

EAST INDIA (ARMY MEMORANDUM),

GIPE-PUNE-064175

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,  
dated 3 June 1904 ;—for,

“Return of the Memorandum recently issued by General Lord Kitchener  
of Khartoum and the Local Commander-in-Chief in India upon  
the Organisation and Training of the Army in India.”

India Office, }  
7 June 1904. }

ARTHUR GODLEY,  
Under Secretary of State for India.

(*Sir Howard Vincent.*)



*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
8 June 1904.

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## INDIA ARMY ORDER No. 246.

Adjutant-General's Office,  
Simla, 11th April 1904.

The following Memorandum of instructions by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the higher training and military education of officers, the distribution of staff duties, the responsibility of General and Staff Officers, and the training of troops for war, is published for information and guidance :—

### **The higher Training and Military Education of Officers, the Distribution of Staff Duties, and the Responsibility of General and Staff Officers.**

For some time past I have had under my consideration the general question of the preparedness of the army in India for war. I have now arrived at certain conclusions which are detailed in the following paragraphs.

Our army is admittedly a small one for the purposes for which it is maintained. There is, consequently, all the more need for a higher standard of excellence with us than obtains elsewhere. It must be the constant endeavour of everyone in the army in India to so train themselves and those under them in time of peace that, when the strain of war comes, all ranks may know what to do and how to do it.

Notwithstanding the many instructions regarding the military training of troops which have from time to time been issued, the results hitherto attained in India in regard to this most important subject have been somewhat disappointing. I recognise that since the South African War there has been some improvement in the military training both of troops and staff officers, but the progress is slow and is apparently hampered by certain difficulties and defects which I shall endeavour to indicate, and which it is my object to remove. I trust that in so doing I may be able to stimulate the professional zeal of all officers from Generals downwards, and to give a fresh impetus to the battle training of the army and to the improvement of its efficiency as a fighting machine.

Our military history supplies instances of how, in the past, we have courted failure and even invited defeat by an overweening confidence in the capabilities of our troops. We have thus lost sight of the necessity for taking every precaution against possible failure by careful previous study of the military problems which confront us, and by the proper training of our troops for war. In South Africa there were several instances of how such complacent beliefs and the consequent neglect of ordinary precautions led commanders to disaster. Against such erroneous ideas we should all most carefully guard ourselves, arising, as they do, from a false estimate of our preparedness for war, or from the feeling that, if we are not really a perfectly trained army, we are at least good enough to cope with any enemy we are likely to encounter. There are many cases to show that from such soothing beliefs there may be a rude awakening. In the day of battle a commander may find that his troops are not so well trained as he had fondly imagined, that his staff itself leaves something to be desired, that the whole military machine, in fact, is inefficient and is not working smoothly. But it is too late then to remedy such shortcomings. It is during peace that we must prepare for war by making every component part of the machine, however apparently small and insignificant, thoroughly sound and serviceable.

Whatever the advantages of having a voluntary force may be, the very constitution and organisation of our army prevents, to a large extent, our

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Our military history supplies instances of how, in the past, we have courted failure and even invited defeat by an overweening confidence in the capabilities of our troops. We have thus lost sight of the necessity for taking every precaution against possible failure by careful previous study of the military problems which confront us, and by the proper training of our troops for war. In South Africa there were several instances of how such complacent beliefs and the consequent neglect of ordinary precautions led commanders to disaster. Against such erroneous ideas we should all most carefully guard ourselves, arising, as they do, from a false estimate of our preparedness for war, or from the feeling that, if we are not really a perfectly trained army, we are at least good enough to cope with any enemy we are likely to encounter. There are many cases to show that from such soothing beliefs there may be a rude awakening. In the day of battle a commander may find that his troops are not so well trained as he had fondly imagined, that his staff itself leaves something to be desired, that the whole military machine, in fact, is inefficient and is not working smoothly. But it is too late then to remedy such shortcomings. It is during peace that we must prepare for war by making every component part of the machine, however apparently small and insignificant, thoroughly sound and serviceable.

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obtaining in the ranks that general high level of intelligence and capacity for learning, which is undoubtedly to be found amidst the general population of the British Isles, while in India our troops are recruited very largely from the uneducated classes.

To remedy these deficiencies in our recruits, and to perfect their physical qualities, we must first inaugurate an improved system of training in the army, and to do this it is necessary that we should have highly trained officers capable not only of becoming trusted and skilful leaders in time of war, but of proving themselves reliable instructors in time of peace.

We must follow a system of training for war suited to the vastly changed conditions of the present day, and steadfastly eliminate all obsolete traditions. In all ranks, from the private soldier to the General Officer, each step up the ladder requires a corresponding increase in knowledge, in self-reliance, in the power of initiative, in the habit of readily accepting responsibility, and in the faculty of command, qualities which can be attained only by unremitting study combined with constant practice.

It is recognised that it is the duty of a commanding officer to educate and train his men in all branches of soldiering, but hitherto it has not been so generally understood that this holds equally true as regards the education and training of the officers serving under him. The plea that teaching is a difficult art which it is given to few to acquire is one which cannot be accepted. The whole secret of preparing for war is a matter of training and instruction, and commanding or other officers who profess or show their incapacity as instructors, and their inability to train and educate those under them for all the situations of modern war, must be deemed unfit for the positions they hold.

The system at present in force in India, whereby officers are sent to garrison classes to prepare for their promotion examinations, is particularly faulty. Knowledge thus crammed up in the course of a few weeks, only to be forgotten as soon as the examination is passed, is in no sense education. (In future the military education of officers must be imparted within their regiments; it must commence from the day they join and continue until they leave the service.) This will never be the case so long as garrison classes exist, and I therefore propose to abolish them and to insist on all officers going up for their examinations direct from their regiments. I recognise, however, that at first, at all events, there may be commanding officers who, through ignorance, indolence, or incapacity, may fail to properly instruct those under them, and that it would be unfair to allow the prospects of young officers to suffer on this account. I therefore propose to retain one garrison class which will be attended only by officers who have failed to pass direct from their regiments. Should such officers subsequently be successful, after attending the class in question, it will be a reasonable inference that the system of education in their regiments is defective, and for this commanding officers must be held responsible. If, however, they should again fail, it will be equally fair to attribute the double failure to their own indolence or incapacity, and their further retention in the service will then become an impossibility.

But, great as is the responsibility of commanding officers for the education and training for war of those under their command, that of the General Officer Commanding is still greater. Many generals appear to imagine that they have fulfilled all their duty when they have reported badly on a unit, and have officially recorded a long list of its shortcomings. This is a view from which I most emphatically dissent. A General must indeed be able to detect and point out faults, but such criticism is useless unless he himself is able and ready to apply the remedy that is needed. Troops must be accustomed to regard their Generals not as necessarily hostile critics always on the look-out for something to find fault with, but as their trusted leaders in war, their instructors in peace, and at all times their ready helpers, able and willing to promote their welfare, and to spare no effort to increase their preparedness for the stress of active service.

General Officers cannot attain this position with reference to their troops by virtue merely of their rank. Before they can expect troops to regard them in this light they must first make themselves thoroughly fit for the positions they occupy. To be regarded as leaders they must be competent to lead; to be accepted as instructors their professional knowledge must be undoubted, and this entails on them the obligation of unceasing study and of constant practical application. In this way alone can they properly prepare their troops for war, and at the same time so train themselves as to be able adequately to discharge the great responsibilities which will devolve on them when called upon to command in the field.

The task which thus falls to the lot of a General Officer, whether in peace or war, is one which he cannot perform adequately without assistance, and for this assistance he is dependent on his staff. Nothing is more essential for complete preparation in peace and for successful operation in war than that an army should have a thoroughly trained and highly educated general staff. If such a staff is provided, and Generals know how to use their staffs, and how to employ and practice them in peace time so as to prepare them for all the changing phases and emergencies of war, we shall have gone a long way towards attaining true efficiency. But this has never yet been fully realised in India, where no special staff training has up to the present been provided, and where, in fact, no facilities whatever exist for any higher military education than that necessary for promotion to the rank of major.

I recognise, too, that another very serious impediment to a sound and practical system of army training in India lies in the present distribution of troops and commands. These have grown up without plan or method, and are largely the legacies of a condition of affairs which has long ceased to exist. They will undoubtedly require re-arrangement, but this is a subject which is being separately dealt with.

In order to meet existing difficulties as regards adequate staff training in India, two things are necessary—

- (1) The means of higher education for the staff officers of the army.
- (2) The practical training for war of the general staff thus formed by the recognition of a proper and logical allotment of their duties during peace.

I am in hopes that sanction may shortly be given for the establishment of a Staff College for India. In order to ensure the selection of none but the best and most promising young officers, only those who are nominated as specially suitable by General Officers Commanding districts will be allowed to compete. Generals will be held to be strictly responsible for the manner in which they perform this important duty, and must therefore take the greatest pains to make themselves personally acquainted with the mental, moral, and social qualifications of all those serving under their command. Should the College be established, officers thus nominated will be subjected to a qualifying examination, both written and practical, the results of which will be forwarded to Army Head-Quarters. The Commander-in-Chief will then select those of them who shall be permitted to appear at the competitive examination by which admission to the College will be decided.

The course of training will result, I hope, in providing the army with a fully instructed and thoroughly practical general staff, competent to afford the maximum of assistance both in peace and war, not only to the Generals whom it serves, but also to the troops for whose benefit it exists.

Having arranged for the preliminary training of the staff it is further necessary to provide for such an allotment of the duties pertaining to staff officers as will enable them to fulfil their main function of assisting their General in training and preparing his troops for war. Such an allotment does not at present exist. Staff duties are now divided into two branches known as A and B respectively. Each of these branches deals with a number of weighty subjects, but the more important work of each is hindered and retarded by the requirements of routine. It is undoubtedly

necessary that this routine work should be adequately performed in order to ensure the comfort and well-being of the troops, but unfortunately it has in times of peace frequently assumed a wholly fictitious importance, with the result that the more essential matter of the training and preparation of the troops for war has been largely lost sight of, and staff officers have as a rule been content to devote themselves to duties of a merely clerical character.

In almost all military countries where war problems have been deeply studied, and where national military requirements have been fully appreciated and worked out, the supreme importance of a logical and efficient organisation of the staff has been recognised, and its functions have thus naturally fallen into two great divisions:—

I. The Art of War.

II. Routine business in peace and war.

The first division is concerned mainly with all the higher problems of war both as regards ourselves and the armies and countries of all possible enemies, and in the practical application of the conclusions thus arrived at to the battle training of the personnel and to the preparation and development of our material resources.

The second division absorbs both in peace and war all that military business which is claimed by the dictates of regulation, and by the requirements of routine, but which is none the less important in its bearings on the efficiency and welfare of the troops in barracks and in the field.

In order to cope with the requirements of the first division of staff duties, and to provide for their proper performance in districts, a further allotment into subdivisions of—

(1) Training and preparation of war,  
and

(2) Maintenance and movement,

is necessary. The staff officer in charge of each of these subdivisions will be directly responsible for all the duties it involves; he will work out all details, and formulate and execute all schemes of his subdivision, under the orders of his General, but he will in no way be relieved from the necessity of possessing an intimate knowledge of all that is dealt with in the other subdivision. The two branches of this great division must in fact work with that combination of purpose and perfect smoothness of execution which is possessed by the twin screws of a ship; though the channels in which they work are divided by the keel-line between them, they will be always in reality working in perfect harmony and on parallel lines under the direction of the General—as their engine—to drive the vessel of the army towards perfect efficiency.

I would further emphasise the absolute necessity for the officers employed in *both* divisions of the staff being at all times and in all their work completely in touch with the feelings and circumstances of the personnel of the army, for it has always been a danger in the past, and one which we must carefully guard against in the future, that officers employed on the staff should drift out of touch with the troops for whose benefit and improvement their labours are incurred.

Armies, whose staff duties are thus organised on logical lines of demarcation, will be prepared to take the field with the smallest possible disturbance of their organisation, and will possess the best chances of success in carrying through their campaign without friction, uncertainty or delay.

Having thus considered the general principles which govern the duties of the staff, it remains only to apply them to the necessities of India. In the majority of existing second class districts the duties marked (1) and (2) in the above subdivision can be dealt with by one staff officer, while a second staff officer, who will also have sole executive charge of the district office, takes the routine division. But in a few districts of the second class, and in all those of the first class, separate officers will be required for each of the subdivisions of the Art of War, and a third officer for routine work.

The distribution of work in two or three sections, as the case may be, is shown in the tabular statement which is annexed. For the present, at least, the allotment of individual officers to particular sections will rest with General Officers Commanding, who will study the intellects and capacities of the staff officers placed at their disposal, and will allot to each that subsection of duties which he seems best fitted to perform efficiently. All staff officers should, however, possess a sufficient general knowledge of the duties of all subdivisions to enable them at any time temporarily to take charge of any subsection.

In accordance with the foregoing ideas, the Secretary of State has sanctioned a re-arrangement of the staff, whereby each first class district in India will have two staff officers of the grade of Assistant Adjutant General, and one of that of Deputy Assistant Adjutant General. The four second class districts of Bombay, Derajat, Sirhind, and Rohilkhand, or their equivalents, under a revised method of distribution, will each have two Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals and one Brigade Major. The remaining second class districts will have one Deputy Assistant Adjutant General and one Brigade Major.

I wish carefully to impress on all Generals and staff officers the fact that, in thus providing for an increase in the number of the latter, it is far from my intention to diminish the work at present done by any individual officer, but, on the contrary, to allow work which is now neglected or left wholly undone to be adequately performed in the future. Thus all staff officers will have more work to do than they have at present, though in many cases it will be work of a different kind. Those who are placed in charge of the Art of War subdivisions must be continually engaged under the orders of their Generals, in superintending and assisting in the war training of officers and men. They must absorb much of what has hitherto been treated as purely technical work, such, for instance, as musketry, signalling, field engineering, the defence of positions, employment of artillery, and the like. In fact they will have to superintend and instruct in all branches of military training equally with drill, marching, discipline, and the care and comfort of the troops. The practice of treating certain parts of our profession as technical subjects to be left almost entirely in the hands of the specialist is one to be strongly deprecated. Staff officers must keep themselves abreast of the times in all military subjects, and be prepared whenever called upon to undertake any duty which may be allotted to a staff officer, whether in peace or war.

### **The Training of Troops.**

The essential points to be observed in the training of troops are laid down in paragraphs 140 and 141, Part VI. of Combined Training, which should be closely attended to. It is impossible to lay too much stress upon the necessity for developing individual intelligence and initiative to the fullest extent—subject, of course, to the requirements of discipline. Without discipline all other training is useless; but in some cases there is a tendency to sacrifice that intelligent individuality, which is so needful in modern war, by carrying to excess the discipline of the parade ground. What is required is to aim at a happy medium which will combine these two important adjuncts of all training—discipline and individual action; for that army will gain a decisive superiority which has best understood how to train each individual man to use his weapon, while at the same time he learns to follow the signs, obey the orders, and emulate the example of his leaders. And the individual training must above all things be thorough. I would particularly impress this on the officers of the Indian Army. I have been struck with the readiness with which native soldiers of all ranks acquire a soldierlike bearing and learn such details of drill and military training as can be acquired mechanically. But if training stops at this point and intelligent action does not take the place of mechanical obedience, such training will in time of stress be found little more than a thin veneer, and when suddenly confronted with unexpected situations, and without a British officer at hand to guide them, our native

troops may become confused and helpless, or what they themselves would term "gabrao'ed," their merely mechanical training rendering them incapable of intelligently meeting unforeseen situations.

In carrying out practical training in the field the great object must be to render officers and non-commissioned officers capable, from the very first of exercising independent command. We must commence from the bottom—from the smallest stones in the foundation of the building. Even the youngest subaltern, when he has completed his recruit's drill, must be given constant opportunities for taking his small command away from the parade ground and exercising it to the best of his ability. Mistakes will, of course, be made; but neither the young officer nor the rising non-commissioned officer should be discouraged by constant and sometimes harassing correction. They should be allowed to carry out their plans, each in his own way, to their legitimate conclusions, so that they can see their mistakes for themselves; and then, if necessary, the superintending officer can with greater advantage point out any errors which have been made, explain their causes, and show how they may be avoided in future. Such a method of instruction, while impressing its lessons more vividly on the young officer and those round him, is the best insurance against their making similar mistakes in war. On the other hand, if a young officer or non-commissioned officer is sharply corrected as soon as he begins to make a mistake, he not only loses the benefit—so invaluable to himself and others—of seeing his errors and how they arose, but that independence of thought and action which it is our aim and object to foster and develop receives a check from which it is slow to recover.

The exercise of independent command having thus been inculcated in the juniors, the system must be carried up through all ranks and be continually developed at each stage of the training. Moreover, the training should not be limited to an officer's own arm of the service; for by so restricting it, an incorrect idea of war would be given at the outset which it would be difficult—or perhaps impossible—to eradicate later on. From the first no opportunity should be lost of working the three arms together, and commanding officers should always be ready, by mutual agreement, to place portions of their units at each other's disposal.

By such a system of training, officers and men will readily develop all the best qualifications of the professional soldier. Some of these, such as individual skill at arms, the physical fitness of the man, and his perfection in the details of drill, are common to all branches of the service. But there are certain points peculiar to each arm which demand particular notice and which should receive careful attention.

In the cavalry, the substitution of an accurate long range rifle for the carbine marks a very distinct change in the employment and training of this arm. The cavalry soldier must have it impressed on him that whereas the carbine has hitherto been merely an adjunct to the lance or sword, the old order has now changed and the lance or sword has become an auxiliary to the rifle.

In laying down this principle I do not wish to be misunderstood, and far be it from me to advocate a system of training which would in any way entail a loss of that dash which has very rightly done so much to make our cavalry famous throughout the world. Opportunities will still occur on the modern battlefield when a well delivered charge may turn the fortunes of the day; and for such our cavalry must be trained and prepared. But these occasions will be few and far between, while, on the other hand, the cavalry leader of the future may continually be able to render valuable assistance to his General by the judicious disposition and bold use of his mobile mounted force. The new weapon has given him a power he has not hitherto possessed, the full development and exercise of which in war demands a special and careful training in time of peace. To this end cavalry soldiers must be trained to work in rank entire; to mount and dismount with the greatest rapidity and with the least confusion; to provide for the safety of their horses while bringing the greatest possible number of rifles into the firing line; and to become proficient in dismounted field duties.



Cavalry must still as ever be "the eyes and ears of the army." Efficient scouting and reconnaissance are of supreme importance to the General in the field, whose success or failure often depends on the receipt of early and accurate information. For this he looks to his cavalry, who, if they are not most carefully trained in peace, will certainly fail in war. These duties, perhaps more than any others, call for the exercise of individual intelligence and resource—qualities which can only be developed by constant training and practice. Closely associated with them, and almost of equal importance, are the duties of despatch riding and delivery of messages in the field. But, so far as I have had an opportunity for observing, I think that there is much room for improvement in this respect both in British regiments and in regiments of the Indian Army, and that the great importance of these duties and the large amount of attention they require in peace training has not been fully realised. Every opportunity should be taken of practising officers in sending in reports from patrols, in order that they may learn to rightly appreciate various military situations and to report clearly and correctly what they have observed.

It seems almost superfluous for me to lay stress on the great necessity for securing proficiency in horsemanship and horsemastership. Without his horse the cavalryman ceases to be a cavalryman, and unless his horse is in a fit condition, his value for mounted duties almost disappears. Moreover, if officers and men do not thoroughly understand how to look after their horses, there will be unnecessarily heavy wastage in the field which it may be difficult to supply; and I hope that every attention will be devoted to these most important details.

In the Artillery, owing to the division of the battery into sections and subsections, the initial training is such as to encourage the exercise of independent command. The same system should be further developed so that battery commanders may be able to fight their batteries as separate units with the greatest effect. The intelligent concealment of guns in action not only minimises losses, but invariably adds to the effectiveness of their fire. This may, however, often entail such wide dispersion that it will be difficult for one commander to control more than a single battery; batteries should, therefore, be constantly exercised in taking up fighting positions independently. The necessity for concealment accentuates the objection to galloping into action, and the increased dispersion of guns requires the greatest intelligence and foresight on the part of every gun leader. The battery commander should always be so far in advance of his battery (or in rear in case of retreat) as to enable him to gain the earliest knowledge of the development of a battle, and to examine the ground over which he will have to work his battery in action. By this means he will be able to use his battery to the best advantage and will, at the same time, avoid hurrying his guns into action with insufficient time or room to enable them to make the best use of ground and cover.

The wide dispersion of guns which will frequently be necessary makes it important that more attention should be paid to signalling in the Artillery, both for the purposes of command and control, and also to convey information, *e.g.*, regarding ranges or movements of the enemy which may be observed from one position and not from another.

With infantry, the increased power of modern weapons necessitates much wider extensions in preliminary formations and in holding attacks than were previously realised or practised; and it is certain that even greater extensions than have hitherto been adopted will result in a fuller development both of rifle power and of the individual intelligence of the infantry soldier. But we must not be led away by recent experience and carry these extensions to excess where decisive attacks are concerned, thereby losing cohesion and allowing control to pass out of the hands of subordinate commanders.

Wide formations render it more necessary than ever to devote very careful attention to fire discipline—not only in the restricted sense of control of fire but in that wider sense which includes the training of the individual to open fire on his own initiative and without orders when those

fleeting but all important opportunities occur which happen so frequently in war—and to constant practice in those formations which are found to admit of the fullest development of rifle fire. The infantry soldier should be a good shot. He should be encouraged to take an interest in his rifle, and by constant practice he should be led to fully appreciate its value and use. If this feeling can be induced in combination with musketry training, a great step in advance will be made.

The power of marching long distances without undue strain and exhaustion is as important as proficiency in shooting. It requires constant practice; and just as the cavalry soldier must be taught to appreciate the real value of his horse, so the infantry soldier should be taught to keep himself in a sound condition of physical training, with his feet and body at all time ready to respond to the heavy calls that are made on them in war.

It is recognised that the development of the individuality of the soldier is dependent to a great extent upon the personal influence of the company officers. There is reason to believe that in India the full value of this influence is often lost owing to frequent changes amongst officers. By linking two companies together, transfers of officers to meet the requirements of temporary absence can be materially minimised, and continuity of association between officers and men can be thus more thoroughly secured.

Last, but not least, comes the preservation and maintenance of discipline, which distinguishes an army from an armed mob, and without which all other training is of small value. The true combination of discipline with a proper exercise of individual intelligence and initiative cannot fail to give the army in which these qualities have been inculcated a decided superiority over one in which they have been neglected.

KITCHENER, General,  
Commander-in-Chief in India.

With the sanction of the Government of India and the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, and with reference to the foregoing:—

The following appointments are abolished from 31st May 1904:—

- (1) Assistant Adjutant Generals of Belgaum, Southern Presidency, Bangalore, Sirhind, Allahabad, Madras, Mandalay, Deesa, Sind and Bombay.
- (2) The Assistant Judge Advocate Generals at Allahabad, Mian Mir, Secunderabad and Quetta.
- (3) Station Staff Officers, 1st Class, at stations commanded by Colonels on the Staff.
- (4) Station Staff Officers, 2nd Class, at Allahabad, Dinapore, Agra, Lucknow, Secunderabad, Kohat, Deesa, Mhow, Neemuch, Kamptee, Poona, Quetta, Dera Ismail Khan, Mian Mir, Jullundur, Peshawar, Abbottabad, Jhansi, Meerut, Bareilly, Ahmednagar, Mandalay and Roorkee.
- (5) Station Staff Officers, 3rd Class, at Dharmsala, Barrackpore, Ahmedabad, Loralai, Hyderabad (Sind), Bhamo, Meiktila, and Shwebo.
- (6) Station Staff Officer, 4th Class, at Aden.
- (7) 2nd Class Station Commanders at Ahmedabad, Hyderabad (Sind), Loralai, Neemuch, Dinapore, Bhamo, Meiktila, and Shwebo.
- (8) Fort Commandants at Asirgarh and Attock.

- (9) Fort Adjutant at Attock.
- (10) Inspector of Ordnance Machinery, North-West Frontier.
- (11) Mountain guns attached to Infantry Regiments in Assam, including Sergeants of Royal Artillery and gun porters.

The following new appointments are made from 1st June 1904 :—

- (1) A Second Assistant Adjutant General in each 1st Class District.
- (2) A Deputy Assistant Adjutant General in each of the following 2nd Class Districts :—  
Sirhind, Allahabad, Rohilkhand, Southern and Deesa.
- (3) A Brigade-Major in each 2nd Class District.
- (4) Station Staff Officers, 2nd Class, at Cawnpore, Sialkot, Rawal Pindi, Nusseerabad, Bellary, Ferozepore, Fyzabad, Bannu and Tochi, Mooltan, Delhi and Nowshera.
- (5) Station Staff Officers, 3rd Class, at Dera Ismail Khan, Mian Mir, Jullundur, Peshawar, Abbottabad, Jhansi, Meerut, Bareilly, Ahmednagar and Mandalay.
- (6) Station Staff Officers, 4th Class at Roorkee, Dharmsala, Barrackpore, Ahmedabad, Loralai, Hyderabad (Sind), Bhamo, Meiktila, Shwebo, Dinapore, Neemuch and Attock.

By order of  
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India,

B. DUFF, Major-General,  
Adjutant General in India.

## ANNEXURE TO INDIA ARMY ORDER 246.

*Redistribution of Staff Work.*

| I.—Art of War.  |  | II.—Routine.   |
|---|--|--|
| (1.) Subdivision (Training and Efficiency).   | (2.) Subdivision (Movement, Maintenance, and Sanitation).  |  |
| <p><b>Training :—</b><br/> Drill and Instruction, <i>all branches</i>.<br/> Camps of Instruction (schemes for and training of troops at).<br/> Education—Military subjects.<br/> Examinations—Military subjects.<br/> Staff Officers and Staff College.</p> <p><b>Efficiency :—</b><br/> Changes in pattern of—<br/> Arms and Ammunition.<br/> Equipment.<br/> Field Service Clothing.<br/> Defence Schemes.<br/> Distribution and Organisation of fighting units and their reserves.<br/> Field Operations and Disturbances.<br/> Intelligence and Maps.<br/> Inspections and Confidential Reports.<br/> Collective discipline of units.</p> | <p><b>Movement :—</b><br/> Camps and Bivouacs.<br/> Communications.<br/> Embarkation.<br/> Marches and Reliefs.<br/> Mobilisation — preparations and plans.<br/> Railways.<br/> Telegraphs.<br/> Transport.</p> <p><b>Maintenance :—</b><br/> Camp equipage.<br/> Defences—buildings.<br/> Field Cooking.<br/> Inspections—non-combatant units.<br/> Distribution, organisation, and training of non-combatant units and their reserves.<br/> Supply.</p> <p><b>Sanitation :—</b><br/> Medical.<br/> Veterinary.<br/> Sanitation.<br/> Water supply.</p> | <p>Executive charge of District Office and Records.<br/> Accounts.<br/> Appointments, Promotions, Exchanges, Retirements, and Casualties—all ranks.<br/> Arms, Ammunition and Accoutrements—except changes of pattern.<br/> Army List.<br/> Bands and Messes.<br/> Barracks.<br/> Barrack department supplies and damages.<br/> Bedding.<br/> Books and Forms.<br/> British Army—Volunteering.<br/> Cantonments.<br/> Clothing (except Field Service), Dress and Necessaries.<br/> Colours and Standards.<br/> Compensation.<br/> Cooks and cooking in barracks.<br/> Discharges.<br/> Discipline.<br/> Drafts.<br/> Ecclesiastical.<br/> Education—non-military subjects.<br/> Equipment—except changes of pattern.<br/> Establishments—Regimental.<br/> Estates.<br/> Forage Rukhs.<br/> Furlough and Leave.<br/> Grass and Dairy Farms.<br/> Guards and Escorts.<br/> Honours and Rewards.<br/> Judicial and Discipline—Individual.<br/> Languages.<br/> Libraries.<br/> Losses.<br/> Medals.<br/> Military prisons and prisoners.<br/> Native lines—Hutting.<br/> Pay and Pensions.<br/> Ranges.<br/> Regimental Institutes.<br/> Reports and Returns.<br/> Reservists and their documents—British and Native.<br/> Schools.<br/> Unattached List.<br/> Volunteer Corps.</p> |

EAST INDIA (ARMY MEMORANDUM).

RETURN of the MEMORANDUM recently issued by General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum and the local Commander-in-Chief in India, upon the organisation and training of the Army in India.

*(Sir Howard Vincent.)*

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
*8 June 1904.*

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*[Price 2d.]*

# INDIAN ARMY (UNIFORMS).

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RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,  
dated 11 July 1904;—*for*.

“RETURN of all Changes in the Regulations affecting the Dress and  
Equipment of Officers in the Indian Army since November 1902,  
showing, where possible, the Approximate Cost of the changes in each  
rank to the Officers concerned.”

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India Office, }  
15 July 1904. }

ARTHUR GODLEY,  
Under Secretary of State.

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(*Sir Seymour King.*)

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
15 July 1904.

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DESPATCH from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, No. 77, dated 9th June 1904.

(EXTRACT.)

The only changes introduced since Lord Kitchener assumed command of the Army in India\* are :—

- (1.) Addition of a patch pocket to the white summer frock. The cost of this does not exceed 8 annas each.  
G. O. C. C. 477 of 1903.
- (2.) Adoption of a gilt metal badge in place of a gold embroidered badge for wear on the forage cap by unattached officers awaiting admission to the Indian Army. This change only applies to officers appointed to the unattached list subsequently to the date of the order.  
India Army Order No. 20 of 1903.
- (3.) Replacement of the knee-boot, worn by mounted officers, by the straight "butcher" or hunting boot. In this case officers in possession of knee-boots are permitted to wear them until new boots are required.  
India Army Order No. 285 of 1904.
- (4.) Changes in patterns of saddlery. These changes do not entail any expense on officers, as the new patterns are not to be obtained until those in use require replacement.  
India Army Order No. 358 of 1903.
- (5.) Changes in the uniform of officers of the 71st Coorg Rifles and the 76th, 82nd and 87th Punjabis in consequence of the reconstitution of these regiments. The cost of the changes up to Rs. 500 per officer was defrayed by the Government of India.
- (6.) Introduction of the Wolseley pattern helmet for wear on all occasions on which officers parade with troops. The cost of this helmet is Rs. 27-8-0.  
India Army Order No. 57 of 1904.

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\* i.e., 28 November 1902.

INDIAN ARMY (UNIFORMS).

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*(Sir Seymour King.)*

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed.*  
15 July 1904.

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[*Price ½d.*]