionary societies especially devoted to the expansion of the faith is a modern phenomenon in the history of Islam, and occurs only as a deliberate imitation of the methods of the Christian missionary societies. In recent times, however, there has been a considerable growth of such Muslim propagandist organization, and the Ahmadiyyah sect has distinguished itself in this respect, for it has established branches of its mission in America, England, and Germany, as well as in parts of Africa and the West Indies.

One noticeable feature of the expansion of Islam in more than one period of its history, is the superficial character of the knowledge which the converts acquired of their new faith at the time of their conversion. This is partly to be explained by the rapid extension of the Arab conquests in the seventh century, whereby the followers of the new faith before the close of that century created an empire stretching from the Atlantic in the West to the Oxus and the Indus in the East, and brought about a widespread acceptance of Islam by many of the conquered peoples. In succeeding centuries there were other examples of such a rapid expansion of this faith and of mass conversions. The creed of Islam is so brief, and the repetition of it is all that is required of the would-be convert, in order to gain admittance into the community of the faithful, that the process of conversion has often been unaccompanied by any profound knowledge or by any adequate recognition of the implications of the creed or by any

understanding of the duties imposed by the new faith. The low level of literacy and the lack of education in many parts of the Muhammadan world have also contributed to the difficulties which the theologians have experienced in imposing upon the converts or their descendants more orthodox views and a more scrupulous observance of Islamic observances. How widespread this illiteracy is may be judged from the fact that out of nearly seventy millions of Muhammadans in India, only 3·7 per cent. of this population is literate; and what is true of a country with an ancient culture and a system of education such as has prevailed in India for many centuries is still more true of the enormous territories in Africa and the Malay Archipelago, with their large Muhammadan populations. From time to time attempts have been made to combat this widespread ignorance and to bring about uniformity in religious practice, but though some measure of success has been attained, notably in connection with the Wahhabi and earlier reforming movements, lack of organized methods, or of continuity of effort has caused the results of this work to be very imperfect, and many so-called Muslims are still profoundly ignorant even of the most elementary doctrines of their religion. Probably few of them have so completely an erroneous conception of their faith as the jungle tribe in the Malay Peninsula, which repeats as its creed: "There is no God save Muhammad, and Allāh is his wife." In Annam the pre-Muslim polytheism still survives under a Muhammadan veneer, and one tribe has made three gods out of the Arabic words of the creed (which, of course, they are unable to understand): Orlah (Allāh), Rasullak (*i.e.*, the Prophet), and Latila (*i.e.*, the first two words: "There is no God"). In India the process of conversion has, in some cases, been so incomplete that even after two or three centuries of nominal allegiance to Islam, some Rajput tribes have, in recent years, returned to the

religion of their Hindu ancestors. Indian Muhammadans, in spite of the rigid monotheism which their faith inculcates, still join in the worship of local village godlings, and many a Muhammadan mother who had not sacrificed to Sitala, the dreaded goddess of small-pox, would feel that she had wantonly endangered the life of her child. In Bengal there are Muhammadans who join in the worship of the sun and offer libations like Hindus, and a community feeling prompts them to take part in the annual Hindu festivals, such as the Durga Puja, connected with the worship of this most popular goddess in Bengal, without realizing that they are thereby showing any disloyalty to their own religion. It is especially in connection with social observances that these survivals of an earlier creed show themselves, and up to recent times, it used to be the custom in many families of Hindu origin to have the marriage ceremony performed according to the primitive Hindu rite and in the presence of the family priest, a Brahman, whose office is often hereditary in Hindu families, before the civil contract, which constitutes marriage according to the Muhammadan Sacred Law, was executed. Similarly, Hindu laws of inheritance prevail, though they are in direct contradiction to the ordinances laid down in the Qur'an, which gives detailed instructions in such matters—e.g., some Panjabi Muhammadans refuse a widow any share in her deceased husband's property, though the Qur'an expressly states that a widow shall receive a fourth part if there are no children, and an eighth if any children have been born to the deceased husband (Qur., iv., 14). In southern India the Mappillas, though they are notorious for their fanatical outbursts against unbelievers, still follow the local Hindu system of inheritance, according to which property descends through the female line, and sons have no claim to a share in their father's property or to maintenance therefrom.

Such survivals of an earlier cult manifest themselves in most parts of the whole Muhammadan world in the worship of saints, and in reverence paid to their tombs, which, in many instances, can be identified with the site of some earlier cult which Islam has displaced. The Wahhabis have rightly recognized that such worship is contrary to the monotheistic doctrines of Islam, and have often razed such tombs to the ground and have endeavoured to abolish the observances connected with them wherever they have been able to impose their domination.

ASCETICISM AND MYSTICISM

THERE are two aspects of the religious life of Islam which demand special consideration—the ascetic life and mysticism. An ascetic tendency manifested itself among the Companions of the Prophet in the early days of Islam. The terrors of the Day of Judgment and of the torments of hell, so frequently and vividly depicted in the Qur'ān, obsessed the minds of such devout persons, and of some it is recorded that they would spend whole nights in prayer, and curb the desires of the flesh by rigid fasts, and pass their days in weeping and solitude. Others imposed upon themselves vows of silence, and of one pious theologian of the first century A.D. it is recorded that for twenty years no worldly utterance passed his lips, and that he kept a careful account of the few words he permitted himself to speak each day.

There is little doubt but that Christian influences and association with Christian monks and hermits exercised a considerable influence on the early develop-

ment of Muslim mysticism, for some of their co-religionists reproached them on this account, and the growth of ascetic communities in Islam was prompted by the organization of the Christian conventional system.

Another early feature that makes its appearance in the oldest stage of Muslim asceticism is the liturgical practice of the *dhikr* (i.e., mention) or devotional repetition of the name of God or of the creed or some other religious formula. Such a form of religious worship was held to be justified by the injunction of the Qur'ān (xxxiii., 41): "O believers, make mention of God with frequent remembrance." In later times such devotional exercises were developed and systematized in various ways by the religious orders, as explained above.

The biographies of the Muslim saints are full of accounts of their ascetic practices. Some would shut themselves up in a retired place for forty days, and spend the time in fasting, prayer, and meditation; one saint used to repeat the whole of the Qur'ān, suspended head downwards in a well; others would wander in desolate places, sleeping only on the ground and feeding on the leaves of trees. The dervishes of the Rifā'i order torture themselves by thrusting swords into their bodies, eating live coals, glass, etc.

Mystical doctrines in Islam first made their appearance among the ascetics, and can be shown to be a natural growth out of the teaching of the Qur'ān, in which God speaks of Himself as knowing what man's soul whispers within him, and as being closer to man than his neck vein (l., 15). Further, "Know that God cometh in between a man and his own heart" (viii., 24), and "Three persons speak not privately together, but He is their fourth; nor five, but He is their sixth; nor fewer nor more, but wherever they be, He is with them" (lviii., 8). From such doctrine the passage to the claim made for the validity of the

mystic experience of the devout ascetic is easy, and the Qur'an itself provided much of the vocabulary of Islamic mysticism. How far external influences—Christian, Neo-Platonic, Persian, or Hindu—may have co-operated in the building up of the vast complex which goes to make up Islamic mystical thought, has been much debated, but this problem cannot be discussed within the narrow limits of the present work, and the reader must be referred to the special treatises on the subject. The early mystics, who by the third century of the Muhammadan era, had become commonly known as Sufis from the woollen garment (*sūf*) they wore, were certainly regarded with some suspicion by the theologians, and it was not until the end of the fifth century that mysticism became an accepted part of orthodox belief under the influence of the great theologian, Ghazālī (*ob.* 1111). His great reputation as a theologian and an authority on canon law had caused him to be appointed a teacher in the Nizamiyah college in Baghdad, but his study of philosophy led him into scepticism, and disgusted with the arid pedantry of the formal theologians, among whom his life was spent, at the age of fifty he fled from Baghdad, and became a wandering dervish and lived a life of contemplation, practising the forms of devotion of the Sufis. He thus regained his faith by the way of personal religious experience. Rejecting philosophy as a means for the attainment of truth, he accepts the fundamental principles and practices of the Muslim faith on the ground of personal experience of their efficacy in bringing the believer into union with God; he lays especial stress on the ethical aspect of mysticism and on the spiritual side of worship.

From Ghazālī's time onwards, mysticism has formed a normal part of orthodox Muslim thought, and has been popularized through the influence of the numerous religious orders. The immense variety of Sufistic doctrine makes it impossible to attempt any complete

survey of it in these pages. So far is it from being a unified and complete system that as many as seventy-eight different definitions of Sufism itself have been collected.

In its philosophical aspect, it is a doctrine of the nature of God as Pure Being and the only Reality, and of the relation subsisting between the phenomenal world and God. When by illumination true knowledge is attained, the mystic knows God, and nothing but God. Such a state is described in the following verses by a Persian poet, Bābā Kūhī of Shirāz, who died in A.D. 1050, as finely translated by Professor Nicholson:

“ In the market, in the cloister—only God I saw.
 In the valley and on the mountain—only God I saw.
 Him I have seen beside me oft in tribulation;
 In favour and in fortune—only God I saw.
 In prayer and fasting, in praise and contemplation,
 In the religion of the Prophet—only God I saw.
 Neither soul nor body, accident nor substance,
 Qualities nor causes—only God I saw.
 I oped mine eyes and by the light of His face
 around me
 In all the eye discovered—only God I saw.
 Myself with mine own eyes I saw most clearly,
 But when I looked with God’s eyes—only God I
 saw.
 I passed away into nothingness, I vanished,
 And lo, I was the All-living—only God I saw.”*

For the attainment of this state of illumination, a long process of training is required, which is known as the Path, and a large part of Sufi literature is taken

* R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 59.
 (London, 1914).

up with an account of the stages* through which the neophyte has to pass. The earliest of these constitute the ascetic and ethical discipline of the Sufi—namely, penitence, abstinence, voluntary poverty, patience, abnegation of the personal will in the will of God, complete dependence upon God, and satisfaction with whatever God ordains. The Sufi then experiences certain spiritual states, according as it may please God to bestow them upon him—servitude, love, abstraction, knowledge, ecstasy, the truth, union with God, and finally identification with Him. This last state the great mystic, Hallaj (who was put to death in Baghdad in 912), claimed to have attained in his lifetime, for in one of his poems he says :

“ I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I :
 We are two spirits dwelling in one body.
 If thou seest me, thou seest Him,
 And if thou seest Him, thou seest us both.”*

But in this some of the Sufis considered Hallaj to be over bold, while others have held that he erred in proclaiming to the vulgar the supreme mystery which ought to be reserved for the inner circle of the elect. In a similar spirit many Sufi treatises were written only for the perusal of adepts, and were couched in obscure language which only serious students of mystical philosophy were likely to be able to understand.

Among the mystics are to be found some of the most famous of the saints of Islam. One example may be taken out of this vast company as illustrating the new attitude of the believer towards his Maker introduced into the religious life of Islam by the mystics, when the love of God took the place of fear of His chastisements. It is the more interesting as revealing

* R. A. Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

the existence of the woman saint, a class of Muslim ascetic not commonly recognized. Rābi'ah was born about the close of the first century of the Muhammadan era, in Basra, where she spent the greater part of her life. She appears at one time to have been a slave, but to have been set free by her master when he came to realize her attachment to the religious life. She refused all offers of marriage, and in spite of constant ill-health she spent the greater part of the day and night in prayer and fasting, suppressing all desire and fully absorbed in the love of God.

One of her prayers is said to have been: "Oh, my Lord, if I worship Thee from fear of hell, burn me in hell, and if I worship Thee from hope of Paradise, exclude me thence, but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake, then withhold not from me Thine eternal beauty." And on another occasion when some pious persons asked her to state her reasons for her worship of God, she answered: "He is a bad servant who worships his God from fear and terror or from the desire of reward, though there be many such." So they answered: "Why do you worship God? Have you no desire for Paradise?" and she replied: "The neighbour first and then the house. Is it not enough for me that I am given leave to worship Him; even if heaven and hell were not, does it not behove us to obey Him? He is worthy of worship without any intermediary." So absorbing was her love for God that she exclaimed: "My love for God leaves no room for hating Satan." And she went on to say: "I saw the Prophet in a dream, and he said to me, 'Oh, Rābi'ah, dost thou love me?' I said, 'Oh, Prophet of God, who is there who does not love thee? But my love to God has so possessed me that no place remains for loving or hating any save Him.'"

The influence of such individual saints was considerable, but it is through the organization of the religious orders, with their large following of men and women

engaged in the ordinary avocations of society, that mystical teaching gained its widest extension, for in this manner it reached the unlettered masses.

Among educated persons the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish poets, who have sympathized with mystical thought, have done much to popularize this religious attitude, and their works take much the same place in the religious life of the Muhammadan world as such books of devotion as *The Imitation of Christ*, by Thomas à Kempis, have in Christendom. Such writers have popularized the teachings of the mystics by means of stories illustrative of some mystical doctrine or ethical precept. One of the greatest and most profound of these poets is Jalāl ud-Dīn Rūmī (ob. 1273). One of his stories tells how Moses came across a shepherd who was praying aloud to God in language which seemed to the Prophet to be shameful and blasphemous. He was saying: "Oh, God, where art Thou, that I may become Thy servant and sew Thy shoes and wash Thy head and kill Thy lice and bring milk to Thee, that I may ease Thy little head and when bed-time comes, sweep out Thy little room, Oh, Thou, to whom all my goats be a sacrifice." Moses rebukes the shepherd and bids him shut his mouth and stop such raving and such blasphemy. The shepherd rends his garments and, sighing, goes into the desert filled with shame and repentance. Then God rebukes the Prophet, saying: "Thou hast parted My servant from Me. I look not at the tongue and the speech, but at the inward spirit and feeling. I gaze into the heart of the worshipper and regard not the mode of expression." Thus rebuked, Moses hastens into the desert in pursuit of the shepherd and tells him that he may disregard rules and methods of worship, and may say to God whatsoever his soul desires, that he is saved since his religion is the light of the Spirit; but he finds that God has already anticipated him, and that the shepherd has already been exalted to such a stage

of spiritual elevation as words are powerless to describe.*

Again, the abiding presence of God everywhere is taught by a story of a mystic saint, Bayāzīd, who set out on the pilgrimage to Mecca in order to visit the Ka'bah. On the way he met an old man who inquired whither he was bound and what provision he had for his journey. When Bayāzīd told him that he had two hundred pieces of silver tied up in the corner of his cloak, the other rejoined: "Make a circuit round me seven times and reckon this to be better than the circumambulation of the Ka'bah and give me the silver, knowing that thou hast performed the pilgrimage and that thy desire has been achieved, for God hath chosen me above His house, for when thou hast seen me, thou hast seen God; to serve me is to obey and glorify God. Open thine eyes well and look on me, that thou mayst behold the light of God in man."†

A more popular writer was Sa'dī, whose works are among the most widely read throughout the eastern half of the Muhammadan world, and though worldly wisdom was his chief characteristic rather than mysticism, yet he popularized much mystical doctrine. Emphasis on the unity of all existence caused the mystics to look with kindly eyes on the adherents of faiths other than their own, and this doctrine of religious toleration is brought out in the story which Sa'dī tells of Abraham's treatment of the fire worshipper. It was the practice of the Prophet never to sit down to his morning meal until some poor traveller had come to share it with him. One morning Abraham saw a very aged man, bowed down with the weight of years, coming across the desert. He invited him in, and when they sat down, Abraham offered thanks to

* *Mathnawi*, translated by Professor R. A. Nicholson, vol. ii., pp. 310-313.

† *Id.*, p. 337.

God. The old man did not utter a word, and when Abraham asked him why he did not give thanks to the Giver of all good things, he replied that he only followed the religious usages that had been taught him by his teachers, the worshippers of fire. Abraham was so horrified that he should have been unawares offering hospitality to an idolater, that he indignantly drove the old man away. Then a voice from heaven rebuked him, saying: "If I have borne with this old man for nearly one hundred years, can you not bear with him for a single day?" Thus rebuked for his intolerance, Abraham hurried after the old man and extended to him a kindly welcome.

Through such stories, and others like them, the mystics of Islam have become the moral teachers of their co-religionists, and many other examples might be given of their inculcation of various ethical excellences. Fidelity to truth is illustrated by a story told of a Sufi named Habib, who was a friend of Hasan of Basra, one of the earliest of the Muslim mystics. Fleeing from some soldiers, Hasan took refuge in the cell of Habib. The soldiers came and asked Habib whether he had seen Hasan anywhere. He answered: "Yes." "Where is he?" "He is in my cell." So they went into the cell, but finding no one there, they thought that Habib was mocking them, but he protested that he was telling the truth. They went in again twice and thrice, but finding no one, at last went away. Hereupon Hasan asked his friend: "I know that it was through thy blessing that God did not discover me to those wicked men, but why didst thou tell them that I was there?" Habib replied: "Oh, master, it was not on account of my blessing that they failed to see thee, but through the blessedness of my speaking the truth. Had I told a lie, we both should have been shamed."*

* The *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, by al-Hujwiri; translated by R. A. Nicholson, pp. 88-89.

The following verses, also translated by Professor Nicholson, commend the virtue of kindness :

“ Cheer one sad heart : thy loving deed will be
 More than a thousand temples raised by thee.
 One freeman whom thy kindness hath enslaved
 Outweighs by far a thousand slaves set free.”*

THE SECTS OF ISLAM AND MODERN MOVEMENTS

DURING the thirteen centuries of the Muhammadan era there has been an immense sectarian development. The Prophet is said to have prophesied that his followers would break up into seventy-three sects, but the total number of those that have made their appearance has been considerably greater. The great mass of Muslims in the world belong to the Sunni sect, and the account given of Islamic doctrine and practice in the preceding pages refers, on the whole, to this group. Their name indicates that they follow the Sunnah—i.e., the use and wont of the Prophet, as set down in the Traditions.

Many of the sectarian divisions of Islam have long ceased to exist, and are of interest only to the student of religious history, but some are still living actualities, and are potent influences in the Muslim world. Oldest among them is the Shiah, which meant originally merely the Shiah or “ party ” of ‘Ali. Like many of the Muslim sects, it was political in its origin and represented those who supported the claim of ‘Ali and

* R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 108.

his descendants to the headship of the Muslim world and the supreme office of Caliph.

The devoted efforts, accompanied by much suffering and persecution, made by the followers of this sect, were for centuries ineffectual, and, indeed, the Shiahs at no time in their history ever succeeded in dominating the whole empire, as did for several generations the Sunni Caliphs. But in different parts of the Muhammadan world there have been established Shiah dynasties, which have been of considerable historical importance; of these the Fatimids (909-1171), who, starting in North Africa, extended their rule over Egypt and Syria, were remarkable for their brilliant achievements in culture and art; in Persia, the Safavids (1502-1736) made Shi-ism the national religion of that country, and it has continued so to the present day, except for a brief interval. One branch of the Shiah sect, under the Zaydī Imāms of the Yemen, has preserved its independence, with but few interruptions from its first establishment in 860 up to modern times; but the Zaydis, in their inaccessible mountains, have lived outside the main currents of the life and history of the Muslim world. There have been several smaller Shiah states that have had an ephemeral existence, but the Shiahs have never succeeded in wresting from their rivals, the Sunnis, the headship of the Muslim community, though they have made many attempts to do so, which have filled their history with a pitiable series of unsuccessful rebellions and martyrdoms. Their own name for themselves is Imāmī, and this indicates their fundamental doctrine that the first Imām was 'Alī, as the only legitimate successor of Muhammad, and that this exalted office, implying the headship of the whole body of believers, was reserved for the members of his family. Disputes as to who was the legitimate successor split them up into numerous sects, which fought one another with relentless fanaticism. The Imām in each generation was re-

garded as the only authoritative spiritual guide of the faithful, and recognition of him was declared to be an essential part of the true faith. The majority of the Shiah hold that the twelfth Imām disappeared about the year 873, but that he is still alive, and though hidden from the eyes of men, he directs the mundane affairs of his followers, and in fulness of time will return in visible form to establish the Shiah faith and fill the world with justice. Even the Persian National Assembly was stated in the law promulgated by the Shah in 1907 to have been "established by the favour and assistance of His Holiness the Imām of the age—may God hasten His glad advent."

This expectation of the "Return" of the Imām fills the minds of the Shiah with Messianic hopes similar to those cherished by the Sunnis, but there is a fundamental difference between the two forms of the doctrine, in that the Shiah identify the Imām Mahdī with a historical personage, a descendant of 'Alī, who has never really died.

A common error, based on the designations usually given to the rival sects, declares that the Shiah pay no regard to the Sunnah or to the Traditions of the Prophet. On the contrary, they have enormous collections of Traditions among their religious literature, and a great number of these Traditions are the same as those accepted as genuine by the Sunnis; but their authenticity is defended by a reference to authorities, which excludes those Companions of the Prophet who resisted the claims of 'Alī, and accepts only the testimony of their own Imāms and their supporters. Thus, they have a Sunnah of their own, which is of special importance to them as serving as a basis for their claims on behalf of 'Alī and his descendants.

Reference has already been made to their celebration of the tragedy of Karbala and the death of Husayn, the son of 'Alī and grandson of the Prophet, in the year 680. The first ten days of the month of Muhar-

ram, the first month of the Muhammadan calendar, are given up to lamentations for his unhappy fate, and the emotions of the mourners are excited by the singing of hymns and the recitations of poems, describing the various incidents of the story, and by dramatic representations. In some cities processions of mourners, carrying a model of the tomb of Husayn and beating their breasts, go through the streets. Sunnis disapprove of such celebrations, but are often unable to prevent the more ignorant members of their sect from taking part in them.

Of other modern sects, one of the most important is that of the Wahhabis, whose founder died towards the end of the eighteenth century. Like many previous Muslim theologians; he desired to restore the faith to its primitive simplicity and to purge religious practice from all the many accretions that had collected round it in the course of centuries. He rejected the great body of systematic theology which had accumulated during previous centuries, and preached the return to the two primitive sources of religious truth, the Qur'an and the Traditions.

His iconoclastic zeal revealed itself in hostility to the worship of the saints, whose tombs were to be destroyed as tending to encourage idolatry by attributing to mere mortals the rôle of intercessors with God.

His followers adopted a severe Puritanical form of life, proscribing the use of tobacco, the wearing of garments of silk, and the playing of musical instruments.

The Wahhabis gained a political importance, which previous reforming movements had failed to attain, through the accession to their movement of the Arabs of the Nejd country in the deserts of Arabia. At the close of the eighteenth century the growing Wahhabi State came in conflict with the forces of the Turkish Government, which were unable to check them, and in 1801 a Wahhabi army sacked the holy city of Karbala and destroyed all the Shiah shrines there, including the

tomb of Husayn, and carried off the vast treasures that had been accumulated through the pious donations of generations of pilgrims. In 1803 they added to their conquests the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and the Muslim world heard with a thrill of horror that the dome over the tomb of the Prophet had been destroyed in Medina and many sacred shrines in Mecca razed to the ground. For nine years the rule of the Wahhabis in Mecca continued unbroken. The task of driving them out was entrusted to Muhammad 'Alī, the Viceroy of Egypt; he commenced operations against them in 1811, but it was not until 1818 that their stronghold in Nejd was stormed and their chieftain sent off to Constantinople to be executed.

In more recent times the Wahhabi movement has experienced a great revival under the present King of the Hijaz and Nejd, Ibn Sa'ūd. During the early years of the present century he gradually extended his power until, in 1921, he became Sultan of Nejd, and, in 1924, conquered the Hijaz and occupied the city of Mecca. Though toleration has been extended to the pilgrims belonging to other sects, so that during their stay in the holy city they are allowed to perform their devotions in accordance with their particular religious observances, yet in the centre of the Wahhabi territory, in Nejd itself, this reforming movement exhibits the same fanatical characteristics as did the earlier Wahhabis about a century ago. They have destroyed the tombs of the saints on the ground that reverence paid to them and the invocation of mere mortals savour of idolatry, and introduce the abomination of polytheism into the worship that should be given to the one God alone. The negligent are still publicly flogged for failure to take part in public worship in the mosques, and the rigid Puritanism of the Wahhabis not only prohibits the drinking of wine, but also the smoking of tobacco, and men are often flogged for the heinous offence of smoking a cigarette. Wahhabi

theologians act as officials of the State to compel the due observance of all the ordinances of Islam, and can call upon the officers of justice to punish offenders.

This sect does not appear to be expanding at the present time outside Arabia, but it had already gained adherents in India early in the nineteenth century, and still has a large number of followers in that country.

Towards the close of the nineteenth century another sect arose in India, which exhibits considerable activity at the present time—namely, the Ahmadiyyah. The teachings of the founder of this sect, Mīrzā Ghulām Ahmad (*ob.* 1908), are noticeably distinguished from the Wahhabi exposition of Islam by their toleration. He expounded the doctrine of Jihād, which to the Wahhabis means religious war against all unbelievers; in terms of the spiritual life as a struggle against the evil life and false doctrine, and taught that the Jihād against unbelievers must be conducted by peaceful means instead of by warlike methods. He claimed to be the Messiah for his generation, and in support of this claim he pointed to the gentleness and simplicity of his life as resembling those of Jesus. As Messiah he is also the Imām Mahdī, who, according to the popular belief of other Muhammadans, will appear some time before the Day of Judgment and will lead the united forces of the faithful in the conquest of the world for the faith of Islam; but a pacific and tolerant interpretation is given to this doctrine as to that of Jihād, and Ghulām Ahmad represented himself as the promised Imām Mahdī as bringing in a new era of religious enlightenment. In his Christology he also differed from the commonly accepted exegesis of the Qurʾān, in that he rejected the common Muslim doctrine that Jesus was taken up straight into heaven and a phantom was crucified in his place, for he maintained that Jesus was Himself crucified, but was taken down alive from the cross, and after the healing of His wounds, made His way into India, and ultimately died

and was buried in Kashmir. The bulk of his followers is to be found in the Panjab, but they carry on an active propaganda and have missionaries in England and Germany, in British colonies, and other parts of the world, and have succeeded in winning converts not only from among other Muslims, but also among Christians.

Apart from these organized Islamic sects there has, in recent times, been a considerable amount of religious speculation in the Muslim world. As stated above, Muslim theology was systematized under political conditions which made citizenship equivalent to the acceptance of the creed of Islam, and the believer was not only a member of a religious community, but also of a state. The law of the State was inextricably bound up with the organization of the religious life, and the civil and the religious authority were intermingled. Under such a system it was inconceivable that any Muslim should live under any non-Muslim rule. The decline of Muhammadan political power, which began as far back as the seventeenth century, and later resulted in the passing of vast Muhammadan populations under Christian rule, compelled them to readjust their views as to their position in human society. They found that they were no longer a dominant power, and that many of them had to live under governments which did not accept their faith. The realization of these altered conditions at first produced a feeling of depression and a sullen acquiescence in the decline of their status; but later, as the Muhammadans began to study the languages and the literatures of the European nations and recognized that by means of the knowledge and science of the western world, they could raise themselves from their sunken condition, some of them began to attempt to restate their theological position and adjust their religious opinions to the new knowledge that they had acquired from the West. Such an attempt was made in India by Sayyid Ahmad

Khān (*ob.* 1898), who, in his theological writings, laid stress upon Nature and sought to harmonize the teachings of Islam with modern science, and in Egypt, by Muftī Muhammad ‘Abduh (*ob.* 1905), who desired to give an exposition of the Muslim faith in a form acceptable to such of his fellow-countrymen as had come under the overwhelming influence of French culture. Both of these theologians combated the prevailing theological attitude among the orthodox, known as *taqlid*—*i.e.*, an unreflecting acceptance of religious authority as it finds expression in the accepted textbooks of earlier theologians—but both of them had been originally trained in the older schools of theology and their reforms were tentative and restrained, though they excited violent protests among old-fashioned thinkers. The younger generation, educated largely on Western lines, and familiar more with English, French, or Russian literature than with the theological writings of their co-religionists, began, when they turned their thought to religious speculation at all, to give to the doctrines of Islam a form and expression harmonious with the circle of ideas in which a European education had caused them to grow up. Particularly were some of them anxious to exonerate the faith of Islam from the imputations cast upon it by Christian controversialists and missionaries of being hostile to civilization and contaminated with beliefs and practices, characteristic of a barbarous age, from which the modern world had succeeded in shaking itself free. At the same time they wished to provide an antidote against the religious scepticism that prevailed among the younger generation and tended to weaken their loyalty towards the Muslim creed, and they hoped to provide them with a statement of their ancestral creed such as they would be willing to accept.

The prevailing character in this modernist movement may be expressed by the cry: “Back to the Qur’ān.” Such thinkers throw over the accumulated

mass of theological literature produced by previous centuries, which, they hold, has obscured the truth and marred the purity of the primitive revelation. They have worked out a new exegesis of the Qur'ān, which condemns polygamy, slavery, and the seclusion of women, and maintains that Islam provides a body of religious doctrine and a scheme of duties more capable of harmonization with modern science and more fitted to heal the evils of modern society than any other faith.

Consequently, there is a tendency in the Islamic world to adopt the same practice of monogamy as prevails throughout the greater part of the civilized world. The Turkish Republic, in 1926, made polygamy illegal by adopting the Swiss civil code, and in other parts of the Muhammadan world it has long been regarded with disfavour. Some modern theologians, such as the Ahmadiyyah, maintain that the verses of the Qur'ān which used to be considered to justify the possession of four wives at one time, were really intended to abolish polygamy altogether, because of the impossibility of practising it in view of the restrictions under which its usage was permitted. Much of the literature of these modernist thinkers consists of a polemic against Christianity in the desire to emphasize the excellences of Islam rather than positive attempts to give a systematic exposition of their own faith.

Apart from these more or less systematic expositions of Islamic theology in its most recent developments, there is a widespread body of opinion which is out of sympathy with the old-fashioned theology and is wont to attract notice more by its hostility towards the earlier circle of ideas and standards of living than by any earnest attempts to work out a restatement of the dogmas of Islam. Such persons have come to think that the theologians, in their reverence for the Sacred Law, believed to be based on divine revelation, have checked any healthy form of development and have

placed obstacles in the way of the much-needed adaptation of Muslim society to the altered conditions of the world and the demands of modern civilization.

In independent Muhammadan states, such as Turkey, the legists had attained a position of great influence in the State, and that influence had been used for the support of such a tyrannical form of government as that of the late Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Modern thinkers had come to recognize that piecemeal reforms were not possible, and that progress could only be achieved by making a complete breach with the established system of Muslim law, and by completely throwing over the accumulated conditions of the centuries. The modern Turkish Republic accordingly separated Church from State, abolished the religious orders and secularized religious endowments, and even penalized the wearing of a costume previously regarded as significant of adherents to the faith of Islam. Some superficial observers have interpreted these measures as indicative of a hostile attitude towards the faith of Islam. It is important, therefore, to recognize that there are Turkish thinkers who are engaged in setting before their fellow-countrymen a modernist exposition of Islam, largely coloured by mystical thought and claiming to return to the primitive faith of the first century of the Muslim era, while shaking off the accumulated accretions whereby later generations have obscured the purity of the primitive revelations. An attempt is thus made to convert the faith of Islam from a system of formal observances into an ethical religion, and stress is laid on a doctrine of duties rather than on the punctual performance of the ritual prescriptions of the old law. One of the exponents of this school of thought is Ziyā Gök Alp, who was born in 1875, and received his early education in a military cadet school. From 1910 to 1912 he was a member of the Central Committee of the Young Turk Party in Salonika, and after the Revolution he became

for a time Professor of Sociology in the University of Stambul; he was among those Turkish statesmen who were exiled to Malta after the occupation of Constantinople by the Allied troops, and since his release he has resided in Asia Minor. He has been active as a prose writer, dealing with many problems of social life and of ethics, and elucidating in modern terms some of the fundamental concepts of Muslim theology; but it is through his poetry that he has chiefly made his influence felt. One of these poems he calls "The Religion of a Turk":

" My religion is neither hope nor fear;
 I pray to God from love alone.
 No dread of hell or longing for the joys of Paradise
 Fills my heart; I listen only to the call of duty.
 O preacher, prate not of the torture of hell fire,
 Whose sparks fly up from hundredweights of
 wood;
 Speak rather of the beam from beauty's sun,
 That makes our hearts glow with the love of God.
 O preacher, tell us what that love is;
 Let Satan and let angels be.
 Tell of the rapture of the chosen band
 Of lovers and their love for God."

His religious aspirations also find expression in a poem entitled "The Fatherland":

" A land in which the call to prayer resounds from
 the mosque in the Turkish tongue.
 Where the peasant understands the meaning of his
 prayers.
 A land where the schoolboy reads the Qur'ān in his
 mother tongue;
 Where all men, high and low, have knowledge of
 the will of God,
 O son of the Turks, that is thy fatherland."

One of the features of the reformation of Islam which the modern Turks were endeavouring to effect is the abolition of polygamy, and the new ideal of marriage found expression in one of Ziyā Gök Alp's poems entitled "Woman":

"Human society rests upon three pillars. The first is the family.

Woman, it is thou who hast fashioned this nest for religion;

It is thou who didst first take the banner of the good life in thine hand,

Thy name it is that is written in golden letters on it. The second pillar is the State; that hath man created. First hunter, then shepherd, from shepherd he became ruler.

He has set up tribunals, saying Right is might; He has formed iron-clad armies, saying Might is right.

The third pillar is the nation. From the earliest days of human society

The souls of men have longed to form a nation. Religion was born of the family, law from the State, The highest ideal of the nation is a morality based on wisdom.

Neither man nor woman alone can build up the nation;

Only man and woman together, two souls united, can make it.

Together on one holy ground, they worship one God together."

In India the modernist movement has found its most remarkable expression in the poetry of Sir Muhammad Iqbāl, a serious and profound student of Western philosophy. Familiar with the most recent developments of philosophic thought, he has transferred some of the thought of Bergson and Nietzsche

into his own speculations; but Sir Muhammad Iqbāl, in spite of his learning and his wide reading, is no mere echo of other men's ideas, but is distinctly an original thinker. Here we are not concerned with his philosophical thought, but with his attitude towards the faith of Islam; in his poetry he expresses a passionate devotion to the person of Muhammad, whom he reverences above all as the Prophet of action; and he believes that in the teaching of Muhammad is to be found the basis for the ideal society, and that the regeneration of the Muslim world will be obtained through the vigorous expression of personality and by self-affirmation and self-development. In so far as every Muslim strives to make himself a more perfect individual, so far will he advance the progress of Islam in the world. In this glorification of action, as taught by the life of the Prophet, there is no room for the quietism which was a characteristic aspect of Muhammadan mysticism, of which this writer is an unsparing antagonist. His influence upon the younger generation of Indian Muslims has been extensive, but, naturally, from the philosophical form in which his teaching is presented, it has not served as the basis for any organized religious movement, nor, indeed, has that been in any degree the author's intention.

From the above brief survey of the various aspects of the faith of Islam it is clear that no single formula—beyond the brief simple words of the creed—can sum up its many diversities. Above all, there is a great cleft between the religious practices and outlook of the uneducated masses and the systematized beliefs of professed theologians; and between these two extremes the varieties of religious opinion are multifarious. Among the Muhammadans belonging to the lower races there are some who have hardly emerged out of the animistic circle of ideas in which their heathen ancestors lived. In nations with an inherited culture there are many devout persons whose theology is still of a medieval

type, while others are ready to adopt the latest phase of philosophical speculation. Some have lived from childhood in an atmosphere of Muslim piety, others have received an education of a Western type, into which hardly any breath of Muslim thought has entered. Some again, of a mystical temperament, retain their early faith, untouched by the shifting currents of opinion around them; others, eager to keep abreast of knowledge in its most recent phases, are impatient and resentful of an orthodoxy which they consider to be obstructive and reactionary.

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In the *Encyclopædia of Islam* (in progress) the reader will find separate articles on most of the items referred to in this book.

EDUCATIONAL THEORIES

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EDUCATIONAL THEORIES

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EDUCATIONAL THEORIES

CHAPTER I

EDUCATIONAL THEORY

A CERTAIN confusion often lurks under the term *educational theory*, arising from the fact that there are at least two different professional points of view from which it may be regarded, to say nothing of the lay attitude that also deserves attention. Teachers not unnaturally regard themselves as in a very special sense experts in this matter, and sometimes complain a little bitterly about the interference of outsiders in matters that concern the teaching craft. To be sure there are others in the profession who have no great belief in theory, and, indeed, openly contemn it. An ounce of practice, they complacently tell us, is worth a ton of theory. In the old manuals prepared for those who were in training to be elementary teachers it was customary to fill in at the beginning a small amount of theory, while the rest of the volume swelled out into what was respectfully treated as practice. For reasons to be found in the history of public education in England, elementary teachers were brought up to be more favourable to theory than were the secondary. The latter prided themselves on the knowledge of the subject-matter rather than on their skill in communicating it.

But teachers of all grades tend to make common cause against lay persons who presume to take a hand in the inner things of education. They admit that in

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the administration of education there is need for some degree of business skill, that for this sort of work those who are not professional teachers have a certain fitness, and that a place must be found for them. But of late these administrative persons have begun to talk with authority on education, and professional teachers are getting restive under it.

The truth is that a sharp enough line of demarcation is not drawn between teaching and education. It is not sufficiently realised that education includes teaching as the greater includes the less. Everyone who teaches another is to that extent an educator. We cannot teach without to some extent educating; but we can educate without going through the actual process of teaching. Most teachers are only too willing to claim to be educators. They feel that in the process of communicating knowledge and skill they are producing effects upon character, and are therefore entitled to be called educators, though this term is more commonly used in America than in England. There are, however, types of professional teachers who decline the more general term, and say that they are teachers and nothing more. They communicate a certain amount of information, and with that their responsibility ends.

Obviously we cannot go much further without making up our minds about what education means. The difficulty of this problem is demonstrated by the amount that has been written on the subject. Dr. Murray Butler sets out his solution in his *The Meaning of Education*. Professor J. Welton has a volume on *What do we mean by Education?* Dr. E. C. Moore has a book with the straightforward title *What is Education?* and Sir Stanley Leathes, claiming to be "the arch-examiner," adopts the same title for his book. It will be noticed in reading these and similar books that the tendency is to define education by its end or aim rather than by its processes. For a satis-

factory answer to the question implied or stated in all such works we must include both aim and process. Taking the view of the man-in-the-street, we get the simple definition "A preparation for life." People of a religious turn are sometimes inclined to make it run "A preparation for the life to come." Herbert Spencer makes the aim a trifle more specific by speaking of a preparation for "complete living." Other aims suggested run from the humble "preparing the child to earn his living" up to the dignified words of Milton's famous reference in his *Tractate on Education* to "a complete and generous education which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war."

One of the most famous definitions of education ever given was that supplied by John Stuart Mill in his well-known Rectorial Address delivered before the University of St. Andrew's. He told his audience that in its widest sense education must include "the indirect effects produced on character, and on the human faculties, by things of which the direct purposes are different: by laws, by forms of government, by the industrial arts, by modes of social life; nay, even by physical facts not dependent on human will, by climate, soil, and local position." Later in the address J. S. Mill gathers up his definition in a simpler form that has won much commendation: "The culture which each generation purposely gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to qualify them for at least keeping up, and if possible for raising, the level of improvement which has been attained."

The moment we ask how this is to be done we introduce the problem of the exact nature of education in itself. We must go beyond the problem of the end and look into the means. If we adopt the logical form of definition—genus plus difference—we have little difficulty in finding the appropriate genus. Most people will admit that education is a *process*. The

trouble arises when we seek to mark off this process from all other processes. Probably the best way will be to work round the educational process, analysing out the various elements that may be fairly said to be essential to the accepted meaning of the term.

To begin with, it will be generally admitted that education is a bi-polar process, the two poles being the teacher-pole and the pupil-pole. No sooner are these terms set down, however, than a feeling of uneasiness arises. It is realised that the terms suggest an undue restriction of the meaning of education. We have already noted the distinction between education and teaching, and now we are speaking of teacher and pupil as if they exhausted the situation. If teacher and educator are not quite synonymous terms, we naturally want to know what is the passive term that corresponds to *educator*. We may write out the statement "As the teacher is to the pupil, so is the *educator* to——" Most people would finish the second part of the proposition with the same word as the first, and, in point of fact, *pupil* is commonly used as the correlate to both *teacher* and *educator*. To maintain clearness of thinking it is, perhaps, well to revive an old seventeenth-century word and speak of the *educand* as the correlate of *educator*. The double form in which the bi-polarity is expressed does not in any way affect the fact that all education is bi-polar, and this fact must be suggested in any working definition we may adopt. The reintroduction of the term *educand* will serve the end of keeping distinct the teaching and the educating aspect of the process.

But while it is true that both teaching and education are bi-polar processes and do not conflict with one another, it does not follow that in either the process necessarily implies two separate persons. The bi-polarity may exist in the experience of one individual. When John Stuart Mill speaks in his description of education of "whatever we do for ourselves and what-

ever is done for us by others," he takes account of the part we play in our own education. What we do for ourselves is as much a part of education as what others do for us. The important point is that even when there is no external educator and we carry on what is called self-education, we are still carrying on a process that is bi-polar. The self is at the same time educator and educand. This reaction of the self upon itself makes up one of the greatest mysteries of life. The self that is acting and the self that is being acted upon are the same self, one and indivisible. The active aspect is sometimes called subjective, and the passive aspect objective, just as the perceiving mind is called subjective, while the outer world that it perceives is called objective. When we say that education is bi-polar we imply that it is a process that necessarily involves a subjective and an objective aspect, though not necessarily two persons.

Even in the conventional school course it is not necessary to have separate persons taking part all the time. Generally speaking, of course, there are two persons involved. The teacher-pole and the pupil-pole are openly in evidence in the persons of teacher and pupil. To the end of the school period the teacher remains teacher and the pupil remains pupil, but the relation between them does not remain the same. At the earlier stages the teacher is the active member playing the directing rôle, and the pupil is passive so far as direction is concerned. But sooner or later, in almost every school course, the pupil begins to take some interest in the process, to wonder what all this education is about, and to take an intelligent share in the process. As soon as the educand begins to take a hand in the process of educating himself he ceases to be a mere educand, and becomes to some extent an educator. As the process of education goes on, the educand takes to himself more and more of the functions of educator, till towards the end of the school

course he may become predominantly educator, without ceasing to be educand. He combines both functions in his own experience. Nor need the professional teacher resent this change of attitude, for it marks the success of his work. So far from resenting the educand's taking himself in hand, the teacher should welcome it as an indication of the success of the process of education. The teacher's function as educator is to make himself dispensable. When he has attained the goal of getting the educand to take himself in hand and undertake the responsibility for his own education, the teacher-educator may quietly fall back on his teacher function and let himself be used as an instrument by the educand, who has now become educator-educand. Naturally not all educands attain this complete emancipation, but all cases of fairly successful education imply the attainment of some degree of partnership in the education process. It is only in the somewhat rare cases of complete educational failure that the educand remains pure educand all the way through.

Coming now to the actual working of this process that we have discovered to be bi-polar, we find that there are at least three elements that are essential to the concept of education.

The first of these is found in the universally accepted notion that education implies some sort of modification of the educand. The nature of this modification is not at all easy to describe. It is difficult to answer the blunt question: "What is it that is to be modified?" In what is called physical education there is no trouble. The body is there ready to be acted upon and modified in the direction the educator may choose. But once we leave the body the trouble begins. Indeed, even in physical education thoughtful educators are not content to limit themselves to the mere, bodily-modification. They talk of the spiritual reactions to physical training, and refer to Montaigne's

famous proclamation that we are not educating a mind or a body, but a man. Modern psychologists are meeting the same sort of difficulty in their study by speaking of the human being as mind-body or body-mind.

Many teachers get over the difficulty by saying that what is modified by education is *character*. But this rather begs the question by introducing what is not of the essence of the problem. Though education is generally applied to training towards moral ends, and is almost universally understood to imply this direction of its efforts, there may be education that is good as education, but that is applied to bad ends. No one can deny that Fagin's academy as described in *Oliver Twist* was an excellent educational institution, however deplorable the results when viewed from the moral standpoint. So if we regard Machiavelli's *Prince* as an educational treatise, we cannot condemn its methods, though we may be far from approving the matter taught.

"The training of the mind" is a not uncommon description of the process, but we have seen that the body, too, is a legitimate object for the educator. "Training of mind and body," besides being clumsy, makes no provision for non-mental qualities such as the emotions, which are not mental in the technical sense of that term, and are yet coming rather prominently to the front as matter for educational treatment. "Modifying the disposition" carries with it a certain vagueness, since psychologists have not quite made up their minds about the exact meaning to be attached to the term *disposition*. Perhaps its very indefiniteness may make it a useful term to use while psychologists are working out the problem of the nature of temperament and its relation to intellectual and other qualities. We may sum up by claiming that, whatever else it means, education concerns itself with the modification of that organic whole

represented by what is called human nature as found in every individual.

The second essential element in the concept of education is *deliberate purpose*. The term *education*, as generally used, indicates no chance happening, but a purposeful process. No doubt our dispositions are modified by a great many forces that exist for all manner of purposes that are not specifically included in the accepted sense of the term *education*. Those extraneous forces referred to in Mill's definition—soil, climate, etc.—should not, for example, be included in the concept of education; and yet the very fact that a careful writer like him does introduce them, though tentatively, suggests that they have at least a claim to be considered. So strong is the feeling that such apparently adventitious forces have an educational effect that a name has been suggested for this informal type of education. When Henry Adams, in his well-known account of his own education, deals with formal education, he has little good to say of it. On most occasions when he finds that education has done him some good he calls it "accidental." A better term is used by Professor David Snedden of Columbia University. The kind of education we get by the mere process of living, the "licking into shape" that we get by our intercourse with others who have no thought of educating us in any way, he calls "by-education."

If into this apparently chance education there be introduced any element of purpose, however remote, a new name is necessary. If, for example, we accept the idea that behind all this apparently haphazard experience that licks us into some sort of shape there is assumed to be some world spirit, some directing influence—if you please, God—we find the demands of the concept of education satisfied, since the idea of deliberate purpose is admitted. Still, the purpose is so indefinite and so far removed from the ordinary course of life that it may be worth while marking off this

form of education in a class by itself, under some such name as "Cosmic Education."

The third of the essential qualities included under the concept education is that it always implies the use of an instrument. There must be some means by which the deliberate modification of the educand may be accomplished. This instrument is not far to seek. The very fact that in the popular mind teaching and education are regarded as all but synonymous at once suggests that this instrument must be knowledge. Teaching is very commonly understood to mean little more than the communication of knowledge. So markedly is this the case that a sort of knowledge fetish has been set up. As one goes to an ironmonger's for hardware, to a fishmonger's for fish, and to a cheesemonger's for cheese, so we naturally turn to the school for knowledge. It is often regarded as a knowledge-store, and the teacher as a knowledge-monger. But while this mechanical view is entirely wrong, it quite correctly suggests the fundamental importance of knowledge in education.

In the theory of education, knowledge has two values: its intrinsic value and its value as a training. Taking the intrinsic value, we have again two values: knowledge has an intrinsic value determined by the power it gives us over Nature and the outer world. This is what is often called "useful knowledge," and includes a great many of the facts of science. But there is another kind of knowledge that has no practical use in itself, but human society makes it valuable, gives it, in fact, a "sort of" intrinsic value. The facts of heraldry and many of the conventions of society are not in themselves valuable, but social custom makes them so. The distinction is not vital, though it has a certain educational importance, as Herbert Spencer brings out in his little book entitled *Education*. The one in which the aim of education may be effectively expressed is by saying that it has to prepare

the educand to make himself at home in his environment. Dr. E. C. Moore, in fact, says that the process of education consists in so modifying the environment that the educand will inevitably adopt the right attitude towards it. Another educational writer, Dr. Thomas Davidson, in a well-known lecture, dealt with "Education as World-Building," by which he meant that education consists in building up an inner world that fits into the outer world. It is not to be assumed that this inner world is a replica of the outer. It is not a picture or a model of the outer world, but merely a world of potentialities, a world of tendencies, a world of possibilities of behaving reasonably in all the situations that are continually recurring in what is called real life. This world is built up by means of supplying appropriate experiences to the educand. It is the function of the school, in fact, to supply experiences of just the right kind to give the educand facility in dealing with the situations of life. In his *Principles of Education*, Professor Franklin Jones tells us that unless the school can supply experience in a more organised and intensive form than can be had anywhere else, there is no justification for its existence. For it is evident that the ordinary process of living will result in the building up of an inner world that will enable the young person to get along sufficiently well in his surroundings. Where the school has the advantage is surrounded by select and organise the significant facts in that it can select their importance in time and space, and thus save much time and many unpleasant, not to say dangerous, experiences that would be otherwise inevitable.

But there is another way in which knowledge may be used as an educational organ or instrument. Apart from its intrinsic value, knowledge may play an important part in the educative process acting as a sort of grindstone on which the wits of the educand may be sharpened. There is much discussion about the

relative values of the various school subjects as trainers of the mind, but all admit that, while the values differ, every subject has *some* value in the training of the mind.

To these three essential elements included in the concept education a fourth may be doubtfully added. This is the element of time. While education may be said to be carried on from the cradle to the grave, it cannot be denied that in ordinary use the educand is regarded as a *young* person. There is, in fact, a certain range within which education may be naturally carried on. What may be called the span of education has varied at different times in the history of the world, and at any period it varies in different countries according to their stage of development. There has been a tendency of late years to increase the span of education, accompanied by a reaction against this increase. It is because of the activity of these opposing tendencies that the suggestion is made that the time element should be included as an essential in the concept of education.

Rousseau tells us that education begins with the first breath the infant draws. Froebel would throw it back to the Annunciation; while, if the eugenists had their way, they would throw it back countless ages. But while cosmic education or by-education may be started at these remote periods, formal education is not usually begun at an earlier period than the infant school age. Comparing the beginning ages for entering school as stated in the official returns from the various civilised countries of the world, we get between six and seven as a very common age, though of late, with the coming of nursery schools and other preliminary institutions, the beginning age has gone down. At the upper range eighteen is a very common limit for secondary school work. Twelve to fourteen is a usual termination of what has been hitherto known as the elementary stage.

What interests us mainly is that at the highest stage of all there does seem to be need for a limit. Twenty-four appears to represent a very common finishing age, and there seems to be a rather general agreement that beyond that stage the law of diminishing returns applies to such an extent that economic and educational considerations both suggest the advisability of drawing the line there. No doubt practice has had more to do than theory with the present span of education. When Plato gets his hand in, the range is greatly extended. Thirty-five years of age, and even fifty, mark stages in his educational scheme. But these advanced ages concern only the élite of his state, and can hardly be quoted in connection with education as a whole. There is, however, now so much discussion of the age limits of education that it seems justifiable to include a reference to age in the general definition towards which we are working.

Keeping in view all that has gone before, and realising the limitations under which the educator labours, we may adopt as a working definition of education: The process of deliberately guiding the development of young persons by the communication and manipulation of knowledge.

In order to get a grip of our subject—educational theory—we had to reach some sort of definition of education. In order to reach that definition we had to theorise all along the line. The inevitability of making assumptions in our subject is all too obvious, and the necessary acknowledgments will be made in their proper place. In the meantime we are concerned with the nature of theory with special reference to education. Theory originally meant looking on intelligently, contemplating, examining critically—and so it went on to represent the rational view of a practical subject. Theory is generally accepted as meaning the thinking out or planning something, and practice as the putting of thoughts or plans into operation. Teachers who

contemptuously proclaim that they have no use for theory do not mean exactly what they say. When asked why they do certain things in the way they do, they are ready enough with an explanation. This, though they are unwilling to admit it, is really their theory; but since it is plain and sensible, they do not recognise it *as* theory.

It is because they have nothing but theory that directors of education and amateurs who write about education are looked at askance by many professional teachers. A name is needed for those who are professionally connected with education, but are not actual teachers, a name that will also include those who make a study of education even though they take no active share in educational work. The word *educationist* offers itself, and is probably preferable to the longer form *educationalist*, though both are current. The word is, perhaps, better reserved for those who make a study of educational theory, whether they are professionally engaged in educational work of a practical kind or not. Many of the administrative officers in education departments are not entitled to be called educationists, and, to do them justice, many of them make no claim to the title. But, on the other hand, many of them are. The same might apply in a less degree to teachers. Most of them take enough interest in the theory of education to warrant them in claiming to be, not only teachers, but educationists, though a minority are content to call themselves merely teachers and leave it at that. For our purposes it will be convenient to keep the term *educationist* for those who are given to the study of education, while the term *educator* is generally reserved for practising teachers. Some educationists, however, have a just claim to be called educators, though they do no actual teaching, for we have seen that education includes a good deal more than actual instruction.

All teachers worthy of the name make some sort of

study of the theory of education, so all that we have to say in this little book is of direct interest to them. On the other hand, there are certain parts of this theory that concern only practising teachers. These include all the activities of the actual class-room. Everything connected with the methods of instruction belongs exclusively to the teachers, and in Chapter V., under the heading "Theories of Method," will be found a treatment of such matters. The educationist is not called upon to read a chapter of this kind, but the bigger problems of education are so pervasive that they have a direct influence on even the practical methodology of the class-room, and the educationist may find something of interest even on the plane of method. The same applies to the chapter on "Standards in Education," though here the educationist will probably find more congenial matter than in the Methods section.

The practical teacher, on the other hand, has no excuse for omitting any of the chapters. It is his business to make himself master of the whole range of education. The time has passed when the teacher can afford to be a mere craftsman; he cannot allow the intelligent outsiders, whom we have called educationists, to know more than he of the inner workings of the process to which he has devoted his life.

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY

EVERY educational theory necessarily implies a more or less clearly defined view of the nature of things, in other words, a philosophy; and every philosophy makes at some point or another at least one—usually many more—assumption. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find in the definition of education suggested tentatively towards the end of Chapter I a big and fundamental assumption. It takes for granted the possibility of education. It assumes the educability of the educand. At first sight, it does not seem an unreasonable demand to ask the reader to admit that education is possible. The world is full of schools and colleges, and something called education is going on conspicuously within them. But theory, being a kind of philosophy, has no right to take anything for granted, without acknowledging that an assumption is being made. It is the business of theory to detect all assumptions in the material it uses, and to acknowledge them.

If every theory of education implies an underlying philosophy, it is obvious that no philosophy can satisfy the educational theorist unless it is consistent with this fundamental assumption of educability. Keeping this condition in view the educational theorist may profitably look into all the available philosophies to find which offers him the safest foundation.

If he be what is called a plain man, one unsophisticated in the ways of professional philosophers, he will find something attractive in the very name of one

School of Philosophy that has had its day. The Common-sense School certainly admits of the assumption that education is possible. It is well accustomed to take things for granted. This is, indeed, its strong suit. It claims emphatically to be the philosophy of things as they are; though its critics are inclined to say that it is the philosophy of things as they appear. It is sometimes called the Scotch School, so we may be prepared to find it working along very cautious lines. It certainly raises no unnecessary difficulties for the educational theorist. There is the educator and there is the educand: they are free to react upon one another in a stable outside world that obeys its own well-established laws, and in which things are what they seem. In so far as the educator masters these laws and makes himself familiar with human nature—both junior and senior—everything is in order. All he has to do is to go in and educate. So long as the educator keeps to the plane of mere teaching, little difficulty need arise, but as soon as he dips into theory at the higher level of education, he finds that the Common-sense School does not carry him far enough.

The seeker after a philosophical basis for educational theory does not fare much better when he turns to determinism. Here he finds himself faced with a universe that is a huge system of causes and effects that make an endless chain through which no educator can break. So huge is the system, however, that there seems to be room for the interaction between educator and educand without loss of freedom on either side. But most educationists have an uneasy feeling that there is not much to be gained by theorising under a scheme that leaves no initiative for any of the elements of a vast mechanism, in the working of which each step is determined beforehand by immutable laws.

Yet some theorists feel so oppressed by the difficulties in dealing with that mysterious entity, con-

consciousness, that they find relief even in determinism. They cannot explain consciousness, and complain that they cannot even observe it. All that comes within their purview is the way in which human beings behave. This behaviour may be the result of conscious processes, but all that the observer can be sure of is the behaviour itself. Accordingly, these theorists call themselves behaviourists, and work within their sphere of experience by studying the behaviour of the educands, and by basing their practice on whatever conclusions they can draw from their observation. The doctrine is getting quite a considerable following, since it frees the theorist from grappling with the ultimate problem of freedom, and yet leaves him at liberty to carry on his work on a high intellectual level.

There is something attractive in a certain view of humanity that can hardly be technically called a philosophy, but has strong affinities with determinism. It is often called the mechanistic view, and may be best presented as the scheme that treats man as a machine.

In the eighteenth century, La Mettrie published a tiny book called *Man the Plant*, which did no harm, for after all a plant is an organism, and the parallel between man the plant and man the animal led to no contradiction. But when La Mettrie followed up the plant booklet by a bigger work called *Man the Machine*, trouble arose among the educationists. For if man is a machine he is beyond the reach of any educator. Certainly La Mettrie is generous, if not quite consistent, in his concessions. Man is a machine, no doubt, but he belongs to that kind of machine that winds itself up, in which case he comes to some extent within the range of the outside educator, who may be assumed to be permitted to take a hand now and then in the winding up. The trouble is that if the human machine can wind itself up it ceases to be a machine in the proper sense of that word, and

accordingly La Mettrie has no status in educational theory. He cannot have it both ways. Either man is a real machine, in which case he lies entirely outside the educator's influence, or he comes under that influence, in which case he is not a machine.

It is interesting to note how often theorists claim to regard man as a machine, and yet treat him as a fit subject for education. They do not seem to realise that they put themselves out of court in educational discussion by depriving the educand of a soul, or its equivalent. Mark Twain, for example, in a curious but intensely interesting excursus into the realm of psychology, published a book, after a quarter of a century of deliberation on the subject, under the title of *What is Man?* The answer to his own question is given in the phrase in the text: "Man the machine" who, he tells us, "is moved, directed, *commanded* by external influences *solely*. He originates nothing, not even a thought." This state of affairs, as Mark tells us elsewhere, "is very offensive." But, however disagreeable to Mark, this outside domination is not objectionable to the educator, who, it will be noticed, is one of the outside influences. Still, Mark is not discouraged by the machine status to which he has reduced man, and goes about his educative work just as if the machine-man had a soul. If a writer extracts man's soul, the least he can do afterwards is to leave the soulless machine in peace. But this is not the way of the mechanist philosophers. They all want to preach to their soulless victims. Mark Twain, for example, in this book of his, produces an *admonition* that he likes so much that he prints it in two different parts of his text. It is an excellent admonition, if only it had been addressed to anyone with a soul: applied to a machine, it is just a little out of place.

Mr. Arnold Bennett is in a little better case, for, at the expense of consistency, he earns the right to do his preaching. In his little book, *The Human Machine*,

he allows man to have an ego, which, of course, involves a contradiction of the title of his book, but at any rate justifies the sermon that he administers to his human machine. Even so clear a thinker as T. H. Huxley falls into the preaching habit when dealing with human beings, whom he has practically reduced to automata. The dramatist Karl Capek, in his *Rossum's Universal Robots*, at least avoids this error. His Robots are men machines that are interesting to the general public and instructive material for broad-minded psychologists, and they are entirely sermon free.

It is this urge of the educationist to preach—that is, to practise the craft about which he theorises, that makes him doubtful about determinism, in spite of its attraction in other directions. So it is not wonderful that he seizes on any opportunity that may enable him to combine the definiteness of determinism with the freedom of initiative that he feels to be essential in the process of education. Accordingly, the loophole offered by Henri Bergson is welcomed by some of the educational theorists. The claims of determinism are so strong that this philosopher practically accepts them for the universe at large, but saves his philosophical conscience by making an exception to the deterministic basis on which he is willing to build up his view of the universe. Living creatures, he is glad to admit, are “centres of indeterminism.” This is quite sufficient for the educationist, for it makes room for the educable educand. Determinism may hold all the rest of the universe in thrall so far as the educational theorist cares, so long as human beings are left their freedom.

But, after all, Bergson's concession is an assumption, and, if we are going to make assumptions anyway, it may be possible to get a less arbitrary one. Accordingly, a large number of educationists turn to the various forms of idealism. Without doubt the

whole of this school of philosophy is based on a big assumption. But the representatives of idealism acknowledge the assumption to be an assumption, and a big one at that.

This assumption is that the universe is rational. Critics smile grimly when they hear this, and point to the many apparently irrational things to be observed in this universe of ours. For the assumption implies—and the idealist philosophers assent—that whatever is actual is rational, and whatever is rational is actual. But the idealists do not claim that whatever is rational is actual at any given moment. They do maintain, however, that what is rational either is or will be actual. For this is no otiose philosophy that would lead the thinker to rest content with the state of things at present existing, however evil that state may be. The idealist realises as well as another that evils exist, and this realisation is accompanied by indignation at the evils and a firm determination to get rid of them. The taunt that the idealistic attitude really admits that “whatever is, is right,” may be met by the contention that whatever *is* at any moment includes not only the evils of that moment but the philosopher’s appreciation of those evils, and his full purpose of and endeavour after their removal.

Being by hypothesis rational, the whole universe is working towards a rational goal in a rational way. If this fundamental assumption is denied, there seems to be no good end to be served by continuing the discussion. Why reason about anything in a universe which is not admitted to be run on a rational basis? It is idle to call upon the idealist philosopher to *prove* his contention, for he and his fellows all form part of this great organic whole that we call the universe, and cannot get outside of it in order to envisage it, and demonstrate its rationality. We can no more get outside the universe than we can stand upon our own shoulders.

Underlying all the educational applications of the idealist position is the idea of organism as applied to the educand. This implies the working together of forces in such a way as to lead to the development of an entity towards a definite end, that end being determined by the nature of the organism. The notion of development is included in the concept *organism*. Growth is mere increase in bulk, but development means the working towards an end, that end being determined by the nature of the organism, and the process of attaining it being determined by the laws of the organism's nature.

But even if we are granted the rationality of the universe, and the nature of organism and development, we are far from free in the working out of an educational theory. Assuming that educator and educand are alike organisms, that they must develop according to the laws of their own nature, and that any interference from without must necessarily result in a stunted product, we do not seem to have much room left for the educator. Froebel, who heartily accepts the idealistic position, tells us in his *Education of Man* that the child naturally and inevitably chooses that which is best for his own development, just as a swallow on the wing selects the exact level at which to catch its prey. If this be true, what place is left for the educator? Surely his occupation is gone.

Froebel's solution is botanical. A plant must develop according to the laws of its own nature, and yet there is room for a gardener. An acorn can develop into nothing but an oak, but the tree cultivator has a great deal to do with the sort of oak that results. Even when a stunted abortion of an oak is the end of the process of development, that result has been brought about by the acorn's following the laws of its own nature. Those inhuman creatures who, in the Middle Ages, produced comical abortions for the sport of courts by compressing children's heads into fantastic shapes, did

their nefarious work by applying the laws of the children's nature. The lesson for the educator is obvious. Like these abortionists he must utilise the laws according to which the child develops, but towards a good end instead of a bad one.

Why, then, the suspicion of the educator that we find so common among critical laymen? If he is only doing for the child what the cultivator does for the sapling, why not treat him with good will, and bid him god-speed in his work? The answer appears to be that the more thoughtful among laymen are afraid of the sacred individuality of the child. Many people share the suspicion of Blake, who thanked God that he never was sent to school to be flogged into following the style of a fool. They do not fall back on the laws of the child's own nature, but express a vague distrust of the educator's influence. The cause of this suspicion may be traced to a certain unintelligent misunderstanding of the relation between educator and educand in the process of education.

The child is set on a moral pedestal, and poets and moralists busy themselves in proclaiming his virtues. We are told that he comes from heaven, which is his home: that he brings trailing clouds of glory in his wake: that he passes with gradually dimming splendour through the stages of boyhood and youth till he reaches the light of common day as a fully developed man. More or less unconsciously the blame for the disappearance of this glory is laid at the educator's door, and it must be admitted that, after all, he is responsible for just the period during which the trailing clouds disappear.

The whole attitude is wrong. An element of antagonism is introduced where it is out of place. Because the child comes from heaven there is a suggestion that the educator comes from another quarter. It is forgotten that he, too, had a cloud-trailing period. It is not realised that he, too, is an

organism, that educand and educator alike form parts of the wider organism of the universe, and that their interaction upon one another is merely the ordinary reconciliation of opposites in a higher organic unity. If there is a conflict between the two personalities, it does not by any means follow that the educand is the one to be subordinated or to go under. In point of fact, the educator, in order to attain his ends, must study carefully the nature and peculiarities of the educand, and must adapt his processes to meet the needs of the educand. Educators have to stoop to conquer. But in the last resort, and taking all things into account, there is no more subjection on the part of the educator than on the part of the educand. Each is working out his salvation in his own way. Each is realising himself, in a thoroughly wholesome way, that can be fully understood only when viewed from the point of view of eternity.

At this stage we are brought face to face with what is probably the highest form in which the goal of education can be presented. *Self-realisation* implies the making the best of oneself; bringing out of oneself the best of which one is capable. Sometimes the same ideal is represented by the term *self-expression*, but this term is not quite so satisfactory. For it implies the existence of a self already made, and ordinary experience shows us that ready-made things are not quite so good as things made to order. A ready-made self is not so attractive as one in the process of making. Further, mere self-expression does not even hint at further development. *Self-realisation* suggests a goal: self-expression does not. The notion of the ideal underlies the concept of self-realisation. Further, it includes the notion of subordination of self to secure higher development for that self. Self-expression comes parlously near what is commonly known as *self-assertion*. There are occasions in life when self-assertion is a virtue, but there are more when it is not. In any case, self-asser-

tion does not suggest any form of self-abnegation or subordination of the self, whereas in self-realisation there is often an imperative call to subordinate the self in certain directions in order ultimately to raise it to higher levels. Thus in religious connections it is not unusual to hear such expressions as "and in Thy service find perfect freedom."

The truth is that the only way in which self-expression can rank on equal terms with self-realisation is when it is regarded as a stage towards self-realisation. It has to be admitted that in order to realise the self we must be continually exercising it. From this standpoint self-expression is a means towards self-realisation. Indeed, when theorists are challenged for adopting self-expression as their goal, they reply, reasonably enough, that they mean the same thing by this term as others mean by self-realisation. This may be readily granted, but it cannot be denied that self-realisation is the more comprehensive term, and, therefore, on the whole preferable.

Limits of space prevent further reference here to other systems of philosophy that may have a share in determining the development of educational theory. Most of the theorists may be allocated to one or other of the systems referred to above, though, of course, there are some erratic writers who do not fit in perfectly anywhere. Herbart, for example, has had his philosophical position determined by his educational views, rather than the other way round. He denies that he is a materialist, so the best we can do for him is to class him under the heading of *atomistic*, as this is the aspect of his philosophy that enables him to make such an effective educational presentation.

There are some ingenious educational theorists that cannot be placed in any recognised philosophical category, and yet have had some influence on the educational thought of their time. Such was Rudolph Steiner, who, by an elaborate system of symbolism,

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created quite a stir in educational circles of the more impressionable type of theorists.

It has to be noted that, though every educational system has a philosophy behind it, there is no reason why each theorist must be classified as belonging to one recognised philosophical school. Naturally, there is a strong tendency to eclecticism, each theorist taking from different schools of philosophy what he finds suits his purpose. Accordingly, in the next chapter the basis of classification will be educational rather than philosophical.

CHAPTER III, CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL THEORISTS

WHEN education as such began to be recognised as a separate study in connection with the training of teachers, and afterwards as a subject in University curricula, it was only natural that lecturers on education should look out through world-literature for great names wherewith to adorn their lists of prescribed reading. Quite naturally Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were seized upon at the very start, and a good deal of ingenuity was shown in bringing out educational principles from their work, oral and written. Plato's *Republic*, no doubt, was begun as a treatise on government, but when finished it could be not unfairly claimed as really a text on education. While Aristotle has no one volume that can be treated in this way, there are passages in the *Ethics*, the *Politics*, and even the *Poetics* that may be legitimately appropriated by the educational theorist. So with Quintilian; though his book, *Concerning the Orator*, was written with regard to one profession, there is a great deal in the text that is of importance to educators. It was only to be expected that all the way down the ages great writers should have been called upon to pay toll to the historian of educational theorists. Even at the present day one of the best ways for a young lecturer on education to establish his claims as an educationist, is to select some well-known writer and publish a book under the title "So-and-So as Educator." Thus we have articles or books on *Hegel as Educator*, *Browning as Educator*, *Wordsworth as Educator*, *Kant as Educator*, and even *Dickens as*

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Educator, little as that novelist sympathised with the schoolmaster attitude.

Anyone taking a wide view of educational theory and proposing to write on the subject will naturally seek for some basis of classification to enable him to arrange his matter in a fairly systematic way. The earliest writers were inclined to select the obvious basis of the chronological order in which the theories appeared. Unfortunately these theories did not come to light in that orderly fashion that writers with tidy minds desire. Accordingly, in the earlier works there is a struggle between chronology and logic in presentation, and often there is a great deal of ingenuity expended in trying to reconcile different bases of classification.

After a preliminary period of experimentation in presentation, in which Dr. Henry Barnard did important work in the collection of material, we reach the point at which R. H. Quick produced his *Essays on Educational Reformers* that marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of the subject. Himself a schoolmaster, with an intense interest in the theory and practice of his craft, Quick was not content to be a mere chronicler, so he let himself go along the lines of his own interest, the result being probably the best book of its kind ever produced. The influence of the work may be estimated by the fact that, for long after its appearance, people seldom spoke of educational theorists, but of educational reformers.

Oscar Browning's *Educational Theories* is a slight work, but was not without its effect in directing the discussions on classification. Certain descriptive technical terms were in general use in his time, and he did something to clarify their meaning, and limit their application. He makes a good point when he starts with the following description of what he considers the three most important types of educational

theorists: "(1) Those who wish to educate through the study of the Classics; (2) those who wish to educate through the study of Nature; (3) those who aim at an education independent of study and knowledge, and think rather of the training of character and the attaining of the Greek ideal, the man beautiful and good." These three classes correspond in a general way to the three descriptive terms that supply the basis of the earlier classification of educational theorists: the humanists, the realists and the naturalists. The terms are still used in educational discussions, so it is worth while examining what underlies each.

Humanism no doubt has a definite reference to the Classics, but is not by any means confined to these subjects. It is the spirit of humanism that counts, and it may be cultivated as well on other matters as on Latin and Greek. In fact, these languages can be taught and studied in a spirit that is starkly un-humanist. There always has been humanism in the world, and always will be, but without doubt the period at which humanism is generally regarded as having reached its highest level coincided with the zenith of the Renaissance. At that time Latin and Greek were valued both for their form and for their content. Their value as language was fully recognised, but attention was not limited to the linguistic side. Men valued Latin and Greek because they brought moderns into touch with the riches of classical thought. By and by the beauty of the instrument began to subtend too big an angle in the minds of those who used it. Scholarship took a narrower, more technical form, and humanism gradually degenerated into pedantry, though, as a tool of education, the classical languages still retained a value, and in the hands of skilful and sympathetic teachers they always form admirable teaching material. All the same, those classical teachers are wise who base their claim for

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their favourite studies to some extent on the merits of the languages, but in the main on the history of Europe for the past twenty-four centuries. The value of the Classics is still mainly humanist.

Humanism in education to-day is no longer limited to the Classics. Any subject that is taught in its bearings on the broader human interests is now ranked as humanist. What is usually called a liberal education has nearly always a strong humanist bias. The liberal arts are generally regarded as those that are worthy of the attention of a free man, arts that are not necessarily useful in the economic sense. Sometimes, indeed, the liberal arts, and particularly the Classics, have been defended on the ground of their uselessness. In this view they are valuable in meeting the spiritual and æsthetic needs of man. So far as these studies meet these needs they serve their purpose, whether they are useful or not, in the popular sense of that term. We are familiar with the story of the humanist mathematician who finished up an account to his friends of a delightfully attractive theorem he had just evolved with the enthusiastic flourish: "And, gentlemen, thank God no use can be made of it." What these humanists really admire is not the uselessness of their results, but their disinterestedness. A study is to be estimated not by what it enables the student to accomplish on the utilitarian side of life, but by its effects on the person who studies it. Because a subject can be applied to useful practical ends, however, it need not lose its culture value. No doubt those who try to make out a case for the culture value of stenography and type-writing have a hard task before them; but it is not a hopeless one, if only they will be content with moderate claims compared with those of the recognised humanist subjects.

In view of all this, it will be seen that it is an insufficient description of *realism* to say that it con-

sists in educating by a study of the works of nature. Still further wrong are those who believe that humanism deals with words while realism deals with things. "Things, not words," has been used as the slogan of the realists. But, on the one hand, true humanism prides itself on dealing with the finest *thought* in the most fitting words, with matter as well as with expression, and, on the other, realism stakes its reputation on being able to describe with accuracy the facts of what is somewhat loosely called real life. When we are told that a science is but a well-made language, we cannot be sure whether it is a humanist or a realist that is speaking. It is true that the very word *real* suggests something tangible. The Germans find it useful to have a plural word to indicate actual things as opposed to mere thoughts. What is represented by their word *Realien* might form the greater part of the data of Geology, yet would make but a poor show in Metaphysics. On the other hand, words would prove a prominent feature in both.

According to the attention paid to words, there may be different kinds of realists: so we need not be surprised when certain qualifying words are attached to the term. *Verbal realist* is obviously an appropriate term to apply to those who give words a prominent place in their scheme. *Sense realist* is the term applied to those who emphasise the part the senses play in the building up of the inner world. Locke, for example, is often called a sense realist. Comenius is frequently referred to this class, though it seems more natural to call him a verbal realist, since the main feature of his scheme of instruction is the correlation of words and *Realien*. His *Orbis Pictus*, the famous textbook in which actual objects are represented by pictures, beside which are printed the corresponding Latin words, may be used to justify the term *sense realist*, since it certainly appeals to the senses: but on the other hand it is obvious that the

pictures are used with the very definite purpose of inculcating the names of the objects. Many of his other books are collections of classified words, and clearly support the application of the adjective *verbal* to his brand of realism.

We have seen, that according to one writer the naturalists form a group of educationists who do not depend on study at all, whether of things or of words; but give their attention to the training of character in the process of living. It was suggested that the Greek ideal of the good and beautiful man was of the essence of naturalism. But a much wider view is now necessary if we are to make room for the many new claimants for a place under the heading "Naturalists."

We cannot do better than take up one who is perhaps the most prominent naturalist who ever wrote on education, and work our way from him outwards to include all the groups that have a right to the name. When he was young, Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote a competitive essay on the general problem of whether civilisation had improved or degraded humanity. With his congenital tendency to say the opposite of the natural and the obvious, he took the view that civilisation was a mistake. This gained him the prize, but set on foot an educational theory that cost educational writers a great deal of trouble to keep in its proper place. Rousseau in his great educational work (called *Emile*, from the name of the boy-educand round whom it is written) begins with the statement that everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Creator, but at once begins to deteriorate in the hands of man. Civilisation is a blunder, and our only hope of salvation lies in retracing our steps. "Back to Nature" is the slogan of Rousseau's educational theory. The noble savage is set up for our admiration, and his somewhat pronounced defects are conveniently ignored.

What separates this noble child of Nature from the degraded men of civilisation is clearly education. One would think that in that case the natural preventive of decay would be the abolition of education. But such a course would have interfered with the publication of this grand work on education, so a middle line had to be followed. Education of some kind had to be dealt with, so Rousseau hit upon his plan of negative education, of which the main principle is to lose time wisely. Since ordinary education is bad, and leads to deplorable results, and since there must be an educator in order that there should be a discussion at all, it was obviously necessary to keep this educator out of mischief by limiting him to the negative work of preventing the damage he would necessarily do if he were allowed to undertake positive work. Leaving this Rousselian tutor to the dull work that his creator's genius contrives to make interesting to the reader, let us consider the naturalism on which the *Emile* is built.

If man must be led back to Nature, it is obviously assumed that man is not himself natural. When left to himself, the implication is that he will inevitably go wrong. Unlike sparks, he has no tendency to fly upwards. His bias is in the other direction, and, if Rousseau is to be believed, the efforts of the external educator are likely to accelerate the downward progress.

All this opposition set up between Nature with a capital letter, and plain human nature, is unwholesome, and is based on the sentimental attitude that we have seen to be favoured by the poets. When Cowper tells us, for example, that

“God made the country, but man made the town,”

we have an opposition introduced that is not warranted. If God did make the country, He also made

man, and is, therefore, indirectly responsible for both town and country. The town-versus-country attitude represents a poetic whim rather than a philosophic attitude. There are those who think in a vague way that a peasant's smock is more natural than a stock-broker's frock-coat.

The practical point for the educator is-to find what Nature wills, and do that. This indeed is what an educational writer has done whom we have already encountered in another connection. John Amos Comenius we have found labelled a realist of some sort, probably of the verbal variety. But whatever else he is, Comenius is certainly a naturalist. In his great work the *Didactica Magna*, he is continually appealing to Nature, and calling upon the educator to follow her. Nature does not proceed by leaps: neither must the educator. Nature always does things at the seasonable time: so must the educator. The book is full of such parallels, and the applications are always apt, if a little far-fetched.

What is somewhat crudely applied in Comenius is the same sort of principle that we find in the philosophical system that adopts the name of Naturalism. In educational theory the term *naturalist* is usually applied to those who follow the big laws that govern the great universe, and among these laws those of human nature are included. For it is not fair to pick and choose among the laws that we are going to regard as natural. If we are to make a selection of laws, we must at least let it be known on what basis we are to proceed. When Pope tells us that

"We are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul,"

he suggests a more wholesome view of Nature, though he introduces a new source of disturbance of the unity of the whole by a sort of antithesis between Nature

and God. When we are urged to follow Nature, what is usually meant is that we should study this stupendous whole, analyse out the fundamental principles underlying its working so far as that is possible, and base our educational activities on what we there discover. In short, the plan of the naturalist in education is, in the Scots phrase, to "get as far ben wi' God" as circumstances and our nature will admit. It is curious that our examination of Naturalism in education should lead to the notion of the World Spirit manifesting itself in the world, since on the religious side Naturalism is the name given to the attitude that eliminates all notion of the supernatural. The meaning of Nature is the essential point in our present discussion, and according to our decision on this matter will our educational theory become optimistic or pessimistic.

In medieval times Naturalism was used to indicate the lower estimate of human nature that laid stress on the fleshly lusts and grosser aims that were set over against the idealism and romance of chivalry. So in the Bible "the natural man" is used in a way that might have given Rousseau pause in his admiration of the noble savage. This natural man corresponds to "the beast" that Tennyson urges us to "work out" in our progress towards higher things. If we are to be true to our assumption of the rationality of the universe and to self-realisation as the ultimate aim of education, we must interpret Naturalism as referring to the better nature, not the worse. The nature that we have to follow is the potential, though not yet realised, state at which all the elements of the universe attain their fullest and finest development. It may be objected that this ideal is unattainable, and therefore outside the pale of practical education. But it is of the essence of the ideal that it should be unattainable. There would not be the incessant quotation of Browning's couplet,

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"A man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?"

unless the implied theory had a firm foundation in the needs of human nature. A mere end or aim is good enough so far as it goes, and we have many witty quips on the folly of striving after the unattainable, but the stimulus supplied by the unreachable goal is its own justification.

"The joy lies in the doing,
And the rapture of pursuing
Is the prize."

To the three standard groups of educational theorists boasting a definite and well-recognised name, there now falls to be added a fourth that is at least on its way to recognition.

With their well-known love of logical arrangement the French theorists have been scandalised by the lack of unity in educational systems. The spirit of Comte has been moving among them, and they are not satisfied with the present haphazard arrangements. They point out that education is a thing of shreds and patches. The pupils have no idea of what it is all about, and just go on from day to day doing their "day's darg," and not troubling about what underlies it all. Nor can the boys be blamed, for it appears that the masters themselves do not trouble about these ultimate things, but do their daily teaching and rest content with that. As Ernest Lavissee graphically says: It is the case of "a fragment of an educator addressing itself to a fragment of a pupil," and he might well have added, "about a fragment of a subject." All this has roused the desire for some sort of unification of the process of education that will integrate all the elements into an intelligible whole. The ideal is excellent, and the general effect of Integral Instruction as a theory will be to quicken the consciences of

educators in the matter of organising their work. But the realisation of the idea of integration must be recognised to be at least remote. Only the most virulent optimism could extract hope from the following excerpt from Lavissee's essay on *An Education that Failed*: "We shall be educators on the day on which, each of us having before the mind the whole successive development of the pupil, we shall be all and each, so to speak, the same master, the perpetual master of that pupil." The essence of Integral Instruction thus resolves itself into an attempt to reduce all education in schools to an organic unity in which the whole teaching body shall act as an organic unit on each individual pupil.

While Integralism may be treated as an independent theory, because it has clearly marked founders and supporters, and can be referred to the influence of a recognised philosopher, there are a great many educational developments of theory that are exercising influence on thought and practice that yet do not offer sufficiently clear stigmata to enable the critic to cord them off into separate, clearly marked groups. Critical writers on educational theory are still glad to use the old terms so far as they go, but with the rapidly increasing complexity of the situation they are now falling back upon a more general form of treatment, and are inclined to deal with *tendencies* rather than with sharply marked-off schools of educational thought.

In this tendential treatment we at least get rid of the chronological complication. We may treat the same writer under several different headings according as his work exemplifies this or that tendency. To illustrate, take the *psychological* tendency. A favourite representative here is Locke, who is certainly at home in this group. But on the other hand, on the purely educational side, he is often rightly classed among the *disciplinarians* from his views on the values of cer-

tain subjects of the curriculum. It would be quite possible to place him also in groups connected with sociology and vocational work. On the other hand, an educationist like Herbart will be placed by many writers definitely in the psychological section and left there, though there will be found writers who would give him a place under several different tendencies. The elasticity thus made possible will be welcomed by all who have suffered under the rigid scheme that leads to interminable quarrels about what are really insignificant differences.

When we consider the *scientific* tendency we find a curious interplay of two tendencies within the big tendency. Some theorists are more interested in science as subject-matter to be taught in schools, others in the scientific attitude to be adopted in dealing with educational theory. Herbert Spencer belongs mainly to the first group, but has certain affiliations with the second. T. H. Huxley is still more closely restricted to the first group. The scientific tendency in educational theory is marked by a certain impatience among its exponents of the purely philosophical attitude adopted by others. Curiously enough, perhaps the most prominent among those representing the scientific tendency is a woman. Dr. Montessori in her writings is continually pointing out that her work is purely scientific, and she has little sympathy with those whose tendency is purely philosophical. G. Stanley Hall was one of the earliest to adopt the scientific attitude, and though many of his conclusions are no longer accepted, his influence is still felt. The tendency at the moment is closely connected with all the quantitative and experimental work that is being done. Perhaps the best representative of the scientific tendency in both aspects is Professor T. Percy Nunn, whose book on *Education: its Data and First Principles*, is the most authoritative presentation on this aspect of our subject.

The sociological tendency is very marked at the present time, particularly in the United States. Education naturally always had a sociological bias; indeed, it is of its very nature concerned with social phenomena of all kinds. It might almost claim to be the first practical form that sociology took in its own development. Of late years the social conscience has been so stirred that there has been a vigorous repercussion on educational theory. Dr. John Dewey is the most prominent writer on this tendency. His philosophy lends itself very naturally to this aspect of education, and his own experience in connection with the training of teachers has given him an excellent background against which to project his theories. His work on *School and Society*, along with the magazine with the same title, makes an excellent presentation of the working of this tendency. No doubt it has rather a leaning towards the by-educational. Its exponents are inclined so to arrange matters that education may be insinuated rather than imposed. When the subject-matter is deliberately treated, there is a natural bias towards citizenship and service. So different is this tendency from any of the others that it naturally introduces from different angles the problem of collectivism in education, which needs the separate treatment which it will receive in our last chapter.

CHAPTER IV

STANDARDS IN EDUCATION

THE trouble experienced in classifying educational theories results from the general lack of organisation in the study of education as such. The subject forms, indeed, a happy hunting-ground for more or less irresponsible critics. People will talk freely about education who show a commendable diffidence in expressing opinions on matters generally recognised as scientific or philosophical. Up till recently there has been a lack of mystery about education: it formed a sort of no-man's-land where opinion was rampant and authoritative doctrine hard to find. A well-known professor of education used to give to his class at intervals the exercise of selecting ten educational principles from recognised authorities, one principle from each authority. This useful exercise was usually well done, but the trouble began with the sequel. This consisted in requiring the students to produce from the works of other educational authorities a contradiction of each of the ten principles they had previously supplied. The interesting thing is that the second exercise did not prove nearly so formidable as both professor and students had expected—so general is the difference of opinion among educational authorities. Occasionally, indeed, a principle would turn out to be so hopelessly sound that no contradiction could be found: but in most cases contradictions bristled to the student's hand.

One lesson learned from the exercise was that a great many of the contradictions were more apparent than real. Examination often showed that, when actually confronted, the contradictory statements could

be honestly reconciled by reference to some higher principle. Often the contradictory statements were taken from different parts of the subject, each statement having a justification in its context, and being quite consistent with the principle to which it was opposed, if only both were taken together, and correlated under a wider principle.

But while all allowance must be made for such false appearance of contradiction, there were quite enough genuine inconsistencies to justify the suspicion with which educational theory has been long regarded. It is only natural that the presence of these real and apparent contradictions should convey to the general reader, to the plain man, and, indeed, to the professional educator, the impression that the subject of education is in a bad way, and has no stability. It is in the nature of things that striking contradictions should attract more attention than commonplace agreements. Yet there has grown up now a great body of accepted truths in education about which controversy has died down, and about which, therefore, there is no enthusiasm. It is worth noting that in the profession of education no use is made of a phrase that is current in law, in medicine, and even in divinity. This is "the books." Doctors and lawyers talk easily about "the books," by which they mean the recognised authorities on their subjects, authorities by which they feel more or less bound to stand. An appeal to "the books" is taken as all but final. It is true that at the advanced borders of their subjects there is an area within which discussion is still possible, and where changes may be effected. But the great body of doctrine is held to be established, and set up as an authority.

Educational theory is just reaching this state of stable equilibrium. There is now a great body of doctrine of such general acceptance that against it there is practically no appeal. Professor S. S. Laurie

was probably premature in calling his well-known treatise *Institutes of Education*. In his day there was hardly a sufficient body of generally accepted doctrine to warrant the dignified title. But to-day we are approaching, if we have not actually reached, the stage at which education may claim a modest place among the stable studies. When there are close on a dozen books in English alone under the uniform title of *Principles of Education*, it is obvious that there is no lack of material for professional study, and when we examine their contents we find such substantial agreement that some people are beginning to wonder whether separate books of this kind are required. No doubt a great many differences are recorded in the pages of these books, but there is growing up a uniformity even in the treatment of differences, which suggests in the most convincing way that there is somewhere a fundamental basis of agreement, if only we can reach it.

The first step towards this general agreement is naturally to get the problem stated in the clearest possible way. In this subject, as in so many others, lack of accurate terminology is one of the main causes of obscurity. It was long before there grew up a technical vocabulary sufficiently accurate to ward off arrogant outsiders on the one hand, and on the other, keep insiders within the path of more or less scientific procedure. So long as there were no mysteries in the profession, no arcana beyond the reach of the lay person, education was exposed to attacks and criticisms from the uninformed. Now, however, that the study is acquiring a respectable technical terminology, the layman is getting a little more diffident in his attitude towards educational theory. Education is gradually attaining an approach to something like scientific standing.

While outsiders are a little unwilling to grant this claim, those in the inner circle are not too anxious to

press it. For they realise that education belongs to that class of studies that can never reach the standard of "exact sciences." It is, indeed, doubtful whether it can ever reach the rank of a science at all. In his *Logic*, John Stuart Mill sketches out a science of character under the name of *Ethology*. Educationists have read this sketch with great interest, for they have seen what an admirable aid it would prove to education if only the sketch could be filled in and the science developed. Yet it has remained in its sketchy form, since it is based on those laws that Mill played with under the name of *empirical*. The question the educationist has to face is whether his subject can ever advance beyond laws that are empirical—that is, laws that are true in most cases, but not true in all. If education can never reach laws above the level of the empirical, it can never attain the rank of a science.

The common use of the phrase "educational theory" rather suggests that education does come under this limitation. Theory always carries with it the suggestion of doubt. So long as we speak of the *nebular theory*, for example, we suggest that it is on its trial. The same thing applies to the various theories in education that fill the textbooks. They are all under consideration, all tentative, many of them in the realm of opinion. We have seen that it is difficult to get principles of education that we can say without fear of contradiction are universally accepted. Even the principle that education is bi-polar is challenged by Sir J. E. Adamson, who holds that it is tri-polar.

In this state of doubt, the problem naturally arises: What is necessary in order that a subject should attain the rank of a science? Perhaps the best answer is—an objective standard. We have seen that at present the subject called education is dominated by opinion. Each writer approaches the matter from his own standpoint, and comes to conclusions that meet his own intellectual needs, but may not at all satisfy his

neighbour. Principles thus reached are called subjective, belonging, as they do, to the individual, but having no sanction beyond the experience of that individual. An objective standard, on the other hand, exists outside of, and independent of, any individual, and may be appealed to by anyone with the certainty that others will admit its authority. A science is a subject of study that has such a standard behind it. The study of Light, for example, is said to have become a science on the day that the laws of the refraction of light were discovered. Up to that time blue, red, and yellow were matters of individual opinion. They could not be accurately compared with what other people experienced. I could not intelligently compare my yellow with yours, because each of our yellows was a private matter, a subjective experience. When wave-lengths were discovered, and the spectrum became a uniform scale to which all could appeal, we had an objective standard, and Physics, so far as light was concerned at any rate, became a science.

The question naturally presses upon us: Can we hope for any similar discovery that will raise education to the scientific level? There are two lines along which hopes have been roused among educationists. One is the line of the brass instrument. The psychological laboratory has produced quite a number of such instruments that look promising. To be sure, they are only psychological, but psychology has become such a close ally of education that any discoveries she makes may be immediately applied to education. An approach to an objective standard may be claimed when such instruments as the following are in operation. The ergograph began life as a means of estimating the power of muscles, developed into a measurer of the amount of work an individual can do, and finally, resolved itself into a test of the amount of fatigue produced under certain conditions. The aesthesiometer is used to determine the range of touch

sensibility, and the tachistoscope to discover the speed of visual reaction.

Such instruments obviously suggest an approach to an objective standard in certain directions, and along with others are found in the educational laboratories that are now considered essential in a well-equipped education department in a University. More vague is the work of a suspicious instrument called an anthropometer, while more specific is the function of an instrument described in a recent number of the magazine *School and Society*, the purpose of which instrument is described as the "automatic teaching of drill material." Whatever encouragement such instruments may give to those in search of an objective standard in education, they are certainly a source of danger, since they introduce into educational discussion a mechanical atmosphere. Most educationists are convinced that not even teaching, much less education, can be carried on by a machine, other than a two-legged one. It is the fear of mechanising the teacher that makes educationists regard the brass instrument with suspicion, and leads them to seek elsewhere support for their claims to scientific standing.

The second line along which an objective standard may be sought is both less dangerous and more hopeful. In order to get away from the subjective standard to which we appear to be limited, we are invited to extend our range, and by taking a wide field try to get at results of a more general character. By increasing the number of cases considered, we may be able to rid ourselves of the restrictions imposed upon us by our limited personal experience. Though we are each confined to our own little island of consciousness, we may, by a process of interpretation, pass beyond its shores and get at truths out of our direct reach. In seeking to verify these truths, we may adopt quantitative methods, and thus set up a standard to which we and others may refer to our common satisfaction.

There is something insidiously attractive in this line of investigation, for human nature seems to have an inherent faith in figures and quantitative methods in general. It is true that we oscillate between the two maxims "figures cannot lie" and "figures can prove anything": but our general bias is towards the first. Once we can reduce a problem to a mathematical equation we feel that we are on safe ground. We are apt to forget that in the process of formulating our equation we have had to depend on our own ordinary individual powers, that, in fact, in seeking to attain our objective standard we have had to depend on our usual subjective one.

In any case, a formula has a very comforting effect on the mind of many educational theorists. In his textbook on psychology, Professor Titchener tells us that the psychology textbooks of the future will be as full of formulæ as are the physics textbooks of to-day: and it almost inevitably follows that textbooks on education will share in this increase in formulæ. There are, indeed, certain formulæ that have already established themselves in educational theory as likely to provide something not far removed from an objective standard. These are known as the Correlation formulæ. The more elaborate kind were introduced by Dr. Karl Pearson, but a simplified form has been invented by Professor Spearman, of University College, London, and is known as "Spearman's Foot-rule." These formulæ make it possible to compare various series of facts in such a way as to determine the degree of their causal relations to one another. For example, the problem of the relative training value of two subjects, say, mathematics and Latin, may be determined by the application of the Correlation formulæ.

It has to be admitted that the preparation of the formulæ for such purposes has to be done by people who are liable to the ordinary human weaknesses. In evaluating the results of

various examinations, the investigator has to depend upon his own personal judgment—that is, the ordinary subjective processes. Take, for example, one of the most promising of the formulæ, the familiar *Intelligence Quotient*, commonly known by its initials I.Q. Here we have a correlation between the age of the pupil and his mental development, so arranged that we are able to set up what appears to be an objective standard of intelligence. The ordinary age of the pupil is easily obtained, and is known as his chronological age to distinguish it from another complicated datum called his mental age, which is calculated in the following way :

A series of mental tests for each chronological age is prepared, and each of these tests counts for a definite period of time. There are six tests for each year between the ages of three and ten inclusive, and each of these tests counts for two months. For the age of twelve there are eight tests, each counting for three months. For the age of fourteen there are six tests, each of which counts for four months. There are six tests for ordinary adults, and six for superior adults, each of the first set counting for five months, and each of the second for six months. When the subject is tested, it is first ascertained for which year he can do all the tests, and he is then credited with that age to begin with. He has then added to his score the appropriate number of months for each test he has been able to meet successfully above the initial age with which he has been credited. The total of all these credits forms his mental age. Then by the simple process of making the mental age thus obtained the numerator and the subject's chronological age the denominator, we get a fraction that represents the subject's I.Q.

Suppose, for example, that a boy aged 11 years and 5 months could do all the tests for the age of 10, four of the tests for the age of 12, two of the tests for the

age of 14, and one of the tests for the average adult, his mental age would be made up as follows :

Full credit age	10 years
4 tests at 3 months		1 year
2 " 4 "		8 months
1 test at 5 "		5 "
Total				...
				12 years 1 month

This gives a total of 145 months for mental age, while his chronological age amounts to 137 months. In fraction form, this gives :

$$\frac{145 \text{ mental age}}{137 \text{ chronological age}}$$

In decimals the result would be represented by 1.05, but it is customary not to use the fractional form, but to take 100 as the standard. In this case the I.Q. would be 105, though 106 would be the still more usual form, for this is somewhat nearer the absolute value of the quotient than 105.

We have here a clear objective standard of mental capacity, if two assumptions are granted. First, the constancy of the result is assumed. We take it for granted that the I.Q. reached in this particular case will remain the same when we test the same person at, say, 14 years of age. On this point there is considerable doubt, though many competent observers are willing to stand for the constancy of the I.Q.

The second assumption is the one that interests us here. It is taken for granted that the test is accurate. But it is obvious that the fixing of the data on which the fraction is built is a purely subjective process. Let it be granted that all possible care has been taken in applying the tests, still there will always remain the

personal equation, the influence of the personality of the investigator applying the test. It cannot be denied, however, that we have here a much closer approach to an objective standard than in the days when the teacher's personal estimate of the pupil was all that was available. There are those, to be sure, who bluntly express their preference for the teacher's raw estimate as compared with the I.Q., and it is, no doubt, true that from certain points of view the personal estimate is preferable to the mathematical one. The moral aspect is beneath the notice of mathematics, and yet has a very high value. It is because of the neglect of this moral element (by which must not be understood merely the ethical) that we are often disappointed in the careers of people with high I.Q.s. The *Intelligence Quotient* has not yet been used by investigators long enough to supply sufficient data on which to base sweeping generalisations. But experience, even in the short existence of the I.Q. testing scheme, gives abundant evidence of the present unreliability of the I.Q. as an objective standard.

A still more deliberate feeling-after an objective standard is to be noted in the use of the various "scales" that have been invented for estimating progress in school subjects. While mental tests are mainly concerned with the estimate of the capacity or ability of the educands, the scales give attention to evaluating the attainments in school subjects. On the whole, mental tests emphasise the educational aspect, scales the teaching. The desire of the scale-makers is to get such a standard as shall enable teachers to use one another's results by reference to a recognised norm. Thorndike's writing scale and Ayres' spelling scale supply excellent illustrations of efforts that approach very closely to the objective standard. Here again, however, the subjective element thrusts itself in, for in the use of the scales the personal equation of the teacher once more makes itself felt. When looking at

the elaborate sheets of specimens set out on the wall, the observer is impressed by the objectivity of the whole. But, after all, in making the comparison between a given piece of handwriting and the various standard specimens on the wall, the teacher's personality counts for something: the subjective element is distinctly present. In the spelling scales the subjective element is somewhat better dealt with, and the general feeling among educationists is that some progress is being made all along the line towards a gradual elimination of the subjective. We may never be able to get absolutely rid of it, but if we gradually obtain such a freedom from subjective interference as shall enable us to make a quantitative discount of its influence, we may comparatively soon be in a much better position than we have ever hitherto been for reaching a workable objective standard.

CHAPTER V

THEORIES OF METHOD

In this chapter we treat of matters that specially concern the practical teacher. While in the matter of the broad theory of education he must admit the educationist to equal rights of interpretation, in matters of instruction he ought not to be called upon to take orders from anyone. In the class-room he is on his own quarter-deck, and is master of the situation. But between the broad principles of education and the more technical principles that must guide the teacher in the actual work of instruction there is a borderland in which both educationist and practical teacher are interested. This is the realm of discipline, and the fact that it has a double interest is vouched by the double meaning attached to the word *discipline*. In the broad general sense with which teacher and educationist are alike concerned, it refers to the educational effect produced by work in school. It takes account both of the effects produced on the mind by the study of the various subjects, and also of the general effect produced on pupils by living and working in the school community. In a general way discipline refers to the learner's or disciple's attitude, as compared with *doctrine*, which belongs to the master's side.

On the other hand, the term *discipline* among professional teachers, particularly among those of the elementary grades, conveys almost exclusively the meaning of controlling classes. "A good disciplinarian" to them means one who has his classes well in hand, and has no difficulty in keeping them in order. It is in this narrower sense that great differences of

opinion have arisen, and mere educationists have joined in with theories of their own. Speaking generally, these outsiders are in favour of a milder discipline than pleases, at any rate, the older type of teachers. Up till about a century ago the profession as a whole was given over to severity. To the teachers of those old flogging days it has been suggested that the name *phlebotomists*—that is, vein-cutters or blood-letters—should be applied. But modern theory is so strongly opposed to these old brutal methods that they no longer count in the realm of educational theory.

To-day we hear a great deal about what is called "free discipline," which is just the opposite of the repression theory. Its extreme exponents want absolute freedom for the educand. Even the mild régime that took the place of the old phlebotomy is resented by the free disciplinarians, for it implies a definite though mild interference with the free development of the educands. Men like Thomas Arnold and Edward Thring certainly used no undue pressure on their pupils, but by the very force of their character they exercised a clearly restraining influence on them. Critics like Norman MacMunn called such teachers *impressionists*, and objected to their imposing their own personality on their pupils, however good that personality might be. The educand must be allowed to grow up into his true self without having any determining influence brought to bear upon him. The extreme free disciplinarians—sometimes classified as *emancipationists*—want the educands to be left really free: the educator is not even to suggest. The experiment of the anarchic school has been made on Tolstoi's estate at Yasnaya Polyana and at several other centres, with varying success, but these practical experiments have done little to settle the vexed question of the relation between the teacher's authority and the pupil's freedom. Without doubt the trend of modern theory in this matter is towards greater freedom for the pupil,

though there is a strong conservative party that is keen to preserve the restraining influence of the teacher.

There is a sharp difference of opinion between the Froebelians and the Montessorians on this point, the latter complaining that their rivals are always in the limelight, whereas the teacher's true place is in the background. The popular notion is that in a Montessori school the pupils can do as they please. This is not quite so; certain definite restrictions are placed upon the pupils in order to make the community workable, but restraints are reduced to the minimum. In particular the teacher must not interfere even by suggestion. So neutral must she become, indeed, that in the scheme there is no talk of teachers, all the Montessorian staff being known as "directresses." There is room for both the Froebelian ideal of leadership and the Montessorian ideal of teacher-effacement, but there is no doubt as to the tendency of modern theory. It is decidedly in favour of the greater freedom of the pupil.

The natural reconciliation between the authority of the teacher and the freedom of the pupil is to be found in a sharing of the responsibility. This partnership must be real; the extreme free disciplinarians demand that the pupils must not be fobbed off with an appearance of freedom, while all the time the teacher in the background pulls the strings. But in most cases the teacher who adopts the plan of free discipline keeps quite openly a veto on the decisions of the council of the pupils who carry on a school on a self-governing basis. This is usually found to be a satisfactory compromise between the reactionaries and the less violent of the emancipationists.

It is worth noting that even in cases where the teachers are unwilling to make any concessions to the new disciplinarian ideals, there is still a notable mildening of the old repressive methods. One can understand how the general spirit of the age produced

this amelioration, but the question remains: What means have the more conservative teachers adopted to fill the place of the old harsh methods? The answer is to be sought in the word *interest*. It is found that, by the use of proper methods, pupils can be aroused to take an interest in their work, and thus find an incentive to keep their attention fixed upon it. Naturally not all teachers have the power to rouse this interest. Some do not care to take the trouble, and still others honestly hold the view that it is bad policy to allow pupils to expect to be coaxed into learning things by having them made interesting in class. It is this last group of teachers who speak lovingly of "the good old grind." They say in dead earnest what Mr. Dooley says in fun: "It does not matter very much what the childer learn, so long as it is disagreeable enough."

Over against the "good old grinders" may be set what are derisively called "the primrose-pathers"—those who seek to make of the educational course a case of "roses, roses all the way." Neither of the opposing groups is wholly right, but modern sympathies are rather on the side of the primrose-pathers. No doubt the severe school have justice on their side when they maintain that young people must learn to face disagreeable things, and must not be so trained as to expect everything to be made easy and pleasant for them in the world for which they are being prepared. But we must not confound the interesting and the pleasant. One can imagine a vast variety of circumstances that are intensely interesting and at the same time extremely unpleasant. The world, as the good old grinders tell us, with sombre satisfaction, will probably not be a very pleasant place for their pupils, but it certainly will be an interesting one, for a while at least, and no danger is incurred in preparing them to be interested in their surroundings.

Drudgery must be faced, no doubt, both in the

school and in the world, but it is not in itself a desirable thing. Even the grim old grinders themselves would not take pride in their schools as providing the finest curriculum in drudgery, or in producing the finest crop of drudges each year. Drudgery is not to be cultivated, but eliminated. If the term stands for meaningless toil, it may be easily sublimated into mere hard work, by the introduction of meaning. Even the hard work that remains will not be altogether unattractive. If "the labour we delight in physics pain," we can understand the steady and apparently monotonous toil of youngsters at the nets, or on the racing track when no matches are on.

Passing now to the actual methods of instruction, we reach the plane where the mere educationist comes at his peril, and the practical teacher feels that he is specially at home in educational theory. No doubt the mere communication of knowledge has definite educational effects that cannot be quite separated from the nature of the matter communicated. The educationist is legitimately concerned with these general effects, but the actual process of communicating knowledge is the teacher's special affair, and he naturally has great interest in the underlying theory.

To begin with, methods of instruction fall into the two groups, general and special, the first dealing with instruction in itself and apart from any consideration of the nature of the subject-matter and its special needs, while the second keeps in view the particular qualities of the matter to be taught and modifies the general methods accordingly. The general methods themselves may be arranged in three groups, according to the division of initiative between the teacher and the pupil in the actual process of teaching.

We have first the didactic method, in which all the initiative lies with the teacher. He feeds in information to the pupil, who absorbs it as best he can. Lecturing forms a natural illustration of this method,

and some people are inclined to describe it as a unipolar process. But this is hardly accurate, since in the actual process the two poles are in active operation, though the pupil-pole is kept at work under the surface. In a good lecture the listeners have to do as much work as the speaker, and in many cases more, since they have not had the previous preparation that he has.

The second is often called the dialectic method, in which teacher and pupil seem to have an equal share in the initiative. Ordinary class-teaching with its rapid give and take between teacher and pupil exemplifies the dialectic attitude. In accurate classification probably we should have only two groups—the didactic and the dialectic, for the third group is really a dialectic form.

The justification for making a triple classification is that the third form, known as the heuristic, makes a convenient balance to the didactic in relation to the dialectic. Taking as basis of classification the amount of initiative left to each of the two parties, the teacher and the pupil, we find that the didactic gives the pupil practically none, the dialectic shares the initiative as equally as possible between the teacher and the pupil, while in the heuristic method the whole responsibility for initiative is thrown upon the pupil. For the heuristic method is the comparatively recent addition to the teacher's armoury that throws upon the pupil the work of finding out things for himself. The teacher puts the pupil in the position where he may be reasonably expected to make headway on his own account, and leaves him there to work out his own salvation. Sometimes the thing is carried too far, as when the pupil is put in the position of some historic discoverer, and then left to see whether he can make the discovery in question. For example, the pupil may be given exactly that amount of chemical knowledge that Priestley had just when he was on the brink of

discovering oxygen, and then left to discover oxygen on his own account. But this is to expect too much from the method, to say nothing of the boy. Apart from the mere amount of knowledge, we cannot put a schoolboy into the same position for discovery as a mature and highly trained man. The advantage of the heuristic method is to be found in the state of mind it encourages in the pupil.

Taking the three types of general method, it is to be noted that the modern tendency is towards the third. Educators are more and more leaning towards methods that throw the responsibility on the pupil. In a way this implies a tendency to throw aside the technicalities of method as too rigid limitations to the freedom of teacher and pupil alike. This tendency is all to the good, for one of the great disadvantages of methodology in the past has been the rigidity with which methods have been applied. This has been, and is, particularly true where apparatus is involved. The "gifts" and "occupations" of the Froebelian scheme, and the technical apparatus of the Montessorians, supply vivid examples. The fundamental merits of such schemes are sometimes rather lost through the scrupulous attention demanded to the details of an over-systematised manipulation of apparatus.

So devoted to their schemes do some of these methodologists become that they actually go out of their way to minimise the share their own personality has in securing success, in order to give the greater credit to the method itself. The Frenchman Jacotot, for example, invented a method that he boldly called "the universal method of instruction." By its application he produced some rather remarkable results, the full credit for which he passed on to his method, though without the least doubt a great deal of his success was due to his own personality. It is true that other educationists, like Ratke, have such faith in their methods that they believe them to have a market value,

and try to make money out of them. But this attitude is remarkably rare in education. Inventors of educational methods are only too glad to throw them open to the world, without money and without price.

Probably the most important element to be considered in educational theory in connection with methodology is the correlation between the personality of the educator and the method he adopts. We are apt to regard methods as intrinsically good or bad.¹ No doubt there is a justification for this classification, and we have seen that we are probably approaching a stage at which we may be able to apply some sort of an objective standard. But in the last resort methods must stand or fall by their suitability to the person who adopts them. There is, without doubt, a considerable body of sound doctrine on method imbedded in the pages of the various "Manuals of Method" that have had their day. These generally accepted principles of method are no doubt universal enough to meet the needs of any individual average teacher, but the moment we reach the stage of special methods we must each make our own individual choice.

Not only do methods vary in suitability for different individuals, but they vary in suitability for the same individual at different stages of his development. Teachers sometimes become worried about their own progress, so every few years they change their methods, and think they have made an improvement by the change. Sometimes their satisfaction at their progress is chastened by the thought that in a few years they will be looking back at their present methods that they think so good with the same contempt as they now regard their methods of a few years back. Their comfort must be that "each thing in its place is best," and that the method they formerly used, and now despise, was the most suitable for them at the time at which they applied it.

¹ What is true of the individual may be applied to

the race in a general way. We are always looking out for some new thing in the way of education, and particularly in the way of method. To-day we have got the length of speaking of *the New Education*, just as we talk of the New Theology, the New Art, and the New Poetry. In the ultimate resort there is no New Education. As the French saying has it, the more these things change, the more they are the same. Yet there is a sense in which it is new. Each generation demands a fresh presentation of old truths. So this so-called New Education is merely the twentieth-century reaction to truths familiar to previous generations in a somewhat different form.

We are fond of telling each other that this is a period of change, that we are at the parting of the ways. Then we tell each other that people have always said this in every age. Finally, we add that this really does seem rather more of a turning-point than usual, that, in fact, it is a genuine nodal point. Certainly it seems hard to find a time when there were quite so many new educational methods flying about, so, begging the question of the absolute newness of the education of to-day, we may fairly set about finding what is its characteristic quality.

Such a quest at once reveals the oldness of the New Education. For the quality that stands out most prominently as a feature of the vast number of new educational plans and methods is the very old one of concentrating the teacher's attention on the pupil. Naturally there never was a time when the educator could altogether neglect the pupil, but there was a time, and that not so long ago, when the teacher's interest in the subject-matter he taught was more pronounced than his interest in the pupil. So important did G. Stanley Hall regard this change of attitude from a previous period that he invented a word to indicate it. When he used the term *paidocentric* he indicated that the trend of education is towards

putting the pupil in the centre of educational interest. The question naturally arises: What occupied the centre before? An answer might be found by inventing a term as cumbersome as Stanley Hall's own, and saying that the preceding education had been *materio-centric*—that is, where the main interest is in the subject-matter. In the old days the master was much prouder of his knowledge of Latin than of his knowledge of the boys to whom he taught that language. But to-day the position has been so much reversed that teachers are accused of knowing their boys better than their Latin. Trainers of teachers are sometimes charged with spending all their time in the study of the boy, while they neglect the subject that is to be taught to him.

If paidocentrism may be justifiably treated as the characteristic of the New Education, we ought to find that all the newer methods are strongly paidocentric. Probably the most striking new development of education in this generation is Montessorianism, and it is fundamentally paidocentric. We have seen that Dr. Montessori puts the child in the forefront, and insists upon the teacher keeping in the background. Her scheme is intensely paidocentric.

Out of the Montessorian system has arisen a scheme that has made a very popular appeal—the Dalton Plan. Here we have paidocentrism rampant. Each pupil is thrown on his own responsibility, and the teachers rank as advisers and helpers. They have to take their place in the background—a very hard-working and important background, but still a background.

The Gary Plan does not at first sight bear a very paidocentric look, for its leading idea is a manipulation of architecture to improve scholastic work. But when we look into the matter we find the pupil dominates everything, and that all the architectural innovations are introduced in his interests. He is emphatically the unit of the whole, and the school

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architect is called upon to fit the buildings to his needs.

Take, again, the Project Plan. Here, if anywhere, one would think that the subject-matter predominates, that the scheme, in fact, centres round the subject-matter, is, indeed materiocentric rather than paidocentric. But when we begin to examine the working of the theory we find that the whole value of the plan lies in the way in which it fits into the needs of the pupil. It is really an exemplification of Dr. E. C. Moore's theory that the business of the school is to enable the pupil to make himself at home in his environment. The plan puts the school in the position to give just that intensified and specially organised experience that justifies its existence. Obviously the pupil is in the very centre of the Project Plan.

The same is true all along the line. If one cares to take a book like Ernest Young's *New Era in Education* and look into the series of experiments and innovations in education, one will find that it is possible in almost every case to apply the adjective *paidocentric*.

CHAPTER VI

THE COLLECTIVE ASPECT

IN the last resort, no doubt, education is an individual matter between educator and educand. This may be regarded as the sort of ultimate unit of education, out of which the whole system may be worked up. For while there are only two persons—indeed sometimes only one—involved in the deliberate process of education in a given case, the activities of many more are essential before the process can be carried to a successful issue. So far as mere communication of knowledge is concerned the affair can be carried on as a private matter, but in the wide sense of *education*, a bigger stage and the presence of many actors are required. Goethe has a couplet that almost every German schoolmaster used to make his pupils learn by heart. Its translation runs: "A talent may be cultivated in solitude, but a character needs the whirl of the world." Man is, as Aristotle told us long ago, a sociable animal, meant to live in communities, and unable to attain his full development apart from his fellows. The solitary is not a real man. He must either be a superman and rise to the status of godhood, or fall below the human level and become a beast. Education has, therefore, to take account of the social aspect, even when the educator's main concern is with the individual educand.

So far we have been considering education purely from the bi-polar point of view, in which two persons react upon one another, or even two aspects of the same personality react upon one another, within the experience of that personality. But now that we find that education in the fullest sense cannot be carried on entirely apart from human intercourse, we must look

into the community aspect. In one of his wise but cryptic remarks, Aristotle tells us that the State is prior to the individual. Naturally, this is not meant chronologically. A state cannot exist without individuals to make it up. Yet it may exist in idea, and may be implied in the very nature of the individuals that are afterwards to enable it to realise itself as an actuality. This Aristotle recognised when he speaks of man as being by nature gregarious, a creature that can attain full development only in a community or state.

It is obvious that this collective education, that comes from intercourse with others in society, is a kind of by-education, though there is this difference in the case of school intercourse, that we are dealing with deliberate arrangements by which social interaction may be utilised for educational purposes. But aside from the partly organised and partly haphazard intercourse of the playground and the school recreation-room, there is a definitely collective aspect of the school instruction itself. All the difference between class-teaching and private coaching comes in here. There is a very general impression that the private coach has a great advantage over the class-teacher, and some writers explain that school classes exist only because it is impossible to afford one teacher for one pupil. No doubt, in the matter of mere instruction, the private coach has certain conspicuous advantages; but even in instruction there are some points in which the class-teacher has the advantage. In the give and take of class-work pupils get the benefit of profiting by the correction of the errors made by their fellows, and by having brought to their notice unexpected ways of dealing with the subjects of their course. This advantage of corporate work is still more marked in the social and moral reactions that are an essential part of a system of education by classes in school.

It may be suggested that we have in this collective form of teaching a multi-polar rather than a bi-polar

process, and to some extent the criticism is justifiable, but it does not affect the general proposition that education is bi-polar. For though there may be fifty pupils in a class the teacher's reaction in the process of instruction is with each of them individually. Even in the case of the mass reaction that marks collective work, it is still a case of the interplay of one pupil on the one hand and all the others as a collective unit on the other. It is still a case of bi-polarity.

We have seen that many people regard class-instruction as inferior to teaching by a private tutor, but some go farther and treat the class as something in itself objectionable. Among these is Dr. Montessori, who dislikes the class so much that she is said to claim that she has rung the death-knell of class-teaching. Critics sometimes do not notice the exact form of her claim. She does not profess to have superseded the class, but only to have eliminated *class-teaching*. While her "directresses" do not undertake collective work with the children, they do arrange to have a certain group of youngsters under the control of one person. These groups—often numbering forty or a little over—are really classes for all but teaching purposes. Probably it is a weakness of the Montessorian system that it has not quite recognised the importance of collective work in education, and there are traces that the Montessorian schools are departing from the rigid individualism of the founder's pure and unadulterated method.

The truth is that the two functions of the class are not clearly separated from one another in the popular or even the professional mind. While the Montessorians do not recognise the class as a teaching unit, they not only recognise but use it as an organisation unit. The class as it exists in our schools to-day had an economic origin. Education certainly began as an individual process. No doubt at the early tribal stage when some member of the community was set apart, or set himself apart, for the training of the youngsters,

he would find it convenient to gather them all together at stated intervals in a suitable place, but, except in the matter of ceremonial rites, he would probably not deal with them as a collective unit. It may be argued that in the medieval Universities we have a case of class-teaching, since well-known professors used to have enormous audiences. But they were audiences, not classes, groups of individuals, not collective units, except in so far as on occasion the eloquence of the professor roused the collective spirit and the audience became, for the time, a psychological unit.

The school class as we know it to-day no doubt began as an organisation unit. In the primitive schools there would always be a wide variety of age and attainments among the pupils, and the single teacher would find it expedient to group them into sets of about equal age and attainment. By-and-by, when schools grew in size, and the staffs increased, it would be possible to organise in greater detail, but still the basis of organisation would be instruction. It is only in the schools of to-day that a modest beginning is being made of the application of collective psychology to the manipulation of the class. Hitherto the size of the class has been determined by the amount of individual attention each pupil required. Economic considerations fixed a limit, but within that limit each teacher was expected to do the best he could for each individual pupil. The economic limits were in most cases very cramping, and teachers, particularly in the elementary schools, were in a continual state of protest against the unwieldy numbers they had to deal with.

One effect of the study of collective psychology and its application to educational theory is the realisation that the proper number of pupils in a class is to be determined in relation to the nature of the subject to be treated. For some kinds of work a large class may not only be no drawback, but a positive advantage. Subjects like languages, mathematics, and most kinds of

science demand very moderate numbers, but subjects like morals, the spiritual side of religion, appreciation work in art and literature—in fact, all the subjects that are sometimes called “inspirational,” benefit rather than otherwise by being taught in large classes. What used to be called “gallery work” in England, and is beginning to be called “auditorial” work in America, includes lessons given in a gallery or in an auditorium to a body of pupils made up of different classes gathered together for this instruction in common. Experience has shown that teachers differ greatly in the number of classes they can deal with in this combined form. Indeed, it is beginning to be realised that teachers may be graded in this matter, each having a co-efficient of power of collective teaching. Some can manage only a couple of classes, others are three-class men, others five-class men, still others seven-class men, while some few seem to have no limit beyond the capacity of the auditorium and the carrying power of the voice. Psychologists are beginning to speak of the range of the teacher's effective personality, and to say that each teacher has an area within which he can make his personality effective, and beyond which his power does not extend. This range does not seem to coincide with the reach of the teacher's voice, but is something independent of mere sound. All this carries us a little farther in theory than we can definitely express, but out of the whole comes the clear conclusion that the size of the class must be considered from two points of view, and that schools must be organised accordingly.

In the secondary schools the size of classes has not been such a vital question as in the elementary, and in the Public Schools of England it has been of comparatively little importance. In point of fact, in these schools the collective element has been allowed free play in other directions. “The building of character” is a phrase that covers a great variety of Public School

processes, but it indicates a very definite general aim that includes not only what is sought for in the class-room but a great deal more. Nowhere has the collective spirit been more used or more successfully than in the Public Schools of England.

This excursus beyond the range of the fundamental unit of education, which is the interaction between the individual educator and the single pupil, leads on to the wider problem of the relation between the individual and the State in the matter of education. It is generally taken for granted that the State has the right to determine the kind of education to be given to its citizens. So far back as Aristotle we find it laid down as a principle that politics is architectonic to education, by which it is meant that since the politician—or rather, let us say, the *statesman*—has to use the material worked up by the educator, he, as statesman, is entitled to say what that material shall be. In other words, the educator must take his orders from the statesman.

As a matter of fact, this principle is adopted wherever a national system of education is established, at any rate at the elementary and secondary grade. At the University level there is usually an understanding that there must be perfect freedom of teaching. The educator at this Higher Education stage comes into his own. But at the school stage the statesman is permitted to give his instructions to the educator, so far as the *kind* of education is concerned. It is understood that the method of producing the type of citizen the statesman demands is left to the educator. Within the class-room the educator is his own master, except in those unwholesome cases where the statesman, by the use of an inspectorial system, penetrates to the class-room itself and dominates even the theory and practice of education.

This interference with education from above raises a problem of much interest in educational theory. So

soon as we pass from a consideration of the interaction between the individual educator and the individual educand to an examination of the relation between the Government and the schools we have to view education in an entirely new light. No doubt there is a certain parallel between individual and national education when we take account of the fact that individual education usually resolves itself into a process in which educator and educand are combined in the same individual. Wherever a nation has established a system of education it has given proof that it has come to collective consciousness of itself. National education implies that the people of that nation have examined themselves and made up their minds that as a nation they are not all they desire to be, and, therefore, have taken steps to modify themselves on the lines that will give them satisfaction.

The new light in which education must be regarded when we introduce the idea of national education, and treat the nation as itself at the educator-educand stage, is brought out by the fact that by treating the nation as a collective unit we are raising it to the rank of a personality. No doubt critics are at hand in abundance—Max Nordau is one of the most trenchant of them—who pooh pooh this theory, and sarcastically demand that this collective personality, in order to justify its existence, ought to have all the animal organs, and should even have sex. As a matter of fact, a writer of distinction, J. C. Bluntschli, does introduce the sex aspect into collective personality, and speaks of the State as masculine and the Church as feminine. But we need not take things so literally as all that. It is enough to recognise the State as a collective unit that, at least in a metaphorical sense, may be treated as a personality. History offers many examples of nations acting in what must be regarded as a personal way. Two in particular are worthy of consideration since they both adopted an educational line.

When in 1868, almost in a night, the Japanese nation westernised its education, we have an example of this working of a national personality. No doubt there were individual leaders who guided the movement, but, after all, a change so radical could not have been imposed on people that were hostile to it. The Mikado and his advisers might lay down certain laws and have them obeyed. But they could not introduce a change that was revolutionary, and that struck at the roots of customs and traditions of immemorial antiquity, unless the spirit of change had been leavening the whole lump of Japanese social life.

Perhaps even a clearer example of the coming to self-consciousness of a nation is provided by the German people after the Battle of Jena. The folk were under the heel of Napoleon, who took away from them all power in every direction—laws, revenue, excise, foreign relations, commerce. But there was a remarkable exception: Education was left untouched. Napoleon is reported on a certain occasion to have said that he had no time to spend on matters of A B C. It is all the more striking that he should have neglected education in Prussia, since at that very time he was completing an educational scheme at home that had for its definite purpose the control of the intellect of France, as he had already secured the control of its physical resources. In any case, the Germans were not slow in seizing on the one loophole left them. The philosopher Fichte went about the country delivering his famous *Addresses to the German Nation*, urging the people to take themselves in hand and make of themselves a greater nation than they had ever been before. He had the co-operation of a group of learned and public-spirited men, and the result was complete success. When the time was ripe, Bismarck was able to say that at Sadowa and at Gravelotte it was the schoolmaster who conquered.

What is seen in a specially striking way in these

two instances may be observed working in a normal and undramatic way all over the world. At the present time in Italy there is going on a process of re-education that illustrates a somewhat different state of affairs. No doubt in the person of Mussolini we have the origin of the whole movement, but his inspiration has been such that the nation appears to have responded, and leader and people alike have united in a conscious attempt to reproduce in the nation the spirit of old Rome. All this affects the grown-up population. But the startling thing is that use is also being made of education at the elementary stage. Instructions have been issued to the teachers that they must think for themselves, and more than that, they must teach their pupils to think for themselves too. Could anything be more unlike what one would expect from a dictator?

While most people regard the use of education by a nation as a legitimate way of making the most of itself, some doubt arises when the leaders of a nation set about using education as a means of moulding the people for political ends. When the Reform Bill of 1832 made England essentially democratic in the matter of government, one of the English statesmen is reported to have said, "Now we must educate our masters," meaning the common people. This is really a political question, one to be dealt with by the statesman rather than by the educationist. But there is a correlative problem that really does concern us here.

The State-versus-the-individual controversy raises the important question of the standardisation of education. Many people are greatly concerned about the loss of individuality involved in the uniform education now being provided for each stratum of society in most countries, and for the whole of the people in the case of the United States. We are getting intolerably like one another all the world over, in dress and customs and general outward matters, and now this uniformity of education threatens a similar sameness in our ways

of thinking. But there is a danger here of confounding individuality and eccentricity. We must be allowed each to develop in his own way along the lines of his own nature, but this does not imply that each of us must be totally different from all the rest. No doubt, from the artistic point of view there is something to be deplored in mechanical uniformity. Most of us sympathise with Dickens in his distaste for the 140 young teachers turned out each year from a certain Training College, all as like one another as so many pianoforte legs. But the figure goes too far. It is, fortunately, impossible to turn out human beings as like one another as articles made by machinery. No doubt a great degree of superficial resemblance may be imposed by education, but there is a limit to the amount of similarity, and a compensation for the sameness that can be imposed.

Some educators have got an inordinate horror of the commonplace. Clever themselves, and proud of their outstanding personality, they fail to appreciate the fact that commonplace people enjoy being commonplace in their own commonplace way. It has been wisely said that one of the chief difficulties of a clever teacher is to allow his clever pupils to be clever in their own way. In the case of dull pupils, the clever teacher's difficulty is even more marked. He spends a great deal of good sympathy where it is not at all needed. Like one another as people may be made by education, they find life very tolerable, and are, after all, not so startlingly alike as critics imagine. Just as all faces are in a general way alike, and yet every face has its unique qualities, so our minds may have a general resemblance and yet be essentially unique.

The compensation underlying this degree of similarity produced by education is that the great body of the people of a country have common backgrounds, and understand one another's point of view. When J. R. Green described England as at one time a country

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of one book—the Bible—he indicated one of the strong points of a standardised education. The people had a common background and had a basis for discussion, but one would be ill-informed who inferred that there was excessive uniformity of opinion in the England of that time. After all, uniformity of acquired knowledge is far from ensuring uniformity of thought and opinion. To be sure we must all think alike so far as the process of thought is concerned. It is because the laws of thought, as thought, are so uniform, so unchangeable, that we can rely upon our neighbour drawing the same conclusions from logical statements as we do. So that if education trains the mind to work uniformly, and supplies a competent background of information, people are in a very fortunate position, even though our background has a rather close resemblance to our neighbour's.

And, after all, with regard to the mental content supplied at school, is there such an excessive degree of resemblance in the minds of the population of a country? The chances are that trouble will rise rather from lack of correspondence than from excessive resemblance in most backgrounds that are compared carefully with one another.

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THE
ENGLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM


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THE ENGLISH
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

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NOTE

IN preparing this short statement on a subject of great complexity, I have had occasion to consult many books and reports, but I should like to express special indebtedness to Birchenough's *History of Elementary Education in England and Wales*, Archer's *Secondary Education in the Nineteenth Century*, and Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge's *The Board of Education*.

C. N.

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THE ENGLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

CHAPTER I

THE ENGLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

THIS book must of necessity be small, and the subject is vast and complicated in detail. I shall attempt merely to trace the general outlines, and refer the reader to the books on individual parts of the English educational system, which will give fuller information both about the history of the past and the details of the present than can here be attempted. Statistics will be used sparingly, for they are apt to be dull, and in a short treatise cannot be complete. The endeavour will rather be to show what is being attempted in each field, the reasons why these efforts take their present form, and the ideals which lie beneath and inspire those who teach and those who administer.

The educational system of this country is not logical, nor has it symmetry: it has not been thought out by legislators or statesmen, and imposed from above upon the nation. At the same time it is not haphazard, but it has grown from practical needs, and is now indissolubly bound up with the national life. It cannot be understood apart from the national history, for it is the product of the national character. One striking feature of that character is its capacity for making an illogical compromise work in practice, and for getting things done without bothering overmuch about theory.

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We are tolerant of anomalies, and patient with survivals, so long as they produce results that are worth while. The history of our education is full of instances of this genius for action and indifference to theory, which lead our critics to belittle our thinking powers and to represent us as a nation intimidated in the presence of a new idea. But in practice we have produced schools which are more powerful for the formation of character, which awake greater and more permanent loyalties, which provide greater scope for individual effort than those of any other people of the present or the past.

One general characteristic is to be noted which is due to the mode in which education has developed in this country. It has been inspired from above. Its ideals have come from the Universities, and from a few schools which looked directly to those Universities and were closely connected with them. Its ideals have, therefore, come from those who have been preparing for the learned professions, for Government, and for administration, and the standard has accordingly been high. There is a profound difference in outlook between a system which, as in this country and in Western Europe generally, has begun from the Universities, and percolated downwards, and systems which in modern times have been based on a good system of elementary schools, and built upwards from them. The observer will find that the general standard of attainment is higher in the former than the latter, and that the ideal of knowledge for its own sake, and of pure scholarship valued for itself and for no utilitarian reasons, is far more secure.

It has been rightly pointed out that past historical development is the reason why education in England is a landscape of peaks and valleys rather than that of a uniform tableland. The work of the twentieth century has been not to lower the peaks, but to raise the general level of the valleys in the hope that the

inequalities will disappear. It is not often realised how recent is the growth of our educational system, or how vast and full of promise of power for the future is that wide extension of education, in the midst of which we are living. A full history, such as cannot be attempted here, would make this clear, but it will be clear, enough for our purposes if we look back a century. A century is not a long time, for it covers no more than the work of three full generations, and a rapid survey of the field of education as it presented itself in 1828 will enable the reader both to measure the immense distance that has been covered, and to understand how it has come about that our system has taken its present form.

In 1828 there existed at one end of that field two Universities and a few Public Schools. Both Universities had risen considerably above the idleness and corruption which had marked them in the eighteenth century. But the Nonconformists were excluded from Oxford, and could not graduate at Cambridge. Work at a low pass level was all that the great majority of students attempted. Genuine examinations had only very recently been introduced. Jeffrey and Sidney Smith, in the *Edinburgh Review*, were wholeheartedly attacking the whole performance of the Universities. They alleged that there was idleness in the atmosphere, that Oxford neglected mathematics and taught classics in a manner which condemned it to barrenness, that Cambridge clung to all that was obsolete, and that the Fellows sought to learn nothing new, and made no contribution of their own to learning. The Public Schools proper were seven only in number, Eton, Harrow, Winchester, Westminster, Shrewsbury, Charterhouse, and Rugby, and they stood very low in public reputation. Bad feeding, bad supervision, and resultant bullying and immorality, were truly alleged against them. Their curriculum was confined to a selection of Greek and Latin

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authors, chosen without intelligence, and taught without conviction. The numbers in attendance were very low. Outside this group there were over seven hundred endowments for secondary education, mostly grammar schools, some classical and some non-classical, but nearly all inefficient. The mass of the nation's children were being educated, so far as they were receiving secondary education at all, in private schools, of which there must have been several thousand: they were of every grade of merit, but few were good, and many were extremely bad. Elementary education had begun, but it was largely charitable in origin, and protective and preventive in object. The Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor was founded in 1796, the Sunday School Union in 1803, the Royal Lancasterian Institution in 1808, and the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church in 1811. Bell and Lancaster had independently discovered how to teach on the cheap by the monitorial system, and the length of school life contemplated was from eighteen months to two years. Five years had still to pass before Parliament made its first grant in aid of elementary education (1833).

It is said that the darkest hour precedes the dawn, but 1828 would not fairly be so described. It was a period when the dawn was already breaking. Oriel College was in its great days, and if its Fellows were not so great as they thought themselves, it was producing great men such as Newman and Keble, and Arnold and Whately. The Oxford Movement was about to begin, and Mark Pattison was at the start of his career. University College, London, was founded in 1827, King's College in 1828, Durham University in 1831, and these were the pioneers of a movement which has since covered the country with a network of Universities. Arnold began his headmastership of Rugby in 1828, and from that followed directly the

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revival, reform, and extension of the Public Schools. Bentham and his followers were demanding popular education on democratic grounds, and Robert Owen was preaching that "the best governed state will be that which possesses the best national system of education." Whitbread had unsuccessfully fought for the cause in Parliament, and his mantle had fallen on Brougham. Nearly a million children were receiving a brief course of training in the National Schools. Brougham's Royal Commission to inquire into educational charities was sitting, and his pamphlet on "Popular Education" (1825) had gone through twenty editions in a year. The spirit of the new movement was abroad, and already self-conscious, but hampered by vested interests in Church and State, by natural indifference, and by its own ignorance of the best way in which to advance.

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CHAPTER II

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

As has been seen, voluntary agencies were first in the field, and the State lagged behind. It is probable that the State would have frankly and fully taken up its burden much earlier if it had not been for inter-denominational jealousy, as some call it, or the difficulty, as others would say, of providing for sound religious teaching. At any rate, owing to this religious difficulty, successive governments, Liberal and Conservative, failed both in 1839 and 1843 to solve the problem, and having burned their fingers left the work to the volunteers, and mainly to the Church of England. By the middle of the nineteenth century a great denominational system, training nearly two million children in elementary subjects, was established, though its imperfections may be realised when we remember that a large number of children were in no school at all, and those that were in school attended generally for less than 100 days a year, and left at the age of eleven. A Royal Commission, which sat from 1858-61, reported that there were 573,000 scholars in private schools, 671,000 in denominational and factory schools, receiving no public grant, and 917,000 in schools, mostly denominational, and in receipt of grant. It was with this situation that the Act of 1870 dealt. It accepted the facts of the case, sought to fill in the gaps, and to provide a certain equality of opportunity. The voluntary schools belonging to the various denominations were recognised and encouraged, while it was enacted that in areas with inadequate or unsuitable provision, Board

schools might be set up by local bodies, elected for the specific purpose, and authorised to raise a local rate not exceeding 3d. in the pound.

Progress became more rapid, and in six years the number of school places was doubled. Compulsion to attend became possible, and between 1876 and 1900 the requirement of attendances was increasingly enforced. In the latter year, authorities were enabled to raise the age of compulsory attendance to fourteen. The policy of payment by results was tried, condemned, and abandoned. It had begun with the revised code of 1862, and had developed into a system under which an inspector tested all the pupils once a year, and the fortunes of the teacher depended upon the result. It led to cram and mechanical teaching, discouraged experiment, and enforced a wrong system upon the schools. A system under which an inspector could solemnly report that "the mental arithmetic of the junior babies left much to be desired" stands self-condemned, but it left its mark on the schools for more than a generation.

The gradual raising of the age to fourteen made it increasingly clear that there were many children in the elementary schools well qualified for more advanced education, and attempts were made towards the end of the nineteenth century to provide for these by scholarships to the secondary schools, and by "Higher Grade" elementary schools, first established in 1894. Even for Englishmen a system by which elementary schools gave secondary instruction was too illogical, and the "Cockerton" judgment of 1901, which declared the expenditure of the London School Board for this purpose to be illegal, brought that solution of the difficulty to an end. But the problem existed, and had to be faced. Other attempts of the School Boards, such as the provision of higher elementary schools with an age-range of 10-15, and of Pupil Teacher Centres, only served to show that the

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problem was greater than with their powers they could solve.

The situation in 1900 had become difficult in other ways. The burden on the voluntary schools had been steadily increasing, and it was becoming increasingly clear that fees for elementary education would have to be abolished. In 1891 free schooling had been made possible, and in the next ten years was made a reality by many School Boards: yet without fees many voluntary schools could hardly carry on. The School Boards themselves, directly elected to perform a limited task in a field where co-ordination is necessary above all things, were proving unequal to their task, and were in any case far too numerous. In 1900 there were existing 3,351 separate and independent authorities for elementary education.

It was a period when it was rightly believed that centralisation and unification of control were necessary if efficiency was to be achieved. The Board of Education Act of 1899 had united the Departments of Education, and of Science and Art, and conferred on it the educational powers of the Charity Commissioners. The Education Act of 1902 which followed is a great landmark in educational history. It replaced the 3,351 independent authorities by 328, and made education a function of local government and an expression of local patriotism. It made possible the establishment of secondary schools, wholly maintained by public money, and in many areas it set up a single authority charged with the provision of all types of education. It took over the cost of secular education as one which fell entirely upon public funds. But great as was the advance which it made possible, it left untouched some abnormalities, nor did it remove the dualism which we owe to our religious denominations. It obliged the new local authorities in all cases to supply and control elementary education: it empowered the county councils and county boroughs to

provide technical and higher education. Thus it put county boroughs in control of all their education, with power to co-ordinate it, but it excepted from the authority of the county councils all the borough and urban districts with a population above 20,000. Thus, in many areas elementary education remained, and remains, under the control of several authorities, while higher education is under one. The Act left the buildings of the voluntary schools in the possession of the denominations, and the religious teaching of the schools under the authority of the school managers, who retained the right to appoint the teacher. All these anomalies left by the Act of 1902 still remain, and in varying degrees impede the course of educational reform.

Nevertheless, the Act removed many obstacles. The relation of elementary to secondary education began to be more fully explored. Continuation, trade, and vocational schools began; secondary schools were increased in number. In 1907 it was made a condition for the receipt of full government grant by a secondary school that it should admit 25 per cent. of its scholars as free places from the elementary schools, though, in practice, anything from 10 to 25 was taken as fulfilling the law. Denominational feeling was, indeed, strongly aroused by the Act of 1902, and various attempts by Mr. Birrell and others to find a way of reconciliation were made and failed. That feeling may now be considered to be dormant rather than extinct, and probably every year that passes makes its revival in the old intense form less likely. Statesmen, however, for the present, continue to prefer to put up with an inconvenient dualism rather than attempt unification at the cost of religious strife.

The feeding of schoolchildren was made possible by the Act of 1906, and medical inspection by the Act of 1907. Under these, and especially the latter, a great work has been accomplished, and it has been supple-

mented by a more enlightened system of physical training, and the work of voluntary After Care and Juvenile Employment Committees, which began in the period before the war, and have done much to humanise the treatment of children, and to state and face the problems that are before them.

The war did much to increase the national sense of the value of education, if only for its testimony to the superiority of educated soldiers over illiterate masses, however brave. It led immediately to further legislation, and the Fisher Act of 1918, however much high hopes have since been dashed, remains the charter of free elementary education. That Act, and the Education Act of 1921, have improved the salaries of teachers, given them pensions, and bestowed more liberal grants. Fees have been abolished, "half-time" forbidden, and attendance has been enforced up to the age of fourteen with the possibility of further extension. A frank partnership has been entered into with the local authorities, in which the initiative is handed over to them, and the preparation of ambitious schemes for development over periods of ten years has been encouraged. But on all this there fell a sudden blight, when the slump in trade occurred, and the national finances were found to be in difficulty. Projected schools were abandoned, the raising of the school age deferred, salaries were reduced. There was embittered altercation between economists and educational reformers. Perhaps the pause has been no bad thing. The nation was embarking on a number of schemes which would have proved expensive and had been insufficiently thought out. The cessation of active expansion has enabled educationists to do some quiet thinking, and the result may well be, when the opportunity arrives, the creation of an education which is really national and really a system.

It is not so very long ago that elementary education was thought to be something fit and proper for the

sons of the labouring poor, secondary education, if not too long continued, a suitable privilege for the middle classes, and University education the proper sphere of the rich, so long as the deserving and clever poor boy was enabled to make his way there by aid of scholarships. There are now many who see that elementary education is that which lies at the foundation of the whole, covering for all children the years from their second to the eleventh. The nursery school, the infant school, and the junior school are stages within the range of those important years. From the eleventh to the sixteenth or eighteenth year lies the province of secondary education, and it is realised that all who come up from the elementary stages need proper and suitable provision. It is here that the great gaps are found which prevent the English system from being really adequate to its full work, but a study of the defects may well be deferred until we have considered all the forms of education at present existent. Full provision for the nation's need can only be made by authorities dominant for the purpose over all types of education throughout large areas, and that full provision will be expensive. But all the omens go to show that in due time and with due consideration this full provision can be made, and that it will be made.

Eighty years ago Macaulay, referring to common schoolmasters, spoke of them as "discarded footmen and ruined pedlars," and our literature is full of terms of contempt for the humble pedagogue. The eighty years which have elapsed since Macaulay passed his judgment have brought higher status, better training, increased knowledge, and more adequate income. There were in 1925 165,047 teachers in elementary schools, an army in themselves, and the most valuable social service which we possess. Their training has greatly improved. Not so long ago it was carried on in sordid surroundings under monastic conditions: neither air nor variety nor exercise were thought

necessary for the future teacher. It was thought that he would thrive best on a consumption of textbooks for knowledge, and sectarianism for religion. But now many types of training are open to him, in a University or University college, or in a denominational or municipal college. The ideal for the future elementary teacher is that he should follow the ordinary school and college course in the company of those who will seek other occupations. Early segregation is certainly bad, and the spirit of the seminary is to be avoided. It will probably become more and more the custom to attach the colleges for the training of teachers to some University, and to endeavour to give them a tutorial staff. And it is to be hoped that future teachers will increasingly give three years to a course of study for a degree, and follow it with one devoted to professional training. It is better to have a wider equipment of general knowledge and a less intensive course of pedagogy than to pass through a long period of class management and class training on a very slender stock of knowledge and a very imperfect education. It should surely be sufficient, if a compromise were effected between the over-training of the elementary teacher and the under-training of the secondary teacher, if the former were trained less and the latter more. It is a wise suggestion that the difficulty of practical training should be met by making the first year in the elementary school probationary, and causing it to be spent under supervision, and thereafter that professional knowledge and technique should be renewed and increased by the institution of summer schools and refresher courses.

A generation ago unattractive conditions of training and poor prospects combined to make the output of trained teachers very low, and quite inadequate to meet the demands of the national service. In 1890 only 2,791 trained teachers were produced. But by 1914 this number had risen to 12,000, and by 1920 to 13,500.

Under the conditions of training now available, and with the improvement in salaries, pensions, and status, a supply of good material is available, and should steadily be forthcoming.

It may naturally be asked at this point: "What is actually taught in an elementary school, and how are the teachers equipped?" To take the latter question first, the teachers have as the basis of their training a knowledge of English, history, geography, elementary mathematics, and science, to which they can add certain optional subjects. They are trained in the elements of exposition, class management, hygiene, and psychology. The schools have become more free and more individual, thanks to the passing of a generation during which they have been free from the tyranny of the three R's, rigidly conceived, and the system of payment by results. The study of formal English grammar has declined, and the old-fashioned readers have given way to the use of literary readers of good prose and poetry, supplemented by the reading of recognised authors in whole or in part. Supplementary reading in history, geography, and nature study is encouraged: school libraries and travelling libraries are in use in country districts, and in towns and cities the use of the municipal library is encouraged and directed. The study of arithmetic has been widened to include the elements of mensuration and of simple algebra and geometry. Physical training has been reorganised, and the place of hand and eye in education has been realised. Handwork and carpentry are regularly taught, and drawing now includes the use of several media—pencil and pen and ink, pastels and paints. Subjects have not so much increased in number as received each a new and wider treatment. Children, for instance, in English not only read aloud and learn repetition, but are encouraged to compose aloud, to speak, and to read for their own enjoyment. Geography is so taught as to be a study of causes and

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effects, and of how to read, understand, and make a simple map. Pictures and acting are brought in to help history, nature study and practical gardening to help elementary science. Needlework means not the production of specimen samplers, but household work and a knowledge of stitches and ordinary garments. Besides this, all, both boys and girls, have lessons in singing, in physical exercises, and in hygiene.

The *London Education Service* of 1927 gives the following as a typical "time-table" of an upper standard in a London elementary school :

<i>Lessons.</i>	<i>Hours per Week.</i>
Bible instruction	2½
English (including reading and writing) and arithmetic	30
History, geography, singing, and dancing	5
Science and practical work (including needlework and domestic economy for girls, and woodwork and metal-work for boys)	5½
Physical education	1½
Play intervals, registration, etc. ...	3
Total	27½

There have been a good many movements in education in the last twenty-five years, and most of them have had their reactions on elementary education. Some of them have led in the direction of a break-away from ordinary class teaching, and of these the most influential has been the Dalton Plan, which came from America. Briefly, this method conceives of pupils divided into small groups, devoting their time continuously to one subject at a time, and helping one another to make the study effective. Discussion, read-

ing, consultation of books, are carried on by the pupils themselves with only occasional guidance from a teacher. It is claimed that the method promotes teamwork, a sense of freedom, and the spirit of co-operation. At an earlier stage the influence that comes from Italy, from the teaching and example of Madame Montessori, has also made for freedom. That the child shall do what it wants to do, and that the teacher should use what the child wants to do, as the best means for its education, that the education consists in providing the best opportunities for individual development, are principles that are steadily gaining ground. From our own country, from the writings and example of Miss Charlotte Mason, who founded the Parents' National Educational Union, and conducted a model school at Ambleside, has also arisen a movement for securing the co-operation of class with teacher and for emphasising the same principle of freedom and self-education. The exponents of her method claim that they secure and maintain the interest of the pupils; and certainly in the hands of good teachers remarkable results have been obtained, in the elementary schools of Gloucestershire and elsewhere, and in preparatory private schools.

A good many people are apt to decry the product of elementary education, and in particular to allege that the old accuracy in the three R's has been lost and a sloppy impressionism substituted. Such people forget that the accurate exponents of arithmetic and spelling, who used to be found in the elementary schools, have now found their way with scholarships and free places to the secondary schools, and that in most cities and towns the elementary schools in the highest standards have more than once been skimmed of their cream. But if anyone doubts whether progress has been real, he need not rely on written argument or the consideration of conflicting opinions. He will be converted if he looks at photographs of elementary

school classes taken at intervals of twenty years. In the pamphlet called *The London Education Service*, issued from the County Hall, there is a photograph of the infants' class at the Oratory School, Chelsea, taken in 1905, and again in 1925, and of a class in an infants' school in Southwark in 1894 and again in 1924. These are more persuasive than many pages of discussion. The look of the face, the carriage of the body, the eye, the mouth, the hands, all tell the tale of improvement to those who look closely. It is not only treatment outside the classroom, but better and more humane methods inside the classroom that have combined to bring about this result.

There is in progress throughout the country an unequal, but still a general, movement towards the reduction of the size of classes. Classes of not more than 40 in the case of infants, and 48 in the case of older pupils are aimed at, and these, as soon as they are realised, bring with them the opportunity of better methods and an altogether higher type of education. At the start, when classes were huge, parents indifferent and hostile, and the child mind not studied, discipline and mechanical accuracy were all that could be secured. Now the elementary schools set themselves to do no less than impart the elements of culture. They rely mainly upon English as a written language and a spoken tongue, and on the cultivation and training of the hand, the voice, and the eye. Dr. Ballard, one of the London County Council's Inspectors of Schools, has said: "If the great discovery of the nineteenth century was the human hand, the great discovery of the twentieth century was the human voice—the discovery that by cultivating the tongue we are at the same time cultivating the mind." Speech, song, elocution, acting, all now have their place.

This chapter must not be closed without reference to the infant schools of this country, which, taking the children into the system of public instruction at

five, a year earlier than any other country, have developed an institution of individuality and peculiar merit. The note of the infant school is freedom and individuality, the children are not passive, but active, doers and not mere listeners, happy and not suppressed. The new methods have spread beyond the elementary school proper into the preparatory private schools, and everywhere in the country now it is possible to see classes of tiny children thoroughly enjoying school and manifestly profiting by it. There is certainly no more pleasant sight in the whole field of education.

Those who wish to know more about the many-sided activities of elementary education at the present day should consult works specially devoted to the subject. It is impossible to discuss them fully here. There are here and there schools with special curricula, devoted to practical work in very poor neighbourhoods, schools for nautical instruction in dockside districts, and for gardening and work on the land where the children come from the land. There is a hopeful movement towards organised games, and the provision of playing-field facilities. There are school journeys and educational visits, and the coming-in of broadcasting and the use of the cinema. Much more might be said about music and art. Much might be said about the whole subject of the treatment of the defective, divided in London into eight types—blind and partially blind, deaf and partially deaf, mentally defective, and physically defective, tuberculous and epileptic. Much ought to be said about the general organisation of After-Care. The impression which a study of the whole subject gives to the observer is that the situation is full of hope, that great things have been accomplished, and greater achievements await us, that we have a splendid body of teachers, and good material upon which they can work. There are defects and gaps in the general system, but they are such as

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better organisation, patience, and, it must be added, the expenditure of more money, can certainly remove.

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CHAPTER III

SECONDARY EDUCATION

A. REVIVAL AND EXTENSION OF THE BOARDING-SCHOOLS

It was remarked in the first chapter that the old boarding-schools a hundred years ago were in a bad way, both in numbers and prestige, and also that a hundred years ago Arnold began his headmastership of Rugby. So far as one man was responsible for the revival and reinvigoration of the boarding-school system, that man was Thomas Arnold. It is fashionable among those who for various reasons dislike and distrust this system to belittle Arnold, and even to speak of his work as a myth. But the fact cannot be denied that after his headmastership all was changed: the old schools were one by one reformed, and new ones founded on the same model. Nor can it be denied that he made a reality of the prefect system, trusting his Sixth and moulding it by his personality, that he modernised and widened the curriculum by introducing French and mathematics as regular subjects, and by teaching history in a living way, and that he saw the proper use that could be made of organised games. Further, he made the chapel the centre of his appeal to the school, a thing which before his day had not been done.

It so happened that his work fell at a time when a larger demand was rising for the sort of education which had hitherto been mainly aristocratic. The middle classes were making their way to power, and seeking equal privileges for their sons. Railways were being built, and transit was becoming easy. Wealth was growing, and there was a very large increase in

the number of those who were earning up to a thousand a year and beyond. The service of the dominions beyond the sea and foreign trade were augmenting the number of those who, compelled to live abroad, yet demanded an education at home for their sons. As a result, a large number of schools came into existence, which were boarding-schools on the old model, as interpreted by Arnold. Some were old foundations, half derelict, but converted by the headmasters from the service of a purely local to that of a national field. Others were completely new, and specifically devoted to the education of the sons of a particular class, as Marlborough for the sons of the clergy, or Wellington for the sons of officers. If anyone were to go through the list of the great boarding-school he would find that, apart from the seven already mentioned, they have nearly all found their origin in their present form in a space of about twenty years in the middle of the nineteenth century, beginning with Cheltenham in 1841 and ending with Malvern in 1862. Since the war the inability of the existing schools to accommodate all who seek to go to them has led to further extension, and Stowe is only the best known of a group of several schools which have been quite recently established on the same model.

The question is often asked, "What is a Public School?" and it is one to which it is impossible to give a clear answer. It is a term supposed to apply especially to the great boarding-schools, and in popular use it is frequently confined to them. But this use is not justified. The great day schools, such as St. Paul's, Merchant Taylors', King Edward's, Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, Bedford, Grammar Schools, have all been in the great tradition. A Public School is one which has a real measure of independence, and can direct its own policy, which keeps its pupils to the full limit of age of eighteen and over, and which has a direct and regularly maintained con-

nection with the Universities. It is obvious, therefore, that every school may aspire to this status, and realise it, and that any school may drop out of it.

Just because of their independence, these schools are of peculiar value, for they are the spheres of influence of remarkable men, prophets of their generation, who can work out unhampered the ideal which possesses them. Moberley of Winchester, Vaughan of Harrow, Thring of Uppingham, Bradley of Marlborough, Benson of Wellington, Percival of Clifton, Almond of Loretto, Sanderson of Oundle are examples of the truth that a great work for education can be done under these conditions. In a great State system of education it is probably vital to its health that there should be a group of schools which stand outside it, where experiment can be tried, and personality find expression. It is worth while to recall that Thring gave six reasons against State-maintained education: (1) That it places the ignorant community in the position of judge; (2) that it places the skilled teacher under the power of the ignorant official; (3) that experiment and improvement are prevented by the regulations of authority; (4) that new types of school cannot be started by individuals who have new ideas; (5) that it destroys interest, since people are indifferent to that for which they do not pay; and (6) that it is undenominational, and no undenominational education can be really religious. The case has gone against Thring, and we have now a great State-aided system of education, doing work which he would have been the first to value, had he lived to see it. But there is enough truth in the objections which he urged to show that it would be a disaster to sweep away all independence from our national provision, as some doctrinaire system-mongers would like to do.

As things stand to-day, a public boarding-school is usually a school of from 450 to 750 boys (though Eton

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is considerably larger than this), divided into Houses, in which the House-master stands in close personal relation to each boy. They generate an intense school feeling, and often a still intenser "House" feeling. The curriculum is much the same as that of other schools in the secondary system, save that Latin holds a stronger position, and science is begun later. Their enemies say that they make a fetish of games, and their friends that they realise the value of games in the building of character, as a moral safeguard, and as an instrument for founding physical health, strength, and grace. They teach boys self-government, and they inculcate the spirit of service. They seek to make the chapel the centre of a definite religious appeal.

They are much studied by observers from abroad, and are the centre of incessant controversies at home. They are the most individual institution of all that this country has created in education, in their merits and their faults the most English. They awake strong hostilities, but intenser loyalties. At their best they have much to give to national education, the tradition of friendship between teacher and taught, the tradition of discipline and loyalty, the tradition of co-operation, and government for the good of the governed, the tradition of service and of the religion which proves itself by its practical fruits. But they are confined to the children of the well-to-do, and neither masters nor boys have sufficient contact with the rest of the national system; for it is clear that social prestige can become snobbery, and isolation can become exclusiveness, and segregation can establish caste.

Beneath these schools, and supplying them, are several hundred private preparatory schools, many of them very efficient, some too luxurious, and some incompetent. It is the most favourable field left for private adventure, and it invites equally the prophet and the charlatan, for anyone may start a school. On

the whole, the work of these schools is conscientious, and in some of them remarkable personalities have given their lives to the well-being of boys from nine to fourteen. But their work tends to be dominated too much by the requirements of the Common Entrance Examination, which has to be passed by nearly all the boys who would enter the great boarding-schools. This tends to cram and mechanical and unintelligent teaching, so that the sons of the well-to-do are now suffering from the very evils which were rightly discarded from the elementary schools of the people towards the end of last century, when payment by results was abolished.

B. SECONDARY EDUCATION DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The nineteenth century was a period when there was much talk about secondary education, but remarkably little was done. There must have been in existence when the century began some 500 endowed grammar schools, and a large but varying number of private schools. Some were wealthy; most were very poor; practically all had been neglected. Their distribution bore no relation to population, and their resources bore no relation to their needs. The Schools Enquiry Commission of 1864 recommended that their finances should be reformed, and that authorities should be set up with power to supplement existing schools. The first recommendation was carried out, and led to a valuable revival of existing schools, but the second was neglected, and nothing was done. Hence arose the need on the elementary side to provide some sort of secondary education for the best schools, and the experiment of those higher grade schools which was stopped by the "Cockerton" judgment of 1901, already referred to. Hence, also,

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as a side development of the Technical Instruction Act of 1889, there came into existence what were known as Organised Science Schools, which devoted an excessive amount of time to science and art, but represented a genuine attempt to give secondary education. Finally, Pupil Teachers' Centres were started to educate the future elementary teachers from fourteen to eighteen. In the last ten years of the nineteenth century all these were in existence, together with a large number of preparatory schools, and schools founded by religious bodies and by companies. Not unnaturally, Lord Bryce's Commission in 1894 posed the question, "How can the sporadically created and unorganised secondary education of England be organised into an efficient and satisfactory system?"

C. PROGRESS SINCE 1902

The Education Act of 1902 empowered county and borough councils to establish and maintain secondary schools, and little by little the new authorities were drawn into taking interest in secondary education, and the existing and struggling secondary schools learned to lose their fear of the newly created authorities and the Board of Education. By 1904 the Board was able to issue its first Regulations for Secondary Schools, and it defined a secondary school as that which offered to its scholars up to and beyond the age of sixteen "a general education, physical, mental, and moral." It required a four-year course, which should embrace English, geography, history, at least one language other than English, mathematics, science, and drawing, together with manual work, physical exercises, and, for girls, housewifery. In 1907 the Board removed inequalities by fixing a uniform grant of £5 for all pupils between the age of twelve and eighteen, and sweeping away the preferential treatment of the

organised science schools. But they imposed two conditions—that the majority of the governing bodies should be representatives of popularly elected authorities, and that the schools should offer 25 per cent. of their places free to ex-elementary schoolchildren.

It would have been, perhaps, better at that time if the State had been more generous and provided the schools with greater means to meet their new obligations. The cost of the free-place system took away the benefit of the increased grant, and what was needed at the time quite as much was the improvement of the salaries of those who taught in secondary schools. But with much searching of heart the schools, on the whole, faced up to the new position, and the free-place system may be said to have justified itself. The free places have become virtual scholarships, and brought into the schools excellent pupils, who remain at school for a longer period than the fee-paying boy. These boys have in a very few years considerably strengthened the fifth and sixth forms, sparsely filled in old days, and many of them have become school-leaders. More than 30,000 such pupils are now being admitted free to the secondary schools each year, and there were in 1925-26 134,177 in attendance.

The period up to the outbreak of the war was one of quiet and solid, but by no means rapid, development. The more progressive authorities surveyed their means, noticed the gaps and the weak places, and made plans to supply the deficiencies. The main struggle of the period was to secure an earlier age of entry to the school, and at the same time to extend the school life; for the four years' course assumed by the Board's regulations was a four years' course only in theory. What results were secured may, perhaps, be best judged statically. The average school life went up in the case of boys from 2 years 7 months to 2 years 9 months, and in the case of girls from 2 years 7 months to 3 years; the average leaving age of boys was

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15·7, and of girls was 16. In 1904 there were 575 schools for boys, for girls, and for boys and girls, and in 1914 1,047, the pupils in attendance had gone up from 97,698 to 178,884, and the number of pupils per 1,000 of population had risen from 2·9 to 5·5.

The war changed the situation. Whatever the cause, it brought with it an intensified desire for education, and it provided large sections of the population with the means to pay for it. Nor was it a passing desire. It warmed suddenly into life a growing appreciation of the value of education which had been steadily gathering force under the surface. This demand, while embarrassing to the schools because of the numbers who clamoured for admission and could not be accommodated, nevertheless enabled them to set their houses more in order, to cut down their purely preparatory departments, to secure a standard of attainment and a proper age for entry, and to increase school life. Again the progress made may be measured statistically. The average school life in 1924-25 had risen to 3 years 8 months in the case of boys, 3·9 in the case of girls, and the average leaving age to 16·1 and 16·3 respectively. The number of schools had increased to 1,301, and the number of pupils in attendance to 367,564. The average size of schools, which had been 190 in 1914, was in 1925 283. The number of pupils per 1,000 of the population is now practically 10.

But the main progress was made in strengthening, and providing for the maintenance of, good work at the top of the schools, and creating sixth forms of respectable numbers. Advanced work had engaged the attention of the Board from 1913 onwards, but progress became really possible when Mr. Fisher in 1917 offered grants of £400 a year for each advanced course which a school could maintain. These were, and continue to be, mainly for science and mathematics, classics, and modern studies, though combinations of these, and geography, have recently appeared. In 1917

there were 82 such courses recognised in science and mathematics, 20 in classics, and 25 in modern studies; in 1925-26 these had become 283, 38, and 189 respectively, apart from 15 others of varying types. In other words, in nine years the advanced courses had nearly quadrupled in number, the most satisfactory evidence that can be offered that the work of the secondary schools as a whole has greatly improved in quality.

In a period of less than twenty years, again, the number of boys proceeding from a secondary school to a University has more than doubled, and the number of girls has more than trebled. And, on the other hand, the newer Universities are set free from the burden of doing elementary work with which they used to be vexed, for it is done in the schools. No University now admits any student who has not matriculated.

Space does not permit of a description of the chaos of examinations which afflicted the secondary schools during the nineteenth century. It must be enough to state briefly the system which, as the result of long consideration and many efforts, is now in force. There are two examinations approved by the Board in secondary schools. The first is for pupils about or just above the age of sixteen. The subjects are divided into four groups: (1) English subjects, (2) languages other than English, (3) science and mathematics, (4) a group of subjects outside the main curriculum, such as music, art, carpentry, domestic science. Every candidate must pass in each of the first three groups. The second examination tests work at a stage two years later, after specialisation in the advanced courses, and is designed for sixth form work of a good standard. These examinations are conducted by eight examining bodies. The school certificates gained at the first examination may exempt from matriculation and from the preliminary examinations of professional bodies.

They have also a definite value in the commercial world. The higher certificate may, under conditions, exempt from University intermediate examinations, and is freely used for the award of scholarships. The whole system is under the general surveillance of the Secondary Schools Examinations Council, established in 1917. In that year (1917-18) 14,232 candidates took the first examination and 550 the second; eight years later the numbers had become 43,092 and 6,380, and they are still rising steadily.

There has therefore been a great and very rapid advance in secondary education during the present century, and the causes have been so admirably summed up in a pamphlet issued by the Board of Education in 1927, "Recent Development of Secondary Schools in England and Wales," that it seems well to close this chapter by quoting it.

"(a) First and most fundamental among these (causes) stands the new fact of public control, without which none of the other developments would have been possible.

"(b) Directly dependent on this stands proper financial provision, both for building and maintenance.

"(c) The regulation of age and conditions of entry have rendered possible effective internal organisation.

"(d) There has been developed a reasonable system of examinations, which afford a test of ordinary school work, to which the whole of the appropriate forms are submitted, and not merely selected pupils.

"(e) Of great importance has been the development of sixth form work, aided by the Advanced Course Regulations. This is of value not only to the relatively few pupils who take part in it, but generally because of its reactions on the whole school, staff and pupils alike.

"(f) Most essential of all has been the growth of a body of teachers, better educated, more generally

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interested in their work, and—though much remains to be done in this respect—with fuller opportunities for learning the technique of their profession.”

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CHAPTER IV

TECHNICAL AND FURTHER EDUCATION

It is impossible to give more than a bare outline of the multiform development of this side of national education, and an imperfect sketch of the present position. The movement has had two sides to it, and these have intermingled, though they are still distinguishable. From the start it has represented a desire to give some form of education, or the opportunity of continued education, to the working classes. But it has also been an attempt to give technical instruction in arts and crafts, and so to produce the skilled operatives who will promote national efficiency, and enable us to hold our own in the field of international trade.

As early as 1760 a Scotch Professor, Anderson, of Glasgow, was holding evening classes for working men, and he left a small fortune, used to establish a chair of physics, of which Birkbeck was the first occupant. Carrying on the work in Anderson's spirit, Birkbeck gathered round him at Anderson's Institution as many as 500 working-class students. In 1823 the mechanics, as they were called, went off and founded an institution of their own, which became the parent of similar Mechanics' Institutes all over the country. By 1850 there were 600 of them. But they subordinated too often their educational work to the demands for recreation, changed their membership, and found no future in the educational system. But Anderson's old Institution survived, and in process of time has become part of the Glasgow and West of Scotland Technical College.

The nineteenth century was a period during the greater part of which little was done. Success in industry had come easily to this country, favoured, as it was, by nature and fortune: it was assumed that it was due to innate natural superiority. The success of the great Exhibition of 1851 enabled £200,000 to be set apart for science, and caused the Science and Art Department to be set up. Its purpose was to promote general education in science in order to produce men of adaptable intelligence, but specific instruction in particular industries was left to the industries themselves. Meantime, apprenticeship was fast decaying, Germany was applying scientific research to industry, and developing a great system of technical instruction. The United States were beginning to imitate Germany. None too soon, a Royal Commission was appointed, and sat from 1880 to 1884. Its work marks the turning-point in the history of technical instruction in this country, for it roused the country to the need for better secondary education as the foundation of industrial success, and for first-class technical instruction built up on that basis. It certainly produced the Technical Instruction Act of 1889, which empowered local authorities to raise a penny rate for the maintenance of Technical Schools, and it may not unfairly be regarded as the inspirer of the Bryce Commission on Secondary Education and of the Education Act of 1902.

Since then the field has been occupied in a great variety of ways, for the needs are manifold. There are the students who have left the elementary schools, and want to go further, those who have had a secondary education and want to go further, those who have been at technical classes, and want to study at a University, those who have been at a University and want to specialise and to conduct research. There are now available the Universities and University Colleges which, particularly in the case of the newer Uni-

versities, provide technological instruction to the highest level, while at Oxford and Cambridge in the last fifty years scientific research has been carried to the highest degree. There are also University Departments of Agriculture, and agricultural colleges and schools which lie outside the province of the Board of Education. Organised under the general control of the Board are very many categories of instruction: (1) Day continuation schools or courses; (2) evening schools; (3) full-time "technical instruction courses," which must include science, and be post-secondary in standard and organisation; (4) courses of advanced instruction in arts, also post-secondary in character; (5) "day technical classes" either of advanced standard, or post-elementary for pupils under sixteen; (6) junior technical schools; (7) schools of nautical training; (8) schools of art; and (9) day art classes.

The faults of the system as a system are that it has grown up in a sporadic and haphazard manner, but, at any rate, it is very flexible, and each part of it has grown to meet a need. As a result, the relations between instruction and industry itself are not close enough, and too frequently there are gaps of one, two, or more years between the close of elementary education and the beginning of technical instruction. Too much of the work has to be done in the evening, when students are tired by other occupations. The technical school is too much cut off from the elementary school which precedes it, for they are controlled by different departments of the Board, and by different administrative bodies in their localities: it is cut off again from the University institutions, which should naturally follow in the case of the best students. There is, therefore, still much to be done to create a more effective organisation, much, too, to create better buildings. For since evening work is alone possible in a very great number of instances, the classes must be held in the centre of cities, and at present many of the build-

ings in which they are held are unsuitable, cramped, or obsolete.

At all times evening schools of one sort or another have played a large part in further education. They have been for pupils of all ages, and, until general elementary education was organised, frequently provided the only available means of instruction. They had their origin in private benevolence, or the corporate activities of religious bodies, and they always tended to fail, because of the difficulty of obtaining regular financial support, and because there was no foundation of elementary and secondary education on which to build. The movement has had its prophets, and Owen, Maurice, Kingsley, and Ruskin all deserve their place of honour for what they have done for this side of working men's education. To-day, with the coming-in of a full system of State education, the position is materially altered. Evening classes under the Education Act of 1902 have become a definite part of the provision for higher education, and apart from this, there has grown up a large and promising organisation for adult working-class education, through the combined efforts of the Workers' Educational Association and the University Technical Classes Committees. In these classes the study is continuous, and lasts for two years: the method followed is that of lecture and discussion. The lecturer gets to know his students, and reading and essay-writing are expected. The classes are organised by the local branches of the Association, and the University Committees provide the teachers.

The extent of the field which is covered on this side of national education may be realised by the quotation of a few figures from the Board of Education Survey of Technical and Further Education, issued in 1926. Of individual students in evening schools and classes there were in 1924: in "colleges" 103,500 boys and men, 38,814 girls and women, and in other evening

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schools, 251,155 boys and men, 243,360 girls and women, making a grand total of 636,829 students of both sexes and all ages. There were 23,416 in day continuation schools, 11,988 in junior technical schools, 12,233 in day technical classes, 4,127 in courses of advanced instruction in art, 49,939 art students of one kind and another, and 1,529 boys receiving nautical training. About 3,000 teachers give the whole of their time to this type of work.

Very various, of course, are the motives among the students who attend these courses; the ambitions of some are humble, of others far-reaching. It requires tenacity of purpose if a student is to go far. But not a few have gone very far, and risen to positions of high responsibility, and it is due to the work of these classes that there is not in this country that deep division between the higher and the lower ranks of industry which characterises some countries. The classes themselves are never likely to be uniform in quality, but that level of attainment is bound to rise steadily as the secondary and other post-elementary schools increase, and become more efficient. The raw material should become better, and the teachers better qualified to make use of it. Already, to quote the pamphlet of the Board, "within the limits permitted to them the schools have wider aims, and with larger opportunities and better prepared students will more completely succeed as places of higher education. The responsible teachers at the present time claim it as their province to develop the intellectual powers of the students, to widen their horizons, to kindle their imaginations, to help them to find legitimate satisfaction in the exercise of their callings, and, in general, to guide them along the way of good citizenship."

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CHAPTER V

A GAP AND SOME LOOSE ENDS

It would not be fair to the unprofessional reader to leave him after this rapid survey of our educational system with the impression that all is well in organisation and quantity, and that all that is now necessary is an improvement in quality. On the contrary, it is to be hoped that we are approaching a reorganisation which will amount to a revolution, and a great extension of the duration of school life for large numbers of the adolescent. The organisation of the Board of Education itself into Elementary, Secondary, and Technical Departments is an indication of the wrongness of the lines on which we have been thinking. The basis of that division is not educational or psychological: it is merely historical in origin, and largely based on social distinctions. Elementary education retains its pupils to the age of fourteen, and thereby occupies three, or at least two, of the years which in the case of the normal child should go to secondary education. Those responsible for it have been forced to make uneasy and incomplete efforts to provide something like a secondary education, though under another name, for this period of overlap. Secondary schools were awkwardly linked on to elementary, for in origin there was a social distinction, and it was supposed that they provided for different classes. Secondary and elementary schools were for long, and to a large extent are, two separate worlds, and when pupils were first transferred from the latter to the former, they were transferred much too late. A large part of technical education is secondary education, or at any rate post-elementary:

many of the old technical classes and science schools have as a matter of history developed into normal secondary schools. There are, for instance, 202,202 students in evening schools who are under sixteen: there must be well over 10,000 students of the same age in the art schools: similar statements may be made about all the forms of instruction which fall within the survey of the Technical Department of the Board. The natural deductions have been made from these facts by the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education, which has just issued a report on "The Education of the Adolescent," known from its Chairman as the Hadow Report. That report recommends that at the beginning of the school year, 1932, the school leaving age should be raised to fifteen, and the necessary legislative and administrative steps taken to make this effective. It calls for a complete reorganisation of the schools, and demands that every normal child should pass about the age of eleven to a new type of school with curricula varied to meet the many aptitudes of the children and the needs of the varying localities. This means that elementary education is a stage through which all pass, but which stops at the age of eleven. After that, begins the secondary stage, which may extend to eighteen. But the Consultative Committee propose more than one type of school. A curriculum of the literary and scientific type is to be the feature of grammar schools, but other secondary schools with a four-year course, and a practical or material basis, are to be known as Modern Schools.

Some such reorganisation is clearly necessary if we are to deal with what at the head of this chapter has been called the gap—that is, the very large number of children who pass out of the region, not only of day-school instruction, but of all instruction and discipline whatever, at the age of fourteen. It is no exaggeration to say that by neglect of these children

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a large part of the effort and money devoted to the task of elementary education is consigned to waste. The children themselves are driven into temporary and blind-alley occupations, forget what they have been taught, and lose good habits. The Reports of the Poor Law Commission twenty years ago brought out the fact quite clearly that the unemployed tend largely to be young, and the unemployable not old.

Those who wish to make a close examination of the figures involved in the full consideration of this problem will find them in the Report of the Consultative Committee, or in "The Next Step in National Education," a private report on the same important subject. It appears that 348,000 children of the age fourteen to fifteen are outside the national system altogether, and 565,000 of the age fifteen to sixteen. Allowing for the fact that in any one year about 45,000 pupils may be found in the schools that are independent of the national system, that still leaves 303,000 and 520,000 as the number who have slipped through the meshes. That is a very large number when it is remembered that the total estimated population in any one year is very slightly above 700,000.

The chief attempt which has been made legislatively to deal with this problem was that of Mr. Fisher in the Act of 1918, which would have eventually required every adolescent, who was not at school till sixteen, to attend a part-time school for 320 hours a year (four hours on each of two days a week) till 18. A start was made with this scheme in London and elsewhere, but the compulsory schools perished in the campaign for economy. They had, however, brought into relief the difficulties of working them, and particularly perhaps the fact that it is not practical policy to impose the obligation on part of the community and not on the whole. If one Authority imposes it, and the next-door Authorities do not,

difficulties at once arise. Compulsion was abolished in London in 1922, and the schools are continued on a voluntary basis. It is satisfactory to know that even so some 12,000 pupils are in attendance.

The scheme was ambitious, based on insufficient experience, and in the nature of a compromise. It is more worth while to consider what attempts have been made from the side of elementary education to provide for their senior pupils. It has been noticed already that the higher grade schools and schools of science were absorbed into secondary education, but this, of course, left the main problem untouched. Certain head teachers began to experiment with their curriculum and to give special teaching to their top standards to suit the commerce or industry of their localities, and it was found that children left other schools in order to secure the benefit of this instruction. So arose the idea of central schools: the term originally meant that selected pupils from a number of schools were sent to a school which was geographically central, but it now means a particular type of post-primary education. Pupils in London are selected at the age of eleven, either by examination or by record, and they follow a four-year course on secondary lines: the curriculum has a practical trend, but it is not devoted to technical training for any particular industry or business. But the system is being tried out in many areas, and at Manchester, where there are now nineteen schools, Mr. Spurley Hey reports that while these schools admit pupils from the same areas and on the same examination as the secondary schools, yet the school life is shorter, classes are larger, the cost is cheaper, and the pupils more commonly enter upon industrial occupations. Non-selective central schools are being tried in Surrey, but owing to the difference of attainments of those who enter have to be worked in each case as virtually two schools.

Elsewhere the same problem is dealt with from

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within the elementary schools themselves. Leicester maintains two types of elementary schools for children over eleven, for those who are fit for secondary education but cannot find places, and for those who have a practical rather than an academic bent. Nottingham, by examination, finds out which at eleven years of age are the abler children, and proposes to send 10 per cent. to secondary schools, 30 to 40 per cent. to central schools, and the remainder to special elementary schools with a wider curriculum. Carlisle organises its education in such a way that all pupils at the age of eleven go either to secondary schools or to district senior schools. In all these cases it is obvious that the more progressive authorities feel that elementary education proper ends at eleven, and that a new organisation is then necessary. Experience goes to show that the next step should be not to endeavour to float a large scheme of part-time education, but to secure a firm hold on all the children from the age of eleven to fifteen, and to make this definitely a course of secondary education, the characteristics of which shall be flexibility and variety.

A thorough-going reorganisation of the Board of Education's constitution will be necessary, and equally a rearrangement of the Local Education Authorities. The sphere of authority of a local authority in education should be large, for homogeneous communities are widespread, and people to-day sleep and have their homes at considerable distances from their work. Above all there should be a single authority within an area for all forms of education, and the anomaly at present surviving, that there are 318 authorities for elementary education, and 145 for higher education, should be swept away, for no truly national and co-ordinated system can be made until this occurs.

Another survival which hampers progress is the dualism in elementary education of the "provided" and "non-provided" schools. As has been

said, this has been left alone, and the denominations are still charged with the maintenance of fabrics and the selection of teachers, because attempts to alter this awaken at once the fire of religious controversy. To many it seems that this controversy has no substance, and that the denominations would serve their own purposes better if they combined to secure in every area an agreed syllabus of Christian instruction under a conscience clause for teachers and taught, and devoted the effort and expenditure, which they now devote to the task of maintaining their schools, to the reform and expansion of their Sunday Schools, where the denominational teaching could most properly be given. The problem of how to secure adequate religious instruction within the rapidly growing sphere of secondary education is one which is really of more vital importance, but the old embers still smoulder and engage the attention of denominationalists, and they are not awake to the greater danger, that in a very few years from now all children over the age of eleven will be in courses of secondary education which so far offer little scope for religious teaching of any sort. There is, however, increasing goodwill, and a general, almost universal, desire that the principles of Christianity shall be adequately taught. It is much to be hoped that the denominations will bury old animosities and combine to bring it about that the coming system of national education shall be effectively Christian.

[NOTE.—The magnitude of the problem can be estimated from a few figures. In 1924-25 there were 11,698 voluntary schools, with 15,461 departments, and 1,759,998 children; 9,038 Council schools, with 15,592 departments, and 3,180,463 children. The number of Council schools tends to increase at about the rate of 150 a year, and of voluntary schools to decrease at the rate of 120 a year.]

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CHAPTER VI

THE UNIVERSITIES

ABOVE the great system of secondary and technical education lies the sphere of the Universities and University Colleges, self-governing and independent, though not entirely unaided by the State. In the last hundred years Oxford and Cambridge have been several times reformed, and all the others have been born—of many of them it can be said that they were begotten in the nineteenth century and born in the twentieth. The two oldest Universities, which were for so long a period of English history the only Universities, are still expensive and residential, but by the aid of scholarships and grants of many kinds they are in effect open to, and used by, all classes of the community. They have discarded all tests, even for theological degrees. They are governed by a council of residents, with a final right of veto reserved for the whole body of masters, both resident and non-resident. In spite of the jests that this only means that country parsons are privileged at will to block reform and change, it remains true that Oxford has admitted women to degrees, and Nonconformists to theological degrees, and has abolished compulsory Greek. Neither fellowships nor scholarships are any longer abused, and the compromise between the professorial and tutorial system has worked singularly well in practice. The professors in a real measure control policy and research, and have a very dominant position in the natural sciences. The tutors lecture publicly, and not to their own pupils only, while with these pupils they have established a tradition of cordial relationship which is one of the happiest features of the old

Universities. Both Universities have done much for research, especially of late years, in all branches of human knowledge, and those who regard them as in the main cultivators of the obsolete and the traditional are very wide of the mark. At no period of their history have they been in closer touch with the full stream of the national life, and their primacy is not likely to be shaken in the least by the growth of newer rivals.

University College, London, was founded as long ago as 1827 as the nucleus of a University from which theology was to be excluded. King's College was the answer of the religious to the secularists, and it began its career in the following year. Eight years later a charter was granted to the new University of London, which was to consist of the two already existing colleges and any other of University rank that should be founded. Owens College, Manchester, did not follow till 1851. Both in the south and in the north these new institutions opened higher education to those who refused religious tests: they recognised from the start the value of applied science, and they were homes of learning possible for the poor.

The fortune of development prevented London from being the teaching University which it had set out to be, though University College and King's College continued their full University work; in 1858 it took the unhappy step of awarding its degrees solely on examination. This has only been reversed in quite recent years, and London University, after two Royal Commissions, remains a very complicated body. It is organised by faculties, and it embraces a variety of institutions as schools in these faculties, the two original University Colleges, Bedford and Holloway, the women's colleges, the medical schools of the hospitals, the East London College, the Imperial College of Science and Technology, the Royal College of Science, the School of Mines, the City and Guilds

Colleges, the South-Eastern Agricultural College, and the London School of Economics. It has, moreover, six schools in the faculty of theology. It still retains a large number of external as well as internal students, and has at last found the definite home which it has long wanted, in the site behind the British Museum.

In the North, Durham University began as long ago as 1831, and was meant to be a group of residential colleges after the ancient model. In 1882 it absorbed the Newcastle Medical School, and later the Armstrong College of Science, so that it combines two atmospheres, the cathedral city with the industrial, the old with the new.

Owens College, Manchester, was the first of a vigorous progeny. Founded in 1851, and passing through a delicate infancy, it then developed steadily, and Yorkshire College was founded in 1874 in imitation of it. These two were combined into the Victoria University in 1880, which was to contain also a college at Liverpool, as soon as it could be erected. University College, Liverpool, came into being in the following year. In 1870, Mason College had been founded in Birmingham with a strong, practical, and utilitarian bent, which it lost only slowly, but it had the distinction of becoming the first University confined to one provincial city, and in 1900 took rank as the University of Birmingham. Almost immediately Victoria University defederalised itself, for the constitution had proved itself in practice very inconvenient, and all the colleges had grown. In 1903, therefore, Manchester, Leeds, and Liverpool took rank with Birmingham, and from similar origins Sheffield followed in 1905, and Bristol in 1909. Similar movements which will convert provincial University Colleges into Universities are in progress elsewhere.

These modern Universities were meant to bring intellectual life into the daily work of the modern world, to spread humanism, and to develop the

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application of science to industry. They have been greatly successful on the whole. They have opened the highest education to many who were entirely shut off, and have brought it to the doors of all large centres of population. They have not neglected the older subjects of culture, while they have widely extended the range of subjects, largely technological, which are proper to University work. They have knit together English society, for, while the remoteness and aloofness of Oxford and Cambridge had put the professions out of sympathy with industry and commerce, the new Universities created a new sympathy, and at the same time reacted on the old, so that these, too, learned to meet the new needs. Their weakest point is their lack of true corporate life, but this, too, is being met by the creation of Halls of Residence, and it may well come about in this century that a morale and a corporate spirit will be engendered which will enable these Universities to stand comparison with any of the old.

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CHAPTER VII
*THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS AND
WOMEN*

THE history of the movement by which women claimed, and made good, their right to an equal education with that of men, is one of great interest, but it is too long for a handbook. Those who would understand its spirit rightly should read the biographies of the women who were the pioneers, for the success which was gained was the personal achievement of a few great women of the middle class. Here can be set down only a few of the important events, and a brief statement of the position as it stands to-day.

It has been on the whole a movement led by women for women, though Queen's College, in date (1847) the first college for women, and really a lecturing agency and offshoot of King's College, was the creation of Maurice. In 1869 Bedford College, now a constituent college of London University, followed, and Miss Emily Davies founded at Hitchin her college for women, which has since developed into Girton. In 1875 Miss Clough became the first Principal of Newnham. The attack on Oxford developed a little later, but Somerville College and Lady Margaret Hall were established by 1879.

They were tolerated by some, derided by many, and the object of the boundless enthusiasm of a few. London University, after long controversy, admitted women to its degrees in 1878, Victoria University in 1880, the Scotch Universities in 1892; in Wales, from the foundation of the University, men and women were equal. It was not till after the war that

Oxford granted the same privilege, and Cambridge has not done so yet.

On the whole, in accordance with the general English tradition, the inspiration for women's education has come from the Universities, and thence descended to the schools. Those who care to inquire into the condition of girls' education in the early part of the nineteenth century will find store of very amusing reading, but they will be very sorry for the girls who had to endure it. Whether the schools were expensive (and some were very expensive) or cheap, they seem to have been uniformly bad: repression, superficiality, and convention were their features. The Schools Enquiry Commission in 1868 summed up the complaints which were made against them as: "Want of thoroughness and foundation; slovenliness and showy superficiality; inattention to rudiments; undue time given to accomplishments, and those not taught intelligently, or in any scientific manner; want of organisation." It is a sufficiently damning indictment. In 1857 Miss Beale was an assistant-mistress at the School for Clergymen's Daughters, and was required to teach, week by week, Scripture, arithmetic, mathematics, ancient and modern history, geography, English, French, German, Latin, and Italian. Further comment is needless.

In the following year Miss Beale was appointed to Cheltenham College, and found her life's work. She created a great model, at once a day-school and a boarding-school with a range covering the whole field of elementary and secondary education. Some years later Miss Buss handed her flourishing school over to a trust, and it became the North London Collegiate School, the model of the high schools. In 1872 the Girls' Public Day School Company was founded, and the movement became committed to the ideal of day-schools in towns and cities. It was largely the result of private effort, and means were lacking to create

boarding-schools of the type then becoming common for boys.

The Schools Inquiry Commission only considered girls' schools because they did not happen to be excluded by its terms of reference, but its report in 1868 is a great landmark. It led to the Endowed Schools Act of 1869, which made possible the foundation of girls' schools out of the surplus funds of the boys' schools, where these existed, and by the end of the nineteenth century there were in existence upwards of 80 endowed schools for girls. On the whole, the dominant tradition of the day-school has been maintained, but in the last twenty-five years public boarding-schools have been founded in fair numbers, and have succeeded; it is probable that a considerable future lies before them.

Inspiring as this movement had been, it had owed very little to the helping hand of the State, which did not take part until the Education Act of 1902 made it possible for Local Education Authorities to do their duty by the secondary education of girls in their areas. What has happened since then can be summed up in a few telling statistics. In 1902 there were on the Board's list 99 girls' schools; in 1925 there were 403; in the same period 184 co-educational schools had grown to 361. The 33,159 pupils had increased to 173,273, and had more than quintupled themselves.

It is impossible for growth to take place as rapidly as this without developing strains in the fabric, and those responsible for the schools are finding it very hard to bring this great mass of new material through the full course of secondary education without imposing upon them undue strain. Hitherto, and quite rightly, the leaders of the movement for women's education have been concerned to demonstrate the equality of men and women, boys and girls, and they have therefore tended to insist on following an identical course of instruction. There are many who

think that, so far as secondary education is concerned, for the great mass of girls this has become an illogical procedure, and they look anxiously for the coming of some personality strong enough to shape the new education into a form which will suit the needs of girls as such, the future wives and mothers of the men of the nation.

But women have already made considerable contribution to the general good of education. More than men they have realised the value of training, and devoted attention to method and the art of exposition. It is to be noted that the two most valuable recent developments on this side of education have both come from women, working out theories in practice, from Madame Montessori, who is exercising a great influence on the training of the early years of childhood in many nations, and from Miss Mason, whose methods inspire a good many primary and private secondary schools in this country, and are gaining ground.

Co-education offers a vexed field of discussion into which there is not space to enter fully. There are 361 co-educational schools known to the Board, and there are a few others. Most of these are co-educational simply for reasons of economy: the few are the creation of those who believe intensely that the sexes should throughout be educated together. There is, however, no doubt that the bulk of teachers, both men and women, like the mass of the nation, believe that while boys and girls are fitly educated together in the earliest years, and should meet again at the University, the intervening years are better spent apart in the interest of both sexes alike.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ADMINISTRATORS OF THE SYSTEM

A. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

IN 1829 a Committee of the Privy Council was charged with the duty of superintending the application of any expenditure which might be approved for the purpose of assisting public education. By 1856 this grew into an Education Department, which was still in theory a Committee of Council. Its powers were increased in 1870 when the Education Act gave it power to extend and to improve elementary education, and its sphere of influence continued to extend. So did that of the Science and Art Department, and such was the overlapping and interpenetration of the two authorities that all saw that a single central authority was necessary. In 1899 accordingly the two Departments were constituted into a Board charged with the care of education in England and Wales. It has a President, who has a seat in Parliament, and changes when Governments change: but as a Board it never meets, though it has a definite membership and could meet if it were desired.

There was much anxious consideration in those days, for it was feared that to place all education under a Government Department would deaden it until it became mechanical, that it would fall under the influence of party politics, and that the transient politicians who were at the head of the Department would inevitably concede power to the permanent officials. Various schemes for the setting up of an educational council were proposed, discussed, and in the end rejected. Probably this was wise. The system

has not worked at all badly, and the evil consequences have not made themselves very apparent. The Board have made no attempt to grasp the whole of power, and the freedom which they have left to secondary schools has reacted with good effect on elementary education. It is improbable that better results would have followed if such bodies as the Teachers' Registration Council or the Consultative Committee had been in charge of national educational policy. It has become increasingly clear that it is the business of teachers to teach and to mind their schools, and of trained specialists to administer. For the educational machine has become very complicated, as it has developed, and it is the work of a lifelong apprenticeship to learn to manage that important side of the system that consists of organisation and finance.

In the years following its institution the Board was organised into the three departments of Elementary, Secondary, and Technical, and concentrated in Whitehall; of these it still consists. Reasons have been stated in a previous chapter for the belief that this organisation no longer meets present facts. The work of organising the new office and adjusting its operations to the activities of the new Local Education Authorities, when they came, was performed with distinction by Sir Robert Morant, who was Permanent Secretary from 1903 to 1911.

Since the Education Act of 1918, and the consolidation of the law relating to education in the Act of 1921, the Board has come to hold itself to be in partnership with the Local Authorities for the promotion of a common task, with which it endeavours not to interfere too much in detail, and leaves to the other side the larger measure of initiative. It trusts to the local bodies to be the best judges of local needs, and to local enthusiasm to carry through the necessary tasks. Hence, it has of late years called for schemes of development to be framed by the varying localities

for themselves, and has abolished the system of particular grants, establishing in their place the minimum percentage grant in aid of the total local expenditure. It has so far as possible frankly dispensed with detailed codes of regulations, and trusts to the spirit of co-operation and the awakened keenness of all members of the educational service. Nothing, for instance, could be wider or less hampering than the following regulation, which comes from the Regulations of 1926: "Secular instruction in a school or centre must be in accordance with a suitable curriculum and syllabus framed with due regard to the organisation and circumstances of the school or schools concerned."

The Board is not supreme over the whole of national education. It has no authority over Universities or University Colleges. Save under the Endowed Schools Act or Charitable Trusts Act, it has no authority over endowed schools which do not receive grants of public money, none over schools conducted for private profit, of which there are very many, and none over the comparatively few schools under other Government Departments. It has nothing directly to do with the payment, appointment, or dismissal of teachers, the choice of textbooks, or the details of the curriculum.

It is a friendly critic, adviser, and helper, spurring on the backward authority, and sometimes of late, under the pressure of public economy, holding back the eager. It has to count the cost, for while it does not order schools to be built, it contributes largely to the necessary expenditure: it must take long views. It is easy for the reformer to say that at least twenty in every thousand of the population should be at secondary schools, but this means in effect doubling the number of schools and doubling the supply of teachers: both problems very much concern the Board. It is responsible for the efficiency of schools,

and for seeing that the nation receives value for its money; here again the Board endeavours not to apply stereotyped standards, but within the necessarily complicated organisation which it maintains, to leave room for flexibility and experiment. Efficiency in particular it is impossible to define, for education is qualitative, not quantitative: Browning has pointed out that the man who misses a million may for all that produce a far higher result than the man who is content with a hundred. But the latter could, on a narrow definition, be efficient, and the former not. The Board declares that every school must be kept on a satisfactory level of efficiency, but all that it can do is to help to bring each group of schools up to the level of the next above. The methods which it can employ are effective, for it has in its hands the use of regulations, the visits of criticism and advice paid by inspectors, the training of a large part of the teaching profession, and all that can be done by the distribution of information.

Certain organisations, subordinate to, or connected with the Board, deserve to be mentioned, for they have all played their part in the development of English education. (1) The Consultative Committee, which now consists of twenty-one members, appointed by the President for a term of six years. In its origin it was all that came out of the plan for a governing council for education, propounded, and strongly advocated, at the end of last century. But it has justified its existence by producing thirteen important reports, not the least valuable of which have been the two recent ones on differentiation between the sexes, and on the education of the adolescent. It is still disputed whether it has a statutory power to offer advice or merely to be consulted at the discretion of the Board; it is a theoretic difficulty which offers little difficulty in practice. (2) The Teachers' Registration Council, which has had a troubled history, like the register which it keeps. It was established in 1912,

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reconstituted in 1926, and is now independent of the Board. Registered teachers, divided into 23 groups, elect its members. It is charged with the duty of keeping a register of teachers, and ultimately of enforcing training. In October, 1926, it had 74,000 teachers on the register, of whom 45,000 were elementary, 19,000 secondary, 8,000 specialist, 400 University, and 2,000 private. As there must be considerably more than 200,000 teachers altogether, this is not an altogether impressive result of fifteen years' work, and to many its practical good is not apparent. (3) The Secondary Schools Examinations Council, consisting of members who are partly representative and partly nominated by the President. It is charged with the duty of helping in the organisation and co-ordination of school examinations. It is, in the main, responsible for the system of the First and Second Examinations in the secondary schools, and it has carried out two sets of "investigations" of these examinations as conducted by the eight examining authorities, which have been valuable, because they have brought school and University teachers, inspectors, and administrators together in a common task. (4) The Juvenile Organisations Committee, a product of the war, which was meant to stimulate voluntary effort to supplement State education. It is understood that this now languishes through lack of funds. (5) The Office of Special Inquiries and Reports, inspired in its inception in 1894 by Sir Michael Sadler. It has produced 28 volumes of reports. (6) Special Committees: (a) those known as the Prime Minister's Committees, which after the war reported on English, Natural Science, Modern Languages, and Classics—a valuable series of reports, which expressed the mind and experience of one generation on the greater part of the subjects of secondary education; (b) those presided over by Viscount Burnham, which have successfully dealt with the problems of the pay and the pensions of

teachers, and are known as Burnham Committees. (7) Educational Pamphlets and Circulars of the Board, which from time to time summarise the history and present position of some portion of the educational system, or of some subject of the curriculum, and are frequently documents of great educational value.

B. THE INSPECTORATE

This is so important a part of the educational machinery maintained by the Board that it requires separate treatment. It was last organised in 1904-05 into five groups for five main branches: (1) elementary, (2) secondary, (3) technical, (4) training of teachers, and (5) art. The first three groups have each a chief inspector, one of whom is the senior for control and co-ordination. There is a Chief Woman Inspector, nine Division Inspectors, and below these District and Assistant Inspectors. There are some who hold strongly that inspectors should always be drawn from the ranks of those who have actually taught in schools. A certain number undoubtedly should be so chosen, but it is probably wiser to say that they should be appointed wherever the right personality is found and whatever the previous training, for they need personality, tact, sympathy, and some measure of statesmanship. They are sent out not to spy and to restrict freedom and experiment, but to help good work wherever they see it, and by criticism and advice to improve bad work. They carry ideas from one school to another, and they carry the ideas of the schools back to the Board. They prevent undue pressure on schools, particularly the pressure of political and social propaganda. In two words, their function is protective and constructive, and they have been, so far as any one body of men can claim the honour, the main agents of the undoubted advance which has been made in education in the last twenty-five years.

In elementary schools inspection began as long ago as 1839, but it became a formidable system when in 1862 payment by results was instituted, and he who should have been the friendly inspector became the dreaded examiner. He had to examine all the children in the elements, and two-thirds of the grant depended on the result. The system was bad for teachers and taught, but when it was abolished the pendulum swung too far the other way, as usually happens; in 1901, for instance, the inspector was confined to criticism and advice, and it was held that the teacher was the only proper examiner. Now things are moving to a more sensible compromise. Inspectors freely question elementary pupils, and inspect their work, but it has been well pointed out that the new spirit is shown by the fact that the Board no longer issues Instructions to Inspectors, but Suggestions to Teachers. It is to be noted also that examination is coming back again into the elementary schools in the shape of tests for scholarships and free places. There were 134,177 free places in 1925-26.

The inspection of secondary schools naturally did not begin until after 1902. It was made a condition, if a school was to receive grant, but it was also offered free to schools which were not in receipt of grant, and after 1906 to such as wished to be styled "efficient." There are very few schools which have not undergone, to their own great profit, inspection by the Board, for the Board's secondary inspectors by long practice have become specialists, and no private agency or University can provide men and women of equal sagacity and experience. A "full" inspection means that a team of inspectors spend the greater part of a week within a school, and observe the curriculum, the teaching, the buildings, the finance, and the whole life of the place; they then confer with the governing body, and subsequently issue a report. It is an exhausting process for those concerned, and inspection

has been freely attacked, and sometimes unreasonably, for, after all, the public has a right to know that its money is being properly expended, and how else or more helpfully could this knowledge be gained? However, the Board's are not the only inspectors: the local authorities sometimes maintain them, too, and there has in the past been something in the complaint that schools were too much inspected, too harassed and interrupted, and too liable to be exposed to the "fads" of successive inspectors. The other line of attack, that inspection makes for a rigid uniformity, and the suppression of initiative and experiment, is simply without foundation: the opposite is rather true. And even the outcry against the frequency and the interrupting character of the Board's inspections must in honesty be tempered by the reflection that a school is exposed to full inspection only once in ten years.

C. THE LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

It has been observed already that there are 318 authorities for elementary education, and 145 for higher education, and that this arrangement, which cannot last beyond the next reorganisation of our national system, greatly complicates the vitally important work of co-ordinating elementary with secondary education in all its forms. They are of very varying sizes, for at one end of the 318 may be found Rutland, with a population of 18,368, and at the other Lancashire, with a population of 1,746,139, and London, with 4,483,249, in itself as big as a small nation. The County Boroughs range from Canterbury, with 23,738, to Birmingham, with 919,438. Strange as it may seem, even London for all its size is not big enough, for it has very many outside its borders who properly belong to it, and it is debarred from doing many things if its neighbours do not follow suit.

Each authority has an Education Committee, the members of which are elected by popular vote, though they can by co-optation add to their numbers experts and advisers. They may be, and are, elected for quite other non-educational qualifications. But this system has undoubtedly worked better than the old School Boards, which were elected specifically for educational work, and in which denominational feeling was apt to run riot. Close upon 10,000 men and women are giving their time and money to this valuable educational service, and perhaps do not receive the full measure of honour which is their due. They are assisted by permanent officials, who since 1902 have become a necessity. All the larger authorities have a Chief Education Officer with a trained staff, a Director of Education, or a Secretary for Education—in the smaller boroughs these duties are often part of the work of the Town Clerk. This permanent staff of the local authorities has a great field of public service in front of it in organisation and finance. But there are some who feel—indeed it is a universal feeling in the schools—that there is a danger that some of these officials may unwisely interfere too much with that freedom and initiative which the Board of Education has been careful to safeguard, and done much to promote, in the schools themselves.

Those who would know how many-sided is the work which a Local Education Authority has to conduct could not do better than study such a book as *The London Education Service*, which has been prepared for the London County Council largely for the service of the thousands of visitors who come each year to study what is being done. It is, of course, far the largest of our Authorities, but that enables the reader the better to estimate the multiplicity of the task. It maintains a large administrative staff, and an Inspectorate of its own. It has within its survey 913 ordinary elementary schools, 74 central schools, 10

open-air schools, 153 schools for children in one way or another defective, 5 industrial schools, 79 secondary schools, and 5 training colleges of its own with 1,398 students in attendance. The work of medical inspection occupies 23 doctors whole time, and 70 part time, 60 dentists, and 350 school nurses. There are 250 day and evening continuation schools, and adult education is promoted through the London University and its colleges, the Workers' Educational Association, the polytechnics and settlements, and men's and women's institutes. There are four ways of circulating books, and 2,000,000 volumes in the circulation scheme alone. The Council further works in close touch with the University, aids many sides of its work, and entirely maintains one school of the University—the Day Training College. These examples, chosen at random and by no means complete, show clearly enough how great a part the local Education Authority plays in securing the well-being of London.

The partnership of the Central with the Local Authorities in the work of national education is fraught with great hope, if it continues to be animated by the spirit with which it has begun. The absence of detailed regulation secures to the local Authorities and to their schools a greater measure of freedom and of responsibility: equally it makes the Central Authority more absolute, because its discretion is unfettered. Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge rightly says, in his book, *The Board of Education*, speaking of the new regulations: "Whether they are successful will depend entirely on the way and on the spirit in which they are worked. If they are worked in the spirit of paymaster and claimant, they will make matters very difficult for both parties, especially as their form exposes their working more, and not less, to the influence of political fluctuations. If they are worked in the spirit of partnership, and a genuine acceptance on both sides of the obligations and conditions of

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partnership, they may contribute greatly to the consolidation of that relation."

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CHAPTER IX

HEALTH AND PHYSIQUE

THERE is one form of progress which is visible to the eye of even the casual observer, and that is the health and general well-being of the children at the schools. It is nearly all a progress of the last twenty years, for the feeding of schoolchildren began with the Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906, and medical inspection was brought in by the Education (Administrative Provisions) Act of 1907. Much educational progress is invisible, and often it is disputable; but the annual report of the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education always records progress, and is among the most inspiring educational documents of the year. It is odd that the nation should have waited until the twentieth century before realising that it is as important to make the child fit to receive education as to devise an education to fit the child. Fifty years ago in the elementary schools of London there were 85 children on the average to a single teacher: they were badly fed and clothed in rags. Child misery was so common that it moved Dr. Barnardo to enter upon his life's work to succour their destitution. What has been done since may be illustrated from the following passage taken from the Report of the Education Officer for London, 1926: "The following notes on a school, which for many years was looked upon as probably the poorest in London, may be of interest. In the early days the school was a battle ground. The neighbourhood was at war with the school authorities: the children were at war with the teachers; and the parents took the side of the children. Physical violence was frequent, truancy was common. The

children were sent to school wretchedly clothed and wretchedly fed: in winter, even when snow was on the ground, many boys came to school without boots and stockings. The teachers often used to buy bread at their own expense for the children." The first struggle was to make them obey rules, the next to overcome sullenness, indifference, and hostility, the next to win their goodwill. Now the next generation has arrived at the school, but the whole neighbourhood has improved. Housing is better, and wages are better. "No child is now without boots: hardly any are in torn clothes: none is in rags. There are no truants, for the children like the quietness of the school. The parents are better than the previous generation. The present generation is better than its parents. The parents trust the teachers, upholding them in any disciplinary measures they may take." In producing this happy result medical inspection and physical care, and the treatment of children as human individuals, have played the largest part.

The object of the medical service is to detect all departures from normal health, and growth, and to advise the proper remedy. This in the first place; but it seeks to go farther, to find out the causes of the defects, and to prevent them: last, its purpose is to teach, and to cause the children to practise, personal hygiene in every school. As a matter of routine every child is medically examined three times in its school life, at the ages of five, eight, and twelve, but opportunity is given both to parents and to teachers to consult the medical adviser at any time, if need arises. Every year sees an advance made, which is not surprising to those who reflect that less than the space of one generation has elapsed since neglect was total. But much further progress can still be made. The life of the child before it arrives at school requires more supervision and care, for the schools are the receivers of damaged goods, and that damage has been done

in the very early years. Hygiene can be better taught, and experience is always improving the methods and adequacy of clinical study. More use can be made of open air and sunlight. But already Sir George Newman claims that there are at any rate six points in which the London school child of 1924 differs favourably from the child of 1894. (*a*) He is better clothed, and he is cleaner; (*b*) his posture and carriage are improved; (*c*) he is more intelligent and happier; (*d*) his physique is stronger; (*e*) mouth breathing has ceased to be common; (*f*) the carriage of the hands is different.

In a progressive authority such as London all the children are examined by nurses in all the schools every term: they are made to wash and keep themselves clean. This inspection enables all departures from normal health to be brought to the notice of the doctors. The children are weighed and measured, and their sight roughly tested: they are sent on, if need be, to the dentist or the ophthalmologist. When the children are found to be ailing, they are dealt with by the School Care Committees, who are groups of voluntary workers attached to each school, or small group of schools. In London these committees now number one thousand: they give personal service and bring the human touch and individual care into the child's life. They choose the children who are insufficiently fed, and arrange that they shall receive proper meals until they can be properly fed at home. They visit the homes, get to know the mothers, and arrange how best the treatment advised by the doctor can be carried out; they make the appointments at the treatment centres. They give special attention to those children who for any cause are going through a bad time, and facing difficulties whether they come upon them from within or without; they advise parents as to employment, and try to obtain a suitable future for the children when they leave. There are special Care

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Committees for the after-care of the blind, deaf, and defective children, and they are singularly successful. The last London report says: "Numbers of children are also sent away from London into the country to epileptic colonies, to open-air camp schools, to the ophthalmic school at Swanley, to the ear hospital at Sutton, to tuberculosis sanatoria, and to hospitals for the rheumatic. Remedial classes are also held in many schools for the benefit of children requiring more than the usual amount of physical exercises. Provision is thus made for dealing according to their physical needs with every type of child, and the help and solicitude evinced by the whole school organisation for the exceptional child has borne fruit in the much improved standard of health and physique which has been established in London."

One other reflection may be put on record. There has, in recent years, been a wonderful fall in infant mortality and a remarkable saving of child life. This has been directly due to the teaching of doctors and nurses, but its real cause lies deeper. It is that the parents of the present generation are those who have been through the reformed type of elementary education which has now so happily established itself.

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Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education.

The London Education Service.

CHAPTER X

THE TEACHERS

IN a book of this character least need be said about those who are most important, for every reader will have had acquaintance with schoolmaster or schoolmistress. The purpose of the book is to describe the system of organisation, supply, and control behind the fighting line, not to discuss the thoughts of those who man the trenches and bear the brunt of the battle. In spite of all the great work which the nineteenth century accomplished for education, it left the status of the teacher too low, and his salary too meagre. The elementary schoolmaster received payment of a very moderate kind, whatever his responsibilities, and the pension to which he looked forward was a mere pittance. In secondary schools it was found in 1894 that the average salary of 800 masters in some 200 schools was only slightly in excess of £100 a year: the portion of women teachers was worse. In neither case was there any pension for them to look forward to. Many of them had undertaken their life's work from a sense of vocation, and did not complain: but there were many hardships, and even tragedies, which closed lives spent in the public service, which were in truth a disgrace to a wealthy nation. Improvement began after 1902, but even in 1914 the average salary of assistant masters in secondary schools stood at £174, and of women at £126. Circumstances are now changed. In 1925 the average salary of headmasters was £763, of headmistresses £598, of assistant masters £390, and of assistant mistresses £310. What is still more important, all those who serve in the State-

aided schools and classes look forward to a pension.

It is generally agreed that the quality of teachers has improved. In the case of elementary teachers, they have usually had the advantage of a much more humane and liberal education than their predecessors, and a course of professional training is a regular thing with them. In secondary schools there has been very great expansion, and for a time the war very seriously interfered with supply. There were in 1908 9,325 men and women teachers in this type of education, in the State-aided schools for which alone figures are available, and in 1925 these had grown to 19,604, 9,718 being men and 9,886 women. The percentage of graduates among the men had risen in the same period from 62 per cent. to 80, and among the women from 41. to 62. On the other hand, in the matter of training undergone before teaching, the women are superior to the men, though in both cases the proportion of the trained to the untrained steadily rises. Just over 40 per cent. of the men, and over 50 per cent. of the women have undergone some course of training. It is to be remembered that the fact that a teacher is not a graduate does not mean that he or she is inefficient, for there are many subjects in secondary education for which qualifications are required other than those of a university degree.

The benefits which have been showered upon the teaching profession in the form of assured salary-scales and pensions are not entirely without drawbacks. They mean that it is far less possible for a teacher to pass to another school once a certain seniority, and therefore expensiveness, on the salary-scale has been reached: it is far less possible to pass the gap which divides the State-aided from the independent schools. Interchange and free movement between types of schools are in themselves good, and the limitation is to be regretted. It is also a more serious thing than it

was for a teacher to become unemployed in middle-life, for new appointments in the interests of economy are almost always made from those who are beginning their career. These defects are not to be lost sight of, but they weigh little in comparison with the great advantages which have been conferred.

Teachers have organised themselves into Sectional Associations, which once a year fill the papers with their discussions, and do perhaps more useful work in their committees and councils, meeting throughout the year and discussing privately questions of professional interest. Most would agree that educational conferences are too numerous, and meet too frequently: they are more in the nature of parades than councils, and their programmes are too frequently artificial. Thring first convened what became the Headmasters' Conference in 1869. It is a misunderstood body. It numbers about 150 members, the headmasters of schools which have a separate and independent Governing Body, and some regular connection with the Universities. It meets for discussion, interchange of ideas, and the settling of common action about questions where common action is desirable. It has never pretended to govern the profession or its constituent schools, or to settle the vexed question of what is or is not a Public School. In the following year, 1870, that which is the largest association was formed, the National Union of Teachers, a powerful body, something of a great trade union of the elementary teachers, which has maintained its representatives in Parliament. Others came thick and fast: the Headmistresses in 1874, the Private Schools in 1883, the Headmasters, a much more catholic body than the Conference, in 1890, the Assistant Masters, and the Preparatory Schools in 1892. There are a good many others. They have to do in the main with educational policies and professional questions, and in other associations teachers, either in common with

others who are not in schools, or segregated into societies, whose members are all of one kidney, discuss the questions that concern the curriculum and the staple subjects of education. Such are the English Association, the Historical Association, the Modern Language, the Geographical, the Classical Associations, or that of the Science Masters. There are many others of smaller range and membership, for they are apt to shoot up wherever two or three enthusiasts gather together.

All that has been considered in this book ends ultimately in the teacher in his classroom, standing in the presence of those whom he teaches. That alone is of supreme and ultimate value. In two ways there has been great progress. The old aloofness of the teacher and the old hostility or indifference of the taught have disappeared. Whether it be the tutor in the University, or the secondary teacher in schools ancient or new, or the elementary teacher in city or village, it is true that the spirit of the relationship between teacher and taught has changed for the better: the teacher tries to be the friend, philosopher, and guide of his pupils. Secondly, slowly as the national system of education takes shape, there emerges a sense of unity throughout the whole teaching profession, a self-consciousness of high vocation which may be capable of great things. The profession begins to feel that in every part of it it is engaged in the national service which is most vital of all, the creation of an educated democracy such as the world has not yet seen. Unless that democracy is created, Britain will prove unequal to the burden and responsibility of her position in the world; unless it is created, there is strong probability that the country will work its own ruin. It feels, also, with growing conviction, that it alone can build that education on the basis of practical religion, since through its hands alone passes the whole youth of the nation. In face of its great work it asks in all its branches for the

THE TEACHERS

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fullest measure of freedom, and the amplest room for initiative and experiment that can be conceded, that it may not fail in the task which is set before it.

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THE RACES OF MANKIND

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THE RACES OF MANKIND

CHAPTER I

HUMAN RACES

JAMES WATT's invention of industrial power on the large scale has multiplied contacts between men of all types and regions, and now, whether we like it or not, we are in a deeper sense than ever members one of another, whether we be black or yellow or white. The application of industrial power on the large scale is converting the torrid lands into producers of raw materials for the manufacturing peoples, who are gathered more especially in temperate regions, and an important aspect of the problems that confront India's statesmen is the rather confused struggle against the allocation of that teeming country to this task, at times at the expense of an invaluable culture heritage. Alongside of the influence of James Watt we have that of Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister, and the host who have followed them, apparently diminishing the dangers Europeans have to face when they go to distant and especially to equatorial lands, and thus making men's conquest of nature more sure and more far-reaching. Yet even the cheeriest optimist has doubts about the extent of the conquest when he gets reports of nervous breakdowns and sees that European children so generally have to be brought back to Europe for health's sake. If, then, contacts of peoples are multiplying, and if, especially, the European cannot simply

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instal himself in place of the coloured men of the torrid lands, it behoves us to understand all we can about the peoples who manage to survive under the trying conditions of those regions in order to establish a working partnership that may be of mutual benefit, for we may be sure that, if the association is harmful to one side, it will be harmful to the other as well. The study of the races of man is thus a matter of prime, practical importance; it is no less of scientific value, too.

Charles Darwin's vision of the unity of nature and man is illuminating dark problems in every part of the field of thought; it is changing our attitude in social and religious and educational matters, and its application to the problems of mankind in general is deepening day by day.

There is no longer any doubt that existing types of men have all evolved from one ancestral type which was already quite human; they have evolved in the course of drifting movements about the world, and it is our business to try to find out how so to study those drifts as to get a picture of their results in the negroes of Africa, the "whites" of Europe, the "yellows" of N. China, and the many types scattered the world over.

Unfortunately for our purpose of evolutionary study we have only too few actual specimens of our early ancestors; the gaps in the series are enormous, and a great deal has to depend, temporarily, at least, on working hypotheses. Still, when we remember that not half the ancient skeletons now known had been found a generation ago, and that the search for implements and other indications of man's presence goes on unceasingly and with increasing success, we may hope for more light in years to come.

While as yet next to nothing was known of ancient man, it was natural that race study should proceed

by attempts to classify, to subdivide, men into groups called "races," with the suggestion that the people of one race are more nearly related to one another than to anyone else, and that they have descended from a common ancestor or group of ancestors. In fact, there has been a natural tendency to exaggerate the resemblances between the idea of a "race" among men and that of a "species" among animals or plants. How is this exaggeration dangerous? It is dangerous because man has acquired powers which mark him off from the animals very sharply. If they move from one climate to another, in most cases they do so very slowly in the course of many, many generations, perhaps, for example, acquiring thick fur in some way to withstand cold; in any case their dispersion is a slow business. Man, on the other hand, puts on an extra thick coat or covers his skin with grease, a much more rapid affair.

In other words, the drifts of men are easier and far less limited by climatic and other factors; men make adjustments in their clothing and food, in their tools and animal helpers, and all this is a sphere of power and opportunity no animal has ever entered. Thus groups of men with, in most cases, very different features of equipment and organisation inhabit every region of the world save the Antarctic Continent, and the same can be said of no animals unless it be a few which have spread in man's company. Species of animals have their characteristic home areas, the human species has become worldwide in its distribution, within which, owing to power of movement, human types or races grade one into another and mix with one another in endlessly complex fashion.

It may be that in some cases living animal species grade into one another, but it is very often the case that they are markedly distinct, and, very often, too, they do not interbreed. Human types or races, how-

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ever, can interbreed very generally; in fact, no case of general sterility of crosses is known. This means that many individuals carry mixed inheritances from two very different parental strains.

For these reasons, it will be seen, there is only a limited value in the idea of basing our survey of human races on a classificatory scheme. It is true that populations in North-West Europe, in torrid Africa, and in Northern China are markedly different from one another, and that a classification of "outstanding types," of which these would be three, has its uses, but even these can be said to merge into one another. It is thus better to think of drifting movements of men from their early home, and to try to ascertain the qualities of each of the drifts and its changes of quality in the course of time. Drifting movements may have continued for long periods, and may often have included mixtures of types, so the matter is very complex indeed; but the drifts of men to each great region, to torrid Africa, to Australia, to America, to Western Europe, to Eastern Asia, have been subjected to the influences of the climates and opportunities they have found along their lines of movement. The equipment they have carried with them, in thought as well as in tools, has varied from time to time, and has made the greatest differences to their fate, differences nowhere so contrasted as between the early drifts into North-West Europe and Australia, with neither metal nor domestic animals nor crops, and the later drifts of the early period of metal into Western Europe and of the modern colonist into Australia with knowledge of agriculture and of a multitude of arts. Thus may one and the same region present very diverse environments to groups who come to it with different ranges of experience; man is not to be set down too simply as the creature of environment; his mental and material furniture, sometimes brought from afar through both time and space,

counts for a great deal in the final result. A region may offer possibilities, opportunities, difficulties; man may meet them in many ways or may merely seek to avoid the new and to cling to the old.

The study of ancient skeletons has demonstrated that some early members of the human species differed in important particulars from living types of men, but they are not found living anywhere at the present time, and it is doubtful whether much of their blood has gone to the making of modern types. Modern men, whether they be Eskimo or Zulu, Araucanian or Scandinavian, seem to be the descendants, modified in various directions, of one ancestral group which was neither the type that is known as the Neanderthal race, to which most of the ancient skeletons of extinct forms of man belong, nor the Piltdown nor any other type known from actual skeletons up to the present, though discoveries may be made any day.

It seems, then, that *Pithecanthropus*, the Piltdown woman, the Heidelberg jaw, the Rhodesian man, and the various specimens loosely grouped together as the Neanderthal Race, represent side branches from very-early-human or not-quite-human stocks. As they are all extinct we leave them aside, and we shall first try to get a picture of the common ancestors of modern man in broad outline.

It is a useful hypothesis that at some prehuman stage, probably a remote one, a member of the ape-group took to living to a far greater extent on the ground and less in the trees, and that at the same time he was growing bigger. Some of the forms at this stage remained in the forests, and are now found as the gorilla, the chimpanzee, the orang-outang, and the gibbon in the equatorial forests, but the fore-runners of man became creatures of the grasslands, and it seems likely that the forests have been hostile to man throughout his early history until he learned

to destroy them, sometimes with sad results for the race, or to manage them as he now does so remarkably in Scandinavian and Germanic lands. With the increase in size, and with life more upon the ground came an increase of the period of pregnancy from seven months to nine months; this may affect some or all of the apes above mentioned, and it is a cardinal fact in man's history. It involved a much increased maternity-tax with many results.

The apes eat a little flesh food, but live mostly on vegetable material. The human ancestors on the grasslands took to an increased proportion of animal food, long eaten raw. To get it they hunted great and small beasts, and the women were less able to take part in such work than before, both for the reason above stated and also because the extra two months of pre-natal growth made it a longer and more difficult affair for the baby to learn to support its head in the erect position. So there arose the division of labour that is such a feature of mankind, the man hunting and doing some collecting, the woman collecting food and nursing and becoming a social focus with duties as an auxiliary in preparation of the proceeds of the hunt, and soon learning to use the skins of animals caught as screens for herself and the baby and for the hunter, too. Such relations and the better assurance of food supplies seem to have led to more nursing and so to delay of the hardening of the skull—*i.e.*, to increased possibilities of brain growth; to increased play, leading, we think, to such arts as flint chipping, to which the immense leisure of the waiting hunter doubtless contributed; to the art of maintenance, and ultimately of creation, of fire, to help in walking more erect, and so on. All these features of life were very probably possessed by the extinct types of men above mentioned as well as by the more direct ancestors of man who are still more or less speculative. We will not venture to assign

either a period or a region to the process of the evolution of man as such. We shall merely take him as a grassland inhabitant and proceed to try to understand the rise of modern types of man. They approach, or, in all but a few of the earliest specimens, have completely attained, an erect posture with, according to Elliot Smith, a much improved stereoscopic vision and power to register detailed visual impressions of objects brought near the mouth by the hands. This, together with the increased nursing above mentioned, seems to have led to an increase of brain-growth, affecting the fore brain more particularly. The earliest specimens of men of modern type show us how this in turn seems to have affected the growth of the skull. The latter serves as the attachment on each side of the great temporal muscles that move the lower jaw up and down, and they were still very important from early childhood in the forerunners of modern man who had heavy jaws and ate half raw or quite raw flesh food at which they tugged. So the increased growth of the skull around the increased growth of brain was unable to express itself very freely in the direction of increased width, and the growth which took place was mainly in length. Thus the early representatives of modern man include several whose heads are very long, and if the head-sides slope steeply these same heads are also very narrow and high, "gabled" one might almost say. Sometimes, for reasons one could discuss, the head sides slope steeply only at some distance from the middle line and then the skull is less high and narrow, but it is usually very long in early types.

It may, however, be that some human types, like certain pygmies of the equatorial forests with small heads that are less long in proportion, represent remnants of those who did not undergo the extra growth in length described. It is often rather carelessly said that many individuals belonging to extinct types of

men were also very long-headed and narrow-headed, but to make measurements comparable, we must deduct the measurements of the enormous brow-ridges of those types; if that be done, extinct types of men, like most species of apes, except one type of gorilla, are more or less round-headed. We shall, at any rate, venture to work upon the idea that, among those becoming men of modern type, there were some who had very long and often narrow and high heads, while others living under less favouring conditions had smaller, rounder heads. With increased use of the hands and increased approach to the truly erect position, and doubtless beginnings of cookery and betterment of nursing, the growth of the jaws, and with this the growth of the brow-ridges also, was lessening. It was a late phase of growth previously, and it has almost dropped out among women, whose growth phase is shorter than that of men, and it survives only in a very mild form among men.

Where did modern types of man originate, and when? Some hypothesis on this subject is necessary to help us to appreciate the facts about human races. The earliest traces we have are from South-West Europe and North-West Africa, and belong to a time when Europe was undergoing its last recovery from ice sheets, a recovery which was a very chequered one at first. The Neanderthal race had apparently managed to fit itself to glacial conditions, and vanished with their retreat. The new types apparently came into Europe from Africa. Now, while the ice sheets kept Europe cold, the dense cold air above them shouldered out the westerly winds which then blew into the land that is now the Sahara and Arabia, and it is especially this region, then an area of winter rain and grass, that may be supposed to have been the home or the cradle of modern man. It must have had a temperate climate with, at the same time, strong sunshine in summer, for we cannot suppose

that the relations of sun and earth have appreciably changed so recently.

When we study modern man physiologically we find that his various organs apparently function best at somewhat diverse temperatures, and that accordingly he favours a variable climate, but a temperature about 60°-65° F. (say 16°-17° C.) should recur frequently to keep him at his best. There should be much cooler weather, especially for the well-being of the nervous system, and any prolonged period at much higher temperatures is not helpful, and may even be very dangerous. At temperatures such as those described, an active handworker may give off as many as 3,200 calories per day, and it would seem that growth is most prolonged, and the full and final establishment of the sex functions is achieved most slowly. The men who live under other conditions—*e.g.*, the natives of equatorial Africa, of the Gobi, of the Tundra, and so on, show various adaptations in the first case to disperse, and in the other two to conserve heat, and it is notable that in West Africa a native can apparently disperse only about half the heat that a North-West European can, and this in spite of many racial features specially developed, as modifications of growth, to increase heat loss. It is thus fair to suggest that man is essentially a creature of the temperate lands, and that his adaptations to torrid and to frozen lands are in some cases not by any means wholly successful. The fact that cool conditions favour especially the nervous system has been held to suggest that the growth of the forebrain took place during a cold period, and it has already been seen that this is probable on other grounds.

As all modern men have very little body hair, it is clear that the reduction of hair was a feature of the type in general, and, as all modern men, again, have some tendency, however slight it may be in Sweden for example, to brown pigment in the skin, we may

suppose that the type was brownish skinned. It may be that this was ancestral hair-pigment concentrated in the skin; it is at any rate important that a certain amount of brown pigment is invaluable as a protection against excess of ultra-violet rays such as would occur at times, whatever the range of temperature, at latitudes of 20° - 30° .

Among the earliest skeletons we find none, of modern type, which indicate an adult, male height of less than five feet, and several are quite tall, almost giants. We have already noted the pygmies of the equatorial forest as probable representatives of those early variants of modern man who did not undergo all the great growth of brain characteristic of the race. It is probable that modern types of man are taller than their predecessors, and that the pygmies again have not undergone the full increase. It is on the other hand possible that the very trying conditions of the equatorial forest have led to an actual reduction of stature, and it is noteworthy that the pygmies often retain a good deal of the fine downy hair of infancy throughout life.

The last character that it is essential for us to consider here is that of the skin and the head hair. Here we need only say that there are reasons for thinking that the skins, both of the people of equatorial West Africa and of peoples indigenous to Gobi and North China are specialisations in different directions, related to the increase or decrease of heat-dispersion, from the more average condition represented by a tough-skinned European in this respect. The same statement may be ventured concerning the kinky hair of the man of equatorial Africa or the straight coarse hair of many men of Gobi, North China, and the Tundra. To try to interpret the contrasts would be to anticipate what must be discussed in more detail in connection with the peoples of Africa, Asia, etc.

The above brief summary of the main physical features of the general type of modern man needs as a supplement a few hints on the primal social conditions involved. A few cases of deliberate burial occur among ancient, extinct types belonging to the "Neanderthal Race," but with the appearance of modern man deliberate burial becomes established, and we have quite a number of instances preserved to this day and mostly discovered within the last half-century or so. This cannot but suggest that some notion, however vague, of a life after death or some feeling of the surviving power of a dead magician, affected men's minds. Men's dreams were obviously taking them beyond the actual and teaching them "to look before and after," and perhaps already "to pine for what is not."

The implements associated with periods before men of modern type appeared are often of very beautiful construction, but are of relatively few types. It seems that the heavy hand of custom lay upon the craftsman, and that his growing spirit found its joy in fineness of workmanship. With the advent of modern men we find considerable variation in the types of flint implements, and they are often small, and give the impression that the owner kept a number at hand for replacement as might be necessary.

Moreover, in some regions at least, he seems quite soon to have learned to mount flint on wood, and he thus had probably found out the value of the lever. In this and several other ways we get an indication of a liberation of the spirit, and this is demonstrated above all by the art of these ancient hunters. We know also that they used fire, and suspect that they already knew how to make it. They seem to have known nothing of cultivation or of domestication of animals or of pottery making or of stone grinding.

Their erstwhile original home has largely become desert, and portions of it near rivers became the

scenes of the next great step forward in human organisation, so on both grounds the ancient hunter-artists and their mode of life are no longer found in the original region. These modes of life have been pressed out to the remotest corners or, in some cases, to areas of specially unfavourable climate, and it is interesting that we can broadly divide the present day peoples who live by hunting and collecting, and who seem to be descendants of people who have always done so, into two groups. Those with small stature and small roundish heads in the equatorial forests of Africa and Asia may be said to be one group, while those with very long and usually narrow and high heads like the Greenland Eskimo, some Fuegians, some South African groups, and the Australian aborigines, and the Veddas of Ceylon, and some jungle tribes of South India form another, scattered group, scattered as it were to the far corners of the earth. The Bushmen of South Africa and the recently extinct Tasmanians are in some ways intermediate between the two groups. It is to be noted that the Tasmanians and the African peoples mentioned in this paragraph all have kinky hair, the Vedda and the Australians wavy or curly hair, and the Eskimo and Fuegians straight hair. In skin, too, there are contrasts in colour and other details, but we cannot close our eyes to the fact that old-fashioned types of head persist in these remote spots in special numbers. It should be added that old-fashioned types of head, especially the very long, narrow, high ones, also persist among many peoples like the British, French, Portuguese, Scandinavian, etc., and among such peoples the bearers of these old characters are usually fully members of the body politic, and indeed may give a rather large proportion of supernormal individuals. Nevertheless, it is very generally true that the hunting and collecting peoples are unable to face modern European commerce and its accompaniments.

The Tasmanians are gone, the Bushmen, the Australians, the Pygmies seem to be going, the Eskimos are being kept from extinction by stringent measures; at least, an attempt is being made to preserve them in Greenland as a population valuable to the world, which would otherwise find a difficulty in the valorisation of the Arctic. We shall have to return to these types in studying the peoples of the various regions, but, prior to that, we must sketch some outlines of the dispersal of types which pressed upon these old-fashioned groups and led to the survival of their full representatives only in the remote or difficult regions mentioned.

The retreat of the ice sheet and the consequent change of position of the zone of the westerly winds from the north of Africa to North-West Europe brought about one of the greatest crises in the story of humanity. In the first place, the forest, first of pine and then of oak, spread over Western Europe, and the grassy plains, which had erstwhile allowed great herds to roam, were very much reduced. The old hunter-artists were faced with a crisis and were unable to keep up their old life. They did not of themselves learn agriculture or stockraising, probably because the grain plants, which are basic for this mode of life, did not grow naturally in Western Europe. They seem to have eked out a rather poor existence on the shores, and on some patches of soil that for some reason were fairly clear of trees.

In the second place, the belt of rain which had formerly brought heavy snow to Central Asia via the Euxine and Caspian was now of much less importance, and parts of Turkestan, which seem previously to have been very wet, probably largely through melting snow, now became drier and more habitable as grasslands still kept fairly moist for some thousands of years by melting of mountain ice. So it became possible for men, whether from the west or from the

south, to trust themselves bit by bit to the great sea of grass.

In the third place, the former peoples of the Sahara and Arabia were pressed out towards the Mediterranean, the Nile, the Syrian and Mesopotamian rivers on the one hand and probably towards torrid Africa and India on the other. Finally, pressure of population on the Nile and the Syrian and Mesopotamian rivers led to the invention of the art of cultivation of crops in these regions in which regular seasonal floods fertilised the soil with an alluvial deposit. In this way agriculture could begin without facing the problem of exhaustion of the soil. The balance of evidence seems in favour of considering Mesopotamia as more nearly the primal home than Egypt. With cultivation came the knowledge that friction with earth would smooth a chipped stone—*i.e.*, stone grinding began and released men from previous dependence on flint, for any stone that was hard enough would lend itself to grinding. There also came settled hearths and homes, villages, and soon cities, pottery, metal working, and many other inventions, making a beginning of what we may call in the strict sense civilisation.

From the development of civilisation onwards, while the old types of long, narrow, and high heads still occur, they become less numerous than heads in which the growth has taken place more freely in width as well as in length, so the nett result is what one may call a moderately long head, or in some cases even a broad head, as we shall see. In what have here been called the old types with long, narrow, high heads, the breadth may be 72 per cent. of the length or even less (some as low as 63 per cent. have been recorded) on the skull, and this is equivalent to about 73·5 per cent. on the living head. In the moderately long-headed types the breadth is 72 to 77·5 per cent. of the length on the skull, or 73·5 to about

78.5 on the living head. In the moderately broad-headed types the breadth is 77.5 to 80.5 per cent. on the skull, or 78.5 to 81.5 per cent. on the living head. With higher percentages we may speak of broad-heads. These are not the figures that have been used in the older books, which have adopted arbitrary arithmetical boundaries, using the name *dolichocephals* for types in which the ratio (cephalic index) is 75 or less, *mesocephals* for those with cephalic indices 75 to 80, and *brachycephals* for those with indices above 80. Some confusion arises through the use of those limits at times for relations on the skull, and at times for relations on the living head. The matter has long needed revision, and the suggestions of 72 to 77.5 to 80.5 are made on the basis of considerable experience in the analysis of types. They correspond approximately to morphological differences of some importance. Those with indices above 72 on the skull rarely have the head highly ridged along the middle line; those with lower head indices usually have the height of the head equal to or even greater than the breadth; and other differences mark off to a certain extent the other groups enumerated above. We have reason to think that the people who learned to cultivate the ground and to develop villages and cities included a good many with indices 73 to 78, people, that is, of long-headed ancestry, whose heads were growing somewhat more freely in breadth. It is likely enough that this was due in part to the development of homes and cooking and milk supplies for the children, all factors delaying the hardening of the skull and reducing the call for very tough and strong temporal muscles (the muscles fastened to the sides of the forepart of the skull above and to the jaws below) used in tugging at flesh. There is also reason to think that from early times there was a broad-headed population in Anatolia; it may have attained this character by widening from a narrow condition, but a less

strained hypothesis is that in Anatolia, as on the equatorial side of the early home of modern types of men, there may have been people who missed something of the earlier growth in length, but who, unlike the pygmies, profited by increased growth later on, and so became broad-heads with heads much larger than are those of the pygmies. Soon, in the history of civilisation, we find the moderately long-headed and the more or less broad-headed peoples living side by side, with a sprinkling of the very high, narrow, long heads among them. This may be held to describe very broadly and summarily the head characters of the peoples of ancient civilisation on the Mesopotamian rivers and the Nile. It seems likely that a long period elapsed before there was very much spread of civilisation far beyond this region. We may think that some drifts of men, chiefly long-headed, had moved from time to time either south of the Himalayas towards the East Indies, or north-west of the Hindu-Kush into Turkestan and Siberia and even to America, or north-west from Iran and Anatolia into South Russia and into Thrace, and so probably along the belt of *loess* soil (loose material not rich in forest) into Western Europe, or south and south-west into torrid Africa: But it seems the most useful hypothesis to hold for the present, largely on negative evidence it is admitted, that very little agriculture had spread from the lands of the ancient rivers before some period roughly dateable about 3,000 B.C. Then seems to have followed another great crisis in man's story. In both Mesopotamia and Egypt, after a phase of great development, the civilisations of the ancient world become disturbed, and, for a time, much impoverished about 2,500 B.C. Ere this comes about, however, there is a great expansion; cities develop on the site of the later Troy (Hissarlik II.), at Knossos and elsewhere in Crete, apparently at Mohenjo Daro and Harappa on the Indus, and perhaps in North-

Western China. At any rate, civilisation, with evident relations to that of Mesopotamia more especially, appears in these and other regions (South Russia, etc.) There is some reason to think that people with a command of the horse did a great deal both to upset the ancient world, which does not appear to have known that animal as a companion, and to spread conquest and culture far and wide.

By this time the high plateau east of the Tianshan mountains, including Gobi, must have become habitable, and it seems to have received already earlier some drifts of people still without agriculture or domestic animals.

We have thus reached the stage of human story at which movements in various directions were giving the world its main racial elements, and in the next section it will be our duty to follow the movements in the following chief directions, determined largely by geographical obstacles and opportunities. In doing so it will be advisable to follow not only the spreads of early cultivators but also the various drifts that seem to precede them.

The directions, from the ancient riverine lands, are broadly as follows:

1. Drifts into and through torrid Africa, including early drifts from the south flank of the early home on the then Saharan grassland, as well as later drifts via the Nile, and, probably, the Red Sea and the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb.

2. Drifts into India, Malaysia, the East Indies, and beyond, including early drifts when the coastline was approximately what is now the hundred-fathom line and later drifts, usually of cultivators, some being quite late, and, in the Pacific, maritime.

3. Drifts north-eastward, probably flanking the Hindu Kush, into Turkestan, Siberia, Gobi, China, Japan, and America.

4. Drifts into Europe, some early on the north

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side of the early home, across land bridges between Tunis and Sicily, and even perhaps between the Riff and Spain, and some via Anatolia and Thrace or the Ægean, and some via Turkestan or the flanks of the Caucasus into South Russia and beyond.

CHAPTER II

RACE IN AFRICA

IN North Africa we have survivals on the spot, or displacements towards the Mediterranean, of race types which have been in or near the Sahara-Arabia zone from the early days of modern types of man. Collignon describes a "Type Gétulien" in North Africa with long, narrow, high head, and one can recognise such a type in many parts of the North African region grading into a less extreme form of long-head. Elliot Smith has emphasised the continuity of type among Egyptian fellahin from the remotest times to the present day, and his work is based upon much study of early burials. The name Hamite has often been used for the average North African long-head who cannot quite be included among Mediterranean types (see Chapter VII.) because the skin colour is too marked, and the same term has often been used for a number of more or less related North African languages apart from Arabic. This double usage is a source of confusion, but less so than the double usage of such a term as Celtic, employed at times to denote a race, at others a linguistic group, and, indeed, with other meanings as well. Elliot Smith has used the term Brown Race to cover at least the long-heads of North Africa and the long-heads of Arabia and its borders, and it has at times been extended to cover the long-heads of the West Mediterranean and the general population of long-heads spread over a large part of the Deccan in India. It is a useful name, especially if kept for the long-heads of North Africa and of Arabia and its borders. Here the skin is brown, often with a reddish tinge, and the head is long, but

there are several differences. Generally speaking, the long-headed population of the borders of Arabia has a sharper profile and a more regular, more prominent, narrower nose than have the long-headed people of North Africa and the Nile, and the linguistic term Semite has rather unfortunately been applied to the former. The nose, then, in North Africa is often fairly short and the nostrils fairly wide, though these features are not by any means so marked as among the peoples of torrid Africa, and, besides, it is important to realise that Arabian stocks have influenced at various times the North African population, especially in the East. The hair is wavy or curly and typically black, but there are much fairer elements in the hill regions of Algeria and Morocco included among the Berber peoples. These fairer peoples are known for North Africa from the ancient Egyptian monuments as well as from modern times, and some think they indicate a southward drift from Europe. Generally the North African long-head is of moderate stature and of relatively spare build. There are broad-heads here and there—as, for example, on Gerba Island, off Tunis—and Elliot Smith has described broad-headed elements as coming into the population of ancient Egypt during the Fourth Dynasty—*i.e.*, between 3,000 and 2,700 B.C. Rodd has recently suggested that some Saharan types still show the characteristics found in the Cro Magnon skeleton of the very early (Aurignacian) period of men of modern type. It is also known that what may have been pygmies were known in ancient Egypt; they may have been brought in from torrid Africa. Allied to the population of North Africa rather than to that of equatorial Africa in general are the people of the dry eastern horn of Africa that has its point at Cape Guardafui; they include Gallas of dark skin, with wavy or curly hair, fairly long heads, moderate stature, and fairly well-developed profile. In Abyssinia elements of this

kind are numerous, but there is also a broader-headed strain akin to the people of South Arabia. A good many peoples on the east side of Africa, however, have characteristics also connecting them with the generality of the population of torrid Africa, which must now be considered.

In the first chapter suggestions have been made about the probably grassland character of the Sahara during the last major phase of the Ice Age of Europe and Asia. It is not that a desert belt was absent; it existed, but lay farther to the south and was narrower. Beyond it towards the Equator lay a belt of high grass, and then the rain forest more or less as now; but apparently it was somewhat cooler, and, so the forest, which is limited largely by rates of evaporation from leaves, was wider spread than now for climatic reasons. The indigenous agriculture of torrid Africa with its fire-clearing is highly destructive of the rain-forest in the end, for that forest is a very complex product of growth and adaptation through geological ages *in situ*, and the growth that springs up after a burning is very different from the original one, and repeated burnings and rough cultivation may reduce an area to what is little better than desert. Another difficulty of the environment is that, while decayed vegetation is a most precious manure if it be not too much exposed to a very warm sun, under conditions of long exposure in equatorial regions the chemical power of the sun's rays, which is at its highest there, may ultimately lead to changes which draw up the soluble iron constituents to the surface and lead to their being deposited there as the moisture evaporates; so in the end an armour-plated desert may be spread in a region which was once equatorial forest. This is, however, a very extreme case. These points may help to interpret some of the facts about peoples of Africa.

We may be sure that those early types of modern man which drifted southward from the then Saharan

grassland were not the ablest or most enterprising, but rather the more dejected who were pressed in that direction with impoverishment of their life in the desert and little chance of doing much with the equatorial forests. Moreover, modern man is a creature of temperate clime, and a drift towards the Equator meant putting up with trying conditions as regards dispersion of heat, and consequently it involved difficulties about mental and physical energy, and about growth as well in some cases.

The character of the skin in torrid Africa varies to a considerable extent, but generally shows adaptations to heat dispersion and to the meeting of other difficulties of such a region. In the first place, the skin is often soft, rather than dry and hard. Secretions keep the live cells from drying too quickly, in spite of enormous evaporation from large sweat glands with loose pores. Both the large evaporation and the lack of a thick, dry layer promote the dispersion of internal heat, and the development of sweat glands is a valuable supplement to the kidneys, which are not at their best under very warm conditions. This skin activity appears to have led in a number of cases to large development of the bloodvessels (capillaries) of the skin, so that, when a fleshy surface is pressed with a finger, removal of the pressure does not mean instantaneous obliteration of the depression as with us; the hollow only gradually fills up as the capillaries fill again. A skin full of bloodvessels and sweat glands, evaporation from which is of prime importance, does not lend itself to marked hair growth, and body hair is very feebly developed in many parts. The pygmies, who in some things preserve what one may call baby characters, often have a good deal of the downy hair of infancy, and may retain it throughout life. The hair of the apes and monkeys, and the downy hair of the human baby, and the adult hair of the wavy-haired and straight-haired peoples all grow from roots

which have a practically straight course obliquely upwards to the surface from the deeper parts of the skin. According to observations that need further confirmation, it is just after birth among the peoples of torrid Africa that the roots of the head hairs become markedly curved so that they lie near the skin surface. The curving of the roots and the looseness of the hair pores give the hair its characteristic form. It is a rather flat oval, with one diameter of the section thirty to seventy per cent. of the other, a consequence of the shape of the pores, and with marked curvature and many kinks, due to the shape of the roots and the looseness of the pores. In several types the neighbouring hairs tend to wind round one another, and may thus leave intermediate spaces on the head with only the hair bases as a covering. This arrangement is sometimes described as "peppercorn hair." The colour of the skin varies considerably. In some cases, as among some forest pygmies, the skin is yellowish and rather drier than is usual in equatorial Africa. Whether the paucity of dark pigment is to be interpreted as a result of life in the forest shade, or whether it is another of the "baby characters" of these people is not clear. Elsewhere the skin varies in colour from a chocolate-brown to an almost pure black, and sometimes people of different tints are found living side by side in the same village. Nevertheless, there seems to be some amount of adaptation in skin tints. The blackest tints occur in some spots in which old populations have found refuge, and they might thence be considered as an old character surviving here and there. This interpretation is, however, of doubtful value, and it is generally true that the regions with the blackest tints are lowland regions with long dry seasons, though not all such places have very black people. It is useful at present to think that the blackest skinned groups are those which have mingled relatively little with lighter skinned conquerors, and that

they occur in several cases under conditions of long, dry isolation, in some cases in areas unsuitable for much cattle, so that hunting is an important aid to life. Conquerors generally avoid such areas, if possible, for their settlement. It is notable that some of these peoples with the blackest skins are very tall, and that their tallness is of the very lanky and extremely long-legged variety; some serious observers think that these features indicate great influence of the secretions of the pituitary body during growth. Such growth, when found as an abnormality in other parts of the world, has been found at times to be due to unusually large secretion of one part of the pituitary. The very dark, lanky people are often also people with strongly projecting mouths, and this character again is associated, when it occurs as an abnormality in other regions, with powerful pituitary secretions. It seems that most of the people in Africa who are very tall are also quite long-headed, and an indirect connection between this and special pituitary activity has been guessed at. The richest chocolate-brown tints are said to occur particularly in regions of continuous moist heat, and may be connected with the large development of skin blood-vessels that is also frequent in such situations, the tint being due partly to brown pigment that is not quite dense enough to give the effect of black, and partly to the blood colour. A certain amount of brown pigment could be understood as an adaptation to withstand excessive influence of the sun's chemically active rays, but there is too much for that. It may be that some of the sun's heating rays are absorbed better at the surface, thanks to this pigment, instead of being allowed to penetrate farther in. It is also known that among other peoples in other regions colour darkening occurs under conditions of poor health, and it may well be that the very dark colour of many African peoples is an expression of the difficulty and incompleteness of the adaptation of the human constitution

to torrid conditions. Investigations on all these points by Dr. Shaxby may throw new light on the problems, and it is at least interesting that in some marine animals the patterns of dark pigment indicate the patterns of skin bloodvessels, the pigment being in the skin overlying the bloodvessel. It may well be, too, that the dark brown pigment is a by-product of the excretory function, performed to an unusual extent in the torrid lands by the sweat glands. In any case, it is well to think of the dark colouring as merely a part of a many-sided modification of the skin under torrid conditions in Africa, and not to require the same interpretations when we come to dark skins elsewhere, among peoples of other types.

Torrid Africa has received many invaders, both from the north across the Sahara and along its borders, and from the north-east, where, as stated above, more or less North African types stretch down, relatively pure, into the dry lands of the horn of Africa behind Cape Guardafui. Towards the south-west border of those dry lands of the east, as well as along the southern border of the Sudan, there are many people who combine something of the North African with a good deal of the torrid African type, the latter element being recognisable by the kinky hair, the rather flat, broad nose, and, usually, the projecting mouth with lips everted, probably for cooling purposes. Where the former element is stronger, the profile is usually sharper, and the nose correspondingly narrower and sharper. In Nigeria, among the Hausa, the more fully torrid African characters are general, but among the Fula the North African features are marked. The Hausa have become more especially cultivators, while the Fula came in as conquerors, and are, or were, to a large extent pastoralists. In the Sudan generally—that is, along the southern border of the Sahara—North African elements are powerful in matters of language and religion, but farther south,

even among peoples who may often have fairly sharp profiles, the languages belong to one great family with the name of Bantu, and they have many peculiar sounds (clicks, etc.) which mark them off as including features that are very old in equatorial Africa. The northern limit of the Bantu languages is approximately a line from Calabar eastwards to the Kenya Mountains, and thence southward to Mombasa. Conquerors in the Bantu region have usually been cattlemen, and in many cases have forced conquered folk to cultivate for them. Conquered peoples have sometimes been driven into fly belts, where insects make the keeping of cattle, beyond, perhaps, a royal herd, very difficult, or into the forests. The swamps of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, west of the Nile, harbour many ancient groups, some with extremely long heads, who are also among the tallest and the darkest of Africans. The great equatorial forest survives up to the present along the Guinea coastlands, except parts of the Gold Coast, which faces south-east, and in the Congo Basin, and here one finds a number of probably ancient types in addition to the pygmies already mentioned. It has been said that some of the pygmies are yellowish, others are very black; most have small round heads and peppercorn head hair, with some downy hair on the body, or even in some cases black adult hair on parts of the body. There are said to be persons of peculiarly ape-like appearance among the forest peoples of equatorial Africa. In South-West Africa the Bushmen are physically, in some ways, akin to the pygmies of equatorial regions; their heads vary from medium proportions, with small size, to the long-headed condition; their colour is yellow-grey, their stature is short, their nose very flat, but their mouths not by any means always projecting; the buttocks may be very fat, especially among the women. The Korana of some parts of the Orange River have included men with very long heads and prominent brows, more

akin to the early types of modern man discussed in connection with North Africa.

In the West African forest country is found the rather tall, strongly built negro with short legs and long arms, long-headed, even very much so, but with bulging forehead instead of prominent brow ridges; the mouth usually projects forwards, and the lips are everted; the nose is broad and flat. It seems thus to have been into an Africa inhabited by a considerable variety of old types that cattle-men with North African inheritance penetrated, mingling with the women of the conquered folk. Agriculture is mainly the work of the conquered peoples, and it is therefore not surprising that it has remained in the stage of hoe culture, that almost all cultivated plants are introductions from the north or, in recent centuries, from America, that the social organisation in the north is allied to the patriarchal tribalism of pastoralists of the grasslands, but that, in the torrid zone, all sorts of combinations of this with more purely indigenous elements occur. On the southern grasslands—that is, south of the Congo Forest—many groups are, or were, of the nature of military hordes—men, women, and children gathered round a warrior of prestige; they have often dispersed and regrouped themselves as prestige changed. The agricultural element is stronger on the eastern side of Africa with its better watered land, while pastoral conditions are more dominant in parts of the west. Southward and south-westward movements have been very important and oft-repeated, but there have been northward spreads of conquering hordes, especially of the Ama Zulu, who show North African features in a rather special degree, and are said to have spread south four or five centuries ago.

In many parts of torrid Africa—as, for example, in the Sudan and in the southern part of the Congo region—there are broad-headed elements which do not seem to owe their head form to pygmy admixture, for

they are not seldom tall. In recent centuries slave-raiders, sometimes of South Arabian origin, have played a notorious part in Africa, and it may be that South Arabians have intervened in Africa for a much longer time still. Broad-heads occur here and there in the Sudan, along parts of the upper courses of the Bahr-el-Ghazal (of the Nile), and here and there (with shorter stature, for the most part) in the Congo region.

Practically every element of the population of Africa south of the Sahara and Abyssinia, apart from nineteenth-century intrusions, has kinky head hair, and most have everted lips, but the profile, stature, and colour vary very considerably. Difficulties of social organisation throughout the region, due to climate and to fly belts, as well as to isolation from the great centres of civilisation, have been greatly complicated by a long succession of slave-raids, which even now have not ceased. The health of many populations is poor, and a medical man, borrowing the phraseology of 1914-1918, says of many that they are not C3 but Z26 groups. In several parts agriculture remains so primitive that the village is moved every few years, a state of affairs of which we have traces in prehistoric Europe, and some few surviving instances in the high country of Central India. It is possible that help given to these populations to stabilise their life and settlements, to reduce disease and promote child welfare, to give education and other interests which might delay the plenary development of the sex passions, might in a century or two effect considerable change in native Africa by improvement of the breed. Attempts to impart European notions and habits recently made have not prospered well, and the study of the physiology and sociology of the African peoples, and especially of their land tenure schemes, is a matter of practical as well as of scientific importance, for betterment efforts must be solidly built on whatever can be saved of the native tradition if they are to be of lasting

value. Abyssinia, among its mountains, stands out as a problem apart, with a North African foundation to its population and a much more complex social organisation than black Africa. It was already on a fairly high level of culture some centuries B.C. South Arabian influences, as well as many from the Nile, have played upon it, and it is likely that exploration of its recesses would reveal a variety of types, including survivals of ancient ones. Slavery must have brought a number of elements from equatorial Africa into the Abyssinian highlands.

The time has hardly yet come when we can link the early drifts of men into torrid Africa with various cultures of which we have traces in the forms of implements, etc. There can be little doubt that the Bushman art and mode of life is in several ways analogous to that of the later part of the Old Stone Age of South-West Europe, probably in the sense that both were spreads, in different directions, from North Africa. Many finds seem to indicate that a drift of the peoples of the end of the Old Stone Age went southwards, it would seem, as the Sahara dried, but one should not date the arrival of such a drift in South Africa by reference to the probable date of its departure from the north. There is a good deal of evidence of considerable movements into West Africa and into the Congo region, at least during the general dispersal of the early part of the third millennium B.C., with the carrying of the arts of agriculture, of stone grinding, and, in places, of metallurgy in copper or bronze. Probably the spread of the potter's art is an early phase of this movement, which found many peoples in the hunting stage with tools of the types of the end of the Old Stone Age. Whereas the drifts of the early part of the third millennium B.C. started cities in India and history in China and the urban and rural civilisations of the Mediterranean and of Danubian Europe respectively, they seem to have been poorer and fragmentary

in torrid Africa, and one finds indications that their influence largely faded away, though it left some knowledge of agriculture, without, however, the use of the plough or the idea of the city. The cattle-men who have successively conquered Africa have usually begun as patriarchal folk, despising cultivation and deeply conservative, and have often become military hordes. They have generally tried to make conquered peoples work for them, and with the absence of an idea of the city, one finds that in several districts the smiths and other craftsmen are still nomads, like our traditional tinkers in Europe, outside the social organism. This is another reason for the weak development of civilisation in equatorial Africa. We do not as yet know much about subsequent movements into Africa until we come to the Muhammadan waves across the Sahara and along the Sudan. The voyages of discovery of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought the great crisis of African history. Not only did slave-raiders under Portuguese and English and other direction deeply disturb African societies, extending the troubles due to Arab slave-traders begun in earlier centuries, but less unworthy influences made themselves felt in the direction of Europeanising the African peoples, sometimes for good, more often for ill because of lack of knowledge of the real conditions. One unquestioned good was the spreading in Africa of many cultivated plants native to torrid America, a fact which might have lifted Africa on to a higher level had not the slave-trade struck at the root of social stability. In the nineteenth century there had been added another crisis, due to the efforts of rival imperialisms to import raw material into Europe for manufactures and for fodder, etc.; this has again disturbed native development, sometimes for good, oftener, again, for ill, through lack of understanding of the relations of landholding to society. The mandate system of the

League of Nations is a first experiment in the direction of international responsibility, and suggests the possibility of very varying schemes for various climates and peoples under expert guidance. Africa is underpopulated, and medical care and health education may make a great difference to numbers and quality of the population, if respect for native group ownership of land can be developed and the influence of traders and shippers can be moderated in the interests of native communities and their evolution. It is felt by many that the best Bantu stocks have large possibilities of development under the best European guidance, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the lowlier peoples, for the mere hunters can hardly survive the multiplication of European contacts. The need of stable and healthy African societies is a very great one, as the future of the world's civilisation is intimately bound up with the assurance of supplies from the inter-tropical lands, supplies that only native peoples can produce in such climates.

CHAPTER III
*THROUGH SOUTH ASIA TO THE
PACIFIC.*

To understand something of the drifts of types of modern men in this direction we should realise, firstly, that, in the last major phase of the Ice Age, the gradation from the ice sheets of the Himalayas towards subequatorial conditions farther south must have been a sharp one, and this implies that the melting snow and ice flooded the lowlands now occupied by the Ganges and Indus. Next we should realise that that phase of the Ice Age was in all probability correlated with an upward movement of the land, so that the coastline may have been somewhere not far from the present hundred-fathom line. That movement was one of the latest phases of the long succession of oscillations right along the mountain scheme of Alps, Armenian heights, Himalayas, and East Indian ranges, known to geologists as the Tertiary mountain systems, and the oscillations represent the dying down of the great movements at the time of their formation. The position of the coastline just mentioned would make the Persian Gulf land, and would add considerably to the land in the more northerly part of Western India. Sumatra, Java, and Bali would all be part of the Malay Peninsula, which would have stretched from the Mekong to Borneo and Palawan. This great land mass may have been separated by narrow straits from a great island, of which the Philippines are remnants, and from another long island, of which the chain from Lombok to Ombaya remains. North Australia and New Guinea would also have been united. Without going into more detail, it is clear that, while these

conditions more or less persisted, the drift of man across from Mesopotamia via South India and the East Indies to parts of Melanesia and to Australia did not involve crossing long stretches of sea. It is natural that the drifts in this direction have some analogies with those that went southward into Africa. Pygmy peoples, with small, roundish heads and kinky, often peppercorn hair, like those of Africa, but here all black, or very dark brown, have drifted east as well as south, and remnants of the eastward drift are found among the Andamanese, the Semang of Malaysia, the Tapiro and others in New Guinea, the Aetas of the Philippines, and probably some peoples of Melanesia. They are usually mere hunters and collectors, and the remnants occur in dense forest areas; it is said that some in New Guinea have learned a little agriculture, while the Andaman islanders, at least, have learned stray fragments of the higher arts. The pygmies of this region are either almost without body hair (Andamanese and Semang) or richly provided with it (Tapiro and Aeta). The Samang and Aeta have broad, very flat noses, but though the lips may be thick, they are not everted. Stature is usually under five feet for an adult man. In the case of Africa, it was noticed that the spreads southward beyond the equatorial forest did not illustrate the pygmy type, though the Bushman, as it were, grades from the pygmy type with a small, roundish head to a very long-headed type. So also, in the case of the south-eastward spread beyond the equatorial forest of the East Indies, we have the Tasmanians, black and kinky haired like the pygmies, but of considerably better stature, and with heads grading from the small, roundish form to an extreme of length. In the present state of ignorance we cannot but suppose that their characters were, in the main, developed during their drift through South Asia and the East Indies, and that possibly their residence in the cool climate of Tasmania accounts for their

taller stature, but may not have been long enough to adjust their skin colour, which was very dark, or their noses, which were very broad. They have become extinct within the last half-century, unfortunately before full records of their lives had been made.

In the case of Africa, it was stated that the Korana of the Orange River, and perhaps others, illustrate a strongly built, fairly tall type with a very long head and strong brow ridges. The development of brow ridges is, generally speaking, slight in Africa. The drifts through South Asia towards the Pacific must have included quite a large element of this long-headed, brow-ridged type, though the brow ridges are present only in some cases. In Africa, again, the general population shares with pygmies the possession of kinky hair on the head, though the downy hair of infancy is wavy and grows from deep, and more or less straight, roots like most human and ape hair. Among the peoples of South Asia, Malaysia, and beyond we find kinky hair in Melanesia and Papua as a feature of the long-headed populations as well as of the pygmies, but it has clearly never been so general as it is in Africa. The fact that Papua and Melanesia have it shows that, as they are at an end of the zone of old-time non-maritime migration in this direction, it is a feature that has been pressed out there, and probably it is thus also an old feature, a feature of an ancient drift which was not anything like so strong as the southward drift of kinky haired people through Africa. We may thus suppose that kinky hair was an early specialisation on the south flank of the primal home of modern man, a specialisation which, therefore, was far more likely to abound in the southward drifts than in the drifts through India and Malaysia, which came from the eastern end of the primal home. It is thought that some kinky haired people lingered here and there in South Asia into historic times (some monuments in

Persia seem to hint at this), but it is quite probable that the drifts of this type occurred largely along the then coastal plains now for the most part submerged. It is quite likely that the submergence helps to account for the relatively small penetration of the kinky haired element in this direction. Most of the peoples with kinky hair in Papua and Melanesia are long-headed and not tall, but there are broader-headed elements which some ascribe to pygmy admixture. The nose is broad, but often much less flat than in Africa, and the brow ridges are prominent in a good many Papuans, but less so in Melanesia. The Melanesian types have spread in the Pacific Ocean since sea-boats able to do fairly long voyages have come into use, but here they are very variable in their characters, owing to admixture. Some few tall strains occur.

More important in South Asia and beyond are the very long-headed peoples (breadth often 72 per cent. of length, or less) with wavy hair and moderately short, average stature. Many have the prominent brow ridges and strong cheek-bones of some of the early types of modern man as known from North Africa and South-West Europe, and of such people as the Korana in South Africa. The drift of this type is more fully traceable than that of the kinky haired folk, for they occur still among the jungle tribes and even among the most civilised elements in Southern India; they are represented by the Vedda in Ceylon and the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula; it is evident that they make one element in the very mixed population of the East Indies, notably among the Toala in Celebes; and their type is that of the native Australians. The hair of these people is usually wavy or curly, and, in section, one diameter of the hair is often from 55 to 75 per cent. of the other, but lank hair is sometimes found. The nose is generally broad and may be flat, but is usually more prominent than that of the non-Bantu African of the

centre or south; it is only moderately broad in the Vedda of Ceylon. The lips are not everted, but they are often quite thick. The mouth generally projects forwards, and some types—*e.g.*, the Australians—often have a high ridged head behind a retreating forehead.

Reference was made in the introductory chapter to the differences between the extremely long-headed and the moderately long-headed types of man. The latter form an important part of the population of South India—in fact, of the whole of the Deccan and of parts farther north, and of the East Indies, Further India, and, with modifications due to admixture, of South China. The skin on the Deccan is brown and may be very dark, especially where the stock has mixed with the older extreme long-heads; head hair is abundant and is often inclined to curl, and the nose is moderate—*i.e.*, not nearly so broad as among the majority of the extreme long-heads. The corresponding people in Further India, South China, and the East Indies, especially in the two former, often show what appears to be admixture with more northerly Chinese stocks, to be discussed in the next section. After that discussion another chapter will be added summarising region by region the people of the monsoon lands of South and East Asia.

To the moderately long-headed, moderate nosed, dark-skinned people of the Deccan the name Dravidian has been given and is a source of confusion, for it has come to be used also for the languages of the Deccan peoples. The origins, paths of dispersion, modes of development, and date of arrival in the Deccan of the Dravidian languages, and those of many features of the civilisation of the Deccan, may be only indirectly related to the origins, dates of arrival, and zones of movement of the people just described as forming the main part of the Deccan's population. The Brahui language in Baluchistan is of the Dravidian family,

and this suggests that the languages came overland from the west somewhere. Sir John Marshall has recently uncovered Harappa and Mohenjo Daro near the Indus, cities with a civilisation related to that of Sumer in the third millennium B.C., and it may have been at that time that the idea of the city reached India, as has been suggested above. Related to these cities are stations in a pass from Baluchistan, so there again we have hints of a spread by land. It seems likely enough that many moderately long-headed people were spreading into Europe and elsewhere at that time, but it would be hazardous to link the spread of the city idea with the spread of the Dravidian languages, or with the spread of the moderate long-heads into the Deccan, especially as a statue head from one of these cities is decidedly broad.

The Asiatic monsoon lands, and Java in the East Indies, have offered such attractions to mankind through their wealth of many kinds that many invasions, as well as drifts of later times with better equipment, have affected their population, while Polynesia beyond has also received these later drifts, in this case in boats. Movements of men with good equipment and organisation have been less determined by physical features, and the Asiatic monsoon lands, the East Indies, and Polynesia have thus received peoples in many places with characters which appear to have developed north of the Hindu Kush and Himalaya. It will therefore be advisable to return to the subject of the population of South-East Asia, the East Indies, and the Pacific after dealing with the north-north-eastward drifts of mankind and the features developed among those peoples.

This chapter must close, therefore, without any completeness, and only a few disconnected points remain to be mentioned. The population of the Bombay Presidency, including Nagar Brahman, Prabhu, Maratha, and Coorg, has in it a number of

broad-heads not in any way akin to the broad-heads of the Eastern Himalayas and Central Asia, but more like some broad-headed peoples of West Asia and South-East Europe, on the whole; the nose is fairly narrow, and the stature may be great. They were once provisionally called Scytho-Dravidian, but Haddon and others have urged the dropping of this unfortunate name. It may be that they, and the Brahui of Baluchistan, whose language is Dravidian and whose heads are broad, are connected with the spread of the city idea to West India in the third millennium B.C., and thus provided considerable elements of the civilisation of the Deccan. This, however, is little more than a surmise as yet.

The later spreads of population eastwards into and beyond the East Indies have been largely by boat, after the sinking of the land to its present level, probably with a phase in which it lay lower still. These spreads have gone, apparently, from island to island, and, it would seem, have generally avoided Australia. That continent, therefore, has depended for its population, until our own day, mainly upon the early drifts of man during a phase of uplift when New Guinea and Australia were apparently joined. Subsequently only strays have touched Australia, and it is an interesting, and perhaps insoluble, problem to settle how far they have influenced either the physical type or the social features of the native Australian. Maps and illustrations in Professor Sollas' classic *Ancient Hunters* may be studied by the reader who cares to follow up this line of thought.

CHAPTER IV

NORTHWARD AND NORTH-EASTWARD DRIFTS IN ASIA

THE grasslands of Turkestan are the next large area of lowland northwards and north-eastwards from the supposed primal home of modern types of man. It is now inhabited by broad-headed men, but there are reasons to think that its early population was a very long-headed one. This is but an inference, but a number of indications make it an almost necessary one. In the first place, graves of uncertain age, some of them belonging to the third millennium *a.c.*, or even later, but some probably older, have yielded skeletons of tall men with long heads and strong profiles: these have been found mostly in the South Russian (*i.e.*, European) part of the steppe, and we unfortunately have very little information about the Asiatic part of the steppe in this matter. Secondly, the early burials at Anau, of uncertain but early date, and probably belonging to the fourth or fifth millennium *a.c.*, have yielded moderately long-headed types. Thirdly, some prehistoric skeletons found in Siberia are very long-headed. Fourthly, the drifts of men north-eastwards through Asia have, in part, gone around the Behring Straits and Aleutian Isles and the Arctic ice to America, and some parts of America most remote from the Behring region and of the nature of "ultimate corners" have very long-headed types. One might cite a number, but it will suffice to mention the Greenland Eskimo and some of the types from the Brazilian plateau, notably those described by Rivet from Lagoa Santa. The argument thus is that, if very long-headed types have drifted to

"ultimate corners" in this direction (*i.e.*, drifting via North-East Asia), they presumably started on their journey long ago, and would thus have been an early element of the population of the region on the north-east of what is here supposed to be the primal home of modern man. In view of many statements as to the origin of man in Central Asia, it may be wise to state that that hypothesis is not discussed here, but only the matter of the origin of modern types, and that the views expressed here are largely, though not perhaps completely, in accord with those of Dr. Haddon. Dr. Halfdan Bryn's views of the origin of man, and apparently of modern types, in Central Asia at a period very remote geologically are not discussed here, as it is felt that they have insufficient foundation and are most difficult to imagine. Fifthly, it seems that long-headed men were once numerous on the steppes of Turkestan and South Russia, for it is the general view that the long-headed Aryans or Indo-Aryans of North-West India came from beyond the mountains from a grassland where they had a pastoral tradition. It seems also that long-headed steppe-men penetrated from South Russia also towards the Baltic in prehistoric times, and formed an important element of the people whose remains have been found there in early graves, now fairly widely allocated to the dawn of the Age of Metal. It is evident that these indications are not conclusive, but, taken together, they do justify the provisional inference that a tall, long-headed population, including a large proportion of extreme long-heads, lived long ago on the Euro-Asiatic steppe. We may picture it as spreading northwards from the eastern part of the primal home, probably as the excessive moisture of Western Asia in the latter part of the Ice Age cleared away. It seems likely that Turkestan then became a sea of grass, well provided with water for many centuries from the melting of remnants of

former great ice sheets, but becoming less hospitable on the whole as time went on. The change of climate and condition would not be continuous, but it is a little venturesome, nevertheless, to argue for quite such definite cycles as does Ellsworth Huntington in his *Pulse of Asia* and other later books.

It is now known, through the work of Italian geographers, that the Ice Age in the Himalayan region went through what were broadly the same phases as did the Ice Age in Europe save that the first maximum (The "Gunz") seems to be less marked. It seems therefore likely that the high plateau of Central Asia, and especially the great mountain land of Tibet, remained glaciated for some time while the ice sheets were retreating in Europe. It is dangerous to build upon negative evidence, but, up to the present, no clear traces of the men and cultures of the later part of the Old Stone Age (known in Europe as the Aurignacian, Solutrean and Magdalenian phases) have been discovered on the central highland of Asia, though explorers have met with remains that could be ascribed to the very end of the Old Stone Age, the period of the great shift of the climate belts described in an earlier chapter. If it is understood as a mere working hypothesis, there is every reason at the moment to suppose that the central highland of Asia only gradually became available to modern types of man, but that these types of man found it far better provided with water than it has been in recent centuries. With this hypothesis we can understand that there may well have been a drift of men towards and into the central highland of Asia, and beyond, during the age between the change of the climate belts and the spread of the arts associated with metallurgy. It is a further useful hypothesis to suppose that the people who thus spread were broad-headed people from the highlands north of Mesopotamia (see Chapters I. and VII.) rather than

long-headed peoples of the primal home. However this may be, Central Asia is, and apparently long has been, the home of broad-headed types; they show some further specialisations of great importance which can be interpreted as related to the conditions of the great highland. In studying Central Asia it will be well to distinguish the mountain valleys of the Hindu Kush and Pamir from the great plateau of Mongolia as well as from the mountain country of Tibet. Many of the broad-heads of the valleys of the Hindu Kush and Pamir and the western part of Chinese Turkestan are more or less like the broad-heads of the Alpine region of Europe in general type, and they may be thought of as drifts in both directions along more or less highland-zones from Anatolia, where broad-headedness has had a special further development. On the plateau the climate is naturally very dry, with bitter cold in winter and strong sunshine in summer; strong winds add to the drying and cooling power of the atmosphere, and the barometer stands extremely high for very long periods in the winter. Under these conditions it would seem that human skin has been modified in the direction of limiting heat loss. The dry layers are thick and the bloodvessels are deeply sunk, so that the skin has a yellow tinge, which, however, may be complicated by more or less development of brown as is usual for a region of strong exposure to glare. Yellow-brown, dry skin is very widespread. With this has gone the limiting of sweat glands and the strengthening of sweat and hair pores, so that they may be firmly closed. The hair pores, firm and round, give a regular, almost cylindrical, section to the hair, which grows very nearly straight, and is usually coarse. The amount of body hair is small in most cases, as is also the amount of beard, save among some types which seem to have an admixture with long-headed hairy types to be discussed later. Some other characters are widespread,

but by no means universal, on the high plateau of Central Asia. There seems to be a widespread tendency to strong growth of the cheek-bones laterally among a good many peoples of regions with a strong anticyclone in winter, and here it is often very marked. Among some types there is also an insinking of the nasal chambers, so that the face is flat, but some Buriats have well-marked profiles. The upper eyelid has an external downfold, giving the eye-opening an oblique direction, but this, again, is not universal, though it is widely associated with the flattened face. Interpretations of these facial characters are mainly speculative. It is thought that as the cases of abnormal growth in Europe, associated with defect of some pituitary secretions, show flattening of the face and something of an eyelid fold, and a tendency to short legs, it may be that some part of the pituitary exercises less influence on growth in Central Asia than in Europe. It is at least interesting that in Africa, under conditions that contrast most sharply with those of Central Asia, there is the possibility that tall, lanky types with projecting mouths show a supernormal influence of some pituitary secretion. The insinking of the nasal chambers may well help to warm the air on its way down to the lungs; the eyelid fold may well have begun as a consequence of the flattening, and, once in existence, its value as a protection against glare may have been of importance for its increase. Both the broadening of the cheek-bones and the insinking of the nasal chambers have apparently contributed to a special broadening of the head, which is characteristically flat-topped. Cephalic indices of 86 and 87 or more are common as an average condition among certain groups, and the proportion of breadth to length of the head in other parts only rarely reaches such a high figure. The matter of the distribution of broad-headedness will be treated in a short chapter later on.

As one goes from Mongolia either north-north-eastwards to the Arctic, or eastwards into North China and Japan, or south-eastwards into South China, the heads become less broad in most cases, and it looks as though broad-headedness had spread in these directions at the expense of long-headedness, whether through the dominance of the broad-head over the long-head in mixed marriages, or because of pressure of populations one on another, with the long-headed types squeezed out to the periphery. There are, of course, irregularities and exceptions, but the above statement is nevertheless broadly true. Towards the Arctic, north of eastern Gobi, one finds people with medium heads, but with the strong cheek-bones and sometimes the flattened faces and oblique eye-slits already mentioned. They have a yellow-brown or yellow-white skin for the most part. The Northern Chinese are, again, medium-headed, but, again, have oblique eye-slits, and often, though not always, flattened faces. The skin tends to be yellow, with less brown than in Mongolia. South China seems to be more mixed in type with some broader- and some longer-headed types; Haddon uses the term *Parcean* for the broader-headed elements. Some have the oblique eye-slits and the broad cheek-bones and sunken noses. The skin colour varies from yellow in the north to brown in the south, and in some places the brown people have straight eyes and noses which are not sunk; they thus grade into the moderately long-headed people, noted in an earlier section in connection with Further India and the East Indies. Throughout those regions, however, the broad-headed element of South China also occurs, and the broader-headed elements of the East Indies, with brown skins, but some mixture with long-heads showing itself in facial characters, are called by Haddon and others *Proto-Malay*. The best interpretation at present is that the broad-headed character common in Central

Asia has spread south-eastwards through South China, Further India and the East Indies, meeting, and more or less dominating, physically, longer-headed groups due to a drift along a more southerly zone, probably via India, as indicated in an earlier section. The case is rather different in North China and Japan, for here the broad-headed type seems to have pushed out longer-headed types, and we have remnants of these among the Ainu of Yezo, South Sakhalin, and neighbouring regions. These people have whitish-brown skins, with strong blood colour at times over the prominent cheek-bones; they rarely show the obliquity of the eye and the other characters above noted unless they are of mixed descent. They have medium heads on the whole, but there are among them long-heads, and even extremely long-heads. Their most notable character is the possession of a unique quantity of body hair, a fact which makes them stand out in contrast to the Central Asiatic peoples.

The Arctic peoples west of the Yenisei, and some few farther east, are usually very broad-headed, and are known as Samoyedes, Yenisei Ostyaks, etc., in Asia, and as Lapps west of the White Sea in Europe.

It is thought that they represent a drift northwards, via the Yenisei or thereabouts, and then westwards, as the retreat of the great Scandinavian ice sheet made this possible. They would thus be a comparatively late drift, dateable, nevertheless, well back in prehistoric time. They often, though not always, have flat faces and oblique eye-slits, but rarely the deep-sunk nose.

Some peoples of the extreme north-east of Asia, including the Chukchi, seem at first sight an exception to the general scheme suggested—namely, that of broad-headedness on the Mongolian plateau grading into longer-headedness around the northern and eastern periphery of Asia, but here we are not at the effective periphery; the extreme north-east of Asia is

really on the route to North-West America, and in treating that continent we shall see much reason to believe that the foundations of its population are of Asiatic origin, and include extreme long-heads in far corners, with medium-heads in more or less intermediate stations, and broad-heads for the most part on the great western mountain lines, these broad-heads being very well marked towards the shores and among the isles of the Behring Sea.

It is likely that Tibet was long almost unapproachable by man because of the lingering of ice sheets after the Ice Age passed away. A good part of its population appears to have spread in from the high Mongolian plateau, as one would expect, but other types have also strayed in, some with fairly long heads and wavy, even curly, hair of a fairly light colour, probably arrivals from the steppes of Turkestan; some of these types have gone beyond Tibet into Eastern China.

The people of the Pamir, Hindu Kush, etc., have already been mentioned. They include broad-headed groups without the yellowness of skin and flatness of face common in the Gobi Desert. The skin over the cheek-bones may be rather highly coloured. On the great plains of Turkestan the population is mostly very broad-headed, with a tendency to high-headedness, which will be discussed for Anatolia in the section on the Mediterranean region and Europe. The skin is white, with a tendency towards yellow, the cheek-bones are often strong, but the profile is prominent. There is often a slight development of the eyelid fold, but the eye-slit is not oblique. Haddon has called these people the Turki, and it is evident that they have been an element among the Bulgarian and Turkish invaders of Europe, and possibly among the Magyars as well. There are "islands" of relatively long-headed peoples in the region between the Ob river and the Ural mountains, and it seems likely

that in spreading into the northern pine forests of Western Siberia and European Russia, these people, and also the Arctic broad-heads, have mixed intimately with long-headed stocks. This is, provisionally, the best interpretation of some Ugrian or Finn types, and it is noteworthy that among them red hair is a common feature; it is a feature which seems to have arisen in several cases in which fairer and darker types with very different accompanying characters have mingled. Thus in certain parts of Great Britain there are nests of red hair mostly in places where an intrusive wedge of fairer broad-headed people ends among people of dark colouring with very long heads. In the case of the red Finns, it seems to be a mixture of darker broad-heads with lighter long-heads.

The broad-headed stocks of Turkestan, as stated at the beginning of this section, have replaced an older long-headed population of the steppe. It is likely that they came originally eastwards and north-eastwards from the Anatolian-Armenian region as a hillside drift, but how the replacement may have occurred we can hardly guess. The plains of Turkestan certainly became less hospitable in the course of time, and the long-heads seem to have spread out as conquerors, the later ones at least with the horse, to Europe, India, and Mesopotamia as well. The stock would thus apparently be at least weakened in Turkestan, and the people of the hillsides have apparently played an increasing part, especially as in some regions the nomads move regularly with the seasons between the plain and the hillsides. More intimate investigation may reveal more traces of long-heads on the steppe than are at present known, but this is doubtful.

CHAPTER V

THE PEOPLES OF THE ASIATIC MONSOON LANDS AND THE PACIFIC

THE drifts of mankind towards the east in Asia north and south of the Himalayan and Tibetan mountain systems have been treated in two separate chapters which could not give a reasonably unified sketch of any one region in which the two sets of drifts have mingled. It is therefore advisable to add a few short notes on the populations of the monsoon lands of Asia, the importance of which stands out at once when we reflect that, quantitatively, they have the greatest masses of population, including nearly half the world's total, and that qualitatively they have been of great value to the world's life, as is shown by the antiquity and long maintenance of civilisations developing philosophical and ethical thought and a specially high grade of handicraft. Moreover, whereas so much of our Western industrial civilisation is maintained upon expenditure of capital, and expresses itself in aggressive and disturbing activities, the civilisations of the East were built to last, though it is doubtful whether they can withstand the present "white peril."

INDIA

Taking India first of all, we find that racial differences are among the myriad factors that have given rise to the caste system. Jungle tribes and pariahs, or outcasts, are apt to include considerable numbers of people with very long, narrow, high heads, flat, broad noses, and very dark skins. Yet, especially in the extreme south, people who carry this type may be

found among the educated leaders of society. It is as though in India, as well as in Western and Southern Europe, some representatives of the old types with the very long, narrow, high heads made an effort and established themselves in the more complex societies of later comers, while others, less vigorous, fell back before the task and now survive on a low rung of the ladder. Similar types are also found among the hills of Central India, some speaking Kolarian languages more primitive than the tongues of the Indian civilisations, and some living either in the jungle or in villages that have to be shifted every few years because of the low grade of agriculture that is practised. The general population of the Deccan, apart from some princely and aristocratic families and the people of the north-west, is formed of people with dark skins, little body hair, moderate noses, and fairly long heads. They usually speak Dravidian languages, three of the best developed of which are Tamil, Telugu, and Canarese, and they are thus often called Dravidians, but we cannot say whether these languages have been learned from outside conquerors or not. In the extreme south-west a mixture of the above types with wanderers from both Malaysia and the west has developed a very mixed language known as Malayalam, and has been rather separate from the rest of India through most of its history, and has interested itself in maritime commerce. In the north-west of the Deccan the population of moderately long heads has been mixed with an important broad-headed element having rather lighter skins and fairly narrow, prominent noses. The origins of this element are doubtful, but may be connected with the spread of the idea of the city from Sumer (Mesopotamia) to India in the third millennium B.C. The old theory, identifying them with Scythian invaders must apparently be given up.

The peoples of the Himalayan slopes and even of

parts of the foot-hills, and, in the east, a good part of the population even of the lowlands includes a broad-headed element that in its facial features often shows hints of the characters of the broad, flat-faced types of parts of the highlands of Central Asia. On the more eastern lowlands it is mixed with the moderately long-headed element, and it has been called Mongolo-Dravidian, though there is serious objection to both halves of the compound name. Many members of it are now moderately long-headed. There seem to be survivals of the extreme long-heads here and there. In North-West India are found the lighter coloured, tall, very long-headed and narrow-headed people with a marked profile, who, in other parts of India, usually occur among the aristocracies. As the type is found purest in parts of Rājputana, and as an aristocracy in South India, it has been identified with the Aryas, the conquerors of India, who brought the Sanskrit languages and the thoughts of the Vedic literature to the land in the early part of the second millennium B.C., according to received opinion. It is quite probable that this view is broadly correct, the more so because the physical type is related to that in many ancient burials of the Russo-Asiatic steppe, the supposed earlier home of these conquerors, and because some of the gods of the conquering Aryas had names now also known as names of deities of peoples in Anatolia in the early part of the second millennium B.C. It may well be that a spread from the steppe brought men, originally related, both to India via the north-west, and to Anatolia either via Persia or via Thrace. Emphasis solely on the cephalic index would lead one to associate these supposed Aryan conquerors with the old types discussed at the beginning of this appendix, but this is not necessarily correct, though both these old types and the peoples of North-West India often have the cephalic index (relation of breadth to length expressed as percentage) in the vicinity of seventy-two, a very

low figure. It is probable that the very long and narrow features so marked in North-West India and Afghanistan are examples of a general accentuation of the middle line in growth; it shows itself in the high head, the strong profile with straight, narrow nose, the slim build, and the tall stature. This emphasis on the growth of the middle line seems to be a feature of several parts of West Asia, including Anatolia; it was noticed above in the reference to the strong profile of some Turki types. More or less Turki types seem to have been included among the later conquerors of North-West India. The lighter coloured types with strong profiles become less general east of the United Provinces, or the zone from Delhi to Benares. This is the region where the grasslands of the north-west graded into the primeval forest of the eastern side, and where, therefore, the "Aryan" invaders met and divided themselves among the forest clearings, dominating and mixing with native folk. This region is therefore naturally a region of special importance in the early and legendary history of India, in which one sometimes glimpses conquerors of rather rude vigour coming into a more urban civilisation. In this region are many of the early historic principalities and regal cities, and it is an area of extraordinarily numerous and complicated castes. Benares is significantly placed at the eastern end of the region as a rallying-point for native tradition mediated by Brahman exponents.

CHINA

Whereas India has a most marked variety of race types and a unique caste system, which has many other factors of origin besides that of race, China has a much simpler race story and an absence of strong hereditary social distinctions. The cephalic index runs frequently to 86 or 87 in the Gobi area, but diminishes somewhat as one comes into China. It

is as though this broad-headedness had developed to its utmost in parts of the Gobi area and the Central Asiatic high plateaux, and as though the earlier drifts from it had spread to China, Corea, and Japan with this particular character less developed. The hair is black and lank throughout most of China, and there is very little hair indeed on the body. The skin is brown in Gobi and in South China, but has paled to yellow-olive, in many cases, in North China. The cheek-bones are very strongly developed, and the nasal chambers are often sunk. There is often, especially in the north, the extra eyelid fold, and with it the oblique eye-slit. In South Chinese there are moderately long-headed elements who probably represent a still earlier part of the drift via Central Asia just mentioned, but they may be a spread from the south-east (see below); they are generally brown-skinned with rather wavy, black, or sometimes reddish, hair, and they often have the nasal chambers rather sunk and the cheek-bones projecting. The nose and cheek-bones are sometimes thought to indicate that they are an early wave of the drift from Central Asia, later waves becoming more broad-headed and increasing the density and the yellow element in the colour of the skin. The idea of a more or less continuous drift with the earliest waves long-headed and the later ones broad-headed, and with the high plateaux as its more immediate starting-point, is one which will be found useful in trying to interpret race questions in America, as Hrdlička, in particular, has shown.

FURTHER INDIA AND THE EAST INDIES

In all this region one finds mainly a fairly long-headed, brown-skinned, wavy-haired element, which Haddon and Buxton have called Nesiot, usually as the lower stratum, with an upper stratum that is at least akin to, if not identical with, the brown-skinned,

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straight-haired, and broad-headed elements of South China.

The term Malay, originally a tribal name, has been used to describe a fairly wide range of types intermediate between the two now described, so far as the Malay Peninsula and the islands near it are concerned, but it is probably best used in connection with language. Reference was made in Chapter I. to the remnants of the kinky-haired types of pygmy stature with small, fairly broad heads, and to a few peoples with the very long, narrow, high heads also discussed in that chapter; and one should remember that the latter element, perhaps somewhat modified, may be more important in the population of the East Indies than is sometimes thought.

NEW GUINEA AND MELANESIA

New Guinea, like Africa south of the Sahara, illustrates the triumph of the kinky-haired character that is almost universal save in a few districts like the south-east, which Haddon has shown to be full of strays derived from maritime migrations. The background in New Guinea is apparently often pygmy, but rather taller elements are numerous and typically show extreme long-heads; it should be remembered that Africa also illustrates the combination of an extreme head length with kinky hair. The relationship of the New Guinea people to the extinct Tasmanians is generally allowed. East of New Guinea, in the island groups which lay almost together when the land stood higher, the same element as in New Guinea appears again, but is influenced more and more in the islands farther towards the Pacific by maritime migrants.

POLYNESIA

There is a good deal of information about Hindu migrants (including Indo-Aryan leaders, in all probability) into Further India perhaps a thousand years ago (the ruined city of Angkor is witness), and into Java from about the beginning of the Christian era, as is indicated by several ancient temples. These movements are to be taken as part of a migration stream which became increasingly maritime in the East Indies and spread into the Pacific, to form one element of the Polynesian peoples, with olive skins and what we are apt to call a very European appearance. Another Polynesian element is related rather to the South Chinese population; it is specially important in the more northerly parts of Polynesia. There are also broad-headed people with light skins, narrow noses, and a very European look in some cases. Polynesian migrations have doubtless carried more or less Melanesian elements with them, and the latter are really very widespread in the Pacific and very notable in Fiji. The Maori may be considered representative Polynesians with some Melanesian elements more or less incorporated.

JAPAN

Here the earliest drift is represented by the Ainu, and now restricted to the islands of Yezo and Sakhalin, with relatives on the adjacent mainland. These people include some individuals with very long, narrow, high heads, and others with moderately long heads; they are the hairiest of mankind, and their hair is wavy or even curly, their skin is whitey-brown, often with a high colour over the cheek-bones, the face is rather broad, the nose moderate or narrow. They are obviously survivors of an early drift, perhaps via Siberia rather than via the Central Highlands of Asia;

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they tell tales of a still older race they exterminated. They probably mixed a good deal with later invaders, among whom we can distinguish a broad-headed type with dark yellow-brown skin, a short nose, and the oblique eye, as well as another, aristocratic type, also broad-headed, that has a strong profile, a prominent nose, and a lighter complexion. This last is also found in Corea, Manchuria, and some parts of Gobi; it has more body and face hair than has the ordinary Chinese type, and it may be that its characters are evidence of some mixture with long-headed types.

CHAPTER VI

AMERICA

THE best interpretation of the indigenous population of America is that it represents many phases of drifts via North-East Asia, the earliest drifts being generally located, now, in ultimate corners remote from the Behring region. The populations, therefore, from Central Asia around Alaska to the far ends of America, apart from European immigrants, thus give us stages of drifts analogous to the drift from Gobi into China and beyond. The results in both cases are that extreme long-heads occur chiefly in the far corners, and broad-heads are most characteristic near the source.

Hrdlička has investigated large numbers of Eskimo and other Arctic types, and finds that, while the Greenland Eskimo have very long, narrow, high heads, with narrow noses and strong cheek-bones, those farther west grade towards the Asiatic broad-heads of the high plateaux. In the Eskimo we seem to have the representatives of a drift of men very long inured to Arctic conditions, and, until white interference affected their mentality, very successful in their scheme of life. Possibilities of economic development of reindeer and musk-ox herds in Arctic America may depend largely on the possibility of maintaining the Eskimo, and his relations to European governments are being seriously discussed in Denmark, which has hitherto tried to keep the European trader right away and to supply Eskimo needs itself. Apparently another long-headed drift went through the northern forests to an ultimate home in what are now the Atlantic States of U.S.A. Another

long-headed drift reached California, and has remnants also in Mexico, the heads are long, narrow, and high, and the noses broad. Still another reached the Matto Grosso plateau and East Brazil, where the Lagoa Santa skulls, some Botocudo people, and some remains from South-East Brazil illustrate it. Some ancient peoples on the west coast of South America and some people in South Patagonia and Tierra-del-Fuego are also very long-headed, and there are other remnants here and there. If we follow back along any of the lines of drift which have the above as their terminal members we grade typically to moderately long-heads, moderately broad-heads, and finally to definitely broad-heads. Among most of the latter the profile is strongly marked, but there are some cases of rather flat features, notably on the Mexican plateau. From time to time suggestions have been made as to migrations, or at least culture influences reaching America across the Pacific and possibly affecting the physical types and the civilisation of Mexico and Peru, for example. This cannot be discussed here, but the reader interested may find much in any library catalogue under the name of Professor Elliot Smith and some very different ideas on the subject under the name of Monsieur Rivet. Both groups of ideas have met severe criticism.

Many of the peoples of the Canadian forest had moderately long heads, and the tendency was towards greater breadth in the north-west. The skin is less yellow than in Asia, and the hair may be slightly wavy, and is usually less coarse than that of the Chinese, the profile is often strongly marked, and the eyelid fold is not often found in the adult. On the whole, the moderate long-heads and broad-heads of the north-west of America seem more akin to peoples of Siberia than to those of China, though the latter do present analogies. Many natives of the plains and the western plateaux have very short, broad heads,

but towards the south, in U.S.A., the longer-headed element is more prominent. As one would expect, in such a focus of civilisation as the Mexican region was until Europeans intervened, there is much mixture of type, and one finds the extremely long, narrow, high head on the one hand, and the broad-headed, flat-faced type on the other, as well as many intermediate types. So-called White Indians of Panama, discussed a few years ago by some papers, are merely albinos who have intermarried to a large extent. The majority of the indigenous peoples of South America are broad-headed, some very much so. Most of them are short, but a few on the Matto Grosso and in Patagonia, broad-heads in both cases, are very tall indeed. The original native population of the West Indies spread thither, it seems, from South America. A second wave, called Carib, was spreading when Europeans arrived. The extermination of these native peoples in the West Indies by Europeans was rapid, and, as is well known, negroes from Africa were brought in as slaves; a few mixtures between them and the original natives have occurred, and there are a few natives surviving in St. Vincent and Dominica. In French Canada the indigenous people have contributed a fair amount to the present population, but it is generally thought that this contribution in Anglo-Saxon or rather Anglo-Celtic America has been relatively small. In Spanish America generally the survival of native blood is very large, especially in Mexico and Bolivia. In Portuguese America, negroes have been introduced, as in Guiana and the West Indies and U.S.A., and the West Indies and Guiana now also have Tamils from South India. The Argentine Republic has Italian, South Brazil Italian and German, and Chile some German and Scottish elements. As cross-breeds of all kinds are abundant, America, especially South America, contains some of the most extraordinarily mixed types of the world.

American populations differ strikingly from those of many regions of the old world in that both the European incomers of the last few centuries and the so-called indigenous peoples they found there are, anthropologically speaking, fairly recent immigrants. The native civilisations of America, apart from that of the Eskimo, have all been built on a foundation which included the art of stone-grinding, and some pottery-making and weaving, at least. It is thus legitimate to suppose that these, at any rate, and probably a good deal else, are imported from Asia; and, if so, it is not likely that the arrivals took place very long before 3,000 B.C. Arrivals at that time may well have brought a number of other cultural features, which have spread more or less, and may have been subsequently forgotten in places.

It is thus not necessary to assume that all the cultural features of indigenous tribes in America are the result of local evolution; we do not know much about the equipment and momentum some migrants from Asia may have brought. We do know that in America they found no large animal save the llama that could be tamed, and so social development was very limited, except in Mexico and Peru, where the native civilisation was the curious one so dramatically described by Prescott in his histories of the conquests of the two countries.

Bates, in his famous *Naturalist on the Amazons*, draws attention to the fact that the physical characters of the Amazonian native make him ill-adapted to the trying moist heat of that region. For that climate he should have all his body adapted to the dispersal of heat, but he has, on the contrary, a tendency to limit the dispersal of heat, as have the peoples of East and North-East Asia for the most part, and he is descended from peoples of that part of the world.

The subject of the fates of the various groups of im-

migrants into America during the past four centuries is of the greatest importance for the future of the races of mankind, but it involves a review of factors so diverse from those affecting the original development of human races that it is not included here. One need but say that Boas' statistics, which seemed to show rapid modification of type towards an American standard on the part of descendants of immigrants into the U.S.A., have now been shown to have undergone treatment that is unsound in the drawing of inferences from averages, and have been set aside by the work of Hrdlička on Old Americans (The Old Americans). The U.S.A. especially is the melting-pot of types in which the black-skinned descendant of the slaves is hardly maintaining himself, while Europeans of all sorts are spread far and wide, with very diverse distributions related to their special racial propensities and social traditions. The result of the complex intermixture is beyond anyone's power to foresee.

CHAPTER VII

EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

THE early hunters and artists who peopled Europe as the last major phase of the Ice Age was passing away seem to have occupied mainly a number of sites around the West Mediterranean and in South-West France and the zone of the loess in Central Europe. Along that loess zone of the Danube and Moravia there seem to have moved westwards, during a dry period, hunters of horse-herds with very high skill in the working of flint. Apparently a temporary return of cold or some other change led them to retreat again. When the ice sheets finally dwindled to their present size, or a still smaller one in all probability, the people of Europe were faced with a crisis. The herds of large animals no longer had great grassy plains over which to wander, for the westerly winds were no longer shouldered out by the cold air over the ice sheet but swept in along the European plain, bringing rain that allowed the growth of forests first of pine, then of oak, and other trees. The hunters now found themselves hemmed in by the forest, and they failed to master it; instead, they retreated to the seashore and some river sites, or sites on the loess which were not forest-blocked. On these sites they lived henceforth, largely by collecting, though doubtless still hunting to some extent. The descendants of these early peoples survive scattered through Western Europe from Italy to Norway, as well as near the zones of loess in Eastern Central Europe. They were originally an extension of a North African and Arabian population, and there also one finds the very

long; high, narrow heads so characteristic of many remote spots in Europe. We must also remember the hunters of horse-herds, who seem to have retreated to the Russo-Asiatic steppes, and there to have become predominantly herdsmen, as distinguished from the dwellers in North Africa and Arabia, who massed along the Mesopotamian rivers and the Nile as cultivators, with herders along their flanks. Apparently the Russo-Asiatic steppe contributed the horse, later on, to the societies of herdsmen of Arabia and North Africa, and the advent of the horse as a companion of man made for an immense enlargement of opportunities. Among the cultivators of the Nile and Euphrates one finds the very long, narrow, high heads, but the general population is of a more moderately long-headed type, usually brown or red-brown skinned, and called by Elliot Smith the Brown Race. In Arabia and its borders there is often a stronger development of profile than in Africa, a development which, it has already been suggested, is highly characteristic of the western half of Asia. The strong, narrow nose and fine features are very noticeable, and stature among the men runs higher than in North Africa. In the latter region the nose varies, but is often rather broad and short, though not so much so as in Africa south of the Sahara. In the hills of Algeria, as already stated, are people who are almost fair in colouring, but along the Mediterranean coasts, especially in the poor quarters of towns, there are many people with long, narrow, high heads, rather short, broad noses and projecting mouths, recalling in several features the characters found in two ancient skeletons (of the Aurignacian period) unearthed in the lower layers of a cave at Grimaldi on the French Riviera. The same old type seems fairly well represented in Mediterranean towns on the European side, and the type with similar head but rather strong brows and less prominent mouth is important in remote districts of North

Portugal, Sardinia, etc., as well as in the Dordogne area in France. The general type around the Western Mediterranean is, however, one with a moderately long head and an oval face, without prominent brows or cheek-bones, obviously related to the general population of North Africa and Arabia, but with a skin that ranges from white to light olive-brown. It may be partly a development locally from the ancient types, just as the North African and Arab types may be also local evolutions. The general type in the West Mediterranean has had given to it the name of the Mediterranean Race. It should be realised that this is a rough general name to cover a number of stocks, some still true to ancient characters, and some more modified, mostly stocks related to North Africa as well as to South-West Europe, but some connected with movements along the loess zone of Central Europe in the Old Stone Age. The various stocks included under this general denomination obviously spread farther northwards along the west in early times, and they are a well-known feature in West France, Cornwall, Devon, Wales, and parts of Ireland, at least. One stock among them that is not yet very clearly matched by any ancient skeletons is usually very tall and bony, with a very narrow, high head, but a long, thin, straight-sided face, a prominent nose and chin, and dark colouring. There seem to be nests of it in West Scotland, in Ireland, on the Denbighshire Moors, on Exmoor, probably in Brittany, though measurements are lacking, and in Castile in Spain. It is fairly obviously related to the types painted by El Greco, for example, in a scene of the Passion that the painter crowded with heads.

Apart from this tall variety, the stocks included under the name of the Mediterranean race are usually rather short and slim of build and rather darker than peoples of other European types, with one exception to be mentioned later.

It may be stated broadly that Europe exhibits two civilisations which have influenced one another in many ways. One is the Mediterranean civilisation based upon the trading city of the third millennium B.C., with all sorts of later developments and importations, but with the city as the ideal unit, so that nationalism has been of very late growth in Italy, for example. It is not that the urban culture is the special work of the Mediterranean race type, though that type has taken kindly to city life; a great culture has nearly always been the result of the work of several types side by side. But the Mediterranean has given Europe the idea of the city of a type rather different, so far as one can judge, from the cities of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India.

The other civilisation is especially associated with Europe north and north-east of the Mediterranean, and primarily with ancient Anatolia, Thrace, Danubian Lands, Galicia and Silesia, Moravia and Bohemia, the Saxon lowland north of Bohemia, the Pfalz and the Neckar, and other parts of Germany, Belgium, and the Paris Basin. The association is with areas of loess, the fine-grained porous soil already mentioned, which is fertile and is not inclined to grow thick forest. This may be spoken of as fundamentally a peasant culture, with the agricultural village as its unit, and it may be said not to have become a full civilisation—that is, a social organism, including cities—until the urban idea reached it from Mediterranean lands. The origins of peasant culture in the parts of Europe mentioned are really a local instance of the vast spread of agriculture and all that arises from it in the third millennium, B.C. The Mediterranean notion of the city took exceptionally long to penetrate to Northern Europe, where it was weak until what we call the Middle Ages, and practically non-existent before Roman times; this was due in part, no doubt, to the vigour of barbarians of

organising talent on the northern and north-eastern fringes of the old peasant zone above explained, but it was also due in part to difficulties in the spread of agriculture, difficulties connected with exhaustion of the soil. The peasants had a long and stubborn fight to conquer this environment, and also, no doubt, to adapt grain crops of Sytio-Mesopotamian origin to the European climate.

The people of this peasant culture are in the main broad-headed, though near the loess here and there, especially in some remote spots, there may be remnants of the ancient long, narrow, high-headed people so often mentioned. These broad-headed people are known as the Alpine Race, though this label, like all others, is open to question. They seem to have penetrated into the forested alpine valleys, and to have cleared spaces there for agriculture, and the breadth of head is sometimes found exaggerated apparently by inbreeding in some alpine fastnesses in the Tyrol. A head-form, not unlike that of the typical mid-European, is found among the people of the Hindu Kush region, and it is suggested as a working hypothesis that both represent drifts from the Anatolian area (*sens. lat.*) long ago. The archaeological evidence of the spread of the peasantry across mid-Europe from the south-east has become increasingly clear of late. It seems that the drifts originally included a number of moderate long-heads, but the broad-head has in the end become the general type. In Anatolia and in the Illyrian Alps a further modification of head-form has supervened, and we get the very high, short head with an almost plane surface up the back right to the vertex. These people have an enormously developed profile in many cases, and may also have a tall stature. The rival names of Anatolian and Dinaric types have been used for this stock; the former is probably the better, and many "Dinaric" individuals really grade between the Anatolian and

the "Alpine." Armenia, as a mountain fastness, retains many broad-heads without the special Anatolian developments. As in the case of the Mediterranean race and the Mediterranean city, it must be said here again that the rural culture of mid-Europe must not be ascribed exclusively to one race type. We can but say that the Alpine race takes kindly to traditional village life and to industries that have grown out of it, especially such industries as have developed skill in minutia. The predominance of the areas of Alpine race in the early phases of commercial development of electrical machinery is a significant modern example of the special aptitudes concerned.

The peasants of mid-Europe had a long fight, not only with exhaustion of the soil, but also with the forest of oak and beech, which occupied so much of their region after the passing away of the Ice Age. Some earlier areas of settlement have kept what is obviously a very ancient fashion of building villages, with houses huddled in picturesquely irregular fashion (the *Hausendorf* of many German students), but penetration into forests, especially on the north and north-east, gave rather more regular villages in clearings, often either round or elongated, by the roadside. Many of the latter seem to date from pre-medieval times, and are in areas which either were (the Oder Basin) or still are (the Vistula Basin) of Slavonic speech in the main. Penetration farther east had to round the immense Pripet Marshes, and the southern way, via what became Kiev, naturally played a greater part than the northern way, via what is now Vilna and the Beresina, especially as swamps begin again on a large scale on the north side of this latter way. There is also a further difference in that east of the Pripet swamps; the spring and summer rain is not sufficient to keep the beech healthy. Great Russia and the neighbouring areas are thus fundamentally a wedge of oak forest, with its base on a line from

about the ancient Novgorod (not Nijni Novgorod) to south of Kiev, and its apex towards the southern end of the Urals. Into this forest the peasant culture and the Alpine type have penetrated bit by bit, meeting other types that will be discussed shortly. Kiev at the main entry from the south-west is a city with a tradition of sanctity, both because, on account of its position, it is a culture-entry, and because it also served as an entry into Great Russia for the religious and urban ideas emanating from Constantinople; there are probably prehistoric factors in the case as well. This reference to Kiev may help to interpret the fact that in South-East Galicia and the Kiev area there occur not only ordinary Alpine types, but also tall broad-heads that have some connection with Anatolian or Illyrian types, or both. There are also, especially it would seem towards the Carpathians, survivors of ancient long-heads, who are usually described as of Mediterranean race, though this rather stretches the use of that term.

Apart from the Illyrian and South-West Russian (or more properly Ruthenian) broad-heads of Europe, and the Anatolian broad-heads of Asia, who are typically tall, the broad-heads of Europe, when of pure stock, are for the most part rather short and thick set. Their colouring is neither very dark nor really fair, their skin may be a rather thick white or may have high colouring over the cheek-bones; alternative developments likely to occur in regions of rather severe winter cold without much softening influence of moist intervals. The broad-headed population of mid-Europe seems to have spread and to be spreading, in places, beyond its original zone, as though broad-headedness were, in some cases at least, dominant over long-headedness in the offspring of mixed heritage. In this way it would seem that broad-headedness has come to be associated, especially on the northern flank of the original peasant zone, with

characters derived from other stocks, and some of the types thus arising will be mentioned a little later. Something of the same kind has occurred in North Italy, where Alpine broad-headedness is often combined with what may provisionally be thought to be the blondness of Lombardic conquerors of post-Roman times, who, however, may well be only a recent member of a long series of invasions.

Another spread of broad-heads must be mentioned. Italian workers have noted a belt of broad-heads across South Italy, from south of Bari across to Salerno. Broad-heads have been noted in Gerba Island off Tunis, and in the Maltese Islands, especially Gozo. They are characteristic of various spots on the south and the south-west coast of Spain, and again on the north coast of Spain, especially near Lueca, and they are a very well-marked element of the population in a zone across Brittany from the Carnac region to the vicinity of Tréguier, though less marked in the interior than towards the coasts. They form rather distinctive patches on the coasts of West Cornwall and Wales, Ireland, the Hebrides, the Shetlands, and Faroes, as quite small groups here and there, and it has been said that there are similar groups in Iceland. Whether the dark broad-heads of Dutch Zeeland and South-West Norway belong to the series or not needs to be worked out. These coastal broad-heads are often, though not always, very tall, and usually have very dark hair and strong noses. On the whole, they suggest something between the Anatolian and the Alpine; their broad, squarish faces belong perhaps rather to the latter, their frequent tall stature and prominent noses to the former, but they have not the former's distinctive sharp slope down from the vertex to the back of the neck. Some in the north may be drifts of Breton or other fisher-folk, and those of Dutch Zeeland and South-West Norway have been, doubtfully, interpreted as spreads of mid-European types.

Those who too hastily generalise from statistics of head-index have said the same of the people of the Breton coasts above mentioned, though in almost every other respect they are very different. It seems wiser to seek archaeological correlations, and these make it evident that coastwise movements affecting the regions from Crete and Malta round to the British Isles were fairly numerous in the early age of metal; and overlap contemporaneous coastwise movements between the South-West Baltic and Brittany, via the Irish Sea. The earlier phases of these movements are associated with the building of megaliths or great stone monuments, the later ones with certain spreads of fashion in bronze swords and other objects. It is probable that when more is known of these old lines of communication and trade the distribution of the coastal dark broad-heads will be better understood. In the meantime it may not be amiss to point out that both archaeological data and the anthropological observations suggest that there is a considerable basis of fact for the legendary histories of Britain and Ireland, however much they may have been embroidered for various purposes by medieval compilers after, apparently, their preservation by oral tradition. It is typical of many of the little groups of this type named that they are interested in long voyages, whether for fishing or for trade.

The ancient graves of the end of the Stone Age and the early Metal Age in the steppe of South Russia reveal a tall type with either a very long, narrow, high head or a moderately long head, and in any case a rather well-marked profile; they may be interpreted for the present as modified survivors of those hunters of the later part of the Old Stone Age who had these head characters, though not the same facial development in many cases.

Archæology gives very fair ground for the view that these people imitated in stone the battle-axe of

metal that had long been known in Mesopotamia. Men with these stone battle-axes and beaker pottery appeared in the West Baltic lands, especially in Jutland and Zeeland, apparently in the latter part of the third millennium B.C. They apparently met and influenced, and were in turn influenced by a civilisation building burial monuments of great stones, the affinities of which seem to be with those of the British Isles and Brittany, though links via Pomerania across East Central Europe are another possibility. It seems as though spreads from South Russia and along Atlantic shores had reached the Baltic and had acquired cultural autonomy there, in a land apparently hitherto occupied by survivors of the collectors and impoverished hunters who lingered on from the late phases of the Old Stone Age. One set of the people who brought and built up these cultures seem to be a large element of the Nordic Race, doubtless incorporating in itself some of the older elements just mentioned. Whatever their original characters on the Russian steppe, they have kept their tall stature and their well-developed profile; some are still very narrow-headed, but many should be called only moderately long-headed. We do not know their original colouring but suspect it to have been fairly dark; at some stage, whether in South Russia or in the Baltic, the increase of pigmentation usually occurring in childhood has in many cases dropped out of the scheme of development and blond hair and blue eyes are very common. Growth is apparently very long continued, and muscularity is highly developed. This type from time to time has apparently spread a military or organising influence southwards, and it seems possible to interpret various types of the southern side of the European plain (Poland, North Germany, etc.) of past and present as the result of intermixture between Nordic and Alpine stocks. From the dawn of the Metal Age we know of

skeletons associated in several areas with beaker pottery of good quality; these reveal in England a tall people with broad, round heads and strong brows, and noses and faces variable, sometimes longer, sometimes more rounded. We know nothing, as yet, about the types from the beaker-yielding graves of Denmark, and can only suspect Nordic elements along with the type now described. From the survivors of this last type among present populations in Germany and the North Sea Lands we may judge that they often shared the blondness as well as the stature of the Nordic race, but the head breadth of the Alpine race, combined, however, with an ancient heritage in the shape of strong brows, and with a very marked general growth. Several other broad-headed types, usually tall and blond, but without the strong brow-ridges, may be distinguished in Germany, and they seem to represent other mixtures of Nordic and Alpine. Some in North-West Russia and North Poland are short, and it may be added that some influence of the Nordic or the old steppe type is widespread in Russia, perhaps especially among the Cossacks.

In this short sketch it was not possible to describe the racial elements in the countries of Europe, but it is hoped that the thoughts suggested may help the reader to interpret the admirable review of European data in Ripley's *Races of Europe*, published a generation ago. Nevertheless, both because this little book is published in England, and because the British Isles present rather a special problem, it is advisable to finish with a very short statement concerning Great Britain and Ireland. The first essential is to realise that they were anciently on the very fringe of the world, and that their population, especially in the West of Great Britain and in Ireland, includes a considerable survival of ancient types relatively unmodified, as has been stated above. The islands were separated from the Continent definitively in the sink-

ings after the passing away of the Ice Age, and by that time had probably received only the very long-headed and some moderately long-headed types, probably neither Mediterranean nor Nordic in colouring and features, but more or less between the two. In the early ages of metal when, some believe, the British Long Barrows were built, there came representatives of the Baltic long-heads, and at some such period or before there would seem to have been a drift up from the Western Mediterranean via West France. During the development of communications in the Early Age of Metal, there came the dark broad-heads, already discussed, and at a very early stage of the knowledge of metal, if not just before it arrived, there migrated to East Britain broad-heads, as already mentioned, who made beaker pottery, and with them, especially in Aberdeenshire, there were other broad-heads of smaller build without the prominent brows. The above types can all be traced in varying proportions in different parts of the modern population. An invasion of bronze swordsmen later in the Bronze Age must have had much influence, and some would ascribe to it the spread of the Gaelic Celtic languages, but the question is far from being decided, and we know very little about the racial types of the swordsmen; Scotland was much affected by their movements, and it is quite possible that their goal was Ireland. A culture-spread, probably accompanying immigrations, occurred later on, in the last few centuries B.C., and is thought to have brought Brythonic Celtic speech to our islands. In later periods our islands have received "Roman," Anglo-Saxon, Danish, Norman, and Flemish elements, the former of which impressed their speech on a large proportion of the earlier inhabitants; it would seem that these post-Roman invaders were largely Nordic in type.

There are, therefore, both Mediterranean and Nordic elements in Britain as well as various types of

broad-heads, but the general foundation of the population is a long-headed type that is neither fully Nordic nor fully Mediterranean. It has dark hair, and often grey eyes, and a general condition intermediate between the two. The suggestion has been made and is repeated that this type probably results less from mixtures of the two types than from survivals of strains which have not evolved fully towards either.

The racial composition of a population changes with changes of politics and economics. The commercial imperialism of Britain in the nineteenth century drew off many Nordic elements to pioneering efforts in lands some of which are climatically rather poorly adapted to the type's special needs. On the other hand, there has been a call for a great increase of the fundamental elements of the population, which seem specially able to withstand the difficulties of industrial towns. The "Beaker" element survives here and there, but would not now be selected as typical for a farmer as it appears to have been when John Bull was first sketched. Indeed, it would seem that the broad-headed elements in the population of England at least have diminished, though we have details of too few skulls of the mediæval period to say much.

In Germany and Denmark it would seem that economic developments have given increased opportunities especially to more or less Alpine types, and other changes are doubtless working themselves out.

The fate of European types which migrate to distant lands is an interesting subject that is being opened up by Hrdlička, but the matter is at too early a stage of inquiry to be the subject of general remarks here. It seems likely that some regions preserve and others exert modifying influences on European immigrants, but the claims made in the name of Boas for rapid modification of types immigrating into America may be discounted.

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CRIMINOLOGY


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CRIMINOLOGY

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CRIMINOLOGY

CHAPTER I

CRIMINOLOGY: MEANING AND METHODS

I

In a popular encyclopædia published twenty years ago, criminology was declared to be "a recently invented term denoting a new science." This encyclopædia, however, was more "popular" than exact, for the term was brought into common use much earlier than the year 1908.

Criminology is really a portmanteau-word, and, as such, was first adopted to replace the cumbersome (but more technically correct) expression, criminal-anthropology. Until about forty years ago (when it crept into everyday language) it was always written between quotation marks.

The true aim of criminology, as at present practised, is to treat first causes rather than secondary symptoms. The difficulty, however, about this is that crime frequently has its origin in conditions that punishment can neither touch nor cure. Among such are ill-health, overcrowding (which is responsible for a number of sexual offences, and in particular for incest), pernicious literature, poverty, lack of work, etc.

According to their main precepts, there are two schools of criminology: (1) the classical, and (2) the positive. The former, which was founded by Beccaria so long ago as the year 1764 (and of which Voltaire and Rousseau were prominent members), studies crime more as an abstract entity than anything else. Since,

too, it holds that conduct is the result of free will, it recognises the necessity of punishment, but endeavours to diminish it in volume and severity. As to actual preventive measures, these scarcely come within its admitted scope. A very similar programme was that established a few years later in England by Sir William Meredith and John Howard, especially with regard to the improvement of prison conditions, a direction in which admirable work was afterwards performed by Bentham, Romilly, and Elizabeth Fry. The juridical principles and disciplinary measures advocated by Beccaria and Howard, and those who followed in their footsteps, appealed to humanitarian instincts, and much was accomplished by them. Since, however, they were in advance of their time (by a hundred years or so), it was perhaps inevitable that they should have been dubbed "mawkish sentimentalists" by those who disagreed with them.

The classical school of Beccaria, which maintained a doctrine of psychological hedonism, rather broke down when it had to be admitted that a similar measure of responsibility could not be applied to each and every offender. This, as Lombroso advocated, necessarily shifted the centre of gravity from the crime to the criminal; and thus gave rise to the inauguration of what has now come to be known as the "positive" school, which, denying individual responsibility, has for its fundamental purpose a detailed study of the genesis of crime, and the construction of a practical system of criminal sociology. Its tenets, too, have been largely accepted in medical jurisprudence, and one of its modern applications is to be found in the Bertillon system of identification. For the positive school is also claimed the serious tackling of the problems presented by insane and habitual criminals.

From the standpoint of the criminologist wishing to make the best of all the various competing theories, there are two factors governing misconduct: (1) the

"internal," and (2) the "external." The former is held to be the result of hereditary instinct plus mentality, and the latter to spring from opportunity plus temptation. In the Scriptures we come across numerous petitions to be "delivered from temptation." It does not, however, appear to have occurred that temperament can be equally dangerous. Yet crime is very largely the result of a clash between the two. A breaking strain exists somewhere in all of us; and even the most virtuous will succumb if the strain exceed that limit of endurance. "There, but for the Grace of God, go I!" declared Richard Baxter, when he saw a criminal led to his doom.

II

Italy may be regarded as the cradle of criminology; and it is from that country that has also come much of the more recent orientation of the study of the connection between crime and the organic structure of the offender. Thus, in addition to the researches of Cesare Lombroso and Enrico Ferri, there are substantial contributions by Raffaele Garofalo, Ernesto Lugaro, Enrico Morselli, and many alienists of note.

Cesare Lombroso, the chief advocate of the "positive," as opposed to the "classical," school, was a member of an Italian-Jewish family. Born at Verona in 1836, he died in 1909. After studying medicine at Padua, Vienna (where he attracted the favourable notice of Virchow), and Paris, he secured an appointment as an army surgeon. Specialising in mental diseases, he became, in turn, director of a lunatic asylum at Pesario, professor of psychiatry and forensic medicine at the University of Turin, and occupant of the Chair of criminal anthropology. In the light of later researches and experience, his theories have met with much hostile criticism, especially from Baer in Germany, Manouvrier in France, and Goring

in England. The hardest to accept is perhaps the one advanced in his *L'Uomo delinquente*, declaring that the "born" wrongdoer exhibits "distinctive anatomical and physical traits." Among such—the Brand of Cain, as it were—he stresses heavy jaws, overhanging forehead, inadequate development of the skull, and even ugliness, plus a low level of intelligence and a more than average vanity.

All this laborious compiling of graphs and charts, recording of alleged "characteristics," and reducing of measurements to decimal points, etc., is worth little more than the paper on which it is set out. It serves next to no utilitarian purpose. After all, even the most pronounced believer in comparative tables is confronted by the upsetting fact that the vicious often present the same physical *stigmata* as the virtuous. Thus, it is the common experience of every individual who keeps his eyes open that a burglar may have the physical contours of a bishop, and a philanthropist outwardly resemble a pander. Similarly, an open and benevolent expression is nearly always to be observed in the bogus company-promoter and the confidence-trickster. There are judges, too, who, where their personal attractions are concerned, would compare unfavourably with the average occupant of the dock. The result is, Lombroso enthusiasts are often confounded by making the unwelcome discovery that "criminal characteristics" (which they declare to be either the cause, or the effect, of delinquency) are strongly marked in admitted non-criminals.

A disquieting example of this occurred some years ago, when an International Congress of Criminal Anthropology (or, as it would now be called, criminology) was being held at the University of Geneva. It was attended by learned savants from all over Europe; and the chief topic for discussion was the then new theory of Professor Lombroso, arguing that there existed a "born criminal," predestined to evil because

of certain physical traits imparted in him at birth. Among these were said to be "projecting ears, prominent brows, straggling beards, protruding chins, and a habit of gesticulating." During the discussion that followed, an acute, but somewhat tactless, speaker upset the harmony of the gathering by pointing out that nearly all these *stigmata* were observable among the members of the Congress themselves. Judging from the published photographs of the distinguished alienists who were present on this occasion, the criticism was not unfounded.

None the less, and notwithstanding the many faulty conclusions at which he arrived in order to establish a fundamentally unsound thesis, Lombroso did a great deal of valuable pioneer work. If there is nothing else to his credit, he was largely responsible for insisting that criminology should be treated from a scientific standpoint. There is, however, much else to his credit; and he was practically the first to insist that the criminal is always more important than the crime, and therefore must be studied individually and apart from his misconduct.

III

Enrico Ferri and Raffaele Garofalo, two other prominent Italian workers in this field of research, have somewhat modified Lombroso's conclusions. Thus, while admitting the existence of the "instinctive criminal," they call the other sort the "victim of circumstances." They have not, however, been able to select an appropriate name for the "victim" of the criminal.

In dealing with crime, Ferri is a strong advocate of "social prevention." By this term he means going to the source of the manifestation, and tackling it from its biological and physical factors. Another plank in his platform is the existence of the "occasional

criminal." In members of this class he finds few, if any, of the *stigmata* to which Lombroso attaches so much importance. The responsible factor in their case he considers to be more a matter of environment than anything else. Still, he is careful to admit that other factors are also contributory. This is as well, since otherwise we should never meet in the flesh the "poor but honest" member of the community; everybody who was poverty-stricken or ill-circumstanced would, as a matter of course, embark upon a criminal career; and, conversely, Mayfair would stand forth as a pattern of shining and unsullied virtue.

William Bonger, who leads the Dutch school, puts down criminality more to economic conditions than to anything else; and the French viewpoint of Gabriel Tarde (who began his career as a *juge d'instruction*, and finished it as the head of the statistics bureau of the Ministry of Justice) is that it is in "psychic impulse" that we have the readiest explanation.

When experts differ, who shall agree?

Although America came somewhat late into this field of research, she has gone farthest in it. Twenty years ago, as the result of a conference held at Chicago, there was founded the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. One of the aims of this Institute has been to encourage a study of criminal science among the general public. With this object, it has, in the *Modern Criminal Science Series*, issued a set of English translations of the best-known Continental works. The result is that the leading Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Spanish authorities are now within the reach of anybody. The more they are read (and understood), the more successful will be our attempts to solve the problem of crime.

CHAPTER II

CONSIDERATIONS OF CRIME

I

CRIME is as old as human society, and, unless our nature alters very much, it will last as long. The ætiology of the subject opens up a very wide field. In fact, an inexhaustible one. Some causes appear to be hereditary; others are certainly contributory. Poverty, ill-health, gambling, drink, overcrowding, and unemployment, etc., all play their parts; and "evil communications corrupt good manners." Adults still plead "the war," and small boys plead "the pictures."

Even the weather is blamed. Thus, an Italian criminologist has laid it down that a hot summer is provocative of bodily assaults, and a cold winter of attacks on property. Heat, too, is declared by him to cause irritability, and thus to stimulate vicious instincts. It has not, however, been seriously advanced that a low temperature has a contrary effect and induces marked phlegm.

Crime, of course, is misconduct. Since a workable definition of conduct is "action in pursuit of ends," it follows that crime is action in pursuit of wrongful ends. The difficulty, however, is to determine what are "wrongful" ends, and what are not. This is a direction in which jurists themselves appear unable to agree. A better definition of crime would perhaps be to say that it is "anti-social."

A great deal of nonsense is talked (and written) about the existence of an "instinctive" criminal class. There is no "instinctive" criminal class (except, perhaps, in magazine fiction) any more than there is an "instinctive" law-abiding one. At any rate, if there

is, Scotland Yard has not yet heard of it. The burglar and the bishop, the policeman and the pickpocket, develop differently, it is true, but each comes into the world alike. After all, every criminal is really a man or a woman, just as is every non-criminal. Similarly, there is immense confusion of thought between acts that are "crimes" and acts that are "sins"—that is, between illegal conduct and immoral conduct. The Law has little to do with the latter, as is evidenced by the stereotyped remark, "This is not a Court of Morals," which learned judges are so fond of making. Again, while an immoral act may be anti-social, it is not necessarily criminal. Yet, a criminal act is nearly always an anti-social one. This is why it is punished.

In days long past, when the tribal instinct was particularly strong, certain offences were held to imperil the whole community, and thus to merit the fiercest repression. Among such were sorcery and witchcraft and breaches of exogamous customs. Conjoint action against them would then be taken by the entire clan. Something of this spirit is still to be encountered among savages and aborigines. In parts of Africa the authority of a chief is very strong, and the more despotic he is, the more well conducted, as a class, are those under his sway. There are districts, too, where the gravity of a crime depends on the rank or position of the criminal. Everywhere, however, "public" crimes—*i.e.*, those endangering the community—are, and always have been, classed as of greater consequence than "private," or individual, transgressions.

Marriage customs, all the world over, have always been responsible for a vast number of breaches of the law. There are countries and races where exogamy must be practised, and others where it is forbidden. Transgressions of this code are considered public wrongs, in the naïve belief that they bring with them such disasters as floods, earthquakes, and damaged crops, etc. The alleged "cure" is generally a sacrifice

to the gods. Tabus also have a supernatural origin and sanction.

II

Where the English code is concerned, crime at the present era falls into two main categories—(1) International, and (2) National. The first division includes anarchy, gun-running, piracy, and slave-trading. The second division covers a much wider field and also has various sub-divisions, such as public and private, direct and indirect, major and minor. Among national offences which are both public and major are treason, stirring up disaffection among soldiers and sailors, and defrauding the revenue. Those which are public and minor include coining and stealing postal letters. Private, or individual, offences are either against the person or against property, with murder and arson at the head of the list.

Undeterred by the inherent difficulties of the subject, a classification of crime has been drawn up by the Home Office. It is not an ideal one, but, being "authoritative," it has to be accepted by the Courts. Under this scheme, all offences are held to fall into one of the six following divisions: (1) Offences against the Person; (2) Offences against Property with Violence; (3) Offences against Property without Violence; (4) Malicious injuries to Property; (5) Offences against the Currency, including Forgery; and (6) Other Offences.

The first of these somewhat arbitrary divisions covers a field that ranges from murder to bigamy; in the second we find officially scheduled blackmail and burglary; in the third are embezzlement and the theft of postal packets; in the fourth we have arson and the wilful destruction of crops; and in the fifth are coining and forgery. The last division, "Other Offences," cuts a wide swath, as in its meshes are high treason, blasphemy, slave-trading, poaching, keep-

ing a disorderly house, and attempting to commit suicide. Thus, a niche of some description for every possible form of turpitude.

Various anomalies are presented by this division of offences, into such as are (1) indictable before a jury, and (2) non-indictable, and disposed of summarily by a magistrate. Thus, a recalcitrant curate can be indicted for departing from the rubric, and dealt with by a judge and jury; but defiance of the sanitary authorities and the endangering of health on this account is regarded as a trivial breach and settled by summons in a police-court. But, however carefully drawn up, classification inevitably leads to an immense amount of sub-division, and also to confusion. There is confusion between acts that are illegal and acts that are immoral. Profiteering, sweating, and cornering supplies for personal advantage are not illegal, but nobody would contend that they were moral. On the other hand, fornication is immoral, but not necessarily illegal. Then, although wife-desertion is illegal, husband-desertion appears to be no offence at all.

Times change, and penal systems with them. Just as, with altered conditions, new offences have been added, so have old ones been dropped. Thus, emigration, which was once a serious breach of the law, is now encouraged; and a penalty is no longer incurred for not listening to a sermon on Sundays. Yet very stern repressions were formerly enacted on this account.

III

In proportion to its gravity (from an official and coded standpoint) every offence is either a treason, a felony, or a misdemeanour. Treason is a somewhat general term for any act that threatens the safety of the country of which the offender is a citizen. It includes encompassing the death of the Sovereign or

heir to the Crown, levying war against the State, or joining the State's enemies, and is dealt with by a special procedure. In the "good old days" the most barbarous punishments were incurred on this account, and a convicted traitor was not merely hanged, but was also "drawn and quartered." It was not until 1870 that the latter penalty was abolished. Except in time of war, a prosecution for treason is of very rare occurrence in England.

Felony was originally a term applicable to any treacherous act of a vassal towards his master. It is now applied to the majority of serious offences; and a consequence of conviction for felony is that an order to pay the costs of the prosecution may be added to any other punishment imposed. To enter into an agreement not to prosecute a felon is to "compound" a felony, and in itself becomes a misdemeanour, as also does neglect to give information of a felony.

There is no very clear or logical distinction between a felony and a misdemeanour; and Sir James FitzJames Stephen, in his *History of the Criminal Law*, says that any difference that ever existed has long become "unmeaning and a source of confusion." In practice, however, a misdemeanour is an act that is regarded as less serious than a felony, and it does not necessarily involve forfeiture of cash or goods on conviction. A lighter punishment, too, is incurred for a misdemeanour than for a felony. Bigamy is a felony, but perjury is a misdemeanour, as also is masquerading in official uniform or forging a passport. A felon, too, may be arrested without a warrant; and admittance to bail is not a matter of right, as it is in a misdemeanour, but of magisterial discretion.

In the French, German, and Italian codes—as well as in some employed in the British Overseas Dominions—there is a broader classification than felonies and misdemeanours. Thus, in France there are *crimes*, *délits*, and *contraventions*; German pro-

cedure makes a difference between what is *Verbrechen* and what is merely *Vergehen*; and Italy has *delitti* and *contravvenzioni*.

IV

The "Age of Chivalry" is often held up as offering a shining example to the degenerate one that followed it. So far, however, as goes its proper claim to anything of the sort, it sailed under false colours, since it was really an age when rapine, brigandage, and murder among those who figured on knightly rolls were of the commonest everyday occurrence. In fact, the security of life and property was then infinitely less than what it is now. The truth is that the medieval knight-errant of ballad, song, and story, who roamed the countryside with prancing palfrey and sword complete, and a self-appointed mission to rescue maidens in distress and avenge wrongs, was often little better than a common cut-purse and highwayman. If following their accustomed avocations to-day, half of them would be in well-merited penal servitude.

The Law exists to remedy wrongs. The "wrongs," however, have to be there first. A misunderstanding on this subject once led to serious and unforeseen consequences. What happened was that a couple of highwaymen, quarrelling over a division of the loot they had secured by their joint efforts, brought actions against each other. The learned judge who tried the case, holding that this sort of thing was "contrary to public policy" (as, indeed, it was), dealt with all the parties to the suit in a fashion they had not anticipated. Thus, the two gentlemen of the road were summarily hanged; the attorneys who had drawn the pleadings transported; and the barristers on either side disbarred. Had there been any witnesses, reprisals would probably have been exacted of them as well.

CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

I

ACCORDING to Lombroso, the wrongdoer is really an anthropological freak, and his misconduct is predestined from birth, while the opposite school of thought declares the one responsible factor to be environment. The acceptance of these conflicting doctrines in certain parts of the world has led to some grotesque legislative experiments in penology, for their logical implication is that punishment is not justifiable under any circumstances. This, in effect, was Tolstoi's view.

Sir James FitzJames Stephen, speaking with the wealth of many years' experience as a judge, would not have this for a moment. A significant passage on the subject occurs in his *History of the Criminal Law*:

"On what ground, it is asked, and under what limitations, has Society a right to punish individuals? These questions appear to me to be almost entirely unmeaning, and quite unimportant. Societies are stronger than their individual members, and do as a fact systematically hurt them in various ways for various acts and omissions. . . . If, all matters being duly considered, the legislature considers it expedient to punish a given action in a given way, I think they would be guilty of weakness if they did not punish the actors in that way, although they had no right to do so. If they consider it inexpedient that the act should be punished, they would be cruel if they punished it, however great a right they might have to do so. On this account the whole of the discussion appears to me superfluous."

While the thick-and-thin follower of the Lombroso

school of criminology may be a determinist, he does not necessarily repudiate punishment. At the same time, he is under no delusion that legally inflicted punishment is anything but retributive. Tell him that people are reformed or deterred by imprisonment, and he will ask (and quite reasonably) why, if this be the case, anybody ever goes to prison more than once. The answer—"Because they do not stop there long enough"—is unsatisfactory. Also it is begging the question.

If an individual should be detected straying beyond the limits laid down (more or less arbitrarily) by the civilised community of which he is a member, he is held to have infringed the social code. His conduct has automatically become misconduct, and is met with repression or punishment, or some other approved form of interdiction. There is, however, an idea, common enough among the unreflecting, that punishment is necessary in order to "vindicate" Justice. This view connotes Justice as an abstraction that requires to be "vindicated." But Justice is not an abstraction. It is something that can, and should be, expressed only in terms of ordinary humanity.

II

In the apportioning of punishment a point strongly urged by Garofalo was the necessity of examining the motives behind the wrongful act. While this is only elementary justice, it does not always meet with full measure of recognition from those who administer the law. Thus, the half-witted ploughboy who sets a rick on fire, merely to see it blaze, and the defaulting tradesman who deliberately burns his business premises (after first insuring the contents above their value) are each guilty of arson. Yet their respective measure of criminality is very different.

The main theories of punishment can be reduced to

three: (1) retaliatory, or retributive, (2) deterrent, and (3) reformatory. The first of these has its origin in a deeply rooted and perfectly natural instinct; and, when the world was younger, it had the full sanction of the lawgivers, as is revealed by the Old Testament. While morally indefensible under the changed conditions in which we now live, retributive punishment has one good point. This is that there is no humbug about it, or any preposterous claim that it either deters or reforms.

The theory of deterrent punishment is based on the assumption that a detected wrongdoer will not commit himself a second time, and that if the "example" made of him be sufficiently severe other people will be deterred, or at least have their criminal proclivities restrained. If this were what happened, there would be good reason for this assumption. It happens, however, to such a limited extent that the assumption cannot be accepted as sound. People break the law, knowing very well the consequences, and often after having suffered from them. Therefore, it is obvious to anybody but a crank that, whatever the ultimate effect of punishment, it is not to deter.

The theory of reformatory punishment also requires a pronounced optimism to accept it. If the effect is to reform, it is difficult to understand why there should be so many recidivists, at once the problem and the despair of lawmakers and prison administrators. The fact that they exist shows that something has gone wrong with this part of the punitive system. There is also a great deal of loose talk about punishment being for the good of society. Society, however, shows no marked indication of being improved because large numbers of people are continually being locked up for longer or shorter terms. The truth of the whole matter in a nutshell is that punishment protects society, and society has a right to be protected.

If we are honest with ourselves (which few of us

are), it will be admitted that all penal systems have their beginnings in vengeance. It is quite natural that this should be so, for vengeance is a reflex action and a primary instinct and the oldest of human passions. This instinct of retaliation, too, is a perfectly comprehensible one, and in primitive times it was regarded both as an ethical axiom and a solemn duty devolving upon the injured family. This idea still holds good in countries where the vendetta, or blood-feud, flourishes, and is thus part and parcel of the *lex talionis* theory of the Mosaic law, as enunciated in Exodus xxi.

As, however, experience proved that the practice of giving the person wronged (or his able-bodied relatives) the right of inflicting private vengeance on the culprit made social life somewhat difficult for other people, the State gradually took upon itself the function of judge and executioner. This assumption was the first real advance in constructive penology; and the original idea was to balance the weight of wrong by the weight of punishment. The idea of deterring and reforming came into the scheme much later.

At an early period it was held that practically any offence against the person of a freeman could be met by restitution in money. According to his status, the injured party had his officially recognised grading and cash value. From murder to a black eye, the tariff was fixed on this assumption. A rough-and-ready method of dealing with a conflict of testimony was also adopted. Thus, when two persons were accused of the same offence, and only one could be guilty, the practice was to condemn the uglier of the pair. Now that women serve on juries, such a system might conceivably lead to violent differences of opinion.

In Norman and Saxon England the authorities had no great affection for imprisonment. They found it costly and troublesome. Also, there was no money in it. A system of fines was, they held, far more to the point, as this brought cash into the pockets of the

judges themselves, in addition to being a substantial source of revenue to the Crown. It was only if a man could not, or would not, pay his fine that he was clapped into prison. But his incarceration there was deliberately made so horrible that he took the first opportunity of getting out of it, either by producing by hook or by crook the sum in which he was mulcted, or performing some equivalent service.

Until the reign of Edward I., terms of imprisonment were seldom fixed definitely. A man might languish in a dungeon for years; on the other hand, he might be freed almost at once. Judges "went circuit" to empty prisons, not to fill them, thus reversing the process now adopted. After the reign of Henry III., however, a practice sprang up of fixing a period that varied with the crime. It was an odd code, since carrying off a nun or stealing a deer incurred precisely the same penalty—viz., three years in durance.

It was "durance vile," too, for enclosing walls and barred doors can hide dreadful things. Here is a picture of a Tudor gaol, as given by a monk:

"I see also a pytyful abuse for presoners. O Lord God, their lodging is to bad for hoggys, and as for their meat it is euil enough for doggys, and yet, the Lord knoweth, thei have not enough thereof. Con-syder, all ye that be kyngs and lqrdys of persons, that inasmoch as ye shut up any man from his meat, ye be bound to give him sufficyant fode for a man and not for a dogge."

III

Corruption among those administering the law was not unknown. During the reign of Edward III. this reached such a pitch that, in 1350, Sir William de Thorpe, the Chief Justice of England, was himself charged with malversation. On confessing that he had received bribes from various accused persons, he was

sentenced to be imprisoned and to forfeit his property. After an interval, however, the affair blew over and he was restored to office. But the evil continued to such a degree that a special commission was appointed to inquire into the whole subject. It was carried out very thoroughly, and judges of the King's Bench and barons of the Exchequer, as well as humbler folk, such as sheriffs, gaolers, and their understrappers, were held to answer for the grievances of all who had suffered from their misconduct.

Out of the evil that was brought to light came a certain amount of good; and, as a result, the judges were required, on their appointment, to take an oath to administer the law equally to all, and to abandon the practice of accepting "presents" from suitors. As this was held to be a sacrifice on their part (as, indeed, it was), their salaries were substantially increased.

But corruption among those who held high legal offices still lingered. In 1621, when he was Lord Chancellor, twenty-eight specific charges were brought against Francis Bacon. "I do plainly and ingenuously confess," he said in his appeal for mercy, "that I am guilty of corruption, and do renounce all defence . . . for which I am heartily and penitently sorry, and submit myself to the judgement, grace, and mercy of the court." He was fined £40,000, removed from his post, and imprisoned in the Tower. None the less, Bacon had his apologists, and it was urged on his behalf that he had only followed the example of other occupants of the Woolsack before him.

Still, there was one good point about the system. This was that it made no marked distinction between rich and poor, and bearers of great names and occupants of lofty positions were amenable to the rigours of the law like anybody else. In the reign of Henry VI. the Duchess of Gloucester was, at the instance of the Bishop of Winchester, condemned for witchcraft; and an inconvenient marriage of Edward IV. was put

down to sorcery on the part of the Duchess of Bedford. The Duke of Clarence had to meet a charge of necromancy, and Jane Shore, when she fell out of favour, was tried for "adultery and lewd conduct."

IV

Until within comparatively modern times, humanity and the penal system in England were not on speaking terms. Arrest—or even accusation—implied guilt; and guilt implied appalling consequences to anybody once in the clutches of the law. Mutilations, accompanied by dreadful barbarities, were, at a period when the world was younger (especially during the Saxon, Danish, and Norman régimes), inflicted almost as a matter of course. William I., who had no squeamishness in his composition, ordered that malefactors should not be killed outright, but gradually dismembered. There was short shrift, too, for erring women, and the one whose morals were found to be at fault was liable to lose her nose and ears. Nor were people with "get-rich-quick" complexes encouraged; the coiner had his hand chopped off, as also had the sheep-stealer and the libeller; and in the year 1571 a man was actually boiled to death for putting arsenic in a family's soup. At any rate, this was the charge. Still, in those days of faulty diagnosis, appendicitis was often put down to "poisoning." Hence, miscarriages of justice.

The reign of Henry VIII. could, where the severity of its penal system was concerned, almost have been written in blood. During this period, which lasted for thirty-eight years, a total of 72,000 men and women went to the block and the gallows; and the scourge, the rack, and the branding iron were in constant requisition. Every village in "Merry England" had its whipping-post and its stocks, generally set up next door to the church. The stake was the regular penalty

for "petty treason" (a classification which included the murder of a husband by a wife, or of a master or mistress by a servant), as well as for heresy; and in 1786 Phœbe Harris was burned in front of Newgate for coining. "A vast concourse of people attended on this melancholy occasion."

These and similar brutalities were enjoined "so that punishment be inflicted, and also the soul preserved." The theory that such a desideratum was secured lingered long. It was even incorporated into the disciplinary code of the Royal Navy, when blue-jackets were strung up at the yard-arm and flogged round the fleet, "for the punishment of vice and the maintenance of true religion."

It cannot be said by even its most ardent champions that, during the widespread depravity of the Middle Ages, the influence of the Church was for good. The clergy committed offences themselves, connived at others, and secured pardon for criminals who could make it worth their while to do so. Among the smaller of their delinquencies were poaching and sheep-stealing, while they did not stop at murder, sedition, and swindling. Similarly, they were obscurantists, and frowned upon every attempt to ameliorate the horrors of the legal code. The bishops were vigorous witch-burners, and dreadful cruelties were carried out by them in the name of religion. Thus, during the reign of Henry VIII. a boy of fifteen was burned at Smithfield for "heresy." The charge was made and pressed by Bonner, Bishop of London, and Chaplain to the King. It was, perhaps, only poetic justice that he himself came to a wretched end.

CHAPTER IV
PENAL METHODS OF THE PAST

I

At one period a man accused of felony could have no protection beyond challenging the jury; and, if convicted, his property was forfeited. To avoid pleading, he would often "stand mute." Still, this did not avail him much, as the practice was then to subject the prisoner (woman as well as man) to *peine forte et dure*—that is, to be "pressed." Judgment was pronounced on such recalcitrants as follows:

"That you be taken back to the prison whence you came, to a low dungeon into which no light can enter; that you be laid on your back on the bare floor, with a cloth round your loins, but elsewhere naked; that there be set upon your body a weight of iron as great as you can bear—and greater; that you have no sustenance, save, on the first day, three morsels of the coarsest bread, on the second day three draughts of stagnant water from the pool nearest to the prison door, on the third day again three morsels of bread and such water alternately from day to day until you die."

The last case on record of this horrible practice being carried out occurred at the Cambridge Assizes in 1741.

In 1772 it was directed that anybody who "stood mute" should be convicted forthwith. Since 1828, however, the practice in such instances has been to enter a formal plea of "not guilty."

Ten years after the last case of "pressing," and at a period when women were burned for coining, and convicted traitors were disembowelled, Henry Fielding blandly informed the Grand Jury of Middlesex that

"the English penal code was the mildest and most devoid of terror of any in the world." He also defended the established custom of nailing a man's ears to the pillory.

Bacon had good reason for declaring "the smell of a prison to be only less dangerous than the plague." The vast majority of these institutions were mephitic dens, with gaol fever rampant. During the Oxford Assizes of 1577, it was responsible for the deaths of nearly all the judges, counsel, and witnesses in the court. Two hundred years later a similar epidemic swept Newgate; and "the Lord Mayor, some of the aldermen, two of the judges, and a number of lookers-on died of the gaol distemper." As a precaution, kept up until within a comparatively recent period, the edge of the dock was always strewn with "sweet-smelling herbs." A bottle of disinfectant is now found more efficacious.

II

With the passage of time certain long-established legislative measures have disappeared, not because they had outlived their usefulness (for they never had any), but because we have become more intelligent in our methods. Among such are "Sanctuary," "Wager of Battle," and "Benefit of Clergy."

What "sanctuary" meant in England was that a fugitive from justice had gained the shelter of a church or its boundaries. Provided he had committed neither sacrilege nor treason, he could then demand protection from arrest for a varying period. At the end of that period he was required to go, clad in sackcloth, to the coroner, to whom he would admit his guilt and give an undertaking to leave the kingdom. If he did not leave, or returned without permission, he was liable to serious consequences. Such individuals were even required to start from an English port within a definite period. They generally made for Dover or

Plymouth, where organised gangs of murderers and thieves crossed the Channel, to resume their temporarily interrupted depredations on the Continent.

Although "sanctuary" was theoretically abolished by James I., it continued in civil processes until much later. In London the principal districts set apart for the purpose were Westminster (which served as an Alsatia and a vast cave of Adullam combined), Blackfriars (handy for journalists), Southwark, and the Savoy, all of which were filled to overflowing with ruffians and fugitives who snapped their fingers at the Law.

Another piece of legislative mummery to be abolished was "Wager of Battle," which, first introduced into England by William I., was also known as "Trial by Combat." Under its curious provisions, if a man brought a charge against another that he could not prove, the latter could challenge him to combat. The pair were then required to fight "until the stars came out, or as long as the Parties could stand." If the accused won, he was held to have established his innocence; whereas if he lost, he was declared guilty, and hanged forthwith. Although the naïve idea was that, this being a direct appeal to Providence, the cause of virtue would necessarily triumph, both contestants were required to give an assurance to avoid witchcraft. The authorities were taking no risks.

In 1818 a successful attempt was made to revive this absurd custom, when one Abraham Thornton was indicted for murdering a young woman, Mary Ashford. On being acquitted he was challenged in the Court of King's Bench by the dead girl's brother, who, as heir at law, claimed that the issue between them should be subjected to "Wager of Battle." Since the Act had never been repealed, the learned judges concurred. "It is our duty," said Ellenborough sententiously, "to pronounce the law as it is, and not as we may wish it to be." Thornton was quite agreeable, but the

challenger, being a youth of inferior physique, showed his discretion by withdrawing at the last moment. Since "Wager" was abolished, disappointed prosecutors who have been tempted to revive the practice on their own account have got into trouble for assault.

It is only just over a hundred years ago (1827) that "Benefit of Clergy" (which had lasted in some form or another since the twelfth century) was finally abolished. Under its provisions, anybody who was able to read a psalm could not be subjected to the penalties that applied to the illiterate. Education among them not being of a lofty standard, the privilege was afterwards extended to peers of the realm who failed to pass this simple test. One of the last of their order to avail himself of "Benefit" was (but not on the grounds of illiteracy) Lord Byron, who, in 1765, was adjudged guilty of manslaughter. It was really a cowardly murder, although the noble defendant declared that his victim's final words to him were: "My lord, all I have to say is that you have behaved like a gentleman."

III

When the belief in the deterrent effect of a fiercely punitive code was somewhat stronger than it is to-day, it was the practice of the prosecution to demand a heavy reprisal "in order to deter others from committing the like offence in all time coming." With the advance of saner thinking this appeal has been dropped. Some of the old-time judges, too, had a habit of solemnly haranguing the condemned man before sending him to his doom. Thus, Lord Eskgrove (who sat on the Bench from 1784 to 1805), in pronouncing "judgment of death" upon a tailor who had killed a soldier in a drunken quarrel, once delivered himself as follows: "Prisoner at the Bar, not only did you murder your victim, whereby he

was bereft of his life, but you did add to your crime by thrusting and projecting, or pushing or propelling or piercing the lethal weapon through the belly-band of his regimental breeches, which said breeches were the property of his Majesty, the King."

On another occasion he addressed in this fashion a woman witness who was wearing a veil:

"Young woman! Here you will consider yourself in the presence of Almighty God and of this High Court. Lift up your veil; throw off all modesty; and look me in the face."

Draconically severe as were early penal methods in England, they failed to repress crime. But they failed for a very obvious reason—viz., because they were so severe that the public would not support them, and juries refused to return convictions for numbers of offences that involved death. This, however, is only natural, for when a code of conduct is too rigid, it defeats itself. Everybody—the law-giver as well as the law-breaker—would then be in the dock. Allowance must be made for weak human nature.

As a result of the general callousness of the ruling classes, the number of crimes for which death could be (and usually was) inflicted began to swell enormously from the year 1688 onwards. At the beginning of the last century it had reached the appalling total of 200. In the year 1805 the number of capital convictions was 350. But it did not follow that a death sentence would be carried out. Jack Ketch could not work overtime. In practice, "transportation beyond the seas" was often substituted.

IV

As a convenient method of getting undesirables out of the country, transportation was first adopted in the Stuart era. Originally, the system was that the condemned man should remove himself, under penalty of being hanged if he did not. As such numbers avoided

both alternatives, in 1718 the Government appointed a contractor, whose business it was to ship them off to the American Colonies, where they were practically sold into slavery. When the war of 1786 made it impossible to use this part of the world any longer for such a purpose, penal settlements were established in Australia; and afterwards Bermuda and Gibraltar (where the notorious Charles Peace once "did time") also served as convict stations. There the wretched outcasts died off like flies, and the settlements at Botany Bay and elsewhere stood forth as cesspools of iniquity, corruption, and cruelty.

But there were still people who would not hear a word against the practice. Thus, Sydney Smith found it in accordance with his clerical functions to sneer at what he dubbed Romilly's "humanitarianism run riot"; and Lord Castlereagh, speaking in the House of Commons in 1819, positively declared that "the general system was one in which the utmost mildness and humanity and attention to the health and morals of those exposed to it were exhibited."

It was the colonists themselves who put an end to transportation by the simple expedient of refusing to let their adopted homesteads be regarded any longer as a dumping-ground for English convicts. But it was not until the year 1867 that their efforts were successful; and during the three-quarters of a century or so that the system lasted, a total of 134,000 men and women were compulsorily exiled. They were not all the scum and off-scourings of the Mother Country. Numbers of them afterwards made good, and rose to positions of honour and trust. Yet, from jealousy, or some other cause, they were not always allowed to forget their past. In this connection a story is told of an "ex-transport," who had become a wealthy squatter. It happened that once, when he was giving evidence in a case, the opposing counsel, with a view to discrediting him, inquired how he had arrived in

the Colony, and pressed the question when it was resisted. "Well, if you really want to know," returned the other, stung by this unfair attack, "I'll tell you. Fifty years ago, I landed in Australia, handcuffed to your father."

V

About the period that Castlereagh, Ellenborough, and their followers were smugly approving the horrors of the criminal law, Sir Samuel Romilly was doing much to ameliorate them. But the horrors were too much for him; and he cut his throat before his work was half finished.

Everybody did not see eye to eye with Mackintosh, Romilly, and Auckland, any more than they had with Meredith and Howard; and there were public men who, despite their full knowledge of its workings, dubbed any attempt to introduce a little common humanity into the penal system of the day "mawkish and ridiculous." In an *Essay on Criminal Jurisprudence*, published in 1821, Barber Beaumont, a Middlesex magistrate, complained with much bitterness that prisons were "too comfortable." He also declared that, as a result of his magisterial inspection, he found them to furnish the inmates with "good lodging, good bedding, warm clothing, excellent food, cheerful society, the daily visits of friends, the condolence and tender treatment of superiors, and light work, or no work at all."

But the imaginative Mr. Beaumont did not stand alone. Fifteen years later a *Treatise on the Magistracy of England* referred with similar bitterness to the "splendid gaols," which, it declared, were being built throughout the kingdom. The author, one Edward Mullins, was a Holborn solicitor. As, together with his legal practice, he combined the lucrative, if unsavoury, appointment of Commissioner of Sewers, he

was held to be specially qualified to enlarge on the subject. The following passage from a country paper was quoted by him with warm approval:

"Within the last fifty years there has sprung up among the Justices and their friends an irregular *mania* on the subject of criminal law. . . . Whether this modern scheme prevents crime or not, at least it entails great expense on the rate-payer. But that is not all. Your Justices must have a nice classification of criminals; the young must be separated from the old, the male from the female, the hardened offender from the fresh criminal, whom Justice, right or wrong, sends to gaol. He must have treadmills, too, and rigid inspection, which imply larger premises and more accommodation."

"Costly fads!" was the angry comment of Mr. Pamphleteer Mullins, who doubtless felt that his pockets were being touched.

VI

Prior to being despatched beyond the seas, large numbers of convicts would spend a preliminary term in the "hulks," which craft also served to relieve the pressure on the ordinary prison accommodation at Millbank and elsewhere. Under an Act of George III., the use of these vessels was adopted "for the more severe and effectual punishment of daring offenders . . . to be employed in hard labour in the raising of sand, soil, and gravel, and cleansing the River Thames, etc." Such prison ships were moored off Chatham, Portsmouth, and Woolwich, where there was always work to be done in the dockyards. The majority of them were converted East Indiamen, and others had been borne on the Navy list. Blackstone and Howard bitterly condemned the use to which they were now put, and with good reason, since they were nothing but floating hells.

The condition of affairs obtaining on board the hulks beggars description. The *Justitia*, for example, moored off Chatham, housed 700 convicts of the lowest possible type, most of them having been sent there from shore prisons as "unmanageable." At night, when they were battened down between decks, only a single warder was left in charge. "The state of morality under such circumstances," says an official report of 1829, "may be easily conceived—crimes impossible to mention being commonly perpetrated." Of the *Warrior*, an old 74-gun line of battleship, which was proudly described as a "model hulk," another report of 1854 says: "She is rotten and unsound from stem to stern." None the less, she was still employed in 1862. It was in vain for protests to be made to the Government. They fell on deaf ears. Even when, in 1854, the Commissioners declared that "of all defects which lessen the prospect of reformation, we do not know of any approaching in magnitude to that presented by the association of the convicts in the prison hulks," the report was pigeon-held by a clerk. But this was inevitable, for criticism was fiercely resented by those who would see nothing wrong with the system. Officialdom, too, took great credit to itself for the fact that each hulk had its "library," the shelves of which were stocked by Whitehall. Among the mental pabulum that some humorist there had selected for convict reading were Marcel's *Conversations*, Paley's *Moral and Political Philosophy*, *The Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties*, and *The Rites and Worship of the Jews*. When the governor of the *Defence* hulk at Woolwich asked that Dickens's *Household Words* should be added, he was told "the chaplain objects to it."

The population of the hulks consisted of men old in crime, together with mere children on the threshold of such a career. Thus, among the 3,000 on board them in one period of twelve months, 2,174 had

already been convicted; 218 were under fifteen years of age; and three were actually under ten years of age. It would be interesting to know the offences of these last young desperados. Where, however, the mass was concerned, there was little but scum and dregs, "the worst class of prisoners from all the gaols of the United Kingdom."

Yet, although it was "originally adopted as a makeshift under pressing circumstances," public opinion was unable to sweep away the hulks system until it had been in existence for nearly seventy years.

CHAPTER V

"JUDGMENT OF DEATH"

I

IN Romilly's day, and for many years to come, apart from despatching them beyond the seas as "transports," the only other traditionally sanctioned method of getting rid of felons or officially classed "undesirables" was to send them to the next world, dangling from the end of a rope.

The House of Brunswick established a dreadful record in this respect. During the reign of George III. alone more offences were made capital than in the reigns of all the Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts combined. One reason for the increase was (in a speech on the subject delivered in the House of Commons in the year 1819) declared to be "the unhappy facility afforded to legislation by Parliamentary government." There were Members, it seemed, who actually appeared to make a hobby of enlarging the number of capital felonies. A mixture of callousness and ambition brought these up to 200. But this total was, it must be remarked, theoretical, for the public were more conscientious than the politicians. As was bound to happen, the severity of the Law defeated itself. Over and over again juries refused to bring in verdicts of guilty, and prosecutors declined to press charges, when a man would go from the dock to the gallows for a trivial offence.

A hundred and twenty years ago the Law stood for terror, and for very little else. Thus, when, in 1810, a proposal was made to abolish "judgment of death" for stealing five shillings' worth of goods from a shop, Ellenborough, the Chief Justice of England, in an oft-

quoted passage, actually declared: "I am convinced with the rest of the judges that public expediency requires there should be no remission of the *terror* denounced against this description of offenders."

Enlarging on this subject, Ellenborough added a further plea:

"Your Lordships will pause before you assent to a measure pregnant with danger to the security of property. . . . My Lords, if we suffer this Bill to pass, we shall not know where we stand; whether we stand upon our heads or upon our feet."

It is perhaps characteristic of the spirit of those days that, not only was the Bill defeated, but that the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other prelates voted against it. This opposition towards any reform of the criminal law continued until 1832.

Sir James Mackintosh, asking for the appointment of a Select Committee "to consider of so much of the criminal laws as related to capital punishment in felonies," furnished instances of crimes "of the most frivolous and fantastic description" which were still held to be capital. In the days of our grandfathers (or very little earlier) these included cutting down a hop vine or a shrub in a private park; damaging a rabbit warren; frequenting the company of gipsies; impersonating a Greenwich pensioner; or being found masked on a public road. It is true that in practice the death penalty was not inflicted for more than twenty-five of the two hundred capital offences that existed at this period. The point was, the legislative system claimed the power to do so.

The standpoint adopted by Mackintosh was that the severity of the scale made it unworkable. Quoting Sir William Grant, he declared that "during the last century, there had been a general confederacy of prosecutors, witnesses, counsel, judges, and advisers of the Crown to prevent the execution of the criminal law. . . . Is it fitting," he added, "that a system

should continue which the whole body of the intelligent community combines to resist, as a disgrace to our nature and nation?"

Yet, despite the sneers of Sydney Smith, neither Mackintosh nor Romilly pressed for the total abolition of the rope. On the contrary, they considered that it should be employed "in cases of murder and other serious offences."

II

In 1823 the idea dawned upon the legislature that a man could conceivably be put to a better use than hanging him, and a hundred felonies were exempted at one bound from capital punishment. Forgery, however, was not removed from the list until 1837. This, it is significant to remark, was on the petition of the London bankers themselves, who found from experience that in many cases juries would violate their oaths rather than convict. Similarly in indictments for theft. When a man could (and inevitably would) be strung up for stealing a couple of pounds' worth of goods, their practice was to assess the value at £1 19s. 6d. The problem set them was not mathematical, but ethical. It was whether the sanctity of their oath was above the sanctity of a human life.

But juries varied, and Jack Ketch still had constant employment. Even mere children were not exempted if they fell into the clutches of the Law. In 1801 a small boy of twelve was strung up by the public hangman for the theft of a spoon from a dwelling-house. Thirty years later, John Bell, a lad of fourteen, was convicted of killing another boy. Despite the jury's recommendation to mercy, "on account of his extreme youth, and the profligate and unnatural manner in which he had been brought up, the learned Judge passed sentence of death, and held out not the slightest hope of mercy." Nor did he get any.

But age was no more spared than was youth. In

September, 1843, an old man who had reached the patriarchal total of eighty-four was sentenced to death by Lord Moncrieff for wife-murder. He was so feeble that he had to be carried to the scaffold on a chair.

Reprieves have not always met with the approval of a Sadistic public. Thus, in 1854, when Lord Palmerston declined to sanction the execution of a man of eighty-four, "on account of his age," the Home Office messenger was, on leaving the prison, pelted by a furious mob for thus depriving them of their promised spectacle.

An evening journal, dated March 12, 1828, gives a lurid account of a public exhibition that must have been witnessed very frequently by our grandfathers :

" AN EXECUTION AT NEWGATE . . .

"The awful sentence of death was carried out before the entrance of Newgate, on five men, at 20 minutes past 8 to-day. The names of the executed men were: W. Melford (21), C. Melford (17), and Jeremiah Sullivan (28), convicted of breaking into a house; and Thomas Chapman (28) and William Johnson (28), for horse-stealing.

"At 6 o'clock the prisoners received their spiritual consolation with thankfulness. William Melford particularly bewailed the fact that he had been a Sabbath-breaker. On our admission, we observed the prisoner Sullivan at one corner of the room engaged in devotional exercises. He appeared contrite and sighed heavily. William Melford wept bitterly. While they bound Charles Melford he kept making illusions [*sic*] to his mother, and he was obliged to be held while the officers were performing their duty.

"A more distressing scene remained to be observed. Johnson, a fine, healthy-looking man, was borne into the room between two turnkeys. He was struck with paralysis while in prison, which deprived

him of the use of his legs. After a short interval he was hoisted on a man's back and carried outside to the execution platform. The prison bell began to toll as the Rev. Ordinary read out the sentence, 'I know that my Redeemer liveth.'

"During the time the ropes were being placed around the necks of the other four men, Johnson was carried in the arms of two men to the fatal scaffold, and was supported by them while the executioner did his duty. While on the scaffold, Charles Melford called to the sheriff: 'Pray let me get off. Pray, sir, take me off.'

"The crowd of spectators was immense."

Since 1861 only four crimes are, under English law, punishable by death. These are (1) setting fire to H.M. dockyards; (2) piracy, accompanied by violence; (3) treason, and (4) murder. Cases of dockyard burning and piracy are rare. At any rate, nobody has been hanged for them within the last seventy years. As for treason, there are only two cases on record since 1900. The Boer War was responsible for one, and the European War for the other. So far as executions for murder are concerned, the annual number now is approximately twelve. In 1925, however, it rose to seventeen.

III

There are many arguments against capital punishment. Without considering those based on ethics, the commonest are that its effect is neither to reform nor to deter. There is something in this. Hanging (or any other description of judicially inflicted death) has never yet reformed anybody. That it has even deterred anybody is open to question. A man is hanged one morning, and somebody else commits a murder the next afternoon. To say that there would be more murders if there were less hangings is merely

to advance an assumption, and one about which criminologists disagree among themselves. Cesare de Beccaria, whose famous *Dei Delitti e delle Pene* (*On Crimes and Punishments*) attracted the notice of Voltaire, always stoutly maintained that the death penalty was less deterrent than long imprisonment. It probably was—under the Italian system in his day (1735-1794).

Two really sound arguments against capital punishment do exist. One is that it is irrevocable; and when a man has been "hanged by the neck until he is dead," nothing can undo it. There may be fresh and exculpatory evidence to hand, but the dishonoured corpse rotting in its limed coffin is beyond recall.

The other great argument against capital punishment is that it debauches so many people who are necessarily concerned with the dreadful business of deliberately ushering a fellow creature out of this world and into the next. Judges and counsel and jury at one end of the grim procession, and prison governors and doctors and chaplains and warders—and, lastly, the executioner himself—at the other.

Then there is also the public to consider. The effect on them is certainly evil. On the morning of an execution a ghoulish mob will always assemble outside the prison gates, to watch the "Black Flag" flutter from its staff, and to read the "official notice" posted on the prison gates. Finally, the subsequent proceedings of the coroner's inquest, together with imaginative accounts of the "condemned man's last speech and confession," are served up in the evening papers. To say that anybody is "improved" or "uplifted" by this sort of thing is to talk (and write) dishonest nonsense.

Lord Buckmaster, in his introduction to Roy Calvert's standard volume, *Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century*, expresses himself very strongly on this subject:

"The whole subject of which Capital Punishment is simply a part has to be carefully studied. It is assumed that society has the right to punish as it pleases all offenders against its laws. The rule which should guide us, however, is not that of doing what the law says we have power to do but what reason, justice, and humanity say we ought to do, and these forbid the continuance of Capital Punishment. . . . Even looked at materially, the Death Penalty fails utterly of its purpose. It does not stop murders in the least. A man does not commit murder after methodical calculation. He commits it because his environment has not taught him to exercise control over his savage feelings; and the only remedy is to improve all standards of conduct and thus make crime a matter of social aversion."

IV

The argument most often advanced against the abolition of capital punishment is that it would lead to an increase of homicide. Experience, however, shows that this has not happened in such countries as have abolished it. Among these are Holland, since 1870; Roumania, since 1864; and Switzerland, since 1874; and it has long been either abolished or abrogated in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden; and also (except for political murder) in Italy. Of the other European countries that still retain it, only France keeps the public executioner ("Monsieur de Paris") at all busy.

The common idea that France once abolished the death penalty, and then, owing to the increase of murders, was compelled to reimpose it, is unfounded. The death penalty was never abolished in France. What happened was that between the years 1906 and 1908 all such sentences were commuted.

Where America is concerned, capital punishment is abolished in eight States of the Union, the lead hav-

ing been given in Michigan in 1847. Of the other States, imprisonment for life is adopted as an alternative in thirty-three, and in the seven States where the death penalty is still imposed will also be found the largest number of murders.

But absolute comparison between countries where capital punishment is still in force and those where it is not is almost impossible. There is no common denominator on which to work, and the factors that contribute to homicide vary. Thus, there are countries where the greatest difficulty exists in securing a lethal weapon, just as there are others where a pistol can be bought by anyone, and "no questions asked." Then, too, the efficiency of the police, and the precautions observed in the care of the mentally unfit, have an important bearing on the subject. If in England lunatics were not put under restraint, and firearms and poisons unpurchasable without a permit or a doctor's prescription, life insurance premiums would probably be the same in London as in Chicago.

Many proposals have, from time to time, been advanced in Parliament to abolish this judgment of death. The matter was first discussed in 1868; and, afterwards, in 1872, 1877, 1881, and 1886. On each occasion, however, the proposals were negated by substantial majorities.

CHAPTER VI

CRIME AND INSANITY

I

MIND and conduct go together, and very closely in their workings. As a result, the border between insanity and crime is often a very narrow one. A touch, and it is crossed. It is when it is crossed that people are apt to find themselves in the dock, for there is obviously a correlation of criminality and mental defectiveness. The problem, however, is to determine just where responsibility begins and ends.

From a legal standpoint, insanity implies irresponsibility. The crude test is, does a wrongdoer know the consequences of his act? If he does, he is sane; if not, he is insane. Since 1843 the accepted definition of insanity in criminal charges has been, roughly, that the accused person "did not know the nature and quality of the act, and also that it was wrong." On its strict interpretation, of course, this would only hold good of a gibbering idiot, for the average lunatic knows very well the difference between right and wrong, and also takes care not to do a criminal act if anybody is near enough to stop him.

The legal definition of 1843 came into existence through the trial of one Daniel McNaghten (almost invariably mis-spelled Macnaughton) for shooting Mr. Drummond, Sir Robert Peel's private secretary, in broad daylight. It was obvious that he was off his head, as he imagined his victim (against whom he had no grudge whatever) was Sir Robert Peel himself. When insanity was pleaded on his behalf, and the Crown called no rebutting evidence, Chief Justice Tindal stopped the case and directed the jury to

acquit McNaghten, who was then removed from Newgate Prison to Bethlehem Hospital.

The circumstances of this trial were responsible for so much public interest that the House of Lords afterwards referred the matter to all the judges for their opinion as to the legal considerations involved. The result was that eleven of the judges declared that insanity was a good defence "if the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong."

So far as trials for murder are concerned, insanity is now pleaded almost as a matter of course; and the finding is delivered by a jury of laymen, not of professional alienists. It is an odd practice, and, apart from other obvious objections, imposes an unfair responsibility upon the twelve men in the box. Dr. Bernard Hollander, in his *Psychology of Misconduct*, voices a very general opinion when he says: "That the question of insanity in a case of murder should be left for decision to the wisdom of a jury appears to be outrageous." To the average member of the public, it appears, to say the least of it, unintelligent. There is, however, a difficulty in altering the procedure. This is, that a jury of alienists would be a "special" one, and murder, being a felony, has to be dealt with by an ordinary jury.

II

As even the most bloodthirsty admit that a mad homicide should not be hanged, the practice is to bring in a verdict of "Guilty, but insane." Prison being no place for such an individual, the law directs that he shall be kept in a criminal lunatic asylum "during His Majesty's pleasure." It is to the one at Broadmoor, in Berkshire, that such people are sent in England, as also are ordinary convicts who have

lost their reason while undergoing penal servitude. The members of this latter class, however, are merely detained until they are cured. Broadmoor was opened as a criminal lunatic asylum in 1863, but there were similar establishments elsewhere much earlier. Bethlehem Hospital (otherwise "Bedlam") was, for example, appropriated to this purpose in 1815; and Scotland and Ireland received their own malefactors adjudged "Guilty, but insane" in separate asylums at Perth and Dundrum.

People can be very mad on some subjects, but very sane on others. The Broadmoor inmates number all sorts and conditions. At one time they even included a distinguished voluntary worker for the *Oxford English Dictionary*, who, from this grim retreat, forwarded hundreds of etymological definitions of such pronounced value that they were gladly accepted by the editor. Yet, in a moment of mania, he had committed a repulsive and purposeless murder, for which, had he not been clearly out of his mind on this point, he would have gone to the gallows.

With reference to this matter of consigning criminal lunatics to criminal asylums "during His Majesty's pleasure" (as it is quaintly put), a specious argument to the contrary is often elaborated by the die-hards and intransigents of the "classical school." What, led by Mancini, the Italian jurist, they say in effect is, if these people are mad, they should not be treated as criminals, because in law they are irresponsible for their actions; and, being irresponsible, their proper place is an ordinary asylum, while, if, on the other hand, they are not mad, they should go to prison.

The fallacies of this contention are obvious. It has repeatedly happened that neglect to place under lock and key individuals who exhibit symptoms of paranoia has led to deplorable crimes, and more especially to assassinations. To this neglect must be attributed the murder of the Empress of Austria by Luigi

Lucheni; of President Carnot by Santo Caserio; of President Garfield by Charles Guiteau; of President Lincoln by Wilkes Booth; of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz; and of Spencer Perceval by John Bellingham; and similarly of the various attempts upon the lives of Queen Victoria and other Sovereigns.

The fate incurred by the perpetrators of the first attacks upon Queen Victoria was such as to induce Sir James FitzJames Stephen, a judge who was noted for his severity, to enter a protest:

"In the early part of Her Majesty's reign," he writes, "two foolish boys, Oxford and Francis, fired pistols at the Queen, loaded or not. One was, with cruel mercy, acquitted of high treason on the ground of insanity, and, though unquestionably sane, was confined in criminal lunatic asylums for upwards of thirty years. The other was convicted and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to transportation for life. . . . Oxford's punishment was, I think, the most severe ever inflicted in England."

Although FitzJames Stephen declares that Oxford was "unquestionably sane," the weight of evidence is very much to the opposite. There was also a family history of madness, and his father had been in an asylum. A lad of nineteen, Oxford himself earned his living as pot-boy in an Edgeware Road public house. His disposition was ill-balanced, and he had an immense passion for notoriety. He had formed an association called "Young England," the members of which adopted ridiculous uniforms and gave themselves fancy names. On an April afternoon in 1840 he waited outside Buckingham Palace until the Queen and Prince Albert drove past him. As they drew near, he fired two shots at the carriage. Both of them missed, and he was immediately seized by the onlookers. During his trial at the Old Bailey his demeanour left no doubt as to his insanity.

When a couple of years later, John Francis, another

youth, followed the evil example of Oxford and fired at Her Majesty, no attempt was made to establish unsoundness of mind. The verdict being "Guilty of the criminal intent to kill," he was sentenced to be "hanged, drawn, and quartered." This, however, was subsequently commuted to transportation for the term of his natural life."

III

The "McNaghten" ruling, if somewhat rough and ready, served well enough for eighty years. In 1922, however, as it was felt to be a little frayed, and not sufficiently elastic, the Lord Chancellor appointed a special committee "to consider and report upon what changes, if any, are desirable in the existing law, practice, and procedure relating to criminal trials in which the plea of insanity as a defence is raised." The most important of the committee's recommendations was that a person of defective mind could not be held guilty of a criminal act "if the defect prevented him knowing that the act was wrongful, or from controlling his own conduct." What this amounted to was the decision that the existence of an "uncontrollable impulse" should, if resulting from insanity, be recognised by the legislature.

Pressed to its logical conclusion, this theory of "uncontrollable impulse" may, of course, be advanced in exculpation of any criminal act. The result may then well be one for which defendants have not bargained. Thus, it may conceivably lead to aristocratic, and often wealthy, women pilferers, who walk off with small articles in shops, or attempt to smuggle silk stockings through the Customs, and elderly gentlemen of distinguished position who thrust their society uninvited upon ladies who are unknown to them, being removed from Belgravia to Broadmoor. If, however, the magistrate or judge is not asked to consider "uncontrollable

impulse" as an excuse for such aberrations, the charge will be purged much more simply.

Although insanity is scarcely ever pleaded in them, sex offences, which are responsible for many committals to prison every year, are far more often due to some pathological cause than to innate viciousness. No amount of imprisonment does (or can do) these offenders any good. It does not reform them, and it does not deter them. Nor does it even protect society, since the offence is continually repeated by the same person.

IV

To discover the cure, it is necessary to discover the cause. Crime, so the psychologists tell us, is a mental symptom. Hence, it has a mental origin. On this account, and only as was to be expected, the psychoanalysts are now dealing with the problem of criminality. Since, however, they study human motives first, the application of their principles is rather to modify the popular conception of wrongdoing. The object of the psychoanalyst is, roughly, to investigate the different steps along which the criminal mind has developed and track down the resulting delinquency to its first source. At the same time, the method is not (except among fervid enthusiasts) a "cure-all"; and, until more is known of its workings, it may conceivably do harm by bringing into play a complex that had much better be inhibited than set free. Still, the psychiatrist is necessarily somebody beyond a criminologist. He has lifted the subject out of the realm of the general (where the criminologist alone was often satisfied to leave it) to the particular. The result is that the medical concept of the suitable treatment of crime is gradually replacing the legal one.

The doctors and the lawyers, however, have never been on the best of terms, and that the latter should

look upon the claims of psycho-analysis as something suspect is not altogether astonishing. Apart from other reasons, its adoption into the routine of a criminal trial would mean a fresh and upsetting concept. Further, there is a wall of prejudice to overcome, for the motivation of psycho-analysis still impresses the average mind (which has heard of the Freudian theories, and no others) as being something exclusively sexual in its workings. The fact that Adler and Jung and their colleagues regard the matter from a different standpoint counts for little. The prejudice remains.

The application of psycho-analysis to criminology is not yet a subject for the Bar examination. Perhaps some day it will be.

CHAPTER VII

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND "HABITUAL CRIMINALS"

I

Less than a hundred years ago (in May, 1833, to be exact) a boy of nine was convicted at the Old Bailey of "breaking and entering" a dwelling-house and stealing two pennyworth from a cupboard there. Mr. Justice Bosanquet passed sentence of death. He had no choice. It was the law.

The child criminal of to-day is the adult criminal of to-morrow. Hence, the importance of dealing in effective fashion with juvenile delinquency at the outset cannot be overestimated. "The only criminal who can be reformed," says Dr. Mercier, "is the young criminal." This is obvious, for he is then plastic and impressionable, instead of matured and hardened.

From a legal standpoint, the youthful offender is, according to his or her age, either a "child" or a "young person." A "child" is anybody under fourteen, and a "young person" is anybody between fourteen and sixteen. It is further ruled that a "child" cannot be committed to prison for any offence, but a "young person" can (and may). He is, however, not eligible for penal servitude. This, of course, is to the good, and a great advance upon the old idea. Still, it does not go far enough. At its best, a prison is an infected area, and therefore no place for a boy; and at its worst (as exemplified by penal servitude) it is a plague-pit.

An official effort to tackle the problem of juvenile offenders was made so long ago as the year 1838, when a special settlement was established for them at Park-

hurst. It was, however, really a prison, and no boy was received there until he had first qualified for a sentence of transportation.

Such a half-hearted attempt to check criminality at the outset roused the wrath of Charles Dickens, who stirred up public opinion and secured the passing of the Reformatory School Act of 1854. The original idea, however, that a taste of prison was a necessary preliminary to reformatory treatment lingered long in the official mind, and the two were inseparable until as late as the year 1899. It has not been entirely eradicated even yet.

For many years after the passing of the Reformatory School Act of 1854 a large-sized prison at Tothill Fields, Westminster (almost under the shadow of the Abbey) was maintained for juvenile delinquents convicted in London. It was an imposing fortress-like structure, with massive entrance gates weighing three tons, frowning walls, barred windows, and warders complete, just as at Millbank or Pentonville. The régime, too, was very similar, with oakum picking, crank-turning, and the treadmill as the approved method of weaning back to good conduct those who had wilfully elected to walk the broad path instead of the narrow one. Even boys of nine were set to unravel one pound of tarred rope a day.

"It was indeed a melancholy sight," says Henry Mayhew in his *Criminal Prisons of London*, "to look at that century and a half of mere children in their prison clothes. Some were so young that they seemed to need a nurse, rather than a gaoler, to watch over them. . . . We know of no sight in London so terribly pathetic—if not tragic—as this same oakum room at the boys' prison at Westminster. . . . True, the place is called a 'House of Correction'; but, rightly viewed, it is simply a criminal preparatory school, where students are qualified for matriculating at Millbank or Pentonville."

Boys were dubbed "criminals" and sent to prison very easily in the days of our grandfathers, and mischievous (but quite natural) pranks, such as knocking at doors and "obstructing," met with stern repression from the Middlesex magistrates, who filled the cells at Tothill Fields. They thought nothing of awarding a child of ten a month's hard labour for playing pitch-and-toss in the streets, breaking a window, or committing some act of petty pilfering. Apparently these Shallows considered that all small children had come into the world with an instinctive respect for the rights of property implanted in their bosoms. If not, they were of opinion that a course of oakum-picking and "skilly" would foster it.

In this respect things have changed a good deal, and very much for the better. Under an Act of 1921, young delinquents may now be committed to a reformatory school, or, if not yet fourteen years of age, to an industrial school. Such distinction, however, as there is between the two is nominal, and is fast disappearing. Release on licence can be earned for good conduct, but a term of supervision follows, and there is also power to revoke a licence thus granted.

II

The first real advance in combating juvenile crime was the passing of an Act of 1908 which prohibited the sending to prison of practically any "young person." So far as possible, all offenders between sixteen and twenty-one (the "dangerous age") convicted of serious delinquency are now committed to a Borstal institution for a term of not less than two or more than three years. During this period they are subjected to a special course of discipline and training; and, on discharge, they are taken in hand by a body known as the "Borstal Association," which busies itself with their subsequent welfare.

During the last few years Borstal treatment has also been made applicable to girls convicted of serious offences. It is carried out in what was once Aylesbury Female Convict Prison, and in an adjoining building that has served as a reformatory for women inebriates. The selection is not a very happy one, for there are grim associations of murderesses and drunkards about these quarters. Still, and with, perhaps, natural resiliency, the girls now occupying them rise superior to such surroundings, and only a very small proportion slip back into misconduct. But, unless grossly misdirected, it would be difficult for the Borstal system not to prove a success. It has the initial advantage that only selected cases are dealt with, that these are brought under its influence at an impressionable period, and that supervision is continued on release.

The setting up of children's courts has proved another step in the right direction. Until 1908, when this practice was first adopted, small boys and girls who had committed themselves would be haled off to the nearest police station, and there herded with "grown-ups." So far as possible, this evil is now avoided, and in the London districts such courts are held in a special room. They are presided over by a stipendiary, but a woman magistrate sits with him, and there is also a woman "probation officer." As a rule, too, the police who give evidence wear plain clothes. In provincial towns the arrangements are often less satisfactory, and in many of them small and terror-stricken children are still dealt with in ordinary police-courts. The curious public, however, are excluded. On the Continent, in France and Italy, where there are no separate children's courts, a similar result is secured by trying all such cases *in camera*.

In 1921 a Bill was introduced, having for its object the appointment of a probation officer to every court of summary jurisdiction in the kingdom. It was not, however, until 1925 that the Bill was passed. The

special business of the probation officer is to look after the young delinquent in his own home, and, by keeping a watchful eye on his physical and moral welfare, to give him at least a chance of winning back his self-respect and developing into a useful member of society.

"Probation" came to England from America. It took thirty years to cross the Atlantic, and was not adopted until the Prevention of Crime Act of 1908 had become law. Among the many good points about the system is that to be "put on probation" does not inevitably mean a conviction.

The misconduct of children is, like that of their elders (but not necessarily betters) often the natural outcome of quite human instincts. An early manifestation is playing truant from school. This, in itself, is, of course, not serious. It may, however, easily lead to something serious, for the young truant is apt to become the associate of older undesirables. Tempted by them, he gets into mischief, and, from mischief, into crime. What happens to him when he first comes into contact with the Law may make or mar his whole future. The responsibility is a terrific one. Yet it is too often discharged as if the Law's deliberate object were to encompass his ruin. Thus, there are magistrates of such curious mentality that they commit small boys to prison for pilfering apples off a barrow, for kicking a football in the streets, or for bathing in a canal without first covering their little bodies in the fashion approved by a policewoman with an ultra-developed modesty complex; and others who think that the birch-rod is the one and only cure for childish misconduct. Nor does it seem to have occurred to them that if neither a reformatory, nor an industrial school, nor a Borstal institution diverts a young backslider's steps from the wrong path, prison treatment is even less likely to have this effect. Yet in the year 1925 as many as 2,760 lads under twenty-one years of age were saddled with the stigma of "gaol-

bird" for trivial misdemeanours. Referring to this matter, the Home Secretary recently said: "One cannot help thinking that in some of these cases imprisonment could have been avoided if more use were made of the methods of probation and supervision."

Instead of "some of these cases," he might well have said "many of these cases."

The mentality of the boy (or, for that matter, of the girl) who "goes wrong" is often impaired. It is thus to the credit of the authorities concerned that trained psychologists have in a number of instances been appointed to examine such offenders and advise upon their ultimate disposal. The trouble, however, is that there are too many young delinquents and not enough officially recognised psychologists to deal with them. Further, it is not always grasped that all the examples of juvenile depravity do not necessarily come from the slums. Mayfair contributes its quota, just as does Whitechapel, but (since these can be better hushed up) one hears less of them.

III

Where the "habitual offender" is concerned, there is a separate problem. With such a man, crime, instead of being an occasional hobby, or the result of unemployment, is a full-time job. He has made a business of wrongdoing, and it colours his whole outlook. As the ordinary prison régime, with all its elaborate machinery, has had no good result, such social misfits are now subjected to "preventive detention." This lasts, at the discretion of the judge, for a period of not less than five or more than ten years, and follows upon a minimum term of three years' penal servitude. Nobody, however, can be officially labelled an "habitual offender" who has not had at least three convictions since the age of sixteen, and is proved to be living dishonestly. It is a hard fate. Still,

nothing else can be done with such people. They are human wrecks, recidivists by force of habit.

"Preventive detention" is carried out at Camp Hill, adjoining Parkhurst Convict Prison in the Isle of Wight. Although the establishment is, to all effects, a prison, with bolts and bars and cells and workshops, etc., and is staffed with governors and doctors and chaplains and warders, it is, nevertheless, conducted on lines very different from those obtaining in penal servitude. All subjected to the régime there live in "association," and, if industrious and well reported on, are eligible for various little privileges, such as permission to buy tobacco and newspapers and extra food out of their small earnings; and also, when the day's work is finished, to play chess, draughts, and dominoes, etc.

The Camp Hill men (or "P.D.'s," as they are known) are, on reception, allotted to "stages," in each of which the degree of rigour varies. Those of the inmates who have reached the highest one (which seldom happens until they have completed two years) live in "parole cabins," consisting of a bedroom, furnished with a gas-ring, and scullery attached. Such men also have garden allotments, the produce of which is purchased from them for prison consumption. The governing idea of this last "stage" is to fit a man to return to liberty by showing him that he can be trusted to work and conduct himself properly without ceaseless and humiliating supervision. There have been failures, naturally, but there have also been outstanding successes.

"Preventive detention," as carried out at Camp Hill, is the nearest approach to an "indeterminate sentence" recognised by the English law. A suggestion that it should also be made applicable in selected cases without a preliminary period of penal servitude has often been advanced. On the last attempt to secure this it met with strong opposition from Lord

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Gladstone, the then Home Secretary. His argument, on the face of it sound enough, was that the “habitual” would thereby be treated with greater leniency than the first offender.

Borstal for the recruit; Camp Hill for the veteran. Some halfway house appears to be badly wanted. It ought not to be beyond the ability of Whitehall to discover one.

CHAPTER VIII

MACHINERY OF JUSTICE

I

MEN are still living who, as children, have seen the pillory in active use, for it was not abolished until Queen Victoria had been twelve months on the throne. A Bill to this effect had passed the Commons twenty years earlier, but Ellenborough and his fellow-obscurantists, true to type, had checked its progress through the Upper House. The pillory had existed in England since 1260, and they looked upon it as a bulwark of the Constitution. Hanging in chains went first. There was also a dreadful custom of "gibbetting." In such instances, the corpse would be tarred or smeared with pitch, to prevent too rapid a decomposition, and then left exposed from the gallows-beam for a month or more, as a warning to evil-doers. The last time that recourse was had to this practice was at Leicester in 1832, when a sanctimonious scoundrel named Cook, who served Dickens as a model for his Uriah Heep, was the protagonist.

The assumption by the State of the sole right of punishment was the first real step in penological evolution. The original idea behind this was to balance the weight of wrong that had been suffered by the weight of a judicially inflicted penalty. The idea, however, of thereby deterring and reforming came into the scheme much later.

It must not be forgotten, when considering the fierceness of some of the old-time judges, that brutal laws make brutal administrators. Hence, there is something to be said even for those Sadistic monsters, Chief Justice Scroggs and Judge Jeffreys. After all, their conduct on the Bench was strictly in accordance

with tradition; and they were not responsible that the tradition of the period was rough and brutal.

The Tolstoi creed that all punishment is morally wrong might, of course, be applicable to Utopia, but it is not applicable anywhere else. This is because, with the world constituted as it is, and not as we should like it to be, it is axiomatic that some form of punishment is necessary. But it must be the right form, and invested only in the hands of those who can be trusted not to abuse it.

Punishment for wrong-doing began in the Garden of Eden. Nobody can say with certitude where it will end. What, however, can be said is that, with the passage of years, the gulf between elementary humanity and penology has become less wide. The late King Edward, when opening the new Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey in 1907, referred to this matter:

"The barbarous penal code, which was deemed necessary a hundred years ago, has gradually been replaced in the progress towards a higher civilisation by laws breathing a more humane spirit and aiming at a nobler purpose."

But the gulf took a long time to bridge. Thus, until the year 1837, a prisoner charged with felony could not employ counsel to speak for him; it was not until 1898 that an accused person was permitted to give evidence on his own behalf; and, until Lord Brougham's Act of 1851, the defendant in a civil case was under a similar disability. Before this, there was an idea that such testimony would necessarily be unreliable, as coming from an interested party, just as if all evidence did not emanate from such a source. There was for long a period, too, when a wife was not a competent witness. This ruling led, as may be imagined, to some curious developments. For example, a man once established an alibi by getting his mistress to prove that he had been in her company when he

was alleged to have committed an offence elsewhere. His wife, however, would have been barred from doing so. Similarly, a murderer has been convicted on the deposition of his mistress, whereas he could not have been convicted had he been her husband.

II

In his *The Criminal and the Community*, Dr. Devon, a very experienced prison medical officer, observes:

"Whatever laws we make, there may always be law-breakers. A man may become possessed by jealousy or wrath and injure his neighbour, or from envy or greed may rob him, but he can only acquire the habit of doing so with our permission. If he is checked at the beginning, and placed under control, he will not acquire that habit. . . . There is only one principle in penology that is worth any consideration; it is to find out why a man does wrong, and make it not worth his while."

By the way, where this matter of making wrongdoing "not worth while" is concerned, a proposal has been seriously put forward by an Italian criminologist that, in addition to any other penalty imposed, a convicted person should be required to "apologise in the Press." This whimsical idea would, perhaps, appeal to newspaper owners and advertisement agents anxious to secure a fresh field of revenue, but to nobody else. It is not within the bounds of practical penology. Another odd suggestion coming from a similar source is that, since law-breakers differ from one another, just as do law-keepers (and, for that matter, law-givers), classification should be extended to such a degree as to establish different prisons for different criminals. This would mean (if it means anything) one prison for burglars and another for bigamists; and others, again, for card-sharpers, em-

bezzlers, etc. Such a scheme falls within the purview of the crank. Apart, too, from other objections, prison staffs would have to be doubled and trebled.

The classification of prisoners, according to the offences of which they are convicted, is nothing new. It has been tried repeatedly, and has repeatedly broken down. But, considering the inherent difficulties, nothing else could well be expected. To begin with, offenders have a disconcerting habit of having fresh charges brought against them every time they appear in the dock. It is not a case of once a burglar, always a burglar. Thus, after a long course of cracking cribs, Bill Sikes will crack a skull, and a pickpocket will perhaps try his hand at shop-lifting or some other, to him, novel form of villainy. "They are always changing places," says an experienced governor, "those in for felony at one Sessions being in for larceny or assault at the next."

Fifty years ago an elaborate report on the subject was drawn up by the Commissioners. The conclusion at which they arrived was distinctly adverse:

"Grades in moral guilt are not the immediate subject of human observation, nor, if discovered, are they capable of being so nicely discriminated as to enable us to assign to each individual criminal his precise place in the comparative scale of vice, whilst, if they could be accurately perceived by us, it would appear that no two individuals were contaminated in exactly the same degree. Moreover, even if these difficulties could be surmounted, and a class formed of criminals who had advanced to just the same point, not only of offence, but of moral depravity, still their association in prison would be sure to produce a farther progress in both."

III

Looking at the matter as a whole, it may fairly be said that in England the existing machinery for estab-

lishing the guilt or innocence of an accused person is thoroughly effective. The result is, there are very few authenticated miscarriages of justice. Where, however, the machinery is not so effective is in its treatment of the individual against whom a verdict has been delivered. There is still too much attempting to "make the punishment fit the crime," when it is, of course, far more important that the punishment should fit the criminal. No real effort, however, is made to secure this. The Law standardises human beings, just as it standardises human turpitude. Education, upbringing, habits, surroundings, etc., are all put on one common denominator. Such a course is neither humane nor scientific, nor even commonly intelligent.

Crime is a disease; and, like other diseases, requires, as shown by its nature and symptoms, a particular remedy for each manifestation that develops. Yet this is just what it does not get, for, once in prison, all offenders—be they absconding solicitors, fraudulent company-promoters, sexual perverts, cat-burglars, or pickpockets—are subjected to precisely the same treatment. Under the circumstances, it is not astonishing that the cures should be few. What, however, is astonishing is that there should be any.

This whole question of imprisonment is very difficult. Even the experts contradict themselves. Thus, Enrico Ferri, in Italy, who has devoted immense labour to a practical, as well as to a theoretical, study of the subject, roundly declares that "long sentences are productive of no good"; and Sir William Joynson-Hicks, in England, gives it as his considered opinion that "short sentences are useless." It would, therefore, appear on the face of it that all imprisonment is futile. Bill Sikes and his cronies would probably agree. The general adoption of any such view, however, would lead to very serious results. At the same time, it is obvious that the longer a man is kept in prison

and shut off from his fellows, the less fit is he to earn his living when released, and thus avoid relapsing into crime. Further, the fact that he has undergone a term of durance is seldom regarded by possible employers as a recommendation to their good offices. Prejudice, perhaps. Still, it exists. What, however, is worse is the attitude of the trades-unions which peremptorily forbid an employer exercising any generous instincts and giving an ex-prisoner a second chance.

In 1925 (the last year for which figures are available) the number of convictions for serious offences in England was 6,639. It is true that the number of committals to prison was much more (reaching an approximate total of 60,000), but the vast majority were for offences that were anything but "serious," and varied from simple theft and assault to the non-payment of fines and taxes. As to this latter, theoretically there is now no such thing as imprisonment for debt. In practice, however (and under the euphemism, "Contempt of Court"), it still exists; and in 1927 nearly 11,000 people were committed to prison on account of unpaid rates and taxes, maintenance orders, tradesmen's bills, etc.

The naïve idea that force is a good remedy against force has long been exploded. The atrocious punitive methods of the early law-givers never checked the atrocious actions of the criminals who incurred them. Their result, indeed, was precisely the opposite. It is, however, more than questionable if nowadays we are not rather going to the other extreme in respect of the ameliorative conditions employed. Thus, the crank and the treadmill have long ceased to revolve, and oakum-picking is reduced to a minimum; diet has been improved; solitary confinement shortened; and the "silence rule" abrogated. Changes for the better, too, in the matter of dress; and even the time-(dis)-honoured broad arrows are on their last legs. Further, various small privileges can now be earned; and well-

conducted prisoners are eligible for a not illiberal allowance of letters and visits. But the most valued concession of all is the possibility of securing a substantial remission of sentence, amounting to as much as one-fourth.

Still, all said and done, prison is prison.

The volume of work performed by the Court of Criminal Appeal, which has now been in operation since 1907, is eloquent of the care that is taken to avoid any possible miscarriage of justice. An accused person who has been convicted on indictment can go to this Court on (1) a question of law alone (provided it be not held "frivolous"); (2) on a question of fact and law together; or (3) on a question of his sentence. In these two latter cases, however, he must first get permission. Appeals are heard by three judges, and the decision is by the majority. While sentences may be increased, they are so much more often reduced, or even quashed altogether, that the average appellant decides that he has little to lose and much to gain. In a murder case, at any rate, he cannot be worse off, since the most that can happen is that the appeal shall be dismissed. The result is that practically every capital conviction is submitted to this Court.

In a murder case there is yet another appeal possible. In theory this is made to the Crown. In practice, however, it is left to the Home Secretary, who is responsible for the exercise of the "prerogative of mercy." An insane person, capitally convicted, is always reprieved, whether the insanity manifested itself before the trial or after it. Such a case occurred in 1928, when a man who had been sentenced to death for murder was found to be mad while awaiting execution.

IV

Without being unchivalrous, it may be remarked that, from the very earliest era of which we have any

record, the opposite sex has not possessed an entirely clean sheet in the matter of conduct. Eve was a receiver of stolen goods; and her sisters have trodden the broad path in numerous other ways.

According to the statistics on the subject, women as a class are much less criminally inclined than men. But there is a reason for this comparative result. It is that they are shown much greater leniency. Judges and juries are reluctant to send women to prison, if it can be avoided; and the presumption that they are always acting under adverse masculine influence is often strained to a ridiculous point. Yet, for a man to plead (as he frequently could with absolute truth) that he has been instigated by a woman to the commission of a particular crime would bring him scant sympathy, although his feminine accomplice, hovering discreetly in the background, would have shared in the result of it had it been successful.

Although a number of them have got into serious trouble through attaching wrong signatures (their own, for preference) to cheques and wills, women criminals, generally speaking (and with the notable exception of Madame Humbert in Paris) have drawn the line at forgery or embezzlement on a large scale. Instead, murder, theft, swindling, and bigamy have been, and are, more often the subject of their nefarious activities. As a rule, too, (and except where murder is concerned), their slips are limited to the lower branches, for disabilities of sex interfere with them securing distinction in the higher flights. Thus, while there are many feminine shoplifters, there are few (if any) feminine burglars and safe-breakers.

From the long distant days of Locusta, Hecate, and Circe, of the Borgias and de Brinvilliers, down to the present, woman, when resolved upon committing murder, has generally had recourse to poison. The drug, rather than the dagger or the pistol, is, it would appear, the medium to which feminine flagitiousness

at its highest turns instinctively. Psychologists, who are prepared to account for anything and everything, affect to see in this a natural disinclination on the part of erring woman to shed blood. Possibly, this is the reason why arsenic or some other subtle poison has so often been the method by which the murderess has accomplished her fell purpose and removed an unwanted husband or child. The green thread of bane, administered by feminine hands, runs in sinuous fashion through the criminal records of all ages and all countries.

Still, the poison phial has not always been the lethal weapon adopted, for, when really criminally intentioned, woman stops at nothing. The most revolting homicide ever planned was probably that which, with the help of her various paramours, was perpetrated by Catherine Hayes, round whose shuddering career Thackeray once wrote a dull novel. The victim of Catherine Hayes was her husband, whose battered corpse she calmly proposed to boil, having first dismembered it. Beside this specimen of evil womanhood, Mother Brownrigg, who had a habit of stripping her girl apprentices stark naked and then beating them to death, was a paragon of humanity.

While it would be idle to pretend that feminine frailty does not still exist, the volume is steadily decreasing. Thus, fifty years ago there were eight prisons in London alone for women criminals. Most of them were always full. Now there is only one (at Holloway), and it is generally half empty. One prison, too (at Liverpool), is found big enough for all the women sentenced to penal servitude in any part of England. Its daily average of occupants is well under a hundred.

CHAPTER IX

REMEDIAL PROGRESS AND CONCLUSIONS

I

THE English prison system of to-day really began in 1846, and was the logical outcome of the flat refusal of the Colonies to have further drafts of convicts thrust upon them. When transportation was thus necessarily dropped, Dartmoor, Chatham, Parkhurst, and Portland functioned as the appointed receptacles of all offenders sentenced to penal servitude, while short terms (that is, anything up to two years, with or without hard labour) were undergone in "local" prisons.

Technically, a local prison is any gaol where penal servitude is not carried out. For years on end one such building was a conspicuous feature of the architecture of almost every big town in the kingdom; and London had upwards of a dozen, besides historic Newgate. Millbank, a pet scheme of Jeremy Bentham, was erected in 1813, with the Speaker of the House of Commons as the first chairman of the governing committee, and an ambitious programme of "seclusion, employment, and religious instruction" for those incarcerated there. A costly and comic failure, it has long been swept away; and on the site where generations of malefactors once picked oakum, and set the treadmill revolving and the crank turning, has now arisen the Tate Gallery.

In 1840 Sir Joshua Jebb designed the "Model Prison" of Pentonville, from which, since it represented an expenditure of £85,000, great things were hoped. Unfortunately, there was no machinery for securing that its occupants should also be "model"

criminals. One of the first of them, as it happened, was a dishonest baronet, a relative of the distinguished penologist who had introduced the system of "separate confinement" that was practised there.

This system of keeping every prisoner locked up in his cell all day and all night (except for one hour's exercise), and making him do his work there, was strongly advocated by the authorities concerned. This perhaps was only natural, since it gave the governors and warders the minimum of trouble. The claims on its behalf, however, put forward by the chaplain of Pentonville in a letter to the Commissioners of 1842 seem a little extravagant. Thus, he declares unctuously: "Separation at once renders corrupt intercourse impracticable, and furnishes the prisoner with direct facilities for reflection and self-improvement. Under this discipline the propagation of crime is impossible, the continuity of vicious habits is broken off, the mind is driven to serious reflection, and slumbering conscience resumes her sway."

But, under the old régime, the prison chaplains as a class were not always selected for their high level of intelligence; and, if the flocks to which they ministered were composed of black sheep, some of the shepherds were sadly wanting in perspicacity. Thus, when in 1824, a couple of ploughboys were condemned to death at Ipswich for stealing a pig, the clergyman under whose spiritual care they were discharged his responsibility in this fashion: "On the Sunday morning immediately preceding their execution, the convicts attended Divine service, when the Rev. Mr. Orridge, with admirable Christian interest, had the thoughts of these criminal men very happily fixed on the certainty of a hereafter by having a coffin placed in front of them."

The Rev. Mr. Orridge, of Ipswich, however, was a long way behind the Rev. Mr. Carver, of Newgate, in his efforts to improve the occasion. Thus, in a

"funeral sermon," which he preached in 1840 to a youth who was to be "turned off" the next morning for a specially revolting murder, he made the following definite pronouncement:

"To you, my dear young friend and fellow-sinner, it has now happened that for the last time you are here treading the courts of God's house of prayer. Before to-morrow's sun shall have set, your eyes will have closed on this world. But pray remember, my dear young friend, that, should you leave it penitent (as I hope and believe you will) a choir of 10,000 angels will welcome you to the heavenly abode, where you will then become a trophy of sovereign grace, and add yet another jewel to the diadem of mercy!"

II

For some reason that does not seem very clear or to have served any good purpose, different names were adopted for precisely the same sort of institution. Thus, Millbank was a Penitentiary, Coldbath Fields was a House of Correction, Clerkenwell was a House of Detention, Newgate was a Gaol, and Pentonville was a Prison. Except that actual sentences were not served in Newgate, these places were all much alike. Still, theoretically, a sentence of less than two years would be undergone in what was humorously called a House of Correction. There is no record, however, of anybody ever having been "corrected" by committal to one of them.

Prior to the year 1877, when all the different prisons in England were brought under one administrative control (forty years after Joseph Hume, M.P., had first made the suggestion) the régime observed in each varied considerably. In some it was supinely lax; in others it was scandalously severe. Charles Reade, in his *It's Never too Late to Mend*, has left on record an unforgettable picture of the manifold abuses that char-

acterised the disciplinary methods at Birmingham Prison, and was instrumental in securing that the governor of that establishment (a typical martinet from the Royal Navy) should be given a dose of his own medicine. But other governors and staffs were not much better. Absolutely autocratic within their own walls, they did very much as they pleased; and those of them who were corrupt as well as cruel feathered their nests handsomely in the process.

With reference to this matter of corruption, Captain Chesterton, on being appointed to take charge of Coldbath Fields, one of the biggest prisons in London, reported that he found "the procurement of dishonest gains, from the late governor downwards, the only rule. . . . It is impossible for the mind to conceive a spectacle more gross and revolting than the internal economy of this polluted spot. The great majority of the officers were a cunning and extortionate crew, practising every species of cunning and chicanery." Nor was another authority, Hepworth Dixon, any better impressed. Thus, in his *London Prisons*, published in 1850, he observes: "The mind must be lost to all sense of shame which can witness the abominations of Horsemonger Lane Gaol without feelings of scorn and indignation."

The Augean stable was gradually cleansed; and all such malpractices as once existed have long since ceased. Now, instead of doing as seems good to themselves, governors and staffs have to do as seems good to the Commissioners at the Home Office. The result is (except where convict establishments are concerned) that there is no difference between one prison and another in respect of routine, diet, or labour.

III

Although Lord Brougham pinned his faith to them to a touching degree, criminal statistics, as such, are

of little use unless their true bearing is applied. Thus, if, for example, there happen to be two red-headed office-boys in a firm, and one of them is caught helping himself to the petty cash, the statistics would show that 50 per cent. of the red-headed office-boys in that particular firm were dishonest. The statistics would be correct, but the inference would be ridiculous. Still, there is always a cheerful optimism about the compiler of criminal statistics. He fastens avidly upon a diminution, and blandly ignores an increase, or ascribes it to any cause but the correct one.

There are a vast number of factors other than the spread of good conduct that reduce the prison population. Among such are the alternative imposition of fines, the extension of probation, the greater leniency of judges and juries, and, above all, the workings of the "First Offenders Act." This last (which dates from 1887) has in itself done more than anything else to keep people out of prison, since, subject to good conduct, it postpones a sentence that would otherwise be inflicted. The system has long been followed in France and Belgium, and also in America.

During the late war a somewhat similar practice was adopted in the British Army at the front. The military authorities are not, as a rule, strikingly receptive of fresh ideas. Still, it did eventually occur to them that, when man-power was badly wanted, soldiers on active service could be put to better use than clapping them into prison for breaches of discipline, and thus doubling the work and risk of their well-conducted comrades. The result was that numbers of sentences passed by courts-martial were "suspended," and those who received them were kept at their normal duty, instead of (as would have happened under a less intelligent system) being shot or consigned to penal servitude. A very large proportion of these men subsequently made good, and distinguished themselves by their bravery in the field.

The English practice of "binding over" and ordering an accused person to "come up for judgment if called upon" is elsewhere known as a "conditional sentence." It has been fiercely denounced by a number of foreign criminologists. Garofalo, for example, has actually suggested that such procedure should be subject to the consent of the "injured party," and Ferri's view is that the latter should first be "compensated." According to him, too, if the defendant is not in a financial position to render this possible, the taxpayer is to be mulcted in the amount fixed by the judge.

IV

A hopeful sign of the times is that it has been found possible to close thirty prisons in England during the last eight years, and that the average annual number of commitments during this period has dropped from about 200,000 to about 50,000. By being more generous in the matter of putting minor delinquents on probation, the figures could be reduced considerably. There are, however, still magistrates, who do not appear to have heard of the system. Under its provisions, a first offender may, if not convicted of something really serious, be handed over to the care of a probation officer, instead of to that of a prison governor. The scheme has its disappointments. Still, it also has its triumphs, and these are in the majority. The system, too, is economical, for it costs the country £65 a year to keep a man in prison, and, humanly speaking, nothing to keep him out of it.

Various societies exist in England for the reform of penology. The most important among them is the Howard League, which, on amalgamating in 1921 with the older established Howard Association and the Penal Reform League, was naturally called after the distinguished humanitarian, John Howard. Its guiding principle is that the suppression of crime is

indissolubly linked with the correct policy to be observed towards the offender. Thus, it devotes itself to getting down to first causes, rather than to prescribing for after symptoms. During its career the League has done much to secure a sane and efficient method of dealing with the problem of the criminal, a problem which it fully recognises can never be solved by theoretical abstractions. Among its successful activities are the founding of reformatories for adults, the setting up of children's courts, the extension of probation, and the abolition of various futile and degrading "disciplinary methods" in prison régime. The League's further programme is concerned with a still wider extension of the probation system; the provision of free legal assistance in police courts for those who require it; the examination by experts of all accused persons whose conduct suggests abnormality; and, finally, the abolition of capital punishment in any and every case.

Although we have advanced considerably in the detection of crime since the days of the red-waistcoated Bow Street Runners, the number of offences for which nobody is brought to book is still large enough to be disturbing. It would seem to suggest, either that their perpetrators are very clever, or else that the police are very stupid. The real explanation, however, is more likely to be found in the fact that the British method of conducting a criminal investigation is the reverse of the Continental one, which is to arrest first and inquire afterwards. Nor is there in England any system of employing an *agent-provocateur* to build up a "case" against a suspect. In fact, it may fairly be said that when the police do catch a wrongdoer (other than red-handed) it is because next to no precautions have been adopted by the latter. The average criminal is abnormally careless. He seldom covers up his tracks, or furnishes himself with a "get-away." Indeed, for all the care they take to avoid subsequent

capture, five burglars out of six might just as well leave their names and addresses behind them.

V

The Law is the strong shield and buckler that protects society from the host of parasites that would devour it. Yet it is open to question if the range and nature of the criminal's activities have not been extended, and crime itself encouraged rather than checked, by some of the modern inventions and amenities that make for luxury and even ordinary comfort. Thus, until bank-notes were issued, there was little forgery. Now there is a great deal of it. The telegraph, the telephone, wireless, the motor car (and now the aeroplane) have also been pressed into disservice. Similarly with the resources of science; and the test tubes and reagents of the analytical chemist and the camera of the photographer are to be found in the equipment of the hunted, just as in that of the hunter.

All said and done, the criminal is a social liability. He is on the wrong side of the ledger. The business of the criminologist is to convert him from a debit to a credit. This, however, is a new orientation; and one that may not meet with the wholehearted approval of a Liturgy which still offers up prayers for "the punishment of wickedness."

As medicine and science advance, fresh springs of human conduct (also of misconduct) are revealed, and fresh methods of treatment suggested. Where, however, modern psychiatry is concerned, much of it is still so inchoate and empiric that dogmatic generalisations are worse than useless. Anybody who attempts them cannot but flounder badly.

It is perhaps more or less inevitable that, side by side with serious students, pronounced cranks should also have invaded the field of criminology. The oddest

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of "cures" and "treatments" have been (and are) clamouring for recognition. It is true that there are (as yet) no correspondence-courses on the subject, but there is always a possibility that they will appear. Nothing is too far-fetched where this matter is concerned. Even the principles of "Coué-ism" have been pressed into the service of the amateur criminologist; and embryo pickpockets and full-fledged burglars are blandly invited by well-meaning enthusiasts to declare that they are getting more and more honest every day.

Before we are much older, a theory will also doubtless be propounded that there is a microbe of crime.

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